
THE RISE OF BANKRUPTCY DIRECTORS

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ABSTRACT

In this Article, we use hand-collected data to shed light on a troubling development in bankruptcy practice: distressed companies, especially those controlled by private equity sponsors, often now prepare for a Chapter 11 filing by appointing bankruptcy experts to their boards of directors and giving them the board's power to make key bankruptcy decisions. These directors often seek to wrest control of self-dealing claims against shareholders from creditors. We call these directors "bankruptcy directors" and conduct the first empirical study of their rise as key players in corporate bankruptcies. While these directors claim to be neutral experts that act to maximize value for the benefit of creditors, we argue that they suffer from a structural bias because they often receive their appointment from a small community of repeat private equity sponsors and law firms. Securing

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future directorships may require pleasing this clientele at the expense of creditors. Indeed, we find that unsecured creditors recover on average 20% less when the company appoints a bankruptcy director. While other explanations are possible, this finding shifts the burden of proof to those claiming that bankruptcy directors improve the governance of distressed companies. Our policy recommendation, however, does not require a resolution of this controversy. Rather, we propose that courts regard bankruptcy directors as independent only if an overwhelming majority of creditors whose claims are at risk supports their appointment, making them accountable to all sides of the bankruptcy dispute.

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INTRODUCTION

In August 2017, the board of directors of shoe retailer Nine West confronted a problem. The firm would soon file for Chapter 11 protection, and its hopes to emerge quickly from the proceeding were in danger due to the high probability of creditor litigation alleging that the firm’s controlling shareholder, private equity fund Sycamore Partners Management, had looted more than \$1 billion from the firm’s creditors.¹ The board could not investigate or settle this litigation because it had a conflict of interest.²

To take control of the litigation, the board appointed two bankruptcy experts as new directors who claimed that, because they had no prior ties to Sycamore or Nine West, they were independent and could handle those claims.³ Once the firm filed for bankruptcy, its creditors objected. They argued that the new directors still favored Sycamore because it stood behind their appointment, so the directors would “hamstring any serious inquiry into [its] misconduct.”⁴ Nevertheless, the gambit was successful. The bankruptcy

1. See Notice of Motion of the 2034 Notes Trustee for Entry of an Order Granting Leave, Standing, and Authority to Commence and Prosecute a Certain Claim on Behalf of the NWHI Estate at 15, *In re Nine West Holdings, Inc.*, No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Notice of Motion of the 2034 Notes Trustee]; Kenneth Ayotte & Christina Scully, *J. Crew, Nine West, and the Complexities of Financial Distress*, 131 YALE L.J.F. 363, 373 (2021) (describing some of the transfers in detail). For example, the private equity sponsor had allegedly purchased the assets of Kurt Geiger for \$136 million in April 2014 and sold them in December 2015 for \$371 million. See Notice of Motion of the 2034 Notes Trustee, *supra*, at 34.

2. See Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Granting Leave, Standing, and Authority to Commence and Prosecute Certain Claims on Behalf of the NWHI Estate and Exclusive Settlement Authority in Respect of Such Claims at 17, *In re Nine West Holdings, Inc.*, No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Nine West Standing Motion].

3. See Transcript of Hearing at 43, *In re Nine West Holdings, Inc.*, No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2018).

4. See Nine West Standing Motion, *supra* note 2, at 34 (“[The lawyers for the independent

court allowed the new directors to take control of the litigation.⁵ The new directors blocked creditor attempts to file lawsuits on their own⁶ and ultimately settled the claims for about \$100 million.⁷

The Nine West story illustrates the emergence of important new players in corporate bankruptcies: bankruptcy experts who join boards of directors shortly before or after the filing of the bankruptcy petition and claim to be independent.⁸ The new directors—typically former bankruptcy lawyers, investment bankers, or distressed debt traders—often receive the board’s power to make important Chapter 11 decisions or become loud voices in the boardroom shaping the company’s bankruptcy strategy.⁹ We call them “bankruptcy directors.”

The rising prominence of bankruptcy directors has made them controversial. Proponents tout their experience and ability to expedite the reorganization and thus protect the firm’s viability and its employees’ jobs.¹⁰ Opponents argue that they suffer from conflicts of interest that harm creditors.¹¹

directors] attended . . . depositions . . . but asked just a handful of questions of a single witness . . . [And they] chose not to demand and review the Debtors’ privileged documents relating to the LBO . . .”).

5. See Nine West Standing Motion, *supra* note 2, at 13 (“The Debtors have barred the Committee from participating in its settlement negotiations with Sycamore . . .”).

6. Shortly after the unsecured creditors proposed to put the claims against the private equity sponsor into a trust for prosecution after bankruptcy, the independent directors unveiled their own settlement plan. See Notice of Filing of the Debtors’ Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 1–3, *In re Nine West Holdings, Inc.*, No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018) [hereinafter *Nine West Disclosure Statement Announcing Settlement*].

7. See Nine West Standing Motion, *supra* note 2, at 11 (seeking permission to prosecute claims for “well over \$1 billion”); Soma Biswas, *Nine West Settles Potential Lawsuits Against Sycamore Partners*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2018, 2:12 PM), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/nine-west-settles-potential-lawsuits-against-sycamore-partners-1539886331> [<https://perma.cc/RLH4-M9EU>] (“Nine West Holdings Inc. unveiled Wednesday an amended restructuring plan that settles potential lawsuits against private-equity owner Sycamore Partners LP for \$105 million in cash, far less than the amount the unsecured creditors committee is seeking.”).

8. See, e.g., *Notice of Appearance—Lisa Donahue, AlixPartners*, PETITION (Feb. 19, 2020), <https://www.petition11.com/news/2020/2/19/notice-of-appearance-lisa-donahue-alixpartners> [<https://perma.cc/NA6H-69AT>] (noting that “[i]ndependent directors in bankruptcy have] . . . become the latest cottage industry in the restructuring space”).

9. See REGINA STANGO KELBON, MICHAEL DEBAECKE & JONATHAN K. COOPER, APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON THE EVE OF BANKRUPTCY: WHY THE GROWING TREND? 17 (2014) (“Employing an outside director to exercise independent judgment as to corporate transactions in bankruptcy may not only provide additional guidance to a suffering business, but can make the decision-making process seem right in the eyes of stakeholders and ultimately, the court.”).

10. See Robert Gayda & Catherine LoTempio, *Independent Director Investigations Can Benefit Creditors*, LAW360 (July 24, 2019, 3:55 PM), <https://www.law360.com/articles/1174248/independent-director-investigations-can-benefit-creditors> [<https://web.archive.org/web/20220401015757/https://www.law360.com/articles/1174248/independent-director-investigations-can-benefit-creditors>] (noting that independent directors are helpful in bankruptcy where “speed to exit is paramount”).

11. See, e.g., *“Independent” Directors Under Attack*, PETITION (May 16, 2018), <https://petition.substack.com/p/independent-directors-under-attack> [<https://perma.cc/G9RY-U9D4>]; Lisa

This Article is the first empirical study of these directors. While a voluminous literature has considered the governance of Chapter 11 firms, this Article breaks new ground in shining a light on an important change in the way these firms make decisions in bankruptcy and resolve conflicts with creditors.¹² It does so by analyzing a hand-collected sample of all large firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 2004 and 2019 that disclosed the identity of their directors to the bankruptcy court.¹³ To our knowledge, it is the largest sample of boards of directors of Chapter 11 firms yet studied.¹⁴

We find that the percentage of firms in Chapter 11 proceedings claiming to have an independent director increased from 3.7% in 2004 to 48.3% in 2019.¹⁵ Over 60% of the firms that appointed bankruptcy directors had a controlling shareholder and about half were under the control of private equity funds.

After controlling for firm and bankruptcy characteristics, we find that the recovery rate for unsecured creditors, whose claims are typically most at

Abramowicz, *Private Equity Examines Its Distressed Navel*, BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2017), <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-26/payless-shoesource-private-equity-examines-its-distressed-navel> [<https://perma.cc/NC4H-DK9M>]; Mark Vandavelde & Sujeet Indap, *Neiman Marcus Director Lambasted by Bankruptcy Judge*, FIN. TIMES (June 1, 2020), <https://www.ft.com/content/0166cb87-ea50-40ce-9ea3-b829de95f676> [<https://perma.cc/5VY4-VQA8>]; American Bankruptcy Institute, *RDW 12 21 2018*, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ah8RkXYdral&ab_channel=AmericanBankruptcyInstitute [<https://perma.cc/KG37-TJUC>]; *The "Weil Bankruptcy Blog Index,"* PETITION (Jan. 10, 2021), <https://petition.substack.com/p/weilbankruptcyblogindex> [<https://perma.cc/L356-TFPY>] (calling the Nine West case a "standard episode of 'independent director' nonsense").

12. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, *Antibankruptcy*, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 651 (2010) (considering creditor conflict); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, *The End of Bankruptcy*, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 784 (2002); David A. Skeel Jr., *Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11*, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 919 (2003) (considering the role of secured creditors); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, *Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations*, 64 VAND L. REV. 749, 754–56 (2011) (considering the role of unsecured creditors). For other articles that, like this Article, criticize recent changes in Chapter 11 practice, see generally Adam J. Levitin, *Purdue's Poison Pill: The Breakdown of Chapter 11's Checks and Balances*, 100 TEX. L. REV. 1079 (2022); Lynn M. LoPucki, *Chapter 11's Descent into Lawlessness*, 96 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2022).

13. Our full dataset consists of the boards of directors of 528 firms and the 2,895 individuals who collectively hold 3,038 directorships at these firms. While all Chapter 11 firms are required to provide information on their board to the bankruptcy court, not all comply with the law. For more on our sample, see *infra* Part III.

14. See *infra* note 152 and accompanying text.

15. We identified bankruptcy directors using information from each firm's disclosure statement. We then searched those disclosure statements and identified 78 cases in which the debtor represented that its board was "independent" or "disinterested." See *infra* Section III.C.1. Independent directors are not new to bankruptcy. WorldCom, for example, used independent directors as part of its strategy to get through the bankruptcy process in its 2003 Chapter 11 filing. See KELBON, *supra* note 9, at 20. The change is that a practice that was once relatively uncommon has become ubiquitous and a central and standard part of the process of preparing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, leading to the growth of an industry of professional bankruptcy directors who fill this new demand for bankruptcy experts on the board of distressed firms. See *infra* Section III.C.1

risk in bankruptcy, is on average 20% lower in the presence of bankruptcy directors. We cannot rule out the possibility that the firms appointing bankruptcy directors are more insolvent and that this explains their negative association with creditor recoveries. Still, this finding at least shifts the burden of proof to those claiming that bankruptcy directors improve the governance of distressed companies to present evidence supporting their view in this emerging debate.

We also examine a mechanism through which bankruptcy directors may reduce creditor recoveries. In about half of the cases, these directors investigate claims against insiders,¹⁶ negotiate a quick settlement, and argue that the court should approve it to save the company and the jobs of its employees.¹⁷ We supplement these statistics with two in-depth studies of cases in which bankruptcy directors defused creditor claims against controlling shareholders: Neiman Marcus and Payless Holdings.

Finally, we consider possible sources of pro-shareholder bias among bankruptcy directors. Shareholders usually appoint bankruptcy directors without consulting creditors. These directors may therefore prefer to facilitate a graceful exit for the shareholders. Moreover, bankruptcy directorships are short-term positions, and the world of corporate bankruptcy is small, with private equity sponsors and a handful of law firms generating most of the demand. Bankruptcy directors depend on this clientele for future engagements and may exhibit what we call “auditioning bias.”

In our data, we observe several individuals appointed to these directorships repeatedly. These “super-repeaters” had a median of 13 directorships and about 44% of them were in companies that went into bankruptcy when they served on the board or up to a year before their appointment.¹⁸ Our data also show that super-repeaters have strong ties to two leading bankruptcy law firms.¹⁹ Putting these pieces together, our data reveal an ecosystem of a small number of individuals who specialize in sitting on the boards of companies that are going into or emerging from bankruptcy, often with private equity controllers and the same law firms.

These findings support the claim that bankruptcy directors are a new weapon in the private equity playbook. In effect, bankruptcy directors assist with shielding self-dealing transactions from judicial intervention. Private equity sponsors know that if the portfolio firm fails, they could appoint

16. See *infra* Table 2.

17. In many cases, a debtor-in-possession contract that requires the firm to leave bankruptcy quickly heightens the debtor’s urgency. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, *Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis*, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 651, 672 (2020).

18. See *infra* Section III.C.4.

19. See *infra* Section III.C.5.

bankruptcy directors to handle creditor claims, file for bankruptcy, and force the creditors to accept a cheap settlement.²⁰ Importantly, the ease of handling self-dealing claims in the bankruptcy court may fuel more aggressive self-dealing in the future.²¹

Our findings have important policy implications. Bankruptcy law strives to protect businesses while also protecting creditors. These goals can clash when creditors bring suits that threaten to delay the emergence from bankruptcy. While bankruptcy directors may aim for speedy resolution of these suits, their independence may be questionable because the defendants in these suits are often the ones who appoint them. Moreover, bankruptcy directors often bypass the checks and balances that Congress built into Chapter 11 when they seek to replace the role of the official committee of unsecured creditors (“UCC”) as the primary check on management’s use of the powers of a Chapter 11 debtor.

We argue that the contribution of bankruptcy directors to streamlining bankruptcies should not come at the expense of creditors. We therefore propose a new procedure that bankruptcy judges can implement without new legislation: the bankruptcy court should treat as independent only bankruptcy directors who, in an early court hearing, earn overwhelming support of the creditors whose claims are at risk, such as unsecured creditors or secured creditors whom the debtor may not be able to pay in full. Bankruptcy directors without such support should not be treated as independent and therefore should not prevent creditors from investigating and pursuing claims.

The creditors will likely need information on the bankruptcy directors to form their opinion, and bankruptcy judges can rule on what information requests are reasonable. This will create standardization and predictability. However, disclosure is no substitute for creditor support. Requiring disclosure without heeding creditors on the selection of bankruptcy directors will not cure bankruptcy directors’ structural biases.

Some might argue that our solution is impractical or otherwise lacking. We answer these claims. More importantly, our solution is the only way to ensure that bankruptcy directors are truly independent. If it cannot be made

20. See Telephonic/Video Disclosure Statement and KEIP Motion Hearing at 34, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 30, 2020) [hereinafter *Neiman Marcus Settlement Transcript*] (arguing that independent directors are changing incentives for private equity sponsors, who will be “encouraged to asset strip”).

21. As Sujeet Indap and Max Frumes write, a leading bankruptcy law firm that advises debtors “developed a reputation for keeping a stable of ‘independent’ board of director candidates who could parachute in to bless controversial deal making.” SUJEET INDAP & MAX FRUMES, *THE CAESARS PALACE COUP: HOW A BILLIONAIRE BRAWL OVER THE FAMOUS CASINO EXPOSED THE POWER AND GREED OF WALL STREET* 419 (2021).

to work, bankruptcy law should revert to the way it was before the invention of bankruptcy directors, where federal bankruptcy judges were the only impartial actors in most large Chapter 11 cases. In such a scenario, debtors will be free to hire whomever they want to help them navigate financial distress, but the court will regard these bankruptcy directors as ordinary professionals retained by the debtor. The court should weigh the bankruptcy directors' position against the creditors', allow the creditors to conduct their own investigation and sue over the bankruptcy directors' objections, and not approve settlements merely because the bankruptcy directors endorse them.

Our study also lends support to the bill recently introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren to prevent debtors from prosecuting and settling claims against insiders.²² Like our proposal, this bill would restore the traditional checks and balances of the bankruptcy process while allowing distressed firms to appoint directors of their choice. Still, our proposal has several advantages. It does not require new legislation, it preserves greater flexibility for the bankruptcy court and, by requiring that bankruptcy directors be acceptable to creditors, it ensures that all board decisions in bankruptcy, not just decisions regarding claims against insiders, advance creditor interests.

Our analysis also has implications for corporate law. Much of the literature on director independence in corporate law has focused on director ties to the corporation, to management, or to the controlling shareholder.²³ We explore another powerful source of dependence: dependence on future engagements by other corporations and the lawyers advising them.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the theoretical background to our discussion, showing how the use of independent directors has migrated from corporate law into bankruptcy law. Part II presents examples of bankruptcy director engagements from the high-profile bankruptcies of Neiman Marcus and Payless Holdings. Part III demonstrates empirically how large firms use bankruptcy directors in Chapter 11. Part IV discusses concerns that bankruptcy directors create for the integrity of the bankruptcy system and puts forward policy recommendations.

22. See Alexander Saeedy, *Elizabeth Warren Floats Expanded Powers for Bankruptcy Creditors Against Private Equity*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2021, 1:17 PM), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-floats-expanded-powers-for-bankruptcy-creditors-against-private-equity-11634750237> [https://perma.cc/P3XE-U24Y].

23. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, *Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders*, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271 (2017); Da Lin, *Beyond Beholden*, 44 J. CORP. L. 515 (2019).

I. THE TRANSPLANTATION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INTO BANKRUPTCY LAW

In this Part, we discuss how reliance on independent directors has become a core feature of corporate law and how this practice has recently migrated into bankruptcy law. First, we explain how regulators, courts, and commentators have encouraged firms to put important decisions outside bankruptcy in the hands of independent directors and summarize the main criticisms of this practice. Next, we discuss how this norm has recently been transplanted into bankruptcy law. Finally, we analyze concerns unique to bankruptcy law that this practice raises.

A. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE LAW

1. The Rise of Independent Directors in Corporate Law

The premise in corporate law is that the board of directors supervises management.²⁴ The board is in charge because it possesses the expertise and the information needed to evaluate corporate decisions.²⁵ When the board has conflicts of interest, it delegates its authority to independent directors.²⁶

Over the last few decades, American public companies have come to rely on independent directors.²⁷ There were several driving forces behind this shift. First, it was a response to the difficulty of dispersed shareholders of public firms in supervising management themselves.²⁸ The idea was that independent board members elected by shareholders could monitor managers and reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control.²⁹ Second, federal mandates adopted after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related stock exchange listing rules, tightened independence standards and required public corporations to populate their boards and their committees with independent directors.³⁰ Third, institutional investors with ever-increasing

24. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2021).

25. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, *The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine*, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 117–24 (2004) (explaining the common rationale for the business judgment rule which suggests that business experts may know business better than judges).

26. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, *The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices*, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1523–26 (2007) (discussing the role of independent directors in vetting transactions involving conflicts of interests); Bebchuk & Hamdani, *supra* note 23, at 1281–82.

27. See Gordon, *supra* note 26, at 1465; Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: *The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite*, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 22.

28. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, *THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY* 6 (1932).

29. See Gordon, *supra* note 26, at 1468.

30. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.01, .04–.06 (2021);

shareholdings emphasized board independence.³¹ Last, corporate managers embraced board independence to avoid intrusive regulation and preserve their autonomy.³²

State courts have also played an important role in encouraging the use of independent directors. They did so by showing greater deference to board decisions made by independent directors.³³

For example, in corporate freeze-outs, a controlling shareholder acquires the shares of public shareholders and takes the company private, often provoking minority shareholder lawsuits.³⁴ These transactions raise the concern that the controlling shareholder will use its influence, its informational advantage, and its choice of timing to pay too little to public shareholders.³⁵ Due to the inherent conflict of interest and the coercive nature of these transactions, Delaware courts have traditionally subjected them to the highest level of scrutiny, entire fairness, as the default standard of review.³⁶ However, a freeze-out negotiated and approved by a committee of independent directors enjoys a presumption of fairness and is almost litigation-proof when also conditioned on minority shareholder approval.³⁷

Reliance on these committees to vet freeze-outs has become the norm.³⁸ To qualify for deferential review, Delaware courts require that the controlling shareholder meet a number of conditions designed to enhance the committee's effectiveness and mimic the dynamics of an arm's-length bargain. The courts examine whether the committee is truly independent and

NASDAQ, THE NASDAQ STOCK MKT LLC RULES § 5605(b)(1), (c)(2), (d)(2), (e) (2021). *See also Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society*, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2187, 2194 (2004) (“The revised listing standards of both the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange] and NASDAQ . . . require (with a few exceptions) that listed-company boards have a majority of independent directors . . .”).

31. *See* Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, *Board 3.0: An Introduction*, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 356 (2019).

32. *See, e.g.*, Gordon, *supra* note 26, at 1523–26; Urska Velikonja, *The Political Economy of Board Independence*, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855, 897–98 (2014).

33. *See, e.g.*, Bebchuk & Hamdani, *supra* note 23, at 1281–82; Gordon, *supra* note 26, at 1484–87 (reviewing the role that Delaware courts played in encouraging public companies to give more power to independent directors).

34. *See, e.g.*, Guhan Subramanian, *Fixing Freezeouts*, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 8–10 (2005).

35. *See, e.g.*, Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, *Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts*, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 247, 248–49 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Subramanian, *supra* note 34, at 32–38.

36. *See Kahn v. Tremont Corp.*, 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (“[W]hen a controlling shareholder stands on both sides of the transaction the conduct of the parties will be viewed under the more exacting standard of entire fairness”); *see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.*, 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983); *In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig.*, 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002).

37. *See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc.*, 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994); *Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.*, 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014).

38. *See* Fernán Restrepo, *Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW*, 6 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 353, 371 (2021) (finding that special committees were formed in over 90% of post-MFW freeze-outs).

disinterested, whether it had a sufficiently broad mandate from the board (including the power to reject the transaction), whether it received independent financial and legal advice, whether it negotiated diligently and with no outside influence, and whether it possessed all material information.³⁹

Derivative litigation is another area where Delaware courts defer to independent directors.⁴⁰ A derivative plaintiff who wishes to sue insiders on behalf of the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty must first show the court that it is futile to make a demand on the board to sue.⁴¹ A board with a majority of independent directors can successfully seek dismissal of the suit on these grounds.⁴²

Even when Delaware courts excuse demand as futile, they permit the board to form a special litigation committee (“SLC”) of independent directors that may wrest control of the litigation from the derivative plaintiff.⁴³ Here, too, Delaware judges have developed an elaborate jurisprudence.⁴⁴ First, they hold SLC directors to a higher independence standard than the regular standard.⁴⁵ Second, they often exercise their own business judgment on the viability of the suit.⁴⁶ A recent empirical study

39. See *M & F Worldwide Corp.*, 88 A.3d at 646–47; see also Andrew R. Brownstein, Benjamin M. Roth & Elina Tetelbaum, *Use of Special Committees in Conflict Transactions*, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 23, 2019), <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/23/use-of-special-committees-in-conflict-transactions/> [<https://perma.cc/A39V-HJKS>].

40. See Bebhuk & Hamdani, *supra* note 23, at 1288–89.

41. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1.

42. See *Aronson v. Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984). A Delaware court held that for plaintiffs to establish the futility of making a demand on the board to sue the controller, it is not enough to charge that a director was nominated by or elected at the behest of the controlling shareholder. See *id.*; see also *Friedman v. Dolan*, No. 9425, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178, at *22 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (stating that “[t]he mere fact that one [director] was appointed by a controller” does not suffice to overcome the presumption of her independence); *Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart*, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) (holding that 94% voting power was not enough to create reasonable doubt of independence). However, in two recent cases, Delaware courts expressed concerns about directors operating in a highly networked community, such as the Silicon Valley community, noting that this may undermine their independence. See *In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig.*, 73 A.3d 17, 54 (Del. Ch. 2013); *Sandys v. Pincus*, 152 A.3d 124, 134 (Del. 2016).

43. See *Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado*, 430 A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981).

44. See generally Minor Myers, *The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical Investigation*, 84 IND. L.J. 1309 (2009) (discussing SLCs).

45. See, e.g., *Beam*, 845 A.2d at 1055 (“[T]he SLC has the burden of establishing its own independence by a yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—above reproach.”); see also *London v. Tyrrell*, No. 3321, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *40 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2010) (“SLC members are not given the benefit of the doubt as to their impartiality and objectivity. They, rather than plaintiffs, bear the burden of proving that there is no material question of fact about their independence. The composition of an SLC must be such that it fully convinces the Court that the SLC can act with integrity and objectivity, because the situation is typically one in which the board as a whole is incapable of impartially considering the merits of the suit.”).

46. Under Delaware law, the court first inquires whether the SLC was independent, acted in good faith, and made a reasonable investigation, and then may apply its own independent business judgement

shows that such “legal standards matter,” as “in states with the lowest level of judicial review, outcomes are more likely to be favorable for defendants.”⁴⁷

2. Reasons to Doubt Independent Directors in Corporate Law

The increasing reliance on independent directors has been subject to criticism. Three decades ago, Jay Lorsch concluded from numerous personal interviews and questionnaire responses that director independence was merely an aspiration.⁴⁸ Still today, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani argue that independent directors are likely to accommodate the controlling shareholder’s wishes because the controlling shareholder is the one making director appointments and these directors seek reappointment.⁴⁹ Lisa Fairfax explains that independent directors may have an unconscious bias in favor of other directors because they view them as part of their group.⁵⁰ Yaron Nili argues that boards have too much discretion in classifying directors as independent and provide investors with insufficient information.⁵¹

These criticisms are relevant when considering whether to encourage bankruptcy judges to give independent directors a larger role in Chapter 11 cases, especially in vetting conflict transactions.

to decide whether to grant the motion. This standard of review is higher than the business judgment rule. See *Zapata*, 430 A.2d at 787–89.

47. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, *How Do Legal Standards Matter? An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees*, 60 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2 (2020) (“[W]e find an SLC report recommending case dismissal in Delaware court in the post-*Oracle* period is significantly and negatively associated with the probability of a case dismissal. Thus, the change in the legal standard appears to have made the Delaware courts more skeptical of SLC recommendations calling for case dismissals.”).

48. See JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 13–14, 83–88, 96 (1989). See also Usha Rodrigues, *The Fetishization of Independence*, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 460 (2008).

49. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, *supra* note 23, at 1274 (arguing that because “controllers [have] decisive power to appoint independent directors and decide whether to retain them, independent directors have significant incentives to side with the controller and insufficient countervailing incentives to protect public investors in conflicted decisions”).

50. See Lisa M. Fairfax, *The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director*, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 153 (2010) (“[T]he psychological research with respect to structural bias is particularly relevant in the context of boards, highlighting the degree to which such bias undermines directors’ ability to be critical of their fellow directors.”); cf. Antony Page, *Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence*, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 252 (“Directors, even those defined as independent, are members of the board of directors and, so the theory goes, are likely to be biased in favor of other directors.”).

51. See Yaron Nili, *The Fallacy of Director Independence*, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 491, 503–04; Yaron Nili, *Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure*, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 53–54, 58–62 (2017).

B. THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT BANKRUPTCY DIRECTORS

Until recently, corporate law's infatuation with independent directors has had no parallel in bankruptcy law. As Congress designed bankruptcy law, the role of the board in vetting conflict transactions is only to propose actions for the judge's approval.⁵² In deciding whether to grant a board's request, the judge considers the input of creditors, who are usually sophisticated investors who can offer independent analysis.⁵³ Bankruptcy law amplifies creditor voice by allowing the appointment of a UCC that acts as a check on the board.⁵⁴

Traditionally, there has thus been little need to focus on the independence of board members. A federal bankruptcy judge was the final decision-maker, and creditors were ready to weigh in on important bankruptcy decisions and state their position. As we demonstrate below, this is no longer the case. Independent directors that join boards shortly before filing for bankruptcy increasingly make important decisions during the bankruptcy process that judges endorse.

1. Factors Contributing to the Growing Popularity of Bankruptcy Directors

While we cannot definitively identify the causes of the rise of independent directors in bankruptcy, we can point to possible theories.

First, as boards developed a practice of looking to expert directors for major decisions outside bankruptcy, it was perhaps natural that similar thinking would carry over to financial distress. A corporate board may want to have an expert in financial distress to enliven board deliberations and help the board meet its fiduciary duty, especially if it is unclear whether the firm will end up in bankruptcy and the board worries about lawsuits.

Second, the lawyers who advise financially distressed companies may see independent directors as helpful in persuading bankruptcy judges to issue orders that allow their clients to leave bankruptcy. Since state court judges

52. See John A. E. Pottow, *Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties in the World of Claims Trading*, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 93 (2018) (noting that creditors serve as a check on a Chapter 11 firm and that the bankruptcy court's oversight means that fiduciary duties are less important since investor conflicts are usually resolved in open court).

53. See, e.g., Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Wei Wang, *Hedge Funds and Chapter 11*, 67 J. FIN. 513, 556 (2012); Jared A. Elias, *Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing*, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 493, 499 (2016); Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin & Jennifer Ivey-Crickenberger, *Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty*, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 178–80 (2014).

54. See Gayda & LoTempio, *supra* note 10 (“Some commentators view these ‘internal’ investigations as infringing on the role of unsecured creditors’ committees, which had historically reviewed and analyzed prepetition conduct of a debtor and the debtor’s management/ownership for potential causes of action.”).

are more deferential to independent directors who make decisions that shareholders oppose, these lawyers may have reasoned that bankruptcy judges would also be more deferential to independent directors who make decisions that creditors oppose.⁵⁵

Third, changing practices in the debt markets, especially among private equity firms, may have increased the need for bankruptcy directors. As we show below, many of the cases involving bankruptcy directors resemble the bankruptcy of Nine West, where a financially distressed company with a private equity sponsor files for bankruptcy and faces creditor litigation alleging looting by the sponsor. As robust debt markets have allowed highly leveraged firms to delay filing for bankruptcy, they may have expanded the space for potential self-dealing, fueling the demand for bankruptcy directors that could manage creditor claims. As bankruptcy directors achieve favorable outcomes, the liability calculus associated with self-dealing changes, generating further demand for bankruptcy directors.

The concentration of the market for bankruptcy services amplifies the effect of these factors. A handful of law firms, financial advisors, and other professionals play a key role as advisors to distressed companies. In other contexts, lawyers disseminate new practices.⁵⁶ When bankruptcy directors have important wins or are involved in high-profile cases, additional lawyers counsel their clients to add bankruptcy directors to their boards as a growing consensus develops that this is the best practice.

2. Reasons to Doubt the Independence of Bankruptcy Directors

In the context of a firm under bankruptcy court protection, there are additional reasons to question the use of independent directors.

Outside bankruptcy, shareholder power to elect directors aligns directors with shareholders. In fact, courts have relied on shareholders' ability to displace directors as a reason for deferring to directors.⁵⁷ Recent

55. See KELBON et al., *supra* note 9, at 17 (“Employing an outside director to exercise independent judgment as to corporate transactions in bankruptcy may not only provide additional guidance to a suffering business, but can make the decision-making process seem right in the eyes of stakeholders and ultimately, the court”).

56. John Coates finds that clients of larger law firms with more takeover experience adopt more defenses in charters of firms conducting an initial public offering. See John C. Coates IV, *Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers*, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2001). Other studies find that large law firms are responsible for the adoption of exclusive forum-selection provisions and that three Silicon Valley law firms drive the use of certain dual-class structures. See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, *The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation*, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 35 (2017); Andrew William Winden, *Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures*, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 886–89.

57. See, e.g., *In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.*, 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The redress for [directors’] failures . . . must come . . . through the action of shareholders . . . and not from

evidence supports this view, showing that the number of directors who fail to receive shareholder support is on the rise, meaning that shareholders use their votes.⁵⁸ These disciplinary mechanisms do not exist in bankruptcy. Creditors cannot influence the election of directors, so bankruptcy directors lack incentives to advance creditors' interests.

Additionally, unlike corporate law, bankruptcy law already contemplates other representatives of creditors. Importantly, a UCC acts as a court-appointed fiduciary to maximize firm value while protecting creditor rights.⁵⁹ Courts have interpreted this broad authority to permit the UCC to participate in all aspects of a bankruptcy case and to initiate legal actions to recover transferred assets or to sue officers and directors.⁶⁰ Moreover, bankruptcy law allows creditors to hire their own lawyers and join the bargaining process in addition to the UCC, and sophisticated investors take advantage of these rights.⁶¹

By appointing bankruptcy directors, debtor firms and their lawyers seek to use the claimed objectivity of these directors to wrest control of self-dealing claims against shareholders from creditors and the court. This sidesteps the checks and balances in Chapter 11 and can undermine the goals of the bankruptcy process.

Moreover, in Chapter 11 proceedings, creditors are usually sophisticated investors advised by expert lawyers.⁶² They can protect their interests. There is no obvious reason to let shareholder appointees prevent creditors from representing themselves in matters on which creditors and shareholders disagree.

There are also concerns specific to bankruptcy law that amplify the structural bias of independent directors in the bankruptcy law context.

First, bankruptcy professionals—lawyers, investment bankers, and bankruptcy directors—form a much smaller community than the corporate

this Court.”); *see also* *Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp.*, 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Nev. 1997) (“[O]ne of the justifications for the business judgment rule’s insulation of directors from liability . . . is that unhappy shareholders can always vote the directors out of office.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Shoen v. AMERCO*, 885 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (D. Nev. 1994)); *Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc.*, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he Rights Plan will not have a severe impact upon proxy contests . . .”).

58. *See* Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, *Competing for Votes*, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 287, 319–20 (2020) (showing that in 2019, the number of directors failing to receive majority support from their shareholders rose to 478, and the number of directors failing to receive at least 70% support rose to 1726).

59. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2019); Peter C. Blain & Diane Harrison O’Gawa, *Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and Duties*, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 605–09 (1990).

60. *See* Blain & O’Gawa, *supra* note 59, at 605–09.

61. *See, e.g.*, Jiang et al., *supra* note 53, at 513–14.

62. *See supra* note 53 and accompanying text.

governance community generally.⁶³ In this environment, it is likely that bankruptcy directors will work with the same professionals on their next engagement. Indeed, the evidence we present below reveals a group of super-repeater directors who have developed a profession of sitting on the boards of bankrupt companies.

Second, financial distress is an extraordinary event in the life of a corporation that can justify the appointment of specialized directors. It provides a natural setting for adding experts to the board to vet conflict transactions without raising suspicion. In contrast, outside bankruptcy, firms are limited in their ability to appoint new directors to investigate a potential derivative claim or negotiate a freeze-out.

Third, about half of the firms appointing bankruptcy directors are private equity-controlled firms.⁶⁴ Private equity sponsors are repeat players that can appoint individuals to many boards.⁶⁵ They can thus reward a director who has served them well on the board of one bankrupt company by placing her on other boards.⁶⁶ Conversely, a bankruptcy director who harms the interests of a private equity controller will likely jeopardize future board appointments at other portfolio companies of the same private equity firm.

Moreover, bankruptcy court dockets are public and make the work of one private equity sponsor visible to other private equity firms: a private equity firm may readily note the favorable outcome that the bankruptcy directors achieved for other private equity sponsors in previous bankruptcies and consider appointing those same directors to the boards of its own troubled portfolio companies. Conversely, an unfavorable outcome may chill the demand for a director's services among private equity sponsors.

In short, bankruptcy directors can be a challenge for bankruptcy law's structured bargaining process, which Congress intended to not only be fair but seem fair.⁶⁷

63. Cf. Edward B. Rock, *Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?*, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997).

64. See *infra* Section IV.C. By comparison, a recent study of controlling shareholders that form special committees of independent directors to negotiate freeze-outs finds that only 12.5% of the controlling shareholders involved in these such transactions are investment managers. See Lin, *supra* note 23, at 536.

65. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, *Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance*, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 222–23 (2009) (explaining that private equity firms typically control their portfolio companies' operations through control of their boards of directors); William Magnuson, *The Public Cost of Private Equity*, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1847, 1861 (2018) (“Since private equity firms control the boards of their portfolio companies, they can easily add directors to fill specific gaps in expertise, and they can compensate these board members highly.”).

66. See Lin, *supra* note 23, at 543.

67. Before the enactment of the modern bankruptcy code, Judge Henry Friendly famously

II. EXAMPLES

In this Part, we present two case studies of how bankruptcy directors can alter the course of a Chapter 11 case. We first present a detailed treatment of the 2020 bankruptcy of department store conglomerate Neiman Marcus. We then present a more cursory treatment of the 2017 bankruptcy of shoe retailer Payless Holdings. In both cases, bankruptcy directors diffused creditor claims against private equity sponsors that controlled the bankrupt firms.

A. NEIMAN MARCUS

In 2017, the private equity sponsors of retailer Neiman Marcus (“Neiman”) searched for a way to protect their investments in the struggling retailer.⁶⁸ They focused on MyTheresa, a Neiman subsidiary that sold luxury goods online.⁶⁹ The private equity sponsors consulted the investment bank Lazard Limited (“Lazard”), which recommended “moving certain assets with strategic value, such as the MyTheresa business [away from creditors].”⁷⁰ This, according to Lazard, would “allow[] the accrual of future MyTheresa value appreciation” for the private equity sponsors only, leaving creditors with no claim against what most observers considered the firm’s most valuable asset.⁷¹ Lazard anticipated that the transfer could be subject to

expressed the sentiment that “[t]he conduct of bankruptcy proceedings not only should be right but must seem right.” *In re Ira Haupt & Co.*, 361 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1966).

68. See Declaration of Mark Weinsten, Chief Restructuring Officer, of Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, In Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions at 2, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereinafter Declaration of Mark Weinsten]; Preliminary Report of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding the Bankruptcy Estates’ Litigation Claims Against Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., The Equity Sponsors and Directors of Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., and Other Parties at 25–26, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 24, 2020) [hereinafter UCC Report] (describing capital structure post-LBO).

69. See Neiman Marcus Discussion Materials, Lazard Presentation at 2, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 24, 2020) [hereinafter Lazard Presentation]; see UCC Report, *supra* note 68, at 30 (“In an email dated June 15, 2016, Ares (Rachel Lee) stated that ‘we had talked a few weeks ago about separating the MyTheresa asset’ and asked Proskauer Rose LLP . . . ‘[i]f we wanted to “dividend” the stock of MyTheresa to existing NMG shareholders, could we do that and what are the implications?’”).

70. See Lazard Presentation, *supra* note 69, at 1.

71. *Id.* at 19 (“Dividend[ing] the MyTheresa business out of the loan group using Restricted Payment basket capacity would allow the accrual of future MyTheresa value appreciation to the Sponsors.”). This sort of scheming has become typical in the 2010s by private equity sponsors, who often greet financial distress by engaging in transactions that shift value to shareholders and away from creditors. See generally Jared A. Ellias & Robert J. Stark, *Bankruptcy Hardball*, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745 (2020) (explaining tactics employed by distressed firms that benefit some stakeholders while harming some creditors). The Financial Times would later report that creditor anger over the transaction and “private equity aggression . . . struck a chord with many in the distressed debt market.” See Sujeet Indap & Mark Vandavelde, *Neiman Marcus: How a Creditor’s Crusade Against Private Equity Power Went Wrong*, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2020), <https://www.ft.com/content/3856bb04-b3ac-4935-8dbf-e0f2fdc090ea>

“challenges from creditors”⁷² over “fraudulent conveyance / fiduciary duty considerations”⁷³ and offered its help in dealing with such “complexities.”⁷⁴

In 2018, the idea became a reality through a series of stock dividends that transferred control of MyTheresa to Neiman’s private equity-owned parent and beyond the reach of the creditors of Neiman’s \$6 billion debt.⁷⁵ The transfer caused the value of the debt to collapse, spurring threats and negotiations between the creditors and Neiman.⁷⁶ A few months later, the private equity sponsors agreed to return some of MyTheresa’s assets to creditors in exchange for a two-year extension of the debt’s maturity date and other credit support.⁷⁷

However, this did not solve Neiman’s problems, which the COVID-19 pandemic made worse,⁷⁸ and in May 2020, the company filed for bankruptcy.⁷⁹ Before the filing, the company agreed with its private equity sponsors and most of its creditors on a plan that would reduce debt by \$4

[<https://perma.cc/FN32-3BKM>].

72. See Lazard Presentation, *supra* note 69, at 1.

73. See *id.* at 10; see also UCC Report, *supra* note 68, at 80.

74. See Lazard Presentation, *supra* note 69, at 1.

75. See UCC Report, *supra* note 68, at 39–42; George Ticknor, Jason Ulezalka & Jonathan Young, *Neiman Marcus Capitalizes on Weak Covenant Package to Transfer Valuable Assets Beyond the Reach of Certain Creditors*, JD SUPRA (Oct. 19, 2018), <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/neiman-marcus-capitalizes-on-weak-26232/> [<https://perma.cc/DUB4-H7TZ>]. The private equity owners would later justify the moves as making it easier to manage MyTheresa without the weight of the Neiman’s debt weighing down the online retailer in negotiations with vendors. See Counter-Report of Ares Management Corp. and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board in Response to Preliminary Report of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at 12, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 24, 2020) [hereinafter Counter-Report of Ares Mgmt.].

76. See Soma Biswas, *Neiman Marcus Bondholder Criticizes Transfer of Valuable Online Business*, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2018), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/neiman-marcus-bondholder-criticizes-transfer-of-valuable-online-business-1537557060> [<https://perma.cc/AR4S-C3UL>].

77. See generally *Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, Current Report (Form 8–K) (Mar. 1, 2019). As part of the exchange, the company’s secured creditors received a partial payment and agreed to extend the maturity date of the loan by two years. See *id.* The secured term lenders received a pay-down of \$550 million of approximately \$2.8 billion in debt. See *id.* They also received additional collateral, which was an important part of the deal. See UCC Report, *supra* note 68, at 49. The company’s unsecured creditors exchanged their debt for a mixture of new secured debt, supported by a lien on MyTheresa’s assets, and MyTheresa preferred stock. See *Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, Current Report (Form 8–K) (Mar. 1, 2019). In many ways, the transfer was a challenge to creditors: Should they negotiate to get part (or all) of the assets back or should they litigate? The creditors appear to have chosen to settle for the return of some of MyTheresa, which would not preclude them from filing a lawsuit if the company later filed for bankruptcy. One dissident creditor tried to bring the lawsuit on its own but lacked standing to do so without the support of a larger number of creditors. See Order Granting Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and Alternatively, Special Exceptions, *Marble Ridge Cap. LP v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.*, No. DC-18-18371 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2019).

78. See Declaration of Mark Weinsten, *supra* note 68, at 3–4.

79. Lauren Hirsch & Lauren Thomas, *Luxury Retailer Neiman Marcus Files for Bankruptcy as It Struggles with Debt and Coronavirus Fallout*, CNBC (May 7, 2020), <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/neiman-marcus-files-for-bankruptcy.html> [<https://perma.cc/WXT4-NMWS>].

billion.⁸⁰ Neiman intended to seek a court order discharging the private equity sponsors from liability over the MyTheresa transfer.⁸¹

In planning its bankruptcy filing, Neiman took steps to hobble the ability of the UCC to pursue the MyTheresa claims. First, the terms of the bankruptcy financing constrained the UCC's investigation budget and required the company to leave bankruptcy in 120 days, limiting the time the UCC could investigate and litigate.⁸² Second, a month prior to the bankruptcy filing, the private equity sponsors appointed two new directors: former bankruptcy lawyer Marc Beilinson and former distressed debt trader Scott Vogel.⁸³ The two received the board's power to handle conflicts between Neiman and its private equity sponsors, including the MyTheresa transfer.⁸⁴ Each of these bankruptcy directors received a \$250,000 flat fee plus \$500 an hour.⁸⁵

Immediately after the bankruptcy filing, a creditor filed a motion to appoint an independent examiner to investigate the MyTheresa transfer.⁸⁶

80. See Declaration of Mark Weinsten, *supra* note 68, at 5, 37. Companies filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy typically arrive with ready Restructuring Support Agreements ("RSAs") tied to bankruptcy financing arrangements, as was the case for Neiman. See Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, *Bankruptcy Process for Sale*, 39 YALE J. REG. 1 (2022); Anthony J. Casey, Frederick Tung & Katherine Waldo, *Restructuring Support Agreements: An Empirical Analysis* (2022) (working paper) (on file with authors). For more on RSAs, see generally Douglas G. Baird, *Bankruptcy's Quiet Revolution*, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, *Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring Support Agreements*, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169, 169 (2018).

81. See Marble Ridge Capital LP and Marble Ridge Master Fund LP's Statement in Response to the Declaration of Mark Weinsten and Limited Objection to Debtors' Emergency Motion for Postpetition Financing at 17, *In re* Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 8, 2020).

82. For governance through debtor-in-possession lending, see generally Ayotte & Ellias, *supra* note 80; George G. Triantis, *A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing*, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 901 (1993); Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, *Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11*, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 461 (2013); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, *Secured Party in Possession*, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2003); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, *Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider*, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557 (2013).

83. Specifically, the private equity sponsors appointed Beilinson and Vogel as "independent managers" at an intermediate holding company, NMG Ltd. LLC. The control of the ultimate parent remained in the hands of the board appointed by the private equity sponsors. See Transcript of Trial at 38, *In re* Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 29, 2020) [hereinafter Neiman Marcus Trial].

84. See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 71.

85. See *id.* at 72.

86. Marble Ridge Capital LP and Marble Ridge Master Fund LP's Expedited Motion, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a), 1104(c), 1106(b), and 1107(a) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2007, For Entry of an Order Appointing an Examiner with Duties to Prosecute, *In re* Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2020) [hereinafter Marble Ridge Examiner Motion]. The bankruptcy code provides creditors with the ability to seek the appointment of an examiner as an independent fiduciary to investigate potential wrongdoing. See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, *Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies*, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2010). Neiman Marcus argued that there was no need for an examiner investigation since the UCC and the bankruptcy directors were already investigating the transaction. See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 41.

The creditor also asked to bar the bankruptcy directors from investigating the MyTheresa transaction.⁸⁷

On the witness stand, Beilinson stumbled.⁸⁸ He could not provide satisfying answers to questions from the bench about the investigation he oversaw,⁸⁹ and his answers revealed that it had not gone very far.⁹⁰ Frustrated, the judge warned that if Beilinson was to remain the firm's bankruptcy director, "he needs to understand his job, and he cannot simply give lip service, knowing a bunch of buzzwords, and think that I'm going to accept that as evidence of someone doing their job."⁹¹ In an extraordinary exchange, the judge warned Neiman that "I do not want to see a fiduciary to this estate ever appear in front of me ever again unprepared, uneducated, and borderline incompetent."⁹² Nevertheless, the judge indicated he would not grant all of the requested relief in the motion to appoint an independent examiner, and the motion was withdrawn.⁹³

Three weeks later, Beilinson resigned, and Vogel remained the sole bankruptcy director.⁹⁴ Vogel's own résumé raised questions for creditors, as

87. See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 130–31 ("For all of the reasons, Your Honor, we're not in a position to trust that we're going to get a good faith, independent examination report that does anything other than say, in order to get out of bankruptcy fast and given the fact that the unsecured creditors aren't entitled to any distribution because we got to satisfy all of the claims of the senior creditors—too bad. Sorry. We know that's the result we're more than likely to get.").

88. See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 53–191.

89. Under questioning from the judge, Beilinson identified as one of the issues whether the MyTheresa dividend was an intentional fraudulent conveyance, but, when asked what mattered for this determination, he gave an answer that the judge described as "completely wrong." See *id.* at 109. Beilinson testified that what mattered as whether "the recovery or the unwinding would benefit or not benefit the bankruptcy estate, and whether it should impact the currently negotiated RSA, which has substantial amount of the debt structure supporting it." *Id.* at 109. In reality, intentional fraudulent transfer claims require investigating evidence that the transfer of value was with an "actual intent" to defraud, hinder, or delay creditors. See 28 U.S.C. § 3304; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, *Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain*, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 830–32 (1985).

90. The judge then asked him for specific examples of what he had done in the past thirty days on the investigation, and Beilinson responded by saying he and Vogel had "spoken with Counsel," that "document requests have gone out" and "[they had] accumulated over 3,000 documents." See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 109.

91. *Id.* at 171–72. The bankruptcy judge asked why Vogel had not offered his testimony given that "[he] had a deposition" and "[he] had to know that" Beilinson's testimony would have gone "bad[ly]." *Id.* at 172.

92. See *id.* at 188. A news report at the time referred to the "extraordinary" exchange as "blistering criticism." See Vandeveld & Indap, *supra* note 11. Another observer later noted that the case was too important for "shenanigans" such as "independent directors doing the bidding of a private equity sponsor (and/or themselves)." See *Our "Matter of the Year,"* PETITION (Dec. 23, 2020), <https://petition.substack.com/p/our-matter-of-the-year> [<https://perma.cc/MM72-US6K>].

93. The judge was willing to grant only a cursory investigation of whether the bankruptcy directors were doing their job, which would not have been very useful to the creditor as it would not be hard for the directors to prove they were not wholly absentee. See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 196.

94. Anna Zwettler, *Marc Beilinson Resigns as Board Member of Neiman Marcus*, FASHION UNITED (June 22, 2020), <https://fashionunited.uk/news/people/marc-beilinson-resigns-as-board-member-of-neiman-marcus/2020062249476> [<https://perma.cc/9G56-7V7T>]; see also Neiman

he was a former employee of a lender that extended a loan to Neiman in the bankruptcy with conditions that made the prosecution of fraudulent-transfer claims against the private equity sponsors more difficult.⁹⁵

The UCC began investigating the transaction and quickly concluded that the claims were valuable.⁹⁶ It then filed a motion informing the court of this conclusion. The motion suggested that if the claims did not settle then the UCC should preserve them for prosecution after the bankruptcy case ended.⁹⁷ A few days later, the UCC indicated it was ready to make the results of its six-week investigation public.⁹⁸

As the UCC was investigating, so too was Vogel. A day before the UCC's report would become public, his lawyers announced in court that he had also concluded there were viable fraudulent conveyance claims against the private equity sponsors and that he was negotiating a settlement.⁹⁹ In response, the UCC's lawyers said they had played no role in those negotiations and expressed concern that the settlement amount would be "too low."¹⁰⁰

On July 24, 2020, the UCC released the preliminary results of its

Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 159 ("[Y]ou didn't hear anything about Mr. Vogel, and you didn't hear any challenges to his independence.").

95. See Marble Ridge Examiner Motion, *supra* note 86, at 10.

96. See UCC, *Neiman Sponsors File Dueling Reports Disputing Neiman Marcus, MyTheresa Valuations, Solvency, Strategic Rationale for MyTheresa Distribution*, REORG (July 27, 2020), <https://reorg.com/ucc-neiman-sponsors-file-dueling-reports/> [<https://perma.cc/9N9M-X76C>].

97. See Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order (I) Terminating Only as to the Committee the Debtors' Exclusive Periods to File a Plan and Solicit Acceptances Thereof Pursuant to Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code; and (II) Authorizing the Committee to File Its Own Plan and Disclosure Statement at 10, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 26, 2020). The UCC sought to give the judge an option of confirming a plan that would be identical to the plan that the debtor had submitted with the exception of not releasing the claims against the private equity sponsors and board members and reserving those claims for a litigation trust. See *id.*

98. See Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to File Under Seal the Emergency Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Unseal (I) Preliminary Report of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding the Litigation Claims against Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., and Other Parties and Appendix Thereto and (II) Initial Expert Report of the Michel-Shaked Group and Executive Summary Thereof and Declaration of Alan J. Kornfeld in Support, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 22, 2020). Prior to the UCC report becoming public, the private equity sponsors filed a "counter report" with their own analysis of the strength of the claims against them. See generally Counter-Report of Ares Mgmt., *supra* note 75.

99. See *Neiman Disinterested Manager Says Viable Fraudulent Conveyance Claims Tied to MyTheresa Transfer Exist; Ares Has Agreed to Requested 'Number' in Settlement Talks; UCC Has Had No Direct Talks with Ares*, REORG (July 23, 2020), <https://reorg.com/neiman-manager-viable-fraudulent-conveyance-claims/> [<https://perma.cc/7U3U-L2WV>] [hereinafter Viable Fraudulent Conveyance Claims]; see also Hearing at 4–7, *In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC*, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 23, 2020).

100. See Viable Fraudulent Conveyance Claims, *supra* note 99.

investigation.¹⁰¹ The report concluded that the transaction constituted a constructive fraudulent transfer and likely also an intentional fraudulent transfer.¹⁰² It added that these claims would merit release only in return for an amount close to their estimated value of the transferred assets—about \$1 billion.¹⁰³

However, six days later, Neiman announced that Vogel had negotiated with the private equity sponsors a much smaller settlement.¹⁰⁴ The settlement included a package of cash and stock that, using the UCC's estimate of MyTheresa's value, would be worth \$172 million.¹⁰⁵

While the UCC accepted the deal given the economy's fragility and Neiman's need to reorganize quickly,¹⁰⁶ it expressed concerns about the role that the bankruptcy director had played in the process.¹⁰⁷ The UCC's lead lawyer stated that Vogel sabotaged the UCC's litigation process.¹⁰⁸ He noted that Vogel secretly met with the private equity sponsors on his own and made offers that were "horrif[ying]" and "so low" that it "put [the UCC] in a deep hole."¹⁰⁹

The UCC's lead lawyer described a collusive process in which Vogel told the private equity sponsors that, "if [you] hit a certain bid," Vogel would "force a settlement down [the UCC's] throat."¹¹⁰ He explained that countering Vogel's settlement offer with a higher one "would have been a massive waste of time because of what had already been told . . . to the sponsors. So I was going to be completely wasting my time. And let me be frank, Your Honor, the sponsors had zero interest, zero, in speaking to me."¹¹¹

More broadly, he offered a grim assessment of the effect of bankruptcy

101. The investigation had taken place in the fifty-one days between the filing of the report and the UCC's retention of counsel. While the investigation involved the review of more than 800,000 pages of documents and eight depositions, it clearly was only at a preliminary stage and could have expanded to cover a wider range of witnesses. *See* UCC Report, *supra* note 68, at 13.

102. *Id.* at 66.

103. *See id.* at 13.

104. *See* Notice of Filing of Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 52, *In re* Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 30, 2020).

105. *See* Statement on Behalf of Scott Vogel, Disinterested Manager of Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, Regarding the Debtors' Proposed Disclosure Statement and Global Settlement, *In Re* Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 30, 2020).

106. *See id.* at 2.

107. *See* Neiman Marcus Settlement Transcript, *supra* note 20, at 19–20.

108. *Id.* at 29.

109. *Id.*

110. *Id.* at 29–30.

111. *Id.* at 30.

directors on creditor recovery and thus on the message to private equity sponsors:

With that said, Your Honor, my goal in doing this . . . is for Your Honor to understand why it is that the system was rigged in this case, and why sponsors going forward and in the past are encouraged to asset strip, because that's just how our system is set up. And until Congress or someone does something about it, that's how it's going to remain.¹¹²

Without changes, he said, bankruptcy directors would turn the system of governance designed by Congress into a “sham.”¹¹³ He urged the judge to scrutinize the conflicts of bankruptcy directors in future cases by scrutinizing “their relationship with the law firms, . . . their relationship with the sponsors, and . . . the[ir] true independence. And that's not just . . . the . . . [bankruptcy directors, it is also] their counsel.”¹¹⁴ In the case at bar, he noted that the law firm for the bankruptcy directors had previously represented the private equity sponsors.¹¹⁵

Subsequent events proved the UCC was conservative in its valuation of MyTheresa. Four months after Neiman left bankruptcy, the private equity sponsors took MyTheresa public at a valuation of \$2.2 billion, more than twice the UCC valuation, which the private equity sponsors had disparaged as “astronomical” back when the company was in bankruptcy.¹¹⁶

Was the \$172 million settlement fair given the information available at that time? After all, the UCC did agree to it. Moreover, as the private equity sponsors argued, a sale process a year earlier had failed to produce a buyer willing to pay more than \$500 million for MyTheresa.¹¹⁷ There will always be questions when the economy changes and assets fluctuate in value after a bankruptcy process. But these unanswerable questions would be less

112. *Id.* at 34.

113. *Id.* at 36. A postscript to this story is that the creditor who sought the appointment of the examiner had to close his hedge fund after trying to deter an investment bank from making a competing bid for MyTheresa stock in violation of his fiduciary duty as a member of the UCC. See Andrew Scurria & Alexander Gladstone, *Hedge Fund Marble Ridge to Close After Scathing Neiman Report*, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2020), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-marble-ridge-to-shut-down-11598014779> [<https://perma.cc/FJQ5-LK2S>]; Sujeet Indap & Mark Vandeveld, *Hedge Fund Manager Admits 'Grave Mistake' in Neiman Marcus Battle*, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), <https://www.ft.com/content/084ba24b-a96b-4888-9bd4-c80001c0be07> [<https://perma.cc/M9FT-ER4G>].

114. See Neiman Marcus Settlement Transcript, *supra* note 20, at 35.

115. See *id.* at 30, 37. When Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP joined, it asked the two independent directors for permission to continue to work with the sponsors, and it received this permission. See *id.*

116. See David Carnevali & Sujeet Indap, *German Online Retailer MyTheresa Valued at \$3bn after US Listing*, FIN. TIMES (January 21, 2021), <https://www.ft.com/content/e8254ebd-700b-441d-a430-33811e63f1fe> [<https://perma.cc/9EF9-22J8>].

117. See Counter-Report of Ares Mgmt, *supra* note 75, at 5 n.15. Most importantly, they already returned part of MyTheresa, which meant that they could argue the amount they had actually received was less than \$1 billion, perhaps \$500 million or even less.

pressing if the UCC had itself negotiated the settlement without the bankruptcy directors looming in the background.

B. PAYLESS HOLDINGS

The 2017 bankruptcy of shoe retailer Payless Holdings (“Payless”) is another example of how bankruptcy directors can shape a Chapter 11 case. As with Neiman, Payless filed for bankruptcy after an ill-fated leveraged buyout.¹¹⁸ Following the buyout, Payless conducted a series of transactions with its private equity sponsors, including a distribution of \$350 million in dividends.¹¹⁹

A few years later, in April 2017, Payless filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Missouri.¹²⁰ As with Neiman, Payless’s private equity sponsors could expect self-dealing claims to dominate the bankruptcy case, with the dividend payout occupying center stage. Consequently, as with Neiman, Payless appointed a bankruptcy director. This director would alter the ability of unsecured creditors to bring claims related to the dividends and settle the claims for a fraction of their potential value.

Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Payless appointed Charles H. Cremens to its board.¹²¹ Payless described Cremens as a seasoned independent director with vast business and restructuring experience.¹²² Cremens joined the board at the suggestion of the debtors’ lead law firm, Kirkland & Ellis LLP¹²³ (“Kirkland”) and immediately began investigating the claims against the private equity sponsors.¹²⁴ He also hired Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP (“Munger”) to represent him in the Chapter 11 case.¹²⁵ As is often the case

118. In 2012, a private equity group led by Golden Gate Capital and Blum Capital took over Payless Holdings LLC, a retail company specializing in selling low-priced footwear, in a \$2 billion acquisition and became the owner of 98.5% of the company’s equity. See Neil Irwin, *How Private Equity Buried Payless*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/upshot/payless-private-equity-capitalism.html> [<https://perma.cc/27ZN-HT2J>]; *Payless UCC Objects to ‘Placeholder’ DS and Fast-Track Plan Process*, REORG (May 25, 2017), https://app.reorg.com/v3#/items/intel/4744?item_id=36001 [<https://perma.cc/CAA6-KPXD>].

119. Notice of Filing of Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Payless Holdings LLC and Its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Ex. 1, at 23–24, *In re Payless Holdings LLC*, No. 17-42267-659 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 23, 2017) [hereinafter *Payless Disclosure*].

120. Lauren Debter, *Payless Files for Bankruptcy, Will Close 400 Stores Right Away*, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2017, 4:05 PM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/04/04/payless-shoesource-bankruptcy-store-closures/?sh=26fb7d645560> [<https://perma.cc/JYQ6-22QN>].

121. *Id.* at 23.

122. *Id.*

123. See Transcript of Hearing at 46, *In re Payless Holdings LLC*, No. 17-42267 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 14, 2017) [hereinafter *Payless Hearing*].

124. *Payless Disclosure*, *supra* note 119, at 23.

125. Debtors’ Application for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Retention and Employment of Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland and Ellis International LLP as Attorneys for the Debtors and Debtors

with bankruptcy directors, his bankruptcy experience raised questions about the extent to which he was truly objective. Cremens had extensive ties to Kirkland¹²⁶ and Munger, and he had recently worked as bankruptcy director with both firms.¹²⁷ He also had ties to one of the private equity owners.¹²⁸

After filing for Chapter 11, Cremens fought to limit the ability of the unsecured creditors to investigate the dividend payout. When the unsecured creditors sought to hire their own financial advisor to study the strength of the claims, Cremens objected, claiming that he was in the midst of such an investigation and that any effort by the unsecured creditors to study the potential causes of action would be “duplicative.”¹²⁹ He also claimed that he wanted to meet the conditions of the debtor’s bankruptcy financing which, as in the Neiman Marcus case, required exit from Chapter 11 within ninety

in Possession Effective *Nunc Pro Tunc* to the Petition Date at 6, *In re Patriot Coal Corp.*, No. 15-32450 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 20, 2015) [hereinafter Kirkland Employment Application]; Payless Hearing, *supra* note 123, at 46.

126. Cremens had worked at other companies represented in bankruptcy by Kirkland. “Three of the Debtors’ current directors—Eugene I. Davis, Charles H. Cremens, and Timothy J. Bernlohr—currently serve, and have served in the past, as officers and directors of certain of K&E’s clients or affiliates from time to time.” See Kirkland Employment Application, *supra* note 125, at 1–13, Ex. B 18–19. Cremens also served as a disinterested director of Energy Future Intermediate Holding, a private equity-owned power company that filed for bankruptcy in 2017 with Kirkland as its lawyers. See Debtors’ Application for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Retention and Employment of Kirkland & Ellis LLP as Attorneys for the Debtors and Debtors in Possession Effective *Nunc Pro Tunc* to the Petition Date at Ex. B 16–17, *In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.*, No. 14-10979 (Bankr. D. Del. May 29, 2014).

127. See Declaration of Charles H. Cremens in Support of Confirmation of the Modified Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of iHeartMedia, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 1–2, *In re iHeartMedia, Inc.*, No. 18-31274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019).

128. Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order (I) Approving the Adequacy of the Debtors’ First Amended Disclosure Statement, (II) Fixing Dates and Deadlines Related to Confirmation of the Plan, (III) Approving Certain Procedures for Soliciting and Tabulating the Votes on, and for Objecting to, the Plan, (IV) Approving the Rights Offering Procedures, Subscription Form and Authorizing the Retention of Financial Balloting Group LLC in Connection Therewith, and (V) Approving the Manner and Form of the Notices and Other Documents Related Thereto at 13–14, *In re Payless Holdings, LLC*, No. 17-42267-659 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 12, 2017) [hereinafter Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order].

Cremens has served on the boards of Aspect Software and/or Bluestem Group with at least three managing directors of Golden Gate Capital, (ii) Aspect Software is owned in part by Angel Island Capital, an affiliate of Golden Gate Capital that currently holds part of the Debtors’ term loan debt, (iii) Cremens was on the board of Conexant Systems, which was acquired by an affiliate of Golden Gate Capital, and (iv) Cremens was on the board of Tactical Holdings, which is a portfolio company of Golden Gate Capital.

Id. Cremens had also worked on other cases alongside Kirkland, as had his lawyers at Munger. See *id.*

129. See Response of Debtors to Application of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Authorizing Retention of Back Bay Management Corporation and Its Division, the Michel-Shaked Group, as Expert Consultant and Dr. Israel Shaked as Expert Witness *Nunc Pro Tunc* at 2–3, *In re Payless Holdings LLC*, No. 17-42267-659 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. May 24, 2017) [hereinafter Response of Debtors].

days, limiting the ability of unsecured creditors to investigate the claims.¹³⁰ By attempting to keep the unsecured creditors from hiring professionals, Cremens undermined their ability to proceed quickly.¹³¹

Cremens ran an investigation that was—in the eyes of unsecured creditors—flawed and superficial. On the one hand, he and his lawyers reviewed hundreds of documents and interviewed twelve witnesses.¹³² On the other hand, he failed to obtain tolling agreements from the private equity sponsors for claims that could have expired during the time of the investigation¹³³ and declined to hire his own solvency expert to determine whether Payless was solvent at the time of the dividends. This was the most critical question for determining the strength of the claims.¹³⁴ Both of these actions raised questions as to how serious Cremens was about litigating the claim. Unsecured creditors would later characterize Cremens’s effort as an attempt to “sweep these [claims against the private equity sponsor] under the rug, to do a cursory examination, to talk to a few people . . . and come up with a conclusion.”¹³⁵

Cremens’s lawyers explained that he did not consider it his role to litigate the claims because he was more of a mediator:

[A]s the case has developed, the independent director, knowing that the committee and other parties were looking into these issues, believed that it was in the best interests of these estates to not disclose a position over these issues, but rather to allow the committee and others to complete their examination, so he could act—if you will—as a mediator, and help to

130. *Id.* at 7.

131. See Tracy Rucinski, *Payless to Try Fending Off Creditor Probe of Owners with Own Review*, REUTERS (May 25, 2017, 8:55 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-payless-bankruptcy-pprivateequity/payless-to-try-fending-off-creditor-probe-of-owners-with-own-review-idUSKBN18L27K> [<https://perma.cc/W8MW-JJCC>].

132. Payless Hearing, *supra* note 123, at 47.

133. *Id.* at 52–53.

134. *Id.* at 47–48.

So now you have Mr. Cremens and Munger Tolles & Olson reporting to him, beginning their investigation in January, basically five, six months ago. They describe in the disclosure statement what was done: we looked at 500 documents, we talked to twelve people. Interesting what they didn’t do, which was hire—as the committee did—hire a valuation expert to go look at the 2012 LBO, the 2013 dividend recap, the 2014 dividend recap. Because the fraudulent transfer claims—potential claims that arise out of those transactions all turn on the issue of whether or not Payless was insolvent at the time or was left insolvent after it made these dividend payments to their shareholders, Golden Gate and Blum. So without really taking a hard look at the insolvency issue, I’m not sure how the independent director is going to reach a conclusion that we can all trust and count on.

Id.

135. *Id.* at 48.

resolve the issues rather than polarize the case by coming out strongly one way or another.¹³⁶

This response infuriated the lawyers for the unsecured creditors, who argued that Cremens misunderstood his role.¹³⁷ Moreover, Cremens tried to block the unsecured creditors from hiring a financial advisor because he was “conducting an investigation.”¹³⁸ The unsecured creditors called this an effort to “usurp [their] role [in] conduct[ing] this kind of investigation.”¹³⁹

The unsecured creditors continued to prepare to prosecute the claims, but their backs were against the wall because their investigation appeared to be at odds with the goal of saving the company. The unsecured creditors announced that they had “accomplished in six weeks what Mr. Cremens has apparently been unable, or unwilling to do in six months—reach a conclusion that [claims should be brought against the private equity sponsors].”¹⁴⁰ The private equity sponsors retorted that the claims were weak¹⁴¹ and that the unsecured creditors’ plan to litigate the claims “threaten[ed] the feasibility of any successful plan for [Payless’s] reorganization.”¹⁴² The unsecured creditors called this a “false narrative” and “fake news” and pointed out that there should not be a conflict between recovering property from the sponsors and reorganizing the firm: they could litigate the claims after bankruptcy.¹⁴³

However, the unsecured creditors’ bargaining power collapsed as the clock continued to run on the debtors’ short timeline, perhaps contributing to their decision to accept a settlement of \$21 million for claims of \$350 million.¹⁴⁴ The unsecured creditors had seen this coming, noting earlier in a court hearing,

[W]hat we’re terribly afraid of, Your Honor, given the conduct thus far, is that we’ll get a late-breaking bulletin on the eve of confirmation, hey, we’ve decided that there are some claims here, but you know what, it’s too inconvenient to bring them; it’s too late. We’re at confirmation; we’re

136. *Id.* at 66.

137. *Id.* at 80.

138. Response of Debtors, *supra* note 129, at 4.

139. Payless Hearing, *supra* note 123, at 45.

140. See Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order, *supra* note 128, at 2.

141. See Reply of Certain Entities Advised by Golden Gate Private Equity, Inc. and Blum Capital Partners, L.P., to the Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to the Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order Approving the Adequacy of the Debtors’ First Amended Disclosure Statement and Related Relief at 3, *In re Payless Holdings, LLC*, No. 17-42267-659 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 13, 2017).

142. *Id.* at 12 (emphasis omitted).

143. See Payless Hearing, *supra* note 123, at 50–51.

144. See Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Payless Holdings LLC and Its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 18, *In re Payless Holdings LLC*, No. 17-42267-659 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 23, 2017).

going to get out of bankruptcy. Let's declare victory. We're going to reorganize Payless; we're going to save jobs; we're going to save stores, et cetera, et cetera. But these claims, they're going to fall by the wayside. . . . [W]hat we're seeing is a concerted effort to sweep these claims under the rug for the benefit of insiders: the sponsors and the directors.¹⁴⁵

Following the high-profile examples of Neiman and Payless, it is hard to imagine the private equity industry not noticing how bankruptcy directors can settle disputes regarding risky dividends for a fraction of the dividend amount.

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this Part, we study bankruptcy directors using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of Chapter 11 boards in the past fifteen years. We begin by describing our data. As a threshold finding, we document a significant rise in bankruptcy expertise on Chapter 11 boards during the sample period. We then examine the role that bankruptcy directors played in the sample cases.

We first show that the percentage of firms in Chapter 11 claiming to have “independent directors”—a claim that usually only arises in the context of bankruptcy directors purporting to exercise board authority as neutral experts—increased from 3.7% in 2004 to 48.3% in 2019. Over 60% of the firms that appointed bankruptcy directors had controlling shareholders, typically private equity funds. The appointment of bankruptcy directors usually occurs in the months leading to the bankruptcy filing and, in about half of the cases, they investigate claims against insiders. Importantly, after controlling for firm characteristics—including the reported ratio of assets to liabilities—the presence of bankruptcy directors is associated with 20% lower recoveries for unsecured creditors, whose claims are typically the most at risk in bankruptcy.¹⁴⁶ This finding raises the possibility that bankruptcy

145. See Payless Hearing, *supra* note 123, at 51–52.

146. Bankruptcy law is generally recognized as a process designed to serve unsecured creditors, whose claims are seen as most at risk in Chapter 11 cases. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., *The (II) Legitimacy of Bankruptcies for the Benefit of Secured Creditors*, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 753 (“Bankruptcy has traditionally been a collective proceeding with the goal of enhancing recoveries for unsecured creditors beyond those that state court remedies could provide to the creditors as a body.” (emphasis omitted)). Existing research focuses on unsecured creditor recoveries when examining the determinants of successful bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tashjian, Ronald C. Lease & John J. McConnell, *An Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged Bankruptcies*, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135 (1996) (finding that unsecured creditor recoveries are higher in prepackaged bankruptcies); Viral V. Acharya, Sreedhar T. Bharath & Anand Srinivasan, *Does Industry-Wide Distress Affect Defaulted Firms? Evidence from Creditor Recoveries*, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 787 (2007) (noting that the conditions of bankruptcy appear to affect senior unsecured debt); Andrew A. Wood, *The Decline of Unsecured Creditor and Shareholder Recoveries in Large Public Company Bankruptcies*, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429 (2011); Lynn M. LoPucki, *The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study*, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341 (2004). A similarly

directors make decisions that are not value maximizing.

We also observe 15 individuals appointed to these directorships repeatedly. Each of these super-repeaters had on average 17 directorships (the median is 13), and 44% of these directorships were in companies that went into bankruptcy when the super-repeaters served on the board or up to a year before their appointment. Our data also show that the super-repeaters had close connections to certain private equity funds and to two law firms. These law firms represented 47% of the companies in our sample that had super-repeaters on their boards.

A. DATA

For this study, we had to build a large dataset of directors of Chapter 11 firms because no commercial dataset contains this information. We began with New Generation Research's list of Chapter 11 debtors that filed for bankruptcy between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2019.¹⁴⁷ Our initial list of the debtors consisted of 770 firms with more than \$250 million in assets or liabilities on their bankruptcy petitions.

We then looked in each court docket for two documents. First, we required the firm to have filed with the bankruptcy court a Statement of Financial Affairs ("SOFA").¹⁴⁸ Chapter 11 firms must list all current and former officers and directors in this document, and firms that did not comply with this requirement did not meet the sample criteria.¹⁴⁹ Second, we required the firm to have filed with the bankruptcy court a disclosure statement. As part of the creditor voting on the bankruptcy plan, Chapter 11 firms must summarize in this document important developments before and during the proceeding and draw attention to facts relevant for the consideration of either the judge or voting creditors.¹⁵⁰

voluminous literature in financial economics examines bondholder recoveries. *See, e.g.*, Rainer Jankowitsch, Florian Nagler & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, *The Determinants of Recovery Rates in the US Corporate Bond Market*, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 155 (2014).

147. This list often serves for empirical research. *See, e.g.*, Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, *Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11*, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 517 (2009); Jared A. Ellias, *What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market Data*, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 app. (2018); Wei Jiang et al., *supra* note 53, at 518. Court dockets are available on the federal court website for bankruptcy filings starting 2004.

148. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(B)(iii).

149. For example, the SOFA filed by K-V Pharmaceutical Company contains the following entry: "If the debtor is a corporation, list all officers and directors of the corporation, and each stockholder who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds 5 percent or more of the voting or equity securities of the corporation." *See* Statement of Financial Affairs at 19, *In re K-V Pharmaceutical Company*, No. 12-13347 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012). The firms that ignored this requirement tend to have either had quick sales or were prepackaged bankruptcy filers that ignored the SOFA requirement during their brief stay in bankruptcy.

150. *See, e.g.*, Glenn W. Merrick, *The Chapter 11 Disclosure Statement in a Strategic Environment*,

Of the 528 firms with SOFAs listing their board members, we were able to obtain disclosure statements for 454 firms.¹⁵¹ The SOFAs identified 2,549 individuals who served on the boards of these firms on the petition date, including 78 who sat on two boards and 12 who sat on more than two boards. To our knowledge, this is by far the largest sample of Chapter 11 directors ever studied.¹⁵²

Next, we hand-matched each individual with BoardEx's dataset of corporate directors to obtain director characteristics and employment history before the sample period. We were able to match 2,009 individuals from 454 boards in our sample.¹⁵³ Finally, we added firm characteristics from CompuStat and bankruptcy information from New Generation Research to all 454 firms.

B. CHANGES IN CHAPTER 11 BOARDS OVER TIME

We begin our analysis by examining how a board's bankruptcy expertise on the petition date has changed. Our proxy for bankruptcy expertise is whether a director on a Chapter 11 board had been a director on a prior Chapter 11 board on the petition date or up to a year thereafter. We find that the likelihood that Chapter 11 boards have at least one director with Chapter 11 experience ("Chapter 11 repeater") is 15.4% between 2004 and 2010, 33.5% between 2014 and 2019, and 41.3% in 2019. This reveals a transformation in bankruptcy expertise, with boards becoming more Chapter 11-savvy over the course of the 2000s.


44 BUS. LAW. 103, 103 (1988).

151. The remaining debtors never filed a disclosure statement. This usually happens when a debtor sells its assets and does not file a disclosure statement for a liquidation plan.

152. See Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Todd A. Gormley & Ankit Kalda, *It's Not So Bad: Director Bankruptcy Experience and Corporate Risk-Taking*, 142 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 265–66 (2021) (studying 356 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1994 and 2013); Megan Rainville, Essay 1: Bankruptcy and Director Reputation, in *Essays in Corporate Finance* 1, 2 (Apr. 2020) (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Nebraska) (ProQuest) (studying 142 firms with 1,089 directors that filed for bankruptcy between 2003 and 2013); Stuart C. Gilson, *Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders*, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356 (1990) (studying sixty-one firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1979 and 1985).

153. We matched the BoardEx directors with CompuStat firm characteristics using the WRDS BoardEx CRSP CompuStat Company linking table. For BoardEx companies with multiple potential matches in the BoardEx data, we took the lowest scoring match, which indicates the best match according to WRDS' methodology. In specifications that involve four-digit SIC codes, we omitted twenty-two firms with two SIC codes in CompuStat.

FIGURE 1. The Portion of Chapter 11 Boards with a Chapter 11 Repeater



Note: Figure 1 shows the portion of 454 boards of firms with assets or liabilities of \$250 million or more that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 2004 and 2019 with a director who had previously been on the board of another firm when it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Chapter 11 repeater). Director work history (including history before the sample period) is from BoardEx, with the director work history supplemented by the information from our court document data gathering.

C. WHAT BANKRUPTCY DIRECTORS DO

While the increase in bankruptcy expertise on Chapter 11 boards is interesting, it does not alone show a change in the role of directors in Chapter 11 proceedings. In this Section, we dive deeper into the data to identify the directors who played an active role in the bankruptcy case. We find that the directors with Chapter 11 expertise are the ones playing this role.

1. The Rise of Bankruptcy Directors

We focus on directors presented to the bankruptcy judge as independent. With some exceptions, we find that Chapter 11 firms label their directors as independent only if they receive board power in connection with the bankruptcy and not merely by meeting general independence criteria.¹⁵⁴

154. Bankruptcy commentators and practitioners usually refer to these directors as “independent directors.” See, e.g., KELBON et al., *supra* note 9. We use the term “bankruptcy director” to capture the

Accordingly, we call these directors “bankruptcy directors.” We require them to be independent directors who are not currently working as firm officers, including as chief restructuring officers.

First, we ran a series of searches that was roughly equivalent to searching all disclosure statements for mentions of the terms “independent director,” “independent directors,” “disinterested director,” or “disinterested directors.” After eliminating false positives, we identified 78 disclosure statements that discussed the presence of a bankruptcy director.¹⁵⁵ For example, in the Nine West bankruptcy, the disclosure statement provided:

As the Debtors worked on this business turnaround, in mid-2017 the Debtors also commenced negotiations with their creditors regarding a comprehensive restructuring of their debt obligations. In connection therewith, the Debtors engaged two independent directors in August 2017, who, in turn, directed the Debtors to hire an independent counsel and financial advisor to act at the direction of the independent directors. These directors took an active role in overseeing restructuring negotiations and in reviewing potential claims and causes of action related to the [leveraged buyout] . . . and other potential conflict matters between the Debtors and their private equity owners.¹⁵⁶

Similarly, Cobalt International Energy, Inc. relied on the investigation that the bankruptcy directors performed to justify releasing lawsuits against lenders:

Kirkland conferred with the independent and disinterested directors of the Board about the investigation on multiple occasions. After completing its work concerning those potential claims, Kirkland presented the results of the investigation and bases therefor three times to the independent and disinterested directors before the independent and disinterested directors voted regarding those claims.¹⁵⁷

unique aspects of serving as a purported independent director in Chapter 11 proceedings. As we discuss below, this service raises particular concerns.


155. We ran a series of three searches. First, we searched for mentions of “disinterested” or “independent.” We then searched a block of text that was [-50 words, +150 words] around the search word to see if it included the word “Manager” or “Director.” To ensure we did not miss anything, we also searched for mentions of “committee” near “Manager” or “Director,” and for “Special Committee.” Our search identified 3,913 potential matching text blocks corresponding to 422 of the 454 sample cases. We then hand-reviewed the 3,913 potential matching text blocks and identified 100 disclosure statements in which the text block appeared to discuss the independence of a director or a committee of directors. We then read those 100 disclosure statements and identified 78 cases involving bankruptcy directors. In 21 of the 78 cases involving bankruptcy directors, the disclosure statement referred to the bankruptcy director using a defined term (for example, “Our Independent Director”) without identifying the person by name.

156. See Notice of Filing Solicitation Version of the Debtors’ Disclosure Statement for the Debtors First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 4, *In re Nine West Holdings, Inc.*, No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2018).

157. See Disclosure Statement for the Fourth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Cobalt International Energy, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates at 45, *In re Cobalt Int’l Energy, Inc.*, No. 17-36709

As Figure 2 shows, bankruptcy directors were uncommon in the late 2000s and became a prominent part of Chapter 11 practice only in the 2010s. In 2009, at the height of a worldwide financial crisis, only 5.7% of Chapter 11 firms represented to the bankruptcy court that at least one of their directors was independent. By 2018, that number had increased to 55.2%.

FIGURE 2. The Portion of Chapter 11 Firms with Bankruptcy Directors



Note: Figure 2 shows the portion of Chapter 11 firms that represented to the bankruptcy court that some of their directors were independent or disinterested. The sample includes 454 firms with assets or liabilities of \$250 million or more that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 2004 and 2019.

2. The Characteristics of Firms and Bankruptcies with Bankruptcy Directors

Table 1 compares firms with bankruptcy directors to other firms. Firms with bankruptcy directors are significantly more likely to have private equity sponsors (45% versus 30%) and somewhat less likely to have publicly traded shares (31% versus 42%).¹⁵⁸

(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2018).

158. A number of public firms in our sample have a controlling private owner, a structure that is especially common in the energy industry.

TABLE 1. Characteristics of Firms, Bankruptcies, and Boards

	Bankruptcy director firms		Non bankruptcy director firms		Difference in means	T-statistic
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
<i>Financial characteristics</i>						
Assets in millions of U.S. dollars	2,928.85	5,673.52	2,373.37	5,287.25	555.48	-0.83
Liabilities in millions of U.S. dollars	3,566.58	7,261.92	2,664.85	5,969.52	901.74	-1.11
Debt to assets ratio	1.24	0.81	1.47	3.11	-0.23	0.62
Secured debt to total debt ratio	0.37	0.36	0.34	0.36	0.03	-0.56
Private equity control	0.45	0.50	0.30	0.46	0.15**	-2.50
Family control or individual investor control	0.17	0.38	0.10	0.31	0.06	-1.59
Any controlling shareholder	0.62	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.21***	-3.41
Public company	0.31	0.46	0.42	0.49	-0.12*	1.89
<i>Bankruptcy characteristics</i>						
Prepackaged bankruptcy	0.12	0.32	0.11	0.32	0.00	-0.09
Delaware venue	0.45	0.50	0.42	0.49	0.03	-0.51
Southern District of New York venue	0.29	0.46	0.24	0.43	0.06	-1.03
Southern District of Texas venue	0.10	0.31	0.07	0.25	0.03	-1.02
Eastern District of Virginia venue	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.14	0.00	-0.24
Debtor counsel is Kirkland	0.32	0.47	0.16	0.37	0.16***	-3.28
Debtor counsel is Weil	0.15	0.36	0.06	0.23	0.10***	-3.06
Restructuring Support Agreement	0.58	0.50	0.38	0.49	0.19***	-3.19
Bankruptcy duration in days	333.17	344.35	362.44	329.46	-29.27	0.62
Percentage of unsecured creditor recovery	0.28	0.36	0.37	0.40	-0.09	1.62
<i>Board characteristics</i>						
Size	6.15	2.89	5.82	3.15	0.34	-0.87
Board includes a lawyer	0.53	0.50	0.38	0.49	0.14**	-2.34
Board includes a Chapter 11 repeater	0.40	0.49	0.19	0.39	0.21***	-4.01

Note: Table 1 summarizes firm characteristics and bankruptcy characteristics from bankruptcy court dockets, and board characteristics from BoardEx for 454 firms that filed a Chapter 11 petition between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2019, and whose court filings include a SOFA and a disclosure statement. Bankruptcy director firms are firms that note in their disclosure statement that they have a bankruptcy director. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In unreported results, we find that the percentage of Chapter 11 firms with private equity ownership is stable over time. The growing percentage of bankruptcy directors thus reflects a change in how firms, including those with private equity sponsors, prepare for bankruptcy, not a change in the percentage of private equity portfolio firms among Chapter 11 filers.

There are additional differences worth noting. Firms with bankruptcy directors are significantly more likely to engage one of the two leading debtor-side bankruptcy law firms, Kirkland (32% versus 16%) and Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (“Weil”) (15% versus 6%).¹⁵⁹ Firms with bankruptcy directors are also significantly more likely to sign a restructuring support agreement, a document outlining a proposed Chapter 11 plan (58% versus 38%). The sample disclosure statements suggest that the bankruptcy directors are often the ones negotiating this document. Finally, boards with bankruptcy directors are significantly more likely to have a director who is a lawyer (53% versus 38%) and a director who was on the board of another Chapter 11 firm prior to their current appointment (40% versus 19%).¹⁶⁰ As we will discuss, the biographies of bankruptcy directors reveal that many more of them have experience in restructuring beyond what this measure captures.

In Table 1, bankruptcy directors are not associated with significantly shorter durations of bankruptcy proceedings (about 333 days versus about 362 days) or significantly lower recoveries for unsecured creditors (28% versus 37%). Nevertheless, as we show below, the difference in unsecured creditor recoveries between cases with bankruptcy directors and cases without them becomes significant when we use multivariate regression to control for other factors that can affect recoveries. The difference in the average duration of bankruptcy proceedings remains insignificant even in multivariate regressions. We turn to this analysis next.

3. The Role of Bankruptcy Directors

Debtors typically tout their bankruptcy directors to win judicial deference.¹⁶¹ They do so in two ways, as statements by one bankruptcy director in the Gymboree Corporation bankruptcy in 2017 illustrate.

159. See Tom Corrigan, Joel Eastwood & Jennifer S. Forsyth, *The Power Players that Dominate Chapter 11 Bankruptcy*, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2019, 5:30 AM), <https://www.wsj.com/graphics/bankruptcy-power-players/> [<https://perma.cc/H7AZ-AKPM>].

160. We use BoardEx data to identify the directors’ entire biographies, including Chapter 11 boards outside of our sample period.

161. See, e.g., The Second Lien Noteholders’ Objection to Confirmation of the Debtors’ Modified Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan at 54, *In re LBI Media, Inc.*, No. 18-12655 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 18, 2019) [hereinafter LBI Plan Objection] (alleging that the “appointment of [the bankruptcy director] is a figleaf [sic] that the Debtors and [the controlling shareholder] are attempting to hide behind”).

The first way is to claim that a board decision in the bankruptcy process (like financing terms¹⁶² or the administration of an auction¹⁶³) deserves deference because the bankruptcy directors who made it are independent. In the Gymboree case, for example, the bankruptcy director explained that he had no prior material relationship with the firm or with its private equity sponsor.¹⁶⁴ The second way is to claim that the board decision deserves deference because the bankruptcy directors who made it are restructuring experts. In the Gymboree case, for example, the bankruptcy director noted his experience in Chapter 11 cases and his background in investment banking.¹⁶⁵

The strategy is to convince the bankruptcy court that the combination of independence and expertise means that the court should view the bankruptcy directors' conclusions as those of a neutral expert—almost as it views decisions of a court-appointed trustee. For example, in the *rue21* bankruptcy in 2017, a bankruptcy director cited his independence, expertise, and the investigation he had led to urge the court to overrule creditor objections.¹⁶⁶

We read each disclosure statement to learn about the tasks that bankruptcy directors perform. Table 2 summarizes our findings. It shows that bankruptcy directors led the restructuring process in 71% of their engagements and investigated claims against insiders (shareholders or lenders) in 46% of their engagements. They joined the board before the bankruptcy filing in 84% of their engagements.¹⁶⁷ They hired their own legal or financial advisors in 49% of their engagements. These numbers are lower bounds for the role that bankruptcy directors played in the sample cases, as

162. See, e.g., Adam C. Rogoff & Priya Baranpuria, *United States: Exercising Independence in Restructuring: The Path to Better Governance*, MONDAQ (Oct. 2, 2018), <https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/financial-restructuring/741656/exercising-independence-in-restructuring-the-path-to-better-governance> [<https://perma.cc/R55P-BC5S>] (discussing the BCBG bankruptcy case).

163. See LBI Plan Objection, *supra* note 161, at 7 (alleging that the bankruptcy directors deliberately ran the auction so to produce a “low-ball valuation”).

164. See Declaration of Steven Winograd in Support of Confirmation of the Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Gymboree Corporation and Its Debtor Affiliates at 3, *In re The Gymboree Corp.*, No. 17-32986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 2017).

165. See *id.* at 2–3.

166. See Declaration of Neal Goldman in Support of Debtors' Reply to Limited Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to the Debtors' First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 2–3, *In re rue21, Inc.*, No. 17-22045 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2017). The director first noted his expertise, his independence, the work he had done to investigate claims against insiders, and his conclusion that legal claims against insiders should be released. See *id.* at 2–3, 6–7. He then rejected the creditors' objections to his conclusion and asked the judge to defer to his business judgment. See *id.* at 7–8.

167. In unreported results, we find that for the forty-two sample cases with detailed information on director join dates the average bankruptcy director joined the board seven months prior to the petition date.

the debtors in the remaining cases did not state that the bankruptcy directors *did not* do these things. In unreported results, we find that, when firms identify their bankruptcy directors by name, both the mean and the median of the number of bankruptcy directors per firm are two and the maximum is five.

TABLE 2. Board and Director Characteristics of Firms with Bankruptcy Directors

Characteristics	% of bankruptcy-director firms
<i>Board tasks (N=78)</i>	
Evaluate restructuring proposals and negotiate with creditors	0.71
Run sale process	0.15
Provide independent directors for subsidiary conflicts	0.13
Investigate private equity sponsor or controlling shareholder	0.44
Investigate claims against pre-bankruptcy lenders	0.17
Investigate private equity sponsor or pre-bankruptcy lenders	0.46
<i>Board independent advisors (N=78)</i>	
Bankruptcy directors engaged own law firm	0.26
Bankruptcy directors engaged own financial advisor	0.15
Bankruptcy directors engaged own law firm OR financial advisor	0.32
<i>Timing of bankruptcy director appointment (N=57)</i>	
All independent directors joined firm pre-bankruptcy	0.84
<i>Expertise that named bankruptcy directors collectively bring (N=57)</i>	
Experience in restructuring or distressed companies	0.81
Lawyer	0.42
Investment banker	0.61
Distressed debt trader	0.21

Note: Table 2 summarizes the role of bankruptcy directors and board characteristics at the firm level

Next, we use regression analysis to learn more about differences between cases with bankruptcy directors and cases without them. As Table 1 shows, while average recoveries for unsecured creditors are 32% lower when debtors appoint bankruptcy directors, the difference is not statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance may result from variation in firm characteristics. A multivariate regression can overcome this problem by controlling for additional factors that may affect recoveries to isolate the contribution of bankruptcy directors.

Table 3 presents the results of such a regression.¹⁶⁸ Specifically, it presents the estimates of an ordinary-least-squares regression examining the relation between unsecured creditor recoveries and the presence of bankruptcy directors while controlling for firm financial and bankruptcy characteristics. It shows that, with full control variables, bankruptcy directors are associated with roughly 20% lower creditor recoveries.¹⁶⁹

168. Table 3 studies a subsample for which we were able to obtain financial control variables (the ratio of debt to assets and the ratio of secured debt to total debt) from court documents. We omit one outlying case with a debt-to-asset ratio of approximately 244:1 (the sample mean is 1.45:1). The outlying firm, nCoat Inc., reported \$914 million in debt and sold its assets in bankruptcy for \$1 million less than the \$3.76 million accounting value of the assets before the sale. This debt amount may have been a scrivener's error of the firm, but contemporaneous press accounts do not question it. *See, e.g., Specialty Coatings Maker nCoat Files for Bankruptcy*, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2010), <https://www.reuters.com/article/ncoat/update-1-specialty-coatings-maker-ncoat-files-for-bankruptcy-idUSSGE67F0KR20100816> [<https://perma.cc/6XFU-DCEE>]. Including this firm does not materially change the coefficient of firms with bankruptcy directors.

169. The industry-fixed effects and the year-fixed effects in Columns 4–5 reassuringly increase the explanatory power of the regressions. In unreported regressions, the coefficient of firms with bankruptcy directors remains negative and significant when we examine the same specifications using a two-limit Tobit model. In another unreported regression, the coefficient of firms with bankruptcy directors remains negative and significant also when we add to the specification in Column 5 of Table 3 indicators for the venue (Delaware, Southern District of New York, Southern District of Texas, Eastern District of Virginia venue), for a public firm, for a firm that entered into a restructuring support agreement, for a firm represented by Kirkland, for a firm represented by Weil, for a board that includes a lawyer, and for a board that includes a Chapter 11 repeater. None of these additional variables other than the public firm indicator (which is positively and significantly related to unsecured creditor recovery) is significantly related to unsecured creditor recovery.

TABLE 3. Determinants of the Percentage of Unsecured Debt Paid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bankruptcy director appointed	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.08)
Ratio of debt to assets		-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.03)
Ratio of secured debt to total debt		-0.49* (0.25)	-0.51** (0.25)	-0.41 (0.26)	0.06 (0.33)
(Ratio of secured debt to total debt) ²		0.78*** (0.28)	0.75*** (0.28)	0.65** (0.29)	0.24 (0.37)
Prepackaged			0.19** (0.10)	0.21** (0.10)	0.16 (0.11)
Private equity or controlling shareholder ownership			0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
Constant	0.36*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.50*** (0.11)	1.01*** (0.37)
Observations	194	194	194	194	193
R-squared	0.04	0.13	0.16	0.23	0.42
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes

Note: Table 3 shows the results of ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the midpoint of the estimated unsecured creditor recovery retrieved from the disclosure statement that the firm filed in connection with the plan of reorganization. For example, Legacy Reserves Inc., which filed for bankruptcy in 2019, stated in its disclosure statement that unsecured noteholders would receive 3.1% to 4.8% of the amount it owed them, with a midpoint of 3.95%. The independent variable of interest is an indicator that equals one if the firm stated that it appointed a bankruptcy director to manage the restructuring process, and zero otherwise. *Ratio of debt to assets* is the ratio of the firm's consolidated liabilities to its assets in the bankruptcy petition. *Ratio of secured debt to total debt* is the amount of debt to secured creditors divided by the amount of debt to all creditors in the firm's disclosure statement. To minimize measurement error, we exclude debt incurred after the bankruptcy filing, intercompany debt, and tax liabilities. *Prepackaged* is an indicator that equals one if the firm reorganized in a bankruptcy plan that creditors had approved before the petition date, and zero otherwise. *Private equity or controlling shareholder ownership* is an indicator that equals one if the firm has a private equity sponsor or another controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. In Column 4, we introduce year-fixed effects and in Column 5 we add Fama-French 48 industry-fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

To be sure, this association does not prove that the bankruptcy directors cause the lower recoveries. One could always argue that firms appoint bankruptcy directors when facing difficult bankruptcies and that this explains the low recoveries. While we use standard financial controls, including the ratio of debt to assets, the ratio of secured debt to total debt,¹⁷⁰ and indicators for private equity ownership and for prepackaged bankruptcy filings, these controls likely capture only part of the story of each Chapter 11 case.

Moreover, a bankruptcy could be difficult for reasons unrelated to the firm's ability to pay. For example, there could be inter-creditor disputes or regulatory issues. We do not observe these factors and cannot control for them. If firms appoint bankruptcy directors precisely when these factors are present, we might wrongly attribute the low recoveries to these directors instead of to the firm's underlying circumstances.

We note, however, a possible explanation that *would not* clear the bankruptcy directors of responsibility for the lower recoveries. A potential omitted variable in our analysis could be that firms with bankruptcy directors are also ones in which the insiders siphoned value. To the extent bankruptcy directors may then steer the bankruptcy case to a relatively lower settlement, this could also explain the relationships we observe in the data.

At the very least, our findings explain why bankruptcy directors are controversial: all else being equal, firms that hire them end up paying on average 20% less to unsecured creditors than do other firms.¹⁷¹ These

170. In unreported results, we observe that unsecured creditor recoveries first decrease, and then increase, in the ratio of secured debt to all debt. Accordingly, Columns 2 through 5 of Table 3 include both the ratio of secured debt to total debt (the "untransformed ratio") and that ratio squared. In Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient of the untransformed ratio is statistically significant and negative while, in Columns 2–4, the coefficient of the squared ratio is statistically significant and positive. This curvilinear relationship may reflect a common Chapter 11 tactic: when unsecured debt is small relative to total debt, the firm may choose to pay the unsecured debt in full rather than deal with a litigious UCC. For example, in the 2019 bankruptcy of sample firm Hexion Holdings, the firm paid unsecured creditors (trade debt, pension debt, environmental claims) all of their claims, while only paying junior secured creditors about 25% of their claims and paying senior creditors about 87% of their claims. *See* Disclosure Statement for Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Hexion Holdings LLC and Its Debtor Affiliates Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, *In re* Hexion Holdings LLC, No. 19-10684 (Bankr. D. Del. May 22, 2019). In that case, the unsecured debt represented less than 20% of total debt, and the firm needed to pay the unsecured debt in full for business reasons. *Id.* The results are qualitatively similar without the squared term, and the statistical significance of the bankruptcy director's indicator variable does not depend on including the squared term.

171. In unreported regressions, when we add an indicator for the presence of a bankruptcy director who investigated claims against insiders to the specifications in Table 3, that variable is not statistically significant, while the indicator for the presence of a bankruptcy director retains its statistical significance. This is consistent with bankruptcy directors reducing creditor recoveries not necessarily through their handling of claims against insiders. Alternatively, firms may underreport investigations by bankruptcy directors of claims against insiders (according to Table 2, they do so in only 46% of the cases involving bankruptcy directors).

differences are statistically significant and likely visible to bankruptcy lawyers and investors active in Chapter 11 cases, who may associate bankruptcy directors with relatively lower creditor recoveries. In our view, these findings at least shift the burden of proof to those claiming that bankruptcy directors improve bankruptcy outcomes.

Finally, on the benefits side, bankruptcy directors may use their expertise to reduce the length and litigiousness of complex cases. While both of these claims are hard to measure, our data allow us to try. In unreported regression models, we investigate how the duration of the bankruptcy case or the number of objections that creditors file on the court docket relate to the presence of bankruptcy directors. We find no statistically significant relationship. That is not to say that bankruptcy directors do not offer these benefits—we could be examining the wrong variables—but we do not find evidence for them in our data.

4. The Biographies of Bankruptcy Directors

To learn more about the backgrounds of bankruptcy directors, we collected biographical characteristics for the 86 named bankruptcy directors in our sample from information in the disclosure statements and supplemented those data with Internet research.¹⁷²

Table 4 summarizes our findings. Forty-eight percent of the named bankruptcy directors in our sample are bankruptcy experts. Table 1 above shows that 83% of the boards appointing bankruptcy directors report having a director with bankruptcy expertise. This means that firms often pair a Chapter 11 expert with a non-Chapter 11 expert as their bankruptcy directors. Table 4 further shows that the named bankruptcy directors are more likely to be former investment bankers (41%) than lawyers (19%), although a small number of bankruptcy directors were both.

172. Of 78 disclosure statements in our sample that mentioned bankruptcy directors, 57 identified 119 bankruptcy directors by name, leading to our sample of 86 unique names holding those 119 directorships. See *supra* note 155 and the accompanying text. Other disclosure statements mentioned bankruptcy directors active in the bankruptcy without identifying them by name.

TABLE 4. Characteristics of Named Bankruptcy Directors

Characteristic	% of identified bankruptcy directors
<i>Director Background (N=86)</i>	
Expertise in restructuring or distressed companies	0.48
Lawyer	0.19
Investment banker	0.41
Distressed debt trader	0.16

Note: Table 4 summarizes the background of directors that the disclosure statement identified as bankruptcy directors. Each individual corresponds to one observation even if serving on multiple boards in the sample.

A subset of individuals within this group of 86 named bankruptcy directors holds many directorships, including in bankrupt companies. We call them “super-repeaters.” As one of the bankruptcy directors noted in a court hearing, they “specialize in going on the boards of companies that are emerging from bankruptcy or going into bankruptcy.”¹⁷³

To study the super-repeaters, we dived deeper into the background of the most active bankruptcy directors. First, we identified the individuals named as bankruptcy directors in more than one disclosure statement. To this list, we added individuals who appeared at least three times in our broader sample of 2,895 unique petition-date directors. After eliminating duplicates, we constructed an initial list of 20 directors.¹⁷⁴

We then obtained information from BoardEx on the background and additional independent directorships of these directors.¹⁷⁵ We reviewed each directorship and eliminated duplicates or directorships for which we do not have service dates.¹⁷⁶ Finally, we identified which additional directorships were in companies that went into bankruptcy during our sample period by matching the list of additional directorships from BoardEx with New

173. See Certification of Transcript at 45, *In re rue21, Inc.*, No. 17-22045 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Rue21 Transcript].

174. We dropped one director who appeared three or more times in the data but was an employee of a private equity firm and thus an inside director.

175. If an individual also serves as an officer in the company, we excluded that directorship from our list.

176. Occasionally, BoardEx includes multiple entries associated with the same directorship. For example, these entries may appear when companies change names, when the directors change position (for example, from a director to a chair of the board), or when directors sit on boards of affiliated companies (for example, a parent and a subsidiary). We eliminated these duplicative entries.

Generation Research's list of Chapter 11 firms. BoardEx does not always provide data on directorship dates. However, when that data were available, we also examined whether the director was on the board of the company on the day of its bankruptcy filing or joined within a year after the bankruptcy filing.¹⁷⁷ After eliminating directors who had only one confirmed directorship of bankrupt companies, a list of 15 directors remained.

These directors have developed a profession of sitting on boards of bankrupt companies. Leading the list is a director who has sat on 96 boards, for which we were able to find the dates of his service, and we confirmed that in 31 of these cases he served on boards of companies at the times of their bankruptcy filings or within a year thereafter.¹⁷⁸

Overall, we find that the 15 super-repeaters on our list had 252 independent directorships, with an average of 17 directorships and a median of 13 directorships per director. Of these 252 directorships for which we have service dates, we find that, in 44% of the cases, the super-repeaters sat on the boards at the time of their bankruptcy filings or within a year thereafter.¹⁷⁹

Finally, we looked at the law firms that represented the bankrupt companies. As we will discuss below, the evidence suggests that these law firms exert significant influence over the selection of bankruptcy directors. Our data show that two law firms, Kirkland and Weil, have a particularly strong connection to super-repeaters. This is unsurprising, as Kirkland and Weil are the two preeminent law firms specializing in the representation of distressed companies.¹⁸⁰

In 76 cases, we were able to find information on the identity of law

177. Due to data limitation, we are unable to confirm whether all of these directors who served on the board of a company on the day of its bankruptcy filing were eventually delegated with the authority to vet conflicted decisions by the board of the company or its controlling shareholders.

178. In addition to his bankruptcy work, this director also had a career as an activist investor nominee to boards of firms not in bankruptcy. *See, e.g., RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis*, 129 A.3d 816, 826 (Del. 2015). In at least one of those cases, a trial court found him to be "largely an absentee director." *See id.* at 835. In one of his bankruptcy director engagements, the director testified that he was not sure how many boards he was simultaneously serving on or whether that number was higher than forty. *See Ad Hoc Group of Unsecured Noteholders' Emergency Motion, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 1104(c), 1106(b), and 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2007.1, for Entry of an Order Appointing an Examiner with Power to Prosecute at 17, In re Sanchez Energy Corp.*, No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2019). In that case, creditors accused him of abdicating his role and allowing the law firm that he was supposedly overseeing to conduct an investigation with no oversight. *See id.* at 20.

179. Our data are likely to underestimate the number of directorships in bankrupt companies that super-repeaters have held. This is because we eliminated from our sample entries for which BoardEx does not provide exact directorship dates to confirm that the super-repeaters indeed served on the board at the time of the bankruptcy (or within a year thereafter). It is possible that some of the directorships we eliminated are of bankrupt companies.

180. *See Corrigan et al., supra* note 159.

firms that represented bankrupt companies with at least one super-repeater on the board. Kirkland represented the bankrupt firm in 33% of these cases, and Weil represented it in 14% of these cases.

Putting all the pieces together, our data reveal an ecosystem of a small number of individuals who specialize in sitting on the boards of companies that are going into or emerging from bankruptcy. This group includes 10 individuals with 10 or more directorships—many of them in bankrupt companies. Next, we will discuss evidence on how these directors are selected.

5. The Selection of Bankruptcy Directors

While firms do not systematically disclose how they select their bankruptcy directors, when they do, they usually describe the appointment as made by shareholders, often on the advice of the debtor's bankruptcy lawyers.¹⁸¹ For example, Neiman's lawyers recruited the firm's bankruptcy directors after an employee of the private equity sponsor reached out to them.¹⁸²

The ultimate decision to appoint a specific person to a directorship belongs to a firm's shareholders, and the law firms merely play an advisory role.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, the role of the debtor's law firm in advising on the candidate raises concerns because a handful of law firms dominate the market for representing companies on their journeys through Chapter 11. As Table 5 shows, Kirkland and Weil command a particularly large share of this market.¹⁸⁴ One bankruptcy director noted in a court hearing that prior history with the dominant law firms is hard to avoid, as Kirkland has an "80 percent market share in debtor cases."¹⁸⁵ While that number is exaggerated, the

181. See Declaration of Alan J. Carr in Support of Restructuring Subcommittee's Response to the Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets to ESL Investments, Inc. at 3–4, *In re Sears Holdings Corp.*, No. 18-23538 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2019) (a bankruptcy director noting that "[i]n late September 2018, I was contacted by [one of the debtor's lawyers] about possibly joining the Sears Board as an independent director"). For private equity-controlled firms, there may not be much of a distinction between the board and the shareholders since the board often comprises insiders of the private equity sponsor.

182. See Neiman Marcus Trial, *supra* note 83, at 54. The employee of the private equity firm who recruited Beilinson had worked with him on a prior Chapter 11 case. See *id.* The employee asked Beilinson if he was available for an "undisclosed assignment," and two lawyers from Kirkland subsequently called to clarify the engagement. See *id.* at 54–55.

183. As one super-repeater bankruptcy director noted, "Kirkland doesn't decide who goes on the board of directors of companies, owners do." See Rue21 Transcript, *supra* note 173, at 45.

184. Because debtors sometimes hire multiple law firms (for example, a national law firm and local counsel), law firm engagements can overlap. For example, Kirkland represented 16% of debtors in the sample, 25% of debtors with a Chapter 11 repeater, 32% of debtors with a bankruptcy director, and 44% of the debtors in which a bankruptcy director investigated claims against insiders.

185. See Rue21 Transcript, *supra* note 173, at 36.

potential for a handful of law firms to influence appointment of these directorships can create what we call “auditioning bias.” We discuss this in detail next.

TABLE 5. Law Firms’ Share of Cases

Law firm	% of cases	% of boards with Chapter 11 repeaters	% of boards with bankruptcy directors	% of boards with bankruptcy directors who conducted an investigation
Kirkland & Ellis LLP	0.19	0.29	0.32	0.44
Richards, Layton & Finger PA	0.12	0.16	0.18	0.17
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.03
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.14
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.06
Paculski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.03
Jones Day	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03
Latham & Watkins LLP	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.00
DLA Piper LLP	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.08
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
Sidley Austin LLP	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.00
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03
Kutak Rock LLP	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
Jackson Walker LLP	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.08
Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman & Leonard PA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
Greenberg Traurig LLP	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.03

Note: Table 5 summarizes the market shares of the 19 law firms advising the most debtors in our sample.

IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this Part, we consider the policy implications of our analysis. First, we argue that judges should defer to the business judgment of bankruptcy

directors only after verifying their neutrality. Second, we claim that bankruptcy directors cannot be neutral if shareholders alone select them or if they have the support of only some of the creditor classes. We thus propose that bankruptcy judges hold a hearing at the beginning of the bankruptcy process to present prospective or existing bankruptcy directors, their credentials, and their potential conflicts of interest. If these individuals then win overwhelming creditor support, the bankruptcy judge should treat them as independent. Otherwise, the judge should regard them without any type of special judicial deference. We further explain why our proposal will not discourage the use of bankruptcy directors or erode the benefits they can bring, such as adding expertise to the boardroom, streamlining the bankruptcy proceedings, and blocking frivolous litigation. We close by considering the recent proposal of Senator Elizabeth Warren, which would accomplish through federal legislation the same goals of restoring the balance of power between debtors and creditors.

A. THE CASE AGAINST DEFERRING TO BANKRUPTCY DIRECTORS IN CONFLICTS WITH CREDITORS

The creation of the new role of bankruptcy directors in the past decade is the work of entrepreneurial bankruptcy lawyers and restructuring professionals. They have cleverly blended corporate law's deference to independent directors with bankruptcy law's faith in neutral trustees.¹⁸⁶

It is easy to see how this innovation might appeal to bankruptcy judges.¹⁸⁷ Chapter 11 cases are contentious and require the bankruptcy judge to navigate the proceedings while understanding the firm's business to a lesser extent than the parties.¹⁸⁸ A neutral expert could assist the court in this task, smooth the path to settlement, and counteract the problems associated with leaving a self-interested board in control.¹⁸⁹ In theory, neutral bankruptcy directors could give the judge some of the benefits of a court-

186. See *supra* Section I.B.

187. See Barry E. Adler, *Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation*, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 215 (2012) (discussing the judge's awareness of creditors' biases).

188. Conflict between creditors is one of the defining aspects of modern bankruptcy practice. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, *supra* note 12. The judge's distance from the business often leaves her reliant on the creditors and the debtor to help her understand the facts. See Jared A. Ellias, *Regulating Bankruptcy Bonuses*, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 653, 657 (2019) (discussing the difficulty that judges have evaluating business decisions).

189. The distortions caused by allocating control of Chapter 11 to shareholders are the subject of extensive literature. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, *Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy*, 57 J. FIN. 445, 447 (2002). Bankruptcy law generally relies on the bankruptcy judge, rather than fiduciary duties, to ensure that decisions in the course of the bankruptcy are fair to creditors. See John A. E. Pottow, *Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties in the World of Claims Trading*, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 93 (2018) (noting that creditors serve as a check on a Chapter 11 firm and that the bankruptcy court's oversight means that fiduciary duties are less important).

appointed trustee without the judge having to appoint one.¹⁹⁰

However, bankruptcy directors are not necessarily neutral. Shareholders usually appoint them on the advice of their lawyers.¹⁹¹ It is reasonable to assume that they would be hard-pressed to disappoint those who chose them for this lucrative engagement. Moreover, a bankruptcy directorship is a short-term engagement that creates incentives to treat it as an audition for the next engagements. The dependence on future engagements strengthens a bankruptcy director's desire to be helpful to shareholders and their lawyers. A bias in favor of shareholders can result in cheap settlements of claims against shareholders and in restructurings that let shareholders retain more equity. A bias in favor of lawyers can result in quick settlements to make the lawyers look good at the expense of creditors.¹⁹² In short, shareholders' control of the appointments of bankruptcy directors undermines the directors' independence.

These conflicts become worse when the controlling shareholder and its lawyers are repeat players in the bankruptcy arena who can influence future nominations to the position of bankruptcy directors.¹⁹³ Those connections among bankruptcy directors, a group of private equity funds, and law firms are key to understanding the environment in which bankruptcy directors operate. To become a bankruptcy director, one must work with the leading law firms and private equity firms in the bankruptcy practice.

Therefore, bankruptcy judges should treat the decisions of bankruptcy directors in conflicts with creditors as they would treat the conclusions of any other professional a Chapter 11 firm hires.

B. ENHANCING CREDITOR VOICE AND INVESTIGATIVE POWER

In this Section, we argue that enhancing the voice of creditors can cure the structural bias of bankruptcy directors. Creditors in Chapter 11 proceedings are usually sophisticated investors with expert lawyers. There is no reason to let shareholders' appointees prevent creditors from representing

190. The role of a bankruptcy judge is both challenging and, in the current administration of bankruptcy law, somewhat ambiguous. See Melissa B. Jacoby, *What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11*, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 573 (2015).

191. See *supra* Section III.C.5.

192. For discussion of the power of law firms in the bankruptcy process, see generally LYNN M. LOPUCKI, *COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS* (2005).

193. Compare this to directors operating in a highly networked community, such as venture-capital nominees. Because of the significant business relationships of these directors with the controlling shareholder or the CEO and other insiders across ventures, the Delaware courts—in two recent cases—expressed concerns that the decision of these directors whether to reject a lawsuit against insiders would have had significant financial and relationship externalities that would have affected other investments and interests of these directors. See *supra* note 42 and accompanying text.

themselves in matters on which creditors and shareholders disagree. Doing so sidesteps the checks and balances built into Chapter 11.¹⁹⁴

Bankruptcy law requires a public hearing to ensure that professionals retained for the proceedings have no conflicts.¹⁹⁵ Both debtor lawyers and UCC lawyers undergo this vetting.¹⁹⁶ Can a similar procedure ensure the neutrality of bankruptcy directors?¹⁹⁷ We believe the answer is no. The current market for bankruptcy directorships creates a structural bias in favor of the shareholders and the law firms that hire these directors. Even a bankruptcy director with no prior connection to the debtor firm or its lawyers may not want to disappoint them and jeopardize future engagements. This structural bias will remain as long as shareholders and their lawyers alone dominate the selection of bankruptcy directors.

The solution is to involve creditors in the selection of bankruptcy directors. In some cases, this is already taking place.¹⁹⁸

Accordingly, we urge bankruptcy judges to use their broad discretion to implement a new procedure that is likely to solve many of the problems we have identified.¹⁹⁹ They should hold a hearing early in the bankruptcy process in which the debtor will present any bankruptcy directors it appointed, or plans to appoint, and the creditors will express their opinions. The court will then treat the bankruptcy directors as neutral actors only if an overwhelming majority of creditors whose claims are at risk support the appointments. The expression “creditors whose claims are at risk” typically means the unsecured creditors and the UCC representing them. However, depending on the facts, the judge may also include in this category any other

194. See *infra* Section I.B.

195. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).

196. See, e.g., *In re* Project Orange Assocs., LLC, 431 B.R. 363, 366 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a Chapter 11 firm’s request to retain a major law firm because of a conflict of interest with the firm’s major unsecured creditor). See also *In re* Glenview Health Care Facility, Inc., 620 B.R. 582 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2020) (considering the conflicts of interest of the UCC’s counsel).

197. As the judge in the Neiman bankruptcy noted, there is no Chapter 11 vehicle to look at the conflicts of bankruptcy directors—no “application to hire those folks” and “no pleading or contested matter for me to look at the independence of an independent director.” See Neiman Marcus Settlement Transcript, *supra* note 20, at 35.

198. In five of our sample cases, we observe the appointment of bankruptcy directors during the bankruptcy case with some, but not necessarily unanimous, creditor support. In those cases, the bankruptcy directors are something of an alternative to the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.

199. See 11 U.S.C. § 105. Creditors can already investigate potential conflicts of interest by seeking the appointment of an examiner under 11 U.S.C. § 1104 or seeking discovery under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004. However, bankruptcy judges are reluctant to appoint examiners, partly due to the costs and the delay that such an appointment entails. See *generally* Lipson, *supra* note 86. Moreover, our proposal offers at least three advantages. First, it ensures that the examination of potential conflicts of interest takes place at the beginning of the bankruptcy process. Second, it empowers bankruptcy directors who received creditor support as they conduct investigations and negotiations. Third, it encourages firms to ensure that their bankruptcy director picks can withstand scrutiny.

creditors whose rights are subject to modification, including some secured creditors. As for the standard of “overwhelming support,” it should be a qualitative equivalent of the two-thirds majority needed to approve a reorganization plan.²⁰⁰

Absent such support, the court should regard the bankruptcy directors as ordinary professionals retained by the debtor: it should weigh their position against creditors’,²⁰¹ allow creditors to conduct their own investigation and sue,²⁰² and not approve proposed settlements merely because the bankruptcy directors endorse them. Dissenting creditors should be able to present their own analysis using both time and estate funds, as Congress envisioned. This approach reclaims judicial discretion, rather than limits it: when the judge concludes that the bankruptcy director is not neutral, the judge has wide discretion regarding the disposition of the case, as a bankruptcy judge traditionally would.

We realize that allowing creditors to conduct a parallel investigation can delay the proceedings. We will address this concern in Section IV.C below. In any event, debtors wishing to ensure that the court will treat their bankruptcy directors as neutral actors could seek creditors’ blessing of their selection in advance or select individuals likely to receive this blessing. Similarly, bankruptcy directors could gather evidence before the bankruptcy petition to immediately turn over to creditors for their analysis. Streamlining the bankruptcy process should not come at creditors’ expense.

Creditors will likely need information on the bankruptcy directors to form their opinion. Bankruptcy judges could rule what information requests are reasonable to create standardization and predictability. Importantly, however, disclosure cannot substitute for creditor support. Requiring disclosure without giving creditors power over the selection of bankruptcy directors will not cure bankruptcy directors’ structural bias.²⁰³

200. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2019).

201. Bankruptcy directors resemble SLCs that boards sometimes form to handle shareholder derivative suits. In Section I.B, we noted important differences between the two institutions that make bankruptcy directors more controversial. However, under Delaware law, even when a court finds that a SLC was independent, acted in good faith, and made a reasonable investigation, it may reject the committee’s recommendations based on the court’s own business judgement. See *Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado*, 430 A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981). Consistently, a recent empirical study found that Delaware courts are skeptical of recommendations by SLCs calling for case dismissals. See Krishnan et al., *supra* note 47.

202. Derivative standing for creditors is a matter of bankruptcy common law, and some judges and circuits have not embraced the concept. Compare Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. *ex rel.* Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 552 (3d Cir. 2003), with *In re Cooper*, 405 B.R. 801, 807 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).

203. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, *The Failure of Mandated Disclosure*, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 738–40 (2011).

Requiring bipartisan support to ensure director neutrality is an old idea. In the corporate law context, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani proposed to let public investors appoint—or at least substantially influence—the appointment of independent directors who vet decisions in which the interests of public investors and the controlling shareholder diverge.²⁰⁴ The American Stock Exchange used to require issuers with a dual-class share structure to adopt this mechanism to protect the holders of the low-voting shares.²⁰⁵ A similar requirement exists for listed controlled companies in the United Kingdom,²⁰⁶ Italy,²⁰⁷ and Israel.²⁰⁸ Using this approach to make bankruptcy directors accountable also to creditors will protect creditors while preserving bankruptcy directors' ability to streamline the bankruptcy process.

C. OBJECTIONS

In this Section, we respond to possible objections to our recommendations. In particular, we examine the arguments that bankruptcy directors bring expertise to the boardroom, streamline the bankruptcy process, and rid the debtor firm of meritless suits. While these claims are possible, we find no evidence in our data to support them. Either way, our proposal would allow bankruptcy directors to continue to contribute to the bankruptcy process while restoring the balance of power between debtors and creditors.

204. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, *supra* note 23, at 1304–11.

205. See Joel Seligman, *Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy*, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 704 n.90 (1986) (“The limited voting class of the common must have the ability—voting as a class—to elect not less than 25% of the board of directors.”); see also Kobi Kastiel, *Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies*, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 92, 126–27, 127 n.212 (2016) (discussing the procedures for appointing minority directors in controlled companies and presenting prominent examples).

206. In 2014, the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority adopted new listing rules, which require subjecting the election or reelection of independent directors in controlled companies to approval by both a majority of shareholders and a majority of minority shareholders. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA 2014/33, LISTING RULES (LISTING REGIME ENHANCEMENTS) INSTRUMENT 2014, at 12 (2014), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2014/FCA_2014_33.pdf [<https://perma.cc/WT3A-KLZD>].

207. Italian law requires public companies to provide public investors with the power to elect at least one member to the board. See Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, *Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy*, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 383 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).

208. Israeli law requires public companies to have at least two “outside directors” who are independent of the controlling shareholder. Public investors hold veto rights over their election. Public investors also have the power to reelect these directors over the controller’s objection. Removal of these directors is possible only for cause. See §§ 239, 245, Companies Law, 5759-1999, LSI 44 72, 74 (1999), (Isr.).

1. Expertise

A common argument for using bankruptcy directors is that their expertise enhances board deliberations and improves the bankruptcy process.²⁰⁹ In an unreported regression controlling for other determinants of litigiousness, we find no evidence of such an advantage: there is no apparent relation between the presence of bankruptcy directors and the number of objections filed in court. Given that sophisticated attorneys advise all of the firms in our sample, the benefits of expertise that bankruptcy directors might bring, beyond what the lawyers do, are questionable.²¹⁰

Moreover, expertise does not compensate for bias. When bias exists, even knowledgeable bankruptcy directors will not examine creditor claims objectively. The reality is that bankruptcy directors will usually not earn more money if creditors have the best possible outcome.

Our two case studies illustrate this point. Marc Beilinson, a bankruptcy director in the Neiman case, had served on fifteen boards, about half of them bankrupt companies. He clearly had significant experience. However, when he took the witness stand, he was unable to answer questions about the investigation he oversaw, and his answers revealed it had not gone very far.²¹¹

Similarly, when Payless appointed Charles Cremens as bankruptcy director, the company described him as having vast restructuring experience, which was true.²¹² Nevertheless, he conducted a flawed investigation in the eyes of unsecured creditors: he failed to obtain tolling agreements from the private equity sponsors for claims that could expire during his investigation, and he declined to hire an expert to determine whether Payless had been solvent when it paid dividends. This was the most critical question for the creditors' claims.²¹³ Yet it is clear from his own representations that he did not see his role to be zealously prosecuting the self-dealing claims.

Finally, there are ways to bring bankruptcy expertise to the board while protecting creditors. As we suggest above, creditors should have a say on the

209. For studies finding that directors with related-industry expertise contribute positively to firm performance, see DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, *THE FIRST OUTSIDE DIRECTOR* (2020). See also Felix von Meyerinck, David Oesch & Markus Schmid, *Is Director Industry Experience Valuable?*, 45 FIN. MGMT. 207 (2016) (finding significantly higher announcement returns upon appointments of experienced versus inexperienced directors). For a study finding that private equity-backed firms navigate Chapter 11 more smoothly than other firms do, see Edith S. Hotchkiss, David C. Smith & Per Strömberg, *Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress*, 10 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 694 (2021).

210. Bankruptcy directors may help the firm manage financial distress outside bankruptcy. This possibility is beyond the scope of our study, which focuses on how the bankruptcy court should treat them.

211. See *supra* notes 88–90.

212. See Payless Disclosure, *supra* note 119.

213. See *supra* note 134 and accompanying text.

identity of the bankruptcy directors.²¹⁴ This will allow the appointment of professional directors who do not owe their appointment only to shareholders. Shareholders could also appoint bankruptcy experts to the board who do not win creditor support, but the court should not treat these directors as independent. Alternatively, boards can acquire bankruptcy expertise by hiring legal and financial advisors rather than appointing new directors.

2. Speed and Practicality

Another argument for the use of bankruptcy directors is that they streamline the bankruptcy process. Here too, we find no evidence of such an advantage: the duration of bankruptcy proceedings in the presence of bankruptcy directors is similar to its duration in their absence both on average and in an unreported regression controlling for other factors that may affect the duration of bankruptcy.²¹⁵

Even if such an advantage existed, it would not alter the calculus. Emerging from bankruptcy quickly at the expense of creditor recoveries undermines an important bankruptcy policy goal.²¹⁶ Bankruptcy directors could achieve speedy results by undercutting rights of creditors and by deflating claims against the shareholders who appointed them. Our finding of lower creditor recoveries in the presence of bankruptcy directors is consistent with this prediction. And the two case studies we presented above illustrate the dynamics. In both of them, the bankruptcy directors prevented unsecured creditors from conducting their own investigations and quickly settled fraudulent transfer claims.²¹⁷

Another objection to our proposal is that it is impractical because bankruptcy directors are usually appointed ahead of the bankruptcy filing and well before the bankruptcy judge and UCC arrive on the scene. However, in modern bankruptcy practice, creditor groups usually organize and enter into negotiations with debtors prior to any bankruptcy filings. The appointment of directors can be part of those negotiations, and courts could take into account prior creditor support when weighing the independence of a director of a firm that enters Chapter 11.

Objectors might also claim that our solution is impractical because creditors will never support debtors' picks for bankruptcy directors. However, we see no reason to assume that this will be the case. Creditors

214. See *supra* Section IV.B.

215. See *supra* Table 1.

216. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, *Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy*, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 909 (2014).

217. See *supra* notes 88–117, 133–35 and accompanying text.

may well oppose some of the current selections for bankruptcy directors, as no one asked for their opinion when making these selections. But both the selections and creditor views about them will likely be different once debtors know that their selections must receive creditor support. And one can imagine compromise slates of bankruptcy directors appointed to represent diverse creditor constituencies.

More importantly, our solution is the only way to ensure that the bankruptcy process retains the appearance of fairness. If it cannot be made to work, bankruptcy law should revert to the way it was before the invention of bankruptcy directors, where federal bankruptcy judges were the impartial actor in most large Chapter 11 cases whose credibility was key to winning public and creditor acceptance of the legitimacy of the proceeding.²¹⁸

3. Avoiding Meritless Litigation

Finally, one could argue that unsecured creditors might pursue meritless claims in the hopes of extracting a holdup-value settlement.²¹⁹ In theory, bankruptcy directors could prevent this by analyzing claims and settling them with minimal delay to the firm's emergence from bankruptcy.²²⁰ In our view, however, this argument is not persuasive. The traditional tools of litigation management—motions to dismiss and summary judgment hearings—address this concern. Bankruptcy judges are experts in identifying meritless claims and can reduce the bargaining power of litigants with weak claims. There is no need to allow bankruptcy directors to preclude unsecured creditors from getting their day in court.

D. SENATOR WARREN'S PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

In October 2021, after the publication of a draft of this Article, Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced draft legislation to curb the ability of bankruptcy directors to undermine creditor rights.²²¹ The proposed legislation has two components. First, it would give exclusive power to the

218. See generally Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, *Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors' Bargain*, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2013) (discussing the historical cycling in bankruptcy practice, in which creditor groups compete through rent-seeking activity and judges and Congress occasionally restore the balance).

219. One of us has found no empirical support for the view that creditors prosecute meritless lawsuits in pursuit of holdup-value settlements. See Jared A. Ellias, *supra* note 53, at 498. Nevertheless, the perception that they do is a powerful narrative in bankruptcy practice. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, *Chapter 11's Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy*, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (2020); Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, *Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain*, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1932 (2006).

220. See generally Alan Schwartz, *A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy*, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2005) (arguing that the potential for protracted bankruptcy proceedings can raise capital costs).

221. See Saeedy, *supra* note 22 and accompanying text.

UCC to prosecute and settle claims against insiders.²²² Second, it would provide the UCC the power to demand a court hearing to examine potential conflicts of interest of any director.²²³

Senator Warren's proposal is consistent with our findings and has similar goals to our proposal. Her proposal also has the benefit of simplicity and, if adopted, will ensure consistent application by different judges. Still, our proposal has two further advantages. First, it lets the debtor firm appoint experts to navigate the bankruptcy process and receive judicial deference as long as these appointees are acceptable to creditors. Second, by requiring that bankruptcy directors be acceptable to creditors, our proposal ensures that all board actions in bankruptcy, not just decisions regarding claims against insiders, advance creditor interests. This is important as we find that bankruptcy directors are associated with lower creditor returns even when not investigating claims against insiders.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, we present new data that reveal that boards of directors of bankrupt companies increasingly delegate important Chapter 11 decisions to bankruptcy directors. These directors have taken on a quasi-trustee role in Chapter 11, holding themselves out to the bankruptcy court as independent even though they owe their appointments to shareholders. They suffer from a structural bias resulting from being part of a closely-knit community: a handful of private equity sponsors that control distressed companies routinely turn to a handful of law firms for representation and—per their advice—pick these bankruptcy directors from a small pool.

Our analysis reveals that these directors are ill-suited to vet claims against insiders and that their presence is associated with lower recoveries for unsecured creditors. This finding at least shifts the burden of proof to those claiming that bankruptcy directors do not favor the shareholders who hire them. Our policy recommendation, however, does not require a resolution of this controversy. We propose that courts regard bankruptcy directors as independent only if the overwhelming majority of creditors whose claims are at risk in a Chapter 11 case supports their appointment, making bankruptcy directors equally dependent on both sides to the dispute.

222. See Stop Wall Street Looting Act, S. 3022, 117th Cong. § 202(e) (2021).

223. See *id.* § 202(d).