Affirmative Acting: The Role of Law in Casting More Actors With Disabilities (A Note in Five Acts)

 

SETTING THE STAGE: INTRODUCTION

“Always find your light.” This is a common piece of advice given to theater artists, encouraging them to make sure they can be seen on stage.1See Cathy Salit, 6 Secrets from the Theater (That Anyone Can Use) for Giving Great Presentations, Performance of a Lifetime (Sept. 11, 2017), https://performanceofalifetime.com/
2017/09/6-secrets-from-the-theater-for-giving-great-presentations-that-anyone-can-use [https://perma.cc
/Z2WS-E66T].
But who gets the chance to grace the stage in the first place? Our society has recently begun to actively ask new questions about equity and visibility. In the context of theater, we have largely focused not on who is on the stage, but on how theater productions can be enjoyed equitably. To answer these questions, we have turned to effectuating and enforcing the standards set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).2Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.

Over the thirty years since the ADA was passed, and even more concertedly following the Act’s 2008 amendments,3See id. theaters have begun to reserve sections of the house4In the theater world, “house” refers to the auditorium or audience. See Theatre Terms, Am. Ass’n of Cmty. Theatre, https://aact.org/theatre-terms-view/h [https://perma.cc/4X6H-YY9F]. Here, the term is used to refer to the former. for patrons with wheelchairs and to renovate facilities to create ADA-compliant restrooms for audience members.5See John Loeppky, Taking ADA from the Page to the Stage, Am. Theatre (Mar.
26, 2021), https://www.americantheatre.org/2021/03/26/taking-ada-from-the-page-to-the-stage [https://
web.archive.org/web/20221011234038/https://www.americantheatre.org/2021/03/26/taking-ada-from-the-
page-to-the-stage].
However, while the ADA has prompted great strides in improving theatergoers’ ability to access productions, figuring out how to apply the ADA to the people on the stage is another question altogether.6Id.

While audience accessibility is a tremendous step forward in ensuring that enjoyment of theater productions does not exclude people who cannot easily access and navigate unwelcoming spaces, the time has come to turn the spotlight back towards the stage. We need to turn our attention to creating and nurturing structures allowing for equal access for theater performers—specifically, for the purposes of this Note, those with disabilities. Pushes in the theater world to pinpoint and remedy gender and racial inequities have become much more prevalent in recent years,7See Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Initiative, League of Resident Theatres (May 2017), https://lort.org/edi-initiative [https://perma.cc/UU6Y-SLGA]. and rightfully so, but we must not leave those with disabilities out of the discussion. As it is, “disability is too often an afterthought, if it is thought of at all.”8Howard Sherman, When It Comes to Accessibility at Theatres, There Is a Law, HowlRound (Apr. 4, 2016), https://howlround.com/when-it-comes-accessibility-theatres-there-law [https://perma.cc/
89D5-5WUD].

Indeed, Actors’ Equity Association (“AEA”), the union for actors and other theater makers,9See Actors’ Equity Ass’n, https://www.actorsequity.org [https://perma.cc/N868-NJEW]. even reported that barely 1% of contracts they issued from 2016 to 2019 went to artists who self-reported living with a disability.10Press Release, Actors’ Equity Ass’n, Actors’ Equity Association Releases Second-Ever Diversity and Inclusion Report (Nov. 18, 2020), https://actorsequity.org/news/PR/DandIReport2020 [https://perma.cc/N36S-AP4H]. AEA also estimated that about a quarter of Americans live with at least one disability.11Id. If you compare these statistics (about 25% of Americans have disabilities, but only about 1% of theater jobs offered over the course of three years went to artists who reported living with disabilities), the problem should begin to crystallize: Why are we not seeing representation of people with disabilities on stage at the same rates as in society?

While data on disability representation on stage is scarce, we can look to data collected in theater’s more closely studied sister entertainment industries of television and film to get a sense of what levels of representation in the theater might look like. For instance, in the sphere of network television in 2018, only 22% of characters with disabilities were actually portrayed by an actor with the same disability; for streaming services, this number decreased to 20%.12Hanna Shaul Bar Nissim & RJ Mitte, Authentic Representation in Television
2018, at 4 (2020), https://issuu.com/rudermanfoundation/docs/authentic_representation_2018_wp_2020 [https://perma.cc/XNL2-5YCQ].
The unfortunate result gleaned from this study and studies like it is that the overwhelming majority of characters with disabilities—at least in the context of film and television—continue to be portrayed by actors without disabilities.13Mark Harris, The Actors with Disabilities Redefining Representation, N.Y. Times Style Mag. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/t-magazine/actors-disability-theater-film-tv.html [https://perma.cc/EGW5-KAVQ]. The first time an Emmy was awarded to a show starring people with disabilities was not until 2016,14Lauren Appelbaum, The Emmys: Seeing African Americans with Disabilities in Hollywood, RespectAbility (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.respectability.org/2016/09/the-emmys-seeing-african-americans-with-disabilities-in-hollywood [https://perma.cc/V6CP-A2GB]. and the number of actors with disabilities who have ever won an Oscar can be counted on one hand.15Tim Gray, Oscar and Hollywood’s Nearly ‘Invisible’ People with Disabilities, Variety (Dec. 4, 2019, 11:47 AM), https://variety.com/2019/film/news/oscar-and-hollywoods-nearly-invisible-people-with-disabilities-1203422966 [https://perma.cc/D2UF-BHAV]. These statistics truly pull back the curtain on an entertainment industry that does not tend to value actors with disabilities.

There is reason to believe the statistics are just as grim in the theater. For instance, it was not until 2019 that an actor in a wheelchair (Ali Stroker) first won a Tony award (for her tremendous performance in a revival of the classic Broadway hit Oklahoma!).16Scottie Andrew & Saeed Ahmed, Ali Stroker Makes History as the First Tony Award-Winning Actor in a Wheelchair, CNN (June 10, 2019, 11:19 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/10/
entertainment/ali-stroker-tony-award-history-wheelchair-trnd [https://perma.cc/YZ3P-D5ZQ].
This lack of representation begs the question of why, as society finally begins to converse more openly about equity, “disability” is still so often excluded from the discussion.17Or, as Ryan O’Connell, an actor with cerebral palsy, puts it: “Why, in this woke-ass culture that we live in, . . . do people with disabilities still largely go ignored?” See Harris, supra note 13 (quoting Ryan O’Connell).

This Note will attempt to answer that question—and explore what role law could play in arriving at a solution—through a variety of lenses, including the ADA and employment discrimination law. It will set the proverbial stage by laying out the history of disability discrimination in theater and entertainment, after which it will discuss relevant federal and state sources of disability and employment law. The Note will then make the case—by looking at potential legal remedies18Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213; Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.—that in the subjective world of theater, the way to increase representation of actors with disabilities on stage is not a simple legal fix; instead, it will likely take a combination of changes—attitudinal, legal, and otherwise—working in tandem in the theater industry to get more actors with disabilities on stage. And while making these moves in the direction of inclusion and equity on stages across the country would certainly advantage actors with disabilities, it would also benefit society at large: theater that reflects our tapestried reality “is simply better, richer, [and] more rewarding when it is by, for, and about all of us.”19Rob Weinert-Kendt, Disability and Theatre, Am. Theatre (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.
americantheatre.org/category/special-section/disability-and-theatre [https://web.archive.org/web/20221
011234406/https://www.americantheatre.org/category/special-section/disability-and-theatre].

ACT I.  HISTORY OF DISABILITY IN PERFORMANCE

All too often, actors with disabilities are excluded from the audition room; much—if not most—of the time, actors with disabilities do not get invited to audition at all, regardless of the disability status of the role in question.20See Lydia X.Z. Brown, Practicing Disability Justice, Honoring Wholeness Onstage, Am. Theatre (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.americantheatre.org/2021/03/26/practicing-disability-justice-honoring-wholeness-onstage [https://web.archive.org/web/20221011234745/https://www.americantheatre.org/
2021/03/26/practicing-disability-justice-honoring-wholeness-onstage].
And if the actor has made it into the audition room? That is only the first part of the journey. Next comes the actual casting of the role, where no matter how many talented actors have made it into the room to audition for a single part, only one person leaves with the job. Even once actors with disabilities make it through the door to get seen by the director, the odds are against them in terms of actually landing a role.

Recent Broadway shows that have main characters who have disabilities provide a good look into the regularity with which actors with disabilities get passed over for roles, while actors without disabilities gain more access to those roles. Broadway productions of relatively well-known shows that fit this description are not hard to find. The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time tells the story of a young man on the autism spectrum, and yet the 2015 Broadway production nonetheless cast an actor “without autism or any other disabilities” for the role.21Emily Kranking, Physical Disabilities Take the Rare Spotlight on Broadway, RespectAbility (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.respectability.org/2019/04/physical-disabilities-broadway [https://perma.
cc/SCT5-JX4F].
Wicked, over its yearslong and wildly popular Broadway run, never once filled the role of Nessarose, who uses a wheelchair, with an actress with physical disabilities.22Id. Likewise, all of the lead roles in recent productions of The Miracle Worker and Richard III, both of which focus on main characters with physical disabilities, were portrayed by actors without physical disabilities.23Id.

This practice of casting actors without disabilities in the roles of characters with disabilities has come to be known, in some circles, as “disability drag.”24Magda Romanska, On Screen and On Stage, Disability Continues to Be Depicted in Outdated, Cliched Ways, Conversation (Nov. 2, 2020, 12:12 PM), https://theconversation.com/on-screen-and-on-stage-disability-continues-to-be-depicted-in-outdated-cliched-ways-130577 [https://perma.cc/LST3-C2N5]. In fact, a whole microcosm of scholarship has developed around this idea of disability drag, which also takes to task the various tropes that seem to be intertwined in the writing of most, if not all, characters with disabilities currently on stage and screen.25Id. This area of academic investigation and rumination asks us to reframe the way we think about characters and people with disabilities: “What if their disability weren’t the thing to overcome but merely one element of one’s identity?”26Id. Nonetheless, on the whole, society appears to turn away from asking itself such introspective questions, especially when the alternative involves making money by casting big-name actors.

None of this means that the world of creating theater is not making some strides on its own. For instance, Deaf West Theatre’s 2015 Broadway production of the musical Spring Awakening was produced and performed in both English and American Sign Language,27Marc J. Franklin, Look Back at Deaf West Theatre’s Spring Awakening on Broadway, Playbill (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.playbill.com/article/celebrate-deaf-west-theatres-2015-spring-awakening-broadway-revival [https://perma.cc/J9WP-JVG6]. with a cast comprised of “25 deaf, hard of hearing and hearing actors and musicians.”28Adam Hetrick & Andrew Gans, Deaf West Theatre’s Immersive Spring Awakening, Directed by Michael Arden, Extends, Playbill (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.playbill.com/article/deaf-west-theatres-immersive-spring-awakening-directed-by-michael-arden-extends-com-331238 [https://perma.cc/RF7Z-FC2V]. The show was met with great success and earned multiple Tony Award nominations, including one for the highly regarded Best Revival of a Musical,29Franklin, supra note 27. Coincidentally, the author of this Note was lucky enough to attend a performance of this revamped Broadway hit, the experience of which led, in part, to the creation of this Note. even though it was a production of a type that Broadway had never seen before.

There are also smaller theater companies popping up that have been created with the explicit goal of promoting the work of artists with disabilities. For instance, the mission of the Phamaly Theatre Company in Denver, Colorado, is “to be a creative home for theatre artists with disabilities” as well as to “model a disability-affirmative theatrical process.”30 About Phamaly Theatre Company, Phamaly Theatre Co., https://phamaly.org/about-phamaly-theatre-company-2 [https://perma.cc/S4SY-3DNS]. Alie B. Gorrie, an actress with low vision, describes her reaction to attending a production “filled with disabled artists, singing, dancing, and actively defying disability tropes” at the Phamaly Theatre Company as the first instance where she felt like she truly belonged in the theater.31 Alie B. Gorrie, Inclusion: We Can’t Do It Alone, Am. Theatre (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.americantheatre.org/2021/03/26/inclusion-we-cant-do-it-alone [https://web.archive.org/
web/20221011234912/https://www.americantheatre.org/2021/03/26/inclusion-we-cant-do-it-alone].
The experience, however, left Gorrie with a lingering question: Why had it taken two decades of working in the theater industry for her to feel this sense of belonging?32Id. Which begs the broader question: How many people who dream of working in the theater industry have already been discouraged and turned away by the lack of access and opportunities?

Despite these steps forwards, it is apparent that sidelining actors who have disabilities deprives society of a wealth of talent. We have seen how powerful performances by actors with disabilities can be and how rewarding it can be to see them in the spotlight, as evidenced in a number of recent television shows. Consider RJ Mitte, an actor with cerebral palsy playing a character with the same disability on the hit AMC show Breaking Bad.33See RJ Mitte Biography, IMDb, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm2666409/bio [https://
perma.cc/WFY2-FXW9].
More recently, think of Lily D. Moore, an actress born with Down syndrome playing a fan-favorite character with the same diagnosis in Mindy Kaling’s Netflix series Never Have I Ever.34See Lily D. Moore Biography, IMDb, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm6504907/bio [https://
perma.cc/M657-3EEM].
Therefore, the question we must now be asking is what legal solutions can be utilized to ensure that Mitte and Moore are not the “token” actors with disabilities, but instead just actors. And are those legal solutions alone enough?

ACT II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND

Scene 1:  The Americans with Disabilities Act

One lens through which to approach the problem returns our attention to the ADA. Signed into law in 1990,35Introduction to the ADA, ADA.gov: U.S. Dep’t Just. C.R. Div., https://www.ada.gov/
ada_intro.htm [https://perma.cc/CB92-HMXQ].
and amended in 2008 to provide broader protections for people with disabilities,36 The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/americans-disabilities-act-amendments-act-2008 [https://perma.cc/5FJW-ZMAC]. the ADA provides for protection of individuals with “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”3742 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see also id. § 12102(2)(A) (defining “major life activities” as including “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working”). The ADA has seen much success over the years: it has empowered people with disabilities to become their own best advocates38See Laura Deck, ADA @ 30: Two Voices on Accomplishments and Shortfalls, Benetech (July 28, 2020), https://benetech.org/blog/ada-30-accomplishments-shortfalls [https://perma.cc/6B3B-FFU2]. and has modernized our built environment to promote physical accessibility.39Robert David Sullivan, The ADA Is a Success, but No Longer a Popular Model for Lawmaking, Am.: Jesuit Rev. (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.americamagazine.org/content/unconventional-wisdom/ada-success-no-longer-popular-model-lawmaking [https://perma.cc/6BNQ-LS6D]. Specifically relevant here, though, is Title I of the ADA, which concerns employment discrimination.40Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117.

Title I of the ADA prohibits employers (including theaters)41Id. § 12181(7)(c). from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”42Id. § 12112(a). Thus, discrimination against people with disabilities in the workplace is already prohibited by law in many circumstances, according to the ADA. There are, however, two distinct points that illustrate how far we have left to go and how far short the ADA has fallen in getting us there.

First, although the ADA requires an employer to make “reasonable accommodations” for employees with disabilities,43Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Congress did not give a clear-cut definition of what exactly counts as a “reasonable accommodation.”44Workplace Accommodations Under the ADA § 3 (2004), Westlaw ADAWORKPLACE CH. 3. Instead, Congress provided examples of accommodations that could be implemented to enable “qualified individual[s]” with disabilities to perform the “essential functions” of their jobs.4542 U.S.C. § 12111(8)–(9). There are no statutory limitations—financial, quantitative, or otherwise—on what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation,” other than that an accommodation that would cause an employer’s business “undue hardship” is not “reasonable.”46Workplace Accommodations Under the ADA, supra note 44. Similarly, Congress did not provide further instruction on how to determine what constitutes “undue hardship.”

This lack of guidance from Congress means that implementing the ADA can easily “become a checklist of what is or isn’t provided.”47Loeppky, supra note 5 (quoting Alexandria Wailes). In other words, it can become the “absolute minimum you can do to avoid looking like a jerk”48Id. (quoting Michael K. Maag). or exposing yourself to liability. Sure, you may have a wheelchair ramp in place, but does that really work to make the actors in need of the accommodation feel welcome and unburdened in their artistic journey?

This Note argues that a wheelchair ramp here and there is not enough. Instead, for actors to truly feel welcomed into the space and able to practice their craft uninhibited, the theater must ask itself questions such as, “Are we putting an extra burden on our artists with disabilities by requiring them to perform while simultaneously navigating a world that is not built for them?” and “How are we ensuring that we are hiring actors with disabilities in the first place?”

Second, while enforcing the ADA may help to ease the strain disproportionately placed on the small group of actors with disabilities who have already made their way into the rehearsal hall, what about those who have yet to be cast? Able-bodied actors are routinely cast in roles portraying people with disabilities,49After #OscarsSoWhite, Disability Waits for Its Moment, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2020), https://
http://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/arts/after-oscarssowhite-disability-waits-for-its-moment.html [https://
perma.cc/BU9R-8FEH] (“If history is a guide, one of the surest ways to get an [award] is by being a nondisabled person playing a disabled character.”).
which diminishes the number of roles available for actors with those disabilities. Further, it often “simply never occur[s]” to casting directors “to cast, or even consider, actors with disabilities in roles that don’t specify whether a character is disabled or not.”50Harris, supra note 13.

Even though we are taking steps towards creating a more inclusive culture, it does appear as though we are nonetheless collectively excluding people with disabilities from that equity-driven vision of our society—even with the assistance of the ADA. So, if the ADA as it currently operates does not seem fit to truly improve diversity onstage, are there other potential legal routes?

Scene 2:  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

When it comes to the world of preventing discrimination in employment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196451Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. is undoubtedly the star of the show. Since the ADA may not, on its own, provide a way to ensure that more actors with disabilities get onstage, it is worth exploring another relevant legal avenue: employment discrimination law governed by Title VII. Congress formulated this broad new civil rights bill in 1963 and took final steps towards securing the bill’s passage in 1964.52Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Admin. & Mgmt., Legal Highlight: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Dep’t Lab., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oasam/civil-rights-center/statutes/civil-rights-act-of-1964 [https://perma.cc/J8VM-L5SS]. Title VII notably included language banning employment discrimination because of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”5342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). While Title VII does not apply to disability discrimination, it provides some guidance as to how the ADA might be amended to address the issues discussed here.

The basic structure of a case alleging individual disparate treatment (also known as intentional discrimination) in one of the above categories has been crafted over time through case law by the Supreme Court. The so-called “burden-shifting” structure that has been created is set forth in the pivotal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.54McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, a plaintiff who alleges disparate treatment under section 703(a)(1) of Title VII “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”5542 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). must prove their prima facie case that (1) they do indeed fall into one of those categories, (2) they applied for a job and were qualified, and (3) they were rejected by the employer.56McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the employer has the chance to bring to light any “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for having rejected the employee.57Id. If the employer can do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who has an opportunity to prove that the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” given by the employer was “pretext” for what in truth amounts to discriminatory animus.58Id. at 802, 804.

Integral to this Note, however, is the language highlighted in section 703(e) of Title VII that an employer may protect itself from liability by presenting a particular affirmative defense.5942 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The essence of this defense is that the employer asserts that it rightfully, and therefore legally, discriminated against this job applicant. The employer can do this by showing that it discriminated because of “religion, sex, or national origin”60Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). if it can also show that “religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.”61Id. § 2000e-2(e) (emphasis added).

This exception to the general rule, which is known as a “bona fide occupational qualification” (typically referred to as a “BFOQ”),62Id. can sometimes be used by employers to legally justify certain discrimination in hiring practices if that discrimination is based on religion, sex, or national origin. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, an all-male prison asserted that it would be unsafe for women to become guards in their prisons.63Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 327 (1977). Female job applicants hoping to become guards then sued the prison, claiming that they were not hired because of their sex.64Id. at 324. The Supreme Court took the side of the prison, holding that while the applicants’ sex was the reason they were not hired, this discrimination was legal due to the BFOQ exception.65Id. at 336–37. In other words, the prison was allowed to reject female applicants because of their sex due to the fact that having male guards was “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.”6642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).

Conversely, in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme Court refused to grant an employer the use of a BFOQ.67UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991). Johnson Controls stated that it would not allow women to work in certain jobs at its manufacturing plant that involved lead exposure, citing an interest in preserving the women’s fertility.68Id. at 198. In essence, Johnson Controls was asserting that being a man was a BFOQ that was required in order to get the job.69Id. at 202. Here, the Supreme Court interpreted the BFOQ exception narrowly by ruling that the amorphous danger of harm to female employees’ fertility is not an appropriate use of the exception and that female employees who were qualified for the job could not be turned away simply on the basis of their sex.70See id. at 204.

As seen in Johnson Controls above, the BFOQ is not a free pass to discriminate against job applicants however an employer sees fit; Congress created the BFOQ exception to be used narrowly and “the courts have construed it as such.”71Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 473, 477 (2001). It is not unreasonable, however, to imagine a scenario in which this affirmative defense could actually be used to benefit a particular group of job applicants. Consider a scenario in which an employer wants to have only Senegalese chefs work at a Senegalese restaurant, with the stated goal of “authenticity.” Here, the employer could use a national origin BFOQ to justify this hiring practice, with the end result being that a minority group (Senegalese chefs) gains greater access to job opportunities they otherwise may not have had. While perhaps counterintuitive, this Note will propose the use of a BFOQ not simply as a way to shield an employer from liability, but also as a way to encourage diversity in the hiring process.

Scene 3:  Threshold Question—Employee or Independent Contractor?

It must be noted going forward that applying the ADA and Title VII to workers hinges on the workers’ classification as “employees,” as opposed to “independent contractors,” because the ADA and Title VII do not cover independent contractors.72Patrick O. Patterson, Reclaiming EEOC’s Mission 6 n.19 (2021), https://niwr.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Towards-Effective-Governmental-Intervention_Patterson-Reclaiming-EEOC-Mission.pdf [https://perma.cc/35NU-AQ9V]; U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-NVTA-2007-1, Health Care Workers and the Americans with Disabilities Act (2007). So what is the difference? The ADA and Title VII both provide the following definition of “employee”: “[A]n individual employed by an employer.”7342 U.S.C. §§ 12111(4), 2000e(f). Since that definition is not particularly elucidating, courts have often looked to the common law of agency for a less circular definition.74Eversheds Sutherland, Classification Tests, WorkerClassification.com, https://www.
workerclassification.com/Classification-Tests [https://perma.cc/QR4D-NBFK].
Among other factors, the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an employee as the “servant” of an employer (the “master”).75Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1958). This relationship is said to be formed when the master gains control over the servant’s performance of a service, and, in particular, when the master gains the right to control the “physical conduct” of the servant.76Id. Conversely, then, an independent contractor is a worker whose physical conduct and general performance are not under the complete control of the master.77Id. § 2(3).

Many theaters officially classify the actors they hire as independent contractors, often primarily in order to take advantage of related tax benefits and to circumvent paying minimum wages, overtime, and workers’ compensation.78Daniel B. Thompson, Independent Contractors and the American Theatre, HowlRound (Nov. 10, 2015), https://howlround.com/independent-contractors-and-american-theatre [https://perma.
cc/A53Z-PH33].
The argument theaters provide for this practice is that actors are temporary workers, typically only hired to perform in one show at a time, and that therefore being an actor is more akin to being a part of the “gig economy”79Gig Economy, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gig%20
economy [https://perma.cc/WP3K-S2WC].
than being a part of a typical workplace. Theaters in this camp tend to paint a picture of their actors not as their so-called “servants” whose physical conduct they control, but instead as transient workers whose job is simply to put on a performance.

In reality, however, there is so much more to an actor’s responsibilities and interactions with a director. While actors may have moments of free decision-making throughout the process of preparing (“blocking”) a play, almost everything comes down to what the artistic director envisions. This is really an employee-employer relationship where the employer has full control over not only when and where rehearsals are held, but ultimately full control concerning when, where, and how an actor portrays their part.

Though employee classification is crucial for actors—as well as employees writ large—to achieve better legal protections, a deeper exploration of the distinction between employees and independent contractors and the implications of this divide for employment equity, particularly in the context of theater, is beyond the scope of this Note.80See Christian Ketter, A Curtain-Call for Performing Arts Industry Clauses: Why Nonunionized Stage-Performers Are “Employees” Not “Independent Contractors,” 9 Ariz. State Sports & Ent. L.J., Spring 2020, at 1. Thus, the remainder of this Note will assume for the sake of argument that actors are classified as employees, not as independent contractors. This classification allows for their protection by the ADA and Title VII.

ACT III.  LEGAL REMEDY NO. 1: CREATING A NEW BFOQ

Scene 1:  Creating a Race or Color BFOQ

Notably missing from the list of categories that can be used to assert a BFOQ defense81See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (listing “religion, sex, [and] national origin” as the only categories from which to create BFOQs). are race, color, and disability. Over the past few decades, the bulk of relevant scholarship has focused on reasons Congress specifically did not include race or color as possible BFOQs.82See, e.g., Frank, supra note 71, at 496–97. Relatedly, scholars have started to ask whether Congress erred in this omission, and some even go so far as to champion adding a race or color BFOQ.83Id. at 501.

More specifically, this question about a race or color BFOQ has recently been explored in the context of entertainment.84See id. at 498–99; Jennifer L. Sheppard, Theatrical Casting—Discrimination or Artistic Freedom?, 15 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 267, 276–77 (1991). Do historically marginalized actors lack opportunities as a “result of illegal discrimination by the theater industry,”85Sheppard, supra note 84, at 271. or is it instead a product of artistic freedom and sound business decisions? Should the issue be relegated to the realm of First Amendment jurisprudence?86Id. at 279–82.

Legal scholars have often approached this question by looking at language used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).87See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov [https://perma.cc/
DD4Q-3VEJ].
The EEOC’s regulations88 The Supreme Court has held that the EEOC’s interpretation of the laws it enforces is “entitled to great deference.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (citing Griggs). mention that a gender BFOQ could theoretically exist for hiring actors if deemed necessary for a play’s authenticity: “Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.”8929 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2022) (emphasis added). The EEOC has thus explicitly “recognized that the entertainment industry is one place where discrimination might be necessary.”90Frank, supra note 71, at 495.

The fact that use of a BFOQ has been considered by the EEOC as potentially useful (and lawful) in an entertainment context gives credence to the idea that it is permissible to legally discriminate, through the use of a BFOQ, in order to preserve a play’s primary functions of storytelling and authenticity.91Id. at 493. Therefore, “it seems reasonable to assume that where the characters are race-specific, race is a job requirement, and hence, should be a BFOQ exception.”92Sheppard, supra note 84, at 276.

Scene 2:  Creating a Disability BFOQ

So, could a disability BFOQ similarly be added to the ADA? The idea is not without precedent, at least in the realm of some states’ local laws. For instance, the Administrative Rules of Montana state that an employer may use a BFOQ “where the reasonable demands of a position require a distinction based on . . . physical or mental disability.”93Mont. Admin. R. 2.21.4005(3) (2022).

But the question remains: Is the addition of a disability BFOQ really enough to make a difference? Or would it just perpetuate the status quo of allowing employers/artistic directors to keep employees/actors with disabilities off the stage? According to the University of Southern California Annenberg Inclusion Initiative, only 2.7% of characters with speaking roles in a survey of 900 popular movies from 2007 to 2016 were characters portrayed with a disability.94Travis M. Andrews, Disabled Actors Say They’re the ‘Last Civil Rights Movement’ in Hollywood, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 25, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/
movies/ct-ent-disabled-actors-films-20190125-story.html [https://perma.cc/9CND-ZW6U].
Assuming the trend holds true across the sister industries of stage and screen, these statistics show that a disability BFOQ probably could not effectuate all that much change. If only around 2–3% of characters are written to have disabilities, even if a majority of directors cast those roles with actors who have disabilities, we would have at most a 3% increase in the number of actors with disabilities getting cast. And there is no guarantee that any directors would even opt to utilize the disability BFOQ. Thus, the most progress a disability BFOQ could make would likely be marginal at best.

Furthermore, creating a disability BFOQ opens the door to possible misuse and abuse by employers. Indeed, use of a BFOQ, though it can be
co-opted for the benefit of a group of employees, is usually seen as an employer-friendly tactic. For example, an employer who does not want to hire actors with disabilities could use the BFOQ as a shield, asserting that such an actor with a disability could not serve “essential functions”9542 U.S.C. § 12111(8). (such as deft movement across the stage) required of the job.

Scholarship at the forefront of this conversation seems to overwhelmingly come to the same conclusion: “[T]he fear that employers could misuse a generally applicable . . . BFOQ to shield invidious . . . discrimination is too great to warrant the enactment of such a provision.”96Frank, supra note 71, at 525. Given these potential setbacks, it becomes necessary to look at what other remedial legal options remain.

ACT IV.  LEGAL REMEDY NO. 2: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Scene 1:  Background

The concept of affirmative action, created during the civil rights movement in the United States, derives from a “paradox,” namely that “[o]nce we amended the Constitution and passed laws to protect people of color from being treated differently in ways that were harmful to them, the government had trouble enacting programs that treat people of color differently in ways that might be beneficial.”97Louis Menand, The Changing Meaning of Affirmative Action, New Yorker (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/20/have-we-outgrown-the-need-for-affirmative-action [https://perma.cc/V5SL-GCXR]. We face a similar problem with regard to disabilities, in that in employment discrimination law’s noble effort to level the playing field, we must fight to create ways to treat people with disabilities that “might be beneficial”98Id. as well.

From a statistical standpoint, affirmative action for race actually resulted in some of its intended effect; the years between 1974 and 1980 saw a 20% increase in the rate of minority employment in businesses relying on affirmative action (as compared to an increase of only 12% in companies without affirmative action plans in place).99Id. Furthermore, there is still room for the affirmative action model to change over time, as “[t]here is no Brown v. Board of Education . . . for affirmative action, no well-established precedent.”100Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the door is left ajar for a new movement in which we use affirmative action tactics to make sure that more actors with disabilities are not only getting into the audition room, but also getting cast.

While decades of proof show that affirmative action has led to success, specifically in the context of school desegregation,101See id. the concept also comes with quite a bit of baggage.102The idea of “affirmative action” in general is in jeopardy as we await a very conservative Supreme Court’s ruling involving Harvard University’s admission practices: “After the Court’s recent overturning of Roe v. Wade and the expansion of concealed-carry gun rights, the abolition of affirmative action at elite universities is high on conservatives’ wish list.” Greg Stohr, Harvard Urges Supreme Court to Preserve Affirmative Action in College Admissions, Bloomberg (July 25, 2022, 2:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-25/harvard-urges-supreme-court-to-let-affirmative-action-survive [https://perma.cc/ZY43-L33N]. Scholars and laypeople alike have been arguing for years over whether “affirmative action for racial minorities disadvantages white people by virtue of their race.”103K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 41, 52 (2000). It is likely that this same argument would surface regarding whether affirmative action in the context of casting actors with disabilities disadvantages able-bodied actors. To this point, however, although there may be winners and losers in affirmative action, it has been determined that the practice is occasionally justified nevertheless.104Id.

In United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Supreme Court created precedent that some affirmative action regimes are, in fact, justified, and it laid out a test dictating when these regimes are constitutional.105United Steelworkers v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding that “Title VII’s prohibition in §§ 703 (a) and (d) against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans”). While the Court’s opinion is perhaps not particularly clear in terms of where to draw that line,106Id. (“We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.”). it does provide us with a set of loose guidelines. In order for a plan to fall on the permissible side of that line, it must (1) be “designed to break down old patterns of . . . segregation and hierarchy,” (2) “not unnecessarily trammel the interests of” other employees or applicants, and (3) be a “temporary measure.”107Id.

These guidelines, specifically designed to apply to affirmative action in regard to racial segregation and discrimination, could easily be adapted to apply to disability as well. One could imagine guidelines for theater companies that (1) break down existing patterns of hierarchy in terms of casting actors without disabilities; (2) do not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of actors without disabilities, who would retain plenty of chances to be cast; and (3) only last until such time that theaters understand and realize not only that diverse casting is a noble goal, but also that it makes sound economic sense. While this raises a different question as to how these guidelines would be implemented, as discussed below, there may actually be no need to adapt these guidelines because of the differences in statutory language between Title VII and the ADA.

Scene 2:  Statutory Interpretation

Challenges to affirmative action in the context of ending racial segregation sometimes stem from a disgruntled white student who feels that a school’s admission policies are a zero-sum game (and thus, feels that their rights are being “unnecessarily trammel[ed]”).108Id. For instance, in Fisher v. University of Texas, a white woman who was denied admission to the University of Texas sued on the grounds that the school’s admissions system was unconstitutional because it took race into account.109Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. 365, 375 (2016); see Margaret Kramer, A Timeline of Key Supreme Court Cases on Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/30/us/affirmative-action-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/23XU-TXNE].
Ultimately, Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the close opinion in favor of the University of Texas, deciding that the university’s policy of considering race as one of a number of factors in admissions “met the standard of strict scrutiny”110Kramer, supra note 109; Fisher, 579 U.S. at 388. and was thus appropriate. While the final outcome of this case comes down on the side of the affirmative action plan being implemented by the university, it also demonstrates the very live and contentious idea that there are people who tend to feel they are being injured by affirmative action schemes at large.

The Court has maintained its belief that at least some affirmative action regimes could be unconstitutional because they “unnecessarily trammel”111Weber, 433 U.S. at 208. other employees’ rights, and their authority on this matter comes from citing the text of Title VII itself: it is unlawful to “discriminate . . . because of . . . race” when hiring employees.11242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). White students have long used this argument to say that they themselves were discriminated against because of their race (as a white person) when a Black student is admitted and there is an affirmative action regime in place at that university;113See Weber, 433 U.S. at 208. the claim is one of “reverse racism.”114See Brett J. Miller & Sarah Nirenberg, Are Employers’ Diversity Efforts Risking “Reverse Discrimination” Lawsuits?, Butzel (July 13, 2021), https://www.butzel.com/resources-alerts-Are-Employers-Diversity-Efforts-Risking-Reverse-Discrimination-Lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/3T4L-4FWG]. Similar arguments have long been made by many white plaintiffs in the employment context: there have “recently [been] a number of headlines regarding ‘anti-white racism’ and there have been a variety of civil rights lawsuits filed by white employees . . . claiming race discrimination.”115Id.

The language of the ADA, on the other hand, dictates only that a covered entity may not “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.”11642 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). The ADA itself provides limited guidance on whether an employer may or may not, for instance, discriminate in favor of a qualified individual on the basis of disability.117In fact, the EEOC itself has weighed in on the matter, stating that “[t]he ADA does not protect an individual who is denied an employment opportunity . . . because she does not have a disability.” U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-NVTA-2011-1, Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (2011); see also U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-NVTA-2017-4, Questions & Answers: The EEOC’s Final Rule on Affirmative Action for People with Disabilities in Federal Employment (2017) (mentioning that “[a]ffirmative action for people with disabilities is not illegal. An employer is allowed to hire someone because he or she has a disability, and a rejected applicant cannot sue an employer for discrimination based on the fact that he or she does not have a disability”). In light of this difference in statutory language, it is possible that an affirmative action plan in the context of disability under the ADA may not even need to pass muster under the three-part Weber118Weber, 433 U.S. at 208. test described above. Further analysis of this distinction in language, although beyond the scope of this Note, is required to determine if theater companies would be within their rights to implement affirmative action regimes regarding hiring actors with disabilities.

Scene 3:  Application

Given the analysis above, this Note proposes that theaters could help remedy the imbalance in casting practices by beginning to use an affirmative action model to bring more inclusivity into the casting room and onto the stage. If future analysis supports the above interpretation of the statutory text, this model does not have to live up to the Weber119Id. standards. Each theater company is unique, with its own set of structures and hierarchies already in place, so the most effective way for each individual theater company to utilize an affirmative action model would likely be best judged by the company itself. The 2020s appear to have ushered in a hunger for an increase in overall diversity,120Jared Pope, 2020: The Year that Changed Diversity, Equity & Inclusion Forever, Work Shield (Dec. 7, 2020), https://workshield.com/2020-the-year-that-changed-diversity-equity-inclusion-forever [https://perma.cc/87J3-BE9H]. and it is possible that some theaters would jump at the chance to create a scheme through which they could improve the diversity on their stages—if only because it would reflect well on the theater.

Perhaps one answer is a required training for theater companies throughout the country (likely in an online format) through which they could gain a better understanding of the necessities and risks associated with creating and implementing an affirmative action plan.121There has been a push towards training managers and recruiters at various workplaces in the realms of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. See, e.g., EEO Training | Affirmative Action Training and Planning, HR Training Ctr., https://hrtrainingcenter.com/eeo-training [https://perma.cc/5B3P-L94A]; Affirmative Action/EEO Training, Emps. Grp., https://www.
employersgroup.com/service/affirmative-action-training [https://perma.cc/6GTK-PCUW].
Then, each theater company could come up with a plan that best fits its specific needs and goals. Implementation of these plans would likely require the creation of an organization to oversee these plans and establish accountability, as well as conduct periodic check-ins with each theater company to assess follow-through and commitment going forward. While this suggestion would involve significant resources (time, money, and otherwise), this Note has demonstrated how crucial it is to take affirmative steps in this arena to enact true change. Investing these resources would be a necessary first step.

However, clearly the nebulous idea of “using affirmative action in casting actors with disabilities” leaves a lot of details to be desired. Who would ensure that theaters truly implemented affirmative action measures? How would relevant statistics be tracked, given that each theater and, more granularly, each show has a completely different set of needs? What kind of penalties would be imposed if theaters chose not to follow their affirmative action plans? All of this is not to say that legal remedies would not move theater in the right direction, but given these difficult questions with no immediate answers, it seems clear that this proposed legal remedy is not enough on its own either. So, what options remain?

ACT V.  A LOOK AT POTENTIAL QUASI-LEGAL AND NONLEGAL REMEDIES

Scene 1:  Societal Shifts—Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

One force that has the potential to shift the way we as a society see entertainment and theater, and therefore theater creators, is the COVID-19 pandemic.122See COVID-19, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-nCoV [https://perma.cc/P72R-QKWN].
Our society’s transition to the use of Zoom and other online platforms has greatly increased theater’s accessibility in a number of ways,123Rosalind Bevan, An Actor Calls for a More Accessible and Inclusive Future in Theater, WBUR (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.wbur.org/news/2021/01/05/future-of-theater-accessibility [https://perma.cc/
WWG2-4JZ6].
perhaps most notably in terms of the internet’s ability to transcend physical barriers and allow people from all around the world to watch a performance.124Id.

Additionally, many virtual productions are simply more affordable125Id.—both for audiences who no longer need to worry about issues such as transportation to and from the theater, costly parking, and the allure of overpriced theater snacks and drinks, and for theater companies that suddenly find themselves without the need for large, elaborate sets, accessible theaters, or a whole team of spotlight operators.

This shift has the possibility to push access for actors with disabilities in the right direction and could provide the movement with enough momentum to continue to embrace inclusivity and accessibility once we (presumably) reenter a less digital world. However, Deaf126“The word ‘deaf’ with a lowercase ‘d’ refers to the audiological lack of the sense of hearing. . . . ‘Deaf’ with a capitalized ‘D’ refers to Deaf people who share the same culture and language, American Sign Language.” Id. theater artist Elbert Joseph has his doubts: “[O]nce we go back to being in person, are people going to be willing to continue [making theater accessible]? Because there is no more excuse.”127Id. (quoting Elbert Joseph). And he is right: we have now seen a digital landscape in which disability has proven to be much less of a barrier in the bid for access.128See Past Productions, Deaf Broadway, https://www.deafbroadway.com/past-productions.html [https://perma.cc/T9HU-YJKD] (providing a list of productions put on by a theater company that has been consistently creating virtual theater throughout the COVID-19 pandemic); About, Deaf Broadway, https://www.deafbroadway.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/LQM6-HQFP] (describing how their shows are “[f]ilmed in real time via webcam with diverse Deaf talent” and that they “provide[] full and complete American Sign Language (ASL) access to beloved selections from the Broadway catalog”).

Writer and performer Katie Hae Leo, while acknowledging the importance of the ADA as it stands, believes that the COVID-19 pandemic has reminded society of the vulnerabilities associated with being a person with disabilities.129Loeppky, supra note 5. She adds that, although the pandemic may have established a precedent of creating more access for artists with disabilities, it will all be for naught unless we “codify some of those changes, and make sure that they become part of, at the very least[,] best practices and at the best, law.”130Id. (quoting Katie Hae Leo).

Now that we have seen, by way of the pandemic, that many accessibility measures are in reality quite easy to implement,131Id. the above legal proposals of adding a disability BFOQ to the ADA and implementing an affirmative action regime for casting actors with disabilities could come into play. When utilized in tandem with the lessons we have learned from being thrust into the virtual world during the pandemic, these legal solutions could help to create a theater landscape that is both welcoming and encouraging to theater artists with disabilities.

Additionally, while creating diversity onstage is a noble goal in and of itself, theater companies do have pure economic reasons to invest in increased representation. Looking back at theater’s sister industries, film and television, that exact understanding seems to be unfolding as the early 2020s progress. While statistics, as discussed above, show dismal rates of casting actors with disabilities over the years, both film and television have begun to make great strides in their bid for inclusivity on screen. Take, for instance, the critically acclaimed 2021 film CODA, which centers on a family with deaf adults and their hearing child.132CODA (Apple Original Films 2021); see also Jeannette Catsoulis, ‘CODA’ Review: A Voice of Her Own, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/12/movies/coda-review.html [https://perma.cc/Q5RS-4CEU]. The deaf characters are all played by deaf actors,133Catsoulis, supra note 132. and the story puts deafness at the heart of the viewer’s experience. The film even led to the first acting Oscar nomination (and win) ever for a deaf man, Troy Kotsur.134Kyle Buchanan, ‘CODA’ Star Troy Kotsur on His Historic, Healing Oscar Nomination, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/16/movies/troy-kotsur-coda-deaf-actor.html [https://perma.cc/C9QF-Z4U3]; Mandalit del Barco, CODA’s Troy Kotsur Is Now the First Deaf Man to Win an Oscar for Acting, NPR (Mar. 27, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/27/1088898875/oscars-2022-troy-kotsur-coda [https://perma.cc/FUA3-FDBY]. Kotsur told the New York Times via a sign language interpreter that the success of this film marks a wider understanding that we should no longer “think of deaf actors from a perspective of limitations.”135Id. (quoting Troy Kotsur). As film and television make these moves forward, and as theaters begin to grapple with the fact that more diverse casts could lead to more money and acclaim, hopefully theaters will begin to follow in the footsteps of their sister industries.

Scene 2:  Building Upon Ongoing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Work

Since it appears that no one solution, legal or otherwise, is sufficient to meaningfully increase opportunities for actors with disabilities on stage, it is worth looking to other work that is already being done in the arena for inspiration. The initiatives currently taking shape, in theater and beyond, are known as Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) initiatives.136What Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Really Mean, Ideal, https://ideal.com/diversity-equity-inclusion [https://perma.cc/22LP-CD94]. DEI work, according to the International Labour Organization, can be responsible for an increase in innovation of up to 59% and an increase in understanding and assessment of consumer demand of up to 37%.137Int’l Lab. Org., Bureau for Emps.’ Activities, Women in Business and Management: The Business Case for Change 21 (2019), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication/wcms_700953.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ7U-VA2U] (specifically discussing the case for improvements in the workplace based on gender diversity initiatives).

This wave of DEI work in workplaces around the country and beyond focuses on the tenets of “diversity” (the ways in which people differ from one another), “equity” (fair treatment and opportunity regardless of identity), and “inclusion” (providing a variety of people with power and decision-making authority).138What Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Really Mean, supra note 136. However progressive a DEI mindset in a workplace might be, though, underrepresentation “remains a very real problem.”139Id.; see also Pippa Stevens, Companies Are Making Bold Promises About Greater Diversity, but There’s a Long Way to Go, CNBC (June 15, 2020, 10:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/
11/companies-are-making-bold-promises-about-greater-diversity-theres-a-long-way-to-go.html [https://
perma.cc/9Z9T-Y8JL] (“Inequality and a lack of diversity in the workplace are certainly not new topics, but the recent protests have prompted companies to speak out, condemning racism, and recommitting to doing better when it comes to fostering inclusive work environments.”).
A 2020 review of workplace diversity, for example, found that around 85% of top executives in the United States are white,140Stevens, supra note 139 (quoting a report by Barclays analysts) (“Companies’ consideration of diversity & inclusion is not only important on the basis of values; it also has a material impact on their long-term performance.”). with similar statistics showing that the majority of top executives do not report having a disability.141Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities & Disability:IN, Disability Equality Index 2022 5 (2022), https://disabilityin-bulk.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/DEI+2022+Report+Final+508.pdf [https://perma.cc/V26N-WCZX] (“30% [of the companies studied) have a Senior Executive . . . who is internally known as being a person with a disability.”).

Even so, companies, including theaters, are now actively considering DEI initiatives; these initiatives tend to center on anti-racism and racial equity.142See, e.g., The Huntington’s Equity & Anti-Racism Update, Huntington, https://www.huntingtontheatre.org/accessiblity/anti-racism [https://perma.cc/FFW4-ATDT]; Our Values, Cent. Square Theater, https://www.centralsquaretheater.org/about/our-values [https://
perma.cc/27U9-3X3Y]; Equity, Diversity & Inclusion Institute, Theatre Commc’ns Grp., https://www.tcg.org/Default.aspx?TabID=1550 [https://perma.cc/SS2U-5N2Z].
Many theater websites boast initiatives to combat racism within their internal structures.143See sources cited supra note 142. In addition to actively increasing representation of people of color in the workplace, these initiatives are shining a spotlight on the destructive effects of racism on the workplace. Imagine if this push for equity in terms of race could be harnessed and used through the lens of disability as well. This would bring awareness to the trials and tribulations of actors with disabilities, as this Note has detailed, and could help to create a society in which anti-ableism becomes central to the workplace.

Scene 3:  Exploring Nontraditional Casting

Another potential route to getting more actors with disabilities on stage would be to follow the dictates of “nontraditional casting.”144See Harry Newman, Casting a Doubt: The Legal Issues of Nontraditional Casting, 19 J. Arts Mgmt. & L., Summer 1989, at 55, 56. Under the regime of nontraditional casting, in order to expand opportunities for
oft-overlooked actors, artists are cast in roles in which certain categories (such as gender, ethnicity, disability, and race) are not “germane to the character’s or the play’s development.”145Id. The attempts at kickstarting nontraditional casting have been widespread; multiple major theater organizations banded together in the late 1980s to create a not-for-profit organization called the Non-Traditional Casting Project (“NTCP”).146Id.

The NTCP, as a part of its advocacy work, identified a few distinct types of nontraditional casting meant to act as “jumping-off points for the imagination,”147Id. at 57. such as “societal casting,”148Id. (noting that “ethnic, female, and disabled artists are cast in roles they perform in society, such as clerks, judges, scientists, and salespersons”). “cross-cultural casting,”149Id. (describing how “a play is transposed to an entirely different cultural world”). and “conceptual casting.”150Id. (noting that “an ethnic, female, or disabled actor is cast in a role in order to bring an extra dimension to that part”). These various categories are meant to serve as tools for creating opportunities for actors who may otherwise be passed over.

One further category to be addressed is “blind casting,” in which “actors are cast on the basis of their talent without regard to their physical attributes [and abilities or disabilities].”151Id. While the idea of blind casting may appear innocuous on the surface, and perhaps even look like a good solution, academic scholarship points us to the conclusion that even casting that is nondiscriminatory on its face leads to the same disparities on stage after all is said and done.152Micha Frazer-Carroll, ‘It’s Dangerous Not to See Race’: Is Colour-Blind Casting All It’s Cracked Up to Be?, Guardian (Aug. 11, 2020, 4:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/

2020/aug/11/its-dangerous-not-to-see-race-is-colour-blind-casting-all-its-cracked-up-to-be [https://
perma.cc/ZB3H-GEWR] (quoting Diep Tran, an arts journalist specializing in diversity) (“Colour-blind casting is dangerous . . . [because] [i]t negates the very real structural hindrances that block actors of colour from the same opportunities as white actors—like low pay in the theatre industry, a lack of roles that are ethnically specific that actors of colour can play, and unconscious bias on the part of white theatres and casting directors.”). Furthermore, in the past, directors have gone so far as to use the idea of blind casting to do things such as cast white actors as characters of color, using the explanation that the white actors just happened to be best for the role.153Id.

Because of the potential harms of blind casting, scholars urge directors to consider “conscious casting” instead, where attributes and abilities/disabilities are taken into account to the extent that they interact with the plot lines and characters and affect the meaning of a play or movie.154Id. Utilizing conscious casting from the nontraditional casting canon may prove another useful tool in the casting toolbox. However, the distinction between casting “blindly” and “consciously” is not always straightforward and still allows for a well-meaning director to make a blunder by casting actors in a way that sets forth an unintentional message.155See id.

Even so, conscious casting can and should be used in the context of casting actors with disabilities. Conscious casting could even be combined with the affirmative action plan discussed above; this could open the door to actors with disabilities not only playing characters with disabilities, but
able-bodied characters as well. Not only would this provide more job opportunities to actors with disabilities, but it would also allow directors to make purposeful statements through their casting about how our society views, and should or should not view, people with disabilities.

Making conscious casting an industry standard would signal to artistic and casting directors alike that diversity on stage could be a meaningful enhancement to their repertoire and the messages conveyed, and, as such, should be taken into account. It is true that some baggage might come along with this approach: it could require extra auditions to be held, extra outreach into various underrepresented communities, and extra thought put into how casting each actor affects how the play comes across to the audience.156Id. (quoting Diep Tran) (noting that “[t]his approach isn’t always simple, . . . but neither is addressing the entrenched structural racism in television, film and theatre”). Given the dramatic loss of talent caused by excluding actors with disabilities, however, this Note argues that the potential for positive outcomes far outweighs the baggage.

CURTAIN CALL: CONCLUSION

At the end of the day, representation on stage can (and should) inspire new generations of both activists and actors, but it appears as though there is no single legal solution that will be able to ensure or enforce that representation. Instead, if we hope that “[o]ne day, every American theatre will be a safe, equitable, and inclusive workplace filled with arts practitioners who represent and reflect the wonderful diversity of the human tapestry,”157Diversity & Inclusion, Actors’ Equity Ass’n, https://actorsequity.org/resources/diversity [https://perma.cc/DV8X-UN6R]. we will need to source solutions from within the legal field as well as beyond.

This Note does not, by any means, cover the breadth of issues and possibilities left to be discovered and discussed in terms of getting better representation on theater stages. For instance, studies that have thus far been done about disability in film and television should be replicated for the stage in order to give us a more accurate picture of the issue as it applies to stage actors.158For example, what percentage of stage actors with disabilities who audition for shows actually end up getting cast? What percentage end up getting turned away? Also, further research beyond the scope of this Note may yield other creative and effective legal and nonlegal tactics that can be used to not only increase diversity onstage, but also to maintain it.

It is hopefully clear by now that there is a problem in the theater world that needs to be addressed. Not enough actors with disabilities are getting employed—or even getting the chance to prove that they should be employed. This issue has negative effects all around. Of course, it impacts actors with disabilities by lessening their opportunities to practice their craft. But it also affects society at large in a number of ways; representation of disabilities on stage can lead to a feeling of “belonging” for many people who have so often felt sidelined, and the art that gets created becomes more inclusive and authentic overall.

It should also be clear by now that there is not yet a simple solution to the above problem, in the law or in society. This cannot dissuade us, however, from fighting to ensure that actors with disabilities have the opportunity to perform on stage. It appears as though it will take a conglomeration of methods: the creation of a disability BFOQ; affirmative action based on disability; monetary and business incentives; ongoing DEI work; and conscious casting could all be pieces of the as yet unsolved puzzle. And while we are still missing puzzle pieces, we should begin by working with the methods we already have.

This Note has presented potential legal avenues for addressing the lack of opportunities for actors with disabilities in the theater industry and has concluded that using the law as a vehicle for improving the odds for these actors is probably not enough. Either way, casting more actors with disabilities is an issue that clearly requires immediate attention. After all, when it comes to the heart of the reason that all of this research and discussion is necessary in the first place, actress Ali Stroker put it best in her Tony Award acceptance speech: “This award is for every kid watching tonight who has a disability, who has a limitation or a challenge, who has been waiting to see themselves represented in this arena,” she said.159Andrew & Ahmed, supra note 16 (quoting Ali Stroker). “You are.”160Id.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 483

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* Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 96; J.D. Candidate 2023, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Drama and Psychology 2015, Tufts University. Thank you to my supportive, loving, wonderful friends and family for having my back throughout law school. Special thanks to my advisor, Dr. Orly Rachmilovitz, for her guidance during the note-writing process, and a final thank you to my mentors (also known as my parents), Barbara and Patrick Patterson, for inspiring me every day. This Note is dedicated to the memory of colleague and friend Jenny Lin.

Race and Politics: The Problem of Entanglement in Gerrymandering Cases

Gerrymandering—the manipulation of political districting processes and boundaries for partisan political advantage—has proven a troubling and difficult area of constitutional concern. This is partly due to the exceptionally divergent standards of judicial review applicable depending upon the basis for the gerrymander claim. The Supreme Court has consistently held that racial gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny review and presumptively violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has recently declared that partisan gerrymanders, on the other hand, are a political question and non-justiciable. 

This Article argues that current guidance from the Supreme Court on standards for evaluating gerrymandering claims is inadequate to guard against constitutional violations because of the problem of entanglement: the race and partisan preferences of voters are so deeply intertwined in many contexts that it is practically impossible to discern whether race or partisanship was the basis for political districting decisions. The entanglement of race and politics in political districting processes means that there is a dangerous risk that unconstitutional racial gerrymanders will escape judicial review under the cover of partisanship. 

This Article explicates the problem of entanglement in gerrymandering cases and evaluates several possible solutions. Presenting original research drawn from the 2020 decennial census and voter data from the 2020 presidential election, this Article establishes an empirical basis for the problem of entanglement. Although prior legal scholarship has emphasized the problem of “conjoined polarization”—the overlap in partisan and racial preferences—as an enabling factor in partisan redistricting processes, this Article claims that racial residential segregation plays a more central and dynamic role than has generally been acknowledged in undergirding the entanglement of race and politics in political redistricting processes.

INTRODUCTION

The manipulation of political districting processes for political advantage—popularly known as gerrymandering—has long bedeviled the United States,1See infra Part I. Political districting involves both the division of geographic units within states into political subdivisions and the drawing of lines in regards to those subdivisions. but concerns about the abuse of this practice have intensified in recent decades due to a confluence of factors: intensifying partisan political polarization, widening racial political polarization, the use of detailed voter files to predict voting behavior, the emergence of sophisticated computer technology to generate ever-more precise political maps, and a sharp divergence in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing different forms of this practice. 

In reviewing suits brought to challenge gerrymandering practices, the Supreme Court has held that state legislative efforts to draw political districts based on race violate the Equal Protection Clause, a natural extension of the Court’s general prohibition on the use of racial classifications in policymaking.2Stephen Menendian, What Constitutes a “Racial Classification”?: Equal Protection Doctrine Scrutinized, 24 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L.  81, 121–23 (2014). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that legislative efforts to draw political districts based upon partisanship or for partisan political advantage are “political questions” and non-justiciable.3Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019). 

In this regard, these two forms of gerrymandering are treated in the utmost extreme: racial gerrymandering is subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny while partisan political gerrymandering is treated as non-justiciable, meaning not that it is subject to the lowest level of judicial review, rational basis review, but that the practice is deemed unsuitable for judicial review at all. Racial gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny judicial review whereas partisan political gerrymanders are not subject to judicial review whatsoever.4“Strict scrutiny” is a level of judicial review requiring that a policy be justified by a “compelling government interest” and “narrowly tailored” to serve that interest. It is the highest level of judicial review. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).  

The Supreme Court’s broader equal protection clause jurisprudence supplies a basis for treating these two types of claims differently. Prevailing equal protection jurisprudence treats race as a “suspect” class in government policymaking subject to strict scrutiny review, while most other classifications are reviewed under a rational basis test.5Which is, by definition, more judicial review than is required of non-justiciable matters, which by definition are not subject to judicial review at all, as noted above. But strict adherence to this approach would compel a very different result than the determination that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable. Lower courts would still be able to entertain such cases, just under a much lower level of review, rational basis.

If there were no relationship between race and partisanship in voting patterns, then political gerrymanders and racial gerrymanders could be regarded as separate and distinct categories and there would be no logical inconsistency in a jurisprudence that regulated one but not the other. Partisan gerrymanders would have no observable racial effect, or vice versa. In practice, however, race has long been highly correlated with partisan political affiliation.6See infra Table 1. Although racial political polarization waxes and wanes over time, it is strong enough that a jurisprudence of gerrymandering cannot neatly divide the two types. 

The Court’s racial gerrymandering jurisprudence makes clear that sorting voters into separate political districts on the basis of race is unconstitutional, just as it is presumptively unconstitutional to sort pupils into different schools on the basis of race.7See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 701. In racially diverse states with racially polarized voting patterns and merely modest levels of racial residential segregation, however, it is likely that partisan gerrymandering will effectively sort people into different districts on a racial basis. In much of the country, race and partisanship are entangled, such that redistricting efforts on one basis are largely indistinguishable from the other. As a consequence, unregulated partisan gerrymanders have a dangerous potential to subvert the constitutional rule against racial gerrymandering.

Although political scientists have long recognized the correlation of race and partisan affiliation (what political scientists term “conjoined polarization”),8Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting Rights, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 867, 872 (2016). prior analysis of gerrymandering jurisprudence has underexamined the specific role of racial residential segregation in facilitating the entanglement of race and politics in redistricting processes. In recent legal scholarship analyzing this problem, segregation is either completely absent from the discussion, mentioned in passing, or is treated as an assumed operative background condition.9See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 58 (2013); Janai Nelson, Parsing Partisanship and Punishment: An Approach to Partisan Gerrymandering and Race, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1088 (2021); Jon Greenbaum & Kristen Clarke, Gerrymandering Symposium: The Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan Gerrymandering Decision, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-of-todays-partisan-gerrymandering-decision/ [https://perma.cc/7HPY-L425]. These articles do not even mention segregation. The role of segregation in relation to gerrymandering processes is both more central and more dynamic than is generally appreciated.

This Article argues that it is the interaction of racial residential segregation and racial political polarization that creates the entanglement problem in redistricting processes, not merely “conjoined polarization” by itself.10The modifier “entanglement” is used advisedly here to characterize this problem: it is used similarly to the notion of quantum entanglement in physics—how two or more particles become linked and share a common quantum state. This entanglement creates an epistemological problem for physicists in attempting to measure, for example, the position or location of a particle. See Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway 270 (2d prtg. 2007). This Article makes an analogous argument regarding the epistemological difficulties judges face in evaluating partisan and racial gerrymanders. Where the level of racial residential segregation is higher, the entanglement of race and politics in districting processes is likely to be greater, not only because of the geographic concentrations of people that facilitate political district line-drawing, but also because regions with higher levels of racial residential segregation have both greater racial political polarization and partisan political polarization. 

This Article presents original analysis of the 2020 presidential election results and 2020 census data to demonstrate that racial segregation and partisan segregation are strongly correlated. Moreover, regions with higher levels of racial residential segregation appear to have higher levels of partisan polarization. As a result, partisan gerrymanders in those regions are likely to result in the segregation of voters into different political districts on the basis of race and vice versa. 

Part I provides a brief history of gerrymandering, including the types and forms of political districts that were historically practiced. Political districts were far more varied in the early years of the republic than is generally appreciated or understood today. More importantly, Part II notes that although gerrymandering practice can be traced to the early decades of the republic, efforts to curb it also extend back into the nineteenth century. Standards and norms for democratic practice have improved and evolved since the framing of the Constitution, laying the groundwork for particularized claims brought to challenge this practice. 

Part II compares racial gerrymandering and partisan political gerrymandering cases, rulings, and reasoning. It analyzes points of divergence and convergence between the two lines of cases. The partisan and racial gerrymandering cases germinate from the same seed and the same soil but have produced extremely divergent results in the body of the Supreme Court’s precedent governing these cases. This creates a problem in cases brought that challenge redistricting where race and partisan affiliation are largely co-extensive. In such cases, racial gerrymandering could escape judicial scrutiny under the cover of partisanship. 

Part III explicates the entanglement problem, that purely partisan redistricting maps are in many cases objectively indistinguishable from redistricting maps that explicitly use race. The key components of this problem are racial political polarization and racial residential segregation. When these factors coincide, partisan gerrymandering is likely to sort people into different districts on a racial basis. Part III also shows that racial residential segregation plays a larger role than is generally appreciated in both racial and partisan gerrymandering processes. It presents original and other recent empirical research suggesting that regions with higher levels of racial residential segregation have both more racial political polarization and political segregation.

Part IV reviews three possible ways to address the entanglement problem in terms of current constitutional law and text, weighing the merits of each. First, any hybrid gerrymandering case in which race appears to play a significant role but is co-extensive with partisanship could be categorically exempted from judicial review if the state raises such a defense. This approach is not a functional solution because it would formalize a loophole for subverting the Constitution as long as racial gerrymanders are clothed in the guise of partisanship. 

Second, any case where race and partisanship are co-extensive could instead be drawn within the racial gerrymandering line and held to strict scrutiny review, even though race cannot be said to “predominate.” This approach would better align with the Court’s broader anti-classification jurisprudence but would require adjustments to the standards applicable to racial gerrymandering cases.

Finally, the Court could reverse its judgment that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable. The Court only recently gathered a majority of Justices in support of that view. It could reverse course and direct lower courts to review such claims under a lower standard of review within the equal protection jurisprudence or some other constitutional provision or basis altogether. In this regard, Part IV makes the case for revisiting the Court’s Guarantee Clause jurisprudence based upon principles and concerns articulated by the framers of the Constitution. 

I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING

Although the United States was still a young nation at the time of the ratification of the Constitution in 1787, the framers already enjoyed decades of cumulative experience with democratic political processes, including political districting, based upon the collective experiments already underway in the various states since the Revolution.11 I am referring here primarily to the adoption of vastly different state constitutions after the Revolution, which occurred more than ten years before the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. To read more about these instruments, see W.C. Webster, Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American Revolution, 9 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 64 (1897). I am also referring, however, to the fact that the framers of the Constitution for the better part of a decade experienced living under the Articles of Confederation, which were devised and adopted in 1777 and 1781. These experiences were formative to the framing of the Constitution, as the authors of The Federalist Papers noted. The Federalist Nos. 15–21 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton). The Federalist Papers, for example, note political districts of varying size and composition both within and between states as a matter of fact. 

In Federalist No. 57, James Madison observes that different sized political districts contribute to both the federal and state legislatures: “The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives. It forms, however, but one county, in which every elector votes for each of its representatives in the State legislature.”12The Federalist No. 57 (James Madison). Thus, Pennsylvania’s county-districting system for electing state legislators necessarily resulted in large population disparities between political districts in that state at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. But in Federalist No. 61, Alexander Hamilton notes that although the New York State Assembly is drawn from counties, the New York State Senate is drawn from districts composed of two to six counties apiece.13The Federalist No. 61 (Alexander Hamilton).

While acknowledging the existence of population disparities between political districts (and implicitly, the existence of inequities in political representation), both Madison and Hamilton unequivocally maintain throughout The Federalist Papers that the principle of majoritarianism—that the majority should prevail—is the fundamental basis of free government and republican government.14The terms “republic” or “republican” are given different meanings in different contexts, from Aristotle to contemporary political philosophers. In The Federalist Papers, however, Madison and Hamilton are quite specific on the definition and how a republic differs from a pure democracy. In Federalist No. 14, Madison explains that “in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person” whereas “in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representative and, agents.” The Federalist No. 14 (James Madison). In their view, the difference is primarily practical, not principled. Id. Madison continues: “A democracy, consequently, must be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.” Id. In Federalist No. 58, for instance, Madison asserts that “the fundamental principle of free government” is that the “majority would rule.”15The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison). In that context, he was writing against the suggestion made by critics of the proposed Constitution that supermajorities should be required for either a quorum or a decision (such as passing a law) in the House of Representatives. As he explains: “In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority.”16Id. 

Indeed, this is one of the chief objections the framers had with the Articles of Confederation, which gave equal suffrage to each state in the federal legislature (unlike the Constitution, which does so only in one legislative chamber, the Senate).17U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. Prior to the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 where the Constitution was hammered out, Madison privately wrote to Thomas Jefferson expressing his hopes for systemic changes to the federal government. Chief among these concerns was converting from a system in which each state receives equal voting power in Congress to a system of representation based upon population.18Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0169 [https://perma.cc/LN8C-YW5K]. It might be wondered, therefore, why Madison and Hamilton acquiesced to a system in which one house of the legislature maintained equal voting power? As historians note, this was a feature of the “Connecticut plan,” and a critical compromise that allowed the convention to proceed. Without it, it is doubtful that the Constitution could have received sufficient support for ratification from smaller states. See Liberty’s Blueprint, infra note 207, at 73.  

Hamilton firmly agreed. In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton maintains that “the fundamental maxim of republican government . . . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.”19The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). Therefore, in his view, Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware [sic] an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania or Virginia, or North Carolina.20Id.  

In a powerful and eloquent denunciation of the principle of equal suffrage between states, Hamilton goes on to develop the argument on the “impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness” in various ways.21Id. 

This argument, however, and all of the reasoning developed in support of it, would appear to have equal force against political districts within states of “most unequal dimensions and populousness.” Indeed, in Federalist No. 46, Madison asserts that “[e]very one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the state, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside.”22The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison).

How can the principles, reasoning, and keen insights developed by Hamilton in pushing for more proportional representation between states in the federal government be reconciled with the apparent lack of concern with unevenly populated political districts within states or the absence of an explicit mechanism regulating it? The answer is not clear. It may have been an oversight. There were many weighty matters that preoccupied the Constitutional Convention, and the issue of unequal political districts within states may not have been a topline concern. Or, if it were a serious concern, perhaps any concerned framers were either outnumbered by those who were not or sensed efforts to regulate it were either impracticable or not a winnable issue. Despite their reputation, especially Madison’s, as “author” of the Constitution, historians have noted that most of the proposals Madison or Hamilton introduced or supported at the convention were defeated.23Despite their reputation as the Constitution’s great proponents and defenders owing in part to their authorship of The Federalist Papers, historians note that, more often than not, Hamilton and Madison were generally outvoted in their preferences for the Constitution. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 208–09 (1985) (“Overall, of seventy-one specific proposals that Madison moved, seconded, or spoke unequivocally in regard to, he was on the losing side forty times.”). 

Or perhaps they assumed that unequal populations across political districts within states, to the extent that they were found, would exist within tolerable limits, or would not result in the vast and strikingly unequal representation of political interests to the same extent found when small states enjoyed the same voting power as the larger states. After all, the proponents of the Constitution were largely concentrating their reform efforts on addressing defects in the experience of government under the Articles of Confederation and the paralysis that resulted from allowing small states to block legislation necessary to advancing the interests of the nation.

Yet another possibility is that they believed that a separate and sufficient mechanism existed for addressing the districting problem. As an example of the latter, perhaps they believed that Article I, Section 4, allowing Congress to alter state electoral rules in federal elections, would suffice to remedy any particularly egregious or extreme case that might arise within a state.24U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. This possibility is purely speculative given that none of the three lengthy Federalist Papers (59–61) dedicated to defending the inclusion of this provision mention the composition, size, or population of political districts. In any case, this provision quickly fell into disuse, because it would be decades before Congress passed a law under this authority.25For instance, one of the first federal election laws passed by Congress, which included prohibitions on false registration, bribery, and reporting false election returns, was enacted after the Civil War. Enforcement Act of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-114, 16 Stat. 140.

Regardless of the framers’ concern—or lack thereof—for the issue of inequities between political districts within states, state legislatures took full advantage of the maneuvering room granted them by the Constitution’s silence on this matter. In one of the most notorious instances of abuse of this power, the Massachusetts legislature passed a redistricting law in 1812 designed to minimize the political power of the Federalist Party in the next election by concentrating Federalist voters into a small number of districts while spreading Republican voters into a wider range of districts.26Jennifer Davis, Elbridge Gerry and the Monstrous Gerrymander, Libr. of Cong. Blog (Feb. 10 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/02/elbridge-gerry-and-the-monstrous-gerrymander/ [https://perma.cc/QQ22-D9AG]. The plan worked because the Republican party won twenty-nine seats compared to eleven for the Federalist Party, despite winning only 49% of the vote.27Becky Little, How Gerrymandering Began in the US, History (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/gerrymandering-origins-voting [https://perma.cc/8SM9-Q2MG]. The map, however, so conspicuously divided up the Boston region in an unnatural manner that critics likened the shape to a salamander. Governor Elbridge Gerry, a leading proponent of the plan, lent his name to political history when a political cartoonist dubbed the plan a “Gerry-mander: A new species of Monster.”28The Gerry-mander, Bos. Gazette, Mar. 26, 1812, at 2.  

The type and form of political district found in the early republic was more diverse and less uniform than those that exist today. Not only were political districts of unequal population and dimension regularly employed, and the manipulation of those districts common to the extent of political tolerance, but the form and type of district were not nearly as uniform as is the case today.29This is true not only of political districts, but also of most of the key political institutions of the era. All states within the United States currently have similar political structures, generally a bicameral legislature and a governor as chief executive. This was not the case in the antebellum period. As noted in various Federalist Papers, many executive branches were composed of councils. Pennsylvania, for example, had a “Supreme Executive Council.” Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power in the Founding Decade, 496 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 43 (1988). In other cases, such as Delaware, the executive branch was derived from the legislature, as is the case today in many parliamentary systems. Del. Const. art. 7. All districts organized for electing members to the House of Representatives today are what political scientists call “single-member plurality” districts.30Greg D. Adams, Legislative Effects of Single-Member vs. Multi-Member Districts, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 129, 139 (1996). This means that each district elects a single member, and that member is elected by a plurality of the vote (winning more votes than any other candidate—also called “first past the post”). This was not, however, the case in the early years of the republic. A variety of district types co-existed, from multi-member to at-large districts. Many of these district types were designed to maximize or entrench partisan political power.

The Constitution neither prescribes nor prohibits particular types of districts or methods of electing representatives, aside from the requirement that voting qualifications be the same as those employed for the most “numerous branch of the state legislature.”31U.S. Const. art. 1, § 2. It only requires a certain number of representatives for each state based upon relative population. Consequently, most of the original thirteen states used multi-member districts in the first congressional elections.32Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1379 (2012).  

Between 20% and 44% of House members were elected from multi-member districts until the Twenty-Eighth Congress.33Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 Soc. Sci. Hist. 159, 171 (1998). This means that each district elected more than one representative. They did not use proportional representation systems, as is common to most modern parliamentary democracies, as such systems had not yet been developed. Instead, they gave some districts greater political representation relative to others. Later, some states used “at-large” voting, meaning that House members were elected in some states by a vote of the entire state, as United States senators are elected today.34Id. at 168. 

As is true of many aspects of our political system and institutions, there was a gradual trend toward greater uniformity. In 1842, Congress passed the first of a series of laws, generally known as “Apportionment Acts,” which outlawed at-large, statewide House districts under its Article I, Section 4 authority.35Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491. Although ostensibly aimed at giving political minorities within states more opportunity to elect members to Congress, it also had the effect of outlawing multi-member districts, not just at-large systems. There were serious doubts about the constitutionality of such laws,36President John Tyler said that “Congress itself has power by law to alter State regulations respecting the manner of holding elections for Representatives is clear, but its power to command the States to make new regulations or alter their existing regulations is the question upon which I have felt deep and strong doubts.” John Tyler, Special Message, Am. Presidency Project (June 28, 1842), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-4212 [https://perma.cc/7M2X-ACNJ]. and at least a few states continued to use at-large systems in violation of the law.

It was not until an apportionment act in 1872 that Congress added that districts should not only be geographically contiguous and single-member, but also that they should contain “as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”37Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28. This requirement was reiterated in similar subsequent enactments, although it was not yet a constitutional principle.38Act of Feb. 7, 1891, ch. 116, § 3, 26 Stat. 735; Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733; Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13. 

In 1967, Congress passed another law prohibiting multi-member and at-large districts (in states with more than one representative) based on concerns that southern states might resort to at-large, statewide systems in response to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.392 U.S.C. § 2(c). Both multi-member and at-large districts could be used to dilute Black voting strength in southern states.40Notably, however, the civil rights scholar Lani Guinier argued in a highly influential law review article in 1991 that multi-member districts could be designed to help increase minority political representation and more closely approximate the advantages of a proportional system. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413 (1991). Shortly after, President Clinton nominated her to be assistant attorney general, but critics highlighted controversial positions and claims made in her voting rights scholarship, prompting the President to withdraw her nomination. David Lauter, Clinton Withdraws Guinier as Nominee for Civil Rights Job: Justice Department: The President Says He Only Lately Read Her Legal Writings. He Decided She Stood for Principles He Could Not Support in a Divisive Confirmation Battle, L.A. Times (June 4, 1993, 12:00 AM) https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-06-04-mn-43290-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q8GH-8TBJ]. 

The key developments, however, were in the courts of the 1960s. In 1962, the Supreme Court ruled that political districting processes were “justiciable” and could be reviewed by courts in the case of Baker v. Carr.41Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232–37 (1962). Two years later, the Supreme Court ruled that political districts should approximate equal population and announced the principle of “one person, one vote.”42Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 28 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558–68 (1964). Unequal political districts undermined this principle. If districts could be devised of unequal size, then some people enjoy greater electoral influence, and their votes might count more than others. This legal principle has been serially re-affirmed and strengthened such that the Court has struck down districting laws drawing districts with deviations of less than 1% in population between them.43Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 735–38, 744 (1983). Permitting suits challenging inequities and disparities in the design of political districts opened the door for the challenges to partisan political and racial gerrymandering processes.

II.  THE GERRYMANDERING CASES

This Part of the Article will briefly review the major challenges to racial gerrymandering and partisan political gerrymandering reviewed by the Supreme Court and conclude with some comparative observations and analysis. 

A.  RACIAL GERRYMANDERING

The first notable racial gerrymandering case actually precedes Baker v. Carr. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a redistricting plan in Alabama that would have rendered the city of Tuskegee a twenty-eight-sided political district for no perceptible reason other than to disenfranchise the town’s Black population, which lived virtually exclusively in the districts outside the newly drawn city boundaries.44Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Court held that complaints alleging racial gerrymandering of municipal boundaries were cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.45Id. 

A decade later, in White v. Regester, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that a redistricting plan adopted in Texas had elements designed to exclude Mexican-Americans from electing representatives in the state legislature through the employment of multi-member districts.46White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The Court, however, rejected a similar claim involving multi-member districts in Indiana that had a disparate effect on Black voters in racially segregated urban neighborhoods.47Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). These cases, however, did not involve the drawing of districts so much as the type of district. 

Racial gerrymandering claims received a significant boost in a series of cases considered by the Supreme Court after the 1990 census, beginning with the landmark case of Shaw v. Reno, in which the Court first recognized this claim as such in the drawing of district lines.48Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1995). After the 1990 census, North Carolina was awarded an additional congressional seat. The state legislature’s initial apportionment plan was rejected by the Department of Justice under the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”).49Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301). A revised VRA-compliant plan created a second majority-Black district. Five white North Carolina residents sued, arguing that the redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the residents claimed that the state engaged in an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander.”50Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633–34.

In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court articulated several principles that helped lay the foundation for a clear rule against racial gerrymanders. First, the Court situated the case firmly within its racial classification jurisprudence, affirming that “laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of [the Equal Protection Clause’s] prohibition,” and that “[e]xpress racial classifications are immediately suspect.”51Id. at 642. Furthermore, the Court asserted that the harms of racial classification are as present in the electoral context as they are in other contexts that the Court had reviewed: 

Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.52Id. at 657.

The Court acknowledged, however, that all redistricting is necessarily race-conscious, drawn with an awareness of racial demographics, just as the legislature is aware of many other demographics features when drawing legislative districts.53Id. at 646 (“[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors.”). Therefore, the Court held that not all race-conscious redistricting is unconstitutional.54Id. The Court did not, however, identify the line between permissible race-conscious political redistricting and impermissible racial gerrymandering. It concluded that the plan in question was so “bizarre on its face that it was ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race.’ ”55Id. at 644. Therefore, the Court held that the appellants stated a claim strong enough to survive a motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further determinations.56Id. at 658. 

A similar set of facts led to another suit that the Supreme Court considered involving Georgia in the case of Miller v. Johnson.57Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). In announcing its decision in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, the Court both affirmed critical parts of Shaw and helped indicate where to draw the line between race-conscious political districting and impermissible racial gerrymandering. 

The Court first specifically rejected the state of Georgia’s claim that “evidence of a legislature’s deliberate classification of voters on the basis of race cannot alone suffice to state a claim under Shaw.”58Id. at 910. Kennedy also observed that “the essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is that the state has used race as a basis for separating voters into districts.”59Id. at 911. Critically, however, the Court promulgated a “predominant factor” test to guide it’s application of the facts to the law in this context.60Id. at 916. 

To establish a racial gerrymandering claim, a plaintiff must prove that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.”61Id. at 916–17. To make this showing, a plaintiff must establish that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.62Id. Where these or other race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a state can “defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.”63Id. at 916. There is a latent ambiguity in the formulation and application of this standard: whether the predominance test is a subjective “intent” or motive-based assessment or an objective test that (a) race has been used by the state legislature in drawing district boundaries and that (b) this use predominates in some sense. Id. In Miller, the Court muddles the issue, asserting that “the plaintiffs [can] show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor.” Id. In some cases, such as Easely v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), the Court seems to be suggesting that the predominance test is a subjective test based on motivation. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (“We must determine whether there is adequate support for the District Court’s key findings, particularly the ultimate finding that the legislature’s motive was predominantly racial, not political.”). The Court’s broader anti-classification jurisprudence, however, is specifically objective; whenever the government uses the race of a person in policymaking, strict scrutiny applies, regardless of motives. See Menendian, supra note 2. Indeed, this is the main gist of the Court’s anti-classification jurisprudence since Crosan/Adarand, that “benign” motives cannot shield a policy or law from strict scrutiny review. In this regard, the presumption against racial classifications is not particularly concerned with intent or effects. It is simply concerned about the use or consideration of race in policymaking, even if race is a “factor of a factor of a factor.” If the predominance standard is an objective test, then it is one that deviates from the Court’s anti-classification jurisprudence in this way: it must predominate, whereas in other contexts it can be a very small factor and still trigger strict scrutiny. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In any case, the anti-classification jurisprudence differs from claims of intentional discrimination brought under the equal protection clause or the provision of many civil rights statutes, such as Title VII, which apply if race is a “motivating factor,” even if there are mixed motives, meaning more than one motivation. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). If the “predominance” standard is a subjective test, a motives or intent-based inquiry, then it is also clearly more stringent than is the case in either ordinary equal protection cases or statutory civil rights frameworks.  

In several subsequent cases involving similar fact patterns and southern states, the Court further clarified that to bring racial gerrymandering claims, individuals must reside in the district that they claim is gerrymandered64United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Sinkfield v. Kelly, 531 U.S. 28, 29 (2000); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). and that such claims should be brought on a district-by-district basis, not against an entire plan.65Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015). This is consistent with the view that these cases are concerned with the dangers of racial classification. An individual residing outside of a district that it claims has been gerrymandered has not, in some sense, been “classified” on the basis of race by government as the Court has construed this concept.66See Menendian, supra note 2. It should be noted that most of the contemporaneous cases heard by the Court at this time involved drawing districts to increase or preserve minority representation in Congress under the VRA.67This is noted to suggest that there is a political valence or direction to these cases, that the outcomes in these cases tended to undermine efforts to increase Black or minority political power, and that the plaintiffs were often white or brought suit on behalf of predominantly white communities or districts.

There remain a number of ambiguities in how to apply the predominance test, some of which the Supreme Court has grappled with, but has not necessarily fully resolved.68Another ambiguity in this test is the quantitative threshold for predominance. On one reading, it seems as though the Court is saying that race must predominate all other factors to trigger strict scrutiny, not that the race factor must simply be greater than any other single factor. In the former case, race must be 50%+1 of the considerations, whereas in the latter construction, it must simply be larger than any other individual factor (and could be 41%) of the scheme. If predominance is measured in this way, then the number of considerations or factors being weighed could theoretically elevate or lower the threshold for quantitative predominance. This aspect to the predominance test remains unsettled, as far as I can tell. In particular, the Court has tried to clarify how the consideration of race is to be viewed in relation to other considerations before triggering strict scrutiny. In a case heard in the 2015 term, the Court rejected a lower court’s ruling that race did not “predominate” as a consideration in the redistricting plan because of “non-racial factors,” including the goal of creating districts of equal population.69Alabama, 575 U.S. at 256. The Court clarified that the equal population factor is not a factor to be considered in the ordinary course of redistricting, but a constitutional mandate.70Id. While that may seem like an easy case, the Court considered a harder question in the 2016 term. 

The state of Virginia defended a Republican-led redistricting plan against a racial gerrymandering claim on the grounds that the “predominance test” should only be applied if the use of race is in conflict with “traditional districting principles,” as it had presumed in cases such as Shaw.71Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178 (2017). The Court rejected this position in a seven-to-one decision presented in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. He concluded that racial gerrymanders can exist or arise even under plans that otherwise conform to traditional factors such as compactness and contiguity. As he explained, “The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit misshapen districts. It prohibits unjustified racial classifications.”72Id. at 189.

Critically, the Court emphasized that an unconstitutional racial gerrymander can arise or exist even if an identical plan could have been adopted without consideration or use of race. Justice Kennedy explained that “[t]he racial predominance inquiry concerns the actual considerations that provided the essential basis for the lines drawn, not post hoc justifications the legislature in theory could have used but in reality did not.”73Id. at 189–90. Thus the predominance test is a factual inquiry into considerations used as part of the actual districting process. Holding otherwise would provide a state with constitutional cover for unconstitutional behavior. As the Court observed, “By deploying [non-racial] factors in various combinations and permutations, a State could construct a plethora of potential maps that look consistent with traditional, race-neutral principles. But if race for its own sake is the overriding reason for choosing one map over others, race still may predominate.”74Id. at 190.  

B.  PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING

Since the early 1960s, the Supreme Court has become more solicitous of racial gerrymandering claims even has it has become more hostile to partisan political gerrymandering claims. This Section will now review the latter line of cases. 

The Supreme Court squarely confronted a partisan gerrymandering claim in the 1986 term in the case of Davis v. Bandemer.75Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1985). In that case, the Court reviewed a redistricting plan proposed by the Republican-controlled Indiana state legislature. This plan yielded an immediate partisan advantage in which 43 out of the 100 seats in the state House of Representatives were filled by Democratic candidates even though 51.9% of the statewide votes went to Democratic candidates.76It should be noted that such disparities are not uncommon in the years since. Lee Fang, Gerrymandering Rigged the 2014 Elections for GOP Advantage, Nation (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/gerrymandering-rigged-2014-elections-republican-advantage [https://perma.cc/B4D5-2GUH].; Tim Dickinson, How Republicans Rig the Game, Rolling Stone (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/how-republicans-rig-the-game-111011 [https://perma.cc/43TH-QBBD]. Upon review, a deeply divided Court produced a fragmented set of opinions in which most justices agreed on the result—a holding that the plan was not unconstitutional—but disagreed on the rationale and basis for that judgment.77Notably, the only “opinion of the Court” is Part II of Justice White’s opinion.  

Six of the Justices, and therefore the Court, endorsed the legal principle that partisan or political gerrymanders are justiciable, while three Justices, Justice O’Connor, Justice Burger, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, preferred to rule that such claims are not. Even among the Justices in the majority and plurality, however, there was a lack of consensus on the grounds for doing so and on the standards that should be adopted to evaluate such claims. The debate between the Justices prefigures most of the issues that have been subsequently debated in this context. 

The plurality of Justices White, Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun begin with the principle that in order to establish a partisan gerrymandering claim, plaintiffs must “prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”78Davis, 478 U.S. at 127. They caution, however, that the mere fact that “a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.”79Id. at 131. In addition, they reject the notion that mere disproportionality in representation is a sufficiently adverse effect to establish a constitutional violation. The plurality advises that reviewing courts examine both the district individually as well as the state’s overall districting plan holistically. The plurality also asserts that a constitutionally infirm redistricting plan can occur either when a minority manipulates boundaries to consistently thwart the will of the majority, or when a majority uses its power to shut a minority out of the political process or a meaningful chance to influence it.

Ultimately, the plurality held that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”80Id. at 132. In applying this standard, the plurality emphasized that claimants would need to examine more than a single election to conclude that an impermissible partisan gerrymander exists, and that they should be able to distinguish between a meaningful structural disadvantage established by districting compared to mere lack of success in persuading voters. The plurality felt that the district court’s conclusions were less persuasive than the state’s defense on this point and voted to reverse the lower court. 

Justice Powell and Justice Stevens found the plurality’s approach too restrictive and would have affirmed the lower court. In particular, Justice Powell wrote in favor of a multi-factor analysis: 

The most important [factor to consider is] the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries. Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution. No one factor should be dispositive.81Id. at 173.

Justice O’Connor and Justice Burger argued strenuously that the majority’s holding would prove unworkable in practice, as illustrated by the inability of the six Justices in favor of holding partisan gerrymanders as justiciable to get behind a single standard and therefore was a “political question” as set out in the framework for evaluating such questions in Baker v. Carr.82Baker identified six factors in determining whether an issue was a political question and non-justiciable, including “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In addition to the lack of a clearly defined and easily applicable standard for adjudicating such claims, they had prudential concerns. Justice O’Connor argued that without a clear standard, opening federal courts to claims of partisan gerrymandering would lead to “pervasive and unwarranted judicial superintendence of the legislative task of apportionment.”83Davis, 478 U.S. at 147. She wondered if there was any logical stopping point short of “roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group.”84Id.

Despite its inviting holding, Bandemer established a heavier burden for plaintiffs to overcome so as to make out a discriminatory political gerrymandering claim than its authors probably imagined. Over the next eighteen years, no federal courts, at any level, ruled that a redistricting plan was an unconstitutional political gerrymander. This was the situation when the Court heard the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer in 2004.85Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).

In Vieth, the Court considered a suit brought by members of the Democratic Party, claiming that the state of Pennsylvania’s partisan redistricting plan violated the Constitution.86Id. at 271. Five Justices agreed that the plan did not violate the Constitution, but four of those Justices took the position of Justice O’Connor, Justice Burger, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bandemer, arguing that political gerrymanders should be non-justiciable and voting to overturn Bandemer.87Id. at 305–06. The fifth Justice, Justice Kennedy, however, agreed that current standards were unworkable, but he preferred to leave the door open to discovering one.88Id. at 317. The four dissenting Justices agreed with Bandemer’s holding but disagreed on the specifics of how to operationalize that principle.89Id. at 292, 317, 343, 354. 

The Court subsequently heard a case that had been held over until Vieth was decided, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.90League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). In Perry, the petitioners challenged the 2003 redistricting plan enacted by the Republican-controlled Texas legislature. Drawn merely a year after the 2002 midterm elections, the 2003 plan led to an election result where twenty-one Republicans and eleven Democrats were elected in congressional elections the following year,91Id. at 400. a far more lopsided result than the aggregate vote count would suggest. The petitioners argued that the mid-decennial nature of the redistricting plan revealed the legislature’s sole motivation to gain partisan advantage,92Id. at 417. which should be sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy entertained the petitioners’ proposed “sole-intent” test, but ultimately found it “not convincing” because some contested district lines were drawn based on more local interests and a number of line-drawing requests by Democratic legislators were honored.93Id. at 417–18.

Interestingly, Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, in their dissent, proposed a different test wherein a plaintiff must prove partisan aims by showing that: (1) the legislature “subordinated neutral districting principles to political considerations” and (2) their predominant motive was to “maximize one party’s power,” along with a showing of discriminatory intent by establishing that (1) the plaintiff’s candidate of choice won election under the old plan; (2) the plaintiff’s residence is now in a district that is a safe seat for the opposite party; and (3) the plaintiff’s new district is less compact than the old district.94Id. at 476. However, this complex alternative test was clearly not entertained by the majority. 

The next major partisan gerrymandering case was heralded when the Court agreed to review a redistricting plan arising from Wisconsin in Gill v. Whitford, based on the fact that a new technical standard had been developed and proposed: the efficiency gap.95Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 831 (2015). This was a formula devised by social scientists to provide metrics that could gauge the specific disadvantage created by certain redistricting schemes. The authors of this formula claimed it provided clear and workable standards for operationalizing them.96Specifically, Stephanopoulos and McGhee propose that any partisan gerrymander resulting in an efficiency gap of more than two congressional seats or 8% of state house seats should be considered presumptively unlawful. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 95, at 884. The result was a letdown when the Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Court also breezily dismissed another case the same year in a per curiam opinion regarding Maryland’s Democratic-favored political gerrymandering.97Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018). This case was reconsidered, and then dismissed, in the 2019 term.

Justice Kennedy’s departure from the Court led to a more decisive result in this line of cases. In Rucho v. Common Cause, a majority of the Court held for the first time that partisan gerrymanders are a political question and non-justiciable largely for the reasons developed in the dissent in Bandemer and the concurrences in Vieth.98Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497–98 (2019). This would seem to be, thus far, the end of the line for claims of partisan gerrymandering. 

C.  POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

The juxtaposition of the racial gerrymandering and partisan political gerrymandering cases is itself revealing. The partisan and racial gerrymandering cases germinate from the same seed and the same soil. They both arise out of a political context in which democratic representation is being distorted or manipulated for specific advantage, and in a legal context in which the Constitution provides scant direct guidance (despite the provision of a political mechanism by which Congress, via Article 1, Section 4, can alter state electoral rules in federal elections). The germ for both claims is the Court’s greater solicitude toward challenges to various electoral schemes in the early 1960s. And yet the Court has evolved vastly different frameworks and conclusions for regulating these forms of political districting activity for reasons that are not entirely convincing or coherent. 

In theory, the different levels of scrutiny and accord given to race versus other classifications under the Equal Protection Clause could explain the differences in treatment, but the proponents of treating political gerrymanders as non-justiciable decline to ground their reasoning on this basis.99This point is raised, but it is not presented as the main ground of defense. See, e.g., id. at 2502. After all, if this were the critical explanatory factor, then partisan gerrymandering claims would be justiciable, just at a much lower level of judicial review. 

Instead, the main contention of the non-justiciable position emphasizes the lack of workable standards and the constitutional structure and history of gerrymandering as a political practice. Recall, for example, that Justice White and the plurality in Bandemer emphasized whether a districting scheme created a severe structural disadvantage in access to the political process, whereas Justice Powell (joined by Justice Stevens) would have applied a multi-factor, holistic approach. Justice O’Connor and the Justices who joined her opinion argued that the Baker factors for evaluating whether an issue is a political question squarely fit, and that there was no logical stopping point short of proportional representation once such claims were entertained.

The most obvious rejoinder to the claim that political gerrymandering suits cannot be grounded onto a workable standard is the fact that workable standards have already been developed and adopted in the racial gerrymandering context. Logically, if the standard is workable in one context, it should be workable in another, absent some factor that would render it otherwise. Indeed, this is a prominent theme of the Justices who support judicial review of extreme partisan gerrymanders. 

In Bandemer, all six Justices in the majority signed onto a sharp critique of Justice O’Connor’s opinion (joined by Burger and Rehnquist) arguing that she failed to “point out how the standards that we set forth here for adjudicating this political gerrymandering claim are less manageable than the standards that have been developed for racial gerrymandering claims.”100Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1985). This was also a central point of contention in Vieth. The plaintiffs in that case modeled their claim on the standard adopted in Miller, that the partisan objective was a “predominant factor” in the redistricting process.101Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 901 (1995). As the plurality in Vieth forthrightly noted, “Appellants contend that their intent test must be discernible and manageable because it has been borrowed from our racial gerrymandering cases.”102Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284 (2004). Yet, it disagreed, for reasons that Justice Stevens upbraided in his dissent: 

Especially perplexing is the plurality’s ipse dixit distinction of our racial gerrymandering cases. Notably, the plurality does not argue that the judicially manageable standards that have been used to adjudicate racial gerrymandering claims would not be equally manageable in political gerrymandering cases. Instead, its distinction of those cases rests on its view that race as a districting criterion is “much more rarely encountered” than partisanship, and that determining whether race—“a rare and constitutionally suspect motive”—dominated a districting decision “is quite different from determining whether [such a decision] is so substantially affected by the excess of an ordinary and lawful motive as to [be] invali[d].” But those considerations are wholly irrelevant to the issue of justiciability.103Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

Moreover, the stronger the argument advanced by the plurality in Vieth and the majority in Rucho against porting the standards used in the racial gerrymandering cases to the political gerrymandering context, the more they reveal the weaknesses of the doctrine they have developed in the racial gerrymandering context. In Vieth, for instance, Justice Scalia writes on behalf of the plurality that the “predominant motivation” test is “vague . . . when used to evaluate single districts, [but] it all but evaporates when applied statewide.”104Id. at 285. Any vagueness, however, is built into the notion that courts can discern the predominance of any particular factor in a complex legislative process. Qualitative considerations in legislative processes are not like mechanical inputs into the production of widgets. They inherently resist the quantification necessary to determine “predominance.” 

The argument Justice Scalia develops in the guise of a rhetorical question is especially revealing: 

And how is the statewide “outweighing” to be determined? If three-fifths of the map’s districts forgo the pursuit of partisan ends in favor of strictly observing political-subdivision lines, and only two-fifths ignore those lines to disadvantage the plaintiffs, is the observance of political subdivisions the “predominant” goal between those two? We are sure appellants do not think so.105Id.  

The exact same argument could be developed at the scale of a single political district in the racial gerrymandering context, using neighborhoods, census tracts, or other census designated geographies as the smaller scale analogue subdivision. The “predominant factor” test seeks to quantify the inherently qualitative. Any deficiency in the predominant factor test in the partisan gerrymandering context is likely equally applicable to the racial gerrymandering context. 

Finally, Justice Scalia tries to draw another distinction to justify this difference in treatment: 

Determining whether the shape of a particular district is so substantially affected by the presence of a rare and constitutionally suspect motive as to invalidate it is quite different from determining whether it is so substantially affected by the excess of an ordinary and lawful motive as to invalidate it.106Id. at 286. 

But this argument utterly ignores the fact that Shaw and its progeny never characterized the pursuit of partisan political advantage as an ordinary (“traditional”) districting principle and also readily acknowledged that virtually all political districting is race-conscious, drawn with the awareness of racial demographics. To that extent, it is impossible to declare that consideration of race is any less “ordinary” than consideration of partisan advantage in the redistricting process. Moreover, in both cases, the argument is that it is only the predominance of this consideration that renders it illegal, not its mere presence. To that extent, Justice Scalia’s comment assumes what it concludes when it declares one legal and the other unlawful. 

Chief Justice Roberts makes a similar leap in logic in Rucho: “A permissible intent—securing partisan advantage—does not become constitutionally impermissible, like racial discrimination, when that permissible intent predominates.”107Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2503 (2019). If true, it is only because he and his colleagues make it so. If they decided that securing partisan advantage was unconstitutional when it predominates the redistricting process, then it would be so. Both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts assume that pursuit of partisan advantage is permissible to justify their conclusion that the case lines are different. Further, if the main reason that partisan gerrymandering is non-justiciable is the lack of workable standards, then the constitutionality of such processes is based upon their judgment in that regard rather than an evaluation of valiant, but ineffective, efforts. 

As unconvincing as these arguments are for why the predominance test cannot be reasonably applied to the partisan context, there is an even stronger argument for why partisan and racial gerrymanders cannot be treated in such categorically distinct ways, and it is a point that the dissenters have not developed: the entanglement of partisanship and race in redistricting processes. 

Against a backdrop of even moderate racial residential segregation, racial political polarization in voting patterns combined with the race-conscious districting processes mean that partisan gerrymandering cannot be clearly distinguished from racial gerrymandering. Even if mapmakers completely ignore racial demographics in generating districting options, a redistricting process motivated by the pursuit of partisan advantage is likely to produce maps strikingly similar to those that might occur if the state had “used race as a basis for separating voters into districts.”108Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995). The next Part of this Article confronts and unpacks this problem.

III.  THE ENTANGLEMENT PROBLEM

The entanglement of race and partisanship in political districting processes is rooted in a few critical phenomena. To understand the entanglement problem, we must first examine the concept of polarization, especially as it is applied to politics. 

Polarization is itself an elusive notion, and it is not always clear what it means. Sometimes polarization is invoked to describe the salience of political conflict.109Anna Bauman & Meghna Chakrabarti, From Political Polarization to Gang Violence: High Conflict and How to Free Yourself from It, WBUR (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2021/12/29/from-political-polarization-to-gang-violence-high-conflict-and-how-to-free-yourself-from-it [https://perma.cc/E7E3-LVPE]. This simple characterization is misleading. Although there may be an underlying relationship,110Noam Lupu, Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A Comparative Perspective, 37 Pol. Behav. 331, 350 (2015). partisanship and political polarization are not coterminous.111Yuval Levin claims that polarization is actually a function of weaker political parties. Institutionally, stronger political parties tend to moderate their more extreme elements. Yuval Levin, A Time To Build 61–65 (2020). Ezra Klein makes a similar argument in Ezra Klein, Why We’re Polarized (2020). See also Josh Huder, Polarization vs Partisanship in the Context of the Impeachment Debate, Gov’t. Affs. Inst. at Geo. Univ. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://gai.georgetown.edu/polarization-vs-partisanship-in-the-context-of-the-impeachment-debate/[https://perma.cc/A3PT-X9JJ]. 

The existence of closely contested elections versus landslide elections cannot tell you whether the electorate is polarized or not. Landslides might occur in deeply polarized contexts but in which one group dominates another, as in the Jim Crow South, or low-polarization contexts in which a broadly popular, mainstream candidate triumphs. Similarly, closely contested elections can occur when both candidates are popular or both are deeply unpopular. Aggregate returns are not indicative. 

More often, polarization is used to refer to intensity of disagreement or political conflict. This conceptualization, however, also fails to capture the essence of polarization. Extreme (corrosive or toxic) partisanship can exist in a state of either high or low political polarization. It is the distance or scope of disagreement, not necessarily the intensity of feeling or contestation, that is key to understanding polarization. This is perhaps easier to understand in an economic context. 

Suppose that most people in a certain society are middle-income, with far fewer extremely rich and extremely poor individuals. Such an income distribution would be depicted graphically in the form of what statisticians call a “normal distribution” (or a “Gaussian” distribution) with a bulge in the middle and smaller downward sloping tails toward the edges of the income distribution.112Robert Sedgewick, Kevin Wayne & Robert Dondero, Appendix C: Gaussian Distribution, Intro. to Programming in Python, https://introcs.cs.princeton.edu/python/appendix_gaussian [https://perma.cc/8VX4-BFWD]. In contrast, suppose that most people in another society are either extremely poor or very wealthy, with fewer people as middle-income. This is what statisticians call a bimodal distribution, with bulges towards the ends of the distribution. The mean or median results could be identical in both situations. See Figure 1.

FIGURE 1.  A Normal vs. a Bimodal Distribution

Polarization refers to a process by which a distribution resembling a normal distribution evolves into something more closely resembling a bimodal distribution. Thus, if the income distribution hollows out this way, economists may describe this as “economic polarization.”113Economic Polarization and Challenges to Subnational Governments: An Introduction, 47 State & Local Gov’t Rev. 220 (2015). The same is true of politics. 

As political scientists and surveyors have demonstrated, American political attitudes have indeed become more polarized in recent decades.114U.S. Is Polarizing Faster Than Other Democracies, Study Finds, Brown Univ. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.brown.edu/news/2020-01-21/polarization [https://perma.cc/BNX2-F73S]. The Pew Research Center, which conducts regular surveys on political attitudes, found that in both 1994 and 2004, more Americans expressed mixed or centrist political opinions than either conservative or liberal views.115Political Polarization in the American Public, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (June 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ [https://perma.cc/JSL2-ALEC]; The Shift in the American Public’s Political Values: Political Polarization 1994–2017, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/interactives/political-polarization-1994-2017 [https://perma.cc/9QLP-VZLH]. By 2014, however, this had reversed, a trend that has continued to the present. 

One particularly important dynamic contributing to political polarization is that Republicans have become more conservative and Democrats have become more liberal. In 1994, only 64% of Republicans were more conservative than the median Democrat, and only 70% of Democrats were more liberal than the median Republican. By 2014, those figures had risen to 92 and 94%, respectively.116Political Polarization, supra note 115. These facts should not be taken, however, to mean that American political polarization is perfectly symmetrical. But it is true that the American electorate has become more polarized.  

Another form of polarization is racial political polarization. This tends to refer to distinctive partisan preferences between racial groups. Table 1 below indicates the significant racial gaps in support for partisan candidates in presidential elections since 2000. 

TABLE 1.  Republican Support by race in Presidential Elections, 2000–2020.117How Groups Voted in 2004, Roper Ctr., Cornell Univ., https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/how-groups-voted-2004 .

Although there is non-trivial variation between electoral cycles, this table shows consistently high political polarization between racial groups in the popular vote for President (and by implication for political party) over two decades. In presidential elections since 2000, Black support for the Republican candidate narrowly ranges from 4% to 12%. White support ranges from 55% to 59%. Latino support ranges from 26% to 44% (in 2004).118It should be noted that this 44% figure has been disputed by leading election analysts, which gauge the actual figure as probably closer to 38%. See Ruy Teixeira, Public Opinion Watch, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Nov. 24, 2004), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/public-opinion-watch-64/ [https://perma.cc/Y2PR-G2B2]. And Asian support ranges from 27% to 43%. The white-Black voting gap ranges from 46 to 53 points. Although political polarization by race seems to reach a peak in 2012, the figures as of 2020 are just as large, if not larger, as they were in 2000. In short, racial political polarization has worsened over time, but it has been consistently high throughout the twenty-first century. 

Similar tables could be generated for congressional races, midterm elections, governor’s races, and the like. Political scientists have observed that racial political polarization in the United States has been pronounced at least since 1965.119Cain & Zhang, supra note 8. This connection between race and partisan affiliation is described as the “conjoined polarization.”120Id. Although this phenomenon might be troubling in its own right, it is not automatically a problem in the context of political redistricting processes. 

If racial groups were evenly distributed across space, then political polarization by race would not factor into political redistricting processes. Gender political polarization offers a contrasting illustration. Gender political polarization has increased significantly in recent years too, and a table similar to Table 1 could be presented illustrating it.121Survey Reveals Stark Gender Gap in Political Views Among College Freshmen, Higher Educ. Rsch. Inst. at UCLA (May 5, 2017), https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/survey-reveals-stark-gender-gap-political-views-among-college-freshmen [https://perma.cc/TQ46-QLPH]. But the absence of gender political segregation means that gender is not a meaningful basis upon which to conduct political redistricting processes.

Residential segregation is the critical element that enables gerrymandering. This is true generally, but in the context of racial gerrymandering, racial residential segregation is the critical factor. 

When racial groups are highly concentrated into certain neighborhoods or communities, and there is a moderate to high degree of racial political polarization, then racial gerrymandering is relatively easy. On the other hand, even if the political community is racially polarized, if racial groups are highly integrated across space, then racial gerrymandering would prove extremely difficult to impossible. If either condition is absent, it is not possible to either use race to draw political districts for partisan advantage nor to draw districts for partisan advantage that segregate people into different political districts on the basis of race. Only when both conditions hold does the entanglement problem arise. Table 2, below, indicates the relationship. 

TABLE 2.  Conditions for Entanglement

The entanglement of race and politics in political redistricting processes, then, is not simply a function of the conjoined polarization of racial political polarization and partisan political polarization. It depends on the existence of racial residential segregation as well. 

Unfortunately, racial residential segregation is persistently moderate to high across much of the United States. Using traditional measures of segregation such as the dissimilarity index, national Black-white dissimilarity in 2020 was 55.2, meaning that 55% of Black Americans would have to move into a predominantly white neighborhood to have no racial residential segregation between Black and white Americans.122John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, Metropolitan Segregation: No Breakthrough in Sight 12 tbl.4 (Aug. 12, 2021), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report08122021.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY4B-3H4U]. This is in a range social scientists regard as “moderately high.” Asian-white dissimilarity scores are 40.0, and Hispanic-white dissimilarity scores are 45.3, in the moderate range.123Id. Even though most of these numbers have improved in recent decades, they demonstrate the persistence of racial residential segregation. In many cities, these figures are much higher.

Other popular measures of segregation are the Isolation/Exposure Indices, which describe neighborhood composition of the typical (median) or average person by race. The “typical” Black and white Americans reside in vastly different neighborhood milieus. As of 2020, the average white resident of a metropolitan area resides in a neighborhood that is 69% white, 9% Black, 12% Hispanic, and 6% Asian.124Id. at 3. In contrast, a typical Black resident lives in a neighborhood that is 41% Black, 34% white, 17% Hispanic, and 6% Asian. Not only are these demographically different worlds, these figures mean that Black “exposure” to white people is 34, roughly the same level it was in 1940. 

Using a different measure of segregation, the Divergence Index, which can account for multiple racial groups simultaneously and provide a single holistic score for every city or metropolitan region, racial residential segregation appears stubbornly persistent.125Elizabeth Roberto, The Divergence Index: A Decomposable Measure of Segregation and Inequality 2, 20 (Dec. 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1508.01167.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC5X-8NRX]. The Divergence Index compares demographic proportions of smaller geographies to larger geographies and then sums those population-weighted differences to yield a holistic score.126 The formula for the Divergence Index for location “i” is , where “xim” is the proportion of racial group “m” within the smaller geography “I,” “xm” is the proportion of racial group “M” within the bigger geography, and “Dii” is the Divergence Index for this geography. The lowest value of DI is “0” when the demographics of a smaller geography are similar to that of the larger geography. Higher values suggest higher segregation. There is no consensus range for “high” versus “low” Divergence scores, but some researchers have tried to determine that. See Technical Appendix, Othering & Belonging Inst. (June 21, 2021), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/technical-appendix [https://perma.cc/ERZ4-GLM4]. Over 50% of cities and metro areas have a higher (more segregated) Divergence score as of 2020 than in 1990.127Stephen Menendian, Samir Gambhir & Chih-Wei Hsu, Roots of Structural Racism: The 2020 Census Update, Othering & Belonging Inst. (Oct. 11, 2021), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/roots-structural-racism-2020 [https://perma.cc/KDC7-LD6G]. 

Given the central role of residential segregation in facilitating or impeding the manipulation of district boundaries for political advantage, it is strange that prior legal scholarship has under-emphasized or ignored this factor in analyzing gerrymandering cases. Perhaps that is because it is assumed that segregation is a neutral or binary background factor that either exists or does not, and does not actually affect the level of partisan political polarization in a region. If so, there are several findings that challenge this assumption.  

A study conducted by the political scientist Jessica Trounstine identified a direct relationship between racial residential segregation and partisan political polarization.128Jessica Trounstine, Segregation and Inequality in Public Goods, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 709, 720 (2016). She finds that the relationship between segregation and racial political polarization is statistically powerful: a city in the 10th percentile of segregation has a 35% point divide in racial support for a political candidate, compared to a 63% point divide at the 90th percentile.129Id. at 712. In other words, the more racial residential segregation, the more racial political polarization. 

Could this difference be explained by the fact that white people vote more conservatively in certain states or regions than others? She tests for this and finds that the relationship between segregation and polarization is unaffected by the conservatism of the local white population. In fact, she found that “cities with more conservative white populations have smaller racial divides.”130Jessica Trounstine, Segregation by Design: Local Politics and Inequality in American Cities 148 (2018). 

In short, racial residential segregation is not a background condition that exists in a binary state, either existing or not, to undergird the entanglement problem. Rather, it is a condition that interacts dynamically with racial political polarization. A higher level of racial residential segregation seems to coincide with higher racial political polarization. Similarly, racial residential segregation interacts dynamically with partisan political segregation and (by inference) partisan political polarization, as will be shown below. 

To appreciate the full relationship between race and politics, it is important first to emphasize that the critical role of residential segregation in relationship to gerrymandering is general, not specific to racial segregation and racial gerrymandering. Partisan political polarization, by itself, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to enable partisan gerrymandering. Political segregation, however, is necessary. If people of different political preferences or partisan affiliation are evenly distributed across space, regardless of how polarized they may be, it is extremely difficult to draw political districts for partisan advantage. On the other hand, high levels of partisan residential segregation (say, Republicans living in one community and Democrats in another) make it much easier to draw districts for partisan political advantage. For simplicity of illustration, compare hypothetical voting precincts of equal size with voting totals depicted in Tables 3 and 4 below. 

TABLE 3.  Hypothetical #1 Voting Precinct Electoral Results

Although the vote total in Table 3 is relatively close (only a two-point margin between the winner and loser), the precincts are extremely divergent from the aggregate vote total, suggesting a high degree of political segregation between precincts. In contrast, consider this a different election with the same aggregate result in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4.  Hypothetical #2 Voting Precinct Electoral Results

In this case, the winner’s vote margin is the same as in the first case, but the precincts only marginally diverge from the aggregate result. The largest gap for support for Candidate A and the aggregate result is just 4 points, in Precinct 1, compared to a 37–40-point gap between each precinct and the ultimate results in the first case. The first case suggests a high level of political segregation across precincts. If these results were stable over time, and not specific to a particular candidate but consistent across candidates and issues, then we could reasonably describe that region as having a high degree of political segregation. It should be much easier for mapmakers to draw political districts for partisan advantage in cases like the first rather than the second (although a larger number of precincts or sub-precinct level voting data would be needed). 

Unfortunately, the United States has widespread political segregation as well, which maps vividly illustrate.131 Emily Badger, Kevin Quealy & Josh Katz, A Close-Up Picture of Partisan Segregation, Among 180 Million Voters, N.Y. Times: Upshot (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/17/upshot/partisan-segregation-maps.html [https://perma.cc/H27B-MACW]. Democrats and Republicans are not just more divergent in their views, they are increasingly residing in different communities.132Ryan Enos and Jacob Brown use the Exposure Index for their study. Jacob R. Brown & Ryan D. Enos, The Measurement of Partisan Sorting for 180 Million Voters, 5 Nature Hum. Behav. 998 (2021). Using this type of data or other geographically disaggregated vote tabulations, it is possible to calculate the degree of political segregation that exists in different regions. Using the formula for the Divergence Index (described above),133Roberto, supra note 125. I have calculated the relative degree of political segregation for different major metropolitan regions of the United States.

Using 2020 presidential election precinct tabulation results, out of the 314 largest metropolitan areas in the United States (those with a population of 200,000 or more), Table 5 below lists the top 20 most politically segregated regions of the United States along with their divergence score.134Miles W. Watkins, Presidential Precinct Data for the 2020 General Election, GitHub (Mar. 13, 2021), https://github.com/TheUpshot/presidential-precinct-map-2020 [https://perma.cc/25XK-R35N]. This calculation assumes that the 2020 presidential election reflects, to the extent possible, stable political preferences by geography. Metropolitan Statistical Areas are defined by the Census Bureau and the United States Office of Management and Budget. United States Census Bureau, Metropolitan and Micropolitan, U.S. Census Bureau (July 5, 2022), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/metro-micro.html [https://perma.cc/KL8J-P3P4].   

TABLE 5.  The 20 Most Politically Segregated Metropolitan Areas in the United States (2020 Presidential Election)

The dynamic of political segregation can also be depicted visually, providing a more intuitive and easily comprehensible approach. Compare maps of Jackson, Mississippi (the most politically segregated metro), with Carson City, Nevada (ranked 273 out of 314), which has one of the lower political divergence scores), in Figure 2, below. The contrast is vivid. 

FIGURE 2.  Political Segregation in Jackson, Mississippi, and Carson City, Nevada

 

As the maps displayed in Figure 2 illustrate, the metropolitan area of Jackson ranks first in political divergence, indicating the presence of ideological extremes where precincts overwhelmingly voted in favor of one party while neighboring precincts voted in favor of the other party. In contrast, all of the precincts in Carson City approximate the regional average, suggesting a much lower level of political segregation. The high level of political segregation in Jackson makes it especially vulnerable to partisan gerrymandering. This is partly what makes districting such a dilemma in the United States: the high degree of political geographic or residential segregation. 

One of the striking features of the list presented in Table 5, above, is that the vast majority of the most politically segregated regions are in the South (17 of the top 20).135This is not true, by the way, of racial residential segregation. The most racially residentially segregated metro regions and cities tend to be in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. See, e.g., Logan & Stults, supra note 122. Given that region’s racial history, it raises the question of whether there is a relationship between political residential segregation and racial residential segregation in the United States. Figure 3, below, confirms the relationship between the two, as shown in a scatterplot. 

FIGURE 3.  Racial Segregation and Political Segregation in the United States, 2020 (314 Metros)

Figure 3 depicts the 314 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. The horizontal axis indicates the divergence index score (calculated as described above) for political segregation and the vertical axis indicates the relative percentile rank for racial residential segregation using the same formula but with data from the 2020 decennial census.136The racial residential segregation score is calculated manually with the formula provided by Elizabeth Roberto using data from the 2020 Census at United States Census Bureau, Decennial Census P.L. 94-171 Redistricting Data, U.S. Census Bureau (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/rdo/summary-files.html#P1 [https://perma.cc/6M7S-ZGFB]. See Roberto, supra note 125. For the precinct data source, see supra note 135. The scatterplot indicates a clear positive relationship, with a 0.50 correlation between the two variables.137Namely, it shows a Pearson correlation coefficient. 

Not only does this analysis suggest a relationship between the two phenomena, but it also means that where racial segregation is higher, partisan gerrymandering should be easier. Conversely, where partisan segregation is higher, racial gerrymandering should be easier. In short, they go hand in hand, but in a dynamic relation.138This finding, while identifying a relationship between racial residential segregation and partisan segregation, and thereby establishing a basis for the problem of entanglement, should not be considered definitive. This Article examines the results from a single election at a particular point in time and only uses one measure of segregation (the Divergence formula). To further investigate this relationship, researchers might seek to overlay patterns of partisan segregation using other measures of segregation (such as the Exposure Index used by Enos and Brown. Enos & Brown, supra note 132), and then identify the degree of observed correlation between racial residential segregation according to those measures and partisan segregation. The problem lies in their coincidence.139To be clear, I am talking about the identity of racial segregation and political segregation, not simple partisan political polarization and racial political polarization. Partisan polarization and racial polarization can exist without racial segregation or without the overlap in racial segregation and political segregation. This is the crux of the entanglement problem, not the simple fact of conjoined polarization between race and politics. 

Whether the context is partisan gerrymandering or racial gerrymandering, the active ingredient is segregation, not polarization. Partisan gerrymandering only requires some degree of political segregation. Racial gerrymandering, however, requires both racial political polarization and racial residential segregation.140To be clear, you could draw political districts based on race without racial political polarization (just based on racial residential segregation), but the term gerrymandering refers to drawing districts or manipulating district boundaries for some political advantage. In a racially polarized context, that could simply be a communal racial advantage(such as hoarding resources in one community and denying it to another through the levers and instrumentalities of political power. So, by definition, racial gerrymandering requires political polarization by race for that advantage to be realized. Prior legal scholarship treats segregation as the backdrop condition and conjoined polarization as the central or proximate problem when the truth is the opposite. 

In practical terms, the persistence of racial political polarization means that the strong correlation between political segregation and racial residential segregation easily facilitates both racial and partisan gerrymandering in ways that are essentially indistinguishable. State officials can draw maps at a hyper-granular level that may relocate a small number of people from one district to another, with full awareness of their race and the fact of conjoined racial identity with partisan preference, and nonetheless claim that the decision was based on partisan motivations. In other words, racial residential segregation enables partisan gerrymandering that will result in the political segregation of people between districts on the basis of race. Even if the map-makers were to scrub all data regarding race from their software, a map drawn on partisan or other non-racial characteristics could appear objectively indistinguishable from maps drawn in cases like Shaw. 

This problem is not speculative or theoretical. The Supreme Court has already heard cases touching on this problem. In oral argument in Wittman v. Personhuballah,141Wittman v. Personhuballah, 578 U.S. 539 (2016). Chief Justice Roberts asked “if race and partisanship are co-extensive, which one predominates?”142Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Wittman, 578 U.S. 539 (No. 14­1504). In that case, several Republican members of Congress appealed a lower court’s decision to strike down a redistricting plan it found to be based on race. This question led to a brief dialogue among the Justices and the lawyer for the original plaintiffs regarding this issue, but the case was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing among the members of Congress to bring their appeal.

In another case decided that same term, Cooper v. Harris, the Court acknowledged that many of the Shaw considerations (compactness, for example) used to assess whether race predominated become less probative when the state raises the defense of partisanship.143Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473 (2017). As it explained, “political and racial reasons are capable of yielding similar oddities in a district’s boundaries. That is because, of course, ‘racial identification is highly correlated with political affiliation.’ ”144Id. (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)). In that case, the Court rejected the claim that partisan goals are a complete defense to racial gerrymandering claims. As it explained, the predominance “inquiry is satisfied when legislators have ‘place[d] a significant number of voters within or without’ a district predominantly because of their race, regardless of their ultimate objective in taking that step.”145Id. at 1473 n.7. The Court continues: 

So, for example, if legislators use race as their predominant districting criterion with the end goal of advancing their partisan interests—perhaps thinking that a proposed district is more “sellable” as a race-based VRA compliance measure than as a political gerrymander and will accomplish much the same thing—their action still triggers strict scrutiny.

Id. 

But this guidance merely sidesteps the more difficult question of how to determine whether a legislature’s districting decisions were “because of race” in such cases, and assumes that racial motives can be disentangled from partisan ones (either as a means or an end).146Recall that the strange appearance of the districts were objective factors considered in Shaw. Such objective “circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics” that Kennedy suggested would be probative in Miller is going to be unavailing if race and partisanship are entirely co-extensive in a redistricting plan. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). Indeed, the entire concept of “predominance” assumes that the factors considered by entities charged with redistricting, and which are being reviewed by courts, are separate and independent elements.147I am implicitly suggesting that the predominance test only makes sense if the inputs being evaluated are largely separate and independent inputs, which, perhaps not coincidentally, are also conditions for quantifying certain other mathematical outcomes, such as calculating probability in cases like flipping coins or rolling dice. See Persi Diaconis & Brian Skyrms, Ten Great Ideas About Chance 59, 148 (2017). The entanglement problem violates the principle of independence. Because of the difficulties introduced by entanglement, lower courts may be hesitant to rule that race “predominates” when race and partisanship are highly entangled or when the state supplies reasons to believe that any apparent use of race was merely partisanship.148For the scholarly debate on the meaning of Cooper v. Harris, see Janai Nelson, Parsing Partisanship and Punishment: An Approach To Partisan Gerrymandering and Race, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1088 (2021). 

Again, this is not a speculative concern. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights brought a suit against Georgia in 2017 alleging that a mid-decade redrawing of political districts was both a racial and political gerrymander.149Other cases have already been brought in lower courts based on this problem. See Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Georgia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2018). The district court acknowledged that ascertaining the existence of a racial gerrymander was “particularly hard to do when the State offers a defense rooted in partisan gerrymandering, as it did here. We did not move these voters because they are black, the State tells us. We moved them because they were Democrats.”150Id. The court ultimately sided with the state for that reason. 

Experience demonstrates that this epistemological problem created by the entanglement of racial and partisan gerrymanders already exists and may be intensifying. The provision of block level census data following the 1990 census meant that state legislatures could draw more fine grain political districts based on race than was ever possible before using computer programs. Indeed, the Court confronted this fact in Bush v. Vera, in which the Court noted that the computer program “REDAPPL enabled districters to make more intricate refinements on the basis of race than on the basis of other demographic information.”151Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996).

This technology has only improved in the intervening decades. It is now possible to generate thousands of potential maps at a keystroke with computer processing and programs that draw from large voter or census files.152For an overview, see Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting Principles for the Twenty-First Century, 62 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1179 (2012). Large data files can be cross-referenced not only to generate demographic profiles, but also psychographic information, such as predicting propensity to vote, donate money, or even respond to certain campaign communications.153Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1601, 1650 (2018) (“These datasets have made it possible for campaigns to generate or purchase predictions for each registered voter of the probability that the voter will turn out in an election, support a particular candidate or political party, give money, or respond in a specified fashion to a campaign communication.” (emphasis omitted)).

Upon the death of a North Carolina Republican strategist involved in redistricting efforts, his daughter made public his personal computer files against the wishes of the party and company he worked for.154 Hansi Lo Wang, Deceased GOP Strategist’s Daughter Makes Files Public That Republicans Wanted Sealed, NPR (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/785672201/deceased-gop-strategists-daughter-makes-files-public-that-republicans-wanted-sea [https://perma.cc/5L9P-Q28Z]. The trove contained thousands of documents detailing the various ways that he sought to generate political advantages for his clients, describing gerrymandering as legal vote stealing.155 Alvin Chang, The Man Who Rigged America’s Election Maps, Vox (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/10/17/20917852/gerrymander-hofeller-election-map [https://perma.cc/98DA-ME9M].

In Vera, however, Justice O’Connor stated that “[i]f district lines merely correlate with race because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which correlates with race, there is no racial classification to justify.”156Vera, 517 U.S. at 968. Although likely dicta, this approach nonetheless does not resolve the issue because, if there is a perfect identity or correspondence of race and partisanship, how is a court supposed to judge whether the lines were drawn “because of political affiliation” or “because of race”? If a state legislature is trying to conceal its racial intentions, it would simply develop a record of partisan purposes and other traditional districting considerations. The entanglement of race and partisanship would then allow state legislatures to subvert the Constitution.157This is not an original insight. See, e.g., Kristen Clarke & Jon Greenbaum, Gerrymandering Symposium: The Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan Gerrymandering Decision, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-of-todays-partisan-gerrymandering-decision [https://perma.cc/5CBW-WAKY] (“[T]his decision . . . will enable map-drawers who have racial motivations or a combination of racial motivations and partisan motivations to claim that they made decisions only for partisan reasons and not for racial ones. The reality is that in many areas of the country, partisanship and race are closely intertwined.”) However, this Article presents recent and original empirical research to try to establish the validity of the premises and highlight the potential of the dangers this problem poses. The vastly divergent standards for both forms of gerrymandering makes it even more difficult to regulate this problem. There are, however, solutions. 

IV.  SOLUTIONS 

This Article argues that the wildly divergent standards established by the Supreme Court governing partisan political gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering claims are untenable. Justices across the ideological spectrum agree that the use of race in drawing political districts may run afoul of the Constitution, but the Court’s extremely divergent rules regulating gerrymandering cases make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to know whether race has been used or not. In too many contexts, partisan political gerrymanders will entail conduct that violates the principles and standards established by the foundational racial gerrymandering cases, or run so closely up to them that any attempt to fully disentangle partisan ends from racial ones is likely to be hopelessly futile or end up subverting the Court’s racial gerrymandering jurisprudence by allowing racial gerrymanders to escape under the cover of partisanship. 

Beyond the categorical differences grounded in the Court’s precedent regulating the use of race at a higher level of judicial review than most other classifications, the Court has tried to manage the entanglement problem in two steps: first, by recognizing that all political districting processes are inherently race-conscious, as they are conscious of other demographic and community characteristics.158See supra note 53. Thus, the Court has distinguished between awareness of race and actions or policy decisions that use race in the sorting of people into different districts. The Court has held that it is the latter that violates the Constitution, not the former. 

Second, by requiring that racial considerations actually “predominate” other factors, the Court has drawn a line between impermissible consideration of race and other ordinary or “traditional” considerations such as compactness, contiguity, community boundaries, and so forth.159See supra text accompanying note 62. It is notable that in the listing of such ordinary considerations that partisan political advantage is never mentioned or listed. And this is presumably not simply because a bare-faced partisan consideration is unseemly, but because it was not considered by the Court (at least in those decisions) as a regular or ordinary consideration in the districting processes. Nonetheless, the Court’s jurisprudence prompts an objective, factual inquiry into whether race was in fact used or not. 

Unfortunately, several demographic factors are converging in a way that makes it much more difficult—if not impossible—to delineate between race and partisanship as a consideration. First, political polarization appears to have increased in recent years.160See Political Polarization, supra note 115. Second, political segregation is highly visible and becoming more pronounced as well.161See Badger et al., supra note 131. Third, racial political polarization has increased markedly in recent decades.162See supra Table 1. The interaction of these three factors, on top of a fourth—the persistence of racial residential segregation163See supra notes 122–27.—means that partisanship and race are highly correlated in a way that makes partisan districting largely and increasingly coterminous with racial districting. In simplified terms, “conjoined polarization” and racial residential segregation interact to create the conditions that entangle race and partisanship in political redistricting processes. 

That this is a practical problem is evidenced by the fact that many cases heard by the Supreme Court in recent years feature both claims, whereas that would have been anomalous even a few decades ago.164See generally Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015). With the Court shutting the door on partisan gerrymandering claims, it seems increasingly likely that suits designed to curb the excesses of partisan gerrymandering will be brought under the color of racial gerrymandering.165 Or they may even be brought under the VRA. See Katie Benner, Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, Justice Department Files Voting Rights Suit Against Texas Over New Map, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/us/politics/texas-voting-rights-redistricting.html [https://perma.cc/ECT3-B6VL]; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affs., Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Files Lawsuit Against the State of Texas to Challenge Statewide Redistricting Plans (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-lawsuit-against-state-texas-challenge-statewide-redistricting-plans [https://perma.cc/D9Z6-9QE8]. Thus, the Court will eventually need to squarely confront and address this problem. 

One possible solution is to carve out an exemption for racial gerrymanders that appear to be largely or entirely based on partisan motives, as Justice O’Connor intimated in Vera, but to extend the exemption to cases in which the objective use of race clearly “predominates.”166Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 994 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Under this approach, mapmakers would be permitted to use race in districting processes as long as their purpose was purely partisan. Under this approach, partisanship would be a complete defense to racial gerrymandering claims. 

This approach would solve the smaller problem of the difficulties lower courts confront disentangling race and partisan motivates, but it would leave intact the larger problem of allowing racial gerrymanders to persist under the cover of partisanship. To that extent, this is only a partial solution or non-solution, because it would potentially obliterate the racial gerrymandering claim and undermine the constitutional prohibition against the use of race in policymaking in many ordinary cases.167Richard Hasen calls this the “party all the time” scenario. Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1837, 1876 (2018). Which, as he notes, has the benefit of logical consistency that is lacking when partisan and racial gerrymandering claims are treated differently. Under a rule such as this, any egregiously racially segregated political district could be justified on the basis of mere partisanship. The obvious exception would be cases in which state legislatures are seeking to create “majority-minority” districts under the VRA, because those could not plausibly be defended on partisan-only grounds. This approach would clearly violate the Court’s prevailing anti-classification jurisprudence and the principles and spirit of Shaw and its progeny’s rules against permitting state legislatures to sort people into one district or another on the basis of race. 

A second possible solution would be to create an exemption in the opposite direction: a supplement could be drawn to the rule that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable if partisan purposes overlay or are essentially indistinguishable from racial considerations. In such a case, partisan gerrymanders could be swept into the racial gerrymandering line, even though it would be difficult or implausible to assert that race “predominates.” This is essentially the tack the Court appeared to take in Cooper v. Harris in its 2016 term, prior to the Court’s more recent decision that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable in Rucho.

The NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s president and director-counsel, Janai Nelson, has suggested an approach along these lines.168Nelson, supra note 148. The approach would shield against rearguard incursions into racial gerrymandering from the partisan direction. This option is most consistent with the Court’s anti-classification jurisprudence: any sorting or segregation of people into different political districts based on race violates the Constitution, even if it cannot be said that race “predominates.” This approach drives the presumptive rule against the use of racial classifications to its logical endpoint. 

Although requiring a tweak to the Court’s racially gerrymandering jurisprudence, the Court can easily justify the use of a threshold test less than “predominance” when two factors are so tightly entangled that “predominance” becomes nonsensical.169See supra note 147. In such cases it is either impossible for race to “predominate” because partisan considerations are co-extensive with race or, even if they are greater, it is because their correspondence renders the possibility of calculating predominance by disaggregating and weighing the relative influence of each factor or consideration impossible.170The latent ambiguities in the predominance test makes hypotheticals hazardous, see supra text accompanying note 63, but let me attempt to illustrate the problem in quantitative terms. Suppose a court or an expert were able to determine that partisan motives are 60% of the considerations in redrawing district lines in a particular case. Suppose further that race is the chief proxy for sorting among partisan affiliation, such that race is somehow estimated to predominate the other factors (either because it is 51% of the actual inputs or a plurality, weighed more than any other single input). Logically, race both predominates and is subservient to partisan motives. This is a paradoxical conclusion, only because, in this context, race and partisanship cannot be separated as independent factors.  

A third possible solution to the entanglement problem is to reverse course on partisan gerrymanders and declare that they are justiciable. Aside from the unlikely chance that the Court will revisit, let alone reverse, it’s recent decision in Rucho, even if it were to do so, there remains the challenge of defining the standard upon which they can or should be reviewed. 

The most obvious and straightforward option is the predominance test—to inquire whether partisan considerations “predominate” over other ordinary districting considerations. In cases where race and partisanship are entangled, this could help solve the larger problem of allowing racial gerrymanders to escape under the cover of partisanship, but it does not actually solve the epistemological problem of how courts may distinguish between entangled factors or inputs.171See supra, notes 128, 142, and accompanying text. Thus, it would have the inverse effect of the first possibility, which is to help address the larger problem, but leave the smaller one intact. 

Moreover, this possibility remains only a partial solution to the larger problem. Even if the Supreme Court were to allow courts to review partisan gerrymandering claims, it is unlikely that such partisan gerrymanders would be reviewed at the exactingly high level of scrutiny as racial classifications are. Thus, there is still some risk present that racial gerrymanders will escape regulation in the guise of partisanship due to the gap in the standards of review.172Even this metaphor shows the challenge here: race and partisanship are so entangled that no guise is needed. To a significant extent, they share an identity. In some contexts, race is partisanship and vice versa. A legislative districting law that sorts people by partisan affiliation into different districts is very likely to also sort people on the basis of race contra ordinary districting considerations, and vice versa.

This third option, however, although requiring a reversal of recent precedent, is at least more logically consistent with the idea that these are categorically distinct claims arising from different case law and constitutional concerns. It renders the entanglement problem less urgently in need of resolution since the more extreme partisan gerrymandering cases would be regulated through a parallel structure under (presumably) rational basis review. 

This approach has several other meritorious considerations in its favor, especially its potential grounding in various aspects of constitutional jurisprudence. Some versions of this approach, for example, naturally conform to the paradigm famously known as “Carolene Products footnote four.”173United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This famous footnote in Constitutional Law maps neatly to the entanglement problem at issue in this Article. That is because at the heart of this footnote are issues of political process and racial equality and their interrelation, the same issues here. As the Court said in that famous footnote: 

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.174Id. (citations omitted).

Carolene Products footnote four has been called a “paradigm” within equal protection jurisprudence on account of the fact that it provides a coherent and comprehensive roadmap for judicial review.175Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1441, 1464 (1990). It is not just that the footnote addresses one possible way of dealing with laws that affect access to the political process, like political redistricting does, but it also specifically deals with the intersection of race and political access: suggesting that laws which impede racial minorities access to the political process should be reviewed more closely. 

The Equal Protection Clause arguably provides a sufficient basis by itself for establishing a rule against partisan gerrymanders: they violate fundamental democratic principles such as those that motivated the Court to rule, in the early 1960s, that political districts should be of equal size. They violate majority rule—what Madison called the “fundamental principle of free government” in Federalist No. 58 and Hamilton called the “the fundamental maxim of republican government” in Federalist No. 22.176The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison); The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). Whether permitting a minority to entrench itself through the manipulation of district boundaries or by manipulating the number of voters in each district, the result can be the same and does violence to the principle of “one person, one vote” either way. 

A claim rooted in equal protection could narrowly assert that permitting extreme partisan gerrymanders would violate a person’s right to be treated equally by law or more broadly assert that it would also hinder access to both the political process and the ability to use that process to remedy unfair or unjust legislation. But even if the Equal Protection Clause itself, or some broader more synthetic reading of it, Carolene Products, or even related associational claims grounded in the First Amendment are part of the foundation for rendering partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable,177Daniel P. Tokaji, Gerrymandering and Association, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2159 (2018). there is another constitutional provision which has lain dormant but could be potentially enlisted to this cause: the Guarantee Clause. 

The Guarantee Clause requires the United States guarantee to the states a republican form of government.178U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. Although rarely invoked, the prevailing consensus is that this Clause requires majority rule and that representatives serving in state governments be selected by elections.179 Gabriel J. Chin & Erin M. Hawley, Interpretation & Debate: The Guarantee Clause, Nat’l Const. Center, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-iv/clauses/42 [https://perma.cc/H39L-XFFC]. In other words, it is a guarantee to the citizens of those states (and of the nation) that each state government must be republican in form. This clause might be the basis for challenges to features of various state governments that are anti- or un-democratic. In addition to a formal recognition of the problem of entanglement in the gerrymandering cases, a revival of the Guarantee Clause could provide an easily understandable basis for reversing or excepting Rucho.

The problem here is that Supreme Court precedent does not allowed federal courts to entertain claims brought under the Guarantee Clause, thus far. In 1849, and again in 1946, the Supreme Court ruled that claims under this clause are non-justiciable.180Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). Prominent and notable jurists, however, would have held otherwise. In his courageous and lonely dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the first Justice Harlan would not only have held that the segregative railway statute adopted by the state of Louisiana and reviewed in that case violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, but also the Guarantee Clause. As he explained: 

Such a system is inconsistent with the guaranty given by the constitution to each state of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.181Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 564 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

The aforementioned Supreme Court decisions, moreover, occurred prior to the Court’s ruling that districting cases are justiciable in Baker v. Carr. And in any event, these decisions cannot be based on the meaning of that clause as understood by its framers.182The current University of California, Berkeley Law School Dean, Erwin Chemerinsky, has previously made this argument a generation ago. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 849 (1994). Chemerinsky argues, however, that the prevailing view that the Supreme Court deemed this clause non-justiciable in Luther v. Bolden is a “common myth,” and that it was not until the twentieth century that the Court decided such. Id. at 861–62.  

Federalist No. 9 explains that the “principles” of republican governance are “now well understood,” and in addition to the fundamental majoritarian principle, they include: (1) “[t]he regular distribution of power into distinct departments”; (2) “the introduction of legislative balances and checks”; (3) “the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior”; and (4) “the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election.”183The Federalist No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). 

Moreover, Federalist No. 39 dealt specifically with the meaning of republican government. As Madison explained there, “we may define a republic to be . . . a government which derives all of its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behaviour.”184The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison). In other words, it is a government, in the words of Lincoln, “of, by, and for the people.”185Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/rbc/rbpe/rbpe24/rbpe244/24404500/24404500.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCQ9-XEFP]. Madison goes onto explain that 

[i]t is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.186Madison, supra note 184. 

Critics might note that, despite Madison and Hamilton’s declarations on the centrality of the principle of “majority rules,” they and their colleagues seemed unconcerned with the use of districting for partisan advantage in terms of either unequal size of districts or manipulation of lines, or else they would have argued against it (as they did against equal suffrage for states) or proposed or included provisions in the Constitution or in their respective roles in the federal government against it. In Part II, a number of possibilities were presented as to why Madison and Hamilton may not have introduced measures relating to this potential problem. A few more may now be considered.

First, any interpretative methodology assessing the Guarantee Clause would have to account for the fact that many categorical exclusions for voting existed at the time of the framing of the Constitution that are now prohibited, including those on the basis of sex, race, and class (through the Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, respectively).187U.S. Const. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV. Thus, there are textual reasons to “update” any originalist understanding of the Guarantee Clause based upon the text of the Constitution itself, as amended. After all, it has already been observed that the modern Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down districting plans with population disparities in percentage terms far less than those observed by Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist Papers. 

Second, the framers failed to anticipate the extent to which partisanship would manifest in the federal councils and the harmful effects thereof. There is no reason to believe that they should devise measures to address problems they lacked the foresight to see. And, by their own accounts, the precautions and safeguards that the framers believed would curtail the harmful effects of partisanship were based on assumptions and premises that proved fallacious or were quickly refuted by experience as political parties organized themselves in the federal councils. 

To be clear, the framers were well-aware of the problem of partisanship. Having observed it within the states and other republics, Alexander Hamilton referred to this problem as “the diseases of faction” and the “demon of faction,” and James Madison called it “mischiefs of faction” and the “rage of party.”188The Federalist Nos. 61, 65 (Alexander Hamilton); The Federalist Nos. 10, 50 (James Madison). What they underestimated was the degree to which political parties would become the primary organizing forces to frame political discourse and focus policy debate in the federal government. 

As Madison and Hamilton explained throughout The Federalist Papers, the framers believed that the size and diversity of peoples and interests represented in the national government would ameliorate the effects of faction as observed in the state governments.189It is notable that Madison also concluded that the causes of faction cannot be eliminated, only that their effects could be regulated. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (“[T]he CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling [their] EFFECTS.”). As Madison concluded in Federalist No. 10, the “variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of [the confederacy of states] must secure the national councils against any danger from that source.”190The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison); see also Mari Kawakatsu, Yphtach Lelkes, Simon A. Levin & Corina E. Tarnita, Interindividual Cooperation Mediated by Partisanship Complicates Madison’s Cure for “Mischiefs of Faction,” 118 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. 50 (2021). Hamilton arrived at similar conclusions in Federalist Nos. 60 and 61, where he wrote that “a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests” would make it unlikely that a “predominant faction” would prefer a particular class of electors over another.191The Federalist Nos. 60, 61 (Alexander Hamilton). Not only that, Hamilton felt that the diverse manner in which the various federal branches would be populated would safeguard against this problem, such that he concluded there is “little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.”192Id.

If at any moment the quantity of highly competitive national political parties had been greater and more numerous or if political parties had not acquired so much significance in organizing political interests at a national level, then this conclusion might have proven correct. But by the end of the first decade of the government’s operation under the Constitution, the problems of partisanship were already manifest to such an extent that it was one of the principal subjects of concern in George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address. Far from leaving office assured with his good works and sanguine on the young nation’s prospects, he sounded an alarm. 

In this regard, any originalist argument would be incomplete without considering George Washington’s remarks in his Farewell Address, which were drafted with input from Hamilton and Madison, his top advisors. The degree to which they underestimated the corrosive effects of toxic partisanship—what they called the “baneful effects of the spirit of party”—is clear from the substance of the address.193George Washington, Washington’s Farewell Address to the People of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Washingtons_Farewell Address.pdf [https://perma.cc/7853-M5TJ].

Having observed the emergent dynamics of partisanship firsthand as the nation’s first chief executive,194The President of the United States Congress under the Articles of Confederation is not a chief executive leading a separate and independent executive branch. Washington expressed a deep-seated fear that political parties presented a danger to the stability of the young republic, and potentially an existential threat. The Senate Historical Office characterizes his remarks concerning the “dangers of parties in state” as reflecting the view that political parties “carried the seeds of the nation’s destruction through petty factionalism.”195That assessment asserts that Washington warned against three distinction problems. It is unclear from a reading of his remarks whether he viewed these problems as distinct or delineated as such, because he describes them as intertwined with each other. Nonetheless, it is notable in the context of the problem of gerrymandering that he specifically connects geographic sectionalism with partisanship, a feature that is discussed in Part IV herein. See Washington, supra note 193, at 14. The remarks specify, in serial form, the harmful effects that flow from extreme partisanship. Among them:

• “It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration.”

• “It agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms,”

• “kindles the animosity of one part against another,”

• “foments occasionally riot and insurrection.”

• “It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.”196Id. 

If anything, the experience of the last few years amply illustrates these dangers, especially in the administration of President Donald Trump, which experienced arguably each of these effects, most obviously in the Ukraine scandal that led to the first impeachment,197Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Impeachment Hearings Open with Revelation on Trump’s Ukraine Pressure, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/us/politics/impeachment-hearing-day-1.html [https://perma.cc/D44M-XUBS]. the interactions with Russian officials that led to the Mueller investigation,198Michael S. Schmidt & Scott Shane, Russia, Trump and Mueller: The Major Moments in the Case, N.Y. Times (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/us/politics/trump-russia.html [https://perma.cc/3NXE-U59C]. and the riot and insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.199Dan Barry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, ‘Our President Wants Us Here’: The Mob that Stormed the Capitol, N.Y. Times (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html [https://perma.cc/B96Z-N4WQ]. 

Extreme partisanship has fostered a visceral antipathy against the other party (what political scientists call “negative partisanship”) often for no other reason than the “animosity of one part against another,” such that even bipartisanship on broadly popular legislation (such as when Republicans in Congress voted for the 2021 infrastructure bill) is viewed within the faction as a violation of partisan solidarity.200Catie Edmondson, House Republicans Who Backed Infrastructure Bill Face Vicious Backlash, N.Y. Times (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/us/politics/republicans-backlash-infrastructure-bill.html [https://perma.cc/QX4W-NBLK]. 

And, in the most extreme case, above all the previously listed concerns, Washington asserted that partisanship could lead to the “destruction of public liberty” in this way: 

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.201Washington, supra note 193, at 13–14.

Some political prognosticators and military leaders have warned that some version of this frightful vision might be realized in the aftermath of the 2024 election.202 Mary Louise Kelly, Ashish Valentine & Noah Caldwell, Retired Generals Warn Segments of the Military Could Support a Future Coup, NPR (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/12/29/1068895489/low-probability-high-impact-3-generals-warn-of-a-potential-military-coup-in-2024 [https://perma.cc/VNE5-FVXH]; Gino Spocchia, Army Generals Warn a ‘Trumpian Loser’ Could Set Off Civil War After 2024 Election, Independent (Dec. 19, 2021), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/2024-election-result-coup-trump-b1978961.html [https://perma.cc/KZQ9-NK2C]. 

Critically, however, Washington also characterized the dangers of extreme partisanship in geographic terms, which he called “the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations.”203Washington, supra note 193, at 13–14. Although he may well have been referring to the sectional divide between the North and the South, the specific formulation is a perfect fit for the excesses of gerrymandering. It accurately characterizes the manifestation of partisanship through gerrymandering, which is a process of making geographic discriminations.

Whether a consequence of the framers’ underestimation of the ultimate role of political parties, the extent to which partisanship would infect the federal government, or some other reason, the Constitution itself is silent in regards to the problems posed by extreme forms of political districting. But that does not mean that the framers left the political community helpless, even in the absence of an explicit constitutional provision adopted to solve this problem. Provisions like the Guarantee Clause are open-textured specifically to empower that political community to address problems such as this, empowering both Congress and the courts to regulate such practices as partisan districting as circumstances may necessitate. 

CONCLUSION

Unlike the canonical and venerated document that it is regarded as today,204Although there are deep disagreements about the meaning of certain provisions of the Constitution, it is notable that virtually all sides of the American polity regard the Constitution as foundational and venerable and strive to remain faithful to its text and structure (at least, as amended). the United States Constitution was recognized by its framers as a political experiment of uncertain prospects.205Although the framers designed the document for posterity, or, in the words Hamilton, “remote futurity,” and for “the probable exigencies of the ages.” It seems likely that even the most far-sighted framer of that document would be surprised at its remarkable endurance, approaching two-and-half centuries. The Federalist No. 34 (Alexander Hamilton). To give the political community governed by it the flexibility to make it work in practice and tailor it to exigencies without violating its text or spirit, the framers provided an amendment process to correct for unforeseen flaws or circumstances and used terse, open-textured language amenable to varying shades of interpretations in enumerating certain powers, rights, or prohibitions.206This is especially notable in provisions of the Constitution relating to certain powers of different branches of government and the text of the Bill of Rights. Evidence that this was by design can be gleaned from the fact that the provisions relating to the Constitution of the three federal branches (their membership, the procedure for election, and so forth) is far less ambiguous. The ambiguous elements (for example, “cruel and unusual punishment”) of the Constitution have frustrated lawyers, judges and politicians alike for generations, fostering divergent and deeply contested methodological approaches for interpreting constitutional text. In practice, this has left the Supreme Court to be the final arbiter of constitutional meaning, an early rooted tradition that is not itself based in constitutional text. As a consequence, this has made the process for selecting Supreme Court Justices highly political and deeply contested, based upon the assumption that the ideological leanings or preferred interpretive methods of the jurist will result in correspondingly different constitutional rulings and decisions. 

Nonetheless, the Constitution was chiefly designed to overcome the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and other problems that had plagued the young republic.207See Michael Meyerson, Liberty’s Blueprint: How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the World (2009). Consequently, it is silent on many issues that subsequently bedeviled the nation governed by it in intervening centuries. Two notable examples that frustrated subsequent generations in the first half of the nineteenth century were the definition of national citizenship and its relationship to state citizenship, and in the latter half of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, the issue of abortion. 

Because the original Constitution did not explicitly indicate how federal citizenship was defined or acquired, the Supreme Court ultimately decided the question of whether persons of African descent were or could become United States citizens, which it did in the most notorious case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.208See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S Const. amend. XIV; John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, Little Rock and the Legacy of Dred Scott, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 1153, 1160 (2008). The Court’s decision was reversed by opening line of the Fourteenth Amendment.209U.S Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the issue of abortion has proven to be highly divisive and one of the most deeply contested legal matters of the last fifty years. Advocates and jurists often look beyond the explicit text to the structure of the Constitution and the history and traditions of the republic at certain points in time to try to resolve these matters.210See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).

Unfortunately, extreme manipulation of political districting processes is another issue upon which the Constitution remains explicitly silent. This does not mean federal officials are powerless to address it. Constitutional text provides indirect solutions, such as the affirmative powers afforded Congress under the Elections Clause to “make or alter” the laws for elections to the federal legislature and implicit protections made by inferences drawn from other provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause. Nonetheless, as a result of the lack of constitutional specificity regarding this issue, certain problems generated by this underlying phenomenon are treated differently, depending on the circumstances, the class of persons most affected, or the form of the districting problem. 

This Article focuses on the problem of the entanglement of race and partisanship in the judicial review of gerrymandering claims. It conducts a brief history of gerrymandering, examines the divergent lines of cases, reveals the factors that contribute to the growing problem of gerrymandering, including the relationship between political segregation and racial residential segregation, and closes with a survey of possible solutions grounded in the constitutional text and structure. 

Although Congress could potentially pass laws curbing gerrymandering in the states, and would have the authority to do so under Article I, Section 4, the core of the problem of gerrymandering is that it violates what Madison called the “fundamental principle of free government”—that of majority rule, and therefore should be within the cognizance of the Constitution, not ordinary legislation, to resolve. This is true even though the Constitution is silent on it, an omission that is adequately compensated for by the applicability of indirect provisions that the framers included such as the Guarantee Clause and subsequent Amendments, most notably the Fourteenth, requiring equal protection of the law. 

Blame for underestimating the rise of political parties and the harmful effects of extreme partisanship cannot be entirely placed on insufficient foresight of the framers. A number of developments have contributed to the intensity of political partisanship in the federal government, including the enlargement of the sphere of national politics, the evolution of the information and media environment, and technological developments.211See Kawakatsu, supra note 190. 

There is no way that the framers could have fully anticipated the extremities toward which political districting processes designed for partisan purposes might distort many of the principles of representative government that they sought to institutionalize. In particular, they could not have anticipated the development of modern technological tools such as computer databases and programs such as Geographic Information System (“GIS”) technology that would easily permit state legislators to essentially select their voters rather than the other way around. But the framers’ insufficient foresight does not leave us helpless.

Whether the remedy lies in an act of Congress or the courts applying a synthetic reading of the Constitution as a whole, Carolene Products footnote four, the Guarantee Clause, or a novel reading of the Equal Protection Clause, partisan gerrymandering is a problem for our health of democracy that requires resolution. It is a problem in its own right because it undermines the values and foundation of the republic, and because it causes and results in the racial segregation of voters in clear violation of the Constitution without necessarily running afoul of the standards established by the Supreme Court to secure those protections. 

 
96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 301

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* Stephen Menendian is the Assistant Director at the Othering and Belonging Institute at University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to thank john powell and Dan Tokaji for their insights on this critical issue, Chris Elmendorf and Joshua Clark for their invaluable expert feedback on drafts of this Article, Samir Gambhir and Peter Mattingly for their contributions to the underlying research regarding segregation and assistance in developing the maps and scatterplots, Wenqi (Michael) Xu, Sara Osman, and Yemaj Sheik for their general research and citation assistance.

Fractionalization to Securitization: How the SEC May Regulate the Emerging Assets of NFTs

Blockchain technology opened the world to a variety of new technological advances that reshaped the way humans interact and transact with one another. One of the most recent and trending applications of blockchain technology is non-fungible tokens or “NFTs.” NFTs are unique digital tokens encoded on a blockchain that represent ownership of specific digital assets such as artwork, collectibles, videos, domain names, and so forth.1See Robyn Conti & John Schmidt, What You Need to Know About Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), Forbes Advisor (May 14, 2021, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/nft-non-fungible-token [https://perma.cc/G5N3-X5J2]. NFTs can be thought of as certificates of authenticity. Although NFTs resemble cryptocurrencies, NFTs are non-fungible. This means that no two tokens are identical, and they are not interchangeable with one another. They are valuable because each comes with a unique digital signature or ledger that allows it to be easily authenticated, verified, and transferred. This has completely revolutionized the way people trade different assets, and many NFTs are sold online for millions of dollars.2See Jacob Kastrenakes, Beeple Sold an NFT for $69 Million, Verge (Mar. 11, 2021, 

10:09 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/11/22325054/beeple-christies-nft-sale-cost-everydays-69-million [https://perma.cc/A5AN-UL9M] (reporting that the digital artist Mike Winkelmann, also known as Beeple, sold an NFT of the digital artwork Everydays: The First 5000 Days for sixty-nine million dollars).
Additionally, NFTs can come in different forms, ranging from whole NFTs of digital artwork or real property to fractionalized NFTs (“f-NFTs”) that break up ownership of an NFT into multiple “shards” so a larger number of people can own a piece of a single digital asset.3Arben Kane, Fractionalized NFT (F-NFTs): All That You Need to Know, Medium (Sept. 9, 2021), https://medium.com/@arbenk/fractionalized-nft-f-nfts-all-that-you-need-to-know-46bc06ea486d [https://perma.cc/9VZK-V5F6].

NFTs are a new and influential technology that can have far-reaching implications for current securities law, intellectual property law, and other legal areas. In securities law, NFTs have established a new way for people to invest and gain returns from digital assets. This has disrupted the legal and financial sectors and created new risks for investors such as fraud and hacking.4Conti & Schmidt, supra note 1. With the recent rise of NFTs as potential investment assets comes the possibility of government regulation to protect investors. The growing use of NFTs alerted many regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), to the possibility of regulating these digital assets as some type of security.5See Robert Anello, Digital Art May Be Next in the SEC’s Crosshairs, Forbes (July 15, 

2021, 9:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2021/07/15/digital-art-may-be-next-in-the-secs-crosshairs/?sh=7dc440b832df [https://perma.cc/3US9-D2MP].
However, regulatory and securities laws struggle to keep pace with emerging innovations and financial technologies like NFTs. Much of the SEC’s limited guidance focuses on cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology generally, with little guidance specifically on NFTs as a security. Leaders in the industry have requested no-action letters, although the SEC remains silent.6No-action letter requests are sent to the SEC when an individual or entity is uncertain whether a particular product, service, or action constitutes a federal securities violation. After reviewing the request regarding a particular securities issue, if approved, the SEC staff will issue a no-action letter stating that the SEC will not recommend that the Commission take any legal or regulatory action against the individual or entity based on the facts provided in the request. This process allows individuals and entities to continue doing business without the fear or surprise of SEC regulation or sanctions. See No-Action Letters, Investor.gov, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/no-action-letters [https://perma.cc/EZ9R-VPRR]; Letter from Vincent R. Molinari, Chief Exec. Officer, Sustainable Holdings, PBC, to SEC (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2021/

petn4-771.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3V5-68T2]; Letter from Brian L. Frye, Sec. Art Inc., to SEC (Sept. 4, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3917699 [https://perma.cc/UH8D-PWEP].
Leaders believe “it would be a lot easier to operate in an environment where sensible ground rules are laid out that allow for innovation.”7Vildana Hajric & Katherine Greifeld, FTX’s Bankman-Fried on Crypto Regulation, Solana Meltdown, NFTs, Bloomberg (Sept. 19, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/

2021-09-19/ftx-s-bankman-fried-o-crypto-regulation-solana-meltdown-nfts [https://perma.cc/PH8K-VMQQ] (reporting the views of Sam Bankman-Fried, the CEO of FTX, which is one of world’s fastest-growing crypto exchanges). Although FTX and Bankman-Fried have been subject to investigation for fraud including improper accounting and undisclosed leverage and solvency issues, this does not discount, and may actually emphasize, the importance of regulators to provide guidance for the innovation of these new cryptocurrency-like technologies. Additionally, since FTX and Bankman-Fried’s legal and business issues stem from improper accounting and corporate governance, this likely does not affect the actual technology behind their business or the need to regulate this technology.
NFT creators, buyers, and exchange platforms must rely on general SEC regulations of other digital assets to guide their decision-making and avoid regulation. Given these issues, it is important for the SEC to provide guidance on NFTs to protect and inform potential investors, while also ensuring issuers can properly develop NFTs and NFT platforms without the fear of strict regulation.

This lack of guidance stems from the fact that many regulators are divided on whether NFTs can be classified as an “investment contract” security or regulated by the SEC. The Securities Act of 1933 defines a “security” as “any note, stock, . . . bond, debenture, . . . [or] investment contract.”815 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test in SEC v. Howey to clarify whether an asset is an “investment contract” security.9SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). The Howey test holds that a contract, transaction, or scheme is an “investment contract” when an individual (1) makes an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with a reasonable expectation of profit (4) derived from the efforts of others.10Id. While some argue that NFTs are not an “investment contract” security under the Howey test because they do not satisfy either the second or fourth prong, others believe that fractionalized NFTs could pass all four prongs.11See, e.g., Anello, supra note 5. There has been little in-depth legal research and analysis that focuses specifically on f-NFTs as securities and the potential regulatory framework that could control this digital asset.12See generally, e.g., Wai-Lin Danieley, Note, Meme Regulation: Analyzing the SEC’s Concerns Regarding Digital Assets and Non-Fungible Tokens, 21 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 236 (2022). The legal field must catch up with rapid technology developments and take a revised look at current regulations to see how they can be applied to NFTs. To analyze if the SEC can regulate NFTs, two main questions need to be addressed: (1) whether certain NFTs can be classified as a security under federal law; and (2) if NFTs are securities, how SEC requirements can be applied to best protect the public’s interests.

To answer these questions, this Note will apply the Howey test to f-NFTs and identify the risks and opportunities of regulating them as securities to better understand how to protect investors while also allowing for the innovation of digital assets. This Note will first conclude that NFTs can be “investment contract” securities and satisfy the four Howey prongs if they are fractionalized. First, when purchasing f-NFTs, buyers make an investment using digital currency that is considered “money.” Second, having an NFT tied to the success of a company or celebrity, or having multiple fractional interests in an NFT that are shared by a pool of investors, are investments in the “common enterprise” of that individual company, celebrity, or whole NFT. Third, f-NFTs have a “reasonable expectation of profit” given that they are easily traded on secondary markets and promoted as a unique way to “unlock liquidity.” Lastly, an f-NFT’s financial return can be derived from the efforts of platforms or issuers to maintain or improve the f-NFT market and support the popularity or price of the digital asset. This Note will then explain that even if f-NFTs are deemed securities, the SEC will need to adopt a clearer regulatory framework for f-NFT issuers, buyers, and platforms by modernizing established regimes of other digital assets. The SEC may have trouble regulating issuers or buyers of f-NFTs because the decentralized networks of f-NFTs already provide a form of digital “registration” that gives sufficient information to investors and prevents fraud through the easily verifiable digital ledgers of an f-NFT’s transactions. However, a platform that creates and trades f-NFTs may be a security “exchange” under federal law, and thus the SEC may be able to place some modified regulations on these f-NFT platforms, such as notice and disclosure requirements or compliance with capacity, integrity, and security standards, which ensure f-NFT and investor protection.

Part I provides a general overview of NFTs by explaining the blockchain technology that powers them. This Part illustrates what NFTs are, how they work, the concept of fractionalizing NFTs, and the principal applications and potential importance of NFTs in the financial markets. Part II lays out the underlying securities law—in particular SEC v. Howey—and the SEC’s current regulatory framework for other blockchain-based financial assets such as cryptocurrencies and digital tokens. Part III applies the Howey test to f-NFTs to show that they can be classified as securities and bolsters this argument by comparing f-NFTs to a digital asset (DAO Tokens) that the SEC has previously determined to be an “investment contract.” Part IV analyzes the pros and cons of regulating certain NFT issuers, buyers, or exchange platforms and provides recommendations for an NFT regulatory framework using comparisons to other developed digital asset platforms. Part V provides a preliminary exploration of existing regulatory models like those that govern traditional stocks and Real Estate Investment Trusts (“REITs”) and how they can be applied to f-NFTs. 

I.  NFT BACKGROUND: A TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF NFTS

A.  TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NFTS

An NFT is a cryptographic unit of data or digital signature stored in a “blockchain” that represents the ownership of a unique digital asset or real-life object.13See Brian L. Frye, NFTs and the Death of Art 3 (2021), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/

ssrn.3829399 [https://perma.cc/5VS9-WMRF].
Since they use blockchain technology, NFTs are typically bought and sold online with cryptocurrency.14See Conti & Schmidt, supra note 1. NFTs are similar to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum because they all use blockchain technology to create a digital object (currency or token) using units of data on a digital ledger. The only difference is that digital currencies are meant to be fungible, in that one Bitcoin is the same as and interchangeable with another Bitcoin, while an NFT is meant to be non-fungible, in that each one is one-of-a-kind and not exchangeable with another NFT.15See Frye, supra note 13. The underlying data of an NFT is unique because there can only be one owner, and that person is the only one who can access or transfer that NFT. This non-fungibility and use of blockchain allow NFTs to have a built-in proof of ownership that is easily authenticated, create exclusivity, and allow for verified transfers.

B.  BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY

NFTs rely on blockchain technology, which creates a secure, decentralized network for transactions of various digital assets. The blockchain is essentially a “chain” of “blocks,” each containing specific information regarding a digital asset and its transactions that is then stored on a digital, secure, peer-to-peer ledger.16Anastasiia Lastovetska, Blockchain Architecture Basics: Components, Structure, Benefits & Creation, MLSDev (Nov. 12, 2021), https://mlsdev.com/blog/156-how-to-build-your-own-blockchain-architecture [https://perma.cc/5Q3J-RBKL]. An NFT is a digital database that stores data in the form of a “smart contract” and a unique identification hash bundled together in “blocks” that are all “chained” together in a distributed network. A smart contract is defined as “a computerized transaction protocol that executes terms of a contract” and is meant to minimize fraud and transaction costs.17Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts (1994), https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/Information

InSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html [https://

perma.cc/P48U-FURL].
In other words, smart contracts are programs stored on a blockchain that automatically execute certain terms of a contract once certain predetermined conditions are met.18See What Are Smart Contracts on Blockchain?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/topics/smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/FZE9-XX6G]. Each blockchain “block” contains three components: (1) data, (2) the hash of the block, and (3) the hash from the previous block.19See Lastovetska, supra note 16. The hash is a digitally generated string of digits and letters used to identify each block in a blockchain structure and acts as a type of unique fingerprint.20See id. The data for an NFT “block” includes a “smart contract” that points to where an NFT is located on the internet and how to retrieve it, dictates the terms of a transaction, provides a verification of ownership, and holds a ledger of the token’s ownership history and transaction record.21See Cryptopedia Staff, The Technical Structure of NFTs Explained, Cryptopedia (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/what-is-a-non-fungible-token-nft-crypto [https://perma.cc/

F3EV-XFRR].

FIGURE 1:  NFT Blockchain Sequence Diagram

 

An issuer creates an NFT by deploying a code to develop a specific type of “smart contract” that contains a blockchain address, typically on the Ethereum Blockchain, where the smart contract resides.22See In re Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553, 2018 WL 5840155, at *3 (Nov. 8, 2018). Later, when someone buys or sells an NFT, the blockchain automatically creates a new “block” and a new hash for this block to add this new transaction to the “chain.”23Lastovetska, supra note 16. The blockchain is essentially recording a “change of state” to the NFT in which the “smart contract” updates its internal ledger and changes the structure of the NFT’s underlying blockchain to reflect the transfer of the NFT to and from different addresses.24See In re Zachary Coburn, 2018 WL 5840155, at *3–4. In short, whenever an NFT is sold, this new ownership is noted as a “new block” in the blockchain ledger, and the digital hash of that NFT is changed.

When purchasing an NFT, you are only buying exclusive access to the unit of data that contains the NFT’s location and are relying on the issuer’s obligation to ensure authenticity.25See Brian L. Frye, SEC No-Action Letter Request, 54 Creighton L. Rev. 537, 546 (2021). You do not gain any property rights of the actual digital asset, such as intellectual property rights (right to copy, right to destroy, and so forth.). Similar to buying a painting, when buying an NFT, you are only buying display rights or the right to say that you own it, but nothing else. You are mostly buying a digital certificate of ownership and authenticity or unique access to a digital object, not the actual digital object itself.26See Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 21. In other words, you own the one-of-a-kind map of where the NFT is located and are the only one who has access to it. The underlying NFT is typically hosted or located on a regular Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”) Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) web address on the internet or on an InterPlanetary File System (“IPFS”) hash, which is a “system designed for hosting, storing, and accessing data in a decentralized manner.”27Id. Using a regular HTTP web address is typically very risky given that a server owner could easily change the underlying content of that particular address and completely erase the actual NFT content that was originally purchased.28Id. However, when housing an NFT on IPFS, the NFT gets assigned a unique content identifier (“CID”) hash that links to the data in the IPFS network.29Id. Using an IPFS CID hash, as opposed to an HTTP URL, allows someone to find the NFT based on its content rather than by its location on a server. Thus, if the content of the NFT is changed, the original CID link would break and create a new one.30Id.

Even though NFTs only give a type of “bragging rights,” they provide various advantages that have changed the tech and financial markets. The benefits of an NFT are that it is easy to authenticate its originality, establish its exclusivity, and transfer the asset.31See Anello, supra note 5. The permanent digital ledger inherent in an NFT acts as a record of ownership and allows for easy traceability across the blockchain network so that the original creator or past owners can be easily traced through their past transactions.32See Megan L. Jones, Tax Tips: Taxation Guidance for Non-Fungible Tokens, L.A. Law., Oct. 2021, at 16–17. This has made NFTs a highly valuable avenue to establish verified ownership over assets such as digital artwork, digital trading cards, video highlight reels, social media posts, collectibles, and even real property.33See, e.g., Anello, supra note 5; Kastrenakes, supra note 2; Yasmin Khorram, Patrick Mahomes Is Jumping into the NFT Business with Digital Art Auction, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2021, 1:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/12/patrick-mahomes-to-sell-nft-trading-cards.html [https://perma.cc/

S2KC-KQTA] (reporting that football star Patrick Mahomes was selling six different art pieces of himself as NFTs); Jabari Young, Rob Gronkowski Will Sell NFTs of His Best Super Bowl Moments, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2021, 12:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/09/rob-gronkowski-will-sell-nfts-of-his-best-super-bowl-moments.html [https://perma.cc/9HLU-L6Z4] (reporting that football player Rob Gronkowski was selling more than 300 NFTs of his best Super Bowl moments and highlights).
An NFT also has the unique capability to internally incorporate royalty agreements into its “smart contract,” where it automatically carries out an agreed-upon payment system whenever the NFT is licensed, resold, or used for some particular purpose.34Jones, supra note 32, at 18. This has provided content creators with new ways to continuously and easily monetize their work through NFTs. Lastly, NFTs have created a new way for people to invest their money in digital assets. With billions of dollars recently being poured into the NFT market, many investors have flocked to these digital assets as a potential high-risk investment strategy.35See Evan Cohen, Investing in NFTs: Why It Matters, Chartered Alt. Inv. Analyst Assoc. (May 25, 2021), https://caia.org/blog/2021/05/25/investing-in-nfts-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/

PXP5-84P9]; Paul Esajian, How To Invest in NFTs: NFT Investing Explained, FortuneBuilders, https://www.fortunebuilders.com/how-to-invest-in-nfts [https://perma.cc/S9VP-9DWW].
However, NFTs have become the target of some security breaches and hacking due to their novelty and outdated or inefficient security protocols.36See Kane, supra note 3; Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 21 (describing the weak structural integrity of NFTs by exemplifying how crypto artist Neitherconfirm listed NFT artworks for sale on a popular digital marketplace, but later swapped the original image that the NFT pointed to, and instead had it point to photos of carpets in order to comment on the current system’s fragile structure). Additionally, the value of NFTs and their potential returns can be volatile and speculative because they are only worth as much as other people are willing to pay for them.37Cohen, supra note 35; Esajian, supra note 35. An NFT’s appreciating value seems to be derived either from its creator or its scarcity.38Cohen, supra note 35. Thus, depending on these two factors, investors could either win the jackpot to resell their NFT for a large gain or end up with a worthless digital asset and a large loss.

C.  FRACTIONALIZATION OF NFTS

One major innovation that has disrupted the way people view and use NFTs as investments is the concept of fractionalizing NFTs. Fractional NFTs, or “f-NFTs,” break an NFT into pieces, or “shards,” which can be subsequently traded and sold in the market at a lower price than the NFT as a whole.39See Karen Garnett, Jeffrey Neuburger & Frank Zarb, NFTs Are Interesting but Fractionalized Non-Fungible Tokens (F-NFTs) May Present Even More Challenging Legal Issues, JD Supra: Proskauer: Blockchain and the Law (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/nfts-are-interesting-but-fractionalized-9904209 [https://perma.cc/G2SL-V2Z5]. F-NFTs represent a fraction of the larger digital asset in which an investor can now share a partial interest in an NFT with other investors.40See Anello, supra note 5. Given that NFTs are routinely sold individually for thousands or millions of dollars, f-NFTs democratize these investments such that average investors can now purchase a smaller portion of a high-priced NFT.41See id. F-NFTs opened up access to NFT markets and allowed more people to invest in these new digital assets.

There are currently multiple platforms that facilitate the creation and trading of f-NFTs, such as Niftex, Fractional.art, and DAOfi. These f-NFT platforms allow owners to break NFTs into multiple shards and sell them at an initial fixed price.42Niftex, https://landing.niftex.com [https://web.archive.org/web/20211204212424/https://

landing.niftex.com/]; Anello, supra note 42.
The shards can subsequently be traded in an open market on the platform. On Niftex, an f-NFT is created through a four-step process: (1) “Owners of NFTs create fractions (‘shards’) by choosing issuance and pricing”; (2) these fractions are then put on sale on the platform at a fixed price for two weeks or until they sell out; (3) once the fixed sale period ends, the fractions can be traded on a secondary market; and then (4) a whole NFT can be fully retrieved by purchasing all of the shards through the platform’s special “Buyout Clause.”43Niftex, supra note 42. This Buyout Clause is embedded within an f-NFT’s smart contract and gives f-NFT investors who own a particular percentage of an NFT’s shards the opportunity to purchase the remaining shards to now own the whole NFT.44The Niftex Buyout Clause is initiated when an owner of f-NFTs (offeror) makes an offer to buy out all the owners of the other f-NFTs (offerees) at a certain price per shard. These other owners can either accept or reject the offer within a two-week period. If the offer is rejected, the offeror loses their fractions at the price they offered to buy them at, and the owners who rejected the offer now purchase and receive the offeror’s fractions proportional to the amount of Ethereum they committed to buy the offeror out. If the offer is accepted, the offeror pays out the other f-NFT holders, claims the whole NFT, and eliminates all the other fractions. See Joel Hubert, The Buyout Clause in Depth, Niftex (Sept. 22, 

2020), https://blog.niftex.com/the-buyout-clause-in-depth [https://web.archive.org/web/20210818142

139/https://blog.niftex.com/the-buyout-clause-in-depth/].
F-NFT platforms have also incorporated the ability to automatically give issuers a portion of the f-NFT created or to give some type of “curator fee.”45Joel Hubert, Introducing Royalty Fractions, Niftex (June 18, 2020), https://blog.niftex.com/

introducing-royalty-fractions [https://web.archive.org/web/20210616021741/https://blog.niftex.com/

introducing-royalty-fractions/]; fractional.art, https://fractional.art [https://perma.cc/E7AU-S5JH].

NFT issuers and platforms have become very creative in the ways in which they utilize and develop this digital asset. One theory is that platforms could put numerous NFTs into one basket and sell f-NFTs of that basket as an investment product or security (“f-NFT bundles”).46See Cointelegraph, Senator Lummis & SEC Commissioner Peirce: Security Token Regulation in the US | Fireside Chats, YouTube, at 23:18 (Mar. 25, 2021), https://youtu.be/dkunmN8wbKE?t=1398 [https://perma.cc/EH2V-SEGF]. While some people do not think a traditional NFT could be a security, an f-NFT may be deemed a security under U.S. securities law. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce warned issuers of f-NFTs that “the whole concept of an NFT is supposed to be non-fungible [meaning that] in general, it’s less likely to be a security,” but if issuers sell fractional interests in NFTs or NFT bundles, “you better be careful that you’re not creating something that’s an investment product—that is a security.”47Samuel Haig, SEC’s ‘Crypto Mom’ Warns Selling Fractionalized NFTs Could Break the Law, Cointelegraph (Mar. 26, 2021), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-s-crypto-mom-warns-selling-fractionalized-nfts-could-break-the-law [https://perma.cc/6VV4-MEHZ]. Peirce argued that “the definition of a security can be pretty broad,” and thus f-NFTs could fall within the SEC’s definition of a security and be subject to some form of regulation.48Cointelegraph, supra note 46. With the high costs of a single NFT, the growing availability of blockchain platforms in the mainstream, and the large development of decentralized finance and decentralized applications, “the continued fractionalization of NFTs is almost inevitable.”49Garnett et al., supra note 39.

II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND: DEFINING “SECURITIES”

The main statutes governing securities regulation are the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). While the Securities Act mostly deals with the issuance of securities, the Exchange Act governs exchanges, brokers, and trading on secondary markets.50See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (stating the rules in which people must follow when issuing securities or when trading or exchanging securities). Together, these statutes establish a registration and disclosure regime that requires any offer or sale of securities to register with the SEC and any issuers of securities to provide accurate and complete disclosures of material information regarding their securities offering or company. These requirements provide key information to investors so that they can make the most informed decisions. The consequences of being subject to these registration and disclosure requirements include filing documents with the SEC any time you sell securities, such as a Form S-1 registration statement, and filing continuous, periodic reports regarding the company’s business operations and financials, such as Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, or Form 8-K.51See id. §§ 77a–77aa. These statutes, along with regulatory rules, provide definitions and tests to help determine whether an asset is a “security” or an organization is an “exchange” that is subject to federal regulation.

A.  SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

The Securities Act makes it illegal for an issuer to offer or sell any unregistered security within interstate commerce unless the security is exempt from registration.52Id. § 77e(a), (c) (2012). This statute defines an “issuer” as “every person who issues or proposed to issue any security,” where “person” includes “an individual, a corporation, . . . [or] any unincorporated organization.”53Id. § 77b(a)(4). It also provides a broad definition of different types of assets that could be considered securities under U.S. federal securities law.54A “security” is defined as “any note, stock, treasury stock, . . . bond, debenture, . . . [or] investment contract.” Id. § 77b(a)(1). This definition specifically includes “investment contracts,” which can be seen as a catch-all term for any type of asset that behaves and feels like a security. Thus, it is sometimes difficult to determine if something falls within the definition of a security.

B.  SEC V. HOWEY

In SEC v. Howey, the U.S. Supreme Court created the Howey test to help clarify what an “investment contract” security is under the Securities Act. The defendant, W.J. Howey Company, sold real estate contracts for orange groves in Florida for a fixed price per acre.55SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1946). Howey then encouraged purchasers to set up service contracts in which they would lease the land back to the company to farm the orange groves, and in exchange the buyers would receive a share of the profits.56Although buyers had the ability to create service contracts with other third parties, Howey discouraged it, and it was very difficult to accomplish. Id. The Supreme Court held that these orange grove service contracts were “securities,” because purchasers were buying shares in Howey’s profits from the orange groves through these service contracts, not the actual orange groves themselves.57Id. at 299–300. The Court developed a four-pronged test in which “an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”58Id. at 298–99. There have since been a variety of cases that helped develop and clarify each of the four Howey prongs. The first prong of “an investment in money” does not need to be in the form of cash and can be satisfied using a different form of contribution or investment, such as cryptocurrency.59See Uselton v. Com. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[I]n spite of Howey’s reference to an ‘investment of money,’ it is well established that cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will create an investment contract. Instead, the ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods and services,’ or some other ‘exchange of value.’ ”).

The second prong of “in a common enterprise” requires that the fortunes of the investor be linked to the success of the overall venture or enterprise. “Fortunes” refers to the “profits” (and benefits) or “losses” (and costs) that occur from a certain asset and that affect a person’s position.60Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1994). There needs to be a kind of commonality or relationship, either among investors or between the “promoter” and investors, in which the investor depends on the actions and decisions of the promoter of the asset.61See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (“A common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment of third parties.”). A promoter is defined as any individual or organization that helps found and organize the business or enterprise of an issuer of any security or that receives ten percent or more of any class of the issuers securities or proceeds from the sale of such securities as consideration for their services or property.62See Guide to Definitions of Terms Used in Form D, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/formddefinitions.htm [https://perma.cc/224Y-3CGA]. Federal courts have typically required that there be either “horizontal commonality” or “vertical commonality” for an asset to satisfy the “common enterprise” prong.63See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87–88. Horizontal commonality is defined as the relationship between investors and a pool of other investors. There is commonality when an individual investor’s fortunes are tied to the fortunes of other investors in a common venture by the pooling of assets, usually combined with the 

pro-rata distribution of profits.64See id. at 87; Hirk v. Agri-Rsch. Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977). Vertical commonality is defined as the relationship between the promoter and the body of investors.65Revak, 18 F.3d at 87–88. Commonality exists when there is a connection between the fortunes (strict vertical commonality) or efforts (broad vertical commonality) of the promoter and the fortunes or efforts of the investors. This type of commonality does not require a pooling of funds.66Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1978).

The third prong of “a reasonable expectation of profits” requires investors to realize some form of appreciation on the development of the asset or participate in the earnings resulting from the use of investors’ funds.67United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). The SEC defines “profits” as “capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or business enterprise or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of purchasers’ funds.”68Strategic Hub for Innovation & Fin. Tech., Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/AVJ7-T59M] [hereinafter SEC Framework]. Courts also include “dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of the investment” in the definition of profits.69SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004). However, the SEC notes that “price appreciation resulting solely from external market forces (such as general inflationary trends or the economy) impacting the supply and demand for an underlying asset generally is not considered ‘profit’ under the Howey test.”70SEC Framework, supra note 68. This prong is very fact-sensitive, and the SEC looks at several factors, like the trading of the asset on secondary markets, identity of the buyers, and marketing efforts, to determine whether an asset satisfies this prong.71Id.

Finally, the fourth prong of “from the efforts of others” is satisfied when the promoter or issuer of an investment creates or supports the market for these assets or the value of the asset is dependent on the promoter’s efforts in generating demand.72Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that an investment was a security because part of its value depended on the efforts of the promoter to generate demand). In Howey, the Supreme Court understood that the Securities Act’s definition of a “security” is broad, so it argued that “[f]orm was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality.”73SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Thus, when determining whether something can be considered a security, one needs to focus on the specific circumstances, facts, and economic impact of the particular asset.74See SEC Framework, supra note 68. For an asset such as digital currencies or tokens, this test may consider factors such as the token’s design, issuance, and how it interacts with its platform or blockchain. Depending on how an NFT is created, structured, marketed, and sold or distributed, such NFTs could be deemed securities. This would mean that any sale of this NFT would be subject to the existing securities law framework.

C.  CURRENT CASE LAW 

Although there are few settled cases regarding whether certain digital assets are securities, there are a couple of key cases making their way through the court system. One of the leading cases being decided is SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., in which the SEC filed an enforcement action against Ripple Labs for selling crypto tokens that the SEC believed were unregistered securities.75SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20-CV-10832 (AT)(SN), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203566 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2021); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Ripple and Two Executives with Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-338 [https://perma.cc/EPF5-3BHG]. The SEC argues that Ripple Labs failed to register its offer and sale of about $600 million of its digital asset called XRP to retail investors, which was used to finance the business. The SEC stated that XRPs were investment contract securities because purchasers of XRP invested into a common enterprise, given that XRP’s demand is tied to Ripple’s success or failure in propelling its trading, and Ripple publicly promised investors that it would “undertake significant entrepreneurial and managerial efforts to create a liquid market for XRP” that would in turn increase its uses, demand, and price, and led reasonable investors to expect profits from XRPs.76Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 75; Complaint at 36–49, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20-CV-10832 (AT)(SN), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203566 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2020). Another notable case that provides arguments for and against regulating NFTs as securities is the class action lawsuit filed against Dapper Labs.77Andrea Tinianow, No Slam Dunk for Plaintiffs in NBA Top Shot Moments Class Action Lawsuit, Forbes (May 17, 2021, 10:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreatinianow/2021/05/17

/no-slam-dunk-for-plaintiffs-in-nba-top-shot-moments-class-action-lawsuit/?sh=3933d179df3d [https://

perma.cc/S7JG-9WF4]. The law firm initiating the class action lawsuit announced the deadline to join the case as a lead plaintiff was October 5, 2021. Press Release, The Rosen Law Firm, Rosen Law 

Firm Announces the October 5, 2021 Lead Plaintiff Deadline in the Securities Class Action Lawsuit 

Filed by the Firm on Behalf of Dapper Labs, Inc.—NBA Top Shot Moments Investors (Aug. 6, 

2021), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210806005442/en/EQUITY-ALERT-Rosen-Law-Firm-Announces-the-October-5-2021-Lead-Plaintiff-Deadline-in-the-Securities-Class-Action-Lawsuit-Filed-by-the-Firm-on-Behalf-of-Dapper-Labs-Inc.-–-NBA-Top-Shot-Moments-Investors [https://perma.

cc/VA9Z-5FNR]. The case against Dapper Labs is working its way through the courts and as of November 1, 2022, Dapper’s defense attorneys have filed a motion to dismiss. Motion to Dismiss, Friel v. Dapper Labs, No. 1:21-cv-05837-VM (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022).
Dapper Labs created the National Basketball Association’s (“NBA”) Top Shot, which sells NFTs of NBA highlights or “Moments” that can be bought or sold using the blockchain and marketplace Dapper Labs developed.78Dapper, https://www.dapperlabs.com [https://perma.cc/D5LJ-74BC]; NBA Top Shot, https://nbatopshot.com [https://perma.cc/9RKD-PFGF]. This class action argues that Dapper Labs is selling securities due to how it operates its resale marketplace and promotes the value of its NFTs. The plaintiffs allege that Moments were sold with “the expectation of profit” where “[t]he reality is that the growing fanatical NBA Top Shot database is all about the investment, speculation and appreciation of the Top Shot NFTs and the NBA Top Shot Marketplace.”79Amended Complaint at 17, Friel v. Dapper Labs, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-05837-VM (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2021); Tinianow, supra note 77. However, the plaintiffs conceded that NBA Top Shot’s Service Terms of Use state that users “are using NFTs primarily as objects of play and not for investment or speculative purposes.”80Amended Complaint, supra note 79, at 17; Tinianow, supra note 77. NBA Top Shot is promoting the NFTs as collectables as opposed to investments, which weighs in favor of the NFTs not being securities. Nevertheless, some argue that NBA Moments may still be “investment contracts” because Top Shot creates and maintains the sole marketplace for these NFTs and thus could be an unregistered exchange.81Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that bank certificates of deposit (“CDs”) offered by a broker dealer were securities because the broker dealer maintained the marketplace for trading these assets, which was crucial for the investor to be able to realize any gains with their CDs); see also Tinianow, supra note 77.

D.  SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 

Once an asset is deemed a “security,” the SEC and the Exchange Act impose numerous regulatory requirements on the “exchanges” or platforms that facilitate the trading of those assets. Section 5 of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any broker, dealer, or exchange to effect any transaction in a security unless the exchange is registered as a national securities exchange under section 6 of the Exchange Act or an appropriate exemption applies.8215 U.S.C. §§ 78e–78f. Registration as a national securities exchange requires any person or entity that offers or sells securities to the public to provide “full and fair disclosure” through the delivery of a statutory prospectus that contains information necessary to give prospective purchasers the proper opportunity to make an informed investment decision.83Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Report of DAO Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017 WL 7184670, at *10 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report]. Under the Exchange Act, an “exchange” is defined as any organization or group of persons (whether incorporated or unincorporated) that maintains or provides “a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities” or conducts functions commonly performed by stock exchanges.8415 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1). The Code of Federal Regulations attempts to clarify when an entity must register as a national security exchange and provides a functional test to assess whether an entity meets the definition of an “exchange” under the Exchange Act. Rule 3b-16(a) states that an organization, association, or group of persons is considered to constitute or maintain an “exchange” if it (1) “brings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers” and (2) “uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders interact with each other.”8517 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2021). Rule 3b-16(b) then lays out what is excluded from the definition of an exchange.86Id. § 240.3b-16(b) (2021). The SEC has argued that when analyzing whether a “system operates as a marketplace and meets the criteria of an exchange under Rule 3b-16(a),” one must look to “the activity that actually occurs between the buyers and sellers—and not the kind of technology or the terminology used by the entity operating or promoting the system.”87SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., & Div. of Trading & Mkt., Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter 

Digital Asset Securities Statement], https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-issuuance-and-trading [https://perma.cc/M3CX-DQB7].
Thus, any trading system that meets the definition of an exchange under 

Rule 3b-16(a), and is not excluded under Rule 3b-16(b), must register as a national securities exchange or operate pursuant to an appropriate exemption.88In re Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553, 2018 WL 5840155, at *5 (Nov. 8, 2018).

Exempted entities do not need to register as a national securities exchange under section 6.8917 C.F.R. § 240.3a1-1(a)(2) (2021). Rule 3a-1-1(a)(2) states that an organization, association, or group of persons is exempt from the definition of “exchange” if it is operating as an alternative trading system (“ATS”) and is in compliance with Regulation ATS.90Id. Rule 3a-1-1(a) also gives two other exemptions from the definition of “exchange” for any organization, association, or group of persons operated by a national securities association or an ATS that is not required to comply with Regulation ATS pursuant to Rule 301(a). See Id. § 240.3a1-1(a)(1), (3). ATSs are SEC-regulated electronic trading systems that utilize the process of “dark pools” to match orders for buyers and sellers of securities.91Dark pools are trading systems where users place orders without publicly displaying the size and price of their orders to other participants. See Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), Investor.gov, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/alternative-trading-systems-atss [https://perma.cc/K5VZ-ADUM]. The SEC defines ATSs as “any system that: (1) constitutes, maintains, or provides a marketplace or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange under Exchange Act Rule 3b-16; and (2) does not set rules governing the conduct of subscribers other than the conduct of such subscribers’ trading on such organization, association, person, group of persons, or system, or discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.” Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70859 (Dec. 22, 1998). The SEC released a report regarding its adoption of new rules and amendments that allow ATSs to “choose whether to register as national securities exchanges, or to register as broker-dealers and comply with additional requirements under Regulation ATS, depending on their activities and trading volume.”92Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70844. ATSs typically face fewer and simpler regulations than national securities exchanges but still have some requirements, such as registering as a broker-dealer, giving notice of initial operations or material changes, providing fair access, keeping records, complying with capacity, integrity, and security standards, and other reporting requirements to safeguarding customer funds and securities.93See 17 C.F.R. § 242.301 (2021). See generally Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70862–70903, 70909; Divs. of Enf’t & Trading & Mkts., Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 

7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawful-online-platforms-trading [https://perma.cc/WWQ4-4GFE].

E.  RULES, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDANCE FROM AGENCIES

In addition to statutes, issuers and platforms of digital assets also rely on statements, reports, and frameworks from the SEC and other regulatory bodies to guide their decisions. As digital assets grew in popularity, the SEC took notice and came out with formal and informal statements regarding its views on cryptocurrencies and tokens. In 2018, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton testified before a Senate committee arguing that cryptocurrencies could be structured as securities products subject to federal securities laws and warned that certain Initial Coin Offerings (“ICO”) structures could implicate securities registration requirements.94Jay Clayton, Chairman’s Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and CFTC, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-Currencies-oversight-role-us-securities-and-exchange-commission [https://perma.cc/M3N6-NEGD]. ICOs are the cryptocurrency industry’s equivalent to an initial public offering (“IPO”) and occur when an individual or company offers and sells digital tokens in their business to raise money. These tokens can either represent a stake in the company or hold some utility in using the company’s product or service. See Jake Frankenfield, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), Investopedia (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.

investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp [https://perma.cc/W5FR-WY9W].
More recently, at the Security Token Summit 2021, Peirce warned issuers of NFTs to be cautious when they create f-NFTs because when used in certain creative ways, they could create a security that is subject to regulation.95Cointelegraph, supra note 46.

The SEC created a branch in 2018 called the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology (“FinHub”) to coordinate and respond to emerging financial technology (“fintech”); serve as a public resource by consolidating, clarifying, and communicating the SEC’s views and actions related to fintech innovation; and inform policy research in these areas.96SEC Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology (FinHub), U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 14, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/finhub [https://perma.cc/UX94-XEH3]. In 2020, FinHub became its own standalone office. Eva Su, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46208, Digital Assets and SEC Regulation 4 (June 23, 2021). In 2019, FinHub published an SEC document called Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Asset, which provided details on how the SEC applies the Howey Test to analyze whether digital assets could be considered an “investment contract” security.97SEC Framework, supra note 68. This is one of the few documents available to guide digital asset creators and platforms.

Although guidance from the SEC regarding digital assets is sparse, there is some case law and reports from the SEC. For example, the SEC issued an enforcement order against the creator of EtherDelta, which provides a marketplace for bringing together buyers and sellers of digital asset securities through the combined use of an order book, a website that displayed orders, and a smart contract run on the Ethereum blockchain.98In re Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553, 2018 WL 5840155, at *5–6 (Nov. 8, 2018). This case held that EtherDelta violated section 5 of the Exchange Act because it issued digital asset securities using blockchain technology as an unregistered exchange.99Id. This is one of the main cases analyzing whether a platform that houses digital assets can be an unregistered security exchange. Other regulatory bodies have provided reports of their research into the intersection of digital assets and securities law. For example, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) published a report containing a broad outline of how federal securities laws and regulations apply to cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and NFTs.100CRS is a “nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress.” Although this type of report provides a good overview, it “should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.” Su, supra note 96, at 21.

The SEC also published the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO”) Report, which discusses U.S. federal securities laws and their applicability to the new paradigm of “virtual organizations or capital raising entities that use distributed ledger or blockchain technology to facilitate capital raising and/or investment and the related offer and sale of securities.”101DAO Report, supra note 83, at *2. The purpose of this report of investigation is to “advise those who would use a [‘DAO Entity’], or other distributed ledger or blockchain-enabled means for capital raising, to take appropriate steps to ensure compliance with the U.S. federal securities laws.”102Id. at 2. Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to make investigations to determine whether a person or entity has violated, is violating, or is about to violate federal securities law and empowers the SEC to “publish information concerning any such violations.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2021). Slock.it created The DAO, which is a “for-profit entity whose objective was to fund projects in exchange for a return on investment.”103DAO Report, supra note 83, at *1, *11–12. DAO Tokens represented a type of “crowdfunding contract” that would help raise “funds to grow [a] company in the crypto space.”104Id. at *4. The DAO offered and sold DAO Tokens in exchange for Ether (“ETH”), a virtual currency used on the Ethereum Blockchain, and the proceeds from these sales were used to fund projects.105Id. at *2–3. DAO Token holders had the right to vote on these projects and were entitled to any anticipated earnings from the projects it funded.106Id. at *4. The DAO platform also had a group of individuals called “Curators” who were given “considerable power” to perform “crucial security functions” and maintain “ultimate control over what projects would be submitted to, voted on, and funded by The DAO.”107Id. at *7. In applying the Howey test to the DAO Token, the SEC’s DAO report found that the tokens meet the criteria of a security and The DAO was required to register as an exchange under Rule 3b-16.108Id. at *10–16; see infra Part III.

Even though there is some guidance for blockchain technologies generally, the SEC has not yet provided any guidance regarding NFTs specifically. Given this small amount of advice, many people have requested that the SEC provide regulatory clarity with respect to NFTs so that they know how to proceed.109See Molinari, supra note 6; Frye, supra note 6 (asking the SEC to agree that the proposal to sell a fractionalized NFT of the no-action letter, which was split into fifty editions or pieces and sold for ten thousand dollars each on the NFT marketplace OpenSea, to the public does not constitute the sale of an unregistered security and that the SEC will not recommend any enforcement action). These requests for guidance come in the form of “no-action” letter requests that encourage “the SEC to engage in a meaningful discussion of how to regulate FinTech companies and individuals that are creating NFTs that may be deemed digital asset securities and the platforms that facilitate the issuance and trading of NFTs.”110Molinari, supra note 6. The existing securities framework provides a “crude mechanism” for regulating NFTs, and the SEC needs to reevaluate or reapply these old frameworks to new financial technologies to establish sustainable guidance and prevent NFTs from becoming the “Wild West” of digital investments.111See id. at 4.

III.  HOWEY TEST: ARE F-NFTS SECURITIES?

Although there are few articles or regulations specifically addressing NFTs, the current view is that NFTs may not be an “investment contract” security that can be regulated by the SEC because an NFT may gain its value through its uniqueness, as opposed to “a common enterprise” (second Howey prong), and any profits realized through an NFT may be derived from regular supply and demand, as opposed to the “efforts of others” (fourth Howey prong).112See Diana Qiao, This Is Not a Game: Blockchain Regulation and Its Application to Video Games, 40 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 176, 219 (2020) (arguing that even though NFTs may meet some of the Howey test elements, they should not be regulated as securities because of their lack of exchangeability); Cointelegraph, supra note 46; Anello, supra note 5. However, to determine an NFT’s ability to be categorized as a security, regulators need to focus on the “economic reality” and specific circumstances, such as how society defines the NFT’s value, how it is utilized, or how it is marketed. On one hand, if the purchaser is a collector and the NFT’s value comes from its uniqueness and artistry, the main purpose of buying the asset is to “consume” it by enjoying its aesthetics; the NFT may also be marketed as allowing buyers to join the ranks of premier owners and connoisseurs of unique digital objects. In such a scenario, an NFT is less likely to be a security. For example, some people may buy a Pudgy Penguins NFT from OpenSea (an NFT exchange website) because they think it is adorable and just want to look at it or display it as a profile picture on social media.113OpenSea: Pudgy Penguins, https://opensea.io/collection/pudgypenguins [https://perma.cc/

NK6S-6R2G].
On the other hand, if the purchaser is an investor and the NFT’s value comes from its ability to gain a return on investment, the main purpose of buying the asset is to sell it later for a profit; or if it is marketed as an asset that will appreciate in value to give a substantial return, then an NFT is more likely to be security. Some purchasers’ main goal in buying a Pudgy Penguin may be to increase their capital.114The lowest-priced Pudgy Penguins NFT sold for around ten thousand dollars, while the highest-priced Pudgy Penguins can be traded around fifty thousand dollars. Id. Other NFTs are sold for millions of dollars. Kastrenakes, supra note 2. In the end, NFTs may gain value from both their uniqueness and their ability to provide a return on investment.

Another prevailing view is that fractionalizing NFTs could create a type of security that is subject to regulation.115See Cointelegraph, supra note 46 (warning issuers and buyers of assets like f-NFTs to “be careful that you’re not creating something that’s an investment product—that is a security”); Garnett et al., supra note 39 (describing the rise of f-NFTs and the question of their legality under securities law); Anello, supra note 5. F-NFTs could be an investment contract under the Howey test depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular f-NFT, such as if you put multiple NFTs into one basket and then sell f-NFTs out of that basket.116SEC Framework, supra note 68 (stating that whether a digital asset is a security depends on the specific facts and circumstances). Although the SEC has yet to initiate any enforcement action against creators or platforms that facilitate the offer and sale of f-NFTs, the SEC and courts have held in many cases that fractional interests in an asset can be a security even if the individual asset itself is not.117See, e.g., Complaint at 6, 19–20, SEC v. Zipprich, No. 20-cv-02308, (D. Nev. filed Dec. 21, 2020) (alleging unregistered fractional interests in promissory notes violated section 5 of the Securities Act); Cease-and-Desist Order, In re R. Baker, Exchange Act Release No. 82929, at 4–5 (Mar. 22, 2018) (holding the sales of fractional oil and gas interests violated section 5 of the Securities Act because sellers failed to file registration statements for the fractional shares); Complaint ¶¶ 15–16, SEC v. Green Tree Inv. Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-1091 (W.D. Tex. filed Nov. 17, 2017) (holding that ownership interests in oil wells were securities because “investors paid money to purchase their ownership interests, and the controlling well owners pooled the investors’ funds together to build, manage and operate the wells”). This Part applies the four prongs of the Howey test to analyze whether an f-NFT can be an “investment contract” security and compares 

f-NFTs to the DAO Token, which has already been deemed a security. 

A.  “MAKES AN INVESTMENT IN MONEY”

F-NFTs most likely satisfy the first prong of the Howey test given that people buy f-NFTs using cryptocurrency. The SEC argues that most digital assets, such as f-NFTs, pass the first Howey prong because they are purchased through an exchange for value.118SEC Framework, supra note 68. It does not matter that this exchange for value is in the form of digital currency such as cryptocurrency. Courts have held that an “investment of money” does not need to be in the form of cash, and thus purchasing something with cryptocurrency, as is the case with NFTs or f-NFTs, would satisfy this definition.119See, e.g., Uselton v. Com. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at 20, 22 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (holding that the investment of a virtual currency such as Bitcoin satisfies the first Howey prong). When comparing f-NFTs to the DAO Token, both of these digital assets make an “investment in money” because both purchasers of the DAO Token and f-NFTs use ETH, the digital currency used on the Ethereum blockchain, to buy their respective digital assets.

B.  “IN A COMMON ENTERPRISE”

A traditional NFT may not pass this second Howey prong because its value stems from its uniqueness—not a common enterprise—and there may not be a relationship between the seller or promoter of an NFT and a buyer or investors in that NFT. However, the SEC’s FinHub stated that a “common enterprise” typically exists for investments in digital assets because the fortunes of individual purchasers of digital assets are tied to other investors or tied to the success of the promoter’s efforts to expand a digital asset platform.120SEC Framework, supra note 68; SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that a digital sales program satisfied all the prongs of the Howey test, including the “common enterprise” element, because this digital asset “generate[d] income for its investors . . . only through constant expansion of membership, which depends on individual recruiting and the appeal of [defendant’s] larger marketing campaign”). Also, courts have determined that the “common enterprise” prong is a distinct element of an investment contract analysis and “does not require vertical or horizontal commonality per se.”121Barkate, Exchange Act Release No. 49542, 2004 SEC LEXIS 806, at *10 n.13 (Apr. 8, 2004); SEC Framework, supra note 68. Thus, there are some arguments that f-NFTs may pass the second prong and have a common enterprise.

Horizontal commonality can be shown for f-NFTs through the fact that if a person owns a partial ownership interest in an underlying NFT, the value of this shard is tied to the fortunes of all the owners of the other shards of that fractionalized NFT.122See Anello, supra note 5. If the value of the underlying NFT increases, the value of each of its shards also increases. Thus, a common enterprise can be found through the relationship between an investor of an f-NFT and the pool of other investors who share ownership of the same fractionalized NFT. One of the very reasons to fractionalize an NFT is to enable smaller investors to “pool resources” together to purchase a smaller interest in an NFT and share in the returns of the whole NFT.123Garnett et al., supra note 39. This is similar to the investors in the DAO Token who pooled together ETH to help The DAO fund large projects with the hope of a return on their investments.124DAO Report, supra note 83, at *11–12. Both the DAO Token and f-NFTs can satisfy horizontal commonality by pooling investors’ assets and tying their interests together. Also, an NFT can be part of a series of similar NFTs, like a collection of artworks by the same person, where the value of one will rise and fall along with the value of the others in the series.125See Not Your Standard Orange Grove: Non-Fungible Tokens & Securities Laws, King & Spalding (June 16, 2021), https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/not-your-standard-orange-grove-non-fungible-tokens-securities-laws [https://perma.cc/8WZW-D3WC]. NFT exchange platform OpenSea houses a variety of different “collections” of NFTs that are similar and part of a series, such as CryptoPunks (little figures of digital people where each NFT in the collection has a different trait) or Pudgy Penguins (digital photos of penguins where each NFT in the collection has different visual features or outfits). Explore Collections, OpenSea, https://opensea.io/explore-collections [https://perma.cc/

CM5B-68V8].
The fortune of one NFT investor in the series may be tied to the increase and decrease in fortune of the other NFT investors in the same collection. 

F-NFTs may also satisfy the vertical commonality requirement, given the relationship between the original issuer of the f-NFTs (promoter) and all the purchasers of the f-NFTs (body of investors). A common enterprise exists under broad vertical commonality when the investors are dependent on the promoter’s efforts or expertise for their increased returns.126Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461–62 (9th Cir. 1978). For f-NFTs, a common enterprise may exist because the success of f-NFT investors gaining returns is dependent on f-NFT companies making the effort to fractionalize or bundle different NFTs and maintain the platform to protect f-NFTs and keep trading running. Additionally, strict vertical commonality can be established if f-NFT platforms gain some type of fee percentage from their efforts in fractionalizing and selling f-NFTs. Thus, if f-NFT platforms actively manage or charge fees for handling these assets, then the fortunes of f-NFT platforms are connected to the fortunes of the f-NFT investors. When f-NFT investors succeed, so does the f-NFT company.

Even certain, whole NFTs may pass the vertical commonality test. For example, many college and professional athletes have been creating NFTs of themselves through digital artwork, highlight reels, and other digital assets.127Professional athletes, such as Patrick Mahomes and Rob Gronkowski, created their own NFTs. See Khorram, supra note 33; Young, supra note 33. College athletes have taken advantage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling that allows NCAA athletes to monetize their name, image, and likeness by creating their own NFTs. See Kevin Stankiewicz, College Basketball Star Luka Garza Becomes 

Latest Athlete to Sell an NFT, CNBC (Apr. 6, 2021, 5:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/06/

college-basketball-star-luka-garza-is-latest-athlete-to-sell-an-nft.html [https://perma.cc/7DRV-6HUU] (reporting that Luka Garza, who was named the best player in men’s college basketball, recently auctioned off an NFT of multiple pictures of himself).
These NFTs may satisfy the “common enterprise” requirement because the value of the NFT would depend on the rise and fall of the athlete’s career and how much effort that athlete put into increasing their popularity. If the particular athlete who is issuing an NFT does better professionally in their sport or increases in popularity, then the value of their NFT may also increase. In other words, the fortunes of the owners of the athlete’s NFT would increase in correlation with the fortunes or the career of the athlete also increasing. The same argument can also be made for NFTs from specific artists or celebrities, such as Beeple or Martha Stewart.128Anne Steel, Martha Stewart Does NFTs—Jack-o’-Lantern Art and a Seductive Selfie, Wall St. J. (Oct. 19, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/martha-stewart-does-nftsjack-o-lantern-art-and-a-seductive-selfie-11634634001 [https://perma.cc/XD4F-T9GM]. Investors of Beeple’s NFTs have their fortunes tied to the efforts of Beeple and his other artworks. The value of an investor’s Beeple NFT will benefit from Beeple and his other artwork becoming more popular or valuable. Thus, there are good arguments that f-NFTs fulfill the second Howey prong.

C.  “WITH A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PROFIT”

F-NFTs can satisfy the third Howey prong if purchasers buy f-NFTs with the expectation that they will realize some type of gain or profit. Given that this prong is heavily fact–sensitive, the SEC provided a list of characteristics that make it more likely for a digital asset to fulfill the “reasonable expectation of profits” prong.129SEC Framework, supra note 68. F-NFTs seem to satisfy three of the characteristics listed: (1) the digital asset is “transferable or traded on or through a secondary market or platform,” (2) the issuer continuously “expend[s] funds from proceeds or operations to enhance the functionality or value of the network or digital asset,” and (3) the digital asset is marketed or promoted in a way that would cause a purchaser to have an expectation of profits. To determine whether an f-NFT can be classified as a security under this prong, one needs to focus on the transaction itself and the way the digital asset is offered and sold.130Id.; SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).

The first characteristic that increases the likelihood of f-NFTs fulfilling the third Howey prong is the fact that investors can transfer or trade these assets on secondary markets or online blockchain platforms.131SEC Framework, supra note 68. The ability to sell or buy NFTs or f-NFTs on secondary markets such as OpenSea provides proof that the investor may expect to realize some type of return or appreciation on the digital asset through secondary trading. This is much like how DAO Token holders were able to monetize their investments in DAO Tokens by reselling and trading them on various secondary trading platforms and markets.132See DAO Report, supra note 83, at *1, *6.

The second characteristic that leans in favor of f-NFTs satisfying the third prong is the fact that f-NFT platforms may “provide essential managerial efforts that affect the success of the enterprise, and investors reasonably expect to derive profit from those efforts.”133SEC Framework, supra note 68. The more likely that f-NFT issuers made efforts to increase the demand or value of the digital asset, the more likely the f-NFT will have a “reasonable expectation of profits.” Different cases have clarified that efforts to “increase the demand or value” include when issuers or platforms (1) create and manage an “ecosystem” for the digital asset which allows them to increase in value, (2) develop the network to inspire creative uses of its assets, or (3) add a new functionality using the proceeds from the token’s sales.134See, e.g., Cease-and-Desist Order, In re Airfox, Securities Act Release No. 10575, at 2 (Nov. 16, 2018) (“A purchaser in the offering of AirTokens would have had a reasonable expectation of obtaining a future profit based upon AirFox’s efforts, including AirFox revising its app, creating an ‘ecosystem,’ and adding new functionality using the proceeds from the sale of AirTokens.”); Cease-and-Desist Order, In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, at 6–7 (Dec. 11, 2017) (“Munchee highlighted the credentials, abilities and management skills of its agents and employees. . . . [T]he value of MUN tokens would depend on the company’s ability to change the Munchee App and create a valuable ‘ecosystem’ that would inspire users to create new reviews, inspire restaurants to obtain MUN tokens to reward diners and pay Munchee for advertising, and inspire users to obtain MUN tokens to buy meals and to attain higher status within the Munchee App.”). First, f-NFT platforms like Fractional.art and Nitfex made “essential managerial efforts” to increase demand or value of f-NFTs by taking continuous, active steps to fractionalize NFTs and make them more accessible to more investors. This created a new ecosystem where average investors could pool their funds together to share in the gains of valuable NFTs. Second, fractionalization networks inspired new creative uses such as bundling various NFTs together and selling f-NFTs of this bundle. The value of these f-NFTs would be dependent on the values of all the individual NFTs that the issuer chooses to place in the basket. Lastly, f-NFT platforms created a new functionality for NFTs by adding the ability to fractionalize one NFT into multiple shards. This allows purchasers to buy smaller interests in many different NFTs to diversify their collection, thus minimizing the volatility of this digital asset and increasing the potential returns.

This view of f-NFTs can be compared to the DAO Token that satisfied the third Howey prong because the proceeds from selling the DAO Tokens were used to fund different proposed projects in which holders had the potential to gain a share of the profits from these projects.135DAO Report, supra note 83, at *12. Also, much like how f-NFT platforms have created an ecosystem for the fractionalized assets, The DAO created a type of ecosystem for its “crowdfunding contracts.” While one may argue that f-NFT platforms are not using the proceeds from selling their tokens to directly improve their network, another may argue that f-NFT platforms collect fees from transactions that occur on their platform and then use these fees to maintain a secure network for f-NFT purchasers. Thus, this characteristic may depend on how the specific f-NFT platform is managed.

The third characteristic that makes f-NFTs more likely to provide a “reasonable expectation of profit” is the way in which f-NFTs are marketed to potential buyers. The SEC provided a list of ways a digital asset could be marketed that weigh in favor of the third Howey prong. F-NFTs may satisfy four of these methods: (1) the “intended use of the proceeds from the sale of the digital asset is to develop the network or digital asset”; (2) a key selling feature of f-NFTs is the ability to readily transfer it; (3) “[t]he potential profitability of the operations of the network, or the potential appreciation in the value of the digital asset, is emphasized in marketing or other promotional materials”; or (4) there is an available market for trading the digital asset or the issuer promises to create or support a trading market.136SEC Framework, supra note 68. F-NFTs can satisfy these marketing characteristics, and many of them are also found in the DAO Token. 

First, although current f-NFT platforms do not directly market that proceeds from f-NFT sales will be used to develop the network, one can assume that these platforms use the fees they collect from sales to maintain the network and allow for continuous fractionalization of NFTs. Second, the fact that f-NFTs are marketed as being easily transferable on platforms such as Niftex, Fractional.art, or DAOfi lean in favor of there being an “expectation of profit.”137Niftex, supra note 42; fractional.art, supra note 45; DAOfi, https://daofi.org [https://perma.cc/C49Y-F5J7]. This is similar to the DAO Token, which was promoted as being readily available to buy and sell on “a number of web-based platforms that supported secondary trading.”138DAO Report, supra note 83, at *1. Third, certain f-NFT platforms emphasize that these assets are a unique and better way to unlock liquidity, gain greater exposure and price discovery for your NFTs as fractions on the open market, trade NFTs with lower cost and greater diversification, get access to a variety of unique and iconic digital assets with low price thresholds, or provide liquidity for shard markets and earn transaction or curator fees.139Niftex, supra note 42; fractional.art, supra note 45; Andy8052, What is Fractional.art?, Fractional.art (Mar. 17, 2021), https://medium.com/fractional-art/what-is-fractional-dd4f86e6458a [https://perma.cc/88R4-CEQ7]. These platforms focus on f-NFTs’ ability to increase exposure of a particular NFT in a market and diversify one’s investments in NFTs to spread out the risk of a single NFT losing value. Increased exposure and diversification can increase an f-NFT’s profitability, and a platform’s emphasis on this promotes an f-NFT’s appreciation in value. However, f-NFTs may simply be marketed as an easier, more accessible way for the average investor to partake in the NFT market.140F-NFTs are a way to provide “community access to owning parts of iconic and historic NFTs.” fractional.art, supra note 45. If this is the case, it is less likely that f-NFTs satisfy the third Howey prong. The DAO platform emphasized its potential profitability by marketing it as an investment where purchasers could share in the profits of the proposed projects the DAO Token funded and thus gain a return on their initial investment.141DAO Report, supra note 83, at *6. Although this is not exactly similar to how f-NFTs’ profitability were marketed, both seem to promise their purchaser some type of liquidity. Fourth, f-NFT platforms provide a readily available market for the trading of various f-NFTs. Creators or purchasers of f-NFTs can easily sell or buy these assets on different websites. These platforms support an f-NFT trading market by providing information regarding how the platform and fractionalization process operates and how the underlying technology works, a “frequently asked questions” section, a link to create or buy and sell f-NFTs, ways to “join the community,” and so forth.142Niftex and Fractional.art both provide “How It Works” sections on their homepage describing a short four-step explanation of how issuers create an f-NFT and how buyers purchase or trade these 

f-NFTs. Niftex, supra note 42; Fractional.art, supra note 45.
This is similar to the DAO Token issuers who supported a trading market for their token by developing a website, a link to detailed information regarding The DAO entity’s structure and source code, and a link to buy DAO Tokens; providing information on how The DAO operated; soliciting media attention; and posting on online forums.143DAO Report, supra note 83, at *5. 

A counterargument is that traditional NFTs are less likely to be a security because purchasers of traditional NFTs buy them for their artistry or bragging rights, proving that NFTs gain their value from their uniqueness, scarcity, or collectable status—not from any expected profits. An NFT’s value may just be based on the normal market forces of supply and demand, which is not considered “profit.”144See SEC Framework, supra note 68. The SEC also notes that digital assets are less likely to satisfy the Howey test if “[a]ny economic benefit that may be derived from appreciation in the value of the digital asset is incidental to obtaining the right to use it for its intended functionality.”145Id. The intended functionality of an NFT may just be bragging rights or display rights, such as displaying a rare NFT artwork as your profile picture on your social media account. Thus, when an NFT increases in value, this may just be incidental to using the asset for its intended functionality of bragging rights. Also, if an f-NFT is marketed in a way that focuses on its role as a piece of digital artwork or a collectible, and not as an opportunity to gain any returns, this may work against f-NFTs being a security.146If a “digital asset is marketed in a manner that emphasizes the functionality of the digital asset, and not the potential for the increase in market value of the digital asset,” then the asset is less likely to be a security. SEC Framework, supra note 68. For example, some platforms market f-NFTs as a way to create more accessibility to the NFT market and not necessarily as a way to increase one’s returns.147Fractional.art, supra note 45. Regulators will need to analyze the specific characteristics of certain f-NFTs and f-NFT platforms to determine whether they satisfy the third Howey prong. 

D.  “THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS”

Some argue that although an NFT may provide the purchaser with a reasonable expectation of profits, this increase in financial returns is not derived from the “efforts of others” and instead comes from the NFT’s own scarcity and uniqueness. Thus, it may be more difficult to argue that an NFT satisfies the fourth and final Howey prong, which requires the asset’s increase in value to come from the “efforts of others.” While a traditional NFT may not fulfill this prong given that its value comes from its uniqueness, an f-NFT may be an exception because its value is derived from the efforts of the f-NFT platforms or issuers who support the f-NFT market. The fourth Howey prong is satisfied if an f-NFT issuer supports a market for f-NFTs or the value of these assets depend on the issuer’s efforts in generating demand.148Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1985). Thus, if an NFT issuer or exchange puts in the work to develop the platform and increase buyers, and the purchasers reasonably expect a return based on this work, then an NFT may pass this last prong.

The SEC Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets lays out two key questions to consider when determining whether a digital asset can satisfy the “efforts of others” prong: (1) does the purchaser reasonably expect to rely on the efforts of an “Active Participant,” and (2) are those efforts “the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise”?149SEC Framework, supra note 68; see also SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). To help answer these questions, the SEC provided a list of six characteristics that lean in favor of a digital asset fulfilling the fourth Howey prong. While none of the characteristics are dispositive, they provide a good framework to help determine when a digital asset gains its value through the “efforts of others.” F-NFTs may satisfy some of the characteristics and thus satisfy the last Howey prong.

The first characteristic is that an issuer is “responsible for the development, improvement (or enhancement), operation, or promotion of the network, particularly if purchasers of the digital asset expect an [issuer] to be performing or overseeing tasks.”150SEC Framework, supra note 68. Platforms that issue f-NFTs may have this characteristic because they are responsible for promoting the f-NFTs on their platforms, bringing more buyers onto their networks, and improving their networks by offering more products such as f-NFT bundles or automatic royalties embedded in smart contracts.151Su, supra note 96, at 19–20 (showing the availability of f-NFTs to easily incorporate and utilize royalties where issuers can gain access to an income stream). These development efforts can increase the value of the actual platform and thus increase the value of the f-NFTs traded on that specific platform. Also, if a platform markets f-NFTs as producing profit based on royalty payments or f-NFT bundles, purchasers may expect that the issuers are putting in some type of managerial efforts to oversee the asset and increase its value. The value of an f-NFT could come from the efforts of a person or entity promoting, selling, choosing, developing, and managing different f-NFT royalties or bundles. This is similar to the DAO Token Curators who managed different projects for investors to create returns by deciding what projects would be submitted to, voted on, and funded by DAO Token holders.152DAO Report, supra note 83, at *7. DAO investors relied on the “managerial and entrepreneurial efforts” of the Curators to manage The DAO network and project proposals because the creators of The DAO represented that they “could be relied on to provide the significant managerial efforts required to make The DAO a success.”153Slock.it created The DAO website and posted on multiple online forms to solicit media attention and communicate to potential DAO Token holders. These promotional materials included information to investors regarding how The DAO works, the role of DAO Token holders, the role of the creators of The DAO and Curators, how they monitor the platform, how investors could use their DAO Tokens, and so forth. DAO Report, supra note 83, at *5, *12. 

The second characteristic is that the issuer performs essential tasks or responsibilities, as opposed to “an unaffiliated, dispersed community of network users (commonly known as a ‘decentralized’ network).”154SEC Framework, supra note 68. This reference to a “decentralized” network may work against f-NFTs being deemed a security because they are inherently run on a “decentralized” network. One can argue that the blockchain technology, smart contracts, and digital ledger perform the “essential tasks or responsibilities” for f-NFTs as opposed to the issuer or platform. However, the DAO Token was still deemed a security even though it utilized blockchain technology, and smart contracts performed tasks for the usage of the DAO Tokens.155DAO Report, supra note 83, at *12–13. Although 

f-NFTs are run on a “decentralized” network, issuers can perform essential tasks such as fractionalizing NFTs, using their expertise to bundle NFTs, or maintaining the network to ensure the f-NFTs are protected.

The third characteristic is that an issuer “creates or supports a market for, or the price of, the digital asset,” which can include (1) “control[ing] the creation and issuance of the digital asset,” or (2) “tak[ing] other actions to support a market price of the asset, such as by limiting supply or ensuring scarcity” through activities like buybacks.156SEC Framework, supra note 68. Issuers of f-NFTs, such as Niftex and Fractional.art, may embody this characteristic because issuers set the original fixed price of an f-NFT when they initially fractionalize an NFT, and many f-NFT platforms have some type of “buyout” provision which lets f-NFT investors purchase the remaining shards to gain ownership of the full NFT.157Niftex, supra note 42; Fractional.art, supra note 45. This buyout provision is similar to a buyback because the original f-NFT issuer can buy back the whole NFT, which can subsequently support a market price of the f-NFTs. Also, as more NFTs are bought and sold on a platform, the rarity and scarcity of a specific NFT may increase, which then affects the price of that NFT.158See Qiao, supra note 112, at 219. Thus, if f-NFT platforms support the growth of their platforms to include more f-NFTs or other products, then these platforms can create a market for and support the price of f-NFTs. A counter argument is that an NFT’s lack of exchangeability with other NFTs impedes its ability to be classified as a security. Traditional securities increase their value from price fluctuation and exchangeability, but due to its uniqueness, an NFT only increases its value through profit increases and not exchangeability.159Id. This issue may be limited with f-NFTs, whose value is tied to other types of price fluctuations.

The fourth characteristic is that the issuer has a “lead or central role in the direction of the ongoing development of the network or the digital asset.”160SEC Framework, supra note 68. By simply maintaining the f-NFT network, these platforms are providing an active management role that contributes to the development and stability of f-NFTs and f-NFT networks. Since the actual NFT is typically hosted on external URLs or IPFS, some caution that NFT networks must be maintained to ensure that NFTs sold on the platform do not disappear, buyers do not lose their purchases, and NFTs do not lose their value. This dynamic can create a system in which “the value of the art is tethered to the value of the platform hosting it.”161Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 21. The managerial efforts of the NFT platforms would be directly tied to the value of the NFTs because if the NFT platforms are not run properly or are shut down, the value of the NFTs decreases or disappears altogether. An issuer can also take a lead role in continuously developing f-NFTs if the issuer is an artist, athlete, celebrity, or company, and the value of their f-NFT is tied to that specific issuer’s popularity or the efforts they undertake to grow their popularity. When buying an f-NFT, you are not buying the underlying artwork but instead are purchasing the right to gain profits from the increased popularity of the creator, whether it be an artist like Beeple or an athlete like Patrick Mahomes.162See Kastrenakes, supra note 2; Khorram, supra note 33. People may invest in NFTs with the hope that the creator increases in fame, which can then increase the profits from the particular NFT. For example, many college athletes are creating their own NFTs, and as an athlete’s career progresses to professional sports, the value of that NFT could exponentially increase.163See Stankiewicz, supra note 127; Andrea Adelson, Florida State’s McKenzie Milton, Miami’s D’Eriq King Join in on NIL Platform Dreamfield, ESPN (June 30, 2021), https://www.espn.com/

college-football/story/_/id/31742166/florida-state-mckenzie-milton-miami-deriq-king-join-nil-platform-dreamfield [https://perma.cc/5ZJE-APVQ] (reporting that McKenzie Milton, the quarterback for Florida State University, issued his own NFT card); Rory Jones, Pac-12 Launches First NFT Marketplace for College Athletes, SportsPro (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/pac-12-ncaa-nil-nft-marketplace-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/UB9G-86BL] (announcing that the Pac-12 Conference recently launched its first NFT marketplace for college athletes where they can sell NFTs of their highlights and moments online).
NFTs issued by corporations or influential public figures may also satisfy the “efforts of others” prong. For example, Nike recently announced its plan to sell “digital shoes,” which resemble an NFT for its iconic shoes; Martha Stewart also created an NFT collection consisting of digital art of her home décor.164Joseph Pisani, Nike Files to Sell Digital Sneakers, as It Seeks Downloadable Kicks, Wall St. J. (Nov. 2, 2021, 1:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nike-files-to-sell-digital-sneakers-as-it-seeks-downloadable-kicks-11635873070 [https://perma.cc/BJ2X-YULZ]; Steel, supra note 128. Nike and Martha Stewart may have a central role in the ongoing development of their respective NFTs because as they put in effort to continuously grow the popularity and profitability of their brand, their NFTs may also grow in value. If an NFT is tied to a specific company or person, the NFT’s value relies on the efforts of that issuer to increase their popularity, which will in turn help develop the underlying NFT.

The fifth characteristic is that the issuer has “a continuing managerial role in making decisions about or exercising judgment concerning the network or the characteristics or rights the digital asset represents.”165SEC Framework, supra note 68. Some examples of what constitutes a “managerial role” include: “determining whether and where the digital asset will trade,” having “responsibility for the ongoing security of the network,” and “making other managerial judgements or decisions that will directly or indirectly impact the success of the network or the value of the digital asset generally.”166Id. The DAO Curators had a large managerial role over the DAO Token—and its potential value—because investors relied on the Curators’ expertise to monitor the operation of The DAO, safeguard their funds, and determine when proposed contracts should be put to a vote to fund projects.167DAO Token holders had very little meaningful control over The DAO or the value of the token through their voting process. Token holders could only vote on proposals and contracts that had been presented to them by the Curators, and because of the anonymity and wide dispersion of individual DAO Token investors, it was unlikely that investors could unite to assert any actual control. The role was similar to just a regular corporate stakeholder. DAO Report, supra note 83, at *12–15. F-NFT platforms may serve this “managerial role” through providing ongoing security for the network. For example, f-NFT platforms must manage their networks to prevent any hacking attempts or fraud that could steal funds during an NFT transaction or destroy the linkage to the underlying NFT.168The creator of an NFT inserted a malicious code into the Miso platform (the token sale platform on the decentralized exchange SushiSwap) which changed the destination address for all the incoming funds in the token sale of a Kia Sedona NFT to their own address, thus stealing the funds. Tim Copeland, ‘Kia Sedona’ NFT Sale Goes Belly up as Contractor Allegedly Runs off with $3 Million, The Block (Sept. 17, 2021, 5:20 AM), https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/117968/kia-sedona-nft-sale-goes-belly-up-as-contractor-allegedly-runs-off-with-3-million [https://perma.cc/6HBW-HYDG]. This is similar to how The DAO and its Curators were relied on for “failsafe protection” and for protecting the system from “malicous [sic] actors.”169DAO Report, supra note 83, at *7. Current f-NFT platforms have yet to show how their managerial decisions can significantly impact the success of f-NFTs, given that they do not have Curator-type workers who actively control f-NFTs. However, if f-NFT platforms sold 

f-NFT bundles, investors would have to rely on the platform’s judgment for what types of NFTs were being pooled together in a bundle and sold as 

f-NFTs. The platform’s expertise may then affect the value of the f-NFT bundle, and it would be more likely that f-NFTs had continuous management from others.

The sixth characteristic is that “[p]urchasers would reasonably expect the [issuer] to undertake efforts to promote its own interests and enhance the value of the network or digital asset” where the issuer has a stake in the digital asset and can realize its own gain from the digital asset or monetize the value of the digital asset.170SEC Framework, supra note 68. Issuers or creators of f-NFTs may satisfy this characteristic because they can program a smart contract to automatically charge a type of royalty or curator fee any time an f-NFT is resold or used in a specific way.171Fractional.art, supra note 45; Jones, supra note 32, at 17. This enables the issuer to monetize the value of the digital asset and promote its own interests in the digital asset. Some platforms such as Niftex have also automatically programmed their f-NFT smart contracts to set aside five percent of an NFT’s fractions for the artist.172Joel, supra note 45. In this system, instead of the creator taking a cut every time a fraction is traded on the open market, they now get to share in the profits of just owning some of the shards. It seems that f-NFT issuers may promote their own interests and enhance the value of the digital asset, because the higher the value of the asset, the more money they can make off their own shards.

Whether or not f-NFTs satisfy the fourth Howey prong will once again come down to the specific facts of how the f-NFT is marketed to purchasers and the specific platform or issuer. However, given the various SEC characteristics taken together and their application to f-NFTs, there may be a good argument that f-NFTs can gain their value from the “efforts of others.” After analyzing f-NFTs under the four Howey prongs and comparing them to other established digital asset securities, f-NFTs can be considered securities.

IV.  HOW CAN NFTS BE REGULATED?

Even if f-NFTs can satisfy all the Howey prongs and be classified as a security, the question still remains whether the SEC should regulate these digital assets and what regulatory framework should be adopted. The SEC cautioned that as financial technologies continue to innovate, there is a possibility that market participants (such as f-NFT buyers, sellers, and platforms) may be conducting activities that fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction in which their transactions, persons, or entities may be subject to registration, regulation, or oversight.173SEC regulation may apply to entities conducting activities like (a) offering, selling, or distributing; (b) marketing or promoting; (c) buying, selling, or trading; (d) facilitating exchanges; (e) holding or storing; (f) offering financial services like management or advice; or (g) other professional services that relate to digital assets. Bill Hinman & Valerie Szczepanik, Statement on “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets,” U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/72U8-APUY]. The SEC can regulate three different types of actors: (1) buyers of a security, (2) sellers or issuers of a security, and (3) platforms facilitating exchanges.174The Securities Act places regulations on issuers of securities, and the Exchange Act establishes regulations for exchanges or brokers of securities. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (stating the specific regulations certain actors must follow to participate in the issuing, buying, or selling of securities). If designated as a security, buyers, sellers, or platforms of f-NFTs sold without registration may be subject to penalties, registration requirements, or filing periodic reports with the SEC.175Digital Asset Securities Statement, supra note 87. 

The SEC needs to discover what types of regulations it can impose on buyers, sellers, and platforms of f-NFTs. This Part analyzes the risks and opportunities of regulating f-NFTs under the existing regulatory framework and how regulations can be applied to the three different actors within the NFT space to recommend a new, modified framework better suited for this digital asset.

A.  REGULATION OF BUYERS

The SEC regulates buyers of securities by only allowing certain “accredited investors” to purchase unregistered securities, which typically are subject to fewer requirements and regulations.176See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–230.508 (2021). SEC Regulation D (“Reg. D”) governs unregistered securities and explains the exemptions from being required to register with the SEC.177Id. Under Rule 501(a) of Reg. D, accredited investors can be institutional investors and entities such as banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, or pension plans;178Id. § 230.501(a)(1). insiders within an issuer such as officers or directors of the issuer of the securities;179Id. § 230.501(a)(4). or wealthy natural persons such as those with a net worth of greater than $1 million, excluding primary residence and mortgage,180Id. § 230.501(a)(5). or those with an annual income of greater than $200,000 for the last two years ($300,000 if filing jointly with one’s spouse).181Id. § 230.501(a)(6).

The policy behind limiting buyers from purchasing certain securities through this regulation is to protect less-knowledgeable individual investors, who may not have the financial stability to absorb the high risks of investing in unregistered securities, while also promoting investments into risky entrepreneurial ventures. Accredited investors are treated differently from the general public because they are sophisticated enough to bear the risks, are more knowledgeable, or have the money to hire someone like a financial advisor to help them make informed decisions. Given that f-NFTs may be unregistered securities, the SEC could regulate f-NFT buyers by only allowing accredited investors to purchase them. However, it may be difficult to prevent people from buying a certain digital asset on a decentralized and easily accessible platform. This would mean that every time an f-NFT was created or sold, an issuer or platform would have to go through the 

time-consuming and costly process of ensuring that every purchaser complies with the definition of an accredited investor. The whole purpose of fractionalizing NFTs was to make these digital assets more accessible to average investors. Thus, it seems counterintuitive to place a new barrier in front of average investors and their ability to participate in this emerging market. The accredited investor regulation is meant to protect average investors from more risky activities, but there may be other ways to prevent harm to less-knowledgeable investors than completely cutting them off from these new assets, such as requiring NFT platforms to provide easily accessible and relevant information regarding trading NFTs and maintaining certain security protocols to protect f-NFT investors and their funds. Thus, it is unlikely that the SEC could or should place any regulations on buyers of f-NFTs.

B.  REGULATION OF SELLERS OR ISSUERS

The SEC may be able to place registration requirements on the initial creators or issuers of f-NFTs. Under section 5 of the Securities Act, any issuer offering or selling an unregistered security in interstate commerce must register non-exempt securities with the SEC.18215 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (2012). These registration requirements serve two main goals: (1) to provide investors with financial and other material information regarding the securities being offered or sold and (2) to prohibit and minimize fraud, deceit, misrepresentations, and other dangers in the sale of securities.183Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Investor.gov, https://www.investor.gov/

introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/registration-under-securities-act-1933 [https://perma.

cc/9SCQ-45V4].
Requiring issuers to provide information regarding their assets to investors through the SEC increases the likelihood that investors will make well-informed decisions and provides a certain standard to minimize fraudulent sales. If f-NFTs are deemed to be securities, the individual or entity that initially fractionalizes the NFT and sells these 

f-NFTs may be considered an issuer under section 5 and thus be subject to SEC requirements such as filing a registration statement and periodically disclosing material information.184Section 77f of the Securities Act of 1933 lays out how to register a security, while section 77g provides the information required to be disclosed in a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77g (2012).

The SEC has cracked down on digital assets and ICOs by bringing and winning enforcement actions against a variety of issuers who have offered and sold digital assets that are deemed securities and were not registered pursuant to the Securities Act.185See SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352, 379–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169, 173–74, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). More recently in 2021, the SEC brought new enforcement actions against different issuers of digital tokens. Complaint at 5–7, SEC v. Uulala, Inc., No.5:21-cv-01307 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2021) (alleging that an issuer committed registration and antifraud violations when it offered and raised more than $9 million through an unregistered offering of digital tokens because these tokens were not sold to users of the app for consumption but were instead advertised as a way to gain profits); In re DeFi Money Market, Exchange Act Release No. 92588 (Aug. 6, 2021) (alleging an issuer violated sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act when it offered and sold over $30 million of securities in unregistered offerings through digital tokens using smart contracts and “decentralized finance”). In 2019, the SEC brought two high-profile enforcement actions against Kik Interactive Inc. (“Kik”) and Telegram Group Inc. (“Telegram”) arguing that the Kik and Telegram tokens were sold to investors as unregistered securities and thus violated federal securities law. The courts applied the Howey test and found that both tokens were securities because the funds from the token sale were used for operating the companies’ respective ecosystem and messaging apps, the tokens were marketed to prospective investors as a way “you could make a lot of money,” and the value of the investments depended on the companies’ respective efforts to develop their messaging apps.186Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 379–82; Kik Interactive, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 173–74. While some issuers of digital assets like cryptocurrency were subject to registration requirements, other issuers of digital assets such as tokens for a membership rewards program (TurnKey Jet, Inc.) or tokens for video game currency (Pocketful of Quarters, Inc.) were given “no-action” letters from the SEC promising that the it would not take any enforcement action against these issuers for selling the digital assets without registration.187TurnKey Jet, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1471132 (Apr. 3, 2019); Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 319 (July 25, 2019). The SEC held that these rewards and video game tokens were not securities because none of the funds from the token sales were used to develop the issuer’s platform, the tokens were immediately usable for their intended functionality (purchasing air charter services or gaming) at the time they were sold, token transfers were restricted to only the company’s internal “wallets,” and the tokens were both marketed in a way that emphasized the functionality of the token for consumption.188See supra note 187.

Given the unchartered territory of f-NFTs, it is difficult to apply the regulation of issuers to the creators of f-NFTs. Although selling f-NFTs may look like a type of ICO, there may be policy reasons not to require registration every time creators wish to fractionalize their NFT. Registering the sale of an asset is a time-consuming and costly process, and it seems unnecessary to require extensive disclosures given that the costs of registration may outweigh the benefits of having an accessible f-NFT marketplace. The main goals of these registration requirements are to provide investors with sufficient information regarding the f-NFT and to prevent fraud.189Registration and ongoing disclosure requirements allow investors to better understand NFTs and their issuances to ensure they are making the most informed decisions. Digital Asset Securities Statement, supra note 87. However, f-NFTs’ blockchain and smart contract technology may satisfy these goals without the need for costly registration. Many platforms always display relevant information regarding an NFT right next to the image of the NFT. This information typically includes a description of the NFT, the total supply of fractionalized shards, the valuation, and some type of table showing all the transactions of that specific NFT, the date on which each sale occurred, the buyers and sellers for each sale, and the price at which it was sold.190CryptoPunk #1605, OpenSea, https://opensea.io/assets/0xb47e3cd837ddf8e4c57f05d70

ab865de6e193bbb/1605 [https://perma.cc/5NPG-LBQW] (displaying an example of the webpage for an NFT called CryptoPunk #1605); Prince Splishysplash, Fractional.art, https://fractional.art/vaults/

prince-splishysplash [https://perma.cc/7WXG-Y37W] (displaying an example of the webpage for an 

f-NFT called Prince Splishysplash).
Thus, potential purchasers can already easily see the relevant financial information regarding the assets to help them make an informed decision. Also, since each f-NFT has a digital ledger that automatically records every transaction and every buyer and seller of that f-NFT, it can be easier to fend off certain types of fraud and easily authenticate true ownership. F-NFTs’ blockchain technology, decentralized network, and easy authentication process can help satisfy the goals that registration requirements aim to reach.

One may argue that if an f-NFT is being sold by a specific entity, artist, or athlete, and the value of that f-NFT is tied to that entity or individual’s external success, then the issuer may need to provide disclosure regarding the entity or individual. For example, would a professional athlete’s f-NFT issuance require a registration statement about their professional sports career? Brands such as Nike and Martha Stewart have recently announced their digital asset plans such as Nike’s “digital shoes” and Martha Stewart’s NFT collection of digital images depicting her home decor and designs.191See Pisani, supra note 164; Steel, supra note 128. Thus, if a company or brand is issuing an NFT or f-NFT, it seems more likely that the SEC may impose registration requirements and disclosures regarding that specific company or brand. Even if the SEC decides to impose registration requirements for the initial fractionalization of an NFT, there should be exemptions for small NFTs of little value or where there is a low number of shards in the initial fractionalization. For example, Reg. D under Rule 504 provides an exemption from registration requirements for companies that issue a small amount of securities, in which they are not allowed to sell more than $10 million worth of securities in any twelve-month period.19217 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2021). This rule could easily be applied or adapted to fit small sales of f-NFTs such that issuers would not be required to register the sale of their f-NFTs if the total value of the sale was below a certain threshold. The SEC will need to balance the costs of the registration requirements for initial 

f-NFT issuers with the need to promote or encourage new markets and assets and not stifle innovation and creativity.

C.  REGULATION OF PLATFORMS OR EXCHANGES 

Although it may be more difficult to regulate buyers or the initial creators of f-NFTs, it may be more reasonable to focus securities regulation on f-NFT platforms or networks that provide for the fractionalization of NFTs and manage the secondary market trading of these digital assets. If an f-NFT platform such as Niftex, Fractional.art, or DAOfi satisfies the definition of an “exchange” under Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a)’s test, then these types of platforms will need to register with the SEC under section 6 of the Exchange Act as a national securities exchange or be exempt from registration, such as by operating as an alternative trading system (“ATS”) in compliance with Regulation ATS.19315 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78f; Divs. of Enf’t & Trading & Mkts., supra note 93. The registration requirements for exchanges apply regardless if the issuing entity is a decentralized autonomous organization as opposed to a traditional company, if purchased using virtual currencies as opposed to traditional paper currency, or if distributed through ledger technology as opposed to certificated form.194DAO Report, supra note 83, at *18.

Under the Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a), an entity is an “exchange” if it (1) “brings together orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers,” and (2) uses “established, non-discretionary methods.”19517 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2021). The SEC clarifies this two-pronged functional test by stating that a system “brings together orders” “if it displays, or otherwise represents, trading interests entered on the system to system users” or “if it receives subscribers’ orders centrally for future processing and execution.”196Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844, 70849 (Dec. 22, 1998). The SEC also explains that a system uses “established, non-discretionary methods either by providing a trading facility or by setting rules governing trading . . . among the multiple buyers and sellers entering orders into the system.”197Id. at 70850. These methods include a computer system in which orders interact, a “trading mechanism that provides a means or location for the bringing together and execut[ing] of orders,” or rules that impose execution procedures or priorities on orders.198Id. at 70851. 

Recently, this test was applied to the EtherDelta, which is an online trading platform that allows buyers and sellers to trade digital assets such as Ether and ERC20 tokens in secondary market trading. The SEC entered an enforcement order arguing that EtherDelta violated section 5 of the Exchange Act because its digital token was a security and the EtherDelta platform was an unregistered “exchange” that was transacting in a security.199In re Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553, 2018 WL 5840155, at *5 (Nov. 8, 2018). This enforcement action found that EtherDelta satisfied the criteria of an “exchange” under Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a) because it (1) operated as a marketplace for bringing together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers of a digital asset that was considered a securities under the Howey test “by receiving and storing orders in token in the EtherDelta order book and displaying the top 500 orders (including token symbol, size, and price) as bids and offers,” and (2) “provided means for orders to interact and execute through the combined use of the EtherDelta’s website, order book, and pre-programmed trading protocols on the EtherDelta smart contract.”200Id. The EtherDelta website also had numerous features that were similar to online securities trading platforms, such as providing access to the EtherDelta order book, sorting the tokens by price and color, and providing account information, market depth charts, lists of user’s confirmed trades, daily transaction volumes per token, and fields for users to input deposits, withdrawals, and trading interests.201Id. at *2. Many of these features are similar to the online trading platforms of f-NFTs. When applying this functional test to f-NFT platforms and comparing them to the EtherDelta, it seems like f-NFT platforms can satisfy Rule 3b-16(a)’s two requirements.

First, f-NFT platforms bring together multiple buyers and sellers onto a single network to transact orders of f-NFTs. f-NFT platforms satisfy the “multiple buyers and sellers” aspect since there is a wide variety of f-NFTs issuers and multiple buyers who can purchase these f-NFTs.202See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70844, 70849–70850 (reporting the SEC’s analysis of what constitutes “to bring together multiple buyers and sellers” to transact orders). These platforms satisfy the aspect of “bringing together” people to “transact orders” because they not only provide a place to fractionalize NFTs but also create and maintain marketplaces for users to trade their f-NFTs. Platforms typically receive and store f-NFT orders in a ledger on the Ethereum blockchain that keeps track of all the transactions of a specific f-NFT, much like the EtherDelta order book.203Lastovetska, supra note 16 (explaining that whenever a new user buys or sells an NFT, the blockchain automatically generates a new cryptographic hash, creates a new “block” representing this new transaction, and adds it to the “chain”). All of these orders and f-NFTs are easily displayed on f-NFT platforms where users can see any past f-NFT transactions and execute orders to buy or sell these digital assets. Similar to EtherDelta, f-NFT platforms like Fracitonal.art also display the top orders and include information such as the token name, number of fractions, and price.204Niftex, supra note 42 (explaining that f-NFTs can be traded like standard cryptocurrencies); Fractional.art, supra note 45 (promoting that the website allows users to “buy, sell and mint fractions of NFTs”); DAOfi, supra note 137 (marketing that f-NFTs are created and sold on the primary market called Fractional.art and then later freely traded on the secondary market facilitated by DAOfi).

Second, f-NFT platforms use a decentralized network that acts as a trading facility and sets rules for any f-NFT transaction through the underlying smart contracts that these platforms embed in the f-NFTs.205Cryptopedia Staff, supra note 21 (explaining how a smart contract works in NFTs). Like EtherDelta, current f-NFT platforms provide a network or trading facility for orders to interact and execute through their individual websites such as Niftex, Fractional.art, or DAOfi, their digital ledgers, and their pre-programmed smart contracts with embedded trading protocols.206In re Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553, 2018 WL 5840155, at *3 n.6 (Nov. 8, 2018). These websites provide the “means or location” for bringing together users and executing orders for f-NFTs.207Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70851. Also, smart contracts use execution procedures and priorities to impose rules and determine the terms for any 

f-NFT transaction on the network.208Id. at 70851–70853 (articulating that “established, non-discretionary methods” include an exchange platform providing a trading facility or setting rules or procedures that govern order execution). Smart contracts can confirm the validity of the transactions and set the conditions of the order by checking certain information, such as whether the f-NFT contains a valid cryptographic signature, if the f-NFT comes with some type of royalty, if there is a buyout option, or if there is some type of curator fee.209Hubert, supra note 45 (announcing that Niftex will automatically reserve five percent of fractions for the creator or artists as “royalty fractions” in all the digital assets on its platform); Fractional.art, supra note 45 (explaining the implementation of curator fees within the f-NFT platforms and how they are set by the f-NFT creator by restricting the platform’s governance); DAOfi, supra note 137; Lastovetska, supra note 16. These characteristics provide the “established, non-discretionary methods” that govern how f-NFT orders interact with each other.

If an f-NFT platform is considered an “exchange,” it could still escape registration requirements if it satisfies one of the exemptions in Exchange Act Rule 3a1-1(a). It is unlikely that an NFT trading platform would fall under the 3a1-1(a)(1) (exemption for an ATS operated by a national securities association) or 3a1-1(a)(3) (exemption for an ATS not required to comply with Regulation ATS pursuant to Rule 301(a) of Regulation ATS) exemptions.21017 C.F.R. § 240.3a1-1(a) (2021). However one could analyze whether an f-NFT trading platform could be considered an ATS that complies with Regulation ATS and thus fits into the 3a1-1(a)(2) exemption for ATSs. This exemption would allow f-NFT exchanges to register as a broker-dealer, which has lower regulatory costs and fewer notice and reporting requirements, instead of as a national securities exchange.211National securities exchanges, in contrast with broker-dealers, (1) come with higher regulatory costs than those associated with registering as a broker-dealer and complying with Regulation ATS; (2) are required to operate as an SRO which comes at the cost of significant amount of time, personnel, and financial resources; and (3) are required to provide fair access that comes with more notice and reporting requirements. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70908–70909. Although operating under this exemption would still come with some notice, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements, it could prevent f-NFT platforms from spending even more time and money on registering as a national securities exchange and dealing with periodic disclosures.

Although digital asset trading platforms resemble traditional exchanges or alternative trading systems, regulators may need to adjust the regulatory framework, much like they did for ATSs, to account for differing characteristics of blockchain-based exchange platforms. Differences between digital asset exchanges and national securities exchanges can include transparency, fairness, and efficiency.212Su, supra note 96, at 9–10. The decentralized aspects of f-NFT platforms may provide their own form of protection that may be more or equally as transparent, fair, and efficient as the regulations the SEC would impose. Thus, the SEC could adopt another new regulatory framework for exchange platforms of digital assets such as f-NFTs that requires less registration or fewer requirements than a national securities exchange and recognizes the fraud and misrepresentation protection that a blockchain platform already affords.

A decentralized platform may be better than SEC-imposed regulation at detecting fraud and protecting users on these types of f-NFT platforms. First, these platforms’ “decentralized” and public nature provides fairness because no one entity controls the network, and therefore anyone can easily access and interact on the platform and all transactions are verified by others on the network. Second, “decentralized” exchanges provide efficiency because the blockchain technology allows them to easily show users “verified business logic [in a publicly verified smart contact],” which a centralized exchange could not do.213In re Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553, 2018 WL 5840155, at *4 (Nov. 8, 2018). Third, f-NFT platforms provide transparency because while traditional exchanges hold your funds with an “exchange owner,” decentralized ones hold your funds through easily verifiable and public digital ledgers that also contain a list of all transactions for a specific f-NFT, including the buyer, seller, and price.214Id.; see, e.g., OpenSea: Pudgy Penguins, supra note 113. The cryptographics embedded in f-NFTs make everything in a sense “registered” through its digital ledger, and all transactions are verified through the whole blockchain network. Thus, the sale of these digital assets may not need SEC regulation.

Even in decentralized networks, there is still a chance of hacking, fraud, and loss that may be mitigated through government regulation. Just as the SEC modernized the regulatory framework to “better integrate alternative trading systems into the national market system,” the SEC may need to modernize the regulatory framework again to integrate NFT trading systems and digital asset sales.215Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70844–70846 (describing how creating the ATS exemption innovated an old regulatory regime, responded to rapid advancements in trading technology, and provided a new regulatory framework that was better suited to digital trading services). For example, the SEC may adopt a new regulatory framework that requires an f-NFT exchange platform to provide or display either convenient one-time reports or costly regular reports on its security protocols and how it deals with bad actors such as hackers that manipulate code to steal the proceeds of an NFT sale.216See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 168 (reporting that an NFT creator placed malicious code that stole the funds from an NFT sale). The SEC may also implement a limiting framework, similar to how Regulation ATS requirements are limited to a subset of ATSs that occupy a certain large percentage of the total trading volume of any security.217Only ATSs with significant volume are required to link to an SRO and publicly display orders, provide investors with fair access, and comply with systems capacity, integrity, and security requirements. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70844, 70865–70866, 70873, 70875, 70902–70903 (requiring ATSs to publicly disseminate their best-priced orders in securities in which they have five percent or more of the total trading volume, imposing fair access requirements for those with twenty percent or more of the trading volume, and imposing capacity, integrity, and security standards for those with twenty percent or more of the trading volume). For example, the SEC could only require registration for f-NFT exchanges that account for a large volume of the overall traded f-NFTs. This may ensure investor protection from large actors while still allowing for innovation through smaller actors. The SEC can also require platforms to comply with certain capacity, integrity, and security standards to ensure f-NFT investors’ funds and assets are protected, given that an f-NFT’s value may be tied to the platform’s ability to maintain and retrieve the NFT.

SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce’s proposal for a “safe harbor” for digital assets and exchanges shows a glimpse into the beginning of a new framework that can provide guidance for digital asset issuers and exchanges. Peirce proposed a regulation in which digital asset exchanges would be allowed to begin distributing their tokens broadly if they provide disclosures such as plans for the network and who is behind the network.218Cointelegraph, supra note 46. These exchanges would then have three years from a token’s initial distribution to develop the network before they would be subject to any securities laws.219Id. This three-year safe harbor allows issuers of digital assets to be exempt from SEC regulation for a certain time period and prevents their digital asset from being immediately classified as a security. It also gives digital asset creators time to set up their networks without government regulation and establish whether their digital asset can be classified as a security. This framework may allow creators to innovate digital and financial assets while continuing to protect investors. At the end of the day, the SEC needs to balance “encourag[ing] market innovation while ensuring basic investor protections.”220Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: Final Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70846–70847.

V.  PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF EXISTING REGULATORY MODELS

The SEC has existing regulation for non-digital securitized products, such as traditional stocks in companies or REITs, which may be applicable to f-NFT products and provide regulators with a starting point from which to develop regulations specific to f-NFTs. 

When an individual or entity initially fractionalizes and issues their 

f-NFTs, it could be called an “Initial Fractionalization Offering,” or “IFO.” An IFO, in which the issuer sells multiple shards of the same NFT to multiple buyers, is similar to a type of IPO or ICO, in which the issuer sells multiple stocks or tokens of the same company to multiple buyers. F-NFTs can be treated as a stock in the original whole NFT, and the sale of these f-NFTs can be the same as selling a share in an individual company. Thus, instead of developing a whole new set of regulations for f-NFTs, regulators can just look at existing securities laws for traditional stock sales and apply them to f-NFTs sales. The rules governing traditional, non-digital securities such as stocks could be slightly modified to better apply to f-NFT sales. For example, f-NFT creators could be required to register their f-NFT sale or IFOs with the SEC by filing a modified Form S-1 that contains information regarding the past performance of the NFT such as its trading history, information regarding the performance of other similar NFTs if the NFT is part of a collection, or information regarding the company or individual creating the NFT.221See Will Kenton, SEC Form S-1: What It Is, How to File It or Amend It, Investopedia 

(March 21, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sec-form-s-1.asp [https://perma.cc/6T9E-LHL7] (explaining the form individuals or entities must fill out and file with the SEC when they wish to issue any securities to the public).
Providing the financial disclosures required by traditional IPOs may be more difficult for traditional NFTs because there is not any managerial or financial information behind a regular NFT besides its intrinsic or artistic value. However, NFTs from a particular brand, celebrity, or company would have an easier time producing accurate managerial and financial disclosures or material information regarding an NFT because these brands and celebrities typically have established financials or data regarding their performance, such as how popular a brand is or the performance statistics of an athlete. For example, Martha Stewart could be required to disclose managerial and financial information regarding her retail company if she tries to issue another NFT collection of her home décor, or Patrick Mahomes could be required to disclose information regarding his football statistics or other brand deals if he issued more NFTs. Thus, traditional registration requirements for issuing stock could be particularly appropriate for a celebrity or company that issues f-NFTs or NFTs and uses the proceeds from the sales to develop their brand or business.

REITs are another securitized product with an established regulatory structure that can be applied to f-NFT regulation. REITs are entities that own and typically operate various “income-producing real estate or real estate-related assets,” such as office buildings, apartments, shopping malls, hotels, or warehouses.222U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., Investor Bulletin: Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 1 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/files/reits.pdf [https://perma.cc/

U2W5-BVH5].
In addition to other requirements, a REIT must have seventy-five percent of the entity’s total assets coming from real estate investment, be managed by a board of directors, and distribute at least ninety percent of its taxable income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends.22326 U.S.C. §§ 856–57 (2021); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., supra note 222. REITs register and file reports with the SEC, can list and trade their shares on a public stock exchange, and allow investors to invest in and own shares of multiple large-scale, income-producing real estate properties without actually having to buy the real estate.224There are three types of REITs: equity REITs, mortgage REITs, and hybrid REITs. Equity REITs typically own and operate income-producing real estate and generate income through rents. Mortgage REITs hold mortgages and loans on real property and generate income through interest payments. Hybrid REITs are those that use investment strategies of both equity and mortgage REITs. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., supra note 222. In other words, REITs take a bunch of commercial real estate assets, bundle them together in one company, and then sell shares of that company to investors so they can reap the benefits of owning commercial real estate. Issuing shares of a REIT is like issuing fractional shares of a basket of NFTs. For example, one way to issue f-NFTs is to take multiple whole NFTs, bundle them together in one large NFT basket, and then sell f-NFTs or fractional shares of that basket 

(“f-NFT bundles”) to investors so they can own shares in multiple NFTs. Just as REITs sell investors shares of a basket of real estate investment properties, f-NFT bundles sell investors shares of a basket of NFTs.

Given these similarities, securities regulations that apply to REITs may also translate and apply to f-NFTs. Most REITs are registered with the SEC and publicly traded on a stock exchange. Under the Securities Act, REITs are required to register their securities using Form S-11 to make disclosures regarding the REIT’s management team and other significant information and make regular SEC disclosures such as quarterly and yearly financial reports.22517 C.F.R. § 239.18 (2021); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., supra note 222, at 2–3. Regulators could follow this existing regulatory model from REITs and impose similar requirements for fractional shares of NFT bundles. Form S-11 requires REIT issuers to disclose information detailing the price of the deal, how the REIT plans to use the proceeds, certain financial data like trends in revenue and profits, descriptions of the real estate, operating data, information on its directors and executive officers, and other data.226See James Chen, Form S-11, (Oct. 15, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sec-form-s-11.asp [https://perma.cc/69Y4-MCDW]. These types of requirements could easily be adopted to regulate f-NFT bundles by creating a new, similar form to Form S-11 for issuers of f-NFTs to file with the SEC. For example, issuers of f-NFT bundles could be required to file a form like Form S-11 that discloses information like the price of each f-NFT; how the individual or entity issuing these f-NFT bundles plans to use the proceeds, such as to purchase more NFTs to add to the bundle; a description of the NFTs currently in the bundle as if they are part of a trending collection; certain financial data of each NFT, such as its past transactions or price; information on the individuals managing the bundle, such as their credentials or how they have managed digital assets in the past; and so forth.

However, REITs are different from f-NFTs in that REIT investors earn a share of the income produced through the rent or mortgage interests from the commercial real estate, while f-NFT investors can only earn a share of the increased value of the underlying NFT.227U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., supra note 222, at 2. It may be possible that an NFT’s smart contract could charge money to anyone who views the particular NFT and then automatically distribute these proceeds out to the 

f-NFT investors as a type of dividend, but this has yet to be seen. Thus, REIT regulations may not translate perfectly to regulating f-NFT bundles since it is difficult to see how f-NFT bundles would file quarterly and yearly financial statements regarding just NFTs. REITs can provide financial disclosures regarding the profits and losses of their various real estate properties, but f-NFTs do not have similar financials beside the increase and decrease in value of the various NFTs within the bundle. However, as described above, there may be more financial information when f-NFTs are issued by specific celebrities or companies. Regulators will need to determine how f-NFTs can disclose financial information to best inform investors. Additionally, there has been a surge of investors buying Metaverse Real Estate, which is real estate in virtual worlds bought and sold using NFTs and cryptocurrency.228There are now virtual real estate companies, such as Metaverse Group, that buy virtual parcels of land and then become virtual landlords. Debra Kamin, Investors Snap Up Metaverse Real Estate in a Virtual Land Boom, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/business/

metaverse-real-estate.html [https://perma.cc/D85G-2X8S].
People can now go onto virtual real estate platforms such as SuperWorld where they can buy a plot of land in the form of an NFT and then share in any of the commerce that happens on that piece of property.229Id. These types of real estate NFTs would be able to charge rent or gain interest on these virtual properties and thus could then distribute income out to the NFT owners, much like REITs, and be subject to similar regulation. This analysis is outside the scope of this Note, but it is a relevant issue that regulators will need to face in the future. Nevertheless, REITs can provide a baseline to help regulators analyze and develop ways to regulate different types of f-NFTs and NFTs.

CONCLUSION

Given the foregoing analysis, f-NFTs can be deemed an “investment contract” security under the Howey test, and the SEC may be able to regulate the issuers or exchanges that facilitate these fractionalization and trading. 

F-NFTs satisfy the four Howey prongs because (1) f-NFT buyers make an investment using money in the form of cryptocurrency; (2) this investment is in a “common enterprise” where the fortunes of the buyer are tied to the successes of either other fractional investors of one NFT or the brand or celebrity that issued the NFT; (3) buyers have a “reasonable expectation of profit” because f-NFTs are traded on secondary markets and promoted as a unique liquidity opportunity; and (4) these financial returns are derived from the efforts of issuers to support the popularity and price of an f-NFT and platforms to maintain and develop f-NFT exchanges and marketplaces.

If f-NFTs or NFTs are deemed securities, the SEC can use the existing regulatory models of digital currencies, traditional stock, and REITs to create initial regulations of a continuously developing digital asset. Due to the wide variety of f-NFTs and the ways in which they are owned and operated, regulators will have difficulty developing one standard that applies broadly. However, by comparing issuers and exchanges of f-NFTs or NFTs to existing securitized products, one can apply slight modifications to established regulations and require disclosures such as an NFT’s transaction history or how an issuer and exchange will use the proceeds from the sale.

Hopefully, this analysis will appeal not only to the legal field and regulators but also to the average investor who is interested in buying, selling, or understanding new digital assets like NFTs. The legal field and the government must face the current issues with NFTs and their classification and regulation as a financial instrument in order to protect investors while also allowing for the innovation of new financial technologies.

 

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 253

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*  J.D., University of Southern California Gould School of Law, 2023. B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 2019.

Ditching Daimler and Nixing the Nexus: Ford, Mallory, and the Future of Personal Jurisdiction under the Corporate Consent and Estoppel Framework

While personal jurisdiction is intended to assess whether a defendant should be forced to defend a lawsuit in a location due to the defendant’s contacts with that forum, the doctrine has shifted to require the plaintiff to show a connection to the forum, even if the defendant otherwise has substantial contact with it. In its 2014 decision Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court further limited the personal jurisdiction of corporate defendants in the spirit of curtailing forum shopping. But the Court’s 2021 decision concerning personal jurisdiction, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District, and the Court’s granting of certiorari in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. cast doubt on the viability of Daimler. The 2021 Ford decision marks the beginning of an expansion of personal jurisdiction for corporate defendants. Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Gorsuch have expressed concerns over the protections afforded to corporate defendants under current doctrine. This Note elaborates on that skepticism. It traces the history of personal jurisdiction to reveal that the doctrine originates from the corporate consent and estoppel model—the very model at issue in Mallory. This Note argues that, absent guidance from Congress, courts must apply the original model—one that is inconsistent with Daimler and the nexus requirement. Finally, this Note argues that returning to the pre-Daimler and pre-nexus era produces favorable policy: it removes baseless corporate protections under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment, clarifies the murky application of the doctrine in internet and stream of commerce cases, opens more fora for plaintiffs to allow free-market considerations to shape state law, and leaves the door open for Congress to legislate if it deems it necessary.

 

INTRODUCTION

Ask any athlete, and they will confirm the importance of home-field advantage. Over a large sample size, home teams win between 55% and 60% of National Football League games.1R.J. White, NFL Betting Tips: How Much Home-Field Advantage Is Worth for Every NFL Team in 2019, CBS (Aug. 20, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/nfl-betting-tips-how-much-home-field-advantage-is-worth-for-every-nfl-team-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/H7E6-NQ9E]. A similar phenomenon takes place in the Major League Baseball.2Jason Catania, Is Home-Field Advantage as Important in Baseball as Other Major League Sports?, Bleacher Rep. (Oct. 9, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1803416-is-home-field-advantage-as-important-in-baseball-as-other-major-sports [https://perma.cc/EKH9-2NQ9]. In the National Basketball Association, the numbers are usually higher at around 65% home-team wins.3Kevin Belhumeur, How Important is Home-Court Advantage in the NBA?, Bleacher Rep. (Feb. 8, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1520496-how-important-is-home-court-advantage-in-the-nba [https://perma.cc/8MPV-6487]. Needless to say, if offered a choice, teams would prefer to play at home. The same is true for litigants. The Constitution recognizes that a litigation forum, the location in which a lawsuit is permitted to take place, is limited.4See infra Part II. The limitation of where a defendant may be sued is known as where the defendant is subject to the court’s “personal jurisdiction.”

Traditionally, a defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular location if the defendant was “at home” in that location. But the definition of where a corporate defendant is “at home” has changed dramatically. Prior to 2013, corporate defendants were “at home” in any location in which they engaged in “continuous and systematic” contact.5See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (collecting cases). See generally Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984). But under the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision Daimler AG v. Bauman,6Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). corporate defendants are now “at home” only in the locations in which they (1) maintain their headquarters or (2) are incorporated.7Id. at 139. Daimler did leave open the possibility of other locations subjecting a corporate defendant to general personal jurisdiction, but for all intents and purposes, the place of headquarters and place of incorporation are the only ones courts have recognized. Consequently, in order for a plaintiff to sue a corporate defendant outside of these two locations, the plaintiff must comply with a significantly more complicated framework, the most perplexing aspect of which is the “nexus” requirement: in order to sue a defendant away from the defendant’s “home” and ensure that the defendant’s due process rights are not offended, the plaintiff must show a connection between the selected location and the plaintiff’s lawsuit.8See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977). For a more thorough discussion on the nexus requirement, see infra Part III.

This relatively new doctrine produces peculiar results. Masquerading as due process, the doctrine inordinately shields corporations from having to defend lawsuits in locations where they previously would have had to. For example, current doctrine forbids Michigan plaintiffs from suing a New York company in California but permits an identical lawsuit in the same venue for the same injuries based on the same conduct by California-residing plaintiffs.9See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). Moreover, the doctrine forbids a Florida-residing plaintiff from suing a Texas corporation in Florida, even though the corporation was registered to do business in Florida; had an agent for service of process in Florida, a distributor in Florida, and a plant in Florida; had been sued for similar claims in Florida; and had itself initiated lawsuits in Florida.10See generally Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018). In other words, in locations where the defendant is not “at home,” current doctrine erroneously assesses the plaintiff’s connection to the litigation forum in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights have been violated. The scenarios described above, and other recent Supreme Court decisions, illuminate how far astray from its origins personal jurisdiction doctrine has drifted.11See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion); Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).

In 2021, the Court handed down its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,12Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022. which revealed that at least three sitting Supreme Court Justices13Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 148–49 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), and Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas, in the concurrence in Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), expressed criticisms regarding the protections personal jurisdiction jurisprudence provides to corporate defendants. are skeptical of the current personal jurisdiction doctrine, arguing that it provides too much protection for corporate defendants under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In April 2022, the Court also granted certiorari to address the corporate consent and estoppel model head on.14See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 2646 (2022). This model, described in further detail below, suggests that if a corporation registers to conduct business in a forum, it implicitly consents to jurisdiction in that forum and is estopped from arguing otherwise. This Note expands on the justices’ concerns and offers a way forward consistent with the way personal jurisdiction has historically been understood.

This Note will illustrate that the modern personal jurisdiction doctrine—and the nexus requirement in particular—was improperly created to curtail forum shopping.15Forum shopping refers to the process by which plaintiffs sue in locations that are more likely to produce judgments favorable to them. It is discussed in detail infra Sections II.A.2, V.D. It will then show that while Congress has passed statutes limiting or expanding jurisdiction in other contexts,16See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (expanding jurisdiction through removal jurisdiction). and has narrowed jurisdiction of federal courts through venue statutes,17See, e.g., id. § 1391. For a more thorough discussion, see infra Section I.C. it has not done the same to limit personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the sole consideration for personal jurisdiction is due process. And under the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdiction is based on the corporate consent and estoppel model, which inquires only into the corporate defendant’s contacts with the selected forum—it is not so concerned with the plaintiff’s connection to the forum. Accordingly, Daimler and the nexus requirement are inconsistent with this traditional model. This Note will also show how a reversion to this model of personal jurisdiction will clarify the doctrine’s application to cases involving internet sales and the “stream of commerce.”18The “stream of commerce” refers to a case in which a manufacturer sells a product in one state and then the product changes hands and ends up in another jurisdiction. For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see infra Sections IV.C, V.C.

This Note begins by synthesizing the genesis and evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine, discussing first the nineteenth century norms and moving into how Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed under the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment. The next Part of this Note narrows in on the relatively new distinction between general and specific personal jurisdiction19For an explanation on the difference between general and specific personal jurisdiction, see infra Section II.B. and the “nexus” requirement that has attached to the latter. The Note continues by listing reasons the nexus requirement is troublesome and difficult to apply, given the narrowing of the “at home” definition for corporate defendants.20In brief, general jurisdiction previously existed in any location in which a defendant had “continuous and systematic” presence. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (citations omitted). It has now been significantly limited to only the locations in which the corporation is headquartered or incorporated. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014). Finally, it ends with a preview of where the Court may be heading: given the granting of certiorari in Mallory, the Court appears to be in favor of reverting to the corporate consent and estoppel model and determining personal jurisdiction through assessing the defendant’s connection to the selected forum alone, consequently ditching Daimler and nixing the nexus requirement.

  1. BACKGROUND
  2. An Explanation of Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction refers to the power a court has to make rulings relating to a party.21Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). Practically, it refers to the location in which a plaintiff may sue a defendant and hold the defendant to answer for that lawsuit. If a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular location, known as a “forum,” the defendant must respond to the lawsuit, and any decision impacting the defendant can be enforced in other jurisdictions.22Id. If a case is in state court, personal jurisdiction answers the question “which state’s court system?” If the case is in federal court, personal jurisdiction answers the question “the federal court in which state?”

Personal jurisdiction analysis is twofold: statutory and constitutional.23See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125. States are free to pass statutes defining the personal jurisdiction of their state courts. These are referred to as “long-arm statutes,” as they extend or retract how far the “arm” of their court system can reach. Under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court applies the long-arm statute of the state in which it is located.24Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). In practice, a federal court in California will first determine whether there exists personal jurisdiction over a defendant under California’s long-arm statute. After making a determination under the long-arm statute, the court would turn to the constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction.

The constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction is based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The analysis involves considerations of state sovereignty, federalism, and fairness. Because most states have long-arm statutes that permit personal jurisdiction to the limits of the constitution,25See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”). the personal jurisdiction analysis often blends into just a constitutional question. As such, courts26This refers both to state courts, which are bound by the jurisdiction set for them by the states in which they are located, and federal courts in that state, which, under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), apply the long-arm statute of the state in which they are located. in states with to-the-limits-of-the-constitution long-arm statutes will only undertake a single analysis and have to answer one question: Is the exercising of personal jurisdiction in this forum consistent with the Due Process Clause? The remainder of this Note focuses only on the constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction.

  1. The Distinction Between General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Another concept crucial to the understanding of this Note is the distinction between two kinds of personal jurisdiction: “general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.”27Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). The former refers to a forum in which any plaintiff can bring any cause of action against the defendant.28Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). The latter is a forum in which, under current doctrine, plaintiffs may only bring causes of action that “arise out of or relate to” the forum.29See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024–25 (citations omitted). The specific personal jurisdiction requirement that the claim “arise out of or relate to” the forum is known as the “nexus” requirement because the plaintiff must show a “nexus” between the claim and the selected forum.

An example may help illustrate how the doctrine functions. Suppose a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware. In that situation, a plaintiff from New York may sue the corporation in Delaware, even if there is no relation between the claim and Delaware—that is, even if the wrong alleged in the complaint took place in Maine. By contrast, suppose that the same defendant is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Delaware. In the event that the wrong alleged in the complaint took place in Maine, the courts in Delaware would not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant and would not be able to adjudicate the dispute—this is because the plaintiff is unable to show a “nexus” between the claim and the selected forum in Delaware.

  1. The Venue Statutes

Besides the due process requirements that plaintiffs must comply with in deciding where to file a lawsuit, Congress has acted to pass statutes narrowing potential venues for litigation. Specifically, Congress has outlined three locations in which a civil action may be brought: (1) where a defendant “resides”;3028 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). A defendant’s residency is defined in § 1391(c): a natural person resides where that person is domiciled, or where that person is a permanent resident, and an entity resides where it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. (2) where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”;31Id. § 1391(b)(2). and (3) if there is no venue that fits (1) or (2), wherever the defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.32Id. § 1391(b)(3).

In situations where a plaintiff files a lawsuit in a location in which the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, Congress permits defendants to nevertheless file motions to transfer venue or dismiss the case.33See id. §§ 1404, 1406; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Congress envisioned two main reasons to permit a transfer of venue despite compliance with the requirements of personal jurisdiction. The first reason is when the plaintiff complies with the requirements of personal jurisdiction but does not comply with the requirements of the venue statute.3428 U.S.C. § 1406. For example, suppose that a corporation is headquartered in San Francisco, California (which is in the Northern District of California) and finds itself to be the defendant in a federal-law dispute35By “federal-law dispute,” I mean a claim that provides subject-matter jurisdiction under the federal-question doctrine, § 1331. I insert this into the hypothetical to avoid complications about subject-matter jurisdiction and to isolate the venue and transfer procedure. with an employee over conduct that took place in San Diego, California (which is in the Southern District of California). If the employee files suit in the Central District of California, the defendant corporation may request a transfer to either the Northern or Southern District of California because, while the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in California, the Central District of California is an improper venue (it is not the venue where the defendant corporation is located,36Id. § 1391(b)(1). and it is not the location where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”).37Id. § 1391(b)(2).

The second reason is for convenience.38Id. § 1404. That is, even if a plaintiff complies with the requirements of personal jurisdiction and with the requirements of the venue statutes, a defendant may nevertheless request and be granted a motion to transfer venue if “the interest of justice” so demands.39Id. In making the discretionary determination to transfer a case for convenience purposes, courts consider the following factors, among others: the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining the attendance of required witnesses, administrative dealings of court congestion, and the local interests of having controversies decided where they took place.40See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). For example,41This example is loosely based on Piper. Id. suppose a plane company is headquartered in Great Britain and flies a plane in Scotland. The plane’s parts were manufactured in Pennsylvania and Ohio. While the company was flying the plane in Scotland, it crashed and killed everyone on board. The heirs of the passengers sued the plane company in Pennsylvania.42In the actual case, the plaintiffs first filed suit in California state court, the defendants removed the case to California federal court, and then the defendants moved to transfer the case to Pennsylvania. Id. at 240. For simplicity, and to better illustrate the transfer process, I have omitted this procedural history in the main text. The Pennsylvania court could dismiss the case under a forum non conveniens theory, concluding that the case should be tried in Scotland.43Piper, 454 U.S. at 240. In reaching this conclusion, the court would note that the crash had occurred in Scotland; the crash investigation had been conducted in Scotland; the witnesses are in Scotland; and the pilot’s estate, the plane’s owners, and the charter company were all located in Scotland.44Id. at 252–53.

The venue statutes supplement personal jurisdiction doctrine. Importantly, though, they are acts of Congress and not judge-made interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As for the forum non conveniens doctrine, there is a common law background to the doctrine, and it existed before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.45See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994) (citing Macmaster v. Macmaster, 11 Sess. Cas. 685, 687 (No. 280) (2d Div. Scot.) (1833)); see also Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283 (D. Pa. 1801) (requiring a Danish seaman to sue a Danish sea captain in a Danish court). This is crucial for originalist judges who believe that that Court should apply common law doctrines only if they existed at the time of the ratification of the amendment at issue. Of course, should Congress desire to narrow or expand the jurisdiction of federal courts and permit more or fewer fora for plaintiffs to file lawsuits, Congress is free to do so.46Some scholars have called on Congress to pass a national personal jurisdiction act. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1311–12 (2014).

  1. Recent Supreme Court Doctrine

The Supreme Court has historically been deadlocked in its personal jurisdiction doctrine. Justices seem to agree on dispositions but not the underlying reasoning for them.47See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion). In March 2021, the Court handed down its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District.48Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2021). That decision doubled down on the Court’s previous personal jurisdiction decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,49Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017). in which the Court required plaintiffs to show a nexus between their claim and the forum state in order to establish specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant corporation that has long been established in the forum selected for the litigation.50Id. In both Ford and Bristol-Myers Squibb, the defendant corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum state despite its significant market presence there;51In Ford, “[T]he company regularly conduct[ed] [business] in Montana and Minnesota . . . [in] every means imaginable,” including advertising, selling, and repairing its cars in the fora. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the company engaged in “business activities in . . . California. Five of the company’s research and laboratory facilities, which employ a total of around 160 employees, [were] located there. BMS also employ[ed] about 250 sales representatives in California and maintain[ed] a small state-government advocacy office in Sacramento.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (citations omitted). in other words, the defendant corporation had purposefully availed itself of the forum state, arguably had continuous and systematic52Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). contact in the forum, but nevertheless was not “at home”53Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). there. In Ford, a plaintiff purchased a malfunctioning car outside of Montana, yet she was permitted to sue Ford in Montana because Montana was the plaintiff’s home state.54Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1032 (“[R]esident-plaintiffs allege that they suffered in-state injury because of defective products that Ford extensively promoted, sold, and serviced in Montana and Minnesota. For all the reasons we have given, the connection between the plaintiffs’ claims and Ford’s activities in those States—or otherwise said, the ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation’—is close enough to support specific jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). In Bristol-Myers Squibb, a group of plaintiffs from Michigan was not permitted to sue in California (even though a group of California residents was permitted to sue there) because the Michigan plaintiffs had no connection to California.55Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“[T]he nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California. The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”). The plaintiffs’ place of residency was thus determinative in failing to establish personal jurisdiction over the corporation defendant and offended the corporation’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.56See id. Under both the first personal jurisdiction case since the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pennoyer v. Neff,57See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). as well as under the revamped “minimum contacts” test in International Shoe,58Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). both Ford and Bristol-Myers Squibb would arguably be permitted to proceed in the selected fora. This Note will explain how the doctrine has evolved to the point of irreconciliation with these landmark cases.

  1. THE STAKES AND HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
  2. The Stakes of Personal Jurisdiction

Before delving into the history of personal jurisdiction and its development over the turn of two centuries, it is necessary to explain why it has been an area of such fierce contention. Personal jurisdiction is not about geography, not about which physical courthouse may entertain a controversy. Rather, it is about who adjudicates that controversy.59See Sachs, supra note 46, at 1311–12.

  1. The Concern of State Judges and Congress’s Statutory Remedy

In most states, state judges are elected by the general public.60Id. Accordingly, a case pending in state court is adjudicated by a judge subject to at least some public pressure. The case also has the potential of being tried before a jury composed of individuals from that state. These factors may create disadvantages for an out-of-state corporation, especially if the plaintiff is from the forum state.61See id. Hence the saying, “Though the courtroom be an adversarial arena, [the judge] is more than a referee . . . more than a linesman. [The judge] is the game.”62The Practice: Judge Knot (20th Century Fox television broadcast Feb. 17, 2002). 

Congress has addressed the fairness concerns of defendants being sued in state courts outside their place of residence through the mechanism of federal court removal.63The process of removing a case to federal court aims to quell these concerns. See generally Daniel M. Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. Legal Analysis 245 (2014). The process of removal, a product of congressional statute, allows defendants to move a case from state court—where judges are usually elected, and plaintiff-friendly state procedural law is likely to apply—to more defendant-friendly federal court if certain criteria apply.64See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. One such criterion is when there exists “diversity jurisdiction.” Diversity jurisdiction occurs when the litigating parties are citizens of different states.65Id. Corporations are citizens of the state in which they are incorporated and the state in which their headquarters is in.66Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 87 (2010). Notably, though, diversity jurisdiction is permitted only in cases of “complete diversity,” which requires all parties on either side of the litigation “v” to be citizens of different states.67See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” (emphasis added)). Given the complete diversity requirement, plaintiffs will oftentimes strategically sue along with a co-plaintiff from the same state as the defendant in order to preclude removal under diversity jurisdiction.68See Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241, 247, 280 (2016). Congress has taken steps to address these concerns as well. In class actions, defendant-corporations rely on the Class Action Fairness Act, another congressional statute that allows defendants to remove a case to federal court so long as the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and there is diversity of citizenship.6928 U.S.C. § 1453. The Class Action Fairness Act does not require complete diversity.70See id.; id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(11)(A).

  1. The Concern of Forum Shopping and Congress’s Inaction

Then there is the issue of “forum shopping.” This term refers to plaintiffs seeking fora that offer the best choice-of-law and substantive law combinations to benefit their case.71See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 68, at 247, 280. Plaintiffs also prefer to file claims in their hometown jurisdictions, where juries and judges are more likely to be sympathetic to the hometown plaintiff.72Id. at 243, 279. Put another way, plaintiffs will choose to sue in locations where the law the court applies is most favorable to them and courtroom decisionmakers are more likely to favor them. One prominent example of the implications of forum shopping is the application of anti-SLAPP laws in various states and their availability in federal court.73Dannielle Campbell, Houman Chitsaz & Constance Yu, Practitioners, Beware! California’s Anti-SLAPP Motions Can Happen to You: A Practical Overview, Marine Cnty. Bar Ass’n (Apr. 2, 2019), https://marinbar.org/news/article/?type=news&id=428 [https://perma.cc/MB5H-56SJ]. SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuits against public participation.” An anti-SLAPP motion is a state-law procedural rule available in many states that allows a defendant to repel and quickly dismiss lawsuits that threaten the defendant’s free-speech rights or matters of public concern. When this motion applies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of prevailing in the lawsuit. Without such a showing, the plaintiff’s case is dismissed. Because anti-SLAPP motions are not creatures of federal law, different circuits have different interpretations of when they can apply in federal court.74Id. Some circuits permit the invocation of state anti-SLAPP motions in federal court in diversity jurisdiction cases while others do not.75The following cases have held that anti-SLAPP laws do not apply in federal court: Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2018), amended, 897 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2018); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010); Bongino v. Daily Beast, 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2020). The following cases have held the opposite: La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2019); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Carbone v. CNN, 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018); Los Lobos Renewable Power v. Americulture, 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018). The difference in these circuits could mean extra litigation costs and a higher potential for settlement.76Campbell et al., supra note 73. Accordingly, the location of where a lawsuit is filed is a crucial strategic decision plaintiffs make.

Congress has not fully addressed forum shopping concerns by statute. While Congress has required certain claims to be litigated exclusively in federal court,77See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (requiring patent claims to be filed in federal court). Congress has few guidelines about which federal court plaintiffs are required to file in.78The exception to this statement is Congress’s passing of the venue statutes. But, as explained supra Section I.C and infra Section V.D, these statutes permit as adequate venue any place in which the defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, Congress has left courts to define personal jurisdiction without any statutory guidance. This is where personal jurisdiction comes in. Personal jurisdiction’s roots are grounded in the Constitution alone, but its newfound application is in part to curtail forum shopping. The tension between personal jurisdiction doctrine’s roots and its modern significance, along with Congress’s inaction to curtail forum shopping, is the premise of this Note.

  1. The History of Personal Jurisdiction
  2. The Consent and Estoppel Model for Corporations

In the nineteenth century, corporations were subject to personal jurisdiction only in the state in which they were incorporated because they did not have the privilege to exist in other states.79Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407–08 (1855). Other states could agree to recognize a corporation by a process called comity.80Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 585–86 (1839) (holding that a state could exclude a foreign corporation from doing business or could impose reasonable conditions on that business but that the exclusion or conditions must be clearly stated). As part of comity, states could require corporations to consent to being subject to the personal jurisdiction of the state in which they are licensed to conduct business.81Lafayette, 59 U.S. at 407. Accordingly, the estoppel model took form: if a corporation exercised corporate privileges in a state, it would be estopped from arguing that it was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of that state.82See id.

The history83Matthew D. Kaminer, The Cost of Doing Business? Corporate Registration as Valid Consent to General Personal Jurisdiction, 78 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 55 (2021) does a tremendous job at laying out the history. The recitation of the history of the consent and estoppel model is thanks to Kaminer’s research. of this model arose in the 1800s to address the “injustice”84St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (“This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in a [s]tate other than that of its creation, was the cause of much inconvenience and often of manifest injustice.”). that would result if a corporation could not be subject to suit in a forum where it does business but nonetheless is not headquartered. States passed statutes that required corporations to consent to being sued in the state in exchange for the privilege of doing business in the state. One of the first cases to recognize this model was Ex parte Schollenberger.85Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 377 (1877). The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Schollenberger required corporations to appoint an agent to receive service that would have “the same effect as if served personally on the company within the State.”86Id. at 374. The statute in question did not explicitly grant jurisdiction, but the Court held that

if the legislature of a State requires a foreign corporation to consent to be ‘found’ within its territory, for the purpose of the service of process in a suit, as a condition to doing business in the State, and the corporation does so consent, the fact that it is found gives the jurisdiction, notwithstanding the finding was procured by consent.87Id. at 377.

A few years later, the Court explicitly held that this model was constitutional.88St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356.

Importantly, the consent and estoppel model did not originally require a nexus between the litigation and the forum. Instead, courts have held that the corporation’s consent to be sued subjects the corporation to general jurisdiction in the forum. For example, in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co.,89Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917). an insurance company based in Pennsylvania conducted business operations in Missouri and, as required by Missouri law, appointed a Missouri in-state agent for service of process.90Id. at 94. The insurance company contracted with an Arizona company to insure its buildings in Colorado.91Id. After the Colorado property was struck by lightning and significantly damaged, the Arizona company sued the Pennsylvania insurance company in Missouri over the Colorado contracts.92Id. The Pennsylvania insurance company argued that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri because the contracts did not involve Missouri whatsoever; that is, there was no “nexus” between Missouri and the plaintiff’s claim.93Id. at 95–96. The Court disagreed, explaining that “the construction of the Missouri statute thus adopted hardly leaves a constitutional question open.”94Id. at 95. The appointment of an agent to receive service in Missouri, the Court held, showed the insurance company’s consent to be sued in Missouri.95Id. This line of reasoning continued in at least three other cases.96See Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 215–16 (1921); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320, 332 (1929) (“[I]n the absence of an authoritative state decision giving a narrower scope to the power of attorney filed under the state statute, it operates as a consent to suit . . . .” (citations omitted)); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 308 U.S. 165, 176 (1939) (finding the defendant’s registration to do business in New York and designation of an agent for service of process to amount to consent to jurisdiction in New York courts).

  1. The Erosion: Shift from Corporate Consent to Corporate “Presence”

The explicit corporate consent model could no longer hold up after the Court, in International Textbook Co. v. Pigg,97Int’l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 110 (1910). held that states could not impede interstate commerce by denying out-of-state corporations from exercising corporate privileges in their states. Put another way, the Court forbade states from denying corporations permission to conduct business within their borders. As such, corporations no longer affirmatively consented to being subject to the personal jurisdiction of states in which they engaged in business activities.98Id. at 112–14. To remedy the doctrine, the Court, in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,99Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). held that when a corporation was “present” in a jurisdiction, it was subject to the personal jurisdiction of that forum through, presumably, an implied consent.100Id. at 586.

Corporate “presence” proved to be a tricky term to define.101See Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat’l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923) (holding that a bank incorporated in Louisiana could not be sued in New York, even though it carried out numerous financial transactions in New York, because it was not “actual[ly] prese[nt]”). Nevertheless, the remnants of the consent model held up well.102The following statutes and cases were collected by Matthew D. Kaminer. See Kaminer, supra note 83, at 83. Pennsylvania maintained its consent-by-jurisdiction framework and was the only state to explicitly inform corporations of what they were agreeing to by doing business in the state. Under Title 42, Section 5301(a) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, registration to do business in Pennsylvania—which foreign corporations are required to do—constitutes consent to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts.10342 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301(1978). For a time even after International Shoe, courts continued to enforce the consent and estoppel model in Pennsylvania. For example, the Third Circuit in Bane v. Netlink104Bane v. Netlink, 925 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1991). held that there was no need to conduct a personal jurisdiction analysis (that is, to assess whether the defendant had systematic and continuous contact in the forum) because the defendant corporation consented to being subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state by virtue of the Pennsylvania statute.105See, e.g., Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 297 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (“[B]ased upon the explicit language in [S]ection 5301, a corporation consents to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts when it applies for and receives a certificate of authority from the state” in compliance with the Due Process Clause.). The court distinguished that situation from another Third Circuit case, Provident National Bank v. California Federal Savings and Loan Association,106Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987). where the defendant had not registered to do business in Pennsylvania.107Id. at 436.

However, in late 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the law requiring out-of-state corporations to submit to jurisdiction as a requirement of registering to do business in the state, finding that the statute is incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Daimler.108Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 2646 (2022). The most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision highlights the split over the constitutionality of such statutes. A number109The following compilation of cases in the proceeding footnotes is the work of the petitioner in Mallory. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mallory, 142 S. Ct. 2646 (No. 21-1168). of other state high courts have reached similar conclusions, rejecting the constitutionality of jurisdiction-by-consent statutes.110Lanham v. BNSF Ry. Co., 939 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Neb. 2020) (holding that “registration to do business in Nebraska as implied consent to personal jurisdiction would exceed the due process limits prescribed” in the Supreme Court’s opinions); Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d 122, 133 (Ala. 2019) (rejecting argument that “Facebook is subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama because it is registered to do business in Alabama” because “any precedent that supported the notion that the exercise of general jurisdiction could be based on a simple assertion that an out-of-state corporation does business in the forum state has become obsolete”); DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2018) (“[E]xtending general personal jurisdiction over all foreign corporations that registered to do business in Montana and subsequently conducted in-state business activities would extend our exercise of general personal jurisdiction beyond the narrow limits recently articulated by the Supreme Court.”). And a number of other state high courts have reached the opposite conclusion, finding that such statutes are constitutional.111Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 863 S.E.2d 81, 90 (Ga. 2021); Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 177 (Kan. 2006) (“We hold that the Due Process Clause is not violated when jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is based upon the corporation’s express written consent to jurisdiction under [the Kansas registration statute].”); Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Minn. 1991) (“[W]e find no constitutional defect in the assertion of jurisdiction based on consent to service of process.”). Other state high courts have used state law to reach conclusions in this area of the law.112Segregated Acct. of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 83 (Wis. 2017) (relying on constitutional avoidance to hold that “outmoded jurisdictional approaches . . . should not be fused with modern statutes, particularly when such concepts are irreconcilable with the due process rights of corporate defendants,” and “[a]bsent express statutory language asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on its appointment of an agent for service of process, we will not depart from the plain meaning of [the registration statute], which serves merely as a registration statute, not a conferral of consent to general jurisdiction”); Figueroa v. BNSF Ry. Co., 390 P.3d 1019, 1022 (Or. 2017) (relying on “due process limitations on exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations” as basis for interpretation of registration statute as not deeming registration to be consent to general personal jurisdiction); Chavez v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 503 P.3d 332, 334 (N.M. 2021) (“Considering the constitutional constraints involved, we conclude that it would be particularly inappropriate to infer a foreign corporation’s consent to general personal jurisdiction in the absence of clear statutory language expressing a requirement of this consent.”); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 138 (Del. 2016) (rejecting “the principle that a state could exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that complied with a state registration statute without a separate minimum-contacts analysis under the Due Process Clause” in interpreting registration statute “narrowly”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 884 (Cal. 2016) (“[A] corporation’s appointment of an agent for service of process, when required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction.”), rev’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); Wainscott v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 351 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ohio 1976) (compliance with state’s registration statute “does not eliminate or abolish the due-process requirement that the necessary minimum contacts exist in order for Ohio courts to acquire in personam jurisdiction”). In April of 2022, the Supreme Court granted certiorari over the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision.113See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 2646 (2022).

But what about states that do not explicitly by statute inform defendant corporations that they would be subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state? Nearly every state requires foreign corporations to appoint an agent to receive service of process in the state.114Andrew K. Jennings, Notice Risk and Registered Agency, 46 J. Corp. L. 75, 77 (2020). Courts were split as to whether these schemes subjected corporations to general personal jurisdiction in the state. Minnesota, for example, has a statutory scheme that allows service of process over a foreign corporation through service on the Minnesota Secretary of State.115Minn. Stat. § 5.25 (2022). In that situation, though, the service is valid “only when based upon a liability or obligation of the corporation incurred within this state or arising out of any business done in this state by the corporation prior to the issuance of a certificate of withdrawal.”116Id.; id. § 303.16. Various Minnesota state and federal courts have interpreted these statutes as creating consent to general jurisdiction for registered foreign corporations.117See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Minnesota law to find that the defendant consented to general jurisdiction in Minnesota by complying with its registration statutes); Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Minn. 1991) (exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the corporation had consented to service of process in Minnesota). In Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines,118Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1200. the Eighth Circuit held that the Minnesota statute requiring a registered agent within the state creates general jurisdiction in that state when service is processed on that agent.119Id. Particularly, the court noted that “[t]he whole purpose of requiring designation of an agent for service is to make a nonresident suable in the local courts,” and, as such, “appointment of an agent for service of process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state.”120Id.

A nearly identical phenomenon has occurred in Iowa. Iowa federal courts, relying on Knowlton, found that an Iowa statute is “almost identical to that of Minnesota.”121Jacobson Distrib. Co. v. Am. Standard, Inc., No. 4-CV-00208-JAJ, 2007 WL 3208562, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 5, 2007). As such, even though it does not explicitly address jurisdictional consequences of registration, the statute confers general jurisdiction in Iowa courts.122Id. The same has been held to be true in Kansas123Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 179 (Kan. 2006). and New Mexico.124Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 272–73 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Brieno v. Paccar, Inc., No. 17-CV-867, 2018 WL 3675234, at *2–3 (D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2018) (following Werner). The Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed the concept as well.125Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 863 S.E.2d 81, 90 (Ga. 2021). And even after International Shoe fundamentally changed the personal jurisdiction analysis, several circuit courts continued to hold that consent by registration obviated the due process analysis and that states could exercise general jurisdiction based on that consent.126Kaminer, supra note 83, at 62–63 (“Since Daimler, the supreme courts of nine states—California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin—have held that registering to do business in their state does not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction, while one state—Georgia—has upheld consent by registration. In five states where consent by registration is alive—Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Iowa, New Mexico, and Kansas—state and federal appellate courts endorsed the concept in pre-Daimler decisions that their lower courts have largely followed ever since.” (citations omitted)). This is not to say that there are no federal circuits holding to the contrary. While six circuits have found jurisdiction-by-consent statutes to be constitutional,127See generally Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990); King v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011); Budde v. Kentron Haw., Ltd., 565 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016). five circuits reached the opposite conclusion.128See generally Cossaboon v. Maine Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2010); Ratliff v. Cooper Lab’ys, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971); Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992); Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1993); Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000). And two circuits avoided the constitutional question.129See generally Brown v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016); Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990). These decisions are all in flux, given the Supreme Court’s decision in 2022 to grant certiorari and review the Pennsylvania statute.130See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 2646 (2022); see also supra text accompanying note 106.

But “presence” and “consent” are two distinct ways of submitting to jurisdiction. Putting aside the question of whether a corporation “consents” through registering to do business—the question that the Supreme Court will aim to answer in Mallory—there is a simpler way to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction: assessing whether the corporation has engaged in systematic and continuous contact in the forum state. The Supreme Court’s guidance in Ford sheds light on where the Court may be heading on the “presence” front. The hallmarks of due process in the context of the consent and estoppel model are reciprocity and fairness.131Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1030 (2021). Ford seemed to reiterate the underlying theme of “reciprocal obligations” between a defendant and the forum as the basis for what makes the exercise of personal jurisdiction “fair.”132Id. In that case, because Ford Motor Company enjoyed “the benefits and protections” of state law while doing business in the forum, “allowing jurisdiction in these cases treats Ford fairly.”133Id. at 1029.

  1. The Fourteenth Amendment: Personal Jurisdiction and the Current Doctrine

With the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Supreme Court saw it proper to provide guidance on personal jurisdiction under a now-federalized due process standard. In Pennoyer,134Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). the Court held that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a party only if that party was served with process in the state seeking to adjudicate the controversy.135Id. at 735. As explained above, this ruling was consistent with the consent and estoppel model and the subsequent corporate presence model.

Despite Pennoyer’s overruling by International Shoe, the Court remained true to the spirit of the corporate consent and estoppel model. Pennoyer was overruled and substituted with the “minimum contacts” test in International Shoe.136Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Under the new International Shoe standard, a defendant becomes subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state with which it engages in “minimum contacts.”137Id. The test was later refined in Hanson v. Denckla138Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). to define “minimum contacts” as contacts that demonstrate a defendant’s “purposeful availment” of the jurisdiction.139Id. at 253. In other words, a corporate defendant becomes subject to the personal jurisdiction of a forum if it takes a purposeful action to benefit from the privilege of doing business in that forum.140See id. Similarly, under World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,141World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). the foreseeability of causing injury in a particular location was held not to be enough to subject a corporation to the personal jurisdiction of the courts in that location.142Id. at 295. Therefore, while the International Shoe test, along with its refinements in Hansen and World-Wide Volkswagen, departed from the Pennoyer service-of-process test, it remained consistent with the consent and estoppel model and the corporate presence model. “Minimum contacts” and “purposeful availment” became the tests to determine whether a corporation was “present” in a forum such that it should be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. Foreseeability of injury, on the other hand, is not synonymous with corporate presence and therefore was not a basis for personal jurisdiction, just as a corporation cannot be “present” in a location based on foreseeability of injury alone and cannot be said to have “consented” to jurisdiction based on foreseeability of injury alone. Applying the new test, the Court in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.143McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). found that a California court could subject a Texas insurance company to its personal jurisdiction, even though the insurance company had a single policy contract with a California resident.144Id. at 224. The corporation was found to have been present in California because it entered into a contract directly in California.145See id.

The adherence to the origins of the personal jurisdiction consent and estoppel and corporate presence model did not last. In Burger King v. Rudzewicz,146Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). the Supreme Court subtly revised its test for personal jurisdiction beyond McGee and bifurcated what was previously a one-step “minimum contacts” test.147Id. at 476. The Court fractured the original intention of International Shoe, holding that personal jurisdiction can be established if two elements are met: (1) the defendant engaged in minimum contacts/purposeful availment of the forum state; and (2) the subjugation of personal contacts does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”148Id. The Court, in a split decision,149Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion). later created five factors by which to determine whether establishing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant would violate “traditional notions of fair play.”150Id. at 113. The factors are (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that state; (4) whether the allowance of jurisdiction serves interstate efficiency; and (5) whether the allowance of jurisdiction serves interstate policy interests.

Two concurrences are most telling in just how far this doctrine has gone adrift. Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi v. Superior Court argued that a defendant’s placing of a product into the stream of commerce may very well satisfy the minimum contacts prong but that it would not satisfy the “fair play and substantial justice” prong. That is, showing minimum contacts is not enough.151Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“This is one of those rare cases in which ‘minimum requirements inherent in the concept of “fair play and substantial justice” . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.’ ” (citations omitted)). Justice John Paul Stevens, in concurrence, agreed that jurisdiction would be “unreasonable and unfair,” but he did not join Justice O’Connor’s opinion, in part because the Court should not have even considered minimum contacts. He wrote that “it is not necessary to the Court’s decision. An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”152Id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring). Minimum contacts, however, is the key framework under which corporate presence is determined.153For more discussion on the departure from International Shoe, see infra Section V.A.

III.  THE HISTORY OF THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT

Under current doctrine, a defendant is subject to the specific personal jurisdiction of a forum if the controversy “arises out of” or “relates to” the defendant’s contact with the forum state. This was first hinted at in Shaffer v. Heitner,154Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). in which the Court held that in rem jurisdiction—jurisdiction based solely on the presence of a defendant’s property in the forum—is insufficient on its own to establish personal jurisdiction.155Id. at 211. In Shaffer, plaintiffs filed a shareholder derivative suit against a corporation and corporate executives.156Id. at 189–90. The basis for personal jurisdiction in the selected forum was the defendant’s property in the forum. The Court held the following:

The presence of property in a State may bear upon the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation, as for example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and defendant, where it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. But where, as in the instant quasi in rem action, the property now serving as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action, the presence of the property alone, i.e., absent other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, would not support the State’s jurisdiction.157Id. at 187.

The Court further explained that

although the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.158Id. at 209.

In making its determination, the Court acknowledged that it was backtracking from the “long history of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property in a State”159Id. by now requiring a “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” in order to establish personal jurisdiction.160Id. at 204. Therefore, the Court engaged in a policy analysis in its departure from the traditional doctrine. It did so presumably to curtail the shareholders’ forum shopping, despite the fact that the defendant corporation was “present” in Delaware due to its property in the state. As such, the Court looked beyond the original understanding of personal jurisdiction. Under the “long history of jurisdiction,” personal jurisdiction could be established “based solely on the presence of property in a State.”161Id. at 209. Even under the “minimum contacts” test from International Shoe, if a defendant owns property in a state, then that defendant has the minimum contacts necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in that forum. Given that Congress has provided no guidance on jurisdiction besides the venue statutes, the proper remedy for defendants faced with lawsuits in locations they prefer not to litigate in is to seek to transfer the case to a more appropriate venue.162I discuss this issue in further detail infra Part V.

In future cases, the Supreme Court attempted to assert that the nexus requirement is, in fact, rooted in the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process standard. In Daimler AG v. Bauman,163Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). the Court explained that the concept of “reciprocal fairness” between corporations and the states in which they conduct business implies a nexus requirement. The Court never attempted to argue that the nexus requirement is rooted in the Pennoyer test, but the Court quoted a passage in International Shoe in support of its argument:

The exercise of th[e] privilege [of conducting corporate activities within a State] may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.164Id. at 133 n.10 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (U.S. 1945)).

But the reliance on International Shoe for this proposition is not entirely accurate. While International Shoe blessed the exercise of jurisdiction in cases where the suit arose out of the defendant’s contact with the state, it explicitly left open the possibility of the exercise of jurisdiction without such a nexus requirement:

While it has been held in cases on which appellant relies that continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity, there have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.165Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citations omitted).

Historically, regarding the personal jurisdiction of corporations, there were instances in which a nexus requirement was explicitly rejected, that is, situations in which the exercise of jurisdiction was upheld despite the lawsuit not arising from the defendant’s contact with the forum.166See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (“We hold, then, that the defendant corporation is engaged in business within this state. We hold further that the jurisdiction does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no relation in its origin to the business here transacted.”). See generally Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); cf. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1913).

While the origins of the nexus requirement have to do with the defendant’s presence connecting with the litigation filed against it, the nexus requirement has now shifted to require the plaintiff’s connection with the forum state as well. The case cited by recent decisions for this proposition is Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.167Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). But importantly, Helicopteros’s understanding of “general jurisdiction” differs from what the term means today. Heliopteros specifically maintains that

[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.168Id.

The Court cited Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.169Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). for this proposition. In Perkins the Court found that a foreign corporation not incorporated or headquartered in Ohio could be subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio in a suit filed by a nonresident of Ohio when the cause of action did not arise out of or relate to the forum because “the foreign corporation, through its president, ‘ha[d] been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business,’ and the exercise of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation by an Ohio court was ‘reasonable and just.’ ”170Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445). In other words, Helicopteros does not require a nexus between the litigation and the forum so long as there is a “continuous and systematic” existence of the corporation in the forum.171See id. Presumably, then, Helicopteros only requires the plaintiff to show that the litigation “arises out of” or is “related to” the forum in situations where the defendant is not “continuos[ly] and systematic[ally]” present in the forum.172See id.

The root of the confusion regarding the nexus requirement is that it was created before the concepts of “specific” and “general” jurisdiction existed or were properly defined. The Helicopteros court, relying on Perkins, held that if a corporation’s presence was “systematic” and “continuous” in a forum, then it would be subject to general jurisdiction in that forum such that no nexus is required at all.173Id. at 414–16. This is no longer the case today. A major reason why this is no longer the case is because of a prophetic article written by two Harvard Law School professors, which influenced the Court significantly.174Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1144–64 (1966). These professors have dubbed the terms we currently refer to as “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction,” while also defining the two to their near identical meanings in the current doctrine.175See id. The Court in Daimler adopted the policy proposed by the article, holding that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only in its place of corporation and its principal place of business.176Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014). But see id. at 139 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” (citation omitted)). There is one crucial problem with the article, however: it is not premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; instead, it is premised on creating the best policy for which to adjudicate matters and includes forum shopping and convenience for the parties as some of its major supporting propositions. But the underlying reasoning for personal jurisdiction is not convenience or effective policy—these are considerations Congress ought to consider in statutes dictating proper venues for litigation. The sole consideration in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is due process.

After the terms general and personal jurisdiction were given their current definition, the Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb applied the Helicopteros rule without consideration of the Helicopteros Court’s understanding of general jurisdiction.177Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (“In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit ‘must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ ” (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984))). As a result, it muddied the waters significantly. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, a group of medicine users sued in California state court a corporation that manufactured the drugs in California.178Id. at 1778. Some of the plaintiffs were not California residents.179Id. The Court held that the non-California plaintiffs could not sue in California because there was no nexus between their litigation and the forum; the non-California plaintiffs’ claims did not “arise out of” or “relate to” California.180Id. at 1782. Put another way, the Court held that it violated the defendant’s due process right to be sued in California by one group of plaintiffs but not another group of plaintiffs for the same cause of action and the same set of events, and the differentiating factor was the plaintiffs’ place of residency181Id. This analysis of the plaintiffs’ connection to the forum is the current understanding of personal jurisdiction, specifically the nexus requirement.

Notably, for the sake of judicial economy, the Bristol-Myers Squibb litigation was consolidated through multi-district litigation, commonly referred to as “MDL,”182The MDL process is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The statute permits courts to consolidate cases that involve “one or more common questions of fact” and for one court to resolve pretrial issues. After pretrial issues are resolved, the transferee court that handled the consolidated cases remands each individual case to its respective origin court for trial. and pretrial proceedings for both groups of plaintiffs took place jointly in California. Through the MDL process, the two groups of plaintiffs could litigate only pretrial issues together in California without regard to personal jurisdiction. Courts have struggled with the application of personal jurisdiction to MDL proceedings.183See Zachary T. Nelson, Multidistrict Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction, 2 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 709, 712–15 (2020). While personal jurisdiction in MDL is outside the scope of this Note, this set of events illustrates that courts take no issue with altering personal jurisdiction doctrine to promote judicial economy and the MDL process, yet they will continue to unnecessarily protect corporate defendants by rigidly upholding the nexus requirement in cases that are not large enough to consolidate through the MDL process.184Courts have long held that an MDL court’s jurisdiction is a “derivative” of the transferor court’s jurisdiction. See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 486 (J.P.M.L. 1968). Scholars have pointed out that position lacks convincing support. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1251, 1319 (2018) (“[The Supreme Court] could find grounds for doing so by raising the arguments against the scope of MDL’s jurisdiction that have been ignored for the last fifty years.”).

  1. ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT DOCTRINE

Based on the above explanations, personal jurisdiction doctrine has strayed away from its original roots of the Fourteenth Amendment and has drifted into a way of curtailing forum shopping. In many circles, this reason alone is enough to demand alteration.185See generally Edwin Meese III, The Case for ‘Originalism,’ Heritage Found. (June 6,
2005), https://www.heritage.org/commentary/the-case-originalism [https://perma.cc/XQ3N-5LG3]; Neil M. Gorsuch, Why Originalism Is the Best Approach to the Constitution, Time (Sept. 6, 2019), https://time.com/5670400/justice-neil-gorsuch-why-originalism-is-the-best-approach-to-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/3E4V-8NXW].
However, as I explain below, not only is the current doctrine inconsistent with the original understanding of personal jurisdiction, but it also causes complications in the context of internet sales and stream of commerce cases. In this section, I detail the current doctrine’s shortcomings. In the following section, I preview a direction the Court may be heading: a reversion to the original understanding of personal jurisdiction based on the corporate consent and estoppel model.

  1. It Provides Corporations with Protections They Are Not Entitled to

While the inconsistency with prior case law and the historical application of personal jurisdiction doctrine are by themselves sufficient to question the nexus requirement in its current form, the present standard is also problematic from a policy perspective. It provides corporations with additional protections not mandated by the Constitution—and nonexistent under statute—under the guise of due process.

Take Ford as an example. The Court held that the Ford Motor Company can be subject to personal jurisdiction in Montana for a case involving Ford Explorer vehicles because it sells Ford Explorers in Montana such that it “cultivated a market” there.186See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022, 1028 (2021). But, presumably, if Ford sold different models in Montana and did not sell Explorers, there would be no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s case in Montana because requiring Ford to answer a complaint in Montana under those circumstances would violate the Due Process Clause. This framing of the “market” being “cultivated” is shaky at best. Does it matter which year Ford started selling the Explorer in Montana? What if the model in question was older than the models Ford has sold in Montana? Does the trim of the model matter? What about the model’s color?187These hypotheticals are based on ones presented by Professor Steven Sachs. See Steven E. Sachs, Originalism and Personal Jurisdiction: Some Tough Questions, Volokh Conspiracy (Dec. 9, 2020, 11:54 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/12/09/originalism-and-personal-jurisdiction-some-hard-questions/ [https://perma.cc/PR5U-64D8].

The Court also held that the plaintiffs’ contacts with Montana are determinative.188Id. at 1028. The Court held that if Ford sells Explorers in Montana, then Montana can decide any case involving an Explorer accident within its borders, regardless of how it got there, so long as the plaintiff has a connection to Montana.189Id. So, no matter how extensive Ford’s contacts with Montana might be, the determinative factor is the plaintiff’s connection with the forum. But what difference does it make to Ford whether the Explorer crash took place in Montana or in Idaho? If Ford already has significant contact with Montana such that it has cases pending in Montana, Ford would not be required to conduct any additional expenses to defend itself in Montana. Requiring Ford to defend one lawsuit in Montana while allowing Ford to dismiss an identical lawsuit solely on the basis of the plaintiff’s place of residency and connection to Montana is perplexing. Requiring Ford to defend the first lawsuit is no more a violation of Ford’s due process rights than it is to require Ford to defend against the second lawsuit.

Similarly, Bristol-Myers Squibb emphasized that the Michigan plaintiff’s suing the defendant corporation in California violated the defendant’s due process rights because the Michigan plaintiffs “did not ingest Plavix in California.”190Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). Nevertheless, a group of plaintiffs from California was permitted to sue in California for the same cause of action relating to the same drugs. The only difference between the two groups of plaintiffs is where they ingested the drugs. But that fact should not have been determinative. What difference does it make if a Texan brings his pills on a California vacation and ingests them there or if the Texan ingested the pills in Texas? 191These hypotheticals were first presented by Professor Sachs. See Sachs, supra note 187. It is odd to argue that these hypothetical cases, as opposed to the ones previously before the Court, would not violate the defendant’s due process rights by allowing jurisdiction in each of these otherwise-identical cases. Figures 1 through 4 below illustrate how the doctrine plays out.

 

Figure 1. Nexus with Forum State Through Plaintiffs’ Residence

Figure 2. Nexus with the Forum State Through Plaintiffs’ Vacation

Figure 3.  No Nexus Despite Defendant’s Continuous

Figure 4.  Scenarios Analyzed Under the Current Doctrine

 

Scenario #1

Scenario #2

Scenario #3

Did the Manufacturer purposefully avail
itself of CA?

YES.  It sold pills in CA.

YES.  It sold pills in CA.

YES.  It sold pills in CA.

Do the plaintiffs have
a “nexus” to CA?

YES.  They bought and ingested the pills in CA.

YES.  They ingested the pills
in CA. 

NO.  They did not buy or ingest the pills in CA.

Conclusion

CA courts have personal jurisdiction over CA plaintiffs’ claims.

CA courts have personal jurisdiction over TX plaintiffs’ claims.

CA courts do not have personal jurisdiction over TX plaintiffs’ claims.

The Ford decision also raises questions about the general jurisdiction framework. The Court seems to erode that concept, perhaps unintentionally. If Ford can “cultivate a market” in a forum, then it can be subject to personal jurisdiction for claims relating to that forum, so long as the plaintiff has a connection to the forum as well. As explained above, the “market” being “cultivated” can prove to be a difficult term to define. And requiring the plaintiff’s connection to the forum results in illogical and arbitrary grants and denials of jurisdiction, as illustrated in the above figures.

Under current general jurisdiction jurisprudence, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction wherever it is “at home,” which has been held to mean its place of incorporation and headquarters.192Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014). But see id. at 139 n.19. But why is it any more compliant with due process for a plaintiff residing in Idaho to sue General Motors (incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan) in Delaware and Michigan as opposed to Texas, where the company has had a factory and has done business since 1954?

The Court’s attempt at showing that Ford cultivated a market in Montana begins to bleed into the general jurisdiction framework. It would be a much simpler and more predictable test to ask whether Ford has “minimum contacts” such that it “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of doing business in Montana, and consequently, it is subject to personal jurisdiction in Montana.

Justice Sotomayor pointed this out in her Daimler concurrence, noting that limiting general justification to a corporation’s principal place of business and its place of incorporation would lead to “deep injustice.”193Id. at 147 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). She pointed out that “the majority’s approach unduly curtails the States’ sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and substantial business operations within their boundaries.”194Id. at 157. She then called into question the special protections corporations would be receiving under the newly defined due process requirements:195Id. Justice Sotomayor also pointed out that the record was undeveloped and that the Court’s new doctrine leads to the question of what to do in situations where corporations have more than one place in which they are “at home”:

But the record does not answer a number of other important questions. Are any of Daimler’s key files maintained in MBUSA’s California offices? How many employees work in those offices? Do those employees make important strategic decisions or oversee in any manner Daimler’s activities? These questions could well affect whether Daimler is subject to general jurisdiction. After all, this Court upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.—which the majority refers to as a ‘textbook case’ of general jurisdiction—on the basis that the foreign defendant maintained an office in Ohio, kept corporate files there, and oversaw the company’s activities from the State. California-based MBUSA employees may well have done similar things on Daimler’s behalf. But because the Court decides the issue without a developed record, we will never know.

Id. at 148–49 (citations omitted).
“Put simply, the majority’s rule defines the Due Process Clause so narrowly and arbitrarily as to contravene the States’ sovereign prerogative to subject to judgment defendants who have manifested an unqualified ‘intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to the[ir] laws.’ ”196Id. at 157–58 (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality opinion)).

There is some indication based on Ford, the Court’s personal jurisdiction case from 2021, that at least some of the Justices are questioning the existing precedent. In particular, Justice Gorsuch’s Ford concurrence, which was joined by Justice Thomas, expressed skepticism of the “at home” test for corporations regarding general jurisdiction.197Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). He wrote, “[I]t seems corporations continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the name of the Constitution. Less clear is why.”198Id.

  1. Difficult Application to Internet Sales Cases

The current doctrine does not adequately address how courts should apply it to cases involving internet sales. When it comes to determining purposeful availment, courts look to whether online conduct was purposefully directed at the forum state.199See Abdouch v. Lopez, 829 N.W.2d 662, 670–71 (Neb. 2013). Courts also use a sliding scale to determine whether the contacts constitute purposeful availment.200See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 477 (5th Cir. 2002). For example, if a website is passive because it only advertises or posts information without any option for users to interact with it, the website may not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the website involves making transactions or entering into contracts through knowing and repeated transmission of files over the internet, personal jurisdiction seems more likely. If the website falls in between these two categories of interactivity, the level of the interactivity and the nature of the website must be examined. In other words, the greater the commercial nature and interactivity associated with the website, the more likely the website operator engaged in purposeful availment of the forum state.

As a corollary to the sliding scale, courts have also recognized that tortious conduct that takes place online can subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction.201Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790–91 (1984). If the defendant’s actions were intentional, uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state, and caused harm in the forum state, personal jurisdiction is proper there, because the defendant is said to have “purposefully directed” actions at the forum state.202Abdouch, 829 N.W.2d at 730. A refined test examines whether the defendant knew and intended the consequences of its actions to be felt in the forum state, not just that the defendant knew where the plaintiff lives.203Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014). That is, if the mention of the state is incidental and not included for the purposes of having the consequences felt in the forum state, there is likely no personal jurisdiction there.

For example, suppose that an Idaho newspaper, which distributes only in Idaho and the bordering towns in Washington State, publishes a story defaming a California celebrity. Can it be said that the newspaper intended the consequences of its story to be felt in California, given that it does not distribute in California? The newspaper has no contacts with California, so how can it be said that the newspaper purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California?

The Ford case adds an additional element that muddies the water even more. What if a corporate defendant “cultivates a market” in a forum? Under Ford, plaintiffs would be permitted to sue in that forum so long as they have a nexus to that market. In the above hypothetical, would the California celebrity be permitted to sue in Washington State because of the market the newspaper cultivated there? Also, as explained above, it is difficult to define the product that a company cultivates a market for, and framing the market being cultivated is highly malleable. For example, does Amazon cultivate a market for delivery in California? Or is the cultivated market analyzed by specific products, as it was in Ford? Assuming the latter, what is the justification of looking at the plaintiff’s connection to the forum to assess the due process rights of the defendant?

  1. Difficult Application to Stream of Commerce Cases

There is no agreed-upon framework by which to address stream of commerce cases. A “stream of commerce” case refers to a situation where a manufacturer sells products to a regional distributor and the regional distributor sells the products elsewhere. For example, assume that a car company manufactures its cars in China and then sells the fully manufactured cars to a distributor in California and no distributors in Oregon. Then assume that the California distributor sold the cars to a dealership in Oregon, and an Oregon resident bought a car from that dealership. If the car malfunctions, may the Oregon resident sue the manufacturer in Oregon? The question is whether the car manufacturer engaged in minimum contacts or purposefully availed itself of doing business in Oregon through the stream of commerce that brought its product to Oregon.

Justice White, in dicta in in World-Wide Volkswagen, suggested that there may exist personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer in a forum even if the manufacturer itself did not sell in that forum; he wrote that personal jurisdiction would exist in such a situation only if the sale in the forum was “not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly the market for its product.”204World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.”).

The Court has been unable to agree on what these instructions practically mean. Justices Breyer and Alito understand this to refer to the number or substantiality of the sale in the forum.205J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 888–89 (2011) (Brennan, J. concurring). Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi held that there would be personal jurisdiction over a defendant manufacturer only if Justice White’s criteria were satisfied and the manufacturer engaged in “additional conduct . . . [that indicates] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state.”206Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion). This could include designing the product for the forum state, advertising the product in the forum state, or establishing channels for providing regular contact to consumers in the forum state. Justice Brennan, writing for the split court in Asahi, indicated that if the maker foresees and benefits from the contact with the forum, personal jurisdiction is satisfied, even without an intentional act targeting the forum.207Id. at 118–19 (Brennan, J., concurring).

The Court’s split continued in McIntyre, in which the Justice Kennedy plurality held that a foreign manufacturer that sold products to a U.S. distributor was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the states the distributor subsequently distributed to.208McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877–78. Justice Ginsberg dissented and wrote that, in her view, there is personal jurisdiction in a state when a manufacturer chooses a distributor who distributes to the entire United States.209Id. at 907–08 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Breyer’s and Alito’s concurrence explained that personal jurisdiction should be dependent on the number of products sold in the state.210Id. at 888–89 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Figure 5 synthesizes current steam of commerce doctrine:

Figure 5.  Current Stream of Commerce Doctrine

The Ford case presented a slightly nuanced version of the hypothetical discussed above. In Ford, the vehicle that malfunctioned was designed, manufactured, and sold outside of Montana.211Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022–23 (2021). Later resells and relocations by consumers brought the vehicle to Montana, where it malfunctioned.212Id. at 1026. As such, it was only through the “stream of commerce” that the particular vehicle at issue was brought to Montana.213Id. The Court united in its holding that Ford’s advertising in and manufacturing in Montana constituted sufficient purposeful availment, and held that the plaintiffs had a sufficient nexus to the forum simply because the car malfunctioned in Montana, even though they did not purchase the vehicle in Montana.214Id. However, if, through the stream of commerce, the plaintiffs were in the neighboring state of Idaho, then presumably there would be no nexus and no personal jurisdiction in Montana, even though the facts—and Ford’s purposeful availment of the Montana forum—would be identical. It is unclear why Ford’s due process rights would be violated if an Idaho plaintiff sues Ford in Montana but would not be violated if a Montana plaintiff who purchased Ford’s product in Wisconsin and drove to Montana sues in Montana.

Figure 6.  The Ford Litigation

  1. WHERE THE COURT IS HEADED AFTER FORD

A reversion to the constitutional underpinnings of personal jurisdiction doctrine means removing the corporate protections available under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case is easier for removing plaintiffs’ requirement to show a nexus to the litigation when suing a corporation in a forum in which the corporation has systematic and continuous contact. As explained above, the nexus requirement came into being with the explicit understanding that it is a requirement only if the corporate defendant has no systematic and continuous contact with the forum. In other words, the case is easy for overruling Daimler and removing the narrow understanding of general jurisdiction, finding instead that general jurisdiction exists wherever corporations implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction through systematic and continuous contact.

However, some Justices may propose going a step further and removing the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction as it is inconsistent with the Court’s original understanding of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, plaintiffs would be permitted to pursue causes of action in any forum in which a corporation engages in minimum contacts sufficient to constitute purposeful availment without showing a nexus to the litigation. Corporate defendants would be permitted to transfer cases under the venue statutes alone.

In situations where a corporation had purposefully availed itself of a forum in a previous one-off occurrence, the claim brought in that forum must allege conduct that took place during the purposeful availment of the selected forum.215Courts have uniformly held that general jurisdiction is to be determined no earlier than the time of filing of the complaint. Sabre Int’l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 60 F. Supp. 3d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases). That is, a corporation would not be able to retroactively cease purposeful availment.

I have already explained why this model is consistent with the original understanding of personal jurisdiction. In many circles, this reason alone would be sufficient to adopt it. However, in this Part I detail why a reversion to this original understanding is good policy as well. It increases fora for plaintiffs, makes for a more predictable personal jurisdiction doctrine (especially in cases involving internet sales and the stream of commerce), and leaves room for Congress to act should it find the need to.

  1. Removing the Distinction Between General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction

One avenue of development post-Ford envisions significantly expanding general jurisdiction in the way it is understood today. This would mean overruling the holding in Daimler, which permits general jurisdiction over a corporation only in its principal place of business and place of incorporation.216Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 177, 119 (2014). But see id. at 139 n.19. Daimler does not completely foreclose the possibility of general jurisdiction in a different location, but it effectively has done so. As explained above, the case is easy to revert to the pre-Daimler jurisprudence, where general jurisdiction existed in each location where a corporation engaged in continuous and systematic contact with a forum, because that was the original understanding of personal jurisdiction. Nothing in the original understanding of personal jurisdiction, early cases dealing with the doctrine, or the Fourteenth Amendment compels affording corporations protections from being forced to defend lawsuits in fora besides their place of incorporation and headquarters. Such protections limiting personal jurisdiction can only come from statutes, and Congress has not legislated in the arena of personal jurisdiction.

However, assessing personal jurisdiction solely through the lens of purposeful availment reveals that the concept of general jurisdiction is unnecessary, especially after it was eroded in Ford. Ford held that if a corporation systematically serves a market, and the plaintiffs are from that forum state, it is as if there is general jurisdiction for those specific plaintiffs in the forum.217Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). But if a corporation is already prepared to defend against lawsuits in a particular jurisdiction, it does not offend due process rights to require the corporation to defend against all lawsuits in that jurisdiction, subject to transfer of venue “in the interest of justice.”21828 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Furthermore, as Douglas D. McFarland points out in his scholarship,

The original, unpolished International Shoe test is a one-step, unitary test. A court is not required to find “minimum contacts” and “fair play and substantial justice.” Neither is a court required to find “minimum contacts” or “fair play and substantial justice.” The opinion requires a court find “minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”219Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 754, 763 (2003).

Given this understanding, it becomes clear that it is more consistent with the Due Process Clause and International Shoe to allow jurisdiction for all claims in a forum where the defendant corporation engaged in “minimum contacts.”220World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 316 (1980). There need not be a difference between the type of claim permitted to originate in that forum. In other words, personal jurisdiction in a forum should be defined by defendant, not by claim. If a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular location, then that defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction in that location for all claims and should be permitted to transfer cases under the guidelines provided by Congress alone. The following figure is identical to Figure 4 above, referencing the three scenarios in Figures 1, 2, and 3, but it includes an extra row showing how the ultimate conclusion would change should Daimler be overruled.

 

Figure 7. Scenarios Analyzed Under the Consent and Estoppel Model
 Scenario #1Scenario #2Scenario #3
Did the Manufacturer purposefully avail itself of CA?YES.  It sold pills in CA.YES.  It sold pills in CA.YES.  It sold pills in CA.
Do the plaintiffs have a “nexus” to CA?YES.  They bought and ingested the
pills in CA.
YES.  They ingested the
pills in CA.
NO.  They did not buy or ingest the
pills in CA.
Conclusion under current doctrineCA courts have personal jurisdiction over CA plaintiff’s claims.CA courts have personal jurisdiction over TX plaintiff’s claims.CA courts do not have personal jurisdiction over TX plaintiff’s claims because there is no nexus.
Conclusion without DaimlerCA courts have personal jurisdiction because the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of California law.CA courts have personal jurisdiction because the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of California law.CA courts have personal jurisdiction because the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of California law.
  1. Clarifying the Doctrine for Internet Sales Cases

A straightforward and predictable test for personal jurisdiction solves issues relating to internet sales cases. Internet sales would be analyzed in the same way as all other sales cases: if the seller does business in the forum, then the plaintiff should be permitted to sue the seller in that forum. Doing business means selling a product in that forum. If a seller wants to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular forum, then it can choose not to sell in that forum.

Take, for example, a 2021 Third Circuit case221Hepp v. Facebook, Inc., 14 F.4th 204 (3d Cir. 2021). involving a lawsuit against Imgur and Reddit, two internet companies, alleging that the companies were compliant in an authorized use of the plaintiff’s likeness when a photo of her in a convenience store began circulating on these websites in an advertisement for erectile dysfunction and dating websites. Living in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff decided to sue Imgur and Reddit in Pennsylvania, despite knowing neither the convenience store’s location nor how the image was posted online. Both companies conceded that they had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania.222Id. at 207 (citation omitted). They nevertheless argued that their minimum contacts with Pennsylvania were not related to the litigation—in other words, they argued that there was no nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the forum. The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.223Id. at 208.

There are troubling implications with this holding. First, a plaintiff is required to do additional research before the opening of discovery to determine where online harm originated. The court found unconvincing the argument that personal jurisdiction is proper in Pennsylvania because that is where the harm took place. Second, the court’s attempted distinction224Id. from Ford draws an arbitrary line. Just as in Ford, in which the motor company “systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States,”225Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). here, the internet companies systematically served a market for the very product that was used to cause the harm—the platform in which the unauthorized posting of the plaintiff’s photo took place.

In other words, distinguishing the type of product that the market was “systematically served” with is unpredictable and malleable. A much more straightforward approach would be to look only at whether Reddit and Imgur continuously and systematically served the market, which they in all likelihood did. And even if they did not continuously and systematically serve the market, they certainly had minimum contacts with Pennsylvania such that they purposefully availed themselves of the state. The burden would then be on the defendant corporations to move for a transfer of venue. The presumption should be that due process is not violated because of the companies’ purposeful availment within the forum. If the corporate defendants seek to transfer venue, they would need to provide evidence for why there is a more suitable venue.

Accordingly, removing the nexus requirement and analyzing personal jurisdiction solely through purposeful availment—and assessing whether the online activity is in fact a purposeful availment—resolves the issue. To be clear, a company may “cultivate a market” in a forum without ever stepping foot into that forum.226See Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 983 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that an Australian company that advertised to “AMERICAN BABES,” advertised about a Black Friday sale, and was featured in American magazines had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the United States). As such, in the case described above, the defendants Imgur and Reddit would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the selected forum because of their admitted purposeful availment and presence in the forum.

This approach is consistent with other cases that have analyzed the issue of internet sales: under current doctrine, a corporate defendant can expect to be subject to personal jurisdiction in a venue in which a “substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”227Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984). In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,228Id. the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction in New Hampshire over a nonresident magazine publisher defendant.229Id. at 772–75. The Court reasoned that although the magazine publisher had a nationwide audience and had not targeted the forum particularly, it should reasonably anticipate an action “wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”230Id. at 781. The same should be true when it comes to internet sales. Therefore, if a corporation wants to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular location, it may cease its business operations in that state.231For the rebuttal to the argument that, in today’s interconnected digital age, it is impossible to cease business operations in only one location, see infra Section V.E.

  1. Clarifying the Doctrine for Stream of Commerce Cases

A reversion to the original understanding of personal jurisdiction would simplify the analysis in stream of commerce cases. Removing the nexus requirement shifts the analysis solely to determining whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of a forum. Courts would look not at whether the plaintiff’s alleged harm has a connection to the forum, since these are venue concerns, not due process concerns.

Instead, courts would assess, as the Court did in Ford, whether the manufacturer “cultivated a market” in the forum state such that it is fair and just to require the defendant to defend a lawsuit in that jurisdiction. As with internet sales, if a manufacturer does not want to be subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular state, it may direct its distributor not to distribute products into that state.232See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 68, at 247, 280. For a law and economics analysis of this position, see Daniel M. Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1551, 1586 (2012). Without such instruction, and if the distributor supplies products in a state, the manufacturer would have minimum contacts with that state that constitute purposeful availment. Under the original understanding of personal jurisdiction, any plaintiff would be permitted to sue the manufacturer in that state, irrespective of whether the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the manufacturer’s contacts. The manufacturer would then be permitted to transfer the case using the venue statutes.

  1. Addressing Forum Shopping

It is clear that reverting to the previous personal jurisdiction doctrine would pave a path to forum shopping.233It is also interesting to note that there already exists a mechanism of personal jurisdiction that incentivizes forum shopping. Although rarely used, Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes courts to exercise nationwide jurisdiction over foreign parties who would not otherwise be subject to jurisdiction in any individual state of the United States. As an initial matter, one must ask whether the negative effects of forum shopping warrant such significant constitutional maneuvering to counter the practice. Perhaps a free market that permits forum shopping is beneficial, as some scholars have argued.234See generally Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990). Forum shopping may cause beneficial competition among states to alter their laws if they want to stimulate businesses.235See id. at 1691. Just as a company considers taxes, state law, and other benefits, so too should companies consider being subject to personal jurisdiction in a state if they want to maintain a presence in that state.236See id. at 1691–95.

Some scholars have pointed out that the possibility of forum shopping provides judges with incentives to make the law more pro-plaintiff and that these judges’ actions have the possibility of creating wide-ranging effects, given that their courts will likely attract a disproportionate share of cases.237Klerman & Reilly, supra note 68, at 242 (“When plaintiffs have a wide choice of forum, such judges have incentives to make the law more pro-plaintiff because plaintiffs choose the court with the most pro-plaintiff law and procedures.”). Professor Dan Klerman points to several examples of this phenomenon taking place, the most prominent being the patent-plaintiff-friendly Eastern District of Texas and plaintiff-friendly mass tort jurisdictions such as Madison County, Illinois. Both of these venues have seen a dramatic uptick in the number of claims filed there.

As a result of these observations, scholars conclude that “[c]onsideration of forum selling helps justify constitutional constraints on personal jurisdiction. Without constitutional limits on jurisdiction, some courts are likely to be biased in favor of plaintiffs in order to attract litigation.”238Id. at 241. However, these policy considerations are for Congress to consider. The solution to these concerns is not judge-made constitutional limits on jurisdiction, because the Constitution is silent on forum shopping.239See infra Section II.A.2. Instead, the solution may be statutory limits on jurisdiction.

It goes without mentioning that parties engage in forum shopping in drafting forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses, which require any dispute arising from a transaction to be filed in a particular location and apply particular law.240Tanya J. Monestier, When Forum Selection Clauses Meet Choice of Law Clauses, 69 Am. U. L. Rev. 325, 355 (2019). If the Constitution prohibits forum shopping, it presumably prohibits forum shopping no matter the context and whether both parties engage in it. Given that courts have continuously upheld forum selection and choice-of-law clauses,241Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). it cannot be said that forum shopping is per se unconstitutional.

More fundamentally, it is important to remember that personal jurisdiction is rooted in due process. Those who argue that it is the Court’s, rather than Congress’s, job to curtail forum shopping assert that impartial judging is a core concept of due process and, as such, personal jurisdiction is the proper route to address these concerns. However, this argument fails to consider that corporations have the option to remove themselves from being subject to personal jurisdiction wherever they feel the judging would not be impartial.242For the rebuttal to the argument that, in today’s interconnected digital age, it is impossible to cease business operations in only one location, see infra Section V.E. Therefore, so long as the defendant purposefully availed itself of a forum, the defendant should be prepared to face a lawsuit in the forum, irrespective of whether the Constitution permits forum shopping.

Furthermore, should forum shopping cause such significant burdens, or should the public demand reform, Congress has authority to act. Congress’s venue statutes currently permit parties to transfer venues in cases of forum shopping,243See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404. and Congress has permitted removal to federal courts specifically to address bias in state courts.244“The choice between federal districts is not generally of constitutional concern.” Klerman & Reilly, supra note 68, at 243. Klerman and Reilly point out that plaintiff-friendly judges in the “Eastern District of Texas show[] that even federal judges can be affected by forum selling.” Id. Nevertheless, the Due Process Clause does not provide such broad protections for corporations that purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of doing business in jurisdictions where such plaintiff-friendly judges may preside. In cases where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum, the defendant may, if it is more convenient for witnesses or collecting evidence, move to transfer the case to a different jurisdiction.245Issues might arise if courts are too backed up: either allow transfer under one of the Burger King factors (allowing a consideration of the interstate interest in efficiently resolving disputes) or allow the market to correct itself—that is, plaintiffs who want efficient justice will have to choose another forum. Various articles have also proposed statutes that codify personal jurisdiction.246See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 46, at 1311–12.

  1. Miscellaneous Considerations

There is merit to the argument that corporations should be permitted to organize their business strategically to avoid lawsuits in unfavorable locations. This is especially true in situations where the removal statutes do not permit a corporate defendant to remove a proceeding to federal court.247One such situation is where there is no “complete diversity,” meaning that at least one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of the same state. In that situation, federal court removal is not permitted. While the removal statutes are beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to point out that Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, which permits corporations to remove class actions involving a significant amount of money at stake to federal court even if there is no complete diversity of parties. The way the Court is heading comports with the notion of strategic business organization. Corporations may choose to engage in business in locations by considering whether the risk of liability is worth the profits of doing business in the forum. Just as corporations assess tax, employment law, and various other factors, so too should personal jurisdiction be another factor. This potential future course undoubtedly increases the fora where a business may be sued, and it may encourage states to pass laws that are more plaintiff friendly. The free market should correct any radical laws because corporations can choose whether to engage in commerce in a particular forum based on the laws that forum passes.

True, without Daimler, corporations that engage in internet sales would be subject to personal jurisdiction in many more locations than they otherwise would have been. But these corporations can decide as a matter of corporate policy not to sell to individuals located in a certain jurisdiction for lack of desire to be forced to defend a lawsuit there.248For example, Flaviar, an alcohol-tasting membership service, declines to ship samples to over twenty states. See Help & Frequently Asked Questions, Flaviar, https://flaviar.com/content/help [https://perma.cc/527E-BPCS]. To be clear, a corporation would not need to suspend access to its passive website in certain locations to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction there. Making a website available solely for consumer browsing (not purchases) in a certain location would not constitute “purposeful availment” because the website would be passive in nature249See Abdouch v. Lopez, 829 N.W.2d 662, 672 (Neb. 2013); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (holding that what constitutes purposeful availment will vary “with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity” in the forum state). and the corporation’s contact with website visitors would be unilateral action on the part of the website browsers, which the Court has already ruled is insufficient to constitute “purposeful availment.”250See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (“The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). For similar reasons, a corporate defendant would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum if, by the stream of commerce, one of its products makes its way into a state where the corporation does not “serve [the] market.”251Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2021) (“When a company like Ford serves a market for a product in a State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State’s courts may entertain the resulting suit.”). Therefore, to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction in certain locations, a corporation can decide not to cultivate a market in the locations where it wants to avoid defending lawsuits.

Another consideration is the discretionary nature of transfer of venue and choice of law. Review of personal jurisdiction is a matter of law that is conducted de novo.252See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). By contrast, transfer of venue is discretionary and is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard.2534 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.6 (4th ed. 2022) (collecting cases). But appellate courts have not been shy to tell the district courts they have abused discretion when it comes to motions for transfer of venue. In other words, plaintiffs would be encouraged to forum shop and choose venues that are less willing to transfer cases out of their jurisdiction. While a valid concern, it is not one that should factor into a constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction. Congress may feel compelled to alter the venue statutes. Even so, despite the discretionary nature of venue transfer, courts have not been afraid to reverse denials of transferring venue, even under the abuse of discretion standard.254The courts of appeal, for example, have not been shy to reverse the decisions denying transfer out of the Western District of Texas, a jurisdiction that has in recent years become infamous for being plaintiff friendly in patent cases. See Ryan Davis, How Judge Albright’s Transfer Denials Riled the Fed. Circ., Law360 (Sept. 21, 2021, 7:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1423013 [https://perma.cc/
Z9W8-6VVB].

CONCLUSION

This Note began with an analogy to sports teams preferring to play in front of their home crowds. There is no question that teams have such a preference. But the defiance of this preference does not constitute a violation of rights. Surely the Los Angeles Lakers, because the team plays in the National Basketball Association, must play away from home across the nation, including in front of less-than-welcoming Boston fans when they face the Celtics.

When a corporation conducts business in a particular location, it avails itself of that location. Under the traditional corporate consent and estoppel model, the privilege of conducting business creates a reciprocal obligation on the corporation to subject itself to the jurisdiction of that location, irrespective of who sues it there.

While personal jurisdiction purports to assess whether a defendant should be forced to defend a lawsuit in a forum due to the defendant’s contacts with that forum, the doctrine has shifted to requiring the plaintiff to show a connection to the forum, even if the defendant has substantial contact with the forum. This Note has explained the history and development of personal jurisdiction doctrine and showed how the Court has narrowed where corporate defendants are “at home.” Consequently, the Court requires the plaintiff to comply with the nexus requirement when suing in locations besides the corporation’s “home.” In doing so, this Note revealed that the evaluation of personal jurisdiction doctrine is a diversion from the traditional corporate consent and estoppel model and is a result of the Court substituting its judgment for Congress’s regarding the need to curtail forum shopping. It offered a prediction of where the Court may be headed: toward an expansion of corporate personal jurisdiction—by ditching Daimler and nixing the nexus requirement.

 

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 207

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*  University of Southern California Gould School of Law, 2023. B.A., University of Southern California, 2020.

Toward a New Fair Use Standard: Attributive Use and the Closing of Copyright’s Crediting Gap

A generation ago, Judge Pierre Leval published Toward a Fair Use Standard and forever changed copyright law. Leval advocated for the primacy of an implicit, but previously underappreciated, factor in the fair use calculus—transformative use. Courts quickly heeded this call, rendering the impact of Leval’s article nothing short of seismic. But for all of its merits, Leval’s article failed to acknowledge or consider the salience of another largely underrecognized and heretofore unnamed factor: attributive use. 

This Article attempts to address this oversight, particularly when viewed in light of the current law of crediting in the twenty years since Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Supreme Court’s decision to permanently foreclose the most common method by which creatives had previously vindicated their crediting interests—the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false designations of origin. After assessing the recent body of empirical work highlighting both the quantitative and qualitative importance of attribution to authors and the value of crediting to consumers, investors, and the broader public, the Article scrutinizes the current state of attribution rights to argue that, post-Dastar, the remaining legal mechanisms for securing crediting, including private contracting, have proven insufficient. 

To address this crediting gap in the law, the Article considers, but rejects, calls to overturn Dastar or enact an independent general attribution right under the Copyright Act. Instead, I propose a more modest solution that needs no congressional action. Like transformative use, attribution promotes progress in the arts by motivating and incentivizing authorial production. Moreover, as this Article’s careful exegesis of the relevant case law demonstrates, issues of crediting have long shaped the contours of the fair use defense. As such, I advocate for the formal adoption of attributive use as an express consideration in the fair use calculus. The Article therefore builds on Leval’s influential work and calls for the formulation of a new fair use standard that more closely calibrates the defense with the utilitarian goals of our copyright regime.

INTRODUCTION

A.  Pierre Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard and Copyright’s Crediting Gap

Thirty years ago, Pierre Leval penned1Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990). what would become one the most influential pieces of legal scholarship of the past generation.2To use one metric, as of the end of 2021, 89 reported decisions had cited Leval’s article and Westlaw’s KEYCITE counted a whopping 1,658 citing references to it. As a federal judge who had then served for twelve years on the Southern District of New York, Leval crafted Toward a Fair Use Standard after he had watched two of his copyright decisions, including his finding that a biographer had made fair use of J.D. Salinger’s unpublished letters, eviscerated by the Second Circuit.3See Leval, supra note 1, at 1105 (noting that his article was inspired by the Second Circuit’s disagreement with his opinions in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (1987) and New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989)). Leval would eventually sit on the Second Circuit. In reflecting upon these repudiations, Leval critiqued his erstwhile approach to the fair use calculus as excessively ad hoc and sought, instead, to fashion a series of governing principles to guide application of the doctrine in future cases.4Id. at 1105–07. In so doing, Leval scrutinized the metes and bounds of the copyright monopoly holistically and posited that infringement claims and fair use defenses both serve the overarching utilitarian goal of the copyright regime, which “stimulate[s] activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public.”5Id. at 1107. With the premise that fair use is not an exception to copyright protection but, rather, a part of the design of copyright law to encourage creativity, he then identified transformative, or productive, use—use that “employ[s] the [original] matter in a different manner or for a different purpose”6Id. at 1111.—as a driving7Id. at 1116 (“Factor One is the soul of fair use.”). concern8Id. at 1111 (“Does the use fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public illumination? This question is vitally important to the fair use inquiry, and lies at the heart of the fair user’s case. Recent judicial opinions have not sufficiently recognized its importance.”). in the calculus.9Notably, however, Leval took pains to caution that transformative use was not necessarily outcome determinative. “The existence of any identifiable transformative objective does not,” he warned, 

guarantee success in claiming fair use. The transformative justification must overcome factors favoring the copyright owner. A biographer or critic of a writer may contend that unlimited quotation enriches the portrait or justifies the criticism. The creator of a derivative work based on the original creation of another may claim absolute entitlement because of the transformation. Nonetheless, extensive takings may impinge on creative incentives. And the secondary user’s claim under the first factor is weakened to the extent that her takings exceed the asserted justification. The justification will likely be outweighed if the takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright owner.

Id. at 1111–12.

Toward a Fair Use Standard quickly precipitated a sea change in the way courts approached application of the fair use doctrine. Only a few years after its publication in the Harvard Law Review, the Supreme Court drew heavily on Leval’s article in famously holding that the transformative nature of 2 Live Crew’s unauthorized parody of Roy Orbison’s Pretty Woman insulated the song from infringement liability under the fair use doctrine.10See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (drawing on Toward a Fair Use Standard to assert that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright”). In the process, the Supreme Court elevated the standing of Leval’s work, enshrining it as a seminal tome on copyright law—one that took a rightful place right beside the actual text of section 107 of the Copyright Act in guiding fair use determinations. Toward a Fair Use Standard continues to enjoy a prized place in the copyright firmament. In 2021, in its first fair use pronouncement since Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court liberally sprinkled citations to Leval’s article through the course of its opinion determining that Google’s exploitation of Oracle’s copyrighted Sun Java application programming interface (“API”) constituted fair use.11Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1197, 1202–04 (2021). Transformation once again lies at the heart of the analysis, as the Court posited that Google’s actions helped “expand the use and usefulness of Android-based smartphones. . . . [by] creat[ing] a new platform that could be readily used by programmers” to develop new programs in the Android environment.12Id. at 1203. The transformative nature of Google’s use did not just determine the first fair use factor; it also subsumed the third and fourth factors of the fair use analysis as well. Thus, despite the extensive use of the Java API, the Court waived away the substantial borrowing that Google made by noting that “[t]he ‘substantiality’ factor will generally weigh in favor of fair use where, as here, the amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose.” Id. at 1205. And, the fact that Google’s transformative use of the Java API spurned the development of new programs and progress in the arts weighed against viewing Google’s use as a cognizable market harm to Oracle: “to allow enforcement of Oracle’s copyright here would risk harm to the public. Given the costs and difficulties of producing alternative APIs with similar appeal to programmers, allowing enforcement here would make of the Sun Java API’s declaring code a lock limiting the future creativity of new programs.” Id. at 1208.

It should come as no surprise then that, in the words of one observer, “Leval’s commentary on the centrality of transformativeness in interpreting fair use decisively changed the way the copyright doctrine was interpreted. He leveraged the forum successfully to accomplish what he had been unable to accomplish thereto in judicial decision-making.”13Patricia Aufderheide, Articles That Matter: Leval, Pierre N. Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990), 25 Comm. L. & Pol’y 412, 412 (2020). Even those who have critiqued Leval’s article have acknowledged its importance and remarkable influence. Scott Alan Burroughs, for example, has upbraided Leval for “upend[ing] 150 years of established jurisprudence” and making “an increasingly muddy morass of the ‘fair use’ doctrine.” Scott Alan Burroughs, The Tyranny of Fair Use (Part III): A Judge’s Critique, Explosive Data, and One Sad Saga, Above the Law (Mar. 6, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/03/the-tyranny-of-fair-use-part-iii-a-judges-critique-explosive-data-and-one-sad-saga [https://perma.cc/LFU5-6ZHP]. Nevertheless, Burroughs concedes that Toward a Fair Use Standard “forever changed the state of author’s rights.” Scott Alan Burroughs, The Tyranny of Fair Use (Part II): One Person’s Outsized Impact on Copyright Law, Above the Law (Feb. 27, 2019, 5:17 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/02/the-tyranny-of-fair-use-part-ii-one-persons-outsized-impact-on-copyright-law [https://perma.cc/KM7A-EF3Z] (further noting that “Judge Leval’s creation, elevation, and entrenchment of a ‘fair use’ factor that did not appear in the statute or caselaw and ran afoul of one of the author’s limited exclusive statutory rights has not gone unnoticed”). Although Leval’s elevation of transformative use to paramount importance in the fair use calculus has enjoyed widespread adoption, including blessing from the Supreme Court, it has not been without some pockets of judicial resistance. In a Seventh Circuit decision, for example, Judge Frank Easterbrook implicitly critiqued Leval’s position, noting that transformation is “not one of the statutory factors” in § 107 and arguing that excessive reliance on transformation “not only replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works. To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2).” Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). This view is not merely anecdotal or impressionistic. The rapid rise of transformation as a crucial, if not decisive, factor in fair use decisions due to Leval’s article is nothing short of stunning. A recent empirical study determined that almost ninety percent of cases now ultimately turn, at least in part, on determinations of transformative use.14See Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 163, 174–75 (2019).

Thus, with Toward a Fair Use Standard, Leval achieved what most authors of law review articles can only dream of. Of course, his deserved reputation as a thoughtful jurist no doubt assisted in propelling his proposal, and his article’s placement in the venerable Harvard Law Review did not hurt either. But, above all, his prescient thoughts on the limitations on copyright protection embodied in the fair use doctrine made eminent sense in any era when courts were just beginning to grapple with the digital implications of a Copyright Act written before the advent of the modern internet.

To be sure, Leval’s work is not without its critics—in industry, on the bench, and in the bar. These interventions have largely questioned the primacy that Leval’s article and interpreting courts have given to transformative use.15See supra note 13. Yet for all of its merit, Leval’s article wholly ignored one area of grave importance in both the utilitarian logic of copyright law and, implicitly, the extant jurisprudence on fair use: attribution. Crediting serves as a prime motivator for authorial production, goes to fundamental issues of equity in our copyright regime, and has enjoyed a tacit (but not entirely express) role within the fair use calculus. Nevertheless, it finds no place in Leval’s article, a fact that Leval’s critics have ignored as well. Indeed, even though Leval dedicated a portion of his article to pondering (and rejecting) the value of “other” fair use factors not expressly detailed in section 107’s text—including good faith, artistic integrity, and privacy—he never expressly discusses or even implicitly addresses the issue of crediting.16Leval dubbed these “false factors” and waived them aside. Leval, supra note 1, at 1125–30 (noting, inter alia, that “[t]he language of the Act suggests that there may be additional unnamed factors bearing on the question of fair use. The more I have studied the question, the more I have come to conclude that the pertinent factors are those named in the statute. Additional considerations that I and others have looked to are false factors that divert the inquiry from the goals of copyright”). In short, attribution appears to play no role in Leval’s analysis of fair use.

Of course, crediting was not Leval’s focus. Nevertheless, this Article attempts to address and assesses this oversight, particularly when read in light of the current law of crediting in the twenty years since the Supreme Court announced its decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,17Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). which permanently foreclosed the most common method by which creatives had previously vindicated their crediting interests—the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false designations of origin. Specifically, this Article proposes to supplement Leval’s work—which lead to the formal adoption of transformative use as a critical part of the first factor in the fair use analysis—by advancing a proposal for the explicit introduction of attributive use18Special thanks are due to Peter Afrasiabi for suggesting this terminology for the concept. to the fair use balancing test.

B.  Giving Credit: Toward an Attributive Fair Use Standard

Give credit where credit is due. It is a principle widely embraced in our social norms.19Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 789, 791 (“Both authors and audiences generally accept that attribution is important to authors, and that false attribution, especially plagiarism, is a moral wrong.”). But like many of the things we learned in kindergarten, adherence to the precept is far from perfect. Moreover, while the exhortation remains a universal aspiration, it enjoys little legal bite. Indeed, the lack of development in the law of crediting is nothing short of surprising. As Jane Ginsburg has argued, “Of all the many counter-intuitive features of US copyright law—and they abound—the lack of an attribution right may present the greatest gap between perceived justice and reality.”20Jane C. Ginsburg, The Most Moral of Rights: The Right to Be Recognized as the Author of One’s Work, 8 Geo. Mason J. Int’l Com. L. 44, 45 (2016).

If the Copyright Act and our broader intellectual property regime seeks to serve its constitutionally mandated purpose—to promote progress in the arts—by incentivizing the creation of works of authorship, it should ideally respond to what actually motivates creators. To be sure, the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance, public display, and derivatization secured for authors under section 106 of the Copyright Act appeal to authorial incentives in at least two ways. First, they serve utilitarian interests by providing monetary rewards to creators by necessitating licenses for the exploitation of their work. Second, they promote natural law and the dignitary interests of authors by enabling them to decide whether (and under what terms) their works are made available to the public at all.2117 U.S.C. § 106; see also John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, and Personsood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 38–39 (2011). But control over reproduction, distribution, public performance, public display, and derivatization are not the only rights that galvanize creators. Specifically, authors gain value—both monetary and otherwise—through other mechanisms. For example, building one’s brand and reputation for creative excellence—achieved only through attribution—is a powerful means toward earning long-term economic rewards and satisfying the dignitary interests that can also motivate authors. As a result, traditional copyright enforcement is not necessarily profit maximizing for creators, and there is often a disconnect between how creators feel about the unauthorized exploitation of their work and how distributors/publishers might feel about it. Meanwhile, authors who may value attribution over enforcement of their copyrights are not necessarily immune to the temptations of the marketplace or more noble than the rest of us. To be sure, some authors may create solely to fulfill their own needs or to edify, amuse, or impact others, and they may merely seek recognition rather than profit. But there is also a monetary component to proper attribution. In the long run, attribution promotes one’s name and its standing, a phenomenon that eggs on economic demand in a variety of forms—whether it is for further creative production, appearances, endorsements, or ancillary activities. Indeed, attribution is part and parcel of the economic equation of copyright and its incentive structure.

With all of this in mind, if our intellectual property regime serves to encourage progress in the arts by motivating and incentivizing authors, the absence of attribution rights would appear to leave the regime wanting. The Lanham Act, which for a time served as a powerful vehicle for protecting attribution rights, can no longer do so as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar two decades ago. Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons we shall explore, alternative legal theories for protection have proven inadequate to provide for general crediting rights. Thus, current law provides little protection for crediting. And it is this crediting gap—what it means, how it came into existence, and how it might be solved—that is the focus of this Article.

Before proceeding further, two important caveats bear mentioning. As a preliminary manner, it is important to lay out what this Article means when it talks about giving credit. Put in the traditional parlance of moral rights, crediting issues can take two general forms. First, there is the positive right of attribution—the ability to have one’s name associated with one’s work. Second, there is the negative right of attribution—the ability to prevent having the work of another falsely attributed to you.22For example, as Jane Ginsburg notes, the right against misattribution opens the slippery slope toward protection of an integrity right. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 47–48. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.—the celebrated Monty Python moral rights case—provides a paradigmatic example of an instance where a court’s recognition of a Lanham Act claim under section 43(a) for (mis)attribution effectively created a backdoor integrity right. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In the case, Monty Python’s successful claim for false designation of origin against American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) for airing bowdlerized episodes of Monty Pynchon’s Flying Circus amounted to an interdiction on unauthorized alterations to their work (which, in the case, had resulted from ABC’s efforts to edit episodes both for length (to both comply with the different length of commercials on American, versus British, television) and content (to guard against perceived sensitivities of American audiences and advertisers)). Id. Notably, however, Gilliam’s holding appears to survive Dastar since it was a passing off, rather than reverse passing off, claim. See Rick Mortensen, D.I.Y. After Dastar: Protecting Creators’ Moral Rights Through Creative Lawyering, Individual Contracts and Collectively Bargained Agreements, 8 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 335, 353 (2006) (concluding that “a mutilation case with facts similar to Gilliam could still be brought under section 43(a)(1)(B) or under the ‘palming off’ provisions of section 43(a)(1)(A), even though Gilliam itself was brought under a more liberal definition of ‘origin’ ”). The former right is about giving credit when credit is due and forms the subject matter of this Article. The latter phenomenon, while important and rife for further analysis, is about misattribution and therefore falls outside of the scope of this analysis.

In addition, as its title suggests, this Article seeks to directly build on Pierre Leval’s influential article. Indeed, it is no less ambitious than Leval’s piece and aims to highlight the fact that considerations of attributive use already permeate (with good reason) the jurisprudence applying and interpreting section 107 of the Copyright Act and seeks to alter the way that courts formally frame the fair use calculus going forward. At the same time, however, the author also understands that he is no Pierre Leval and, as detailed infra,23See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. is prone to delusions.

With these caveats in mind, the Article’s analysis begins by scrutinizing the value of crediting. Rather than resting on the mere intuition that attribution matters, Part I delves into both the quantitative and qualitative literature on crediting to determine just how and to what extent crediting fuels authorial motivations and serves broader societal interests. We start with an anecdote to illustrate how authorial reactions to infringement both with and without attribution can differ radically. In the process, we identify and critique the peculiar disconnect between our current legal regime—which fetishizes protection against infringement over failure of attribution—and the economic and dignitary interests of at least a sizeable percentage of creators. Next, we examine the burgeoning scholarship in law, economics, psychology, and organizational behavior to assess and interrogate the value of attribution to creators. As we see, a growing body of empirical work supports the intuition that crediting matters—a lot—and, in fact, authors are often willing to forgo substantial amounts of compensation in return for securing attribution. As such, crediting can and does play a primary role in motivating authorial production. At the same time, a fulsome attribution regime would not merely serve authorial interests. As I argue, it would also inure to the benefit of consumers, investors, and society at large by promoting the efficiency of resource allocation in intellectual property-driven fields (thereby benefiting investor welfare and broader economic interests in optimized markets operating with superior information), reducing consumer search costs, advancing the organizational integrity and coherence of literary and artistic endeavors, and even enhancing public support for the protection of intangible rights such as copyright by bringing the legal regime governing creative works in greater harmony with norms of equity and by humanizing creativity-driven products.

Having established the value of crediting to both authors and the public, this Article turn its attention to assessing the current state of attribution law. Part II therefore begins by exploring the rationale and implications of the Dastar holding and detailing the ways in which the decision effectively ended the ability of creators to bring attribution-related reverse passing off claims under the Lanham Act. Next, we identify the crediting gap left in Dastar’s wake by examining what alternative theories of liability remain to vindicate crediting interests post-Dastar and how said theories have fared in the intervening two decades. In the process, we scrutinize the extant jurisprudence on false advertising claims under the Lanham Act,24See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). attribution claims under the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”),25See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. falsification and removal/alteration of Copyright Management Information (“CMI”) claims,26See id. § 1202. state unfair competition law, and private contracting. As this Article’s analysis suggests, these theories are insufficient to protect the crediting rights of the vast majority of creators. False advertising claims can, at best, only provide relief to famous authors and only in circumstances of material reliance by consumers in purchasing decisions. VARA claims suffer from myriad subject matter constraints that makes the protections available to only a small corner of the creative universe (certain types of visual art works that are not works made for hire, only in originals or prints of two hundred or less, potentially only in digital form). Claims pertaining to falsification, removal, or alteration of CMI have a high double-scienter requirement that has made relief unlikely. Meanwhile, the statutory scheme regarding CMI primarily serves the goal of infringement prevention rather than the protection of any independent interests that authors may have in crediting. Finally, state unfair competition laws have suffered either from federal preemption under Dastar or from the fact that they are viewed as coterminus with Lanham Act protections.

In the end, therefore, we are left only with private contracting for relief. And while a few notable industries (such as Hollywood and academia) have implemented meaningful attribution regimes, private ordering suffers from the leverage and bargaining disparities inherent to contractual solutions. Indeed, as we demonstrate, the history of private crediting systems is riddled with instances where power dynamics trump actual origination.27See infra Section II.B.5. Drawing on several notable examples where crediting abuses fell on racial, gender-based, and socioeconomic fault lines, I argue that continued reliance on such systems could have particularly deleterious implications for social justice issues in intellectual property. In short, therefore, there exists a sizeable crediting gap—a vast disconnect between the high value of attribution to authors and the public and the low value given to it by way of legal protection. Moreover, without the legal vesting of more stout attribution entitlements, ongoing reliance on the pure operation of the marketplace for crediting determinations could continue to have vexing consequences.

Part III considers potential reform to the current state of affairs. Although I caution that social value should not always translate into legal mandate and that good norms do not always make good law, the particular inadequacies of the extant crediting regime and the social and economic (rather than private or familial) interests at play warrant examination of potential legal solutions. To that end, I evaluate but reject two of the most significant mechanisms for change: reversal of the Dastar holding by legislation amending the Lanham Act and passage of an affirmative cause of action under the Copyright Act to provide for crediting rights. As I argue, despite its shortcomings, Dastar revealed the poor fit that the Lanham Act—with its focus on consumer confusion—ultimately provided for attribution protection. Moreover, even if an amendment to the Lanham Act were limited to situations involving works still under copyright protection (so as to avoid the issue of erstwhile rightsholders with expired copyrights attempting to extend their monopoly over creative works through trademark law), it would still raise significant concerns about the potentially onerous scope of crediting requirements and the fine line between providing proper attribution and triggering false endorsement claims. Meanwhile, amendment of the Copyright Act to provide for an affirmative crediting claim has its own shortcomings. In particular, this Article examines the way in which the allocation of a formal crediting entitlement could stifle licensing efforts in the marketplace, a result exacerbated by the combined impact of the endowment and creative effects—behavioral phenomena that have caused economists to question traditional neoclassical assumptions in entitlement allocations in recent years. Finally, as a practical matter, I also observe the particular difficulties in pursuing a legislative change.

Instead, I propose a more modest solution, and one that I argue is already an implicit part of the existing jurisprudence: formal accounting of attributive use as a part of fair use calculus. In conducting a careful exegesis of the extant case law on fair use, I argue that courts have often woven consideration of attributive use into the first, fourth, and “fifth” factors—a move that the important Second and Ninth Circuits have blessed.28See infra Sections III.D.1–4. Further, I argue that the implementation of an attributive use subfactor makes doctrinal sense given both the utilitarian and equitable functions of the fair use doctrine and that such a consideration is strongly supported by our existing copyright clearance norms. Thus, just as Pierre Leval identified transformative use as a critical but underappreciated consideration in the fair use calculus, I make a similar argument with respect to attributive use. In the process, I call for crediting to take its place alongside commercial and transformative considerations in courts’ assessment of the first fair use factor—the purpose and character of use. In this way, I advance an incremental, but important, step toward recognition of the value of crediting while also avoiding some of the broader concerns that a general right of attribution—whether achieved under the Lanham Act or the Copyright Act—might present.

I.  WHY CREDITING MATTERS

A.  One Author, Two Moments

I begin my assessment of the importance of attribution by reflecting upon the perspective of one author—this author—on what motivates creative enterprise. Such a focus is admittedly biased and may be completely unrepresentative. But it illustrates how the current state of affairs in copyright law—where infringement receives stiff punishment but failure to credit receives none—can be inadequate to protect the motivating interests of at least some creatives. Specifically, two recent incidents involving the use of my published work provoked strong, but diametrically opposing, reactions within me. And while I do not claim that my attitude toward these events reflects on how typical authors might respond, my contemplations are nonetheless instructive as to how some authors might experience issues related to infringement and crediting.

Not long ago, while doing some research on the dirty underbelly of the piratical dark web, I came across a site that resembled a veritable Library of Babel,29Jorge Luis Borges, The Library of Babel, in Collected Fictions 112, 112–18 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking Penguin 1998). providing free access to a remarkable collection of digital books to all comers. While publishers would not hesitate to characterize this “celestial jukebox”30Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 28 (Stan. U. Press 2003) (1994) (promoting Goldstein’s concept of the “celestial jukebox,” where digital technologies will enable the efficient and seamless distribution of all manner of entertainment products and informational works to consumers around the world with the touch of a button); Paul Goldstein, Copyright in the New Information Age, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 829, 829–30 (1991) (referring, for the first time, to Goldstein’s prescient concept of the “celestial jukebox,” borrowed from an unknown poet, where, “[s]ooner than you expect, systems may evolve that can store a digital version of every motion picture and sound recording ever created, enabling individuals around the world to summon up these works on command, through satellite or some yet unforeseen communications vehicle”); see also Comm. on the Judiciary, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-274 at 5–9, 12–13 (1st Sess. 1995) (referencing the concept of the “celestial jukebox” whereby “interactive services . . . enable a member of the public to receive, on request, a digital transmission of the particular recording that [that] person wants to hear”). of books as a cesspool of wanton infringement, I felt compelled, as a good academic, to investigate further before drawing any definitive conclusions. So, in an act of curiosity and thorough vanity, I punched my own name into the site’s search box. To my surprise, a beautiful e-book edition of one of my tomes popped up, available freely to all who had interest in it. I can neither confirm nor deny that I immediately downloaded a copy, but some context might help explain why I may have made a decision to do so.

A number of years earlier, I had posed what I thought was an innocent request of the publisher of one of my forthcoming books: I sought a final PDF copy of the work for my records and personal use. The response was rapid and reproachful. “We don’t do that, John.” The implication was clear: they had to protect against piracy, even if it meant denying authors copies of their book in digital format. Instead, they offered me a compromise: the first three chapters. Since they made it clear this was not a negotiation, I took what they gave me. Fast forward a decade and it should be easy to understand why I may have been elated when this website offered me what my own publisher had denied me: a final, electronic form of my book without any encryption or digital rights management (“DRM”) associated with it.

My book’s appearance on the website also pleased me for an entirely different and more fundamental reason. As a delusional academic, I dream of my ideas getting attention, impacting the way people might approach or think about an issue and, ultimately, influencing policy. So I naturally fantasized about individuals (at least one or two!) potentially stumbling on this website, finding my book, and then reading it when they otherwise may have never known about my work or ponied up the cash necessary to buy it. The royalties I see from my writing are trivial and economically irrelevant. Instead, I want my books to reach as many people as possible (that is, more than my mother) and I want to maximize their exposure. Whether that is accomplished through sales or piracy, I care not. After all, as science fiction writer and librarian Eric Flint once put it, “The real enemy of authors— especially midlist writers—is not piracy . . . It’s obscurity.”31Mike Glyer, Eric Flint (1947-2022), File 770 (July 17, 2022), https://file770.com/eric-flint-1947-2022 [https://perma.cc/V6RR-BWSU] (quoting Eric Flint).

So far from making me angry, the discovery of my book pirated online for anyone to read resulted in nothing but sheer delight. Yes, this was infringement of my copyright, pure and simple. But I was all smiles.

Around the same time, I had another experience related to one of my publications—but, this time, what occurred was far less welcome. One day, I received an email from a local law school about an upcoming distinguished lecture. While I might usually give only fleeting attention to such a notification, this one caught my eye because of the topic, which just so happened to be the exact subject matter of my first book, which I wrote in 2008. So I naturally took an interest and thought about attending. But as I read further, my curiosity turned to disappointment. The talk was about a recently released book whose description was, almost word for word, based on the book I had written. And then I saw the name of the author, which was one I recognized.

I had met the author a decade ago when she was a graduate student attending a talk I had given about my own book. I distinctly remember her chatting with me after my lecture and expressing how much she had enjoyed and appreciated my book. It turns out those comments weren’t mere puffery. She had proven that by writing her own version. As I read the full description of her lecture and then found her recently released book, I was struck by how the summation literally encapsulated my own book in its entirety.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I told myself in a failed attempt to downplay the anger I felt. But more than flattery, I wanted acknowledgement. Of course, no one’s work is wholly original. But her book came uncomfortably close to mimicry of mine. It was not just drawing on or borrowing ideas to build and expand on my book; it was literally taking my entire work and rehashing it as purportedly original material. Specifically, and most egregiously of all, the use of my work was wholly without proper credit. And, to add insult to injury, as the email before me indicated, she was now giving a distinguished lecture at a local university that had never shown the least bit of interest in my work.

Even if I were inclined to pursue some kind of legal remedy against her, there was none readily forthcoming. Because of the nature of the use, an infringement claim would be difficult to make. Meanwhile, current law provides no general right of crediting or attribution. Admittedly, I did have a form of extralegal relief; if I wanted to pursue the matter, university policies against plagiarism and the failure to properly credit sources offered some remedies. Certainly, I could have notified the author’s publisher and her university-employer to trigger potential investigations. But, at the end of the day, such an effort would be purely punitive and would not undo the real damage I had already suffered; the book, after all, was already published. So, in the end, I concluded that, instead of going through the pain of a vindictive letter-writing campaign that would only waste my own time, I would work out my issues far more constructively: by writing a law review article.

These two incidents—close in time—provided a remarkable study in contrasts.32Besides illuminating the inadequacies of our present authorial regime, these two incidents also reveal that this Article’s author may be prone to exhibiting disturbing signs of both pettiness and delusionality. I implore you to excuse these character flaws (often attributed to “artistic” mentalities) and consider the arguments presented in this Article on their merits and without the weight of the author’s considerable baggage. In the first matter, I encountered the wholesale piracy of my work, and I found myself not merely indifferent but hopeful. After all, I had received credit for my work and the work’s unauthorized distribution helped disseminate my ideas more broadly. I would take whatever boost I could get. The website in question had undoubtedly infringed my work, but I was perfectly content to let that happen. In the second instance, while it was arguable whether the subsequent author had infringed my work, she had indisputably failed to give me proper credit for my work—upon which she had indisputably and heavily drawn—and had, in my view, violated basic norms of attribution. I was disturbed and troubled by what had happened.

While I found the second incident far more offensive than the first, the law saw things differently. I possessed a colorable claim for infringement if I were inclined to fight the piracy of my book. By contrast, I had little hope of a legal remedy for my fellow academic’s abysmal failure to provide me appropriate attribution. In short, our copyright regime provided no shortage of remedies for an injury that I cared little about—infringement. By sharp contrast, it provided no remedy for something that more directly motivates my production of content—crediting and recognition.

As a result of these two incidents, I began to wonder whether I was the kind of author the Copyright Act wanted to encourage in the first place.33While entirely possible, for purposes of sanity and the preservation of self-worth, I shall ignore this prospect. As a writer, I meet the definition of what the Framers referred to as “authors” in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, and my work comes under the subject matter of the Copyright Act. But I am also not the kind of author who makes a living (or even seeks to make a living) on the sale of my works. Consequently, my incentives might be quite different from someone whose income solely or largely comes from authoring works—the kind of author who might care substantially more about piracy.

That said, however, the vast majority of authors make little to no money from their work. Some, of course, may still pursue the craft for (in part) future potential riches. But, for many, remuneration is far lower on the list of their motivations than other factors, such as attribution and recognition. As Laura Heymann points out,

[F]or many creators, particularly individual creators, the profit motivation is not paramount. Rather, the creator is motivated most by the public knowledge that she is the creator—by attribution of the work to her. Indeed, as others have noted, such creators value wide dissemination of their work over compensation, and so benefit from the fair use doctrine and, even, the movement of their work to the public domain, both of which ensure that their work reaches as large an audience as possible.34Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. Rev. 55, 95 (2007).

As my reaction to the two incidents indicates, I belonged to this class of authors. And, by failing to reflect the importance of attribution and recognition as a motivating factor in the production of creative content, it appeared that the existing copyright regime did not know members of this class very well and did not appear fully responsive to their incentives and needs. For a utilitarian regime dedicated to progress in the arts, this curious result begs further investigation.

B.  The Empirics of Attribution

There is no doubt that our moral sensibilities strongly support the practice of proper attribution, and common sense tells us that authors value crediting and recognition as well. As Heymann has posited, “[I]t seems safe to conclude that the two things that virtually all creators desire is to receive credit when appropriate and to eliminate the suggestion of association when it is not.”35Id. at 96. But before taking these assumptions to heart based on mere intuition, it is worth scrutinizing them more closely. While the value of attribution has traditionally received scant attention in the academic literature and little empirical testing, all of that has changed in recent years as an emerging body of data and experimental work has provided overwhelming support for the notion that attribution serves a vital role in motivating and incentivizing creatives.36See Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco & Zachary Burns, What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1389, 1391 n.1 (2013) (detailing the studies in recent years establishing the general sense of attribution’s value to creatives).

One of the largest innovations and behavioral experiments to ever take place in the creative world occurred with the launch of the Creative Commons some twenty years ago. Founded by law professor Larry Lessig, computer scientist Hal Abelson, and literary advocate Eric Eldred, the Creative Commons sought to give creators the ability to opt out of the protection-heavy default rules of copyright, which automatically vest in authors3717 U.S.C. § 201(a) (vesting, as a default rule, copyright in the author of a work). the exclusive right to control reproduction, distribution, public display, public performance, and derivatization of their works38Id. § 106 (detailing the exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright holders). for a period of their lifetime plus seventy years after their death.39Id. § 302(a) (granting a term of protection of lifetime of an author plus seventy years to any work created by an individual and not as a work made for hire). Such rights spring into existence for all original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, regardless of formalities. In subverting these default protections and the “permission culture”40See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity 8 (2004) (using the term “permission culture” to refer to the way in which heavy enforcement of intellectual property rights has impaired the ability of the public to create and share culture). that they serve and support, Creative Commons allowed authors to make their works available to the public to promote educational access and spur further creativity by increasing the pool of works from which others can freely build without the need for costly licenses. By ceding their works to the Creative Commons, creators opt into a different regime, where all rights are not reserved. Thus, under various Creative Commons licenses, they can make work available for use without payment for noncommercial purposes—to create new derivative works or for any purpose whatsoever.

The notable success of the Creative Commons and the particular manner in which it has operated illustrates two important points. First, millions of creators have deeded hundreds of millions of creative works to the Creative Commons.41See Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1935, 1980 (2014) (noting the existence of 172 million pages with Creative Commons licenses by fall 2008). As Eric E. Johnson has put it, this fact illustrates “the contemporary existence of an attitude held by at least a significant number of people that the full panoply of copyright entitlements is not important to them.”42Id. at 1980–81. As Jessica Silbey also notes, “To cultivate reputation, interviewees describe widely and freely sharing their work despite IP protection that controls access to maximize rent. IP’s blunt protections disserve the multifaceted and contextually specific nature of reputational interests.” Jessica Silbey, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property 151 (2015). Second, while many, but not all, authors want to stop infringement of their works, virtually all authors want attribution and the operation of the Creative Commons provides empirical support for this view. As the data collected over the past twenty years show, authors putting their work on the Creative Commons almost always choose to condition any use on one requirement: proper attribution.43See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1331, 1361 (2004) (finding that 2% of Creative Commons dedications do not require proper attribution as a condition of use); Glenn Otis Brown, Announcing (and Explaining) Our New 2.0 Licenses, Creative Commons (May 25, 2004), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216 [https://
perma.cc/E39L-WKRM] (noting that 97–98% of Creative Commons contributors chose to preserve their right to attribution). More recent data on Creative Commons licenses suggests that these numbers have remained relatively consistent over time. A 2014 report found that, while 76% of Creative Commons contributors allow uncompensated adaptations of their work and 58% allow commercial use of their works, just 4% waive attribution. See State of the Commons, Creative Commons (2014), https://
web.archive.org/web/20151104081140/https://stateof.creativecommons.org/report [https://perma.cc/
7QLK-K3M8]. Thus, while all Creative Commons licenses allow some kind of uses that might otherwise be infringing, 96% condition any use on attribution. See id.
For at least a certain set of creators, therefore, the right of attribution trumps the right of exploitation and the ability to receive license fees from the use of one’s works.

Even aside from the Creative Commons, the widespread sharing, rather than exclusive reservation, of intellectual property rights in many sectors illustrates the strong incentive social validation can play in promoting creative enterprise. Though long underappreciated in the intellectual property literature,44See Johnson, supra note 41, at 1937 (“Sharing is ubiquitous in our world, yet it is something of a wallflower in the scholarly literature.”). this widespread “non-market form of exchange,” characterized by sharing, is particularly attractive for an enormous body of works that may not enjoy clear-cut commercial profitability but are also not entirely valueless.45See id. at 1937–39. In these sharing regimes, such as open-source software licensing pools and microstock photography collections, pecuniary gain is largely forgone but, quite notably, attribution is retained and reputational satisfaction constitutes a key part of the value proposition for creators, as they derive “a feeling of satisfaction and a sense of social connectedness out of sharing.”46Id. at 1938; see also Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 41, 59 (2007) (arguing that “prestige, not money drives open-source production” and that “standard Free and Open-Source Software (F/OSS) licenses are characterized by a trade of standard copyright protections for authorial attribution”).

The thriving of the “sharing” economy and of the Creative Commons—where millions of creators are eager to opt out of the default protections of the Copyright Act, but only as long as they continue to receive recognition for their creative efforts—should come as no surprise. Indeed, recent experimental work has validated the intuition and experience that suggests that creators place significant weight on crediting and recognition. Notably, researchers Christopher Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, and Zachary Burns have conducted a series of empirical tests in mimic conditions of real-world bargaining meant to put a tangible monetary value on attribution rights. In the first experiment, they found that 180 casual photographers were, in the aggregate, willing to receive far less payment for publication of their work when it came with, rather than without, attribution.47Sprigman et al., supra note 36, at 1408–11. Indeed, subjects were willing to drop their payment demand by some 35% (from $202.26 to $132.28), on average, when attribution was provided. See id. These findings were even more pronounced in their second experiment, which involved professional and advanced amateur photographers.48See id. at 1415 (finding that “professional and advanced amateur photographers value attribution far more than do . . . casual snapshooters”). In short, these tests produced robust results, leading Sprigman, Buccafusco, and Burns to conclude that, on average, creators actually value attribution and the receipt of recognition for their work more than getting paid and that they are “willing to sacrifice financial benefits to obtain [attribution].”49Id. at 1417.

Beyond the valuable case study provided by Creative Commons and the experimental evidence that has quantitatively established the worth of crediting to authors, important qualitative ethnographic and observational work has also supported the stock that creators put in attribution. For example, in her comprehensive qualitative study of innovation, in which she conducted dozens of interviews with creatives and intellectual property professionals across a wide variety of industries,50Silbey’s ethnographic study is based on “fifty face-to-face interviews that [she] conducted with a wide range of scientists, engineers, musicians and artists, their business associates, and intellectual property lawyers over the course of four years. . . . [as] part of an effort to learn more about the intersection of intellectual property law on the one hand, and creative and innovative work on the other.” Silbey, supra note 42, at 4. Jessica Silbey concluded that attribution serves as a primary motivator for creative enterprise.51See id. at 149, 166–69 (2015) (detailing, among other things, how her interviewees would commonly refer to their creative or innovative output in familial terms (as offspring), as priceless, or as a key part of their identity).  As she notes, “[T]he interviews are replete with expressions of how attribution and integrity are crucial to the work’s optimal promotion and dissemination, whether or not for profit, because they safeguard and manage the development of professional identity and audience.”52Id. at 166. Similarly, in her sweeping survey on the legal and normative standards of attribution across a wide range of industries—including Hollywood, journalism, political speechwriting, software, advertising, graphic design, science, and medicine—Catherine Fisk has also documented the significant value creators place on crediting.53Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 Geo. L.J. 49 (2006). As she puts it, “Attribution is foundational to the modern economy” and, as such, “greater legal recognition of attribution rights is desirable.”54Id at 50, 52. 

       Finally, recent literature in the field of organizational behavior55See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1487, 1519 (2017). and psychology56See Onne Janssen, Job Demands, Perceptions of Effort-Reward Fairness and Innovative Work Behaviour, 73 J. Occupational & Organizational Psych. 287, 295 (2000). has emphasized the crucial role of crediting in nurturing innovation and promoting perceptions of fairness in creative environments. For example, Teresa Amabile, a leading theorist on creativity and innovation, has highlighted how proper credit allocation can motivate employees to work harder and enhance productivity.57Teresa Amabile & Steven Kramer, The Progress Principle: Using Small Wins to Ignite Joy, Engagement, and Creativity at Work 245 (2011). In short, a burgeoning body of work in the social sciences has strongly supported the intuition that crediting matters—a lot. 

C. The Societal Value of Attribution

But in focusing largely on the impact of attribution on creatives—both in the way that crediting incentivizes innovation and how it serves the dignitary interests of authors—this emerging literature has actually understated the case of attribution rights. Quite critically, attribution does not merely serve authorial interests. Rather, it also benefits other players in the marketplace for creative works and advances broader societal interests.58For example, in her taxonomy of attribution, Fisk identifies four functions served by crediting: (1) a non-monetary incentive to spur further creativity; (2) a mechanism by which to lay blame for failure; (3) a branding purpose that facilitates consumption decisions; and (4) a humanizing function for creative output. See Fisk, supra note 53. Three of these four functions—discipline, branding, and humanization—focus on the value that attribution provides to nonauthors.

First, crediting advances the efficacy of the marketplace, particularly in an information economy dominated by the production of intellectual property. Generally speaking, free and open exchange of relevant information facilitates the optimal functioning of markets by improving the efficiency of allocation decisions. Information about inputs, such as labor, guides the dedication of scarce resources. Crediting provides actionable data about labor involved in the production of intellectual property—data that are often onerous to divine elsewhere or without substantial additional cost. Indeed, “because it is difficult to measure worker knowledge directly in the way that the ability of the typists and machinists of the industrial economy could be tested simply by watching them perform a task,”59Id. at 50. credit is particularly valuable in an information economy. A reliable, accurate, and comprehensive crediting regime can therefore dramatically advance interests in the efficient allocation of resources in creative enterprises. Crediting, after all, provides vital information to financiers of those enterprises about the nature and quality of a particular author’s work.60To put it in reverse terms, crediting also promotes a “discipline” function—a mechanism by which to “allocate blame.” Id. at 61.

Secondly, crediting advances the interests of those who consume creative works and other forms of intellectual property. Authorship represents a form of branding akin to trademark, and accurate authorship labeling helps promote many of the basic goals of the trademark regime, which serves consumers (and not just authors) by “reduc[ing] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions” and “help[ing] assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”61Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1373 n.1 (2005) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)). Heymann has highlighted the value that a meaningful crediting regime provides to even nonauthors. Instead of calling for an attribution right that recognizes an inherent moral right authors might have in proper attribution, she calls for what she dubs “authornymic” attribution, the recognition of crediting for the sake of “organizational integrity”—a “reader-centered” law that ensures that “reader responses [to creative works] will be informed and minimizes the likelihood of confusion a consumer of creative commodities might otherwise experience.”62Id. at 1446. In this way, she argues, a law of attribution is vital to supporting “efficient literary consumers” who can have “some confidence that the works that we read—and later draw on for our own creative activity—are situated within a coherent literary structure.”63Id. at 1448–49.

Thirdly, an attribution regime can also promote public respect for intellectual property law. It does so in at least two different ways. As Stephanie Plamondon Bair argues in her study of the role of fairness in copyright law, when we align copyright law more closely with public perceptions of equity, we heighten the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of society.64See Plamondon Bair, supra note 55, at 1507 (“Given the widespread belief that fairness plays a role in intellectual property law, we may add efficiency to our system by openly acknowledging this role.”). Given the strong popular support for the norm of attribution, a copyright system that protects crediting rights bolsters respect for the regime itself. Separately, the act of putting a real face (or, at least name) behind creative works humanizes them and can help buttress support for the intellectual property rights that protect them. As Catherine Fisk explains, such a task is particularly important “[i]n a world of corporate production, and in particular skepticism about corporate production.”65Fisk, supra note 53, at 65. After all, it is no secret why corporate interest groups bring relatable artists to the forefront when making pitches for greater protection and rights enforcement, especially in the war on piracy—even when those artists are not the real rightsholders.66Some might criticize this practice as blatant masquerading, akin to massive agricultural conglomerates using family farmers to put a sympathetic face on their efforts to lobby Congress for agricultural subsidies. On the other hand, in some instances, the protections sought by entertainment companies can inure to the benefit of individual artists as well. When the music industry sought to apply pressure to Google to provide more favorable use fees for the exploitation of music on YouTube, it had the likes of Taylor Swift and U2 sign off to an open letter that was used to drum up public support for the cause and to lobby Congress for reform.67See Peter Kafka, The Music Industry Signs Up Taylor Swift and U2 in Its Fight Against YouTube, Vox (June 20, 2016, 5:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/20/11974514/taylor-swift-youtube-dmca-music-letter [https://perma.cc/2HGK-FCKE]. The letter also sought to increase public awareness of the role of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) (and, in particular, its safe harbor) in the current situation and to lay the foundation for congressional reform:

[The DMCA] was written and passed in an era that is technologically out-of-date compared to the era in which we live. It has allowed major tech companies to grow and generate huge profits by creating ease of use for consumers to carry out almost every recorded song in history in their pocket via a smartphone, while songwriters’ and artists’ earnings continue to diminish.

Anthony Ha, Taylor Swift and Other Big Names Join the Music Industry’s Campaign Against YouTube, TechCrunch (June 20, 2016, 2:33 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/20/taylor-swift-dmca-letter [https://perma.cc/JSU6-9NUG] (quoting the letter). And when the Motion Picture Association (“MPA”) sought an alternative to an unpopular litigation campaign against piracy, it put together testimonial advertisements that highlighted the ways in which piracy hurt those people whom we only know as lines at the end of the credit roll.68See Patrick Goldstein, Hollywood Deals with Piracy, A Wary Eye on CDs, L.A. Times
(Sept. 9, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-sep-09-et-gold9-story.html [https://perma.cc/6L3K-9GSR] (detailing the anti-piracy campaign by the MPA and noting the role of David Goldstein, a set painter, in the spots).
Thus, attribution promotes the very operation of the intellectual property regime by giving it a human face that legitimizes the sometimes impersonal and intangible rules it enforces. In an era where digital technology has made mass piracy on a global scale all too easy, this function is perhaps of greater value now than ever before.

All told, therefore, our common sense tells us that crediting is deeply important to authors, a position backed by the emerging social science literature on the subject. Meanwhile, a proper attribution regime also has critical benefits to the efficient functioning of the marketplace for creative works and thus has strong benefits for consumers and investors as well. Despite all of this, however, as we have alluded to, the law provides shockingly little protection for crediting rights. This state of affairs that has grown particularly dim in the past two decades in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar, a subject to which we now turn. 

II.  THE LAW’S SIZEABLE CREDITING GAP

A.  Dastar and the Decline of Crediting Law

Although we have established the important value of attribution—to creators, investors, and the public as a whole—we are left with a strange conundrum: the law of crediting is surprisingly thin and underdeveloped. Indeed, it is counterintuitively so, as the wholesale absence of any broad law of attribution runs counter to the assumptions of many in the creative community. As Silbey reported for her survey of artists and authors, “Many interviewees were stunned to learn that copyright law does not require attribution or prohibit misattribution.”69Silbey, supra note 46, at 146.

That said, for a period of time in the recent past, rightsholders enjoyed one particular means of crediting protection: a direct vehicle for legal redress when their creative works were being used by others without proper attribution. Specifically, a line of case law had emerged that considered improper crediting of someone else’s work as one’s own to constitute a “false designation of origin . . . or false or misleading representation” actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.7015 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). In these cases, courts found that, in the words of Thomas McCarthy, the Lanham Act “has progressed far beyond the old concept of fraudulent passing off, to encompass any form of competition or selling which contravenes society’s current concepts of ‘fairness.’ ”712 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25.1, at 170 (1973). Such a capacious reading of the Lanham Act allowed for recognition of a cause of action for reverse passing off—when someone passes off the goods or services of another as their own—and, therefore, provided a viable claim for their failure to provide credit.

In 1981, this reading of the Lanham Act received the blessing of the Ninth Circuit for the first time, a move that propelled it to widespread acceptance. In Smith v. Montoro, the Ninth Circuit held that the failure to credit an actor for his role in the movie Convoy Buddies (and, in fact, the substitution of his name with that of another actor in both the film credits and advertising material), constituted reverse passing off under section 43(a).72Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 606–07 (9th Cir. 1981). As a matter of public policy, the court opined, such conduct was “wrongful” in that “the originator of the misidentified product is involuntarily deprived of the advertising value of its name and of the goodwill that otherwise would stem from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfactory product.”73Id. at 607. The court recognized that was particularly the case in the film industry:

[B]ig box office names are built, in part, through being prominently featured in popular films and by receiving appropriate recognition in film credits and advertising. Since actors’ fees for pictures, and indeed, their ability to get any work at all, is often based on the drawing power their name may be expected to have at the box office, being accurately credited for films in which they have played would seem to be of critical importance in enabling actors to sell their “services,” i.e., their performances.

Id. The Montoro decision proved widely influential, and within a few short years, federal courts throughout the country were entertaining attribution-related claims under section 43(a) for reverse passing off.74See John T. Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 709, 717–20 (1997) (detailing the explosion of cases allowing reverse passing off claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act following the Ninth Circuit’s Montoro decision and the application of such claims to myriad artistic works, including musical compositions, sound recordings, books, scripts, and, quite bizarrely, dolls). But all of that changed in 2003 when the Supreme Court announced its decision in Dastar.75See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).

It was in the shadow of Montoro and its progeny that the Dastar controversy began. To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of World War II, Dastar Corporation had decided to put out a new video set titled World War II Campaigns in Europe. The collection made extensive, but unauthorized, use of a television series based on President Dwight Eisenhower’s book, Crusade in Europe.76Specifically, Dastar took the original series, edited it down to “slightly more than half” its original length and then “substituted a new opening sequence, credit page, and final closing . . . ; inserted new chapter-title sequences and narrated chapter introductions; moved the ‘recap’ in the Crusade television series to the beginning and retitled it as a ‘preview’; and removed references to and images of the book.” Id. at 26–27. Twentieth Century Fox had owned the copyrights to this program until it had inadvertently forgotten to renew them and the show fell into the public domain.77Id. at 26. Released in 1949, the series had a twenty-eight year copyright term under the 1909 Copyright Act, meaning that failure to timely renew the work by 1977 would result in its ceding to the public domain. As a result, Fox could not sue Dastar for infringement of its Crusade in Europe television series to prevent publication and distribution of World War II Campaigns in Europe.78That said, Fox did try to claim that the Dastar video set violated the rights to the original Eisenhower book upon which the Crusade in Europe television series was based, which allegedly remained under copyright protection. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Ent. Distrib., 34 F. App’x 312, 314 (9th Cir. 2002); Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 n.2. So, like many other entities who have lost their erstwhile rights in one of our intellectual property regimes, Fox turned to a neighboring intellectual property regime upon which to rest its claims.79See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26–27 (2001) (drawing on trademark law to raise infringement claims against an imitator of a plaintiff’s dual spring mechanism for road signs when the plaintiff’s patent in said system had expired). It made a Lanham Act claim instead.

The procedural posture of the case was unusual and suggested something significant was afoot by the time it got to the Supreme Court. Both the district court and Ninth Circuit upheld the reverse passing off claim. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit thought so little of the issue’s weight overall significance that the decision was unpublished. The Supreme Court, of course, typically grants certiorari to only a tiny fraction of cases; so, it certainly raised eyebrows when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a seemingly routine and mundane decision that the Ninth Circuit did not even bother to designate for publication.80See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) (granting certiorari to unpublished Ninth Circuit decision in Twentieth Century Fox, 34 F. App’x 312). The action presaged the Court’s view that the unpublished decision from the Ninth Circuit missed something fundamental and significant, about which the Court appeared ready to opine.

In its decision, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit and rejected Fox’s attempt to use a Lanham Act claim for false designation of origin as a means of preventing Dastar’s reproduction of an audiovisual work (to which Fox had previously owned the copyright) that had fallen into the public domain.81Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 at 38. In so holding, the Court warned against the risk of creating a “species of mutant” intellectual property protection that would impede the public’s right to make unfettered use of creative works that no longer enjoy copyright protection.82Id. at 34.

As the old saw goes, hard facts make bad law. Fox’s gambit to eschew the “limited times” requirement in copyright law by ginning up trademark claims against Dastar struck a nerve with the Court, and the case came before it at a particularly opportune time (as far as Dastar was concerned). As Justin Hughes points out, the close proximity of the Dastar decision to the holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft83See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). suggests that that the former may have intentionally served as a “2003 Term counterweight” to the latter,84Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 Utah L. Rev. 659, 685. which rejected concerns about the public domain in declining to find a twenty-year extension of copyright terms unconstitutional.85Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208, 218. Indeed, concerns about aggrieved former rightsholders, like Fox, attempting to circumvent copyright’s careful calibrated balance between private protection and public access expressly animated the Dastar decision. Specifically, the Court sought to thwart future efforts by lapsed copyright holders to make disingenuous use of trademark law to assert monopolistic control over the exploitation of works that had fallen into the public domain, in contravention of the very intent of the copyright regime and its (constitutionally mandated) policy of allowing ownership over creative works to eventually expire so that the public may make free use of them.86Notably, the Dastar Court was not the first to recognize this problem. Decades earlier, Judge Learned Hand had flagged this issue. See Capitol Recs., Inc. v. Mercury Recs. Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664–68 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting). In a prescient 1955 dissent in a suit between Capitol and Mercury Records, id., Hand cautioned against the use of unfair competition law to achieve copyright-like protection that would “grant to an author a perpetual monopoly” over works in a way that would circumvent their eventual and proper dedication to the public domain, id. at 666–67; see also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting Hand’s concern over “allow[ing] unfair competition protection where Congress has not given federal protection . . . in effect granting state copyright benefits without the federal limitations of time to permit definite public domain use”). Hand’s concern was not merely the injury to reasonable investment-backed expectations and commerce, but also the broadside such legal machinations represented to public access to creative works and the exercise of attendant First Amendment rights.

Thus, under Dastar, the Supreme Court found that reference to “origins of goods” in the Lanham Act could not be read to mean the authorial origins of a work; instead, it referred only to the physical source of the embodiment of that work in tangible products.87Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31–32. As the Court rationalized, the reference to “origin of goods” in section 43(a) was “incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such an extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and inconsistent with precedent.”88Id. at 32. So, even if Dastar had failed to give proper credit to the intellectual source(s) of the materials contained in its video collection, this did not, and could not, constitute a violation under the Lanham Act. All that mattered for the purposes of the section 43(a) was that there was not false designation of the origin of the actual physical video collection. Since Dastar literally published and distributed the video collection, self-attribution was entirely proper as far as the Lanham Act was concerned. As such, Fox had no actionable claim for false designation of origin. 

At the same time, however, the Court’s holding reached broader than necessary to achieve the laudable goal of protecting the public domain. By grounding its ruling in a reading of the Lanham Act that definitively excluded the intellectual wellspring of a product from the meaning of “origin,” the Court precluded attribution claims under section 43(a) for all creative works. Thus, in the past two decades, courts have generally rejected all such claims, whether they apply to public domain works (as in Dastar) or works still under copyright protection (unlike Dastar).89See Jane C. Ginsburg, Moral Rights in the U.S.: Still in Need of a Guardian Ad Litem, 30 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 73, 81 (2012) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Moral Rights]; Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 263, 268 n.17 (2004) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Right to Claim Authorship] (“Federal district court decisions subsequent to Dastar have declined to limit that decision’s impact to copyright-expired works.”); Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 111, 113 (2005) (noting that, although “the Dastar Court seemed particularly solicitous of the public domain,” its interpreting progeny has “not, however, confined the ruling to public domain materials” and, in the process, has significantly diminished “[w]hatever protections to the right to claim authorship of one’s works that the Lanham Act formerly provided”). In the process, therefore, Dastar eliminated relief for those seeking remediation of a harm quite distinct from unlawful reproduction, distribution, display, or performance of a creative work: the act of not giving credit to its original author. In one fell swoop, “the Court swept away close to twenty-five years of precedent that held that failure to give credit to an entertainment product such as a film or song, or providing misleading credit, was a violation of trademark law.”90K.J. Greene, Trademark Law and Racial Subordination: From Marketing of Stereotypes to Norms of Authorship, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 431, 442 (2008).

In part, two other concerns can explain and warrant broader application of the holding to all creative works, not just ones in the public domain. First, the Court noted the difficult position that an attribution-related reverse passing off claim could put manufacturers of products containing creative works. “On the one hand,” notes the Court, “they would face Lanham Act liability for failing to credit the creator of a work on which their lawful copies are based; and on the other hand they could face Lanham Act liability for crediting the creator if that should be regarded as implying the creator’s ‘sponsorship or approval’ of the copy.”91Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)). In other words, if Dastar had put out its video set and kept the original credits to Fox, Fox could have sued Dastar for violating the Lanham Act for direct passing off by suggesting that Fox sponsored or approved Dastar’s product. Meanwhile, because it had removed Fox’s name, Dastar now faced a claim for failure to attribute under a theory of reverse passing off. If the Court had affirmed the availability of an attribution-related passing off claims, the resulting quagmire could stifle the use of works—both those in the public domain (for which no licensing is required) and for those still under copyright protection (when lawful copyright clearance might leave a licensee subject to exposure for a Lanham Act violation). 

Second, the Court raised its concern that an attribution requirement could leave distributors of copyright content with a duty to credit that might grow impossibly burdensome and impractical. The opinion put a fine point on the scope of crediting that a broader reading of section 43(a)’s “designation of origin” reference would compel by assessing the type of attribution that might be required to distribute the film Carmen Jones. As the Court posited, to avoid liability for reversing passing off under Montoroand its progeny, a distributor might have to give attribution “not just to MGM, but to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the musical was based), and to Prosper Mérimée (who wrote the novel on which the opera was based).”92Id. at 35. Determining origin could amount to a complicated task. To illustrate this point, the Court turned no further than the case at hand, opining that

[w]hile Fox might have a claim to being in the line of origin, its involvement with the creation of the television series was limited at best. Time, Inc., was the principal, if not the exclusive, creator, albeit under arrangement with Fox. And of course it was neither Fox nor Time, Inc., that shot the film used in the Crusade television series. Rather, that footage came from the United States Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and unidentified ‘Newsreel Pool Cameramen.’ If anyone has a claim to being the original creator of the material used in both the Crusade television series and the Campaigns videotapes, it would be those groups, rather than Fox.93Id.

Interestingly, the Court’s language on this issue referred only to the context of uncopyrighted works, noting that “[w]ithout a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word ‘origin’ has no discernable limits.”94Id. But unless the reference to uncopyrighted works meant works that had never enjoyed copyright protection in the first place, it is unclear why this problem would be greater with once-copyrighted works that have fallen out of the public domain as opposed to works still under copyright protection. 

While these rationales offer substantive justification to eliminate attribution-related reverse passing off claims through the Lanham Act in all instances—not just claims relating to public domain works—the holding in Dastar was not without its significant problems. First, Dastar suffered a seemingly significant incongruity with the purpose of the federal trademark regime. If the goal of the Lanham Act is, indeed, consumer protection, the Supreme Court’s central holding in Dastar—that the Lanham Act’s reference to origin means the source of an actual physical product and not the wellspring of the idea or intellectual property embodied in a particular product—fails to reflect the reality of what factors animate consumer behavior, particularly with respect to intellectual property. Crediting is not just important to authors; it is vital the public’s decision-making process when it comes to consuming entertainment content. As Mary LaFrance has pointed out, contrary to the ultimate thrust of Dastar, which held that trademark law only protects against misidentification of the maker of the actual product rather than the ideas behind it, 

in the case of literary works or entertainment works, the identity of the actual author, performer, or creative overseer may frequently be more crucial to the consumer’s purchasing decision, than the identity of the party that manufactured the physical embodiment [because] the identity of key creative participants is often viewed as a source indicator that is an important predictor of the quality or content of the goods.95Mary LaFrance, When You Wish Upon Dastar: Creative Provenance and the Lanham Act, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 197, 235 (2005). 

Indeed, Dastar creates an unusual result for physical products containing intellectual property, as it provides protection to the designation of origin about which consumers arguably care the least. To put a finer point on it, consumers do not care if the movie they are watching was printed on Kodak film or released by Warner Brothers; they care about the fact that it was directed by Martin Scorsese or written by Charlie Kaufman. Readers do not care about whether Random House or Harper Collins was responsible for the paper and ink on which a book appears; they care about whether the book was written by J.K. Rowling or Thomas Pynchon. Music listeners do not care if the album was issued by SubPop or Merge Records; they care about whether it contains performances by Spoon or The Mountain Goats. The disconnect between the law’s protections and this reality could not be more stark or problematic.

Most importantly, for a large swath of creatives, Dastar all but eliminated hope for securing crediting rights through legal claims.96There have been a few outlier decisions that have at least entertained the possibility that Dastar did not kill all attempts to vindicate attribution rights. In Gensler v. Strabala, for example, the Seventh Circuit left possible room for attribution claims based on Gensler’s clever recharacterization of its claim as about designation of origin for services, rather than an intangible good. Gensler v. Strabala, 764 F.3d 735, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2014). But commentators such as Mark McKenna and Lucas Osborn have argued that such a distinction is unavailing, in that it “depends on a mischaracterization of Dastar.” Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1425, 1436 (2017); see also Masck v. Sports Illustrated, No. 13-10226, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81677, at *9 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2013) (refusing to grant a motion to dismiss a misattribution claim on the basis of the Dastar because the court was “not ready . . . to conclude that Plaintiff’s photo [was] an intangible item” and not a tangible good, to which the Lanham Act’s definition of origin would apply). Admittedly, the Supreme Court took pains to caution that its decision had not necessarily eliminated all means to vindicate attribution rights and that Dastar did not speak to alternative causes of action to enforce crediting under common, state, and federal law, including other theories (such as false advertising) available under the Lanham Act. But as one practitioner euphemistically noted in the wake of Dastar, the remaining options relied on “creative lawyering.”97Mortensen, supra note 22. This turned out to be shorthand for shots in the dark that have little chance of working. For as we shall analyze in great detail infra, Dastar marked a significant inflection point in the state of attribution rights—significantly curtailing (if not altogether eliminating) the ability of most creators to receive credit under the law.98See, e.g., Ginsburg, Right to Claim Authorship, supra note 89, at 266 (noting that Dastar “drastically limited invocation of the trademarks law to enforce authors’ interests in being recognized as the creators of their works” and giving the “(despondent) answer that in the United States neither the copyright nor the trademarks laws establish a right of attribution generally applicable to all creators of all types of works of authorship”).

B.  The State of Crediting Rights in the Two Decades Since Dastar

In his post-Dastar assessment of the state of attribution rights written in 2007, Justin Hughes argued that the crediting gap left by Dastar was not as wide as commonly believed. “[I]f we work through all the possibilities, the practical hole created by Dastar may be operatively modest,” he contended.99Hughes, supra note 84, at 699. 

Dastar creates a gap in protection for those works and circumstances where there is a failure of appropriate attribution and no cause of action under VARA, under state moral rights laws, under 17 U.S.C. § 1202 for failure to include copyright management information, or under state unfair competition laws in states where the courts hold that Dastarshould not control, and where contract law does not establish a framework to protect attribution.100Id. at 699–700. 

Hughes’s assessment has proven excessively sanguine, unfortunately. Although the legal theories to which he cited as alternative bases for protection may be numerous in quantity, they are qualitatively impoverished and provide scant (if any) relief in the vast majority of situations. Moreover, in the nearly two decades since Dastar, the significant size of the credit gap has become manifest as the jurisprudence of the intervening years has made clear how little bite these alternative legal theories provide for the vindication of crediting interests.

1.  False Advertising Claims Under the Lanham Act

The very cause of action to which the Supreme Court cited as continuing to provide attribution protection post-Dastar—the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false advertising or misrepresentations of fact—has proven feeble in this regard. While Dastarexpressly foreclosed the possibility of attribution-related claims under section 43(a)(1)(A), it did not altogether eliminate the ability to vindicate crediting rights under the Lanham Act. Since the Dastar holding only opined as to the meaning of “origin” in the statute (which is invoked in section 43(a)(1)(A), referring to “confusion . . . as to the origin”),10115 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). remaining provisions of the Lanham Act that did not employ that word could still have application to attribution-related issues. This was true for the Lanham Act’s cause of action for false advertising that, under section 43(a)(1)(B), created liability for anyone who “misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities . . . of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities.”102Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B). In fact, Dastar expressly pointed to this provision as one ground for relief that may still be possible following the decision. As the Court noted, 

If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite different from that series, then one or more of the respondents might have a cause of action—not for reverse passing off under the “confusion . . . as to the origin” provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the “misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities” provision of § 43(a)(1)(B).103Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38. 

That said, such a path has proven less than promising and the Court’s supposition that such relief might be forthcoming has proven too optimistic, at best—or disingenuous, at worst. First, despite Dastar’s seemingly express exhortations to the contrary, subsequent courts have found that the holding in Dastar actually prevents both section 43(a)(1)(A) and section 43(a)(1)(B) claims on similar facts.104For example, in Agence France Presse v. Morel, a district court found that “the allegations supporting Morel’s false advertising claim are identical to those supporting his false representation claim. The import of Dastar that an author’s recourse for unauthorized use is in copyright cannot be avoided by shoe-horning a claim into section 43(a)(1)(B) rather than 43(a)(1)(A).” Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). That said, McKenna has argued that such holdings have “gone too far in barring all false advertising claims.” Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. Intell. Prop. L. 357, 378 (2012). Second, and more fundamentally, false advertising claims face additional hurdles not present in an attribution claim under section 43(a)(1)(A). These impediments would be difficult for most plaintiffs seeking vindication of an attribution right to clear. For example, many courts require competitor standing to bring a false advertising suit. Until the Supreme Court recently broke a circuit split, false advertising claims were, in many circuits, per se limited to commercial “actual” (direct?) competitors.105Virginia E. Scholtes, The Lexmark Test for False Advertising Standing: When Two Prongs Don’t Make a Right, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1023, 1034–35 (2015) (noting and detailing the three-way circuit split (balancing test, direct competitor test, and reasonable interest test) on standing for false advertising claim prior to Lexmark). Even now, standing remains a significant issue. As the Supreme Court noted in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., false advertising plaintiffs must show that they “fall within the zone of interests” protected by the statute and must have suffered a harm proximately caused as a result of the act of false advertising.106Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129–31 (2014). But to fall within the zone of interests, the plaintiff must “allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.”107Id. at 132. Since consumers typically do not lose sales or suffer an injury to reputation, the new standard makes it exceedingly unlikely that consumers can bring a false advertising claim. While plaintiffs need not be direct competitors anymore to bring a claim under section 43(a)(1)(B), they still generally need to be competitors of some sort. 

Finally, false advertising is actionable under section 43(a)(1)(B) if and only if the statement is false on its face or the misrepresentation is material, that is, relied upon in consumers’ purchasing decision.108Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2007); Turbon Int’l, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 769 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that to be actionable under section 43(a)(1)(B), “[t]he misrepresentation must be ‘material,’ in that it would influence consumers’ purchasing decisions”). This consumer reliance requirement makes eminent sense for false advertising claims, but it makes less sense when dealing with issues of attribution which should be, first and foremost, about vindicating the rights of authors to receive credit for their works rather than rights of the public from being deceived in material consumption decisions. Moreover, while the most famous and acclaimed of authors may survive such a materiality requirement, the vast majority will have a far more difficult time. 

2.  Attribution Claims Under the Visual Artists Rights Act

On the surface, VARA would appear to provide significant protection for the attribution rights of authors. Codified in section 106A of the Copyright Act, VARA offers creators an independent cause of action “to claim authorship of [their] work,” and “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create.”10917 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A)–(B). VARA claims are eligible for recovery of both statutory damages and attorneys’ fees and, to make matters even better for putative plaintiffs, unlike for infringement claims, an author does not even need to timely register the work in question as a condition for these remedies.110Id. § 412 (providing that “[i]n any action under this title, other than an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under section 106A(a) . . . no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be made” if the infringement occurred before registration, unless registration occurred within three months after first publication of the work (emphasis added)). Thus, a cursory examination of VARA might elicit hope for the vindication of crediting. But a closer look reveals just how profoundly limited the rights under VARA are. 

First, as the very name of the legislation makes clear, VARA’s attribution rights only encompass works of visual art.111Id. § 106A. “Visual arts” are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. As such, the Act fails to apply to large swaths of subject matter otherwise protectible under the Copyright Act, including writings, music, and other important works. But the limits do not end there, as the attribution right does not even attach to all forms of art that might be characterized as visual in nature. Rather, the statute covers only paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs created for exhibition purposes only.112Id. § 101. It therefore excludes the most commercially important of visual art—film.113Id. § 101 (“A work of visual art does not include . . . any . . . motion picture or other audiovisual work.”). It also does not apply to any “poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, . . . book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication” or any “merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container.”114Id. In addition, all works made for hire fall entirely outside of VARA’s protections.115Id. (“A work of visual art does not include . . . any work made for hire.”). Finally, for the narrow category of visual art works to which VARA might apply, the attribution right only attaches to original versions of those works or limited editions thereof issued in sets of “200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.”116Id. At the end of the day, therefore, VARA’s attribution right only applies to a limited set of visual art works that are not prepared as works made for hire. In short, VARA provides no crediting protection for the vast majority of authors.

3.  Falsification and Removal/Alteration of Copyright Management Information Claims Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

Introduced into law with the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998 (“DMCA”), the provisions of the Copyright Act that make it unlawful to falsify, alter, or remove copyright management information, which includes any authorship and copyright ownership data accompanying a work,117Id. § 1202(c)(2)–(3) (including, as copyright management information, “[t]he name of, and other identifying information about, the author of a work” and “[t]he name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of copyright” when “conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work”). would seemingly serve as a powerful vehicle to vindicate attribution rights. But while these provisions—codified in 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (“section 1202”)—constitute the sole protection granted to authorship information in all (rather than VARA’s narrow subset of) copyrighted works, their reach is deliberately constrained. Among other things, the structure of the two causes of action provided under section 1202—a claim for falsification of copyright management information (“CMI”)118Id. § 1202(a). and a claim for removal or alteration of CMI119Id. § 1202(b)(1).—makes clear that the protections therein are subservient to the goal of fighting infringement and not any inherent value that may come from crediting. In other words, the guiding principle behind section 1202 is preventing further infringement, not vindicating an author’s very real, but potential separate, interest in crediting. As such, section 1202 fails to provide a meaningful right to crediting for authors.

Specifically, a claim for falsification of CMI requires that plaintiffs show that defendants “knowingly and with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement . . . provide[d] copyright management information that is false.”120Id. § 1202(a). Similarly, a claim for removal/alteration of CMI requires that plaintiffs show that defendants “intentionally remove[d] or alter[ed] copyright management information . . . knowing, or . . . having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement.”121Id. § 1202(b)(1). Thus, both falsification and removal/alteration claims have a strict double scienter requirement that necessitates plaintiffs demonstrate that defendants acted with a particular mens rea—that is, knowingly and with intent to facilitate infringement. 

This onerous scienter requirement is significant in at least three ways. First, it contrasts markedly from the complete absence of any scienter requirement in matters of direct copyright infringement.122Secondary liability is another matter. Knowledge is an essential element of any claim for contributory liability. See A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “contributory liability requires that a secondary infringer ‘know or have reason to know’ of direct infringement” (citations omitted)). Specifically, infringement has always been a strict liability tort,123It is an axiomatic principle of copyright law that infringement constitutes a strict liability tort. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663, 678 n.21 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (“Copyright infringement, however, is at its core a strict liability cause of action, and copyright law imposes liability even in the absence of an intent to infringe the rights of the copyright holder.”); Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong in the sense that a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability in order to prevail.”); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting copyright infringement “is a strict liability tort”); Gener-Villar v Adcom Grp., Inc, 509 F. Supp 2d 177, 124 (D.P.R. 2007) (“[T]he Copyright Act is a strict liability regime under which any infringer, whether innocent or intentional, is liable.”). where a defendant’s state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the issue of liability.124Although state of mind never impacts the liability calculus for direct infringement claims, it can impact damages awards. While actual damages are not mitigated in any way by a defense of innocent infringement, statutory damages can be. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Even an innocent infringer is liable for infringement. . . . Innocence is only significant to a trial court when it fixes statutory damages, which is a remedy equitable in nature.”); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 133, 182–83 (2007) (noting the declining value of the innocent infringement defense through the course of American copyright history). By sharp distinction, to prevail on an attribution claim through section 1202, a plaintiff must meet not one but two (if not three125One might argue that section 1202 actually has a triple scienter requirement, as the knowledge component has two independent criteria that must be met: “(1) knowledge of the existence of copyright management information, and (2) knowledge that the copyright management information has been removed or altered.” Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 939 (C.D. Cal. 2018).) showings on the defendants’ state of mind. 

Second, by conditioning attribution relief on an intent to facilitate infringement, section 1202 firmly grounds its protections in service of the fight against infringement rather than any broad vindication of crediting rights. This position is further buttressed by the fact that section 1202 only protects CMI that is “conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work.”12617 U.S.C. § 1202(c). Furthermore, some courts have even read the legislative history and intent behind section 1202 to preclude application of falsification and removal/alternation claims to nondigital works.127See, e.g., Textile Secrets Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that section 1202 was not “intended to apply to circumstances that have no relation to the Internet, electronic commerce, automated copyright protections or management systems, public registers, or other technological measures or processes as contemplated in the DMCA as a whole”); IQ Grp., Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding that section 1202 “should not be construed to cover copyright management performed by people, which is covered by the Copyright Act, as it preceded the DMCA; it should be construed to protect copyright management performed by the technological measures of automated systems”). But see Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the logic of IQ Group and Textile Secrets and holding that section 1202 claims are “not restricted to the content of ‘automated copyright protection or management systems’ ” and “potentially lie[] whenever [CMI] is falsified or removed, regardless of the form in which that [CMI] is conveyed,” whether digital or not). According to the logic of these courts, section 1202’s primary purpose—fighting the scourge of piracy in the online environment because of the unique ease of digital infringement—compels such a limitation on section 1202 claims. Such a position, however, leaves attribution rights outside of the digital environment unaddressed.

Third, and relatedly, the dual scienter requirement makes it extraordinarily difficult to prevail on a section 1202 claim. To state a cognizable removal/alteration claim, for example, a plaintiff must demonstrate that either a work “came into Defendant’s possession with CMI attached, and Defendant intentionally and improperly removed it” or a work “came into Defendant’s possession without CMI attached, but Defendant knew that CMI had been improperly removed, and Defendant used the [work] anyway.”128Merideth v. Chi. Trib. Co., No. 12 C 7961, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2346, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2014). A plaintiff may be unable to show how or in what form a work came into the defendant’s possession in the first place129This is particularly true pre-discovery and yet, with the “plausibility” pleading standards of Iqbal and Twombly, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007), courts will routinely dismiss section 1202 claims at the Rule 12 stage—prior to allowing discovery, see, e.g., Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of section 1202 removal claim on the grounds that the complaint failed to identify specific instances where the original photograph which the defendant accessed contained CMI and where said CMI was then removed by the defendant). and, even if they can, it is rare to have sufficient evidence showing that the removal/alteration was specifically with the intent to facilitate infringement. For example, an erroneous belief about the copyright status of an image can preclude a finding of the knowledge required to state a claim under section 1202.130See, e.g., Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd., v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23052, at *45 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004) (holding that a plaintiff’s subjective belief that the disputed work was not under copyright protection precluded imposition of liability under section 1202). Meanwhile, even intentionally cropping out a copyright notice from an image is insufficient to meet the intent to facilitate requirement.131See, e.g., William Wade Waller Co. v. Nexstar Broad., Inc., No. 4-10-CV-00764 GTE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72803, at *12–13 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2011) (granting summary judgment to the defendants on a section 1202 claim since the intentional cropping of a copyright notice from an image was insufficient to show that the defendant had acted with intent to “induce, enable, facilitate or conceal infringement”).

Not surprisingly, therefore, CMI claims are frequently adjudicated as a matter of law based on the failure to adequately make even a threshold showing of knowledge and intent.132See, e.g., Chevrestt v. Am. Media, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 629, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss since “there are no factual allegations supporting an inference that [the defendant]’s CMI alteration or removal was done intentionally”); Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1052–53 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s section 1202 claims on the grounds that “[the p]laintiffs present no evidence that [the defendant] intentionally removed CMI” and that “[the p]laintiffs fail to provide any evidence that [the defendant] knew or had reasonable grounds to know that the removal of CMI in the metadata would lead to copyright infringement”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (granting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s section 1202 claims on the grounds that, inter alia, “[the p]laintiff has not offered any evidence showing [the d]efendant’s actions were intentional, rather than merely an unintended side effect”). Consider, for example, the difficulties that an author might face in bringing a section 1202 claim even against someone who both knowingly and intentionally crops an image to cut out the authorship information. Even assuming such authorship information qualifies as actionable CMI, there are myriad reasons (that may have nothing to do with the concealing of infringement) to crop out such authorship information. Among other things, the person making use of the image could claim to have cropped the images for aesthetic purposes, because of inherent space limitations for the usage, or without any idea that they were removing CMI.133Cf. Sid Avery & Assocs., Inc. v. Pixels.com, LLC, 479 F. Supp. 3d 859, 870–71 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that allowing contributors to place watermarks containing false CMI on images contained on a network was insufficient to form the basis for section 1202 claim against the network operator since the allowance of such watermarks could be for reasons other than to “induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement”). In all of these instances, authors may have legitimate, if not strong, interests in seeing uses of their work include attribution. Yet they would be unactionable under section 1202.

4.  Attribution Rights Under State Unfair Competition Law and Other Common Law Theories.

Although there was initially some optimism about attribution rights remaining available under state law post-Dastar, such hopes have proven misplaced. First, in many states, such as California, courts have interpreted unfair competition protections as coextensive with the Lanham Act. Thus, if Dastar renders attribution claims no longer viable under the Lanham Act, such claims must necessarily also fail under state unfair competition law.134See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting a reverse passing off claim related to failure to attribute on the grounds that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state law unfair competition claims are ‘congruent’ with Lanham Act claims” and that Dastar precludes such a claim under the Lanham Act). In California, although state unfair competition law mirrors federal law in terms of liability, remedies can differ. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (providing for the availability of punitive damages for any torts under state law, such as unfair competition, when the defendant acts with oppression, fraud, or malice). Second, in the wake of Dastar, both Tom Bell135Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 Md. L. Rev. 206, 232 (2006). and Michael Landau136Michael Landau, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 273, 304–05 (2005). suggested that copyright preemption issues raised by the decision could preclude use of state or common law theories to protect attribution rights. These predictions turned out to be correct, as courts have regularly read Dastar in such a manner.137By 2007, the Southern District of New York had no compunction about declaring that “[i]t is well-settled that a claim for reverse passing off predicated on the theory that defendant’s product replicates plaintiff’s expressions contains no extra element and is therefore preempted.” Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 579, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). This state of affairs continues to this day. See, e.g., Shepard v. Eur. Pressphoto Agency, 291 F. Supp. 3d 465, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that an unfair competition claim that the defendants misrepresented the plaintiff’s photos as their own was preempted); Ryoo Dental, Inc. v. Han, No. SACV 12-308-JLS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (holding that state law false advertising and unfair competition claims against a defendant for copying a website and passing it off as his own work constitutes a reverse passing off claim that is preempted, per Dastar, by federal copyright law); Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (expressly rejecting a claim for “reverse palming off” of certain house design plans under state unfair competition as “preempted by the Copyright Act”); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.15[E][2] (2022) (contending that a reverse passing off claim “is in fact a disguised copyright infringement claim and, hence, preempted”). In fact, even prior to Dastar, some courts viewed state unfair competition claims seeking credit as preempted.138See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Assuming arguendo that the false claiming of authorship constitutes a separate tort under California law, such a cause of action is nevertheless preempted by federal law.”).

The absence of clear legal protections for crediting has led some plaintiffs to rely (often futilely) on a veritable smorgasbord of common law theories in an attempt to cobble together some basis for relief. For example, when a Cornell graduate student (Antonia Demas) sued a member of her advisory committee (Professor David A. Levitsky of the School of Human Ecology) for improperly taking credit for research she had conducted into the nutritional habits of elementary schoolchildren, using that research to obtain a significant grant without her name, and then actively and publicly rebuffing her allegations of wrongdoing,139See generally Demas v. Levitsky, 738 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). Demas also sued Cornell University for failing to protect her from Levitsky’s actions. she did not bring a claim under the Lanham Act for misattribution.140Id. at 407. Instead, she was left reciting the common law’s greatest hits in her complaint by claiming liability for misappropriation, fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.141Id. While circumstances may make it possible to prevail on one of these theories, victims of crediting abuse face an uphill battle in meeting all of the required elements of such common law claims.142For example, Demas had her breach of fiduciary duty and contract claims dismissed on the grounds that that she could not demonstrate the existence of either. Id. at 408. Indeed, most circumstances of crediting abuse will not involve the existence of a contract calling for crediting rights (due to power differentials that will likely preclude such a provision, even if there is privity of contract between the two parties) or a fiduciary duty (which is imposed for only special relationships).

5.  Private Contracting: The Promise and Perils

With false advertising, VARA, CMI falsification/removal/alteration and unfair competition claims providing little relief, creators are left with private contracting to do the work of crediting.143See Sprigman et al., supra note 36, at 1402 (“The paucity of formal IP protection for attribution rights in the U.S. does not, however, mean that creators are unable to obtain credit for their efforts; it simply means that creators must use the property rights that U.S. IP law gives them as leverage to negotiate for attribution. Instead of being a subject of IP law, attribution in the U.S. becomes a subject of contract law and the operation of social norms that either favor or disfavor attribution within specific creative communities and industries.”). There is no doubt that, in some industries, private contracting and even social norms have gone a long way toward ensuring proper crediting. But significant lacunae remain and, even where private contracting and norms do provide for crediting, it is not always reflective of authorial contributions. As such, reliance on private systems to govern crediting is insufficient to provide for appropriate attribution rights.

There are some fields where private contracting has given rise to deeply nuanced and vigorously patrolled crediting requirements. Two paradigmatic examples are Hollywood and academia.144See David A. Gerber, Copyright Reigns–Supreme: Notes on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 93 Trademark Rep. 1029, 1033 (2003) (“Academia and Hollywood are perhaps the industries most focused on creative credits. Anti-plagiarism codes (in the former) and collective bargaining agreements containing elaborate credit requirements (in the latter) are common methods by which these industries self-regulate the provision of credit.”). In the movie industry, collective bargaining has helped level the playing field between the studios and talent, and the operative guild agreements have insisted on getting even the most minute of credits done correctly.145See, e.g., Robert Davenport, Screen Credit in the Entertainment Industry, 10 Loy. Ent. L.J. 129, 154–55, 159–60 (1990) (detailing the guild-related crediting provisions for writers, directors, and actors). Though it is not without its flaws,146See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. the system has worked relatively well.147Fisk, supra note 53, at 80 (“Equality and fairness are fairly high in the formal credit process . . . . [But b]ecause the system costs significant time and effort, the credit system seems to work only for those contributors (directors, producers, writers, and actors) for whom the financial value of credit is large enough to make it economically sensible to invoke the whole cumbersome process.”). And even if it might seem a tad onerous to any member of the public who has sat through the credits of a motion picture, those credits instill industry professionals with a sense of pride over their brief moment of acknowledgement on the silver screen. Just as importantly, by making the contributions of industry professional publicly legible in databases such as IMDb.com,148Founded in 1990, IMDb.com is the Internet Movie Database, which touts itself as “the world’s most popular and authoritative source for movie, TV and celebrity content.” What Is IMDb?, IMDb https://help.imdb.com/article/imdb/general-information/what-is-imdb/G836CY29Z4SGNMK5 [https://
perma.cc/VC9T-3KR4]. IMDb is likely the most comprehensive publicly searchable movie information system in the world; its IMDbPro system is used widely by entertainment professionals, and individual IMDb profiles serve as important resumes and business cards in the industry.
the regime also ensures that those individuals can reap the reputational and economic benefits of their credits,149See Davenport, supra note 145, at 129 (noting that “[s]creen credit is probably the single most important factor for artists in the entertainment business. This factor determines who is ‘hot’ and who is not; it is the basis for determining whether artists are offered subsequent assignments and their increase in compensation for those assignments”). or, to give a notable example, help avoid the ruin that might come from an unfair attribution. To wit, from 1968 through 2000, the Directors Guild of America allowed aggrieved directors who believed a studio or other producer had butchered their movie in unimaginable ways to petition to have their directorial credit replaced with the fictional “Alan Smithee” pseudonym, lest the final product sully the real director’s good name.150See generally Directed by Allen Smithee (Jeremy Braddock & Stephen Hock eds., 2001).

In the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, strong attribution norms have given rise to anti-plagiarism codes, which have the bite of law and are frequently enforced against offenders in university disciplinary proceedings. Though not perfect,151In 2004, two of Harvard Law School’s most celebrated professors—Charles J. Ogletree Jr. and Laurence H. Tribe—faced allegations of plagiarism for the misuse of sources. See Sara Rimer, When Plagiarism’s Shadow Falls on Admired Scholars, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 2004), https://www.nytimes.
com/2004/11/24/nyregion/when-plagiarisms-shadow-falls-on-admired-scholars.html [https://perma.cc/
LY7G-S7DX]. Both professors admitted to wrongdoing but claimed that their failings were entirely accidental. Id. Some, including the Harvard Crimson, criticized the relatively light sanctions Ogletree and Tribe received from the university, which seemed particularly mild when compared to punishments meted out to students in similar situations. Id.
the carrot of the norm and the stick of disciplinary proceedings have served to ensure generally robust crediting practices.

But in other industries without collective bargaining or finely tuned attribution codes, where crediting is just as important and billions of dollars are on the line, there are no such formal crediting regimes. In such endeavors, crediting decisions are often left to general norms and individual negotiations. As a result, crediting often becomes more about power than actual contribution. As Catherine Fisk points out about most fields of entertainment, “Apart from the guild-controlled screen credit system, the credit system for other creative and technical people in entertainment seems to be more governed by norms, charity, and power than by law.”152Fisk, supra note 53, at 80. One notable example of this is producer credits, which are not governed by collective bargaining. As a result, producing credits are notoriously corrupt, and a veritable “prestige market” for production credits exists. Meanwhile, even in the guild crediting systems of the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, the Writers Guild of America, and the Directors Guild of America, power relations frequently trump creative contributions in determining attribution rights. As Fisk notes,

Because the guild agreements limit the number of people who can be credited in some roles on any one film, power relations among various possible contenders for credit affect who is listed. Individual workers with significant bargaining power (actors, directors, writers, and producers) negotiate for specific treatment on each project, which may or may not reflect the same level of artistic contribution as compared to others who receive a similar type of credit on a different film or who receive the same credit (or no credit) on the same film.153Id. at 77.

The absence of legal protection for attribution rights outside of private contracting has profound consequences for distributive justice. When viewed through the prisms of race, gender, or socioeconomic disparities, crediting practices have a particularly troubling history. Simply put, those who are not white, male, or wealthy have far too often struggled to receive credit, even when they indisputably authored work. This is because crediting is as much (if not more) about power dynamics and contractual leverage as it is about origination. As K.J. Greene has poignantly noted, 

Top directors, such as a Spike Lee or Steven Spielberg, will have no problem obtaining credit [by exercising their bargaining power in negotiations to contract for it], but anyone else dependent on a contract to secure credit will likely lose out. . . . [W]hile Dastar, on its face, seems completely neutral on the subordination issue, it actually promotes greater subordination; despite the Oprah’s and Denzel’s of the world, Blacks, women, and other minorities still occupy the bottom of the totem pole in entertainment hierarchies, making them the most vulnerable to misattribution abuses.154Greene, supra note 90, at 444.

Greene’s concern is not speculative or hypothetical. Unfortunately, it is widely reflected in the history of scientific and creative enterprise.

Consider, for example, the systematic undervaluing and underrecognition of innovations by women. In the sciences, the phenomenon even has its own term—the Matilda effect155Historian Margaret Rossiter coined this phrase as a reference to the systematic undervaluing and lack of crediting to women in the sciences. See Margaret W. Rossiter, The Matthew Matilda Effect in Science, 23 Soc. Stud. Sci. 325, 325–26 (1993).—and it is no less prevalent in the world of arts and letters. To take a few illustrative examples, Margaret Keane was the actual painter of the “big-eyed waifs” long credited to her husband, Walter;156Jessica Gelt, Relative of Discredited ‘Big Eyes’ Artist Makes a Defense, L.A. Times (Jan. 2, 2015, 5:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-keane-nephew-20150102-story.
html [https://perma.cc/Z7AY-NLSJ]; see Keane v. Keane, No. 87-1741, 1990 WL 2874, at *2–4 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1990).
Elizabeth Magie created the game of Monopoly, not Charles Darrow;157Mary Pilon, Monopoly’s Inventor: The Progressive Who Didn’t Pass ‘Go’, N.Y. Times
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/business/behind-monopoly-an-inventor-who-didnt-pass-go.html [https://perma.cc/8TM9-AAXU].
and although attributed to Marcel Duchamp, The Fountain—the infamous urinal that rocked the art world at the 1913 Armory Show—was likely the work of Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven.158William A. Camfield, Marcel Duchamp: Fountain 13 (1989); How Duchamp Stole the Urinal, Scot. Rev. of Books (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.scottishreviewofbooks.org/2014/11/how-duchamp-stole-the-urinal [https://perma.cc/78R6-ZWLV] (citing an April 11, 1917 letter, not made public until 1983, wherein Duchamp admits that Fountain was the work of “[o]ne of [his] female friends,” thereby contradicting public claims he made to sole authorship of the work). In short, crediting is often about who has the leverage (and, in the cases of some swindlers, the gall) to claim authorship, not who really created a work.

The dogged persistence of disparities in attribution has far-reaching consequences, exacerbating existing gender gaps in a number of professions, including the law. For example, Jordana Goodman’s empirical study of crediting practices for patent attorneys, which examined a set of over 200,000 patent applications and office action responses before the United States Patent and Trademark Office from 2016–2020, found an alarming divergence between “attribution and presence” for female patent attorneys, even when accounting for nongendered partner-associate power differentials, years of practice, and other relevant experience.159Jordana R. Goodman, Ms. Attribution: How Authorship Credit Contributes to the Gender Gap, 24 Yale J. Law & Tech. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=4105773 [https://perma.cc/L379-DWHX].
 In the field of computer software, for instance, Goodman estimates that female attorneys suffered a thirty-one percent shortfall in crediting.160Id. at 6. As she concludes, the “lack of equitable attribution perpetually disadvantages women, negatively impacts their career progression, and likely creates an insurmountable chasm between their capabilities and their prestige.”161Id. at 5. Ultimately, such practices “contribute[] to women’s systemic underrepresentation at top leadership levels throughout the United States,”162Id. at 4. a state of affairs presided over by current private ordering regimes such as the workflow structure of modern law firms.163Id. at 21–25.

       The problematic dynamics in leaving crediting to private contracting are on full display in the music industry. As Fisk points out, “in music there is a not uncommon practice of people who do not contribute to the writing of a song being ‘cut in’ on songwriting credit.”164Fisk, supra note 53, at 80. The practice is not always nefarious, of course. Peter Jackson’s Beatlesdocumentary, The Beatles: Get Back,165The Beatles: Get Back (Apple Corps Limited & WingNut Films 2021). provides a notable example. As the film’s exhaustive studio footage capturing the crafting of the title song makes crystal clear, the work was the singular product of Paul McCartney’s musical ingenuity. But the song’s writing credits—“Lennon/McCartney”—tell a very different tale. In this case, a desire to keep an uneasy (though ultimately unsustainable) peace and to honor the duo’s (soon-to-be dissolved) songwriting partnership came at the expense of accuracy. Less innocuously, however, there are myriad instances where crediting practices reflect power more than creative contribution and cut along disturbing gender or racial fault lines. To take one example, Little Richard coauthored the classic Tutti Frutti with Creole songwriter Dorothy LaBostrie.166Richard would later claim that he solo-authored Tutti Frutti, a claim that LaBostrie rejected in asserting that she, and not Richard, wrote the song alone. See Jeff Hannusch, I Hear You Knockin’: The Sound of New Orleans Rhythm and Blues 222 (1985). The actual provenance of the song therefore remains a mystery. However, as if it were not bad enough that handlers cajoled him into selling his publishing rights to his record company for a proverbial song (a meager fifty dollars), he also provided songwriting credit to a party that likely had nothing whatsoever to do with the authorship of the song167Although the facts surrounding who actually wrote the song are in dispute, besides
Richard and LaBostrie, the official musical composition contains a songwriting credit for Joe
Lubin. See Songview Search, BMI, https://repertoire.bmi.com/Search/Search?Main_Search_Text=
tutti%20frutti&Main_Search=Title&Sub_Search=Please%20Select&Search_Type=all&View_Count=0&Page_Number=0 [https://perma.cc/5GMA-NGUV].
—one that may have been the be pseudonym for the owner of Richard’s record label (who reaped the royalties, which continue to be earned on the song to this day).168See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 339, 376 (1999) (citing Jim Dawson & Steve Propes, What Was the First Rock and Roll Record? 189 (1992)). Art Rube owned Specialty records, and there is a dispute as to whether Joe Lubin was a pseudonym he would use to earn royalties on songs or whether this was actually songwriter Joe Lubin, who had written songs for the likes of Doris Day, Lainie Kazan, and others. Dawson and Proper argue the former, while others, including the New York Times, have claimed the latter. See Associated Press, Joe Lubin, 84, Co-Writer of ‘Tutti Frutti’, N.Y. Times (Oct. 20, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/20/arts/joe-lubin-84-co-writer-of-tutti-frutti.html [https://perma.cc/
VT2X-JJ6Q].
As Greene documents, Richard’s experience was no outlier; it was par for the course. And as he observes, “The fact that minority artists received less protection—or in many cases no protection—for their compositions undermines the incentive theory of intellectual property laws. Many Black artists received little no economic reward for their creations. Others certainly received less than what they should have.”169Greene, supra note 168, at 378.

Even beyond issues of race, gender, and socioeconomic status, crediting often reflects relational and power dynamics that may have nothing whatsoever to do with real creative contributions, such as the tenured professor receiving sole authorial credit for a work that includes substantial contributions from graduate students, the law firm partner who has no problem enjoying attribution for the work of a junior associate, or the senator whose “words” are actually those of a speechwriter. Indeed, Spenser Clark’s deep dive into the crediting practices on Hold Up, one of the songs from Beyoncé’s acclaimed concept album Lemonade, illustrates this point in the world of pop music.170Spenser Clark, Hold Up: Digital Sampling, Copyright Infringement, and Artist Credit Through the Lens of Beyoncé’s Lemonade, 26 J. Intell. Prop. L. 131, 134–35 (2019) (describing Beyoncé’s crediting decisions as having no “rhyme or reason”). As Clark explains, Hold Up’s title and some of its lyrics come from a line that Ezra Koenig, the lead singer of Vampire Weekend, had once tweeted (which, itself, was based on a lyrics from Maps, a song by indie rockers the Yeah Yeah Yeahs) and subsequent lyrics Koenig had developed in the studio with Beyoncé’s noted producer, Diplo, while they were working with a loop from an Andy Williams song.171Id. Beyoncé ultimately gave Koenig and the Yeah Yeah Yeahs songwriting credit on Hold Up and Diplo a producing credit, but, notably, Williams received no credit at all—either as a songwriter or producer.172See id. at 135; see also Brittany Spanos, Ezra Koenig Explains Writing Credit on Beyonce’s ‘Lemonade’, Rolling Stone (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/ezra-koenig-explains-writing-credit-on-beyonces-lemonade-73547 [https://perma.cc/756Z-B7JA]; Ezra Koenig (@arzE), Twitter (Apr. 25, 2016, 11:05 AM), https://twitter.com/arzE/status/7246605875
23805184 [https://perma.cc/E3C4-W7EV].
As Clark concludes, 

Oftentimes [artist crediting] choices are not based in law, but rather more intangible considerations like the desire to maintain relationships with creators they wish to work with in the future. Andy Williams’ song, for example, was released in 1963, and therefore [Beyoncé] Knowles was probably less concerned with that relationship as she was with other, more relevant artists.173Clark, supra note 170, at 135.

Notably, in the music industry (just as in some other creative fields), crediting is not only of reputational or ethical significance; it also determines payment of royalties related to the exploitation of sound recordings and musical compositions.

Finally, besides the power dynamics inherent in the private negotiation of credits, the fundamental constraints of contracting also limit how far it can go in ensuring proper attribution. Crediting claims that rest on negotiated obligations require privity for enforcement, and the realities of the marketplace dictate that not all uses of one’s work will be by individuals or entities with whom an author could or would contract.174Fisk, for example, has presented a compelling case for the existence of an independent law of attribution that operates outside of the intellectual property laws dealing with infringement, see Fisk, supra note 53, at 106–07 (“[C]redit is valuable and, consequently, collaborators often are tempted opportunistically to claim credit where it is not due. The temptation cannot be fully controlled simply by voluntary agreement.”), and she proposes an implied right of attribution in every employment agreement that could be expressly waived depending on the nature of the attributive work, id. at 111–12. Indeed, this is precisely why we do not leave protection against unauthorized reproduction or other unlawful uses of copyrighted works to contracts and, instead, have infringement claims available that require only access and substantial similarity—no privity and, indeed, no knowledge. All told, therefore, while contracting, especially via collective bargaining, has enjoyed some success in certain industries, private law has not proven sufficiently robust to ensure that crediting rights are adequately protected in the many areas of the information economy where they matter vitally to authors, investors, and consumers.

III.  REFORM

A.  Questioning Attribution Rights: Why Good Norms Do Not Necessarily Make Good Law

Our legal regime’s present crediting gap—the yawning chasm between the high value of attribution and the surprising absence of safeguards in our existing system to protect the practice—would seem to suggest a manifest need for reform. But before wholeheartedly embracing the adoption of some kind of credit-mandating legal regime, it is worth pausing to consider that best practices do not always translate into righteous laws. In other words, while giving credit might be the right thing to do, that does not necessarily mean we should legally require it, either broadly or in limited contexts. To put it bluntly, not all norms need the bite of law. For example, compliance with some norms—like thanking a gift giver—is more meaningful when it results from volition rather than compulsion. Moreover, to limit the scope of potential government intrusion into personal affairs, we do not want the law to microregulate every aspect of human existence. Thus, it is important to approach any effort to expand the law to regulate behavior that was previously not squarely within the aegis of our legal regime with a healthy amount of skepticism. 

For example, despite moral entreaties against them, prevarications mostly lie175Pardon the pun. outside of the scope of legal regulation—and with good reason. As Judge Alex Kozinski explained in one of the most mordant and entertaining paragraphs ever to appear in the Federal Reporter, such a societal choice honors the freedom of human expression, regardless of moral valence, and serves greater First Amendment interests. “Living means lying,” Kozinski famously posited (in words that are part of the public domain and thereby forgiving of extended quotation):

Self-expression that risks prison if it strays from the monotonous reporting of strictly accurate facts about oneself is no expression at all. Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying. We lie to protect our privacy (“No, I don’t live around here”); to avoid hurt feelings (“Friday is my study night”); to make others feel better (“Gee you’ve gotten skinny”); to avoid recriminations (“I only lost $10 at poker”); to prevent grief (“The doc says you’re getting better”); to maintain domestic tranquility (“She’s just a friend”); to avoid social stigma (“I just haven’t met the right woman”); for career advancement (“I’m sooo lucky to have a smart boss like you”); to avoid being lonely (“I love opera”); to eliminate a rival (“He has a boyfriend”); to achieve an objective (“But I love you so much”); to defeat an objective (“I’m allergic to latex”); to make an exit (“It’s not you, it’s me”); to delay the inevitable (“The check is in the mail”); to communicate displeasure (“There’s nothing wrong”); to get someone off your back (“I’ll call you about lunch”); to escape a nudnik (“My mother’s on the other line”); to namedrop (“We go way back”); to set up a surprise party (“I need help moving the piano”); to buy time (“I’m on my way”); to keep up appearances (“We’re not talking divorce”); to avoid taking out the trash (“My back hurts”); to duck an obligation (“I’ve got a headache”); to maintain a public image (“I go to church every Sunday”); to make a point (“Ich bin ein Berliner”); to save face (“I had too much to drink”); to humor (“Correct as usual, King Friday”); to avoid embarrassment (“That wasn’t me”); to curry favor (“I’ve read all your books”); to get a clerkship (“You’re the greatest living jurist”); to save a dollar (“I gave at the office”); or to maintain innocence (“There are eight tiny reindeer on the rooftop”).

. . . .

Even if untruthful speech were not valuable for its own sake, its protection is clearly required to give breathing room to truthful self-expression, which is unequivocally protected by the First Amendment. . . . If all untruthful speech is unprotected, as the dissenters claim, we could all be made into criminals, depending on which lies those making the laws find offensive. And we would have to censor our speech to avoid the risk of prosecution for saying something that turns out to be false. The First Amendment does not tolerate giving the government such power.176United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc), aff’d 567 U.S. 709 (2012).

We not only insulate certain forms of morally suspect speech from legal liability, but also certain acts. So while we believe cheating on a spouse is repugnant to one’s martial vows, in most states no civil liability attaches to unfaithfulness, and it is largely irrelevant in most divorce proceedings. Thus, while we may have a broad societal consensus that some actions constitute moral wrongs, we do not necessarily criminalize, or impose civil liability on, all of those wrongs. 

That said, crediting directly ties to a matter of significant public, rather than solely private or familial, interest. As we have detailed, attribution rights not only strike at the core of the utilitarian function of the copyright regime—advancing progress in the arts by incentivizing the production of creative work—but also other social benefits tied to economic and cultural interests. Indeed, in the conclusion to her exhaustive survey of crediting regimes in a wide variety of industries involved in scientific and cultural production, Fisk concludes that, while private law and norms have provided some protection for attribution rights, the current state of affairs warrants, if not compels, some type of legal intervention.177Fisk, supra note 53, at 111 (“My survey of attribution norms throughout American society convinces me that the degree to which and circumstances in which attribution should be granted vary. Consequently, law should supplement but not supplant the process by which work communities create norms of attribution.”). But Fisk also cautions that any reform should supplement, but not supplant, existing practices.178Fisk takes pains to caution that she only advocates modest reform, as she emphasizes the value in flexibility and avoidance of overly onerous regulations. Id. at 109–11. Since private ordering and norms have functioned with some success, there appears to be wisdom in approaching attribution rights with a disinclination to implement any new regime that is overly onerous or excessively undermines flexibility. With that caveat in mind, we turn to assess several proposals for reform. 

B.  The Problem with Overturning Dastar and Amending the Lanham Act

The most immediate and obvious reform measure for addressing the crediting gap created by Dastar and its progeny would involve overturning Dastar’s core holding. For example, as Justin Hughes has suggested, such an action could occur through legislation that amends the Lanham Act to define origin as including the intellectual source of creative works that have not yet fallen into the public domain.179Hughes, supra note 84, at 684. In other words, congressional action could restore the availability of attribution-related claims for reverse passing off for works still under copyright protection. But such legislation would also respect the Supreme Court’s rightful concern about limiting erstwhile rightsholders with expired copyrights from attempting to perpetuate their monopolistic stranglehold on the exploitation of creative works by turning the Lanham Act into a “species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use” ’ expired copyrights”180Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (citing Bonita Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boards, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)). However, even if the legislation is carefully crafted to apply the holding of Dastar only to works with expired copyrights, such a proposal might create more problems than it solves. Among other things, the Lanham Act is a poor fit for the vindication of attributive interests in creative works, and, even prior to Dastar, those inadequacies and fissures showed.

The ability of litigants to vindicate attribution rights through the vehicle of the Lanham Act has always been less than ideal—the Ninth Circuit’s Montoro decision and its progeny notwithstanding. Indeed, Bobbi Kwall argued this very point in 2002—just before the Dastar ruling—when she highlighted at least three ways in which the extant jurisprudence of the time stunted attribution claims, even under the Lanham Act.181See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 Wash. L. Rev. 985, 1020 (2002). First, competing interpretations of section 43(a) by the federal courts in different jurisdictions had created a patchwork of inconsistent requirements that hampered the viability of reverse passing off claims for misattribution.182See id. at 1005–14. Second, courts had sometimes even found such claims preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act.183See, e.g., Natkin v. Winfrey, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012–13 (N.D. Ill. 2000); LaCour v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 99 C 7105, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7286, at *25–27 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Tensor Grp., Inc. v. Glob. Web Sys., Inc., No. 96 C 4606, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12721, at *8­9 (N.D. Ill. 1999); FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334, 1363–64 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046–47 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Finally, and potentially most problematically, section 43(a)’s ultimate focus on consumer confusion and the prevention of deception184See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (providing a cause of action against “[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”). led courts to “become preoccupied with different manifestations of ‘falsity’ at the expense of [protecting] an author’s personality and reputational interests.”185See Kwall, supra note 181, at 1020. Thus, dignitary injuries to an artist from a lack of attribution, or even speculative injuries as to the future harm that a lack of recognition may bring, are not cognizable under a section 43(a) claim. So, for example, in 1999, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a record label on a section 43(a) claim for reversing passing off based on the record label’s alleged failure to credit the authors of a digital sample of the authors’ work.186Batiste v. Island Recs., Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 225 (5th Cir. 1999). Even though it acknowledged the lack of attribution, the Fifth Circuit still denied the claim on the basis that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a genuine issue of likelihood of confusion.187Id. It also helped that there was some crediting in the liner notes to the band of which two of the plaintiffs were members (though not to these two plaintiffs’ actual names). Id. Read strictly, section 43(a)’s requirement of a showing of likelihood of consumer confusion would threaten most attribution claims, especially those that stem from smaller uncredited uses of a work188See, e.g., Debs v. Meliopoulos, No. 1:90-cv-939-WCO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864, at *47–48 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (“Dr. Meliopoulos may have technically violated the Lanham Act . . . because he failed to attribute Dr. Debs’ contribution, albeit relatively small, to his EE6520 class notes. However, because the court finds that no likelihood of confusion exists [and] because there is no evidence of actual confusion, the court finds that Dr. Debs is not entitled to [legal] relief under section 43(a).”). The holding in Meliopoulos highlights that risks that the plaintiff in Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989)—who was caught in a similar situation—would have faced if she had pursued Lanham Act relief. See infra notes 263–71 and accompanying text. and even larger uses of works by authors that are not sufficiently well-known so as to meet the threshold of consumer confusion necessary to sustain a claim under section 43(a).189See Kwall, supra note 181, at 1022 (“If a plaintiff author’s work is not sufficiently well-known to trigger public recognition, it is questionable whether a plaintiff’s act of ‘reverse passing off’ will spark the necessary confusion on the part of the consuming public to support relief under section 43(a).”). In other words, the Lanham Act’s conditionality of liability on consumer confusion inherently and significantly narrows the breadth of any protection for attribution it might otherwise provide. Overruling Dastar would do nothing to address this issue. 

Meanwhile, although restoration of attribution-related reverse passing off claims for works still under copyright protection might address the Supreme Court’s concern about the potential private recapture of public domain works, it would not address another problem that undergirded the rationale of Dastar: the catch-22 of crediting. As the Dastar Court pointed out, attribution rights can mire users of copyrighted works in a damned if you do, damned if you don’t scenario. On one hand, if they do not provide credit, they might face claims for failure to attribute. On the other hand, if they do attribute, they might face accusations of a type of passing off—effectively engaging in a form unwanted attribution that the attribute regards as connoting sponsorship, endorsement, or affiliation with their product. This, in turn, can produce liability under the Lanham Act.190But see Hughes, supra note 84, at 684 (arguing that the use of carefully crafted and factually true attribution that expressly disclaimed sponsorship could eliminate the problem of claims of improper affiliation, meaning that “the ‘damned-if-you-do’ side is not as potent as the Court makes out”).

Meanwhile, though the anticompetitive implications of reverse passing off claims related to attribution are most pressing when a work is otherwise in the public domain, the ability of such a cause of action to stifle legitimate uses of works under copyright protection also bears consideration. Specifically, the Supreme Court’s anxieties about a mutant form of copyright law apply more broadly than the re-copyrighting of works that have fallen into the public domain; they apply with equal force to how a crediting regime could entangle and ensnare all sorts of unwitting users of copyrighted works, including properly licensed ones, for failure to make proper crediting. Attribution requirements can be onerous, particularly if we return to the pre-Dastar state of affairs under the Lanham Act, where it was unclear just how much crediting might be required to avert potential reverse passing off claims. Indeed, in the unanimous Dastar opinion, Justice Scalia cited the “serious practical problems” that would result from an attribution requirement without carefully circumscribed limits.191Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003). After detailing the exhaustive list of potential credits that Dastar would have had to give192Id. if the Court had found that the Lanham Act’s reference to “origin” required attributions to all of the originators of “the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain,”193Id. at 32. Scalia quipped that it made no sense to interpret the Lanham Act as requiring a search “for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”194Id. at 36.

A restoration of the pre-Dastar state of the law for works still in copyright could adversely impact the rights of legitimate users of copyrighted works and enable a similar type of result as Fox sought to achieve in pursuing its claims in Dastar. An example illustrates this point. If a producer-rightsholder grants a distributor rights to its work and then the distributor properly sublicenses those rights to an exhibitor, there is no issue of copyright infringement and, under our current regime, the exhibitor would feel secure in exploiting the work. But if attribution-related reverse passing off claims are restored under the Lanham Act, all manner of mischief could result in undermining the exhibitor’s properly granted exploitation rights if a purported “source” does not receive the attribution they believe they deserve in conjunction with the exploitation. The broad scope of who or what might constitute a “source”—as illustrated by Dastar’s infamous passage about the “Nile and all its tributaries”—makes this clear. 

Thus, it may be with good reason that the period of time during which courts recognized an attribution-related claim for “reverse passing off” was relatively short. Although there were occasional outlier decisions in the distant past, “[w]idespread acceptance of [such] a cause of action began around 1980”195Cross, supra note 74, at 717.—meaning that creators enjoyed access to such a claim for less than a quarter century and questions about the practice abounded during that era. Several theorists, for example, argued that use of the Lanham Act in this (admittedly sympathetic) context stood on shaky, if not wholly unjustifiable, legal grounds. Although he acknowledged that the right of attribution was “a commercially valuable right,”196Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 45, 82 (1995). Randolph Stuart Sergent asserted that such a claim failed to serve the Lanham Act’s purported goals and was inappropriate under section 43(a).197Id. at 68–77 (detailing Sergent’s objections to the use of a reverse passing off claim under section 43(a) to vindicate crediting rights for authors). In presciently anticipating Dastar, he bemoaned the power of Montoro-like claims to serve as “a tool for controlling the sale of the underlying product [in a manner that would] reduc[e] marketplace competition . . . to the immediate detriment of consumers.”198Id. at 82. Meanwhile, John Cross argued that, although “[a]llowing [a] plaintiff to recover for reverse passing off certainly ‘feels’ right,”199Cross, supra note 74, at 751. it is worth noting that “vague feelings of impropriety . . . are not enough to justify a cause of action.”200Id. at 752. In his analysis, imposing liability under the Lanham Act for reverse passing off failed “to prevent or cure any meaningful consumer deception” and undermined the delicate balance between encouraging innovation and promoting competition by allowing original sources to monopolize works that are either ceded to or eventually fall into the public domain by operation of copyright and patent law.201Id. at 759. These concerns remain for any effort to overturn Dastar.

In short, even before Dastar, the Lanham Act simply did not provide consistent protection for authorial crediting. As such, simply reforming Dastar does not really get us a proper fix for vindicating attribution rights. Although there is much to criticize about Dastar—the void it has created in the law of crediting and its shaky factual premise—there are also compelling reasons to leave the primary holding of Dastar undisturbed and to eschew reliance on the Lanham Act as a means to vindicate attribution rights. Indeed, if Dastar achieved any good, perhaps it was in taking the issue of authorial attribution out of the scope of the Lanham Act, where it represented a square peg being forced into the proverbial round hole.

C.  The Challenges with Creating an Independent Attribution Claim Under the Copyright Act

Other scholars have considered whether it might make sense to amend the Copyright Act to provide for a general attribution right.202See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945, 2004 (2006); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1745, 1798 (2012). Jane Ginsburg, for one, has advanced such a proposal.203Ginsburg, Right to Claim Authorship, supra note 89. While the idea certainly has a great deal of merit, it also suffers from some significant shortcomings. On the positive side, Ginsburg’s proposal seeks to resolve this surprising lacuna in American intellectual property jurisprudence by finally granting creators a general right of attribution. Meanwhile, Ginsburg advocates the duration of the attribution right to match the copyright term—thereby averting instances of attribution liability for the use of public domain works. For reasons that we have also advocated,204See supra Section III.B. she also recognizes the importance of taking attribution rights outside of the Lanham Act given that attribution should be recognized regardless of proof of economic harm or consumer confusion.205See Ginsburg, Right to Claim Authorship, supra note 89, at 302. She also attempts to address potential issues regarding the unwieldy and uncertain scope of attribution obligations pre-Dastar by limiting the affirmative right of attribution to just legal authors and performers.206Id. at 301–02.

But Ginsburg’s proposal has some significant difficulties. While legal authorship is often singular, performers can number into the thousands. Thus, the inclusion of performers in the attribution requirement could create the specter of liability for the unwitting.207She defines this obligation as encompassing the names of people in “musical, dramatic, choreographic or audiovisual performances.” Id. at 301. More broadly, crediting of authors is not always practicable. Although Ginsburg addresses this concern by suggesting that the statute would be subject to a standard that incorporates a “reasonableness criterion,”208Id. at 299. such ambiguity is arguably the last thing that copyright law needs. After all, copyright users already have the remarkable illegibility of the fair use analysis with which to contend. Adding an additional crediting requirement that has no restraint other than “reasonableness” adds just another unfortunate layer to the copyright thicket of licensing and clearance requirements that already stifle creative activity.

Indeed, the very example that Ginsburg uses to tout the salutary and nimble nature of an attribution requirement grounded in the ambiguous notion of “reasonableness” demonstrates the very dangers of such a regime. As she writes,

[A] requirement to identify all authors and performers may unreasonably encumber the radio broadcast of a song, but distributed recordings of the song might more conveniently include the listing. This may be particularly true of digital media, where a mouse click can provide information even more extensive than that available on a printed page.209Id. at 304.

Admittedly, with its relative dearth of spacing limitations, digital media makes it arguably reasonable (from a spacing point of view) to credit any number of authors and performers. But such a requirement can quickly become onerous. Consider a professor teaching a Russian history course who wants to screen excerpts from Alexander Sokurov’s acclaimed experimental drama Russian Ark, a ninety-six-minute film shot in just a single take one night at the Hermitage with a cast of more than two thousand actors and three orchestras.210Russian Ark (Seville Pictures 2002). Though such an action would likely constitute fair use, meaning the professor could engage in the use without the hassle of payment and permission and without fear of infringement liability, Ginsburg’s proposal would place the professor in jeopardy of a different kind of liability: failure to attribute.

Ginsburg’s proposal also lacks any fair use defense, a point emphasized when she explains that “the test of reasonableness in this context is not the same as for fair use. The question is not whether the use should be prevented or paid for, as it is when fair use is at issue, but whether the use, even if free, should acknowledge the user’s sources.”211Ginsburg, Right to Claim Authorship, supra note 89, at 304. While such a move is welcome from an equity point of view—for all too long, copyright law has devalued the creative contributions of performers212See John Tehranian, Sex, Drones & Videotape: Rethinking Copyright’s Authorship-Fixation Conflation in the Age of Performance, 68 Hastings L.J. 1319, 1326 (2017).—it bodes less favorably for those making use of copyrighted works. It is hard enough to prevail on a fair use claim; but now users will have to contend with a whole other issue: liability exposure under an independent and separate cause of action depending on the reasonableness of their crediting practices.

In addition, entitling creators to an affirmative right of attribution could have a surprisingly adverse impact on the functioning of intellectual property licensing markets. For example, while they acknowledge the critical importance of crediting and recognition to authors (a position backed up by their own empirical experiments), Sprigman, Buccafusco, and Burns have suggested that the indisputable value that creators place in attribution should not automatically lead to legislative enactment of an affirmative attribution right.213Sprigman et al., supra note 36, at 1426–27. As they caution, the operation of a default right of attribution, even if waivable, could result in significant inefficiencies in the licensing market. Most obviously, transaction costs would increase. But less obviously, the combined impact of the endowment and creator effects—which can cause irrational overvaluation of the intellectual property rights held by authors in their creative output—can make licensing transactions increasingly unlikely and more burdensome.

Grounded in the public interest and the efficient functioning of licensing markets, this argument warrants further examination and should give pause to any hasty enactment of attribution legislation. To understand why, an examination of the emerging literature in behavioral economics is in order. Specifically, in recent years, psychologists and economists have observed a phenomenon dubbed the “endowment effect,” wherein the subjective valuation an individual will give a particular object increases significantly when the individual possesses that object, even for a limited time.214Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325, 1342 (1990) (noting that the endowment effect holds that “the value that an individual assigns to [objects] appears to increase substantially as soon as that individual is given the object”); see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228 (2003). As a consequence of this effect, individuals will “demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it.”215Steffen Huck, Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, Learning to Like What You Have— Explaining the Endowment Effect, 115 Econ. J. 689, 689 (2005). Although not without its critics,216See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449, 1462–63 (2007) (arguing the endowment effect is largely a product of experiment design and vastly exaggerated). this result appears to subvert neoclassical economic theory, which assumes that an individual’s willingness to pay (“WTP”) for a good should equal the willingness to accept (“WTA”) compensation for the loss of the good. In a now-classic experiment, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler found that randomly assigned buyers valued a particular mug at three dollars, on average.217Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 214, at 1332–34. By sharp contrast, randomly assigned owners of the very same mug required substantially more money (seven dollars, on average) to part with it.218Id. In short, the owners’ loss in divesting themselves of the mug was valued at more than twice the buyers’ gain in acquiring the exact same mug. Thus, under the endowment effect, most people appear to require a much higher price to part with a product to which they hold a legal entitlement (that is, through possession or ownership) than they would pay to purchase the very same product.

As it turns out, the endowment effect can be especially pronounced and dangerous in matters dealing with intangible property such as copyright. The tendency toward overvaluing endowed goods is amplified when measurements of value are more subjective, and the lack of fungibility for creative works can exacerbate holdout problems and make completion of licensing deals more difficult. This leads to what James Surowiecki and others have billed as the “permission problem.”219See James Surowiecki, The Permission Problem, New Yorker, Aug. 11, 2008, at 34. And the impact is not merely the stifling of creative rights of scholars, critics, satirists, and others. Since the endowment effect raises the price otherwise demanded for access to a copyrighted work, “members of society do not enjoy the increased access to art that the copyright law is designed to provide.”220A. Michael Warnecke, Note, The Art of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: The Postmodern-Art Challenge to the Copyright Law, 13 Rev. Litig. 685, 701 (1994) (observing that an endowment effect would cause copyright holders to demand more for access to their work than would otherwise be predicted).

It is at this point that Sprigman, Buccafusco, and Burns’s findings become particularly salient. They found that that endowment effect was particularly extreme when creators engage in transactions involving their own work. This so-called “creativity effect”—what Sprigman, Buccasufsco, and Burns refer to as the “the tendency of creators of goods to assign higher value to their works not only compared to would-be purchasers of the goods, but relative also to mere owners (that is, subjects who had not created but merely been given the works, as in previous studies)”221Sprigman et al., supra note 36, at 1396.—can badly “magnify the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect. The creativity effect drives creators’ WTA even further away from buyers’ WTP, and in doing so it makes deals over creative goods more difficult to reach.”222Id. at 1397. The data from Sprigman, Buccafusco, and Burns’s work therefore suggests that vesting an affirmative attribution right in creators could serve as a significant impediment on the licensing market and further complicate and stifle the ability of would-be licensees to reach deals for the use of creative content—a cost that impacts consumers of copyrighted works as well as the vast number of authors who draw upon preexisting content to create transformative works.223By sharp contrast, a proposal that makes attribution a factor in the fair use analysis, rather than a vested entitlement that can support an independent cause of action, could avoid this problem while still providing strong incentives for acknowledgement and better respect for crediting. As a result, they conclude that an affirmative attribution right would ultimately not serve the public weal and could have a disruptive effect on commerce.

But, perhaps most damningly, the biggest drawback against an independent claim for attribution under the Copyright Act is not whether it would make for good law but, rather, whether it would be feasible to pass such legislation in the first place. To illustrate this point, it is worth considering a few salient points about the history of copyright law in our country. It took almost 100 years for the United States to accede to the terms of the Berne Convention of 1886, which, since 1928 and per Article 6bis, requires member states to recognize a right of attribution.224Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–27 (1986). When the United States finally acceded to Berne in 1988, the House Report on its implementation concluded that a patchwork of existing laws in the United States already provided sufficient protection for attribution to meet Berne’s minimum standards.225H.R. Rep. No. 100–609, at 34 (1988). The availability of Lanham Act relief for reverse passing off in situations of misattribution was key to this conclusion.226Id. Nevertheless, Congress passed a narrow right of attribution under VARA shortly thereafter in 1990 which, as we have discussed, does not cover the vast majority of creative works and provides only scant protection. Furthermore, since Dastar, there has been no meaningful effort to undo its holding in Congress, making the path toward a legislative fix unlikely, at best. As this timeline illustrates, the odds of congressional intervention to add a broad attribution right to the Copyright Act—particularly given how constrained the attribution claim embedded in VARA ultimately became when it was finally passed in 1990—do not seem particularly good.

D.  A Modest Proposal: Locating Attributive Use in Section 107

With this analysis in mind, we turn our attention to a modest proposal that I believe would not require legislation and, in fact, already reflects the jurisprudence on fair use: the recognition by courts of attributive use as an express subfactor in the application of the fair use defense to allegations of copyright infringement. This proposal advances the cause of attribution rights in an incremental, but significant, manner; provides flexibility for courts to adapt the concept to contexts and emerging technologies; and bolsters norms of crediting in a way that can lay the framework for future (and bolder) changes in the law.

Moreover, the proposal builds on the important work done by Pierre Leval with his article Toward a Fair Use Standard some three decades ago. Just as Leval argued that transformative use was already, and had good reason to be, playing an important role in fair use determinations, I argue the same with attributive use. In that spirit, as the title of this Article suggests, I advocate a move toward a new fair use standard. As our exegesis of the extant jurisprudence on fair use reveals, attributive use already has an implicit place in the fair use calculus. I argue that courts should lean into this reality and make attribution an explicit consideration in their factor one analysis on the purpose and character of the use. Just like transformative use, which advances the utilitarian aim of the copyright regime to promote progress (by enabling the creation of new work), attributive use serves a key role in the copyright regime by helping advance progress in the arts (by appealing to the incentivizing function of crediting). So, under this scheme, as part of their factor one analysis, future courts would consider: (1) whether a use is commercial; (2) whether a use is transformative; and (3) whether a use is attributive. In short, attributive use would take its place with commercial and transformative use as key factors in determining the purpose and character of a defendant’s unauthorized exploitation of someone’s copyrighted work.

Admittedly, leaving attribution rights to only function as an affirmative defense to infringement still leaves crediting as a tail, wagged by the infringement dog. But this solution avoids the numerous complications posed by either an affirmative attribution right in the Copyright Act or an undoing of the Dastar holding. Under such a proposal, works used with permission can continue to have exploitation governed by licensing terms that can call for proper attribution as appropriate and meaningful, thereby leaving existing crediting regimes in place and enabling further development of new ones. But for unlicensed works, an attributive use subfactor will provide significant encouragement of crediting while not requiring it in every instance and leaving some flexibility around the issue, so that courts can consider the context of a particular use to decide whether attribution is valuable, meaningful, or practicable under the circumstances.227For example, courts can show flexibility on the manner of crediting preferred for parodies since they inherently need to conjure up enough of the original anyway in order to make sense to audiences. With that in mind, 2 Live Crew wouldn’t need to label each of its albums with “based on a song by Roy Orbison.” But, in other instances, where formal crediting makes sense—such as use of thumbnails for search engine purposes—it could be weighed heavily. As a result, crediting will not become an absolute requirement, thereby addressing the significant concerns that would come from a broad attribution right. Meanwhile, for public domain works, there will be no concern about attribution because such works would not be subject to a fair use defense since their exploitation is, per se, noninfringing. As a result, the proposal averts rightful concern about erstwhile copyright holders using crediting requirements to achieve perpetual protection for works that fall into the public domain.

Moreover, to avoid making attribution overly onerous, the crediting at issue could be limited to legal authorship. As even Ginsburg admits, attribution requirements can be burdensome, potentially causing a problem that Ginsburg characterizes as the “most practical of all”: a regime that mandates “tiny print or endless film credits that no one will look at anyway.”228Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 48. The reference to tiny print that no one looks at may be too dismissive and flippant. After all, while not many people will look at the tiny print, anyone involved in a creative enterprise will know that that tiny print will be scrutinized by at least a few individuals—those who poured their hearts and souls into the work—each and every time. So while the tiny print may not mean much to the consuming public, it matters desperately to those whose names appear in that tiny print. At the same time, as detailed earlier, that tiny print is entered in databases that follow creative crediting and play a large role in developing reputations that enable decisionmakers with capital to flow resources in particular directions. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (regarding IMDb.com). To Ginsburg, criticisms about the potential burdens of crediting requirements are exaggerated. As she opines,

[D]ifficulties in determining whether a contributor at the fringes of a creative enterprise should be denominated an “author” or “co-author” should not obscure attribution claims where authorship is apparent. Moreover, where the creators are multiple, business practice may assist in identifying those entitled to authorship credit. That the resulting credits may not attract most readers’ or viewers’ attention does not warrant forgoing them altogether.229Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 48.

But there may also be a simpler refutation to these objections. Specifically, as Ginsburg herself admits, “Our caselaw has enough trouble, in the joint works context, identifying who is an author.”230Id. This is certainly true but it is also worth noting that, as a result of this difficulty, courts have shown themselves extraordinarily loathe to recognize joint authorship. Indeed, numerous doctrines, such as the strict reading of the mutual intent requirement, have emerged from courts to avert recognition of joint authorship.231See John Tehranian, Copyright’s Male Gaze: Authorship and Inequality in a Panoptic World, 41 Harv. J.L. & Gender 343, 375 (2018). So, on a practical level, the problem of endless attribution seems quite solvable by considering crediting not of all creative contributors, but of the legal authors—a designation that courts have gone out of their way to make singular and, consequently, quite knowable (despite the many flaws in the way courts define legal authorship). In other words, given that courts already carefully circumscribe the notion of legal authorship in order to avoid the messiness of joint authorship and the accompanying headache it may cause in the fracturing of rights, attribution rights that are limited to recognition of legalauthorship are not quite as complex as objectors may suggest.

All told, this solution draws and expands upon, with some important alterations, a proposal once presented briefly by the late Greg Lastowka at the end of his article considering the (morbid) state of attribution rights post-Dastar.232Lastowka, supra note 46, at 84–85. After bemoaning the extant law’s lack of protection for crediting, Lastowka proposed a corrective step: congressional amendment of section 107 to incorporate attribution as an explicit fifth factor in the fair use analysis.233Id. at 44, 84–89 (“I propose that the ‘fair use’ provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 107 be amended to include a fifth factor: the provision of attribution.”). I tweak Lastowka’s proposal for two reasons. First, the addition of an express fifth factor would require legislative amendment, making change less likely (as I have documented with the difficulty in passing any affirmative attribution right in the Copyright Act). Indeed, as the influence of Leval’s 1990 article has suggested, change through the common law is both swifter and more likely. Leval, of course, achieved a dramatic change in the way courts have approached the fair use analysis in the past three decades by emphasizing the importance of a factor that had received scant explicit consideration before: transformation. Secondly, analytically speaking, I argue that attribution already resides in the existing four factors without the need to add a fifth. Most significantly, as I shall detail, courts have both explicitly and implicitly considered attribution in the fair use calculus in the past, often as part of assessing the purpose and character of the use (factor one). Building on the occasional, but unpredictable, judicial solicitude to attribution as a part of the fair use balancing test, I argue that, normatively, such a move makes a great deal of sense.

1.  Attributive Use and the Existing Fair Use Calculus

As Lastowka argued, courts have occasionally drawn on attribution as a factor in the fair use calculus. But, as he cautioned, 

[w]hat these cases demonstrate is not that attribution is regularly considered by courts as a factor in the fair use analysis. This is most certainly not the case. The cases merely illustrate that in certain cases, plaintiffs and defendants have been successful in persuading courts to incorporate evidence about attribution into a fair use analysis.234Id. at 88.

Lastowka may have understated matters, however. Indeed, a careful exegesis of the relevant jurisprudence—including noted decisions from the two circuits (the Second and the Ninth) that most prominently opine on copyright law, as well as consideration of the broad attributive practices in clearance norms—strongly suggests that attribution is already a guiding factor in the fair use calculus and, either explicitly or implicitly, is playing a (rightful) role in fair use determinations. As such, the proposal advanced here calls for overt recognition of attribution as a key subfactor in how courts weigh the purpose and character of a use. 

The fair use doctrine finds its origins in Justice Joseph Story’s influential 1841 opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.235See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Eventually codified in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act, fair use typically involves the weighing of a four-part balancing test to determine whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is excused from infringement liability. These factors include:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.23617 U.S.C. § 107.

However, with its use of open-ended language, the text of section 107 suggests that the four listed factors are not exhaustive of the considerations a court may undertake.237See id. (implying that the fair use analysis is not limited to the four enumerated factors by stating that “[i]n determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include [the aforementioned factors]” (emphasis added)). As a result, courts have always had the freedom to introduce other relevant factors to their fair use analysis. Indeed, some have accepted the invitation, including many that have made attribution and crediting practices a consideration.

2.  The Role of Attribution in the First, Fourth, and “Fifth” Fair Use Factors

In Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., for example, a Massachusetts district court drew on “equitable considerations” as a fifth factor and found that the defendant’s attribution practices supported a fair use defense against infringement claims for unauthorized reproduction of two fine art photographs in a magazine.238Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 214 (D. Mass. 1986). Specifically, the defendant’s fair use claim was substantially aided by the fact that it made “no effort . . . to palm [the photos] off as anything other than [the photographer’s] creations.”239Id. Thus, in some cases, attribution can and has become a part of the fair use calculus through an unofficial “fifth factor.”

That said, courts do not necessarily have to resort to the introduction of a fifth factor to make room for crediting. In fact, numerous decisions have integrated attributive use into their analysis of the existing four factors.240The Haberman court did so as well. Drawing on Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises’ guidance, the court raised the issue of attribution in its consideration of the first factor, observing that “relevant to the ‘character’ of the use is ‘the propriety of the defendant’s conduct.’ ” Id. at 211 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)). Since Hustler had provided credit on the two photographs it had reproduced, this factor weighed in favor of fair use. Id. at 211 (“Hustler credited Haberman with the copyright of the reproduced works and informed readers of how they could buy them from him. Thus, there was no attempt to palm off Haberman’s work as its own.”). This body of case law suggests that attribution already has a place (and voice) in the existing four fair use factors—particularly the first (“purchase and character of the use”) and fourth (“market harm”).

Melville and David Nimmer, for example, have argued that attribution can and should be a proper consideration in the first factor,2414 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 [A][1][d] (2022). as it speaks to nature and character of the use being made by a defendant. Numerous courts have subscribed to this view, whose application is illustrated in Williamson v. Pearson Education, Inc.242See generally Williamson v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8240, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17062 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001). In the suit, Pearson Education offered up a fair use defense to infringement claims stemming from its publication of a book featuring unauthorized quotation of a number of passages from a prior work on General Patton’s leadership principles. Drawing on Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises’s instruction to consider the “propriety of the defendant’s conduct” as part of the nature and character of a defendant’s use of a copyrighted work, the Court found that the first fair use factor favored defendants because, among other things, they were “not attempting to pass [the] fact-gathering off as their own. Rather they are crediting [the plaintiff] as the source of the factual information that defendants use to construct some of the arguments in their book.”243Id. at *1728 Similarly, in Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., a court identified the propriety of the defendant’s conduct as one of three subfactors under the “purpose and character of the use” consideration and found this factor favored the defendant since the defendant had “credited [the plaintiff] clearly and favorably in the text.”244Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ’g Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 919 (D. Mass. 1993). In another infringement case—one involving unauthorized use of a portion of a report about a hydropower facility—a federal court deemed that the defendants’ acknowledgement of the source of the original work helped the first fair use factor “weigh[] heavily in favor of a finding of fair use.”245See Lathan v. City of Whittier Alaska, No. 3:10-cv-00070-TMB, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 159477, at *34 (D. Alaska Aug. 4, 2011).

It is not just the first factor that makes room for attribution. While “good faith” is the most common doctrinal vehicle through which crediting finds a voice in the first factor, economic factors form the doctrinal vehicle through which crediting finds a voice in the fourth factor. Meanwhile, the market harm factor also leaves room for consideration of attribution. Specifically, as Rebecca Tushnet has argued in the context of fan fiction, giving attribution attenuates the possibility of market harm.246Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 651, 680 (1997). As she reasons, “Correct attribution helps prevent confusion and preserves the market for the official product and bears an indirect relation to the fourth fair use factor.”247Id. Tushnet’s view is not merely aspirational; it is also already reflected in some cases. In Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Industries, Inc., for instance, a New York federal district court declined to grant a fair use defense to The Hollywood Reporter/HRI for its unauthorized use of a photograph of Laurel and Hardy in a feature spread on special effects and stunts.248Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Indus., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 182 F.3d 901 (2d Cir. 1999). The failure to attribute the photograph to its author played an important role in the court’s calculus. “HRI’s use of the photograph without attribution to Feiner represents to the world that the photograph is in public domain,” the court concluded, “thus potentially impairing Feiner’s future revenue both in income and in the costs of protecting its rights.”249Id. at 315. Based on this logic, the court found significant market harm in HRI’s actions and found the fourth fair use factor militated against the defendant. Indeed, the Feiner case stands in contrast to Nuñez v. Caribbean International News Corp., in which a different member of the media—a Puerto Rican newspaper named El Vocero—also published an article making unauthorized use of a photograph—an image from the modeling portfolio of the former Miss Puerto Rico Universe 1997.250Nuñez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000). In Nuñez, crediting played a role in the fair use analysis under both factors one and four. On the first factor, the court considered good faith, which favored El Vocero since it had “attributed the photographs to Núñez.”251Id. at 23. On the fourth factor, the court pointed to the fact that “the only discernible effect of the publication in El Vocero was to increase demand for the photograph”252Id. at 25.—a consequence doubtlessly buttressed by the credit that El Vocero provided to Nuñez, which enabled future licensees to know whom to approach for permissions to use the image. 

3.  Harper & Row’s Good Faith Admonition

With all of this said, it is important to acknowledge that the consideration of “good faith,” which courts have often used to raise attributive concerns, has come under fire in recent years. On the surface, this might suggest increasing judicial resistance to the factoring of crediting in the fair use calculus. But a closer examination of this trend says otherwise. 

The clearest expression of the invitation to consider good faith in fair use determinations (and the basis upon which some courts have invoked attribution) came in Harper & Row, in which the Supreme Court dictated, in seemingly absolutist terms, that “fair use presupposes ‘good faith.’ ”253Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (citations omitted). Despite the blusterous verbiage, the exhortation remained inchoate, as the case gave little guidance as to just constituted “good faith.” In that particular instance, the Court was referring to how The Nation’s knowing exploitation of a purloined manuscript that remained unpublished demonstrated bad faith because the magazine had usurped the copyright holder’s valuable commercial rights of first publication. The Court then grafted this assessment of propriety to its consideration of the first, second and fourth fair use factors in finding that The Nation’s actions had no refuge in the defense.254Id. at 562, 564 (“The Nation’s [unauthorized] use [of the unpublished manuscript] had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first publication. . . . and infringe[d] the copyright holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control [over the first public appearance of the work].”). Notably, the matter of attribution (as a form of good faith or otherwise) had nothing whatsoever to do with that case. 

In the intervening years, the Supreme Court has walked back on Harper & Row’s language about good faith. In both of its two most recent fair use pronouncements—Campbell in 1994 and Oracle in 2021—the Court has expressly downplayed the consideration. In Campbell, the Supreme Court acknowledged a split in persuasive authorities as to whether fair use must necessarily presuppose good faith.255Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) (comparing Harper & Row’s bold appraisal that fair use presupposes good faith with views from both Folsom v. Marsh and Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard that good faith should be irrelevant to the fair use analysis). In Oracle’s dicta, the Court cited to Leval’s work to express its skepticism as to whether good faith should ever be a factor in fair use determinations.256See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021) (“As for bad faith, our decision in Campbell expressed some skepticism about whether bad faith has any role in a fair use analysis. [Campbell,] 510 U. S. at 585, n. 18, 114 S. Ct. 1164. We find this skepticism justifiable, as ‘[c]opyright is not a privilege reserved for the well-behaved.’ ”) (citing Leval, supra note 1, at 1126).Ultimately, however, the Oracle Court eschewed taking a definitive position on the issue, leaving the weight (if any) given to good faith squarely to lower courts to determine. As the Court mused, “We have no occasion here to say whether good faith is as a general matter a helpful inquiry.”257Id. Nevertheless, it would not be stretch for lower courts to view the commentary in Campbell and Oracle as dampening enthusiasm for further use of a general good faith consideration in the fair use calculus.

The evolving concern about consideration of “good faith” as dictated in Harper & Row is compelling—at least in the manner in which the Harper & Row, Campbell, and Oracle Courts used the term, where they considered if an alleged infringer had engaged in related wrongdoing, such as exploiting a purloined manuscript or proceeding with making use of a work despite being denied permission.258See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18 (asking whether a “request for permission to use the original should be weighed against a finding of fair use”); see also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding that an author copying and including images from the plaintiff’s film after he was denied permission to use them in his book constituted bad faith that weighed against fair use but that the other factors ultimately weighed in favor of a finding of fair use). After all, if someone asks for, and is denied, permission but proceeds with a use anyway, it is worth considering whether that demonstrates good faith or bad faith, or does not necessarily suggest anything at all. As Elina Lae points out, courts have gone both ways on this issue259See Elina Lae, Mashups—A Protected Form of Appropriation Art or Blatant Copyright Infringement?, 12 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 31, 51 (2012). —a fact that speaks to the unworkability of the factor.260Compare Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Recs., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that attempt to obtain license signaled defendant’s bad faith and knowledge that use without a license would constitute infringement), with Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to consider defendant’s prior attempt to obtain a license as a factor against him). Or if a defendant genuinely believes that their actions constitute fair use and does not ask for permission, it is hard to understand why that factor should be held against them in the very determination of whether something is fair use.261Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that a defendant’s failure to request a license from the photographer even though he was known and clearly identified as the owner of the copyrights thereto was “evident” bad faith). The Second Circuit’s reversal of the finding of fair use made no comment on this particular part of the lower court’s ruling. And although there is much to criticize in the district court’s approach to bad faith, for further discussion of the Second Circuit’s ultimate decisions and critiques of its rationale, see John Tehranian, Dangerous Undertakings: Sacred Texts and Copyright’s Myth of Aesthetic Neutrality, in The SAGE Handbook of Intellectual Property 418 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert eds. 2015). Indeed, while conceding the potential the utility of a good faith consideration in the fair use calculus,262Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436–37 (“Because ‘fair use presupposes “good faith” and “fair dealing,”’ courts may weigh ‘the propriety of the defendant’s conduct’ in the equitable balance of a fair use determination.” (citations omitted)). the Ninth Circuit long ago pointed out that “to consider [a defendant] blameworthy because he asked permission [and went ahead with the use after not receiving it] would penalize him for this modest show of consideration. Even though such gestures are predictably futile, we refuse to discourage them.”263Id. at 437.

More pointedly, reading the Copyright Act holistically, the introduction of considerations of propriety into the fair use calculus would appear unbalanced, particularly when one acknowledges that courts do not typically weigh such factors in determining putative rightsholders’ entitlement to copyright protection. As Leval has forcefully argued, 

Copyright seeks to maximize the creation and publication of socially useful material. Copyright is not a privilege reserved for the well-behaved. Copyright protection is not withheld from authors who lie, cheat, or steal to obtain their information. If they have stolen information, they may be prosecuted or sued civilly, but this has no bearing on the applicability of the copyright. Copyright is not a reward for goodness but a protection for the profits of activity that is useful to the public education. The same considerations govern fair use.264Leval, supra note 1, at 1126.

In the end, therefore, when viewing fair use as an integral part of the utilitarian goal of our copyright regime, the ultimate focus on progress in the arts would appear to preclude consideration of the subjective mental state of a defendant or a defendant’s general intentions. 

But, quite critically for our purposes, the discussion about good faith in Harper & Row, Campbell, and Oracle has never once touched on the issue of attribution. And although both Campbell and Oracle cited to Leval’s admonition to decouple fair use from good behavior,265See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18. (1994). his entreaty also had nothing to with attributive practices. Indeed, as Leval reasons, fair use should be focused on progress in the arts. As we have detailed, that is precisely the reason why attribution should be considered, while other good faith factors, such as a defendant’s state of mind or general intentions, should not. Thus, despite the concern about good faith expressed in Campbell and Oracle and by Leval, these contemplations do not speak to the issue of crediting. And, if anything, the case law’s continued emphasis on promoting a vision of fair use dominated by the utilitarian goals of the copyright regime favors the consideration of attribution (though perhaps not general good faith) in the fair use calculus.

4.  The Existing Role of Attribution in Second and Ninth Circuit Jurisprudence

All the while, attribution has and continues to play a role in the existing body of fair use jurisprudence in the influential Second and Ninth Circuits—from which the plurality, if not majority, of copyright caselaw stems.266Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 566–68 (2008) (describing the Second and Ninth Circuits as the most influential circuits in the development of copyright’s fair use doctrine). While these decisions that explicitly invoke attribution do not take the next step of formally mandating a role for crediting in the enumerated factors, when read together they suggest that such a role—much like the transformative use element identified by Leval in Toward a Fair Use Standard—would be consistent with the existing fair use rubric. Indeed, if district courts in these circuits hewed more closely to this extant jurisprudence, attribution would enjoy more overt recognition as a fair use factor. 

The precedent of the Second Circuit is replete with cases where attribution has played a key, if not decisive, role in the fair use calculus. Weissmann v. Freeman267Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).  is a particularly instructive case because it stemmed from an academic dispute where credits and notoriety, rather than significant profits, were at stake.268At best, one could argue that the $250 honorarium that Freeman had received for the review course might have constituted tangible profits. As the Second Circuit concluded, however, there was an “absence of a dollars and cents profit.” Id. at 1324. In the suit, a professor at the Albert Einstein School of Medicine, Heidi S. Weissmann, took legal action against her colleague and erstwhile collaborator, Leonard Freeman, for copyright infringement, claiming that Freeman had unlawfully reproduced fifty copies of one of her articles for use in a special review course he was giving at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine. Ordinarily, such a relatively de minimis and educational use of a work would not give rise to infringement litigation. But one key fact made this case atypical: Freeman had deleted Weissmann’s name from the paper and, after adding three additional words to the title, put his own name on it.269Id. at 1316. Although Weissmann might have pursued a claim for reverse passing off (albeit with some potential hurdles270See supra note 174 and accompanying text. ), she focused on a copyright infringement claim.271Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1316. Though the lower court had held Freeman’s use was a fair one, the Second Circuit reversed. 

Despite claims that Freeman’s use was noncommercial and for academic purposes, his failure to credit Weissmann (and his substitution of his own name as the author) proved outcome determinative in the Second Circuit, and the court cited the crediting issue in its analysis on the first, second, and fourth fair use factors. On the first factor, the court determined that, in wresting credit from Weissmann, Freeman’s motivations were commercial in nature as he profited from the use, which enhanced his professional reputation. As the court noted, “Particularly in an academic setting, profit is ill-measured in dollars. Instead, what is valuable is recognition because it so often influences professional advancement and academic tenure.”272Id. at 1324. On the second factor, the court noted the importance of weighing the incentives for continued creation of scholarly work and thereby linked attribution and progress in the arts. As it reasoned, crediting provided the likes of Weissmann “with an incentive to continue research—an endeavor that, if successful, would and has led to professional and monetary benefits [and that courts] need to uphold those incentives necessary to the creation of works such as [the article].”273Id. at 1325. Finally, on the fourth factor, the court saw clear market harm because “[i]n scholarly circles such as, for example, the small community of nuclear medicine specialists involved in this suit, recognition of one’s scientific achievements is a vital part of one’s professional life.”274Id. at 1326. As the court added,

The fact that Dr. Freeman’s planned use of [the article] was for the same intrinsic purpose as that intended by Dr. Weissmann not only undermines Dr. Weissmann’s ability to enjoy the fruits of her labor, but also creates a distinct disincentive for her to continue to research and publish in the field of nuclear medicine.

Id. In short, the issue of crediting permeated the entire fair use analysis in Weissmann. In the end, the court also emphasized that “[n]o case was cited—and [they] found none—that sustained [a fair use] defense under circumstances where copying involved total deletion of the original author’s name and substitution of the copier’s.”275Id. at 1324. This observation alone suggests the implicit role of attribution (and the disfavor with which misattribution is viewed) in the extant fair use jurisprudence.

Rogers v. Koons,276Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). one of the most well-known copyright decisions from the Second Circuit, also emphasizes the role of attribution in fair use determinations. The Rogers controversy started when prominent modern artist Jeff Koons found inspiration in a cheap tourist postcard featuring Art Rogers’s Puppies, a photograph of a couple and their dogs posing in Rockwellian tranquility.277Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Koons appropriated the depiction without Rogers’s permission and accentuated various elements to create a sculptural work, String of Puppies, that satirized suburban American aesthetic sensibilities.278See id. at 476, 479. As Koons’s attorney, Martin Garbus, explained, Koons

saw sentimentality, inanity and kitsch. When he blew up the image to larger than life size, stuck daisies in the hair of the sickly sweet smiling couple (the flowers were not in the photograph) and painted the finished ceramic, the sculpture acquired a horrific quality quite distinct from the original.

Martin Garbus, Book Review, Lolita and the Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1999 (§ 7), at 35. Rogers, unamused by Koons actions, sued for copyright infringement and Koons claimed fair use. The district court rejected Koons’s defense, holding that, among other things, his activities were not sufficiently transformative because they did not criticize or comment upon Rogers’s original photograph.279See Rogers, 751 F. Supp. at 479. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that, “though the satire need not be only of the copied work and may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the original work.”280Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. Because Koons purportedly did not “need” the original work to make his expressive point, there could be no fair use.281See id. The result of the case was a debacle for Koons. In addition to damages, he was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.282Id. at 313.

To critics of the decision—which came down before Campbell, the trumpeting of Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard, and its advocacy for the primacy of an expansive notion of transformative use283See Leval, supra note 1, at 1111 (suggesting that transformative use includes “parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses”).—the court gave short shrift to the transformative use that Koons had arguably made of Rogers’s original work.284See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (2013). Indeed, one could argue that the Second Circuit implicitly reversed itself in its next case involving Jeff Koons and appropriationist art, in which it reached an exact opposite conclusion.285In Blanch v. Koons, the plaintiff owned the copyright to a photograph entitled Silk Sandals by Gucci—a commercial work used in advertising. Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Koons usurped the image, reproducing a portion of it for his painting Niagara, which had been commissioned by Deutsche Bank. Id. at 479. This time, however, the court found that the fair use doctrine protected Koons’s activities as a form of transformative appropriation, id. at 480–82, a decision affirmed by the Second Circuit, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006). In the latter decision, the Second Circuit cited to, and quoted extensively from, both Campbell and Leval’s article while giving far less attention to its own prior decision in Rogers v. Koons. See id. at 250.

That said, the absence of proper crediting served as a critical factor in justifying the court’s rejection of Koons’s fair use defense. Specifically, in considering the first factor—the purpose and character of the use—the court drew on notions of attribution in two separate ways to weigh against a finding of fair use. First, employing the “good faith” criteria, the court pointed to Koons’s decision to remove a copyright notice from one of Rogers’s notecards that he sent to Italian artisans when he commissioned fabrication of his statue based on the Rogers photograph. As the court concluded, this action “suggests bad faith in defendant’s use of plaintiff’s work, and militates against a finding of fair use.”286Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309. Second, the court concluded that the failure to credit supported its finding that Koons’s work was not commenting sufficiently on the original work to qualify for the heightened protection usually given to parody. As the court argued, Koons’s use failed to make the public aware of the original work and the resulting lack of proper crediting undermined a key reason why certain types of commentary—attributive ones—get fair use protection. “If an infringement of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim to a higher or different artistic use—without insuring public awareness of the original work—there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense,” noted the court.287Id. at 310.

Koons’ claim that his infringement of Rogers’ work is fair use solely because he is acting within an artistic tradition of commenting upon the commonplace thus cannot be accepted. The rule’s function is to insure that credit is given where credit is due. By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody, we merely insist that the audience be aware that underlying the parody there is an original and separate expression, attributable to a different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in some manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the parody.288Id. (emphasis added). This aspect of the Rogers decision gives a further nuance to the traditional distinction that courts have drawn between parodic and satirical uses of works, where the former gets far greater protection than that latter. See, e.g., Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 284, at 14 (detailing the parody/satire distinction in copyright’s fair use jurisprudence and its grounding in necessity, and criticizing it for advancing a conceptualization of fair use that is highly propertized, “allowing borrowing only when conditions absolutely require it and by casting fair use as a privilege rather than a right”). Courts have partly grounded the dichotomous treatment of parody and satire in necessity—for the former, a defendant must conjure up enough of the original that the audience understands what work is being mocked; for the latter, making a broader social point does not inextricably require use of the work for which permissions are lacking. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” (emphasis added)); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. (“It is the rule in this Circuit that though the satire need not be only of the copied work and may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the original work.” (emphasis added)). But this language from Rogers also suggests that attribution interests play a key role as well.  

Courts within the Second Circuit continue to pick up this language from Rogers to emphasize the importance of crediting in the fair use calculus. For example, in a recent published decision, the Southern District of New York drew upon Rogers’s bad faith analysis to find this subfactor within the “purpose and character of use” weighed in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant removed the copyright mark, thereby robbing the use of attribution.289Yang v. Mic Network, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 537, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The intentional removal of a copyright mark can ‘suggest[] bad faith in defendant’s use of plaintiff’s work, and militate[] against a finding of fair us[e].’ ” (quoting Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309)). All the while, at least one Second Circuit decision, NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, has mandated that good faith be considered by any court conducting a fair use analysis.290NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he subfactor pertaining to defendants’ good or bad faith must be weighed, and . . . it was error for the district court not to have fully and explicitly considered it.”). NXIVM did not expressly mention attribution or crediting, however, and it also cautioned that good faith is not “itself conclusive of the fair use question, or even of the first factor.” Id. (citation omitted). In some instances, this mandate has inexplicably been ignored. For example, in Cariou v. Prince, the district court had an extensive discussion of bad faith, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), but in the process of reversing the lower court’s decision to reject the defendant’s fair use decision, the Second Circuit made no consideration of good faith and provided no explanation for why it ignored this factor, Cariou v. Prince 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).

The Ninth Circuit has also cited the failure to provide authorial attribution as an important factor weighing against fair use. In Marcus v. Rowley, the court hewed to Harper & Row’s good faith edict in making attribution a part of the first fair use factor.291Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, the defendant’s failure to provide credit weighed against a finding of fair use.292Id. at 1176. As in Weissmann, the complete absence of any pecuniary harm and the use of the work in an academic setting did not trump the failure to credit.293Id. at 1179 (“Rowley’s [learning activity package], which was used for the same purpose as plaintiff’s booklet, was quantitatively and qualitatively a substantial copy of plaintiff’s booklet with no credit given to plaintiff. Under these circumstances, neither the fact that the defendant used the plaintiff’s booklet for nonprofit educational purposes nor the fact that plaintiff suffered no pecuniary damage as a result of Rowley’s copying supports a finding of fair use.”). Meanwhile, in Narell v. Freeman, the author of a best-selling novel, Cynthia Freeman, was caught having lifted, word-for-word, portions of her work from a previously published book by Irena Narell about the history of Jewish migration to San Francisco.294Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 909 (1989). Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the misappropriated sections were largely factual in nature and not protectible expression, it nevertheless addressed the issue of fair use. And while it ultimately found Freeman’s actions protected by the fair use doctrine, it held that the first factor “weigh[ed] heavily against Freeman because she did not acknowledge in her work that she had consulted Our City in writing Illusions.”295Id. at 914.

The Narell court cautioned that acknowledgment would not, by itself, excuse infringement.296Id.  And that has certainly proven true in other cases. For example, when a luxury fashion designer pushed back against claims that it had infringed a photograph of a model wearing its clothing, it advanced its fair use defense by pointing out that it had credited the photographer. The court demurred, noting that 

Defendant has not pointed to any precedent supporting its theories that because Defendant credited the photographer in the caption of the Photograph or because Plaintiff hired the model to wear Defendant’s clothing, Defendant has a right to use the Photograph. Simply put, attribution is not a defense against copyright infringement.297Iatosca v. Elie Tahari, Ltd., No. 19-cv-04527, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 171512, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 18, 2020).

Even there, however, the court reaffirmed the value of attribution in the fair use calculus by citing to Narell favorably and noting that, while “acknowledgement does not itself excuse infringement,” a “finding [of] failure to properly attribute copyrighted material weighs against fair use.”298Id. (citing Narell, 872 F.2d at 914).

5.  The Implicit Role of Attribution in Transpurposive Use Cases

Beyond the case law from the Second and Ninth Circuits explicitly embracing attribution as a factor, there are instances where crediting has played an implicit role in fair use determinations. This is particularly true in a body of recent cases involving technology-related transpurposive uses excused by courts under the defense. So, for example, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth Circuit blessed the unauthorized creation of thumbnail versions of online images to facilitate search engine functionality.299Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–22 (9th Cir. 2003). This judgment was famously reaffirmed in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., when the Ninth Circuit found that Google’s creation of thumbnails for its search engine was also protected.300Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164–68 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Kelly suit resulted from Arriba’s practice of crawling websites and indexing them by creating thumbnail versions of images that it found on those sites.301Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815–16. Arriba would then provide these thumbnails to its users, as relevant, in results on its search engine.302Id. Photographer Leslie Kelly, a chronicler of the American West in her images, objected and sued for infringement. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that Arriba’s activities constituted fair use and the attributive nature of Arriba’s use helped propel both the first and fourth factors.

On the first factor, the court placed great weight on the fact that the use of the photographs was both transformative and attributive. Unlike the original images, which were intended to inform and provide visual enjoyment, Arriba’s thumbnails served no aesthetic purpose and, instead, functioned solely as “a tool to help index and improve access to images on the internet and their related web sites.”303Id. at 818. Here, the attributive characteristics of Arriba’s thumbnails become important, as they were instrumental to the transformative functionality they embodied. As the court noted, clicking on thumbnails would produce an “Images Attributes” page that would provide a link back to the original page, which was the photographer’s home page, where sourcing information and attribution would naturally follow.304Id. at 815–     16. If the thumbnails did not produce sourcing and attribution, they would not serve a true indexing purpose and, consequently, they would not promote the locational function of search engines.305Providing a link is a common way to provide attribution in the digital environment. In fact, recognizing the crediting that links can provide, the Creative Commons updated its licenses early on in its existence to allow for links as a form of attribution. See Brown, supra note 43 (noting the addition of links as a form of attribution to Version 2.0 Creative Commons licenses to reflect the crediting function that links provide).

As for the fourth fair use factor, the court found no market harm precisely because of the link-back attribution feature: “By showing the thumbnails on its results page when users entered terms related to Kelly’s images, the search engine would guide users to Kelly’s web site rather than away from it.”306Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. Steering users to the home webpage for the original source of the photographs would then provide them with crediting and attribution information and, if they were interested, the ability to license. Although the Kelly court never invoked the language of crediting, attribution played an implicit role in permitting its creation and use of thumbnails under the fair use doctrine.307As a counterfactual, consider what the case might look like if Arriba were merely just creating thumbnails without a purpose that could drive people back to the original, credited source of the images. If the thumbnails were created without an ability to link back to the original source (where attribution would be given), they would be neither “transpurposive”308See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2013) (defining a transpurposive use as one “where an original work is set to a new purpose.”). nor without market harm.

Similarly, when evaluating whether Google’s creation of cached copies of websites and the images of them for its search engine would be excused from infringement liability, the court in Field v. Google Inc., drew on prior Ninth Circuit authority309Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (D. Nev. 2006) (“Because ‘fair use presupposes “good faith” and “fair dealing,” ’ courts may weigh the ‘propriety of the defendant’s conduct’ in the equitable balance of a fair use determination.” (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436–37 (9th Cir. 1986))). and the open-ended language of the Copyright Act310Id. (“The Copyright Act authorizes courts to consider other factors than the four non-exclusive factors.”). to find authority to weigh as a fifth factor in the fair use calculus “a comparison of the equities.”311Id. at 1123. Notably, the equities and good faith that mattered to the court revolved around Google’s decision to provide a link back to cached websites—a key mechanism for digital attribution.

6. Attribution and Copyright Clearance Norms

Finally, the copyright norms we hold most dear as a society also support attribution as a mitigating factor in practices that might otherwise constitute infringement. For example, although the practice of quotation literally reproduces and distributes copyrighted material without permission, notwithstanding the antics of the James Joyce Estate,312See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You 49 (2011) (detailing the attempts of the litigious James Joyce Estate, headed by Joyce’s grandson, Stephen, to squelch any unauthorized use of Joyce’s works, including academic quotations); see also D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, New Yorker, June 19, 2006, at 34 (quoting Stephen Joyce as telling one academic who sought to excerpt Joyce in his work, “You should consider a new career as a garbage collector in New York City, because you’ll never quote a Joyce text again”); cf. Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1085–86 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that a Stanford professor had a fair use right to quote James Joyce over the Estate’s objections and awarding attorneys’ fees to said professor given the manifest unreasonableness of the Estate’s position). it is universally viewed as per se fair use. Indeed, the decision that gave rise to the fair use defense in the first place, Folsom v. Marsh, announced the obviousness of this proposition when Justice Story wrote that “no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism.”313Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).Quotation inherently involves attribution. The use of inverted commas around a sentence directly indicates that the sentence’s origins lie with a third party and not with the author of the text that one is reading. Critically, those inverted commas are then accompanied by some form of attribution. Admittedly, the attribution is part of the transformative function of quoting. After all, criticism or commentary about someone else’s work cannot occur unless that other work is identified. But the equitable nature of a quotation—giving attribution—distinguishes it from the act of taking someone else’s words without permission in the exact same way but without attribution—an act that can amount to infringement. Or, to put it in the form of a Zen-like koan:

Q: What is a quotation without quotation marks?

A: An infringement.

When using portions of someone else’s work, a key differentiator between infringement and fair use is the act of attribution.

Common beliefs about copyright law reflect our mores (even when they do not entirely match up with the law), and these popular notions have also long viewed attribution as a factor in what actions should or should not constitute infringement. As any copyright practitioner knows, popular misconceptions about fair use abound.314See, e.g., Lloyd J. Jassin, Ten Common Copyright Permission Myths, CopyLaw.com, https://www.copylaw.com/new_articles/copy_myths.html [https://perma.cc/3BAB-EGDZ] (detailing ten popular misconceptions regarding the use of copyrighted materials). Members of the public will often cite a particular bright-line threshold of use (no more than five percent of a work, for example) as providing insulation from infringement liability; they will claim that, so long as one does not profit from unauthorized exploitation of a copyrighted work, it constitutes fair use; or they will contend that any educational use automatically constitutes fair use. Of course, each of these absolute statements is wrong. But the beliefs are all based on a kernel of truth: the less one uses of a work, the less one profits from an unauthorized exploitation, and the more academic a use, the more likely it is to constitute fair use. The same dynamic is at play with another popular myth: that giving proper credit can insulate you from infringement liability for the unauthorized exploitation of someone else’s work.315Id. (noting the common misunderstanding that proper crediting can excuse an infringement under the fair use doctrine). While this notion is obviously incorrect, it is not entirely without basis. Although it may be infringing just the same, a credited use is indubitably more fair than an uncredited use, as the former better complies with societal norms against plagiarism and advances authorial interests in attribution. As such, the former is more likely (even if marginally so) than the latter to enjoy a viable fair use defense.

For example, consider a recent controversy at the intersection of intellectual property and cultural appropriation. In 2021, Addison Rae Easterling, a popular social media influencer, appeared on The Tonight Show to “teach” Jimmy Fallon eight of the most popular dances trending on TikTok and other social media sites. Although the dances can enjoy copyright protection as choreographic works,316See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (extending the subject matter of copyright protection to “choreographic works”). the routines were not licensed from their creators, and, to make matters worse, Easterling and Fallon originally failed to give any credit at all to the originators of the dances. As Kamilah Moore, an entertainment attorney and the chairperson of the California Assembly’s Reparations Task Force, has noted, this misstep was particularly pernicious because of its racial valence: it “received major backlash” because white TikTok superstars “have often gained notoriety and received millions of views by parroting dance routines primarily created by Black creators and other creators of color” while failing to provide “proper attribution in the marketplace.”317Kamilah Moore, #BlackTikTokStrike: How TikTok Dance Creators Can Begin to Protect Their Choreographic Works, CDAS (July 21, 2021), https://cdas.com/blacktiktokstrike-how-tiktok-dance-creators-can-begin-to-protect-their-choreographic-works [https://perma.cc/3E4N-BJ6H]. Easterling and Fallon’s unauthorized recreation of the dances could well constitute fair use, but there is a vast difference between an unlicensed use that is also uncredited versus one that is at least attributive. Recognizing this and responding to public pressure, Fallon subsequently attempted to make amends by hosting the dance creators in a later broadcast of his show.318See Abid Rahman, Jimmy Fallon Interviews TikTok Dancers After Addison Rae Backlash, Hollywood Rep. (Apr. 6, 2021, 4:40 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-news/jimmy-fallon-interviews-tiktok-dancers-after-addison-rae-backlash-4161735 [https://perma.cc/SF6E-MV2M]. Given the importance of correcting for persistent gaps in crediting that troublingly fall along racial, gender, and socioeconomic lines as well acknowledging the economic value of proper attribution,319See, e.g., Tanya Chen, Black TikTokers Who Create Viral Dances Are Asking the
Platform’s Most Popular Teens to Properly Credit Their Work, Buzzfeed News (June 24,
2020, 2:57 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tanyachen/black-creators-on-tiktok-demanding-proper-dance-credits [https://perma.cc/XK8Y-H3DM] (emphasizing the particular import of the issue of crediting in the Easterling/Fallon controversy “because dances are no longer a frivolous pastime on the platform, but a way to become famous and make real money”).
 a fair use regime that incorporates attribution as a factor would incentivize users of intellectual property to at least recognize the cultural influencers from whom they draw.

As this survey of the fair use landscape and extant jurisprudence has shown, acknowledged or not, crediting is already an implicit fair use factor. The only remaining question is to what degree it is or should be. That query provides rife fodder for future scholarship, as the weight accorded to attributive use, just like the other fair use factors in section 107, would be something left firmly to the discretion of judges who can consider the particular context in an adaptive and holistic manner.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decided Dastar almost twenty years ago. Since that time, the sky has admittedly not fallen.320Indeed, there has been little to no effort to undo Dastar with an amendment to the Lanham Act. As such, it would be hyperbole to suggest there is some kind of pressing emergency to address the absence of attribution rights. Nevertheless, as we have detailed, the lack of substantive legal protection for crediting in the post-Dastar era has impoverished the responsiveness of our intellectual property regime to the interests and motivations of authors. With this in mind, change through legislation would face difficult odds. After all, it took almost a century for the United States to accede to the Berne Convention and, when it did, that only sparked the most minimal of efforts to comply with Berne’s attribution requirements through the relatively limited scope of VARA. The most significant legislative efforts on attribution in the past generation came through the falsification, removal, and alteration of CMI provisions passed as part of the DMCA. But even there, facilitation of infringement, rather than vindication of crediting interests, drove the statute—a fact made clearly by the claims’ onerous double-scienter requirements. As such, it would be disingenuous to fail to recognize that the prospects for legislative action for broader crediting protection are dim, at best. Moreover, there are good reasons to doubt whether the benefits of providing affirmative attribution rights either by overruling Dastar or by providing an independent cause of action for crediting under the Copyright Act would outweigh the risks. Instead, change can come in another, more incremental fashion—one that averts key dangers of an affirmative cause of action for crediting, has grounding in the existing jurisprudence, and could occur without legislation action.

A generation ago, Pierre Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard forced a first major change in fair use jurisprudence. I argue for a second. Like the implementation of transformative use, attributive use fits comfortably into the existing jurisprudence on fair use, speaks to the purpose and character of the use and even market harm factors, and ultimately supports the underlying purpose of the overall copyright regime: promotion of progress in the arts. Since fair use only represents a defense to infringement, such an admittedly restrained approach still tethers attribution to infringement and, as such, it does not represent a complete victory for the independent value of crediting. Nevertheless, as the success of Leval’s appeal to transformative use shows, such an entreaty for change can have an impact. Moreover, if implemented, recognition of attributive use would promote further development of a culture of crediting, a particularly important move at the dawn of the digital age, when all individuals make daily (infringing) use of copyrighted works thousands of times per day.321See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543–48 (detailing the numerous unwitting infringements of copyright law that we all commit on a daily basis). Ultimately, therefore, the attributive use doctrine could not only enable fair use to operate in a way that is more consistent with the utilitarian design of our copyright regime, but it can also help build support for further recognition of attribution rights in the future.

 

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1

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A.B. Harvard, J.D. Yale Law School. Paul W. Wildman Chair and Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) School of Law.

The Invention of Antitrust

The long Progressive Era, from 1900 to 1930, was the Golden Age of antitrust theory, if not of enforcement. During that period courts and Progressive scholars developed nearly all of the tools that we use to this day to assess anticompetitive practices under the federal antitrust laws. In a very real sense, we can say that this group of people invented antitrust law.

The principal contributions the Progressives made to antitrust policy were (1) partial equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run analysis, and later provided the foundation for the development of the antitrust “relevant market”; (2) the classification of costs into fixed and variable, with the emergent belief that industries with high fixed costs were more problematic; (3) the development of the concept of entry barriers, contrary to a long classical tradition of assuming that entry is easy and quick; (4) the distinction between horizontal and vertical relationships and the emergence of vertical integration as a competition problem; and (5) price discrimination as a practice that could sometimes have competitive consequences. Finally, at the end of this period came (6) theories of imperfect competition, including the rediscovery of oligopoly theory and the rise of product differentiation as relevant to antitrust policy making.

Subsequent to 1930, antitrust policy veered sharply to the left. Then, two decades later it turned just as sharply to the right. Eventually it moderated, reaching a point that is not all that far away from the Progressives’ original vision.

INTRODUCTION

The long American Progressive Era to the New Deal, roughly 1900 into the early 1930s, was the formative age of antitrust policy.1Politically, the Progressive Era ended with the election of Warren Harding in 1920. As an intellectual and economic movement, it survived and morphed into the New Deal. See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (1955); Morton Keller, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900–1933 (1996). During this period a diverse group of policy makers developed nearly all of the analytic tools that antitrust law uses today to evaluate business practices or market structures thought to be anticompetitive. For all intents and purposes, they invented antitrust law. In fact, after decades of experimentation we are reclaiming much of it. The extraordinary Progressive influence on antitrust policy was at least partly a historical coincidence. The passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the development of techniques for evaluating practices tracked extraordinary developments in technology as well as social and economic thought. Antitrust policy would have looked very different had it developed a half century earlier.

The Progressive Era antitrust movement was both political and economic. It reflected the emergence of new interest groups as well as new sources of economic concern and theoretical developments. The emergent interest groups were large multistate business, the trade association movement dominated by small business,2E.g., Arthur J. Eddy, The New Competition: An Examination of the Conditions Underlying the Radical Change that Is Taking Place in the Commercial and Industrial World—the Change from a Competitive to a Cooperative Basis (1913); I.L. Sharfman, The Trade Association Movement, 16 Am. Econ. Rev. 203 (1926); see Laura Phillips Sawyer, American Fair Trade: Proprietary Capitalism, Corporatism, and the “New Competition,” 1890–1940 (2018). consumers, and labor. The new sources of concern were industrialization, the rise of modern distribution, the labor movement, and the increasing importance of consumers as market participants. The new theoretical developments were the rise of marginalist economics and industrial organization theory, which provided competition analysts with a set of tools like none they had before.

The legislative debate leading up to the Sherman Act can hardly be characterized as a dispute about economic theory. That came later as litigants and courts looked for tools that would enable them to assess practices in a coherent way. Consistent with the economic-focused language of the Sherman Act itself, the tools that emerged were mainly economic, although they were applied by non-economist lawyers and judges. The record of their engagement with the law is impressive; judges routinely used them even if they were not aware of their economic origins or technical meaning. Nearly all of these developments placed antitrust theory on an expansion course that prevailed until the reaction against the New Deal found a voice in the neoliberalism of the 1940s, particularly as expressed by the Chicago School. Even so, the neoliberal revolution adopted most of these tools, although it modified some of them and rejected a few.

The Progressives are occasionally caricatured as people who really did not care about costs and productivity but were concerned exclusively about bigness as such. That could not be further from the truth. By and large the Progressives appreciated the fact that the trusts had lower costs than smaller firms and did not want to punish them for that. In fact, they were fairly obsessed with efficiency and cutting of costs.3See Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in 1912, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2025 (2015). That obsession extended even to Louis Brandeis, a strong proponent of business efficiency even as he railed at large firms.4See Louis D. Brandeis, Organized Labor and Efficiency, in Business: A Profession (1914); John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (on Brandeis’s embrace of “Taylorism”). On Brandeis’s dedication to Taylorism as a way of having efficiency without bigness, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Slogans and Goals of Antitrust Law, N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming 2023). He campaigned for “Taylorism,” or scientific management, as a way of limiting price increases.5See Mark Aldrich, On the Track of Efficiency: Scientific Management Comes to Railroad Shops, 1900–1930, 84 Bus. Hist. Rev. 501 (2010) (commenting on Brandeis’ arguments that scientific management could save the railroads $1 million daily, avoiding the need for a rate increase); see also Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man’s Life 315–30 (1946) (noting Brandeis’s advocacy of scientific management as a way of reducing railroad costs). One antinomy in Brandeis’s work was his persistent failure to acknowledge the relationship between greater efficiency and larger size, even though contemporary economists clearly did.6See, e.g., Note, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition and Smallness: A Dilemma Re-Examined, 66 Yale L.J. 69 (1956) (exploring this conflict); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1011 (2005).

The numerous and varied participants in the Chicago Conference on Trusts, discussed below, favored lower costs and were also concerned about higher prices.7See infra text accompanying notes 37–41. They worried that exclusionary practices might be a vehicle for achieving them and making market dominance permanent.

I.  THE CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS

The Progressive Era was heavily preoccupied with the rise of larger firms, or the “trust” problem. The initial reaction was an eclectic range of views about what to do about them, or whether to do anything at all. The gigantic 1899 Chicago Conference on Trusts, hosted by the Civic Federation of Chicago, is an exceptional window into the contemporary mindset because it reflected this diversity of views. Its personnel and proceedings, which were published in 1900, represented every interest group that had a stake in policy about the trusts. Some participants were invited by the conference managers, while others were invited by the governors of individual states.8See Jeremiah W. Jenks, Chicago Conference on Trusts, 15 Pol. Sci. Q. 349, 349 (1900). The speakers included politicians, economists, lawyers, social scientists and statisticians, industrialists, labor union leaders, insurance company representatives, and even clergy.9Chicago Conference on Trusts: Speeches, Debates, Resolutions, List of the Delegates, Committees, Etc., Held September 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 1899, at iii–vii (1899) (listing participants and the title of their contributions); see also Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916, at 203–28 (1988) (describing the conference).

This diverse group identified a number of phenomena that explained the rise of the trusts and that either justified or damned them. Some argued that the trusts were entirely the consequence of economies of scale or scope and as such were an engine of economic progress that should be left alone.10E.g., Charles Foster, Desirability of Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 268, 268–71. Others argued that potential competition and new entry would always be present to discipline monopoly pricing, thus mitigating any concerns.11See discussion infra text accompanying note 65. Many others saw the trusts as harmful and blamed their rise on deficiencies in state corporate law. They debated about a national corporation act as a potential solution.12A.E. Rogers, Historical Development of the Corporation, with Exclusion of the Principle of Public Benefit, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 409, 409–21; William Jennings Bryan, The Man Before the Dollar: Society Not Enthralled to an Institution Solely Because the Institution Exists: The Remedy of Congressional License, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 496, 503–09; see also William Dudley Foulke, In Criticism of Certain Views of William J. Bryan, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 579, 579–80 (opposing Bryan’s suggestion that corporations be generally forbidden from doing business in more than one state). Others both blamed and defended tariffs13E.g., Bryan, supra note 12, at 501 (arguing that trusts are a product of high tariffs); Byron W. Holt, Tariff the Mother of Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 171, 171–76 (speaking on “Tariff, the Mother of Trusts”); Samuel Adams Robinson, The Antidote of Free Trade and the International Trust, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 193, 193–201; Lawson Purdy, The Wrong of Special Privilege, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 166, 166–71 (arguing that tariffs were a principal vehicle for the rise of the trusts; “the combinations not protected by an iniquitous tariff are few in number”); accord John F. Scanlan, Trusts and Free Trade, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 177, 177–86; Thomas Updegraff, Protection and Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 187, 187–88 (“Protectionists would kill the snakes and save the paradise. Free traders in America would devastate the paradise and save the snakes.”). Contra Henry W. Blair, The Tariff Not Mother of Trusts, but Mother of American Wealth and Power, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 604, 604–19 (stating that “the protective tariff is not the mother of trusts, but the protective tariff is the mother of American wealth and power”). or unethical business actors.14E.g., William Fortune, A Plea for Moderate Action, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 53, 53–57; G.W. Northrup, Jr., Practical Remedies for Industrial Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 522, 522–30; J.G. Schonfarber, Corporate Ownership of Railroads the Backbone of the Trust; Protective Tariff Its Right Arm, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 343, 343–45.

Within this amalgamation of concerns the Sherman Act itself was hardly dominant. In fact, it played a surprisingly small part, and the speeches tended to emphasize its deficiencies more than its strengths. Henry Rand Hatfield’s well-known contemporary account of the Chicago Trust Conference is very likely responsible for the view that the economists who spoke were nearly all opposed to the Sherman Act.15See Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 6 (1899) (“The weight of evidence . . . supported the view that the modern system of large business establishments was the outgrowth of natural industrial evolution. This was necessarily the view of those who advocated trust methods, but it was also advanced by all save one of the professional economists, by the leading labor representatives, and even by some who were avowed anti-trust men.”). At the time, Hatfield was an instructor in accounting at the University of Chicago. A fair reading of the proceedings suggests two quite different splits. First was the division of those who thought that the trusts were efficient and harmless from those who regarded them as threatening. Contrary to Hatfield’s view, a clear majority believed that the trusts presented a serious problem. Second was the question of the best legal tools for confronting them. Here, Hatfield’s point has more traction. As correctives, corporate law and tariff reform were at least as prominent as the Sherman Act, and many of the speakers professed strong disappointment in Sherman Act litigation to that time. Although the speakers were hardly unanimous, the strongest consensus around a single view was that the trusts should be controlled by changes in corporate law.

Prior to the Chicago Conference, the Civic Federation had sent a questionnaire to participants.16Hazen S. Pingree, The Effect of Trusts on Our National Life and Citizenship, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 263, 263–65; David Kinley, Analysis of Industrial Statistics Collected by the Civic Federation of Chicago, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 530, 530–31. The summaries contained in the Proceedings say nothing about the methodology, but there were 554 respondents to 69 questions. The respondents were described as “trusts, wholesale dealers, commercial travelers’ organizations, railroads, labor associations, contractors, manufacturers, economists, financiers, and public men.”17Pingree, supra note 16, at 264. A separate list, or circular, was sent to a smaller but overlapping group of lawyers, economists, and “public men.” The description of the survey also fails to indicate whether respondents were limited to one answer or could select multiple answers. Nor does it specify how recipients of the questionnaire were selected and what was their distribution over various interest groups. These omissions largely reflected the state of public opinion research at the time.18See Anthony Oberschall, The Historical Roots of Public Opinion Research, in The Sage Handbook of Public Opinion Research 82 (Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, eds., 2008). In any event, nothing suggests that this was anything more than an informal questionnaire distributed broadly to invitees.

David Kinley, a professor from the University of Illinois, reported on the results.19Kinley, supra note 16, at 530. However, former Michigan Governor Hazen S. Pingree also commented on the report. Pingree, supra note 16, at 263–64. Three quarters of the participants overall believed that the trusts injured consumers.20Kinley, supra note 16, at 531 (reporting that 105 responses on the issue thought consumers were injured; 24 thought they were benefitted; and 41 believed there was no difference). Two-thirds of the respondents regarded the trusts with “apprehension.”21Id. at 532. Most on the main        questionnaire believed that the trusts resulted in higher prices.22Id. at 531–32. As Kinley summarized,

The items of information about prices aggregate 506; 452 were to the effect that prices rose after combinations were made; 24 that they fell, 15 that there was no change, and 15 that they were fluctuating; 210 do not specifically assign a cause, 189 assign trusts as the cause of the change (increase, in most of these cases); and 40 assign other causes, usually “increased demand,” “rise of raw materials,” or the tariff.

Id. at 531. However, 90% of the respondents on the second Circular, which was more focused on academics, lawyers, and government officials, believed that the effect of the trusts was to reduce costs.23Id. at 531. Kinley noted that 432 thought that combinations “should” reduce production costs; 17 believed that they “should” increase it. Among these, 289 believed that this “ought” to be a benefit to society, and 74 thought that it “ought” to be a detriment. Apparently, several respondents believed that the trust both reduced costs but raised prices. On the question of passing on of reduced costs, there were 444 answers. Forty said it “depends on competition”; 110 concluded that customers would eventually “get most or all of the gain”; 101 believed that passing on would “depend on the trusts”; and 75 believed that “the consumer will gain nothing.” The rest were uncertain. On worker wages, 180 believed that the combinations increase them, and 148 that they reduce them. Fifty-one respondents said that they would reduce the number of employees; three believed they would lengthen the working day and three that they would shorten it. Twenty-five believed they would have no effect. Two-thirds of the respondents on this second list also believed that consumers would benefit. Interestingly, roughly two-thirds of the respondents overall believed that labor organizations should be treated as all other trusts, while one-third took an unspecified “opposite view.”24Id. at 532. This suggests that the idea of a labor “exemption” from antitrust law did not have popular support in 1900.25On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Worker Welfare and Antitrust, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023). Tellingly, this occurred after the federal courts had begun using the Sherman Act as a powerful striking-breaking device.26See infra text accompanying note 31. Evidently, most of the participants did not object.

The survey concluded with a very general question: “What shall be done with combinations?” The answers were all over the place, with pluralities going to unspecified “legislation” (61 respondents), “let alone” (60) and the third highest specific proposal going to “Tariff revision” (45). “Antitrust” did not appear on the list, except to the extent it may have been included in unspecified legislation. Twenty-six respondents preferred government ownership or control of natural monopolies, and even fewer (10) supported “Stricter Limitation on Corporate Powers.”27Kinley, supra note 16, at 533. No specific proposal other than “let alone” received 10% of the votes, and it received only 10.8%. The list of options did not include any that were obviously related to morals or ethics, although 123 responses were classified as “miscellaneous,” with no specification of their content.

At the time of the conference, the Sherman Act was nearly ten years old and had produced two important Supreme Court decisions condemning railroad cartels.28United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). Even here, the very small number of comments on the railroad cartel decisions were more negative than positive. One complaint was that the railroad cartel cases did not authorize the courts to set reasonable rates, but only to condemn bad agreements.29Robert S. Taylor, The Main Problem—How Shall We Distinguish Among Corporations?, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 72, 75; F.B. Thurber, The Bogey Monster: A Thing to Be Regulated and Encouraged, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 124, 127–33. Another was that the Trans-Missouri railroad cartel case, which had adopted a per se rule against price fixing, had largely “expunged” the rule of reason from the law.30Thurber, supra note 29, at 135.

By 1900 the Sherman Act had also been used aggressively several times against labor unions, a development that was both praised and condemned by participants. In nearly all of the labor cases the plaintiff had been the United States, thus inviting debate about what should be government policy toward labor union activities.31See generally United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1895) (instructing jury that Sherman Act reaches labor conspiracy); United States v. Elliott, 62 F. 801 (E.D. Mo. 1894) (granting preliminary injunction under the Sherman Act, under what is now 15 U.S.C. § 25); United States v. Agler, 62 F. 824 (D. Ind. 1894) (similarly, approving injunction even against defendants who were not named in the bill); see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding labor conspiracy injunction against Eugene Debs under Congressional power to regulate commerce; not relying on Sherman Act, but noting that the district court did and expressing no opinion about whether that was correct). Other decisions are discussed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 919, 950 (1988). P.E. Dowe, statistician of the Anti-Trust League, declared that while the cost of living within the last two years had increased some 12–16%, wages had risen by less than 3%.32P.E. Dowe, Trusts and Their Effects Upon Commercial Travelers, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 115, 119. Nevertheless, as noted above, there was little support for labor antitrust immunity. Overall, while attitudes toward labor changed significantly between 1890 and 1914 when the Clayton Act was passed, most of this was not yet reflected in the conference proceedings.

Other conference participants criticized the Supreme Court’s very first Sherman Act decision, United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,33United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). which had concluded that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to control intrastate manufacturing simply because the goods were destined for interstate shipment. That provoked the view that the country “must have a constitutional change if the general government is to deal with the trust problem.”34John I. Yellott, The Trust: An Institution Pronounced by the United States Supreme Court, in 1895, Beyond Congressional Control, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 427, 434–35 (concluding that “this enabling amendment must be made, or we must rely upon state legislation for a remedy”). Largely in accord was William Dudley Foulke. Foulke, supra note 12, at 579–80. Another speaker praised the railroad cartel decisions as well as E.C. Knight for developing the distinction between intrastate and interstate trusts.35Northrup, supra note 14, at 523–24. Many commentators expressed concerns about federalism, but most were of the nature that while the states had a primary role in combatting trusts they could not control interstate companies without federal assistance.36E.g., Foster, supra note 10, at 270; Jefferson Davis, The Arkansas Anti-Trust Law, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 271, 272; George R. Gaither, Jr., Maryland and the Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 285, 290–291; Francis G. Newlands, Federal Taxation as a Means of Regulation, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 305, 306–308.

Several conference participants spoke about the role of costs. Many recognized that the trusts tended to reduce costs.37E.g., A. Leo Weil, The Combination in History, Ethics, and Political Economy: Should It Be Prevented by Law?, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 77, 89 (“That such large enterprises reduce the cost of production, is an economic fact too well established now to need further authentication.”); Foster, supra note 10, at 270 (acknowledging that Standard Oil has reduced the cost of gas for lighting); George Gunton, The Public and the Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 276, 278–80 (noting that both trusts and railroads greatly reduce the cost of production); David Ross, Combinations the Inevitable Incidents of Industrial Evolution, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 371, 372, 374 (similar); Edward W. Bemis, Trust Evils and Suggested Remedies: A Problem for a Generation to Settle, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 394, 394–96 (citing economist Henry Carter Adams for proposition that large trusts significantly reduce costs); Foulke, supra note 12, at 453 (similar, Standard Oil); Emerson McMillin, Combinations in the Main Beneficial, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 617, 617 (similar, and concluding that “[t]he consumer and the laborer should be the chief beneficiaries”); James W. Ellsworth, The Advantages of Rightful Combination, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 618, 618 (similar). Even the “Great Commoner” William Jennings Bryan acknowledged the cost reductions but protested that nothing ensured that these savings would be passed on in the form of lower prices.38Bryan, supra note 12, at 497–99. On the overall audience’s conclusions about passing on, see supra note 23. “A trust, a monopoly, can lessen the cost of distribution. But when it does so society has no assurance that it will get any of the benefits . . . .”39Bryan, supra note 12, at 499. Similarly, others indicated a concern for higher prices. For example, John M. Stahl of the Farmers’ National Congress acknowledged that the trusts had lowered costs but accused them of setting anticompetitively high prices.40Aaron Jones, Federal and State Regulation of Trusts, in Chicago Conference of Trusts, supra note 9, at 218, 223. Some participants defined competition in terms of cost reduction.41E.g., Weil, supra note 37, at 87 (“The true and only kind of competition that is desirable is the constructive, which wins by decreasing cost or improving product.”); Holt, supra note 13, at 173 (observing that the steel trust had reduced the cost of production sufficiently to offset the 1891 McKinley tariff); Robinson, supra note 13, at 195–97 (similar).

       Critics later faulted the Chicago Conference for failure to make specific recommendations, and state governors called a second conference for that purpose which met in St. Louis later in 1899. It issued a number of recommendations, but its proceedings were apparently never published and it received little attention from the press. It was dominated by state attorneys general who focused largely on corporate law remedies.42See Benjamin Woodring, Quo Warranto: The Structure and Strength of a Common Law Antitrust Remedy, 96 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 187, 215–16 (2019); John B. Cassody, Remedies for Monopolistic Trusts Proposed by the St. Louis Antitrust Conference, 33 Am. L. Rev. 889, 905–07 (1899). Its recommendations either duplicated those already contained in the Sherman Act or else called for corporate law modifications limiting the power of corporations to do business in more than a single state.43See Sylvester Pennoyer, How to Control the Trusts, 33 Am. L. Rev. 876, 877–78 (1899) (describing St. Louis conference). The conference resolutions called for

the enactment and enforcement, both by the several States and the nation, of legislation that shall define as crimes any attempted monopolization or restraint of trade in any line of industrial activity,..; punishment to the corporation to the extent of dissolution; an efficacious system of reports to State authority by corporations and the strict examination of all such as are organized under its laws; the prevention of entrance within a State of any foreign corporation for any other purpose than interstate commerce, except on terms that will put it on a basis of equality with domestic corporations, making it mandatory upon foreign corporations to procure State license as a condition precedent to their entry ; the enactment of State legislation preventing corporations created in one State from doing business exclusively in other States; providing that no corporation shall be formed in whole or in part from another corporation, or hold stock in another corporation engaged in similar or competitive business; recommending that each State pass laws providing that no corporation which is a member of any pool or trust in that State, or elsewhere, can do business in that State ; that the capital stock of private corporations should be fully paid up, and that shareholders shall be liable to twice the face value of the stock held by each.

The path of antitrust development that took place in subsequent years leading up to the Clayton Act in 1914 was much more focused than the conference debates, mainly because many alternatives dropped away. The move for a national incorporation statute or expanded state corporate law remedies ran out of gas.44On the rise and fall of the movement, see Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (1963); Camden Hutchison, Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement, 2017 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1017, 1023–24, 1078–79 (2017); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 Va. L. Rev. 603 (1991); Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 Am. J. Legal Hist. 160, 180 (1982). Debates over the tariff remained, but no legislation ever linked them to trusts as such.

The role of labor became more controversial after 1900, with distinctive positions emerging by the 1912 presidential election. The 1912 Democratic Party platform called for protection of labor organizing so that “members should not be regarded as illegal combinations in restraint of trade.”451912 Democratic Party Platform, Am. Presidency Project (June 25, 1912), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1912-democratic-party-platform [https://perma.cc/43Z2-44RU]. The Republican platform was silent on that issue, although it did advocate for preservation of high tariffs as a means of protecting workers’ wages.46Republican Party Platform of 1912, Am. Presidency Project (June 18, 1912), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1912 [https://perma.cc/XF5Y-VXJE]. High tariffs, it should be noted, protected producers directly, and labor only if producers passed on some of their gains in the form of higher wages. The Progressive Party, with Theodore Roosevelt as its head, called for an end to labor injunctions but did not mention a substantive antitrust immunity.47Progressive Party Platform of 1912, Am. Presidency Project (Nov. 5, 1912), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/progressive-party-platform-1912 [https://perma.cc/K7PE-BUP8]. The Democrat’s 1912 election victory very likely accounts for insertion of a labor immunity into the Clayton Act, now as section 6.4815 U.S.C. § 17 (2018); see Hovenkamp, supra note 25.

Debates over good morals in business behavior are of course never ending, but the concerns were never reflected in the text of an antitrust statute. Rather, when it passed the Clayton Act in 1914, the Progressive-dominated Congress doubled down on the use of exclusively economic language. The Act condemned conduct when it threatened to “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”4915 U.S.C. § 13 (2018) (predatory price discrimination); id. § 14 (2018) (tying and exclusive dealing); id. § 18 (2018) (horizontal mergers). Section 13 was subsequently amended so as to cover a supplier’s discrimination between its dealers, and 15 U.S.C. § 18 was subsequently amended to reach both vertical mergers and asset acquisitions, but it continued to use the “substantially lessen competition” language.

One thing that emerges powerfully in the proceedings of the conference is that, even though the participants represented a wide variety of political beliefs as well as professions, for a clear majority of them the dominant concern was with the power of the trusts to set high prices or drive rivals out of business. But there were some exceptions. Of the roughly seventy participants whose statements were published, a half dozen emphasized political or social concerns either in addition or as an alternative to the economic ones. The most prominent in Progressive circles was economist Henry Carter Adams, at this time a statistician for the Interstate Commerce Commission. Adams spoke at some length about rising concentration and economic power, as well as the deficiencies of state corporate law. However, he also complained about the “general social and political results of trust organizations” that must be considered. “For the preservation of democracy there must be maintained a fair degree of equality in the social standing of citizens,” he observed, and wondered whether the rise of the trusts was consistent with that.50Henry C. Adams, A Statement of the Trust Problem, in Chicago Conference of Trusts, supra note 9, at 35, 38–40. He concluded:

I would not claim, without discussion, that the trust organization of society destroys reasonable equality, closes the door of industrial opportunity, or tends to disarrange that fine balance essential to the successful workings of an automatic society; but I do assert that the questions here presented are debatable questions, and that the burden of proof lies with the advocates of this new form of business organization.51Id.

He also suggested that the trusts might have outsize political influence.52Id. at 39.

Dudley Wooten, then a member of the Texas legislature, agreed, arguing that the trusts were antidemocratic perversions brought about by selfishness.53Dudley G. Wooten, Principles and Sources of the Trust Evil as Texas Sees Them, in Chicago Conference of Trusts, supra note 9, at 42, 42. Aaron Jones, a leader of the national Grange, a populist political organization of farmers,54See Robert C. McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History, 1877–1898, at 50–142 (1991) (on the Grange, or National Grange Patrons of Husbandry, and other agricultural populist groups). observed that the sugar trust made political contributions to the Republican Party in Republican-controlled states and to the Democrats in Democrat-controlled states.55Jones, supra note 40, at 221. John W. Hayes, General Secretary of the Knights of Labor, saw a political war between the power of the state and the power of the trusts,56John W. Hayes, The Social Enemy, in Chicago Conference of Trusts, supra note 9, at 331, 334. as did Edward W. Bemis from the Bureau of Economic Research.57Id. at 394, 397–98. However, Bemis also praised chain stores for offering low prices and distinguished them from the trusts. While the trusts cut prices selectively in order to drive out rivals, the department store “furnishes alike to all the advantage of lower prices, which are rendered possible by the economies of a big business.”58Bemis, supra note 37, at 395. At this time most of the chain store debate lay in the future. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4. William Dudley Foulke, a prominent journalist and political activist for Progressive causes, argued that “the political and social effects of monopoly are far more menacing to society than its economic results.”59Foulke, supra note 12, at 454.

For more conservative political activist George Gunton, by contrast, politics were present but pulling the other way: politicians were being urged to abandon sound economic principles of “industrial freedom” in order to vote the “arbitrary paternalism” of harsh regulation of the trusts.60Gunton, supra note 37, at 276.

Following the Chicago Conference, Progressives began to focus more narrowly on the antitrust laws and the discipline of economics as the preferred tool for dealing with the trusts. While political and moral rhetoric about the trusts has always been present, there is little evidence that it provided substantial guides to policy making. The dominant tool became marginalist economics, then in its infancy, and the darling of the younger generation of political economists in the United States. Most of these were Progressives with a much stronger bias in favor of government intervention than their predecessors had supported.61See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 993, 995 (1990).

The principal tools that emerged were (1) partial equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run analysis, and later came to justify and provide support for the concept of antitrust’s “relevant market”; (2) classification of costs into fixed and variable, with the emergent belief that industries with high fixed costs were more problematic; (3) development of the concept of entry barriers, contrary to a long classical tradition of assuming that entry by new firms is easy and quick; (4) the distinction between horizontal and vertical relationships and the emergence of vertical integration as a competition problem; and (5) price discrimination as a practice that could have competitive consequences. Finally, toward the end of this period came (6) theories of imperfect competition, including the rediscovery of oligopoly theory and the rise of product differentiation as relevant to antitrust policy making.

II.  MARGINALIST ECONOMICS AND MARKET REVISIONISM

The antitrust movement in the United States coincided with a far-reaching revolution in economics. The marginalist revolution has unfortunately been seriously undervalued in history writing about antitrust, mainly because so many historians did not understand it and failed to appreciate its implications.62E.g., Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition (1954) (no references to marginalism); William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1954) (same). Some later histories contain brief discussions. See, e.g., Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Competition Policy in America 1888–1992: History, Rhetoric, Law 94–96 (1996) (briefly describing marginalist revolution). Nevertheless, the fact remains that one cannot understand the set of tools that Progressive antitrust policy makers deployed without understanding their underlying economics. By the 1930s nearly all economists were marginalists.63See Frank Knight, Marginal Utility Economics, in The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson, eds., 1930), reprinted in Frank Hyneman Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays 148–49 (1935).

The classical political economists had seen value as inhering in goods or the labor that went into making them.64On marginalism and the reaction to classical political economy, see Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 277–310 (5th ed. 1997); R. S. Howey, The Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870–1889 (1960); Yuval P. Yonay, The Struggle Over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalist and Neoclassical Economists in America Between the Wars 29–48 (1998). In American law, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 305 (1993). They tended to assess costs and benefits by looking at averages, which were necessarily taken from the past. They also tended to believe that capital would flow naturally toward profit and that the only practical impediment was government licenses or other restrictions.65See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 105, 149–50 (1989). In sharp contrast, marginalists saw value as willingness to pay or accept for the next, or “marginal,” unit of something. As a result, its perspective on value was forward looking. Further, market entry was a dynamic concept and its ease and likelihood varied greatly from one market to another.

Three features of marginalism account for both its influence and the resistance to it. One was that marginalist analysis enabled various values governing demand, supply, or economic movement to be “metered,” or quantified, in ways that classical political economy could not do. This feature also made marginalist economics much more technical, with increasing informational demands, but also promised to give Progressive Era economists capabilities far beyond those of their predecessors. Second, and relatedly, marginalism expanded the use of mathematics in economics, to a degree unknown by the classical political economists. This became a particularly attractive feature to younger economists and social scientists looking to add rigor and expertise to their disciplines. It also accounts for some of the resistance from older economists.66See Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science 98–140 (1991); Mary O. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905 (1975). On the resistance from older economists, see Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 1021–23.A third feature was that marginalism undermined the classical view that markets are competitive unless the state creates monopoly. Under marginalism competitiveness was a matter of degree, and only a small percentage of markets satisfied the conditions for perfect competition. As a result, marginalism began to make a broad and unprecedented case for selective state intervention in the economy.67Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 1023–24.

A.  Markets as Human Institutions: Coercion

The classical political economists saw the world of commercial relationships in binary terms. For private arrangements people were either free or bound. Aside from government constraint, the boundaries of obligation were defined by contract, property, and tort law. Value inhered in things or the labor used to produce them, and people either purchased or not. Setting aside public obligations, within that world people were free to make their own economic decisions unless a contract, property right, familial hierarchy, or sovereign command bound them.68See discussion infra text accompanying note 79 (discussing Robert Hale and the classic statement of this disjunction). That bond was particularly strong because the common law principle of liberty of contract refused to set very many contracts aside.69See generally Patrick. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1985). Further, the classical tradition regarded the market itself as a part of nature. Francis Wayland’s popular textbook on political economy defined the discipline in 1886 as “a branch of true science,” and by science “[he] mean[t] a Systematic arrangement of the laws which God has established.”70Francis Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy 4 (Aaron L. Chapin rev. ed., 1886).

By contrast, one prominent feature of the late nineteenth century was its fascination with change—in everything from biological evolution to physics to mechanics. The historian Howard Mumford Jones described the period as the “Age of Energy.”71Howard Mumford Jones, The Age of Energy: Varieties of American Experience, 1865–1915 (1970). It was only natural that economists would develop marginalism, with its forward-looking concept of value that focused on change and the next thing rather than on averages from the past.72See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law: Neoclassical Legal Thought, 1870–1970, at 4–52, 75–158 (2015). “Equilibrium” became the steady state to which all change aspired but seldom reached. Motion rather than stasis was the natural order of things.

Marginalism began with the premise that value is a measurable expression of human choice. Value depended on willingness to pay or willingness to forego. Further, marginalism distinguished among goods depending on costs, availability, and preference. One corollary was the increasing belief that markets were not all the same and did not all function equally well. This opened the way for more substantial if selective intervention to correct market deficiencies.73On marginalism and the development of American regulatory policy, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 455 (2019).

This change in the conception of markets from a pure product of nature to a created human institution was perhaps Progressive economics’ most important contribution. Markets became imagined as human creations and not merely a reflection of permanent natural laws. Their design was a product not only of preference but also of state policy, which could be for good or for ill. As the institutionalist progressive economist John R. Commons put it in his important book on law and capitalism, the evolution of economic phenomena was artificial, more like “that of a steam engine or a breed of cattle, rather than like that of a continent, monkey or tiger.” 74John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 376–78 (1924). Further, the “phenomena of political economy” are in fact “the present outcome of rights of property and powers of government which have been fashioned and refashioned in the past by courts, legislatures and executives through control of human behavior by means of working rules, directed towards purposes deemed useful or just by the law-givers and law interpreters.”75Id.

An outpouring of literature stretching from the 1890s through the early decades of the twentieth century developed aspects of this view that markets are “created” rather than simply present in the natural world. One manifestation was unprecedented economic concern with the distribution of wealth as a legitimate target of state policy because, after all, the state was responsible for it in the first place.76Published books alone include John Bates Clark, The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits (1899); Thomas Nixon Carver, The Distribution of Wealth (1904); John R. Commons, The Distribution of Wealth (1893); Rufus Cope, The Distribution of Wealth (1890); Charles William MacFarlane, Value and Distribution (1899); John A. Ryan, Distributive Justice (1916); Charles B. Spahr, An Essay on the Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States (Richard T. Ely ed., 1896); David A. Wells, Recent Economic Changes, and Their Effect on the Production and Distribution of Wealth and the Well-Being of Society (1889). Progressive economist Richard T. Ely argued in his two-volume book on the common law and the distribution of wealth that the legal system itself was strongly biased against the poor. The coercive rules of property and contract relinquished power to those who already had it.771 Richard T. Ely, Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth (1914). In a review, Cambridge economist Charles Percy Sanger concluded that “the most salient fact is the mass of evidence which shows how hostile the constitution of the United States, as interpreted by judges, is to the poor or the public.”78Charles Percy Sanger, Richard T. Ely, Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth, 25 Econ. J. 424, 424 (1915) (book review). Sanger was a student of Alfred Marshall and focused on mathematical economics until he drifted into law.

 A related consequence that had more salience for antitrust policy was the idea that markets themselves could be coercive instruments that limited human freedom. Columbia Professor Robert Hale, another Progressive who was one of the earliest economists to be hired onto a law school faculty, expressed this idea for an entire generation. In an article entitled “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,” he observed that the economic systems that had been developed by classical economists gave lip service to freedom. In reality, however, their systems are “permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom, and with restrictions, moreover, out of conformity with any formula of ‘equal opportunity’ or of ‘preserving the equal rights of others.’ ”79Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 470 (1923). On Hale, see Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and Economics Movement (2001).

Many of these newly discovered concerns about market coercion showed up in public law—things such as greater protection for labor from onerous wage agreements, prohibitions of child labor, women’s suffrage, the progressive income tax, and eventually the expansive safety net programs of the New Deal. But they also affected competition policy. For example, the law of vertical restraints became increasingly aggressive, particularly in its protection of small retailers. It abandoned very benign common law rules for virtual per se illegality for most distribution agreements that limited dealer behavior, as well as aggressive rules for vertical mergers.80See discussion infra text accompanying notes 457–65. The classical conception that new entry would always be around to discipline monopoly unless the government prevented it gave way to one that saw markets themselves as forestalling new competition.81See discussion infra text accompanying notes 241–47. The idea of competition itself came increasingly under attack, and not from socialists who did not believe in it. Rather it was from neoclassically-trained economists who realized that the viability of competitive markets depended on several assumptions that did not invariably obtain.82See discussion infra text accompanying notes 241–47.

B.  Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Marginal utility theory permitted the creation of tools for determining the relationship between costs and either competitive or monopoly prices within a firm. By itself, however, it was not able to assess how competition works among multiple firms or what the conditions are for achieving it. That required additional theory about interactions among firms.

Partial equilibrium analysis permitted people to group firms producing similar products into “markets” on the assumption that the interactions of firms within the same market were much more important for evaluating competition than the interactions (or lack of them) among firms in different markets. Cambridge University Professor Alfred Marshall, the first great marginalist industrial economist, borrowed this approach from the science of fluid mechanics: for goods within the same market, prices and demand would flow toward equality, but not across the market’s boundaries.

In 1890 Marshall brought the ideas of marginal utility and equilibrium together in a way that made the analysis of market behavior both tractable and useful. First, he developed what came to be known as the Marshallian demand curve, illustrating the inverse relationship between price and output of a single commodity.83Famously specified in Milton Friedman, The Marshallian Demand Curve, 57 J. Pol. Econ. 463 (1949), which also cites the lengthy history of conceptual development up to that time. Marshall’s own specification appears in Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 159 n.1 (1890). The downward slope of the demand curve is driven entirely by the next, or “marginal,” buyer’s willingness to pay for one unit of that commodity. The model ignored choices people might make about different commodities, even though in a world of limited budgets such choices were relevant.

Marshall was not the first marginalist,84See Howey, supra note 64; Knight, supra note 63. but he did turn marginalism into a practical tool of competition analysis. He explained that he had come to attach great importance to the fact that our observations of nature, in the moral as in the physical world, relate not so much to aggregate quantities, as to increments of quantities, and that in particular the demand for a thing is a continuous function, of which the “marginal” increment is, in stable equilibrium, balanced against the corresponding increment of its cost of production.85Marshall, supra note 833, at x.

For example, a firm would calculate a selling price by comparing the amount of additional cost that production and sale would encounter and the amount of additional revenue that it would produce.86Marshall did not use the term “marginal revenue” in reference to the monopolist’s profit-maximizing output and price. Rather, he spoke of “net revenue,” which appears to mean the same thing. See Marshall, supra note 83, at 458–59. For example, he concluded that in the long run a monopolist might charge a little lower price in order to earn higher profits sufficient to “recoup him” for the short run losses. Id. at 464–65.

Marginalism provided a partial theory of individual firm behavior, but not so obviously a theory of firm interaction and competition. In order to do that, Marshall needed a mechanism for identifying who in the economy competes with whom. This was in contrast to earlier contemporaries such as Leon Walras and Marshall’s own successor as professor of political economy at Cambridge, Arthur Cecil Pigou, who were more concerned with the economy as whole. Today this division roughly segregates macroeconomics and microeconomics.87Criticized in Friedman, supra note 83.

Marshall’s concern was to make economic analysis more manageable by focusing on those firms that competed with one another in an obvious way. He realized that everything in an economy affects everything else, but the most important influences can be identified and tracked. In the influential eighth edition of Principles, published in 1920, Marshall observed that informational demands made it necessary for people, with their “limited powers” to “go step by step.”88Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 366 (8th ed. 1920). They would have to break up “a complex question, studying one bit at a time and at last combining [their] partial solutions into a more or less complete solution of the whole riddle.”89Id.

He described his solution, which came to be known as partial equilibrium analysis, this way:

The forces to be dealt with [in the economy are] so numerous, that it is best to take a few at a time; and to work out a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus we begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in regard to a particular commodity. We reduce to inaction all other forces by the phrase “other things being equal”: we do not suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their activity. This scientific device is a great deal older than science: it is the method by which, consciously or unconsciously, sensible men have dealt from time immemorial with every difficult problem of ordinary life.90Id. at xiv.

This focus on individual industries quickly took over the entire field of business economics, or “industrial organization,” as a distinct area of economic inquiry. Industrial organization theory seeks to determine the conditions under which a particular industry attains equilibrium. Today, antitrust has become a substantially microeconomic discipline, certainly in litigation if not always in theory.

Marshall set industrial organization economics on the path of studying industries individually by identifying goods, which he termed “commodities,” that were sufficiently similar that they could be said to compete with each other. He borrowed from Augustin Cournot the definition that a “market” is the “whole of any region in which buyers and sellers are in such free intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly.”91Id. at 324 (translating and quoting Augustin Cournot, Les Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses 46–60 (1838)).

This assumption had numerous implications that were relevant to antitrust. One was to invite questions about exactly how to identify who was in such a market and who was not. A second was to consider whether the identity of the firms in this grouping changed over time. The concept of “entry barriers” explained the likelihood that firms would cross this line, coming in when profits were high. A third was to make the analysis of relationships among competitors, or “horizontal” relationships very different from the analysis of vertical or other relationships.92See discussion infra text accompanying notes 353–66. A fourth was a search for the conditions that either furthered or undermined competition once such a group of firms or their commodities had been defined.

Marshall clearly realized that in reality there is no such thing as a single market that is completely isolated from the rest of the economy. Partial equilibrium analysis, as it came to be called, was no more than a working assumption—although a very important one for making economic analysis manageable. The idea that groupings of similar (competing) commodities should be industrial economics’ principal subject of study had a profound influence on antitrust policy. One of the most important antitrust tools to come out of this focus was the idea of the “relevant market,” or the grouping of sales whose products and prices are strongly influenced by one another.93See discussion infra text accompanying notes 295–97.

The late nineteenth century was the golden age of engineering and science, including social science and economics. Marshall borrowed his ideas about markets, movement and equilibrium straight from Newtonian physics: “When two tanks containing fluid are joined by a pipe, the fluid, even though it be rather viscous, which is near the pipe in the tank with the higher level, will flow into the other,” he wrote in 1890.94Marshall, supra note 83, at 705–06. Further, “if several tanks are connected by pipes, the fluid in all will tend to the same level . . . .”95Id. at 706.

While he appeared to be discussing fluid mechanics, Marshall was actually speaking of the principle of economic substitution at the margin, which he defined as the tendency for prices within a single market “to seek the same level everywhere,”96Id. at 387. just as the fluid in a tank. Further, “unless some of the markets are in an abnormal condition, the tendency soon becomes irresistible.”97Id. He observed, “And similarly, the Law of Substitution is constantly tending by indirect routes to apportion earnings to efficiency between trades and even between grades which are not directly in contact with one another, and which appear at first sight to have no way of competing with one another.” Id. at 706. Within this model a “market” was a closed system in which fluids moved naturally toward equality. A different market would be a different enclosed system, and without any flow from one system to the other. Further, as soon as one relaxed the assumption that resources would move freely and quickly from any place of low utility to any place of higher utility, it became prudent to investigate where such movements could be expected to occur, when they would be less likely, and what were the obstacles that stood in the way.

Irving Fisher, who was to become one of America’s most important early marginalists, used his Ph.D. program at Yale in the 1890s to construct a “utility machine.” The machine illustrated with fluids controlled by pumps and valves how prices within the same market flowed to an equilibrium, but did not flow across market boundaries.98Irving Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices, in 9 Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences 28, 38 (July 1892).

The utility machine was thought to be so innovative that it was scheduled for display at the 1893 Columbian Exhibition in Chicago but was destroyed in route.99See Robert W. Dimand & John Geanakoplos, Celebrating Irving Fisher: The Legacy of a Great Economist, 64 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 3 (2005); see also William C. Brainard & Herbert E. Scarf, How to Compute Equilibrium Prices in 1891, 64 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 57 (2005). On the underlying mathematics, see Donald Brown & Felix Kubler, Comment on William C. Brainard and Herbert E. Scarf’s “How to Compute Equilibrium Prices in 1891,” 64 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 85 (2005). Other American economists also used illustrations derived from fluid mechanics to illustrate the equilibrium of prices in a market.100E.g., John M. Clark, A Contribution to the Theory of Competitive Price, 28 Q. J. Econ. 747 (1914).

Figure 1. Irving Fisher’s Utility Machine (1893)

Sources: Timothy Taylor, Photos of Fisher’s Physical Macroeconomic Model, Conversable Economist (Oct. 25, 2016, 8:06 AM), https://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2016/10/photos-of-fishers-physical.html [https://perma.cc/N64M-VLR7].

Marshall’s conclusion that the fluids in a tank would flow to a level equilibrium, even though they were “rather viscous,” presaged another development in marginalist economics: the idea of friction, or “costs of movement,” in the words of Marshall’s successor Pigou.101A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 138–39 (4th ed. 1932); see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 Antitrust L.J. 67 (2012). This idea was later narrowed and refined to become “transaction costs.”102See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 Ind. L.J. 499, 503–10 (2011). The idea was simply that the costs of moving resources to an equilibrium varied from one market situation to another, and in some cases these costs prevented the movement altogether. As a result, one feature of some markets was “chronic disequilibria,” as Joseph Schumpeter later observed.103Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. Pol. Econ. 249, 256 (1934). Another result was increasing awareness that these costs could interfere with a market’s movement toward competition. These concerns were reflected in the increasing attention toward barriers to entry, in contrast to the historical classical assumption of free entry.104See discussion infra text accompanying notes 241–47.

Marginalist industrial economics also broke the bond that had always existed between classical political economy and laissez faire policy—at least until significant neoliberal pushback occurred in the 1940s. The classicists had been strenuous opponents of government intervention in the economy, but the new Progressives were not. Indeed, Marshall himself moved significantly to the left as he grew older.105According to John Maynard Keynes. See J.M. Keynes, Alfred Marshall, 1842–1924, 34 Econ. J. 311, 352, 358 (1924); see also Theodore Levitt, Alfred Marshall: Victorian Relevance for Modern Economics, 90 Q. J. Econ. 425 (1976). As the technical study of market competition under marginalist principles developed, economists became increasingly concerned about defining the conditions for “perfect” competition. Accompanying this came the realization that the conditions are in fact quite strict. Nearly all markets deviated from them, although some more than others.106J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 241, 241 (1940) (stating perfect competition “does not and cannot exist”). One thing that marginalism provided was a set of tools for measuring these deviations, provided that the data were available. Antitrust policy in turn became a tool for examining certain industry structures and practices in order to determine whether they were anticompetitive and, if so, whether they could be corrected by the legal system.

C.  Industrial Concentration

The idea of a correlation between the number of firms in a market and its degree of competitiveness dates back to Cournot, a French mathematician who wrote in the mid-nineteenth century.107Augustin Cournot, Researches Into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (1838, Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1897). For a brief biographical introduction, see Antoine Augustin Cournot, 1801–1877, Hist. Econ. Thought, https://www.hetwebsite.net/het/profiles/
cournot.htm [https://perma.cc/M45C-XVJG].
In Cournot’s model, as the number of effective competitive players in a market becomes smaller, the margin between price and marginal cost increases until it reaches the monopoly level with a single firm.108On declining price and cost margins as the number of rivals increases, see Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 977 (1991). For more than a century, the relationship between industrial concentration and competitive performance has been an important component in competition policy, both at the legislative level109E.g., Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 228–50 (1960) (detailing Congress’s concern in the 1940s with rising industrial concentration). and more specifically in merger policy. Nevertheless, its role has been controversial.110See Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann & J. Fred Weston eds., 1974); Lawrence J. White, Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1051 (1976) (book review) (noting variety of positions and influence of Chicago School).

“Concentration” refers to the number of firms in a market and, under most measures, their size distribution. A market is said to be more concentrated as the number of firms goes down or as the size distribution is more lopsided. In order to have a measure of industrial concentration someone needs to have a concept of a market, or “industry,” and that is why partial equilibrium analysis was an essential premise.

Around the turn of the century, marginalist economists began to examine the relationship between market structure and industry performance. As early as 1888 Gunton used data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures to conclude that over the previous half century, industrial concentration in some markets had grown significantly.111George Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspect of Trusts, 3 Pol. Sci. Q. 385, 391 (1888). For example, the cotton industry census data from 1830 and 1880 showed that during that interval the amount of capital invested in the industry grew fivefold, the amount of production more than tenfold, but the number of firms had actually shrunk from 801 to 756.112Id. at 391–92. The data also showed that the amount of capital invested per worker had roughly doubled, indicating that the firms were becoming more capital intensive.113Id. Gunton also identified railroading, telegraphing, petroleum production, and sugar as showing greatly increased concentration.114Id. at 392.

Gunton’s conclusions were not addressed to competitiveness. He never discussed the relationship between the number of firms in a market and the threat of oligopoly or collusion. He observed that some had complained that the “concentration of capital tends to increase prices”115Id. at 390. Gunton did not identify who the complainers were. but found no evidence of it. Rather, he found that most of the facts “point the other way.”116Id. Prices in most of the industries that had experienced higher concentration had actually gone down rather than up.117Id. (sugar, freight, petroleum). He also rejected the argument that “although these trusts have constantly resulted in reducing prices,” still greater saving would result “should the government run the business.”118Id. at 398. He then concluded that the large firms were fundamentally a good thing.119Gunton wrote:

Manifestly, therefore, the charge that the concentration of capital in the form of trusts and syndicates, necessarily tends to produce monopoly (in the obnoxious sense), destroy competition, increase prices, oppress labor, or to put the government into the hands of an industrial oligarchy, is without any real foundation in fact, or justification in reason. On the contrary, these institutions, instead of being the evidence of industrial abnormity and economic disease, are the natural consequence of modern industrial differentiation, and in their nature are economically wholesome, and politically and socially harmless.

Id. at 406. Gunton did not attribute these charges to any particular person. See also Charles H. Cooley, The Theory of Transportation, 9 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass’n 13, 75–76, 109–20 (1894) (finding increasing concentration troublesome but acknowledging that it led to lower costs).

Increasingly, however, economists and competition lawyers became less sanguine. Boston attorney Lionel Norman lamented that industrial concentration was increasing at an alarming rate.120Lionel Norman, Legal Restraints on Modern Industrial Combinations and Monopolies in the United States, 33 Am. L. Rev. 499, 499 (1899). Cornell economist Jeremiah Jenks and Walter Clark, a professor of mathematics and economics, were also much more pessimistic,121Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, The Trust Problem 15–19 (1901). He was joined in several later editions by Walter Clark. as were Progressive economists Ely122Richard T. Ely, An Introduction to Political Economy 42–47 (rev. ed. 1901) (“Readers can readily gather from census and trade reports many similar illustrations of this concentration of business, which is one of the main causes of the existence of present economic problems.”). Ely ultimately recommended expanded public ownership. Id. at 264. and Edwin R.A. Seligman.123Edwin R.A. Seligman, Principles of Economics: With Special Reference to American Conditions (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1905). Looking at the business landscape just after the turn of the century, Seligman concluded that the “study of modern business enterprise thus becomes virtually a study of concentration.”124Id. at 330. He also relied heavily on data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures, which showed rapidly increasing concentration around 1900 and a significantly greater number of “combinations,” or firms that had attained their large size by merger. All but one of the top twenty-five combinations had been formed between 1890 and 1904.125Id. at 342–43; see id. at 343 tbl.1 (ranking the largest combinations). United States Steel is at the top, followed by American Tobacco, and then American Smelting and Refining. On effects, he noted both the possibility of lower costs and higher profits.126Id. at 347. He also noted that higher profits did not necessarily mean higher prices, because higher output and lower prices could also be profitable.127Id. He seemed particularly troubled by the fact that the trusts earned higher margins, even if they sold at lower prices.128Id.

Progressive railroad economist and Harvard Professor William Z. Ripley also undertook a comprehensive examination of industrial concentration data derived from the Census of Manufactures.129William Z. Ripley, Industrial Concentration as Shown by the Census, 21 Q. J. Econ. 651 (1907). The two census figures he found to be most informative were those of the number of firms in each consecutive five-year census period and the value of their gross product.130Id. at 652. He concluded that in 142 of the 322 industries grouped in the census, the number of firms had declined, and there had been significant increases in per firm output. He was able to group industries by their tendency toward monopoly, simply by examining the trend toward increased concentration.131Id. at 655. “Concentration varies more or less directly with the degree of monopolization,” he concluded.132Id. at 657.

These writers generally assumed a correlation between the data contained in the Census reports and the “markets” that Marshall referred to for partial equilibrium analysis. In fact, the census data correlated very poorly. For example, one classification in the 1909 Census of Manufactures was “[f]urniture and refrigerators,” which included both metal and wood furniture of all kinds, as well as wooden iceboxes and metal refrigerators, which were first coming into commercial use.1339 Dep’t of Com. & Lab., Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910, Manufactures 806, 1046 (1909). A metal refrigerator did not compete very much with an upholstered chair, which did not compete very much with a wooden bed. This very poor fit between industry census data and antitrust markets has served to weaken conclusions about industry competitiveness from census classifications—something that a few Progressive economists realized already at the turn of the century.134See Balthaser H. Meyer, Trusts—Discussion, 5 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass’n 108 (1904) (acknowledging that the data were not well designed to answer questions about changes in the number and size of firm and the propensity of a market toward collusion or trust formation). Meyer was an economist at the University of Wisconsin who also served several years as a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This poor correlation has remained to this day as a problem with the measurement of industrial concentration through the use of census data. The classifications are better today than they were a century ago, but they still are not well designed to address this problem.135See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 714 (2018) (observing the poor correlation between the census data and relevant markets). Nevertheless, data of this type have been in continuous use to produce measures of industry competitiveness ever since the late nineteenth century.136E.g., Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade 98–99 (1945); Orris C. Herfindahl, Concentration in the U.S. Steel Industry (1950); see also Clair Wilcox, Monograph No. 21: Competition and Monopoly in American Industry (1941). The FTC expressed alarm in Federal Trade Commission, The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions (1947), a prelude to the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act.

The Chicago School largely rejected the significance of concentration data, opting for a position more like Gunton’s that the aggregation of large firms resulted mainly in greater efficiency and lower prices.137E.g., George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 23 (1950). Numerous other scholars from the mainstream and further left have disagreed.138For example, Ralph Nader. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 Yale L.J. 890 (1973). In the mid-1970s, the debate produced an influential conference collecting representatives from both sides.139Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, supra note 110; see Richard R. Nelson, Goldschmid, Mann, and Weston’s Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, 7 Bell J. Econ. 729 (1976) (book review); F. M. Scherer, The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial Concentration, 22 J.L. & Econ. 191 (1979); Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J.L. Econ. 229 (1977). The resulting book hardly put the debate to rest, however, and census-driven concentration data continue to find a controversial but important place in debates about American competitiveness. For example, the Biden Administration’s 2021 executive order on American competitiveness lamented declining competition and relied on concentration data to make the point.140Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021). For antitrust analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, President Biden’s Executive Order on Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, 64 Ariz. L. Rev. 383 (2022).

D.  Fixed Costs and Equilibrium

Both marginalism as a theory of value and Marshall’s theory of equilibrium made cost classification essential. In fact, for Marshall, the cost problem produced significant frustration. Competition drives prices to marginal cost which, by definition, are costs encountered for each incremental change in output. But if hard competition drives prices to marginal costs, then how could a firm pay off its other costs?

Marshall used the term “marginal cost” to describe the immediate additional cost that a firm faced when it increased output by a single unit. In a chapter on the “Equilibrium of Normal Demand and Supply,”141Marshall, supra note 89, at 366, 399, 704. Marshall used the term “marginal cost(s)” three times in the 1890 edition but 56 times in the eighth edition. he observed that under what he called “free competition” prices would be driven to a level very close to marginal cost,142Id. at 412. and this would become a stable equilibrium.143Id. at 535.

Marshall’s theory of marginal cost was an effort to determine how firms decide on prices. He observed that prices are related to costs but not all costs are the same. Some costs seem to be quite unrelated to a firm’s decision about what price to charge, at least over the short run. This included administrative costs as well as depreciation on plant and durable equipment.144On Marshall and different types of cost, see Ragnar Frisch, Alfred Marshall’s Theory of Value, 64 Q. J. Econ. 495 (1950). In calculating whether a particular price is immediately profitable, the firm largely ignores these costs. Marshall identified “total cost” as the sum of these supplemental costs plus marginal costs.145Marshall, supra note 83, at 599. In the short run each additional sale would add to a firm’s profit so long as it was at a price that exceeded the firm’s marginal costs.

Marshall never used the terms “fixed costs” or “variable costs.”146He also never used the term “overhead costs,” which some economists used to describe fixed costs. E.g., J. Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs 463 (1923). He devoted an entire chapter to “cost of production,” which spoke of “prime costs,” “total costs,” and “marketing costs.” The words “prime” and “direct” were almost always used as references to what we would call variable costs.147Marshall, supra note 83, at 452, 518–19, 522, 599. Within prime costs he included “the (money) cost of raw material used in making the commodity and the wages of that part of the labour spent on it which is paid by the day or the week.”148Id. at 519. He excluded salaries such as are paid to management because these did not vary with output over the short run.149Id.

Marshall observed that for goods that require a “very expensive plant” the “[s]upplementary” cost is a “large part of their [t]otal cost.”150Id. at 520. As a result, a “normal price” “may leave a large surplus above their [p]rime cost.”151Id. In today’s terminology, in order to be profitable a business with high fixed costs would have to charge a premium above its variable costs. He also observed what would become a significant problem for establishing equilibrium in markets with high fixed costs. “[I]n their anxiety to prevent their plant from being idle” producers may “glut the market.”152Id. If they “pursue this policy constantly and without moderation,” price may be so low “as to drive capital out of the trade, ruining many of those employed in it, themselves perhaps among the number.”153Id. When firms are under “keen competition” this urge becomes inevitable, and firms “whose business is of this kind . . . are under a great temptation” to sell “at much less than normal cost.”154Id. at 640.

Marshall’s problem was getting an equilibrium that would sustain a market that was both competitive and had high fixed costs—an increasingly prominent feature of industrial production. By his eighth edition in 1920, Marshall had come up with a largely unsatisfactory biological model to explain how firms with significant fixed costs might attain equilibrium. Firms were like trees in a forest, he explained. They have individual lifecycles, and thus come and go, and some never survive infancy.155Marshall, supra note 89, at 315–16. He even used different species of trees as a metaphor for “different branches of industry.” Id. at 434. On Marshall’s changing use of the trees metaphor through successive editions, see D. C. Hague, Alfred Marshall and the Competitive Firm, 68 Econ. J. 673 (1958). This organic metaphor never fit very well into the emergent neoclassical model of equilibrium that looked strictly at the mathematics of profit-maximization.156On the role of the biological model in addressing the equilibrium problem, see Neil Hart, Marshall’s Dilemma: Equilibrium versus Evolution, 37 J. Econ. Issues 1139 (2003). On the subsequent debate over equilibrium within Marshall’s framework, see Hovenkamp, supra note 102.

 During the formative years of antitrust policy in the United States, a “fixed cost controversy” drawn from Marshall’s model of competition dominated important debates about the appropriate roles of competition, antitrust policy, and regulation.157The debate is recounted in Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836–1937, at 308–22 (1991). In industries such as the railroads or heavy steel manufacturing, the argument went, “ruinous” competition would occur because firms would be forced to cut their prices toward marginal cost, leaving insufficient revenue to pay off their fixed costs. One equilibrium solution was the emergence of monopoly, perhaps by merger. Others were collusion or price regulation. These concerns were very likely a major contributing factor to the great merger wave that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century.158See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904 (1988); George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & Econ. 201 (1982) (generalizing from the railroads to heavy manufacturing industries). Antitrust lawyers representing cartel defendants in markets with high fixed costs repeatedly asserted a “ruinous competition” defense to price fixing, but the federal courts consistently rejected it,159United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 368–69 (1897) (rejecting defense that competition would push railroads to “ruinous extremes”); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 576 (1898) (rejecting ruinous competition defense); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 213–14 (1899) (same); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220–21 (1940) (same, dicta); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982) (same, dicta). as they do today.160More recently, see United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 2015) (same, dicta, in the market for e-books, which also have very high fixed costs).

On the other side, several of the more left-leaning Progressives denied that there was any such thing as chronic overproduction.161Richard T. Ely, An Introduction to Political Economy 149 (1889); see also Henry Rogers Seager, Introduction to Economics 160–61 (1904) (arguing against general overproduction); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Principles of Economics 584–86 (3d ed. 1908) (noting that the problem is not overproduction, but rather overcapitalization based on expectations of future orders); Charles J. Bullock, Trust Literature: A Survey and a Criticism, 15 Q.J. Econ. 167, 205–10 (1901) (rejecting a general overproduction problem; “the evils of competition are greatly exaggerated”). By rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the Supreme Court was effectively taking their position. That was ironic, because the principal architect of the view was Justice Peckham, also the author of Lochner v. New York.162Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). He could hardly be classified as a left-leaning Progressive. Peckham’s opinion in the Joint Traffic case expressed strong doubts about the ruinous competition argument, concluding that the principal consequence of very low rates was increased demand, which would in turn produce a larger supply.163Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 576. One possibility, of course, was that Justice Peckham did not fully understand the implications of high fixed costs.

Justice Peckham’s clever response to the defense in the Addyston Pipe case was that, whether or not competition was ruinous, the defendants themselves could not be trusted to set a price no higher than necessary to prevent it. In fact, they had set prices so high as to deprive the public of the advantages of any competition at all.164Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 236–37. The Court cited cost evidence developed in the lower court that the reasonable cost of the defendants’ pipe, including a fair profit, did not exceed $15 per ton and could have been delivered profitably to Atlanta for $17 to $18 per ton. The bid price was actually $24.25 per ton.165Id. at 237. That statement at least suggested that one judicial response to a ruinous competition defense could be a judicial inquiry into costs, but the Court never went down that rabbit hole. It simply rejected the defense outright, as it has done ever since.

Theorizing about the behavior of firms with high fixed costs became a central focus of early antitrust literature, as well as the early American economic literature on the theory of industrial organization.166See Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 122–43 (discussing the literature during the period 1900–1930). It also proved to be a general attack on the model of perfect competition.

Prior to the development of imperfect and monopolistic competition models in the early 1930s167See discussion infra text accompanying notes 512–14. the principal Progressive theorist of fixed costs was the institutionalist economist John Maurice Clark. Clark found the existence of significant fixed costs, which he termed “overhead” costs, to be a disruptor of the standard notion of the equilibrium of supply and demand under competition.168Clark, supra note 146. The problem, as he noted, was that in the short run of immediate demand price and output are determined by demand and marginal cost, but in the presence of fixed costs this could be attained only over some longer run.169Id. at 464. High fixed costs continuously produced “irregularities” that threw the relationship between demand and supply out of balance, with some periods of excess capacity and others of excessive demand.170Id. at 465. Echoing Marshall, he observed that “where overhead costs are a substantial item, the perfect theoretical equilibrium is not found.”171Id. at 468.

The implications, as Clark worked them out, were chronic overproduction, because any price above short run marginal cost would serve to reduce the deficit in payment of fixed costs.172Id. at 469 (“[W]ith some capacity unused the differential cost of producing more goods is low, and it pays to sell them for anything above differential cost, but if all goods are sold as cheap as this, the concern will not even cover all its operating expenses.”). Another result was that price discrimination became a profitable strategy to the extent that a firm was able to maintain higher prices on established demand while bidding a lower price for new sales.173Id.; see also id. at 428–33. One characteristic of price discrimination as a solution to the problem of high fixed costs is that when it occurs it results in increased output. Clark concluded that there was nothing inherently anticompetitive or even suspicious about most instances of price discrimination.174Id. at 2–4. They were simply a mechanism that firms used to sell individual batches or product at a profit-maximizing (or loss-minimizing) price. That view has very largely persisted within antitrust policy.

The Marshall equilibrium problem ultimately went away when economic models began to incorporate product differentiation, particularly in the theory of monopolistic competition.175The developments are briefly recounted in Blaug, supra note 64, at 375–78. The principal problem had been Marshall’s assumption that all sellers in competition sold identical “commodities.” As a result, firms competed only on price. When differences in the product or even the terms of sale were incorporated, it became possible to have equilibrium without relying on any non-economic theorizing about the nature of the firm. The significance of this debate, which occurred almost entirely during the Progressive and New Deal eras, is difficult to exaggerate. It gave us much of our theory about equilibrium in industrial markets, analysis of costs, and theories about the limits of competition and the appropriate scope of regulation.176See Hovenkamp, supra note 73, at 454–70, 484–92. It also fueled the Harvard School view that markets differ from one another, and antitrust policy thus requires intense factual queries into particular industries and practices.

E.  Market Failure and Regulation

The fixed cost controversy strongly supported Progressives’ suspicions that markets were not as inherently benign as the classical political economists had believed. However, some worked better than others. Antitrust for its part is dedicated to the proposition that markets can be made to work tolerably well on their own with only selective intervention. In other cases, however, the roots of failure are so deep that ordinary market forces are ineffective.

Increased appreciation of market diversity led to a more general theory of market “failure,” championed by Pigou.177E.g., Pigou, supra note 101; Arthur C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance (1928). Pigou developed the idea of a “divergence” between private and social costs, or “externalities” that private bargaining could not correct. For example, a negative externality might occur when a polluting refiner was not required to compensate downwind neighbors for its air pollution. By contrast, a positive externality occurred when the inventor of a new product could not effectively prohibit people from copying it. In the first case the result would be too much pollution; in the second case it would be too little invention.

 The idea, which became more technically expressed in the 1950s,178Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. Econ. 351 (1958); William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State (1952). was that in a few markets sustainable competition is impossible without state intervention. The goal of regulation became to emulate competitive outcomes in these markets. Adams had anticipated a version of that argument already in the 1880s, arguing that competition was not sustainable in industries with declining costs because the emergence of monopoly was inevitable.179Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass’n 7, 55 (1887).

The Progressive Era then saw an outpouring of literature on regulation as a corrective for market failure, much of it focused on transportation and public utilities.180See Hovenkamp, supra note 73. Among the most important contributions was Joseph Beale and Bruce Wyman’s 1906 book on railroad regulation.181Joseph Henry Beale, Jr. & Bruce Wyman, The Law of Railroad Rate Regulation with Special Reference to American Legislation (1906). Other important contributions include Needham C. Collier, A Treatise on the Law of Public Service Companies (1918); William Z. Ripley, Railroads: Rates and Regulations (1912); Hugo Richard Meyer, Government Regulation of Railway Rates (1905); Dewitt C. Moore, A Treatise on the Law of Carriers (1906). On ruinous competition and regulation among railroads, see Harry Gunnison Brown, The Competition of Transportation Companies, 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 771 (1914). They made two important observations. The first was that monopoly provisions in corporate charters for railroads and bridges were common at least since the early nineteenth century. The argument that Justice Story articulated for them already in 1837 was that monopoly privileges were essential to attract investment into public utility markets, which were distinctive because of the amount of investment they acquired.182See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 608 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (complaining that failure to imply monopoly provision in bridge charter would “arrest all public improvements” by making investment in such structures uncertain); Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 21 (2015). However, Beale and Wyman observed a second rationale, which was “virtual monopoly”—namely, that the cost structure of these industries required a monopoly. Further, they argued, this was the “true ground” for regulation of monopolies.183Beale & Wyman, supra note 181, § 55, at 57. “[W]here competition prevails it regulates the conduct of business by its own processes, but monopoly requires the intervention of the law of the land . . . .”184Id.

This neoclassical theory of regulation has since formed the basis of core regulatory theory in the United States, as well as one of its most controversial features: cost-of-service rate making.185The leading treatment for decades was Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (2d ed. 1988). The idea of market failure expanded significantly in the 1930s and after, bolstered in significant part by the Depression. Regulation moved far beyond the relatively narrow neoclassical conception of market failure even to the idea that markets themselves cannot be trusted to distribute goods or services in an efficient, egalitarian manner.186For a good critique, see Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulator Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 299 (1983) (noting how the concerns blended classical concerns about production with more egalitarian concerns about wealth distribution).

 Both Progressive and New Deal regulatory theory were aggressively assaulted in the 1960s and 1970s by Chicago School critics such as George J. Stigler.187E.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell. J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). His critique completely ignored natural monopoly or other structural characteristics thought to justify regulation. Rather, he substituted a theory based entirely on political capture—namely, that regulation is nothing more than interest group purchase of regulatory favors from legislatures or government agencies. Stigler never even mentioned declining average costs or natural monopoly. In fact, the only costs he discussed were the cost of operating the political process, including the costs to lobbyists or political operatives of obtaining favorable legislation.188Id. at 12. He argued, for example, that the costs of successfully lobbying for an exclusionary occupational license are small when distributed over each member of society, but they can produce enormous gains to activists seeking such licensing protection.189Id. at 13–14. In sum, Stigler’s model completely divorced the theory of regulation from firm costs or market structure; it was purely political.

That Chicago School effort substantially failed. It never generated a theory with significant explanatory power outside the realm of badly designed regulation that could be explained only by political influence. For example, it could not explain why public utilities are subject to price regulation at the retail level while groceries in every state are sold competitively, except perhaps by offering that the utilities had better lobbyists. To be sure, the Chicago School did make some important contributions at the margins—mainly by hammering home the proposition that regulation can lead to harmful capture and there are good reasons to be on guard about overreach. In addition, regulatory fervor led to excessive controls that did more harm than good. For that, however, the usable critiques came from centrists such as then-Professor Stephen Breyer190Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 2 (1984). or Cornell economist and Chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board Alfred E. Khan.191Kahn, supra note 185.

F.  Price Discrimination

Price discrimination, which technically refers to selling to two or more customers at different ratios of price to cost, has always produced divisions in antitrust policy, most typically between economists and non-economists.192On the economics of price discrimination and the way that the framers of the Robinson-Patman Act understood it, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice §§ 14.1–14.6 (6th ed. 2020). Lawyers often view it with suspicion, something like race or gender discrimination. By contrast, economists have always tended to be more circumspect, and more inclined to divide it up into different varieties. Even a Progressive institutionalist economist such as John Maurice Clark discussed it in relatively benign terms. Minnesota economist and eventual Director of the United States Census Edward Dana Durand probably stated the consensus view among Progressive economists. In a critique of the Clayton Act, he observed that price discrimination “is an all but universal practice and is not necessarily injurious or calculated to bring about a monopoly.”193E. Dana Durand, The Trust Legislation of 1914, 29 Q.J. Econ. 72, 79 (1914). However, he also observed that price discrimination could be a strategy of selective predatory pricing used to drive competitors out of the market.194Id.

Most of the economic foundations for our understanding of price discrimination developed during the Progressive Era as an outgrowth of marginal analysis. The principal originator of the modern theory was Pigou.195On Pigou, see Ian Kumekawa, The First Serious Optimist: A.C. Pigou and the Birth of Welfare Economics (2017). Pigou divided price discrimination into three types, which he named first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination. First-degree, or “perfect” price discrimination, is an analogue of perfect competition: it never exists in the real world but is an important tool for analysis. Under it, a seller sells every unit at that customer’s reservation price, or the highest price that customer is willing to pay. The result is that output is at the competitive level, but all of the industry profits go to producers rather than consumers.196For Pigou’s classification, see Pigou, supra note 101, at II.17.6. On the three degrees of price discrimination and antitrust policy, see Hovenkamp, supra note 192, § 14.4, at 729–32.

Second-degree price discrimination occurs when the seller adopts a discriminatory pricing formula and the buyer “chooses” its price by selecting how to purchase. A quantity discount schedule is one prominent example. The purchaser can obtain a lower price by buying more. A discount for early booking is another.

In third-degree price discrimination the seller preselects categories of customers based on certain observed characteristics and charges them different prices—for example, one price for commercial users and another for residential users.

United States antitrust law has never developed general antitrust rules governing price discrimination. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, subsequently amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, addressed a practice that it called “price discrimination.”19715 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). But the set of practices that statute reached often had little to do with economic price discrimination. Rather, the statute simply condemned price differences.198See 14 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2320a, at 63–66 (4th ed. 2019). The Progressives did often identify predatory price discrimination as one of the evils brought about by the trusts, particularly Standard Oil.199E.g., 2 Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company 31–63 (1904); see Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 573 (2012). The result was the original section 2 of the of the Clayton Act,200The original Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12) provided:

That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade.

Id. which the Robinson-Patman Act later amended. The original statute was intended to reach a particular form of predatory pricing widely attributed to the Standard Oil Company as well as others.201On the early litigation history, see Breck P. McAllister, Sales Policies and Price Discrimination Under the Clayton Act, 41 Yale L.J. 518 (1932). The House Judiciary Committee report on the provision indicated that its purpose was to target the practice of large corporations using local price cutting intended to destroy a competitor.202H.R. Rep. No. 63-627, at 8 (1914) (“This section expressly forbids discrimination in price . . . when such discrimination is made with the purpose or intent to thereby destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a competitor, either of such dealer or seller.”). In a 1923 decision, the Second Circuit described the condemned practice this way:

[P]rior to the enactment of the Clayton Act a practice had prevailed among large corporations of lowering the prices asked for their products in a particular locality in which their competitors were operating for the purpose of driving a rival out of business. Such lowering of prices was maintained within the particular locality while the normal or higher prices were maintained in the rest of the country; and this practice was continued until the smaller rival was driven out of business, whereupon the prices in that locality would be put back to the normal level maintained in the rest of the country. The Clayton Act was aimed at that evil.203Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774, 778–79 (2d Cir. 1923). The court went on to conclude that the defendant’s practice of refusing to charge retailers the same price as wholesalers was not a violation.  

The statute did not explicitly require that the lower price be below cost, but that was largely the way it came to be interpreted.204See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (requiring sales “below cost” in order to protect the statute from a void for vagueness constitutional challenge). The Supreme Court initially construed the statute broadly without discussing any requirement of below-cost pricing.205See George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. Am. Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (7th Cir. 1929) (not addressing whether the statute required the lower price to be below cost); see also Wm. S. Stevens, Unfair Competition, 29 Pol. Sci. Q. 282, 284 (1914); cf. Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929) (noting that price discrimination among buyers of cigarettes was unlawful when the lower price was below cost); Am. Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930) (similar). Further, the statute’s express limitation to “commodities” meant that it could not apply to things such as railroad rates, which were one of the biggest targets of price discrimination concern.206See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017, 1050–55 (1988).

John Maurice Clark’s important 1923 book on fixed costs made a convincing argument that, setting aside differences in bargaining relationships or customer sophistication, price discrimination is largely a consequence of fixed costs.207Clark, supra note 146. A firm with a heavy fixed cost investment needs to keep its output up, and any sale at a price greater than incremental costs will improve its bottom line. As a result, it tries to retain legacy customers at higher prices while bidding lower prices for new or spot market sales. When a firm has excess capacity, these pressures are great.

This explanation of price discrimination was already known in the railroad industry by Clark’s time. Forty years earlier Yale economist and eventual President Arthur Twining Hadley had made a similar observation in justifying railroads’ policies of charging different freight rates for different commodities depending on shippers’ willingness to pay.208More technically, the seller attempts to set a price at the inverse of each buyer’s elasticity of demand. Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization § 3, at 2231–49 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter, eds., 2007). By doing this the railroads were able to maximize output. Given their high fixed costs, this meant that the average cost of transportation went down.209Arthur T. Hadley, Railroad Transportation: Its History and Its Laws 117 (1885).

The Robinson-Patman Act was passed in 1936, subsequent to the period under discussion here. It was not a way of approaching the problem of fixed costs. The statute condemned many of the things that Clark’s analysis had explained as causing no competitive harm.210Hovenkamp, supra note 192, §14.6. In any event, the Robinson-Patman Act was a complete misfire. The concern motivating the statute was the emergence of large chain stores such as A&P, which had become the nation’s largest grocer. A&P drove many smaller grocers out of business, mainly because it was vertically integrated and also because it was able to purchase in large quantities, enabling it to undersell small grocery stores. The Robinson-Patman Act ignored vertical integration and scale economies and identified the problem entirely in terms of a firm’s insistence on charging some buyers lower prices than others.211See Hovenkamp, supra note 4.

The statute completely failed to limit vertical integration because of its requirement that both the higher priced and lower priced transactions be “sales.”212See Hovenkamp, supra note 198, ¶ 2312. The courts consistently held that a “sale” refers to a transfer of goods from one firm to a different firm. The vertical passage of a good from a firm to its wholly owned store or other subsidiary was not a “sale.”213See id. ¶ 2311; see, e.g., Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979) (holding “[t]ransfers from a parent corporation to its wholly owned subsidiary” not a “sale” under the Act); Snyder v. Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodges, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ill. 1976) (holding intra-firm transfers not a “sale” under the Robinson-Patman Act). The Act did condemn a few large suppliers, such as Borden, for selling milk to large grocers at a lower price than to small grocers.214FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) (condemning Borden for selling its name brand and house brand milk at different prices); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (condemning Morton Salt for quantity discount program that was not justified by cost savings). Further, because the statute targeted “sales,” it did not effectively reach powerful buyers such as A&P itself. The statute did contain a buyers’ liability provision, almost as an afterthought, which was never very effective.215Hovenkamp, supra note 198, ¶ 2361.

During the Progressive Era through the New Deal, the antitrust analysis of price discrimination was spotty and indeterminate. In fact, however, it remains indeterminate to this day. We have never developed good theory for generalizing about the competitive effects of price discrimination. The consensus of economists today is probably not much different from what it was in the 1920s and 1930s—namely, most instances are competitively harmless, particularly if the discrimination tends to increase output.216See Hovenkamp, supra note 196, § 14.5.

G.  Monopoly Power and Structure: Potential Competition, Barriers to Entry, and the Relevant Market

In 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, legal doctrine did not have a coherent conception of market power as a measurable phenomenon. Economics was not much further along. Judicial decisions contained plenty of discussions of “monopoly,” virtually always in relation to patents or other grants of exclusive rights. In most cases “monopoly” was simply assumed from the existence of the exclusive grant itself. For example, many nineteenth-century decisions spoke of the “patent monopoly,” as if the relationship between the two terms was automatic.217E.g., Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 555 (1898); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873); Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 481–82 (1853); Bigelow v. Nickerson, 70 F. 113, 127 (7th Cir. 1895). All of the references to patents in the Chicago Conference used the term this way.218E.g., Jeremiah W. Jenks, Elements of the Trust Problem, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 27, 27; Azel F. Hatch, Causes, Dangers, and Benefits of Combinations, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 65, 70; Weil, supra note 37, at 86; Benjamin R. Tucker, The Attitude of Anarchism Toward Industrial Combinations, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 253, 257; Henry White, A Period of Doubt and Darkness in a New Industrial Era, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 323, 324; John Bates Clark, The Necessity of Restraining Monopolies While Retaining Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 404, 408. The law dealing with various aspects of monopoly came essentially from three sources: patent and copyright law, the common law of unfair competition and contracts in restraint of trade, and state corporation law. None contained a market power requirement, and power was generally either assumed or irrelevant.

Estimation of market power by reference to the share of a relevant market, as it is used today in antitrust cases, was a relatively late arrival. Today it has become so conventional that we regard it as routine, and in 2018 a divided Supreme Court mistakenly concluded as a matter of law that it is the only way to assess power in a vertical case.219Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018). Since the existence and measurement of market power present questions of fact, the Court’s conclusion was not only technically incorrect, it was also a dictatorial intrusion of policy into fact finding. Econometric tools for assessing market power, such as the Lerner Index, were actually developed prior to judicial usage of the “relevant market” in antitrust analysis.220A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 Rev. Econ. Stud. 157 (1934). Today econometric methods often produce better results than traditional measurement.221See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010). Further, the use of econometric devices is fundamentally inconsistent with the model of perfect competition. The firms within a perfectly competitive market have no power to price above marginal cost unless they collude. Implicit in the Lerner Index, and later in the development of more sophisticated econometric tools for assessing the power of individual firms, is that the firms are not operating in perfectly competitive markets.222See id. On the use of such methods in antitrust cases, see 2B Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & John L. Solow, Antitrust Law ¶ 521 (5th ed. 2020).

1.  Potential Competition and Barriers to Entry

The belief that trusts both promised lower costs and threatened higher prices at least partly explains the heavy focus in the early antitrust literature on “potential competition” as a disciplinary tool. In 1895, Gunton optimistically described potential competition as a force “that is ever waiting to step in where large profits warrant the risk.”223George Gunton, Book Review, 10 Pol. Sci. Q. 324, 324 (1895) (reviewing John A. Hobson, The Evolution of Modern Capitalism (1894)). Even a dominant trust would not charge monopoly prices if the looming threat of competition was sufficient to keep its prices down. Classical political economists had always assumed that any attempt to charge monopoly prices would invite new competitive entry that would force prices back to the competitive level. About the only things that would prevent this were government restrictions on entry, including patents.

In his 1884 critique of traditional political economy, Ely, who was to become one of the most prominent Progressive economists, caricatured the classical assumptions of easy market entry, which he described as “the absolute lack of friction in economic movements. Not only do capital and labor move with perfect ease from place to place and from employment to employment, but this . . . is accomplished without the slightest loss.”224Richard T. Ely, The Past and the Present of Political Economy 12 (1884). Under this image of the economy, Ely continued:

The silk manufacturer diverts his capital into another employment like the construction of locomotives with precisely the same facility with which he turns his family carriage horse from an avenue into a cross street, while the Manchester laborer on a moment’s warning finds a suitable purchaser for his immovable effects and without expense or loss of time transfers himself to London where employment is at once offered him at the rate of wages there current. Equality of profits and equality of wages flowed naturally from these assumptions.225Id. 

By contrast, the emerging discipline of industrial economics began to consider how long this might realistically take, what were the market factors that determined the speed and scope of new entry, and the power of incumbent firms to throw obstacles in the way. As Adams admonished in his book on trusts, “[t]he point at issue is whether the public is justified in placing sole reliance upon potential competition, active competition having disappeared.”226Henry C. Adams, Trusts, 5 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass’n 96 (1903), reprinted in Henry C. Adams, Trusts (1904).

Privately created barriers emerged as a concern of antitrust law early in the Progressive Era. They were undoubtedly heightened by the Progressives’ increased sensitivity to the natural coercive power of markets.227See discussion supra text accompanying notes 177–79. The Supreme Court recognized one such barrier already in 1904. In an early private action under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court condemned a guild rule that limited membership and effectively prohibited market participation by tile layers who were not members of the defendant organization.228Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904). Members of the association were prohibited from dealing with non-members. As Justice Peckham noted in his opinion for a unanimous Court, the association’s rules prohibited dealers from acquiring tile “upon any terms” from members of the guild, and all of the manufacturers in the area were members.229Id. at 44.

A few years later, in the American Tobacco case, the Court referred to a dominant firm’s vertical integration and market foreclosure as creating “perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco trade.”230United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183, 190 (1911). Some lower courts were less concerned. For example, in United States v. Quaker Oats Co.,231United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1916). the court rejected the government’s claim of attempt to monopolize, noting that the product at issue, packaged rolled oats, was a commodity produced by many firms, and that the defendant had no reasonable means of excluding them.232Id. at 502.

Most of the participants in the multi-disciplinary proceedings of the Chicago Conference on Trusts saw potential competition as crucial to any assessment of the likelihood of monopoly. They disagreed about its effectiveness. The debates reveal that the classical assumption of free entry had become controversial. For example, Jenks was a skeptic. He acknowledged the existence of potential competition as a disciplinary force but doubted that the power of the large trusts to charge high prices would be effectively controlled.233Jenks, supra note 218.

Attorney A. Leo Weil was less concerned. He observed that the trusts generally reduced costs and prices, but if there were any tendency toward price increases, potential competition from new firms would tamp them down. Further, this new entry could be expected to occur “unless the laws of trade are to be reversed.”234Weil, supra note 37, at 89. Statistician Joseph Nimmo observed that as a consequence of the revolution in railroad transportation, the range of potential competition was much wider than it had been previously.235Joseph Nimmo, Jr., The Limitation of Competition and Combination as Illustrated in the Regulation of Railroads, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 156, 161–62. Economist James R. Weaver from De Pauw University was even less concerned. He suggested that potential competition “rarely fails” to aid the consumer.236James R. Weaver, Efficacy of Economic Checks in Regulating Competitive Trusts, in Chicago Conference on Trusts, supra note 9, at 293, 297. Accumulations of capital were easily assembled, and those who controlled it stood “ready to enter any specific field of production, whenever the profits of that industry offer sufficient inducement.”237Id. Further, it was well known that at the present time entrepreneurs were sitting on “a great mass of idle capital.”238Id. As a result, “to avoid this new competition, prices must be lowered or profits shared with the consumer.”239Id. Francis B. Thurber, the President of the United States Export Association, believed that the trusts merely moved competition to a higher and more beneficial level:

If a combination of capital in any line temporarily exacts a liberal profit, immediately capital flows into that channel, another combination is formed, and competition ensues on a scale and operates with an intensity far beyond anything that is possible on a smaller scale, resulting in breaking down of the combination and the decline of profits to a minimum.240Thurber, supra note 29, at 130.

John Bates Clark, the most prominent economist among the Conference participants, was much more skeptical.241Clark, supra note 218, at 404 (giving an address on “The Necessity of Suppressing Monopolies While Retaining Trusts”). Clark had developed these ideas previously in John B. Clark, The Limits of Competition, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 45 (1887); see also John B. Clark, Monopolies and the Law, 16 Pol. Sci. Q. 463 (1901). In theory, he observed “potential competition . . . is the power that holds trusts in check,” but “[a]t present it is not an adequate regulator.”242Clark, supra note 218, at 407. The “potential competitor encounters unnecessary obstacles when he tries to become an active competitor.”243Id. He mentioned patents as one obstacle, but refused to endorse abolition of the patent system.244Id. at 407–08. He was also more cynical about the railroads, which he regarded as using manipulation of shipping rates as a device for deterring potential competition.245Id. at 408. Clark also blamed selective price discrimination—or the power of the trusts to exclude entrants by charging unreasonably low prices in that particular portion of the market where new entry was threatened.246Id. A particularly pernicious form of price discrimination was selective predatory pricing:

The ability to make discriminating prices puts a terrible power into the hands of a trust. If . . . it can sell goods at prices that are below the cost of making them, while it sustains itself by charging high prices in a score of other fields, it can crush me without itself sustaining any injury. If, on the other hand, it were obliged, in order to attack me, to lower the prices of all its goods, wherever they might be sold, it would be in danger of ruining itself in the pursuit of its hostile object. Its losses would be proportionate to the magnitude of its operations.247Id. 

This observation became the theory under which original section 2 of the Clayton Act was passed in 1914—namely to prevent firms from using selective, geographically limited discounts to drive rivals out of business.248See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (prior to the Robinson-Patman Act amendments); see discussion supra text accompanying notes 197–206. Finally, Clark opposed tariffs because their higher costs deterred the potential competitor “from becoming an actual one.”249Clark, supra note 218, at 407.

Several years later Clark was even more pessimistic.250John Bates Clark, The Possibility of Competition in Commerce and Industry, 42 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 63 (1912). Largely in agreement was Arthur S. Dewing, Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations (1914). See also the similar contribution by Clark’s son John Maurice Clark, Clark, supra note 100, and also Robert L. Raymond:

From a theoretical point of view competition, actual or potential, will not permit the existence of monopoly control. What would happen in theory can, I believe, be made to occur in fact. At present it does not represent the usual course of events. Effective in theory, potential competition under actually existing circumstances is impotent.

Robert L. Raymond, Industrial Combinations—Existing Law and Suggested Legislation, 20 J. Pol. Econ. 309, 312–13 (1912). At one time potential competition may have been more effective at keeping prices down, he acknowledged, but today that power had largely been eliminated by incumbent firms’ use of selective preferential rates, local discrimination, and exclusionary agreements.251Clark, supra note 250, at 64. Clark then gave a strong endorsement to the Sherman Act, although he believed that more was necessary, including a federal law chartering corporations and an “industrial commission” designed to examine the competitiveness of individual large firms. Further, he would impose on them “a burden of proof,” first to show that they do not dominate the entire market and, secondly, to show “that the way is so open for the entrance of more that prices cannot become extortionate.”252Id. at 66.

Adams agreed in a 1903 essay on the trusts,253Adams, supra note 226. as did Boston lawyer Robert L. Raymond.254Robert L. Raymond, A Statement of the Trust Problem, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 79 (1902). Raymond argued what came to be a common position held by Progressives—that potential competition was natural and ordinarily to be expected, but that dominant firms could devise practices that would prevent or limit its operation. He also observed that potential competition did not “instantaneously” become actual competition. Rather, “even with abundant capital one cannot erect a steel manufacturing plant or a sugar refinery until considerable time has elapsed.”255Id. at 90–91. This delay, he observed, gave dominant firms an opportunity to behave strategically.256Id. at 91. He also warned, however, that competition policy should not go further; it had to preserve the “true economic value” that they promised while also preserving the power of potential competition to limit their prices.257Id. at 93. Progressive economist Ely, who published his book on monopolies and trusts simultaneously with the Chicago Conference, doubted potential competition as a device for disciplining monopoly. He concluded that “[n]o evidence has been adduced of the sufficient action of potential competition in the case of monopoly.”258Richard T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts 251 (1900).

Clark returned to this problem in The Control of Trusts, a book he had had originally published in 1901.259John Bates Clark, The Control of Trusts: An Argument in Favor of Curbing the Power of Monopoly by a Natural Method (1901). For subsequent editions he was joined by his son, John Maurice Clark.260John Bates Clark & John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts (1912). The revised edition was even more pessimistic than John Bates’ original, very likely reflecting John Maurice’s more institutionalist leanings. “When the first edition of this work was issued, so called potential competition had shown its power to control prices,”261Id. at vi. the Clarks lamented, but

[t]he potentiality of unfair attacks by the trust tended to destroy the potentiality of competition. Under these conditions it was and is clearly necessary to disarm the trusts—to deprive them of the special weapons with which they deal their unfair blows. It is necessary to repress the specific practices referred to and so to enable every competitor who, by reason of productive efficiency, has a right to stay in the field, to retain his place and render his service to the public.262Id. at vii. 

As a result, they concluded, while experience has shown that “potential competition is a real force, it has also shown that it is a force which can be easily obstructed.”263Id. at 28. A few years later, John Maurice Clark argued that potential competition was an unlikely discipline for monopoly in markets with “heavy permanent investment”—that is, with high fixed costs.264Clark, supra note 146, at 446. In such cases, he noted, incumbent firms will be holding excess capacity and be able to expand their own output in response to new entry. Knowing this, potential competitors will not wish to make a significant investment in entry.265Id. Further, he observed, prospective entrants into such a market would realize that total output would be higher when their own production was added in, and thus prices lower. So what appeared to be profitable entry before might not be so later.266Id.; cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284 (1977) (adapting this model of post-entry prices to illustrate the possibility of predatory pricing at above cost prices).

The Clarks’ work developed the basic model that emerged by mid-century for monopolization cases and that prevails today. That judge-made formulation required a showing of both monopoly power and anticompetitive practices. This model retained faith that in a market that is not restrained by either the government or private action, new entry could be expected to maintain competition. The problem for the antitrust laws was anticompetitive practices that forestalled competitive entry before it could occur or become effective. “A merely possible mill which as yet does not exist may forestall and prevent monopolistic acts,” the Clarks conceded, but only provided that the way is “quite open for it to appear.”267Clark & Clark, supra note 260, at 121.

Writing in 1911 about the ongoing government cases against Standard Oil and American Tobacco, Raymond observed that the firms’ growth had depended on the suppression of potential competition.268Robert L. Raymond, The Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 31 (1911). In American Tobacco, the district court condemned a trust agreement that involved a group of the same shareholders’ acquiring interests in multiple companies. The court acknowledged the defense that potential competition would discipline any monopoly because the combination itself did not involve any sort of market exclusion.269United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 191 F. 371, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). But entry would take some time, the court observed, and the “objection is to present and not future conditions.”270Id. The court believed that argument to be worthy of “serious consideration.”271Id.

By contrast, in the 1918 United Shoe Machinery (“USM”) merger case the Supreme Court refused to condemn the union of several shoe machinery makers into what became the USM Company.272United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918). The government’s argument was that the merged companies were potential competitors who could have turned into actual competitors but for the merger. The case thus invited a tradeoff question that remains to this day: some mergers increase productive efficiency by enabling a firm to do things at lower cost, but in the process may harm competition by preventing competition that might have developed had the merger not occurred.

The USM union was a merger of complements, and the district court had concluded that the individual companies were not in competition with one another at the time of the merger.273See id. at 41–42. Justice Holmes had actually elaborated on that conclusion several years earlier in a decision that approved the original merger.274United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913). He also observed that the participating firms had not been competitors but rather were makers of complements. One firm produced lasting machines, another welt-sewing machines, and others outsole-stitching machines and heeling machines.275Id. at 215. It was not the purpose of the Sherman Act to “reduc[e] all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest degree.”276Id. at 202. In this case “the combination was simply an effort after greater efficiency.”277Id. at 217. He compared the merger to a situation in which a single firm was created to make “every part of a steam engine,” rather than using the antitrust laws to force “one to make the boilers and another to make the wheels.”278Id. at 217–18.

In the American Can case, which condemned the can-making trust but declined to break it up, the court also cited potential competition as the reason for being cautious about the remedy.279United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 903 (D. Md. 1916). The court observed that the American Can Company, given its large size and multiple plants, was highly efficient and made good cans.280Id. at 894 (“Defendant makes good cans. . . . The impression produced by the testimony is that it has been more uniformly successful in so doing than perhaps any of its competitors, although the larger and more responsible of these have, in recent years, habitually turned out thoroughly satisfactory packers’ cans.”). Further, the record revealed “that there are many ways in which a large and strong can maker can serve the trade, and a small one cannot.”281Id. at 903. In any event, the defendant’s power to restrain competition was limited by “a large volume of actual competition and to a still greater extent by the potential competition” from which it cannot escape.282Id. For example, when the defendant raised its price—perhaps prematurely believing that it had destroyed enough rivals—new competitors quickly re-emerged. It became “apparently profitable for outsiders to start making cans with any antiquated or crude machinery they could find in old lumber rooms.”283Id. at 879. At that point the defendant became so desperate that it actually started buying cans from its rivals, even though these were “very badly made.”284Id. at 880. Many of these were later destroyed.285Id.

The language of potential competition evolved into the modern doctrine of “barriers to entry,” a term that came into common use at mid-century. An entry barrier could be either natural or fabricated obstacles that made it more difficult for competition to enter the market. The Supreme Court first used the term in the American Tobacco case, when it referred to the defendant’s acquiring control of numerous “seemingly independent corporations, serving as perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco trade.”286United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183 (1911). More specifically, the Court referred to the defendant’s acquisition of plants “not for the purpose of utilizing them, but in order to close them up and render them useless,” and also to noncompetition clauses placed on sellers that kept them from re-entering the market.287Id. A few years later a district court quoted this language in condemning Eastman Kodak of monopolization by acquiring around twenty companies and assembling all of the components of the photography industry.288United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 1915). The phrase did not find much use in the economic literature until the 1940s, followed by significant expansion in the 1950s.289E.g., R.G. Hawtrey, Competition from Newcomers, 10 Economica 219 (1943); see also Joe S. Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 Am. Econ. Rev. 448 (1949) (Bain’s first article on the subject). It entered the mainstream antitrust literature after Joe S. Bain’s pioneering work on barriers to entry in the 1950s.290E.g., Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries (1956).

2.  From Potential Competition to the Relevant Market

As long as confidence was high that potential competition could be trusted to control prices, the precise definition of the market in which firms operated was relatively unimportant. Even monopolists could be kept in check if potential competition was robust. The assumption of robust potential competition explains both why early antitrust decisions involving dominant firms were not particularly fussy about market definition and also why they tended to emphasize detailed litanies of exclusionary practices. Monopolization was all about harmful conduct intended to exclude rivals.

 As confidence in the efficacy of potential competition waned, however, it became more important to know the number and robustness of a firm’s actual competitors. Any discipline of monopoly would come primarily from them. As John Maurice Clark observed in 1923, for most markets “it is inherently impossible to have industry effectively governed by potential competition alone.”291Clark, supra note 146, at 445.

Concerns about potential competition are inherently dynamic. They ask about where a market is going, rather than how it may appear at this moment. In fact, accounting for movement and the ability to make useful predictions about it is one of the most challenging questions of antitrust policy.292See Sean P. Sullivan & Henry C. Su, Antitrust Travel: Entry & Potential Competition (U. Iowa Coll. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 2022-09), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
4088860 [https://perma.cc/SN57-K47H].
Classical economists assumed markets were competitive unless the government intervened because they focused so completely on the long run. The fact that monopoly might be dissipated by new market entry is certainly reassuring. Eventually such a market may reach an acceptably competitive equilibrium, but how long will that take, and who will be affected along the way? Focusing on macroeconomics in the 1920s, John Maynard Keynes ridiculed the optimistic faith of many economists that eventually the economy would move to a healthier equilibrium. In contrast stood the policy maker’s more immediate concerns about time. He famously concluded that the “long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.”293John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform 80 (1923). Further, focusing on the long run makes economics worthless as a policy tool: “Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.”294Id.

The “relevant market” in antitrust analysis emerged as a device for trading off these static and dynamic concerns. First of all, it revealed who was competing with whom in the present instant. If the market was well defined and included consideration of entry barriers, it also estimated what was likely to change over time. The evolving concern was with how rivals and customers would respond to a future price increase above competitive levels.

The idea of a “relevant market” is entirely a creature of partial equilibrium analysis. While that proposition is uncontroversial, it was not commonly acknowledged in the antitrust literature until Oliver Williamson began talking about antitrust policy and welfare tradeoffs in those terms in the 1960s.295Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 699 (1977). On Williamson’s usage, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 B.U. L. Rev. 489 (2021). There were a few predecessors. See, e.g., Jesse W. Markham, A Note on Concentration Studies and Antitrust Policy, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 331 (1958) (relating antitrust problem of industrial concentration to partial equilibrium analysis); Edward S. Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 471 (1956). As Marshall had observed, in selecting a market economists should group sales of close substitutes and then make a working assumption that those within the grouping affect one another’s behavior, but that firms outside of the group do not.296See Marshall, supra note 88, at 324 (defining a market as goods that are in “free intercourse” in trading such that their prices move to the same level). Marshall also realized that this was a simplifying assumption and not a hard picture of a situation in which the elasticity of substitution between goods in the same market is infinitely high, while the substitution between goods inside and goods outside is zero.297See discussion infra text at notes 313–14; cf. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 295, at 23. Williamson wrote:

Our partial equilibrium analysis suffers from a defect common to all partial equilibrium constructions. By isolating one sector from the rest of the economy it fails to examine interactions between sectors. Certain economic effects may therefore go undetected, and occasionally behavior which appears to yield net economic benefits in a partial equilibrium analysis will result in net losses when investigated in a general equilibrium context.

Id. Today we commonly say that to the extent a market is “well defined” these two conditions come closer to applying.

Assessing antitrust practices by reference to the “market” in which they occur naturally produced several questions about delineation and measurement. The most obvious one was how to identify the particular grouping of firms to which the analysis should be applied. Marshall himself paid scant attention to the issue. He identified the grouping of sales in a particular market as a “commodity.” His favorite example was tea.298E.g., Marshall, supra note 83, at 154, 159. In that case, sales of tea constituted the relevant market. He gave only a little thought to questions about whether tea competed with coffee or water, or even the extent to which a coffee producer might switch to tea in response to a higher price. He did conjecture at one point that a failure in the coffee harvest might lead to an increase in demand for tea.299Id. at 160 (describing coffee as something that could be used as a substitute for tea). He made a similar conjecture about beef and mutton.300Id. at 168 n.2 (noting that the price of substitutes might change, thus affecting the demand for the primary good; for example, a fall in the price of beef might cause it to be used in place of mutton). He also noted that questions about “where the lines of division between different commodities can be drawn must be settled by the convenience of the particular question under discussion.”301Id. at 160 n.2. For some purposes, he acknowledged, we might even acknowledge Chinese and Indian teas as different.302Id.

Early Sherman Act cases took roughly the same approach, never putting a fine point on market definition. For example, neither the 1911 Standard Oil303Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). nor American Tobacco304United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (noting that the complaint referred to “tobacco and the products of tobacco”; no further analysis of market boundaries). decisions discussed the boundaries of the “market” under consideration. In StandardOil, the Court referred repeatedly to “petroleum and its products,”305E.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 32. without saying anything about what that might include. In American Tobacco, the Court did observe that the defendant produced a number of products, including “cheroots, smoking tobacco, fine cut tobacco, snuff and plug tobacco.”306Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 159. A cheroot is an inexpensive, untapered cigar. The Court did discuss some vertical practices that involved specific products. For example, the defendant also tried to control sales of licorice paste, an essential ingredient in plug tobacco, in order to exclude rivals.307Id. at 170. In United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 56–57 (1920), the Supreme Court did consider whether one railroad line eliminated competition when it acquired a contiguous line and held that the lines were not competing. See also United States v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 203 F. 295 (S.D. Ohio 1912) (similar; some lines competed but others did not). The Court never spoke of any of these products as relevant markets, or considered whether they were in the same or different markets.

The American Can decision a few years later described a large litany of bad practices but said virtually nothing about the scope of the market, other than to refer to it as “cans.”308United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916); see also United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (dismissing complaint with no discussion of relevant market). In United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 214 F. 987, 989, 991 (D. Minn. 1914), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 587 (1918), the court condemned a voting trust of several companies that formed the defendant. The product was identified as “harvesting machinery,” of which the defendant controlled 85%, but with no dispute or discussion about market boundaries. The court did observe that International Harvester was a New Jersey corporation and that its charter stated that it was formed to manufacture, sell, and deal in harvesting machines, tools, and implements of all kinds, including harvesters, binders, reapers, mowers, rakes, headers, shedders, machinery, engines, wagons, motor vehicles, and vehicles of all kinds; agricultural machinery, tools, and implements of all kinds, binder twine, and all devices, materials, and articles used or intended for use in connection therewith, and all repair parts and other devices, materials, and articles used, or intended for use, in connection with any kind of harvesting or agricultural machines, tools, or implements, or any gasoline, electric, or other vehicles.

Id. at 989; see also United States v. Corn Prod. Refin. Co., 234 F. 964, 974, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919) (condemning a trust, but in the process noting that the relevant process included both wet milling and dry milling of corn; the court observed that cost distinctions among them were relevant). The Court wrote:

If the wet process is cheaper than the dry, then, although a monopoly of the wet will be limited by the dry, it is improper to consider the production of the dry millers, when ascertaining the proportion of production controlled by a supposed monopolist of wet milling. If, on the other hand, the dry process is cheaper than the wet, and if, which would be hardly possible, a sustained competition between them existed, then one could not disregard the dry production for all purposes.

Id. at 976; accord O’Halloran v. Am. Sea Green Slate Co., 207 F. 187, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1913), rev’d on other grounds, 229 F. 77 (2d Cir. 1915) (noting that where black and green slate competed for some buyers but the green slate manufacturers had both production and cost disadvantages, their power was limited by price of black slate); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (noting that although gasoline made by traditional refining methods and the defendant’s large scale “cracking” method was fungible, the latter had an advantage in production costs). The court gave no thought to such questions as whether glass bottles, which were also widely used for preserving food,309See W.V. Cruess, Home and Farm Canning 7–10 (1916) (noting preference for jars in home canning). were in the same market. Such questions arose regularly after mid-century.310Cf. United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (combining metal cans and glass bottles into the same relevant market for antitrust analysis).

The International Shoe case, decided in 1930, included a brief discussion of the proper delineation of a product market. It also reflected the emergence of product differentiation as a factor in market analysis. The FTC challenged a merger of two manufacturers of dress shoes. McElwain made more expensive, attractive, and “modern” shoes entirely of leather. International made cheaper shoes that included some non-leather components.311Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). Without discussing the scope of the market, the Court did credit the defendants’ testimony that there was “no real competition” between the two firms.312Id. at 299; cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (noting that defendants controlled 74.4% of coal production in their area but only 12% of production east of Mississippi River, and nearly none of the purchasers were in the smaller area); Indiana Farmer’s Guide Publ’g Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publ’g Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934) (reversing and remanding after noting dispute about whether the area of effective competition for the defendants’ farm publications was limited to the territory in which they operated or should include the entire country).

Estimating market power today by reference to a share of a “relevant market” is not a pure exercise in static partial equilibrium analysis. In Marshall’s model, one examined equilibrium in the market under study on the assumption that the price and output of everything else remained constant.313Marshall, supra note 83, at 160. However, he also acknowledged that this assumption often fails to obtain in the real world:

[T]he demand schedule represents the changes in the price at which a commodity can be sold . . . other things being equal. But in fact other things seldom are equal over periods of time sufficiently long for the collection of full and trustworthy statistics . . . . This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that in economics the full effects of a cause seldom come out at once but often spread themselves out . . . .”314Id. at 170. 

A price increase naturally invites other sellers to move into the price increaser’s market territory and customers to defect away. These substitutions upset the equilibrium, and within Marshall’s model, continue to occur until the equilibrium is restored. To the extent the market is more rigorously defined and the market share of the price increaser is higher, the movements would take longer or be less likely to occur.315See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 Yale L.J. 34 (1937).

The 1940s and 1950s saw a significant expansion in antitrust usage of relevant markets to estimate market power. Judge Hand’s discussion in the Second Circuit’s 1945 decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America has become well known.316E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (regarding cellophane). The first Supreme Court decision to contain a significant discussion about the scope of a relevant market was United States v. Columbia Steel Co. in 1948.317United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 495, 495 (1948). It concluded that the market that the government alleged was too narrow.318Id. at 510–22. First, the area of effective competition was larger than the government claimed. Second, the two firms actually made different although somewhat overlapping types of steel. On a 5–4 vote, it dismissed the complaint. Justice Douglas’s dissent (joined by Justices Black, Murphy, and Rutledge) contained almost no discussion of the relevant market except to dispute the fact that the acquired firm’s three percent share of the purchasing market under consideration was insubstantial.319Id. at 538 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

The chronology of these concerns is revealing because of what it says about the declining faith in potential competition to solve monopoly problems. As noted previously, as of 1899 even monopoly was not a matter of concern for some participants in the Chicago Trust Conference because potential competition could be trusted to keep prices down.320See discussion supra text accompanying note 37. Subsequently, greater doubts about the disciplinary effects of new entry naturally led to increased concerns about just how competitive the market was when entry is disregarded. By the 1930s most antitrust cases involving large firms were harboring significant doubts about the ameliorating effects of potential competition. That explains the rising importance of market definition in antitrust cases.

3.  The Rise of Structuralism and the Diminishing Importance of Conduct

As Chief Justice White observed in the 1911 Standard Oil decision, the monopolization offense required bad conduct and not mere monopoly status. Chief Justice White’s reasoning was that the practices condemned by section 1 of the statute actually forbade “all means of monopolizing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract, combination, and so forth.”321Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911). To this, section 2 of the Sherman Act sought,

if possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even although the acts by which such results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced within the general enumeration of the first section.322Id. 

The lower court had spoken much more clearly: section 2 should require a restraint of trade as embraced by section 1, but the difference was that “[o]ne person or corporation may offend against the second section by monopolizing, but the first section contemplates conduct of two or more.”323United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177, 195 (E.D. Mo. 1909). That is in fact the distinction that modern courts have adopted.

What the statute did not do, Chief Justice White continued, was condemn “monopoly in the concrete,” or the mere status of being a monopolist.”324Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61–62; see Comment, Efficiency or Restraint of Trade, 27 Yale L.J. 1060, 1064–65 (1918).

At that point, however, the Chief Justice cast his entire reasoning and perhaps even his mental acuity into doubt with his infamous argument that because “reason was resorted to” in deciding earlier cases the law reached only unreasonable actions.325Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 64–66. That dubious rationale presaged the more formal recognition of a rule of reason seven years later.326Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).

All of this was in pursuit of a larger point, as the Chief Justice elaborated, which was to shunt aside the argument that a court could not constitutionally divest an innocent firm of its property without compensation simply because it was a monopolist. Property owners had no right to engage in restraints on trade.327Id. at 69–70. Rather, the statute was directed to “particular acts,” even though these were inferred only “generically” from the statutory language.328Id. at 69. That is, requiring wrongful acts—even though the statute did not explicitly list them—was essential to the statute’s constitutionality.329Id. at 69–70. The great corporate scholar Victor Morawetz had addressed this issue in 1909, concluding that the statute should not be amended so as to enumerate the specific anticompetitive acts that might constitute monopolization:

No doubt it would be desirable to define what constitutes a monopoly or an attempt to monopolize a part of interstate trade or commerce; but it is very questionable whether a comprehensive and clear statutory definition could be framed. A statutory definition probably would give rise to as much uncertainty and litigation as the word “monopolize,” and judicial decisions would be necessary to define the definition itself. The safer and better course is to let the courts, guided by common understanding of the word “monopolize” and by the principles of the common law, settle the meaning of the statute by determining its application to individual cases as they arise.

Victor Morawetz, Should the Anti-Trust Act Be Amended?, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 492, 497–98 (1909). At that point the opinion turned to a detailed summary of Standard Oil’s conduct.

The Clayton Act developed this theme further by its enumeration of specific acts that threatened to create monopoly—namely selective and discriminatory predatory pricing,33015 U.S.C. § 13. tying and exclusive dealing contracts,331Id. § 14. and anticompetitive mergers.332Id. § 18. Nothing in the Clayton Act even hints of possible condemnation of monopoly without fault; indeed, its added specificity points in the other direction.

It is thus not surprising that Progressive Era monopolization cases often read like tort cases—with an extensive discussion of conduct, accompanied by relatively thin treatment of market structure and power. This period preceded the structuralist revolution that would occur in the late 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, some commentators from the period wrote of the monopolization offense as if it did not contain a market power requirement at all, but only guilty conduct.333E.g., Edward A. Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 246, 261 (1917). After World War II antitrust policy as led by industrial economists completely flipped that script.334See Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 206–19; Herbert Hovenkamp, Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023).

Already in the 1930s some industrial economists began to study the monopoly problem by looking at the types of structures most likely to produce it. In 1937 Harvard industrial economist Edward S. Mason observed that in “recent years economic thinking on the subject of monopoly has taken a radically different trend.”335Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 Yale L.J. 34, 35 (1937). It began with the observation that “monopoly elements” of conduct were apparent in the “practices of almost every firm.”336Id. at 35. As a result, policy makers were increasingly required to make “distinctions between market situations all of which have monopoly elements.”337Id. For that, conduct alone provided little basis for differentiation. The important differences were not the conduct but rather the markets in which the conduct occurred. He noted an emerging distinction between “restriction of trade” and “control of the market.”338Id. If economics was to make a contribution to the problem of monopoly, Mason observed, it must move beyond practices and descriptive accounts of anticompetitive behavior and look for structural features that made markets more or less conducive to monopolization.339Id. at 48–49.

The development of imperfect competition theories in the early 1930s forced a shift in focus toward the particular market structures that made noncompetitive outcomes more likely. Some of the foundational work was done earlier. For example, in the 1920s economist John Maurice Clark looked at the manifold sources of economies of large plant size.340John Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs 104–34 (1923). The economies, which resulted from technology and engineering, were inherent in certain industries. In addition, the presence of high fixed (“overhead”) costs provided an explanation for price discrimination, showing it to be typically but not invariably procompetitive.341Id. at 2–3, 32 (“Efficiency requires discrimination . . . .”), 416–33. Clark also discussed “economies of combination,” showing how the effect of high fixed costs and large plant size made markets more conducive to both horizontal and vertical control arrangements.342Id. at 146–47. In such industries “large-scale production, combination, and monopoly or restricted competition are all more or less bound together, and all occur in the same class of industries.”343Id. at 146. Everything in Clark’s book pointed in the direction of assessing competition problems by assessing the particular structural characteristics of each firm, emphasizing the extent and nature of fixed costs.

Clark’s book was too technical to have widespread public appeal, but it did both reflect and lead an important set of developments in the field of industrial economics. Antitrust policy became more interested in the types of market structures that made noncompetitive outcomes more likely. Enforcement policy followed these developments, culminating in massive monopolization cases brought against capital intensive firms in the 1930s and after, including Alcoa and USM. Both decisions emphasized market structure and market definition and de-emphasized conduct. Indeed, both toyed with but did not ultimately embrace the idea of monopoly “without fault”—or that certain dominant firms should be broken up simply because they are too big. In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand discussed the possibilities of a presumption that a firm that had acquired a ninety percent market share was behaving unlawfully. It could defeat that presumption, however, by showing that monopoly had been “thrust upon it,” or that it was merely the “passive beneficiary” of monopoly.344United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945). A few years later in the USM case, Judge Wyzanski characterized Alcoa as suggesting that a firm with an overwhelming market share monopolizes whenever it “does business.”345United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953). That was as close as American antitrust law ever came to a rule of no fault monopolization.

With those decisions the courts entered the era of antitrust structuralism, which in its strongest form made evidence of bad conduct almost but not quite irrelevant.346See Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 206–19. That largely ended the Progressive Era’s tort theory of monopolization.

III.  THE EMERGENCE OF VERTICAL COMPETITION POLICY

A.  “Competition,” Horizontal and Vertical

Progressives were the first to examine vertical practices and vertical integration systematically as competition problems. While some law of vertical contracting practices existed prior to that, almost none of it was concerned with competition. The Progressive accomplishment was noteworthy, because vertical business practices have historically been the most poorly understood in antitrust and have provoked the most controversy. Articulate writers have argued that they should be governed by both the extreme rules of per se illegality and per se legality.347See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L.J. 1487 (1983) (per se illegal); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981) (per se legal). The Progressives in fact opted for a highly defensible middle ground that has proven to be very durable.

Progressive Era contributions to the law of vertical integration and restraints were formative but also modest.348See Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 154–66. Mainly, they focused on the relationship between vertical integration or vertical contracting and realistic threats of monopoly. Subsequently the antitrust law of vertical business relationships veered to the left and became very aggressive, condemning many practices where harm to competition was never seriously threatened.349Id. Later it changed course again, veering very far to the right and developing rules of virtual nonliability in Chicago School academic writing. The case law never went quite that far.350E.g., Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 280–309 (1978). Since 2000 or so it has been moderating once again. The rule of reason that is currently the law for nearly all vertical practices is in between, although somewhat closer to a rule of nonliability.351See Hovenkamp, supra note 192, §§ 9.1–9.3. This is at least partly because the courts have made it so difficult for plaintiffs to win rule of reason antitrust cases.

The thoroughly conventional distinction that antitrust and economics makes today between “horizontal” and “vertical” practices is actually a fairly recent development. Today most of our antitrust rules of illegality are driven by it: horizontal restraints are more suspicious than vertical ones. Unlike horizontal agreements, vertical agreements do not increase the effective market share of the participants. The means by which horizontal price fixing agreements reduce market output are more obvious and better understood than for vertical price agreements. Vertical arrangements have a greater potential to produce cost savings.

Classical political economists and most lawyers prior to the 1910s or so did not see these distinctions. They tended to see competition as “rivalry,” and the vertical rivalry that might occur between a buyer and a seller, or employer and employee, counted as “competition” just as much as the rivalry between two competitors. For example, in the 1888 edition of his popular text on political economy, MIT economist Francis Walker defined competition as “the operation of individual self-interest among buyers and sellers.”352Francis A. Walker, Political Economy 263 (3d ed. 1888).

Marshall did only a little better in Principles of Economics. On horizontal competition, he focused almost entirely on the theory of monopoly, or single firms that accounted for all sales in a market. In a footnote he spoke briefly about “partial monopoly,” which he described as a firm whose wares were better known than those of other firms.353Marshall, supra note 83, at 112 n.1. Marshall’s chapter on “The Theory of Monopolies” largely assumed exclusivity and focused on how the monopolist determines its output and price when there is no threat of entry.354Id. at 456–72. He did mention that a vulnerable monopolist, such as a railroad threatened by new competition, would very likely charge a lower price in order to protect its trade.355Id. at 465. Never once in the 750 pages of the first edition did Marshall mention cartels or price fixing. While he drew his theory of marginalism from Cournot,356See id. at x. he never discussed Cournot’s very influential theory of oligopoly. He did mention the rise of the American trusts in his Eighth Edition in 1920, seeing them largely as an alternative to German cartels357Marshall wrote: 

The economies of highly organized buying and selling are among the chief causes of the present tendency towards the fusion of many businesses in the same industry or trade into single huge aggregates; and also of trading federations of various kinds, including German cartels and centralized co-operative associations. They have also always promoted the concentration of business risks in the hands of large capitalists who put out the work to be done by smaller men.

Marshall, supra note 89, at 282. On the United States trust as an alternative, see id. at 304. and ultimately describing them as “treacherous.”358Id. at 495. He also saw the evil of the trusts as “narrowing . . . the field of industry which is open to the vigorous initiative of smaller businesses.”359Id. at 304. None of these discussions mentioned vertical integration or restraints.

Marshall’s relatively infrequent expressions about “competition” seem almost amateurish today—for example: “The strict meaning of competition seems to be the racing of one person against another . . . .”360Marshall, supra note 83, at 5. He complained that the term “competition” has “gathered about it evil savour, and has come to imply a certain selfishness and indifference to the well being of others,”361Id. at 6. and that “unrestrained competition” produced suffering.362Id. at 41. He spoke of competition as “glorified individualism.”363Id. at 42–43. He also lamented that machine production had led to undesirable competition that, “like a huge untrained monster,” led to weakness and disease.364Id. at 92. He blamed this on excessive British protection for liberty of contract.365Id. Marshall made the same complaint about labor, where he saw unfettered competition as driving wages to subsistence levels.366Id. at 226.

Marshall also had little to say about vertical integration and vertical relationships, and nothing about their impact on competition. His few mentions focused on labor. For example, he distinguished horizontal movement of workers from one firm to another from vertical movement, or promotion within a firm.367Id. at 277. Speaking again of labor, he also discussed the “vertical” competition that existed between skilled and unskilled workers who performed the same task.368Id. at 373, 705. He concluded that for workers competition was both vertical and horizontal. First, they competed vertically for advancement within the firm. Second, they competed horizontally by movement from one employer to another.369Id. In Chapter 8, entitled “Industrial Organization,” he used the term “integration” a single time, using a biological metaphor. He defined it as “a growing intimacy and firmness of the connections between the separate parts of the industrial organism.”370Id. at 301. On this statement as an expression of Marshall’s nascent theory that firms operate as an alternative to markets, see John Foster, Economics and the Self-Organisation Approach: Alfred Marshall Revisited?, 103 Econ. J. 975, 985–87 (1993). Coase later picked up on Marshall’s idea about the relationship between organizations and markets. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 386, 388 (1937). Late in his life, in his much less prominent and overly long book on Industry and Trade(1919), Marshall began exploring some of the differences between horizontal and vertical expansion.371Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade: A Study of Industrial Technique and Business Organization; and of Their Influences on the Conditions of Various Classes and Nations (1919); see discussion infra text accompanying notes 409–12.

Prior to 1910 or so, courts also viewed “competition” in terms that did not distinguish the horizontal from the vertical. Often the reference was to the “competition” that exists between the two parties to a bargain, with the seller wishing to receive as much as possible while the buyer wished to pay as little as possible. For example, John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,372John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). one of the earliest Sherman Act challenges to resale price maintenance, spoke of the practice as “protecting the seller of property against the competition of the buyer.”373Id. at 45; see also State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506 (1909) (noting that a joint venture challenged as a cartel did not undermine ordinary “competition between seller and buyer”). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma treated resale price maintenance agreements as a form of noncompetition covenant, used to protect “the seller of the property against the competition of the buyer.”374Stewart v. W.T. Rawleigh Med. Co., 159 P. 1187, 1189 (1916). Today, of course, we would characterize the relationship between a buyer and a seller as vertical, at least in most cases.

Even Justice Holmes, whose grasp of economics was better than that of most contemporary judges, spoke of competition interchangeably as horizontal or vertical. While a Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he had defined competition in a tort case as “not limited to struggles between persons of the same class” but rather as applying “to all conflicts of temporal interests.”375Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes also developed this view in Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894). He continued, offering a purely vertical illustration:

One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return.376Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081.

In keeping with more modern views, in 1908 the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected that characterization, describing it as “fanciful and far-fetched.”377A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 Ill. 424, 432 (1908). It then concluded that an employer and its unionized employees could not be said to be in “competition” with one another, even though their interests clearly diverged.378Id. at 432–33.

Holmes also dissented from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision condemning resale price maintenance. The Court had reasoned that resale price maintenance was a restraint on alienation that served to eliminate competition among dealers in the sale of Dr. Miles’s brand of medicines.379Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407–08 (1911) (describing the resale price maintenance agreement at issue as “designed . . . to prevent competition among those who trade in them”). Holmes responded that the competition of “conflicting desires” should be sufficient to do that for most goods that were not essential, and Dr. Miles medicines were not.380Id. at 412. If a good was not essential (Holmes’s example was “short rations in a shipwreck”), the price would be set by the “competition” between the seller’s wish to charge more and the buyer’s wish to pay less.381Id. In the Northern Securities merger case he dissented from the majority’s condemnation of a merger to monopoly under section 1 of the Sherman Act.382N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The “act says nothing about competition,” he observed.383Id. at 403. He then described the litany of common law situations characterized as contracts in restraint of trade and concluded that the facts of the present case did not fit into any of them.384Id. at 403–04. The idea that elimination of competition between firms that had previously been rivals might result in higher prices did not obviously trouble him.

With one implicit exception, the Sherman Act itself never distinguishes vertical from horizontal practices. The exception is the reference to “contracts . . . in restraint of trade” in section 1 of the Act.38515 U.S.C. § 1. As Justice Holmes pointed out in his Northern Securities dissent, at common law that phrase referred to “contracts with a stranger to the contractor’s business, . . . which wholly or partially restrict the freedom of the contractor in carrying on that business as otherwise he would.”386N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 403–04 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes gave as an example the British decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds.387Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181. The lessor of a building to be used by the plaintiff as a bakery promised not to open a competing bakery in the vicinity. Noncompetition agreements such as these are vertical because they are formally between the seller (lessor) and buyer (lessee) of property or in other situations between an employer and an employee. Nevertheless, the agreement also has a horizontal effect to the extent that its purpose is to limit the competitive choices of the promisor. In Mitchel, the lessor had promised the lessee that he would not enter into business in competition with the lessee.

Even the Clayton Act, passed in 1914, ignored vertical competition issues with one limited exception. That was section 3, which prohibited the sale of commodities on the “condition or understanding” that the buyer not deal in a competitor’s goods.38815 U.S.C. § 14. This of course became the basis for the modern law of tying and exclusive dealing. Even here, however, while the law condemned a vertical agreement, the impact was horizontal. The concern was agreements that limited competition from rivals. Further, its historical focus was on patent license agreements in which it was thought that patentees used ties to extend their patent beyond its lawful scope.389See discussion infra text accompanying notes 444–49. The Clayton Act did not seek to expand the law of purely vertical restraints that limited only the sales of a manufacturer’s own product.

Section 2 of the original Clayton Act prohibited price discrimination directed at rivals, a form of predatory pricing.390Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12). That was a purely horizontal practice. The provision was amended in 1936 as the Robinson-Patman Act so as to reach so-called “secondary line” price discrimination, or the charging of two different prices to two different customers, favoring the customer who paid the lower price.39115 U.S.C. § 13. These 1936 amendments effectively turned it into a predominantly vertical statute. Ever since, the Act has distinguished “primary line” (horizontal) and “secondary line” (vertical) violations. However, the first was entirely a creature of the original 1914 Act, while the second was developed by the 1936 amendments.392See Hovenkamp, supra note 198, ¶ 2332 (primary line); id. ¶ 2333 (secondary line).

 Likewise, the original Clayton Act provision condemning mergers reached only those that limited competition “between” the merging firms—that is, mergers of competitors.393Original section 7 prohibited mergers “where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition.” Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18). It was amended and extended to vertical mergers in 1950, as it appears today.39415 U.S.C. § 18; see Clayton Act, ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). 

In sum, while the Clayton Act greatly expanded upon the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court largely interpreted it that way, it was concerned almost exclusively with horizontal practices. It became “vertical” only through amendments passed in the mid-1930s and after. Outside the law of resale price maintenance, which did not have a well-developed economic rationale other than the concern for restraints on alienation, competitive concerns about vertical integration had not yet emerged. While the Sherman Act’s concern with contracts in restraint of trade and the Clayton Act’s concern with tying were both vertical, today we would characterize both as “interbrand” restraints. That is, they were vertical contracts aimed at limiting horizontal competition.

At the same time, however, section 3 of the Clayton Act and the 1917 Motion Picture Patents case became important vehicles for developing a theory of anticompetitive vertical practices that expanded greatly in the 1930s.395Motion Picture Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Notably, however, the practice in that case was substantially horizontal, directed at insulating the patentee’s films from the films offered by rivals.396See discussion infra text accompanying notes 464–65.

B.  Progressive Economics and Vertical Integration

One important chapter in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was entitled “That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the Market.”3971 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 21–27 (1776). Smith’s point was that larger markets permit greater specialization because businesses are able to depend more on exchange rather than internal supply.398Id. at 21 (“When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment . . . .”). In isolated villages in Scotland, “every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer, for his own family,” and in such towns it is hard even to find a professional carpenter or mason.399Id. From Smith’s insight that larger markets lead firms to rely more on others for certain inputs, Stigler fashioned a theory that small markets provide an impetus for internal vertical integration.400George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. Pol. Econ. 185 (1951). As markets grow larger firms have more opportunities to buy rather than make. But to turn that argument into one that saw Adam Smith as developing a general economic theory of vertical integration was a stretch. 

During antitrust’s early years the idea of competitively harmful vertical practices was almost entirely absent in economics as well as law. Very little of that occurred prior to the twentieth century. In the 700 pages of proceedings of the Chicago Conference on Trusts401See discussion supra text accompanying notes 8–61. neither lawyers nor economists ever once discussed vertical integration or vertical practices as a competition problem. A few years later federal courts first began addressing resale price maintenance under the Sherman Act.402E.g., John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907) (finding RPM agreement unenforceable).

Exploration of vertical business relationships and competition policy began to enter economics literature in the early twentieth century, although somewhat haphazardly. Notwithstanding the heightened Progressive concern about the trusts, they did not see vertical integration or vertical control as a threat. The early discussions spoke of it in very benign terms. In 1901 William F. Willoughby, a political scientist and lawyer who taught at both Harvard and Princeton, concluded that the competitive effects of vertical integration were overwhelmingly positive.403William Franklin Willoughby, The Integration of Industry in the United States, 16 Q.J. Econ. 94 (1901). Speaking of Andrew Carnegie’s steel company, he concluded that the “policy of the company” in integrating vertically was “not in attempting to lessen outside competition, but in seeking to bring about a more perfect organization and integration of its own properties.”404Id. at 102. Overall, he believed, the principal reason that firms integrated vertically was to ensure themselves of adequate and timely supply in the event of shortages.405Id. at 114–15.

 Progressive economist and President of the University of Wisconsin Charles Van Hise’s 1912 book on the Trust Problem spoke a single time of “vertical combination.”406Charles R. Van Hise, Concentration and Control: A Solution of the Trust Problem in the United States 204 (1912). He was referring to vertical integration in the steel industry, but drew no conclusions about vertical integration generally.407Id. John Bates and John Maurice Clark’s important 1914 book on The Control of Trusts never discussed vertical practices or vertical integration at all.408See generally John Bates Clark & John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts (1914). That omission is significant because at the time the father, John Bates, was one of the most prominent economists in the country and a leading marginalist. More generally, their book was a fierce indictment of the trusts.

In his 1919 book on Industry and Trade, written near the end of his life, Marshall did speak several times about the “vertical expansion” of firms into markets for supply or distribution.409Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade: A Study of Industrial Technique and Business Organization; and of Their Influences on the Conditions of Various Classes and Nations 215–16, 507 (1919). He noted, for example, that firms sometimes integrated vertically in order to avoid the effects of upstream cartels.410Id. at 381. His only sustained discussion of vertical integration was in relation to firms that did so in order to assure sources of supply or distribution, and he spoke of it entirely in benign terms.411Id. at 146–50. A few other economists did talk about vertical integration, mainly to emphasize the efficiencies that vertical control made possible.412E.g., Henry W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry: A Study of Business Organisation (1907).

John Maurice Clark’s 1923 book on fixed (“overhead”) costs did contain a more detailed discussion of vertical integration.413Clark, supra note 146. He spoke briefly of “vertical combination” in the steel industry414Id. at 81. and more generally in a chapter entitled “Economies of Combination.” He described it as “the combination under one management of successive stages in a chain of productive operations.”415Id. at 135 n.1.

Clark cast the vertical integration problem as one of managing information and fixed costs: “The employer’s knowledge of his own needs and of the conditions of his own business is an expensive industrial asset . . . .”416Id. at 137. Further,

[A]nother gain from integration arises, in the shape of great reliability in the supplying of materials. The two concerns adapt their processes to each other, and the supply of materials, both in quality and regularity, can be more carefully suited to the needs of the user than they would be if the two were independent concerns . . . .417Id.

As a result, “[a]nother thing that is saved is all the work of negotiation, bargaining, higgling, stimulating demand (on the part of the seller) . . . and much of the other work of buying and selling, which could be reduced to a matter of routine.”418Id. He described this as “an overhead outlay which is capable of being enormously reduced by vertical combination.”419Id.; see also L. Kotany, A Theory of Profit and Interest, 36 Q.J. Econ. 413 (1922) (noting vertical integration reduces costs). Clearly Coase was not the first to observe that internal integration is a way of avoiding the costs of using the market.420See Coase, supra note 370. Clark’s own contribution was mainly to observe that high fixed costs and product differentiation exacerbated problems of market coordination of upstream and downstream levels.

During the Depression the economic treatment of vertical practices did an about face, becoming much more critical, minimizing the role of cost savings or even finding them harmful, and focusing on problems of monopoly.421See Hovenkamp, supra note 72, at 220–40; Hovenkamp, supra note 157, at 331–45. One of the most pessimistic was economist Arthur R. Burns’s 1936 book The Decline of Competition, which was heavily influenced by the theory of monopolistic competition. He presented vertical integration as inherently monopolistic and as strong evidence that competition was in decline.422Arthur Robert Burns, The Decline of Competition: A Study of the Evolution of American Industry 421–45 (1936).

C.  Progressives and the Emerging Law of Vertical Integration

In distinguishing vertical from horizontal practices, the difficult part was to determine how a firm’s control of a vertically related market affected competition. As previously noted, economists of the day were keenly aware that vertical integration could reduce costs.423See discussion supra text accompanying note 412. So were many courts. Already in 1866, a British decision observed that one effect of a railroad’s acquisition of a colliery was to reduce the cost of coal necessary for its operations.424Lyde v. E. Bengal Ry., 55 Eng. Rep. 1059, 1062 (1866).

The courts were also aware of foreclosure threats but did not generally find them decisive. In 1886, the Supreme Court held that a railroad that had integrated into express freight delivery services had no obligation to provide equivalent services for an independent delivery company.425Memphis & Little Rock Ry. Co. v. S. Express Co., 117 U.S. 1 (1886). Justices Miller and Field dissented. Given that the delivery service was a complement to the railroad, they observed, the effect of the refusal would be to exclude competing express companies from the markets served by that railroad. There was no relevant antitrust law or even an Interstate Commerce Act, which was passed a year later.426Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Rather, they would have found a duty under the common law of common carriers.427Memphis, 117 U.S. at 29, 33. A few years later the first Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court declaring that an exclusive dealing contract between a railroad and a provider of sleeping cars was not contrary to public policy or common law.428Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Pullman S. Car Co., 139 U.S. 79, 89–90 (1891). Justice Blatchford did not participate. The action did not rely on any federal statute.

Speaking of noncompetition covenants, which are a form of vertical exclusive contracting, Judge Taft’s 1898 antitrust opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.429United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). noted that they could sometimes be harmful. They might injure the parties by depriving them of opportunities; or they might deprive the public of services that would be valuable and thus discourage enterprise. In addition, he gave two reasons more directly related to competition policy: they might “prevent competition and enhance prices,” and they “expose the public to all the evils of monopoly.”430Id. at 280 (quoting Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 54, 36 Mass. 51 (1837)). For its part, the common law approved the great majority of vertical agreements with the exception of some noncompete agreements.431See Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 156–58. In any event, Judge Taft’s statements in Addyston Pipe were dicta, because the case involved only naked horizontal price fixing.

That analysis still left many questions open. For example, how does one account for the fact that vertical arrangements may simultaneously reduce costs and exclude rivals? One of these things seems beneficial and the other harmful. Further, how much weight should be given to the common law’s traditional strong protection for liberty of contract and the freedom to trade? Those concerns loomed large in cases involving resale price maintenance and other vertical restraints, where the freedom to trade came to be the freedom to be free from restrictions on distribution.432See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 403 (1911) (condemning resale price maintenance agreement: citing the “public interest in maintaining freedom of trade with respect to future sales after the article has been placed on the market and the producer has parted with his title”). As the Supreme Court reiterated in a 1919 decision declining to find an agreement to engage in resale price maintenance, the purpose of the Sherman Act is to “preserve the right of freedom to trade.”433United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).

Historically the common law did recognize limitations on business firms’ vertical integration by contract, but the concerns did not relate to competition policy. First was the common law policy against restraints on alienation, which courts had used regularly to decline enforcement of certain types of contracts.434E.g., De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852) (refusing to enforce restraint on alienation covering sale of land); Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506 (1881) (restraint on subsequent resale of land unenforceable). See also the interesting decision in Williams v. Ash, 42 U.S. 1 (1843) (noting devise of slaves subject to condition that if the devisee attempted to sell them, that they should be set free was not an unlawful restraint on alienation). Later on, antitrust decisions cited this policy as a rationale for using the Sherman Act to condemn vertical contractual limitations on resale, including resale price maintenance.435Dr. Miles Med., 220 U.S. at 403–04 (“The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables . . . .” (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907))); see also John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property §§ 27, 28 (2d ed. 1895); 2 Sir Edward Coke, Coke Upon Littleton § 360 (1628). The Supreme Court cited concerns about restraints on alienation in an antitrust case as recently as 1967, when it declared territorial restraints on dealers to be per se antitrust violations.436United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1967) (agreeing with government that territorial restraints are “restraints upon alienation which are beyond the power of the manufacturer to impose upon its vendees”).

Second, many exclusive dealing and similar contracts were incomplete because they did not specify price or quantity. The common law itself exhibited a strong preference for “one off” contracts that contemplated sales with precise terms covering all important elements. Here, the most frequently challenged practice was requirements contracts, which later came to be called exclusive dealing. Under them, a purchaser promised to purchase its needs for a product from the seller but did not state the quantity. Through the early twentieth century such contracts were routinely struck down, not because of concerns for competition, but because the contracts lacked specificity. As the New York Court of Appeals declared in 1921, while a contract did not necessarily need to specify a precise amount, the quantity must be able to be “determined by an approximately accurate forecast.”437Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper’s Glue Factory, 132 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1921). This rule threatened the early development of business franchising, because franchise agreements were by nature open ended as to price, quantities and even other terms of dealing.438E.g., Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., 262 F. 116 (8th Cir. 1919) (automobile franchise agreement invalid for indefiniteness); see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 863, 892–900 (2010). Within a few years such open-ended contracts were to become a routine and essential part of franchised dealership networks.439For a good brief history, see Joseph Cornwall Palamountain, Jr., The Politics of Distribution (1955). This occurred largely as a result of contract law’s developing doctrine of the good faith purchaser.440For a thorough discussion of the relationship, see Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1 (1959).

In his influential 1920 treatise on contracts, Harvard’s Samuel Williston approved of the common law’s restrictive interpretation. He also suggested a workaround, however, that revealed that competition policy was not the driving concern. As a general rule, he concluded, a promise to sell a purchaser’s needs without precise specification of the number is “not sufficient consideration” to make an enforceable contract.441Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts § 104, at 216 (1920).

A promise to buy such a quantity of goods as the buyer may thereafter order, or to take good in such quantities “as may be desired” . . . is not sufficient consideration since the buyer may refrain from buying at his option and without incurring legal detriment himself or benefiting the other party.

Id. at 216–17 (citing numerous decisions); see, e.g., Oscar Schlegel Mfg., 132 N.E. at 149 (contract that did not specify quantity void). Other developments are analyzed in Hovenkamp, supra note 438. He then added however, that the contract could be made enforceable if the buyer promised to purchase all of its needs from the seller. Thus “the promise of a seller not to manufacture except for the buyer, or the promises of a buyer not to buy except from a particular seller” was adequately supported.442Williston, supra note 441, at 218. Williston’s statements, amply supported by case law,443E.g., Virginia Consol. Milling Co. v. Rwy. Supply & Mfg Co., 17 Ohio Dec. 794 (1907) (approving requirements contract for “entire output”); Burt v. Garden City Sand Co., 141 Ill. App. 603 (1908) (awarding damages for breach of such a contract); Morier v. Moran, 58 Ill. App. 235 (1895) (upholding contract for purchase of entire output); Robert E. Lee Silver Min. Co. v. Omaha & Grant Smelting & Refining Co., 16 Colo. 118 (1891) (same). reflected that the common law around 1920 ran in just the opposite direction as the subsequently emerging antitrust rule: contracts of this kind were enforceable at common law only if they were exclusive. By contrast, under antitrust law exclusive contracts were looked at with ever increasing suspicion.

Another concern that the case law reflected and that did breach the boundary into antitrust policy was when contractual restraints were included in patent or copyright licenses. Initially the courts refused to enforce many such agreements under patent law, using a variety of doctrines intended to limit the power of patentees to impose restrictions on patented articles once they had been sold.444See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1155 (2018); see, e.g., id. at 1163–65 (unenforceable restraints on alienation). For example, in its influential decision in Wilson v. Simpson, forty years prior to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court held that a patentee could not require purchasers of its wood planing machine to purchase its own unpatented disposable blades.445Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850). In Adams v. Burke, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a condition imposed by the manufacturer/patentee of coffin lids limiting the geographic area where the lids could be used for a burial.446Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 460 (1873). That restriction, the Court held, was not “within the monopoly of the patent.”447Id. at 456. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,448Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349–51 (1908). it refused to enforce a resale price maintenance agreement contained in a book copyright license, three years before the Supreme Court applied the antitrust laws in the Dr. Miles decision. The decision did not cite the antitrust laws. Long prior to the passage of the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court was routinely denying enforcement to vertical restrictions contained in patent or copyright licenses. Much of this doctrine eventually found its way into antitrust law.449Hovenkamp, supra note 444.

These decisions did not consider anything about competition in distribution, but only whether the restrictive license provision fell outside the scope of the intellectual property grant. Eventually, however, the patent decisions did generate some pushback on competition grounds. One example was Judge (later Justice) Horace Lurton’s 1896 opinion in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.450Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).The seller of a patented button-fastening machine prohibited purchasers of the machine from using it with any except its own unpatented fasteners, one of which connected each button to a garment. In modern terms we would characterize this arrangement as a variable proportion tying arrangement.451See Hovenkamp, supra note 192, § 10.6e. In addition to a dispute over the reasonable scope of the patent license in which the restriction was placed, the purchaser made an argument “based upon principles of public policy in respect of monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade.”452Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener, 77 F. at 292. The gist was that “public policy forbids a patentee from so contracting with reference to his monopoly as to create another monopoly in an unpatented article.”453Id. Judge Lurton responded by noting that the tying clause served the useful purpose of measuring usage of the machine in order to determine the royalty.454Id. at 296 (“The fasteners are thus made the counters by which the royalty proportioned to the actual use of the machine is determined.” (quoting the complainant’s counsel)).

In 1912 a divided Supreme Court relied heavily on the Button-Fastener case to hold in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. that the maker of a patented office copying machine could tie its own unpatented paper, stencils, and ink to the machine.455Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). By this time Judge Lurton had been elevated to the Supreme Court and wrote the opinion. The Sherman Act had now been passed, but the Court rejected the contention that it prohibited this kind of agreement. Rather, the Court noted the general rule of “absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws.”456Id. at 29–30.

The Henry decision proved to be too much. Congress responded two years later with section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited ties of goods “whether patented or unpatented,” provided that harm to competition was shown.45715 U.S.C. § 14 (2018). That is, competition law rather than the appropriate scope of the patent became the driver. With that statement, the law of tying migrated from patent law into antitrust law. Section 3 became the first antitrust statute specifically targeting a vertical restraint. The statute actually went further, prohibiting not only absolute ties but also discounts or rebates conditioned on tying.458Id. (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to . . . discount from, or rebate upon . . . price, on the condition [of tying] . . . .”). However, it did not condemn all ties or even all patent ties, but only those that threatened to “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” Indeed, it is hardly clear that the Clayton Act would have condemned the button and office copier ties that had provoked Congress to act. Both were of common commodities and very likely caused no harm to competition.

 In 1917 the Supreme Court overruled Henry in condemning a tying arrangement involving the Edison motion picture projector. It was sold subject to a patent license agreement that prohibited users from showing any films other than the seller’s own.459Motion Picture Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). By the time of the litigation, separate patents on the film had expired. The Court read the license restriction as effectively attempting to continue the film patent’s exclusivity by tying the film to the patented projector.460Id. at 518. While the decision generally relied on patent law, the Court quoted the new Clayton Act provision as confirming its conclusion.461Id. at 517. Unlike Henry, the Motion Picture Patents case did involve a serious threat of monopoly in the infant motion picture industry.462See Barak Orbach, The Fight of the Century: On the Exploitation of Social Divides, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 493 (2020); Ralph Cassady, Jr., Monopoly in Motion Picture Production and Distribution, 1908–1915, 32 S. Cal. L. Rev. 325 (1959). After 1930 the tying decisions were not so circumspect and began condemning competitively harmless ties.463E.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Pats. Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); see discussion infra text accompanying notes 504–05.

Decisions such as Motion Picture Patents never spoke of vertical practices, but the decision did indicate judicial recognition of downstream control of films as a monopoly problem, at least in the area of patents. The concern in this case was that a patented film projector and control of film could become the lever for control of the motion picture industry. In the 1930s this concern about vertical practices as a tool of monopoly became prominent in the literature of industrial economics.464E.g., Donald H. Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry (1937); E.A.G. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry (1932); S.R. Dennison, Vertical Integration and the Iron and Steel Industry, 49 Econ. J. 244 (1939). In the motion picture industry itself, it eventually led to a near obsession with vertical integration reflected in the 1948 Paramount decree.465United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (broad decree enjoining numerous distribution practices in the film industry and separating production from distribution). The decree was finally lifted in 2020. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 2020 WL 4573069 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting that many of the practices covered by the 1948 decree had become obsolete).

Resale price maintenance—a so-called intrabrand restraint because it does not limit competition with rival products—received the harshest treatment of all. Today we are inclined to think that tying arrangements present greater potential for competitive harm than do resale price maintenance agreements. In 1907 Judge Lurton, still on the Sixth Circuit, held that an agreement between a proprietary medicine manufacturer and its various distributors and resellers stipulating their resale price was not enforceable because it was a contract in restraint of trade.466John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). There were no antitrust issues.467Judge Lurton did note that a case involving a horizontal agreement to engage in resale price maintenance had proceeded under the antitrust laws. Id. at 35 (discussing Jayne v. Loder, 149 F. 21 (3d Cir. 1906)). The difference between this case and his own previous decision in the Button-Fastener case was that the medicines in question may have been protected by a trade secret, but they were not patented.468Id. at 27–28. Four years later the Supreme Court agreed in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.469Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Justice Lurton was already on the Supreme Court but did not participate. It referenced the Sherman Act only to conclude that earlier decisions refusing to apply it had all involved patented products.470Id. at 400 (referring to the horizontal price fixing agreement contained in patent license ruled enforceable in Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902)).

Federal antitrust case law did not refer to a practice as “vertical” until the 1930s. In 1934 a district court opinion in the SugarInstitute case spoke about the possibility that “vertical organization of distribution agencies” might result in “a lower price to the ultimate consumers.”471United States v. Sugar Inst., 15 F. Supp. 817, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 

More explicit judicial recognition of a distinction between horizontal and vertical practices emerged a little later, and from an unlikely source. After the Dr. Miles decision holding resale price maintenance unlawful, small business interest groups began a “fair trade” movement to permit individual states to opt out of federal law and permit resale price maintenance within their borders.472On the Fair Trade movement, see Sawyer, supra note 2, at 303–04 (2018); Palamountain, supra note 439, at 235–54. For contemporary commentary, see Robert E. Freer, Fair Trade in Operation, 2 J. Mktg. 303 (1938). Harvard industrial economist Edward S. Mason was a fierce critic. See Edward S. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1265 (1949) (lamenting that the Miller-Tydings Act made clear that “we don’t want price competition in a large section of retail trade”). After some state attempts to do so contrary to federal law, Congress yielded to an intensive campaign of small business groups led by the National Association of Retail Druggists, which had drafted a “model act” for Congress to adopt.473Palamountain, supra note 439, at 236. Congress responded with the Miller-Tydings Act in 1937.474Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801 (1975). President Roosevelt opposed the bill and threatened to veto it, but he caved to political pressure at the last moment.475Palamountain, supra note 439, at 247–49.

Miller-Tydings authorized states to approve resale price maintenance within their borders, but it invited considerable dispute about its scope. While it never used the terms “vertical” or “horizontal,” it did contain a proviso that it did not immunize agreements among manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers.476Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 50 Stat. at 693. The Act provided that section 1 of the Sherman Act should not

render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the re-sale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State . . . in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale . . . .

Id. However, then the statute provided further

[t]hat the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other.

Id. The scope of this immunity had to be determined judicially. Because the proviso was triggered by state legislation, it was interpreted mainly by state courts, which very largely concluded that the statute exempted “vertical” agreements but not “horizontal” ones. For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained in 1939:

The agreements authorized by the law are vertical, between manufacturers or producers of the particular branded commodity and those handling the product in a straight line down to and including the retailer; not horizontal, as between producers and wholesalers or persons and concerns in competition with each other . . . .477Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 4 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1939); see also Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co., 363 Ill. 610, 614 (1936) (“Contracts between plaintiff and wholesale distributors, or between distributors and retailers, are denominated vertical price-fixing contracts. Such contracts are permitted by the statute. Contracts between producers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or re-sale prices are denominated horizontal price-fixing contracts and are not within the terms of the statute because of their character as combinations in restraint of trade.”); see also Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, 1 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (App. Div. 1938) (explicitly distinguishing horizontal and vertical agreements); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 561–62 (1936) (same).

The Supreme Court eventually confirmed this view as a matter of federal antitrust law in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,478Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). concluding that the statute did “not authorize horizontal contracts, that is to say, contracts or agreements between manufacturers, between producers.”479Id. at 410; see Comment, Resale Price Maintenance by an Integrated Firm: The McKesson & Robbins Case, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1957).

By the early 1930s the law of vertical practices had developed to a place not all that different from where it is today, save for the treatment of resale price maintenance. Tying arrangements were addressable under antitrust, but liability was very largely limited to firms that had dominant market shares or where foreclosure percentages were high. In addition to Motion Picture Patents, the IBM tying case of 1936 found a tie of IBM’s computation machine and its data cards to be unlawful on a market share that exceeded eighty percent.480Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 136 (1936) (IBM made 81% of the tabulating cards while its only rival, Remington-Rand, made 19%). By contrast, General Motor’s (“GM”) tie of car repairs to its original equipment parts was approved when the court concluded that the tie was essential for quality control and that there was plenty of competition in any event.481Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1935), aff’d per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). Other decisions also approved ties when the markets in question were competitive.482United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 264 F. 138, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1920), aff’d, 258 U.S. 451 (1921) (noting the delicate nature of tied repair parts); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475 (1923) (refusing to condemn a gasoline franchisor’s tie of its own gasoline; noting that the market was competitive).

The same thing was true of exclusive dealing, which condemned the practice when it realistically threatened to perpetuate market dominance. In a decision applying the Clayton Act to exclusive dealing, the Court noted that the supplier controlled roughly forty percent of the dress pattern outlets in the country and that the exclusive agreement in question threatened to create several local monopolies.483Standard Fashion Co. v. Margrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1922); see also Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 1926) (condemning exclusive dealing in player piano rolls under FTC Act, where defendant apparently controlled about 60% of market). Contra D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Refin. Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915) (refusing to condemn exclusive dealing, apparently challenged only under the Sherman Act, with no discussion of market shares). A few decisions also condemned exclusive decisions under state antitrust law. E.g., Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Coonrod, 230 S.W. 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (condemning exclusive dealing under Texas Antitrust Act; no discussion of market share). There was no antitrust law of vertical territorial restraints until the Supreme Court addressed the issue in the 1960s in White Motor Co. v. United States.484White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (“We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain.”). Justice Douglas held for the Court that it was too early to say. Resale price maintenance, which remained unlawful per se, was the outlier.

The law of vertical mergers and ownership vertical integration cut a similar path. The courts condemned it when it appeared to create or preserve monopoly, but generally required evidence of market dominance or foreclosure. For example, judicial condemnation of vertical integration in the American Tobacco,485United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); see also United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 874 (D. Md. 1916) (condemning a potpourri of vertical practices by a dominant firm). Corn Products,486United States v. Corn Prods. Refin. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (acquiring candy companies and then selling candy below cost; price squeeze on syrup—both efforts were unsuccessful but condemned as attempt to monopolize). Kodak,487Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). and Keystone Watch488United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 F. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (condemning combination of watch case and watch movement manufacturers). decisions were all predicated on at least an assumption of dominant market shares. On the other hand, the court refused to condemn United States Steel’s integration into distribution facilities,489United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 103–08 (D. N.J. 1915), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (noting it is not unlawful to develop its own warehouses, freight lines, and shipping facilities if these were responsive to ordinary needs of trade). finding that the integration improved efficiency and reduced costs and uncertainty.490Id. at 124–25, 134. In affirming, the Supreme Court cited evidence that it was cheaper for the defendant to combine several operations in a single facility and that this combination would enable it to compete more effectively in the world market.491U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 443–44.

 In its unanimous antitrust decision in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass’n v. United States, the Court even intervened to protect ownership vertical integration in the lumber industry.492E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 611 (1914) (noting that those who refused to participate were branded as “unfair dealers”). The defendants were classic examples of Progressive Era small businesses who relied on the mantle of “fair trade” to protect themselves from larger vertically integrated firms. In this case they organized a boycott, which the Court condemned, agreeing among themselves that they would not purchase lumber at wholesale from anyone who had vertically integrated into retailing. The decision never used the words “vertical” or “integration.” Rather the boycott was cast in terms of wholesalers who sold directly to customers rather than exclusively to the defendant retailers.

D.  Growing Fears of Vertical Control After World War II

The law of vertical relationships began to go off the rails in the 1940s, and for a confluence of reasons. One of course was the Great Depression and the dramatic rise of small business as an interest group following World War I.493On the rise of trade associations after World War I, see Ells W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly 37–38, 53–72 (1966); Palamountain, supra note 439; Butler D. Shaffer, In Restraint of Trade: Trade Associations and the Emergence of “Self Regulation,” 20 Sw. U. L. Rev. 289 (1991). On the antitrust response during the Depression, see Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 255 (2013). Another was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s appointment of Thurman Arnold to be head of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, turning it into a potent antitrust and anti-patent tool. The development of influential models of imperfect competition also had considerable influence.494See discussion infra text accompanying note 514.

In its International Salt tying decision in 1947, the Supreme Court applied both the Sherman and Clayton Acts to condemn a non-foreclosing tie involving a common staple—salt—that was not realistically capable of being monopolized.495Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The case effectively migrated patent act tying policy into antitrust law by holding that the defendant’s patents on its salt injecting machine created a presumption of market power sufficient to condemn that tie. It also watered down the Clayton Act requirement that an unlawful tie must “substantially lessen competition”49615 U.S.C. § 14 (2018). by holding that proof of competitive harm did not require foreclosure—something that would have been impossible to show, given that the tied product was ordinary salt.497Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. at 396. Rather it was enough to show that the tying contracts covered a significant amount of salt. In this case that was approximately $500,000 per year.498See id. at 395.

From that point tying law was used aggressively to condemn competitively harmless practices that the Court did not understand. Nor did it need to, because the per se rule for tying that the Court adopted created a strong presumption of illegality without competitive analysis.499Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). The Court relied on Justice Frankfurter’s dicta in the 1949 Standard Stations exclusive dealing case that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”500Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949). That dicta served to make the Court more hostile toward tying arrangements than it was toward exclusive dealing.

In its 1949 Standard Stations decision, the Supreme Court expanded the rules against exclusive dealing to prohibit Standard Oil of California from engaging in “single-branding,” or insisting that its franchised gasoline stations pump only its own gasoline.501Id. Standard Oil’s contracts covered 6.7% of the gasoline sold in California.502Id. at 295. The Court’s condemnation of the practice was too much for Justice Douglas, otherwise an aggressive antitrust enforcer, who predicted in his dissent that requiring franchised gasoline stations to sell multiple brands of gasoline would force the refiners to build their own stations, thus eliminating the smaller dealers altogether.503Id. at 315–18.

One effect of these decisions was a long-standing hostility toward tying arrangements, although it never extended quite as far to exclusive dealing.504See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (applying rule of reason in exclusive dealing case and dismissing complaint for inadequate showing of foreclosure). That distinction does not make a great deal of sense. While a tie requires a dealer to carry a specific second product as a condition of obtaining the first, exclusive dealing excludes a particular product from the dealer’s entire business. For example, under tying a dealer that sells GM cars might be required to repair them using GM parts.505Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1935), aff’d per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). By contrast, under exclusive dealing the dealer would be prohibited from selling non-GM cars altogether. While outcomes vary with facts, often the amount of market exclusion produced by exclusive dealing exceeds the amount produced by tying. In any event, the per se rule for tying was not a creature of the Progressive Era, but rather of the late 1940s.

The courts also became more aggressive about vertical integration by merger and even by new entry.506E.g., United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (condemning vertical integration and exclusive dealing in sleeping cars). In fact, vertical integration almost became a suspect category. After the merger law was amended in 1950 so as to reach vertical as well as horizontal mergers, the Court applied it liberally to situations where foreclosures were not in the 40% and above range that Progressive courts had condemned, but as low as 3% or 4% on the Supreme Court,507E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 302–03, 328 (1962). or barely over 1% in the lower courts.508United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 611–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Internal vertical expansion earned similar treatment. For example, some decisions condemned automobile makers’ distribution of cars through wholly owned dealerships rather than contracting with independents.509Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff’d per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). While the Mt. Lebanon Motors decision observed that the law of exclusive dealing required market power, the requirement was met when the court defined the market as “Dodge automobiles [sold] at the retail level in Allegheny County,”510Id. at 460. thus guaranteeing that Chrysler’s market share would be 100%.

Numerous decisions in the 1960s and 1970s prohibited nondominant firms from doing any more than switching to self-distribution rather than relying on independent dealers.511See generally Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968) (condemning Kroger’s decision to build its own dairy, covering about 20% of a local market); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (condemning vertical integration on a very narrow market for “drive through” as opposed to general photofinishing); Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting the defendant was the largest among seventy manufacturers of industrial sealants); Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1970) (self-distribution of movie posters); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964) (condemning vertical integration by nondominant refiner). None of these decisions has survived today.

CONCLUSION

In 1933, two disruptive books appeared that presented the theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition. One was written by Cambridge University’s Joan Robinson,512Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933). and the other by Edward Chamberlin from Harvard.513Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933). Both books reflected the Progressives’ increased skepticism about the benign qualities of markets. In the process they also paved the way for significantly more aggressive enforcement.

The theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition immediately became influential in academic circles. They gradually evolved into a single set of theories that today go by the name of imperfect competition.514See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, 24 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 293, 328–29 (2022). Whether incidentally or as a result, antitrust policy began to veer left, often past all reasonable boundaries, condemning efficient practices where the creation of monopoly was virtually impossible.

This increased level of antitrust enforcement subsequently provoked a fierce neoliberal reaction, mainly from the Chicago School. It was prominently represented in the writing of George J. Stigler and, a little later, Robert Bork.515Id. The Chicago School fought an ultimately losing battle to present imperfect competition models as untestable or incoherent. An empirical renaissance in economics, mainly in the 1970s and after, refuted that critique.516Id. Today imperfect competition models clearly dominate the microeconomic literature as well as antitrust law, and their empirical robustness is well established.517See Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev 1843 (2020).

The most general result has been a shift back toward the center. Today antitrust policy sits between the aggressiveness of the Roosevelt Court on one side, which often condemned competitively harmless practices, and the decaying remnants of the Chicago School on the other. Against this the Progressive response—aggressive in its own time but quite moderate today—has proven to be surprisingly durable.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 129

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James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School and the Wharton School. Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp and Matthew Panhans for valuable comments.

Fifty Ways to Leave Your Lover: Doing Away with Separation Requirements for Divorce

Despite the evolution of no-fault divorces, which were intended to remove certain barriers to divorce and essentially make any divorce filed inevitable, many jurisdictions prescribe a waiting period before eligibility for divorce, during which there must be a demonstrable period of separation. In support of findings of facts and conclusions of law about whether the divorcing couple has established a separation, some jurisdictions will ask whether the couple has lived in the same abode and, if so, will inquire about the divorcing couple’s roles and choices vis-à-vis one another—for example, preparing meals for one another or engaging socially with one another. Other jurisdictions will make explicit inquiries into whether a couple has had sex with one another. Probing into families’ living arrangements and adults’ sexual choices does real and particular harm to marginalized social groups, and doing so defies the liberty and privacy interests of families and couples. In explicating this litany of critiques, this project attempts to avoid the trap that family law scholarship can too easily fall into; namely, criticizing doctrine “on a low level of abstraction” and rushing to a proposed reform. This piece, therefore, offers a taxonomy of the harm that separate and apart requirements cause—paying particular attention to the ways in which these laws are classist, heteronormative, gendered, and racially charged—and illuminates how constitutionally precarious such laws are. The project is ambitious as it attempts to situate and expose the deep-seated problems of separate and apart requirements as reflective of the deep-seated flaws in family law jurisprudence generally. The piece offers a comprehensive analysis and investigation of separate and apart requirements, and it serves as an invitation to further conversation and exploration of the themes raised herein.

Based on the author’s practice experience as much as her scholarship, the proposal insists that where couples are struggling deep in the heart of the matter about their choices—the good ones and the mistakes—they do not need or desire a judicial officer to ask them to wait or to organize their life a certain way before allowing them to divorce. Nothing and no one is served by insisting on some normative view about what the end of a marriage looks like and requiring some time period for performance of that view. The proposal in this piece joins a growing chorus of practitioners, judges, and scholars talking about administrative divorces. The distinct voice in this piece advocates for administrative divorce as a procedural decoupling of divorce from any underlying or attendant economic and custody issues. The piece motivates this argument based on the premise that allowing families to proceed thusly will enhance the self-determination of families in transition and promote use of the courts when, and only when, the families determine that court involvement in matters of children and economics will improve their stability. 

INTRODUCTION

The problem is all inside your head, she said to me

The answer is easy if you take it logically

I’d like to help you in your struggle to be free

There must be fifty ways to leave your lover1Paul Simon, 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, on Still Crazy After All These Years (Columbia Recs. 1975).

Paul Simon knew full well that there are 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, yet many jurisdictions insist on just one. That one way looks something like this: decide you are unhappy, unsafe, or unstable in your marriage. Leave the marital home or somehow excise your spouse from it. Pay for that additional rent or mortgage or count on the fact that your spouse can and will. File some paperwork with the court and wait. Wait a long time. Pay a lawyer. Pay a lawyer a lot of money. While you are waiting and paying you are still married, but you are also not really married. So do not resume living with your spouse, even if there is room in that property for you. If you do find yourself back in the house (but goodness, please don’t) do not socialize unduly with your spouse. You may not be sure what that looks like, but just please refrain from it. Do not share meals with your spouse. Certainly do not sleep with your spouse. Never. Not if you are living together or if you have moved out. Eventually, go to court. See a judge. Let the judge know that you followed these rules.  

This Article takes up those rules, namely jurisdictions’ requirements that couples live separate and apart and wait out arbitrary waiting periods to be eligible for no-fault divorce. Despite the evolution of no-fault divorces, which were intended to remove certain barriers to divorce and essentially make any divorce filed inevitable, many jurisdictions prescribe a waiting period before eligibility for divorce, during which there must be a demonstrable period of separation.2See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-12-301, 307, 308, 310 (2022) (requiring spouses in a covenant marriage to separate for one year without reconciliation from the date of decree of separation); D.C. Code §§ 16-904, 16-905 (2022) (requiring six months of voluntary separation or living separate and apart without cohabitation before filing for divorce); Idaho Code §§ 32-601, 610 (2022) (requiring partners to live separate and apart for five years without cohabitation before filing a suit); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.170 (West 2022) (requiring divorcing spouses to live separate and apart for a waiting period of sixty days); La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 102, 103.1 (2022) (requiring divorcing spouses with no minor children to live separate and apart for 180 days, while divorcing spouses with minor children must live separately for 365 days); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-104 (2022) (requiring partners to live separate and apart for 180 days before filing for a divorce); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2 (West 2022) (requiring couples to live separate and apart for eighteen months); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (McKinney 2022) (requiring a separation period of one year); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3301 (2022) (requiring divorcing spouses to live separate and apart for one year prior to filing for affidavit of divorce); 15 R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-3 (2022) (requiring divorcing spouses to live separate and apart for three years, during which time they cannot have ordinary and usual relations that exist between married persons, including intercourse); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-10 (2021) (requiring a separation period of one year); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-4-101 (2022) (requiring a separation period of two years for couples seeking divorce for irreconcilable differences); Va. Code Ann. § 20-91 (2022) (requiring parents of minor children to separate for one year prior to filing for divorce, while divorcing spouses with no minor children and a written separation agreement must wait only six months before filing). In support of findings of facts and conclusions of law about whether the divorcing couple has established a period of separation, some jurisdictions will ask whether the couple has lived in the same abode and, if so, will inquire about the divorcing couple’s roles and choices vis-à-vis one another—for example, preparing meals for one another or engaging socially with one another.3See infra Section I. Other jurisdictions will make explicit inquiries into whether a couple has had sex with one another. These are questions about families’ living arrangements and adults’ sexual choices, questions that invade the privacy of families concerning their living arrangements and adults concerning their sexual choices. Moreover, the requirements of separateness and the inquiries they inspire do real and particular harm to certain social groups. This Article critiques these requirements as being classist, heteronormative, gendered, and racially charged and suggests that they defy constitutional protections. The Article ends by proposing a process that protects the dignity of divorcing couples and better provides predictability and stability for families in transition.

The primary argument for separate and apart requirements posits that separateness is a proxy for establishing that the decision to leave one another is mutual and voluntary or at least that one spouse has given the other a very clear indication that they want out.4See, e.g., D.C. Code §§ 16-904, 16-905 (2022). To the extent that one regards marriage as a contract, a meeting of the minds as to a modification of its terms or its termination makes a certain sense. But the requirements of separateness and the inquiries they inspire are superfluous and odd, given several realities of divorce: first, under no-fault divorce, no one has to prove any particular transgression; and, second, the contestations in divorce are rarely if ever about the divorce itself—rather, disagreements concern custodial, property, and support disputes.

A second argument, more tenuous than the first, to justify these requirements is anchored on the belief that marriage is a primary source of stability and security for children, families, and society. Divorce, the argument goes, is a destructive life event that couples should avoid, delay, or undertake painstakingly slowly.5See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Concord with Which Other Families?: Marriage Equality, Family Demographics, and Race, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 99, 103 (2016); Scott Coltrane & Michele Adams, The Social Construction of the Divorce “Problem”: Morality, Child Victims, and the Politics of Gender, 52 Fam. Rels. 363, 363 (2003); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2181, 2184 (1995). Yet the passage of time and greater visibility of families and couples not hiding their choices and arrangements has debunked the myth that marriage is the only available and functional means of raising children and ordering a civil society. Meanwhile, the time periods and requirements embedded in many separate and apart requirements are deeply destabilizing and burdensome.6See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Marriage Economy: ‘I Couldn’t Afford to Get Divorced,’ NPR, (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/12/20/144021297/marriage-economy-i-couldnt-afford-to-get-divorced [https://perma.cc/8Q5R-F6ZR]. 

Moreover, the requirements for separateness burdens certain social groups in particular. To begin, living—and parenting—separately prior to final orders for support and division of assets is challenging if not impossible for those who are under-resourced or living in poverty; these economic realities impact women in particular. Moreover, the obsession about what is happening behind closed doors and what those intimate and interpersonal choices might tell the public about a couple’s desires or capacities is deeply rooted in heteronormative thinking and reasoning that applies rigid binaries to gender, gender performance, sexuality, and family constellations.7See Ramona Faith Oswald, Libby Balter Blume & Stephen R. Marks, Decentering Heteronormativity: A Model for Family Studies, in Sourcebook of Family Theory & Research 143 (Vern L. Bengston, Alan C. Acock, Katherine R. Allen, Peggye Dilworth-Anderson & David M. Klein eds., 2005). Many expressions of self, love, and family do not match rigid constructions of how to “do” family.8Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider and Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT Identity, 42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 521, 524 (2015); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 4 n.10 (1999). Moreover, inquiries into sex or home life are a particular violation to women, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and people of color, as classes of people whose sexuality and home life are too often distorted or weaponized against them.9See generally Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 7 (examining “the social problem of systemic violence against oppressed social groups, the anti-racist and legal responses to this violence, and more generalized discussions of heterosexism and gay and lesbian equality within anti-racist discourse and critical race theory” and observing that much of the “oppressive violence” against LGBTQ+ people, specifically LGBTQ+ people of color, involves sexual subordination). Meanwhile, the requirements appear contrary to constitutional protections.10As shall be discussed in greater detail herein, the many rights that are important to families are located in the margins of overlay of stated constitutional rights: the penumbra of those rights. Family rights—an inexact and under-theorized jurisprudence—relies on a liberty interest the “exactness” of which is difficult to define, but which “[w]ithout doubt . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and an articulation of a privacy right “formed by emanations” from other constitutional guarantees, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see infra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. The articulation and application of these rights has been vital to those in familial and intimate relationships, yet Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization casts a worrisome pall over existing liberty and privacy rights, let alone future extensions of them. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2258 (2022) (stating, at least, that cases such as Meyer, Griswold, and Lawrence have a different and safer articulation of liberty interest than Roe, Casey, and Dobbs). A fulsome accounting of harms—both shared and specific—and a survey of the constitutional concerns reveal that separate and apart requirements defy the very expectations we ought to have for family policies. They do not extend the dignity and respect to couples and families that they deserve, and they do not scaffold the predictability and stability that divorcing couples and families need.  

Part I of this Article will explore the context of divorce—who is divorcing and why people leave marriages. This Part also offers a primer as to how the process and requirements for divorce are situated in the history of divorce. Part II will clarify and expand upon the harm done by separate and apart requirements generally and the intrusion they inspire. The Part will begin with an overview of the toll that pursuing divorce takes and how separate and apart requirements compound these burdens. This Part also seeks to situate these harms in the context of the disenfranchisement experienced by those who the law subordinates or fails to anticipate, as well as the particular psychological harm to subordinated communities brought on by invasions of privacy and judgment about lifestyle. To the extent that Part II describes how separate and apart requirements complicate the lived experience of families, Part III introduces the legal doctrine that should challenge the existence of the requirements themselves. 

Part III outlines preliminarily the substantive due process right to be free from the burden of separate and apart requirements and inquiries. Specifically, the Part will illuminate an intersection in the Venn diagram of family law—namely, in the overlay of intimacy cases, right to marry cases, and family rights cases that suggest separate and apart requirements are on shaky constitutional ground. This Part will be in conversation with scholars calling for a right to sexual privacy and a right to unmarry, and it is meant as an invitation to further and future analysis. Preliminary analysis is offered here in this inchoate form to illuminate how clumsily and carelessly we define and defend family as a matter of law. It is not just that separate and apart clauses cause or exacerbate psychic and sociological harm—the risk of this harm exists and persists even where the law appears to be on precarious constitutional footing. In many respects, the Article agrees with Martha Minow’s assessment from almost thirty-five years ago that there is “an incoherent jurisprudence about families, [because it is] a jurisprudence tugged and pushed by other concerns.”11 Martha Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74 J. Am. Hist. 959, 959 (1987).

The final Part of the paper will turn to a consideration of what really matters to families: (1) being afforded dignity and respect; and (2) stability and predictability for ordering finances and property and raising children. Interestingly, these are the public policy concerns cited in support of, but not actually served by, divorce law. Part IV will offer prescriptions that eschew dogmatic and political views of marriage and actually serve familial interests. First, jurisdictions must do away with separate and apart requirements. Second, jurisdictions should bifurcate the adjudication of divorce in a prompt administrative proceeding, allowing for subsequent adjudication or alternative dispute resolution of custodial, property, and support disputes.   

This Article attempts to avoid the trap that family law scholarship can too easily fall into criticizing doctrine “on a low level of abstraction” and rushing to a proposed reform.12Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 Minn. J.L. & Ineq. 1, 3 (1984). This Article offers a taxonomy of the harm that separate and apart requirements cause, paying particular attention to the unique harm to those whose experience of the law is too often invisible. The Article also illuminates how constitutionally precarious such laws are. The project, then, is both ambitious and insufficient, as it attempts to situate and expose the deep-seated problems of separate and apart requirements as reflective of the deep-seated flaws in family law jurisprudence generally.13“Family law both reflects and helps create an ideology of the family—a structure of images and understandings of family life.” Olsen, supra note 12, at 3; see also Minow, supra note 11. The Article is intended, therefore, to serve as an invitation to further conversation and exploration of the themes raised herein.

I.  YOU JUST SLIP OUT THE BACK, JACK: GETTING DIVORCED

People get divorced for all sorts of reasons along a spectrum: from mistaken compatibility to situations that pose health and safety risks to spouses or children. All along this spectrum, there may be elements of neglect of self or partner in the marriage, or unkindness or sorrow or even deceit and scandal, but there is also room for collaboration or planning for a next chapter and a changed future. Whatever the reason, or whatever the conduct of the spouses involved, states now universally recognize the importance of letting people out of unhappy marriages.14Cyn Haueter, “I Can’t Afford to Leave Him” Divorcing a Spouse with Superior Financial Resources, 31 Hastings Women’s L.J. 237, 237 (2020) (“[A]doption of no-fault divorce laws in all fifty states indicates the government-recognized importance of the ability to leave an unhappy marriage.”). And about forty to fifty percent of Americans will avail themselves of that option each year.15Healthy Divorce: How to Make Your Split as Smooth as Possible, Am. Psych. Ass’n
(2013), https://www.apa.org/topics/divorce-child-custody/healthy [https://perma.cc/7HUU-NMRV]; John Harrington & Cheyenne Buckingham, Broken Hearts: A Rundown of the Divorce Capital of Every State, USA Today (Feb. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2018/
02/02/broken-hearts-rundown-divorce-capital-every-state/1078283001 [https://perma.cc/FY89-XEHX]; Marriage & Divorce, Am. Psych. Ass’n, https://www.apa.org/topics/divorce-child-custody [https://
perma.cc/4TBW-FMFC]. This rate is higher for subsequent marriages.
Even where a party can now rely on no-fault grounds for divorce, in many jurisdictions they must establish eligibility under the jurisdiction’s separation requirements. A separation requirement refers to the amount of time two spouses must live separately to be eligible for a divorce.16Jennifer S. Tier, So You’re Getting Divorced: What to Expect and How to Proceed, 42 Fam. Advoc. 4, 4 (2019). Separation requirements range from sixty days to five years.17Id. In some jurisdictions, one can file for divorce before waiting out the separation period, but the matter will not be calendared for final adjudication until the matter is “ripe.” In jurisdictions such as Kentucky, for example, a party can file for divorce prior to separation, but the court will not enter a final divorce decree until the parties have lived separate and apart for sixty days, where “[l]iving apart shall include living under the same roof without sexual cohabitation.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.170(1) (West 2022). These requirements affect when a party can file and start the clock regarding when the matter will actually be heard or finalized.18In many jurisdictions, the language of the statutes and the pleadings do not line up readily with reality. Take Maryland and the District of Columbia for example. Both statutes have similar language: in Maryland, a “court may decree a divorce on the following grounds . . . 12-month separation, when the parties have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for 12 months without interruption before the filing of the application for divorce,” Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 7-103 (West 2022); in the District of Columbia, “[a] divorce from the bonds of marriage may be granted if (1) both parties to the marriage have mutually and voluntarily lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of six months next preceding the commencement of the action; [or] (2) both parties to the marriage have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of one year next preceding the commencement of the action,” D.C. Code § 16-904(a)(1)–(2) (2022). The fiction bound up in the semantics of the statutes is that once someone files for divorce they will be seen by a judge to adjudicate that divorce. But of course, they will not. They must serve the other party, which takes time. The clerk must calendar the matter, which will take time. There will be preliminary hearings, which will take all sorts of time. The time from pleading to divorce can easily be a year, which means that a couple has waited well in excess of the statutory period. Moreover, in many cases, these waiting periods are not just a matter of running the clock; rather, the period of separation has to have demonstrable features of separation to satisfy the court that the matter is ripe for divorce.  

Judges in Pennsylvania, for example, may seek evidence that the spouses began to lead independent lives, may inquire about whether spouses have stopped sharing a bedroom and whether they have had sex, may ask how much time a spouse spent in the marital home, and may question whether the spouses shared meals.1923 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3301(d)(1) (2022); Jim Cairns, What Does Separate & Apart Mean During an Uncontested Divorce?, Cairns L. Offs. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.mypadivorce
lawyer.com/blogs-articles/2016/december/what-does-separate-apart-mean-during-an-uncontes [https://
perma.cc/834U-69DA]. Compare Frey v. Frey, 2003 PA Super 135, ¶ 13 (concluding that a cohabiting couple had lived separate and apart after consideration of the husband and wife’s arrangements and choices during the period of separation, which included examination of dinners out, shared meals in the home, and timetable of sexual intercourse), with Britton v. Britton, 582 A.2d 1335, 1337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (concluding that a three-year separation was invalidated as being a sufficient term of living separate and apart when for three months the couple “shared the same bedroom and resumed sexual relations, shared a joint checking account, and had a social life as husband and wife”).
In the District of Columbia, as in Pennsylvania, a couple is permitted to remain in the same marital home pending divorce, but the court will make explicit inquiry into whether the couple has had sex with one another and may additionally inquire about whether and when the spouses began to use separate bedrooms and how household finances were managed.20D.C. Code § 16-904(c)(1) (2022); Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1946). In Maryland, couples are not permitted to cohabitate at all, which does not forestall inquiry into the spouses’ sexual relationship; rather, Maryland courts will make a direct inquiry regarding sex. Two spouses who have had sex will be deemed to be cohabitating regardless of a reality of separate abodes.21Bergeris v. Bergeris, 90 A.3d 553 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014).The existence of separation periods and the depth of inquiry required in some jurisdictions are vestiges of confounding Victorian principles and the conspiring paternalism of the state when it comes to divorce.

A.  Current Requirements in Conversation with the Confounding History of Divorce

Historically marriage was a matter of “status and cultural location” as well as economic security (of dependent women) and property rights (of men).22Richard H. Chused, Private Acts in Public Places: A Social History of Divorce in the Formative Era of American Family Law 5 (1994). As stated by the Supreme Court in 1888,

Marriage is something more than a mere contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once formed, a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change; and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement, but upon the law, statutory or common. It is an institution of society, regulated and controlled by public authority.23Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 191 (1888). 

Divorce, then, was about restructuring one’s economic life and one’s public standing.24Chused, supra note 22, at 6. By extension, divorce was quite public and political. Perhaps the greatest indication of this was the manner of seeking a divorce, namely through a petition to the legislature.25Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1497, 1501 (2000); Chused, supra note 22, at 8. Divorce by legislature meant a popularly elected branch of government would decide whether a marriage harmed the spouses and the community to such an extent that the harm justified ending the marriage.26See also Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213 (finding that marriage is a matter of “public ordination” rather than of “private agreement”); Sandra F. VanBurkleo, “Belonging to the World”: Women’s Rights and American Constitutional Culture 69 (2001). Divorce laws then reflected the belief that marriages were social contracts unlike any other known contract. Id. at 71 (citing Maryland Acts of 1841) (“[P]arties cannot mutually dissolve it . . . because there is no accepted performance which will end it, . . . because it is not dissolved by a failure of the original consideration, . . . [and] because no suit for damages will lie for the non-fulfillment of its duties . . . .”). The move from legislative halls to courtrooms did not really render divorces particularly more available, any more private, or any less political.27Maryland offers an apt example of the adoption of “modern” divorce reform. Historical Background—Divorce Records, Md. State Archives http://guide.msa.maryland.gov/pages/
viewer.aspx?page=divorce-historical-background [https://perma.cc/7S4Y-TA7H] (“The legislature continued its role in divorce proceedings until it passed an act to give the chancery court and the county courts, as courts of equity, jurisdiction in cases of divorce on March 1, 1842 (Acts of 1841, Ch. 262).”); Reports of Cases in the High Court of Chancery of Maryland 1846–1854, Archives of Md. Online https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000200/html/am200c–562.html [https://perma.cc/PY7E-CAF4] (featuring excerpts of 1841 Md. Laws 262). Judicial divorce was almost universal by 1900. Friedman, supra note 25, at 1501. Maryland adopted judicial divorce in 1841, but even here, the Maryland judges shared jurisdiction with the legislature until well after 1850 and exercised very little of the discretion they were granted. Chused, supra note 22; see also VanBurkleo, supra note 26, at 71. Meanwhile, lingering Victorian morals and general concern over a rising divorce rate held back any significant reform to the law beyond moving the matters into court. Chused, supra note 22, at 159–60. The first major change to divorce law did not occur for seventy years until 1937, when an amendment added a period of separation of five years as grounds for divorce, thereby formally ushering in limited opportunity for consensual divorce. Id. at 159; Benjamin Schenker, A History of Divorce in Maryland, Md. Bar J., Nov. 2016, 41, 42.
Separate and apart periods and requirements reflect the longstanding insistence that marriage has an awful lot to do with the performance of normative roles and obligations, so divorce is only an option if there has been a failure to execute these roles. Proving oneself eligible for divorce inspires the same theater of early divorce law and continues to invite or advance a regime of judicial paternalism.

1.  Marriage as Performance of Obligation

Where the legislature might have asked itself if a given marriage violated public policy, the courts addressed divorce as an adversarial process concerning a breached marital contract.28Friedman, supra note 25, at 1501; Davey v. Davey, 96 A.2d 606, 608 (Md. 1953) (finding that a wife “did not make out a sufficient case entitling her to a divorce” and instead declared her to be an insufficient housekeeper and nursemaid because she did not clean up after her husband or have sex with him when he did not bathe for several weeks and soiled his underwear and bedsheets); Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 606 (N.Y. 1926) (finding where wife does not “submit to ordinary marital relations,” she cannot accuse her husband of abandonment and compel support from him). The terms of the contract flowed between husband and wife reflecting normative values. The conventional story of marriage in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was this: man and woman meet, perhaps based on love, but more likely based on a courtship promoted and controlled by the involved families. Man marries and stays man; woman marries and becomes wife, a person no longer entitled to an independent legal identity.29Consider the phrase, “I now pronounce you man and wife” (emphasis added). The phrase contemplates the man’s continued existence as a man, whether or not he is married, while the woman’s self-alters to that of wife. Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History 101 (2000). Husband assumes the legally and culturally assigned role of provider and protector for this now vulnerable creature. Wife agrees to obedience and sexual submission in order to birth children and tend to a home.30Joanna L. Grossman, Separated Spouses, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1613, 1613 (2001) (reviewing Hartog, supra note 29).  

Even as divorces left legislative halls, the jurisprudence of divorce still reflected a second social contract that flowed between the couple and the state.31See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888) (suggesting marriage is a matter of “public ordination,” rather than of “private agreement”); VanBurkleo, supra note 26, at 71. The state had an interest in reinforcing predictable, regulated (gendered) expectations of support and obligation.32VanBurkleo, supra note 26, at 71, 79; Fineman, supra note 5, at 2187. The prevailing notion was that this paradigm policed virtue and upstandingness. As sole benefactor to his family, a man would be sober and productive. As keepers of the hearth, women would be too busy or grateful to be performing their manifest destiny as mothers to notice their disenfranchisement.33Claire P. Donohue, The Unexamined Life: A Framework to Address Judicial Bias in Custody Determinations and Beyond, 21 Geo. J. Gender & L. 557, 563–65 (2020). Children would be fed and clothed and sheltered.34Historically, jurisdictions have denied all manner of benefits to children born out of wedlock “based on morals and general welfare because it discourages bringing children [deemed illegitimate] into the world.” Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968). Conduct such as adultery, desertion, or cruelty—and eventually habitual drunkenness and use of illicit drugs—became acceptable common grounds for divorce as they amounted to an obvious breach in the promises flowing not just from husband to wife, but also between married couple and state.35Friedman, supra note 25, at 1531; see, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 1 (2022). 

2.  Divorce as Theater

Forced to comply with divorce law’s requirements for specific action or omission by a spouse, “one-sided evidentiary hearings[] and feigned testimony became common.”36Chused, supra note 22, at 160. Litigants continued to make public performances in courts concerning the appropriateness of their divorcing, just as they had before the legislature.37Id. Indeed, litigants would “blithely relate[] prefabricated stories of their spouses’ ‘extreme cruelty’ destroying their marriage.”38J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 519, 521 (1994); see also Friedman, supra note 25, at 1504 (regarding migratory divorce); id. at 1505–06, 1511–13 (discussing New York). The following situation seems humorous in retrospect, but is in actuality a maddening example of what happens when there is such a gulf between law and society.39Friedman, supra note 25, at 1504. In New York, couples staged elaborate farces, complete with paid actors, for example, to play a mistress who would substantiate an adultery ground for divorce.40As early as 1896, the New York Times complained: 

Among the more recent creations of knavery is a trade which ought to become as infamous as some other callings which the law visits with its severest penalties. . . . The object of it is to procure divorces by means of fraud and perjury. The husband or wife who wishes to get rid of a disagreeable partner has only to go to some sharper calling himself an attorney, who advertises his readiness to get divorces without publicity, and who at once undertakes to do all the dirty work incidental to the case. If there is no evidence he forges or invents as much as he wants. If the man or woman against whom he is employed is innocent, he finds someone to lay all sorts of crime to their charge. 

Nelson Manfred Blake, The Road to Reno: A History of Divorce in the United States 190 (1962). 

In 1934, the New York Mirror’s Sunday magazine featured a sensational series entitled “I was the ‘Unknown Blonde’ in 100 New York Divorces!” A woman calling herself Dorothy Jarvis claimed that she had been a respectable stenographer in a lawyer’s office until she lost her job during the depression. Her former employers sent her to a firm of private detectives who employed many girls as professional witnesses in divorce cases. At first Dorothy received from $25 to $100 for each job, but the field became overcrowded and she could get only $10 to $50. With a cooperative husband, the procedure was routine. She would accompany the man to some hotel room and remove a few outer garments. Then a raiding party would break in and surprise the guilty couple. Usually the interlopers were three in number—a private detective, some person who knew the husband (about half the time the wife herself), and a professional process server who would later hand the defendant the summons and complaint in the divorce suit. The eventual hearing before the referee would be routine, even to following a mimeographed list of questions.” 

Id. at 193.
Attorneys and judges played along.41Reed v. Littleton, 289 N.Y.S. 798, 800–01 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (“[H]as not my good brother overlooked the fact that a certain amount of naïveté is an essential adjunct to the judicial office? Does not the Supreme Court grind out thousands of divorces annually upon the stereotyped sin of the same big blond attired in the same black silk pajamas? Is not access to the chamber of love quite uniformly obtained by announcing that it is a maid bringing towels or a messenger boy with an urgent telegram?”), rev’d, 292 N.Y.S. 363 (App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 9 N.E.2d 814 (N.Y. 1937). The truly affluent skipped the show and headed to Reno for “quickie” divorces.42Blake, supra note 40; Friedman, supra note 25. When New York, one of the last states to allow no-fault divorces finally did so, the two “chief evils the new divorce law was designed to eliminate” were the “collusive or fraud-ridden divorce actions” and “out-of-state divorces based upon spurious residence and baseless claims.”43Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012). If a party failed to keep up the guise of the performance or a judge was not as accommodating of any novelty or stretch in the arguments litigants made, this could forestall the divorce.44Friedman, supra note 25, at 1507 (reciting a case in which a divorce was denied because the parties drew up a property settlement agreement in which the husband agreed “that he will . . . allow the case to go forward as an uncontested case,” which was against the public policy of the great state of Ohio). And of course, any party not willing to concede grounds or agree to the divorce could lock a miserable couple together in perpetuity.45Id. at 1509 (describing a six-year-long marriage that went unconsummated and a husband who ultimately left the marital home, but the wife contested and blocked the divorce); see also Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (describing a wife who tried to divorce her husband three times during a ten-year period in which they were not even living together, but the court threw out the case because husband contested). 

Eventually, the chasm between what relationships actually looked like and what divorce laws and jurisprudence required grew too huge and too public to ignore.46Friedman, supra note 25, at 1498, 1504. The nineteenth century Women’s Movement had animated questions about women’s roles and capacity that challenged the prevailing notion about family.47Minow, supra note 1112, at 974. These reformers raised consciousness regarding women’s property rights and a desire to dismantle male domination, “alter[ing] the notion of the husband/father as the legal representative for the family in public and commercial realms.”48Id. That said, one must note that for many reformers, including Stanton herself, the reform was about helping women out of oppressive or dangerous situations, not rejecting family life. Id. One can see that in this way, even Stanton was not immune to clinging to a heteronormative family model. Id. at 973. Decades later, in the 1960s, a powerful secondwave of feminism supplied further fodder for divorce reform.49See Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families Under the Law 32 (2008) (stating that passage of no-fault divorce statutes amounted to “a political consensus to conform law to modern life”); Divorce and Separation, 1 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 16, 17 (1972) (citing the National Organization of Women’s Model Divorce Reform Bill). These twentieth-century feminists were outspoken in naming the privilege and subordination of the varying roles and opportunities available to men and women in marriage and the public realm (for example, the privileged public role of man as employee versus the subordinated private role of woman as caretaker).50See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 160 (1989) (“[O]ver time, women have been . . . disenfranchised and excluded from public life.”); Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 Minn. J.L. & Ineq. 1, 19 (1984). They mounted resistance to the subordination of private roles and to a woman’s default position in them. Emerging notions that women might have myriad ways of deciding whether and how to be wives and mothers lent themselves to reforms that facilitate movement in and out of marriage.51See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (stating that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas”); see also Donohue, supra note 33, at 569–70. For example, law and social reforms around birth control challenged the notion that the family was a necessary institution in ways that built on, but were distinct from, reforms based on securing property rights for women or rhetoric and reform designed to resist subordination to men. Minow, supra note 11, at 974. This cultural revolution combined with the chorus of litigators, judges, and families who were growing tired of the system-inspired collusion and fraud piloted a transition to no-fault divorces. 

The timeline for states adopting no-fault divorce statutes tracked with Supreme Court cases chipping away at laws that carried or reflected assumptions that women would marry, marry young, and remain dependent in their marriages.52VanBurkleo, supra note 26; see Stanton, 421 U.S. at 7. See generally Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The first state to adopt no-fault divorce was California in 1969, and the last state was New York in 2010. To this day, only seventeen states have true no-fault statutes whereby the parties cannot raise fault.53Charts 2019: Family Law in the Fifty States, D.C., and Puerto Rico, 53 Fam. L. Q. 353, 371–79 chart 4 (2020) [hereinafter Charts 2019]. While the concept of fault eroded or became of second order importance in the divorce law of most states, requisite periods of separation did not, and normative requirements for what constitutes appropriate levels of disconnectedness arose.54See, e.g., Chused, supra note 22, at 159 (discussing Maryland, a state that reluctantly ushered in no-fault divorce); Schenker, supra note 27. Parties’ abilities to satisfy the court that they have lived separately turns on their abilities to perform as expected.  

The standards before a family court judge are notoriously subjective. The best interest of the child standard in custody matters, for example, asks judges to make determinations concerning a child’s welfare and happiness.55See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 31 (2022) (“In making an order or judgment relative to the custody of children, the rights of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to be equal, and the happiness and welfare of the children shall determine their custody.”). On the margins—where one parent is unfit or dangerous—this may be an easy call, but, in the vast majority of cases, judges are trying to parse facts about things like parental involvement, a “child’s adjustment,” and “the wishes” of the parties and the child in order to make predictive determinations about what arrangements will best serve the needs of a child.56D.C. Code § 16-914(a)(3) (2022). These determinations inevitably turn on a judge’s opinion of the parents—opinions, which are in turn, based on the judge’s own observations and values.57See Donohue, supra note 33, at 572–73. Parties that do not play the predictable and expected part of mother as nurturer and father as provider can struggle in custody determinations.58See id. at 573, 580–81. Similarly, judges’ expectations and values about roles and behavior inevitably also come to bear when judges consider the conduct and choices of parties when making findings of fact and conclusions of law about whether or not couples’ marriages have in fact broken down irretrievably.59Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012). Trials and colloquies on these issues, after all, seek to unearth the couples’ “inner most beliefs.”60Id. Perhaps because this task is so impossible and offensive, some jurisdictions pretend to have turned instead to “objective” evidence of separateness to prove the claim that the marriage is over.61Id. But see Caffyn v. Caffyn, 806 N.E.2d 415, 422 (Mass. 2004) (stating that personal decisions about a marriage or divorce should be “free from overwhelming state control” (citation omitted)). And yet even here these inquiries can include questions about sex and particularized questions about shared meals, sleeping arrangements, and social engagements when a couple continues to share a residence. Just as with other aspects of family law, couples whose performance is outside of a subjective norm can and will struggle to convince the court that they are eligible for divorce.62Order for Counseling, Potts v. Potts, No. 21-CI-00358 (Ky. Bullitt Cir. Ct. Fam. Ct. 2021) (denying a divorce to a couple whose family planning and testimony seemed too composed and too collaborative); Theisen v. Theisen, 716 S.E.2d 271, 272–73, 276 (S.C. 2011) (citing that “the night before the hearing in the family court, Husband, Wife, and their children ‘all celebrated a very nice Easter dinner as a family at [their] home’ ” and finding that “living separate and apart must involve more than the cessation of the parties’ romantic relationship” and include “something more than a discontinuance of sexual relations,” such as “parties must live in separate domiciles”).

One appropriately wonders if any of these inquiries into intimate and familial choices are necessary given that parties can plead in plain and simple language that yes, in fact, through “no fault” of either party, there has been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.63Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 1A (2022); Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 725. Surely the inquiries are of no consequence when neither party contests the divorce, and even where one spouse contests the divorce, under a no-fault regime, this spouse cannot successfully defend against the divorce itself for long: if one spouse wants out, they will get out.64Tier, supra note 16; Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (citing Strack v. Strack, 916 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup. Ct. 2011)). And indeed, the contestations are rarely, if ever, about the divorce itself; rather, disagreements concern custodial, property, and support disputes. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 1509. And yet all scenarios—from uncontested divorces to those where someone will impotently contest an inevitable divorce—many courts can and do inquire into the conditions or level of separation before entering an order of divorce.

3.  Judicial Paternalism

The early days of judicial divorce and the jurisprudence of fault invited an era of judicial paternalism in which parties aired the failures of their spouse to act in accordance with norms, and the court’s orders were a mechanism to replace the failed male head of household.65VanBurkleo, supra note 26. Subsequent divorce reform allowing for no-fault divorce shifted the “regulatory” energy or emphasis away from that of locating blame on one individual and towards the “internal aspects of family life.”66Coltrane, supra note 5, at 365. The need for parties to demonstrate that they have lived separate and apart generally, and the companion assumption that this means something, particularly about the way a couple shares bed and board, tells us that models of judicial paternalism are alive and well. 

In twenty-nine states, parties must invite the court to enter their home to determine if they and their soon-to-be-ex-spouse are behaving as if the marriage is truly over.67Charts 2019, supra note 53. The suggestion, in turn, that evidence of sex acts or contributions to a shared residence is sufficient proof of an intact marriage reflects antiquated and gendered visions of marriage, namely that marriage is nothing more than the exchange of sexual services and housewifery for the support of bed and board.68Friedman, supra note 25, at 1508–10 (discussing cases where some “exchange” of services was seen as sufficient grounds to maintain (seemingly miserable) marriages). It is also a reminder that marriages have always been a vehicle for the state to police interpersonal relationships and regulate society: “Marriage defines normality. It is the standard against which all other relationships are judged. Societies promote and expect marriage. And governments use marriage to police social groups.”69Brian L. Frye & Maybell Romero, The Right to Unmarry: A Proposal, 69 Clev. St. L. Rev. 89, 91 (2020).

The creation of family courts themselves signal a sense that what the court and judge were doing was intervening into the family, not merely presiding over a breached contract or brokering terms for a party wishing to modify their marital contract.70Friedman, supra note 25, at 1531. Family courts as originally conceived were meant to “mend, and if possible cure, sick marriages,” ending them only “if cure was hopeless.”71Id. Judges, then, became marriage doctors or conciliators.72Id. Still today in many jurisdictions, when one files through no-fault grounds, it triggers not just a separation period and the inquiry into separateness already discussed, but it can also trigger a requirement that the couple undergo mandatory “counseling” sessions.7323 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3302(b)–(c) (stating the court “shall require up to a maximum of three counseling sessions”); Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). In Pennsylvania, for example the court does not have to order counseling but may do so on information and belief that there is a reasonable prospect of reconciliation.74Rich, 815 A.2d at 1108 (“The law is clear that the trial court is under no obligation to order marriage counseling if no reasonable prospect of reconciliation exists.” (citation omitted)). So, if a judge determines that the couple really meant that they wanted to be divorced when they filed for divorce, the judge may decline to order them to counseling. But if the judge decides—what exactly?—that one spouse might still be invested in the marriage and should be able to use state resources to pursue their disinterested spouse, or that either spouse has not thought it through?75Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012) (“In most cases, these other states require the courts to find, as an objective fact, that the marriage is ‘irretrievably broken down.’ Pennsylvania, for example, permits a divorce upon the grounds of ‘irretrievably broken,’ but the legislature permits the opposing party to obtain a hearing if they deny that allegation and allege that counseling may repair the marriage.” (citation omitted)). Then the judge can order the parties into counseling. And counseling to what end? To reconcile?76Id. at 725 (suggesting that there is no standard for evaluating reconciliation). To “play nice”? This is not counseling. This is social engineering.77See, for example, Potts v. Potts, No. 21-CI-00358 (Ky. Bullitt Cir. Ct. Fam. Ct. 2021) for a shocking case out of Kentucky in 2021 where a court declined to order a couple’s divorce and instead ordered them into counseling. In so doing, the court made the following (excerpted) findings of facts:

[B]oth parties testified to having formed long-term goals for themselves and their child . . . . [T]hese parties have weathered the stresses of being a military family for a long term . . . . The Court . . . observed the emotional responses the parties had toward one another. . . . [T]he parties were respectful and courteous to one another and both held themselves in dignified and mature composure. . . . Frankly, the Court observes these two parties to be two people who have lost the ability to communicate with one another about their emotional relationship and, perhaps, have let their pride become a wall between them.

Id. at 1–2. The court then ordered a “suggestion” that the couple seek counseling to see if they could resolve their issues—one of which included a party’s desire to relocate—“without ending the marriage.” Id. at 3. The court went on to order that neither party could introduce the child to any “dating interest” or speak to their own child “about such person or relationship or permit any third party to do so.” Id.;
see also Unusual Ruling: Kentucky Judge Denies a Couple’s Divorce, WLKY (Sept. 4, 2021, 9:01
AM), https://www.wlky.com/article/unusual-ruling-kentucky-judge-denies-a-couples-divorce/37456279 [https://perma.cc/AGC7-B6YS].
It is well studied that in order for clinical intervention to be successful, particularly in family counseling, each member must come to the counseling with a sense of autonomy, choice, and insight.78See, e.g., Laurie Heatherington & Myrna L. Friedlander, Manifestations and Facilitation of Insight in Couple and Family Therapy, in Insight in Psychotherapy 81, 81–99 (Louis G. Castonguay & Clara E. Hill eds., 2007). 

Of final and considerable concern, courts’ paternalistic “fact” finding into separateness seeks to ask and answer heteronormative and gendered questions about family composition and choices. The burden of the courts’ voyeurism is not something experienced or borne equally across all populations; rather, it is a practice that disproportionately subordinates people of color, women, the poor, and members of the LGBTQ+ community. Meanwhile, the intrusion into divorcing couples’ intimate choices and shared living arrangements, and its disparate impact on subordinated populations, is inapposite to family rights doctrine and the evolution of privacy rights in marital and non-marital homes. 

II.  SHE SAID IT GRIEVES ME TO SEE YOU IN SO MUCH PAIN: BURDEN AND HARM FROM INTRUSION INTO INTIMACY AND FAMILY

While there is some variation across jurisdictions, one can articulate a “typical” process to secure a divorce. One spouse will file a complaint and another will answer, or the two will file a joint complaint; the matter will be marked for a preliminary hearing, at which point the court and the parties chart a path for the divorce, which may include discovery deadlines and a series of court appearances; thereafter follows a final hearing, which may or may not be contested, so this hearing may be an evidentiary hearing or more of a colloquy with the parties; and finally, finally, finally the court will enter an order pronouncing the couple divorced and addressing issues of custody, support, and property. Yet, even within this similar arc of a divorce case, the distinct experience of a given family will be different depending on the predilections of their jurisdiction or the circumstances of the litigants.79In every case, there is the matter of establishing a tracking order that accommodates pretrial issues. The pretrial goalposts may include preliminary hearings regarding temporary orders for custody or support, and cases with property issues follow a track that reflects the likelihood of more involved discovery or protracted litigation regarding designation of property and its equitable distribution. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, couples must submit to mandatory mediation or take a parenting class prior to any further court-calendared event. How long it takes to divorce depends in large part on how long the adjudication of contentious matters will take, because, typically, the matter of the ending of the marriage is tied up with the resolution of these corollary issues. Even for a divorce in which these matters are not an issue—either because the parties reach private settlement in regard to them or because they were not an issue in the marriage in the first place—a divorce will not be immediate. The length of a divorce is also a function of how busy the court is and the residency requirements of the state. Tier, supra note 16. A rudimentary Google search tells us that on average it will take a couple about one year to secure a divorce.80Id.; E.A. Gjelten, How Much Will My Divorce Cost, Nolo, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/ctp/cost-of-divorce.html [https://perma.cc/8YHH-8ECT]. There is very little difference in the timeline even when a divorce is uncontested. Press Release, Alicia Davis, Principal Ct. Mgmt. Consultant, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Family Courts Need to Adapt to Modern Families, New Study
Shows (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/news-releases/2018/family-courts-need-to-adapt-to-modern-families [https://perma.cc/6Q7B-MYL5].
In those jurisdictions that require a waiting period before filing for divorce, however, the timeline will be one year plus that waiting period; in Maryland for example, practitioners will set clients’ expectations to contemplate a total wait of about two years before the divorce is final.81See, e.g., Gary Miles, The Length of the Divorce Process in Maryland, HG.org L. Res., https://
http://www.hg.org/legal-articles/the-length-of-the-divorce-process-in-maryland-34881 [https://perma.cc/
5A9P-BCWN].
These timelines have elongated substantially during the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing crisis of capacity and flexibility in state courts to administer matters remotely.82See Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, Family Law During COVID-19: Virtual Hearings, Family Court Proceedings, and the Future, 54 Fam. L. Q., fall 2021, at ix, ix (regarding the impact of COVD-19 on family court operations). 

A.  Social Emotional and Financial Costs of the Divorce Process

Scholarship about divorce includes studies tracking divorce rates, attempting to predict why couples divorce, and describing how they fare in the years after divorce. Dwarfing that scholarship are the multitude of articles and studies about how children fare after a divorce. In contrast, there is very little writing and research about the experience—the trajectory and social emotional states—during the years that pass when couples are waiting to file for divorce and moving through the courts to secure a divorce. We do know that leaving a marriage is a significant life stress.83David A. Sbarra, Divorce and Health: Current Trends and Future Directions, 77 Psychosomatic Med. 227, 229 (2015). “For many people, marital separation means substantial financial upheaval, the renegotiation of parenting relationships and co-parenting conflict, changes in friendships and social networks, moving locally or relocating cities, as well as a host of psychological challenges, including re-organizing one’s fundamental sense of self: Who am I without my partner?”84Id.

We also know that the divorce process imposes financial strain on families. Divorces are costly.85Haueter, supra note 14, at 240–45 (detailing the costs of divorce). There are filing fees associated with the process.86Vedantam, supra note 6. But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372–73, 382 (1971). People using an attorney pay for that assistance—sometimes as much as $400 per hour.87Gjelten, supra note 80. Divorces may involve consultation with accountants, therapists, or other professionals, none of whom work for free.88Geoff Williams, 4 Ways You’re Making Your Divorce More Expensive, U.S. News (June 20, 2022), https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/family-finance/articles/ways-to-avoid-an-expensive-divorce [https://web.archive.org/web/20220908233956/https://money.usnews.com/money/
personal-finance/family-finance/articles/ways-to-avoid-an-expensive-divorce].
Divorcing may require refinancing homes and cars to adjust ownership of that property.89Id. Couples may face moving costs or additional rents and payments to set up separate homes.90Id. The particular time periods and separate and apart requirements of certain jurisdictions are deeply destabilizing and burdensome. The waiting periods and the requirements of separate and apart make the cost of divorce more immediate or pronounced.91Id. Protracted divorce proceedings mean lost wages or use of personal leave for multiple court appearances, as well as the risk of job loss for missing work time and the cost of childcare expenditures.92Lynda B. Munro, Johanna S. Katz & Meghan M. Sweeney, Administrative Divorce Trends and Implications, 50 Fam. L. Q. 427, 429 (2016). 

Financial strain and the protracted timeline for divorce map onto a sea of logistical and existential difficulties that are already part of divorce for families.93See Vedantam, supra note 6 (“[U]nhappy marriages and more unhappy couples trapped in marriage—is cause for serious worry.”); Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012). One difficulty surrounds the public airing of private matters. We are socialized—and in fact, the law affirms in many respects—that our marriages are confidential places.94Stephanie Fairyington, Do You Have a Right to Privacy in Your Marriage?, Time (Aug. 8, 2016, 10:58 AM), https://time.com/4419321/privacy-in-marriage [https://perma.cc/CY27-FJHH]; see also Commonwealth v. Vigiani, 170 N.E.3d 1135, 1138 (Mass. 2021) (discussing spousal privilege and disqualifications). Yet, the divorce process invites, even requires, an invasion of this privacy. When the issue of privacy breaches in divorce is discussed publicly or in legal discourse, the discussion usually centers on situations in which one spouse may have crossed an ethical, if not legal, line in accessing information to buttress their claims for a divorce. The invasions I refer to here, in contrast, are invasions solicited by the court and the legal process itself. Even leaving aside the particular inquiries of separate and apart, divorce itself as it is conceptualized and adjudicated asks litigants to discuss a breakdown of a (previously) private domain. It may further require discussion or examination of child rearing and finances. Now layer onto this the particularized inquiry of some separate and apart jurisdictions: last sexual encounters, sleeping arrangements, or the nature of shared meals and social engagements. In almost any other context, sex, money, and child rearing are hallowed grounds. These are issues that one may not have reason or comfort enough to discuss with anyone at all, or only with close friends; and yet now the divorce requires a public airing, all while insisting that the subject matter of the litigation is not to locate or determine any one person’s fault. As shall be discussed in more detail below, privacy is an important concept in one’s sense of self and sense of control, so the confusing breaches of it take a human toll.95See infra Section II.B.2.

Additionally, families arriving in divorce court are not on happy or easy footing to begin with. They have experienced interpersonal stressors or have had pressures outside the marriage spill over into the marriage, which have triggered the marital conflict.96Guy Bodenmann, Linda Charov, Thomas N. Bradbury, Anna Bertoni, Raffaella Iafrate, Christina Giuliani, Rainer Banse & Jenny Behling, The Role of Stress in Divorce: A Three-Nation Retrospective Study, 24 J. Soc. & Pers. Relationships 707, 724 (2007). When the divorce process itself introduces new sources of stress and strain—financial, logistical, psychological, and otherwise—it taxes the very families who are already struggling to maintain a sense of collaboration and problem-solving.97Id. (“When asked to recall why their marriage ended, participants tended to endorse dyadic skill deficits, lack of commitment, or emotional alienation as primary reasons.”). Where deterioration of the social fabric is absolute, the inability to abide each other, let alone work with one another, presents a particular problem for families with children.98See David M. Frost & Allen J. LeBlanc, Stress in the Lives of Same-Sex Couples: Implications for Relationship Dissolution and Divorce, in LGBTQ Divorce and Relationship Dissolution 70, 71 (Abbie E. Goldberg & Adam P. Romero eds., 2018) (discussing the experience of stress within “key social roles (e.g., Mother . . . caretaker), the obligations of such roles, and the social and interpersonal interactions attached to them”). The prevailing wisdom is that (absent issues of abuse or parental unfitness) children benefit from access to and care by both parents, and so the presumption at law is one of joint custody. Essentially, divorcing parents will need to “deal” with one another regarding the care of their shared children.99See id. at 71 (stating that stress moves not only “within individuals’ lives,” but also “between individuals”). Childcare is not the only matter that requires cooperation or compromise during a divorce. Divorcing couples must make decisions about property distribution and support or risk the court making the decision for them. Even in situations in which couples are willing and able to communicate and contribute to the joint enterprises of raising children or structuring post-divorce households, navigating these scenarios requires heightened intentionality and care in order to avoid or minimize discord. This work is exhausting. Enter separate and apart requirements—requirements that exacerbate all of the sources of stress and tension described above. 

B.  Burdens Are Not Evenly Held

While any household or divorcing couple risks facing the burdens described above, the risk of exposure to the burdens or the depth of experience of each burden is not evenly borne by each family and couple. This is because not all families are resourced, respected, and accounted for in a way that provides them political and social power. It is worth starting by pointing out the ways in which differently situated families’ actual passages through the divorce process will be different; from there, we will move to consideration of the more nuanced aspects of social and political differentiation as it impacts families’ relative treatment in, and experience of, the divorce process. To begin then, it is not uncommon for different types of cases to be “tracked” differently, with separate judges for each type of case and distinct tracking orders that reflect the different realities of the pace and nature of the litigation. For families with fewer means, and particularly for those without counsel, pretrial events become the occasion for negotiation and mediation, much of which can be happening before the judge’s eyes or with the judge’s involvement. Where there are breakdowns or confusion regarding temporary orders, there are no attorneys to turn to for assistance, so the parties will seek the assistance of the court. In contrast, for parties with means, many pretrial court appearances are quite pro forma. The attorneys for the parties submit or discuss the private separation agreements that the divorcing spouses have agreed to in out-of-court negotiations or mediations. Parties produce evidence and ask and answer questions in depositions or interrogatories. Court appearances can be an occasion for announcing what is known, what has been done, and what has been decided. 

The effect is to offer people of means the opportunity at least for the vision of divorce that Cady B. Stanton herself had wanted when she advocated for marriage to be considered a private agreement between the parties that could be terminated themselves with only state acknowledgment of the termination.100VanBurkleo, supra note 26. What she argued against is what people of lesser means arguably endure: supervised marital relations by surrogate governmental heads of household.101Id. Yet, for certain families, the entire scaffolding for divorce invites judicial involvement and threatens judicial paternalism. All this, in turn, maps on to the public discourse about the divorce “problem.”102See Coltrane, supra note 5; Patrick Fagan & Robert Rector, The Effects of Divorce on
America, Heritage Found. (June 5, 2000), https://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/report/the-effects-divorce-america [https://perma.cc/6EKP-C763].
One hears claims that feuding parents should stay together for the sake of the children, that revaluing the idea of marital service and obligation would improve family life, and that marrying and not divorcing would lift women and children out of poverty.103Id. Conservative pundits have laid blame for all manner of social problems on the thresholds of “broken homes.”104Polikoff, supra note 5, at 100. “[M]arriage, rather than a shift in public priorities, [is] the solution to poverty, violence, homelessness, illiteracy, crime, and other problems.”105Id. It is in this context of punitive and judgmental rhetoric and under the eye of judicial paternalism that families are asked to declare their choices about whether they have lived together, how much they have communed with one another if they have lived together, and whether or not they have had sex with one another. There is a risk that subordinated and under-resourced families will have a particularly difficult or strained experience in such a divorce process.106Id. This is not only unfair on a systemic level for a society that strives for justice, but it is painful on a personal level for those individuals whose families and needs are ignored, mischaracterized, or marginalized.

The state’s intrusion into sexual and familial choices is a story told in race, class, gender, and sexuality, yet the state will declare its laws neutral.107Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 893, 899–900 (1995) (citing Stanley E. Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing, Too 21 (1994)) (“[C]ritical legal studies view of legal precedent [is] not a formal mechanism for determining outcomes in a neutral fashion—as traditional legal scholars maintain—but is rather a ramshackle ad hoc affair whose ill-fitting joints are soldered together by suspect rhetorical gestures, leaps of illogic, and special pleading tricked up as general rules, all in the service of a decidedly partisan agenda that wants to wrap itself in the mantle and majesty of law.”). The critique herein is twofold: first, to notice the inadequacy or stubbornness of the law, but also to take the time to name the psychic collateral consequences of our subordinating jurisprudence. An example will help here. Let us consider the law of rape. It is well studied that when Black women report rape, their accusations are under-investigated and under-prosecuted.108See, e.g., Black Women & Sexual Violence, Nat’l Org. for Women, https://now.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Black-Women-and-Sexual-Violence-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE3F-FMW8]. Yet, in other contexts, the law is swift and careless in its intrusion into Black communities for the purpose of criminalizing the behavior of Black bodies.109See, e.g., Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://naacp.org/resources/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/VN6S-RSFS] (discussing the racialized nature of policing and incarceration in the United States). Kimberlé Crenshaw explains how, therefore, a Black woman may be reluctant to call the police even when she has been raped or assaulted due to an unwillingness to subject her private life to the “scrutiny and control of a police force that is frequently hostile” to the Black community. 110Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1257 (1991).Will her account be heard as an assault as clearly as it would if it had been reported by a white woman? Will her assault and the violation of her sanctity be credited as intolerable as it would if it had been reported by a white woman? This has led, then, to the reality of Black women underreporting violations to their bodies. It has confirmed in the hearts and minds of many in the Black community that the law, for them, is not about protection and safety. There is also lasting psychic harm to Black women, and ongoing risks to their bodily safety.111Id.

One can follow a similar path in analyzing separate and apart requirements and inquiries. To begin, requirements and inquiry around separate and apartness are manifestations of not believing—not believing that a family is considering or preparing itself appropriately for divorce; not believing their declarations that a marriage is over. Not being believed takes a psychic toll.112It is well studied that the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder following sexual assault are correlated with victims’ perceptions of whether or not their account was believed. See, e.g., Kaitlin A. Chivers-Wilson, Sexual Assault and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review of the Biological, Psychological and Sociological Factors and Treatments, 9 McGill J. Med. 111, 115 (2006). Secondly, these laws require probing into private spheres, and often, sexual choices. In this way law is primed—designed?—to alienate, ignore, or suppress classes of people, because not everyone’s sexual dignity is held in positive regard, and because the law is tethered to heteronormative arrangements for what the private family sphere is “supposed” to look like. Moreover, inquiry in search of “proof” of separation invades a person’s sense of privacy. Here, I do not refer to privacy in the constitutional sense (though I will do so in later sections of this Article) but rather in the ways in which individuals understand, hold, and value their privacy.113Marijn Sax, Privacy from an Ethical Perspective, in The Handbook of Privacy Studies:  An Interdisciplinary Introduction 143, 143 (Bart van der Sloot & Aviva de Groot eds., 2018) (focusing “on questions such as ‘What is the value of privacy?’ and ‘What privacy norms should be respected by individuals (including ourselves), society, and the state?’ ”). Privacy is an elusive concept: Privacy is associated with liberty, but it is also associated with privilege (private roads and private sales), with confidentiality (private conversations), with nonconformity and dissent, with shame and embarrassment, with the deviant and the taboo . . . and with subterfuge and concealment.”114Louis Menand, Why Do We Care So Much About Privacy?, New Yorker (June 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-much-about-privacy [https://
perma.cc/SXH9-E2RX].
Perhaps as a consequence, people perceive invasions of privacy differently and bear those invasions differently.115Id. We are not all situated similarly in terms of the treatment we receive, the ways we are heard, the sense people make of our lives, and our experience of normative expectations.116“Neutral” laws and procedures touch us differently, so the harm they reap lands differently. Emily Joselson & Judy Kaye, Pro Se Divorce: A Strategy for Empowering Women, 1 Minn. J.L. & Ineq. 239, 246, 269 n.68 (1983). As described above, rhetoric about divorce is already punitive and judgmental.117Fagan, supra note 102; see also Coltrane, supra note 5, at 367 (describing the claim making that portrays “divorce as the cause of ‘broken’ families”); Polikoff, supra note 5, at 100 (writing that broken homes are analyzed as a racist and gendered trope—throughout this rhetoric, “women raising children outside of marriage, a group that is disproportionately populated by women of color,” receives the disapproval of conservative pundits who “posit[] marriage, rather than a shift in public priorities, as the solution to poverty, violence, homelessness, illiteracy, crime, and other problems”). Black, Indigenous, and people of color (“BIPOC”), LGBTQ+, and under-resourced families, meanwhile, are asking for divorces in the context of their own stigmatization, discrimination, and associated psychic pain. They are asking for divorces in the context of specific stigmatization and discrimination about their families and sexuality.118Fineman, supra note 5, at 2192.

1.  Stigma & Discrimination

Discrimination contributes to poor health outcomes and specifically affects mental health when the experience alters “one’s perception of self and their surroundings.”119Tina Chou, Anu Asnaani & Stefan G. Hoffman, Perception of Racial Discrimination and Psychopathology Across Three U.S. Ethnic Minority Groups, 18 Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psych. 74, 74 (2012). One’s stigmatized social status can create “unique minority stressors” for stigmatized and disadvantaged populations.120See Frost, supra note 98, at 72. People of color, specifically, are “stressed by individual, institutional, and cultural encounters with racism.”121Robert T. Carter, Racism and Psychological and Emotional Injury: Recognizing and Assessing Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 35 Counseling Psych 13, 14 (2007). Specific encounters with racism may be aversion, harassment, discrimination, hostility, and violence.122Id. These encounters and experiences can be the source of affirmative trauma or the cumulative experience of them can lead to toxic stress responses.123The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines trauma as “actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 271 (5th ed. 2013) (hereinafter DSM-V). Toxic stress is defined as the “persistent elevation” of the body’s stress response, “which occurs in response to persistent stressors and leads to disrupted physiological development and poor health over time.” Eileen M. Condon, Margaret L. Holland, Arietta Slade, Nancy S. Redeker, Linda C. Mayes & Lois S. Sadler, Associations Between Maternal Experiences of Discrimination and Biomarkers of Toxic Stress in School-Aged Children, 23 Maternal & Child Health J. 1147, 1147 (2019). Unsurprisingly, studies suggest that these race-based stressors have an impact on BIPOC’s psychological and physical health.124Carter, supra note 121. 

LGBTQ+ people also suffer from individual and institutional discrimination. LGBTQ+ people may suffer from stigmatization by individuals and institutions, which can in turn provoke self-stigma. LGBTQ+ people are specifically subjected to stigmas based on perceptions of illegitimacy: gay and lesbian individuals do not participate in legitimate relationships; transgendered persons do not express their gender in a legitimate way.125Michele Bograd, Strengthening Domestic Violence Theories: Intersections of Race, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Gender, 25 J. Marital & Fam. Therapy 275, 278 (1999). Researchers have identified different categories of stigma. “Felt stigma” is the knowledge of society’s perception of you.126Gregory M. Herek, J. Roy Gillis & Jeanine C. Cogan, Internalized Stigma Among Sexual Minority Adults: Insights from a Social Psychology Perspective, 56 J. Counseling Psych. 32, 33 (2009). Felt stigma can motivate LGBTQ+ persons to “constrict their range of behavioral options (e.g., by avoiding gender nonconformity or physical contact with same-sex friends) and even to enact sexual stigma against others.”127Id. Felt stigma may encourage some LGBTQ+ people to conceal their identity or socially isolate.128Id. Another manifestation of self-stigma is “internalized sexual stigma . . . . Internalizing sexual stigma involves adapting one’s self-concept to be congruent with the stigmatizing responses of society.”129See id. (emphasis omitted); see also Frost, supra note 98. Finally, stigmas of a different flavor plague women and particularly poor women. Since time immemorial, women looking to leave marriages were cast as lustful and deviant.130Donohue, supra note 33, at 564. To this day, poor women, in particular, are subject to commentary about their being imprudent and reckless.131Id. at 579–86 (discussing “branding” of mothers). Consider, for example, the double standard of marriage as something that is necessary or ideal for mothering. A white celebrity in all her staged glory and living in an environment buttressed by endless support and resources can tell a story of her personal redemption and strength in her decision to be a single mother. The object of a “welfare mom,” however, is scrutinized as having subjected herself, her children, and society at large to her irresponsible decision to mother alone.132Susan J. Douglas & Meredith W. Michaels, The Mommy Myth: The Idealization of Motherhood and How It Has Undermined Women 88 (2004). Moreover, numerous studies have confirmed that the accumulation of stress present in a life of poverty has adverse health and mental health outcomes.133See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, Sick of Poverty, 293 Sci. Am. 92, 94 (2005).

Withstanding the domination and control of racist, gendered, or heteronormative systems interferes with one’s esteem and mood states.134Chou, supra note 119. It also frustrates one’s locus of control.135Id. In psychology, a locus of control refers to one’s perception that they control what happens to them and around them.136Richard B. Joelson, Locus of Control, Psych. Today (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.
psychologytoday.com/us/blog/moments-matter/201708/locus-control [https://perma.cc/RU5Q-JYBK].
Someone with a strong internal locus of control can believe and actualize that they are the masters of their own destiny.137Id. Individuals with external loci of control are left with the feeling that the world happens to them and that they are powerless to chart or change their path.138Id. Clinicians understand a total inability to identify or shift to an internal locus of control as maladaptive. A culturally competent clinician, however, would recognize that the lack of control felt by members of subordinated groups is not illogical or pathological. See generally D. J. Ida, Cultural Competency and Recovery Within Diverse Populations, 31 Psychiatric Rehab. J. 49 (2007). The requirements of divorce risk adding to accumulative stress, stigmatization, and a loss of control already experienced by vulnerable families. Additionally, any judgment or rejection during a divorce proceeding about not getting the separation “right” follows a litany of experiences and systems that tell them BIPOC, LGBTQ+, and under-resourced families are not getting family “right.”139Fineman, supra note 5, at 2192–93. 

2.  Getting Family and Sex “Right”

Consider, specifically, the requirement for inquiry into a couple’s decision to cohabitate during a period of separation. As previously discussed, anyone might be annoyed or embarrassed by offering a virtual stranger in open court an account of your bed and board choices, but these requirements and inquiries present particular insult to subordinated populations. Separate and apart inquiries specifically are an intrusion into the inner workings and decision-making in a private realm. For subordinated populations in particular, this private realm is a last bastion of dignity. The experience of the intrusion into a private sphere can be particularly painful and acute for those who weather subordination in the public sphere.140Crenshaw, supra note 110, at 1257. 

As Crenshaw so astutely surmised, 

There is . . . a more generalized community ethic against public intervention, the product of a desire to create a private world free from the diverse assaults on the public lives of racially subordinated people. The home is not simply a man’s castle in the patriarchal sense, but may also function as a safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist society.141Id.

Racism’s chronic external, public assaults on dignity create resistance to, or sensitivity about, inquiry and critique of private family decisions that are nuanced and, therefore, more susceptible to racist misinterpretations and biased reasoning.142Id.; Donohue, supra note 33, at 564. People of color are not alone in distrusting inquiries into private realms or experiencing heightened discomfort during such inquiries. The LGBTQ+ community has borne bias in many spheres of life.143Michael Friedman, The Psychological Impact of LGBT Discrimination, Psych. Today (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/brick-brick/201402/the-psychological-impact-lgbt-discrimination [https://perma.cc/C9FG-BBY9]. For too many members of the LGBTQ+ community, rejection and judgment started in their homes and families.144Id. The rejection of LGBTQ+ children in homes and in school can turn violent.145Id. Judgment and hostility in the workplace or public spaces is common too.146Id. Far too often, LGBTQ+ families are cast as deviant, illegitimate, or confusing to children.147Lloyd R. Cohen, Rhetoric, the Unnatural Family, and Women’s Work, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2275, 2278 n.6 (1995) (using quotes around the word “families” to subordinate and other LBGTQ family constellations and around the word “professional” to minimize the contributions of those whose writing about family suggests that the presence of a cis male father is not necessary for children). The home spaces and families designed by some members of the LGBTQ+ community are an expression of what is required to build the family or keep it safe from heteronormative hostility.148Maria Federica Moscati, Understanding LGBTQ Unions and Divorces: Essays Provide Valuable Insight into How Today’s Families Travel Through Transitions, 25 Disp. Resol. Mag. 30 (2019) (book review); Suzanne A. Kim & Edward Stein, Gender in the Context of Same-Sex Divorce and Relationship Dissolution, 56 Fam Ct. Rev. 384, 388 (2018). Family design can also reflect a conscious decision to reject gendered norms for a family’s financial and social arrangements.149See generally, e.g., LGBTQ Divorce and Relationship Dissolution: Psychological and Legal Perspectives and Implications for Practice (Abbie E. Goldberg & Adam P. Romero eds., 2018) (offering a series of essays that explicate the diverse ways children, parents, and partners are connected in ways beyond those anticipated by heteronormative ideals). These families may feature partners and children connected in diverse ways.150Id.; Fineman, supra note 5, at 2190–91. Historic lack of protection—or affirmative criminalization—for the family ordering of LGBTQ+ families leave many LGBTQ+ families with legacies of perceived vulnerability, a perception that can be particularly acute during divorce.151Moscati, supra note 148.  Preliminary research regarding same-sex couples, for example, suggests that these couples feel a “heightened social scrutiny at the time of a relationship’s end.”152Kim, supra note 148, at 391. LGBTQ+ families are not alone in structuring families that do not fit a rigid heteronormative paradigm—male head of household, female companion, children. Under-resourced communities, foreign-born families, and Black families are all more likely than white affluent families to live in multigenerational homes.153Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 509 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing this trend in Black families); D’vera Cohn & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Record 64 Million Americans Live in Multigenerational Households, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans-live-in-multigenerational-households/ [https://
perma.cc/9326-P4EA] (illustrating the trend in Asian and Hispanic households).
There are racial and ethnic disparities in marriage matters as well.154See generally R. Kelly Raley, Megan M. Sweeney & Danielle Wondra, The Growing Racial and Ethnic Divide in U.S. Marriage Patterns, 25 Future Child. 89 (2015). Lastly, there are growing disparities by class concerning modalities for child rearing.155Claire Cain Miller, Class Differences in Child-Rearing Are on the Rise, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/upshot/rich-children-and-poor-ones-are-raised-very-differently.html [https://perma.cc/2QAV-CRXJ].
When families operate outside of the norm, they raise the hackles of our system of supervision: a class-based system of white, heteronormative supervision.156See Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare, at ix (2002) (arguing that racial inequities in the child welfare system cause “serious group-based harms by reinforcing disparaging stereotypes about Black family unfitness and need for white supervision, by destroying a sense of family autonomy and self-determination among many Black Americans, and by weakening Blacks’ collective ability to overcome institutionalized discrimination”); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1977) (comparing the critique that “foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of the poor” with the courts’ perceptions that “the poor resort to foster care more often than other citizens”). Yet, even here the Court acknowledges the roles discrimination and coercion play in the role of the child welfare system in poor families: “discrimination doubtless reflects in part the greater likelihood of disruption of poverty-stricken families.” Id. at 834. And “[t]he extent to which supposedly ‘voluntary’ placements are in fact voluntary has been questioned on other grounds as well.” Id.; see also Fineman, supra note 5, at 2189, 2192 (“Intimate groups that do not conform to [normative family models] historically have been labeled ‘deviant’ and subjected to explicit state regulation and control justified by their nonconformity.”). 

Finally, consider where the inquiry into the private family sphere includes specific inquiry about sex. Domination and control of sex and sexuality is an old tool in the arsenal of oppression. Consider, for example, that there was a time when the law did not acknowledge marital rape as a crime. This was because sex was an “essential obligation of marriage,” and sex between married people was “private.”157Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 30, 38 (2003). Bound up in the protection of male entitlement to sex and freedom from scrutiny regarding how they pursued it was systemic acceptance of the domination of women. Eventually, the mantle of marriage could not disguise the violence of rape and the public came to see the law’s willful ignorance of the violence as tantamount to support.158Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 Yale L.J. 1870, 1877 (2019). On a similar theme, before dissemination of one’s nude images online without one’s consent was dubbed “nonconsensual pornography” and made punishable, there was a perception that the availability of one’s nude images was the product of one’s risky behavior and the unsavory choices of a vexed ex-lover. Legal reform did not begin until law makers began to understand that nonconsensual pornography is exploitation and control of the female body. Claire P. Donohue, A Feminist Framing of Non-Consensual Pornography, 17 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 247, 251–53 (2017). But see Citron, supra, at 1878–79. The change in law, in turn, better reflected and resisted the dominance and control inherent in rape and acknowledged that dominance and control is no less dangerous and damaging in the context of a marriage. Legacies of domination and control explain why women, BIPOC, and LGBTQ+ persons face the most abuses of their sexual privacy and are vulnerable to critique of their sexual choices in public spheres.159Citron, supra note 158, at 1875. 

Anti-racist scholars have also demonstrated the “sexualized nature of racial oppression.”160Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 7. Since the time of slavery, when Black women were reduced “to a sexual object, an object to be raped, bred or abused,” and onward, Black women’s sexuality has been co-opted and weaponized against them.161Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1437 (1991). Meanwhile, the hyper-sexualization of Black men is “one of the most prevalent stereotypes in white America’s racial mythology.”162Earle V. Bryant, The Sexualization of Racism in Richard Wright’s “The Man Who Killed a Shadow,” 16 Afr. Am. Rev. 119, 119 (1982). Indeed, in family court proceedings and the child welfare context, one still sees that the sexual stereotypes of Black men and women result in the “devaluation” of mothers and the stereotype of the absent father.163Roberts, supra note 161. The scrutiny of Black parents generally, and their sexuality specifically, is ingrained into our definition of the worthy and unworthy poor.164See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Poor Women and the Protective State, 63 Hastings L.J. 1619, 1621–22 (2012). Under the New York State Prenatal Care Assistance Program (“PCAP”), women seeking prenatal care must submit to a psychological and nutritional assessment. 

It is an understatement to describe the psychosocial assessment as intrusive. Even without a “risk factor,” the woman must submit to a series of intimate questions designed to discover relevant information; with a “risk factor,” the series of questions grows longer and more intimate. It deserves underscoring that women in New York are led into these conversations only when they are poor, pregnant, and seeking state-assisted prenatal care. Wealthier women with private insurance can avoid enduring such conversations. 

Id. at 1620–21.

LGBTQ+ communities, meanwhile, have experienced state-sponsored hostility regarding private, consensual sexual expression for centuries. Consider “sodomy laws” for example, which “do not merely express societal disapproval; they go much further by creating a criminal class.”165Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 103, 110 (2000). Sodomy laws provide a particularly clear example that the law is often clumsy and mean in its desire and attempts to define, understand, and regulate relationships.166Citron, supra note 158, at 1929. Separate and apart laws are no exception to this general rule. Laws and procedures that require probing into family constellations and sexual choices are not neutral or kind—not by design and not in effect. Meanwhile, how we define and dignify intimacy between people and to whom we extend corollary rights to privacy and liberty matters. It has significant implications for equality.167Id. at 1875. When we hone in on considerations of liberty and privacy interests, what also becomes clear with separate and apart laws, beyond the fact that they are bastions of bias and unkindness, is that they are not obviously even permissible. 

III.  SHE SAID IT’S REALLY NOT MY HABIT TO INTRUDE: INTIMACY, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY

The legal grounds for doing away with separate and apart requirements and their invasive inquiries are hiding in the shadows where many rights important to families and those in relationship do. Our Constitution does not articulate positive rights, rights securing access to a given thing—education or housing or health care, for example.168U.S. Const. amends. I–X; see also Linda R. Monk, Rights . . . Have We Gone Too Far?, PBS (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.pbs.org/tpt/constitution-usa-peter-sagal/rights/#.YXGfnBrMI2w [https://
perma.cc/E3W4-L6EL].
The quintessential articulation of rights in the U.S. Constitution—the Bill of Rights—articulates a series of negative rights, or limits on the government. The Ninth Amendment does, however, remind us that the enumeration of certain rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”169U.S. Const. amend. IX. And so, against a scaffolding of governmental restraint and in combination with an explicit invitation to recognize rights of the people, we see a liberty interest the “exactness” of which is difficult to define, but which “[w]ithout doubt . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children”170Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). and an articulation of a privacy right “formed by emanations” from other constitutional guarantees.171Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1938 (2004). The articulation and application of these rights has been vital to those in families and relationships.172Tribe, supra note 171, at 1932 (“[T]he way constitutional law has long treated rights in general, including those that find their home snugly in the Bill of Rights, has not been as flattened-out collections of private acts, or even as specific groups of private actions, that are identified as protected from government prohibition or undue restriction. They have been treated as the reflections, in the lives of individuals and groups, of constitutional principles with a more complex architecture, centrally concerned with the ways we have determined that government must not dictate the kinds of people we may become or the kinds of relationships we may form.”). These rights as discussed in the context of intimacy cases, right to marry cases, and family rights cases suggest that separate and apart requirements are on shaky constitutional ground. 

A.  Privacy: Intimacy

In 1965, the Supreme Court asked itself if our society could tolerate the police searching the “sacred precincts” of a marital bedroom for evidence of use of contraceptives. It answered its own question, declaring that “[t]he very idea is repulsive.”173Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. The Court’s language in Griswold v. Connecticut, describing the image of a police officer in the bedroom in order to regulate the intimacy of two adults, was not hyperbolic rhetoric. Rather, the description was reminiscent of the actual encounter that Mr. and Mrs. Loving had with police in their bedroom in 1958 and foreshadowing of state action to come.174Marisa Peñaloza, ‘Illicit Cohabitation’: Listen to 6 Stunning Moments From Loving
v. Virginia, NPR (June 12, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/12/532123349/illicit-cohabitation-listen-to-6-stunning-moments-from-loving-v-virginia [https://perma.cc/VAN2-5XS4] (describing the Caroline County Sheriff entering the bedroom of Mildred and Perry Loving and “shining a light in their face in the privacy of their bedroom”).
 In 1988, an officer entered Michael Hardwick’s home with a (moot and invalid) warrant for his arrest on another matter, and, upon seeing him in his bedroom having sex, arrested him. Then, in 1998, police entered John Lawrence’s home on a report of a “weapons disturbance,” saw John Lawrence and Tyron Garner having sex, and arrested them.175Adam Liptak, John Lawrence, Plaintiff in Gay Rights Case, Dies at 68, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/us/john-lawrence-plaintiff-in-lawrence-v-texas-dies-at-68.html [https://perma.cc/KRR4-A9DJ].
All might have been lost for Lawrence as it was in Bowers v. Hardwick had the Court not recognized that the issue before it concerned “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of place, the home.”176Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). In so doing, the Court finally agreed that the question provoked by a law regulating sex between consenting adults was not a question of what an individual was doing in the privacy of his own bedroom, but rather what was the state doing there.177Having lost the Bowers case and subsequently authoring an amicus brief for Lambda Legal in Lawrence, constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe successfully insisted on this frame. See Tribe, supra note 171 (offering his reflections on Lawrence). Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–79 (holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to adult males who had engaged in consensual act of sodomy in privacy of home), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–96 (1986) (holding that “[t]he Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy”).  Griswold, Lawrence v. Texas, and their progeny tell us that the bedroom becomes a proxy for “the exercise of . . . personal rights.”178Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972)). These cases also confirm that these rights exist within, but also extend beyond, marital relationships.179Id. (“In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The case was decided under the Equal Protection Clause; but with respect to unmarried persons, the Court went on to state the fundamental proposition that the law impaired the exercise of their personal rights.” (citation omitted)).

Danielle Keats Citron argues more specifically that it is “time to conceptualize sexual privacy clearly and to commit to protecting it explicitly.”180Citron, supra note 158, at 1877. Citron’s advocacy concerns civil and criminal liability for those who attack and assault the sexual dignity of individuals through any range of behaviors, including nonconsensual pornography, coerced sex, nonconsensual capture of nude images, and so forth, but her analysis affirms concepts important for the issue at hand. Citron defines sexual privacy as “the behaviors, expectations, and choices that manage access to and information  about the human body, sex, sexuality, gender, and intimate activities.”181Id. at 1870. She argues that sexual privacy combines principles of equality, intimacy, and sexual agency and that recognition of such a right and protection under it allows people to “author [their] intimate lives and be seen as whole human beings rather than as just . . . intimate parts or innermost sexual fantasies.”182Id. at 1875. Protecting the self-disclosure and vulnerability inherent in sex upholds principles of dignity and equality. While the concept of sexual privacy is developed and litigated, cover for the literal and figurative “bedroom” at issue in separate and apart inquiries is undeniably located in the penumbra of privacy interests.183Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The privacy rights here clearly establish that the state is not, when it comes to consenting adults, permitted to intrude on who is having sex184Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Eisenstaedt v. Schweitzer, 159 N.Y.S.2d 296 (App. Div. 1957). and to what end.185Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. 

One cannot help but notice how these principles of privacy around sexual intimacy erode completely in the context of separate and apart requirements. Indeed, in the context of divorce, at least, the needle has moved since the early and deeply influential articulations of why privacy matters. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in their seminal contributions to the conversation of privacy, repeatedly emphasized protection of “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions,” not just the body and property.186Sax, supra note 113, at 149; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 198 (1890). They made their impassioned case for privacy following publicity and specifically photography of a wedding at which the many Boston elite were present. To their thinking, by photographing the wedding and making those pictures available for public view, the press was laying bare “the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”187Warren, supra note 186, at 195; see also Sax, supra note 113, at 147–48 (describing the provoking event). If photographing marital joy was so compelling to early proponents of privacy, how can seemingly superfluous inquiry at the time of a divorce not seem problematic? Consider, for example, in Bergeris v. Bergeris, from the year 2012—not 1812—in which we see a court probing the interactions of a couple to determine whether and what type of phone sex they had.188Bergeris v. Bergeris, 90 A.3d 553 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014). The probing occurred despite Maryland ostensibly being a no-fault jurisdiction. The probing occurred despite the procedural posture of the case, in which Ms. Jeanine Bergeris sought and received a protective order against Mr. Bergeris, and both parties had—at varying times in the history of the case—sought limited or absolute divorces from one another.189Brief for Appellant at 1, Bergeris, 90 A.3d 553 (No. 0405) (laying out the procedural posture of the case). A consequence of requiring separation periods, particularly those as long as the ones required in Maryland, is that, in order to access the assistance of the court for orders of support or distribution, parties will seek orders of separation or limited divorces to “tide themselves over.” See id. In Bergeris, for example, there were no less than five filings that finally resulted in access to a final hearing approximately two years after filing on the matter of divorce. See id. And, in which, the scrutiny of “sexually explicit telecommunications” forestalled the divorce of this couple, despite their having been locked in litigation for two years during which time one or both of them was seeking one.190But see Bergeris, 90 A.3d at 554. For reasons not at all clear to the author, Ms. Bergeris does suddenly seek a motion to dismiss the divorce, despite she herself being among the first parties to seek one. 

Privacy for sexual intimacy is not the only substantive right important to families hanging out in the shadow of liberty interests.191Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. One can see declaration after declaration that “[t]here . . . exist[s] a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’ ”192Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977). As stated in Carey v. Population Services International, “[w]hile the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions ‘relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.’ ”193See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court has admonished laws that abridge the freedom of personal choice in matters of family life.194Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54, 460, 463–65 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974); Smith, 431 U.S. at 842 (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 166); Moore, 431 U.S. at 494. The family realm, as a site for making choices for and about one’s family, has been afforded both substantive and procedural protection.195Smith, 431 U.S. at 842 nn.46–47. 

B.  Family Rights

Families’ privacy and liberty interests can link in important ways to their survival.196Consider that in Smith, foster parents argued that certain procedural protections best secured their survival as a family unit, while biological parents surely experience foster care and the attendant hearings and proceedings as “class-based intrusion” into their family. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 833, 839. In Moore, the chosen constellation of the Moore family was linked to the needs of minor children and the family’s choices regarding their resources. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 508. This liberty interest has translated into the law affording families’ choices dignity, respect, and a wide berth.197Smith, 431 U.S. at 842. Family survival has, in turn, always included the notion of change or restructuring.198Consider the narratives behind seminal family rights cases: for example, Smith, id. at 816, which involves the hopes and dreams of foster families entrusted with the care of a child for an entire year as compared to the vital interest of that child’s biological family; or Moore, 431 U.S. at 494, a case flowing from the death of a child and a grandparent’s decision to care for her grandchild with the help and companionship of her grown son and his child; or Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390, which is a case stemming from the experience of family members who migrated from their native land and attempted to carve out a life for their family and education for their child that speaks to both their native identity and their identity as Americans. These are all stories of families in transition or periods of adjustment. Any suggestion that families journeying through a divorce are no longer families or will no longer be families once the divorce is finalized is intellectually dishonest and demeaning. To begin, any argument that the end of a marriage means the end of a family does not track with common sense or with the Court’s recognition of many non-nuclear or bi-modal families.199Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that the Constitution has not “refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony”); Smith, 431 U.S. at 843 (stating that “biological relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family”). Indeed, “[t]he legal status of families has never been regarded as controlling.” Id. at 845 n.53. Moreover, statutes adjacent to divorce, namely support, child custody, and property distribution statutes, confirm that divorced families will still be tied to one another through continued coordination, support, or cooperation, even while each spouse will be entitled to independence from the marriage. Property distribution statutes, for example, do not just consider spouses’ past contributions to marital property and past acquisitions of assets and income to design equitable distributions, but also consider spouses’ future opportunities for acquisition of assets and income, and forward-looking needs in terms of providing care for any children.200See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (2022); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, § 34 (2022). Custody statutes will ask about the living arrangement and structure of care to which children are already accustomed while also asking questions about a parent’s willingness and capacity to shape new and presumptively shared custody arrangements going forward.201D.C. Code § 16-914 (2022). Alimony statutes call out spouses’ past contributions to the achievements of the other or running of the household, while also enumerating forward-looking considerations of spouses’ abilities to find employment or achieve financial independence. In this way, the jurisprudence around care of children, support, and division of property reflects the complex reality of divorced families: while the pathways for two divorcing individuals is diverging, there is a history that binds them and a tomorrow that involves them both. 

Prior to any restructuring contemplated above, there is a limbo period during which spouses are contemplating divorce or are in the process of negotiating or litigating a divorce. What couples are in this stage is still married. And what the couple is doing at this stage is making choices. These choices might include choices about how to spend money, how to organize their affairs, and how to care for children and prepare them for their new reality. Couples’ status as (still) married and the choices they are confronting provoke liberty interests. Direct and easy application of family rights doctrine should forestall court inquiry into the private realm of their family dealings.202Consider an example from New York. The New York Bar was wrangling with the efficacy and legality of litigating an element in its divorce statutes, namely the “possibility of reconciliation.” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (McKinney 2022). A Monroe County Court declared that allowing a right to a jury trial on the issue of reconciliation would “invad[e], in an incalculable manner, the inner privacy of married couples.” Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012). Parents of a child, for example, may make decisions to continue to share physical space and even a degree of intimacy as part of a larger vision of how to provide the best care for a child during a time of emotional and financial upheaval.203Paul R. Amato, Jennifer B. Kane & Spencer James, Reconsidering the “Good Divorce,” 60 Fam. Rels. 511, 514 (2011) (“According to stress theory, a large number of changes concentrated within a short time can have adverse effects on the mental and physical health of adults and children.”); Leonard I. Pearlin, Scott Schieman, Elena M. Fazio & Stephen C. Meersman, Stress, Health, and the Life Course: Some Conceptual Perspectives, 46 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 205, 207–08, 213–14 (2005) (discussing the impact of stress and social status on health inequities over the life course of a family, which in turn invites consideration of families’ efforts to mitigate financial burdens and minimize stress during a life course interruption). This ability to decide how to raise one’s child is a clearly constitutionally protected interest.204See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). Families’ interest in childrearing, their interest in protecting their family, and their interest in creating social and legal order were considerations Justice Kennedy named as buttressed to the right to marry. He wrote: “marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”; marriage is an “intimate association,” a “union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals”; “the right to marry . . . safeguards children and families”; and finally, “marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order.”205Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665–67, 669 (2015). Taken together, these four principles put flesh on the bones of the interests bound up in marriage. 

C.  Right to Marry

In Obergefell, the Court had relatively recent occasion to write its latest love letter to the institution, agreeing with sentiments from Courts before it that marriage is the “relation . . . most important” in life,206Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). and that freedom to marry is a “vital personal right[] essential to . . . happiness.”207Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). And yet, our nation has a shameful history of denying access to marriage for all sorts of reasons. Until appallingly recently, many states had anti-miscegenation laws on their books. When, in 1968, Loving v. Virginia declared such laws unconstitutional, fifteen states in addition to Virginia had similar laws.208Frye, supra note 69, at 93 n.14 (citing David Goodman Croly & George Wakeman, Miscegenation: The Theory of the Blending of the Races, Applied to the American White Man and Negro (1863) (explaining that “[t]he term ‘miscegenation,’ which means ‘racial mixing’ via sexual relations, marriage, or procreation, was coined by New York World reporters David Goodman Croly and George Wakeman in an 1863 pamphlet intended to discredit abolitionism”)); see also Sidney Kaplan, The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864, 34 J. Negro Hist. 274, 284–86 (1949). And there was not a clear, unencumbered pathway for same-sex couples to marry until 2015.209Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681. 

Loving, Obergefell, and their progeny clarify and confirm that the state may not “significantly interfere” with decisions to enter a marriage, but it is well understood that states can and do regulate marriage, both in terms of one’s entrance into it and exit from it.210See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 191. With few remaining constraints, however,211See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 1–17 (2022) (listing grounds for prohibited marriages, including void marriages from “nonage or insanity,” marriage to minors, polygamy, and marriage to relatives). you can decide to be married and you can—relatively immediately—be married.212Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978); Frye, supra note 69. In contrast, there is no prohibition against interference regarding the decision to divorce. The only restrictions on states are that they cannot deny access and opportunity to be heard to end the marriage and they must extend full faith and credit once a jurisdiction has pronounced a divorce.213Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377. Thus, states police both the gateway to marriage and the gateway to divorce, but they are neither the same gate nor do they swing with equal ease or open to equal breadths.214Frye, supra note 69. 

Those arguing for a “right to unmarry” take issue with the fact that the process to divorce is so encumbered, as compared to the process to marry. 

The government promotes marriage by making it fast and easy, at least if it’s your first marriage. In states like Nevada, you can even get married on the spot. By contrast, divorce is slow and burdensome. It can take many months and inevitably requires many filings. Unlike marriage, which is essentially a ministerial act, divorce typically requires legal representation, multiple filings, court appearances, and considerable expense. You can get married on a lark, but getting divorced is always a bear.215Id. at 102 (citation omitted).

They argue—quite convincingly—that all four Obergefell principles regarding marriage apply to a right to a prompt divorce. In its argument that the fundamental right to marry “must apply with equal force to same-sex couples,” the majority opinion relied upon four principles: (1) individual autonomy; (2) intimate association; (3) the promotion of familial relationships; and (4) social order.216Id. at 97 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665–70 (2015)). In articulating these principles, the Obergefell Court declared that marriage “draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education” and that choices about marriage “shape an individual’s destiny.”217Id. at 97–98 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 666, 667). Proponents of the right to unmarry suggest that “[i]f it offends autonomy and dignity” to prohibit a given marriage, then surely it “offends autonomy and dignity” to bind someone to a marriage they no longer wish to be part of, particularly where that bind constricts their ability to marry another.218Id. at 99. 

One can see that protecting the “choices” and “destiny” of those in a marriage means nothing—and in fact sets us back hundreds of years—if we then limit the acceptable choices to only those that reflect a willingness to stay bound to a marriage no matter the consequences to safety, psychology, or finances. But a stronger, or additional, argument might thread the needle a little differently. One can argue that the principles in Obergefell apply directly to a divorcing couple because, during a divorce proceeding, a couple is married. The operation of laws confirms this simple truth: until parties are actually divorced, they are married. They cannot, for example, remarry in the interim without risking the subsequent marriage being deemed polygamous.219See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 4 (2022). Property acquired before a divorce is final can be deemed marital property, and property disposed of before the divorce can be seen as a party dissipating assets.220Compare Cal. Fam. Code § 771(a) (West 2022) (stating that property acquired after legal separation is separate property), with Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(3) (2022) (stating that property acquired after separation but before divorce is marital property). Couples engaged in divorce proceedings should, therefore, be entitled to privacy in any intimate association they choose to maintain and deference to their sound discretion concerning child rearing and creation of stability and predictability, because doing so will indeed serve to preserve social and legal order.221Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 646–47. 

These constitutional mandates taken in combination with one another are suggestive of a substantive due process right to be able to maintain privacy and demand state deference to familial decision-making during a divorce. These protected rights of family liberty and privacy should foreclose parties from having to submit to a hearing about their choices to engage in sex, share meals, or occupy similar space.222Id. at 665–66 (“This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. Indeed, the Court has noted it would be contradictory ‘to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.’ ” (citation omitted)). There may also be equal protection challenges embedded in the pronounced burdens that separate and apart laws place on to particular social groups.223But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). But, what both the typology of harms and the analysis of the rights and interests show more generally is that separate and apart requirements are baffling and problematic. They are a “solution” in search of an actual problem, which meanwhile ignores the legitimate needs of families in transition. Perhaps this should surprise no one because family law jurisprudence and the associated rights and obligations so rarely reflect the needs and interests of families and the individuals that make up those families; rather, they are a reflection of prevailing political forces and wills.224Minow, supra note 11. Divorce, in particular, is “a lightning rod for deep-seated political anxieties that revolve[] around the positive and negative implications of freedom.”225Coltrane, supra note 5, at 364 (citation omitted). And we have a long and particularly brutal history of disregarding or distorting the familial rights and interest of subordinated groups.226Consider the reality of treating enslaved people and their children and spouses as divisible property, the separation of migrant children from their parents at U.S. borders, or the ruinous child welfare practices that resulted in Black children being four times as likely to be in foster care as compared to white children despite being only fifteen percent of the total population of children, thus altering the landscape of Black families and communities. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New Research Paradigm, 87 Child Welfare 125, 127 (2008).

IV.  MAKE A NEW PLAN, STAN

If we are to design laws and procedures that protect families, it is worth pausing to name, even in the most general sense, what matters to families. What appears to matter—sociologically, psychologically, and historically speaking—is (1) stability and predictability for raising their children and ordering finances and property; and (2) being afforded dignity and respect.227Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The States provide for the stability of their social order, for the good morals of all their citizens, and for the needs of children from broken homes.”); Coltrane, supra note 5, at 363. Separate and apart requirements, and the invasive inquiries that some requirements provoke, defy these interests. They deny some families a path to the clean, expeditious exit that they need, despite it being “socially and morally undesirable to compel a couple whose marriage is dead to remain subject to its bonds.”228Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 39 (1970). For other families, it forces social arrangements that feel premature, unnatural, or disadvantageous to a family’s plan for transition. In contrast, the proposal herein better protects and reflects a commitment to stability and predictability and dignity and respect. Preliminarily, divorce law must be rid of separate and apart requirements. From there, one could more easily contemplate divorce as an administrative and civil—not judicial—matter, just as marriage is a civil and administrative matter. Divorce could then be bifurcated from subsequent adjudication of custodial, property, and support disputes where the circumstances and needs of a family require adjudication of those matters.   

A.  Stability and Predictability

In a manner relatively consistent since the Victorian era, divorce has been cast as the cause of many social ills—sex-crazed men and women, unrestricted by a commitment to have sex only in order to have children and then raise children together; vagabond children left by the aforementioned parents; impoverished women-led households.229Polikoff, supra note 49, at 13–14; Coltrane, supra note 5, at 364. Today, conservative pundits insist that decline in marriage is the cause of children struggling in school, financial strife, and even crime and violence.230Polikoff, supra note 5. Indeed, the specific rhetoric of married parents being the optimal prototype for child-rearing helped propel the argument for same-sex marriage, despite the statistics that relatively few same-sex couples are raising children; specifically, 16–18% of same-sex couples are raising children compared to 69% of heterosexual couples. Id. at 99; see also Bill Browning, Anthony Kennedy Says He ‘Struggled’ with Marriage Equality Ruling, LGBTQ Nation (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.
lgbtqnation.com/2018/11/anthony-kennedy-says-struggled-marriage-equality-ruling [https://perma.cc/
9G6W-7HJC] (“As we thought about this and I thought about it more and more, it just seemed to me, you know, wrong under the Constitution to say that over 100,000 adopted children of gay parents couldn’t have their parents married. I just thought that this was wrong.”). 

Initially, opposition to same‐sex marriage was part of the conservative canon. But over time, some conservatives revised their position to encompass support for same‐sex marriage precisely because it was marriage. To capture or solidify this support, LGBT advocates often either adopted or acquiesced in positions preferring childrearing by married parents—as long as same‐sex couples could marry. 

Polikoff, supra note 5, at 100 (citation omitted).
Rather than unearth the complicated social realities and psychology that contributes to struggling marriages or undertake public policy reform to address social ills, it is far easier to posit marriage as “the solution to poverty, violence, homelessness, illiteracy, crime, and other problems.”231Polikoff, supra note 5, at 100; see also Coltrane, supra note 5, at 363.

Yet, far from causing all social ills, divorce actually provides important social and financial recalibrations for many families.232Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012) (“[D]ead marriages . . . should be terminated for the mutual protection and well being of the parties and, in most instances, their children.” (citation omitted)); Misty L. Heggeness, When Laws Make Divorce Easier, Research Shows Women Benefit, Outcomes Improve, U.S. Census Bureau (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/12/the-upside-of-divorce.html [https://perma.cc/
5AF4-BTJZ].
As way of example, let us begin with an honest look at the ubiquitous claim of many pro-marriage and antidivorce activists: what about the children?!? Divorce obviously affects children, and studies have rather consistently concluded that the event of a divorce will produce measurable anxiety and depression for many children.233Amato, supra note 203. What early studies failed to ask, however, was how long or pronounced that suffering would be; and moreover, how evidence of anxiety, depression, or clinical antisocial behavior was linked to the quality of family life prior to divorce.234Id.; Lisa Strohschein, Parental Divorce and Child Mental Health Trajectories, 67 J. Marriage & Fam. 1286, 1286–87 (2005). More nuanced studies reveal that children in marriages marked by high dysfunction suffer, so their antisocial behavior decreaseswhen parents dissolve unhappy marriages.235Strohschein, supra note 234; Amato, supra note 203. Other studies suggest a positive relationship between divorce and measures of increased resilience across time.236Risk and Resilience in Children Coping with Parental Divorce, Dartmouth Undergraduate J. Sci. (May 30, 2010), https://sites.dartmouth.edu/dujs/2010/05/30/risk-and-resilience-in-children-coping-with-parental-divorce [https://perma.cc/V8TV-RLS9]. Paying attention to the experiences and outcomes for high-conflict families is particularly important when one considers the reality that divorce is also a means of escape from affirmatively abusive environments. Approximately, twenty-five percent of divorces are initiated in response to domestic violence.237Mary Pat Brygger, Domestic Violence: The Dark Side of Divorce, 13 Fam. Advoc. 48, 48–51 (1990). There is also an inverse correlation between divorce rates and domestic violence rates: “In the first five years after the adoption of no-fault divorce, divorce rates did indeed rise, but the domestic violence rates fell by about 20 to 30 percent, and wives’ suicide rate fell by 8 to 13 percent.”238Vedantam, supra note 6. 

Even in situations that do not overtly threaten one’s personhood, divorce can increase predictability and stability because it opens the door to structuring parenting and finances.239E. Mavis Hetherington & John Kelly, For Better or for Worse: Divorce Reconsidered 48–49, 97 (2002). It is no secret that divorce can create economic hardship and that this hardship disproportionately affects female headed households, but it is not true that financial independence and competence would have been assured if the marriage had remained intact.240Id. Similarly, it is true that custodial disputes can be contentious and painful, but it is not true that marriages produce equal and adequate parenting.241Id. at 7, 9. Oftentimes, divorce recognizes the truth that some people reach more authentic or sustainable parenting and financial arrangements when they are apart. And indeed, it is only through divorce and not within an intact marriage that parties have a legal right to equitable distribution of property, claims for support, and claims of custody that are severable from that of the child’s other parent.242Cf. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (“The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the husband’s attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said in his behalf. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage relation is being carried out.”). It is only in the context of divorce and not marriage that parties can seek intervention of the court to help them act on these rights. 

Whether the assistance of the court or an internal reckoning gets them there, divorces can and do change people’s choices regarding their parenting and decisions to work or pursue training. After studying nearly fourteen hundred families, Mavis Hetherington describes custodial parents learning to round out their skills as parents; for example, a parent may learn more about discipline and control or strive for greater kindness and softness when the parent cannot offload some aspect of parenting on the other parent and must develop the skills themselves.243Hetherington, supra note 239, at 115–18. She also writes about a group she calls “divorce activated fathers”244For Better or for Worse: Divorce Reconsidered takes up divorce in an entirely heteronormative frame. Hetherington, supra note 239. For consideration of a more diverse set of families, one might also consult the scholarship of authors cited in LGBTQ Divorce and Relationship Dissolution. Frost, supra note 98. who “begin to do all the things they were too busy to do before divorce or had relegated to their wives,” for example, soccer games and school plays.245Hetherington, supra note 239, at 121. Other individuals studied reported that divorce ignited an opportunity or a motivation to go back to school, find work, or switch jobs. For many of these divorcees, these changes in their roles and ways they conceived of themselves in their families led to self-discovery and empowerment.246Id. 

B.  Dignity and Respect

Perhaps precisely, because divorce is a pathway to refiguring one’s social, financial, and custodial relationships, leaving a marriage can be an important expression of agency and self-determination. Self-Determination Theory looks to human experience to understand what motivates people and posits that the ultimate goal for any intervention is inspiring a person’s optimal functioning. The theory suggests that three basic psychological needs are associated with increases in wellbeing: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Autonomy refers to the need to have an independence of being; competence is defined as the desire to “master one’s environment”; and relatedness refers to the desire for meaningful social interactions. Scholars have described marriage as an “expressive resource” and that commitment to marriage is an expression of association and personhood. 247David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 925, 933 (2001) (presenting marriage as a First Amendment issue pre-Obergefell); Frye, supra note 69. David Cruz argues that that ability to hold oneself out in a relationship recognized by civil law, and not just social reality, is an expressive resource.248Id. (“Marital commitment is expressed not simply by ceremonies, rings, and gifts. It is also expressed by the act of undertaking and continuing to live under the responsibilities of civil marriage, and by letting it be known that one is living as a part of a civil marriage. One’s statements of marital commitment gain additional credibility from the civil status. A proposition of (civil) marriage is an invitation to a partner to join a publicly valued institution, not simply to maintain a relationship in the realm of the private.”) He made this case in 2001 to argue for same-sex marriage, but the notion easily applies to divorce as well. A decision to divorce and an appeal to have that divorce recognized by law is an expression of needs and choices about the continuation of a union with another person and the associated intermingling of finances, property, child rearing, and habitation. Limiting an individual’s expression inside marriage to only those decisions and behaviors that commit to the marriage constrains one’s self-determination. Divorce can be a valid expression of one’s autonomy, decision-making, and desire for a different manner or source of relatedness. Divorce allows people the opportunity to resituate themselves in new relationships or outside of any relationship at all. Additionally, in ways unavailable to them in an intact marriage, those seeking divorce are able to pursue orders for equitable reallocation of property or for support that may alter financial and power dynamics with their spouses in important ways.249Compare McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (“The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine . . . .”), with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (2022) (“When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of property as may be reasonable . . . .”).

It is not just the ability to divorce that matters for one’s self-determination; freedom from public scrutiny regarding the mode and manner of separation while divorcing has implications for one’s self-determination and mental health as well. Much of divorce reform acknowledges that judges have no business probing into families’ personal issues, because their doing so is beside the point if the couple themselves declared their marriage “dead” and because such probing produces “gut-wrenching pain” and injures families.250Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012) (citation omitted). Moreover, such probing is also fated to skew toward normative bias or whimsy, which in turn tend to ignore, silence, or diminish voices of those who fall outside the dominant narrative.251Donohue, supra note 33. at 575. Nothing defeats a sense of autonomy and competence like being told “you might have meant x, y, or z by your words and actions, but we find your interpretation of your own words and actions less valuable than our own interpretation of your words and actions.” Moreover, certain requirements of separation ask families to distort or hide their truth by either rearranging themselves or avoiding certain disclosures, or they incentivize families to misrepresent themselves. Truth-telling, meanwhile, promotes social emotional health. Research suggests that truth-telling strengthens the connection between our prefrontal cortex—our “adult” brain—and our limbic brain—our “child” brain. Truth-telling is literally good for our brains.252Terry Gross, In ‘Dopamine Nation,’ Overabundance Keeps Us Craving More, NPR (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1030930259 [https://perma.cc/2L2J-M6HU]. 

What if, instead of substituting our judgment about what the end of a marriage looks like or incentivizing distortion to satisfy our judgment, we simply said “okay” when a party said, “I wish to no longer be bound by marriage to this person?” What if our process reflected the reality that when couples are struggling deep in the heart of the matter about their choices—the good ones and the mistakes—they do not need or desire a judicial officer to ask them to wait or organize their life a certain way before deciding to divorce or while undertaking the divorce? What if we could avoid forcing “efficacious resolution of economic issues and custody” to take a back seat to the timeline of divorce by decoupling these issues from the right or opportunity to divorce? We would then be free to conceptualize alternative dispute resolution alternatives that can improve outcomes for the thorny issues of custody and economic issues.253Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 725. 

C.  Prompt Administrative Divorce

This Article proposes that divorces should be administratively and promptly issued upon the filing of a request by an aggrieved party to a marriage; such that, thereafter, issues of support, equitable distribution, and custody can drive the manner and mode of adjudication or alternative dispute resolution. First, one must note that this proposal flips the script on divorce, suggesting that a pronouncement of a divorce can be disaggregated from and precede final resolution of matters of property, custody, and support. Currently, in all states, a divorce starts when a party files a complaint and serves it on the other; after which time the parties enter a “kind of purgatory,” a “pendente lite stage.”254Munro, supra note 92, at 429. During this time, the court holds hearings or the parties submit agreements regarding temporary decisions on parenting, support, and use or access to certain marital property (such as homes or cars) while the case is pending. After (in some cases) protracted discovery or (in all cases) protracted waits due to court congestion, matters are calendared and heard in final hearings, or negotiated final agreements receive judicial blessing. The meat of these final hearings and agreements are the minutia and nuance of the same issues that were handled initially and temporarily, namely custody, support, and property. 

The embedded notion is that a party cannot be divorced until matters of custody, support, and property are squared away. But why? It is a social and legal myth that parties cannot negotiate and contract regarding support and property or negotiate and mediate about parenting children outside of the bonds of marriage. As a matter of law, it is actually possible, for example, to grant a divorce and table or calendar matters of custody for a final hearing. Socially, we know full well that many children are raised in households by unmarried parents or are raised in and by two separate households.255Naomi Cahn & Kim Kamin, Adapt Old Strategies to Fit New Family Arrangements, 47 Est. Plan. 30, 30 (2020); see also Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2017, U.S. Census Bureau (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2020/demo/p60-269.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK6T-UZZQ].
 Moreover, even in the current regime, the litigation of custody, support, and property issues often persists and survives after the dissolution of marriage via motions to modify or motions to compel.256See, e.g., Budrawich v. Budrawich, 240 A.3d 688, 705 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020) (concerning a motion to modify order of alimony); Downing v. Perry, 123 A.3d 474, 477–78 (D.C. 2015) (concerning a motion to modify custody).

In addition to disaggregating the divorce itself from resolution of corollary matters, this proposal conflates or includes the concept of shortening waiting periods with freedom from requirements during that waiting period. Any proposal to promptly issue divorces and do away with separate and apart requirements can find comfort in the fact that plenty of states do not have them, and the world appears to have kept on spinning. States such as Alaska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Idaho have short waiting periods for divorce.257Erin Danly, Top 7 Places to Get a Quickie Divorce, Avvo Stories (July 27, 2015), https://stories.avvo.com/relationships/divorce/top-7-places-to-get-a-quickie-divorce.html [https://perma.
cc/2X9V-A7LJ].
These same states do not have involved requirements for demonstrating separation in order to qualify for the divorce.258Alaska Stat. § 25.24.010 (2022); Idaho Code § 32-601 (2022); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 125.010, 125.020 (2021); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:7-a (2022); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-104 (2022); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4-2 (2022). When one cross-checks “quickie” divorce states against other states, one is struck by the fact that nothing is striking. To begin, aside from Nevada, which has a distinct explanation for being an anomaly,259In 1931, Reno, Nevada became known as the “Divorce Capital of the World” when lawmakers reduced the residency requirement for divorces from three months to six weeks. The loosened divorce laws drew a steady flow of “divorce tourists,” which strengthened the local economy through lodging and entertainment. See Sofia Grant, How Reno Became ‘the Divorce Capital of the World’—and Why That Reputation Faded, Time (Feb. 13, 2020, 7:36 PM), https://time.com/5783893/reno-divorce-history [https://perma.cc/ER2W-4NTE]. divorce rates in these other low-bar states are on par with other states, and even Nevada is not alone in being a high divorce rate state.260Divorce Rate by State 2022, World Population Rev., https://worldpopulationreview.com/
state-rankings/divorce-rate-by-state [https://perma.cc/AY7X-DR68].
But, then again, separation periods and normative standards for periods of separation are about creating predictability for children and economic and psychological security for families. So then, surely the citizens of Alaska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Idaho must be floundering in a state of civic and familial chaos. But no. No, they are not: measures of social services consumption, child welfare statistics, school performance data, and so forth are all unremarkable compared to other states with more stringent divorce requirements.261Data by State, Child.’s Bureau, https://cwoutcomes.acf.hhs.gov/cwodatasite/byState [https://perma.cc/ACW5-BQCS]; State Profiles, Nation’s Rep. Card, https://www.nationsreportcard.
gov/profiles/stateprofile?chort=1&sub=MAT&sj=&sfj=NP&st=MN&year=2019R3 [https://perma.cc/
SB7E-7C5C]; SNAP Data Tables, USDA, https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap [https://perma.cc/Y45S-WKGQ]; State-by-State Child Support Data, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures (June 25, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/state-data-on-child-support-collections.aspx [https://perma.cc/AC7B-R7MX].
 

The question then becomes what, if anything, should the requirements be for the administrative pleadings and requests for divorce. Here again, we see examples of jurisdictions offering opportunities for “summary dissolution,” “streamlined dissolution,” or “simplified dissolution” to offer parties efficient, less public, and more cost-effective dissolution of their marriage.262Munro, supra note 92, at 428. These processes still require judicial approval, but they do not contemplate a trial and instead invite parties to craft their own agreements. States allowing these dissolutions may impose limits on assets, requests for spousal support, or length of marriage, or they may be limited to cases in which there are no children. France has taken this approach one step further and allowed matters that can be handled summarily to move forward without judicial involvement at all.263   Margaret Ryznar & Angélique Devaux, Voilà! Taking the Judge out of Divorce, 42 Seattle U. L. Rev. 161, 168 (2018). The same is true in Australia, where uncontested divorces with no children can be obtained by administrative procedure through the mail.264Sharon Shakargy, The Outlawed Family: How Relevant Is the Law in Family Litigation?, 47 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 568, 578 (2021). Denmark similarly allows for an administrative procedure in uncontested cases.265Id.

An expeditious administrative process supports the goals of creating a system that respects the families utilizing it, as well as the goal of creating predictability and security for families. To begin, an administrative process that separates requests to divorce from requests for the court’s assistance with property, support, and custody better reflects several important realities beleaguering the family courts and harming the families who are forced to engage with the courts. Family courts are overcrowded and inefficient.266Munro, supra note 92, at 427. Family courts also deal with vast numbers of pro se litigants.267Id. As compared to represented parties, pro se litigants are more likely to have substantive or procedural missteps such as missed deadlines or deficient filings. As a family court judge and two practitioners put it, 

This perfect storm created by a void of knowledge of procedural, substantive, and evidentiary law on the part of individuals stuck in a system to deal with unhappy, very personal, and, at times, highly conflicted matters results in an unnecessary overuse of judicial resources and a growth of the backlog in the court’s docket.268Id. at 431.

Under this new proposal, certain divorce scenarios would come off the court docket all together, clearing room for those matters that require more time and attention. Other matters could come before the court, not automatically upon the filing of a divorce, but rather when the families’ own needs and energies direct them to file. Some parties may feel they need court intervention to understand, negotiate, and contract around their property interests, support needs, or child custody issues; some parties may not.269There are a myriad of avenues for mediating and negotiating settlements: negotiation between parties with or without attorneys, mediation or conciliation with a third-party neutral, or collaborative divorce processes. See Probate and Family Court Approved Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) Programs, Mass.gov, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/probate-and-family-court-approved-alternative-dispute-resolution-adr-programs [https://perma.cc/S92R-79D9]; Collaborative Divorce and Family Law, Mass. Collaborative L. Council, https://massclc.org/collaborativedivorce [https://perma.cc/9ZKU-WKCU]. Further, in some jurisdictions, one can choose to use state child support services rather than file privately in the context of a traditional divorce. See, e.g., Opening a Child Support Case, D.C. Child Support Servs. Div., https://cssd.dc.gov/service/opening-child-support-case [https://perma.cc/Q7BU-YK4N].
Some parties may choose to merge and incorporate settlement agreements into court orders, while other parties may not.270Parties who have reached a settlement agreement on matters corollary to divorce, for example custody and property, will ask the court to recognize that agreement at the time of decreeing the divorce. See To Merge or Not to Merge: A Look at “Incorporated and Merged” vs. “Incorporated but Not Merged” Language in a Divorce Decree, Fam. L. Guys: Blog, https://familylawguys.com/merge-not-merge-look-incorporated-merged-vs-incorporated-not-merged-language-divorce-decree [https://perma.
cc/PK2X-WDPN]. If they ask that their agreement be incorporated into the divorce, then essentially, the private settlement is incorporated by reference in the divorce decree but exists as a private contract enforceable through standard civil breach of contract channels. Id. If the parties merge and incorporate the settlement into the divorce decree, then it becomes part of the decree, thus ceasing to exist as a private contract and existing as a court order instead. Enforceability, then, is via motions to compel or motions for contempt. Id.
 

Courts and legislatures recognize that the more process a law requires or inspires, the greater the delay and that the greater the delay, the greater the agony.271For a discussion of legislative history which highlights the logistical and mental loads caused by delay, see Palermo v. Palermo, 950 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Sup. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 953 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2012). Social science literature—and if we are honest with ourselves, our own lived experiences—buttress this conclusion. People do not like to wait; and waiting for uncertain time periods, for an uncertain outcome, is the worst kind of waiting.272Garrett Bomba & Michael Burke, Psychology Behind How Waiting Affects Patients, Experity, https://www.experityhealth.com/ebooks/psychology-behind-how-waiting-affects-patients [https://perma.
cc/RR6T-Z7X2]; David H. Maister, The Psychology of Waiting Lines 6 (1985), https://
davidmaister.com/wp-content/themes/davidmaister/pdf/PsycholgyofWaitingLines751.pdf [https://perma.
cc/83WH-RYYK].
People become agitated and irrational under these conditions; “[w]aiting in ignorance creates a feeling of powerlessness, which frequently results in visible irritation and rudeness.”273Maister, supra note 272; see also Bomba, supra note 272. The psychology of waiting is often studied in connection with customers waiting in line, so one must consider how these same psychological tendencies toward frustration and anger will be amplified when the matter at hand—a divorce—is more socially emotionally fraught than a trip to a customer service center. Consider, for example, patients asked to wait for medical procedures due to COVID-19 protocols and barriers. Here, patients showed marked symptoms of mental distress as they waited to undergo their procedures.274Anna R. Gagliardi, Cindy Y.Y. Yip, Jonathan Irish, Frances C. Wright, Barry Rubin, Heather Ross, Robin Green, Susan Abbey, Mary Pat McAndrews & Donna E. Stewart, The Psychological Burden of Waiting for Procedures and Patient-Centered Strategies that Could Support the Mental Health of Wait-Listed Patients and Caregivers During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Scoping Review, 24 Health Expectations 978 (2021). To add insult to injury, the psychic toll did not just cause suffering in the patient, but it also adversely impacted patients’ trust in the health care system.275Id. As it turns out, such findings do and have translated onto the legal system generally and family courts specifically. Delay upon delay with uncertainty about the divorce risks exacerbating the social-emotional stress a family is under and threatens to diminish litigants’ ability to work together and confidence in the legal system.276See Press Release, Alicia Davis, supra note 80. 

Simplifying and truncating the line between wanting a divorce, filing for a divorce, and getting a divorce has advantages for almost every type of couple who the family court sees. The law lacks teeth on the issue of divorce itself; so much of divorce law is actually about regulating or apportioning property and money among family members to support the individuals and bimodal family constellations arising out of breakdowns in the married, nuclear family.277Shakargy, supra note 264, at 570. Some couples struggle financially to create separate households or face contentious divorces. Without the benefit of advocacy and assistance, separation periods are rarely productive and simply impede the couples’ full opportunity to use the resources of the court and the force of the law to plan and prepare for a new future. A prompt administrative divorce clears the way for these couples to immediately seek final resolution for the matters that will help them prepare financially and logistically for their next chapter. In contrast, some resourced and represented couples are able to negotiate agreements about property, support, and child support. These couples do not need active involvement of the court to broker agreements, but they need the court’s prompt attention to finalize them. For these resourced couples, the murkiness created by periods of separation prior to divorce can create confusion around what holdings or debts are marital property.278Compare Cal. Fam. Code § 771 (West 2022) (regarding property acquired after legal separation as separate), with N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 2022) (regarding date of executed separation agreement or commencement of action for divorce as dispositive). Clearly delineating the moment of divorce from the period of negotiation and possible adjudication regarding property and support interests clarifies which choices and conduct were “marital” and which were not.279See, e.g., Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 151 S.W.3d 135, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (detailing a case in which a husband and wife disagreed about the designation of property and propriety of a certain expenditure of the husband vis-á-vis the date of their separation and commencement of the trial for divorce). Still other couples have “simple” cases where they own little to no property and have no children. Despite shifts in divorce law leaving the courts with little to no authority over the matter of divorce itself, these couples must queue up, adding to the clogged docket, missing work for interim court appearances, and waiting—sometimes years—for a pronouncement of what they themselves have known all along: their marriage is over.280Shakargy, supra note 264, at 577–78 (stating that shifts in the law that do not, ultimately, give the court much authority at all over the “substance” of the divorce itself: “divorce is always attainable;” and “not only is divorce more flexible, but it is also governed chiefly by the wishes of the parties”). The current divorce system not only creates all these inefficiencies and delays, thus forestalling family problem-solving, but it also decentralizes the problem-solving.

Court filings automatically trigger the involvement of bureaucratic authority, which can be demoralizing or unnecessary for many families. Administrative trends reflect a jurisprudential reality that divorces seem less like a “legal matter in need of adjudication and more a private matter subject to administrative regulation.”281Id. at 576, 579. Administrative divorce trends, meanwhile, also mirror the parallel practice of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) trends. Many states, even those without summary dissolutions on the books, allow families to use ADR such as mediation to settle their disputes before seeking judicial approval. Such practices promote parties’ self-determination over personal matters and their everyday lives.282Ryznar, supra note 263, at 175–76. One argument is that court processes and the role of judges are often about rewarding and punishing or incentivizing and barring. These frames contemplate one winner and one loser. The frames are not comfortable or appropriate for people trying to share property equitably or contemplate some sort of partnership to raise children.283Shakargy, supra note 264, at 576, 589. Others point out that the process of re-conceptualizing family relationships in a new family system is slow, iterative, deeply personal, and ideally collaborative. The divorce process is not currently designed with the space to negotiate, grieve, try, fail, and try again. A system that reduces dockets and narrows issues before the tribunal might better foster opportunity to design systems and processes more respectful of, and responsive to, families’ needs.  

CONCLUSION

The origin story of separate and apart requirements is a legacy of the bizarre and lasting stalemate between what people were doing inside unhappy or unhealthy marriages and the technical lawful authority to divorce.284Friedman, supra note 25, at 1525–26. Surely now we can begin to narrow that divide between law and society, because after all, the train has left the proverbial station.

About half of all Americans over the age of 18 are married, but an increasing number of them have been married before.Over the past ten years, the number of cohabiting adults over the age of 50 has increased dramatically, from 2.3 to 4 million. More than one-quarter of married men in their seventies report having had an intimate relationship with someone other than their spouse. The grey divorce rate—the divorce rate for those age 50 and older—doubled from 1990–2015, although it remains significantly lower than the rate for those under 50. Almost a third of Americans (30%) have a step- or a half-sibling. . . . As many as 5% of Americans are polyamorous, having serious intimate relationships with more than one person at the same time. Approximately 40% of children are born to unmarried mothers, but more than a third of those mothers are cohabiting at the time they give birth.285Cahn, supra note 255, at 30 (citation omitted).

“[S]tatistics have normative as well as empirical implications.”286Fineman, supra note 5, at 2189. One can see these implications playing out on our TV screens, in our neighborhoods, our schools, our work, and our social spaces. Families increasingly “do” family all sorts of ways—ways that suggest that family is a beautifully nuanced thing. Bound up in this, is the reality that marriage must also be a beautifully complicated thing—or at least something that is about more than sex and meals. It is illogical to hover the magnifying glass on these issues when a party seeks to end their marriage. Moreover, this piece suggests it is acutely painful and harmful to certain populations and constitutionally precarious to do so. A simple conclusion flows from all of this: these requirements do not make sense. They require performance and permission that is neither necessary in life nor should be acceptable in law.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 77

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* Assistant Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School, Director of Interdisciplinary Practice and Family Law Professor. With thanks to the members of the Boston College Summer Writers’ Workshop for their comments on this project; and thanks also to Laura Robinson for her tireless enthusiasm, even for my most tedious asks; and to Karen Breda, Boston College Law School Librarian and Lecture, who I am convinced, could find anything anyone ever asked for.

Justice Breyer’s Friendly Legacy for Environmental Law

Environmentalists did not cheer President Bill Clinton’s decision in May 1994 to nominate then-First Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer to fill Justice Harry Blackmun’s seat on the Supreme Court. Just the opposite. Many instead expressed serious concerns about Breyer’s impact on environmental law were he to be confirmed, and openly questioned whether a Justice Breyer might be “hazardous to our health.” This Article considers whether, in light of Justice Breyer’s actual record over the past twenty-seven years on the Court, environmentalist concerns about him at the time of his nomination were realized. The Article concludes they were not. Justice Breyer was instead friendly to environmental protection concerns even if he fell shy of being an unqualified friend on the bench. In almost all of the most important environmental cases of the past twenty-seven years, he was a reliable vote joining the majority in the big cases environmentalists won—often providing the critical fifth vote. And although Justice Breyer on a handful of occasions was less a reliable vote in dissent with liberal justices sounding the alarm in the big cases environmentalists lost, in none of those cases was his vote dispositive of the outcome. For this reason, although environmentalist concerns at the time of Justice Breyer’s nomination were reasonable, and had the potential to cause the very problems environmentalists identified, they proved largely insignificant in actual application. Finally, Justice Breyer’s actual record on the Court suggests the wisdom of rethinking what it means to be a “dream” justice for environmental law. Most simply put, the best Justice for environmental law may not be a Justice who always votes in favor of the outcome favored by environmentalists in individual cases.

INTRODUCTION

Environmentalists did not cheer President Bill Clinton’s decision in May 1994 to nominate then-First Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer to fill Justice Harry Blackmun’s seat on the Supreme Court. Just the opposite. While Justice Breyer had his defenders, environmentalists mostly expressed serious concerns about Justice Breyer’s impact on environmental law were he to be confirmed. And some denounced him on that ground, worrying that he might be “hazardous to our health”1Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 491 (1994) (statement of Ralph Nader) (citing the attachment Thomas O. McGarity, Could Justice Breyer Be Hazardous to Our Health?) [hereinafter Breyer Confirmation Hearings].—a concern strikingly similar to that which had been expressed a year earlier by attorneys advising President Clinton when the President had first considered Justice Breyer for a vacancy on the Court.2See infra notes 14–25 and accompanying text. Yet, ironically, although those concerns had abruptly derailed Justice Breyer’s nomination only hours before its expected announcement in 1993, they became a major reason why the President chose Justice Breyer over the President’s first choice for the nomination in 1994. Senate Republican leaders threatened to wage an all-out campaign against the President’s first choice, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, because of his reputation as an unabashed environmentalist.3See infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. And that same Republican leadership promised smooth sailing if Justice Breyer were instead the nominee because Justice Breyer had expressed concern about unduly costly environmental protection requirements and therefore was perceived, unlike Babbitt, as pro-business.4See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.

Justice Breyer’s recent retirement from the Court after twenty-eight years5Letter from Justice Stephen Breyer to the President (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.supremecourt.
gov/publicinfo/press/Letter_to_President_January-27-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7CF-Q7EL].
provides an opportune moment to reflect on his legacy for environmental law based on his actual record—as reflected in the votes he has cast and the opinions he has written. More specifically, this Article considers whether Justice Breyer’s record on the Court confirms or contradicts the expectations of his supporters and detractors more than a quarter century ago.

To that end, the Article is divided into three Parts. Part I reviews the events surrounding Justice Breyer’s nomination and the role that environmental law then played in securing both his nomination and confirmation. Part I includes discussion of previously undisclosed information long buried in the official archival papers of President Clinton related to the decision not to nominate Justice Breyer in 1993. Part II reviews Justice Breyer’s record in environmental cases before the Court, with special emphasis on opinions he wrote in those cases, whether majority, concurring, or dissenting.

Part III considers whether, in light of Justice Breyer’s actual record on the Court, environmentalist concerns—shared by some advising the White House—about Justice Breyer were realized. Although those concerns were understandable and pertained to the very problems that White House advisors and environmentalists identified in 1993 and 1994, they have proven largely insignificant in actual application. In the vast majority of environmental law cases heard by the Court during Justice Breyer’s tenure to date, Justice Breyer has both displayed heightened sensitivity to environmental protection concerns and voted in a manner sympathetic to environmentalists, without expressing any concern about environmental protection requirements being too demanding. And, in those relatively few cases in which his concern with unduly stringent environmental law was relevant to a legal issue’s resolution, Justice Breyer’s views made no difference to the outcome of the case, nor has he written an opinion of the Court in any of those cases, instead at most writing a separate concurring opinion of no legal effect. In only one relatively unimportant case that defied application of liberal or conservative ideology did he ever supply the decisive fifth vote against environmentalists,6See infra note 108. likely because the Court has been consistently dominated by at least five more conservative Justices ever since he joined the bench.

I.  WHITE HOUSE ADVISOR CONCERNS AND ENVIRONMENTALIST OPPOSITION TO JUSTICE BREYER’S NOMINATION

President Clinton’s decision to nominate then–First Circuit Judge Breyer to fill Justice Harry Blackmun’s seat in May 1994 was remarkable because only one year earlier, the President had decided at the last minute not to nominate Judge Breyer to fill Justice Byron White’s seat on the Court. In June 1993, Judge Breyer had been the expected nominee, bolstered by the strong support of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy.7Richard L. Berke, Judge in Boston Is Called Likely for High Court, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1993, at A1. But in what was dubbed by the New York Times as “A Surprise Choice,” Clinton instead tapped D.C. Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to fill the opening.8Richard L. Berke, A Surprise Choice—President Hails Judge as Force for Consensus and Rights Pioneer, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1993, at A1.

According to press accounts at that time, Judge Breyer’s nomination stumbled in the final day and hours because of reports that he had failed to pay Social Security taxes on the wages of a part-time housekeeper.9Richard L. Berke, Favorite for High Court Failed to Pay Maid’s Taxes, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1993, at 1. Judge Breyer’s problem was an especially sensitive one for the White House because the President had recently suffered repeated embarrassment when his two successive choices to serve as the first female Attorney General were abandoned because of problems with their domestic household employees: the first had reportedly failed to pay taxes for a childcare provider and the other had failed to inform the White House that she had once hired an illegal alien as a household employee (although, in her defense, that hiring was not itself unlawful when it occurred).10Id.; Richard L. Berke, Judge’s Friends Try to Save Candidacy for High Court, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1993, at A11. And, as much as the Clinton White House sought to distinguish Judge Breyer’s circumstances, the specter of excusing conduct from a man that resembled conduct that had only recently derailed two female cabinet picks apparently cratered Judge Breyer’s nomination.11Berke, supra note 9. Judge Breyer also reportedly interviewed poorly with the President not long before Ginsburg was announced—which Judge Breyer’s supporters blamed on painkillers he was taking while recovering from a serious bicycle accident for which he had recently been hospitalized.12Berke, supra note 10; Richard L. Berke, President Has First Meeting with High Court Candidate, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1993, at 10; Berke, supra note 8.

But what was not reported at the time is that White House concerns about Judge Breyer were also substantive in nature.13In 2014, the Clinton Presidential Library released several hundred pages of previously undisclosed documents regarding the nominations of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer
to the Supreme Court. See Robert Barnes, Clinton Library Release of Papers on Ginsburg, Breyer Nominations Offer Insight, Some Fun, Wash. Post (June 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/clinton-library-release-of-papers-on-ginsburg-breyer-nominations-offer-insight-some-fun/2014/
06/08/3aac9276-ed8d-11e3-9b2d-114aded544be_story.html [https://perma.cc/NXH6-G952].
In early June 1993, White House Counsel Bernie Nussbaum asked Joel Klein, a highly skilled and trusted D.C. private sector attorney, to conduct a confidential review of both Judges Ginsburg and Breyer to assist the President’s decision. Over the course of just a few days, Klein orchestrated detailed reviews of the record of both judges by forty lawyers at six law firms. And Klein provided Nussbaum a comparative analysis of the two judges in memos dated June 10 and June 1114Draft Memorandum from Joel Klein to Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President on Judge Breyer’s Opinions and Legal Scholarship (June 10, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/
items/show/14693 [https://perma.cc/95AQ-66Y7] [hereinafter Klein-Nussbaum Draft Breyer Memo]; Memorandum from Joel Klein to Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President on Judge Ginsburg’s Opinions and Legal Scholarship (June 11, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/
14693 [https://perma.cc/5LDG-VGHD] [hereinafter Klein-Nussbaum Ginsburg Memo].
—precisely the time period when President Clinton pivoted away from Judge Breyer in favor of Judge Ginsburg, whose Senate confirmation Klein then championed in his new role as Deputy White House Counsel.15Ronald J. Ostrow, Joel Klein, L.A. Times (Apr. 12, 1998), https://www.latimes.com/
archives/la-xpm-1998-apr-12-op-38666-story.html [https://perma.cc/9S4L-4AWP].

The reviews were devastating to Judge Breyer’s prospects. As summarized by Klein to Nussbaum, “Judge Ginsburg more closely meets the President’s articulated standards for the Supreme Court than does Judge Breyer.”16Klein-Nussbaum Ginsburg Memo, supra note 14, at 4. Her “work has more of the humanity that the President highly values and fewer of the negative aspects that will cause concern among some constituencies.”17Id. at 5. “She has written more, and consistently, about the human condition and the plight of the disadvantaged, and she has done so with obvious conviction and commitment.”18Id. at 1. In a draft memo to Nussbaum on Judge Breyer, while describing Judge Breyer as “a brilliant jurist” with “the potential to rank with the most distinguished judges in our past,”19Klein-Nussbaum Draft Breyer Memo, supra note 14, at 1. Klein also described the “dispassionate” nature of his writing and how “he does not wear his heart on his sleeve.”20Id. Klein added that Judge Breyer’s views on government regulation such as environmental risk regulation were “conservative” and in a recent book he authored on risk regulation, he had proposed “a government-wide cost/benefit approach” akin to what Republicans then favored and to those regulatory reforms supported by the prior presidential administration.21Id. at 6.

Those attorneys who reviewed Judge Breyer’s writings for Klein stressed Breyer’s apparent lack of sensitivity to the human stakes of economic regulation and environmental protection requirements. In one memo dated June 8, and sent to Klein on June 9, two reviewers described the “bloodlessness” evidenced by Judge Breyer’s penchant for “analyz[ing] every problem he is considering within a framework [so] bounded by economic theory or rules of logic that the result seems devoid of emotion and even . . . humanity.”22Memorandum from Jim Hamilton to Joel Klein 1, 3 (June 8, 1993), https://clinton.
presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14693 [https://perma.cc/QC5W-J84V] [hereinafter Hamilton-Klein Breyer Memo].
The reviewers harshly contrasted Breyer’s writings with those of Bruce Babbitt—the candidate favored by environmentalists who was then serving as Secretary of the Interior—which were described as “lucid, exuberant and wide-ranging.”23Id. at 3. A second memo, prepared on June 7, similarly described Judge Breyer as a “cold fish,” “bring[ing] no passion or insight” and as so “lack[ing] of vigor in his jurisprudence that one suspects he does not have (or refuses to utilize) any innate sense of justice.”24Memorandum from Tom Perrelli and Ian Gershengorn to Joel Klein, Judge
Breyer’s Civil Rights, Privacy and National Security Opinions, 1–2, 8 (June 7, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14693 [https://perma.cc/QC5W-J84V] [hereinafter Perrelli-Gershengorn-Klein Breyer Memo].
The memo concluded that Judge Breyer was “certainly a judicial conservative” and “[c]onservatives will be thrilled if Judge Breyer is appointed. . . . Nothing in Judge Breyer’s opinions suggests that he would be a great Supreme Court Justice.”25Id. at 9. “In no way is he a ‘man of the people,’ as some other candidates have been.”26Id. at 2. When this memo was released for the first time in June 2014, its two co-authors, Tom Perrelli and Ian Gershengorn, quickly and easily acknowledged they had been completely mistaken. They were second- and first-year law firm associates at the time, and Perrelli commented, “That shows why you shouldn’t have second-year associates evaluating Supreme Court nominees.” Gershengorn noted that Breyer has been “a terrific justice” and, quoting the baseball manager Earl Weaver, “It is what you learn after you know it all that counts.” Both Perrelli and Gershengorn served in high-ranking positions in the Justice Department during the Obama administration—Gershengorn as Solicitor General. Barnes, supra note 13.

These concerns had a clear impact. Then-Associate White House Counsel Ron Klain made an explicit reference to the concern in his June 11, 1993, memorandum to White House Counsel that listed the questions that the President could ask Judge Breyer in their interview.27Memorandum from Ron Klain to Berrnie Nussbaum on Areas of Discussion for the President (June 11, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14734 [https://perma.cc/WHG9-UXDY]. One question asked Judge Breyer to respond to the claim that his “writings suggest an over-emphasis on economics: putting a cost on lives, for example.”28Id. at 1. Another question more pointedly asked him to “respond to the criticism that his opinions are ‘bloodless.’ ”29Id. President Clinton’s interview with Judge Breyer that same day did not go well,30Neil Lewis, As Political Terrain Shifts, Breyer Lands on His Feet, N.Y Times, May 15, 1994, at 1. and a few hours later, Klein called Judge Ginsburg to let her know she should be available for a meeting with President Clinton. She met with the President two days later, Sunday, June 13, and the President called her later that same night to offer her the job.31Ruth Bader Ginsburg, My Own Words 177–82 (2016).

What resurrected Judge Breyer’s prospects a year later and secured President Clinton’s nomination was the President’s desire to avoid a Senate confirmation battle. Clinton’s apparent first choice in 1994, as it had first been in 1993, was Bruce Babbitt.32Thomas L. Friedman, Latest Version of Supreme Court List: Babbitt in Lead, 2 Judges Close Behind, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1993, at A20. Liberals in the Democratic Party strongly endorsed Babbitt, as did environmentalists, in 1994 because of his progressive views and his championing of environmental protection causes both as Governor of Arizona and Interior Secretary.33Ron Fournier, Babbitt One of Three Court Favorites, Ariz. Daily Sun, May 11, 1994, at 2. Indeed, environmentalists had a year earlier been so enthusiastic about Babbitt that some had actually opposed his nomination to the Court to replace Justice White because they did not want to lose his leadership at Interior—in retrospect a decision they may well regret.34See Berke, supra note 8; Friedman, supra note 32; Thomas L. Friedman, The 11th-Hour Scramble—After Hoping for a “Home Run” in Choosing a Justice, Clinton May Be Just Home Free, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1993, at A1.

But it was that same environmentalist enthusiasm for Babbitt that ended up sinking his possible nomination to replace Justice Blackmun in 1994. When the White House let leak to the news media that the President had settled on Babbitt and would announce his nomination shortly,35Gwen Ifill, President Is Said to Pick Babbitt for Court Despite Senate Concern, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1994, at A1. Republican Senate leadership preemptively announced that they would vigorously oppose Babbitt—because of his reputation as an ardent environmentalist.36Id. Simultaneously, the Republican Senate minority leader, Senator Bob Dole, predicted “smooth sailing” were President Clinton to nominate Judge Breyer instead.37Gwen Ifill, Pragmatic Jurist—Bipartisan Support Seen as Clinton Sidesteps Risky Senate Fight, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1994, at 1. The President blinked, and Judge Breyer became the nominee. Judge Breyer also overcame Clinton’s earlier doubts, upon meeting him a summer before, that he lacked energy, by literally taking a run with the President along the Capital Mall to establish his physical stamina for the job.38Lewis, supra note 30. Judge Richard Arnold of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had also been an early favorite to receive the nomination in 1994, but his nomination faltered after President Clinton learned from the judge that he had recently been treated for a cancer diagnosis. The President’s interest in Judge Arnold had been so keen that he even contacted the judge’s own doctors to learn more about the judge’s prognosis, preferring to appoint a Justice who could serve on the Court for many years. Id.; Neil A. Lewis, Richard S. Arnold, 68, Judge Once Eyed for Supreme Court, Dies, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2004, at B9. Some environmental law professors at the time wrote a letter in support of Judge Arnold, rooted in the judge’s writings and National Environmental Policy Act litigation he performed in the early 1970s for the then-new public interest organization the Environmental Defense Fund. See William Funk, Justice Breyer and Environmental Law, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 735, 735 & n.2 (1995) (citing to a letter in support of Judge Arnold from thirty-three law professors to President Bill Clinton); Summary & Comments Article in This Issue: “Substantive Rights Under NEPA,” by Richard S. Arnold, 3 Env’t L. Rep. 10069, 10079 (1973) (describing Richard Arnold “[a]s an attorney who has brought several NEPA suits for the Environmental Defense Fund”). Arnold also published an article in the Environmental Law Reporter on the substantive right to environmental quality under the National Environmental Policy Act. See Richard S. Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 Env’t L. Rep. 50028 (1973). The White House’s concerns of a year earlier, regarding his lack of humanity and affinity for regulatory reform, apparently disappeared—these qualities had been transformed from a political liability into a political virtue.

Most liberal Democrats in Congress muted their displeasure with the Judge Breyer choice, presumably to avoid breaking publicly with their own President, following twelve years of Republican administrations. But some of the more progressive Democrats and hardcore environmentalists did not shy away from sharply criticizing the nominee, revealing their obvious frustration that the President had let pass a potentially historic opportunity to have an acclaimed environmentalist join the High Court.39Neil A. Lewis, In a Sea of Praise, Discouraging Words, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1994, at A10.

The focus of their criticism was a common theme evident in Judge Breyer’s scholarship, work experience, and judicial opinions in favor of reform of excessively burdensome regulations. These were the same concerns that advisors to the White House had stressed in 1993. As counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, on leave from Harvard Law School in the late 1970s, Breyer had worked effectively in a bipartisan fashion with both Democrats and Republicans in support of legislation that deregulated the airline industry. He favored such deregulation on the ground that regulation imposed unnecessary costs on industry and impeded the operation of free market forces that could on their own lead to better products and services for lower prices than burdensome government regulation might achieve.40Joan Biskupic, Breyer: Pragmatic Lawyer and Judge, Wash. Post (June 27, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/06/27/breyer-pragmatic-lawyer-and-judge/90ac
d981-f9b6-452b-8c57-ef013b2b5549 [https://perma.cc/8LQS-ADFD].

Indeed, Breyer had so impressed Senate Republicans with his support of regulatory reform that they endorsed President Carter’s nomination of Breyer to serve on the First Circuit even though that nomination occurred on November 13, 1980—a time when a nomination for a life-tenured position should have been dead on arrival in Congress. After all, the date of the nomination was only nine days after Carter had lost the Presidency to Ronald Reagan and the Democrats had lost the Senate to the Republicans. Confirming Breyer to the First Circuit during a congressional lame duck session would accordingly mean the elimination of an important federal appellate court vacancy that would otherwise have been available for a Republican President and Republican Senate to fill a couple months later. Yet, because of Senator Kennedy’s clout and significant Republican leadership support for Breyer, rooted in his work on regulatory reform as a Senate staffer, Breyer was confirmed as a federal appellate judge less than a month later in December 1980.41David Rogers, New England in Washington: The Politics Behind N.E. Judgeship, Bos. Globe, Nov. 30, 1980; Richard H. Stewart, Profile in the News: They Call Him a Natural for Federal Bench, Bos. Globe, Dec. 10, 1980; Martin Tolchin, Bill to Strengthen Fair Housing Act Killed as Senate Cloture Vote Fails, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at B8 (reporting on Judge Breyer’s confirmation to First Circuit following vote of eighty to ten to defeat an attempted filibuster).

As an appellate judge, moreover, Judge Breyer continued to be a proponent of regulatory reform, including for environmental protection rules. In both his judicial rulings and his extra-judicial writings, Judge Breyer expressed concern about the possible harm caused by irrational environmental regulations with compliance costs that far exceeded their benefits.

One of Judge Breyer’s most prominent opinions for the First Circuit was United States v. Ottati & Goss, in which the court upheld a trial court ruling that had rejected the proposed remedy by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to clean up a hazardous waste site on the ground that the public health benefits did not warrant the high cleanup costs.42United States v. Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d 429, 444–45 (1st Cir. 1990). The ruling was remarkable at the time because it was so unusual for a court not to defer to EPA’s judgment about the extent of cleanup needed to reduce risks from hazardous wastes. Although the force of Judge Breyer’s opinion for the First Circuit was a bit muted because the appellate court was simply affirming the trial court’s ruling against EPA—concluding that “[w]e cannot say that the district court was ‘clearly erroneous’ or unreasonable”43Id. at 442.—his opinion seemed to join the lower court in ridiculing EPA’s decision to base its cleanup remedy on the proposition that a child would eat contaminated soil over a sustained period of time.44Id. And, while declining to impose sanctions on EPA, Judge Breyer’s opinion gratuitously took the occasion to “wonder about the government’s priorities in the face of other, apparently more serious, environmental demands for ‘cleanup’ time and effort.”45Id. at 445.

Judge Breyer, moreover, did far more than just author the opinion. Outside of his judicial role, he trumpeted its policy themes regarding how environmental risks should be regulated. He used the Ottati & Goss case as the basis for his 1992 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School, which he then published as a book entitled Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation the following year.46Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993). In that book, Judge Breyer identified why and how government regulation of risks, including environmental risks, had a tendency to require excessive expenditures to reduce the “last ten percent” of risks,47Id. at 11. here too referring to the facts of the Ottati & Goss case as an illustrative example.48Id. at 11, 40. Judge Breyer more broadly proffered the question whether determining the acceptable level of environmental risk was best answered by a political process vulnerable to accommodating the public’s tendency to overreact to environmental risks. And, answering his own question, Judge Breyer concluded that such public policy questions were better answered by expert, technical agencies removed from the pressure of politics and popular opinion.49Id. at 59–81.

What simultaneously made Judge Breyer’s book so popular with the Republican Party and regulated business and so unpopular with Democratic Party progressives and environmentalists was its embrace of the rhetoric of regulatory reform. Regulatory reform had in fact been an express and significant part of the agenda of the administration of President Jimmy Carter and EPA when Judge Breyer first endorsed it in his work at the Senate in 1980.50U.S. EPA, OPA-114/8, 1978 Report: Better Health & Regulatory Reform (1979) [hereinafter EPA 1978 Report]. Regulatory reform then was a more benign political issue, and it enjoyed support on both sides of the political aisle. In March 1978, President Carter issued an executive order, developed in part by EPA leadership, that sought to “reform” the process for developing “significant regulations” in order to eliminate regulations that “impose unnecessary burdens on the economy.”51Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, §§ 1–2, (Mar. 24, 1978); see also EPA 1978 Report, supra note 50, at 10. Political appointees at EPA during the Carter administration favored opportunities to employ economic analysis to ensure that the Agency was directing its limited resources to the most serious environmental issues and taking advantage of market incentives to reduce pollution in general.52Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 103–04 (2004). The Reagan administration announced from the outset that it would similarly champion a regulatory reform agenda that took more account of the costs of environmental protection.53Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 Md. L. Rev. 253, 261 (1986); Lazarus, supra note 52, at 99–101.

But by 1993, the term “regulatory reform” had become a highly partisan term, tainted by efforts during three Republican administrations to cut back on environmental protections under the guise of cost-benefit analysis and economic efficiency. Reagan administration officials at the Office of Management and Budget and EPA used the rhetoric of regulatory reform and cost-benefit analysis but in a wholly skewed fashion to justify deregulation based on exaggerated estimates of regulatory costs coupled with underassessments of the benefits of environmental protection.54McGarity, supra note 53, at 260–68; Lazarus, supra note 52, at 101–06. Environmentalists vehemently opposed those efforts.55McGarity, supra note 53, at 268–73; Lazarus, supra note 52, at 101–06.

Even prominent supporters of President Reagan openly commented at the time that his environmental appointees had so bungled the regulatory reform effort that they had undermined it. The President’s own chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, a stalwart champion of regulatory reform, publicly declared: “We will be lucky if by January 1985, we are back where we were 1981 in terms of the public’s attitude toward” regulatory reform.56Lazarus, supra note 52, at 100–05.

That is why Judge Breyer’s promotion of regulatory reform rhetoric in his 1993 book set off alarm bells throughout the environmental community, and to those reviewing his writings for the White House Counsel in 1993, to a degree that would not have happened in the late 1970s during the Carter administration. But, in light of how much the political debate had shifted since 1980 when Breyer was working on deregulation on the Senate Judiciary Committee, his 1993 publication was either politically tone-deaf or deliberately designed to position Judge Breyer for promotion as a justice with bipartisan support. With Judge Breyer, the former is a distinct possibility. However, whatever the actual motivation, the publication of Judge Breyer’s book coincided with the openings of two seats on the Supreme Court in successive years and played a central role in whether he would be nominated and confirmed.

Republicans and the business community became his cheerleaders while environmentalists expressed serious concerns. The latter’s criticism could be scathing. “[I]t is clear that [Judge Breyer] is no fan of health and environmental regulation.”57Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 495 (statement of Ralph Nader) (citing the attachment Thomas O. McGarity, Could Justice Breyer Be Hazardous to Our Health?). If he “had been a member of Congress, he would not have supported many of the current health and environmental statutes.”58Id. at 502. They accused him of blithely accepting the economic
analysis of right-wing think tanks to belittle the risks addressed by government regulation,59Id. at 496. minimizing “the risks posed by toxic chemicals
in the environment,”60Id. “reject[ing] a policy of erring on the side of safety . . . because it leads society to spend too many dollars chasing after what he believes to be trivial risks,”61Id. at 499. failing to recognize the limits of cost-benefit analysis,62See id. at 500–01. and of “even accept[ing] the highly dubious ‘richer is safer’ argument against stringent regulation of activities that pose health and safety regulations.”63Id. at 501.

Consumer advocate Ralph Nader pulled no punches in testifying against Judge Breyer’s confirmation. Nader described Judge Breyer as an “extremist.”64Id. at 470 (statement of Ralph Nader). According to Nader, Judge Breyer was “ridden with fantasy” and “insensitive on the ground to the health and safety needs of the American people.”65Id. Judge Breyer, Nader concluded, “appears to seriously question many health and safety laws that he will be expected to interpret impartially as a Justice of the Supreme Court.”66Id. at 477 (statement of Ralph Nader).

There were, of course, supporters too. The renowned scholar Professor Cass Sunstein, a close professional colleague of Judge Breyer, casebook co-author, and the leading legal scholar in support of the central role of cost-benefit analysis for rational regulation, testified in favor of Judge Breyer’s nomination.67Id. at 577–78 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein). More moderate legal academics contended that Judge Breyer would be a “friend” to environmental law and that, even though “in sheer numbers, his rulings against environmental groups probably exceed his rulings in their favor”—only because they lose most of their cases—the judge “ha[d] shown a sensitivity and appreciation for environmental issues.”68Funk, supra note 38, at 736, 745.

Only one environmental public interest organization affirmatively supported Judge Breyer’s nomination—the Conservation Law Foundation, headquartered in Massachusetts—perhaps because of his favorable ruling in a case they had brought to clean up Boston Harbor, because of geographic allegiance to Judge Breyer, or perhaps even more likely, because of institutional loyalty to his principal political sponsor, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy.69Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 130 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (citing the attachment Letter from Douglas I. Foy, Executive Director, Conservation Law Foundation, Boston, Mass. (June 30, 1994)) (supporting Judge Breyer’s nomination to the Supreme Court); United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding a district court order that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to remedy violations of the Clean Water Act that had polluted Boston Harbor, was barred from hooking up new sewer lines emptying into the harbor until the state provided its Water Resource Authority the power to acquire a suitable landfill site to avoid such continuing pollution). But even that organization’s letter was noticeably understated. It was only two paragraphs long and addressed merely “To Whom It May Concern.”70Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 130 (Letter from Douglas I. Foy). The most the organization’s director could muster in his opening sentence was that “Stephen Breyer has fashioned a remarkable record on environmental matters that have come before the First Circuit Court of Appeals.”71Id. The word “remarkable,” is, of course, itself remarkable for what it does not say in a letter that purports to be an endorsement.

During his own Senate testimony, Judge Breyer plainly sought to assuage concerns by walking back from the deregulatory import of some of his writings. While conservative Republican Senator Strom Thurmond stressed how he “was pleased to learn of [Judge Breyer’s] concerns with excessive regulation,”72Id. at 140. Judge Breyer asserted that the “role of economics” was necessarily “much more limited” in application to “health, safety, and the environment . . . because, there, no one would think that economics is going to tell you how [much] you ought to spend helping the life of another person.”73Id. at 128. He also characterized the book as “a plea . . . not to cut back by 1 penny this Nation’s commitment to health, safety, and the environment” but only to “reorganize[e] that commitment” to ensure that money was spent on saving real lives rather than “on the statistical life that might not exist.”74Id. at 308.

The Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of Judge Breyer’s confirmation to join the Court.75Helen Dewar, Breyer Wins Senate Confirmation to Top Court, 87 to 9, Wash. Post (July 30, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/30/breyer-wins-senate-confirmation-to-top-court-87-to-9/762b763f-f95f-46de-8f8a-fd6dc567b54a [https://perma.cc/W9AE-W8P6]. Eighty-seven senators voted in favor, only nine were opposed, and four did not vote.76Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress—2nd Session, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1032/vote_103_2_00242.htm [https://perma.cc/TS5W-Y8EH].
And the only votes opposed were a smattering of conservative Senate Republicans.77See id. No liberal Democrat opposition challenged their own President’s nominee notwithstanding any misgivings they might have harbored.78Id.

II.  JUSTICE BREYER’S RECORD IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES BEFORE THE COURT

Justice Breyer’s environmental law record consists of his votes in individual cases and his written opinions in a subset of those cases. During the past twenty-eight years on the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer has written more than five hundred opinions: (1) about two hundred opinions for the Court; (2) approximately one hundred concurring opinions; (3) just shy of two hundred dissenting opinions; and (4) approximately thirty opinions dissenting and concurring in part.79See Writings by Justice Breyer, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/
justices/breyer.dec.html [https://perma.cc/D98H-6V3T].

The Justice has written relatively few opinions in environmental cases, mostly for the straightforward reason that the Court does not decide that many environmental cases. Environmental law is, at least numerically, a relatively small part of the Court’s docket so long as one defines “environmental law” more narrowly as I am doing for the purposes of this inquiry.

My narrower approach considers only those cases that arise in a fact pattern in which environmental protection concerns are at stake and those stakes are not wholly incidental to the legal issue raised. That definition sweeps in both cases involving the construction and application of classic environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy Act8042 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347. as well as those cases involving general cross-cutting legal issues such as the scope of congressional commerce authority in a case where environmental protection is at stake. A broader, and perfectly fair contrary approach would be to consider all cases that raise legal issues that, although not arising in an environmental protection setting in the case then before the Court, are likely to have significant implications in future cases that do.81A clear example is a case like United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a Court ruling involving the scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority. The Lopez case itself raised the question whether a federal firearms law exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, id. at 552, but the Court’s decision has clear implications for the reach of other federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. The same is true for the Court’s decisions on a host of other wide-ranging legal issues that cut across many fact patterns, including those implicating environmental protection. A Supreme Court decision on standards of judicial review in interpreting statutes or regulations, the rules of civil procedure, limits on corporate liability, Article III standing, among myriad others, are naturally not confined to the fact patterns in which they arise. Nor, in the vast majority of circumstances, could they be or should they be for those Court rulings to be coherent. Consistent, however, with the author’s belief that there is a discernible “environmental” dimension to environmental law that is important for judges (and Justices) to consider,82Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703, 744–63 (2000); Lazarus, supra note 52, at 16–42. But see Jay Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 260 (2006). this Article relies on the narrower definition instead.

Based on that narrower definition, I have identified sixty-three “environmental law cases” decided by the Court during Justice Breyer’s tenure to date, in which he participated in sixty-one due to his recusal in two cases in which his brother, also a federal judge, participated in the case in the lower courts. This subset of cases fulfilled two conditions: (1) each case raised legal issues in the environmental protection context; and (2) that context was not wholly incidental to the legal issue being considered by the Court.83See infra Appendix A. My database does not include original action equitable apportionment cases involving the allocation of water rights between states. A very strong argument could be made for inclusion of those cases. The only reason I did not do so was, correctly or incorrectly, I did not include them in my original 2000 database, and I decided it was best to be consistent for comparative purposes over time. In all events, those cases amount to a very small percentage of the cases and are unlikely to have any significant impact on the resulting statistics or the accompanying analysis. For instance, I excluded from my sample a case like Alaska v. United States,84Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75 (2005). a 2005 original action case in which the State of Alaska and the United States were disputing ownership over certain submerged lands in Glacier Bay. I also excluded the Court’s recent decision in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore,85BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore,141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021). concerning the scope of judicial review of a district court ruling not to allow removal of a state court case to federal court. In neither of those cases, or those like them, do the environmental stakes play any non-incidental role in the Court’s resolution of the legal issue to be decided.86Unsurprisingly, whether the legal issue is “incidental” to the environmental protection concerns is a judgment call, and there are close cases. As a general matter, if it was close, my tendency was to include the case. But I included cases like Article III standing and regulatory takings cases because, as I have elaborated in previous scholarship,87Lazarus, supra note 82, at 749–52. the environmental dimension of those cases should bear on the application of the relevant legal standards even if, as described below, individual Justices and sometimes a majority of the Justices too often fail to grasp its relevance.

A.  Justice Breyer’s Votes

In 2000, I published an article that tried to develop a rough quantitative basis for comparing how individual Justices voted in environmental law cases and for assessing whether certain Justices and the Court as a whole were more or less responsive to the need for environmental protection. The article argued more broadly in support of the thesis that there was a uniquely “environmental” dimension to environmental law relevant to judicial decision making—for instance, how such concerns might provide a proper basis for rethinking what constitutes a “concrete injury” for Article III standing purposes, a “property right” in natural resources for regulatory takings purposes, an “intelligible principle” for nondelegation doctrine purposes, an “economic activity” in Commerce Clause analysis, or the degree of judicial deference owed a federal agency in both technical assessments and statutory interpretations.88Id. at 744–63. While concluding that the Court overall had displayed “apparent apathy or even antipathy towards environmental law,”89Id. at 703. I concluded that some individual Justices had shown more sensitivity than others to how environmental protection concerns could be relevant to how the legal issues before the Court should best be decided.90Id. at 721–34.

My 2000 analysis relied on a scoring system somewhat analogous to that employed by the League of Conservation Voters in scoring members of Congress on environmental matters,91See generally, e.g., League of Conservation Voters, National Environmental Scorecard (1998), https://scorecard.lcv.org/sites/scorecard.lcv.org/files/2021_LCV_Scorecard.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BJ9-KSSK]. but now applied to each Justice. A Justice was awarded one point for each outcome that I classified as “pro-environmental protection,” resulting in each Justice receiving an “EP score,” based on the percentage of pro-environmental votes the Justice cast out of those in the sample of environmental cases in which that Justice participated. Although nominally quantitative in its ultimate yield, I freely admitted at the time the “inevitabl[e] arbitrariness and sometimes downright foolishness in attempting any such ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ policy assignments to Supreme Court rulings, especially assignments that purport to be binary in nature.” 92Id. at 722.

The problems are obvious. First, I defined as “pro-environmental” the legal position favored by environmentalists in each case. An environmental advocate, however, trying to win a particular case may in fact be making an argument that leads to a win in that case but to losses in other future environmental cases. For instance, the advocate may be arguing against deferring to an expert agency’s judgment because, in the case before the Justices, an argument against such deference may be needed to secure a win. But if the advocate prevails in that case, the precedent established may cause environmentalists in the future to lose far more than they win if it turns out that judicial deference to agency expertise is more advantageous to environmental protection concerns over the longer term.

Second, the legal position favored by environmentalists in a particular case may be very weak on the merits and warrant rejection. There is no necessary correlation between a legal argument favoring environmental protection and its being a meritorious argument. Not every argument in favor of environmental protection is necessarily a strong legal argument that a judge or Justice should accept.

Indeed, there is good reason to worry that the Justices tend to hear cases in which the legal arguments favoring environmental protection are disproportionately weaker. As I have detailed elsewhere,93Richard Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1524–26 (2008); Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 Yale L.J. Online 89, 95 (2009); Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 Geo. L.J. 1507, 1532–34 (2012). the Court’s decision-making at the jurisdictional stage for most of the past fifty years that define the modern environmental law era has been skewed against environmentalists. The vast majority of the cases in which the Court has granted review are cases in which the position favored by environmentalists prevailed in the courts below. The Court has taken relatively few cases in which the environmentalists lost and then sought the Court’s review, especially those in which the federal government was the prevailing party.94For instance, when the Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in Massachusetts v. EPA, 548 U.S. 903 (2006), in June 2006, it was the first time since 1970 that the Justices had granted a petition supported by environmentalist parties over the federal government’s opposition and ruled on the merits. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971). The Court has, in effect, cherry-picked the cases in which environmentalists may have won based on potentially weak arguments while not being similarly ready to review cases in which business interests have won on weak grounds.95The most troubling explanation for this persistent decades-long trend is that the Justices have been far more ready to conclude at the class certification stage that a lower court ruling in favor of environmentalists is wrong and important enough to warrant granting review than if the environmentalists had instead lost. To be sure, once the Court grants review, the Court gains a fuller appreciation of the competing legal arguments, and it quite often ends up affirming the lower court’s judgment, sometimes unanimously. But the resulting skewed docket nonetheless still means that the Court is far less ready to correct mistakes in cases environmentalists won in the lower courts than in cases they lost. And there is no obvious reason to presume that the lower courts only make mistakes in the former category and not in the latter too. A contributing factor to such skewing, however, may also be that environmentalists who have lost in the lower courts have been understandably wary of taking their cases to the Court over the past fifty years because of its conservative leanings. Just when modern environmental law was taking off in the United States in the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon was transforming the Supreme Court, which had not long before been fairly liberal, into a far more conservative Court. Nixon appointed four new Justices to the Court in fewer than three years, including a Chief Justice—Warren Burger—who replaced Earl Warren. About the Court: Justices 1789 to Present, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/9T5R-46C9]. Since 1972, only two years after the EPA was created and Congress passed the Clean Air Act, the Court has been reliably conservative, and it has been increasingly conservative over time as conservative Republican Presidents have dominated the nominations for the past fifty years. See id. Nor is a general reluctance to have the Court hear cases in which environmentalists have lost limited to certiorari petition–shy environmental advocates. In a not-for-attribution conversation with a Justice a few years ago, the Justice confided that they followed the same practice. They would not vote in favor of review in a case important to them that they thought was decided incorrectly by the lower court unless they were confident that, once granted, they could later secure five votes to win. While it takes only four Justices to agree to hear a case, it of course requires five votes to win. Lazarus, supra note 52, at 230 & n.32.

I accordingly warned in 2000 against drawing any conclusions based on EP scores apart from those at the two extremes—either very high or very low. Because of the obvious limits to such scoring, only such extreme discrepancies in scores might offer a fair basis for positing that the Justice in question was more or less “likely to rule in favor of or against an environmentally protective outcome because of that outcome’s environmental dimension.”96Lazarus, supra note 82, at 722–23. Those same limits are also a reason not to be surprised when even the highest EP score is not that high—the potential result of a skewed merits docket.

In 2000, Justice Breyer had served on the Court for only six years, and his EP score back then of 66.6 after six years of service was in fact one of the highest of those then on the Court. It far exceeded Justice Scalia’s strikingly low score of 13.8 and the scores of Justices Thomas (20.0) and Kennedy (25.9). But, of course, his score came nowhere close to Justice Douglas’s, who retired from the Court in 1975. An environmentalist hero and former member of the Board of the Sierra Club,97See M. Margaret McKeown, Citizen Justice: The Environmental Legacy of William O. Douglas—Public Advocate and Conservation Champion 107–22, 146–47, 188–89 (2022). Douglas boasted of a score of 100—apparently no matter the legal issue presented, and perhaps even the relative strength of the competing arguments, Douglas always voted in favor of the outcome supported by environmentalists. Justice Breyer’s EP score of 66.6 was also higher than Justices Brennan (58.3), Marshall 61.3), Blackmun (58.3), Stevens (50.6), Souter (57.1), and Ginsburg (63.6) but not to any significant extent, especially because both Justice Breyer and Ginsburg had both served for far fewer years than Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens and therefore reflected very different cases too. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens were accordingly being measured based on cases in which it might have been harder on the merits to vote for the side favored by environmentalists.98Id. at 725–28.

Two decades later, the number of environmental cases in which Justice Breyer has participated has naturally risen, and interestingly his new EP score (62.3) is essentially the same as before and as the two other Justices with high scores—Sotomayor (64) and Kagan (68). Yet Justice Breyer’s score is sufficiently higher than former Justices Scalia (23.4) and Kennedy (36.0) and current members such as Chief Justice Roberts (20), Justice Thomas (20.6), and Justice Alito (10.5) for their overlapping cases since 1994 to suggest significant differences in the application of law to environmental protection. Justice Alito’s score of 10.5 is astoundingly low. The only cases in which Alito voted on the side supported by environmentalists were in four cases that the Court decided unanimously in their favor.99S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006); Env’t Def. Fund v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007); Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1608 (2021).

On the other end of the spectrum, although former Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg’s scores in 2000 were a tad lower than Justice Breyer’s at that time, all of their scores became higher—Stevens (78.4), Souter (80.6), and Ginsburg (71.9)—than Justice Breyer’s for the cases on which they overlapped while serving on the Court. The gap between Justice Breyer and both Justice Stevens and Souter is not especially significant but arguably enough to suggest a potential difference in their respective willingness to consider how the environmental protection dimension of the case might be relevant to their resolution of the legal issue before the Court and, for Justices Stevens and Souter, in favor of a more protective outcome.100See infra Appendix B.

Finally, not all environmental cases are, of course, equally important, and the individual votes are more significant in some cases than in others. Some cases are far more significant in terms of their import for environmental protection. Whether EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act101Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–34 (2007). is clearly more important than whether a certain river in Alaska is “public land” for the purposes of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.102Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1085 (2019). And, because in some of those more important cases the vote was also closely divided, the vote of any one Justice in the majority is outcome-determinative. In that distinct respect, the individual vote of any single Justice in a five-Justice majority is more significant.

Based on this criteria, Justice Breyer’s votes in several cases were especially significant, including Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA,103Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 (2004). upholding the EPA’s authority to override Alaska’s issuance of a permit under the Clean Air Act; Kelo v. City of New London,104Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–89 (2005). sustaining a local government’s exercise of its eminent domain power to condemn residential property to promote commercial development; Massachusetts v. EPA,105Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520, 534–35. both upholding environmental-plaintiff standing and rejecting the EPA’s claim that it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; and Murr v. Wisconsin,106Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949–50 (2017). rejecting a regulatory takings claim against a local environmental restriction on residential development. Those are all, moreover, cases environmentalists won.

By contrast, in only one of the sixty-one environmental law cases in which Justice Breyer participated and environmentalists lost did he provide the critical vote against their position.107See infra Appendix A. Justice Breyer voted against the legal outcome favored by environmentalists on twenty-three occasions. In eleven of those cases, the Court ruled unanimously and in three others the vote was eight to one against the environmentalist position. Justice Breyer supplied the sixth and seventh vote for the majority in six cases and dissented in the last two. The only case in which Justice Breyer’s vote was outcome-determinative in a case that environmentalists lost during the past twenty-eight years was the Court’s ruling in June 2021 that the condemnation authority provided by the federal Natural Gas Act to recipients of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate of public convenience and necessity extended to the right to acquire state-owned property. Interestingly, the five-Justice majority was an unusual one, consisting of Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the Court’s opinion, and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh.108PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2021).

B.  Justice Breyer’s Opinions in Environmental Cases

Justice Breyer has written opinions in nineteen environmental cases, which is a disproportionately large number of the sixty-one environmental cases in which he has participated. He has written three majority opinions for the Court,109Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998); Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000); Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). six concurring opinions,110Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010). and ten opinions either dissenting in full or in part.111Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Def. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 777 (2021); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct 2063 (2021). Although Justice Breyer’s majority opinions are clearly the most significant because they alone announce binding legal precedent, the concurring and dissenting opinions may well be the most personally revealing because they largely resulted from the Justice’s own decision to write an opinion expressing his views rather than, as with majority opinions, an assignment from the senior Justice in the majority to write the official opinion of the Court.112One caveat is that when several Justices are all dissenting on a common ground, the most senior Justice dissenting may informally decide which of the Justices should author the dissent. However, that assignment lacks the weight and obvious significance of an assignment to author an opinion of the Court. The majority opinion, however, nonetheless can very much reflect the priorities and values of its author, especially whether the Justice chooses to write the opinion narrowly and tries to attract as many votes as possible or instead drafts the opinion in as sweeping a way as possible consistent with maintaining the bare minimum of five votes required for a majority.113Richard J. Lazarus, Back to “Business” at the Supreme Court: The “Administrative Side” of Chief Justice Roberts, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 38–39 (2015).

1.  Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinions

Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinions in Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club,114Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998). Public Lands Council v. Babbitt,115Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000). and County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.116Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). None is a headliner. Nor is that at all surprising, given that Justice Breyer remained the most junior Justice for his first twelve years on the Court,117See Justices 1798 to Present, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/F4SL-7RSH].
which does not lend itself to especially high-profile opinion assignments from his more senior colleagues. That status is also likely why it was not until 2019 that Chief Justice Roberts assigned Justice Breyer a moderately more important environmental case, County of Maui, though still far short of a blockbuster.

All three Court opinions by Justice Breyer evidence his essential pragmatism, a catchword that the White House promoted when he was nominated and that was accordingly captured in the first New York Times headline announcing his nomination.118Gwen Ifill, Pragmatic Jurist: Bipartisan Support Seen as Clinton Sidesteps Risky Senate Fight, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1994, at 1. His pragmatism was similarly the theme of favorable testimony provided before Congress by one of his leading academic supporters.119See Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 424–26 (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan) (describing Breyer “as a pragmatist in the tradition of Holmes”).

Ohio Forestry is a classic opinion assigned to a junior Justice. Indeed, it might well be classified as one of the “dogs” of the docket that Term, a term of art the Justices use informally in referring to the kind of case no Justice has any particular interest in writing.120Lazarus, supra note 113, at 63–64. At issue was whether the Sierra Club’s challenge to the Forest Service’s plan for managing the Wayne National Forest in Ohio was justiciable.121Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998). The Court ruled unanimously that the lawsuit was not ripe for review on the ground that the plan did not itself create any adverse effects of a “strictly legal kind” because it did not purport to authorize any particular action within the forest.122Id. at 733. It would be far more sensible, Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court reasoned, to wait until “the Plan is implemented” which would allow the reviewing court to benefit from “further factual development” of the issues.123Id. at 733, 737.

Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court evidences significant sensitivity to the administrative preferences of the federal agency and to the resources of the federal judiciary. The ruling that the case was not ripe emphasizes how allowing the Sierra Club’s lawsuit to proceed would have “require[d] time-consuming judicial consideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan . . . without benefit of the focus that a particular logging proposal could provide.”124Id. at 736. There is obvious force to the Court’s concern. But the opinion evidences no comparable consideration of the litigation resource challenges that a public interest organization like Sierra Club faces in trying to oversee a series of site-specific logging proposals over time. What the Court posits as the better approach may well be better in theory, but the challenges of such constant site-specific oversight may in fact be preclusive as a practical matter of any meaningful review of future logging decisions in a national forest.

To that same end, the Court declined to consider a series of other ways that the Forest Plan could immediately harm the Sierra Club and its members. The Court reasoned that Sierra Club’s argument “suffer[ed] from the legally fatal problem that it ma[de] its first appearance [before the] Court in the briefs on the merits.”125Id. at 738. That is a fair point, and the Court is not at all out of bounds in strictly applying administrative law exhaustion principles in denying consideration of Sierra Club’s argument. Yet, here too, the ruling ignores the practical limits of a resource-strapped public interest organization maintaining lawsuits in an effort to ensure other unrepresented interests are given voice. An organization like the Sierra Club is hard-pressed to monitor all the site-specific decisions that Forest Service personnel are making on a daily basis throughout a national forest. For this reason, the Club’s only practical recourse may be to persuade a court, as they tried unsuccessfully to accomplish in the Ohio Forestry case, to establish some guidelines for the exercise of Forest Service personnel discretion in the future. And the Court’s lack of sensitivity to that practical limitation contrasts unfavorably with the many ways that the Justices, in my experience both litigating for and against the United States, routinely allow the federal government to raise new arguments and bring to the Court’s attention new facts not considered below, because of the Justices’ awareness of the practical limits in the government’s ability to oversee all of its lower court litigation.

The Court’s providing such practical flexibility to the United States makes great sense. Otherwise, the Court would be making significant pronouncements of law affecting the country based on incomplete arguments and flawed factual assumptions. And, given the thousands of cases the federal government handles in the lower courts, it is exceedingly limited in its ability to ensure that all the best arguments are made in the timeliest manner. The Court, however, could demonstrate some sensitivity to the practical needs of environmental citizen suit litigants too. Justice Breyer’s opinion for the unanimous Court in Ohio Forestry evidences no such awareness of the problem.

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt126Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000). was a logical sequel to Ohio Forestry. Again, Chief Justice William Rehnquist assigned the junior Justice Breyer the task of writing an opinion for a unanimous Court in another public lands administrative law case that was likely of little, if any, interest to the Justices. The major difference was that, rather than environmental plaintiffs challenging the Forest Service’s management of a national forest, it was commercial livestock interests challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s administration of grazing permits on public lands.

The basic result was the same. The Court concluded that the federal agency’s regulations governing the issuance of permits were valid under the relevant statutory language and that the commercial plaintiffs’ concerns that they might be harmed in how those regulations were applied in the future were largely premature.127See id. at 750. The plaintiffs should instead wait, not unlike the environmental plaintiffs in Ohio Forestry, until the federal agency actually applied the regulations in a specific factual context that harmed them.128Id. at 743–44. While the reasoning is similar is tone, there is still a significant practical difference between the two cases because the commercial party subject to a grazing regulation will naturally always know as soon as such harm happens in the future, which is not true for an environmental organization striving to learn of any possible site-specific decision to allow logging or other potentially harmful activity within a very large area of land such as a national forest.129Id. at 739–44.

It took twenty more years for Justice Breyer to write a third opinion for the Court in an environmental case, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.130Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund,140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). And, reflecting his more senior status by that time, the case is far more significant than either Ohio Forestry or Public Lands Council. It is not a mere unanimous toss-off. County of Maui instead presents a rather thorny and important question of statutory interpretation under the Clean Water Act—the type of question that nicely lends itself to Justice Breyer’s proclivity to pragmatic solutions.

The precise legal issue raised in County of Maui concerns how direct or indirect an addition of pollutants into navigable waters must be to constitute a “discharge” of a pollutant into navigable waters requiring a pollution permit under the Clean Water Act.131Id. at 1468; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1321. In County of Maui itself, the municipal sewage treatment facility seeking to avoid the permit requirement injected contaminated water into a well located about a half mile from the Pacific Ocean—but the discharge naturally reached the Pacific within a few months through the ground water.132See Cnty. of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469. The facility contended that no permit was required unless the pollutants were directly introduced into a navigable water body like the Pacific, meaning that the pollution was exempted from the Clean Water Act permit requirement if it travelled even just a few inches through groundwater or over the surface land before reaching the ocean.133See id. at 1473. The EPA agreed that any travel through groundwater placed the addition of pollutants outside the Clean Water Act but contrasted that any travel over surface land would depend on a more contextual analysis of directness.134Id. at 1469–71.

In rejecting both those limits, Justice Breyer’s opinion for a six-Justice majority held that a Clean Water Act permit was required “when there is a discharge from a point source directly into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”135Id. at 1476. The Court’s ruling displays Justice Breyer’s willingness to embrace a nuanced and accordingly ultimately vague legal test—such as “functional equivalence”—when he believes clearer legal rules fail to account for all the factors that should be relevant in solving a problem. The Court’s “functional equivalence” test rejects any hard-and-fast lines for when an addition of a pollutant is too indirect in favor of a multi-factor inquiry. The opinion candidly acknowledges that there are “too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court to use more specific language,”136Id. while both highlighting seven relevant factors and underscoring that “time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.”137Id. at 1477. Interestingly, the Chief Justice expressed confusion at oral argument about what Justice Breyer’s “functional equivalence” test meant, when Justice Breyer then raised the possibility of such a test,138Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260). but nonetheless subsequently chose Justice Breyer to write the Court’s opinion.

The County of Maui ruling is significant for environmental law. Although the Court nominally vacated the lower court’s judgment favorable to the environmental plaintiffs and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration in light of its ruling, the functional equivalent test amounted to a clear win for the plaintiffs. They will do well under that test, as will environmental plaintiffs in a host of cases across the country who have brought Clean Water Act citizen suits against sources that discharge to navigable waters in a proximate but still indirect water through groundwater and over land. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the County of Maui ruling, environmentalists targeted leakage of coal ash into navigable water bodies from power plants.139Ellen M. Gilmer, Environmentalists Eye Power Plants After Supreme Court Ruling, Bloomberg L., (April 24, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/
environmentalists-eye-power-plants-after-supreme-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/8WDC-27GM].
Although County of Maui does not rise to the front page headline status of a case like Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,140Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). expanding Article III standing for environmental citizen suit plaintiffs, or Massachusetts v EPA,141Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). establishing the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, the case will make a big difference in application to lots of factual circumstances and represents an increasingly rare environmentalist victory as the Court’s own bench becomes more conservative.

2.  Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinions

As described above, Justice Breyer’s separate opinions are even more revealing because, unlike majority opinions that are assigned by the most senior Justice in the majority, one can be more confident that the Justice writing separately is expressing their own views. Justice Breyer wrote six concurring opinions, four of which both address significant legal issues and relate directly to the concerns raised by environmentalists when Justice Breyer was nominated. In each, Justice Breyer expressed views that promoted the very regulatory reform themes antithetical to many environmentalists. His doing so each time in a concurring opinion makes clear that these themes remained very important to him, just as environmentalists had feared at the time of his nomination.

First, in General Electric v. Joiner,142Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). decided in 1997, Justice Breyer wrote separately while also joining the majority ruling that upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude from jury consideration expert testimony proffered to demonstrate a link between the plaintiffs’ exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) and small-cell lung cancer.143Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring). In his separate opinion, Justice Breyer stressed that “modern life, including good health and economic well-being, depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances,”144Id. at 148. presumably alluding to a chemical like PCBs, and the need for judges to use their gatekeeping authority to ensure that tort liability did not effectively “destroy” the “wrong” chemicals.145Id. at 149. Such a concern with the potential for excessive tort liability to harm businesses was in the late 1990s a major talking point for business leaders seeking to curb large tort liability awards.146See, e.g., Barry Meier, Companies Likely to Seek Federal Court Reviews, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1996, at A19; William Glaberson, The Nation: Looking for Attention with a Billion-Dollar Message, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1999, at WK3.

In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,147Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). decided in 2001, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion was the one blight on an otherwise glorious day for environmentalists. In Whitman, Justice Scalia authored a unanimous opinion for the Court that repudiated what had been a major attack on the constitutionality of a central part of the Clean Air Act. The Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s remarkable ruling that the Act violated the nondelegation doctrine by requiring the EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards requisite to protect public health without basing its determination of those standards on an intelligible principle such as cost-benefit analysis.148Id. at 472–76.

Scalia’s opinion not only rejected the notion that cost-benefit analysis was required to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine’s requirement of an intelligible principle, but it further ruled that the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act barred the EPA from considering economic costs at all in promulgating the national standards.149Id. at 486. It was a sweeping win for both environmentalists and the EPA. But what made their victory even sweeter still was that it was unanimous and written by Justice Scalia, the Court’s leading conservative.

Justice Breyer’s separate concurring opinion fell far short of dampening the victor’s spirits that day, but his words were nonetheless chillingly expressive of some of the worst fears of environmentalists upon his confirmation. He disputed Scalia’s powerful statement that the EPA could consider compliance costs only if Congress’s textual commitment to such consideration was “clear.”150Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring). According to Justice Breyer, “other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting [rather than] forbidding” regulatory agencies from adopting “rational regulation” that considered a proposed regulation’s adverse economic effects.151Id.

Even more telling, Justice Breyer conflated economic costs with public health, just as industry had long been arguing should be done. According to Justice Breyer, because an overly protective environmental protection requirement that returned society to the “Stone Age” would clearly not be “requisite to protect the public health,” “the EPA, in setting standards that ‘protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety’” should be deemed to be able to weigh compliance costs against environmental benefits at least to guard against disproportionately high costs for only trivial benefits.152Id. at 495–96.

For environmentalists, Justice Breyer’s language sounded unsettlingly similar to the business community’s claims that a healthy society was a wealthy society and environmental protection laws that reduced business profitability were accordingly undermining rather than promoting public health.153See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Mercatus Center in Support of Cross-Petitioner at 12–22, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-1426); Brief of Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation and California Chamber of Commerce in Support of Cross-Petitioners American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. at 15–18, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-1426).  Had Justice Breyer authored his concurring opinion in any context other than a concurring opinion with no legal import and when environmentalists were otherwise enjoying an enormous victory, it might have garnered far more attention and concern. But, on a day of widespread relief and celebration, few paid attention to Justice Breyer’s concurrence.

Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Bates v. Dow Agriculture Sciences LLC,154Bates v. Dow Agric. Scis. LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). decided in 2004, strikes a similar concern about the adverse impacts of excessive government regulation. In Bates, however, the issue arose in the context of a federal preemption case, in which a pesticide manufacturer was arguing that federal pesticide regulation preempted state common law tort liability.155See id. at 435, 448–49. The majority opinion, which Justice Breyer joined, rejected the manufacturer’s more sweeping preemption theories, concluded that some state tort law liability might not be preempted, and remanded the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings.156See id. at 452–54. Justice Breyer wrote separately to emphasize that the EPA, the federal agency charged with administering the federal pesticide statute at issue, enjoyed authority to promulgate regulations that effectively preempted state tort liability to avoid “a counter-productive ‘crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements.’ ”157Id. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 448 (majority opinion)).

Finally, similarly sensitive to his perception of excessive environmental regulations was Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Conservation Council158Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). in 2009, in which the Justice provided the more conservative wing of the Court with its sixth vote in a major loss to environmentalists. At issue in Coeur Alaska was in effect whether a gold mine that was discharging toxic slurry into a lake three miles away could avoid having to comply with section 402 of the Clean Water Act, which would likely have barred the activity, by characterizing their toxic slurry as “fill,” thereby triggering section 404 of the Act, which separately and less restrictively regulates the addition of fill into navigable waters.159See id. at 265–67. The gold mine had placed enormous volumes of toxic slurry into the lake, which was 51 feet deep, 800 feet wide, and 2,000 feet long.160Id. at 294 (Breyer, J., concurring). And the EPA freely acknowledged that the slurry would kill all of the lake’s fish and nearly all of its aquatic life.161Id. at 297 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, JJ., dissenting).

To the environmental plaintiffs and the Ninth Circuit in its lower court ruling, the gold mine’s claim that it was “fill” rather than pollutant seemed like a blatant end run around the Water Act’s section 402 limitations on the addition of pollutants into navigable waters. But, relying on the EPA’s agreement that section 404 rather than section 402 applied, the Court ruled in industry’s favor.162Id. at 291 (majority opinion). Justice Breyer agreed, declining to join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which both Justices Stevens and Souter joined. Exhibiting the same preference for deferring to expert technical agencies promoted by his 1993 book, Justice Breyer explained the reasons why he joined the majority: “I cannot say whether the EPA’s compromise represents the best overall environmental result; but I do believe it amounts to the kind of detailed decision that the statutes delegate authority to the EPA, not the courts, to make (subject to the bounds of reasonableness).”163Id. at 294 (Breyer, J., concurring).

The contrast between Justice Breyer’s willingness to defer to the EPA, notwithstanding the extreme results, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent for herself and Justices Stevens and Souter was stark:

The Court’s reading . . . strains credulity. A discharge of a pollutant, otherwise prohibited by firm statutory command, becomes lawful if it contains sufficient solid material to raise the bottom of a water body, transformed into a waste disposal facility. Whole categories of regulated industries can thereby gain immunity from a variety of pollution-control standards.164Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, JJ., dissenting).

Justice Ginsburg, unlike Justice Breyer, was not willing to assume that the EPA would ensure this loophole was not abused in future applications, especially given the dissent’s view that it had been abused in the facts of the case then before the Court.165See id. at 303 n.5.

3.  Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinions in Part or in Full

Justice Breyer wrote separate opinions that dissented either in part or in full on ten occasions. In some, he concurred in part or in full with conservative majorities, and in others he dissented in part from liberal majorities. And on a few occasions, he dissented in full. The latter category tended to be those instances when Justice Breyer expressed views wholly favorable to the legal arguments of environmentalists. 

Two of the cases involved tort liability. In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers,166Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003). decided in 2003, Justice Breyer dissented from that part of the Court’s ruling that allowed tort plaintiffs who had been exposed to asbestos fibers and were suffering from asbestosis to recover for damages from their related reasonable fear of cancer.167See id. at 182 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer acknowledged that the legal issue was “a close and difficult one.”168Id. But he dissented in part from Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion because he was worried both about the “impossibility of knowing an appropriate compensation” for such fear169Id. at 185. and that compensating victims for their fear might leave too little money remaining later on for victims who ultimately suffered from cancer.170Id. at 185–87. On the other hand, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,171Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). decided in 2008, Justice Breyer dissented from a majority ruling limiting punitive damages from the Exxon Valdez Alaska oil spill based on his view that the punitive damages awarded the oil spill victims in that case need not be reduced.172Id. at 525–26 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Unlike in Norfolk and Exxon Shipping, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,173Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Entergy v. Riverkeeper,174Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,175Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). it was Justice Breyer’s partial concurrences with a conservative majority rather than his dissent from a liberal majority that were telling. In each, Justice Breyer’s separate opinion reflected his pragmatism and general desire to provide federal expert agencies with flexibility absent excessive judicial second-guessing.

In Winter, Justice Breyer declined to join Ginsburg’s dissent from the majority ruling overturning a lower court injunction of U.S. Navy exercises that the environmental plaintiffs alleged were harming marine mammals.176See Winter, 555 U.S. at 33; id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred in part with the conservative Justices who made up a majority and concluded that the plaintiffs’ evidentiary support was too “weak or uncertain” to justify the “seriousness of the harm” that the Navy maintained the injunction would do “to the Navy’s ability to maintain an adequate national defense.”177Id. at 36–37 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In Entergy, Justice Breyer returned most explicitly to his argument, reflected in his 1993 book and earlier concurring opinion in American Trucking, that cost-benefit analysis is essential in setting rational environmental protection standards. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented from the majority ruling that the Clean Water Act permitted the EPA to engage in cost-benefit analysis in deciding the extent to which a power plant’s cooling water intake structure must minimize its adverse environmental impact.178Entergy, 556 U.S. at 236 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) Justice Breyer, however, agreed that such analysis was permissible, arguing that “an absolute prohibition would bring about irrational results.”179Id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While suggesting some limits on how demanding such a cost-benefit analysis could be, he also cautioned that “in an age of limited resources available to deal with grave environmental problems, . . . too much wasteful expenditures devoted to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious) problems.”180Id. at 233. 

In Utility Air Regulatory Group, Justice Breyer again concurred in part with a conservative majority but this time to a very different policy end. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, ruled that the term “any pollutant” under the Clean Air Act did not extend to greenhouse gas pollutants as applied to one significant part of the Act.181Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 320–24 (2014). Justice Breyer proffered a different approach that, like the majority, avoided the EPA’s being compelled to regulate sources that the EPA agreed would be administratively impractical, but by interpreting instead the term “any source” in a manner that would ultimately provide the EPA more discretionary authority to choose how best to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. As described by Justice Breyer, “[t]he Court’s decision to read greenhouse gases out of the [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] program drain[ed] the Act of its flexibility.”182Id. at 341 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And Justice Breyer’s preferred approach “le[ft] the EPA with the sort of discretion as to interstitial matters that Congress likely intended it to retain.”183Id. at 342.

On the other hand, the Justice’s practical approach prompted him to dissent in full from the Court’s ruling in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club,184U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club,141 S. Ct. 777 (2021). decided in March 2021, in favor of a federal agency’s decision not to release a document to environmental plaintiffs under the Freedom of Information Act.185See id. at 783; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). That Act requires agencies to release to the public final agency decision-making documents unless they are deliberative in nature, reflecting Congress tempering its desire for public disclosure with a competing desire not to unduly chill those candid internal exchanges of ideas that might not occur if the participants knew all their thinking would later be made part of the public record.1865 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 141 S. Ct. at 785–86.

Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, the Interior Department’s Fish & Wildlife Service and the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service provide formal “biological opinions” to any federal agency whose proposed action may “adversely affect” an endangered or threatened species or its critical habitat.187U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 141 S. Ct. at 783–84; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, the two Services were preparing biological opinions on a proposed rule by the EPA under the Clean Water Act to regulate power plant cooling water intake structures because of the potentially adverse impact of those structures on aquatic wildlife.188U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 141 S. Ct. at 783–84.

Had the Services provided the EPA with a final biological opinion, the parties would not have disputed that such a final opinion would have been subject to public disclosure.189See id. at 786–87. In the case, however, the two Services never submitted a final biological opinion because the EPA ultimately rescinded its initially proposed rule after receiving an early draft of the Services’ biological opinion that had not yet been formally approved by either Service for submission.190See id. at 784. In challenging the EPA’s final cooling water intake structure, Sierra Club sought a copy of the informal draft biological opinions on the original proposed rule, which it hoped to use to attack the final rule.191See id. at 784–85.

The majority easily concluded, based on FOIA’s text, that such draft biological opinions—especially ones never approved by the relevant officials of the two services—need not be disclosed because they lacked any formal legal status within the ESA: “The deliberative process privilege protects the draft biological opinions at issue here because they reflect a preliminary view—not a final decision—about the likely effect of the EPA’s proposed rule on endangered species.”192Id. at 786. Such preliminary assessments were, the Court concluded, “both predecisional and deliberative.”193Id. at 788.

In dissent, Justice Breyer naturally took a more practical approach, looking not at the formal name of the relevant document, but its function in the agency decision-making process. Because, Justice Breyer reasoned, “[t]he function of a Draft Biological Opinion finding jeopardy [of an endangered species] . . . is much the same as that of a Final Biological Opinion” and triggers the same process within EPA, the same reasons that justify public release of the final biological opinion apply with equal force to the draft.194Id. at 790 (Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). However, because it was not clear whether the biological opinions at issue in the record were “drafts” or merely “Drafts of Draft Biological Opinion,” because they had never been approved by all relevant officials in the two Services, Justice Breyer contended the case should be remanded back to the court of appeals to decide their status.195Id. at 791–92.

In short, in some instances Justice Breyer’s lack of commitment to formalism supports policy ends favored by environmentalists, as in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. But in other instances, as in Coeur Alaska, he frustrates environmentalists by allowing the government to avoid what seems, on the face of the relevant statutory language, to be a clear transgression of congressional purpose.

However, Justice Breyer’s support for the constitutionality of environmental restrictions has been unqualified in Fifth Amendment takings cases. He has participated in ten Fifth Amendment takings cases while on the Court. And he voted against the regulatory takings claim in nine of those cases196Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1995); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (judicial taking); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). and against a per se physical takings claim in the tenth case.197Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct 2063 (2021). In one of those regulatory cases, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,198Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606. he filed a separate dissent to underscore his agreement both with Justice Ginsburg that the case was not ripe and with Justice O’Connor that it was relevant to regulatory takings analysis whether the landowner was challenging a land use restriction that existed at the time of their purchase of the property.199Id. at 654–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). And in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,200Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. 2063. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion on the ground that the majority erred by analyzing the state regulation of land use as a per se physical taking rather than as a possible regulatory taking.201Id. at 2089–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Finally, Justice Breyer also earned high marks from environmentalists for his support of environmental plaintiff Article III standing. Like regulatory takings, Article III standing has been a persistent issue in environmental law since the 1970s.202See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Admin. Procs., 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Justice Breyer voted in favor of environmental plaintiffs in the two most important standing cases during his tenure on the Court, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw203Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). and Massachusetts v. EPA,204Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). and he authored the opinion for himself and three other Justices dissenting from the Court’s ruling against the plaintiffs’ standing in Summers v. Earth Island Institute205Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). in 2009.206Id. at 501 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Breyer took direct issue with the majority’s ruling that the environmental plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a concrete injury in their lawsuit challenging the U.S. Forest Service’s salvage sale of timber from a national forest.207Id. at 501–10.

 III.  ASSESSING JUSTICE BREYER’S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW LEGACY: FRIEND OR FOE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION?

Justice Breyer is likely the only Justice ever chosen because of his perceived views on environmental law. But, ironically not because he was viewed as an ardent environmentalist. Just the opposite. He was thought to be a Justice who would instead be more sensitive to business than to environmental protection concerns.

That is both why Breyer failed to secure the nomination to the Court in 1993 and environmentalists opposed his selection in 1994—strongly favoring Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. And it is also why Republican Senate Leadership, including the Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole and the Judiciary Committee’s Ranking Minority Member Orrin Hatch, informed the White House that they would fight Babbitt’s nomination and promised a smooth confirmation process for Judge Breyer. As described at this Article’s outset, President Clinton chose not to fight, notwithstanding environmentalists’ warnings that Judge Breyer would be bad for environmental law and even “hazardous to our health.”208Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1.

So, which has Justice Breyer turned out to be—friend or foe? The answer seems relatively clear: friendly, if still shy of an unqualified friend. As reflected in a rough sense in his EP score, especially compared to those of his colleagues on the bench, Justice Breyer has voted in favor of results supported by environmentalists far more than most of the other Justices on the Court. And, in almost all of the most important environmental cases of the past twenty-eight years, he was a reliable vote joining the majority in the big cases environmentalists won—often providing the critical fifth vote—and no less a reliable vote in dissent with liberal justices sounding the alarm in the big cases environmentalists lost—as he did in West Virginia v. EPA, the very last environmental case decided by the Court when Justice Breyer was on the bench.209West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). These cases include major cases decided under framework environmental laws like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, as well as those involving major issues of constitutional law, such as Article III standing, congressional Commerce Clause authority, and regulatory takings. Justice Breyer has been a reliable, forceful vote for environmental protection in the biggest cases that mattered the most.

Environmentalist concerns about Justice Breyer’s support for regulatory reform proved overblown in application, but not because they were wrong about his views on the central role that cost-benefit analysis should play in setting environmental standards and his willingness to believe that such standards are unduly protective. They weren’t incorrect. Especially in his concurring opinions and in a scattering of his votes, Justice Breyer made clear, just as they feared, his belief in the essential role of cost-benefit analysis as well as his receptivity to concerns that environmental protection requirements may be so exceedingly expensive as to undermine, rather than promote, public health.210Jonathan Z. Cannon, Environment in the Balance: The Green Movement and the Supreme Court 126–27, 133–34 (2015).

However, in no case did Justice Breyer’s distinct views make a difference. He never once provided the critical “fifth vote” in any case in which he expressed those policy preferences for cost-benefit analysis.211The only case in which Breyer provided the decisive vote for the majority in which the position favored by environmentalists did not prevail was the recent PennEast case described above, which did not implicate cost-benefit analysis. The only legal issue raised in PennEast was whether the eminent domain authority possessed by a natural gas company pursuant to its receipt of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission extended to the condemnation of state-owned property. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. And his concurring voice was of no legal effect at all. Of course, had the makeup of the Court when those cases were decided been tilted slightly more to the left, Justice Breyer’s vote might well have made a critical difference, just as environmentalists had worried it would. But that concern was never realized in almost three decades.

Justice Breyer has also proved far less dogmatic in his views than assumed by his detractors at the time of his nomination. While supporting EPA’s authority to use cost-benefit analysis in his separate concurring opinion in Entergy, Justice Breyer agreed with the environmental respondents that Congress had intentionally curbed EPA’s ability to rely on cost-benefit analysis in the Clean Water Act.212Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 232 (2009) (“As this language suggests, the Act’s sponsors had reasons for minimizing the EPA’s investigation of, and reliance, upon cost-benefit comparisons.”). Where Justice Breyer departed from the environmental respondents was his view that EPA nonetheless was permitted to take such analysis into account so long as the agency did so in a very limited way: to guard against costs wholly disproportionate to environmental benefits—a far more modest invocation of cost-benefit analysis than that sought by industry.213Id. at 134. Justice Breyer also later fully joined Justice Kagan’s forceful dissent in Michigan v. EPA,214Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 764 (2015) (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). which criticized the majority for concluding that EPA was required to consider potential compliance costs in determining whether regulation of toxic mercury emissions from power plants was “appropriate.” Justice Breyer agreed with the other Michigan dissenters that Congress had instead instructed EPA to base its threshold determination of the appropriateness of emissions controls only on the extent of environmental harm posed by such emissions. None of the Justices, including the four dissenters, disputed that the Clean Air Act required EPA to consider control costs in subsequently determining the extent of emissions reduction subsequently required of power plants.215Id. at 769–78.

Finally, critics of Justice Breyer’s nomination to the Court failed to appreciate how Justice Breyer’s pragmatism and openness to consideration of regulatory costs and cost-benefit analysis might prompt the Justice to favor upholding EPA regulations those critics favored. In two very significant Clean Air Act cases, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation in 2014 and the recently-decided West Virginia v. EPA, EPA’s legal arguments in favor of the regulations at issue—the Clean Air Interstate Rule in EME Homer216EPA v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2013). and the Clean Power Plan in West Virginia217West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).—were weakened by the absence of clear support in the relevant statutory text. But what strengthened each of those EPA regulations was that both sets of ambitious regulations justified their broad reading of that language by the extent to which it permitted the EPA to take costs and benefits into account. In short, the kinds of economic analysis Justice Breyer favored allowed EPA to adopt more, not less, demanding environmental protection requirements.

To be sure, Justice Breyer has been no Justice Douglas. He has not voted in favor of the position favored by environmentalists in all cases. But nor is it clear that the nation, including environmentalists, should necessarily want such a Justice on the Court. Such a Justice might be a very good environmentalist, but not an especially good judge.

As described above, in eleven of the twenty-three environmental cases in which Justice Breyer voted against the position favored by environmentalists, all the Justices voted the same way.218See infra Appendix B. None dissented, neither Justice Souter, Stevens, Kagan, nor Sotomayor. All the other most progressive Justices on the Court agreed that there was no, or at least too little, merit to the legal position favored by environmentalists. In three more of those twenty-three cases, environmentalists lost by a vote of eight to one. Perhaps a Justice who dissented in those cases could be credited with perceiving actual strength in legal arguments that the others were missing. But it is also quite possible that they would be engaging in the very kind of ideologically driven judicial decision-making that environmentalists correctly condemn in those Justices with very low EP scores like Justices Alito and Scalia. Even those of us who care deeply about environmental protection, and worry no less deeply about the failings of our elected branches of government, should not see a judiciary that decides cases strictly on personal ideology rather than fair consideration of the actual strengths of the competing legal arguments as the proper solution to those failings.

Finally, contrary to the predictions of those advising President Clinton in June 1993, Justice Breyer has not remotely proven to be a dispassionate, “bloodless,” “cold fish” Justice lacking any “innate sense of justice.”219See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. To be sure, Justice Breyer is no Justice Sonia Sotomayor—a Justice whose writings evince a compassion for victims of injustice without ready modern parallel. He is a committed pragmatist. But his striking pragmatism should not be mistaken for a lack of passion. He has proven himself deeply committed to social justice and the fundamental role of the judiciary in its pursuit. He has made that philosophy clear in both his judicial opinions and in his writings outside of the Court, especially his 2005 book, Active Liberty, in which the Justice contends that judges should not merely attend to the need to ensure that individuals are free from governmental coercion but also ensure they enjoy freedom to participate fully in government itself, including the right to vote.220Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 32 (2005). 

CONCLUSION

Justice Breyer was certainly not environmentalists’ dream pick in 1994. And they had good reason to be concerned. But he has proved in actual practice to be an outstanding jurist for the nation and an excellent Justice for environmental protection law.

More fundamentally, Justice Breyer’s record on the Court suggests the wisdom of rethinking what it means to be a “dream” justice. Should it mean having a Justice who shares one’s ideological preferences on certain issues like environmental protection and will vote accordingly? Or should it mean having a Justice whose votes are rooted in a broader understanding of the proper role of the courts in interpreting law and deciding cases, including the central role our Constitution assigns to the judiciary to safeguard certain individual and collective rights? While the former Justice may reliably receive an EP score of 100, the latter is the better Justice, even if that means they sometimes will, as they should, rule in ways that disappoint.221Professor William Funk may have nailed it at the time of Justice Breyer’s confirmation. See Funk, supra note 38, at 736 (“Environmental law does have a friend on the Court, albeit a friend who places his duty to the law higher than his love for the environment.”).


APPENDIX A

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES OCTOBER TERM 1994–OCTOBER TERM 2021


Case Name

Citation

EP Designation

Dolan v. City of Tigard

512 U.S. 374 (1994)

Dissent

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Communities for A Great Oregon

515 U.S. 687 (1995)

Majority

Meghrig v. KFC Western

516 U.S. 479 (1996)

Dissent

General Electric v. Joiner

522 U.S. 136 (1997)

Dissent

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment

523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Dissent/Concur

Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club

523 U.S. 726 (1998)

Dissent

United States v. Bestfoods

524 U.S. 51 (1998)

Majority

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.

526 U.S. 687 (1999)

Concur

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.

528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Majority

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

529 U.S. 728 (2000)

Majority

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States

531 U.S. 159 (2001)

Dissent

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

531 U.S. 457 (2001)

Majority

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Dissent

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

535 U.S. 302 (2002)

Majority

Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers

538 U.S. 135 (2003)

Majority

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA

540 U.S. 461 (2004)

Majority

South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe

541 U.S. 95 (2004)

Majority

Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality Management District

541 U.S. 246 (2004)

Dissent

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

541 U.S. 752 (2004)

Dissent

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Association

542 U.S. 55 (2004)

Dissent

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences

544 U.S. 431 (2005)

Majority

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

544 U.S. 528 (2005)

Majority

Kelo v. City of New London

545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Majority

S.D. Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

547 U.S. 370 (2006)

Majority

Rapanos v. United States

547 U.S. 715 (2006)

Dissent

Massachusetts v. EPA

549 U.S. 497 (2007)

Majority

Environmental Defense Fund v. Duke Energy Corporation

549 U.S. 561 (2007)

Majority

United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority

550 U.S. 330 (2007)

Plurality

United States v. Atlantic Research Corporation

551 U.S. 128 (2007)

Majority

National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife

551 U.S. 644 (2007)

Dissent

Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker

554 U.S. 471 (2008)

Dissent in part

Winter v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.

555 U.S. 7 (2008)

Dissent 

Summers v. Earth Island Institute

555 U.S. 488 (2009)

Dissent

Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

556 U.S. 208 (2009)

Dissent

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States

556 U.S. 599 (2009)

Dissent

Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council

557 U.S. 261 (2009)

Dissent

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

560 U.S. 702 (2010)

Concurrence in part

Monsanto Company v. Geertson Seed Farm

561 U.S. 139 (2010)

Dissent

American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut

564 U.S. 410 (2011)

Dissent

Sackett v. EPA

566 U.S. 120 (2012)

Dissent

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States

568 U.S. 23 (2012)

Dissent

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

568 U.S. 597 (2013)

Dissent

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District

570 U.S. 595 (2013)

Dissent

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation L.P.

572 U.S. 489 (2014)

Majority

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA

573 U.S. 302 (2014)

Concur/Dissent

Michigan v. EPA

576 U.S. 743 (2015)

Dissent

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association

577 U.S. 260 (2016)

Majority

Sturgeon v. Frost

577 U.S. 424 (2016)

Dissent

United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Company

578 U.S. 590 (2016)

Dissent

Murr v. Wisconsin

137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017)

Majority

Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service

139 S. Ct. 361 (2018)

Dissent

Sturgeon v. Frost II

139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019)

Dissent

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v Warren

139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019)

 Majority

Knick v. Township of Scott

139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)

Dissent

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian

140 S.  Ct. 1335 (2020)

All But Alito

County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund

140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020)

Majority

United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association

140 S. Ct 1837 (2020)

Dissent

United States Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club

141 S. Ct. 777 (2021)

Dissent

Guam v. United States

141 S. Ct 1608 (2021)

Majority

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021)

Dissent

Hollyfrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association

141 S. Ct 2172 (2021)

Dissent

PennEast Pipeline Company v. New Jersey

141 S. Ct 2244 (2021)

Dissent

West Virginia v. EPA

142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022)

Dissent

 

APPENDIX B

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (“EP”) SCORES OF SELECTED INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

OCTOBER TERM 1994–OCTOBER TERM 2021

 

Justice

Number of Cases

EP Points

EP Score

Breyer

61

38

62.3

Scalia

47

11

23.4

Stevens

37

29

78.4

Kennedy

50

18

36

Thomas

63

13

20.6

Souter

36

29

80.6

Ginsburg

57

41

71.9

CJ Roberts

40

8

20

Alito

38

4

10.5

Sotomayor

25

16

64

Kagan

25

17

68

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1395

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Howard J. & Katherine W. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Professors Hope Babcock, Jonathan Cannon, Bill Funk, Steph Tai, and Susannah Weaver for their terrific comments on a preliminary draft of this Article. Kathryn C. Reed, Harvard Law School Class of 2022, provided outstanding research and editorial assistance. Although it has no bearing on my analysis, for the sake of disclosure I served as counsel for either one of the parties or an amicus in the following Supreme Court cases that fall within this Article’s scope of review: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farm, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); and Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).