Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law – Article by Richard H. McAdams

From Volume 82, Number 2 (January 2009)
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In reviewing a game theory text almost twenty years ago, Ian Ayres complained that “countless” law review articles “rearticulate the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but few even proceed” to the simplest of other games. Several years later, in what is still the most significant book treatment of game theory for law, Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal Picker began by lamenting how legal scholars had neglected game theory up to that point “other than to invoke a simple game such as the prisoner’s dilemma as a metaphor for a collective action problem.” All of these scholars asserted the great value of game theory to legal analysis and the hope that it would transform legal theory as it has transformed economic theory.


 

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