Adventure Capital

This symposium Article traces the history and rise of venture capital and venture-backed startups in the United States from a business law perspective and explores the current big questions in the field. This examination highlights that after lawmakers shaped the enabling environment for venture capital to flourish, corporate and securities law has responded to the rise of venture-backed startups incrementally but with profound effect. Although business law has not always fit easily with the distinctive features of venture-backed startups, it has provided an enormous space in the private realm for them to order their governance and maneuver with relative freedom. This private realm is a good fit for the needs of startups that drive economic growth and innovation, but their activity can also create lingering issues of social costs and policy that are difficult to address. Grappling with this reality is essential to continuing to foster a vibrant venture capital ecosystem while also developing a coherent business law response to the current wild era of “adventure capital.”

Venture capital has fueled the rise of some of largest businesses in the world.1Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155, 156 (2019). This relatively small asset class produces huge social and economic impact. By one measure, venture capital funds less than one percent of companies started in the United States each year, yet accounts for the backing of nearly half of the companies that enter the public markets.2Josh Lerner & Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation: What We Know and How Much We Still Need to Learn, 34 J. Econ. Persps. 237, 237 (2020). Among U.S. public companies founded since 1968, venture-backed companies account for 77% of total U.S. market capitalization, 41% of total employees, and 92% of research and development spending.3Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, The Economic Impact of Venture Capital: Evidence from Public Companies       (Working         Paper   2021),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmid=2681841 [https://
perma.cc/3AMU-7KRV].
Further, the impact of venture capital is not only evidenced in public markets, but also spans the footprint of disruptive startups operating in the private realm and the technology that they generate. From the personal computer you use to access the internet to the search engine by which you navigate it, the innovation fueled by venture capital touches everyday life in innumerable ways.4Tom Nicholas, VC: An American History 2 (2019).

The industry that produces such outsized social and economic impact is notably of relatively recent vintage and the result of both business and legal transformation. Some of today’s venture capital resembles aspects of the risk-sharing ventures of centuries ago from Genoese merchants to American whalers, but the modern industry began in earnest in the mid-twentieth century—originally coined “adventure capital.”5Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 238–39; Sebastian Mallaby, The Power Law: Venture Capital and the Making of the New Future 18, 26 (2022). See generally Nicholas, supra note 4 (detailing the origins and history of venture capital). It was not, however, until the 1980s when venture capital really took off. In 1979, the Department of Labor changed an Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) rule that freed pension fund managers to take portfolio diversification into account in fulfilling their “prudence” standard.6Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 238–39. With this change, pension fund managers could allocate a portion of their funds to venture capital even if companies in the venture fund’s portfolio were relatively illiquid or failed.7Id. With a greater influx of investment dollars, the venture capital sector grew quickly,8Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15 J. Econ. Persps. 145, 148 (2001) (noting that within less than a decade after the Department of Labor changed its rule, venture capital investment multiplied and pension funds accounted for more than half of all investment dollars into venture capital funds). and in less than half a century has become “the dominant source of financing for high-potential startups commercializing risky new ideas and technologies.”9Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 239.

Although a significant and growing body of scholarly literature examines venture-backed startups, many questions remain open and legal scholars do not often step back to examine the broader landscape of business and legal transformation in this area. How has business law facilitated and responded to the rise of venture capital? What is the social welfare impact of venture capital? Should the law do more to shape the direction of entrepreneurial finance or startup governance? This Article takes aim at stimulating discussion and research about these important questions.

First, the Article traces the history and rise of venture capital in the United States and highlights that venture capital contracting has largely settled upon an established set of practices that create distinctive governance features in startups and the types of companies funded.10The focus in this Article is primarily the U.S. venture capital industry and startups. The distinctive features and set of practices that have become closely associated with venture capital emerged out of the United States, and the National Venture Capital Association estimates that it generates approximately half of the world’s venture capital financing. See id. Notably, however, non-U.S.
venture capital has grown in the past two decades and is worthy of further study as well. Id.; CB Insights, State of Venture: Global 2022 Recap 14 (2023) (providing an overview of           global   trends in         venture capital); Global Guide, Dealroom.co, https://dealroom.co/guides/global-venture-capital-monitor [https://perma.cc/2BLP-97E6] (noting growth in non-U.S. venture capital by geographic region); see also Gompers & Lerner, supra note 8, at 163–64 (noting a shift toward increased globalization of venture capital at the turn of the twenty-first century).
This discussion illuminates how the rise of the modern venture capital industry evolved to rely on laws that enable private business entities and private markets.

Second, it argues that after lawmakers shaped the enabling environment for venture capital to flourish, in subsequent decades, corporate and securities law has responded to the rise of venture-backed startups incrementally and with some challenges or tensions with the distinctive features of venture capital and startups. The big picture, however, is that the enabling nature of corporate law and the deregulatory trend of securities law have facilitated an enormous space in the private realm for venture-backed startups to order their governance and maneuver with relative freedom. This private realm is highly useful for cultivating startups that drive valuable innovation and create outsized economic impact.

Notably, venture-backed startups also create lingering issues of social costs that have prompted rising concerns in recent years. Therefore, the Article concludes by highlighting two promising avenues for developing a deeper understanding of whether a business law response is warranted: a more systematic study of impacts on stakeholders such as employees and customers or users, and further inquiry into whether and when any governance intervention would be optimal using a realistic understanding of a startup’s timeline in the venture cycle. Building a solid foundation of understanding of these issues in the current era would advance a measured approach to the future of business law, while continuing to promote a vibrant ecosystem of startups and venture capital.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the rise of venture capital and the distinctive features of venture-backed startups. Following on this background, Part II examines how corporate and securities law has facilitated and responded to venture capital and venture-backed startups. Finally, Part III identifies and starts a conversation about the big questions that the current regime raises.

I.  THE RISE OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF VENTURE-BACKED STARTUPS

Entrepreneurs have long sought financing for risky ventures.11See generally Nicholas, supra note 4, at 315 (tracing the history of venture financing from the whaling industry to Silicon Valley). The venture capital industry emerged in the United States in the mid-twentieth century with its own unique history, and subsequent decades have witnessed its meteoric rise and establishment as a key driver of innovation and economic growth in society. This Part provides an overview of the origins and development of venture capital, as well as an examination of the special characteristics and governance of the startup companies they fund. Although the venture capital industry continually changes, and startup governance varies by individual company, certain patterns have taken shape that can be described by their distinctive features.12Id. at 9 (“Although there have been some organizational structure and strategy innovations, these have been paradoxically rare in an industry that finances radical change.”); Pollman, supra note 1, at 162–70, 196–200 (describing the distinctiveness of startups and their life cycle and governance).

A.  A Brief History of Venture Capital

Throughout the history of entrepreneurship in the United States, wealthy individuals and family offices have served as notable sources of funding when commercial banks and Wall Street financiers have been unwilling to invest or lend to risky new enterprises.13Nicholas, supra note 4, at 80–90. Wealthy families that “dabble[d]” in investing in “risky fledgling businesses” in the 1940s included the Whitneys and the Rockefellers. Mallaby, supra note 5, at 25. An informal San Francisco lunch club emerged in the 1950s convening a small group of what today might be termed “angel investors” who listened to entrepreneurs’ pitches and made handshake deals, including for the tape-recording pioneer Ampex that was wildly successful. Id. at 26–27. By contrast, commercial banks lacked domain expertise in tech firms and were not a clear fit for risky, unprofitable ventures that might require long periods of funding with uncertain futures and high likelihood of failure. Nicholas, supra note 4, at 107. Insurance companies and other institutional investors were subject to regulatory constraints, a culture of conservative investment styles, and a lack of facilitating intermediaries. Id. It was not until the period after World War II, however, that formalized organizational structures started to emerge to provide high-risk, innovative new firms with financing.14Nicholas, supra note 4, at 107–43. Startup capital before that time was relatively scarce—representing what many perceived as a funding gap or market failure.15Id. at 107–09.

Historians pinpoint several key institutions, individuals, and policies that played an important role in catalyzing the modern venture capital industry. A few highlights are worth discussing here to capture how government policy as well as trial and error from enterprising individuals and firms were required before hitting upon the modern formulation of venture capital investing.

Some start the story with one of the most serious early experiments—American Research & Development Corporation (“ARD”).16Id. at 1; Gompers & Lerner, supra note 8, at 146. The Boston-based firm made high-risk investments in companies working on technology developed for World War II.17Gompers & Lerner, supra note 8, at 146. The firm, established in 1946 by Harvard Business School professor Georges Doriot and MIT President Karl Compton, was structured as a publicly traded closed-end fund and imbued with public-service motives.18Id.; Mallaby, supra note 5, at 28. It did not ultimately serve as a model organization for later venture investors as the public structure ensnared it in regulation that restricted its ability to invest fresh capital into portfolio companies, calculate the value of its investments, and grant employee stock options.19Mallaby, supra note 5, at 30. Further, the firm’s public-service ethos that disdained financial incentives disappointed staff and investors, and prevented the firm from productively abandoning underperforming portfolio companies.20Id. at 30–31. ARD’s inability to impress Wall Street investors and difficulties with its regulatory structure, culminating in a raid of the firm’s offices by the SEC, contributed to the firm’s ultimate end in 1972 when it was acquired by an industrial conglomerate. Id. at 29–31.

Nonetheless, ARD provided proof of concept of a couple of key ingredients for venture investing. First, a single investment—Digital Equipment Corporation—accounted for the lion’s share of all the gains that ARD generated over a quarter century.21Mallaby, supra note 5, at 28–29. This represented an early demonstration of what later became known as the “power law”22Id. at 29. or “long-tail investing”23Nicholas, supra note 4, at 2. business model that attracted the attention of others interested in financing technological innovation. A small number of big “hits” can drive a fund’s success despite numerous other failures. Second, the leader of ARD and a key figure in risk capital during this era,24Mallaby, supra note 5, at 29 (citing Spencer E. Ante, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital (2008)). Doriot, was deeply involved in providing managerial counsel as well as capital to his portfolio companies.25Id. at 29. In his view, founders were the visionary stars and venture capitalists’ role was to provide wisdom and guidance.26Id.

Another important development of the era was the passage in 1958 of the Small Business Investment Company (“SBIC”) Act, which reflected the U.S. government’s effort to respond to the perceived funding gap for entrepreneurial finance.27Nicholas, supra note 4, at 132–33. Under the SBIC Act, a privately-owned investment fund aimed at making investments in qualifying small businesses would be eligible for favorable tax treatment and a government loan at nominal rates.28Id. at 135–36. The program engendered debate between advocates of government subsidy to encourage small business formation and those who believed in market-based solutions.29Id. at 132–35. Neither side received total vindication as the government intervention made clear impact, but it was market players who ultimately pioneered what became the venture capital industry.

Practically speaking, the limitations on SBICs proved too restrictive for pioneering investors in the nascent venture capital industry who sought to finance startups—highly risky innovative ventures with the potential for outsized returns.30Id. at 139; Mallaby, supra note 5, at 41–43. Early problems with violations of SBIC rules, as well as significant issues with fraud and malpractice, led Congress to impose additional burdens, exacerbating the restrictions that limited the program’s utility. Nicholas, supra note 4, at 139. Most SBICs were small and undercapitalized.31Nicholas, supra note 4, at 139. SBICs could not exceed a fund size of $450,000 to qualify for maximum assistance, and “could not compensate their investment staff with stock options, nor could they invest more than $60,000 into a portfolio company . . . .”32Mallaby, supra note 5, at 41. SEC registration rules were burdensome and costly, and SBICs and their shareholders were subject to double taxation.33Nicholas, supra note 4, at 139–40. In sum, these rules were poorly suited for enabling venture capitalists to provide adequate capital to high-growth, innovative companies, and to compensate the investors for their efforts. Despite these drawbacks, or perhaps thanks to the lessons they generated, the program shed light on the legal policies and financial institutions that would clear the way for venture capital and startup entrepreneurship to thrive.34Id. at 142. Because of the structural design flaws of the program, “most SBICs gave up trying to invest in technology ventures. By 1966, only 3.5 percent of SBIC portfolio companies were engaged in applied science . . . .” Mallaby, supra note 5, at 43.

The year before the SBIC Act’s passage, and before ARD had financed Digital Equipment, one of the most significant events occurred in the history of venture capital—a tremor that became an earthquake that eventually opened a new landscape in the orange groves around Stanford University. A group of eight young Ph.D. graduates had been recruited by the renowned inventor William Shockley to work at Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory on developing new semiconductor devices at Fred Terman’s new research park.35Mallaby, supra note 5, at 17. These “Traitorous Eight” young engineers quickly became “fed up” with “suffering” under Shockley, the famous Nobel Prize winning “father of the semiconductor,” who acted as a “tyrant.”36Id. at 17, 21–24 (noting Shockley “was at once a scientific genius and a maniacal despot”). One of the group members, Eugene Kleiner, had a connection through his father to a New York investment firm.37Id. at 24. He wrote and asked if perhaps a financier could find an employer willing to hire all eight as a team.38Id. Their “act of defection” in 1957 “created the magic culture of the Valley,”39Id. at 17. and it was made possible by an equally visionary young banker, Arthur Rock, who was given the letter by Kleiner’s father.40Id. at 24, 31. Rock had already immersed himself in the emerging semiconductor industry and was intrigued by the request from an elite team so he flew out to San Francisco to meet with them. Rock proposed a possibility they had not even imagined: striking out on their own as founders of a new company that he would help finance.41Id. at 32–33. Rock was joined by a Hayden, Stone & Co. partner, Alfred “Bud” Coyle. Id. at 32.

Rock’s vision was radical at the time.42Id. at 35. And, after trying to raise capital from numerous backers without avail, just one wealthy individual willing to fund the Shockley rebels emerged from Rock’s search—Sherman Fairchild.43Id. at 36–37. But Fairchild cut a hard bargain—the eight co-founders put up a small amount of cash in return for 100 shares each, the budding venture capitalist bought 225 shares at the same price, 300 shares were set aside for recruiting managers, and Fairchild put in $1.4 million in the form of a loan that came with control via a voting trust and an option to purchase all of the company for $3 million down the line.44Id. The startup, Fairchild Semiconductor, was wildly successful—within two years, each of the Traitorous Eight and Rock received six hundred times what they had invested, but Fairchild, the passive financier, did even better.45Id. at 38–39. The legacy of Fairchild Semiconductor is enormous. By 2014, seventy percent of publicly traded tech companies in Silicon Valley could trace their lineage back to the founders and employees of Fairchild. Id. at 21 (citing David Laws, Fairchild, Fairchildren, and the Family Tree of Silicon Valley, Comput.      Hist.        Museum: CHM Blog (       Dec.     20,        2016)), https://computerhistory.org/blog
/fairchild-and-the-fairchildren [https://perma.cc/34HW-JGBX]).

Beyond the obvious riches, one important takeaway from the Fairchild Semiconductor adventure was that without dedicated pools of money looking to finance startups, the investors held the bargaining power and the innovators got short shrift. In the 1960s, after a taste of success, Rock moved out to California, and, with a like-minded partner, started to raise a venture fund with a limited partnership structure in which the two general partners would seed the fund with some of their own capital.46Id. at 44. The limited partnership structure had been used by another early venture firm, Draper, Gaither & Anderson. Id. By eschewing SBIC loans and public market money, they raised over $3 million from thirty “limited partners”—wealthy individuals who served as passive investors—and avoided the regulatory restrictions that had held back SBICs and ARD.47Id. They had enough money to supply risky yet promising startups with the capital needed to grow aggressively, and they incentivized entrepreneurs and key employees with equity.48Id. at 44–45. After fund raising, they made concentrated bets on a dozen or so companies, respectfully exercised a measure of governance control with the aim of helping the entrepreneurs succeed, and returned a handsome share of profits to limited partners on a set timeline by identifying and nurturing hits that could find an exit by going public or being acquired.49Id. at 46–47, 50.

A winning formula for financing risky technology startups was finally found—it involved private business entities and private markets. Venture capitalists in the subsequent period built upon these early lessons, fine-tuning investment and governance practices, and pushing for favorable government policies. By the 1970s, several pioneering venture capital firms emerged alongside the early players—including Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins, among others.50Nicholas, supra note 4, at 225–27, 206–14. They funded some of the big hits of the era, including Intel, Apple Computer, and Genentech.51Id. at 201–05, 215–22; Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 239. In this period, the importance of deal flow, repeat entrepreneurship, incentive compensation, and governance support were solidified.52Nicholas, supra note 4, at 203. Venture capitalists learned to lower their risk by actively guiding founders and staging financings, with each capital infusion calculated to encourage the company to hit an agreed milestone and leaving open the possibility of abandoning underperforming startups.53Mallaby, supra note 5, at 59, 81. Silicon Valley became an ecosystem of early-stage finance and entrepreneurship with universities, a pool of potential founders, specialized investors, large tech companies and employees, lawyers with dealmaking savvy, and more.54Id. at 81; Nicholas, supra note 4, at 232. See generally AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (1996) (tracing the history of Silicon Valley and the development of a thriving regional network-based system).

Further, the National Venture Capital Association, a trade association of venture capitalists founded in 1973, lobbied heavily for the legislative change that freed pension funds from previous restrictions in allocating a portion of their capital to venture funds.55Nicholas, supra note 4, at 7. Pension funds joined university endowments, insurance companies, and a handful of wealthy individuals in this nascent asset class.56Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 239. With a supply side boost of capital thanks to supportive policymakers, the venture capital industry rapidly grew in the 1980s.57Nicholas, supra note 4, at 232–34 (“Annual new commitments to VC funds had been about $100 to $200 million during the 1970s, but they exceeded $4 billion annually during the 1980s.”).

Over time it became clear that the venture capital industry and the tech firms they financed were subject to boom and bust cycles.58Id. at 236–37. Further, it remained difficult to systematically generate outsized returns from “long-tail” portfolios.59Id. at 2, 305, 307. The top-quartile funds have typically outperformed the bottom quartile by a wide margin.60Id. at 310; Mallaby, supra note 5, at 376–77; see also Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, Steven N. Kaplan & Ruediger Stucke, Has Persistence Persisted in Private Equity? Evidence from Buyout and Venture Capital Funds 22–23 (Fama-Miller, Working Paper 2022),          https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304808 [https://perma.cc/E2P9-2RXE] (“[W]e do find persistence for VC funds using the performance of the previous fund (and indeed the second previous fund) at fundraising . . . . VC funds with previous performance in both the top and second quartiles outperform the S&P 500.”).
But the overall trendline was one of continued growth and maturation of the industry and the Silicon Valley ecosystem.61Nicholas, supra note 4, at 234–39. By the 1980s and 1990s, a set of practices around venture capital investing took shape which fostered a distinctive set of features for venture-backed startups that remain today.

B.  Venture-Backed Startup Features and Governance

As the discussion so far has highlighted, the rise of the venture capital industry reflected a historically contingent confluence of business and legal transformation. Pioneers of the industry experimented with a variety of arrangements and then settled on a model that uses the limited partnership form to raise and deploy pools of risk capital over a set period of time. Further, the industry matured through the development of contracting and governance mechanisms aimed at addressing the particular challenges involved in financing and nurturing high-risk and potential high-reward innovative, young companies. The discussion will now turn to those practices and their implications for the kinds of businesses that get funding, and their governance.

It is worth emphasizing at the outset that the most fundamental aspect driving venture capital investing is the “power law.” As noted above, this is not a true law in any sense. Rather it is a phenomenon or understanding that a very small subset of deals typically generates the bulk of the returns for a successful venture capital fund.62Peter Thiel with Blake Masters, Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future 86 (2014) (“The biggest secret in venture capital is that the best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund combined.”); Mallaby, supra note 5, at 6–9 (noting “the most pervasive rule in venture capital” is that “each year brings a handful of outliers that hit the proverbial grand slam, and the only thing that matters in venture is to own a piece of them”). As one well-known venture capitalist, Peter Thiel of Founders Fund, has explained, “This is a scary rule, because it eliminates the vast majority of possible investments.”63Thiel, supra note 62, at 86. Why? As no one knows with certainty in advance which companies will succeed, and as innovative startups are highly risky, many will fail or have mediocre returns. For this reason, “every single company in a good venture portfolio must have the potential to succeed at vast scale.”64Id. at 87 (emphasis omitted). Downside risk is limited to the total investment 1x while upside gain could be 100x or more within a relatively short amount of time.65Mallaby, supra note 5, at 251; Mahendra Ramsinghani, The Business of Venture Capital: The Art of Raising a Fund, Structuring Investments, Portfolio Management, and Exits 248–51 (2021) (discussing venture capitalists’ “agony of missed opportunities” and how some firms such as Bessemer Venture Partners showcase them in an “anti-portfolio” of companies they declined to invest in). Venture capitalists are therefore not just looking for startups with the possibility of becoming profitable—they are aiming at investing only in startups that have the potential to utterly disrupt or create industries with large addressable markets.66Mallaby, supra note 5, at 383. Crystallizing this point, Bill Gurley of Benchmark Capital has remarked, “Venture capital is not even a home run business. It’s a grand slam business.”67Chris Dixon, Performance Data and the ‘Babe Ruth’ Effect in Venture Capital, Andreessen Horowitz (June 8, 2015), https://a16z.com/2015/06/08/performance-data-and-the-babe-ruth-effect-in-venture-capital [https://perma.cc/2ZK4-42JS].

Further, the power law operates within an assumption that often goes unarticulated—not only must venture capitalists aim to invest only in potential grand slams, but they also need startups to find an exit within a timeframe that roughly corresponds with the term of their fund. There are just two main paths to a successful exit: sell the company or go public.68Pollman, supra note 1, at 164 (“Unlike traditional closely held corporations, startups are aimed at eventually being acquired by another corporation or transforming to a public corporation—their existence in startup form is understood to be ephemeral like a caterpillar in its chrysalis.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2021) (“Venture capitalists . . . naturally want to get paid. But the way they get paid is unique among funders because it depends on selling the company.”). See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Failure, 73 Duke L.J. 327 (2023) (explaining the M&A trade sale and IPO pathways to successful exit and how startup failures are commonly dealt with by venture capitalists and entrepreneurs). As venture capitalists typically use a 10–12 year term for their fund,69Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1071–72 (2003) (describing typical features of VC funds including the ten-year term structure). VC funds often provide for the possibility of a one- or two-year extension at the discretion of the general partner VC managing the fund. J. Brad Bernthal, The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, 2018 BYU L. Rev. 773, 843 n.276. this dynamic shapes the type of companies they invest in and the way that they govern them.70Mallaby, supra note 5, at 386 (“Venture capital is suitable only for the ambitious minority that wants to take the risk of growing fast . . . .”); see also Lemley & McCreary, supra note 68 (“From the very outset of a startup’s life, VCs (and therefore the startups they fund) are focused on an ‘exit strategy’: a way to turn the VCs’ equity into liquid cash.”). One venture capitalist put it succinctly, “I sell jet fuel.”71Erin Griffith, More Start-Ups Have an Unfamiliar Message for Venture Capitalists: Get
Lost, N.Y. Times (Jan.  11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/technology/start-ups-rejecting-venture-capital.html [https://perma.cc/93KL-N5NS] (discussing how taking venture capital can change a startup’s trajectory and put pressure to grow aggressively).
Venture-backed startups must grow fast to succeed.72One puzzling issue concerns why the relatively short fund length is sticky among venture capitalists despite variation in the maturation of firms in different industries and different areas of industry focus for venture capital firms. See Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 253.

This dual reality of power law returns and the need for exit on a relatively short timeframe distinguishes venture capital and the types of startups they invest in from other businesses or stages of a business life cycle. For example, private equity portfolios typically aim to optimize each portfolio company’s performance and leverage the gains.73See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 115, 130 (2013–2014) (“The literature suggests that private equity firms make certain subtle changes that, while modest, have a measurable impact on company performance. And the use of leverage magnifies the return to shareholders . . . .”) (footnote omitted). They often target existing, underperforming businesses rather than help build new, innovative companies that have a large risk of failure.74See id. at 131 (describing private equity firm practices). Other private businesses include traditional closely held enterprises that range from small mom-and-pop businesses to virtual behemoths such as Cargill and Koch Industries.75Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 619, 626 (2015) (describing the universe of private companies). These companies often begin as sole proprietorships, partnerships, or family businesses, and organically grow over time without a particular aim at exit.76See id. Because of the growth and liquidity pressures that often come with venture capital, a commonly debated topic among entrepreneurs is whether to take financing from such investors. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 71 (discussing startup founders choosing to forego venture capital financing because of concerns about “the pressure of hypergrowth”).

In turn, because venture capitalists are specialized intermediaries uniquely tailored to financing innovative startups, they have developed contracting and governance mechanisms aimed at addressing the particular constellation of issues that these companies pose: uncertainty, information asymmetry, agency costs, and incomplete contracting.77See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 5 J. Fin. 1461, 1467 (1995); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 281, 282 (2003); Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog, Venture Capital Contracting and the Valuation of High-technology Firms 1–26 (Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog eds., 2003); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 473, 493 (1990). In the early stages of a startup, its success is highly uncertain—more so even than the usual new business because startups are typically innovative, not replicative.78See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, The Innovative Entrepreneur 2 (2014) (“Innovative entrepreneurs differ from replicative entrepreneurs who imitate or purchase existing business models. The innovative entrepreneur combines inventions, initiative, and investment to create the start-up.”). Entrepreneurs often have more information than investors and their interests are not fully aligned.79See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967, 983 (2006); Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 37, 40–41 (2006). Contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists will inevitably be incomplete because of the participants’ bounded rationality and their inability to foresee and resolve all potential contingencies.80Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 1731, 1732, 1737 (2017); Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473, 473 (1992).

These were the challenges faced by the pioneers of venture capital, from Georges Doriot to Arthur Rock. And, since the maturation of the venture industry in the 1980s and 90s, a set of contracting practices for venture capital funds and startup investing has become the norm, creating an “interrelated bundle of incentives and protections” that facilitates the flow of funds to entrepreneurs.81See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in Bridging the Entrepreneurial Financing Gap: Linking Governance with Regulatory Policy 54, 71 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001) (“[T]he two sets of contracts [for venture capital funds and startup investing] create interrelated bundles of incentives and protections that allow investors to make essentially blind investments that ultimately end up in the hands of entrepreneurs who go on to create great wealth.”).

Venture capital firms raise capital from passive limited partners, organized in funds with 10–12 year terms, charging an annual management fee and a percentage of profits.82Gilson, supra note 69. Acting as general partner of the fund, venture capitalists make and monitor investments in a portfolio of startups.83Id.; see also Klausner & Litvak, supra note 81, at 55 (“[T]he data show that VCs add value in screening investments, monitoring their portfolio companies, and facilitating the professionalisation of these companies’ management.”). Startup founders and employees will typically have an incentive-based ownership stake that vests over time and takes the form of common stock or options.84Klausner & Litvak, supra note 81, at 62. Venture capitalists invest in syndicated, staged financing rounds for convertible preferred stock that come with liquidation preferences and other protections for downside risk and the ability to convert into common on the upside.85Id. In the seed stage or earlier, a startup might self-fund, raise money from family and friends or angel investors, or participate in an accelerator program. Bernthal, supra note 69, at 789–817; Pollman, supra note 1, at 170–71. Notably, venture contracts separate cash flow ownership from voting and other control rights. Venture capitalists typically participate in board governance and bargain for shareholder voting rights and the right to veto certain major management decisions.86See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 77, at 313. Over the life cycle of a venture-backed startup, as it increases the number of participants with varied interests and claims, the vertical and horizontal tensions among and between common and preferred shareholders tend to multiply.87Pollman, supra note 1, at 159–60. Ultimately, if a venture-backed startup survives past its early stage, governance complexity increases and pressure builds for the startup to find a liquidity event.88Id. at 209–16.

These basic contours of venture capital investing and governance are well understood. Naturally, much more could be said about industry trends and entrepreneurial finance. The point here is to highlight that the basic practices of venture capital in the United States have been established for over four decades now—and have become sticky—fostering a distinctive set of companies and governance in the business world.89As Klausner and Litvak explain, “[t]he success of these contracts is reflected in the high volume of funds invested with VCs” and “the success of venture-backed firms.” Klausner & Litvak, supra note 81, at 54. Although the U.S. style of venture capital investing has been influential around the world, laws and practices in other regions demonstrate global variation. See, e.g., Lin Lin, Venture Capital Law in China 318 (2021) (describing the Chinese venture capital market developing through heavy governmental intervention).

With this foundation set, the next Part can take up the big picture view of how business law has enabled and responded to the rise of venture capital and startups, with subsequent discussion to explore the lingering issues of social costs and policy they raise.

II.  BUSINESS LAW’S CREATION AND RESPONSE TO THE RISE OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND VENTURE-BACKED STARTUPS

As the previous Part has highlighted, the rise of the modern venture capital industry developed to take advantage of laws that enable private business entities and private markets. Both state business law and federal securities laws facilitated this combination.90The focus of this Article is on business law, but notably other areas of law including tax, labor, intellectual property, antitrust, and immigration also foster the environment for venture capital and entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Nicholas, supra note 4, at 317 (“Government has various levers at hand to affect the supply of and demand for venture capital, and policies with regard to taxation, immigration, and labor law have historically been key influences.”).

Traditionally, business entity formation and governance have been a matter of state law. Under enabling state laws, venture capitalists can form limited partnerships for the purpose of raising and operating venture funds, and founders can form corporations through which to engage in startup entrepreneurship. The internal affairs doctrine provides that the law of a firm’s state of incorporation governs the relationships among the firm, its investors, and managers.91See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of L. § 302 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1971); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). Venture capitalists and startup entrepreneurs have predominantly chosen Delaware as their preferred state for formation of limited partnerships and corporations.92See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1737, 1739–40 (1994); Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location, 14 Fla. Tax Rev. 319, 329–33 (2013); Gregg Polsky, Explaining Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 70 Hastings L.J. 409, 411 (2019).

Federal securities law, under the architecture of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, has partitioned issuers, securities, and offerings into two realms—public and private—with each side bearing distinct privileges and burdens.93Elisabeth de Fontenay & Gabriel Rauterberg, The New Public/Private Equilibrium and the Regulation of Public Companies, 2021 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1199, 1201. See generally George S. Georgiev, The Breakdown of the Public-Private Divide in Securities Law: Causes, Consequences, and Reforms, 18 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 221 (2021) (describing the public-private divide under U.S. federal securities laws). Public company stock, once registered, can be freely issued and traded, but the issuing companies are subject to extensive mandatory disclosure as well as active enforcement mechanisms.94de Fontenay & Rauterberg, supra note 93; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109 Geo. L.J. 353, 366–67 (2020) (describing active enforcement of public company fraud through government action and private securities litigation). Conversely, the issuance and trading of private company stock must conform to restrictions of registration exemptions, but regulation of private firms is otherwise light.95de Fontenay & Rauterberg, supra note 93, at 1201–02. Investment funds are subject to an analogous public-private divide.96Id. at 1209, 1215. Since Rock started his first fund in the 1960s, venture capital firms have organized their activity to fall on the private side in both the arrangement of their own funds and the portfolio companies in which they invest.

Given the importance of business law to venture capital and venture-backed startups, this Part takes up the question of how the law has responded to the developments traced thus far and describes the big picture of the growth of the private realm and the wild (and sometimes questionable) adventures of startups in it.

A.  The Evolution of Corporate and Securities Law in an Age of Venture Capital and Startups

Corporate and securities law have taken vastly different approaches to the rise of venture capital since the industry began to solidify, grow, and mature in the 1980s. They have in common one high-level response: neither creates a legally defined category for venture-backed startups.97Pollman, supra note 1, at 162–63 (“The law does surprisingly little to formally define startups or mandate their governance.”). In the public realm, the JOBS Act of 2012 created an IPO on-ramp and the category of “emerging growth company” as a subset of public company regulations with reduced reporting obligations for up to five years. Georgiev, supra note 93, at 246, n.79.

While the key corporate law state for startups—Delaware—has been generally enabling and highly regarded, its case law has not been particularly favorable for startup participants as it is not crafted for the distinctive characteristics of these companies and is instead often made in the context of very different public corporations. Despite these tensions, for the most part, startups are able to take advantage of the enabling nature of Delaware corporate law through venture contracting practices and can avoid ex post litigation, so state corporate law ultimately creates an environment for highly flexible governance practices and a stable backstop, albeit sometimes problematic, for the rare disputes that go to court.

By contrast, securities laws have responded to the rise of venture capital and venture-backed startups with enormously favorable provisions and a deregulatory trend that has facilitated a radical transformation of private markets over the past several decades. The combination of these relevant state corporate and federal securities laws, which are discussed further below, work in tandem to foster a growing public-private divide and startup governance challenges that characterize the present era and raise big questions for the role of business law in the future.

1.  Corporate Law and Venture-Backed Startups

Delaware famously makes and applies one general corporate law.98Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993) (declining to adopt special rules for private corporations when not qualified as statutory close corporation); see also Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1087, 1088 (2012) (“Delaware courts generally adopt one corporate law for various different types of corporations (from closely held to public . . . .”). Delaware has special subchapters devoted to statutory close corporations and public benefit corporations. 8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, Subchapters XIV and XV. Thus, the same statute and case law generally apply whether the corporation at hand is one of the world’s largest public corporations or a brand-new private startup. The rise of venture capital and venture-backed startups has therefore posed interesting and challenging issues of fit between corporate law and startup participants’ interests and needs.

As permitted under Delaware corporate law, venture-backed startups customize their governance arrangements through the organic documents of the corporation (charter and bylaws) and extensive shareholder agreements, typically re-bargaining these arrangements in each round of venture financing.99Pollman, supra note 1, at 205. For an argument against allowing private ordering through private shareholder agreements, see Jill E. Fisch, Stealth Governance: Shareholder Agreements and Private Ordering, 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. 913, 913–14 (2021). Delaware’s enabling approach is a boon in this regard. For example, it is mandatory to have a board of directors, but Delaware corporate law requires only one director, allows for different sizes and compositions, and does not impose requirements of independence, qualifications, committees, or the like.100See 8 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 141. When disputes arise, however, Delaware case law takes a highly fact-specific approach and often imposes its most rigorous standard of scrutiny—entire fairness—when venture-backed startups are involved because they generally lack disinterested and independent boards and shareholders.101Pollman, supra note 1, at 217.

Over time, this divergent dynamic between public and private corporations and fiduciary litigation has become more pronounced as federal securities law has added a layer of corporate governance requirements on public companies, requiring majority independent boards.102See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (discussing federal corporate governance provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1779, 1779 (2011) (discussing federal corporate governance provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010). In addition, Delaware corporate law doctrine has developed more pathways to lighter review under the deferential business judgment rule if certain process protections are followed with disinterested and independent board members and/or shareholders.103Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311–14 (Del. 2015); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 651–54 (Del. 2014). This means that absent specific conflicts or the like, most public company boards would receive deferential review if their decisions are challenged and could likely dispose of litigation in early motion practice, whereas startup boards would not often be so lucky and might be encouraged to incur costly procedures such as banker fairness opinions or special committees that are not otherwise a fit for the norms or circumstances.104On navigating Delaware corporate law expectations in the realm of venture-backed startups, see Steven E. Bochner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board Member’s Survival Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 2 (2016); Abraham J.B. Cable, Does Trados Matter?, 45 J. Corp. L. 311, 312–13 (2020).

Furthermore, some venture-backed startup cases involving fiduciary litigation under the strenuous entire fairness standard have provoked controversy. Most notably, in a case involving a conflict between the interests of the common and preferred shareholders in an M&A exit, In re Trados, the Delaware Court of Chancery declared that directors owe a fiduciary duty to maximize value for the common shareholders as residual claimants.105In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013). Corporate law scholars have pointed out that this approach can give rise to inefficient outcomes that fail to maximize aggregate welfare.106Pollman, supra note 1, at 190–91, 216–19; Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 255, 290–95 (2015); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1815, 1816, 1885–87, 1904–06 (2013). Similarly in cases involving venture capital contracts and the status of preferred shareholder rights, Delaware courts have taken a strict construction approach that has elicited criticism given its potential to disrupt expectations and allocated risks.107See, e.g., Benchmark Cap. Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ.A 19719, 2002 WL 1732423, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Benchmark Cap. Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper Fin. Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003) (unpublished table opinion); Bartlett, supra note 79, at 95–113; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 106, at 1816.

None of these doctrinal tensions have been insurmountable impediments.108For an argument that a special form of business corporation should be created to better fit the distinctive characteristics of venture-backed startups, see Gad Weiss, The Venture Corporation, (Columbia L. Sch. Working Paper, 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4338030 [https://perma.cc/TRP2-ZPTT]. On balance, venture-backed startups and their participants have largely learned to take advantage of the freedom for private ordering and to generally avoid litigation. This latter point is likely a matter of practicality—given that failure or economic realities often make litigation less relevant for startups109Brian J. Broughman & Matthew T. Wansley, Risk-Seeking Governance, 76 Vand. L. Rev. 1299 (2023); Pollman, Startup Failure, supra note 68, at 33.—as well as norms in an ecosystem of repeat players and reputational concerns.110See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 69, at 1085–87. Further, a community of knowledgeable and experienced lawyers has flourished over decades, playing an important role as dealmakers and guides providing counsel to venture-backed startups through contracting practices, conflicts, fiduciary duties, and more.111See, e.g., Bochner & Simmerman, supra note 104, at 10; Cable, supra note 104, at 321; Mark Charles Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (February 1994) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with Stanford University). The National Venture Capital Association has also played a notable role in coordinating a set of model venture capital agreements with annotations about relevant corporate law rules and doctrine. See Model Legal Documents, NVCA, https://nvca.org/model-legal-documents [https://perma.cc/MT69-6Z7X].

2.  Securities Law and Venture-Backed Startups

While corporate law’s response has been a mix of enabling rules with certain doctrinal tensions in application, securities law has provided a veritable windfall to the venture capital industry. The legal transformation to securities laws regulating private markets and companies has occurred incrementally over many years. In the aggregate, this deregulatory shift has been sufficiently dramatic to raise existential questions about the coherence of the securities law framework and its approach to venture capital and venture-backed startups.

First, in 1988, during a period of rapid growth in funds allocated to venture capital, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted Rule 701, permitting private companies to issue equity-based compensation to employees and service providers, in limited amounts, without registering the offering or providing extensive disclosures.11217 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2018); see also Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 867, 870–71 (describing the history of Rule 701). As the history of venture capital illuminates, equity-based compensation for founders and entrepreneurs has long been understood as a key ingredient for attracting and retaining talent in risky enterprises, and the SEC’s rule added important clarity for startups to offer equity compensation to prospective employees lacking sophistication or high net worth.113Aran, supra note 112, at 888. At the time of adoption, the SEC had come under considerable pressure from scholars, industry representatives, and lawyers to create this special exemption.114Id. at 889. And, under continued lobbying pressure from industry players, the SEC has periodically, across decades, increasingly relaxed various aspects of the remaining Rule 701 restrictions, “turning [a] small exemption into a significant channel of securities offerings to household investors.”115Id. at 891–92.

Second, a long trajectory of additional deregulatory actions since the early 2000s has opened the floodgates to private markets and loosened restrictions.116Georgiev, supra note 93, at 223–24. The result is larger, more complex private markets and a regulatory environment in which two firms that are virtually identical in value, number of employees and shareholders, access to capital, and size and footprint of operations can be subject to vastly different regulatory obligations and oversight.117Id. at 224 (describing a “regulatory paradox” of different treatment for public and private firms); de Fontenay & Rauterberg, supra note 93, at 1199–1200, 1205, 1226, 1243 (observing that incremental securities law changes that have occurred serially over the past two decades have produced “two widely different ecologies for firms” and “[a]s a result, two similar corporations, one public and the other private, will be subject to very different corporate governance mandates”). The implicit bargain that venture-backed startups faced through the 1990s of becoming a public company subject to an extensive federal regulatory regime in order to access large and liquid pools of capital has been replaced by a new set of options.

After the dot-com bust and financial accounting scandals of the early 2000s, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, setting in motion a narrative of “over-regulation” amid a deepening decline in IPO activity.118See Georgiev, supra note 93, at 262. While the costs and obligations on public companies concerning governance arrangements, internal controls, and disclosures indeed ratcheted up, a set of market forces including increased M&A activity and greater availability of private capital also took effect.119Id. at 259–63; Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?: The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 83, 87 (2016). The number of IPOs and U.S. publicly traded companies significantly dropped.120Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445, 454–55 (2017) (“From 2001 through 2012, there were an average of only 99 IPOs per year, compared to 310 IPOs per year between 1980 and 2000.”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, C.E.O.s Meet in Secret Over the Sorry State of Public Companies, N.Y. Times (July 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/dealbook/ceos-meet-in-secret-over-sorry-state-of-public-companies.html [https://perma.cc/98EY-QSPX] (“In 1996, there were 8,025 public listed companies in the United States; by 2012, the number of companies was about half: 4,101, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.”).
Shortly after Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 in the wake of the global financial crisis, further increasing regulatory burdens on public corporations, it passed the JOBS Act of 2012, which deregulated major aspects of the rules concerning venture financings and easing startups’ exit pathway with a new IPO on-ramp.121Georgiev, supra note 93, at 264–65; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 181 (2012) (discussing the JOBS Act provisions affecting startups and the private market). Meanwhile, the SEC has done little to adjust accredited investor requirements over many years, despite economic growth and inflation, thereby providing a greater number of investors access to private investments. Id. at 226–27. The percentage of households qualifying as accredited investors since 1983 has increased from 2 to 13% of all U.S. households. Georgiev, supra note 93, at 272. The venture capital industry, startups, and exchanges that stood to gain from the changes lobbied heavily in favor of them.122Michael Rapoport, Tallying the Lobbying Behind the JOBS Act, Wall St. J. (May 25,
2012, 9:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-WB-34693 [https://perma.cc/TUA4-6XBP]  ;           Usha    Rodrigues, Securities        Law’s        Dirty Little Secret         , 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3389, 3392 (2013).
As the “SEC continued to prioritize the deregulation of the private markets in the name of public capital formation,”123Georgiev, supra note 93, at 267. the tables began to turn—going public changed from a rite of passage that successful startups would go through after a few years in the venture cycle to an idiosyncratic, firm-specific choice that could be significantly delayed.124de Fontenay & Rauterberg, supra note 93, at 1238–40; see also Pollman, supra note 1, at 209–16 (observing governance and liquidity pressure building in late stages of mature venture-backed startups). The pathway to exit via M&A became much more common than IPO.125Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.–Dec. 2017 at 94, 99 (“[A] start-up is 30 times as likely to be acquired as to go public.”).

With massive inflows of private capital and new investors to private markets, the SEC’s rationale for its deregulatory trend took an ironic twist away from capital formation to “democratizing” access to private markets.126Georgiev, supra note 93, at 266–68. Delayed timelines to venture-backed startup exits had effectively allowed startups to grow larger and for much of their growth to occur on the private side of the divide.127Mark Suster & Chang Xu, Upfront Ventures, Is VC Still a Thing? 23–25 (2019),
https:// http://www.slideshare.net/msuster/is-vc-still-a-thing-final        [https://perma.cc/7ZA5-7HUQ]; see also     Rodrigues, supra note 122.
“Unicorn” companies that raised venture financing at a private valuation of $1 billion or more exploded.128Georgiev, supra note 93, at 266–68. On the outcomes of the first batch of unicorns, see Abraham J.B. Cable, Time Enough for Counting: A Unicorn Retrospective, 93 Yale J. on Regul. Bull. 23, 23–24 (2021), https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/time-enough-for-counting-a-unicorn-retrospective [https://perma.cc/LZ2G-7JG8]. In 2020, the SEC adopted extensive rule amendments to permit larger and more frequent private offerings to be offered more widely to the general public.129Georgiev, supra note 93, at 267, 272. A number of other regulatory developments also opened the gate to private market investing. See, e.g., Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Investment Company Act Release, 17 C.F.R Parts 239, 274 (1992) (increasing limit to 15% on mutual fund holdings of restricted securities or other assets not having readily available market quotations); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Div. of Fiduciary Interpretations, Opinion Letter   on Private Equity Investments in Retirement Plans (June 3, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/
information-letters/06-03-2020 [https://perma.cc/7YK4-9UPG]   (allowing defined contribution plan to offer private equity as an investment option).

In hindsight, it became evident that a slow-motion series of piecemeal securities law developments transformed the public-private divide and the environment in which startups go through the venture cycle.

B.  The Wild Adventures and Misadventures of Venture-Backed Startups in the Private Realm

With an understanding of the business and legal history that has brought about and transformed venture capital, startups, and the regulatory environment that they enjoy, the discussion can now explore the implications of these developments and what the role of business law might be in the future.

The heart of the matter concerns the enormous space that business law creates for venture-backed startups to operate for long periods without significant governance or disclosure requirements. Accountability mechanisms beyond the internal participants’ private ordering are also vastly limited in comparison with those in the public company context.130See, e.g., Holger Spamann, Indirect Investor Protection: The Investment Ecosystem and Its Legal Underpinnings, 14 J. Legal Analysis 16, 16–17        (2002) (arguing that the key mechanisms protecting portfolio investors in public company stock are provided indirectly by an “ecosystem that investors (are legally forced to) inhabit, as a byproduct of the self-interested, mutually and legally constrained behavior of third parties without a mandate to help the investors such as speculators, activists, and plaintiff lawyers”). Private startups are generally free from securities class actions, short sellers, quarterly earnings pressures, public stock prices, and the like. Further, regulators at different levels from federal to local, in different areas of subject matter expertise, face challenging dynamics responding to innovative startups—their activity might fall into unmapped territory, legal gray areas, or regulatory blind spots until egregious circumstances develop.131See, e.g., Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 Duke L.J. 1841, 1851–52 (2011); Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 383, 383 (2017); Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1561, 1624–25 (2017); Chris Brummer, Yesha Yadav & David Zaring, Regulation by Enforcement,  96 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2024). With limited resources, regulators might prioritize oversight and enforcement of large established companies.

This environment of relative freedom to push the envelope fits the needs of venture capital and startups, which are fundamentally “a machine for running experiments.”132Benedict Evans, When Big Tech Buys Small Tech, Benedict Evans (Nov. 12, 2021     )           ,           https://
ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2021/11/12/when-big-tech-buys-small-tech [https://perma.cc/6NUL-DSBY]; see also Mallaby, supra note 5, at 11–12 (describing the philosophy of venture capital that the future “cannot be predicted” but it “can be discovered by means of iterative, venture-backed experiments”).
Moreover, given the power law, these startup experiments are typically not seeking to hit a single or double—they aim at “disrupting entrenched corporate power” in lucrative markets that could be grand slams.133Mallaby, supra note 5, at 388. As we have seen, venture capitalists are looking for “radical departures from the past.”134Id. at 14. Room for maneuvering without disclosures that would prematurely share information with competitors or potential competitors is important for incubating innovative products and services. Longer timelines for staying private enable startups to try moonshots that might take significant time to develop or find product-market fit.

Recent years have witnessed venture-backed startup activity that has increasingly raised concern about the growing public-private divide and startup governance, however. The private space and relative freedom that are embraced by startup entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have given rise to scandals from Theranos to FTX, governance fiascos such as WeWork, and controversial products and services such as Juul’s vaping technology and Uber and Lyft’s ride sharing services. With a massive influx of private capital over the past decade, venture capital has spread sectorially to startups aimed at widespread industries from health to transportation.135Id. at 13. And with this long timeline and large footprint have come concerns about harms to customers, employees, and other stakeholders, as well as questions about how society is impacted more generally by venture capital.136See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, We’(re) Working on Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Vulnerability in Unicorn Companies, 23 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 505, 508 (2021) (exploring “changes that might be made to rein in unicorns and protect stakeholders”); Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale, Corporate Adolescence: Why Did “We” Not Work?, 99 Tex. L. Rev. 1347, 1349–50 (2021) (exploring “risk-taking and rule-breaking” in “high-tech start-up companies” and arguing that “start-up adolescence is . . . [a] real cause for concern”).

A vivid example of this complex dynamic of startups in the private realm comes from the burgeoning artificial intelligence (“AI”) industry. AI is posed to deliver some of the biggest financial hits of the current generation of startups and it threatens to destabilize countless industries and impact social and economic activity globally in unpredictable ways. Sam Altman, the CEO-founder of OpenAI, which has developed ChatGPT, currently valued at $29 billion, has declared that it is better to continue running the company privately so that his decisions are not limited.137Rachel Shin, Sam Altman Says OpenAI Won’t Go Public Now Because He May Have to Make ‘A Very Strange Decision’ That Investors Will Disagree With, Fortune (June 6,      2023, 2:37 PM), https:
//fortune.com/2023/06/06/sam-altman-openai-wont-go-public-now-decisions [https://perma.cc/75YE-28CX]. 
Altman remarked, “When we develop superintelligence, we’re likely to make some decisions that public market investors would view very strangely.”138Amy Thomson, ChatGPT Maker OpenAI Is Staying Private So It Can Make ‘Strange’ Decisions, Bloomberg (June 6, 2023, 10:31 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-06/openai-staying-private-and-free-to-make-strange-decisions [https://perma.cc/JX9Z-ASUB].

Notably, however, Altman made these statements about staying private while on a world tour of meetings with governments in which he warned them of the existential threat posed by AI. He testified to the U.S. Congress: “I think if this technology goes wrong, it can go quite wrong.”139Noor Al-Sibai, OpenAI CEO Hopeful World Leaders Will Save Us From AI He’s Building, Futurism, https://futurism.com/openai-sam-altman-world-leaders [https://perma.cc/8LFX-7LUU]. And although he originally expressed a desire for his company to work with governments on responsibly regulating AI, he threatened that OpenAI would leave Europe in response to new European Union regulations.140Shiona McCallum & Chris Vallance, ChatGPT-Maker U-Turns on Threat to Leave EU Over AI Law, BBC (May 26, 2023),         https://www                 .bbc.com/news/technology-65708114 [https://perma.cc/
8SVQ-2BVY]   .
He later backtracked after EU lawmaker pushback,141Id. but he could not unring the proverbial bell that raised questions about the dangers of the technology being developed and the sincerity of its stewards’ statements about embracing regulation.

As regulators’ ability to rein in the harms posed by venture-backed startups is often limited as a practical matter, and the protections of public markets are absent, focus has shifted to startup governance and the failures of private ordering to create checks and balances. For over a decade, with more private capital available in a low-interest rate environment and intense competition for venture deals, many venture capitalists adopted “founder-friendly” stances.142See, e.g., Blank, supra note 125, at 101 (explaining the rise of founder-friendly governance); Broughman & Wansley, supra note 109, at 55 (discussing venture capital competition and founder-friendly governance). Some founders have been allowed to act as “monarchs” with “unchecked power.”143Charles Duhigg, How Venture Capitalists Are Deforming Capitalism, New Yorker (Nov.
23, 2020),         https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/30/how-venture-capitalists-are-deforming-capitalism [https://perma.cc/9CDA-HYMQ]; see also Blank, supra note 125, at 101.
Critics have expressed concern that venture capitalists have turned into “hype” people exercising little managerial oversight—“a money-hungry mob” pushing for “hyper growth” instead of the prudent “midwives to innovation” they had been in the past.144Duhigg, supra note 143.

In some instances, utterly disastrous startup governance has come to light. One example is the collapse of FTX, one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges, once privately valued at $40 billion.145Darreonna Davis, What Happened To FTX? The Crypto Exchange Fund’s Collapse Explained, Forbes (June 2, 2023, 10:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darreonnadavis/2023/06/02/what-happened-to-ftx-the-crypto-exchange-funds-collapse-explained [https://perma.cc/W43Z-H3KK]. The CEO-founder was “the paragon of crypto,” and vaulted to celebrity status as he led the startup through rocket-ship growth.146Eric Wallerstein, FTX and Sam Bankman-Fried: Your Guide to the Crypto Crash, Wall St. J. (Jan. 19, 2023, 11:57 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftx-and-sam-bankman-fried-your-guide-to-the-crypto-crash-11669375609 [https://perma.cc/NEH2-7MS8]. After troubling reports came to light about potential leverage and solvency concerns, customers attempted to pull out of FTX, precipitating the company’s downfall. Prosecutors and regulators quickly closed in on the CEO-founder, asserting that FTX had been illegally using clients’ deposits.147Id. Shortly after, the CEO-founder resigned and the company filed for bankruptcy. One of the biggest unicorns crumbled within days.

In the aftermath, FTX installed a new CEO to handle the bankruptcy—the same person who had handled the cleanup of the massive accounting and audit scandal at Enron that had prompted the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.148Dan Byrne, FTX Collapse Is a Case Study in Bad Governance, Corp. Governance Inst. (Nov. 22, 2022), https://www.thecorporategovernanceinstitute.com/insights/news-analysis/governance-causes-ftx-collapse [https://perma.cc/8622-7X6M]. After taking the helm at FTX, he said: “Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here.”149Id. The company had no board of directors—none of the well-known venture firms that had financed FTX had taken seats.150Noam Wasserman, FTX and the Problem of Unchecked Founder Power, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 1, 2022),           https://hbr.org/2022/12/ftx-and-the-problem-of-unchecked-founder-power [https://perma
.cc/7LCY-HSYM]         ; Michael Lewis: Going Infinite 129 (2023) (“All of [the VC firms] caved to Sam’s refusal to give them a seat on the board (he had no board) or any other form of control over the business.”).
According to media reports, “control was in the hands of ‘a very small group of inexperienced, unsophisticated and potentially compromised individuals.’ ”151Byrne, supra note 148. Company financials were not tracked.152Wallerstein, supra note 146. Software was reportedly used to conceal the misuse of client money.153Id. The CEO-founder was arrested and charged with multiple criminal counts, and other top executives pleaded guilty and admitted that they knew what they did at the startup was wrong.154Id.; see also Corinne Ramey & James Fanelli, Caroline Ellison Apologizes for Misconduct in FTX Collapse, Wall St. J. (Dec. 23, 2022, 4:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/caroline-ellison-apologized-for-misconduct-in-ftx-collapse-11671818789 [https://perma.cc/T3PD-FGTU]. Potentially billions of dollars in customer funds went missing.155Alexander Saeedy, FTX Says $8.9 Billion in Customer Funds Are Missing, Wall St. J. (Mar. 2, 2023, 10:12 PM),        https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftx-says-8-9-billion-in-customer-funds-are-missing-c232f684 [https://perma.cc/LJ3G-NZMW].

Apart from governance scandals is the separate concern that with venture capitalists raising and deploying dramatically larger funds, they might end up funding money-losing companies that are creating “disruption without social benefit.”156Martin Kenney & John Zysman, Unicorns, Cheshire Cats, and the New Dilemmas of Entrepreneurial Finance, 21 Venture Cap. 35, 39       (2019). In some cases, startups might in fact be “destroying social value” and crowding out the development of superior technologies.157Id.; Duhigg, supra note 143. Venture capital goes to a narrow slice of potential innovators and not necessarily those that would produce the most social value or positive innovation.158Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 238, 251; see also Nicholas, supra note 4, at 311 (raising concerns that the VC model is “largely incompatible” with financing companies that “require high levels of initial capital and sustained financial support to grow” such as certain companies in the clean energy sector). Even venture capitalists themselves have raised this concern, for example noting, “We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters.”159Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Facebook Investor Wants Flying Cars, Not 140 Characters, Bus. Insider (July 30, 2011, 7:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/founders-fund-the-future-2011-7 [https://perma.cc/UY9E-9BZ4]. And while the social value that Twitter produced is certainly debatable, it compares favorably to many other startup inventions including robotic pizza makers and “Juicero” juicers.160See Yuliya Chernova, More Startups Throw in the Towel, Unable to Raise Money for Their Ideas, Wall St. J. (June 9, 2023, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-startups-throw-in-the-towel-unable-to-raise-money-for-their-ideas-eff8305b [https://perma.cc/NB65-PEMF]; Sam Levin, Squeezed Out: Widely Mocked Startup Juicero is Shutting Down, Guardian (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/01/juicero-silicon-valley-shutting-down [https://
perma.cc/CN53-JHPS].
Commentators have also raised concerns that only a relatively small number of venture capital investors shape the direction of a substantial amount of the capital that is financing radical technological change.161Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 238, 251.

A number of proposals for reform have been offered. These have tended to be somewhat narrowly focused on particular aspects of problematic facets of the public-private divide and startup governance. For example, proposals from scholars and regulators include special disclosure regimes for unicorns,162Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 583, 607 (2016); Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 Ind. L.J. 151, 156 (2013); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 165, 165–67 (2017). enhanced disclosures for startup employees,163Aran, supra note 112; Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 87 Tenn. L. Rev. 983, 997 (2020). expanded anti-fraud enforcement efforts,164Pollman, supra note 94, at 402; Verity Winship, Private Company Fraud, 54 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663, 665 (2020). facilitating private company stock trading for price accuracy,165    Matthew Wansley, Taming Unicorns, 97 Ind. L.J. 1203, 1247 (2022); see also Jesse M. Fried & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Valuation and Governance Bubbles of Silicon Valley, Colum. L. Sch. Blue Sky Blog (Oct. 10, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/10/the-valuation-and-governance-bubbles-of-silicon-valley [https://perma.cc/8P4V-LDYK] (expressing concern for “governance bubbles” in venture-backed startups due to a dynamic of “one-sided market sentiment” in which “structural features . . . favor the expression of positive sentiments”). For a contrary perspective expressing skepticism about arguments that unicorns pose investor protection and other problems, see Alexander I. Platt, Unicorniphobia, 13 Harv. Bus. L. Rev.   116 (2023         ). and reforming the “shareholders of record” trigger for public company status.166        Allison Herren Lee, Remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2021, Going Dark: The Growth of Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy           (Oct. 12,           2021), https:/sec.gov/news/speech/lee-sec-speaks-2021-10-12 [https://perma.cc/C437-MPXA].

Without a more systematic approach to these issues, however, it is difficult to know if there is a problem with venture-backed startups and the private realm, and whether private ordering, new lawmaking, or enforcement could provide a solution. The next Part takes up some of the larger issues and promising avenues for future research.

III.  THE BIG QUESTIONS

It might be impossible to accurately calculate the social welfare impact of venture capital, but researchers have begun to ask this question.167See, e.g., Lerner &. Nanda, supra note 2, at 238. For most industry players, researchers, and others who are involved in some way in startups and venture capital, the answer is intuitively positive—despite drawbacks and harms, the gain is incalculably large as it is a key economic driver of growth and innovation that changes millions of lives.168           See, e.g., William A. Sahlman, Risk and Reward in Venture Capital, Harv. Bus. Sch. N9-811-036, at 2                       (2010) (“The societal return on venture capital has been, and remains, very high.”). The vibrant U.S. venture capital ecosystem is a jewel of the economy that countries around the world seek to emulate. Innovation is not automatically good for society,169Christopher Buccafusco & Samuel N. Weinstein, Antisocial Innovation, 58 Ga. L. Rev. 573 (2024) (arguing that “the law is deeply committed to fostering innovation,” but many innovations are neutral or “simply bad for society” such as cigarette additives, worker surveillance, and firearm bump stock); see also Robin C. Feldman, David A. Hyman, W. Nicholson Price & Mark J. Ratain, Negative Innovation: When Patents Are Bad for Patients, 39 Nature Biotech. 914, 914 (2021) (identifying negative innovation, “in which patent law drives innovation into spaces that are affirmatively harmful to patients”). but “in the long run, innovation is essential to productivity gains and economic growth.”170Nicholas, supra note 4, at 2–3.

As one researcher explained: “Venture capitalists generate private value in the form of fund-level returns, but the social value they create surely exceeds that. That social value is equivalent to private value plus all other returns realized from the technological change that venture financing enables.”171Id. at 316. And on the latter point, “[n]umerous innovations developed by VC-backed firms, from memory chips to recombinant insulin . . . have moved society forward—and in turn, stimulated additional waves of technological development with immense collective impact.”172Id.

At the same time, even those who have a rosy or optimistic view about the aggregate social value that venture capital produces might be uncomfortable with the lingering impacts on stakeholders that arise in the context of venture-backed startups. Further, the rise of founders with unchecked power and the decline in active corporate governance by venture capitalists is concerning to many observers.

This Article offers two promising avenues for further inquiry for legal scholars and policymakers. Although the social welfare impact of venture capital may be somewhat intractable in the abstract, there are concrete related questions that would benefit from additional legal study and debate.

First, researchers can usefully focus attention on studying which persons impacted by venture-backed startups, if any, are systematically suffering harm. Key areas for additional investigation include startup employees and customers or users.

A number of researchers have raised concerns about startup employees developing incorrect expectations about the value of their equity compensation or suffering losses by exercising vested options and incurring tax consequences.173See, e.g., Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 615, 615, 617 (2017) (noting the investment decisions and tax consequences for startup employees related to stock options, and questioning the merits of a permissive regulatory approach to equity compensation for mature startups); Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 107, 117 (discussing stock option-related dilemmas faced by startup employees); Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 135 J. Fin. Econ. 120, 123 (2020) (observing that “[m]any employees use post-money valuation as a reference when valuing their common stock or option grants, which can lead them to dramatically overestimate their wealth”); Yifat Aran & Raviv Murciano-Goroff, Equity Illusions, 2023 J. L., Econ., & Organization at 1, 1, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad017 [https://perma.cc/523C-UV7P] (finding that “employees commonly respond to economically irrelevant signals and misinterpret other important signals,” suggesting that startup employees’ “illusions . . . can lead to inefficiencies in the labor market, which sophisticated employers can legally exploit”). Assessing the value of startup equity compensation is challenging because of the lack of liquidity and a clear market price.174 Aran & Murciano-Goroff, supra note 173. Further, as discussed above, startups rely on Rule 701 to avoid registering compensatory offerings with the SEC, and have limited disclosure obligations.175 Id. at 1–2. Complex and often opaque capital structures add to the challenges for startup employees to evaluate their equity compensation.176 Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 867, 906–08. Venture capitalists typically receive preferred stock, which comes with contractual protections such as liquidation preferences, and is considerably more valuable than the common stock for which employees are typically granted stock options.177 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 173, at 128. In short, an illiquid market, incomplete information, and complex capital structures often make it difficult for startup employees to make informed decisions about their equity compensation.178 Aran & Murciano-Goroff, supra note 173, at 2. A more systematic study of the issue offers a concrete path for legal reform that could temper some of the harms of startup governance failures or fraud as other startup participants—venture capitalists, founders, and executives—are often better situated to bear the risk or avoid creating the harm in the first place.

Another group of individuals impacted by startups that deserves deeper inquiry are customers or users.179 Other stakeholders that startups may systematically impact include suppliers and lenders, though these parties are often more sophisticated and in contractual relationships with startups, and may be better positioned to protect themselves from potential harms. For a discussion of the social welfare costs of financial misrepresentations to various stakeholders generally, see Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1887 (2013). Some salient examples of startups that have harmed users in recent times have included the blood-testing company Theranos, vaping pioneer Juul, and the crypto exchange FTX.180 Rishub Karan Das & Brian Christopher Drolet, Lessons from Theranos – Restructuring Biomedial Innovation, 46 J. Med. Sys. 24, 25 (2022) (noting that “Theranos’ equipment provided inaccurate results . . .  resulting in thousands of unnecessary and negative experiences for patients” including “emotional trauma following false cancer diagnoses” and “treatment decisions . . . using inaccurate diagnostics”); Jamie Ducharme, How Juul Hooked Kids and Ignited a Public Health Crisis, Time (Sept. 19, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://time.com/5680988/juul-vaping-health-crisis [https://perma.cc/M4YA-QSTJ] (“To a remarkable degree, a single company is front and center in one of the biggest public-health crises facing the country: the sharp rise in vaping among teenagers and young adults.”); Peter Whoriskey & Dalton Bennett, Crypto’s Free-Wheeling Firms Lured Millions. FTX Revealed the Dangers., Wash. Post (Nov. 16, 2022, 3:58 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2022/11/16/ftx-collapse-crypto-exchanges-regulation (“In bankruptcy filings, FTX revealed that it could owe money to more than a million people and organizations.”).
Determining whether startups pose distinctive risks to customers is difficult, however. Corporate harms and externalities are certainly not unique to startups—closely held and publicly traded companies are involved in a range of pressing social issues from the opioid crisis to environmental pollution and catastrophes. Nonetheless, one could imagine that startups more frequently pose risks, or uncertain impacts, to customers or users stemming from the innovation or technology that is at the heart of venture-backed experiments. And yet, attempting to regulate the harms from innovation through corporate and securities laws may be inefficient or worse. Further work could be done to bring together relevant research across silos of business law, technology and innovation law, and regulatory and enforcement approaches.

Second, a worthy area of legal focus is whether and when a governance intervention is optimal on a startup’s timeline in the venture cycle. Many observers have bemoaned bad startup governance and even blamed it for major scandals, yet little work has been done to examine how the venture contracting and governance model could change to incentivize active monitoring or whether regulatory mandates are necessary.181Relatedly, business lawyers and scholars could explore whether there are organizational models for incubating and financing “tough tech” that would produce social value. See Lerner & Nanda, supra note 2, at 256.

For example, would additional disclosure, due diligence, independent directors, audited financials, or some other mechanism improve startup governance? Is there a bargaining or market failure that prevents such a governance mechanism from being used in most startups? As many startups fail, particularly in their early stages, increasing governance or compliance costs may be unwise and impinge on the valuable space for maneuvering in the private realm that fosters a thriving startup ecosystem. Further, as startups mature, they are often navigating increasing potential tensions among a larger number of participants and greater costs of bargaining, while trying to find a path to a successful exit.182 Pollman, supra note 1, at 209–16. Therefore, it may be relatively easy to point to startup governance failures as a problem in the abstract, but difficult to find an ideal moment in the timeline to introduce mandatory obligations and to know which solutions, if any, are optimal. As the topic of startup governance garners more attention, it is important to bolster the empirical and theoretical foundations for understanding whether any legal reform is due.

In sum, while the U.S. venture capital ecosystem is a jewel of the economy and a key driver of innovation, it has also catalyzed concerns about social costs which are worthy of further examination. Further inquiry into two key areas—whether any stakeholders systematically experience negative impacts and potential improvements to the venture contracting and governance model—could help illuminate a path for the future of business law in this area.

CONCLUSION

Technology and innovation in the digital era have profoundly transformed business and society. This Article has investigated how law, particularly corporate and securities law, has facilitated and responded to the rise of venture capital that has been the key financial driver of this transformation.

The discussion has explored in particular how, after lawmakers shaped the enabling environment for venture capital to flourish, corporate and securities law has responded to the rise of venture-backed startups incrementally but with profound effect. Although business law has not always fit easily with the distinctive features of venture capital and startups, it has provided an enormous space in the private realm for venture capital and startups to maneuver with relative freedom. This private realm is a good fit for the needs of innovative companies, but their activity creates lingering issues of social costs and policy. Important and promising areas of future research lie ahead to develop a coherent business law response to the current wild era of adventure capital..  

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1341

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* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. Special thanks to Danny Sokol and the participants and editors involved in the 2023 Symposium of the Southern California Law Review. Additional thanks for helpful comments and valuable discussion to Brian Broughman, Elisabeth de Fontenay, and workshop participants at Seoul National University School of Law, the Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance at Goethe University Frankfurt, and Bocconi University.

Regulation by Enforcement

An increasingly common response by regulators to what they view as undesirable market trends or challenges has been a sharp turn toward litigation to introduce novel legal theories and frameworks that could have been the product or subject of legislative or administrative rulemaking. The decision to do so has been met by calls claiming such administrative action to be unfair, and in some instances, illegal.

This Article revisits the New Deal origins of regulation by enforcement, and its more recent incarnations, and explains that as a legal matter, regulators generally enjoy discretion as to whether to make policy through rulemaking, adjudication, or by filing a lawsuit in federal court. However, there are some exceptions to this principle, as well as some reasons to believe that recent doctrinal developments hostile to agency adjudications could reduce the discretion of agencies to choose their policymaking tool, especially when their actions are understood to be naked attempts to grab turf or circumvent democratic norms embedded in the Administrative Procedure Act. In this Article, we analyze the incentives facing agencies when choosing to regulate by enforcement, consider some of the new risks, and lay out a framework for thinking about when agencies should regulate by rule, and when they should regulate by enforcement.

INTRODUCTION

One visible response by regulators to what they view as persistent—or particularly fast-moving—market challenges has been a sharp turn toward litigation to introduce or test out novel legal theories and frameworks that could have been the product or subject of legislative or administrative rulemaking.1We recognize that regulators often deploy adaptive, innovative regulatory strategies when addressing new technologies and market trends. Our argument here relates to analyzing the tradeoffs between regulation and enforcement, two critical regulatory strategies within the larger regulatory toolkit. On administrative innovation see generally, Hilary Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 579 (2019) (detailing the deployment of regulatory sandboxes as an administrative technique); Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 2011 (2017) (noting the significance of administrative innovation within the regulatory toolkit). This approach, popularly termed “regulation by enforcement,” prompted fierce critiques from commentators and the marketplace, often from the standpoint of fairness—and based on an implicit assumption that such regulatory conduct might be illegal, or at the very least, politically motivated.2See e.g., Andrew James Lom & Rachael Browndorf, Regulation by Enforcement Takes Center Stage Again for the US SEC, Norton Rose Fulbright (July 2022), https://www.
nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/df8f5eab/regulation-by-enforcement-takes-center-stage-again-for-the-us-sec [https://perma.cc/F54B-FA8X]; Andrew B. Kay & P. Randy Seybold, Combating Regulation by Enforcement: A Strategic Framework for Responding to State Agency Overreach, Venable LLP (June 2019), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/
2019/06/combating-regulation-by-enforcement-a-strategic [https://perma.cc/7HSH-XMHW] (noting regulation by enforcement at state-based levels). For an early discussion of aspects of regulation by enforcement within the context of international securities regulation, see generally Paul Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: an International Perspective, 7 Yale J. Reg. 305 (1990); Fran Velasquez, CFTC’s Regulation by Enforcement Needs to Change, Commissioner Says, CoinDesk (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/10/06/cftcs-regulation-by-enforcement-needs-to-change-commissioner-says/ [https://perma.cc/2QXZ-MKAH].
In response, defenders of agency action have called the criticisms “bogus,” “misguided,” and lambasted politicians, market participants and even academics, for uttering the phrase.3Stephen Katte, Former SEC Chief Blasts ‘Bogus’ Catchphrase: ‘Regulation by Enforcement,’ CoinTelegraph (Jan. 23, 2023), https://cointelegraph.com/news/former-sec-chief-blasts-bogus-catchphrase-regulation-by-enforcement [https://perma.cc/49S9-75DB].

In this Article, we work to give substance to what is all too often a nebulous term of art. In Part I, we provide an overview of how this particular species of regulatory intervention—visible across multiple issue areas such as the oversight of cryptocurrencies, environmental and social governance (“ESG”), insider trading and antitrust—tests certain assumptions about the nature of the administrative state. Specifically, we show that the work of regulatory agencies is traditionally understood as consisting of creative and destructive functions, mapped along axes of rulemaking and enforcement, respectively. Rulemaking by enforcement, however, blurs the lines between the two, both disrupting and supplementing the rulemaking toolkit.4Generally, the term “regulation” derives from the verb to “regulate,” meaning to “govern or direct according to rule.” Regulate, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regulate [https://perma.cc/B94T-CSBA] (last updated July 30, 2023). In financial regulation, for example, the term regulation typically refers to the establishment of rules and guidelines for overseeing the marketplace. Regulation contrasts with the supervisory function that involves evaluating compliance with applicable rules and ultimately, promoting enforcement. See e.g., What is the Fed: Supervision and Regulation, Fed. Rsrv. Bank S.F., https://www.frbsf.org/education/teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/supervision-regulation; Supervising and Regulating Financial Institutions and Activities, 5 Fed. Rsrv. Sys. Purposes & Functions 73, 74 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUN6-7WA7] (“Regulation entails establishing the rules within which financial institutions must operate—in other words, issuing specific regulations and guidelines governing the formation, operations, activities, and acquisitions of financial institutions. Once the rules and regulations are established, supervision—which involves monitoring, inspecting, and examining financial institutions—seeks to ensure that an institution complies with those rules and regulations . . . ”); Peter Conti-Brown & Sean Vanatta, Focus on Bank Supervision, Not Just Bank Regulation, Brookings (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/we-must-focus-on-bank-supervision/ [https://perma.cc/SW3Q-PG3Y] (“If regulation sets the rules of the road, supervision is the process that ensures obedience to these rules (and sometimes to norms that exist outside these rules entirely). Regulation is the highly choreographed process of generating public engagement in the creation of rules . . . supervision functions as a distinct mechanism of legal obedience—a means by which government or private actors seek to alter bank behavior . . . These mechanisms can be displayed on two axes, between public and private mechanisms, which require the exercise of coercive and non-coercive power.”). Moreover, as discussed in this Article, the regulatory toolkit comprises an array of formal and more informal levers that extend along a continuum of intensity between fulsome rulemaking and enforcement actions. In addition to the hard power visible in rulemaking and enforcement, agencies can deploy “softer,” situational and tailored mechanisms like interpretative guidance, press releases, no-action and exemptive letters, or public statements and speeches that can indicate the direction of agency thinking and regulatory priorities. James Cox, Robert Hillman, Don Langevoort, & Ann Lipton, Securities Regulation: Cases & Materials, Ch. 1(B)(f) (Aspen, 10th Ed., 2021). See generally Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 Duke L.J. 1841 (2011) (detailing the increasing use of “threats” or make or enforce a rule as a useful regulatory device to address fast-moving industry trends); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 294 (1996) (highlighting using empirical analysis and increasing use of best practices as an administrative tool). Thus, while creating important opportunities for advancing regulatory priorities, it invariably raises normative questions about its appropriateness as a matter of legal and historical precedence.

In Part II, we take a closer look into rationales explaining why a regulator might choose to create policy by means of enforcement rather than through more traditional rulemaking.5Or by using intermediary measures, such as no-action letters, interpretative guidance, or public statements. To begin, we first identify what “regulation by enforcement” has meant historically, starting with key precedent and decisions introduced at the twilight of the New Deal era, and moving toward more recent iterations in the last quarter century. Next, we identify what can be understood as a spectrum of possible incentives and motivations behind regulation by enforcement. These range from the necessary—where agencies act because they have no other option, such as when notice-and-comment rulemaking is not possible owing to the absence of clear legislative authority—to the optional, where regulation by enforcement (rather than detailed rulemaking) offers a faster or more expedient pathway to exercise or expand oversight. Underlying these motives driving regulation by enforcement, we highlight opportunities for regulators to achieve a variety of laudable goals, such as promoting the realization of their institutional missions, delivering desirable marketplace outcomes in relatively expeditious ways, and offering a statement of intent on the part of authorities about preferred policy positions in a manner designed to arrest misconduct before it can wreak actual damage.6Scholars have increasingly pointed to the challenges regulators confront in determining optimal policy priorities and trade-offs. See e.g., Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 617, 2020) (noting the high information asymmetries impacting financial regulators in an innovating financial market); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 Geo. L.J. 232 (2019) (positing a trilemma where regulators are only able to achieve two objectives when balancing market integrity, rules clarity, and financial innovation). However, we also point out other less savory possible incentives to pursuing rulemaking through enforcement, as opposed to through administrative processes, including an interest in reducing or circumventing the transparency and accountability intended by traditional administrative processes, and extending an agency’s authority in ways that might otherwise be impermissible, politically costly or even illegal.7See, e.g., Jennifer Huddleston, Supreme Court Considers Case Against Agencies Run Amok, The Reg. Rev. (Nov. 22, 2022) https://www.theregreview.org/2022/11/22/huddleston-supreme-court-considers-case-against-agencies-run-amok/ [https://perma.cc/A56Z-F2UB]; John Joy, The Race to Regulate Crypto: CFTC vs. SEC, Jurist (Nov. 24, 2021) https://www.jurist.org/
commentary/2021/11/john-joy-crypto-sec/ [https://perma.cc/7UJR-SYTA].

In Part III, we investigate the legality of regulation by enforcement and explore these trade-offs in greater depth. In analyzing applicable case-law, we suggest that its legality is more complicated than scholars and commentators might appreciate. On the surface, the strategy of regulation by enforcement is perfectly legal and stands on solid legal ground—well within the authorization afforded to agencies by governing case law. Looking deeper, however, courts have been silent on a more fundamental question: whether regulation by enforcement is legal when it involves more than filling gaps in administrative and legislative dictates, and it is used as a substitute for detailed rulemaking or, even more extreme, in a way designed to undermine the procedural safeguards put in place to ensure informed rulemaking. With this in mind, Part III then moves to examine the appropriateness (rather than just the legality) of regulation by enforcement. Here, the Article inspects under what circumstances this regulatory strategy is (and is not) in line with normative rule-of-law values that underpin the administrative state, as well as expectations that rulemaking be informed and loyal to the values of legitimacy and procedural fairness.

We observe that regulation by enforcement can enable regulators to achieve a range of positive outcomes. It gives agencies teeth to promote their institutional mandates and to generate confidence among the public that the agency is, in fact, doing the job it is charged to do. Regulation by enforcement can thus create efficiencies in agency administration when it produces sought-after policy results (for example, improved investor protections, more competitive markets) at relatively lower bureaucratic cost (for example, with greater speed and encompassing fewer procedural steps). On the other hand, the strategy can also come with notable shortcomings. When enforcement attempts to circumvent longstanding norms of procedural fairness, informed rulemaking, deliberative analysis, and the quality of the policymaking can be diminished, with lower informational content, shallower expertise, and limited public engagement underlying decision-making.8Letter from John Boozman, Senator, to Helen Albert, acting SEC Inspector General (Mar. 16, 2023), https://www.boozman.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0/d/0d9ca45c-01d6-4bc1-b284-888f7
79e9d61/9FE27A1BD55965A2C221EB9F8C301CCE.senator-boozman-sec-oig-audit-letter-31623.pdf [https://perma.cc/33KQ-WGW4] (expressing concerns about the significance of preserving procedural safeguards in the notice-and-comment process, and noting that short notice-and-comment periods can be detrimental for the quality of rulemaking. See generally, Yuliya Guseva, When the Means Undermine the End: the Leviathan of Securities Law and Enforcement in Digital-Asset Markets, 5 Stan. J. Blockchain L. & Pol’y 1 (2022) (detailing sub-optimal outcomes from enforcement actions in cryptocurrency markets resulting in a market environment with less information).
Regulatory effects may be scattershot, where high-profile actions target certain actors but leave others alone. These procedural and outcomes-driven effects can mean that regulation by enforcement can end up suffering from a perception of limited legitimacy, increasing the reputational risks to agencies, as well as raising the critique that agency action may be excessively political and not grounded in the rule of law. Regulatory agencies thus risk being viewed as less technocratic and expert and driven more by selfish, rather than public interests. In such cases, concerns can filter into the judicial review mechanism, and ambitious attempts to engage in regulation by enforcement can run around in which courts rule against the government’s position—or even more dramatically, roll back the general authority being asserted by the litigating agency.9Evan Weinberger, CFPB Appellate Ruling Portends ‘Chaos’ in Financial System, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 21, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpb-appellate-ruling-portends-chaos-in-financial-system?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/LBC4-ULJ4] (on the capacity of judicial rulings to entirely defang agency authority and competence); Lauren Feiner, Meta Acquisition of Within Reportedly Approved by Court in Loss for FTC, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2023), https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/01/ftc-loses-attempt-to-block-meta-acquisition-of-within.html [https://
perma.cc/5VNR-EET6].

Against this backdrop, this Article provides a framework for understanding regulation by enforcement, and examines the historical precedent, legal basis, and tradeoffs that undergird the practice. Throughout, we recognize the complexity of agency decision-making, tasked with maintaining stability, integrity, as well as entrepreneurialism within the market. Our Article situates regulation by enforcement as part of a spectrum of tools deployed by regulators looking to fulfill the demands of their institutional mandates, within tight budgets and under the eye of political critics and an engaged public. As such, the strategy comes with a number of significant advantages and benefits. But it also presents notable risks and costs for advocates of governmental authority, especially given recent Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers jurisprudence that have privileged settled expectations as a check on regulatory innovation.10See e.g., West Virginia v. Env’t Protection Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). See also the Supreme Court’s decision to review the principle of Chevron deference that has traditionally afforded administrative agencies extensive latitude in how they exercise authority. Josh Gerstein & Alex Guillen, Supreme Court Move Could Spell Doom for Power of Federal Regulators, Politico (May. 1, 2023), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/01/supreme-court-chevron-doctrine-climate-change-00094670. Rather than taking a particular side—and seeking to overcome the ideological tensions that have polarized discussion on this topic—we offer an account that highlights the legal and normative trade-offs involved, in a bid to contribute to a more thoroughgoing understanding of regulation by enforcement as an administrative phenomenon of the 21st century regulatory state.

I.  THE RULEMAKING/ADJUDICATION DICHOTOMY

The modern regulatory agency has two principal ways to make policy with the force of law.11For discussion of less formal and softer administrative measures, see infra, Section II.B. It can promulgate rules of prospective application and general applicability that interpret the statutory authority given to it by Congress. This is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act as “rulemaking,” and almost always takes the form of “notice and comment” or “informal” rulemaking.125 U.S.C. § 553. “Formal rulemaking,” is an effort to create a rule—policy with prospective application and general applicability—in a courtroom proceeding presided over by an administrative law judge. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57. It is essentially never used in the modern administrative state. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 106 (2003) (arguing that “formal rulemaking has turned out to be a null set”). Alternatively, it can enforce those rules, and its other statutory authorities, through adjudications pursued either through administrative adjudicatory proceedings or by filing suit in federal court—or through informal settlement negotiations with entities charged with illegal conduct.135 U.S.C. §§ 554–57. In this section, we describe the basic implications and processes required to engage in rulemaking and adjudication. We then illustrate them with some examples from the SEC’s halting efforts to regulate cryptocurrencies, which have been undertaken largely through enforcement actions that are adjudicated either by agency officials or in the federal courts, rather than through rulemaking.14For a detailed empirical analysis of the history of enforcement against crypto, see generally Yuliya Guseva, The SEC, Digital Assets & Game Theory, 46 J. Corp. L. 629 (2021) (noting that early enforcement trends showcased an attempt to create greater clarity and certainty, but that this approach has evolved to become more scattershot and predictable, fostering greater distrust between industry and regulators). It should be noted that some discrete proposed rulemaking has been put forward in the area of overseeing custody of investor assets that can extend to include cryptocurrency assets. See SEC Proposes Enhanced Safeguarding Rule for Registered Investment Advisers, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-30 [https://perma.cc/W8JL-LJK7]. In addition, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have jointly proposed amendments to disclosures made by private funds in Form PF with respect to these funds’ holdings of digital assets. See SEC/CFTC Proposed Amendments to Form PF, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/files/ia-6083-fact-sheet-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD6Z-PWBL]. Finally, the SEC has put out a bulletin (rather than proposed notice-and-comment rulemaking) setting out regulatory stipulations for those providing custody of crypto assets. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121 on Accounting for Obligations to Safeguard Crypto-Assets an Entity Holds for Platform Users, 17 C.F.R. 211 (Apr. 11, 2022).  In the following section we consider some of the incentives the agency must consider when it decides how, exactly, it should make policy—and what the tradeoffs are of making policy through adjudication—that is, by suing the entities that it regulates, rather than via the rulemaking process.15The SEC looks to have increased its enforcement intensity in the context of crypto-related cases between 2020-2023. In 2021, the agency brought 30 crypto-related enforcement actions, a rise of 50% from 2020 figures. By May 2023, the SEC had brought 13 crypto-related actions, putting it on track to beat 2022 numbers by 25%. The SEC has brought around 30% of its 140 crypto-related enforcement actions between late 2021-mid-2023. For a detailed description and discussion, SEC Crypto Enforcement Actions on Track to Outpace 2022, PYMTS (May. 5, 2023) https://www.pymnts.com/cryptocurrency/2023/sec-crypto-enforcement-actions-could-outpace-2022/ [https://perma.cc/84T5-Y6HS].

Conceptually, rulemaking and adjudication are distinct exercises. Rulemaking can be understood as a “creative act.” It might be analogized to legislation—or at least “legislation” in an agency-specific area subject to a particular set of procedural requirements.16Those requirements are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. When Congress passes statutes, it is making laws of prospective application and general applicability, as opposed to a backwards-looking individualized determination.17Admittedly, the APA defines rules confusingly, but general applicability and future effect seem to be important: “agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). When making rules, agencies are doing the same thing. Regulatory agencies embark on a process that is intended to be both open to public observation and comment, and that is conducted on the basis of the expertise that the agency can mobilize in developing the rule, both from resources developed within the agency, and from whatever knowledge that can be harnessed outside of it.18Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; The Administrative Procedure Act generally tries to strike a balance between transparency and the legal basis to act. When an agency promulgates rules with the force of law, the traditional test is found in Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 842 (1984); For further discussion, see sources and comments, infra notes 116–126. The agency drafts the rule, publicizes the proposal, seeks and responds to public comment from interested parties, revises the rule, obtains approval for promulgation from the political leaders of the agency, and then publishes the final rule, making it subject to judicial review.19For a much more detailed investigation into this process, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (6th ed., American Bar Association 2018).

Policymaking through enforcement, by contrast, can be interpreted as more of a “destructive” act. Successful agency litigation stops conduct by a regulated industry, through a cease-and-desist order, for example, a censure, license suspension, or fine.20Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/992R-TUPS] (discussing sanctions that Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) may impose, including “cease-and-desist orders; investment company and officer-and-director bars; censures, suspensions, limitations on activities, or bars from the securities industry. . . [and] civil penalties,” among other sanctions). For a discussion, see David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1155, 1219 (2016). It imposes sanctions in most cases in which the agency wins in court. Agency adjudication is the administrative law version of a judicial proceeding—it looks backwards at conduct that has already occurred and, if it concludes that the conduct violated the law, it imposes penalties.21See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 744 (2002) (noting the “numerous common features shared by administrative adjudications and judicial proceedings”). As with a judicial proceeding, adjudication begins with an investigation by the agency’s personnel, and then the filing of a lawsuit or an administrative proceeding. The government and the defendants then participate in a process of discovery (usually very limited in the administrative law context), briefings, arguments, and a decision rendered old by an adjudicator as to whether a violation has in fact occurred.22The process, notably, can involve courts and judges both internal and external to the regulatory agency. In the former case, individuals litigate issues in federal court; in the latter, cases can be litigated internally in administrative proceedings, which are increasingly subject to scrutiny and constitutional challenge. See Petition for Review of an Order of Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Jarskey v. SEC, No. 20-61007 (5th Cir. 2022) (No. 20-61007) (holding that held that Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the SEC when it gave the SEC full discretion to choose whether to bring actions in an Article III court or before an ALJ). https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-61007-CV0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8N5-M9FH]; Rebecca Fike, Fifth Circuit Issues a New Blow to SEC Administrative Law Judges, Vinson & Elkins (May 19, 2022), https://www.velaw.com/insights/fifth-circuit-issues-a-new-blow-to-sec-administrative-law-judges/ [https://perma.cc/XJF3-LNB3].

As a general heuristic, “rulemaking” refers to an action when an agency behaves like a legislature, and “adjudication” occurs when it acts like a court. However, there are complications. Enforcement through adjudication can take place in courts of law, or in in-house administrative proceedings run by agency officials, the administrative law judges who preside over formal adjudications, or the myriad other kinds of agency judges who decide various kinds of agency adjudications.23As Christopher Walker and Melissa Wasserman have explained, “Some new-world adjudicatory systems handle hundreds of thousands of cases a year, while others handle just a few cases annually. Many are essentially just as formal as APA-governed formal adjudication; others are quite informal.” Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 141, 143 (2019). See also sources and discussion, supra note 4. And, of course, it can take place through settled enforcement actions. In such cases, the agency is not acting like a court at all, but rather like a prosecutor extracting a plea deal, at times before even bringing a charge.24Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 873, 923 (1997) (“although arm-twisting by agencies is not akin to plea bargaining by prosecutors, there are similar grounds for fearing abuse”).

Crucially, policymaking for the future—which is ultimately, the point of rulemaking—can also take on guises that escape simple dichotomies. In other words, agencies can exercise authority through a sophisticated, “softer” range of levers that, while carrying persuasive and expressive power, wield lesser formal intensity and legal obligation than notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication.25Tim Wu, for example, has described agency threats—the threat to make or enforce a rule—as a desirable policy levers, especially within industries that are in a state of change and where there is a high degree of uncertainty within market conditions. Wu, supra note 4, at 1842. Agencies can spotlight their positions using mechanisms like no-action and exemptive letters, interpretative guidance, and even press releases and public statements.26For discussion, Donna Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 924–27(1998) (highlighting the profound significance of no-action letters for market participants and noting that they are often viewed as formal and legal, but highlighting that they express unofficial informal interpretations). See also, Cox, Hillman, Langevoort, & Lipton, supra note 4; Wu, supra note 4 (highlighting the use of threats as a regulatory device). Noting debates surrounding the ambiguity attaching to the definition of “force of law” in the context of agency interpretations, see discussion and analysis in Lisa Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005). Interpretations of law, and in the case of no action letters, the application of law to specific facts—while avoiding the process of rulemaking—can set expectations and impact market behavior. At the same time, such intermediate measures do not possess the hard finality offered by rulemaking or enforcement. Agency staff can always reconsider positions taken in the letters and adjust course (and even abandon it) when necessary. Indeed, verbiage accompanying such letters makes clear that staff disseminating them speak only for themselves, and not the agency as a whole.27Cox et al., supra note 4; 17 C.F.R § 202.1(d).

Moreover, adjudication can involve the application of law to facts in a way that can result in new interpretations with binding effect on how the law is pertains to like circumstances, effectively creating prescriptive direction for regulators and industry alike.28In this way, adjudication maps along a popular and larger debate in legal philosophy, and the question as to whether judges “find” or “make” law. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 37 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that “these judgments will become a ‘source’ of law” resembling “the exercise of delegated rule-making power by an administrative body”). Adjudication can, in the process, draw on the soft law tools noted above, like staff guidance or answers to frequently asked questions, all the way to previous formal rulemaking, to create new support structures for the law that themselves carry legal effect.29See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of their government statutes only if those interpretations have been promulgated pursuant to a rulemaking or formal adjudication, as then the agency has acted with force of law). Similarly, even findings of fact—like whether certain behavior meets a condition precedent for establishing an illegal act or violation of the law—may involve interpreting and expanding black-letter legal requirements, even as fact-finding ordinarily ranks as the least law-oriented task of an adjudicator.30See Hart, supra note 28, at 97 (observing that if courts can “make authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been broken, these cannot avoid being taken as authoritative determinations of what the rules are”).

Securities law offers no shortage of examples illustrating just how consequentially law making can be performed by adjudicators. In what is widely considered to be the most important case for establishing the perimeter of securities law, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court (not Congress) defined the bedrock concept of an “investment contract”—a “catch-all” type of “security” falling outside of more traditional categories (for example a stock or a bond).31Congress defined the term, “security,” in the Securities Act of 1933 and gave the SEC the power to regulate investment contracts in the Exchange Act of 1934; the agency and the courts then had to define what counted as an investment contract and what did not. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Drawing on prior judicial interpretations of states’ Blue Sky Laws, Howey laid out a broad set of standards with which the SEC would, quite literally, prosecute the shifting parameters of its authority for the next eight decades.32See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For discussion of the historic impact of the Howey test on the marketplace and securities jurisprudence see for example, Miriam Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading this Test on a Curve?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2011). It is important to note that SEC staff has issued no-action letters that provide guidance on the application of the Howey test to situations in which promoters are operating within grey areas and in which guidance from the SEC can carry special legal and commercial importance. See, e.g., Re: Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., Response of the Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 25, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/pocketful-quarters-inc-072519-2a1 [https://perma.cc/KT5T-V44K]; Re IMVU, Inc., Response of the Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/imvu-111920-2a1%5Bhttps://perma.cc/Y8EV-QTUE%5D. The 1946 case, which concerned real estate transactions involving orange groves in Florida, declared that an investment contract arises where there is (i) an investment of money; (ii) in a common enterprise; (iii) for profit; and (iv) derived from the efforts of others.33See supra note 32. This court-created framework was intended to anchor a facts-and-circumstances based analysis, and was flexible enough to apply to situations in which investor-risks arose from novel or new financing arrangements. But in detailing these four prongs in 1946, even the Supreme Court could not have possibly imagined the sheer range of schemes and assets to which the Howey test would eventually be applied, from animal breeding arrangements to contracts for death benefits.34See e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group Inc, 494 F.2d 414 (1974) (on animal breeding arrangements for chinchillas); SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (on life insurance benefits); Albert, supra note 32. Invariably, these individual requirements have each been subject to a multitude of interpretations over time as Howey prongs have been thoroughly litigated by parties contesting the ambit of the market’s regulatory perimeter—and whether a particular kind of issuer should be included, or not.35See also, requests to the SEC for guidance and no-action letters to determine the scope and interpretation of Howey. See supra notes 25–26. See also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017) (setting out analysis and guidance on the potential application of securities laws to tokens issued by a decentralized autonomous organization (“DAO”)); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, Investor.gov (July 25, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins-16 [https://perma.cc/T8LJ-MU8C] (guidance on the application of the Howey test to initial coin offerings (“ICOs”)).

To take one example, the Howey Court itself left unresolved how the common enterprise prong should be interpreted. In other words, it did not lay out specific and exclusive criteria to define what a common enterprise should be, and the elements needed to constitute one. To fill this gap, the lower courts have created different tests for the type and intensity of “common enterprise” required to be found to establish that a contract is an investment contract subject to SEC oversight. In Howey, the common enterprise could be found through the service contract, which gave the servicer “full and complete” possession of the land specified in the contract, and permitted the servicer to pool the investors’ money and to then distribute returns from selling oranges to them on a pro rata basis in accordance with their contribution.36See supra note 35. In this scenario, the Howey contract purchasers enjoyed so-called “horizontal commonality” with one another, as the returns to the investors were pooled and correlated with one another pro rata. When seeking out such commonality, the analysis looks at the relationship between the investors themselves to determine whether they were all facing similarly shared risks, collective action burdens and information asymmetries that could be mitigated by the presence of SEC regulation. 

But courts have also found other kinds of commonality sufficient to satisfy Howey’s common enterprise prong. Specifically, “vertical commonality” examines the relationship between investors and a promoter or issuer.37SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (“a common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent on the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties”). Vertical commonality can exist even if investors receive diverging returns as among each other (in contrast to horizontal commonality). Some courts have divided vertical commonality into a “broad” and a “strict” variance. In the case of “broad vertical commonality,” investors need not show any kind of intertwined risk between themselves and a promoter as long as they are dependent on the promoter’s efforts with respect to money management (in other words the promoter gets paid regardless of whether investors make money).38SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-479 (5th Cir. 1974); Albert, supra note 32, at 17–19. “Narrow vertical commonality,” on the other hand, requires showing shared risk between the investors and the promoter (that is, the promoter only gets paid if the investors make money).39For a discussion, see Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 Tenn. L. Rev. 897, 935 (2018); Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.; Albert, supra note 32, at 17–19.

The common enterprise components of the Howey test affect different securities-adjacent businesses in different ways. Consider cryptocurrencies in their various forms. For example, a crypto-token that is digitally developed by a promoter to raise money for a venture and sold to buyers with the promise of future returns from the business might look like a pretty conventional type of common enterprise.40This kind of transaction broadly describes an ICO. There are, of course, multiple other kinds of crypto-asset transaction types, such as stablecoin issuance. On ICOs, see for example, James Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed (UCLA Sch. L., Lowell Milken Inst., Rsch. Research Paper No. 18-13 2018). For a discussion of variety of crypto-asset types and dynamic pathways resulting in token characteristics evolving over time, see Yuliya Guseva, A Conceptual Framework for Digital Asset Securities: Tokens and Coins as Debt and Equity, 80 Maryland L. Rev. 166 (2020). Money is pooled. And the fortunes of the purchasers are linked to each other and to the success of the promoter’s efforts.41SEC v. Int’l Loan Networks, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (DC Cir. 1992). But relatively more “decentralized” cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin look quite different. There is no typical promoter as such.42Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 25, 2017). That said, purchasers of the crypto-token will see their fortunes rise and fall depending on whether the currency is adopted widely and appreciates in value. Because of this shared state, it may be argued that holders are part of a kind of common enterprise, but one that happens to be a uniquely decentralized one. Does that satisfy the definition of an investment contract? Or does the absence of pooling by a central issuer as well as its apparent absence for the purposes of vertical commonality mean that the definition of common enterprise is unable to reach relatively more decentralized cryptocurrencies? 

The definitions of an investment contract—and interpretations of the Howey test—provide one important example of how SEC enforcement through adjudication can make policy—and why incremental litigation against one sort of coin can still leave important questions unanswered with regard to other kinds of coins.43As noted above, see also, the work of the SEC in guiding policy interpretations on Howey through softer tools like no-action letters. On more informal sources of SEC rulemaking, see Nagy, supra note 26. But additional examples abound of critical policy derived by or generated through litigation.44Interestingly, commentators note that that enforcement actions, alongside settlements, undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) are resulting in the creation of a novel body of law on privacy and cybersecurity. For example, Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog argue that FTC’s enforcement actions against corporate privacy policies—generally resulting in settlements—have produced what the authors call “a common law of privacy.” Using its authority to policy unfair and deceptive trading practices, the FTC’s enforcement efforts have produced a corpus of agreements that companies look to when crafting their information privacy policies. For a detailed analysis, see Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2014). For a detailed analysis of varying sources of privacy regulation in the United States, see Anupam Chander, Margot Kaminksi & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1733 (2021). For example, it has been courts that have not only defined what counts as “material” information but have also defined its application for industry standards and practice. What a reasonable investor would find important given the “total mix” of information is both a fact based inquiry and court policymaking that, while based on the specific circumstances of litigants in a dispute, ultimately define the outer reaches of securities law and the agency’s jurisdiction.45TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The meaning of materiality has thus been worked out through a number of enforcement actions, as well as through other adjudications. For example, the SEC has worried that ordinary investors will not understand the material risks posed by cryptocurrency investments.46See Tyler C. Lee, Decrypting Crypto: Issues Plaguing Today’s Hottest Regulatory Nightmare, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 551, 561–62 (2020) (“SEC Chairman Clayton continues to raise concerns that the material facts and risks involved in cryptocurrencies are beyond the understanding of the Main Street investors.”).

In these instances, the line between “finding the law” and “creating the law” can become blurry as the law intersects with unanticipated, real-world operations of new technologies. Cryptocurrencies offer plenty of obvious examples: do staking services constitute an “investment of money,” where the customer maintains control and ownership of staked digital assets? Does it matter when those wishing to stake their crypto assets do so to protect the integrity and continuity of a blockchain rather than for the reward of additional tokens? Does the presence of a permissioned blockchain, in which participation in its infrastructure is restricted rather than open to all—necessarily mean that its native cryptocurrency is “dependent on the efforts of others”? Can an instrument that begins life as a security become so decentralized in its underlying governance that, eventually, it no longer qualifies as one? And if so, what constitutes the legal inflection point at which this transition occurs? Just as these questions involve the application of long-standing principles to new fact patterns, they can also involve exercising judgment about how entire domains of technology, and their supporting operational systems and transactions should be categorized, and under what circumstances. Thus, they represent issues that could well be clarified as a matter of administrative rulemaking or more informal guidance (for instance, through no-action letters). But at the same time, they could also constitute questions that are sufficiently substantive and related to precedent or statute that they end up being adjudicated in court.47For example, in some foreign legal systems, like that of the European Union, questions such as these have been subject to detailed rulemaking. See, e.g., Justin Williams, Davina Garrod, Peter I. Altman, Ezra Zahabi, Jenny Arlington & Alexander Armytage, EU Close to Introducing Groundbreaking Law to Regulate Crypto, Akin Gump (Oct. 27, 2022), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/eu-close-to-introducing-groundbreaking-law-to-regulate-crypto.html [https://perma.cc/6HXQ-KVCT].

II.  WHY WOULD AN AGENCY SEEK TO CREATE LAW THROUGH ENFORCEMENT?

Regulation by enforcement, while effective in times of crisis, is usually a choice, something regulators have themselves explicitly acknowledged.48See infra note 65. In this section, we review the discretion traditionally afforded to regulators, and the logic behind it. We then explore the criticisms and incentives faced by regulators who choose to engage in regulation by enforcement.

A.  Policymaking by Enforcement: The Historical Endorsement

So, why should agency leadership choose to make policy through adjudication rather relying on a more formal rulemaking process?

Regulators do not spend much time justifying their choice of policymaking tools.49For a detailed discussion on the continuum of regulatory priorities and factors governing the decision-making of the SEC in choosing between adjudication and rulemaking, see generally, Don Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1591, 1619–622 (2006) (highlighting the impact of a highly motivated, litigation-minded enforcement division as impacting the choice between enforcement vs. rulemaking). But courts have identified reasons why making policy on a case-by-case basis is useful. The traditional view, as we have observed, is that adjudication creates a common law regime where precedents produced by a series of enforcement actions can give regulated industry direction about the concerns of regulators, while giving regulators the flexibility to take a different approach in the next enforcement action.

The case most famously associated with this proposition is Chenery v. SEC.50332 U.S. § 194 (1947). Chenery involved a breakup of a utility company holding company scheme that allowed insiders to control the utility despite having a tiny amount of equity in the enterprise by a pyramid corporate structure. The Supreme Court considered the case twice, and on the first occasion in 1943, invited the SEC to promulgate a rule setting forth limits on minority control through the holding company structure, something to which the dissent objected.51SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943) (“Had the Commission, acting on its experience and peculiar competence, promulgated a general rule of which its order here was a particular application, the problem for our consideration would be very different.”). The dissent believed that Congress had given the SEC “wide powers to evolve policy standards, and this may well be done case by case.” Id. at 100.

When the agency declined to do so, the Court, reviewing the case a second time in 1947, took the refusal in stride.52Robert Thompson and Adam Pritchard argue that the embrace in Chenery II of the Chenery I dissent’s indifference between policymaking through rulemaking or adjudication is due to a change in personnel on the Court, resulting in declining influence of Justice Frankfurter, who had been a leading thinker on administrative law at the time. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 Va. L. Rev. 841, 900 (2009). It held that “the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”53Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 194 (1947). As the Court observed,

Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.54Id.

The idea is that administrative agencies should be able to engage in discrete, incremental lawmaking via litigation if this happens to be their preferred choice. Like common law, where judges are tasked with making rules on a case-by-case basis, adjudication allows courts and agencies to engage in problem-by-problem or issue-by-issue analysis, building on precedent to create a well-established body of law.55See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design As the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 139, 160 (2004) (identifying “instances in which the U.S. common law model has captured some of those advantages in its administrative adjudications”). See also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 403–09 (1981) (characterizing common law adjudication as incremental regulation). For the Court, this sort of phased analysis may be appropriate when a rule may not obviously be the best approach or if the risks in implementation are unknown. This scenario may arise if there is a novel administrative scheme, or if the costs and benefits of a particular formal rule may not be clear. In such cases, regulators may decide to establish rules via courts as they recognize shortcomings, as opposed to putting forward an entire regulatory framework from the outset, or so the administrative law traditionalists have put it.56See Diver, supra note 55. On regulatory uncertainties and information asymmetries facing financial regulators, see Awrey & Judge, supra note 6.

The limits to agency discretion, at least by this classical account, are few.57For limitations on deference to administrative agencies, see for example, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). In analyzing the scope for deference to rules made by the Department of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Supreme Court highlighted the significance of factors like fair notice, procedural fairness, and substantive consistency of promulgated rules with governing statutes. In this case, the Court overturned rules made by the Department of Labor, noting that, in the Court’s opinion, the rulemaking did not comport with standards of procedural fairness and substantive coherence. Most important has been something akin to a regulatory “eye test”: as the First Circuit has put it, “an agency cannot merely flit serendipitously from case to case, like a bee buzzing from flower to flower, making up the rules as it goes along.”58Henry v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996). Especially when adjudications are made in-house, a showing of very different outcomes for similarly situated cases could form the basis for a conclusion by a court that the agency has been acting arbitrarily, and thus violating basic procedural norms and rules that authorize its work.59Id. (quoting Davila-Bardales v. I.N.S., 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994)) (“[A]gencies do not have carte blanche. While a certain amount of asymmetry is lawful an agency may not ‘adopt[ ] significantly inconsistent policies that result in the creation of conflicting lines governing the identical situation.’ ”) (citation omitted). Still, inaction by agencies—indeed a decision to pursue an enforcement action in one case, and not to do so in a similar case—is largely protected. As discussed below, the Supreme Court has held that an agency’s decision not to pursue an enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable, as such actions are “committed to agency discretion by law,” under § 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), with very narrow exceptions, such as when an agency is totally abandoning its statutory responsibilities.60Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

B.  The Contemporary World of Regulation by Enforcement—and its Critics

Fast forward eighty years, and the deployment of regulation by enforcement has grown in ways unanticipated by the Court in Chenery. Some government officials have explicitly, and proudly, identified their willingness to use litigation as a means of progressing novel legal theories to change the law, rather than merely addressing unexpected or unanticipated facts with which agencies have limited experience.61See e.g., Sheelah Kolhatkar, Lina Khan’s Big Battle to Rein in Big Tech, New Yorker (Nov. 29, 2021) (reporting statements made by FTC Chair, Lina Khan: “Even in cases where you’re not going to have a slam-dunk theory or a slam-dunk case, or there’s risk involved, what do you do?” she said. “Do you turn away? Or do you think that these are moments when we need to stand strong and move forward? I think for those types of questions we’re certainly at a moment where we take the latter path.”). Others have leveraged enforcement proceedings to make policy after abandoning a failed notice and comment processes.62One recent example comes from the CFTC. In 2018, Chairman Giancarlo proposed a revised rule for SEFs—exchanges created after Dodd Frank Act that are intended to provide the regulated venues for swaps trading. The rule suggested that trade reporting protocols should be a part of SEF functionality—and the process for releasing it was subject to the APA, and there were numerous comments received. After considerable pushback from industry, however, Chairman Tarbert officially withdrew the proposed rule in 2020. However, just a year later, the same day as a settlement with a platform for running an unregistered swap exchange facility, CFTC published a Staff interpretation that essentially restated what had been proposed in the 2018 rule and that was officially withdrawn by the Chair, in effect using the enforcement action to state its interpretation of what was now the law. Yet others highlight an interest in sending strong signals to the market, seemingly prioritizing innocuous but “high profile” cases with media personalities to drive home their policy points and underscore their authority in contested fields.63Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Nov. 4, 2021) (transcript on file with the SEC) (“[H]igh-impact cases are important. They change behavior. They send a message to the rest of the market, to participants of various sizes, that certain misconduct will not be permitted. Some market participants may call this ‘regulation by enforcement.’ I just call it ‘enforcement.’ ”). In doing so, commentators have argued that they depart from at least the tone and tactics taken on some other issues in similar circumstances in the past.64In the case of Regulation FD, for example, the SEC publicly admitted contemplating between enforcement and rulemaking for advancing disclosure policy, and opting ultimately for rulemaking:

“Prior to Regulation FD, the legal question presented by selective disclosure was whether this practice violated insider trading law and was thus subject to civil and criminal penalties as a type of securities fraud. Under judicial interpretations regarding insider trading law, the answer has not always been clear.



Against this backdrop of legal uncertainty, the Commission began to see increasing numbers of public reports that issuers were disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to selected securities analysts or institutional investors before public disclosure. Even after Commissioners began to focus public attention on this practice through speeches, reports of additional selective disclosures continued. The issue for the Commission then became what, if any, regulatory response was appropriate. One option would have been to pursue a series of “test cases” charging fraudulent insider trading in some of these matters, with the goal of clarifying existing judicial interpretations in this area. Ultimately, however, rather than engage in what some might call “regulation by enforcement,” the Commission determined that the better approach was to engage in rulemaking proceedings, with full opportunity for public notice and comment, in order to craft a more targeted regulatory response to selective disclosure.”

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Written Statement Concerning Regulation Fair Disclosure (May 17, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htm [https://perma.cc/27BP-P4KR].

Not surprisingly, the flexibility to choose between making rules or making policy through a case-by-case adjudicatory process, has had its share of critics dating back to Chenery. In the last forty years, they have slowly earned greater prominence in both academic and regulatory circles. As early as 1982, Former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel argued that the SEC was using its enforcement powers to enlarge its regulatory turf, and suggested that rulemaking was better for predictability.65See generally Roberta Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution (1982). A decade later, former SEC Chair Harvey Pitt and Karen Shapiro similarly concluded that regulation by enforcement was deployed to “utilize enforcement proceedings to develop new legal theories and remedies.”66Harvey Pitt & Karen Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 149, 155 (1990) (“Unlike many of its sister agencies, the SEC consistently has maintained a vigorous, highly visible, and largely successful enforcement profile.”). Pitt and Shapiro echoed argued “that notions of due process require ample, advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be prohibited, before any person may be civilly or criminally prosecuted for a violation of those standards.” Id. For a discussion, see Nagy, supra note 26, at 1013. For Pitt and Shapiro, the enforcement paradigm, which emerged once the Supreme Court created a private right of action through doctrine rather than an explicit legislative rule, incentivized the agency to try to expand its regulatory powers through enforcement actions that sought to push at the existing edges of the doctrine.67Id. Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). This created fertile ground for a consequential but otherwise fairly “amorphous” body of law, epitomized by the prohibition against insider trading, which has evolved in its application largely through litigation, rather than rulemaking.68See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1999) (noting that it was an enforcement action “that for the first time treated exchange-based insider trading as federal securities fraud”); Langevoort, SEC as Lawmaker, supra note 49, at 1619–620. But see some rulemaking in the area, notably, Rule 10b-5(1) and Rule 10b-5(2), 17 CFR § 240.10b5-1; 17 CFR § 240.10b5-2. For a detailed discussion of the history, Adam Pritchard & Robert Thompson, A History of Securities Law in the Supreme Court, Ch. 5., (Oxford Un. Press, 2023) As detailed by Pritchard and Thompson, the prohibition against insider trading has evolved as a “quasi common-law prohibition” under Rule 10b-5, alongside a much narrower type of statute-based violation under Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934. The statutory track, they note, is narrow but relatively clear. According to Pritchard and Thompson, the case-based, Rule 10b-5-derived body of law is much less clear and more “amorphous” in its construction.

The criticism has intensified recently, especially in the context of cryptocurrency, as well as climate-related and environmental-social-governance-related (“ESG”) rulemaking.69On the history of the term ESG and an analysis of the controversies that have arisen in light of the term’s popularity, including the empirical challenges in demonstrating the connection between ESG and financial performance, see generally, Elizabeth Pollman, The Meaning and Making of ESG, U. Penn., Inst Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 22–23 (Oct. 2022). Critics argue that the agency has made notable attempts to police what it has perceived as “green-washing” and illegal issuances of securities by cryptocurrency sponsors without first offering actionable or coherent rules on the implementation of standards for ESG principles or concrete guidelines to outline when a crypto-asset is a security.70For example, in Spring 2021, the SEC announced the creation of its Climate and ESG Task Force within the Division of Enforcement. This Task Force was created to, “identify any material gaps or misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules. The task force will also analyze disclosure and compliance issues relating to investment advisers’ and funds’ ESG strategies.” Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues (Mar. 21, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42 [https://perma.cc/ZAG5-LY5A]. See also Kevin B. Muhlendorf and Martha E. Marrapese, SEC’s First ESG Enforcement Action Is Latest Move In Agency’s ESG Efforts, Wiley (May 17, 2022), https://www.wiley.law/alert-SECs-First-ESG-Enforcement-Action-Is-Latest-Move-In-Agencys-ESG-Efforts [https://perma.cc/AF9W-RCRF]; Andrew Ramonas, Recent SEC Enforcement Hints at Looming Crackdown on ESG Claims, Bloomberg (Aug. 10, 2022) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/recent-sec-enforcement-hints-at-looming-crackdown-on-esg-claims [https://perma.cc/N44C-2VX3]. Similarly, in the context of cryptocurrency and cyber-enforcement, the SEC has significantly increased its enforcement staff in recent years with the creation of the Crypto and Cyber Unit (formerly, the Cyber Unit), boasting fifty specific positions. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Nearly Doubles Size of Enforcement’s Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit, (May 3, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-78 [https://perma.cc/2Q6L-G9EC]. What rulemaking the agency has done in the space is limited to a proposed reinvigoration of the Names Rule, which constrains the ability of investment funds from inaccurately describing their investment strategy. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investment Company Names, 17 CFR Parts 232, 270 and 274, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ic-34593.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q6L-G9EC]. The criticisms, recently encapsulated by the Wall Street Journal, lament that the SEC’s “regulation by enforcement isn’t working and merely fuels market uncertainty.”71Editorial Board, The FTX Crypto Fiasco, Wall Street J. (Nov. 10, 2022) https://
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ftx-crypto-fiasco-cryptocurrency-sam-bankman-fried-alameda-coindesk-binance-11668122004; see also, James Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 Duke L.J. 625, 663 (2007) (“for the most part, the regulated prefer that regulators utilize rulemaking over principles-based enforcement actions”); Comm. Capital Mkts. Regul., Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 66, 66 (2006), http://www.
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFT-PLG3] (“When new standards are introduced through specific enforcement actions and only later codified as explicit rules, confusion and distrust are likely to be the consequences.”).
For cryptocurrencies, SEC Commissioner Mark Uyeda has criticized his own agency for pursuing enforcement actions instead of making rules. “This is an example of a situation where regulation through enforcement does not yield the outcomes achievable through a process that involves public comment, because without the benefit of comments from crypto investors and other market participants, the commission is unable to consider their perspectives in developing an appropriate regulatory framework.”72Kenneth Corbin, ‘Regulation by Enforcement’ Won’t Work for Crypto, Argues SEC Commissioner, Barron’s (Sept. 9, 2022), https://www.barrons.com/advisor/articles/sec-regulation-enforcement-crypto-commissioner-51662747452 [https://perma.cc/32QV-BG9E]. Another Republican SEC Commissioner, Hester Pierce, also complained that the agency has “tried to cobble together a regulatory framework through enforcement actions.”73Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Regulatory Transparency Project Conference on Regulating the New Crypto Ecosystem: Necessary Regulation or Crippling Future Innovation? (June 14, 2022). Not surprisingly, cryptocurrency entrepreneurs have also loudly criticized an approach driven by regulation by enforcement as regulatory technique.74Brian Armstrong, Op-ed: Crypto Markets Need Regulation to Avoid More Washouts like FTX, CNBC (Nov. 11 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/11/op-ed-crypto-markets-need-regulation-to-avoid-ftx-type-situations.html [https://perma.cc/9RWX-K2AW] (“Instead of putting in place clear guidelines for crypto, U.S. regulators have focused on regulation by enforcement.”).

The criticisms have bothered the SEC under the Biden administration. For example, the agency’s enforcement director has characterized the agency’s approach to emerging technologies and novel investment contracts as something that involves enforcement, but that is not using enforcement as a particular policymaking tool. As Director Gurbir Grewal noted in a keynote address, “this is not ‘regulation by enforcement.’ This is not ‘regulation by enforcement.’ This is not ‘regulation by enforcement.’ There. I have said it thrice and what I tell you three times is true.”75Gurbir Grewal, Director, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Div. Enf’t, Remarks at the 2021 SEC Regulation Outside the United States—Scott Friestad Memorial Keynote Address (Nov. 8, 2021) (on file with Sec. Exch. Comm’n).

Notwithstanding such statements, accumulating critiques have set the stage over the years for considerable push-back striking at regulation by enforcement..76Still, courts have tried to preserve the integrity of enforcement, and even in some instances incented adversarial process. For example, when the SEC proposed to settle cases against banks in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis without obligating them to admit any wrongdoing, judges questioned the policy and tried to throw out some of the settlements as being nonbinding–taking on regulation by enforcement by incenting more adversarial proceedings. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated and remanded, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A] n allegation that is neither admitted nor denied is simply that, an allegation. It has no evidentiary value and no collateral estoppel effect.”). See, e.g., Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 Mich. St. Int’l .L. Rev. 961, 988 (2014) (declining to approve proposed settlement). The SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy has been questioned by several judges, most notably Judge Jed Rakoff. As, for example, the SEC diverted more cases to administrative adjudicatory proceedings, the securities bar responded with a successful effort to characterize these proceedings as technically unconstitutional based on the relative independence of agency adjudicators from political oversight.77Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). As a result, the courts have started to demand that administrative proceedings be politically controlled, an idea usually inconsistent with the fact that an individual should be entitled to a hearing before an unbiased judge. And even more recently, defendants have pushed to vacate civil monetary judgments based on the structure of regulatory agencies and “unprecedented agency action that ignores fundamental constitutional principles.”78Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Pro. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, No. 19-7, slip op. (2020). These tactics, grounded in separation of powers arguments, have found a receptive audience at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and ushered in a reduction in agency independence.79PHH Corp.. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. Ct of App., 2018). For a discussion, see David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 Yale J.  Reg. 708, 754 (2020).

C.  A Continuum of Agency Incentives Driving Regulation by Enforcement

Many attempts to undermine regulation by enforcement are indirect and at times lead to outcomes eroding governmental supervision that are, in our view, inconsistent with the best interests of regulators and industry alike. Still, the rising tide of criticism is important insofar as it highlights an underappreciated theoretical and practical reality—namely, that there are a range of possible incentives that can drive the adoption of regulation by enforcement, or at least make it more attractive.80See also, Langevoort, SEC as Lawmaker, supra note 49, at 1619–21. Sometimes these incentives push agencies to enforce for the right reasons—regulators are unsure how to proceed, and so make policy on a case-by-case basis. By taking this careful approach, the damage of a bad choice is limited. In other cases, however, viewed more skeptically, regulators can use enforcement to avoid the burdens of other kinds of rulemaking—processes designed to make policymaking decisions better informed and more accountable.

We think that when regulators turn to adjudication, their incentives to do so can thus plausibly be characterized as lying along a continuum ranging from an interest in cautious case-by-case refinement and regulatory modulation to attempts to bypass administrative controls intended to enhance public participation and review. We have identified the bull case for regulation by enforcement as an essential gap filler and crisis response mechanism. For example, such an approach can reap gains where rulemaking still lags in its early stages or if its application and impact may be unclear. Regulation by enforcement can step in to tamp down on public harms in the absence of a clear rule or one that is under development. We have also explained that, as a matter of administrative law, courts have generally deferred to agency choices to prosecute, instead of legislating. But it is worth highlighting that there is a bare case, with tradeoffs that extend beyond the more usual concerns about whether regulation by enforcement makes for an unpredictable, unclear, and more ad hoc regulatory system.81See e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. Banking, Housing & Urban Affs., Toomey: SEC’s Regulation-by-Enforcement Approach Harmed Consumers (July 28, 2022), https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/toomey-secs-regulation-by-enforcement-approach-harmed-consumers [https://perma.cc/WAY5-96L5].

First, agencies could pursue adjudications, or at a minimum find adjudication attractive, insofar as it enables rulemaking in ways that avoid the kind of public scrutiny and involvement entailed in administrative procedure. Normally, the rule writing process is just that—a process that, by definition, is intended to attract attention and inspection. The most visible and significant element of such review is the notice-and-comment process, designed to encourage commentary on rulemaking in ways that expose it to critique, criticism, and refinement. During notice-and-comment, new proposals are exposed to review by industry and civil society, and agencies are often required to, at a minimum, respond to the concerns raised in the review.82A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, Fed. Reg., https://www.federalregister.
gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/758S-NU8U].

While this is how rulemaking is meant to work, the standard process can create political obstacles that draw negative media attention, private sector pushback, and can end up diluting or strengthening proposals in ways that might be out-of-sync with the views of agency leadership. The potential for such frictions provides one reason why adjudication can be such an attractive administrative tool. Adjudications limit the required responsiveness of agencies to the sort of wide-ranging assessments and suggestions that notice-and-comment rulemaking entails. Furthermore, they channel primary responsibility of dissent to the particular defendant selected by an agency to be the subject of an enforcement action. In this way, agencies can choose to set the terms of a debate, and even rope in other actors without necessarily giving them their day in court or a direct opportunity to participate.83For example, the SEC’s 2022 complaint against three cryptocurrency traders is illustrative of an approach whose fullest regulatory implications can extend well beyond the actors and issues laid out in the case itself. In this instance, the SEC brought charges for insider trading in violation of securities rules against three crypto-traders, one of whom worked for the crypto-exchange, Coinbase Inc. In its complaint, the SEC offered the argument that the defendants were involved in insider trading with respect to nine “crypto-asset securities,” thus triggering the application of insider trading rules. This case comes with a number of intriguing and expansive implications. First, while alleging that nine coins were crypto-asset securities, the SEC did not sue the issuers of these assets as part of the complaint. In addition, by suggesting that these coins were securities, the SEC also raised the prospect that any crypto-exchanges hosting trading in these assets could face potential sanction for doing so. However, in the complaint itself, the SEC did not sue any exchange transacting in these assets, nor did it explicitly threaten them. As commentators note, this enforcement strategy appears especially tricky by causing a number of coins to become viewed as “securities,” owing to the fact that the onus of showing that they are not ends up falling on three defendants, rather than issuers or exchanges that may be better placed to absorb the costs of making that case. They can also potentially extract negotiated settlements from weaker or vulnerable actors without even ever having to go to court, and by publicizing the terms of the settlement and the infraction shape the public perception as to what the law “is.”

Practically, adjudication can also enable agencies to bypass some internal restraints accompanying administrative rulemaking.84Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rulemaking in the 21st Century (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015); Langevoort, SEC as Lawmaker, supra note 49, at 1619 (“As administrative law has long worried, enforcement actions bypass controls, such as notice, comment, and judicial review, designed to introduce deliberation and accountability.”). Following the decision of the DC Circuit in Business Roundtable vs. SEC, agency rulemaking must be supported, in most instances, by a detailed cost-benefit analysis in order for it to pass muster.85Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The demand to produce such analyses in the promulgation of a rule means that agencies must demonstrate that their rule has been developed in a way that considers costs, if not numerically, then at least seriously.86See id. In Business Roundtable, the court faulted the SEC for failing to consider the entirety of the costs that would be imposed on public companies if long term minority shareholders could place dissident candidates on the same ballot as management nominees to the board in the annual vote by shareholders. In NAM v. SEC, however, the same court allowed the SEC to not try to calculate the benefits of a rule designed to help to end a civil war in central Africa because those benefits would be difficult to calculate, and whatever the outcome of a cost benefit analysis, Congress had ordered the SEC to try to help in ending the war. NAM v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As the D.C. Circuit put it, “the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified,” it risks reversal for failing to follow its legal requirement that it consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation in its rulemakings.87See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144. That court also faulted the SEC’s evaluation of costs and benefits in an earlier case. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Often, this means employing experts (for example, economists) that can develop an unimpeachable economic case to support the rule. Otherwise, the rule might be challenged and struck down in court as one that is arbitrary and capricious. 88Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (requiring reviewing courts to take a “hard look” at agency policymaking make with the force of law). All the while, most of the records involved in the analysis are “FOIAable,” enabling any member of the public the right to access scrutinize them—and use them as the basis for potential criticism of agency leaders or even litigation.89David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 Yale J. Reg. 708, 751 (2020). This process has generated intermittent risks to agency rulemaking. For example, in reviewing a rule designed to reduce human rights abuses from armed groups financed by conflict minerals, academics and industry pointed to extensive shortcomings in the SEC’s analysis, noting deficiencies in modeling, the assumptions being made in these models, and resulting cost estimates. More recently, SEC’s 2022 proposal to regulate climate disclosure has attracted critique for its cost-benefit analysis by industry and lobbying groups. Notably, such critiques may derive from self-interest or ideological disagreement with the goals of the regulation. Nevertheless, precisely because agencies are constantly under the spotlight for their expertise, research and economic analysis, rulemaking entails procedural steps and strategy designed to ensure that it is informed and methodologically robust. In particularly contentious, ideological or high-stakes areas of oversight, playing offense by litigating—as opposed to engaging in rulemaking and waiting to be sued—can present a lower risk route to making policy.

Additionally, adjudication need not be as rigorous as typical administrative processes. As Jim Cox has observed, “when the SEC brings enforcement actions, it does not have to do cost-benefit analysis.”90James D. Cox, Headwinds Confronting the SEC, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 105, 107 (2013). Additionally, while litigation itself consists of a (potentially long and winding) process, it does immediately signal the policy posture of the agency without opening the agency up to the same kinds of risks entailed in rulemaking. The administrative checks of rulemaking, for better or worse, can be mostly avoided by pursuing an enforcement action.

Adjudication also enables agencies to shift responsibility for rulemaking to the courts, a shirking strategy.91The typical armchair economic incentives invoked in these contexts are rather at odds with one another. See, e.g., Xingxing Li, The Cross-Border Transplantation of Variable Universal Life Insurance: The Evolution and the Regulatory Challenges, 20 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 279, 326 (2021) (noting cases in which “an agency’s typical behavior is shirking responsibility in spite of their tendency to relentlessly expand their turf”). In short, regulatory agencies, especially when faced with politically difficult choices, may wish to punt the ultimate responsibility for crafting particular rules to other actors. To the extent that legislation is not forthcoming, agencies may view courts as more optimal forums for hashing out difficult questions in ways that relieve agencies of the pressure, or responsibility, associated with “making law” through the administrative process. As a part of this balancing process, agency administration may also be tempted to view an enforcement decision as a way to relieve relevant leaders of the need to confront the criticism involved in taking on contentious rulemaking. Generously, adjudication may arguably be seen as an expression of administrative modesty. More critically, it may be viewed as a kind of shirking or avoidance in cases in which regulators should really be coming forward to engage in detailed and ambitious rulemaking.

In other situations, agencies could alternatively turn to adjudication as an expressly political act. Litigation is, by definition, a confrontational exercise, whether in order to enforce existing rules or to make new policy. As a result, regulation by enforcement presents an opportunity for agencies to signify their interest in taking action in ways that conform with certain policy or ideological moorings. Litigation can be designed to bolster or echo the Executive’s priorities or the priorities of key members of Congress to demonstrate high performance and in the process, enhance the career prospects of agency leaders. Alternatively, agencies could perceive certain forms of conduct as especially odious or dubious, and as a result, wish to engage in litigation as a more effective route of bringing media attention to the issue than the rulemaking process.

Finally, regulation by enforcement, even in the case of unsuccessful or discredited lawsuits, offers a means to extend the regulatory perimeter in ways unavailable under more conventional administrative rulemaking. To fully understand this particular strategy, it is important to understand that enforcement actions, particularly when exercised in novel ways, can freeze activity in the sector targeted by an agency. For example, by asserting that a particular digital asset is a security, a lawsuit can cool or temper the production or trading of that and similar digital assets. One question raised by the SEC vs. Wahi litigation, for example, was whether the mere claim by the SEC that a token was a security might prompt platforms that offer trading to preemptively delist it and any others deemed similar to avoid any potential punishment for themselves.92See e.g., Andrew Hinkes, Richard Kerr & Keri Riemer, SEC v. Wahi: An Enforcement Action Impacting the Broader Crypto/Digital Assets and Investment Management Industries, K&L Gates (Aug. 23, 2022), https://www.klgates.com/SEC-v-Wahi-An-Enforcement-Action-Impacting-the-Broader-Crypto/Digital-Assets-and-Investment-Management-Industries-8-23-2022 [https://perma.cc/N9XD-CNX5]. This kind of preemptive deterrence effect takes place the moment the litigation is filed and can remain in effect for as long as the litigation is arising. As a consequence, the act of litigation can have an injunctive impact on actors, regardless of its merits, but with potentially high upside for a regulator. If successful, the suit helps to establish precedent that cannot be undone by future agencies; if unsuccessful, the suit chills politically undesirable but legal activities in ways that can extend far beyond its regulatory perimeter.

III.  THE LEGALITY AND TRADEOFFS OF REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT

The turn to arguably more ambitious and consequential forays into regulation by enforcement raises two key questions. First, does this trend violate the strict letter of the law? And second, even if regulatory action is legally justified, does it offer a more effective means of governance – in other words, do the trade-offs justify the move? These inquiries are not mutually exclusive. For example, to the extent that the first question may not yield a straight-forward answer, the greater or lesser benefits of pursuing regulation by enforcement might impact judicial (in)tolerance for its continued use within the administrative canon. To state things differently, even if the practice might be acceptable legally or is at least ambiguous in this regard, it might yet fall foul of norms that underlie a deeper administrative commitment to the rule of law, such that the continued reliance on regulation by enforcement warrants further scrutiny.93Kevin Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1985, 1986–87 (2015); Richard Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 43–44 (1997) (highlighting the framing significance of the concept of rule of law).

A.  The Legal Question: Does It Violate the Law?

As described earlier, it is now well-established that courts afford expansive latitude to agencies in determining how best to forward rulemaking.94On certain limitation to agency deference, see for example, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). But while Chenery supports the proposition that agencies should be given discretion to pursue lawmaking through the judicial system, it is not without its complications. Perhaps the most important of these is the  APA. Outlined earlier, the APA governs the process by which federal agencies develop and issue regulations. A bedrock of administrative practice and good governance, the APA includes requirements for agencies to publish notices of proposed and final rulemaking as well as to offer the public opportunities to provide comment on notices of proposed rulemaking.95A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, supra note 82. In this way, the APA provides a systematic form of an “external” check on the processes and procedures that govern administrative agencies charged with carrying out the grunt work of implementing congressional statutes and that exercise extensive latitude to do so under Chenery.96Gillian Metzger & Kevin Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239 (2017) (detailing the tension between the “external law” and the “internal law” of agencies and highlighting the application of the APA as being consistent with the imposition of both external and internal constraints).

Enacted in 1946, just months before the release of the Chenery decision, the APA explicitly directs agencies to engage in a particularized and defined process when developing and writing rules. The process is intended to (1) ensure that agencies keep the public informed of their organization, procedures, and rules, (2) provide for public participation in the rule-making process, (3) prescribe uniform internal, organizational standards for the conduct of formal rule making and adjudicatory proceedings, and (4) restate the law of judicial review.97Cynthia Scheopner, Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Administrative-Procedures-Act [https://perma.cc/6WHZ-5BTE] As Ed Rubin writes, the APA is far from perfect.98Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 97–98 (2003). Some scholars suggest that it goes too far in its strictures, while others advocate that it does not go far enough.99See id. What is clear, however, is that it imposes a range of internal organizational norms alongside external checks that were devised as a way to respond to the rapid expansion of the administrative state following the New Deal reforms of the 1930s.100Metzger & Stack, supra note 96, at 1266–76 (detailing the historical dynamics giving rise to the passage of the APA in 1946).  

But what does the APA mean for regulation by enforcement? In particular, does it curtail the ability of agencies to govern through litigation? Chenery, as noted above, does allow agencies considerable discretion to engage in both rulemaking and adjudication. But what about in more murkier instances? Specifically, could an agency willfully circumvent the APA, and its public policy goals, by engaging in regulation by litigation rather than through detailed rulemaking?

At least at first glance, the APA should make little difference to an agency’s ability to engage in regulation by enforcement, even if this reflects a deliberate strategy to circumvent the act. That is, because the APA lacks an anti-evasion clause, it should allow agencies to pursue a workaround its provisions. Moreover, courts have tended to interpret their ability to intervene in enforcement-related issues as being highly constrained. In Heckler v. Chaney, perhaps the most cited example of this principle, inmates sought redress after had been sentenced to death by lethal injection. They petitioned the FDA to take enforcement action to prevent the use of a specific drug protocol in capital punishment cases, alleging that use of these drugs constituted a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).10121 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq. The FDA refused to intervene. Seeking review under the APA, the inmates filed suit in District Court asking that the FDA be required to stop the use of the drugs. The Court of Appeals held that the FDA’s refusal to take enforcement action was both reviewable and an abuse of discretion and remanded the case with the directions that the FDA be required “to fulfill its statutory function.”102Id. When the case was finally appealed to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that an agency’s decision to refrain from taking enforcement action should be assumed to be insulated from judicial review under the APA. That is, the FDA’s determination to avoid intervening was perfectly legitimate.103Id.

Looking deeper, however, it is worth asking whether Heckler is the last and complete word on the question. Crucially, it is silent on the issue of whether an agency’s decision to proactively enforce—rather than to refrain from enforcing – constitutes a potential violation of the APA. Heckler speaks to an agency refusing to deploy its resources in a case—the implication being, that by dint of its inaction, it chooses to leave the existing parameters of the law unchanged. By contrast, the Court in Heckler does not address what happens when an agency decides to bring a case—that is, to use its power, authority, and resources to sanction a regulated entity in a bid to further a specific interpretation of the law. Stated differently, Heckler leaves open the question of what legal consequences follow under the APA when an agency takes steps to either “make law” or “find law” through an active deployment of its enforcement power. As detailed in this Article, agencies might decide to pursue enforcement for any number of reasons. Chenery provides considerable latitude allowing such a strategy. But, as noted above, agencies may opt for launching litigation over rulemaking for reasons that might reflect a more cynical motive to affirmatively avoid the requirements of the APA. What happens then? Heckler, arguably, does not provide an answer.104To be sure, this enforcement discretion can be exploited by agencies. Selective enforcement of rules can undo some of the consistency advantages of rulemaking.

To be sure, there are serious difficulties involved in identifying that line between an agency’s decision to pursue sanctions as part of its expected exercise of enforcement authority, and one in which its choices lie in deliberately (or recklessly) skirting the APA’s administrative process. Perhaps the most obvious is the challenge of finding evidence that might point to this administrative intention.105In the question of deference to agency decision-making, the Supreme Court highlighted that deference may not be given when the Court suspects that the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question,” such as when it might promote a “convenient litigating position.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012). As any lawyer knows, the task of uncovering “proof” that points to a state-of-mind is notoriously difficult. First, agencies are complicated creatures, staffed by many people, and it is difficult to attribute a single intent to so many individuals. Second, it requires looking for incriminating materials like internal memos, emails, or evidence of conversations had between decision-makers that could suggest a nefarious motive, and obtaining discovery against an agency in an APA case is very difficult.106As the Supreme Court has observed, “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). Obtaining this kind of material is challenging in the best of times. But it is especially difficult when agencies decide to pursue adjudication. Notably, the APA affirmatively shields agencies from having to publish their own internal organizational processes and rulemaking for public consumption. That is, there is no need for an agency to subject its own in-house enforcement deliberations to notice-and-comment.107Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). This leaves agencies relatively unconstrained in their abilities to develop their own procedures and processes without having to first subject them to outside scrutiny.108Metzger & Stack, supra note 96, at 1277–78. Without such affirmative disclosure about internal policies, those looking to understand why agencies might be acting as they do have to rely on costlier measures. Discovery within litigation offers one expensive pathway, if a court is willing to allow it.109As one commentator has noted, “After all, the presumption of regularity is a rebuttable presumption.” Conley Hurst, Comment, The Scope of Evidentiary Review in Constitutional Challenges to Agency Action, 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1511, 1519 (2021). Or, when possible, observers could also try to gain informational access through Freedom of Information Act requests that might yield clues as to agency process—but which itself has notable constraints as to what information must be provided by government.110Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). As a result, understanding whether an agency’s enforcement decisions are being driven by a wish to deliberately avoid the APA is, ironically enough, a task made more difficult by the very application of the APA itself.111Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996).

In short, the question as to whether regulation by enforcement is legal under the APA is not entirely settled, even as most of the foundational principles are. On the one hand, agencies clearly have wide latitude under Chenery. And according to Heckler, the decision to avoid enforcing is essentially unreviewable. However, Heckler is incomplete: it does not address the scenario in which agencies affirmatively choose to bring a case. Moreover, there is little in either Chenery or Heckler that addresses a much more foundational inquiry, namely whether the pursuit of enforcement to circumvent the APA deliberately or recklessly is permissible, especially when it is intended to establish novel legal arrangements or dictates normally reserved for the rulemaking function.

B.  Legal Scrutiny Beyond the APA

The APA is but one vector of risk for agencies dependent on regulation by enforcement for rulemaking. Even where the APA offers few restrictions on agency action, perceptions of agency abuse or mischievousness can create considerable perils for the administrative state. Some commentators and scholars have noted that regulation by enforcement may lead to Congressional oversight hearings and the politicization of agency action—whether in the form of traditional rulemaking or litigation.112See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 66; Karmel, supra note 65. But we think the consequences may be far greater, and perceptions of overzealous regulation could, over time, catalyze court reactions that ultimately undermine the very authority of the agencies to pursue their missions.113See, e.g., William Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 4 (2003) (addressing, for what it is worth critically, “contemporary political critiques often including battle cries that there is just too much regulation, and poor regulation at that”). At a minimum, litigation efforts can backfire, creating unfavorable precedent for the particular regulatory action or claim in question. But far more ominously, agency overreach can become grounds for courts to rein in the larger administrative authority. To be sure, normatively, imposing checks and balances on agencies constitutes the preserve of the judiciary. However, an ambitious agency pushing novel rules and doctrine in ways found to be unfair, unvetted, or unaccountable can increase the risk to itself of attracting judicial ire, and ultimately undermining the scope of its authority and sphere of influence.

Risks are particularly acute given the recent arc of Supreme Court decisions and posture. One possible target lies in the Chevron doctrine, a Constitutional principle many scholars argue was designed to get the courts out of the policing of agency policymaking. The Supreme Court has formally agreed to review its constitutionality, with a decision likely to be delivered in summer 2024, placing in jeopardy a critical lever by which agencies have exercised their authority with relative legal confidence over the decades.114See, e.g., Gerstein & Guillen, supra note 10. The doctrine, named after “the most cited case in administrative law,”115David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 135, 144 (2010). The Financial Stability Oversight Council, for example, saw its designation powers challenged and curtailed through litigation, where the court found that the FSOC violated administrative law when designating Metlife as a systemically risky firm and that its process was “fatally flawed.” See Lee Myerson, Metlife: FSOC “Too-Big-to-Fail” Designation, Metlife: FSOC “Too-Big-to-Fail” Designation, Harvard L. Sch. Forum Corp. Gov. (May 2, 2026), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/02/metlife-fsoc-too-big-to-fail-designation/ [https://perma.cc/U2TH-FPTF]. outlines the standard of review courts must exercise when reviewing agency actions. For the first step, the reviewing court must ask whether, after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” it is evident that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”116Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984). If so, the statute is “unambiguous[],” and the agency must not differ from Congress’ clearly expressed command.117Id. If, however, the court decides that the statute empowering the agency action is ambiguous, it then moves to step two of the inquiry. That step requires the court to uphold the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”118Id. For one of the leading critiques, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (“the failure of Chevron to perform as expected can be attributed to the Court’s reluctance to embrace the draconian implications of the doctrine for the balance of power among the branches, and to practical problems generated by its all-or-nothing approach to the deference question”).

The standard was popular in the courts for decades, but increasingly seems to have fallen out of favor at the Supreme Court.119See e.g., Nathan Richardson, Deference is Dead (Long Live Chevron), 73 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 441 (2021) (arguing that the Chevron doctrine has been in steady decline). Although the Court has not expressly overruled the case, it has unanimously restricted certain aspects of agency deference for in-house adjudication, and has not deferred to an agency interpretation of its government statute in six years.120Editorial Board, Supreme Court 9, Administrative State 0, Wall St. J. (Apr. 14,
2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-axon-v-ftc-sec-v-cochran-administrative-state-federal-court-elena-kagan-43f6b20 (discussing the ruling in Axon Enterprise v. FTC and SEC v. Cochran, in which the Court stated that litigants did not need to first exhaust agencies’ administrative processes before being able to proceed to federal court).
The Court did not cite Chevron in a majority opinion during the 2021 term, and cited it only three times in 2020, raising the likelihood that the Justices may have soured on the idea that courts should defer to agencies in most matters of legal interpretation.121But see Isaiah McKinney, The Chevron Ball Ended at Midnight, but the Circuits are Still Two-Stepping by Themselves, Yale J. Reg. Notice & Comment (2022), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-ended/ [https://perma.cc/VXP9-7KYC] (noting that circuit courts do often adhere to Chevron). No agency would wish for the end of deference. But the seeming diminishing of Chevron at the Supreme Court opens up questions about what kinds of agency conduct may have irritated the Court sufficiently into taking a much closer and critical look at agency behavior.122McKinney, supra note 121. Here, the pursuit of enforcement, if designed or interpreted to bypass administrative norms, could provide an easy target for fully unwinding judicial deference.123In slightly different context, the Bankruptcy Court strongly admonished the SEC in the context of judicial hearings designed to scrutinize and approve Binance.US’s plan to buy the bankrupt entity, Voyager Digital. In responding to the SEC’s contention that Binance.US and the proposed sale were in violation of applicable securities law, Judge Wiles demanded specific evidence and criticized the agency for failing to offer clarity about the application of securities regulation. See, e.g., Dietrich Knauth, SEC Objections to Voyager-Binance Deal Criticized by U.S. Judge, Reuters (Mar. 2, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/sec-objections-voyager-binance-deal-criticized-by-us-judge-2023-03-02.

And Chevron is not the only source of legal scrutiny. Notably, the Court has recently emphasized that an agency, when it breaks new policymaking ground, must “be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”124Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020). See also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) (also invoking the reliance interest). An agency that has used enforcement actions to expand its regulatory turf, or to try out novel legal theories, might be particularly vulnerable to a charge that it arbitrarily failed to consider the settled expectations of a regulated (or previously unregulated) industry. Reliance interests are not dispositive, but they must be part of an agency’s reasoned decision-making. As the Supreme Court has explained, an agency “may determine, in the particular context before it, that other interests and policy concerns outweigh any reliance interests,” but “that difficult decision [is] the agency’s job.”125Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 1914. See also, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) (on the importance of fair notice and procedural fairness in granting deference to agencies). An agency that proceeds through litigation is going to find it difficult to establish that its enforcement action included some sort of attention to the reliance interests of the defendant in the action.126For example, in April 2023, Coinbase filed an appellate petition in the Third Circuit to compel the SEC to clarify the scope of its rulemaking vis-à-vis Coinbase and to respond to questions that Coinbase had requested the SEC to address. This petition took the form of “a writ of mandamus,” designed to compel the SEC to respond to Coinbase questions. Coinbase’s petition followed service by the SEC in March 2023 of a “Wells Notice”—a common precursor to a potential enforcement action. Crystal Kim, The SEC Has 10 Days to Respond to Coinbase, Axios (May 4, 2023), https://www.axios.com/2023/05/04/coinbase-sec-crypto-regulation; Dave Michaels, Coinbase Tries Novel Defense in SEC Fight, Wall St. J. (May 5, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coinbase-tries-novel-defense-in-sec-fight-43298183. In June 2023, the SEC formally launched an enforcement action against Coinbase, alleging, inter alia, that Coinbase was operating an unregistered securities exchange. For discussion of the complaint, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Coinbase for Operating as an Unregistered Securities Exchange, Broker, and Clearing Agency (June 6, 2023).

Another possible vector of risk involves the “major questions doctrine,” which holds that courts should not defer to agency statutory interpretations that concern questions of “vast economic or political significance.” In 2022, the Court indicated that it intended to take the major question doctrine seriously with a last-day-of-term effort to gather the few cases applying the doctrine into a coherent whole. In West Virginia v. EPA, a case concerning the EPA’s power to encourage power plants to shift away from coal, and toward gas, wind, and solar, the Court explained that “in certain extraordinary cases . . . something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary” to permit a new agency to go forward.127West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022). To do so, the “agency instead must point to clear congressional authorization for the power it claims.”128Id. (quotation marks omitted). So far, the major questions doctrine has only been deployed by the Supreme Court to reverse rules—which incentivizes agencies like the SEC to avoid rulemaking and make policy through enforcement.129In one case, the Court reversed a rule like “order” promulgated by the Centers of Disease Control setting and extending a nationwide eviction moratorium. See 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (2020) (charactering the moratorium as an “Order”). The order was rule-like in that it was a government action of general applicability and future effect, per the definition of a rule in 5 U.S.C. § 551. See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021). Nonetheless, to the extent that regulation by enforcement is turf expansive, there is some risk that the courts could get frustrated and sanction regulators who move beyond their usual remits, however they do so, including by enforcement. Indeed, in the Wahi litigation outlined above, when the SEC sought to sanction defendants engaged in insider trading, arguing that the tokens traded are securities—led to a tussle on the major questions doctrine in court. In the Wahi case, defendants argued that the determination of tokens as securities constituted a major question, one that the SEC should seek Congressional permission to answer.130Matthew Bultman, Ex-Coinbase Manager Tests If SEC Crypto Reach Is ‘Major’ Question, Bloomberg (Feb. 16, 2023), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/ex-coinbase-manager-tests-if-sec-crypto-reach-is-major-question [https://perma.cc/5BJW-4ZKY] (“If the court agrees with the defendants here and grants the motion to dismiss, this will be one of the first cases of this magnitude,” Rutgers Law School professor Yuliya Guseva said. “It will have broad implications in future cases.”); Dave Michaels, Coinbase Ex-Manager Convicted of Insider Trading Is Crypto’s Latest Legal Hope, Wall St. J. (Mar. 26, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coinbase-insider-trading-case-spearheads-cryptos-latest-bid-to-avoid-sec-oversight-a43bd268. 

This set of concerns, then, leads to what is perhaps the most fundamental question: whether agencies even have constitutional basis on which to bring their claims. In other words, agencies face the risk that the legal basis for their very authority to legislate and enforce comes under challenge. This risk is not theoretical. Already the courts of appeals have invoked two rarely invoked constitutional provisions, the nondelegation doctrine and the appropriations power, to stop relatively novel exercises of agency power, in a sort of thermostatic constitutional response to policymaking perceived as overzealous.

The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers to other entities—including the President, administrative agencies or, perhaps most disapprovingly, private organizations. In J.W. Hampton v. United States, the Court ruled that Congress must give its delegates an “intelligible principle” on which to base their legislative-like regulatory actions; and that, if it did so, it could appropriately transfer some of its legislative responsibilities to someone else.131“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The doctrine has not been used to strike down legislation since 1935, so it is a doctrine that has, as Cass Sunstein has put it, had “one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”132Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000). The Fifth Circuit turned to the doctrine nonetheless to reject an enforcement action brought administratively by the SEC. The appellate court objected to the absolute discretion, per Chenery and Heckler, the agency thought it enjoyed when it came to choosing its forum for enforcement actions. When Congress did not create a standard about when to bring an enforcement action, if “the intelligible principle standard means anything, it must mean that a total absence of guidance is impermissible under the Constitution,” the court concluded, meaning that the decision to bring the case administratively had been made without any congressional guidance.133Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446, 462 (5th Cir. 2022). That in turn meant that the enforcement proceeding had to be dismissed.

In Community Financial Services Association of America Ltd. v. CFPB, trade associations sought to challenge how the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is funded, arguing the agency’s financing model—where it receives its working budget from the Federal Reserve rather than via the Congressional appropriations process—was unconstitutional.134Cmty Fin. Serv. Ass’n of Am. Ltd. v. CFPB, No. 21-50826 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2022). It should be noted that the CFPB has appealed and filed an application for certiorari with the US Supreme Court. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, Scotus Blog, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-v-community-financial-services-association-of-america-limited/ [https://perma.cc/E4BA-Z9ME]. See also Cecilia Kang, F.T.C.’s Court Loss Raises Fresh Questions About Its Chair’s Strategy, N.Y. Times (July 11, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/technology/lina-khan-ftc-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/6SA5-JE9M] (highlighting risks of the FTC’s litigation’s strategy after the FTC’s lawsuit challenging Microsoft’s proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard, a video game maker); An Interventionist SEC Risks a Courtroom Backlash, Financial Times (Sept. 10, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/630a9923-6d63-4cf4-af0d-9668d2404bcb [https://perma.cc/5EV5-5EQ9]. The plaintiff trade associations made the argument that the CFPB’s Payday Lending Rule was invalid owing, amongst other things, to its unusual funding process. The Fifth Circuit agreed, opening the door for plaintiffs to now contest any number of rules and enforcement actions delivered by the CFPB. While this case relates specifically to the workings of the CFPB, its implications can arguably extend much farther.

When agencies pursue litigation in ways that depart cavalierly from Chenery, and in ostensible circumvention of more traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, their actions, however well intentioned, risk judicial pushback and may prove to be fertile grounds for rollbacks of administrative power more broadly. Stated differently, regulation by enforcement, while largely permissible under Chenery, does not mean that it is always allowed, and miscalculations carry risks for not only discrete cases, but also for the very powers of the regulatory state.

C.  The Normative Question: (When) Are the Trade-Offs Worth It?

Recapping, we earlier described the bull case for regulation by enforcement. Regulation by enforcement, rather than rulemaking, enables important gap filling and incremental rule-giving. Regulators can reduce errors and respond to unforeseen situations and even emergencies when necessary. In pushing high-profile litigation, agencies can additionally send a powerful signal of their intent to police the marketplace.135Sometimes, of course, they can do so without filing an enforcement action. See Wu, supra note 4 (“The use of threats instead of law can be a useful choice—not simply a procedural end run”). This can foil activities by reckless risk-takers that become fearful of punishment and being publicly shamed in the media. A litigation-focused strategy—being public and liable to deter widely—can also instill confidence in the agency’s competence and its commitment to the cause it has been created to forward.

But there are deeper normative risks—both to the quality of the rulemaking, as well as to the underlying legitimacy of the regulatory framework. As we discuss below, regardless of the ultimate legality of rulemaking via litigation, its deployment can have costs to the quality of resulting rules, as well as to its acceptance as legitimate and fair. Furthermore, by shifting rulemaking to courts rather than agencies, the approach invites judicial interpretations and interventions that can ultimately undermine, rather than expand, regulatory authority. In other words, the courts can reject an agency’s adjudicatory efforts, and leave regulators red-faced, equipped with a much lighter reserve of institutional power that the agency might have wanted.

1.  Informational Costs and Rulemaking Quality

Favoring ex post adversarial litigation over formal ex ante rulemaking creates the possibility of a much lower-quality, lesser-informed policy intervention. The content of the new law can end up being less sophisticated substantively and more thinly informed.136On information asymmetry facing regulators in financial regulation, see Awrey & Judge, supra note 6.

There are internal-to-the-agency advantages of rulemaking. The act of developing a new rule requires an agency to engage in extensive research, crafting, analysis, and careful drafting even before it is presented to the public for scrutiny. This rulemaking process is designed to generate a deep reserve of information, opinion and analysis that exposes new proposals to various forms of expertise and the exigencies of real-world application. It requires agencies to engage substantively with the industry they are seeking to regulate, understand the risks, model the various directions that implementation might take, calibrate the costs that firms will have to pay when seeking to comply with the rule, as well as calculate the overall aggregate effect of the rule on the market (for instance through cost-benefit analyses). Well before the rule takes shape, then, it must be developed through an internal process designed to collect information, make a case for its benefits, to substantiate this argument for a potential challenge in the courts, and then to draft a rule that can coherently reflect the most optimal statement of the agency’s concerns versus the costs involved in execution.137See e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost–Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882 (2015); Jonathan Guynn, The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking after Business Roundtable, 99 VA. L. Rev. 641(2013) (highlighting court scrutiny of agency rulemaking on cost-benefit grounds).

There are also outside-of-the-agency benefits to rulemaking. Rulemaking can prompt extensive dialogue between the public and agencies even before proposals reach the notice-and-comment stage, opening up pathways for information to flow between agencies and others well before any drafting begins. Envisioning future rulemaking (because it is mandated by a Congressional statute), members of the public often try to engage with agencies early in a bid to see their interests reflected in upcoming proposal drafts—ahead of when the proposal is ready for publication in the notice-and-comment period. Lobbying by certain interest groups offers the most visible example of such a practice, where industry or citizen representatives seek out opportunities to make their views heard at early stages of drafting. In her study of the Volcker Rule—a post-2008 Financial Crisis measure designed to restrict how freely banks could engage in risk-taking for their own account—Kimberly Krawiec examined 8000 comment letters received by the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the pre-proposal stage.138Kimberly Krawiec, Don’t Screw Joe the Plumber: The Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 55 Arizona L. Rev. 53 (2013). In addition to industry input, her study observed a surprising degree of private-public interest, bolstered by organizations like Americans for Financial Reform or Public Citizen.139Id. at 58. To be sure, scholars diverge on whether such public commentary is, in fact, expert and informative for agencies.140Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions, 55 Duke L.J. 893 (2006) (highlighting a lack of informational value in public comment by members of the everyday public); Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. Public Admin. Res. & Theory 103 (2005) (showing that public comment letters can make a difference to the content of rulemaking); Krawiec, supra note 138, at 58. However, as Krawiec notes, the fact of receiving such input can often be informative in its own way, notwithstanding concerns about substantive content.141Krawiec, supra note 138, at 58.

Litigation, by contrast, involves fewer informational inputs. In lieu of notice-and-comment, it offers informational opportunities through three critical tools: the discovery process, testimony, and amicus briefs. Discovery, for its part, creates the parameters for dispute and comprises the occasion where parties to the process supply information to one another. But discovery is an imperfect proxy for detailed policy-based research. It is centered on the case itself and, therefore, on the alleged conduct of the defendant. Its data gathering and analysis may not reach the interests of the industry as a whole, or offer a rigorous public analysis conducted by the agency about the merits of the case. And even where it is collected, not all data will be presentable during a dispute and could be disregarded for any number of legal or procedural reasons.142Sometimes, one supposes too much data can be a trap for the aggressive regulator—an increased number of bases to find problems with a rule, a harsh spotlight on the decision-making process. But it is ever the case, and generally we think that more informed policymaking is better than its less-informed alternative.

Amicus briefs or “friends of the court” briefs, by contrast, enable expert and interested third parties to offer instruction and insight to the court. However, like litigation, amicus briefs do not involve the opportunity for policy engagement, much less counterproposals. Instead, they represent occasions for authors to provide legal theory or partial legal analyses courts may or may not deem to be relevant to assigning liability or guilt. As a result, full scrutiny need not be brought to bear on specific rulemaking agenda items. And there is also no requirement or even expectation for agencies to respond to amicus briefs, unlike in the case of rulemaking, where regulators are expected to consider and address input gathered through the notice-and-comment process. For these reasons, even as the number of briefs issued has grown,143Leah Ward Styles, Why and When to File an Amicus Brief, Smith Gambrell Russell https://www.sgrlaw.com/ttl-articles/why-and-when-to-file-an-amicus-brief/ [https://perma.cc/X99L-AB4J]; Brendan Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs?, Slate (Apr. 1, 2003), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2003/04/do-judges-read-amicus-curiae-briefs.html. scholars have long debated whether they really impact the decision-making of judges in practice. On the one hand, their contribution has been noted in cases where they offer judges specific expertise (for example, statistics) that is not included as part of the record. Briefs can be cited in decisions, showcasing their significance. On the other, judges are, as mentioned above, under no duty to heed such briefs. Unlike agencies that must be cognizant of the comments they receive and cannot just ignore them, judges can exercise far greater discretion.144Koerner, supra note 143. Indeed, one study points to a divergence in attitude to amicus briefs between judges. While some welcome the interventions, others like Judge Richard Posner have been openly hostile.145Joseph Kierney & Thomas Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Court Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Penn. L. Rev. 743 (2000). Ultimately, the receptivity toward amicus briefs, even in their limited utility, can depend on a number of factors, such as the particular court in which they are filed, the judge in the case, the kind of brief offered (for example, offering specific expertise), as well as whether the person submitting is respected and trusted by the court.146Koerner, supra note 143.

Testimony, as a final source of information, comprises statements gathered by critical parties to the dispute. It can take place in the form of pre-trial depositions or in-court testimony. Like both discovery and amicus briefs, testimony is generally tied to specific facts. And in order to be admitted into deliberations, it, like discovery, must meet procedural and substantive requirements, like avoiding hearsay and other requirements—standards inapplicable to notice-and-comment. Moreover, larger questions deemed irrelevant to the dispute, even if critical or central to policy considerations, will have no sanctioned weight in the adjudication—even where agencies engage courts in order to regulate by enforcement.

2.  Fairness and Legitimacy

Regulation by enforcement, as opposed to regulation by administrative process, also raises important fairness and legitimacy concerns. The APA aims to create a system of procedural fairness around the rulemaking process to ensure that authorities govern through proper, transparent, well-evidenced, and objective processes.147Stack, supra note 93, at 1993. Through publicity, notice-and-comment, and mandatory agency engagement, those that may be bound by new legislation —as well as anyone else—is invited to provide input and contribution. Judicial review of rulemaking offers the ultimate check on the implementation of the process. Though agencies enjoy considerable deference, they do confront the possibility of being challenged, for example, where regulations are found to be arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, the process is intended to give regulated entities and the public a preview of the expectations and rules that will apply to them.

By pursuing an enforcement action as a first means of creating new law, policymakers raise the risk of doing so in a way that, justified or not, could appear to give those affected scant prior notice of illegality or expected punishment.148Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). Or even where parties ought to understand or expect enforcement, the absence of a rule can create unequal compliance opportunities for firms. Some firms will have greater resources to track potential regulatory actions. Moreover, certain defendants are better positioned to bear these costs than others. Smaller companies may have few resources to defend themselves, while larger actors might be better placed to withstand and contest the action. The Wahi case again offers an example. Rather than target large entities like crypto trading platforms or issuers, the SEC chose to bring a case against three individuals, whose capacity to direct vast resources to the litigation was arguably extremely limited.149Hinkes et al., supra note 92. This asymmetry leads to the potential for procedural unfairness (or perceived unfairness) in situations where smaller defendants or individuals may be specifically selected as test cases, owing to the likelihood that they fail to contest the claim (because they are small firms) or, conversely, if they are sufficiently high profile that agencies can generate the needed buzz, publicity, and wider deterrent effects on smaller players in order to make the case for a new jurisprudence.150On selective enforcement by the SEC in the context of initial coin offerings, where the SEC has brought actions against “small and significant” defendants, and possible explanations for this trend, see James Park & Howard Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and Initial Coin Offerings, 61 Wash. J.L. Policy 99 (2020). Because rulemaking in such cases arises by dint of an adversarial process, it arguably necessitates an even greater need to show procedural fairness. As enforcement implies the need for defendants to fight back, it makes sense to consider whether those subject to new rules have the capacity, notice, and opportunity to take on the contest.

Finally, fairness norms may also call into relief the motives of agencies to make new rules and ultimately their authority and technocratic credibility. As Kevin Stack observes, achieving coherence within the law represents an essential value within the regulatory system. Agencies, he notes, have a key role in implementing coherence to facilitate the creation of a legal “system” that aims to be internally and philosophically consistent.151Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 329–30 (1990). They are expected to deliberate and execute policy in a way that can connect into and reflect the wider administrative/legal system of which it is a part, to offer continuity with past practice as well as contemporary policy priorities.152Stack, supra note 93, at 2011–13.

When policy is generated through litigation that does not derive from clearly articulated rulemaking, or that is designed to shape industries or punish particular actors without prior notice and guidelines, there may be doubts about the agency’s adherence to these rule of law norms. For example, in August 2023, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled against the SEC in the agency’s decision to deny asset manager Grayscale’s application for a bitcoin exchange-traded fund. Strikingly, in reviewing the legality of the SEC’s decision, the D.C. Circuit unanimously determined that the agency had acted in an “arbitrary and capricious manner” when it refused Grayscale’s petition.153Paul Kiernan, Grayscale’s Court Win Over SEC Lifts Hopes for Bitcoin ETF Approval, Wall St. J. (Aug. 29, 2023) https://www.wsj.com/finance/regulation/grayscale-wins-lawsuit-against-sec-over-bitcoin-etf-1b305cfa. In other words, there emerges, in short, a difference between “filling a gap” and “filling a legislative void.” The former involves targeted elaboration of existing legislative or administrative processes and thinking. The latter attempts to create a legal artifice in the absence of such groundwork. Eliding the rigors of information gathering and public input can, in short, have costs. Rather than being perceived as fair, impartial, and guided by their public interest mission, deficiencies within the rulemaking process can fuel negative views of agencies as being excessively political, insufficiently motivated by internal expertise and lacking technocratic professionalism.154In a startling decision, the court in SEC vs. Digital Licensing (Debt Box) ruled that the SEC’s behavior in bringing a restraining order against the defendant crypto company constituted a “gross abuse of power.” The court ordered the SEC to pay the defendant’s legal and other costs relating to the complaint, noting that the SEC had repeatedly misled the court by presenting falsehoods and mischaracterizations of the facts to support its submissions in the case. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Digital Licensing, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-00482 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 2023); see also Nikhilesh De, SEC Committed ‘Gross Abuse of Power’ in Suit Against Crypto Company, Federal Judge Rules, CoinDesk (Mar. 18, 2024), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2024/03/18/sec-committed-gross-abuse-of-power-in-suit-against-crypto-company-federal-judge-rules/ [https://perma.cc/SQ74-GHFG]. Ultimately an erosion of trust in the fundamental norms governing agency rulemaking can curtail confidence in the mission of the agency and its ability to execute it successfully and legitimately.

III.  WHEN SHOULD AGENCIES REGULATE BY ENFORCEMENT?

Enforcement is a critical function of the regulatory state, and for the most part noncontroversial. Government agencies are charged with mission-critical responsibilities aimed at serving the public and undertaking actions that preserve the integrity of rules designed to protect investors, consumers, and even the overall economy. For what purpose enforcement is used can, however, vary. At times, agencies may seek to utilize their enforcement powers in ways that preserve the integrity of existing law; at others, they may seek to establish new legal theories, or even regulatory regimes, powers, or jurisdiction. In all cases, discrete and expansive, regulatory action may be considered essential, or even vital and a necessary action to send powerful signals to the market in a timely manner. Or it could deliberately enable what are ultimately abusive practices by agencies.

The sheer variety of ways and motives driving regulation by enforcement raises a number of pressing doctrinal questions. Overall, regulation by enforcement is a firmly established and jurisprudentially sanctioned practice. Still, precedent has not to our knowledge distinguished among the different scenarios in which it is practiced. This void offers the courts, and especially a Supreme Court skeptical of broad remits of administrative authority, considerable leeway to respond in ways that regulators may find surprising. Agencies also risk the possibility that their actions could have serious reputational consequences, and provide fodder for legislative actions clipping their budgets, and legal decisions eroding their very authority.

Enforcement by regulation should thus be undertaken with a clear understanding by regulators as to its risks and exercised in ways that optimize the long-term interests of agencies, their stakeholders, and regulated entities. From this standpoint, we foresee a number of helpful rules of thumb. Ultimately, some of the same kinds of cost-benefit and data analysis compelled in rulemaking should be institutionally embedded in agencies for enforcement actions. Here, coordination among enforcement and rulemaking staff might be helpful. We understand that the distinction between preserving and creating law can be murky, but cases in which serious questions arise, the cost benefit analysis should, in turn, likewise increase in its rigor. A practical understanding of the divergent incentives of staff in each office is warranted, as well as the incentives of agency stakeholders in approving and guiding enforcement actions.

Additionally, enforcement actions in novel policy areas should be ideally initiated as early as possible in the lifecycle of the disputed market practice as to mitigate subsequent market disruption. If an entity is selling what an agency believes is an unregistered security, or if an entity is violating rules as an unregistered securities exchange or unlicensed bank, enforcement activity should be brought to bear early—or a rulemaking initiated. Waiting years to bring an enforcement action can be misinterpreted, as well as heightens perceptions of agencies acting only when convenient, politically palatable, or for other than merits-based reasons.155See e.g., Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85 (2023) (discussing the Due Process Clause and requirements for fair notice in the context of the Bank Secrecy Act).

At the same time, regulation by enforcement is likely to be most accepted as legitimate when it is understood to be a last, rather than first resort. The APA is designed to enable not only democratic participation and accountability, but also predictability. Taking the pains to articulate the agency’s expectations, even if only through soft law tools like staff guidance and no action letters, are more likely to set the stage for more broadly accepted enforcement actions with high policy throughput. Yet even here, in order to be effective, the guidance should be coherent, thought through, and offer a clear set of expectations for market and industry participants built on top of established legal principles, precedent, and rulemaking.

Finally, enforcement actions designed to promote policy should embrace some of the public facing norms of administrative process. Adjudications are, as mentioned, by their very nature confrontational, and usually represent a zero-sum game for participants. Nevertheless, regulatory agencies should, when possible, respond to amicus briefs and other interventions by industry and civil society, even in the context of legal proceedings. By conferring voice to a broader set of stakeholders, agencies can relieve the pressure generated by opting out of administrative process.

Ultimately the increasing attention directed toward regulation by enforcement creates a rich research area for academics, policymakers, and the press. Commentators would do well to keep an eye out for developments that suggest such strategies risk decisions that not only create bad precedent, but also risk decaying the very authority of the agency.

At the same time, the drivers behind regulation by enforcement deserve greater scholarly and popular attention. To some extent, the turn to enforcement can be attributed to partisan politics. Litigation can further the political objectives of democratically elected representatives who have appointed personnel to the administrative state. And it can be used to bolster the bona fides of officials and regulators seeking greater visibility, and perhaps, professional promotion. And in such cases, the incentives of a regulator may not necessarily conform with their agency, with the regulator having moved on when the agency faces potentially adverse litigation or judicial weakening. Still, regulation by enforcement may also reflect how changes in the reception of administration of policy may drive the exploration of a greater toolbox for regulators. In this sense, litigation may beget litigation, and proliferating lawsuits by private actors to agency rulemaking incents regulators to sue preemptively instead, creating a doom loop of legal challenges that not only stifle courts, but also ultimately add to regulatory uncertainty.

In the end, identifying and disentangling motives will not always be easy. Though attempts to do so will continue to abound—if not by courts, then from legislators and the public. In this process, the credibility of all actors will be tested. The ability of government to solve problems resides in trust, just as does the ability of the private actors to sell their goods and services. The outcry from “regulation by enforcement,” however well or ill-informed, at a minimum indicates that the trust is no longer always there. The key for regulators, lawmakers, and courts will be to see just what is responsible for its decay, and how to restore it in ways that advance the public interest.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1297

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* Chris Brummer is the Agnes Williams Sesquicentennial Professor of Financial Technology at Georgetown University Law Center.

† Yesha Yadav is the Milton R. Underwood Chair, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School.

‡ David Zaring is Elizabeth F. Putzel Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. For their invaluable insights, perspectives and comments, we are most grateful to Anita Bandy, Anupam Chander, Patrick Corrigan, Elizabeth de Fontenay, Keir Gumbs, Kathryn Judge, Don Langevoort, Jai Massari, Donna Nagy, Peter Molk, Alex Platt, Todd Phillips, Adam Pritchard, Elizabeth Pollman, Bob Rasmussen, Adriana Robertson, Kevin Stack, Bob Thompson, Anne Tucker, Yuliya Guseva, and to participants at the BYU Winter Deals Conference, the Digital Transformation in Business and Law Symposium sponsored by the Southern California Law Review at USC and the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics (ILE) Roundtable (Spring 2023). We thank Alex Ang Gao for excellent research assistance. Errors are our own.

Justices on Yachts: A Value-Over-Replacement Theory

The Justices have it made. On top of their government salaries, guaranteed until retirement or death, they are pampered with luxuries supplied by various wealthy benefactors—billionaire friends, big publishing houses, and well-funded nonprofits. These benefactors make (and forgive) large loans, book fancy resorts in exotic locations, and save seats on their yachts—glacial-iced cocktails included. The public is rankled. Something seems amiss, but it is hard to say exactly what. There is scant evidence of any quid pro quo. None of this luxury treatment has likely changed any Justice’s vote in any particular case. Thus, the problem here is not run-of-the-mill corruption.

In this Article, we explore an alternate theory. These donors are not trying to influence individual votes; they are trying to influence Justices’ decisions about whether to keep voting at all. The Justices’ government salaries are generous. But their private-sector earning potential is far higher, providing a strong incentive to retire relatively early and maximize lifetime consumption. Supplying a sitting Justice with a luxury lifestyle reduces the retirement incentive, “locking in” the Justice as a voter in more cases.

We explore this strategy for influencing the Court and model its expected results. We argue that, rationally, the strategy will be deployed differentially. All other things equal, Justices who are older and more ideologically extreme, compared with the expected replacement Justice, will receive more pampering. This will systematically alter both the mix of cases the Court hears and its substantive decisions to favor moneyed and politically hard-line interests.

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