KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

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ABSTRACT

This Article answers two of the most urgent and important questions facing the contemporary law of armed conflict. First, how certain must a soldier be that a given individual is a combatant and not a civilian before attacking that individual? Second, what risks must soldiers accept to themselves and to their mission in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians?

In the absence of clear legal rules, leading states, scholars, and practitioners have embraced a “Balancing Approach” according to which both the required level of certainty and the required level of risk vary with the balance of military and humanitarian considerations. However, this Article shows that the Balancing Approach ignores the moral asymmetries between killing and letting die and between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians. As a result, in a wide variety of situations, the Balancing Approach would permit soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are either probably, much more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants. These implausible implications expose the fatal defects of the Balancing Approach and demonstrate the need for a morally defensible alternative.

To meet this need, this Article develops a deontological account of

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both the required level of certainty and the required level of risk. The first part of this new account, “Deontological Targeting,” prohibits a soldier from intentionally killing an individual if the soldier believes the individual is a civilian, or if the soldier does not reasonably believe the individual is a combatant. These constraints establish a minimum threshold of certainty that soldiers must reach before using deadly force. Above the reasonable belief threshold, the required level of certainty varies with the relative costs of error but, crucially, also reflects the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. In particular, except in rare cases, targeted killing operations against individuals who pose no immediate threat are permissible only if there is conclusive reason to believe that the individuals are combatants.

The second part of this new account, “Deontological Precaution,” requires, at a minimum, that soldiers take as much risk as necessary to reach the required level of certainty. In addition, soldiers must take further precautions unless doing so would increase the risk to the soldiers substantially more than doing so would decrease the risk to civilians. If soldiers are unwilling or unable to reach the required level of certainty or accept the required level of risk then they must hold their fire.

The Article concludes by distilling these complex moral principles into new legal rules, reinterpretations of existing legal rules, and model rules of engagement in which soldiers can be trained and that can guide soldiers through the fog of war.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The great uncertainty of all data in War is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance.

—General Carl von Clausewitz

The point is, is that we’re Marines. We’re the toughest guys on the block. We know how to defend ourselves. We know how to aggressively take people down. And to suggest that we can’t do the shades of gray in between is a cop-out, and I think it sells Marines short.

—Colonel John Ewers

Imagine that you are a soldier, ordered to protect a military or diplomatic convoy as it passes through hostile territory, and you see a car stopped by the side of the road ahead. Or imagine that you are stationed at a security checkpoint and a car approaches despite signs and warnings directing it to stop. The occupants of the car may be civilians, but they also may be irregular forces waiting to attack. Or imagine that you are sitting safely in an office, or on an airbase, piloting an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ("UAV") by remote control, trying to determine whether the individuals you see on your monitor are members of an implacable insurgency or merely locals carrying arms for their own protection in a dangerous area. Finally, imagine that you are the president of the United States and a team of intelligence analysts informs you that they are “between forty and sixty percent” confident that Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is living in a residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, surrounded by civilians.

What should you do? How certain must you be that the individuals in question are opposing combatants, rather than civilians, before using deadly force? What precautions must you take, what information must you seek, and what risks must you accept in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians? How can the law of armed conflict, as well as the rules of engagement promulgated by your armed forces, provide better guidance to you as you make such determinations?

The urgency and importance of such questions are particularly clear in irregular, asymmetric armed conflicts in which state armed forces face nonuniformed adversaries intermingled with civilian populations. Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that as many as seven out of ten civilian deaths caused by U.S. forces in planned military operations result from a failure to verify that the target of the operation is military rather than civilian. Finally, the advent of UAVs creates an unprecedented opportunity to submit target verification to determinate, morally defensible legal rules.

To provide moral and legal guidance to participants in contemporary conflicts, this Article deploys concepts and theories drawn from the law of armed conflict, decision theory, criminal law, and moral philosophy. It is, in that sense, a work of both intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary legal scholarship.

As Part II explains, under the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”), also known as international humanitarian law (“IHL”), soldiers are not free to shoot first and ask questions later. On the contrary, soldiers must distinguish between combatants and civilians; do everything feasible to verify that the individuals they target are combatants and not civilians; consider individuals to be civilians in cases of doubt; and hold their fire if it becomes apparent that a targeted individual is a civilian. However, as the International Committee for the Red Cross (“ICRC”)—a leading expositor of IHL—has commented, “the various provisions are relatively imprecise and are open to a fairly broad margin of judgment.” In the absence of clear legal rules, the ICRC, as well as leading states, scholars, and practitioners, embrace what I will call the “Balancing Approach,” according to which the required level of certainty and the required level of risk vary with the

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balance of military and humanitarian considerations. As the balance tips in favor of humanitarian considerations, the required levels of certainty and risk rise; as the balance tips in favor of military considerations, the required levels of certainty and risk fall.

As Part III explains, the Balancing Approach remains imprecise and undertheorized. To date, no proponent of the Balancing Approach has attempted to show how one could derive a specific level of certainty from the balance of military and humanitarian considerations. Interestingly, decision theory provides a method for deriving a precise level of certainty from the relative costs of an erroneous decision. Unfortunately, by making the Balancing Approach more precise, we also reveal its fatal flaws. Most importantly, the Balancing Approach ignores the moral asymmetries between killing and letting die and between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians. As a result, in many cases, the Balancing Approach would permit soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are probably, much more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants. These implausible implications expose the fatal flaws of the Balancing Approach and call for a morally defensible alternative.

Part IV develops an alternative approach to target verification that I call “Deontological Targeting.” I argue that it is clearly impermissible for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual the soldier believes is a civilian or whom the soldier believes is probably a civilian. Most importantly, I argue that it is both unjustifiable and inexcusable for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual if the soldier does not reasonably believe the individual is a combatant. Reasonable belief, understood as belief supported by undefeated reasons, constitutes a minimum threshold of certainty that soldiers must achieve before using deadly force. Above the reasonable belief threshold, the required level of certainty reflects the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. Importantly, except in rare cases, targeted killing operations against individuals who pose no immediate threat are permissible only if there is conclusive reason to believe that the individuals are combatants. I conclude by comparing my approach with a recent proposal by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Corn.

Part V develops an alternative approach to precaution in attack that I call “Deontological Precaution.” I argue that soldiers must accept any personal or operational risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty. If soldiers are unable to reach the required level of certainty, or if they are unwilling to accept the risks necessary to do so, then they must hold their fire even if their forbearance will leave them at greater risk.
Soldiers also have a general moral obligation to take additional precautions to avoid mistakenly killing civilians, including acquiring additional information regarding potential targets, unless taking those precautions would increase the risk to the soldiers substantially more than taking those precautions would decrease the risk the soldiers impose on civilians. In developing the latter argument I engage critically with important recent work by David Luban.

Part VI distills the moral principles defended in the previous sections into new legal rules and reinterpretations of existing legal rules. These legal rules are then translated into model Rules of Engagement for training soldiers and guiding their conduct on the battlefield. Properly trained soldiers generally will make better decisions by following these simplified rules than by following existing law or by attempting to engage in complex moral or legal reasoning while under fire. U.S. Rules of Engagement, which generally require “Positive Identification” of targets with “a reasonable certainty,” are constructively criticized.

The proposed reforms provide civilians far more protection than they have received in recent asymmetric conflicts. Among other things, the reforms preclude “firing blind” into cars, crowds, or dwellings; the creation of free-fire zones as well as the declaration that an entire area or building is hostile and on that basis killing its occupants without positively identifying each targeted individual as a combatant; as well as the “zero-risk” policy of shelling buildings on the mere suspicion that the individuals inside are combatants without taking meaningful steps to find out. Neither force protection nor mission success can justify or excuse killing civilians in these circumstances.

No set of legal rules can replace human judgment, eliminate human error, or prevent armed conflict from claiming civilian lives. However, the proposed reforms provide superior guidance to commanders and soldiers as well as greater protection to civilians. If such progress is possible, then it must be pursued.

* * *

Two points of clarification are necessary before we begin. First, the moral principles defended and the legal rules proposed in this Article apply to all participants in armed conflict who must determine whether an individual is a legitimate target or an illegitimate target. However, for the

6. Legitimate targets include members of regular armed forces, members of organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function, and civilians directly participating in hostilities.
sake of convenience, this Article generally refers to soldiers who must determine whether an individual is a combatant or a civilian. Since civilians directly participating in hostilities are legitimate targets, in these passages, readers should understand “combatant” to include civilians directly participating in hostilities and should understand “civilian” to exclude civilians directly participating in hostilities. This terminological clarification is important because in many contemporary conflicts the challenge is precisely to distinguish civilians directly participating in hostilities from civilians not directly participating in hostilities. The principles defended and rules proposed in this Article apply with particular urgency to such contemporary conflicts.

In addition, for the purposes of this Article, a soldier intentionally kills an individual only if it is the soldier’s purpose, goal, or conscious object to kill that individual. Such intentional killings of targeted individuals are the primary subject of this Article. By contrast, a soldier who knowingly kills civilians as a side effect of attacking a legitimate target is primarily beholden to the proportionality principle that I have discussed elsewhere.

II. DISTINCTION AND PRECAUTION

International law requires that soldiers distinguish between opposing combatants and civilians and take precautions to avoid mistakenly killing civilians. These requirements receive their clearest expression in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, but several are also recognized as rules of customary international law. As we shall see, the indeterminacy of these requirements has led leading states, scholars, and practitioners to adopt a Balancing Approach to target verification, according to which both the required level of certainty and the required level of precaution varies with the balance of military and humanitarian considerations.

I. Illegitimate targets include civilians not directly participating in hostilities, religious and medical personnel, detainees and prisoners of war, as well as individuals who have surrendered or been rendered hors de combat by illness or injury. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 11–13, 75 (Nils Melzer ed., 2009) [hereinafter DPH GUIDANCE].

7. For example, the proposed rules would apply to a civilian-intelligence operative covertly participating in armed conflict who must determine whether or not a civilian is directly participating in hostilities before attacking that civilian.

8. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Proportionality (in War), in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 399 (Hugh LaFollette et al. eds., 2012).
A. DISTINCTION

First, “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”\textsuperscript{9} The principle of distinction is a well-established part of customary international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{10} The principle does not specify a level of certainty that soldiers must achieve or a level of risk they must accept to achieve that level of certainty. The drafting history provides little insight, as discussion of this principle focused on the varying technological capacities of different armed forces to distinguish between civilians and combatants, rather than on the level of certainty with which this distinction must be made.\textsuperscript{11}

Protocol I also states that “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”\textsuperscript{12} The language of this provision, which suggests a legal duty of care owed by soldiers to civilians, might gesture toward a duty to accept some personal or operational risk to achieve an adequate level of certainty. According to the ICRC, “[t]his provision appropriately supplements the basic rule of Article 48 . . . which urges Parties to the conflict to always distinguish between the civilian population and combatants . . . . It is quite clear that by respecting this [latter] obligation the Parties to the conflict will spare the civilian population . . . .”\textsuperscript{13} This comment is somewhat misleading and in any case unhelpful. Even if a soldier succeeds in distinguishing between civilians and combatants, the soldier is hardly guaranteed to spare the former: among other things, the soldier must still select discriminating means and methods of warfare that can be directed at combatants and away from civilians. Conversely, if the soldier exercises adequate care, then the soldier cannot be faulted if attempts to distinguish civilians from combatants do not succeed. But the comment tells us nothing about the level of care with which soldiers must

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} See \textit{JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW} 3 (2005) (“The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.”).
\item \textsuperscript{11} See \textit{Protocol I Commentary, supra} note 5, at 599–600.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Protocol I, supra note 9, at 29 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Protocol I Commentary, supra} note 5, at 680.
\end{itemize}
attempt to distinguish civilians from combatants. As A.P.V. Rogers concludes, “The law is not clear as to the degree of care required of the attacker and the degree of risk that he must be prepared to take.”

In the absence of clear textual guidance, several scholars have turned to the Balancing Approach to describe the required level of care. In perhaps the most influential contemporary work on the ethics of armed conflict, Michael Walzer writes that “the degree of risk that is permissible [for soldiers to impose upon civilians] is going to vary with the nature of the target, the urgency of the moment, the available technology, and so on,” and concludes “that civilians have a right that ‘due care’ be taken,” which reflects the balance of the relevant variables.

More recently, Matthew Waxman argues that soldiers should apply a flexible standard of “reasonable care,” according to which “reasonableness is judged in terms of costs to the attacker of performing more rigorous analysis or expending scarce military resources.” Importantly, as the potential costs to an attacking force rise, the required level of certainty and the required level of risk fall. As Waxman concedes, “the reasonable care rule is disquieting. It vests belligerents with considerable discretion in multifaceted balancing and legitimizes even large-scale injury to innocent civilians under certain circumstances.”

These disquieting implications of the Balancing Approach will be the subject of Part III.

B. DOUBT

Second, Protocol I states that “[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.” Since civilians are not legitimate targets, this provision entails that “in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person” may not be targeted. Although “[s]ome States have written this rule into their military manuals,”
“[o]thers have expressed reservations about the military ramifications of a
strict interpretation of such a rule.”21 Indeed, if the provision is interpreted
to mean that a soldier may never intentionally kill an individual if there is
any reason to doubt that the individual is a combatant (that is, any reason to
believe the individual is a civilian), then the provision would prove highly
restrictive. It is worth noting, however, that the Protocol does not identify
the degree of “doubt” that would preclude a lawful attack. Moreover, the
ICRC has not endorsed the provision as a rule of customary international
law.

Tellingly, both France and the United Kingdom entered reservations
to the Protocol I provision, with the United Kingdom stating that the
provision “applies only in cases of substantial doubt” and with both
countries stating that the provision cannot override “a commander’s duty to
protect the safety of troops under his command or to preserve his military
situation.”22 In other words, both France and the United Kingdom maintain
that it is lawful to attack individuals, despite substantial doubt that they are
combatants, if mistakenly sparing them (that is, if they turn out to be
combatants) would jeopardize troop safety or mission success. The degree
of doubt sufficient to preclude attack would therefore seem to vary based
on the balance of military and humanitarian considerations.

In light of conflicting state practice, the ICRC found it “fair to
conclude that when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment has to
be made under the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation
as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack. One
cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious.”23 The
quoted passage indicates that, according to the ICRC, the principle of doubt
means only that a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual whom the
manuals of Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Hungary, Kenya, Madagascar,
Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia).

21. See id. at 24 n.141 (citations omitted).

22. United Kingdom Reservation / Declaration of July 2, 2002 to Protocol I, supra note 9,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?Open
Document; France Reservation / Declaration of Nov. 4, 2001 to Protocol I, supra note 9, available at
seems to accept a similar interpretation. See Rogers, supra note 14, at 181 (“In the event of doubt about
the nature of the target, an attack should not be carried out, with a possible exception where failure to
prosecute the attack would put attacking forces in immediate danger.”).

23. I HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 10, at 24. See also PROTOCOL I
COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 612 (concluding that the principle of doubt “concerns persons who
have not committed hostile acts, but whose status seems doubtful because of the circumstances. They
should be considered to be civilians until further information is available, and should therefore not be
attacked.”).
soldier is almost certain is a civilian just because there is some reason to
doubt that the individual is a civilian or, put the other way around, just
because there is some reason to believe that the individual is a combatant.
This is, to put it mildly, a very low bar. So interpreted, the principle seems
to permit intentionally killing an individual who is most likely a civilian if
there is a substantial possibility that she is a combatant. In the vast majority
of cases, this interpretation will prove far too permissive.

More recently, the ICRC has embraced the Balancing Approach,
stating that the level of doubt that precludes attack is not fixed but rather
varies with the possible consequences, for soldiers and civilians, of an
erroneous decision:

Obviously, the standard of doubt applicable to targeting decisions cannot
be compared to the strict standard of doubt applicable in criminal
proceedings but rather must reflect the level of certainty that can
reasonably be achieved in the circumstances. In practice, this
determination will have to take into account, *inter alia*, the intelligence
available to the decision maker, the urgency of the situation, and the
harm likely to result to the operating forces or to persons and objects
protected against direct attack from an erroneous decision.24

Similarly, Ian Henderson writes that “[i]t cannot be expected that
armed conflict will be reduced to the point where a commander can act
only when he or she is 100 percent certain in all cases. Rather, the level of
certainty should vary based on the consequences for the civilian
population.”25

Finally, a recent document reflecting the consensus of a group of
distinguished experts states that “[t]he degree of doubt necessary to
preclude an attack is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the
same or similar circumstances to abstain from ordering or executing an
attack.”26 Notice that, in this formulation, the degree of doubt that would

24. DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 76.
25. IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
PROPORTIONALITY, AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 164 (2009); id. at
165 (”[T]he level of verification required to reduce doubt, and the degree of acceptable doubt, will vary
depending upon the likely adverse consequences of a wrong decision.”).
26. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE
HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 87 (2010)
[hereinafter HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY]. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in
International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292, 335 (2009) (“In all cases of doubt,
the appropriate international humanitarian law standard on the battlefield is whether a reasonable
warfighter in the same or similar circumstances would hesitate to act based on the degree of doubt he
harbored.”).
lead a reasonable attacker to abstain from attacking must vary based on the circumstances; otherwise, the reference to such circumstances would be superfluous. It follows that, in some circumstances, a reasonable attacker might attack even in the face of substantial doubt; in other circumstances, a reasonable attacker might abstain from attack in the face of even slight doubt. The group of experts does not adopt a fixed standard of certainty but rather adopts a variable standard. Unfortunately, the group of experts does not identify the relevant variables. However, it would be difficult to argue that a reasonable attacker would never consider the costs of an erroneous decision in deciding whether or not to attack despite some degree of doubt. So it seems safe to assume that, in their view, the degree of doubt sufficient to preclude attack varies with the relative costs of error.

C. VERIFICATION

Third, Protocol I states that “those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives.”27 This provision is also recognized as a statement of customary international law.28 This provision raises at least two sets of questions: First, what level of certainty is required to “verify” the legitimacy of a target? Is the legitimacy of a target verified if it is probably military rather than civilian, much more likely military than civilian, or almost certainly military and not civilian? Second, how much risk, if any, must soldiers accept to themselves or to the success of their mission in order to “do everything feasible” to verify the legitimacy of their target? If the information soldiers already have or could safely acquire is insufficient to warrant the level of certainty required for “verification,” must they seek additional information at additional risk?

In its original commentary on Protocol I, the ICRC stated that “in case of doubt, even if there is only slight doubt, [those who plan or decide upon an attack] must call for additional information and if need be give orders for further reconnaissance.”29 This comment suggests that the level of certainty required to verify the legitimacy of a target is extremely high—so high as to exclude even “slight doubt.” Moreover, the comment suggests

27. Protocol I, supra note 5, at 29 (emphasis added).
28. See 1 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 10, at 55 (“Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.”).
29. Protocol I Commentary, supra note 5, at 680; id. at 681 (“The evaluation of the information obtained must include a serious check of its accuracy . . . ”).
that soldiers must engage in reconnaissance, accepting risks to themselves, to gather enough information to satisfy the required level of certainty. However, as we saw in the previous section, the ICRC no longer maintains that international law requires a fixed, high level of certainty but instead recognizes a variable level of certainty in keeping with the Balancing Approach.30

Although Protocol I does not define the phrase “everything feasible,” Protocols II and III to the Conventional Weapons Convention (“CWC”) state that “[f]easible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”31 The ICRC has stated that the definition of “feasible precautions” under the CWC Protocols provides the definition of “everything feasible” under Protocol I.32 Unfortunately, the CWC Protocols define the vague notion of what is “feasible” in terms of the equally vague notion of what is “practicable or practically possible,” as well as a sweeping reference to all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.33 In light of this indeterminacy, the ICRC now limits itself to stating that “[t]his determination [of feasibility] must be made in good faith and in view of all information that can be said to be reasonably available in the specific situation.”34 No required level of certainty is proposed, and soldiers are not called on to risk themselves or their mission to obtain additional information.35

30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 74–75 & n.203.
33. Id. at 75 & n.203.
34. Id. at 75. See also Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict 126 (2004) (characterizing the principle of verification as “an obligation of due diligence and acting in good faith”).
35. Similarly, the Advisory Committee to the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) concludes that “[t]he obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets during operations.” INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA para. 29 (2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/
In the absence of clear textual guidance, leading scholars have turned to the Balancing Approach to describe the precautions that soldiers must take to verify that their targets are military and not civilian. For example, Michael Schmitt argues that the “feasibility [of a precaution] must be interpreted by balancing humanitarian and military considerations. . . . By this analysis, the greater the anticipated collateral damage or incidental injury, the greater the risk [soldiers] can reasonably be asked to shoulder.”36 Relatedly, a group of distinguished experts of which Schmitt is a member concludes that the feasibility of precautions often depends on considerations of force protection, suggesting that the required precautions vary based on the weight of military considerations.37 Similarly, Geoffrey Corn argues that the feasibility inquiry permits attackers to balance the risk to their own forces against the risk of mistakenly attacking civilians.38 Finally, Matthew Waxman concludes that

[the responsibility to ‘do everything feasible’ [to verify the legitimacy of potential targets] . . . is generally interpreted to be not a fixed and always highly exacting duty—like, say, the beyond reasonable doubt approach of criminal law—but a balancing one: Parties are obliged to balance humanitarian concerns for civilians with military needs.39

Before moving on, it is worth noting that many states have incorporated the principle of verification into their military manuals.40 No state has clearly identified the level of certainty, either fixed or variable, that qualifies as “verification.”41 With respect to the level of risk soldiers must accept in order to achieve verification, most states simply follow

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37. HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 136–38 (discussing feasible precautions in the context of aircraft warfare).
38. See Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Note, Principle 3: Endeavor to Prevent or Minimize Harm to Civilians, 1998-OCT ARMY LAW 55, 55–56 (“Feasibility provides a limited mechanism to bypass applying certain rules related to minimizing civilian harm when application would be harmful to the force.”).
40. See 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 10, at 55 n.29 (cataloging the incorporation of verification principles into national military manuals).
41. 2 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 368–74 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-ii-icrc-eng.pdf. A possible exception is Belgium, which instructs its forces that an “object can be attacked only when it can reasonably be considered to be a military objective.” Id. at 368.
Protocol I and require their forces to do “everything feasible” to achieve target verification;\(^{42}\) some cast the requirement in terms of what is reasonable;\(^ {43}\) and some prefer different, but equally open-textured formulations.\(^ {44}\) Only two small states explicitly require that all necessary measures must be taken to verify that a potential target is a military objective.\(^ {45}\) In addition, a number of states impose an unqualified duty to verify the status of targets which, taken literally, would require their forces to take all necessary risks to achieve the (unspecified) required level of certainty.\(^ {46}\) Finally, three states explicitly require reconnaissance, which generally places troops in harm’s way.\(^ {47}\) As these different instructions make clear, there is no consensus among states regarding either the level of certainty required for verification or the level of risk soldiers must accept to achieve verification.

D. APPARENT PROTECTION

Finally, Protocol I states that “an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection.”\(^ {48}\) This provision is also recognized as a rule of customary international humanitarian law.\(^ {49}\) The ICRC remarks that “[t]he text is sufficiently clear for lengthy comment to be superfluous,”\(^ {50}\) but there are at least two textual ambiguities that must be resolved. First, is it “apparent” that a potential target is civilian and not military if, given available information, it is probably or more likely civilian rather than military? Second, states do not always require that all reasonable precautions be taken to verify that a potential target is military. Id. at 368–70 (citing military manuals of Australia, Canada, Kenya, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom).

\(^{42}\) Id. at 368–70 (citing military manuals of Australia, Canada, Kenya, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom).

\(^{43}\) E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS para. 8.1 (1995) (“[A]ll reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are targeted . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 41 (1956) (“Those who plan or decide upon an attack . . . . must take all reasonable steps to ensure . . . . that the objectives are identified as military objectives . . . .”).

\(^ {44}\) For example, Argentinian forces are directed to verify that potential targets are military “as far as possible,” Israeli forces are told that “it is imperative” to verify that potential targets are military, and Cameroonian forces are instructed to do “everything that is practically possible” to verify that potential targets are military. 2 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 41, at 368–69.

\(^{45}\) Id. at 368–70 (citing military manuals of Benin and Togo).

\(^ {46}\) Id. at 369–70 (citing military manuals of France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden).

\(^ {47}\) Id. (citing military manuals of Madagascar, Spain, and Italy).

\(^ {48}\) Protocol I, supra note 9, at 29 (emphasis added).

\(^ {49}\) See 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 10, at 60 (“Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective . . . . ”).

\(^ {50}\) Protocol I Commentary, supra note 5, at 686.
military, much more likely civilian than military, or almost certainly civilian and not military? Second, does the provision apply only when it is subjectively apparent to the actual attacker that a target is civilian, or does it also apply when this would be objectively apparent to a reasonable attacker faced with the same information?

The ICRC comments, by way of illustration, that “an airman who has received the order to machine-gun troops travelling along a road, and who finds only children going to school, must abstain from attack.”\footnote{Id.} This example suggests that an attack must be canceled or suspended only if, as a result of new information, the actual attacker comes to subjectively believe that a person or object is almost certainly civilian rather than military.\footnote{See id. (“It is principally by visual means—in particular, by means of aerial observation—that an attacker will find out that an intended objective is not a military objective, or that it is an object entitled to special protection.”). The phrases “find out,” “is not,” and “is” imply that an attack must be cancelled or suspended only if the attacker is almost certain that an object is not military or is otherwise protected. HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 130 (stating that an attacker must cancel or suspend an attack “when it becomes apparent to them . . . [t]hat the target is not a lawful target”).} At best, the ICRC Commentary leaves the textual ambiguities unresolved; at worst, the Commentary gives the provision an extremely narrow construction. In either case, the provision offers little guidance in situations of significant uncertainty. To provide greater guidance to soldiers and greater protection to civilians, international law must be informed by a moral theory of killing in the fog of war. It is to the search for such a theory that we now turn.

III. THE BALANCING APPROACH AND ITS LIMITS

As we have seen, in the absence of clear legal rules, the ICRC as well as leading states and scholars have adopted the Balancing Approach to target verification. According to the Balancing Approach, the level of certainty required to permissibly attack an individual varies with the balance of relevant military and humanitarian considerations. Until now, proponents of the Balancing Approach have not explained how to weigh military considerations against humanitarian considerations or how to derive the required level of certainty from the resulting balance. As one scholar observes, “Humanitarian considerations would require a pilot to get close to the target to identify it properly; military considerations would require the pilot to fly at a safe height to be at reduced risk from anti-aircraft fire. This is a conflict that cannot be resolved easily.”\footnote{Rogers, supra note 14, at 175.} However,
this part argues that decision theory provides a method for deriving the required level of certainty from the relative costs of error.

Unfortunately, by clarifying the Balancing Approach we also expose its serious flaws. In many situations, the Balancing Approach implausibly entails that soldiers may attack individuals they believe are probably, much more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants. The implausibility of these implications is best explained by two moral asymmetries. The asymmetry between killing and letting die explains why it is substantially worse to kill a civilian than to allow a soldier to be killed, even though the loss of human life in each case is the same. The asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing the innocent explains why it is far worse to intentionally kill an individual correctly believing that individual to be a civilian than to intentionally kill an individual mistakenly believing that individual to be a combatant, even though both the loss of human life and the causal structure of the action are the same. These two moral asymmetries doom the Balancing Approach and ground the alternative, deontological approach to targeting developed in Part IV.

A. Uncertainty

Proponents of the Balancing Approach have never explained how to derive a required level of certainty from the balance of military and humanitarian considerations. This neglect leaves the Balancing Approach imprecise and conceals its flaws. Fortunately, the entire field of decision theory is devoted to determining how to make rational decisions in the context of factual uncertainty. On most views, our primary goal when faced with uncertainty should be error reduction. For example, in a criminal trial, our primary purpose is to learn the truth about past events so we may convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. We seek to avoid both false convictions and false acquittals. Similarly, the primary goal of a soldier, in the context of our discussion, is to accurately distinguish between civilians and combatants so the soldier may spare the former and kill or capture the latter. Soldiers should seek to reduce both the number of civilians they mistakenly harm and the number of opposing combatants they mistakenly spare. It follows that before attacking an individual, soldiers should gather and evaluate as much relevant information about that individual as they can without risking themselves or their mission.

Unfortunately, we can reduce—but never completely avoid—erroneous decisions. Some residual uncertainty will always remain despite our best efforts, and as a result inevitably we will make mistakes. Hence
our secondary, fallback goal when faced with uncertainty should be error distribution. Given that we will make errors, we must determine which errors are more costly and which we should therefore try harder to avoid. Our judgment regarding the relative costs of error are reflected in a standard of certainty which, if consistently followed, will yield over time the lowest total cost of error. For example, in criminal law, our judgment that convicting an innocent defendant (a false positive or Type I error) is much worse than acquitting a guilty defendant (a false negative or Type II error) is reflected in the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which yields over time far fewer false convictions than false acquittals. Similarly, the level of certainty a soldier must achieve before killing an individual should reflect a moral judgment regarding the relative moral weight of killing a civilian and allowing oneself, one’s fellow soldiers, or other civilians to be killed.

Legal scholars drawing on decision theory traditionally calculate the level of certainty required to reach a rational verdict by comparing the relative costs of false positives and false negatives. On this approach, the probability (“P”) of a claim (“C”) given the evidence (“E”) must be greater than the following function of the costs of a false positive (“D+”) and a false negative (“D−”):

\[ P(C|E) > \frac{1}{1 + \left( \frac{D-}{D+} \right)} \]

Given plausible assumptions, this function can yield plausible results. For example, if convicting an innocent defendant of a crime generally is ten times worse than acquitting a guilty defendant of a crime, then the level of certainty required for criminal conviction will be very high:

\[ P(C|E) > \frac{1}{1 + \left( \frac{1}{10} \right)} = 0.91 \]

Presumably, greater than 91 percent certainty is a fair approximation of the criminal law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. By

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54. ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 15–16 (2005). See also id. at 149 (using a different formula to fix the required level of certainty, according to which the odds that a claim is true, given the evidence, must be greater than the ratio of the costs of a false positive to the costs of a false negative: \( O(C|E) > \frac{D+}{D-} \)). Larry Laudan and Harry Saunders favor a more complex approach that also reflects the benefits of true positives and true negatives. See, e.g., Larry Laudan & Harry Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of Trial Outcomes, 7 INT’L COMMENT. EVIDENCE 1, 4 (2009) (arguing for a criminal justice system which accounts for the utilities of true acquittals and true convictions). However, in the context of armed conflict, true negatives do not appear to have significant benefits other than avoiding the costs of false positives, and true positives do not appear to have significant benefits other than avoiding the costs of false negatives. I will therefore use the simpler formula for expository purposes.
contrast, if a false judgment for a tort plaintiff is neither better nor worse than a false judgment for a tort defendant, then the level of certainty required to find for the plaintiff will be just barely higher than the level of certainty required to find for the defendant:

$$P(C|E) > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{2} = 0.50$$

Presumably, greater than 50 percent certainty is a fair approximation of the private law standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Before using this formula to clarify the Balancing Approach, it is worth pausing to consider the formula’s moral foundations. One account, offered by many decision theorists, is that decisionmakers should adopt decision rules that will minimize the total cost of the errors they will make over the long term. The total cost of error, in turn, depends on the relative costs of the different errors one might make. In order to minimize the total cost of error, decisionmakers should adopt a decision rule that will lead them to make more less-costly errors and fewer more-costly errors. The standard of certainty is a mechanism for skewing decisions in favor of less-costly errors. In other words, since we can reduce but never eliminate the risk of error, we should distribute any residual risk of error so as to minimize the total cost of error.

All of this may sound uncomfortably consequentialist, but it need not. We could just as easily say that our primary goal is to avoid committing serious moral wrongs; that, given factual uncertainty, we will unavoidably fail and end up committing some such wrongs; that the best we can do is try to reduce the overall seriousness of the wrongs we commit; and that we must therefore act in the face of uncertainty in a way that reflects the relative seriousness of different wrongs. For example, it is wrong to convict the innocent and wrong to acquit the guilty. Unfortunately, we can reduce but not eliminate the risk of mistakenly committing one wrong or the other. Since the former is a much more serious wrong than the latter, we should convict only with a level of certainty that will lead us to mistakenly commit the more serious wrong (false conviction) much less often than the less serious wrong (false acquittal). We will thereby reduce the overall seriousness of the wrongs we mistakenly commit.

B. THE BALANCING APPROACH REVISITED

We now can see how decision theory can enhance the determinacy of the Balancing Approach. In the context of target verification, soldiers may err in two ways: by mistakenly identifying a civilian as a combatant and
then killing the civilian (a false positive), or by mistakenly identifying a combatant as a civilian and then sparing the combatant (a false negative). False positives carry obvious costs to civilians, while false negatives carry significant costs to the attacking force. According to decision theory, the level of certainty a soldier must possess that an individual is a combatant and not a civilian before using deadly force can be represented as a function of the relative costs of a false positive and a false negative. Importantly, the relative costs of error to civilians and to the attacking force will vary from case to case, so the required level of certainty will vary as well. In other words, the required level of certainty varies with the balance of military and humanitarian considerations, just as the Balancing Approach proposes.

To simplify the following discussion, let us assume that the cost of a false positive is that you will kill a civilian, and the cost of a false negative is that you will spare a combatant who may go on to kill one or more of your fellow soldiers. This is no more than a simplifying assumption, subject to three important qualifications.

First, the costs of both killing civilians and (particularly) sparing combatants vary from case to case. On one hand, while every false positive involves the death of a civilian, not every false negative results in the death of a fellow soldier. Not every opposing combatant makes a necessary contribution to lethal operations such that killing that combatant will prevent even one fellow soldier from being killed, and mistakenly spared combatants will often be killed in future engagements before they can kill even one fellow soldier. In addition, according to contemporary counterinsurgency theory, killing an insurgent may not yield a net military benefit because the insurgent’s death may inspire others to take up arms. Moreover, killing a civilian may yield a net military cost by turning the civilian population against one’s forces. On the other hand, the death of a combatant not only eliminates the threat the combatant poses, but also may (perhaps temporarily) deplete the opposing force. In some cases, a combatant who is mistakenly spared at one time may become more dangerous or more difficult to kill or capture later. In addition, the deaths of soldiers at the hands of mistakenly spared combatants may place other soldiers at greater risk or jeopardize the success of a mission or, over time, the success of the war effort. Though important to keep in mind, these variables offset one another to a sufficient degree that their net weight

should not significantly change the conclusions of this part.

Second, a soldier who intentionally kills a suspected combatant will also often unintentionally, but knowingly, kill one or more civilians as a side effect of the attack. In such cases, the soldier must not only reach the required level of certainty that the targeted individual is a combatant, but also ensure that the expected military advantage of killing that individual (that is, the advantage of killing a combatant, discounted by the likelihood that the individual is a combatant) substantially outweighs the unintended loss of civilian life.\footnote{See Haque, supra note 8, at 4–5.}

Finally, the costs of error will themselves be uncertain, so—strictly speaking—we should compare the average expected costs of error, that is, the average of the possible costs of an erroneous decision discounted by their respective probabilities. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that the average expected costs of error are that either a soldier will kill a civilian or that a spared combatant may kill one or more soldiers.

We should start from the assumption that the death of a civilian and the death of a soldier are equally bad outcomes. Civilians and soldiers are, after all, human beings. Accordingly, it would seem that even if the cost of a false negative would be the death of only one soldier, the required level of certainty would be fairly low:

$$P(C|E) > 1/(1 + \frac{1}{2}) = 1/2 = 0.50$$

In other words, it seems that the Balancing Approach permits you to kill an individual you believe is only slightly more likely a combatant than a civilian in order to prevent one soldier from being killed if the individual turns out to be a combatant. Moreover, it seems that if the cost of a false negative would be the death of even two fellow soldiers, then the required level of certainty falls even lower:

$$P(C|E) > 1/(1 + \frac{3}{2}) = 1/3 = 0.33$$

So, according to the Balancing Approach, it is permissible to kill an individual you believe is at least twice as likely to be a civilian (66 percent) than to be a combatant (33 percent) and at most half as likely to pose a threat to two soldiers than to pose no threat at all. More broadly, on this view, it is permissible to kill an individual you are reasonably confident is a civilian if by doing so you might (but are reasonably confident you will not) save a small number of soldiers. These implications of the Balancing
Approach are implausible in theory and dangerous in practice.

For example, consider the following scenario used to train U.S. Marines deployed in Iraq:

You are in a five-vehicle convoy moving . . . at 60 mph. As you pass under an overpass you observe an adult male, with a grenade-sized object in his hand, looking over the pedestrian railing above your lane. You cannot tell what’s in the man’s hand. What do you do?57

The U.S. Marine Corps correctly instructs its forces to “[s]tay ready, observe the man on the bridge and prepare to fire if you observe hostile intent or hostile act.”58 However, according to the Balancing Approach, if a substantial number of Marines would be killed if the man turns out to be an insurgent armed with a grenade, then it would be permissible to intentionally kill the man even if he is probably, much more likely, or almost certainly a civilian rather than an insurgent. If four Marines would be killed by a dropped grenade, then you may kill the man if you are 20 percent sure he is an insurgent (and 80 percent sure he is a civilian); if nine Marines would be killed then 10 percent certainty would be enough; and so on.

These implications of the Balancing Approach are morally indefensible. However, as the next section explains, these implications follow from the failure of the Balancing Approach to recognize the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die.

C. LIMITS: KILLING AND LETTING DIE

The fact that soldiers and civilians are human beings whose lives are equal in value does not entail that their deaths should count equally in determining the relative costs of error. We must also consider how their deaths come about—how their deaths are causally related to our conduct.59 Specifically, there is a moral asymmetry between killing a human being and letting a human being die.60 This moral asymmetry manifests itself in

59. The idea that the permissibility of our actions depends not only on their consequences, but also on their causal structure is an essential part of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Toward the Essence of Nonconsequentialism, in FACT AND VALUE 155, 155–56 (Alex Byrne et al. eds., 2001).
60. As Jeff McMahan observes, “Virtually all of us, even consequentialists, act on the presupposition that the constraint against harmful killing is in general stronger than the constraint
several important ways. Most importantly, it is not morally permissible to kill one innocent person either as means or as a side effect of preventing another innocent person from being killed.\(^6\) It is not permissible to intentionally kill one person as a means of preventing several others from being killed (say, by using the healthy organs of one person to replace the damaged organs of several others). Nor is it permissible to unintentionally kill one person as a side effect of preventing one other person from being killed (say, by throwing a grenade at an attacker surrounded by innocent bystanders). If forced to choose between killing one innocent person and allowing another innocent person to die, we must choose the latter.

In contrast, absent special obligations, generally it is permissible to allow an innocent person to die as a means or as a side effect of preventing several others from being killed.\(^6\) For example, generally it is permissible to use limited medication to save several people even if, as a side effect, one other person will die without that medication. In addition, if removing one person from danger will expose several others to the same danger, then generally it is permissible to leave the one person in danger as a means of protecting the several. Finally, it is generally impermissible to kill an innocent person to avoid serious harm to yourself, but permissible to allow an innocent person to die if rescuing that person from danger would involve serious harm to yourself.

Each of the asymmetric outcomes described above reflect the general moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. We can refer to this moral asymmetry by saying that killing is morally worse, or harder to justify, than letting die.\(^6\) We can also say that killing is *substantially worse* than letting die to indicate that it takes substantially stronger reasons to against harmfully allowing someone to die, when all other relevant factors, such as intention, are the same in both cases.” Jeff McMahan, *The Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants and Noncombatants*, 38 Phil. & Pub. AFF. 342, 369 (2010).

61. *See id.* (“This moral asymmetry between killing and letting die provides, among other things, part of the explanation of why it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander as a means of preserving one’s own life, and perhaps the full explanation of why it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander as a side effect of defending or preserving one’s own life.”).

62. *E.g., Jeff McMahan, Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War, 23 Phil. PERSP. 345, 345 (2009).*

63. Significantly, in some cases, *unjustifiable* killing and *unjustifiable* letting die may be equally morally blameworthy. For example, intentionally allowing a child to drown to inherit a large fortune seems as blameworthy as intentionally drowning a child for the same reason. See James Rachels, *Active and Passive Euthanasia*, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78, 79 (1975) (arguing that killing a child and letting a child die are morally equivalent). However, killing is still harder to justify than letting die, and is worse in that sense. For example, it would not be permissible to drown a child to avoid drowning yourself, but it would be permissible to allow a child to drown to avoid drowning yourself.
justify killing than to justify letting die. For example, killing is at least twice as bad as letting die if the amount of harm to others the prevention of which would justify killing is at least twice as great as the amount of harm to others the prevention of which would justify letting die.

If killing generally is substantially worse than letting die, then, even if the lives of civilians and the lives of soldiers have equal moral value, generally it is substantially worse to kill a civilian than to allow a soldier to be killed. If you are deciding whether to kill an individual who might be a civilian or possibly allow a fellow soldier to be killed, then generally you should err in favor of the latter, generally lesser wrong. More precisely, if killing a civilian is substantially worse than allowing a soldier to be killed, you may not kill an individual unless she is at least equally substantially more likely (or proportionately more likely) a combatant than a civilian. For example, if killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as allowing a soldier to be killed, then you may not kill an individual unless you are at least twice as certain that the individual is a civilian (67 percent versus 33 percent); if at least three times as bad then three times as certain (75 percent versus 25 percent); and so on.

One might think that the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die is offset by the moral obligations of soldiers to protect one another. Such associative obligations may be very strong. Many soldiers feel obligated to risk their own lives to defend their fellow soldiers from attack, to carry those who are wounded, and to rescue those who are captured. However, there are at least three reasons why such associative obligations do not substantially offset the moral asymmetry between killing civilians and allowing soldiers to be killed.

First, generally it is not permissible to shift risks from one person onto another person who has not voluntarily assumed those risks or, more accurately, to remove risks from one person by imposing risks on another person who has not voluntarily assumed those risks. In such cases, the

64. Does the asymmetry between killing and letting die also entail that it is worse to kill an opposing combatant than to allow a soldier to be killed, since combatants are also human beings whose lives have equal moral value? No. It is generally permissible to kill a lethal attacker in self-defense or defense of others. Soldiers fighting for a just cause have a moral right to kill opposing combatants to defend themselves and their fellow soldiers from lethal attack. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Criminal Law and Morality at War, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 481, 491 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).

65. See Haque, supra note 8, at 6.
risks must lie where they fall. If those at risk have voluntarily assumed those risks, then it is even harder to justify shifting those risks onto others who have not voluntarily assumed those risks. Since soldiers generally assume the risks of combat voluntarily and civilians generally do not, it is even harder for soldiers to justify shifting risks from themselves onto civilians.

Second, the notion that associative obligations can help justify killing civilians is itself highly dubious. As Jeff McMahan observes,

> a third party acting to defend another person may in general cause no more harm to innocent bystanders than the person he is defending would be permitted to cause by acting in self-defense. And most people agree that it is not permissible for a person to defend her own life if in doing so she would unavoidably kill an innocent bystander as a side effect.

Similarly, Walzer observes that officers “cannot save [the soldiers under their command], because they cannot save themselves, by killing innocent people.”

Finally, it is both morally and legally impermissible to indirectly cause the death of a civilian either as a means of saving oneself or another soldier (for example, by using a civilian as a human shield) or as a side effect of saving oneself or another soldier (for example, by hiding among civilians). It could hardly be permissible to directly cause the death of a civilian in order to save oneself or another soldier.

The preceding discussion also explains why it remains worse for a soldier to kill a civilian than to allow another civilian to be killed, even if the soldier has a stronger moral obligation to protect some civilians than to protect other civilians.

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66. Id. In some cases, it may be permissible to redirect a preexisting threat from several people to one person. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thompson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L.J. 1395, 1395–97 (1985). But generally it is impermissible to redirect a preexisting threat from one person to one other person. Certainly, generally it is not permissible to create a new risk of harm to one person in order to avert a preexisting risk of harm to another person.

67. Of course, many soldiers are conscripted or join the military to escape poverty. However, generally it is not permissible to kill or risk killing innocent people to avoid punishment or escape poverty.

68. McMahan, supra note 60, at 376–77. Again, it would not be permissible to throw a grenade at a lethal attacker surrounded by innocent bystanders.

69. WALZER, supra note 15, at 155.

70. Haque, supra note 8, at 6–7.

71. Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin argue that soldiers have a stronger duty to minimize harm to fellow citizens than to minimize harm to foreign civilians and conclude that soldiers are morally permitted to minimize harm to fellow citizens by killing foreign civilians. See Asa Kasher & Amos
one group of innocent people to another, then generally it is impermissible to shift risks from one group of civilians to another. Moreover, a soldier has no right to inflict greater harm to protect any civilians than those civilians have a right to inflict to protect themselves. Since it is impermissible for one civilian to kill another civilian as a means or as a side effect of saving his or her own life, it is also impermissible for a soldier to kill one civilian as a means or as a side effect of saving another civilian. Finally, since it is impermissible to protect any civilians by indirectly causing the death of other civilians (by using the other civilians as human shields or by hiding among them) it cannot be permissible to protect any civilians by directly causing the death of other civilians. It follows that whether mistakenly sparing a combatant will result in the death of soldiers or the death of civilians, the required level of certainty must always reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die.

D. LIMITS: INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL KILLING

Would a “Modified Balancing Approach” that incorporates the distinction between killing and letting die provide a moral basis for targeting in armed conflict? For the sake of convenience, let us assume that mistakenly killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as mistakenly allowing a soldier to die. If a mistakenly spared combatant would kill one soldier, then soldiers must be moderately certain that an individual is a combatant before attacking her:

\[ P(C|E) > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{1.5} = 0.67 \]

To some, 67 percent certainty that an individual is a combatant may sound like a reasonable level of certainty to require of soldiers.

However, even the Modified Balancing Approach entails that, in many cases, it would be permissible to intentionally kill an individual you believe

Yadlin, Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS 3, 14–15, 18–21 (2005). I will not discuss their argument at length because the intermediate premises of their argument are highly implausible. For example, they assert that “[i]t is as morally wrong for the state to let its citizens die [when killing foreign civilians would prevent their deaths] as it is morally wrong to kill them.” Id. at 20. However, it seems clear that it is much worse for a state to kill its citizens than to allow its citizens to be killed, holding the state’s reasons (say, to avoid killing foreign civilians) constant. Certainly it is much worse for a state to kill its citizens for no reason than to allow its citizens to be killed to avoid killing foreign civilians. I will therefore only discuss the less implausible claim that a soldier’s duty to protect certain civilians offsets the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. For a more comprehensive refutation of Kasher and Yadlin’s arguments, see McMahan, supra note 60, at 346–50.

72. See Haque, supra note 8, at 5.
is probably, much more likely, or almost certainly a civilian. For example, in the Marine Corps training scenario described in the previous section,\textsuperscript{73} if a truck carrying twenty Marines is about to drive under an overpass then, according to the Modified Balancing Approach, it would be permissible to intentionally kill a man standing on the overpass even if he is almost certainly a civilian if there is even slight reason to believe that he is an insurgent carrying a grenade:
\[ P(C|E) > 1/(1 + 20^2) = 1/11 = 0.09 \]

So, according to even a Modified Balancing Approach, it is permissible to kill an individual whom you are almost completely (90 percent) certain is a civilian if there is a small (10 percent) chance that the individual is a combatant and that by killing that individual you might (but almost certainly will not) prevent a substantial number of soldiers (twenty) from being killed. Such implications seem completely implausible. However, as we shall see, such implications follow from the failure of even the Modified Balancing Approach to recognize the moral asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians.

To begin with, if you are almost certain that a person is a civilian, then—unless you are highly irrational—you also will believe that person is a civilian. Moreover, if you intentionally kill an individual believing the individual to be a civilian, and that individual is in fact a civilian, then you intentionally kill a civilian. This is true even if you kill the individual “just in case” or in the off chance that the individual is a combatant. Importantly, intentionally killing a civilian is much worse than unintentionally killing a civilian. For example, intentionally killing civilians as a means of spreading terror generally is considered unjustifiable in principle.\textsuperscript{74} In contrast, unintentionally killing civilians as a side effect of achieving a proportionate military advantage (including preventing substantially greater harm to others) generally is considered justifiable. Since intentionally killing a civilian is much worse than unintentionally killing a civilian and unintentionally killing a civilian is substantially worse than allowing a fellow soldier to be killed, it follows that intentionally killing a civilian is far worse than allowing a fellow soldier to be killed. Certainly, it is not morally justifiable to intentionally kill an individual you believe is a

\textsuperscript{73} See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.

\textsuperscript{74} Alternatively, some writers argue that it is justifiable to intentionally kill civilians to prevent far greater harm to others. For example, Walzer argues that attacks on civilian populations are justifiable to prevent a “supreme emergency” involving the destruction of an entire political community. See WALZER, supra note 15, at 251–68.
civilians for a small (10 percent) chance of preventing a substantial number of soldiers (twenty) from being killed.\textsuperscript{75}

Part III.C assumed, based on the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die, that mistakenly killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as mistakenly sparing a combatant and thereby allowing a fellow soldier to be killed. But we have now introduced a second, stronger moral asymmetry between intentionally killing civilians and unintentionally killing civilians. In other words, we earlier assumed that mistakenly killing a civilian is equivalent to unintentionally killing a civilian. But this need not be the case. If you intentionally kill someone whom you reasonably but mistakenly believe is a combatant, then you have unintentionally killed a civilian. And unintentionally killing a civilian is substantially worse, but not far worse, than allowing a soldier to be killed. By contrast, if you intentionally kill someone you believe is a civilian, then you have intentionally killed a civilian. And intentionally killing a civilian is far worse than allowing a soldier to be killed.

We can put the point a different way: We have been following the assumption of the Balancing Approach that the required level of certainty is a function of the relative costs of error. But, we see now that the relative moral costs of error are themselves a function of an actor’s subjective level of certainty. A soldier’s subjective level of certainty that an individual is a combatant or a civilian affects whether or not, in the event of a false positive, the soldier intentionally kills a civilian or unintentionally kills a civilian. As we have seen, the moral cost of a false positive will be far greater if the soldier intentionally kills a civilian than if the soldier unintentionally kills a civilian. Crucially, this difference in the moral costs of a false positive will, in turn, affect the level of certainty required to permissibly open fire. The asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians, as well as the effect of this asymmetry on the required level of certainty, will be discussed in greater depth in the following part.

IV. DEONTOLOGICAL TARGETING

This part develops a normative theory of target verification based on the very moral asymmetries that the Balancing Approach ignores. This

\textsuperscript{75} Indeed, it is probably impermissible to intentionally kill a civilian to certainly save twenty soldiers. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 253 (1996) ("[If the norms of morality prohibit the action of killing an innocent person, then an actor may not kill an innocent person even if doing so would prevent twenty innocent people from being killed.").
normative theory, which I call “Deontological Targeting,” is developed in three stages. Section A argues that it is impermissible for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual the soldier believes is a civilian or an individual the soldier believes is probably a civilian. Section B goes further, arguing that it is unjustifiable and inexcusable for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual the soldier does not reasonably believe is a combatant. Reasonable belief that an individual is a combatant constitutes a minimum threshold of certainty that soldiers must reach to permissibly use deadly force. Finally, Section C argues that, due to the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die, a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual unless the soldier is reasonably convinced that the individual is a combatant; is reasonably confident that the individual poses an immediate threat to a soldier or civilian; or reasonably believes that the individual poses an immediate threat to a substantial number of soldiers or civilians. Section D compares Deontological Targeting with an alternative view proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Corn.

A. THE INTENTION-BELIEF CONSTRAINT

In Part III, I claimed that the moral and legal constraint on intentionally killing a civilian is violated when one intentionally kills an individual, believing that individual is a civilian, and the individual is in fact a civilian. 76 Importantly, to kill civilians intentionally one need not kill them because they are civilians; it is enough that one correctly believes that they are civilians. 77 This understanding of intentional killing is supported by general principles of criminal law. As Glanville Williams puts it, “Intention is a state of mind consisting of knowledge of any requisite circumstances plus desire that any requisite result shall follow from one’s conduct . . . .”78 In the current context, the requisite result that must be desired is the death of the individual attacked, while the requisite circumstance the existence of which must be known is the fact that the individual attacked is a civilian. Similarly, the Model Penal Code states that “[a] person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense

76. See supra Part III.
77. Obviously, some terrorist groups intentionally kill civilians because they are civilians; others intentionally kill civilians simply because they are vulnerable to attack and their deaths will spread terror. Similarly, soldiers carrying out a campaign of genocide may intend to kill individuals because of their race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality, irrespective of whether they are civilians or opposing soldiers. Nevertheless, if terrorists or genocidaires intentionally kill individuals correctly believing them to be civilians then, for both moral and legal purposes, they intentionally kill those civilians.
when . . . if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” Michael Moore puts the point even more strongly: “The one simple truth is that the law nowhere requires true purpose with regard to such circumstances.”80 The same is true in international criminal law.81 On all of these accounts, to intentionally kill a civilian is to intentionally kill an individual whom one correctly believes is a civilian.

The structure of intentional killing provides moral and legal support for A.P.V. Rogers’s otherwise undefended assertion that “[a]t the very least, customary law would require those responsible for attacks not to attack persons or objects which they know or believe to be civilian.”82 Customary law clearly prohibits intentionally attacking civilians, and intentionally attacking civilians is simply intentionally attacking individuals one knows or correctly believes are civilians.

The prohibition on intentionally killing individuals one believes are civilians provides an outer limit to the Balancing Approach: one may not kill an individual believing that individual to be a civilian, even if there is some chance that the individual is a combatant and that sparing the individual will result in harm to one’s forces or mission. However, this outer limit remains far too weak: the prohibition would not apply to a soldier who “shoots first and asks questions later” by attacking an individual without forming either a belief that the individual is a civilian or a belief that the individual is a combatant. Such a soldier necessarily violates the legal obligation to distinguish civilians from combatants.83 At a minimum, distinguishing civilians from combatants requires deciding, judging, determining, or concluding who is a civilian and who is a combatant. In addition, soldiers are legally required to exercise “constant

79. Model Penal Code § 2.02(a) (1985). See id. § 2.02 cmt. 2 at 233 (“Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common element in both [purpose and knowledge].”).
80. Michael S. Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 64, at 179, 187 (“This is certainly true of general intent crimes such as rape: the actor need only know that the woman is [not] consenting, he need not be motivated by that fact (wanting only forced sex, for example). But this is even true of specific intent crimes such as assault with intent to rape . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, 19 CRM. L.F. 473, 495 (2008) (“Logically speaking, there is no offence which requires the prosecution to prove that the accused, in the true sense, intends a particular circumstance to exist at the time he carries out his conduct.”).
82. Rogers, supra note 14, at 176.
83. See supra Part II.A.
care” to spare civilians and are morally required both not to try to kill civilians and to try not to kill civilians. At a minimum, constant care to spare civilians and trying not to kill civilians requires deciding who is a civilian and who is a combatant. In ordinary life, you are often morally permitted to withhold judgment in the face of uncertainty. But if the question is whether the individual you intend to kill is a civilian or a combatant, then you are not allowed to keep an open mind.

What moral and legal concepts best capture the culpability of the soldier who intentionally kills an individual without forming any affirmative belief regarding that individual’s liability to be killed? It is tempting to say that such a soldier acts recklessly with respect to whether the individual attacked is a civilian or a combatant. However, the concept of recklessness will not advance our understanding. Recklessness generally involves the unjustified creation of a substantial risk; to find an actor reckless we must compare the risk the actor creates with the reasons for taking that risk. In the current context, a finding of recklessness would involve comparing the risk of mistakenly killing a civilian with the risk of mistakenly sparing a combatant. In other words, a recklessness inquiry would lead us back to the Balancing Approach we have already rejected. Even a recklessness inquiry that reflects the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die would still entail that it is permissible to intentionally kill an individual who is almost certainly a civilian if doing so might (but almost certainly will not) prevent a substantially greater (but not far greater) number of soldiers from being killed. If that proposition still seems implausible, then the concept of recklessness cannot lead us forward.

Alternatively, we could regard the soldier who attacks individuals without forming any belief regarding their legal status as morally equivalent to a soldier who attacks individuals believing that they are civilians. This approach finds some support in modern criminal law. According to the Model Penal Code, “[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” The drafters of the Model Penal Code believed that their understanding of knowledge “deals with the situation that British commentators have denominated ‘willful blindness’ or ‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of the probable existence

84. See supra Part II.A.
85. See WALZER, supra note 15, at 155–56 (proposing a principle of “double intention”).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985).
of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or does not exist. Following this approach, we would regard a soldier who is aware of a high probability that an individual is a civilian, and who does not affirmatively believe that the individual is a combatant, as morally equivalent to a soldier who affirmatively believes that the individual is a civilian. If the willfully blind soldier intentionally kills an individual, and the individual is in fact a civilian, then the willfully blind soldier has intentionally killed a civilian.

Taken to an extreme, the asserted moral equivalence of willful blindness and affirmative belief can erode the distinction between knowledge and recklessness. If you believe that there is a low probability that a fact exists, but form no affirmative belief one way or the other, then it seems unfair to regard you as if you affirmatively believe that fact exists. However, if we take the requirement of a “high probability” seriously, the asserted moral equivalence seems sound. Specifically, a belief that a fact probably, or more likely than not, exists, absent an affirmative belief that the fact does not exist, seems morally equivalent to an affirmative belief that the fact exists. At first glance, when an individual withholds judgment regarding a particular fact, we may feel that the individual could just as easily conclude that the fact does exist or that the fact does not exist. If the individual’s culpability would be significantly less were that individual to conclude that the fact does not exist (in which case the individual might be reckless regarding that fact, but would not “know” that the fact exists), then we may feel that we ought to give the individual the benefit of the doubt and treat the individual as if he or she has a lower level of culpability. We essentially give the individual moral credit for the less culpable mental state that the individual could have formed but did not. But this grant of moral credit would be inappropriate if the individual estimates that the fact probably does exist, because in that case it would be irrational for the individual to conclude that it does not exist. It would be irrational for the individual to think “A is probably x, but A is not x.” Specifically, it would be irrational to estimate that someone is probably, or more likely than not, a civilian but nevertheless form an affirmative belief that that person is a combatant. Withholding judgment should not mitigate one’s blameworthiness when one is rationally restrained from forming the less culpable judgment. In such cases, withholding judgment is morally comparable to forming the more culpable judgment, which is the only judgment one could rationally form.

87. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 9 at 248.
We have therefore identified two plausible constraints on the Balancing Approach: a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual whom the soldier either (1) believes is a civilian, or (2) believes is probably a civilian and does not affirmatively believe is a combatant. However, these constraints remain too subjective and too weak: they permit soldiers to intentionally kill individuals whom they unreasonably believe are probably combatants, or whose probable statuses they have not even bothered to estimate. The following section proposes a stronger, objective threshold of certainty that soldiers must achieve before using lethal force.

B. THE REASONABLE BELIEF THRESHOLD

In the preceding section, we saw that soldiers may not intentionally kill individuals whom they subjectively believe are or probably are civilians. The goal of this section is to show that soldiers may not intentionally kill individuals unless the soldiers reasonably believe those individuals are combatants.

The reasonable belief threshold already has some basis in state practice and international court judgments. For example, the U.S. Naval Handbook states that “[c]ombatants in the field must make an honest determination as to whether a particular person is or is not taking a direct part in hostilities based on the person’s behavior, location and attire, and other information available at the time.” In other words, soldiers may not intentionally kill individuals unless they sincerely believe those individuals are combatants. This principle precludes soldiers from attacking an individual without first forming an affirmative belief that the individual is a combatant. Unfortunately, the honest determination standard permits a soldier to attack based on an unreasonable belief that an individual is a combatant. This standard is an improvement over the standards discussed in the previous section, but is also too subjective.

The correct position was elegantly expressed by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) when it wrote that “a person shall not be made the object of attack when it is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the person contemplating the attack, including the information available to the latter, that the potential target is a combatant.” This principle precludes soldiers

from attacking an individual unless they both sincerely and reasonably
believe that the individual is a combatant. Unfortunately, the Trial
Chamber did not explain the moral or legal basis for its statement and its
actual holding was more limited.90 Indeed, it appears that the Trial
Chamber’s statement has been almost entirely ignored by courts,
commentators, and scholars.91 The argument of this section provides moral
support for the Trial Chamber’s legal claim.

At the most fundamental moral level, what makes the intentional
killing of a civilian presumptively morally wrong is not the killing of a
civilian but the killing of a human being. The fact that an individual is a
civilian does not give that individual any more rights or additional moral
protection than the individual would otherwise enjoy simply by virtue of
being human.92 Indeed, the crime of murder is simply the intentional killing
of another human being. It follows that, from a moral perspective, it is the
intentional killing of other human beings that soldiers need to be able to
either justify or excuse.

What might justify a soldier in intentionally killing another human
being? Among other things, the fact that a human being is a combatant
might justify intentionally killing him or her, because by becoming a
combatant he or she may forfeit his or her moral right not to be
intentionally killed and thereby become morally liable to be intentionally
killed.93 So international law, and much of just war theory, has it exactly

90. The Trial Chamber held that it is a war crime to willfully or recklessly attack civilians. See
id. ¶ 54. However, as we have seen in the previous section, a recklessness threshold replicates the very
Balancing Approach we earlier rejected.

91. Searches of Westlaw and Google indicate that the Trial Chamber’s statement has never been
cited by another judge or examined by a single scholar, and has been quoted, without discussion, in
only two sources. See 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 10, at 571 nn.15–16; JENNIFER
TRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 96–98,

92. Cf. WALZER, supra note 15, at 144 n. (“[T]he theoretical problem is not to describe how
immunity [to intentional killing] is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with; our right
not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships.”).

93. The moral basis of liability to intentional killing in armed conflict remains the subject of
profound philosophical disagreement. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 15, at 144–45 (arguing that all
combatants are liable to be killed because they pose a threat to opposing combatants and civilians);
Haque, supra note 64, at 495–96 (arguing that combatants fighting for a just cause may defend
themselves from opposing combatants who forcibly resist their achievement of their just cause; civilians
and prisoners are never liable to be killed); JEFF McMahan, KILLING IN WAR 234 (2009) (arguing that
only combatants who fight for an unjust cause are liable to be killed because they are responsible for an
unjust threat to opposing combatants and civilians; in principle, civilians and prisoners who share
responsibility for an unjust threat are also liable to be killed). However, our topic is sufficiently narrow
to avoid most points of controversy. We are designing legal rules for soldiers who presumably believe
wrong: the fact that an individual is a civilian is not a wrong-making feature of intentionally killing that individual; the fact that the individual is a human being is sufficient to make it presumptively wrong to intentionally kill that individual. Instead, the fact that an individual is a combatant is a wrong-justifying feature of intentionally killing that individual. By becoming combatants, individuals may make themselves morally liable to be intentionally killed.94

But what if you intentionally kill a human being who, it turns out, is not a combatant but instead a civilian who retains his or her ordinary right not to be intentionally killed? You are not justified in killing an individual who is not a combatant. However, you may be excused in killing an individual if you reasonably believe the individual is a combatant. If you reasonably but mistakenly believe that a justifying circumstance exists, then your belief does not justify your action—but generally it will excuse your action. Indeed, “the paradigm excuse is that one had a justified belief in justification.”95 Your reasonable mistake does not make what you did morally right, but generally it does render you morally blameless. So, if you intentionally kill another human being, then you have committed a presumptive moral wrong that you must either justify or excuse in order to avoid moral fault. If you act on the true belief that the individual is a combatant, then you may be justified; if you act on the reasonable but mistaken belief that the individual is a combatant, then you may be excused.96

What, then, is a reasonable belief? In general, a reasonable belief is a

down: 498 (defending the legal rule that civilians lose their immunity from attack if and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities).

95. John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 444 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2000) (“The contrast here is between having reasons for action and having reasons to believe that one has reasons for action. It corresponds to the distinction, well known to all lawyers, between justifications and excuses. One justifies one’s actions by reference to the reasons one had for acting. One’s actions are excused in terms of the reasons one had for believing that one had reasons for action.”).

96. Alternatively, we can say that action based on a reasonable belief in a justifying circumstance is permissible relative to the evidence—even if it proves impermissible relative to the facts. See J. DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 150–51 (2011) (“Some act of ours would be wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the morally relevant facts, . . . and wrong in the evidence-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we believed what the available evidence gives us decisive reasons to believe, and these beliefs were true.”).
justified belief; a justified belief is a belief supported by undefeated reasons; and reasons are undefeated if they are at least as strong as any opposing reasons.\textsuperscript{97} It follows that a belief that a justifying circumstance exists is reasonable just in case the reasons to believe that circumstance exists are at least as strong as the reasons to believe that circumstance does not exist.\textsuperscript{98} Conversely, a belief that a justifying circumstance exists is unreasonable if the reasons to believe that circumstance exists are outweighed by the reasons to believe that circumstance does not exist. We can express the same idea by saying that it is unreasonable to believe that a justifying circumstance exists if you have reason to believe that the circumstance \textit{probably} does not exist or \textit{most} or \textit{strongest} reasons to believe that the circumstance does not exist. We can also see why generally we excuse actions based on reasonable but mistaken beliefs: human beings have no choice but to act on the basis of beliefs that may prove false; if we act only on the basis of justified beliefs, then generally we have done all that morality demands.

The defender of the Balancing Approach might nonetheless ask: Why isn’t it reasonable, and therefore excusable, to intentionally kill another human being, even if that human being is probably not a combatant, provided the number of lives you might save are substantially greater (though not far greater) than the number of lives you would take?

The most straightforward response draws on the Kantian idea that generally it is impermissible to treat a person as a mere means to an end.\textsuperscript{99} In my view, to harm a person as a means is to harm that person in order to bring about some desired result or consequence. To harm someone as a “mere” means is to harm someone as a means when that person has done nothing to make himself or herself liable to be harmed as a means—in that case you cannot justify harming that person by reference to his or her own voluntary actions. Finally, to treat a person as a mere means is to harm the person as a means when you do not reasonably believe that the person is liable to be harmed as a means. If you intentionally harm one person to prevent harm to others, then you harm the first person as a means. However, if you reasonably believe the person is liable to be harmed, then you do not treat that person as a \textit{mere} means. By contrast, if you do not

\textsuperscript{97} E.g., JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 110 (2007) (“One must have an undefeated reason for one’s belief, and that must moreover be the reason why one holds the belief.”).

\textsuperscript{98} See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 267–68 (2007) (“A belief is justified if there are good reasons for accepting it, reasons at least as good as those for rejecting it; it is unjustified if there are no, or insufficient, reasons for accepting it.”)

\textsuperscript{99} E.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429 (1785).
reasonably believe that the person is liable to be harmed, then by harming that person to prevent harm to others, you impermissibly treat the person as a mere means.

If the reasonable belief threshold is a general feature of moral justification and excuse, then soldiers can justify or excuse the intentional killing of another human being only if they act on an affirmative and reasonable belief that the individual killed is a combatant. It follows that a soldier’s reasons to believe that an individual is a combatant must be at least as strong as the soldier’s reasons to believe that the individual is a civilian. In contrast, soldiers cannot reasonably believe that an individual is a combatant if they have reason to believe that that individual is probably a civilian or most or strongest reason to believe that the individual is a civilian. By embracing the reasonable belief threshold, Deontological Targeting avoids the counterintuitive implications of the Balancing Approach: soldiers may never intentionally kill an individual who is probably, much more likely, or almost certainly a civilian.

Importantly, a well-trained soldier can form and act on reasonable beliefs rapidly and reliably under pressure. Military training already aims to sharpen situational awareness and streamline information processing so that soldiers immediately pick out relevant features of their surroundings and swiftly form judgments regarding their tactical situation. No doubt, some soldiers will panic under fire and shoot anything that moves. However, we must not lower our moral, legal, and professional standards to accommodate soldiers overwhelmed by their circumstances. Instead, we must properly train soldiers to rise and meet morally justified standards, even in the most difficult circumstances. In addition, leaders should design military operations so that soldiers can meet morally justifiable standards: political leaders and military commanders should not place soldiers in tactical situations in which meeting morally justified standards will prove too much for too many of even the best-trained soldiers.

* * *

The preceding moral argument for the reasonable belief threshold is supported by general principles of criminal law. However, three aspects
of the criminal law governing justification and excuse warrant brief discussion. First, leading criminal law scholars agree that a reasonable belief that a justifying circumstance exists provides a “justification” if that belief is true, but only an “excuse” if the belief is false.101 However, many jurisdictions do not systematically distinguish between justifications and excuses.102 As a result, many jurisdictions regard a defendant who reasonably but mistakenly believes that a justifying circumstance exists as justified rather than excused. For our purposes, what is important is that—under either approach—an actor must reasonably believe that the justifying circumstance exists in order to escape moral blame and criminal liability.

Second, in most jurisdictions, a defendant who intentionally kills another person, believing that person is liable to be killed, may be convicted of nothing if that belief is reasonable, but may be convicted of murder if that belief is unreasonable.103 In other jurisdictions, a defendant who kills with an unreasonable belief that the individual killed posed a lethal threat will be granted a partial or “imperfect” defense and will only be liable for second degree murder or manslaughter.104 For our purposes, what is crucial is that a defendant must affirmatively and reasonably believe that the justifying circumstance exists to escape moral blame and

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101. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 10.1.2, at 762-69 (1978) (arguing that reasonable, but mistaken, belief in impending attack should be considered excuse); Gardner, supra note 97, at 110 (“Thus the most basic or rudimentary case of non-technical excuse remains that of unjustified action upon justified belief.”); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 283-84 (1975) (concluding that reasonable but mistaken belief is “erroneously adopted from the doctrine of excuse”).

102. Indeed, the Model Penal Code does not even recognize excuses as a distinct category of affirmative defenses, preferring to lump duress (an excuse) with complicity (a mode of responsibility) and entrapment (a bar to prosecution) under the capacious heading of “General Principles of Liability,” MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 2.06, 2.09, 2.13 (1985). See also 2 Lafave, supra note 100, § 9.1(b), at 10 (discussing the Model Penal Code approach and concluding that “[i]n those instances in which the defendant is mistaken in his belief, what is called a justification would seem more properly characterized as an excuse”).

103. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. 1986) (observing that this approach “provide[s] either a complete defense or no defense at all to a defendant charged with any crime involving the use of deadly force”); 2 Lafave, supra note 100, § 10.4(c), at 147.

104. See, e.g., 720 ILL. Comp. Stat. 5 / 9-2 (1987) (second degree murder, Illinois); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2503(b) (2008) (voluntary manslaughter, Pennsylvania); In re Christian S., 872 F.2d 574 (1994) (voluntary manslaughter, California). Similarly, under the Model Penal Code, a defendant who kills in the mistaken belief that the individual killed posed a lethal threat will be liable for murder if that belief was formed due to extreme recklessness; manslaughter if that belief was formed due to ordinary recklessness; and negligent homicide if that belief was formed due to criminal negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.09 (1985).
Finally, the reasonable belief threshold applies to ordinary individuals and government agents alike. For example, law enforcement officers are justified or excused in using deadly force only if they reasonably believe that a justifying circumstance exists: for example, that such force is necessary to defend themselves or others or to prevent the escape of certain dangerous suspects.\(^5\) Similarly, under the European Convention on Human Rights, “the use of force by agents of the State . . . may be justified . . . where it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken.”\(^6\) Finally, in the United States, a police officer acts unconstitutionally by using deadly force absent a reasonable belief that a suspect poses a threat to public safety.\(^7\)

C. Above the Threshold

Are soldiers who satisfy the minimum threshold—and reasonably believe that an individual is a combatant—free to fire at will? They are not. Since a soldier’s reasons not to kill a civilian are substantially stronger than the soldier’s reasons not to allow a fellow soldier to be killed, generally a soldier may kill an individual only if that soldier’s reasons to believe that

\(^{105}\) E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a (West 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1) (Consol. 1980). Similarly, under the Model Penal Code, a law enforcement officer will be held criminally liable for using deadly force based on a recklessly or negligently formed belief that the relevant justifying circumstances exist. MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 3.07, 3.09(2) (1985). Cf. COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, INC., STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1–2 (1983) (concluding that police departments must restrict the use of deadly force to situations in which “the officer reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life . . . or in defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury”).

\(^{106}\) McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50 (1995). See also id. at 32 (“The relevant domestic case-law establishes that the reasonableness of the use of force has to be decided on the basis of the facts which the user of the force honestly believed to exist: this involves the subjective test as to what the user believed and an objective test as to whether he had reasonable grounds for that belief.”) (citations omitted).

\(^{107}\) See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (finding unconstitutional the use of deadly force by a police officer who “could not reasonably have believed that [the suspect]—young, slight, and unarmed—posed any threat”); Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Sincerely held but unreasonable belief does not justify the use of force . . . .”). Although U.S. courts often use the phrase “probable cause” to describe the level of certainty required by the U.S. Constitution, when it comes to the use of deadly force, probable cause and reasonable belief are equivalent standards. Id. at 971 (“Both [probable cause and reasonable belief] standards are objective and turn upon the circumstances confronting the officer rather than on the officer’s mere subjective beliefs or intentions, however sincere.”). Certainly there is no indication that the U.S. Constitution permits police to intentionally kill fleeing suspects whom they have most or strongest reason to believe probably pose no threat to the public.
individual is a combatant are considerably stronger than the soldier’s reasons to believe that individual is a civilian. For example, if killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as allowing a fellow soldier to be killed, then a soldier may intentionally kill an individual only if the soldier’s reasons to believe that individual is a combatant who will otherwise kill two soldiers are at least as strong as the soldier’s reasons to believe that individual is a civilian (50 percent certainty); or if the soldier’s reasons to believe that individual is a combatant who will otherwise kill one soldier are at least twice as strong as the soldier’s reasons to believe that individual is a civilian (66 percent certainty); or if the soldier has conclusive reason to believe that individual is a combatant (that is, if the soldier has no reason to believe that individual is a civilian), even if that individual poses no threat. Moreover, as we have seen, it is never permissible for a soldier to kill an individual if the soldier’s reasons to believe that the individual is a civilian are stronger than the soldier’s reasons to believe that individual is a combatant.

For example, imagine that you are remotely operating a UAV and see several armed men on your monitor. The men’s weapons, age, dress, and movements provide you with strong reasons to believe that they are insurgents. However, demographic and cultural patterns provide you with strong reasons to believe that the men are civilians armed and organized to defend themselves and their community from insurgent attacks. Suppose that, even if the men are combatants, they pose no immediate threat to anyone and it is highly unlikely that they will kill a substantial number of soldiers or civilians before being captured or killed in a future engagement. In such a scenario, it would be wrong to kill the men even if your reasons to believe that they are opposing combatants are as strong, or slightly stronger, than your reasons to believe that they are civilians.

What, then, should you do? If possible, you should track the men’s movements and kill them only if new information provides you with conclusive reason to believe that they are combatants; with much stronger reason to believe that they pose an immediate threat to a comparable number of soldiers or civilians than reason to believe that they pose no such threat; or with most reason to believe that they pose an immediate threat to a substantially greater number of soldiers or civilians. Put another way, you

108. Put another way, since killing a civilian generally is substantially worse than allowing a soldier to be killed, it is impermissible to intentionally kill an individual unless the expected harm (that is, the possible harm discounted by its probability) of mistakenly sparing the individual is equally substantially (or proportionately) greater than the expected harm of mistakenly killing the individual.
should kill the men only if you are reasonably convinced that they are combatants; if you are reasonably confident that they are about to attack a comparable number of soldiers or civilians; or if you reasonably believe that they are about to attack a substantially greater number of soldiers or civilians. However, if such time and resources cannot be spared to obtain additional information and reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians, then you must disengage and accept the risk of mistakenly sparing combatants. These principles should guide all targeted killing operations conducted from relative safety, including through the use of UAVs.

So, although a reasonable belief that an individual is a combatant is always necessary to excuse intentionally killing that individual, it is often not sufficient. As the relative costs of a false negative decrease, one’s level of certainty must increase. In other words, above the reasonable belief threshold, the Modified Balancing Approach seems plausible: the required level of certainty should vary with the relative costs of error, adjusted to reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. It is only below the reasonable belief threshold that the Modified Balancing Approach loses its plausibility.

If we embrace Deontological Targeting and reject the Balancing Approach, must we accept that it is never permissible for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual who is probably a civilian (that is, whom the soldier has strong reasons to believe is a combatant but stronger reasons to believe is a civilian)? Not necessarily. So-called “threshold deontologists” generally believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill an innocent person in extreme circumstances to prevent far greater harm to others. 109 These threshold deontologists may also accept that it is permissible to intentionally kill an innocent person to prevent far greater expected harm to others (that is, the harm that killing the person might prevent discounted by the likelihood that killing the person will prevent that harm). For example, if it is permissible to intentionally kill an innocent person if the number of innocent people this would save exceeds some numerical threshold, then it may be permissible to kill an innocent person if the expected number of innocent people killing the first person would save (that is, the number of innocent people killing the first person might save discounted by the likelihood that killing the first person would save them) exceeds the same numerical threshold. It might therefore be permissible for a soldier to

109. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 893 (2000); WALZER, supra note 15, 251–55 (arguing that intentionally killing civilians might be permissible in a “supreme emergency” in which the survival of a political community is at stake).
intentionally kill an individual who is probably a civilian to prevent far greater expected harm to others (that is, the harm killing the individual would prevent if the individual turns out to be a combatant discounted by the likelihood that the individual is a combatant). However, since it is hardly ever the case that intentionally killing someone who is probably a civilian will prevent far greater expected harm to others, the reasonable belief threshold is, for all practical purposes, absolute.

Significantly, Deontological Targeting entails that there may be cases in which it would be permissible to intentionally kill an individual one reasonably believes is a combatant to prevent substantially greater harm to others but impermissible to intentionally kill an individual whom one has strong—but not decisive—reason to believe is a combatant to prevent substantially greater harm to others. For example, suppose you receive reliable human and signals intelligence that a specific insurgent will open fire with a concealed weapon at a specific time and location and kill a substantial number of soldiers or civilians. At that time and location, you see an individual whose facial and physical appearance closely matches that of the insurgent and whose clothing and behavior is strongly corroborative of an intended attack. Under such circumstances, if nonlethal options are not available, it may be permissible to attack the individual, even if such an attack would unintentionally kill two nearby civilians, to prevent substantially greater harm to others.

In contrast, if you see three individuals who closely resemble the insurgent, then even if you reasonably believe that one of them is the insurgent, you cannot reasonably believe that each of them is the insurgent. Under the latter circumstances, it would be impermissible to attack each individual, even though in both cases you would kill one combatant and two civilians. Such implications of Deontological Targeting may seem paradoxical but they should not. By definition, every nonconsequentialist moral view holds that it is sometimes permissible to bring about good outcomes in one way but not in another way. If the distinctions between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians and between reasonable and unreasonable belief in justifying circumstances are morally significant, then this necessarily entails that we are sometimes permitted to unintentionally kill civilians as a side effect of an attack on a combatant, but not permitted to intentionally kill individuals we do not reasonably believe are combatants as a mere means of eliminating a possible but unlikely threat.
D. AN ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERED

In his 2012 article, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Corn proposes that a soldier may intentionally kill an individual if the soldier (1) reasonably suspects that the individual is a member of an opposing regular armed force; (2) believes, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the individual is a civilian directly participating in hostilities; or, (3) believes, beyond reasonable doubt, that the individual is located outside an area of active hostilities but performs a continuous combat function in an organized armed group. At first glance, Corn’s proposal seems to resemble my own. In fact, our views are dramatically different.

First, Corn is wrong to think that the required level of certainty that an individual is liable to attack varies with the different legal bases of liability to attack (membership in an armed force, direct participation in hostilities, and continuous combat function). Of course, generally it will prove easier to satisfy the required level of certainty while fighting a uniformed enemy than while fighting a nonuniformed enemy or while targeting individuals based on their present conduct rather than their organizational role. But the required level of certainty remains the same for each category of liability.

Second, the reasonable suspicion and preponderance of the evidence standards that Corn endorses are inadequate. For example, if you are fighting a uniformed enemy but cannot tell whether a particular individual is wearing a uniform (because it is too dark, or the individual is too far, or your view is obstructed) it would be wrong to kill that individual merely because you reasonably suspect that the individual is a uniformed soldier. If you reasonably suspect that individual is liable to attack then you should investigate further. But, if you cannot reasonably conclude or believe the individual is liable to attack, then you must hold your fire.

Similarly, if your unit takes small-arms fire and you see an individual running away, it would be wrong to kill that individual even if it is slightly more probable that the individual fired at you and is retreating from the engagement (activities which would constitute participation in hostilities) than it is that the individual did nothing and is simply fleeing to relative safety. As we saw in Part IV.C, above the minimum threshold of reasonable belief, the required level of certainty must vary with the magnitude of the threat and reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die.

Finally, Corn writes that international law does not clearly permit the use of armed force outside an area of active hostilities or against members of organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function but are not currently directly participating in hostilities.\textsuperscript{111} Strangely, Corn does not conclude that states should refrain from such attacks until their legality is clearly established, but instead concludes that such attacks may be carried out if it is beyond reasonable doubt that the targeted individuals perform a continuous combat function.\textsuperscript{112} Conceptually, Corn is wrong to think that factual certainty can compensate for legal uncertainty. Substantively, Corn offers the wrong argument for the right conclusion. Individuals outside an area of active hostilities generally pose no immediate threat. Based on the arguments of the previous section, we can conclude that such individuals generally may be attacked only if there is conclusive reason to believe that they are liable to be killed. Contrary to Corn’s view, the same high standard applies both inside and outside areas of active hostilities. In particular, this high standard applies to targeted killing operations directed at all low-level and most mid-level insurgents.

V. DEONTOLOGICAL PRECAUTION

If a group of soldiers sees an armed insurgent run into a house, and then sees someone move past the upstairs window, may the soldiers fire at the person they see, or must they enter the house and search for the insurgent room-by-room? Searching the house would place the soldiers at greater risk, but firing at anyone moving inside the house would place civilians at greater risk. When must soldiers accept greater risk to themselves rather than impose greater risks on civilians?

As we saw in Part II, the law of armed conflict requires soldiers to do everything feasible to verify that their targets are not civilians prior to attack.\textsuperscript{113} We also saw that this requirement has been widely interpreted to reflect a Balancing Approach to precaution in attack. According to the Balancing Approach, a precaution is not feasible and need not be taken if the military considerations against taking the precaution outweigh the humanitarian considerations in favor of taking the precaution. In other words, according to the Balancing Approach, soldiers need not seek additional information regarding potential targets if seeking that information would increase the risk to soldiers even slightly more than

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 490-95.
\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 493-94.
\textsuperscript{113} See supra Part II.C.
obtaining that information would decrease the risk to civilians. This section proposes an alternative theory of precaution in attack that I call “Deontological Precaution.”

According to Deontological Precaution, soldiers must accept any personal or operational risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty. If soldiers are unable to reach the required level of certainty, or if they are unwilling to accept the risks necessary to do so, then they must hold their fire, even if that forbearance will leave them at greater risk. This aspect of Deontological Precaution may seem demanding, but it follows logically from the theory of Deontological Targeting defended in Part IV. The required level of certainty already takes into account the risk of attack (that one might kill a civilian) and the risk of restraint (that one might spare a combatant who may kill one or more fellow soldiers). Specifically, if the required level of certainty is higher than the minimum threshold of reasonable belief, then the moral risk (that is, the consequential risk adjusted to reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die) of restraint is less than the moral risk of attack. If the moral risk of verification (that one or more fellow soldiers might be killed while seeking additional information) is greater than the moral risk of restraint, then the soldiers may choose the less risky option and hold their fire. Conversely, if the moral risk of verification is less than the moral risk of restraint, then the moral risk of verification must also be less than the moral risk of attack. Either way, the moral risk of verification cannot justify attack when the required level of certainty has not been reached.114

According to Deontological Precaution, soldiers who have reached the required level of certainty are often morally required to obtain additional information regarding potential targets. Evidently, soldiers who seek additional information regarding potential targets often increase the risk of being killed, while soldiers who do not seek such additional information often increase the risk of killing civilians. However, as we saw in Part III, generally it is substantially worse for a soldier to kill a civilian than to allow a fellow soldier to be killed.115 It follows that generally it is

114. Rogers reaches a similar conclusion regarding air attacks on ground targets: If [an aircrew’s] assessment is that (a) the risk to them of getting close enough to the target to identify it properly is too high, (b) that there is a real danger of incidental death, injury or damage to civilians or civilian objects because of lack of verification of the target, and (c) they or friendly forces are not in immediate danger if the attack is not carried out, there is no need for them to put themselves at risk to verify the target. Quite simply, the attack should not be carried out.

Rogers, supra note 14, at 179.

115. See supra Part III.C.
substantially worse for a soldier to increase the risk that the soldier may kill a civilian than to increase the risk that the soldier may allow a fellow soldier to be killed. Therefore, a soldier must seek additional information regarding potential targets unless seeking that additional information would increase the risk to soldiers substantially more than obtaining that additional information would decrease the risk to civilians. For example, if killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as allowing a soldier to be killed, then soldiers must seek additional information regarding potential targets unless seeking additional information would increase the risk that soldiers will be killed at least twice as much as obtaining additional information would decrease the risk that the soldiers will mistakenly kill civilians.

The additional obligation described above is inspired by an important recent proposal by David Luban. Luban argues that soldiers must use more discriminating tactics (such as engaging with opposing forces in close combat) rather than less discriminating tactics (such as engaging with opposing forces from afar using artillery and air power), unless using the more discriminating tactics would increase the marginal risk to soldiers substantially more than using the less discriminating tactics would reduce the marginal risk to civilians.

My proposal differs from Luban’s in at least two ways. First, my proposal is concerned with determining whether an individual is liable to attack (distinction), while Luban’s proposal is mostly concerned with determining how to attack individuals who are liable to attack (discrimination). Interestingly, however, both my proposal and Luban’s can be generalized to apply to all precautions in attack: soldiers should take additional precautions to avoid harming civilians unless taking these precautions would increase the marginal risk to soldiers substantially more than taking these precautions would decrease the marginal risk to civilians. This general principle should guide both target verification and selecting means and methods of attack.

117. Id. (manuscript at 8, 20–21). Luban defines the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) as the difference between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers use more discriminating tactics and the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers use less discriminating tactics. Id. (manuscript at 20).
118. In general, the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) is the difference between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers take some precaution and the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers do not take that precaution.
119. In the target verification context, the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) is the difference between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers obtain more information and the risks to
The more important difference between Luban’s proposal and my own is that I ground the duty of soldiers to accept risks to themselves (rather than impose risks on civilians) on the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die, while Luban grounds this duty on “the vocational core of soldiering.”\textsuperscript{120} I suspect that professional obligation is an infirm point on which to balance risk to soldiers and risk to civilians. Evidently, professional obligations are created, sustained, and defined by social conventions including laws, codes of conduct, and custom. Yet the laws of armed conflict are indeterminate and the rules of engagement vary with each armed force and each armed conflict, and as a result state practice remains unsettled. Moreover, an armed force may opt out of whatever convention exists, rejecting the professional obligations associated with it, and construct its professional identity through a different set of norms, values, and ideals.\textsuperscript{121} Of course, defecting from a social convention can be a moral wrong in itself if the convention has a compelling moral justification.\textsuperscript{122} However, the most compelling moral justification for the social convention that Luban supports is the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die.

From a soldier’s perspective, the marginal risk to civilians is the marginal risk of killing the civilians, while the marginal risk to soldiers is the marginal risk of allowing them to be killed. The risk is not simply that an equivalent harm will befall either a civilian or a soldier, but rather that the soldier will commit a more serious moral wrong or a less serious moral wrong. Luban treats the death of a soldier and the death of a civilian as equally bad events—an equal loss of human life—and it is only the soldier’s professional obligations that require risking the former before risking the latter. But this is misleading. Killing a civilian is an action, not merely an event, and the moral significance of an action is a function not only of its outcome but also of its causal and intentional structure. Soldiers should accept greater risks to themselves in order to avoid imposing smaller risks on civilians. They should do this not because the lives of

\begin{itemize}
\item soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers obtain less information.
\item Luban, supra note 116 (manuscript at 28).
\item Similarly, McMahan goes somewhat astray when he argues that the reason why combatants are required to expose themselves to risk in the course of defending those who are threatened with wrongful harm is simply that it is their job to do that: it is what they have pledged to do and are paid to do. It is part of their professional role.
\item McMahan, supra note 60, at 366. The goal of the inquiry is to determine what level of risk the role-based duties of soldiers should require soldiers to accept, and on pain of circularity this determination cannot rest on the role-based duties of soldiers to accept risk.
\item See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS 84–87 (2010) (arguing that morally justified legal conventions impose moral obligations).
\end{itemize}
civilians are worth more than the lives of soldiers, but because killing is worse than letting die.123

Importantly, it is the responsibility of military planners to train and equip their soldiers to verify the legitimacy of their targets in the safest way possible. Tactical and technological innovation can substantially reduce, though never eliminate, the risks involved in distinguishing civilians from combatants. Undeniably, soldiers facing a nonuniformed enemy force will often find that reaching the required level of certainty will require accepting serious risks that they or their fellow soldiers will be killed. In individual cases, accepting such risks will require soldiers to display tremendous moral integrity and psychological fortitude. Over the length of an irregular conflict, accepting such risks will mean that a significant number of soldiers will be killed while attempting to verify the legitimacy of their targets. The moral and strategic implications of such losses are obvious. However, armed forces must not reduce or avoid such losses by inflicting comparable losses on the civilian population. Instead, military commanders must train and equip their forces to reduce the risks of verification; prepare their forces to accept any remaining risks of verification; and, whenever possible, avoid placing their forces in situations in which the risks of verification are individually too difficult to bear or collectively too difficult to sustain. As General David Petraeus observes, “to be brutally frank about it, if your overriding objective is to protect your own force, then you probably should not have deployed in the first place, because the only way to avoid risk to your forces is not to get involved.”124

VI. IMPLEMENTATION

This final part distills the complex moral principles defended in the previous parts into relatively simple rules that soldiers can be trained to follow even under fire. Section A proposes new legal rules as well as reinterpretations of existing legal rules. Section B proposes model Rules of Engagement for training soldiers and guiding their conduct on the battlefield.

123. Luban invokes the asymmetry between killing and letting die in a separate discussion of whether soldiers may unintentionally kill foreign civilians to prevent their own civilians from being killed, but not to determine when soldiers may risk killing civilians to reduce the risk of being killed themselves. See Luban, supra note 116 (manuscript at 33).

A. LEGAL RULES

The most elegant way to incorporate the moral principles defended in the previous parts into international law would be for states to adopt three new legal rules either as part of a new international convention or as the basis for new customary international law. The first rule would essentially codify the Galić dictum:

(I) “[A] person shall not be made the object of attack when it is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the person contemplating the attack, including the information available to the latter, that the potential target is a combatant.”[^125]

In addition, a new rule could be adopted regarding the level of certainty required above the reasonable belief threshold:

(II) A person shall not be made the object of attack unless the risk of sparing that person is substantially greater than the risk that the person is a civilian.

Finally, a new legal standard could be adopted to govern precautions in attack generally:

(III) Attacking forces shall take every effective precaution to spare civilians unless taking a precaution will increase the risk to attacking forces substantially more than taking that precaution will decrease the risk to civilians.

These three rules would identify both the level of certainty that soldiers must achieve and the level of risk that soldiers must accept. By following these rules, soldiers can ensure that their actions will prove either justified (if the targeted individual turns out to be a combatant) or excused (if the targeted individual turns out to be a civilian).

Alternatively, existing legal rules could be interpreted by states as well as by international courts to reflect the relevant moral principles. As we saw in Part II, Protocol I fails to specify either the level of certainty necessary to “verify” that an individual or object is military rather than civilian or the level of risk that is “feasible” for soldiers to accept in order to discharge their precautionary obligations. The principle of verification could be interpreted along the following lines.

(IV) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:

(A) do everything possible to verify that the persons to be attacked are not civilians but are combatants unless seeking additional information would increase the risk to soldiers substantially more than obtaining such information would decrease the risk to civilians;

(B) do everything necessary to verify that the persons to be attacked are more likely combatants than civilians;

(C) do everything necessary to verify that the persons to be attacked are sufficiently likely to be combatants that the risk of sparing them is substantially greater than the risk that they are civilians.

These specifications reflect the complementary goals of error reduction and error distribution: soldiers should gather as much reliable information as they can without increasing the risk to themselves substantially more than they would decrease the risk to civilians; and soldiers must put themselves and their mission at as much risk as necessary to achieve the required level of certainty.

We also saw that the principle of doubt fails to identify the standard of certainty relevant to targeting decisions, or sets that standard too low, or permits the standard to vary without limitation based on the relative costs of error. Instead, the principle of doubt should set a minimum threshold of certainty and allow the required level of certainty to vary only above that threshold:

(V) In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian unless there is reason to believe that the person is probably a combatant; a person may be attacked only if any remaining doubt is sufficiently small that the risk of sparing that person is substantially greater than the risk that she is a civilian.

Similarly, the principle of apparent protection seems to permit a soldier to carry out an attack unless it becomes subjectively apparent to the soldier that the target is almost certainly not a combatant but rather a civilian. This principle should be interpreted to require that, at a minimum:

(VI) An attack shall be canceled or suspended if there is reason to believe that the objective is probably not a military one or is probably subject to special protection.

Interpreting existing legal rules along these lines will incorporate into international law the minimum threshold of reasonable belief applicable in all cases; the required level of certainty applicable when the threshold has been satisfied; and the level of risk required to avoid mistakenly killing
B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The new rules and interpretations of existing rules proposed above enhance the determinacy and moral force of existing law. However, here as elsewhere, the price of greater determinacy is greater complexity. While military commanders and operational planners often will have access to legal advisors, we cannot expect soldiers under fire to apply complex legal standards to every targeting decision. Instead, military commanders should issue Rules of Engagement (“ROE”), written in ordinary language, which soldiers can be trained to apply in combat. Such ROE will inevitably simplify the underlying legal rules, but such simplification is legitimate so long as soldiers will better conform to the legal rules indirectly—by following the ROE—than directly—by attempting to apply the legal rules under adverse conditions.

In general, soldiers need just one rule:

(I) Do not shoot anyone unless:

   (A) you reasonably believe that the person poses an immediate threat to several members of your unit or to several civilians;

   (B) you are reasonably confident that the person poses an immediate threat to yourself, another member of your unit or a civilian; or

   (C) you are convinced that the person is a combatant, even though that person poses no immediate threat to you or others.

In the vast majority of engagements, individual soldiers will make better decisions by following this ROE than by attempting to calculate the required level of certainty on a case-by-case basis by balancing military and humanitarian considerations adjusted by the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. By contrast, the teams of military and intelligence personnel who remotely operate UAVs generally have the time, resources, personal safety, and direct access to legal advisors needed to make more precise judgments and directly follow the legal rules proposed in the previous section.

Importantly, in targeted killing operations directed at high-level combatants, it may be appropriate for commanders to issue mission-specific ROE permitting soldiers to intentionally kill an individual whom they reasonably believe is a particular high-level combatant even if the individual poses no immediate threat. The long-term costs of sparing high-
level combatants may be very high even when they pose no immediate threat. However, it is impermissible to intentionally kill an individual whom you have reason to believe might be, but probably is not, a particular high-level combatant. Moreover, additional information confirming the identity of the possible target must be sought unless doing so would increase the risk to soldiers substantially more than doing so would decrease the risk to civilians. For example, putting other legal issues aside for a moment, President Obama was right to send Navy SEALs to identify Osama bin Laden by sight rather than strike his compound by air.

The United States and its allies have issued ROE that substantially overlap with the ROE proposed above. For example, ROE issued to coalition forces in Iraq in 2005 provide that “Positive Identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target.”\textsuperscript{126} It is not clear, however, whether under current U.S. ROE “a reasonable certainty” refers to a fixed, moderately high level of certainty or to whatever level of certainty soldiers deem reasonable under the circumstances. On one hand, a fixed standard of “reasonable certainty” may prove too restrictive when the stakes are very high, too permissive when the stakes are very low, and too vague standing alone. On the other hand, a variable standard of certainty that does not identify the relevant variables provides poor guidance to soldiers. In contrast, the proposed ROE offers soldiers sound guidance in the vast majority of situations they will confront—without overwhelming soldiers with rules that are too fine grained to apply under pressure.

Unfortunately, the U.S. military has at times permitted soldiers to intentionally kill individuals without positively identifying them as legitimate targets, for example in “free-fire zones”—from which civilians have been warned to leave—as well as in buildings declared “hostile” prior to attack. Most dramatically, on November 19, 2005, U.S. Marines killed twenty-four civilians in Haditha, Iraq, based on instructions by their platoon commander that once a dwelling is declared hostile they need not positively identify the individuals inside as combatants before using deadly force against them.\textsuperscript{127} No morally sound ROE would permit such a practice.

Importantly, the proposed ROE is intended to guide, not replace,


human judgment. That is why, like all ROE, the rule proposed must be incorporated into Situational Training Exercises (“STEs”) in which soldiers are taught to apply their ROE in scores of realistic combat simulations. In addition, like all ROE, this rule can form the basis of real and hypothetical case studies through which soldiers learn to recognize scenarios in which the use of force is, or is not, appropriate. These exercises will clarify linguistic ambiguities in the wording of the ROE and convert rules into reflexes. Soldiers must often rely on pattern recognition as much as rule application, refined instinct as much as careful calculation. So long as their training is grounded in sound legal and moral norms, soldiers can trust themselves to make legally and morally sound decisions under fire.128

VII. CONCLUSION

This Article began with two questions: First, how certain must a soldier be that a given individual is a combatant and not a civilian before attacking that individual? At a minimum, a soldier must reasonably believe that the individual is a combatant and not a civilian. Above the reasonable belief threshold, the required level of certainty will vary with the relative costs of error and reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. If an individual is not in a position to kill several soldiers or civilians, then that individual may not be attacked unless the attacker is reasonably confident or reasonably convinced that the individual is in fact a combatant.

Second, what risks must soldiers accept to themselves and to their mission in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians? Soldiers must take whatever personal or operational risks are necessary to reach the required level of certainty. Soldiers must also seek additional information unless seeking additional information would increase the risk to the soldiers substantially more than obtaining additional information would decrease the risk the soldiers impose on civilians. If soldiers are unwilling or unable to take the required risks, then they must hold their fire.

Unavoidably, this Article has left several important questions unanswered. How much worse is it to kill a civilian, intentionally and unintentionally, than to allow one’s fellow soldiers to be killed? How should we compare harm to civilians with military advantages other than

128. See, e.g., Jørgen Weidemann Eriksen, Should Soldiers Think Before They Shoot?, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 195, 214 (2010) (arguing that soldiers with substantial combat experience may be able to intuitively distinguish between combatants and civilians).
preventing harm to one’s fellow soldiers? These are difficult questions that any morally serious approach to the law of armed conflict must address. Fortunately, the progress we have already made gives us reason to believe that these questions also have answers.

129. Among other things, proper application of the principle of proportionality depends on these answers. See Haque, supra note 8, at 3–4.