FRAMING THE PROSECUTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

The enormous value of Dan Simon’s *In Doubt* lies not just in its nuanced exploration of the challenges to accurate criminal factfinding, but also in its challenge to us to rethink trials themselves. Even as we endeavor to give criminal defendants the means and license to raise reasonable doubts, we need to think more about when and how those doubts can be allayed. Just because most jurisdictions have not come out of the first round of play—the one in which defendants get the tools to poke holes in the cases against them—does not mean it is premature to consider what should happen in the second period: What tools should we give jurors to assess the alleged holes—the “reasonableness” of an alleged doubt? And how can the prosecution try to mend them? These questions do not simply go to the fairness and, to use Simon’s term, the “diagnosticity of the trial.” They also, as I hope to show here, go to the role that criminal trials will play in a world with so few of them.

Metaphors are powerful tools for understanding complex phenomena—for “framing” them. And the “framing” metaphor itself, with its resonance of intentionality and contingent perception, is a powerful tool for understanding and reformulating the criminal trial. The thicket of

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2. *Id.* at 182.
procedural and evidentiary doctrines deployed in our trials is founded on the fear that the state will—intentionally or insouciantly—try to “frame” an innocent defendant. That, among other reasons, is why the state must proceed first and meet a heavy burden of proof. With the state’s responsibility for assembling a case and putting it on, however, comes a troubling advantage of which we were long aware but that recent cognitive science literature⁵ has driven home: having been presented with what seems like a nicely drawn picture of guilt—evidentiary pieces selected by the prosecutor, which coincidentally fit within a frame selected by her as well—the jury may not bother to look beyond it.

There is a broad consensus in the literature—even if reality has yet to catch up—that we need to ensure that defendants have a fair opportunity to challenge this evidentiary frame, so that they can expose the cognitive biases that infected the cops’ initial construction of the case and the prosecutors’ later assembly of it. Understandably less thought, however, has been given to the risk that, in doing so, defendants will “frame” cops and prosecutors. No claim is made that this risk is of similar moral dimensions to the others. Nevertheless, it has systemic implications worth worrying about.

Criminal trials are not the only, and may not even be the best, way to promote the competency and integrity of the police in the nearly 18,000 law enforcement agencies⁶ and the over 2300 prosecutors’ offices⁷ around the country. One could imagine a variety of nonadjudicatory mechanisms, both outside these institutions and within them, that could do the same thing. From the outside, consulting firms could do random audits; inspector generals could poke around; state attorneys general—while generally lacking hierarchical control over county prosecutors—could use habeas defense work as a basis for oversight; funders could look more carefully at how their money is spent; citizen commissions could have real informational gathering resources and powers... The list goes on. From

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⁵. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 363–74 (2011) (discussing framing effects—“the unjustified influences of formulation on beliefs and preferences”—and their impact).


the inside, training, culture and office structure could be engaged to the same end. And mutual monitoring between police and prosecutors could be fostered as well. Yet given political and institutional realities, it is hard to imagine any combination of these quality control measures doing the fine-grained work across all jurisdictions that we rely on the adversary process to do. At the same time, it is hard to even pretend that the adversary process is operating at full throttle in the vast majority of criminal cases—the cases in which the adjudicative process consists only of a negotiated guilty plea and a sentence. So while trials may be the exception, they still provide the rule for police and prosecutorial conduct. And even as we look to the fairness of trials to defendants, we should be more attentive to the signals trials send and the incentives they create for cops and prosecutors.

Of course, trials are not particularly good signals to police and prosecutors of the quality of their work. Even with most cases pleading out, the average trial will end in a guilty verdict. And if one considers all the choices made (or negligently foregone) in the course of an investigation and trial, the likelihood that one or more enforcers involved in the case made one or more, possibly cascading, mistakes is considerable, and the likelihood that a jury verdict will reflect that mistake, pretty small. Were enforcers to start thinking of trials as the only assessment of their work that matters, the insensitivity of this mechanism would surely promote overconfidence and sloth. Still, even as we promote alternative, nonadjudicatory mechanisms, we can work to promote greater sensitivity.

These signals and incentives are the focus of this Essay, which proposes a quiet reframing of trials as regulatory interventions into a sparsely regulated world.

II. DECONSTRUCTING THE INVESTIGATIVE FRAME

Consider the classic criminal trial drama: A few eyewitnesses will testify. Police officers will tell of having conducted a search or two, perhaps pursuant to their arrest of the defendant, and will authenticate physical evidence that they seized. An officer will tell of the defendant’s postarrest statements (since he probably waived his Miranda rights). Perhaps someone from the police lab will attest to a “match” between biological material found at the crime scene and the defendant. And maybe a coconspirator will take the stand, in hopes of receiving (or maybe after

already having received) sentencing leniency. This parade of prosecutorial witnesses remains pretty standard, and their testimony pretty predictable. But at least to those who have kept abreast with developments in forensic and cognitive science, our understandings of how this evidence should be assessed have changed radically.

In part because the surveillance state so feared by privacy champions works far better on TV than in reality, eyewitnesses will continue to star in criminal trials for the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding fevered talk of omnipresent surveillance cameras, transit and vehicle tracking, and cellular tower triangulation, any wholesale rejection or even deep-discounting of eyewitness testimony would put all too many serious crimes beyond legal sanction.\(^{10}\) Still, we have increasing concerns about the reliability of eyewitness testimony when it is based on fleeting, stressed, and cross-ethnic observations, and those concerns only grow when investigating authorities are not careful in their recovery efforts.\(^{11}\) Moreover, the possibility of investigator contamination when memories are retrieved and reconstructed is not limited to fleeting observations. While a workplace or accomplice witness might be justifiably more certain about whom he saw, he may have the same uncertainty or susceptibility to manipulation as to what he heard and saw, and when. And the manipulation can come at the witting or unwitting hands of prosecutors—during proffers or trial preparation—as well as cops.\(^{12}\) Nor are confessions and witness statements (from eyewitnesses and others) the only kinds of evidence that cops and prosecutors can taint. Physical evidence can be lost, contaminated, or otherwise mishandled by those that collect it, process it, and, to the extent someone bothers, tests it. Lab results can be mistaken, misleadingly presented, or just plain fabricated.\(^{13}\) And we are increasingly aware of how

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13. See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMY, NAT’L
the selective process of case construction can fall victim to what Simon has labeled “biased reasoning processes.”

That human activities are subject to human fallibility is not news, I hope. The challenge, so nicely framed by Simon, however, is the “limited diagnosticity” of an enterprise that relies on self-selected humans to collect and select data and on dragooned members of the public to assess it. Yet the challenges to diagnosticity go beyond that. Sure, criminal defendants are presumed innocent—a bedrock principle so celebrated by popular legal culture that it infects discussions where it should have little place. Yet I do not think we give sufficient attention to the cognitive dissonance that the presumption of innocence creates for jurors. In what other context do we set up a politically accountable bureaucracy (like the police or a prosecutor’s office), ask citizens to take a political interest in its functioning, and then ask some of those same citizens to “presume” that the same bureaucrats have accused the defendant by mere chance in the particular case before them? I am not claiming that jurors necessarily trust the police (I work near the Bronx after all), nor that district attorneys necessarily have robust political accountability. Indeed, in a country in which criminal justice is primarily a county-based enterprise, even the average citizen/juror’s baseline views about police and prosecutorial sorting powers will surely be geographically specific. Nor am I embracing

14. See id. at 203–05 (arguing that the capacity of the adjudicatory process to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate evidence is limited).
the idea that jury trials should be implicit case-crossing referenda on a police force’s professionalism, though I am not sure that would be such a bad thing, given how unaccountable police departments can be. The point is simply to highlight the fundamental tension between the development of trust and legitimacy by local authorities and the skepticism that we celebrate as the heart of our criminal trials.

Even if prosecutors did not come before juries with a democratic wind at their backs, their ability to select and prepare their cases and their control over the order of proof could make even the most doubt-promoting investigation seem eminently reasonable and adequate. Insiders have always known that the seamless trial testimony that witnesses (especially police officers) give on direct examination is an artifact of specific trial preparation and general training. But we are all too inured to the charade we present jurors: the witnesses who appear months, even years, after an event and deliver personal narratives, prompted only by nonleading questions, that shed potent light on the transactions in dispute; the memories that are suddenly “refreshed” with a glance at a document, and the notion of an investigation without loose and dead ends. In the hands of a competent prosecutor, the case against the defendant, however cobbled together beforehand, unfurls like a testamentary scroll.

The deconstruction of the prosecution’s case and the investigation that preceded it is, thus, not just a defense tactic, but a necessary part of the inquiry into reasonable doubt. While that standard is rooted in the distant world explored so nicely by James Whitman (one long before the rise of professional criminal investigators), our current understanding of it offers a capacious analytical framework well suited to second-guessing the official story and exposing the choices made and foregone by those purporting to

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19. See David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 114–31 (2008) (discussing the relationship between a democratic policing agenda and greater public participation in police decisionmaking). It is hard to allude to trials as case-crossing referenda on police—particularly in a Los Angeles conference—without mentioning the OJ Simpson case.


present a burnished story of guilt. In addition to deconstructing the prosecution’s case, a defendant will want to offer a counter-narrative, and “the cops jumped to conclusions” may be the best he can do. Indeed, while several experienced practitioners at this Conference reported that this line of defense can alienate jurors, it may be a defendant’s only possible entry in the contest for “relative plausibility” (as Ron Allen and Alex Stein nicely put it).

The defendant, of course, will be the primary beneficiary if his lawyer can successfully deconstruct the prosecution’s case. And society will avoid the unjust conviction of someone in its name. Yet trials are too rare and expensive, and alternative mechanisms of accountability all too limited, for us to ignore the contributions that trials can make to the regulation of a county or district’s criminal justice system.

We cannot pretend that trials are random audits. While a market-clearing price may not always be available in our guilty-plea driven system, it usually is. Upon hearing that a criminal case went to trial almost anywhere in the U.S., one’s first thought is to wonder why. The answer is just as likely to be about the sentencing consequences or the defendant’s personal circumstances as it is to be about the closeness of the

23. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 68 (describing a strategy in which “[t]he defense attempts to attack the prosecutor’s history, impeach the credibility of the state’s witnesses, and deconstruct the linear narrative that the prosecutor offers, breaking it up until it is transformed into a nonsensical, incredible tale too full of inconsistencies and loose ends to withstand the onslaught of reasonable doubt.”). Breaking the prosecutorial frame can also be a critical part of the defense case in a capital sentencing phase. See John M. Hagedorn & Bradley A. MacLean, Breaking the Frame: Responding to Gang Stereotyping in Capital Cases, 42 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1027, 1040–52 (2012) (discussing how jurors are inclined to view evidence in gang-related cases according to their preexisting, biased personal frames and how an effective defense in such cases requires addressing these frames).

24. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 55 (“The defense must buttress any uncertainty it induces with something stable, or risk sending the jurors scurrying for any scrap of certainty the prosecution offers. And to be sure, the prosecution will be offering certainty.”).

25. Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 571–79 (2013) (explaining how factfinders rely not only on fancy probabilities, but also on a natural reasoning process that compares the relative plausibility of each side’s explanation of the evidence).

26. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1911–12 (1992) (explaining how most criminal cases are resolved without a trial, and often by relatively informal means). Thus, in the absence of a good model, efforts to extrapolate data on investigative pathologies from exonerations in murder and rape cases—where the felt need to pursue even a weak case may be greater—usually end up being exercises in rhetoric, not social science. For a nice attempt at sorting through the data, see generally Samuel Gross, How Many False Convictions Are There? How Many Exonerations Are There?, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: CAUSES AND REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 45 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2013) (examining different methods of estimating the number of false convictions).
case or the weakness of the evidence. Still, just as (in part for lack of effective alternatives) we embrace the exclusionary rule for the incentives it gives the police to comply with the Constitution, so should we embrace trials as opportunities to identify and punish specific instances of shoddy police work, and perhaps even acknowledge jobs well done. As the “diagnosticity” of trials will inevitably go to investigations as well as guilt, we should embrace that duality as a feature, not a bug, of our criminal justice regime. Victims should not feel like they are on trial; police and prosecutors definitely should. And the Second Circuit quite rightly rebuked the prosecutor who, in rebuttal summation, urged the jury: “[T]his is not a search for reasonable doubt. This is a search for truth.”27 Truth is indeed important. But reasonable doubt is the way we get there.28

Our first challenge in criminal trials is thus to ensure that the sources of doubt are properly aired. That means (1) giving defense counsel sufficient information about the conduct of the investigation so that they can critique and perhaps supplement it, (2) making sure that counsel have the zeal, expertise, and resources to expose prosecutorial flaws to the jury and that judges have the patience to let them, and (3) giving jurors the tools to assess what doubts are reasonable.29

How can we accomplish these goals? A large part of the solution is conceptually straightforward, even as the political and institutional obstacles can be enormous: Defense counsel need to get adequate information not just about what the prosecutor included in her case, but also about what she left out. The amount of ink that has been spilled on the inadequacies of the law governing prosecutorial disclosure and on the all-too-frequent failure of prosecutors to comply with their all-too-limited legal obligations is deservedly large,30 and I will not add to it here. Even the

27. United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. The court explained,

To say that “this is not a search for reasonable doubt” but “a search for truth” has the potential to distract the jury from the bedrock principles that “even if the jury strongly suspects that the government’s version of events is true, it cannot vote to convict unless it finds that the government has actually proved each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “that if the evidence is insufficient to permit [the jury] independently to ‘find the truth,’ its duty, in light of the presumption of innocence, is to acquit.” . . . The prosecution thus erred here by failing to frame the question for the jury “by reference not to a general search for truth but to the reasonable doubt standard that the law has long recognized as the best means to achieve the ultimate goals of truth and justice.”

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
29. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 195 (noting the variation and inadequacy of “reasonable doubt” instructions across jurisdictions); State v. Stevenson, 298 P.3d 303, 306–08 (Kan. 2013) (describing inelegant prosecutorial efforts to distinguish between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “beyond all doubt” during voir dire).
30. See, e.g., Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the
most liberal disclosure reform proposals, however, will not ensure that
defense counsel gets what she needs. Given the resource asymmetries in an
adversarial system in which talk of “equality of arms” conceals more than
it protects, prosecutors also need to have the zeal and competence to find
critical evidence in the first place. As anyone familiar with the Brady
problem(s) in Connick v. Thompson\(^\text{31}\) knows, a constitutional disclosure
obligation that looks to the forensic analyses that the prosecution has
actually performed will be of little help when prosecutors are too lazy or
inert to conduct tests that are as likely to help as to hurt their case, or when
investigators are too lazy or inert to collect evidence in the first place.\(^\text{32}\)

Another conceptually straightforward, but practically daunting, part of
the solution is that defense counsel must be adequately funded and have
sufficient expertise and zeal. More than fifty years after Gideon v.
Wainwright,\(^\text{33}\) this goal remains distant.\(^\text{34}\) Retrospective relief for
defendants ill-served by counsel is virtually impossible to get, not just
because of Strickland v. Washington’s demanding standard,\(^\text{35}\) but also
because evidence of even clearly inadequate performance is unlikely to
surface. And ad hoc retrospective provision for what needs to be a critical
ex ante assurance makes little sense, not just from a rights perspective, but

\(\text{Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 416–21 (2010) (examining Brady}
\)violations in the prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s \textit{Bunch of Flaws}, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1539–40 (2010) (describing how Brady has failed to live up to the
expectations of some in practice); Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After
Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOK L. REV. 1329, 1330–32 (2012) (noting Brady’s weak enforceability);
Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 25
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 919 (2012) (noting prosecutorial pressures that lead to Brady violations and
the inadequate means of addressing violations).

\(^{31}\) Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).

\(^{32}\) See Jennifer E. Laurin, Prosecutorial Exceptionalism, Remedial Skepticism, and the Legacy
of Connick v. Thompson, in \textit{27 NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY
FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK}, 29, 50–51 (Steven Saltzman ed., 2011) (discussing how Connick’s
concession that a Brady violation occurred, and most Justices’ consequent inattention to that point, left
unanswered Justice Scalia’s plausible argument that no violation occurred when prosecutors failed to
check whether Thompson’s blood type matched that on the victim’s pants); Jennifer E. Laurin,
\textit{Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight}, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1076–86 (2013) [hereinafter Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward] (discussing the
inadequacies of police evidence collection).

\(^{33}\) See Joel M. Schumm, \textit{NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE SOLUTION IS
MULTIFACETED} 5 (2012) (noting the insufficient funding for public defender offices and other indigent
defense providers). For various essays published in the Yale Law Journal in conjunction with a
symposium commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, see \textit{Symposium, The
Gideon Effect: Rights, Justice, and Lawyers Fifty Years After Gideon v. Wainwright}, 122 YALE L.J.
2106 (2013) (providing various essays exploring the meaning, implementation, and legacy of Gideon).

from any reasonable perspective. There is no substitute for a well-funded and motivated public defender organization (or collection of such organizations) within a county or district, able to collect information about police practices and bring it to bear across cases. Even the most crime-control oriented should appreciate a system’s need for zealous and skilled quality inspectors who are ready to take on the confirmation biases and tunnel vision of police and prosecutors, but reliable institutional structures for such inspectors are rarely in place.

Of course, the basis for finding doubt must also get to juries. This may seem obvious. Yet Supreme Court intervention was needed in *Holmes v. South Carolina*, where state law barred a defendant from introducing evidence of third-party guilt if the prosecution had “introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly support[ed] a guilty verdict.” As the Court noted there, an evaluation of “the strength of only one party’s evidence” allows no “logical conclusion [as to] the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt.” Put differently, the “reasonableness” of the narrative frame proposed by the prosecution can hardly be assessed without reference to the evidence just outside of it.

*Holmes* should not be expected to remove the temptation to construct judicial walls around the prosecution’s case.

36. See Laurin, *Remapping the Path Forward*, supra note 32, at 1096–100 (citing literature on how biases affect how police and prosecutors process information).
37. While the focus here is on juries—the usual factfinders in felony criminal trials—the analysis here largely extends to bench trials as well. Frederick Schauer, *On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law*, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 187 (2006) (“[E]ven judges are often afflicted with the kinds of cognitive failings that juries are, and . . . many of the same reasons that exist for imposing second-order exclusionary (or other) rules on juries’ first order epistemological assessments also apply to the arguments for imposing second-order rules on the first-order epistemological assessments of judges.”).
39. Id. at 321.
40. Id. at 331.
41. See, e.g., Birts v. State, 2012 Ark. 348, 2012 WL 4471108, at *8 (Sept. 27, 2012) (finding fingerprint and trace-DNA evidence of unknown persons found at the crime scene and at a victim’s residence too remote and speculative to be admitted); State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶¶ 27–28, 4 A.3d 478, 484–85 (reviewing limitations on alternative suspect evidence). The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, recently adhered to its “direct connection” rule:
To be admissible, evidence that another person had an opportunity or motive for committing the crime for which a defendant is being tried must tend to prove that the other person committed some act directly connecting him with the crime. The evidence must be of the kind that directly connects the other person with the *corpus delicti* and tends clearly to point to someone other than the accused as the guilty person. Disconnected and remote acts, outside the crime itself cannot be separately proved for such purpose; and evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.
*State v. Nash*, 339 S.W.3d 500, 513 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (quoting *State v. Rousan*, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo. 1998) (en banc)).
the prosecution narrative of the defendant’s guilt can easily spin out of control when the defendant responds by pointing at someone else or simply persons unknown. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) explained,

the admission of feeble third-party culprit evidence poses a risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth, because it inevitably diverts jurors’ attention away from the defendant on trial and onto the third party, and essentially requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the third-party culprit did not commit the crime.42

At the very least, however, we should ensure that courts are receptive to defense challenges to the adequacy of the police’s investigation. The Massachusetts SJC explained the difference:

While the inference to be drawn from third-party culprit evidence is simply that someone else committed the crime, the inference that may be drawn from an inadequate police investigation is that the evidence at trial may be inadequate or unreliable because the police failed to conduct the scientific tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police investigation would have conducted or investigated, and these tests or investigation reasonably may have led to significant evidence of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. A jury may find a reasonable doubt if they conclude that the investigation was careless, incomplete, or so focused on the defendant that it ignored leads that may have suggested other culprits.43

As a matter of logic, this sort of proof might bear less than third-party culprit evidence on the issue of a defendant’s guilt. Save for cases of bad faith in which the police consciously disregard an investigative lead, it is not obvious that evidence known, but not pursued, should bear more on doubt than evidence indicative of nonguilt that the police did not know of. Yet proof of investigative deficiencies is considerably more manageable as a practical matter. Since prosecutors are less likely to be completely blindsided (assuming they communicate with the police), the risk of fabrication is lower.44 Moreover, as the Massachusetts SJC later noted, “because the Commonwealth may generally, on redirect examination, explain why particular leads were not followed, the risk of prejudice posed by [such alternative suspect] evidence is often lower than that associated with third-party culprit evidence.”45 Still, wariness about the framing

43. Id. See also United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2001) (drawing a similar distinction).
44. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1970) (justifying the imposition of disclosure obligations on criminal defendants by pointing to “the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated”).
power of the prosecution’s case should counsel courts to be more receptive to both kinds of proof.

Attentiveness to the trial’s role as a systemic regulatory device, however, does not mean that judges should completely abstain from regulating defense efforts to poke holes in the fabric of the prosecution’s case. The concern is not simply that court and jury time ought not be wasted by clock-running, or that there is a difference between poking holes and blowing smoke. It is also to create a judicially patrolled space between what defense counsel knows and what he can use—a space that counsel cannot be counted on to create on her own. Here is where the dynamic aspects of disclosure and evidence come into play. While I realize it is an unsupported behavioral and predictive claim, I suspect that prosecutors might be more ready to memorialize and disclose investigative tracks, including roads not taken, to defense counsel if they had confidence that objectively silly lines of cross would not be pursued in court.

Take a recurring page from federal practice and consider a potential cooperator’s first proffer session with the government: odds are that he will initially minimize his culpability. After some eye-rolling and prodding by his lawyer or the government, perhaps he will come clean in this session. Perhaps it will take another one before he does so. (Yes, I realize that assessments of “clean” are contestable.) When the government eventually calls him as a trial witness, it will need to disclose “material” exculpatory and impeachment evidence under Brady (even if not written down), and all memorialized statements bearing on the case, but not non-Brady material that is not written down.46 To what extent should the prosecutor who worries that even the slightest inconsistency between the cooperator’s initial statements and trial testimony will provide grist for tedious cross-examination take careful notes? A strict Bayesian47 might want to assure the prosecutor that immaterial inconsistencies or natural narrative


evolutions would be treated as such by the jury, and that she, therefore, need not worry about disclosure. A savvy defense lawyer would not bother to pursue the matter, and an inept one would find no profit in it. Indeed, weak impeachment of this nature might even strengthen the jury’s assessment of the witness’s credibility and the prosecution’s case more generally.48 Still, risk aversion and effort minimization combine to deter memorialization. Would judicial restriction of that cross remove this disincentive? I am certainly not sure, but it would be worth a try, given the current dynamics, particularly on the federal side, where the luxury of a lighter caseload and the freedom that certain agents and prosecutors have to pursue sustained investigations reduces their (perceived) need to create aids to memory.49 And I suspect (but cannot prove) that attention to such disincentives might similarly promote disclosure of other investigative matters. We regularly use evidentiary rules to create space for and foster socially valuable internal processes,50 and the intervention here would be with respect to use at trial, not disclosure.

A call for more thoughtful judicial management of impeachment is not a call for a curtailment of cross-examination or defense evidence designed to make the police and prosecutors look bad. That project, after all, goes to the heart of “reasonable doubt.” And defense efforts to explore investigative short-cuts, leads not pursued, and forensic tests not ordered should be welcomed. Judicial hostility to such efforts arises not simply from the desire to move a trial along but from the same habituation to routine and internalization of resource limitations that cause the investigative inadequacies in the first place. The notion that “we don’t do that type of thing in these types of cases” or “that never works” is as likely to be accepted by the judge—who as a former prosecutor or defense lawyer is used to what is “normal”—as by the investigators. But the relatively few trials we have provide occasions for questioning the “normal.” And if we

are to embrace the retail inquiry of a trial not just as a means of assessing a particular defendant’s guilt but as an opportunity to audit investigative decisionmaking, judges should not shut down awkward questions about work undone.

Note that the last two paragraphs have contradictory implications for judicial gatekeeping. Yet such balancing is precisely what we pay trial judges the big bucks to do. Blindness to the effects of trial management on the cases that do not go to trial will not prevent those effects from occurring. And there is no escaping the normative: when defense counsel wants to inquire into the failure of investigators to search NSA electronic intercepts in a local burglary, judicial responses ranging from eye-rolling to explicit signaling that the jury’s time is being wasted are appropriate. When, in a case involving a line-up or photo array, counsel wants to ask about the failure to use sequential identification procedures, judicial curtailment should be deemed an abuse of discretion. When the defendant wants to play all six hours of a videotaped interrogation, reasonable minds might differ. Close calls should, of course, favor the defendant. As the Connecticut Supreme Court recently noted, even while conceding that “[c]onducting a thorough, professional investigation is not an element of the government’s case,”

[a] defendant may, however, rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect. See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485–86, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980) (trial court improperly instructed jury not to consider evidence of investigators’ failure to perform certain scientific tests when defendant’s presentation at trial focused on raising inference that “police had contrived much of the case against him” and he emphasized that failure “in order to call into question the integrity of the police investigation”).

If we are trying to promote correct jury valuation of defense evidence, we might also consider how defense counsel use proof or leads disclosed to them by prosecutors, pursuant to a constitutional, statutory, or institutional obligation. When defense counsel, either in her own case or on cross, introduces or alludes to, say, a statement or witness disclosed pretrial by

51. See Simon, supra note 1, at 71–73 (comparing simultaneous and sequential lineups).
the prosecution, but not thus far introduced, one can imagine at least three possible jury assessments (or some combination thereof). If the jurors did not know where defense counsel got the proof, they might easily misassess prosecutorial thoroughness or integrity and think: “if the prosecutor missed this, her investigation must have been pretty shoddy or one-sided,” or “if the prosecutor knew about this and did not tell us, our prior baseline confidence in government regularity needs to be recalculated.” Of course, defense counsel might, himself, clarify the source of the evidence to prevent jurors from speculating in a third direction: that notwithstanding the absence of a burden, defense counsel looked hard for evidence to undercut the prosecution’s case, and this and other such proof was the best he could find. I am not arguing for a particular protocol to govern disclosed evidence, but simply that giving serious attention to the jury as the diagnostian of reasonable doubt and the assessor of investigative adequacy may require us to do more to clarify the source of evidence.

Ensuring that trial juries are given evidentiary grist for finding doubt will not be enough if we do not equip them to think productively about what doubts are reasonable. At the very least, juror doubts ought not be dispelled with gratuitous, even misleading, instructions. Faced with defense arguments about forensic tests not pursued, some prosecutors are tempted to request “anti-CSI effect” instructions. The theory is that defendants should be prevented from tapping into the so-called CSI effect, which supposedly leads jurors to expect real investigations to be as exhaustive and sophisticated as those in fake TV dramas. It is not at all clear that there is a CSI effect for prosecutors to worry about. Far clearer is the risk—recognized by some courts in recent years—that some variant

55. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 714 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury not to “speculate” as to why the government had not called a cooperating witness (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1053–54 (2006) (“While the CSI effect has been widely noted in the popular press, there is little objective evidence demonstrating that the effect exists. As is often the case with legal issues, the pace of public discussion has outstripped the ability of scholars to research the issue. Lacking any empirical data, discussions of the CSI effect have instead been based upon the personal impressions of lawyers and legal scholars.” (footnote omitted))
58. See Wheeler v. United States, 930 A.2d 232, 235 (D.C. 2007) (“We hold that an instruction to the jury that the lack of fingerprint evidence cannot, as a matter of law, constitute reasonable doubt impermissibly invaded the jury’s exclusive province to weigh the evidence as a whole against the standard of reasonable doubt, and requires reversal even under the high standard for plain error
of the anti-CSI instruction will relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. The question is not whether the prosecution is legally required to use any particular investigative technique or conduct any particular forensic analysis. Rather, it is whether, in the context of the case, the jury will take a judge’s authoritative denial of any such legal obligation as a conclusive excusal of investigative inadequacies.

Here, again, a balance must be struck that might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, even from county to county.59 We certainly do not want the police to practice the law enforcement version of “defensive medicine,” ordering unneeded expensive tests to satisfy unreasonable jury expectations. But where the adequacy of an investigation is hotly contested, even the most anodyne judicial expressions concerning the prosecution’s investigative burden are fraught, and particularly when their systemic effects are considered, ought to be deployed with more care.

Indeed, we need to think more generally about the mix of permitted argument, case-specific expert evidence, and both tailored and general judicial instruction that juries need to properly assess the strength of the prosecution’s case.60 Doors hitherto closed on defense lines of attack are slowly starting to open to various degrees in various jurisdictions. The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, recently reversed itself and joined a growing number of courts holding that qualified expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications does not “invade the province of the jury.”61 Cautionary instructions on eyewitness testimony

59. The size and heterogeneous nature of the U.S. judicial system challenges every evidence law generalization. Hence my utterly contestable “methodology” here: broad opining with minimal secondary support, coupled with citation of recent illustrative cases.

60. See Spottswood, supra note 47, at 171–99 (applying dual-process models of cognition to the context of legal factfinding).

61. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731–32 (Conn. 2012); Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 307–08, 314 (Mass. 2009) (permitting an eyewitness identification expert to testify that police failed to follow five recommended procedures, including showing photographs sequentially). For a sense of the law in other jurisdictions, see United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court abused its discretion by excluding an expert witness’s testimony without first conducting a hearing pursuant to Daubert). But see United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046,
will soon become more common, as will (perhaps) cautionary instructions when police have failed to videotape an interrogation from which statements have been introduced. We may even see expert testimony on how certain interrogation techniques combine with psychological factors to generate false confessions.

One hardly wants to declare victory in battles that are far from over in so many jurisdictions. And, but for the fact that so few will read this piece, I would worry that the best could be the enemy of the good, particularly in a world where defendants and reformers bear the burden of persuasion. Still, at least in our insulated circles, we need to consider the trade-offs among these pedagogical measures. One doubts that there is a single optimal mix of measures for all jurisdictions. On the other hand, judicial

1053–54 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may be properly admitted in some circumstances, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it in this case); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277–78 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining to adopt a blanket rule that qualified expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification must be routinely admitted or excluded, but upholding the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony in this case); United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299–300 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the exclusion by the district court of expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as “skillful cross examination of eyewitnesses, coupled with appeals to the experience and common sense of jurors, will sufficiently alert jurors to specific conditions that render a particular eyewitness identification unreliable”).

62. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pires, 899 N.E.2d 787, 790–92 (Mass. 2009) (holding that an instruction allowing the jury to “consider whether or not the witness might simply be mistaken,” which accompanied an instruction on the possibility of mistaken identification, was sufficient “to apprize the jury on the possibility of an ‘honest but mistaken’ identification”).

63. See State v. Lockhart, 4 A.3d 1176, 1180–92 (Conn. 2012) (declining to mandate recording policy and reviewing law in other jurisdictions); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 (Mass. 2004) (declining to create an exclusionary rule for unrecorded confessions, but holding that “when the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant’s confession or statement that is the product of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place of detention (e.g., a police station), and there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction advising that the State’s highest court has expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable, and cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any recording of the interrogation in the case before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant’s alleged statement with great caution and care”); Andrew E. Taslitz, High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes: The Policy and Politics of a Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial Confessions, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 400, 427–32 (2012) (examining the efficacy of cautionary instructions for violating a proposed recording requirement for confessions).

64. See People v. Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Mich. 2012) (holding that the expert testimony was potentially admissible, but the trial court “did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony regarding the published literature on false confessions and police interrogations on the basis of its determination that the testimony was not reliable, even though the subject of the proposed testimony is beyond the common knowledge of the average juror,” but also holding that the trial court “abused its discretion by excluding the proffered testimony regarding defendant’s psychological characteristics because it failed to consider this evidence separately from the properly excluded general expert testimony”).
management considerations argue for appellate courts to make some choices in this area. A fact-sensitive “totality of the circumstances” approach that defers to trial court discretion on the appropriate mix of argument and instructions will, given the press of business, likely drive the problem under the rug, with most efforts simply affirmed on appeal when contested. And however much one applauds the readiness of more courts to allow expert testimony in these areas, such resource-intensive retail moves can offer only sporadic relief.

Having opened the door to a few educational experts, we must think beyond them. Resource concerns argue for top-down measures like pattern instructions promulgated at the wholesale level. While there is evidence that jurors do not fully absorb instructions, those studies do not adequately consider that the relevant “treatment” is not just the giving of instructions, but their deployment by counsel in argument (or their effective preclusion or weakening of certain counter-arguments). The next goal will be to hardwire what we have learned from experts into the trial process to ensure that expert testimony is used more equitably and perhaps more sparingly. Indeed, the highest and best use of their expertise may be to inform investigations, not trials.

III. DEFENDING THE CASE?

The focus so far—both in the developing case law and this Essay—has been to ensure that defendants are given a fair chance to expand the tight evidentiary frame proffered by the prosecution: to show the pieces that do not fit and the ones that were crammed in. And that is the appropriate place to start. To be sure, the asymmetry of appellate relief—there being no appeal from acquittals—means that challenged restrictions on defense efforts will necessarily loom larger than restrictions on the prosecution in the reported cases. But, notwithstanding the challenge of developing rigorous empirical proof, I would be surprised if courtroom

65. Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 745 (Zarella, J., concurring) (suggesting a totality of the circumstances approach in a case involving an eyewitness identification expert).
66. I distinguish “educational” experts from qualified “hard” forensic science experts testifying to DNA or other such testing.
67. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1537, 1537 (2012) (discussing studies suggesting jury inadequacies, but finding, based on evidence from the deliberations in fifty real civil cases, that “juries in typical civil cases pay substantial attention to the instructions and that although they struggle, the juries develop a reasonable grasp of most of the law they are asked to apply”).
denizens of any jurisdiction had confidence that grist for reasonable doubt was regularly exposed and pursued, or thought that prosecutors were more likely than defense counsel to be disadvantaged by restrictive rulings and instructions.

It is not premature, however, to start thinking about how the prosecution should be allowed to respond to expansions of its evidentiary frame, and about the extent to which those responses can expand the frame even further. There are several reasons to do so. First, judges who had a clearer sense of how and when prosecutors could explain away an alleged deficiency would surely be more receptive to defense challenges in the first place. (My underlying empirical assumption is that some combination of the umpirial ethic and the comfort of a spectator’s seat leads most judges to prefer that the adversary system run its course, so long as it moves smoothly.) Second, whatever one’s optimal ratio of false positives to false negatives, there are at least some guilty defendants who one does not want walking free. Finally, even if the radically unequal balance of power in American criminal justice systems (understandably) leads one to be unsympathetic to the prosecutor whose case is misleadingly tanked, the place of trials in the larger investigative ecosystem should make one worry about courtrooms where good police work gets pooled with bad in the minds of jurors. Resources are always finite and investigations will always be subject to the law of diminishing returns. Some cases may need to be brought even though they will never be “slam dunks.” Still, wide variations in the competence and zeal of investigations are inevitable, and certainly from a systemic approach, we should equip juries to discern the good from the bad and where their case falls in that spectrum.

Some of this separation process is straightforward and barely noticed. For example, the police officer cross-examined on his failure to talk to more people at the crime scene can, on redirect, explain that there were not any more witnesses to interview. Where cross has suggested gaps in the chain of custody supporting a physical exhibit, a prosecutor can provide the links on redirect, call new witnesses, or wait until summation and suggest the absence of any reason to doubt evidentiary integrity. Similarly, the prosecution witness impeached with prior inconsistent statements can be


70. See Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, *Deadly Dilemmas*, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2008) (challenging the conventional perspective set out by the Blackstone ratio, and discussing the balancing of risks on both sides of the equation from errors (either wrongful prosecution or acquittal)).
rehabilitated through the introduction of prior consistent statements or redirect examination that allows the witness to explain the inconsistency away. The fuss defense counsel makes over the failure to obtain touch DNA results from a firearm can be met with testimony about the impossibility of doing so in that specific instance. Expert testimony might be permitted to explain away what defense counsel suggested was curious victim behavior in, for example, sexual and domestic violence cases.

The process will not always be easy, however. Thus, we return to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s reference in Commonwealth v. Bright to the prosecution’s freedom, on redirect, to “explain why particular leads were not followed.” Sometimes trial courts will avoid the issue, conducting their own inquiry outside of the jury’s presence and then rejecting defense evidence of a disregarded tip as unduly speculative. And when a prosecutor does offer an explanation, courts will likely give her some leeway, as the defendant was the one who opened the door (and the evidentiary frame). Yet, what happens when the real reason a tip was not pursued was “I have had considerable experience with this kind of case in this neighborhood, and the tip just didn’t make sense”? Or, “word on the street is that the guy pointing the finger at [third party] regularly talked trash about [third party]”? A tough balance needs to be struck in these cases: should the prosecution be hamstrung in its ability to respond to perfectly fair but answerable defense challenges, the jury will not be able to assess the reasonableness of the doubt that has been raised. On the other hand, allowing the prosecution to freely offer explanations of this sort raises grave concerns about the deployment of official authority.

Evidence doctrine has long tried—with various degrees of success

71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Seng, 924 N.E.2d 285, 293–94 (Mass. 2010) (“It is clear that the Commonwealth was entitled to rebut in some fashion the impression left by the defendant’s cross-examination. While generally, ‘impeachment of a witness by prior inconsistent statements or omissions does not, standing alone, entitle the adverse party to introduce other prior statements made by the witness that are consistent with his trial testimony,’ the Commonwealth is permitted to rehabilitate the witness by asking questions designed to explain or contradict the inconsistency even though prior consistent statements by the witness are implicated.” (citation omitted)). Also, the prior consistent statement may be admissible only on credibility and not for its truth (under a jurisdiction’s hearsay rule), so long as the distinction is made clear. See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding reversible error where no such distinction was drawn).


74. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 22–23, 22 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a detective’s notation of an informant tip pointing to an alternative suspect, even if the evidence had some probative value).
across jurisdictions—to ensure that police officers do not throw their weight around on the witness stand. Troubled by a case in which a police officer had expressed his opinion that an observed transaction was the drug sale at issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently rejected the notion that there is an additional category of testimony between “fact testimony, through which an officer is permitted to set forth what he or she perceived through one or more of the senses” and qualified expert testimony that “explain[s] the implications of observed behaviors that would otherwise fall outside the understanding of ordinary people of the jury.”75 Other courts have hewed to that line, for fear that the wide investigative knowledge of an officer will lead juries to be unduly deferential.76 How the legitimate concerns articulated in these cases can accommodate explanations that go to an investigation’s reasonableness needs far more thought. If trials are to be intensive inquiries into the adequacy of case construction, investigators need to be able to explain their decisions with reference to the expertise that (one hopes) they have.

It is worrisome enough when a police officer deploys his authority and expertise, but at least he is amenable to cross-examination and lacks the status of the prosecutor in the courtroom—the acknowledged representative of “the People,” “the Commonwealth,” or “the Government.” So it is probably worse when a prosecutor “vouches” for a witness by, say, suggesting that a police officer’s testimony should be believed because the officer would be fired if he perjured himself. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained,

> [E]ven when grounded in an inference from the evidence, a prosecutorial statement may nevertheless be considered impermissible vouching if it “place[s] the prestige of the government behind the witness” by providing “personal assurances of a witness’s veracity.”

Vouching of that sort is dangerous precisely because a jury “may be inclined to give weight to the prosecutor’s opinion in assessing the credibility of witnesses, instead of making the independent judgment of credibility to which the defendant is entitled.” It is up to the jury—and

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76. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 65–66 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that, although the court’s admission of lay testimony was an error under FRE 701 because it was based on specialized knowledge gained from working on other drug investigations, the error was harmless because the agent would have qualified as an expert and offered the same testimony); United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that, although the practice of allowing a witness to testify as both an expert and fact witness in the same trip to the witness stand is routinely upheld, the witness’s dual role might confuse the jury); United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215–17 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that a DEA agent’s opinion that the defendant was a partner in charged cocaine distribution conspiracy was not admissible as lay opinion testimony).
not the prosecutor—to determine the credibility of a witness’ testimony.

In that respect we stress that the ethical bar is set higher for the prosecutor than for the criminal defense lawyer—a proposition that has been clear for at least seven decades. Although to be sure no lawyer, either public or private, should lay his or her own credibility on the line by expressing his or her own opinion about a witness’ believability, the difference is that a private lawyer’s impropriety in that respect carries no implication of official governmental support.  

How, then, is the prosecution supposed to respond when defense counsel is permitted to introduce prior statements by the prosecutor’s office, or perhaps even another office, that undercut the view of the facts that the prosecution now urges the jury to accept? While I do not know how often this question comes up, it has been posed several times in the Second Circuit alone in cases reversing convictions based, in part, on a trial court’s failure to admit the prior, allegedly undercutting claims. In the cases I have come across, the appellate court has found error in the trial court’s failure to admit prior inconsistent prosecutorial statements. And one can cogently argue that juries should be alerted to prosecutorial flip-flops on factual positions, as such reversals surely suggest the existence of some doubt. Prosecutors are (or should be) experts on their cases, and one might infer a lot from their assessments or actions. Cynthia Jones recently

77. United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2005) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).

78. See United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 244–45, 248–51 (2d Cir. 2012) (vacating and remanding after finding that the district court erred in excluding nonharmless evidence of government’s charging decisions, and that the district court should have allowed the defendant to cross-examine an officer about a judge’s finding in a separate case that would unequivocally discredit his testimony); United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 812 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a jury was entitled to know that the government had, in a prior prosecution, characterized the defendant as a “puppet on a string” even though it now charged him as a “bid-rigger”), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing based, in part, on failure to admit the government’s initial—later superseded—bill of particulars). I should disclose that this issue has been bugging me since I worked on the briefs for the government in Salerno and GAF. See also Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 112 (D.C. 2003) (finding error in the exclusion of a police officer’s affidavit relied on by the prosecutor to obtain a search warrant); Bellamy v. State, 941 A.2d 1107, 1113–14 (Md. 2008) (holding that the trial court’s exclusion of a prosecution proffer from an accomplice’s plea hearing was erroneous); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1998) (holding that a prosecutor’s statements in prior court proceedings were not admissible).

79. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1473 (2001) (arguing that prosecutorial inconsistency violates the defendant’s due process rights by misleading the jury and suggests reasonable doubt).
suggested that juries be told about the government’s intentional violation of its constitutional disclosure obligations (should such violations come to light), and be allowed to infer “consciousness of a weak case.” If courts are to become more hospitable to these types of defense arguments, however, we need to give equal thought to permissible answers that will clarify (if possible) the alleged inconsistency. This gets messy indeed. I do not doubt that a large prosecutor’s office could spare an assistant to testify that “our initial view of the case was X, but after considering the following we are convinced that the correct view is Y.” Whether this is a tolerable expansion of the evidentiary frame is another matter. Unless courts plan to relax the prohibition on prosecutorial vouching—and I do not suggest any such thing—they need to recognize that opening the door to defendants on that score without keeping it open for prosecutors will come at the expense of either the truth-finding process or thoughtful prosecutorial decisionmaking, or both.

One last thought as we consider smashing through the evidentiary frame to allow prosecutors to explain why apparent holes in their cases are not actually holes and why the apparent weakness are not actually weaknesses. The last decade has seen a growing literature on the cognitive distortions that may prevent police officers and prosecutors from seeing the deficiencies of their own cases. And may that literature continue to grow, for this is a critical challenge that can be addressed only through a mix of legal doctrine, institutional design, culture, and training. We need more progress, however, on how—outside those cases in which forensic evidence, rightly done, allows a more rigorous approach to probability—prosecutors can legitimately be convinced of guilt in a messy world of epistemological challenges and bureaucratic limitations. And while we are looking into this, we might want to consider the degree to which the

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80. Jones, supra note 30, at 421–22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. For thoughts on how to instill an ethical prosecutorial culture, see generally James B. Comey, “The Way Things Are Done Around Here” Prosecutors and Ethical Culture (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
83. See Liebman et al., supra note 48, at 633–38 (discussing “big” and “small” evidence,” direct and circumstantial).
responsible and professional prosecutor, being so convinced, can share the basis for her confidence with the jury.

How does a prosecutor signal to the jury that a careful, thoughtful investigation was carried out? The weird “coincidence” in the trial testimony of two prosecution witnesses on some minor observation may be merely a misleading artifact of trial preparation, but all sorts of other coincidences that arise as the investigation unfolds are not. If one thinks about how an investigator comes to believe he has the right person, it is the time sequence of statements and the varying contexts in which they were made that do much of the work. The way an investigator comes to know a case is, thus, quite different from the way a jury comes to know a case. Should we embrace this difference or try to limit it? When I was a prosecutor, I was struck by the challenge of showing the jury precisely what it was that led me to credit a witness’s (particularly a cooperator’s) story. To what extent would jurors’ diagnostic capabilities be improved by giving them a better sense—as a matter of course—of how the actual investigation unfolded?

As we might revisit (even if only to consider the costs) restrictions we place on prosecutors’ appeal to their own authority, we should also be even more open to appeals to legitimate sources of epistemic authority outside of prosecutorial offices. Jennifer Mnookin has sensibly suggested that the focus of forensic science testimony in court should be less about an expert’s description of his methodology and more on the extent to which the method he used has been adequately validated by appropriate empirical testing.\(^\text{84}\) Were we to adopt the salutary proposals of the National Academy of Science by establishing an independent oversight agency, clarifying best practices, and developing accreditation procedures for forensic laboratories around the country,\(^\text{85}\) a lab’s high status within that regime would be the sort of evidence that a jury should hear. However, bolstering should still be limited. I certainly do not propose letting cops or cooperators freely testify as to their promotions or accolades (unless defense counsel is foolish enough to open that door). But giving forensic experts license to display merit badges would surely promote institutional efforts to earn them. So would encouraging defense counsel to point out the absence of such

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\(^{85}\) NAS REPORT, supra note 13, at 14–25.
badges.

By now, the wary reader doubtless worries that I am pigheadedly overcompensating for the literature’s focus on unjust convictions and exonerations and proposing to turn trials into inquests, all in the name of fairness to prosecutors, who really do not need help at all. In fact, I worry myself, and certainly recognize that the legal community should take care when using trial rules to create systemic incentives.\(^{86}\) That said, extending Dan Simon’s ideas about trials’ diagnosticity for separating the guilty from the not guilty to a broader consideration of their capacity to sort the competent investigations from the incompetent offers promise without much risk. What I would recruit to the project of giving jurors better tools for assessing reasonable doubt is less evidence doctrine writ large than the common law of evidentiary rulings. If trial judges reset their “mental dials,”\(^ {87}\) they would be more receptive to breaching and repairing the prosecutorial frame.

Is this too much to ask of trial judges? Notwithstanding my general skepticism about criminal justice reforms at the trial level that rely on heroic efforts by hard-pressed trial judges (particularly given the heterogeneous composition and incentives of the U.S. criminal trial bench),\(^ {88}\) I do not think that reframing the trial embraced here is over-ambitious. Indeed, it is more susceptible to condemnation as pathetically ameliorist or simply a theorization of the status quo. Courthouse cultures vary, as do the balances individual judges strike between moving cases along, deferring to party interest, and protecting the public.\(^ {89}\) Yet, there is good reason to think that operationalizing “doubt” in terms of investigative

\(^{86}\) One might make similar arguments for licensing prosecutors to expand the evidentiary frame with respect to character evidence. What about giving prosecutors an incentive—in the form of a proof “subsidy” that makes the jury more likely to convict—to prosecute repeat offenders? See Richman, supra note 18, at 979 (arguing against relaxation of the rules governing prior convictions, but noting that admission would support socially useful prosecutorial priorities). Nonetheless, concerns about the fairness and the need for cross-cutting incentives to look for evidence specific to the charged transaction, see John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1631–35 (2010) (examining the rationale for the Best Evidence Rule), seem to vastly outweigh those arguments.

\(^{87}\) Both this image and the broader point come from my colleague Jim Liebman.


Adequacy makes life easier, rather than harder, for all members of the courtroom working group.

But what about judicial gatekeeping competence? Or jury competence? How good is either likely to be at assessing investigative adequacy? This challenge sounds like a fatal blow to the framing model, but it becomes glancing as soon as one takes our jury system as a given and asks how it can most usefully be deployed. Even if one does not think jurors (or judges) are particularly good at discerning whether an investigation was up to snuff, the claim here is simply that they are better at that than at conducting a retrospective historical inquiry on the basis of “primary sources” that have been raked through and even modified by adversarial parties. Far from being an “outside the box” contribution, the model embraced here is of the existing box and its known capabilities.

Appellate courts can promote the model, at least at the margin. Because of asymmetric appellate rights, they would likely hear only defense claims about precluded challenges to the investigative process or, perhaps, inappropriate prosecutorial responses to, or preemptions of, those challenges. But over time, they too would get a sense of the range of experimentation on both sides. And should police and prosecutors respond to the possibility of more extensive audits by investing more responsibly in their investigations and clarifying the bases for those investment decisions, we will have achieved much.

Would evidence rulings be different were judges to consider the reframing proposed here? I suspect they would. Frames matter. Recognizing that trials are generally as much about the prosecution as about the defendant (and perhaps even more so) would be a good start, so long as we ensure that both sides get a fair trial.