Bridging the Gap: Modernizing Civil Rights Laws Through Transgender Healthcare Statutes

The past few years have seen record-breaking numbers of anti-transgender bills introduced and passed in state legislatures, many of which restrict transgender healthcare. In light of these bills, the varying outcomes from trans rights litigation in the courts, and President Trump’s anti-trans executive actions, it is worth reevaluating the state of trans healthcare protections. The majority of scholarship on trans rights discusses if and how sex discrimination doctrine can be leveraged to secure trans rights, including access to gender-affirming care. However, the complex and mosaic-like nature of sex discrimination doctrine leaves gaps within which judges holding anti-trans bias can insert their own agendas. This Note suggests a different path: rather than leaving trans rights up to the whims and biases of judges or letting the executive branch encroach upon the legislative branch’s authority to regulate commerce and healthcare, Congress should pass new civil rights statutes establishing LGBTQ+ status as a basis for discrimination claims. In particular, Congress should pass a healthcare statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of transgender or nonbinary status in the coverage and administration of healthcare services. Such a law would provide an additional or alternate cause of action in trans healthcare cases where judges misapply or fail to apply sex discrimination analysis.

  INTRODUCTION

For transgender people in the United States, daily life is becoming increasingly fraught with danger. The past decade has seen the growing recognition and visibility of transgender identity, the passage of state-level protections of trans rights, and historic victories for LGBTQ+ equality in both state and federal courts. However, the tide is now turning, and transgender people have become the center of a burgeoning culture war—they have been marked as a social contagion,1See S. Baum, Fact Check: Being Trans Is Not a Social Contagion, Despite Latest Submission To UN, Erin in the Morning (July 18, 2025), https://www.erininthemorning.com/p/fact-check-being-trans-is-not-a-social [https://perma.cc/78PK-RR77] (“These sensationalized stories—which paint the rise in documented cases of trans youth as a sort of mass hysteria—use junk science and outdated myths about sex and gender as an excuse to hinder trans kids’ access to life-saving care.”); see also Jack L. Turban, Brett Dolotina, Dana King & Alex Keuroghlian, Sex Assigned at Birth Ratio Among Transgender and Gender Diverse Adolescents in the United States, 150 Pediatrics 49 (2022) (debunking the basis of social contagion theory). accused of grooming children,2See Melissa Gira Grant, “Grooming” Is Republicans’ Cruel New Buzzword for Targeting Trans Kids, New Republic (Mar. 17, 2022), https://newrepublic.com/article/165761/republican-governors-grooming-crt-trans-rights [https://perma.cc/8QC2-XQCN]. scapegoated for violence,3See Odette Yousef, Trump’s Anti-Trans Effort Is an Agenda Cornerstone with Echoes in History, NPR (Feb. 6, 2025, 10:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/2025/02/06/nx-s1-5288145/trump-anti-trans-executive-order [https://perma.cc/MT2T-VEGL]. and characterized as a domestic terrorist threat.4See Ken Klippenstein, White House Eyes Transgender “Terrorist Movement,” Ken Klippenstein (Sep. 20, 2025), https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/white-house-eyes-transgender-terrorism [https://perma.cc/U7GU-CW4V].

Since 2020, the proliferation of anti-trans legislation at the state level has dramatically escalated, particularly in the area of trans healthcare.5See discussion infra Section I.B. The states have been even further emboldened by the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in U.S. v. Skrmetti,6United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025). which upheld a Tennessee law restricting gender-affirming care for trans minors. As the anti-trans moral panic reaches a fever pitch, the attack on trans healthcare has moved from the states to the federal level under President Trump’s second administration.7See discussion infra Section I.C. This Note thus discusses the current war on trans rights, focusing on the stripping of access to trans healthcare.

This Note will use the terms “trans healthcare” and “gender-affirming care” (“GAC”), which “refers to health services that support a person in living in alignment with their gender identity when their gender identity differs from their sex assigned at birth.”8Elana Redfield, Impact of Ban on Gender-Affirming Care on Transgender Minors, UCLA Sch. L. Williams Inst. (Jan. 2025), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/impact-gac-ban-eo [https://perma.cc/S4DC-EV5E]. These “treatments are considered evidence-based and typically follow standardized practice protocols”9Id. and are widely supported by medical consensus.10Fact Sheet: Evidence-Based Health Care for Transgender People and Youth, GLAAD (Jan. 12, 2024), https://glaad.org/factsheet-evidence-based-healthcare-transgender-people-and-youth [https://perma.cc/MS9G-H96H]. Limiting such care can and will have disastrous consequences.11Kevin B. O’Reilly, Why Anti-Transgender Bills Are a Dangerous Intrusion on Medicine, Am. Med. Ass’n (May 7, 2021), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/population-care/why-anti-transgender-bills-are-dangerous-intrusion-medicine [https://perma.cc/A6QL-RVN8].

Access to gender-affirming care is frequently litigated under sex discrimination doctrine, a strategy that has achieved great success. However, this success relies upon judges who apply sex discrimination doctrine in a principled manner. This Note suggests that, in light of the second Trump administration’s actions, the varying results of GAC litigation, and the Supreme Court’s troubling foray into the debate,12United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025). current law and sex discrimination doctrine are not enough to protect trans healthcare, and new strategies must be pursued.

This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the sharp spike in anti-trans legislation in recent years and discusses how the overreach of executive power under President Trump’s second administration has fanned the flames of a growing anti-trans movement in the United States. Part II examines the role of the judiciary in addressing trans rights, exploring how the courts have expanded these civil liberties through principled interpretations of current federal law and sex discrimination analysis. This Part then argues that, despite these victories, the viability of these arguments is narrowing, and the limits of sex discrimination doctrine cannot be overcome through reliance on the courts. Part III argues that, given the risks of leaving this issue up to the executive or judicial branch, Congress is best suited to protect gender-affirming care. This Part proposes that Congress pass new federal legislation to cement LGBTQ+ status as a basis of discrimination, specifically passing a healthcare statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of transgender or nonbinary status. This Part will also discuss how Congress can tailor this statutory scheme to overcome to the implications of the Court’s ruling in Skrmetti.

Given the current makeup of Congress, this Note does not pretend to suggest that such legislation will be passed in the foreseeable future. It does suggest, however, that the status quo is dangerous, unstable, and will cause irreparable damage to trans people, their loved ones, and anyone who pushes the boundaries of free expression. As this Note will demonstrate, Congress is the branch best suited for the action necessary to protect trans rights. If—and when—a Congress with the political will to protect trans rights emerges, the question is what path it will take to do so. This Note offers one such path.

I. ANTI-GENDER IDEOLOGY AND THE NEW SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER

A. The International Growth of “Anti-Gender Ideology”

Opponents of trans rights often cite “gender ideology” as the catalyst for the increasing visibility of trans people in social and political life. This Note refers to the “social movements mobilizing opposition to what they call ‘gender ideology,’ ‘gender theory’ or ‘genderism’ ”13Kate Walton, Opposition to Gender Equality Around the World Is Connected, Well Funded and Spreading. Here’s What You Need to Know About the Anti-Gender Movement, CNN (2024), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/asequals/anti-gender-equality-threat-explained-as-equals-intl-cmd [https://perma.cc/7FL2-QGLS]. as “anti-gender ideology movements.” Such movements have gathered power over the past few decades, opposing various concepts that they view as undermining “ ‘traditional’ ” social units—including “the rights of LGBTQ+ people, ‘reproductive rights, sexuality and gender-sensitive education in schools, and the very notion of gender.’ ”14Id. Across the world, “the attack on ‘gender ideology’ is as much an attack on feminism, especially reproductive freedom, as it is on trans rights, gay marriage, and sex education.”15Judith Butler, Who’s Afraid of Gender? 67 (2024). The United States is materially implicated in the global anti-gender network, as “US-based anti-gender groups such as Alliance Defending Freedom, the Federalist Society, the Cato Institute, and the Heritage Foundation pump millions of dollars into global campaigns” against so-called gender ideology.16Susan Stryker, Gender and Anti-Gender: Complex Legacies of US Global Power and Influence, GATE (Mar. 26, 2024), https://gate.ngo/knowledge-portal/article/gender-and-anti-gender-legacies [https://perma.cc/Q95R-6RD4].

Trans people constitute a tiny minority; in the U.S., only one percent of the population identifies as trans.17Jody L. Herman & Andrew R. Flores, How Many Adults and Youth Identify as Transgender in the United States?, UCLA Sch. L. Williams Inst. (Aug. 2025), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/trans-adults-united-states [https://perma.cc/5BN9-Z7R9]. Given the small number of trans people, why is gender such a galvanizing force? Judith Butler argues that “ ‘gender’ absorbs an array of fears and becomes a catchall phantasm for the contemporary Right,” creating a moral panic and manifesting as an existential threat.18Butler, supra note 15, at 6. After all, the “very existence of transgender and non-binary individuals poses a threat to the traditional (fixed, binary, hierarchical) gender order.”19Deborah L. Brake, Title IX’s Trans Panic, 29 Wm. & Mary J. Race, Gender & Soc. Just. 41, 57 (2022). The panic over trans people becomes a funnel for “a broader backlash against LGBTQ equality and an assault on many of the feminist gains wrought by the women’s movement since the 1960s and ’70s.”20Id. at 56–57. Such reactionary sentiment is not new—“backlash politics and jurisprudence have emerged as a response to the gains of different marginalized social groups at various points in time, including women, people of color, and sexual and gender minorities.”21Jordan Blair Woods, The New Sexual Deviancy, 113 Geo. L.J. 911, 915 (2025).

The trans rights issue has become a way for conservative lawmakers to rile up their base, “perform opposition to the ‘woke left’ and ensure evangelical voters show up to vote,”22Nicole Narea & Fabiola Cineas, The GOP’s Coordinated National Campaign Against Trans Rights, Explained, Vox (Apr. 6, 2023, 12:50 PM PDT), https://www.vox.com/politics/23631262/trans-bills-republican-state-legislatures [https://perma.cc/F98J-FPPV]. especially now that the question of same-sex marriage and gay relationships has largely faded as a hot button political issue.23Kate Sosin, How Did Trans People Become a GOP Target? Experts Say It’s All About Keeping Evangelicals Voting, The 19th (May 17, 2022, 1:15PM), https://19thnews.org/2022/05/white-evangelical-voters-gop-anti-trans-bills [https://perma.cc/NM86-U6WN]. For example, many state bills banning trans girls from women’s sports “are the product of national right-wing strategists, having found that this particular issue has traction to elect and empower Republicans in electoral politics.”24Brake, supra note 19, at 45.

Anti-gender ideology is not, however, limited to traditional conservatives. The moral panic has been fueled by both mainstream conservative and liberal media outlets, which have “reinforced the anti-trans movement’s unscientific ‘child protection’ claims, sensationalized them, and profited from the resulting panic.”25Simone Unwalla, Profiting from Moral Panic: How Profit-Driven Media Outlets Empowered the Anti-Trans Movement, The Flaw (Jan. 21, 2024), https://theflaw.org/articles/profiting-from-moral-panic [https://perma.cc/48L2-HT9S]. See also Serena Sonoma, The New York Times’ Inaccurate Coverage of Transgender People Is Being Weaponized Against the Transgender Community, GLAAD (Apr. 19, 2023), https://glaad.org/new-york-times-inaccurate-coverage-transgender-people-being-weaponized-against-transgender [https://perma.cc/9T9T-RHSR]. A re-fashioned narrative of sexual deviancy—echoing decades of anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda—has emerged,26Woods, supra note 21, at 911 (explaining how “sexual deviance concepts are grounded in dated sociological and psychological theories of deviance and propagate harmful stereotypes of LGBTQ+ people as deviants, sinners, mentally ill, sexual predators, and dangers to children”). often obscured under a politically neutral veneer of protecting children’s health and women’s safety. In recent years, “a relatively small but vocal group of self-proclaimed ‘gender-critical feminists’ (who are sometimes called trans-exclusionary radical feminists, or ‘TERFs’ for short) eschew transgender legal rights that they perceive as potentially threatening to the rights of cisgender women.”27Henry F. Fradella, The Imperative of Rejecting “Gender-Critical” Feminism in the Law, 30 Wm. & Mary J. Race, Gender & Soc. Just. 269, 270 (2024). See also Viv Smythe, I’m Credited With Having Coined the Word “Terf”. Here’s How It Happened, The Guardian (Nov. 28, 2018, 6:37 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/29/im-credited-with-having-coined-the-acronym-terf-heres-how-it-happened [https://perma.cc/JNR8-EDTH]. The debate between the faction of gender-critical feminists and the majority of feminists—who see trans rights as a necessary component of the feminist project28See, e.g., Sally Hines, Trans and Feminist Rights Have Been Falsely Cast in Opposition, The Economist (July 13, 2018), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/07/13/trans-and-feminist-rights-have-been-falsely-cast-in-opposition [https://web.archive.org/web/20250727013207/https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/07/13/trans-and-feminist-rights-have-been-falsely-cast-in-opposition].—goes back decades, to “the height of the second-wave feminist movement.”29Samantha Schmidt, Women’s Issues Are Different from Trans Women’s Issues, Feminist Author Says, Sparking Criticism, Wash. Post (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/13/womens-issues-are-different-from-trans-womens-issues-feminist-author-says-sparking-criticism [https://perma.cc/CQJ2-7G9E] (“In one example from 1973, at the West Coast Lesbian Conference, in Los Angeles, the group split over a scheduled performance by the folk singer Beth Elliott, who is what was then called a ‘transsexual.’ ”). With the increasing visibility of trans people and the rising prominence of high-profile trans-exclusionary feminists like author J.K. Rowling,30See Clare Mulroy, J.K. Rowling Celebrated UK Supreme Court Ruling with a Cigar. Backlash Was Swift., USA Today (Apr. 18, 2025, 4:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2025/04/18/jk-rowling-anti-trans-controversy/83161361007 [https://perma.cc/5NLT-R67N]. the debate “has become a matter of intense public conflict.”31Butler, supra note 15, at 134–35.

A deep dive into the extent of the debate between gender-critical feminists and gender-inclusive feminists is beyond the scope of this Note. Nonetheless, this debate is vital to acknowledge because it has significant political and legal consequences that have contributed to the rise in anti-trans sentiment and policy.32Fradella, supra note 27, at 284. Gender-critical feminists center biology as the sole determinant of sex and believe that “as a result, transgender women are really men ‘who should not be allowed to use women’s facilities’ ” because they will assault cis women in these facilities.33Id. at 275. Such narratives feed into the “bathroom predator myth,” perpetuating the false claim that trans women are a threat to cisgender women in sex-segregated spaces like public restrooms.34Julia Serano, Transgender People, Bathrooms, and Sexual Predators: What the Data Say, Medium (June 7, 2021) https://juliaserano.medium.com/transgender-people-bathrooms-and-sexual-predators-what-the-data-say-2f31ae2a7c06 [https://perma.cc/X8YL-XDVS]. This myth echoes the “fears of sexual predation” that have been historically invoked to paint gays, Black men, and Jewish people as violent threats to women and children.35Id. Moreover, it belies the reality that there is “no evidence of increased harms to people who are not transgender when transgender people are allowed to use restrooms and other gendered facilities

according to their gender identity,” but “it is a consistent finding across studies and over time that transgender people report . . . experiencing verbal harassment and physical assault from others in these spaces.”36Jody L. Herman, Andrew R. Flores & Elana Redfield, Safety and Privacy in Public Restrooms and Other Gendered Facilities, UCLA Sch. L. Williams Inst. (Feb. 2025), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/safety-in-restrooms-and-facilites [https://perma.cc/KH5L-H4FQ].

These myths also harm gender non-conforming cisgender women who are “harassed in bathrooms because of anti-transgender hysteria,”37Serano, supra note 34. as in the case of eighteen-year-old Gerika Mudra, a cisgender girl who was followed into a restaurant by a server who accused her of being a man.38Jo Yurcaba, Minnesota Teen Says Server Forced Her to Prove Her Gender in Restaurant Bathroom, NBC News (Aug. 12, 2025, 1:52 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-news/minnesota-teen-says-server-forced-prove-gender-restaurant-bathroom-rcna224562 [https://perma.cc/ZLW8-2R9J]. Mudra felt compelled “to prove to the server that she is a woman, so she unzipped her hoodie to show she has breasts.”39Id. Gender-critical feminists seem to overlook these incidents, which exemplify how trans people and feminists share common concerns and principles such as the right to bodily autonomy and expression outside of traditional gender norms.40Courtney Megan Cahill, Sex Equality’s Irreconcilable Differences, 132 Yale L.J. 1065, 1083 (2023) (“Radical feminists and queer theorists have long argued that biological justifications for sex difference and sex discrimination are sex stereotypes because culture always shapes our understanding of biological categories.”). Gender-critical feminism feeds into the anti-gender movements pushed by the Right by calling such principles into question. This rhetoric provides fodder for right-wing critiques of “gender ideology,” which push similar narratives of a spectral threat to women and children’s safety as a shield for limiting both transgender and cisgender people’s right to self-determination.

This phenomenon is not merely rhetoric. The growth of gender critical feminism and anti-gender ideology reflect shifting public opinion in the United States. Within just the past four years, “Americans have become more supportive of laws that limit protections for trans people—and less supportive of laws aimed at safeguarding them.”41Americans Have Grown More Supportive of Restrictions for Trans People in Recent Years, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 26, 2025), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/02/26/americans-have-grown-more-supportive-of-restrictions-for-trans-people-in-recent-years [https://perma.cc/MM27-E7HB]. This sentiment is reflected in the recent wave of anti-trans legislation passed at the state level.

B. Trans Rights at the State Level

Several hundred anti-trans laws have been proposed in states across the country in recent years. Journalists in 2022 noted that “[s]chools [had] emerged as the front line for anti-trans legislation,” with several states successfully passing bans on trans children in sports, parental disclosure laws, and curriculum restrictions.42Koko Nakajima & Connie Hanzhang Jin, Bills Targeting Trans Youth are Growing More Common—and Radically Reshaping Lives, NPR (Nov. 28, 2022, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2022/11/28/1138396067/transgender-youth-bills-trans-sports [https://perma.cc/RWT2-28TQ]. Bathroom bills, which were thought to have lost steam after North Carolina’s failed 2016 attempt to ban trans people from public restrooms that do not correspond with the sex listed on their birth certificate, have made a comeback.43Id. In the years since, states have restricted discussion of gender and personal pronouns in schools,44Adeel Hassan, States Passed a Record Number of Transgender Laws. Here’s What They Say., N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/27/us/transgender-laws-states.html [https://perma.cc/CT48-FYXY]. prohibited or placed significant restrictions on the ability to change gender markers on ID documents,45Nakajima & Jin, supra note 42. and passed restraints on free expression through drag bans.46Tracking the Rise of Anti-Trans Bills in the U.S., Trans Legis. Tracker (2025), https://translegislation.com/learn [https://perma.cc/HJ8F-XHQU].

The rate of these attacks is accelerating. The ACLU tracked 616 anti-LGBTQ+ bills in 2025,47Mapping Attacks on LGBTQ Rights in U.S. State Legislatures in 2025, ACLU (Sep. 19, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/legislative-attacks-on-lgbtq-rights-2025 [https://web.archive.org/web/20250313040005/https://wp.api.aclu.org/legislative-attacks-on-lgbtq-rights-2025]. up from 533 in 2024,48Mapping Attacks on LGBTQ Rights in U.S. State Legislatures in 2024, ACLU (Dec. 6, 2024), https://www.aclu.org/legislative-attacks-on-lgbtq-rights-2024 [https://web.archive.org/web/20251007022023/https://www.aclu.org/legislative-attacks-on-lgbtq-rights-2024]. and 510 in 2023.49Mapping Attacks on LGBTQ Rights in U.S. State Legislatures in 2023, ACLU (Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.aclu.org/legislative-attacks-on-lgbtq-rights-2023 [https://web.archive.org/web/20250824040747/https://www.aclu.org/legislative-attacks-on-lgbtq-rights-2023]. Other advocates focusing specifically on anti-trans legislation have found that 2025 was the sixth consecutive record-breaking year in anti-trans bills considered across the country, with trans healthcare becoming an increasingly targeted category.502025 Anti-Trans Bills Tracker, Trans Legis. Tracker (2025), https://translegislation.com/bills/2025 [https://perma.cc/N99G-WX83]; Trans Legis. Tracker, supra note 46. The majority of anti-trans bills do not become law, but “each year, Republicans introduce more and more bills. And each year, those bills become broader and more extreme, as politicians look for new ways to enforce a binary definition of gender—and that escalation is turning up in the bills that do pass.”51Orion Rummler, As Anti-Trans Laws Get More Extreme, Here’s Where State Laws Stand in 2025, The 19th (May 28, 2025, 3:10 AM), https://19thnews.org/2025/05/anti-trans-extreme-state-laws-2025 [https://perma.cc/PW6F-L5JP].

One of the main targets of these bills has been gender-affirming care. In 2024, state legislators introduced 189 bills targeting these services, a slight increase from 2023 (in which there were “more bills targeting gender-affirming healthcare . . . than the last 5 years combined”).52Trans Legis. Tracker, supra note 46. Most of these bills are targeted towards transgender and nonbinary minors. As of August 2025, “27 states have enacted laws/policies limiting youth access to GAC.”53Lindsey Dawson & Jennifer Kates, Policy Tracker: Youth Access to Gender Affirming Care and State Policy Restrictions, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.kff.org/lgbtq/gender-affirming-care-policy-tracker [https://perma.cc/6NCN-8MLN]. As a result, “40% of trans youth (ages 13–17) live in a state that has enacted a law/policy limiting access to GAC.”54Id.

These bills “are devastating. They force trans kids and their families to leave entire states and regions of the country. They exacerbate trans kids’ already alarmingly high suicide rates by withholding necessary medical interventions from them.”55Courtney Cahill, How Extreme Anti-Trans Laws Will Backfire for Conservatives, Slate (Apr. 30, 2021, 2:45 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/anti-transgender-laws-backfire-jane-crow.html [https://perma.cc/RBV3-U6TA]. Researchers have found that these bills have inflicted severe psychological harm on trans youth. In states where anti-trans laws were passed, trans and nonbinary young people “experienced statistically significant increases in both the number of past-year suicide attempts and the reporting [of] at least [one] past-year suicide attempt, especially [one] and [two] years after anti-transgender law enactment.”56Wilson Y. Lee, J. Nicholas Hobbs, Steven Hobaica, Jonah P. DeChants, Myeshia N. Price & Ronita Nath, State-Level Anti-Transgender Laws Increase Past-Year Suicide Attempts Among Transgender and Non-Binary Young People in the USA, 8 Nature Hum. Behav. 2096, 2100 (Nov. 2024).

These bills do not stop at children—a troubling development is the shift towards limiting this healthcare for adults.57Nada Hassanein, Here’s How State Lawmakers Are Taking Aim at Transgender Adults’ Health Care, Stateline (Feb. 14, 2025, 5:00 AM), https://stateline.org/2025/02/14/heres-how-state-lawmakers-are-taking-aim-at-transgender-adults-health-care [https://web.archive.org/web/20250814163306/https://stateline.org/2025/02/14/heres-how-state-lawmakers-are-taking-aim-at-transgender-adults-health-care]. The primary means of doing so is through bills that block the use of state Medicaid funds for coverage of gender-affirming care services.58Id. By the beginning of 2025, “[t]en states — Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas—[had] enacted policies that explicitly prohibit Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming care for all ages.”59Id.

These state bills have already sowed chaos and confusion among transgender and nonbinary people as well as their families. Under the second Trump administration, such chaos and confusion have now moved beyond the state level to the federal.

C. The Executive Branch and Federal Intervention

Legal scholars and journalists have already noted that President Trump’s actions in his second administration have generated questions about the bounds of executive power. The President has issued “numerous executive orders that pushed at the generally understood limits of presidential power, fired numerous officials and dismantled an agency in clear violation of statutory limits, and frozen spending authorized by Congress without clear authority.”60Maggie Haberman, Charlie Savage & Jonathan Swan, Trump Suggests No Laws Are Broken if He’s “Saving His Country”, N.Y. Times (Feb. 15, 2025) https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/15/us/politics/trump-saves-country-quote.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20251108084039/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/15/us/politics/trump-saves-country-quote.html].

Among the spate of executive orders, several are directly aimed at erasing trans people from public life. Echoing the anti-gender ideology movement, the executive orders repeatedly invoke “gender ideology” as an enemy to be conquered.61See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615, 8615–16 (Jan. 20, 2025). Executive Order 14168 declares that it is now “the policy of the United States to recognize two sexes, male and female.”62Id. In line with this reasoning, this Order forces incarcerated trans women to be housed in men’s prisons,63Id. at 8616. exposing them to severe risk of sexual assault and abuse.64Ash Olli Kulak, Locked Away in SEG “For Their Own Protection”: How Congress Gave Federal Corrections the Discretion to House Transgender (Trans) Inmates in Gender-Inappropriate Facilities and Solitary Confinement, 6 Ind. J.L. & Soc. Equal. 300, 314 (2018) (“One common tactic among men’s prison facilities is ‘V-coding,’ or placing transgender women in cells with aggressive cisgender male inmates as a form of social control. V-coding is so common that it has become ‘a central part of a transwoman’s sentence.’ ”). See also Nora Neus, Trans Women Are Still Incarcerated with Men and It’s Putting Their Lives at Risk, CNN (June 23, 2021, 2:54 PM EDT) https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/23/us/trans-women-incarceration/index.html [https://perma.cc/6EFV-WQBN]. In addition, the Order prevents trans people from changing the gender marker on their identification documents,65Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8616. increasing the likelihood of harassment, denial of services, and assault for trans people whose ID lists a name or gender that does not match their gender presentation,66Jody L. Herman & Kathryn K. O’Neill, Gender Marker Changes on State ID Documents: State-Level Policy Impacts, UCLA Sch. L. Williams Inst. (June 2021), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/gender-marker-policies [https://perma.cc/8TNF-AET2]. and creating complications for intersex Americans.67Jaclyn Diaz, Trump’s Passport Policy Leaves Trans, Intersex Americans in the Lurch, NPR (Feb. 21, 2025) https://www.npr.org/2025/02/21/nx-s1-5300880/trump-passport-policy-trans-gender-intersex-nonbinary [https://perma.cc/V8KV-RPGW]. Such policies effectively remove trans, nonbinary, and intersex people from legal recognition. The President has also furthered attempts to remove trans people from public life through executive orders banning trans people from the military68Exec. Order No. 14183, 90 Fed. Reg. 8757, 8757 (Jan. 27, 2025). and prohibiting participation of trans women in women’s sports.69Exec. Order No. 14201, 90 Fed. Reg. 9279, 9279–80 (Feb. 5, 2025).

Of particular significance to this Note is Executive Order 14187, which bans gender-affirming care for trans youth under the age of nineteen.70Exec. Order No. 14187, 90 Fed. Reg. 8771, 8771 (Jan. 28, 2025). The order characterizes gender-affirming care as “maiming” children,71Id. resulting in “chemical and surgical mutilation” through puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and surgical procedures.72Id. Through this Order, the President promotes false claims73See Meredithe McNamara, Christina Lepore, Anne Alstott, Rebecca Kamody, Laura Kuper, Nathalie Szilagyi, Susan Boulware & Christy Olezeski, Scientific Misinformation and Gender Affirming Care: Tools for Providers on the Front Lines, 71 J. Adolescent Health 251, 252 (2022). that trans people who receive gender-affirming care will be “trapped with lifelong medical complications, a losing war with their own bodies, and, tragically, sterilization.”74Exec. Order No. 14187, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8771.

The President’s authority to issue this order has not been established, and there are serious constitutional questions raised by his attempt to usurp Congress’s commerce powers75U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. to threaten to cut off federal funding to medical institutions that study and provide gender-affirming care.76Id. at § 4. See also Francesca Paris & Charlie Savage, Is That Legal? A Guide to Trump’s Big Moves So Far, N.Y. Times: The Upshot (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/upshot/trump-executive-orders-legality.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20250930172023/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/upshot/trump-executive-orders-legality.html]. Nevertheless, some medical institutions have already begun cutting off treatment for trans youth, even if they are located in “sanctuary states” for gender-affirming care.77Anna Betts, US Hospitals Suspend Healthcare for Transgender Youth After Trump Order, The Guardian (Feb. 3, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/03/trans-youth-healthcare-hospitals-trump [https://perma.cc/347D-C5VF]; Mira Lazine, Handful of Hospitals Complying with Trump’s Illegal Order to Stop Trans Care Under 19 Years of Age, Erin in the Morning (Feb. 2, 2025) https://www.erininthemorning.com/p/handful-of-hospitals-complying-with [https://perma.cc/H2ZK-ANMZ]. This preemptive compliance “with Trump’s executive order stand[s] in direct contradiction to state healthcare policies designed to protect access to care. This is a textbook case of institutions surrendering before a fight even begins, bowing to political pressure despite the lack of any immediate enforcement mechanism.”78Lazine, supra note 77.

Despite the disappointing acquiescence of these institutions, legal advocates have not hesitated to push back against this executive overreach—hundreds of lawsuits have already been filed challenging the Trump administration’s executive orders throughout his second term,79See Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions, Just Sec. (Oct. 31, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/107087/tracker-litigation-legal-challenges-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/C4NB-E3C2]. including suits challenging Executive Order 14187. Soon after the Order was issued, attorneys general of three states (Washington, Minnesota, and Oregon), joined by three doctors who provide gender-affirming care within these states, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief.80Complaint, Washington v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00244-LK (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2025). The lawsuit alleges violations of the Tenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, arguing that the Order discriminates on the bases of transgender status and sex.81Id. Moreover, the complaint draws attention to the drastic overreach of executive power effectuated in the Executive Order, noting that the

Order also violates constitutional Separation of Powers by usurping Congress’s legislative powers and exclusive power of the purse. None of the federal funding that medical institutions . . . receive is conditioned on a promise by the institutions that they would deny gender-affirming care to their patients under [nineteen] years of age. Congress has never imposed such a condition, and it is unconstitutional for the President to do so via executive fiat.82Id. at 5–6.

The district court issued a preliminary injunction, and litigation is ongoing.83Washington v. Trump, 768 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). More recently, sixteen state attorneys general, joined by Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro (in lieu of Pennsylvania’s Republican attorney general),84S. Baum, 16 States (Plus Washington DC) Launch Joint Legal Fight for Trans Health Care, Erin in the Morning (Aug. 1, 2025), https://www.erininthemorning.com/p/16-states-plus-washington-dc-launch [https://perma.cc/DZ3T-Y63X]. brought suit against the Order.85Complaint, Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-12162, (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2025). The Complaint argues that the Order violates states’ Tenth Amendment right “to regulate the practice of medicine within their States,”86Id. at 71. and “coerce[s] hospitals, individual providers, and others to potentially violate Plaintiff States’ antidiscrimination and age-of-majority state laws.”87Id. at 4.

Whether the Executive Order survives the legal battle to follow is uncertain. What is certain is that the President has decided to use the force

of the Executive Branch to vilify and erase a small, already vulnerable minority. This erasure is not merely rhetorical—as Butler notes,

when the law names you in a certain way, cornering you into a box, then the force of language actually does create a new situation: a legal status is conferred. In these contexts, a performative use of language brings about the reality that it names. . . . Indeed, when one is called male when one is a woman, or called female when one is a man, the calling is an effacement of what one is. That effacement is an actual effect, a modification of reality, and its own specific form of violence.88Butler, supra note 15, at 183.

The mere existence of trans people is already seen as grounds for violence: research indicates that “[t]ransgender people are over four times more likely than cisgender people to experience violent victimization, including rape, sexual assault, and aggravated or simple assault.”89Transgender People over Four Times More Likely Than Cisgender People to Be Victims of Violent Crime, UCLA Sch. L. Williams Inst. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/ncvs-trans-press-release [https://perma.cc/KZT4-SNDY]. In addition, among the already high rates of sexual abuse among LGBTQ+ youth, trans children report even more disproportionately high rates.90Sexual Violence and Suicide Risk Among LGBTQ+ Young People, Trevor Project (Mar. 27, 2024), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/research-briefs/sexual-violence-and-suicide-risk-among-lgbtq-young-people.

The inflammatory rhetoric that contributes to high rates of victimization is only escalating under this administration as it takes on the mantle of the anti-trans culture war. Trump has used this issue as a partisan wedge, claiming that Democrats “want transgender for everybody, everybody transgender.”91The White House, President Trump Holds a Press Conference, Aug. 11, 2025, YouTube (Aug. 11, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtVMoko3mSI [https://perma.cc/7224-CATQ]. Nonsensical phrasing aside, the core of this framing is dangerous, especially as it is borne out in executive policy considerations. The Trump DOJ has latched onto claims that trans people are a security threat and has considered measures to ban trans people in the United States from owning guns in response to false narratives of an epidemic of trans mass shooters,92Evan Perez & Hannah Rabinowitz, Trump DOJ Is Looking at Ways to Ban Transgender Americans from Owning Guns, Sources Say, CNN (Sep. 4, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/04/politics/transgender-firearms-justice-department-second-amendment [https://perma.cc/F765-PYD2] (“The vast majority of mass attacks in the US have no connection to transgender people. From January 2013 to the present, of the more than 5,700 mass shootings in America (defined as four or more victims shot and killed), five shooters were confirmed as transgender.”). a move so extreme that the NRA has publicly expressed

opposition to it.93Hannah Rabinowitz, NRA Says It Opposes Idea of Banning Transgender Americans from Owning Guns, CNN (Sep. 5, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/05/politics/nra-transgender-gun-control [https://perma.cc/FGN7-LE9Z]. Reporting also indicates that the FBI “is preparing to designate transgender people as ‘violent extremists’ in the wake of Charlie Kirk’s murder.”94Ken Klippenstein, FBI Readies New War on Trans People, KlipNews (Sep. 18, 2025), https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/fbi-readies-new-war-on-trans-people [https://perma.cc/777R-B3RR]. After Kirk’s killing, Attorney General Pam Bondi claimed that the left is “ ‘putting this crazy ideology in our schools,’ echoing the growing view of many in Trump’s inner circle that a ‘cult of gender ideology’ is behind an explosion of violence by some as yet unidentified ‘radical left,’ ”95Id. despite the complete lack of evidence for such conspiracy theories. As trans people become an increasingly common scapegoat, the United States becomes an increasingly terrifying place for trans people to live.

Regardless of one’s personal beliefs about trans people, it is obvious that the anti-trans moral panic has no basis in reality but plays an outsized role in American politics and culture. Moreover, legal scholars should recognize that the Trump administration’s actions—issuing executive orders that intrude into domains of power relegated to Congress and threatening the constitutional rights of a minority group with no real justification—have significant constitutional implications. As it stands, the Executive Branch poses a significant threat to the lives of trans people, usurping legislative power to do so.

II. THE LIMITS—AND RISKS—OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

This Part will analyze the role of another branch of the federal government in the battle over trans rights: the judiciary. Much of the legal scholarship on trans rights thus far has focused on leveraging existing law and utilizing the courts as the main tool to secure protections. This Part will evaluate those arguments and discuss how these protections are at risk of being gutted under the current Trump administration, significantly limiting the courts’ ability to protect trans healthcare. This Part will also discuss the limits of sex discrimination doctrine in achieving large-scale trans rights victories.

A. The Limits of Existing Federal Protections

Two major federal statutory schemes have been utilized to argue for trans healthcare protections: Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act.

  1. Medicaid

Medicaid96Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. is a “system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ ”97Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (citation omitted). jointly funded by the federal government and the states to provide healthcare services to the indigent.98Evelyne P. Baumrucker, Sarah K. Braun, Alison Mitchell, Angela Napili & Varun Saraswathula, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43357, Medicaid: An Overview 3 (2025). Medicaid requires states to cover medically necessary care. Within the Medicaid Act itself, “[t]he principal statutory basis for the contention that states cannot eliminate coverage for medically necessary services is the general purpose clause,”99Lucinda M. Finley, State Restrictions on Medicaid Coverage of Medically Necessary Services, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1491, 1499 (1978). which allows Congressional appropriations of funding to enable

each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care.10042 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2023) (emphasis added).

Beyond the statute, federal regulations require state Medicaid programs to cover certain services for Medicaid recipients. While states cannot “arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, and scope of a required service . . . solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition” of the beneficiary,10142 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2024). states do retain a certain level of discretion. State agencies “may place appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures.”102Id. § 440.230(d) (emphasis added).

This “medical necessity” criterion has never been officially defined at the federal level for the purposes of Medicaid. Nevertheless, medical necessity “has become a judicially accepted component of the federal legislative scheme.”103Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its coverage.”104Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). As a result, “the medical necessity of the procedure is the touchstone for evaluating the reasonableness of standards in state Medicaid plans.”105Allen v. Mansour, 681 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1986). This could serve as an extremely powerful tool in GAC litigation for Medicaid recipients because the data is overwhelming and certain—GAC is medically necessary.106See, e.g., What Does the Scholarly Research Say about the Effect of Gender Transition on Transgender Well-Being?, Cornell Univ.: What We Know, (2018) https://whatweknow.inequality.cornell.edu/topics/lgbt-equality/what-does-the-scholarly-research-say-about-the-well-being-of-transgender-people [https://perma.cc/KM22-NCQW]; O’Reilly, supra note 11. As there are an estimated 276,000 transgender adults enrolled in Medicaid, Medicaid coverage of GAC would be life-saving for a significant number of people.107Christy Mallory & Will Tentindo, Medicaid Coverage for Gender-Affirming Care, UCLA SCh. L. Williams Inst. (Dec. 2022), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/medicaid-trans-health-care [https://perma.cc/6RZP-F2S4].

The debate over the merits of this argument goes back decades. For example, in 1980, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits came to opposing conclusions on state Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming care. In Pinneke v. Preisser,108Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980). the Eighth Circuit held that gender-affirming care could be found to be medically necessary for a Medicaid recipient, and “[t]he decision of whether or not certain treatment or a particular type of surgery is ‘medically necessary’ rests with the individual recipient’s physician and not with clerical personnel or government officials.”109Id. The Fifth Circuit came to a seemingly opposite conclusion in Rush v. Parham.110Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1154–56 (5th Cir. 1980). The court in Rush noted that, although the physician has “the primary responsibility of determining what treatment should be made available to his patients . . . the physician is required to operate within such reasonable limitations as the state may impose.”111Id. at 1155–56. This ruling upheld a Florida law that limited physicians’ power by denying coverage for gender-affirming care (which the state believed to be “experimental”), even when the physician approved the treatment.112Id. at 1154–55. The reason for the differing outcomes essentially came down to the question of whether states could provide evidence that these services were experimental, demonstrating the weight of state discretion in Medicaid cases.113Gene P. Schultz & Charles A. Parmenter, Medical Necessity, AIDS, and the Law, 9 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 379, 397–98 (1990) (“The Pinneke court was not confronted with the question of how the treating physician’s discretion might be circumscribed in a case where the record revealed a supportable state determination that a given medical procedure is experimental.”).

In the following decades, successful arguments for Medicaid coverage of GAC have often rested on the fact that there is broad medical consensus in favor of GAC, and these services should thus be considered medically necessary. Some have even recognized that past decisions denying coverage for gender-affirming care lacked the medical knowledge now available.114See, e.g., Fain v. Crouch, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313, 331 (S.D.W. Va. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Kadel v. Folwell, 100 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2024) (recognizing that previous court decisions that denied gender-affirming care lacked “the robust medical evidence in the record that this Court has before it”); see also Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1021 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (“[T]he medical consensus is that gender-confirming treatment, including surgery, is accepted, safe, and effective in the treatment of gender dysphoria . . . the denial of Medicaid benefits for needed medical treatment completely fails to protect the public health.”). These cases demonstrate that an understanding of medical necessity that incorporates medical consensus is vital to protecting gender-affirming care.

However, not all courts have this understanding. Because of the weight of a state’s discretion in defining medical necessity, a state’s characterization of GAC services as “experimental” could sink the justification for Medicaid coverage of GAC, especially in front of judges who do not recognize the stakes of treating gender dysphoria. At least eleven states have instituted policies excluding trans healthcare for all ages from their Medicaid policies,115Medicaid Coverage of Transgender-Related Health Care, Movement Advancement Project, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/medicaid [https://perma.cc/ER63-KCHL]. indicating that deference to state discretion is becoming increasingly risky. So, while the “medical necessity” argument has been successful in securing GAC in many cases, it is not a surefire solution to protecting Medicaid coverage of these services.

This is especially true under the new Trump administration and its influence on Congress. Precedent set by the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae weakens the medical necessity argument.116Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980). There, the Court considered whether state Medicaid programs were required to cover the cost of medically necessary abortions when the state would not receive federal reimbursements due to the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of federal funds to pay for abortion services.117See Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat 1418, 1434 (1977). The Court ruled that states had no such obligation, despite the plaintiffs’ argument that that the state’s refusal to pay for medically necessary abortions violated the Medicaid statute as well as their Due Process rights under Roe v. Wade.118Harris, 448 U.S. at 312–18. Rejecting these arguments, the Court held that “absent an indication of contrary legislative intent by a subsequent Congress, Title XIX does not obligate a participating state to pay for those medical services for which federal reimbursement is unavailable,” so the exclusion of coverage for even medically necessary abortions did not violate Medicaid regulations.119Id. at 309.

Members of Congress are exploring the possibility of creating an equivalent of the Hyde Amendment for trans healthcare. The House Appropriations Committee’s proposed Fiscal Year 2026 bill for the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee included language blocking the use of funds for “for any social, psychological, behavioral, or medical intervention performed for the purposes of intentionally changing the body of an individual (including by disrupting the body’s development, inhibiting its natural functions, or modifying its appearance) to no longer correspond to the individual’s biological sex.”120H.R. 5304, 119th Cong. § 244 (2025). The scope of this provision is wide-ranging, and “[r]ead broadly, the provision could shutter entire hospital programs that serve transgender patients and, at minimum, severely disrupt care for adults who rely on Medicaid, Medicare, and other federally funded services.”121Erin Reed, House HHS Appropriations Bill Would Devastate Trans Adult Healthcare Nationwide, Erin in the Morning (Sep. 8, 2025), https://www.erininthemorning.com/p/house-hhs-appropriations-bill-would [https://perma.cc/3TC7-UGXP]. Should a provision like this pass, states will be free to argue that they are not obligated to cover GAC services under Harris.

President Trump has wielded his influence on this matter, using anti-trans provisions as a key point in his messaging on government funding debates in Congress.122Erin Reed, Trump Digs in on Anti-Trans Provisions in Shutdown Fight Message, Erin in the Morning (Sep. 23, 2025), https://www.erininthemorning.com/p/trump-digs-in-on-anti-trans-provisions [https://perma.cc/KY5M-T6D5]. Another issue is posed by President Trump’s Executive Order restricting GAC for transgender youth.123Exec. Order No. 14187, 90 Fed. Reg. 8771 (Jan. 28, 2025). The Executive Order is also analogous to the Hyde Amendment in that it seeks to halt federal funding for GAC.124Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615 (Jan. 20, 2025). Whether this element of President Trump’s Executive Order will stand in the coming years is another unanswered question, especially because the President does not have Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Nonetheless, in an era where the Supreme Court is expanding the Executive’s power beyond its traditionally understood limits,125Catherine Lewis, The Uncertain Future of the Separation of Powers, Regul. Rev. (Aug. 24, 2025), https://www.theregreview.org/2025/08/24/spotlight-the-uncertain-future-of-the-separation-of-powers [https://perma.cc/U7TY-9CJV]. the Order could very well survive and foreclose the medical necessity argument for trans healthcare in Medicaid litigation.

  1. The Affordable Care Act

Another major federal legislative scheme that has been used to strike down bans on GAC is the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).12642 U.S.C. § 18116. It has been argued that GAC bans violate Section 1557, the anti-discrimination provision of the Affordable Care Act. This provision states that:

Except as otherwise provided for in this title (or an amendment made by this title), an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 794 of Title 29 [(The Rehabilitation Act)], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments). The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 794, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.12742 U.S.C. § 18116(a).

Section 1557 thus incorporates the protections of other anti-discrimination laws, including Title IX and its prohibition on sex discrimination.12820 U.S.C. § 11681. Prior to President Trump’s second term, there had already been significant back and forth over the definition of sex discrimination under this provision. Under the Biden administration, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in 2024 issued a rule “codifying that Section 1557’s prohibition against discrimination based on sex includes LGTBQI+ patients.”129HHS Issues New Rule to Strengthen Nondiscrimination Protections and Advance Civil Rights in Health Care, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Apr. 26, 2024), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2024/04/26/hhs-issues-new-rule-strengthen-nondiscrimination-protections-advance-civil-rights-health-care.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20241223223823/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2024/04/26/hhs-issues-new-rule-strengthen-nondiscrimination-protections-advance-civil-rights-health-care.html]. This HHS action sought to reinstate and expound upon an Obama-era HHS rule that included gender identity under the umbrella of sex discrimination,130Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 8 Fed. Reg. 31376, 31387 (proposed May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sex further includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity.”). but was removed in 2020 by the HHS under the Trump administration.131Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, Delegation of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37160, 37163 (June 19, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156). Three federal courts postponed the effective date of the provisions or prohibited the full implementation of the 2024 rule.132Tennessee v. Becerra, 739 F. Supp. 3d 467 (S.D. Miss. July 3, 2024); Fla. v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 8:24-CV-1080-WFJ-TGW, 2024 WL 3537510 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2024); Texas v. Becerra, No. 6:24-CV-211-JDK, 2024 WL 3297147 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2024), modified on recons., No. 6:24-CV-211-JDK, 2024 WL 4490621 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2024) (clarifying that the nationwide stay of the 2024 Rule applies only to the sections relating to sex and gender identity). See also MaryBeth Musumeci, New Regulations Counter Discrimination in Health Coverage and Care but Are Delayed by Courts, The Commonwealth Fund (July 10, 2024) https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2024/new-regulations-counter-discrimination-health-coverage-and-care-are-delayed-courts [https://web.archive.org/web/20251016131718/https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2024/new-regulations-counter-discrimination-health-coverage-and-care-are-delayed-courts].

It follows that federal agencies cannot be relied upon as a stable protector of healthcare rights. Although agencies are a function of the power-sharing system between Congress and the President, as part of the executive branch, they are subject to the priorities and agendas of any given president. The trend towards the weakening of federal agencies133See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (overturning Chevron deference); Charlie Savage, Weakening Regulatory Agencies Will Be a Key Legacy of the Roberts Court, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-regulatory-agencies.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20250914061419/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-regulatory-agencies.html]. is further indication that, when important rights are at stake, waiting for an agency to create and implement protections—which could be easily upended when a new president comes into office—is a precarious strategy.

Irrespective of HHS guidelines, the ACA has been successfully used to secure trans rights in litigation, namely as a result of the 2020 Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County.134Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).

B. The Shifting Borders of Sex Discrimination Law: Bostock and the ACA

Bostock v. Clayton County has sparked national debate over the relationship between LGBTQ+ rights and protections against sex discrimination.135Id. Bostock was a sex discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination in employment.13642 U.S.C. § 2000(e). In this case, gay and trans employees brought suit when they were fired after their respective employers learned of the employees’ sexual orientation or transgender status.137Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38. The Court held that firing an employee for being gay

or transgender constitutes sex discrimination and thereby violates Title VII.138Id. at 1744 (“When an employer fires an employee for being homosexual or transgender, it necessarily and intentionally discriminates against that individual in part because of sex. And that is all Title VII has ever demanded to establish liability.”).

The Bostock majority opinion focuses on a purely textualist, “formal, sterile, individualistic concept of ‘but-for’ causation,”139Jessica A. Clarke, Sex Discrimination Formalism, 109 Va. L. Rev. 1699, 1702 (2023). never touching explicitly upon gender identity per se. The opinion—written, unexpectedly, by Justice Gorsuch—notes that there is a dispute between the parties as to whether the term “sex” “reach[es] at least some norms concerning gender identity and sexual orientation. But . . . we proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’ . . . refer[s] only to biological distinctions between male and female.”140Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (emphasis added). The majority thus operates on a binary definition of sex, choosing not to directly address the term “gender identity.”

It is vital to note that Bostock did not materialize from thin air—there is a body of caselaw considering disparate treatment for gender-nonconformity as a form of sex-stereotyping, and, therefore, as sex discrimination. In the 1989 case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court found that sex-stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination,141Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (in which a female employee was denied the opportunity to become a partner at the accounting firm and brought a Title VII claim, alleging that she was denied the promotion in part because she was seen as overly aggressive for a woman). establishing “[s]ex equality’s crown jewel,”142Courtney Megan Cahill, Sex Equality’s Irreconcilable Differences, 132 Yale L.J. 1065, 1070 (2023). the anti-stereotyping principle, which asserts the “idea that sex classifications are illegal when they force people to conform to sex roles, like the homemaker wife or the breadwinning husband.”143Id. at 1097–98 (2023). The Court noted, for example, that “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”144Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added). Here, as Justice Brennan observed, basing a decision—in this case, a hiring decision—on perceived flaws in the performance of gender is sex discrimination. As a district court later explained, “Price Waterhouse shows that gender-stereotyping discrimination is sex discrimination per se.”145Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 522 (D. Conn. 2016).

The implications for transgender people are apparent in a number of Title VII cases that arose from Price Waterhouse.146Id. at 522–23 (“The acknowledgement in Price Waterhouse that discrimination by means of gender stereotyping is discrimination ‘because of sex’ under Title VII eventually led to a significant shift in the direction of decisions examining alleged discrimination on the basis of transgender identity.”).  In 2016, a federal district court judge evaluated some of these cases (including decisions from the Ninth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits),147See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“What matters . . . is that in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that he believed that the victim was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one. Thus, under Price Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences between men and women—and gender.”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (criticizing decisions that exclude trans people from Title VII protections, as “these courts superimpose classifications such as ‘transsexual’ on a plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination based on the plaintiff’s gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly unprotected classification”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes . . . Accordingly, discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012) (“When an employer discriminates against someone because the person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment ‘related to the sex of the victim.’ . . . In . . . these circumstances, the employer is making a gender-based evaluation, thus violating the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘an employer may not take gender into account in making an employment decision.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). See also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is unlawful to discriminate against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women.”). ultimately concluding that,

In some usages, the word “sex” can . . . mean the distinction between male and female, or the property or characteristic (or group of properties or characteristics) by which individuals may be so distinguished. Discrimination “because of sex,” therefore, is not only discrimination because of maleness and discrimination because of femaleness, but also discrimination because of the distinction between male and female or discrimination because of the properties or characteristics by which individuals may be classified as male or female.148Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 526.

“Sex stereotyping arguments rooted in Price Waterhouse and its progeny have thus far played the most significant doctrinal role in convincing courts to recognize transgender discrimination as sex discrimination.”149Annie Schuver, Scrutinizing the Bathroom Binary: Equal Protection Theories for Nonbinary Students, 122 Mich. L. Rev. 1519, 1526 (2024). Bostock follows this line of cases,150Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“Title VII’s message is ‘simple but momentous’: An individual employee’s sex is ‘not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.’ ”) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion)). bringing an undercurrent in sex discrimination law up to the surface: discrimination on the basis of gender non-conformity is a facet of sex discrimination. Regardless of its normative implications, the ruling was clear: “discrimination based on . . . transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen without the second.”151Id. at 1747.

The next consideration, then, is whether Bostock’s understanding of sex discrimination applies to the ACA. For now, this is an open question. In Skrmetti, the Court declined to extend the Bostock analysis to the interpretation of a Tennessee statute banning gender-affirming care for trans minors and deferred the question of the scope of Bostock’s reasoning to a later date.152United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1833–34 (2025). Nevertheless, many courts have extended Bostock’s logic, and there are obvious reasons for doing so, as discussed below. The majority in Bostock itself clarifies that questions beyond hiring decisions “are questions for future cases, not these,” which has does nothing to bar courts from applying the analysis thus far.153Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753.

However, the application of Bostock outside of the Title VII context has been a major point of contention between the lower courts, and the analysis of these approaches is imperative to understanding the current state of federal trans healthcare protections. As stated by the Western District of Washington,

[A] plaintiff states a viable claim for sex discrimination under Title IX, and by extension the ACA’s anti-sex discrimination provision, by plausibly alleging: (1) the defendant is a healthcare program that receives federal financial assistance, contracts or credits; (2) the plaintiff was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in the provision of healthcare services; and (3) the latter occurred on the basis of sex.154C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ill., 536 F. Supp. 3d 791, 796 (W.D. Wash. 2021).

Because the ACA incorporates Title IX protections, the link between Title VII jurisprudence and the ACA is neither tenuous nor novel. “The entire legal theory of sexual harassment,” one of the most significant strands of sex discrimination law,155Sexual harassment is “a subspecies of sex discrimination,” and “[s]exual harassment law derives from Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination against any individual ‘because of such individual’s . . . sex.’ . . . Thus, to prevail on a sexual harassment claim, a woman must show she was harassed because she is female.” Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 Duke L.J. 525, 525, 529 (2013). See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that same-sex harassment is also actionable under Title VII). “has been developed in the context of Title VII,” originating in the issue of quid pro quo sexual harassment in hiring and firing decisions.156Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Federal courts have long used the abundance of sex discrimination case law under Title VII in assessing Title IX claims,157Id. including federal appellate courts. For example, the Tenth Circuit reasoned in 1987 that, “[b]ecause Title VII prohibits the identical conduct prohibited

by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination, we regard it as the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX’s substantive standards.”158Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317, n.6 (10th Cir. 1987). See also Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (“We look to case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in evaluating a claim brought under Title IX.”).

Continuing this trend, several courts have extended Bostock’s Title VII analysis of sex discrimination to various contexts, such as Title IX, Equal Protection, and Due Process claims,159See, e.g., D.T. v. Christ, 552 F. Supp. 3d 888, 896 (D. Ariz. 2021); Hammons v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 3d 104, 116 (D. Md. 2023); LeTray v. City of Watertown, 718 F. Supp. 3d 192, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2024); Doe v. Ladapo, 676 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1217 (N.D. Fla. 2023); Tirrell v. Edelblut, 748 F. Supp. 3d 19, 26–27 (D.N.H. 2024). including appellate courts. The Tenth Circuit has used “Bostock’s commonsense explanation for how to detect a sex-based classification” in evaluating Equal Protection and Due Process claims against an Oklahoma law that prevented transgender individuals for changing the sex listed on their birth certificates.160Fowler v. Stitt, 104 F.4th 770, 790–91 (10th Cir. 2024). The court found no issue with Bostock’s narrow holding, reasoning that the Bostock “Court’s focus on Title VII and the issue before it suggests a proper exercise of judicial restraint, not a silent directive that its reasoning about the link between homosexual or transgender status and sex was restricted to Title VII.”161Id. at 790. Four circuit courts have mirrored the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in various Title IX cases: the Fourth Circuit stated in 2020 that “[a]lthough Bostock interprets Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . it guides our evaluation of claims under Title IX.”162Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020) (holding that a school district’s policy of excluding transgender students from their preferred bathrooms constitutes sex discrimination). Since 2020, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth circuits have also approved the use of Bostock’s sex discrimination analysis in evaluating Title IX claims.163A.C. v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Martinsville, 75 F.4th 760, 769 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Martinsville v. A. C., 144 S. Ct. 683 (2024); Brandt v. Rutledge, 47 F.4th 661, 667 (8th Cir. 2022) (affirming a district court’s decision that relied on Bostock’s sex discrimination analysis in Brandt v. Rutledge, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882, 889 (E.D. Ark. 2021)); Hecox v. Little, 104 F.4th 1061, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2024).

Can this analysis be applied to the Affordable Care Act? So far, the only federal appellate court that has done so is the Fourth Circuit; in Kadel v. Folwell, a case from April 2024, the Fourth Circuit held that state health programs must provide coverage for gender-affirming surgeries.164Kadel v. Folwell, 100 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2024). The

court directly stated that Bostock provides the appropriate standard, observing that “there is nothing in Bostock to suggest the holding was that narrow” so as to only apply to employment.165Id. at 164.

The Kadel court employed an analogy Justice Gorsuch used in Bostock, a thought experiment in which an interviewer requires the applicant to tick a box on the application indicating whether they are gay or transgender, redacting any indication of the applicant’s sex. In this scenario, even when the employer does not know what the applicant’s sex is, there is still sex discrimination because

There is no way for an applicant to decide whether to check the homosexual or transgender box without considering sex . . . . Likewise, . . . [b]y discriminating against transgender persons, the employer unavoidably discriminates against persons with one sex identified at birth and another today. Any way you slice it, the employer intentionally refuses to hire applicants in part because of the affected individuals’ sex, even if it never learns any applicant’s sex.166Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1746 (2020).

The Fourth Circuit reshaped this analogy and applied it to the healthcare context. At issue in Kadel is North Carolina’s health program, which covers surgical procedures for cisgender people, but does not cover those same procedures for transgender people.167Kadel, 100 F.4th at 133–34 (“For example, the Program covers mastectomies to treat cancer, but not to treat gender dysphoria; breast-reduction surgery to treat excess breast tissue in cisgender men, but not to treat gender dysphoria in transgender men; and chest-reconstruction surgery for cisgender women post-mastectomy, but not for gender dysphoria in transgender women.”). The court gave various examples, including that of a patient seeking vaginoplasty, a situation in which the patient’s sex is not readily apparent because the procedure is used by both transgender and cisgender people.168Id. at 153. Under the state’s policy, the coverage decision cannot be made “without knowing whether the vaginoplasty is to treat gender dysphoria—in other words, whether the patient was assigned male at birth.”169Id. at 154. The decision, like the interviewer’s decision in Justice Gorsuch’s thought experiment, hinges on the person’s sex. Ultimately, the state law at issue

is textbook sex discrimination, for two reasons. For one, we can determine whether some patients will be eliminated from candidacy for these surgeries solely from knowing their sex assigned at birth. And two, conditioning access to these surgeries based on a patient’s sex assigned at birth stems from gender stereotypes about how men or women should present.170Id. at 153 (citing Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742–49).

While Kadel can serve as a model for courts to use Bostock’s understanding of sex discrimination in ACA cases, the Supreme Court has thrown a wrench in the works by vacating and remanding the case back to the Fourth Circuit in light of its ruling in Skrmetti.171Folwell v. Kadel, 145 S. Ct. 2838 (2025). The Fourth Circuit could very well come to the same conclusion as its original ruling, but uncertainty remains. Nevertheless, Kadel is, in many ways, the culmination of decades of evolving interpretations of sex discrimination law, trending towards the recognition—whether intentional or not—of the role of gender identity in sex discrimination. When we interpret the ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender status, many of the legal arguments for gender-affirming care bans collapse. However, the key issue here is just that—interpretation. It comes down to individual judges and justices to interpret sex discrimination law in this manner, and this has led to a significant variation of outcomes in gender-affirming care litigation.

Not every court has applied Bostock in trans rights cases. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, argued that Bostock should not apply in a Title IX case regarding the exclusion of transgender students from school bathrooms that aligned with their gender identity.172Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 57 F.4th 791, 811 (11th Cir. 2022). The court did not interpret Bostock’s ruling as equating sex with gender identity, as “the Supreme Court in Bostock actually ‘proceed[ed] on the assumption’ that the term ‘sex,’ as used in Title VII, ‘refer[ed] only to biological distinctions between male and female.’ ”173Id. at 813 (citation omitted). The majority even characterizes “reading ‘sex’ to include ‘gender identity’ ” as detrimental to Title IX litigation, claiming that it “would result in situations where an entity would be prohibited from installing or enforcing the otherwise permissible sex-based carve-outs when the carve-outs come into conflict with a transgender person’s gender identity.”174Id. at 814.

The argument that Bostock’s conception of sex does not extend to gender identity is unconvincing. The crux of the argument for linking transgender status to sex discrimination is the choice to fire someone “for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”175Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (emphasis added). For example, if “an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is insufficiently feminine and also fires a man, Bob, for being insufficiently masculine . . . in both cases the employer fires an individual in part because of sex.”176Id. at 1741. Discrimination on the basis of gender non-conformity is thus an inherent aspect of sex discrimination, reflecting the long-established anti-stereotyping principle in sex discrimination doctrine.

Interestingly, the dissenters in Bostock seemed to base their arguments on the belief that the majority is equating transgender status with gender identity. Justice Alito, for example, mentioned the term “gender identity” forty-eight times in his dissent, repeatedly characterizing the majority’s opinion as extending Title VII to gender identity.177Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1761 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“By proclaiming that sexual orientation and gender identity are ‘not relevant to employment decisions,’ the Court updates Title VII to reflect what it regards as 2020 values.”); Id. at 1778 (“What the Court has done today––interpreting discrimination because of ‘sex’ to encompass discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity––is virtually certain to have far-reaching consequences.”). Such catastrophizing indicates the fear—and understanding—that the Court has recognized gender identity as a facet of sex.

Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly insisted that Bostock applies only to Title VII and the employment context. In a 2023 case brought against Alabama for its ban on gender-affirming care for minors, the Eleventh Circuit declined to extend the Bostock analysis to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims.178Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala., 80 F.4th 1205, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023). In doing so, the court referenced the Sixth Circuit’s decision earlier that year in L.W. ex rel. Williams v. Skrmetti, which upheld Tennessee’s ban on gender-affirming care for minors.179L. W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F.4th 460, 491 (6th Cir. 2023), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1837 (2025). The Sixth Circuit explicitly stated that Bostock’s “reasoning applies only to Title VII.”180L.W., 83 F.4th at 484. The Sixth Circuit had already established this position in 2021181Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he Court in Bostock was clear on the narrow reach of its decision and how it was limited only to Title VII itself.”). and reiterated it in 2024.182Gore v. Lee, 107 F.4th 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2024) (holding that Tennessee’s refusal to allow transgender people to change the biological sex on their birth certificates did not constitute sex discrimination, and Bostock does not apply). It seemed the Eleventh Circuit almost had a change of heart in 2024 when it used Bostock to rule against the exclusion of gender-affirming care from insurance coverage, but this case was granted rehearing en banc, and the original decision was subsequently vacated.183Lange v. Houston Cnty., 101 F.4th 793, 798–99 (11th Cir. 2024), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 110 F.4th 1254 (11th Cir. 2024).

Aligning with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, several district courts have declined to extend Bostock beyond the Title VII context.184See, e.g., Neese v. Becerra, 640 F. Supp. 3d 668, 676 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (“Bostock does not purport to interpret Section 1557, Title IX, or any other non-Title VII statute . . . Bostock decided only what Bostock decided.”); Poe v. Drummond, 697 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1251 (N.D. Okla. 2023); Texas v. Cardona, 743 F. Supp. 3d 824, 880 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (“Bostock stated without equivocation that its holding only applies to Title VII.”). This was also a major component of the reasoning behind delaying the 2024 HHS rule that would have included gender identity under sex discrimination.185See discussion supra Section II.A.2. For example, a Florida district court granted an injunction against the HHS Rule, stating that the “Eleventh Circuit has spoken on this point, clearly: Title IX does not address discrimination on the basis of gender identity.”186Florida. v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 739 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1104 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (citing Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. John’s Cnty., 57 F.4th 791, 812–15 (11th Cir. 2022)). See also Texas v. Becerra, 739 F. Supp. 3d 522, 535 (E.D. Tex. 2024) (“HHS contends that the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock compels its interpretation of Title IX to prohibit discrimination on the basis of ‘gender identity’ and ‘sexual orientation.’ Not so. Bostock’s holding was limited and clear.”) (citation omitted). Whether the Supreme Court will validate these arguments is uncertain. Given the Supreme Court’s ambivalence on Bostock and its affirming of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Skrmetti,187United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025). it could very well refuse to extend its reasoning to the ACA. However, this refusal would be inconsistent with the crux of Bostock’s reasoning: a textualist approach to Title VII.

Common criticisms of expanding the scope of Bostock fall away when considering the ACA context. As discussed above, the link between Title VII and Title IX analysis is well-established, and the ACA explicitly incorporates Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination. Justice Thomas’s contention in his Skrmetti concurrence that Bostock cannot be applied to constitutional questions188Id. at 1839 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would make clear that, in constitutional challenges, courts need not engage Bostock at all.”). is irrelevant: interpreting the ACA is a matter of statutory analysis, not Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine. Justice Gorsuch’s purely textualist approach can just as easily be applied to Title IX as it can to Title VII. The question of whether sex encompasses gender identity are equivalent is also irrelevant: under a but-for causation standard, sex assigned at birth is enough to satisfy the analysis.

Nevertheless, in light of the current legal landscape, arguments under the ACA could be weakened or potentially shut down altogether. While both the ACA and Medicaid have historically been used to secure trans healthcare protections—and could very well be used to do so in the future—these paths are increasingly narrowing.

C. Is Sex Equality Enough? Trans Rights Under Equal Protection

Much of the existing scholarship on trans rights focuses on establishing that LGBTQ+ discrimination is sex discrimination, and rightfully so. Sex discrimination jurisprudence is an already existing framework doctrinally consistent with LGBTQ+ equality, with precedent favorable to trans rights cases, as seen in the above discussion on Bostock. However, as the previous Section demonstrates, there is significant room for judges to inject their own biases in deciding to apply Bostock. For advocates bringing constitutional claims, there is even further risk of anti-trans animus to poison the legal reasoning. This Section discusses how sex discrimination doctrine under an Equal Protection framework can be misapplied or outright ignored in trans rights cases, underscoring the limits of sex equality doctrine in protecting trans rights.

  1. When Is Sex Discrimination Doctrine (Mis)applied?

In assessing how courts deploy sex discrimination analysis, it is worth discussing the definitional debates over the term “sex.” One of President Trump’s recent Executive Orders, for example, states that sex is defined by “an individual’s immutable biological classification as either male or female,” and states that the government will only “recognize two sexes, male and female. These sexes are not changeable and are grounded in fundamental and incontrovertible reality.”189Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615, 8615 (Jan. 20, 2025).

Biologists, medical professionals, and historians, however, dispute this aforementioned “fundamental and incontrovertible reality.” The Executive Order fails to take into account the existence of intersex people, who have “innate bodily traits that . . . cause a person’s chromosomes, gonads or other internal reproductive organs, genitals, and/or hormone function to differ from characteristics that are ‘typically’ male or female.”190US: Anti-Trans Bills Also Harm Intersex Children, Hum. Rts. Watch (Oct. 26, 2022), https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/26/us-anti-trans-bills-also-harm-intersex-children [https://perma.cc/2J3S-8SKL]. The manifestations of intersex conditions vary widely191Alice D. Dreger & April M. Herndon, Progress and Politics in the Intersex Rights Movement: Feminist Theory in Action, 15 GLQ: J. Lesbian & Gay Stud. 199, 210 (2009) [https://perma.cc/73B6-6G2Q]. and are not always obvious or consistently apparent. For example, “[s]ome intersex traits—such as atypical external genitalia—are apparent at birth. Others—such as gonads or chromosomes that do not match the expectations of the assigned sex—manifest later in life, such as around puberty.”192“I Want to Be Like Nature Made Me”: Medically Unnecessary Surgeries on Intersex Children in the US, Hum. Rts. Watch (July 25, 2017) https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/25/i-want-be-nature-made-me/medically-unnecessary-surgeries-intersex-children-us [https://perma.cc/73B6-6G2Q]. Intersex people constitute around 1.7% of the population, although some estimates place the number closer to 4%—because components of sex such as chromosomes, genes, and hormones cannot be evaluated unless testing occurs, many do not realize they are intersex unless they seek such testing as a part of other medical treatment, so the number of intersex people may be significantly undercounted.193Fradella, supra note 27, at 293; see also Claire Ainsworth, Sex Redefined, 518 Nature 288, 290 (Feb. 2015) (“Many people never discover their condition unless they seek help for infertility, or discover it through some other brush with medicine. Last year, for example, surgeons reported that they had been operating on a hernia in a man, when they discovered that he had a womb. The man was [seventy], and had fathered four children.”). While some see intersex people as “statistical outliers” that have no bearing on how we conceptualize sex categories,194Kathleen Stock, Changing the Concept of “Woman” Will Cause Unintended Harms, The Economist (July 6, 2018), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/07/06/changing-the-concept-of-woman-will-cause-unintended-harms [https://web.archive.org/web/20250602022906/https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/07/06/changing-the-concept-of-woman-will-cause-unintended-harms]. this framing is inaccurate—rather than being fringe cases, intersex people exemplify the spectrum upon which sex is constructed for everyone. Nor is intersex simply a “third” box to neatly funnel “outliers” into. The vast variation in intersex conditions and the physical manifestations of these conditions indicate that “intersex is not a discrete biological category.”195Dreger & Herndon, supra note 191, at 217.

Intersex people are often cited as an indication that sex is socially constructed because the definition of intersex itself is socially constructed. The medical field views intersex as “variations in congenital sex anatomy that are considered atypical for females or males. The definition of intersex is thus context specific. What counts as an intersex phallus, for example, depends on local standards for penises and clitorises.”196Id. at 200. The treatment of intersex people demonstrates that sex categories are informed by beliefs and norms. However, asserting “that sex is ‘socially constructed’ does not mean that biological sex differences do not exist or do not matter. It simply conveys that our definition of sex, and the way that we categorize people into sexes, is determined by society and our assumptions about how the world works.”197Julia Serano, Transgender People and “Biological Sex” Myths, Medium (July 17, 2017), https://juliaserano.medium.com/transgender-people-and-biological-sex-myths-c2a9bcdb4f4a [https://perma.cc/XRB3-236U].

It is, of course, unlikely that most politicians and judges are interested in sitting down and carefully pondering the social construction of sex. The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that, regardless of normative claims, both objective science and historical reality show that efforts to pin down a definition of “biological sex” are inherently messy, misguided, and inaccurate. Moreover, these messy, misguided, and inaccurate efforts have material consequences in how they are applied and interpreted in the law.

The next question, then, is how sex is or should be defined in the law. Should we define sex based on paperwork? Many states do: twenty-two states and Washington, D.C. allow “residents to mark M, F, or X on their driver’s license,” and sixteen states and Washington, D.C. allow “residents to mark M, F, or X on their birth certificates.”198Identity Document Laws and Policies, Movement Advancement Project (2025), https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/identity_documents [https://perma.cc/GXB2-BQF8]. These states promote the idea that gender identity is “the primary indicator of legal sex.”199Noa Ben-Asher, Transforming Legal Sex, 102 N.C. L. Rev. 335, 374 (2024). However, not all states agree—some focus on binary, biological indicators of sex. Definitions based in biological sex that identify specific physical traits are deeply misguided, as biologists do not think there is “ ‘one biological parameter that takes over every other parameter.’ ”200Ainsworth, supra note 193, at 291. Nevertheless, many state “laws regulate gender and define sex as only male or female, typically based on a person’s presumed reproductive anatomy, chromosomes, hormones, or other physical characteristics at birth.”201Regulating Gender to Allow Discrimination, Movement Advancement Project, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/nondiscrimination/defining_sex [https://perma.cc/RP76-C6AK]. At least twelve states regulate sex under these laws, creating “dangerous implications for transgender people when it comes to bathrooms, identity documents, and other areas of law or policy.”202Id. Laura Lane-Steele identifies the contours of such “ ‘sex defining laws,’ ” which

are a product of state legislatures and school boards, among other legal actors, codifying what they understand to be the true meaning of sex. For the most part, these laws define sex based on some combination of sex assigned at birth (SAAB), genitalia, chromosomes, and reproductive anatomy. Under these laws, people assigned male at birth (AMAB), who have penises, testes, and XY chromosomes are male, while people assigned female at birth (AFAB), who have vaginas, ovaries, uteruses, and XX chromosomes are female. These definitions are deployed to determine if someone is male (M) or female (F) for bathroom access, participation on single-sex sports teams, and eligibility for sex marker changes, among other things.203Laura Lane-Steele, Sex-Defining Laws and Equal Protection, 112 Cal. L. Rev. 259, 262 (2024).

Such laws are not necessarily a barrier to favorable rulings. In bathroom bill cases involving these laws, for example, courts have ruled that trans-exclusionary bathroom policies discriminate on the basis of sex.204See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020). Yet, Lane-Steele points out that although these courts came to the right conclusions, they failed to explain why the state’s definition of sex does not comport with the state’s purported justification for the exclusion.205Lane-Steele, supra note 203, at 291. As a result, “they are of limited use in future sex-defining equal protection cases.”206Id.

To remedy this, Lane-Steele argues that courts should apply “a contextual approach to sex applied to an equal protection challenge to a sex-defining law” in which “a court would identify the precise model of sex the state is using . . . . Once the court has identified how exactly the state is defining sex, it can then square up the question presented, using the state’s exact definition of sex as the relevant means” to determine whether the state law substantially relates to the state’s interest and should survive intermediate scrutiny.207Id. at 300–01. However, Lane-Steele also acknowledges that, because the decision to apply a contextual approach requires “rejection of naturalized and pre-legal definitions of sex . . . some conservative judges will not adopt it.”208Id. at 324. As she puts it, “[a] contextual sex analysis is off the table for those committed to certain pre-existing and inflexible views about sex and who cannot suspend their gender ideologies when doing their jobs. Indeed, most, if not all pro-trans arguments are probably off the table for these judges.”209Id. Judges, then, cannot be fully relied upon to accurately identify and evaluate how states are deploying definitions of sex in sex discrimination claims brought by trans people. Absent such evaluation, equal protection arguments could easily be struck down.

Another issue is that sex discrimination cases depend on which thread of sex equality doctrine the judge chooses to follow. Jessica Clarke identifies an “ascendant”210Clarke, supra note 139, at 1795. trend of “sex discrimination formalism” in which judges tend to apply one of

three distinct types of formal rules when it comes to intentional sex discrimination: (1) but-for causation, which asks whether mistreatment would have befallen an individual if their sex were different; (2) anticlassification rules, also referred to as “blindness,” which ask whether a decision-maker acted pursuant to an explicit or implicit policy that considers sex; and (3) “similarly situated” rules, which forbid decision-makers from treating individuals of different sexes who are alike in all relevant respects differently.211Id. at 1704.

While Clarke maps this typology in great detail, this Subsection will briefly discuss one of these rules as an example of the judicial malleability of certain aspects of sex discrimination doctrine—the “similarly situated” inquiry, which “has been particularly prominent in transgender rights litigation.”212Id. at 1706.

In this inquiry, it is necessary to identify which groups are being compared and evaluate whether they are truly similarly situated. Yet, what is the point of comparison? Take, for example, trans inclusion in sports. Satisfying the similarly situated inquiry “requires recognizing gender identity as the relevant point of comparison—that is, that a transgender girl excluded from girls’ sports is being treated worse than other similarly situated girls whose gender identity (when aligned with their ‘biological sex’) is being respected.”213Brake, supra note 19, at 82. In other words, the court must understand gender identity as the indicator of sex, rather than “biological sex.” If the court chooses to define sex as “biological sex,” this argument could fail, as the court might find that a transgender girl who is excluded from girls’ sports is being treated the same as other students assigned to teams based on their “ ‘biological sex’ (e.g., male students).”214Id. The definitional debate over sex is thus always running in the background.

Additional complications arise for nonbinary people. While many material concerns of trans people and nonbinary people overlap (such as access to gender-affirming care), other concerns are thought to be in contradiction. For example, “plaintiffs in transgender bathroom cases (ostensibly) are fine with sex separatism in restrooms; their disagreement is with the sex category into which they have been assigned. The same holds true for plaintiffs in transgender-sports litigation: theirs is an issue of sex assignment, not sex separatism.”215Cahill, supra note 142, at 1132. Annie Schuver reminds us that for nonbinary people, the re-entrenchment of sex separatism is not the goal; rather, many nonbinary people seek sex-neutral spaces, such as all-gender bathrooms.216Schuver, supra note 149, at 1520–21.

How do sex discrimination claims for nonbinary people play out? In analyzing the application of but-for rules to nonbinary cases, Schuver poses the hypothetical of “two students, both assigned female at birth. They are identical in all significant respects, except one identifies as nonbinary and the other does not. The aforementioned bathroom policy requires both students to use the girls’ bathroom because it aligns with their sex assigned at birth.”217Id. at 1537.

What happens if a judge uses the “similarly situated” route? Similar to the but-for inquiry, if the point of comparison is assigned sex at birth, the argument fails—both students are of the “same” sex, and they were treated equally.218Id. The difficulty here is coming up with an alternate point of comparison. A transgender boy could argue that he was “treated worse than other boys because he was not permitted to use restrooms consistent with his gender identity.”219Clarke, supra note 139, at 1735. This argument does not work for nonbinary students. If gender identity is an indicator of sex, then no nonbinary student is being treated worse than any other nonbinary student—none of them have access to all-gender bathrooms, so they are all being treated the same. The judge in this case might hesitate to deviate from this formalistic reasoning because “[a]part from ideology, courts are unlikely to explicitly adopt principles directed at systemic injustice, stereotypes, or balancing of interests as controlling inquiries due to concerns about institutional competence.”220Id. at 1769. So, if a judge chooses to use the similarly situated inquiry in a case of this nature, the nonbinary plaintiff will likely fail.

The success of trans and nonbinary plaintiffs can hinge on the judge’s choices in selecting from a menu of definitions of sex and formal rules of evaluating sex discrimination. There is thus a significant amount of room for personal anti-trans biases to slip into the analysis. Ultimately, “[j]udges with ideological reasons for upholding laws that target transgender people will find grounds for doing so, even if they acknowledge that those laws classify on the basis of sex and therefore trigger heightened scrutiny.”221Jessica A. Clarke, Scrutinizing Sex, 92 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2025).

  1. When Is Sex Discrimination Doctrine Not Applied At All?

The most consequential recent development in trans rights cases has been the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in U.S. v. Skrmetti.222United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025). At issue in this case was a Tennessee law—referred to as SB1—that banned gender-affirming care for transgender minors. The operative word here is “transgender”—the same procedures are permissible

to treat a minor’s congenital defect, precocious (or early) puberty, disease, or physical injury. . . . The law defines the term “[c]ongenital defect” to include an “abnormality present in a minor that is inconsistent with the normal development of a human being of the minor’s sex,” . . . but excludes from the definitions of “[c]ongenital defect” and “disease” “gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, [and] gender incongruence.”223Id. at 1826–27 (citations omitted).

In other words, cisgender children can receive these treatments, but healthcare providers are prohibited from administering the same treatments to transgender children. Three transgender minors, their parents, and a medical provider were joined by the United States government under President Joe Biden’s administration in bringing suit against the law, alleging that it violated equal protection.224Id. at 1827.

Unlike the above discussion on the misapplication of sex discrimination doctrine, the majority—written by Chief Justice Roberts—sidestepped the application altogether, holding that SB1 classifies on the basis of age and on the basis of medical use, neither of which “turn[] on sex. Rather, SB1 prohibits healthcare providers from administering puberty blockers and hormones to minors for certain medical uses, regardless of a minor’s sex.”225Id. at 1829. To establish SB1’s classification on the basis of medical use, Roberts used the example of a transgender boy who takes puberty blockers to treat his gender dysphoria and a cisgender boy who uses the same treatment for precocious puberty.226Id. at 1830–31. According to Roberts, SB1 simply “restricts which of these medical treatments are available to minors,”227Id. at 1830. and “[t]he application of that prohibition does not turn on sex.”228Id. at 1831.

Nor does SB1, according to the Court, “mask sex-based classifications” because

the law does not prohibit conduct for one sex that it permits for the other. Under SB1, no minor may be administered puberty blockers or hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence; minors of any sex may be administered puberty blockers or hormones for other purposes.229Id.

Chief Justice Roberts also rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that SB1 constitutes impermissible sex-stereotyping through somewhat circular logic, asserting that there is no sex-stereotyping because the law does not classify on the basis of sex.230Id. at 1832.

The opinion also dodged the question of whether transgender individuals constitute a suspect or quasi suspect class, asserting that the question is immaterial in this case because “SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status.”231Id. at 1833. In reaching this conclusion, the majority resurrects a case that had “long been largely moribund as a precedent”232Katie Eyer, Transgender Equality and Geduldig 2.0, 55 Ariz. St. L.J. 475, 480 (2023). in Supreme Court equal protection doctrine since it was handed down in 1974—Geduldig v. Aiello.233Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). This case faced significant public backlash and was repudiated by Congress through the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. See discussion infra Part III. In Geduldig, the Court upheld a California insurance program that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage, ruling that the policy did not discriminate on the basis of sex.234Id. The Court “explained that the program did not exclude any individual from benefit eligibility because of the individual’s sex but rather ‘remove[d] one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.’ ”235United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1833 (2025) (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974)). Furthermore, there was no sex discrimination because the program “divided potential recipients into two groups: ‘pregnant women and nonpregnant persons,’ ” and “[b]ecause women fell into both groups, the program did not discriminate against women as a class.”236Id. This case established that “a State does not trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny by regulating a medical procedure that only one sex can undergo unless the regulation is a mere pretext for invidious sex discrimination.”237Id. at 515; see also Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.

Chief Justice Roberts analogized SB1 to the insurance program at issue in Geduldig. SB1

removes one set of diagnoses—gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence—from the range of treatable conditions. SB1 divides minors into two groups: those who might seek puberty blockers or hormones to treat the excluded diagnoses, and those who might seek puberty blockers or hormones to treat other conditions . . . . Because only transgender individuals seek puberty blockers and hormones for the excluded diagnoses, the first group includes only transgender individuals; the second group, in contrast, encompasses both transgender and nontransgender individuals.238Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1833.

This logic, coupled with the lack of showing that “SB1’s prohibitions are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against transgender individuals,” led the Court to reject a finding of discrimination on the basis of transgender status.239Id. at 1833–34.

Because the Court found no sex-based classification and no suspect or quasi-suspect class status for trans people, it did not apply heightened scrutiny.240Id. at 1832–34. Instead, under a rational basis review standard, the Court upheld SB1. Echoing Tennessee’s misleading claims about the supposed experimental nature of gender-affirming care and its threat to the mental and physical wellbeing of minors, the Court found SB1 to be rationally related to the state’s purported “interests in ‘encouraging minors to appreciate their sex’ and in prohibiting medical care ‘that might encourage minors to become disdainful of their sex.’ ”241Id. at 1832.

Justice Sotomayor laid out a powerful critique of the majority’s unconvincing reasoning in her dissent, pointing out that which is obvious—SB1 facially classifies on the basis of sex and on the basis of transgender status. The majority’s assertion that the law does not classify on the basis of transgender status (an assertion so dubious that even Justice Alito rejected it in his concurrence)242Id. at 1855 (Alito, J., concurring). does not hold water. Justice Sotomayor observed that the law “prohibits Tennessee physicians from offering hormones and puberty blockers to allow a minor to ‘identify with’ a gender identity inconsistent with her sex.”243Id. at 1879 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However, “[d]esiring to ‘identify with’ a gender identity inconsistent with sex is, of course, exactly what it means to be transgender. The two are wholly coextensive.”244Id.

Even more salient for the purposes of this Note is Justice Sotomayor’s argument that SB1 does classify on the basis of sex. The law establishes that “sex determines access to the covered medication.”245Id. at 1873. To illustrate, Justice Sotomayor used the example of a “mother who contacts a Tennessee doctor, concerned that her adolescent child has begun growing unwanted facial hair. This hair growth, the mother reports, has spurred significant distress because it makes her child look unduly masculine.”246Id. The physician’s course of action “depends on the adolescent’s sex. If the patient was identified as female at birth, SB1 allows the physician to alleviate her distress. . . . What if the adolescent was identified male at birth, however? SB1 precludes the patient from receiving the same medicine.”247Id.

Justice Sotomayor identified a key point that is completely glossed over by the majority—the treatments at issue are used by both transgender and cisgender children for gender-affirming purposes. Medical providers

may prescribe these same medicines to adolescents whose physical appearance does not align with what one might expect from their sex identified at birth. An adolescent female, for example, might receive testosterone suppressors and hormonal birth control to reduce the growth of unwanted hair on her face or body (sometimes called male-pattern hair growth or hirsutism). . . . [and] [a]n adolescent male may also receive hormones to address a benign but atypical increase in breast gland tissue (known as gynecomastia), sometimes resulting from below-average testosterone levels. Like any medical treatment, hormones and puberty blockers come with the potential for side effects. . . . Yet patients and their parents may decide to proceed with treatment on the advice of a physician, despite the accompanying medical risks.248Id. at 1868–69.

This passage highlights that cisgender children, like transgender children, may have an interest in potentially altering even physically “benign” characteristics to alleviate psychological distress about their gender presentation. Under SB1, cisgender children and their parents are allowed to make informed decisions about their treatment in conjunction with their doctors. Transgender children, seeking the same care with the same informed consent standards and for the same purpose, do not have the same right.

Such a policy is, contrary to the majority’s circular logic, rooted in sex-stereotyping. After all, “[m]ale (but not female) adolescents can receive medicines that help them look like boys, and female (but not male) adolescents can receive medicines that help them look like girls,”249Id. at 1868. cementing expectations of gender presentation within the law.

This becomes especially clear when considering SB1’s built-in exception for intersex children. SB1, like virtually all state bans on gender-affirming care, provides a carve out for “gender-normalizing surgeries, which are performed on intersex infants to conform their bodies to socially constructed expectations about the male/female binary.”250Holning Lau & Barbara Fedders, Scrutinizing Transgender Healthcare Bans Through Intersex Exceptions, 36 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 1 (2025). In SB1’s case, this is reflected in allowance for the use of these treatments to treat a “ ‘[c]ongenital defect,’ ” which is defined as “an ‘abnormality present in a minor that is inconsistent with the normal development of a human being of the minor’s sex.’ ”251Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1826–27. Significant “research has demonstrated that intersex surgeries often produce a range of harms that can include sterilization (sometimes triggering the need for lifelong hormone therapy), loss of sexual sensation, physical scarring, ongoing pain, and a host of psychological ailments.”252Lau & Fedders, supra note 250, at 16. Moreover, “[t]he irreversibility of these surgeries and the inability of infants to consent are abundantly clear.”253Id. at 1.

How can these procedures be squared with GAC bans? The contradiction is glaring—“[t]he very concerns cited to justify the bans—medical harm, irreversibility, and lack of informed consent—are even more pronounced in the context of intersex surgeries.”254Id. However, “intersex exceptions are, in fact, consistent with sentiments behind bans on gender-affirming care: a deep-seated fear of and discomfort with children who do not conform to traditional sex stereotypes.”255Id. Tennessee’s concern that minors “appreciate their sex” seems to fall away when it considers intersex children, whose physical characteristics at birth can “challenge cultural understandings about the fixedness of biological sex characteristics.”256Id. at 28. By allowing for exceptions for intersex and cisgender children, the law reflects the state’s commitment to enforcing sex stereotypes. The majority’s sanctioning of such a law threatens and “implicates the core concern of the Supreme Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence—that the state should not use its laws to force individuals to conform to a stereotyped view of how members of one sex should act.”257Bagenstos and Schlanger on Supreme Court Trans Rights Ruling in US v. Skrmetti, Mich. L. (June 19, 2025), https://michigan.law.umich.edu/news/bagenstos-and-schlanger-supreme-court-trans-rights-ruling-us-v-skrmetti [https://web.archive.org/web/20250916045333/https://michigan.law.umich.edu/news/bagenstos-and-schlanger-supreme-court-trans-rights-ruling-us-v-skrmetti].

Even if we put aside these contradictions and assume that Tennessee is operating out of a good faith concern for protecting the health and wellbeing of minors, the fundamental calculus does not change. Deference to the state in its policy decisions may be valid and necessary in some contexts, but Justice Sotomayor reminds us that the role of the legislature “does not change the Court’s obligation, as mandated by our precedents, to determine whether the challenged sex classification in SB1’s categorical ban is tailored to protecting minors’ health and welfare, or instead rests on unlawful stereotypes about how boys and girls should look and act.”258United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1883 (2025). The core question here is not a finding of fact regarding the medical efficacy of GAC procedures to the treat gender dysphoria—the question is whether the law is subject to heightened scrutiny, and thereby, whether the law is sufficiently tailored to the state’s purported interest. Had the majority applied sex discrimination analysis and heightened scrutiny, it could have formed a far more principled analysis of SB1.

The long-term implications of Skrmetti are yet to be seen. While “ ‘[t]he Court left undisturbed Supreme Court and lower court precedent that other examples of discrimination against transgender people are unlawful,’ ”259ACLU, Lambda Legal Respond to Supreme Court Ruling in U.S. v. Skrmetti, ACLU (June 18, 2025 10:50 AM), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-lambda-legal-respond-to-supreme-court-ruling-in-u-s-v-skrmetti [https://perma.cc/F2X4-HNN4]. Skrmetti “offers cover for the courts, including the Supreme Court, to simply deny reality and refuse to see sex or gender identify classifications. If there was no such classification in Skrmetti, then perhaps there are also no such classifications in laws banning transgender people from the military, excluding them from sports, or banning them from gender-identity-congruent restrooms.”260Katie Eyer, The Limits of Anti-Classification Doctrine in U.S. v. Skrmetti, Regul. Rev. (July 14, 2025), https://www.theregreview.org/2025/07/14/eyer-the-limits-of-anti-classification-doctrine-in-u-s-v-skrmetti [https://perma.cc/V8X6-YRBS].

The Supreme Court seems open to such outcomes, vacating and remanding major favorable trans rights cases back to the circuit courts: Kadel v. Folwell261Crouch v. Anderson, 145 S. Ct. 2838 (2025). and its companion case Anderson v. Crouch262Kadel v. Folwell, 100 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2024), vacated sub nom., Crouch v. Anderson, 145 S. Ct. 2835 (2025). in the Fourth Circuit, as well as Fowler v. Stitt263Fowler v. Stitt, 104 F.4th 770 (10th Cir. 2024), vacated, 145 S. Ct. 2840 (2025). in the Tenth Circuit. While Kadel and Anderson concerned GAC coverage, Fowler had nothing to do with trans healthcare; the state law at issue involved gender markers on identity documents.264Fowler, 104 F.4th at 770. Despite Skrmetti’s apparent silence on issues outside trans healthcare for minors, it seems that the Court is willing to wield its influence on the lower courts on other trans rights issues. This influence is far reaching—even cases untouched by the Court are now being reconsidered. For example, the Seventh Circuit has decided sua sponte to vacate and reopen D.P. v. Mukwonago Area School District (a trans bathroom case in which the court ruled in favor of the transgender plaintiff) in light of Skrmetti.265D.P. v. Mukwonago Area Sch. Dist., No. 23-2568, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 16097, at *1 (7th Cir. June 30, 2025).

Skrmetti is a prime example of how, even when there is obvious sex discrimination at play in a trans healthcare case, the courts—including the highest court in the land—can simply ignore it. While the battle for trans rights is ongoing and unresolved, the case poses a significant danger to trans healthcare—and the future of the Court’s equal protection doctrine.

III.  CONGRESSIONAL ACTION: MODERNIZING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

This Part argues that Congress should pass new civil rights legislation specific to LGBTQ+ equality. This Part then proposes that, as a part of this legislation, Congress pass a new healthcare statute prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of transgender or nonbinary status.”

A. Reframing LGBTQ+ Equality

Through the courts, the category of “sex” in discrimination claims has broadened to include trans people. As the previous Part demonstrates, however, current sex equality jurisprudence has its limitations in that judges retain a certain amount of ideological leeway. This Section proposes reframing LGBTQ+ discrimination as its own category within civil rights law. If broadly applied, this additional categorization would carve out explicit protections for LGBTQ+ people in the same areas as other civil rights laws, such as in employment and education.

On a macro level, there are various reasons for this proposed change. Directly naming LGBTQ+ status as a basis for protection against discrimination codifies a cultural recognition of LGBTQ+ people—in other words, it makes us socially and legally legible. This legibility is especially vital in this current moment, where efforts to erase trans people from public life are on the rise. This change would also acknowledge that LGBTQ+ people face specific challenges that must be addressed and rectified at the national level.

Beyond signaling a new cultural understanding, this change would also significantly simplify the legal analysis. Many judges are ill-equipped to sort through the nuances of sexuality and gender. Instead of bumbling through normative questions into which they can inject their own biases, judges could

focus their decision on a clear question: was this person discriminated against on the basis of their LGBTQ+ status?

B. A Brief Note on Feminism

Some feminists and trans rights advocates may ask that, in a moment where anti-gender ideology and trans-exclusionary feminism is on the rise, does separating LGBTQ+ equality from sex equality concede that the concerns of trans people have no place in questions of women’s rights? For example, does such distinction cement the idea that trans women are not “real women” because their concerns are not the same as cis women?266See, e.g., Samantha Schmidt, Women’s Issues are Different from Trans Women’s Issues, Feminist Author Says, Sparking Criticism, Wash. Post (Mar. 13, 2017 7:14 AM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/13/womens-issues-are-different-from-trans-womens-issues-feminist-author-says-sparking-criticism [https://perma.cc/472T-B5AR]. Does this not feed directly into the rhetoric of TERFs and the anti-gender ideology movement?267See discussion supra Part I.

Not at all—this proposal does not in any way suggest that LGBTQ+ rights should be severed from principles of sex equality. As Courtney Cahill notes, “sex equality and LGBTQ equality are overlapping and interdependent . . . Historically, the social and political movements for sex equality and LGBTQ equality were intertwined—at least for a time—based on their shared commitment to eradicating sex-role stereotypes”268Cahill, supra note 142, at 1129. Just as many “American feminists are far from trans-exclusionary and have long been among the most supportive groups of LGBTQ equality,” many “transgender women and men have long and fully participated in all factions of feminist activism.”269Kelsy Burke, Feminists Have Long Supported Trans Rights, Wash. Post (July 27, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/made-by-history/2023/07/27/trans-rights-feminism-conservative-women. [https://perma.cc/3EL5-GH3U]. LGBTQ+ equality and sex equality are inextricably linked, and this Note does not advocate for severing this tie.270See generally, Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Feminist Defense of Transgender Sex Equality Rights, 34 Yale J.L. & Feminism 88, 91 (2023).

The implementation of this Note’s proposal would not preclude queer and trans people from bringing sex discrimination claims. Regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in Skrmetti, the Court has made clear that LGBTQ+ discrimination falls under sex discrimination in at least some contexts, indicating that these two forms of discrimination are not mutually exclusive, and decades of sex equality jurisprudence support this understanding.271Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).

Activists and advocates have no reason to abandon the implications of this hard-fought victory. The legislation proposed in this Note is based in large part on practicality—creating a new category of discrimination law specific to LGBTQ+ status provides an additional or alternate cause of action when judges misapply sex equality doctrine and avails LBGTQ+ people to a more concrete layer of protection. This Note, therefore, encourages advocates to fight for this legislation in addition to promoting arguments based on sex equality.

C. Legislating New Trans Healthcare Policy

As the central focus of this Note is trans healthcare, I specifically propose that, in conjunction with this reframing of LGBTQ+ equality law, Congress pass a new healthcare statute explicitly prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of transgender or nonbinary status” in the coverage and administration of healthcare services. Congress can use its power of the purse to enforce this law on all institutions receiving federal funding.272U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

This proposed legislation is narrow and straightforward. It is predicated on the idea that transgender and nonbinary people should have access to the same treatments available to cisgender people. As discussed in Part II, a core aspect of gender-affirming care bans is that they do not ban this care for cisgender people.273See discussion supra Part II. The discrimination question—whether it be on the basis of sex or on the basis of transgender status—disappears if legislatures categorically ban GAC for everyone.274Clarke, supra note 221, at 28. However, legislatures will not do this, “likely because nontransgender people require health care for purposes indistinguishable from gender affirmation,”275Id. and routinely access this care already. In reality, “most gender-affirming care is in fact provided to cisgender patients—that is, persons whose sex assigned at birth matches their gender identity. Puberty blockers, hormone replacement therapy, and surgery are interventions provided for cisgender and TGD [(transgender and gender-diverse)] patients alike to affect their embodiment of gender.”276Jacob D. Moses, Theodore E. Schall & Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Unjust Discrimination Between Cisgender and Transgender Gender-Affirming Care, 176 Annals Internal Med. 991, 991 (July 2023).

There are also significant disparities in how such care is accessed. For example, among the millions of cisgender men taking off-label testosterone to affirm their masculinity, studies demonstrate that these men “tend to initiate conversations about the treatment, do their own research at home, and see their role in decision making as that of self-advocacy.”277Id. In contrast, when trans patients pursue hormone therapy, they are “criticized by prescribers for doing their own research, asking about interventions ‘out of turn,’ and advocating for access to gender-affirming care.”278Id. Both cisgender and transgender people “may engage in the same behaviors that facilitate cisgender access to the hormone but experience very different judgments from some clinicians.”279Id.

These disparities are not just seen in attempts to seek hormone therapy, but also in attempts to receive gender-affirming surgery. Research has shown that while gender-affirming surgeries are incredibly rare for trans minors, “cisgender minors and adults had substantially higher utilization of analogous gender-affirming surgeries than their [transgender and gender-diverse] counterparts.”280Maya Brownstein, Gender-Affirming Surgeries Rarely Performed on Transgender Youth, Harv. T. Chan Sch. Pub. Health (July 8, 2024), https://hsph.harvard.edu/news/gender-affirming-surgeries-rarely-performed-on-transgender-youth [https://perma.cc/WX76-A3L9]. For example, “[d]espite affecting analogous anatomical structures and sharing evaluation criteria, the legitimacy of cisgender postmastectomy surgery has been protected in law, whereas the legality of chest surgery for TGD people is being undermined in many states.”281Moses et al., supra note 276, at 991. Prohibiting discrimination on the basis of transgender and nonbinary status would help reduce these disparities and increase fairness in the administration of healthcare.

Has Skrmetti foreclosed the efficacy of such a statute by holding that a ban on GAC for minors does not discriminate on the basis of transgender status? Not necessarily. Skmetti’s reliance on Geduldig282United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1833 (2025). is actually instructive here. As Reva Siegel explains, the Supreme Court applied its Geduldig reasoning to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,283Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). a pregnancy discrimination case brought under Title VII, “[b]ut Congress soon repudiated the Court’s efforts. Within two years, it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), which defined discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex under the nation’s employment discrimination law.”284Reva Siegel, The Pregnant Citizen, from Suffrage to the Present, 108 Geo. L.J. 167, 193 (2020). See also Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (June 25, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-pregnancy-discrimination-and-related-issues [https://perma.cc/5DXD-VSVC] (“Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978 to make clear that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).”).

The PDA contains specific language rejecting the Supreme Court’s holdings, clarifying that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”28542 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). An analogous provision could be implemented in the context of trans healthcare. The statute could prohibit “discrimination on the basis of transgender status” in the administration of healthcare, with the added provision that “the terms ‘because of transgender status’ or ‘on the basis of transgender status’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of diagnosis of gender dysphoria, gender incongruence, or related medical conditions.” Like the PDA’s rejection of Geduldig and Gilbert, this proposed provision would reject Skrmetti and overcome its negative implications for trans healthcare protections.

D. Notes on Partisanship and Political Responsibility

While I acknowledge that this Note’s proposed legislation cannot come to fruition in the near future, it is worth addressing the politics of protecting trans rights. Some think it is a simple question of partisanship—once Democrats are back in power, they will surely endeavor to protect trans rights. However, it would be a mistake to assume that a Democratic majority in Congress is the direct answer. Many non-cisgender people—the author included—feel that the Democratic Party has abdicated responsibility in protecting trans rights and is headed in a dangerous direction. Of course, Democrats have endeavored to protect trans rights, from President Biden’s administration’s attempts to effectuate trans healthcare protections via HHS guidelines286See discussion supra Part I. and arguments against gender-affirming care bans in front of the Supreme Court,287United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025). to attorneys general of Democrat-led states challenging President Trump’s anti-trans executive orders.288Complaint, Commonwealth v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-12162 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2025).

However, it has been disheartening to see some Democrats and liberals shift away from trans rights as the anti-trans moral panic intensifies. Some Democrats, including high-profile Party figures like California Governor Gavin Newsom, have taken the bait, “ceding ground on trans rights—particularly when it comes to sports—following Trump’s re-election.”289Orion Rummler, As Anti-Trans Laws Get More Extreme, Here’s Where State Laws Stand in 2025, The 19th (May 28, 2025), https://19thnews.org/2025/05/anti-trans-extreme-state-laws-2025 [https://perma.cc/PW6F-L5JP]. Some are now parroting Republican talking points about the “dangers” of trans people’s participation in sports and ignoring any sort of scientific nuance on the issue,290See, e.g., Jack Turban, Trans Girls Belong on Girls’ Sports Teams, Sci. Am. (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trans-girls-belong-on-girls-sports-teams [https://perma.cc/7DQE-35GP]; Joshua D. Safer, Fairness for Transgender People in Sport, 6 J. Endocrine Soc’y 1 (2022). despite the negligible number of trans girls and women in girls’ and women’s sports.291For example, “[o]ut of 510,000 athletes competing at the collegiate level, there are fewer than 10 who publicly identify as transgender, Charlie Baker, the N.C.A.A. president, said in January” of 2025. Talya Minsberg, What We Know About Trump’s New Executive Order on Trans Athletes, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/us/politics/trump-trans-athletes-executive-order.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20260125015553/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/us/politics/trump-trans-athletes-executive-order.html]. Giving in to these distractions diverts attention from the real, material harms currently affecting trans people and only serves to perpetuate fear of trans people.

Trans people are not only scapegoated for society’s ills by conservatives292See discussion supra Section I.A. but also scapegoated for the Democratic Party’s own failures. Some blame support for trans rights as a factor in former Vice President Harris’s loss in the 2024 presidential election, despite the fact that “Harris largely avoided the issue on the trail and in interviews and it was notably absent from [that] year’s Democratic National Convention.”293Matt Lavietes, Some Democrats Blame Party’s Position on Transgender Rights in Part for Harris’ Loss, NBC News (Nov. 8, 2024 3:15 PM PST), https://www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-politics-and-policy/democrats-blame-partys-position-transgender-rights-part-harris-loss-rcna179370 [https://perma.cc/J2M8-UT8Z]. There was virtually no response to Trump’s anti-trans advertising, and “reports have emerged indicating that some Democratic strategists [were] shaken by the anti-trans ad blitz and are getting cold feet around anti-trans advertising.”294Erin Reed, Opinion: This Week’s Gallup Poll Shows Why Dems Shouldn’t Fear Anti-Trans Ads, Erin in the Morning (Oct. 10, 2024), https://www.erininthemorning.com/p/opinion-this-weeks-gallup-poll-shows [https://perma.cc/FCU4-UGJB]. The last election’s postmortem need not be reopened, but these points are important to acknowledge because they indicate that, to many, trans people are now an “issue” to be debated and cast aside when politically expedient. This is especially obvious as the Party debates how to appeal to voters295Rummler, supra note 289. in the midst of a “new discomfort on the issue from a party that has long seen itself as a champion of L.G.B.T.Q. Americans.”296Kellen Browning, Democrats’ Wary Response to Transgender Ruling Shows the Party’s Retreat, N.Y. Times (June 18, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/18/us/politics/democrats-supreme-court-transgender-ruling.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20250912173224/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/18/us/politics/democrats-supreme-court-transgender-ruling.html]. This Note urges Democrats—and for that matter, Republicans—to remember that trans people are ordinary Americans and to not let partisanship interfere with protecting civil rights.

  CONCLUSION

This Note has endeavored to outline the current state of trans rights in the United States and to suggest that advocates, lawyers, and policymakers pursue a new strategy to promote trans equality. Passing civil rights legislation specific to trans people will provide protections while limiting both executive overreach and the power of ideologically driven judges, creating a concrete basis upon which trans people can bring discrimination claims.

It will certainly be an uphill battle to reach a point where enactment is feasible. However, it is clear that neither the executive branch nor the judiciary can be relied upon to establish protections for trans people, especially in the realm of healthcare. Nor is it necessarily within their jurisdiction to do so. Congress is the branch that decides how federal funds are spent.297U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress is the branch that establishes national standards in healthcare policy.298See, e.g., Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Congress is the branch that enacts federal civil rights law and provides means of enforcing it.299See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Establishing clear standards and protections in the area of trans rights and trans healthcare is thus the responsibility of Congress. Protecting and engaging with the democratic process will therefore be a vital component of the American LGBTQ+ equality movement.

Trans people will continue to exist. As will nonbinary people, intersex people, and gender non-conforming people. How many will be able to survive unscathed by the current legal and cultural assault on our existence is an open question. What is clear, however, is that absent a principled approach to equality, the clock will continue to turn back on civil rights.

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 677

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* Executive Postscript Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. 2022, University of California, Berkeley. I am deeply grateful to Professor Jessica Clarke for her expertise and guidance in crafting this Note; the editors and staff of the Southern California Law Review for their hard work and thoughtful suggestions; and the millions of transgender, nonbinary, and gender-nonconforming people across the United States who continue to persevere against all odds.

To Defer or Not to Defer: Squaring the Administrative Procedure Act’s “Substantial Evidence” Standard of Review with the Demise of Agency Deference

While the 2024 Supreme Court decision overruling the Chevron doctrine, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, held that Article III courts cannot defer to agencies’ findings of law, it was silent on whether judicial deference is owed to agencies’ findings of fact. In reaching this decision, the Court interpreted language from the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), a comprehensive legislative scheme that governs administrative agencies’ rulemaking and adjudicative processes and prescribes the applicable standards of review for such actions, to mean that courts must review agencies’ findings of law de novo. Given this holding, one could infer that the APA, which says that courts should apply the deferential “substantial evidence” standard of review to formal agency adjudications, should be interpreted to mean that Article III courts ought to defer to agencies’ findings of fact. However, scholars have, on occasion, argued that this standard of review is unconstitutional. For these scholars, it violates the Constitution’s separation of powers principle, especially in cases involving private rights, in which Article III courts must adjudicate matters from start to end. However, Loper Bright and another 2024 Court case SEC v. Jarkesy both implicitly acknowledged and responded to some of these scholars’ concerns.

This Note builds on these developments. Specifically, it identifies one implication of the Loper Bright holding: Congress has discretion to set standards of review for agency decisions, meaning the substantial evidence standard is lawful in some cases. Additionally, it explores Jarkesy’s revival of the public/private rights distinction, in which public rights cases may be freely adjudicated by agency tribunals. This Note concludes that this distinction is crucial. Under Jarkesy, the APA’s substantial evidence standard attaches to judicial review in public rights cases and implicitly excludes cases that implicate the Seventh Amendment and private rights, since agency tribunals cannot decide Seventh Amendment, private rights cases in the first place. By clarifying the constitutional limits of the APA’s substantial evidence standard, this Note provides courts and litigators with guidance on navigating administrative law challenges in a post–Loper Bright landscape.

INTRODUCTION

It would take roughly 6,500 Supreme Courts to handle the caseload of one of the busiest federal administrative agencies1This Note uses the term agency to refer to a “governmental unit” within the executive branch that Congress has “delegated” the “power to affect [individuals’ and entities’] legal rights and obligations through rulemaking, adjudication, or similar functions.” Michael Asimow, Five Models of Administrative Adjudication, 63 Am. J. Compar. L. 3, 4 n.2 (           2015). alone.2See Hearings and Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/D8YF-EL5K] (noting that the Social Security Administration hears over 650,000 cases a year); About the Supreme Court, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about [https://perma.cc/JCD5-78H2] (noting that the United States Supreme Court hears about 100 to 150 cases annually). Of course, this argument is somewhat simplistic considering, for one, the Supreme Court, unlike the Social Security Administration, is largely an appellate-level court and conducts limited fact-finding. See Timothy B. Dyk, The Role of Non-Adjudicative Facts in Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 Stan. L. Rev. Online 10, 10–11 (2023) (recognizing that, in addition to fact-finding in the form of judicial notice, the Supreme Court “regularly . . . determine[s] ‘legislative facts’ ”). Nonetheless, the large spread between the Social Security Administration’s and Supreme Court’s caseloads highlights the significance of agency-level adjudication. For many legal commentators, agencies’ significant role in defining and protecting individuals’ rights by adjudicating hundreds of thousands of cases annually is reason to grant extensive powers to these agencies.3See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Administrative Conference Recommendation 2018-5: Public Availability of Adjudication Rules 1 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Law & Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State 4–5 (2020). For others, agencies are constitutionally defective, and dangerously so, given how much influence agencies have over our daily lives.4See generally Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014) (criticizing the American administrative state by drawing similarities to the medieval English system that the Constitution implicitly repudiated). The Supreme Court has recently weighed in on this debate, giving indications that it may fall into the latter camp.5See, e.g., Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890, 897 (2023) (declining to answer whether agencies’ “combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions” violated the Constitution’s separation of powers principle, but, in this case, held that agencies had no jurisdiction to resolve this “fundamental” constitutional question); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984), overruled by, Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Among its recent criticisms of administrative law, the Supreme Court has derided judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of law.6See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273 (“Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority . . . .”). What the Supreme Court has yet to conclusively decide, among other issues, is whether this concept of judicial independence extends to agencies’ findings of fact.7In dicta from Loper Bright, the Court noted a tradition of judicial deference to agency tribunals’ findings of fact if such findings were supported by evidence and such agency proceedings did not violate litigants’ due process rights. Id. at 2258.

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides a comprehensive scheme for conducting and reviewing adjudications by federal agencies, including setting the standards of judicial review for different types of findings made by agencies.8See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706. When Article III courts9Article III courts are courts that exercise “judicial Power” that the Constitution “vest[s] in one supreme Court” and other “inferior Courts” that Congress establishes. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. review agencies’ decisions made pursuant to “formal” hearings prescribed by the APA, they generally examine agencies’ findings of fact under a deferential “substantial evidence” standard.105 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 907 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“ ‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ . . . [is] a highly deferential standard of review.”). One who reads the 2024 Supreme Court case overturning the Chevron deference doctrine, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, may conclude that the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review passes constitutional muster: there, Chief Justice Roberts noted that section 706(2)(E) of the APA (which codified the substantial evidence standard of review) did mandate deferential judicial review of agencies’ findings of fact.11Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2261. Yet, this decision did not explicitly answer whether the APA’s substantial evidence standard itself is constitutional. Rather, the Court merely asserted that Congress intended Article III courts, in applying section 706(2)(E) of the APA to reviews of formal agency adjudications, to defer to agencies’ findings of fact.12See id. (finding that Congress intended a “deferential standard applicable to questions of” fact).

In contrast, in interpreting another clause from section 706 of the APA, which says that a “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,”135 U.S.C. § 706. the Loper Bright Court read in a “de novo” standard of review.14The Supreme Court’s Double Hammer to Agencies: Loper Bright and Corner Post Set New Precedents for Challenging Federal Agency Action, Crowell & Moring LLP (July 11, 2024), https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/the-supreme-courts-double-hammer-to-agencies-loper-bright-and-corner-post-set-new-precedents-for-challenging-federal-agency-action [https://perma.cc/3DUD-RWR8]. This holding stands in stark contrast to decades of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of law.15See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to agencies’ interpretations of laws in certain circumstances), overruled by, Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. 2244. Furthermore, this holding brings into relief the fact that the Supreme Court can, and will, interpret the APA to meet constitutional demands. Finally, this holding begs the question: Is the substantial evidence standard of review as applied to formal agency adjudications constitutional?

Some scholars believe it is not. According to these critics, judicial deference to agencies’ findings of fact offends the Constitution’s separation of powers principle, including the judicial branch’s historical primacy, if not exclusivity, over resolving private disputes.16See infra text accompanying notes 89–139. However, much of this criticism came before Loper Bright and another Supreme Court case Jarkesy v. SEC17SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024). were decided, which, taken together, shed light on these issues and contextualize these critics’ arguments.

In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court recognized that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches when the cause of action litigated before an administrative tribunal sounds in “common law,” or is analogous to a common law claim, and the case does not involve resolution of a “public right[].”18Id. at 2127. A “public right[]” is one that is “held by the people as a whole,” such as the right to obtain a patent for an invention; it also includes a “government-created entitlement[] or benefit[].” Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y. 27, 32 (2018). In contrast, a private right refers to the Constitution’s guarantee of one’s right to “life, liberty, [and] property”; deprivation of these rights requires resolution by an Article III court. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Bernick, supra, at 31–33. By implication, this allows the executive and legislative branches to freely adjudicate public rights. Consequently, in having the power to regulate public rights, Congress may also limit its power. This is supported by the Court’s finding in Loper Bright that when Congress exercises its discretionary powers, its findings in court are conclusive.19See infra note 366 and accompanying text. One way Congress may limit its power is through setting the applicable standard of review for its findings of fact. Here, Congress creates agencies, meaning it can delegate to agency tribunals the power to make findings of fact and tell courts to scrutinize these findings according to the applicable standard of review.

This Note’s conclusion draws support from recent Supreme Court decisions that have, broadly speaking, cut the power of administrative agencies to make legal determinations while also yielding to agency tribunals’ findings of fact. Part I first explores background constitutional principles, including the separation of powers doctrine and scholarly criticisms of administrative law. In reviewing this material, this Part explains one of the rationales behind the APA—to bring administrative law in conformity with these constitutional principles. It also explores whether the APA, according to some scholars, fails to fully vindicate these constitutional concerns because it codifies the appellate review model,20See Hamburger, supra note 4, at 6, 318–19. or the idea that agency tribunals engage in initial fact-finding and law-finding, the former of which is treated deferentially by reviewing courts.21Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of American-Style Judicial Review, in Comparative Administrative Law 389, 389 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010). After defining the substantial evidence standard of review in Part I, this Note then proceeds, in Part II, to compare Supreme Court jurisprudence on agencies’ quasi-legislative22Quasi-legislative power refers to agencies’ power to “make rules and regulations having the force of law,” which bears similarities to Congress’s power to pass laws. See Quasi-legislative, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quasi-legislative [https://perma.cc/4A8J-ZUQ5]. and quasi-judicial power,23This Note uses the term quasi-judicial power to mean that agencies possess “a partly judicial character” through resolving legal claims pursuant to certain procedures. See Quasi-judicial, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quasi-judicial [https://perma.cc/7LNT-L3NZ]. concluding that, while the Roberts Court has curtailed agency power in many respects, it has spoken little on the issue of whether agency tribunals can make findings of fact, which Article III courts then deferentially review. Then, Part III synthesizes the Court’s holdings in Loper Bright and Jarkesy and concludes that, given the Court’s current formulation of permissible agency adjudication, the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review is constitutional in public rights cases.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances, and the Administrative State

In recent discussions of administrative powers, the Supreme Court has often invoked the Framers’ belief in a government that is divided into three branches, each possessing purely legislative, executive, or judicial powers with the ability to “check and balance” the other branches’ excesses.24See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2257 (2024). For at least some Justices, the United States’ strong English ties are evidence of the separation of powers and checks and balances doctrines. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 116–17, 124–25 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that philosophers from the English Civil War believed a division of executive and legislative powers would reduce the “dangers of tyrannical government posed by” “conflict[s] between the King and Parliament . . . ”; also, Chief Justice Coke effectively checked executive overreach by declaring that the “King c[ould not] change any part of the . . . law . . . without Parliament” (quoting Case of Proclamations (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75)). According to the Court, administrative agencies, which fall under the purview of the chief executive, challenge this framework, especially when agencies exercise “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial power.”25See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., concurring). Of course, this argument has many nuances, including the fact that any given agency possesses skills and experiences that may make it uniquely qualified to receive legislative and judicial questions. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 531 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]h[e] [Supreme] Court has recognized the constitutional legitimacy of a justification that rests agency independence upon the need for technical expertise.”).

Under the separation of powers theory, the division of power between three branches of government serves two purposes: (1) it promotes each branch’s integrity through denying each branch the ability to wield the other branches’ powers, and (2) it uplifts individual liberty through curtailing government overreach.26Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011). As to the first point, the separation of powers principle “preserve[s] the integrity of” the judicial branch, for example, because it affords “judicial Power” to this branch and denies such power to the legislative and executive branches, which gives the courts and their acts credibility.27See id. at 484. In other words, the judiciary as an institution would lose all meaning if Congress or the president could simply do what a court does. Hayburn’s Case makes this clear.28Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). In that case, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether Article III courts could, pursuant to a congressional act, hold hearings to determine injured veterans’ eligibility for certain government benefits.29See id. at 410 n.†. It answered in the negative.30Id. at 409. There, the Court noted that “the business directed by” Congress was “not of a judicial nature,” meaning that courts had no “constitutional authority” to conduct such hearings.31Id. at 411 n.†. As Mark Chenoweth noted, the holding of Hayburn’s Case “applied equally to all of the branches”: “No branch could exercise a type of power other than that vested in it by the Constitution.”32Reining in the Administrative State: Agency Adjudication and Other Agency Action: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Admin. State, Regul. Reform, & Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 7 (2024) [hereinafter Reining in the Administrative State] (testimony of Mark Chenoweth, President and Chief Legal Officer, New C.L. All.).

Additionally, the Founders recognized that when “the power of judging [was] not separated from the legislative and executive powers,” there would be “no liberty.”33The Federalist No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (citation omitted). If Congress or the president could offer their input on “Cases” and “Controversies,”34U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. the risk of arbitrary decision-making grew. Congress and the president were political actors who were susceptible to temporary “passions” that did not necessarily promote individual rights;35See The Federalist No. 10, supra note 33, at 61–62 (James Madison). meanwhile, judges had an office of “judgment,” meaning they were supposed to be independent arbiters in search of the law.36Hamburger, supra note 4, at 146–48; see Sheldon Whitehouse, Knights-Errant: The Roberts Court and Erroneous Fact-Finding, 84 Ohio St. L.J. 837, 844–45 (2023); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). According to the Founders, separation of powers insulated courts from the political branches and their susceptibility to public pressure, such that judges could exercise their independent judgment and promote individual liberty.37See Whitehouse, supra note 36, at 844; The Federalist No. 10, supra note 33, at 61–62 (James Madison); U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law . . . .”).

Separation of powers works in tandem with the checks and balances principle, which further enhances individual liberty. In arriving at this conclusion, the Founders looked to the English court system in which judges had no tenure or salary protections, which created arbitrary decision-making marked by executive pressure on judges.38See Stern, 564 U.S. at 483–84. Thus, the Founders surmised that these constitutional guarantees, in addition to other structural checks and balances such as executive and legislative involvement in the selection of Article III judges, would reduce the risk of each branch wielding power without limit.39See id.; Branches of the U.S. Government, USAGov (Sep. 22, 2025), https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government [https://perma.cc/W3WP-PR8Z]. Meanwhile, Philip Hamburger, an administrative law skeptic, argues that the separation of powers and checks and balances system promotes individual liberty because liberty can be “constrain[ed]” only in certain situations: here, an individual’s liberty is constrained inasmuch as Congress can pass legislation and judges can issue judgments determining what they can and cannot lawfully do.40See Hamburger, supra note 4, at 1. Furthermore, the executive branch binds individuals only in the sense that it implements congressional acts, such as disbursing government benefits, or seeks enforcement of the laws in the courts.41Id. at 3–4.

  1. The Three Branches of Government

The Constitution incorporates the separation of powers and checks and balances principles by vesting “legislative Powers” in Congress, “executive Power . . . in a President,” and “judicial Power” in “one supreme Court[] and . . . inferior Courts as . . . [prescribed by] Congress,”42U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. and enumerates some of these “Powers.”43For example, the judicial branch has the power to decide “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Yet, the Constitution is relatively short and somewhat vague regarding the three branches’ functions, which has resulted in gap-filling by the courts to define the precise contours of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.44See Kim Lane Scheppele, Perspectives on the Constitution: Constitutions Around the World, Nat’l Const. Ctr., https://constitutioncenter.org/education/classroom-resource-library/classroom/perspectives-on-the-constitution-constitutions-around-the-world [https://perma.cc/F7Y9-7KA4].

For the legislative branch, the “intelligible principle” doctrine has informed much of what Congress can do. Here, Congress’s ability to implement laws depends on telling the president what to execute.45See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). However, given that laws require the vote of a majority of members of Congress to enact, sometimes have technical aspects that Congress is ill-equipped to handle, and often entail unforeseen consequences, Congress may not necessarily write laws with clarity and may leave the details to the executive to hash out.46See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984), overruled by, Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). So, when the executive fills in statutory gaps, they may be engaging in lawmaking power in contravention of the separation of powers principle.47See Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that “Congress cannot delegate a power it lacks,” that is, it cannot delegate the power to legislate to the executive branch since this power is nontransferable). In response to this concern, the Supreme Court in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States held that not all delegations were unconstitutional; only when Congress failed to provide sufficient instructions to the executive branch, or what the Court called an “intelligible principle,” did the president impermissibly engage in lawmaking.48See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409–11 (1928) (holding that when Congress “declare[s] the event[s] upon which its expressed will [is] to take effect,” the executive branch is merely executing the law when it carries out such will by regulation); Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2275 (Thomas, J., concurring); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 595 & n.138 (2007) (finding that the intelligible principle test arose because it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish legislative from executive power). This was because an intelligible principle authorized the executive branch to do no more than act as a “mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which [Congress’s] expressed will” or policy “was to take effect.”49J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 410–11. Notwithstanding recent attacks on the intelligible principle doctrine,50See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2619 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In 2022, the Supreme Court produced the “major questions doctrine,” which has curtailed the salience of the intelligible principle doctrine. See id. this constraint on congressional power has helped determine what legislative power is and the executive branch’s role in it.

As J.W. Hampton suggested, executive power often depends on whether Congress has given the executive branch any laws to execute. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court held that President Truman’s executive order, which directed the secretary of commerce to seize steel mills in order to stave off a potential strike, was unlawful because no congressional act permitted him to do so.51Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–84, 588–89 (1952). Yet, presidents are not completely reliant on Congress in order to exercise executive power. As Justice Jackson noted in his influential concurrence, in some situations, the president may be able to act without congressional authorization, such as in the foreign affairs realm, because the Constitution granted the president sole discretion over this realm.52See id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (holding that the president has discretion over matters concerning foreign affairs). In the case of a steel mill seizure, however, the Constitution did not give the president sole authority to act.53Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640, 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).

Finally, the 1803 Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison established the core of judicial power, in which Chief Justice Marshall declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”54Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). For the Marbury Court, this “duty” meant courts had to resolve the laws in favor of the Constitution.55Id. So, while Congress prevents unlawful exercises of legislative power by the executive branch by supplying it intelligible principles, courts also constrain executive action by serving as the final arbiter of the laws’ meaning.56See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2257 (2024). This means the executive branch is necessarily constrained by courts’ definition of (1) the laws the executive branch is charged with carrying out and (2) its own executive power.

Since Marbury, the Supreme Court has continued to refine its definitions of legislative, executive, and judicial power. Yet, perhaps the most enduring theme in these cases is Marbury’s framing of judicial power as a responsibility—one that may not be abdicated57Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 4 (“Had Article III recited that the judicial power ‘is hereby vested’ in the courts, it could be argued that that power, like title to land, could be conveyed without any limitation on its subsequent transfer.”). —that courts independently resolve “[C]ases” and “[C]ontroversies.”58See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2278 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1); Hamburger, supra note 4, at 238 (noting the courts have the “power to bind subjects in particular instances”). While the intelligible principle doctrine may authorize some quasi-legislative actions by the executive branch, courts’ continued insistence on this judicial duty to decide Cases and Controversies, coupled with the Supreme Court’s attacks on agencies’ rulemaking powers in Loper Bright,59See infra Section II.A.2. sits uncomfortably with the idea of administrative agencies that are empowered to adjudicate individual rights.

  1. Administrative Agencies: A Fourth Branch of Government?

As James Madison warned in 1787, “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another . . . , the fundamental principles of a free constitution[] are subverted.”60The Federalist No. 47, supra note 33, at 325–26 (James Madison). Many critics of agency power argue that the rapid creation and expansion of agencies, or what they call the administrative state, during the New Deal in the twentieth century embodies this risk because many modern-day agencies (arguably) perform legislative, executive, and judicial powers in contravention of the Constitution.61See Hamburger, supra note 4, at 17–19, 231; Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 4–6.

However, in the same passage, Madison observed that there was “not a single instance” in state constitutions in which the branches were “absolutely separate and distinct”; in fact, he encouraged some overlapping functions between the three branches of government.62See The Federalist No. 47, supra note 33, at 327–28 (James Madison). Indeed, agencies have been around since our nation’s founding, which may be indicative of the Founders’ understanding of constitutionally permissible distribution of powers. For example, the First Congress authorized executive officers to decide matters such as those relating to taxation and foreign commerce.63Nelson, supra note 48, at 594–95. While many administrative state opponents concede this point, they note that such categories fall within the ambit of executive discretion and were never contemplated by the Founders as unconstitutionally encroaching on the legislative or judicial branches.64See Hamburger, supra note 4, at 292–93. This argument is foundational for understanding permissible forms of judicial deference to agencies’ findings of facts. See infra notes 89–139 and accompanying text.

On the other hand, proponents of agency power maintain that agencies are perfectly consistent with the Constitution because agencies actually promote the two concerns addressed by the separation of powers and checks and balances principles. To this end, such proponents argue that agencies help carry out Congress’s will (given that Congress creates agencies in the first place) while also promoting the president’s interests (through presidential appointment of agency heads).65See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1–5. Furthermore, agencies may enhance individual liberty through making “reasonable . . . judgments about the common good and the general welfare.”66Id. at 4. For example, agencies oversee programs intended to prevent or curtail “subordinat[ion] [caused] by market exploitation” and harm caused by “ill health, poverty, pollution, and old age.”67Id. at 4–5.

Hamburger rejects the agency power proponents’ arguments and posits that agencies unconstitutionally “exercise . . . binding legislative and judicial powers,” given that the Constitution implicitly rejected government structures from medieval England and eighteenth-century America, which were marked by decision-making bodies that wielded legislative, executive, and judicial powers.68See Hamburger, supra note 4, at 4, 15–16. For Hamburger, agencies become unconstitutional when they have “absolute” power, or power that is (1) “extralegal,” meaning it “runs outside the law”; (2) “supralegal,” meaning that agencies rely on “judicial deference” for legitimacy; and (3) “consolidat[ed],” meaning powers that are supposed to be split between three branches are housed in one.69Id. at 6. As Hamburger contends, the Founders’ beliefs were informed by English pushback against the Crown’s “prerogative” legislation, called proclamations, and “prerogative courts,” such as the Star Chamber and High Commission.70Id. at 22–23, 133–34. The Star Chamber was an English court that “grew out of the medieval king’s council as a supplement to the regular justice of the common-law courts.” Star Chamber, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Star-Chamber [https://web.archive.org/web/20260104161846/https://www.britannica.com/topic/Star-Chamber]. Although the Star Chamber was “not bound by the common law” and had many procedural “advantages over ordinary courts,” English kings began using it to “enforce unpopular political and ecclesiastical policies,” leading to its abolishment in 1641. Id. The Star Chamber, for example, could bind parties and prosecute crimes arising under Crown-issued proclamations.71Hamburger, supra note 4, at 133–34. The Star Chamber was authorized to do so because Parliament recognized the Star Chamber’s many advantages, including its ability to dispose of cases swiftly without interference from juries that could be bribed and prosecutors who could be scared off from prosecuting.72Id. at 134–35. Against this backdrop, English courts, unlike the Star Chamber, refused to limit their review of prerogative actions on account of their “office of judgment, in which” judges recognized and adhered to their “duty to follow the law of the land.”73Id. at 287–88. Eventually, Parliament abolished these prerogative courts in response to public criticism over such courts’ unchecked, extralegal nature and in recognition of the fact that such courts contravened the Magna Carta’s decree that “no one was to be deprived of his liberty or property, other than by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”74Id. at 138.

The Constitution corrected these unchecked dangers, Hamburger argues, through housing judicial power in Article III courts, guaranteeing juries, and providing tenure and salary to judges, among other structural protections.75See id. at 8, 147–48, 154. However, agencies may threaten to undo this constitutional balance by binding people through executive-made legislation and adjudication.76Id. at 1–3 (arguing that a central feature of “administrative law” is executive power to issue “directives,” including “rules, interpretations, adjudications, orders, or warrants,” which are binding on executive officers and the public at large). Hamburger’s worry lies partly in the fact that, like the prerogative actors of medieval England, executive officers lack structural protections that promote independent judgment and often opt to work for the president because of personal precommitments favoring the government.77See id. at 147–48 (noting that decisionmakers sitting on the Star Chamber “swor[e] to support the king” and often joined the court because they had “sympathies with the Crown’s prerogative power”).

Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule contest Hamburger’s version of events. Sunstein and Vermeule argue that administrative state critics like Hamburger focus too narrowly on the risk of executive overreach that they fail to recognize the Founders had other goals in mind when creating a national government.78See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 21–23. For Sunstein and Vermeule, the Constitution struck a balance between checking “official abuse” and promoting “public participation and accountability, . . . efficiency in government, . . . rational and coordinated policymaking[,] and . . . the common good and overall welfare.”79Id. at 23–24. The Founders recognized that the executive was well suited to promote these latter goals, which is why they created a powerful executive branch.80See id. In support of their argument, Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule looked to the writings of James Madison, who recognized that “in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused.” Id. at 34 (quoting The Federalist No. 41, supra note 33, at 269 (James Madison)). While recognizing that some limits to agency power are important, Sunstein and Vermeule oppose eliminating administrative agencies wholesale on constitutional grounds.81See id. at 34–42. They argue that too much judicial interference in the realm of administrative law harms individual liberty because it risks the possibility that Article III judges will weigh in on matters

that they are ill-suited to resolve, such as those involving “technocratic expertise and political accountability.”82Id. at 37.

Some Supreme Court Justices echo Hamburger’s concerns and question agencies’ constitutionality,83Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890, 906 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end”). and the Court as a whole has a “fraught” relationship regarding its view of executive power.84Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 26–27 (cataloguing the Roberts Court’s inconsistent stance regarding agency power, upholding judicial deference to the executive in some cases, including Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), and denying deference in other cases, such as Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). However, as it currently stands, agencies may permissibly wield some power.85See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261–63 (2024) (holding that Chevron deference is overruled because it does not adhere to the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) command to reviewing courts to independently interpret statutory ambiguities, which implies that the APA constitutionally permits agencies to act within prescribed limits). To what extent, including whether agencies may conclusively determine facts in some adjudications, remains to be seen.

B. The Administrative Procedure Act and the Standards of Judicial Review

The APA embodies the “appellate review model” in which agencies, much like trial-level courts, hold initial adjudicatory proceedings that courts review using different levels of deference depending on whether agencies’ findings of fact or law are at issue: in the former case, courts grant moderate deference to agencies’ findings, whereas in the latter case, no deference is given.86Merrill, supra note 21, at 389. The appellate review model predates the APA and arose to prominence in the early twentieth century;87Id. at 393. it also shaped “widespread demand for legislation to settle and regulate . . . administrative law and procedure” in the 1930s and 1940s.88S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 187 (1945); cf. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1559–61 (1996) (finding the APA was a compromise between New Deal proponents and opponents). For a competing report of the history of the APA, see Jeremy Rabkin, The Origins of the APA: Misremembered and Forgotten Views, 28 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 547, 553 (2021) (arguing that the APA sought to counter “administrative absolutism” with the “rule of law” against a backdrop of European totalitarianism (quotation omitted)).

  1. 1.  The Origins of the APA

As Evan D. Bernick, a critic of judicial deference to agency fact-finding, notes, from the nation’s founding until the early twentieth century, “judicial review of governmental action was both narrow and deep”: “It was narrow in that complaints about governmental activity often did not entitle individuals to judicial review”; and “[i]t was deep in that, if individuals did have a complaint that triggered judicial review, that complaint was adjudicated in an especially rigorous way.”89Bernick, supra note 18, at 31. Individuals were precluded from judicial interference unless they could trace government action “upon core private rights.”90Nelson, supra note 48, at 569. This was because the Magna Carta, which in turn inspired the Constitution, held that if the government sought to deprive an individual of certain rights—that is, the private rights of “life, liberty, or property”—it could only do so in accordance with due process considerations and “the law[s] of the land.”91Id. at 568. In other words, potential deprivation of one’s private rights triggered court intervention that followed certain procedural requirements,92Id. at 569, 574. including an obligation to “interpret[] . . . the relevant law,” which was performed by judges, and to “determin[e] . . . the relevant facts,” which was a jury task.93Bernick, supra note 18, at 33. Congress could not run around these requirements by creating “entities called ‘courts’ ” that could not otherwise exercise judicial power or did not follow these procedural requirements.94Nelson, supra note 48, at 574–75 (emphasis omitted) (explaining that the Constitution only allows Congress to give judicial power to entities that are (1) the Supreme Court or inferior courts created by Congress (2) that have judges that receive salary and tenure protections).

Thus, when the executive branch sought to affect an individual’s private rights, it had to do so through an Article III court; it could not bind the individual pursuant to agency proceedings.95Bernick, supra note 18, at 32. Once in an Article III court, any findings of fact made by the executive beforehand were treated as “merely the records of one of the parties in the case” rather than “records at law” with “presumptive verity or validity.”96Id. at 33 (quoting Hamburger, supra note 4, at 297); Hamburger, supra note 4, at 297–98. An 1843 Supreme Court case United States v. Irving97United States v. Irving, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 250 (1843). is one such time in which the government had to litigate individuals’ private rights through an Article III court. In that case, the government sought to recover a federal customs collector’s “debt[s] from” the collector’s “sureties” after he had fled the country.98Bernick, supra note 18, at 33. Here, the Court held that the United States Treasury’s various factual findings, including a transcript it created describing the customs collector’s account, were to be treated as “prima facie evidence,” that is, such determinations could be rebutted by other evidence and weighed by juries.99Id.; Irving, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 262–63; see also Nelson, supra note 48, at 591 (“Just as legislatures could not come along after the fact and retroactively redraw the lines that defined the parties’ core private rights, . . . so too legislatures could not authoritatively apply the preexisting lines to individual cases or make binding determinations about exactly what had happened in those cases.”). In other words, because the Treasury’s transcript had no “presumptive effect [like] a court record”—notwithstanding it being “an executive record . . . kept by officers who,” like the court, “were expected to exercise judgment rather than will”—the jury was free to determine the transcript’s validity and persuasiveness.100Hamburger, supra note 4, at 298.

Meanwhile, the executive branch could freely adjudicate matters concerning “public rights and quasi-private privileges.”101Nelson, supra note 48, at 577. This was because “disposition of those legal interests did not require the use of ‘judicial’ power.”102Id. The Supreme Court “has not ‘definitively explained’ the distinction between public and private rights,”103Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (plurality opinion)). but precedent has generally included among the category of public rights “claims that were understood to be held by the people as a whole,” such as

(1) proprietary rights held by government on behalf of the people, such as the title to public lands or the ownership of funds in the public treasury; (2) servitudes that every member of the body politic could use but that the law treated as being collectively held, such as rights to sail on public waters or to use public roads; and (3) less tangible rights to compliance with the laws established by public authority “for the government and tranquility of the whole.”104Bernick, supra note 18, at 32 (quoting Nelson, supra note 48, at 566).

Privileges were created by Congress to “carry out public ends[,] . . . ‘originat[ing] with the state rather than the individual.’ ”105Nelson, supra note 48, at 567–68 (quotation omitted).

In 2018, the Supreme Court in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC affirmed the significance of the public/private rights distinction but essentially collapsed rights held by the people as a whole and quasi-private privileges into the umbrella of public rights.106Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74 (pointing out that Article I of the Constitution grants “Congress the power ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,’ ” and that “Congress has authorized the executive branch to grant patents that meet [certain] statutory requirements for patentability” (first alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). In that case, the Court considered a challenge to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which created an “inter partes” review process.107Id. at 1372. Through the inter partes review process, an individual could petition the United States Patent and Trademark Office to cancel a patent’s claims without needing to resort to a jury trial.108Id. at 1371. “[P]ublic rights,” the Court confirmed, “cover[ed] matters ‘which ar[ose] between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.’ ”109Id. at 1373 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). There, the Court held that the granting of—and therefore revocation of—a patent constituted a public right because patents (1) were “ ‘public franchises’ that the Government,” and therefore the public, “grant[ed] ‘to the inventors of new and useful improvements’ ”;110Id. (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533 (1871)). and (2) could be granted by the executive or legislative branches “without ‘judicial determination.’ ”111Id. at 1374 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50–51). Therefore, like all other public rights, the granting and revocation of a patent through the inter partes review process could be adjudicated by any branch of government.112Id.; Bernick, supra note 18, at 32; see also Nelson, supra note 48, at 577 (explaining that Congress could authorize nonjudicial officers to adjudicate matters involving public rights).

Historically, when individuals wanted to challenge agencies’ decisions in public rights cases, they had to bring separate lawsuits—rather than appeal the decisions within the agencies—in Article III courts where they would be entitled to “damages or other remedies against wayward executive officers.”113Hamburger, supra note 4, at 294. However, as Hamburger points out, litigants had to show injury in order to recover.114Id. at 294–95 (“This approach . . . had the virtue of keeping the executive and the judicial proceedings apart.”). Once they demonstrated harm “such as distraint or payment under protest,” then courts would, like in private rights cases, treat the agencies’ findings of fact as prima facie evidence.115See id. at 294–96. This was because the “judicial proceedings were not extensions of the executive proceedings.”116Id. at 295. Meanwhile, judicial deference, if any were given, applied to the agencies’ findings of law. But Hamburger argues deference is too strong a term since what the courts were doing was “defer[ring] to the law,” which gave the executive discretion to determine public rights, not the agencies themselves.117Id. at 293–94. The 1840 decision Decatur v. Paulding illustrates this point.118Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). There, the secretary of the navy, interpreting two statutes, refused to grant a widow two pensions even though the statutes apparently required payment of both.119Id. at 498; Hamburger, supra note 4, at 293. As the pensions fell under the public rights doctrine, the executive branch had authority to regulate their disbursement.120Hamburger, supra note 4, at 293; Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 515. Although the Supreme Court recognized it had authority to invalidate an agency’s construction of a statute, the relevant statutes permitted the secretary to interpret them.121Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 515. Thus, the Court merely deferred to the law when it upheld the secretary’s interpretation because the law said the secretary could exercise discretion in disbursing pensions.122Id.; Hamburger, supra note 4, at 293–94.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, the appellate review model began to take shape, ushering in an era of judicial deference to agencies’ findings of fact.123Merrill, supra note 21, at 393. In 1906, Congress passed the Hepburn Act, which modified the process by which the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) prescribed rate orders.124Id. at 394–97. Before the Hepburn Act, the ICC had to file bills of equity in appellate-level courts for its rate orders to have binding force; afterwards, its rate orders were self-executing thirty days after their issuance.125Id. at 395. Another aspect of ICC rate orders that the Hepburn Act changed was how courts reviewed challenges to such orders. Although appellate courts had previously reviewed ICC orders under a de novo standard of review, the Hepburn Act failed to prescribe the applicable standard of review for self-executing ICC rate orders.126Id. at 397 (noting that Congress failed to agree on the applicable standard of review, so they effectively left this task to the Supreme Court to decide). In a series of Supreme Court cases following passage of the Hepburn Act, the Court, borrowing from the standard of review that courts applied to jury findings of facts, effectively read in a substantial evidence standard for reviewing self-executing ICC rate orders.127See id. at 397–400. Under this standard, reviewing courts independently analyzed the ICC’s legal findings but deferred to its findings of fact.128Bernick, supra note 18, at 36. This contrasted with decades of precedent in which courts had treated the ICC’s findings of fact as merely prima facie evidence.129See id. at 33. For the Court, the substantial evidence standard made sense because the Hepburn Act, in making ICC orders self-executing, “endowed the [ICC] ‘with large administrative functions,’ ”130Merrill, supra note 21, at 398 (quoting ICC v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910)). that is, the ICC had the “institutional competence to determine ‘whether [its] administrative power ha[d] been wisely exercised.’ ”131Bernick, supra note 18, at 35 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. at 470).

In 1932, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a statute that required reviewing courts to defer to an agency’s findings of fact involving two private parties.132Id. at 37. In Crowell v. Benson, an employer challenged the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), which authorized the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission to issue workers’ compensation awards against employers for employee injuries occurring on navigable waters.133Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 36–38, 45 (1932). According to the employer, the LHWCA violated the Fifth and Seventh Amendments’ due process and jury trial rights.134Id. at 36–37. The Crowell Court found that the LHWCA’s requirement that reviewing courts defer to an agency’s findings of fact in workers’ compensation matters was “constitutionally unproblematic” because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency.”135Bernick, supra note 18, at 37–38 (alteration in original) (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46). Thus, Crowell expanded an agency’s power by permitting it to adjudicate matters involving private rights with at least some binding effect (inasmuch as an agency’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence).136Some scholars have pointed out that Crowell was a case in admiralty, and such cases have historically been decided by non-Article III courts. See Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 16; Merrill, supra note 21, at 405. Yet, the Court noted that it still had an obligation to independently review (1) an agency’s findings of law as well as to (2) determine “jurisdictional” facts, or facts that had to exist for an agency to not exceed its statutory authority, and “constitutional” facts, or facts that had to exist if a challenged action was to be upheld as constitutional.137See Bernick, supra note 18, at 37 & n.51; Ari Goldstein, The Lost World of Jurisdictional and Constitutional Facts in Administrative Law, 78 Admin. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 20–22) (finding that in this case, “the ordinary facts were facts about ‘the circumstances, nature, extent, and consequences of the [employee’s] injuries,’ ” and as such could be analyzed under the substantial evidence standard; jurisdictional and constitutional facts included “question[s] of whether [the employee] was in fact [the employer’s] employee, and . . . whether [the employee’s] injury occurred on navigable waters” (first alteration in original)). This, according to Chief Justice Hughes, was because in private rights cases, “the ‘essential attributes’ of the judicial decision [had to] remain in an [A]rticle III enforcement court,” which courts ensured through reviewing issues of law as well as jurisdictional and constitutional facts de novo.138See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 923–24, 924 n.57 (1988) (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50). Yet, the Court’s distinct treatment of jurisdictional and constitutional facts would not last; today, most courts do not review jurisdictional and constitutional facts de novo.139See Bernick, supra note 18, at 37 n.51.

Around the time that the Court decided Crowell, scholars, lawmakers, and interested parties began calling for administrative reform.140Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1560–65. Although contemporary scholars debate the driving force behind this movement,141See supra note 88 for a brief discussion of scholars’ competing views of what drove widespread demand for the APA. they agree that this movement coincided with a rapid expansion of administrative agencies and an agency-friendly Supreme Court as exemplified by the Crowell decision.142See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1561–63. For many reformers, Congress could ensure agencies acted lawfully by creating a comprehensive body of law to guide their actions while also correcting potential constitutional violations that they perceived existed in agencies.143See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 187–89 (1945). One potential violation of prime importance to these reformers was some agencies’ tendency to act as “prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner” in making the rules and enforcing them.144See Rabkin, supra note 88, at 554. Thus, what would become the APA emerged as a solution to the issue of unchecked administrative power.145See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 187–89.

One thing the APA did to ensure that agencies did not exceed their constitutional limits was to distinguish formal from informal adjudication.146See id. at 193. It subjected proceedings of the former type to stringent requirements, reflecting the idea that such cases typically needed more than objective tests, measurements, or standards to resolve, and implicated agencies’ executive and quasi-judicial powers.147See id.; Comm. on Admin. Proc., Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 5, 36–38, 43–45 (1st Sess. 1941); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45–46, 48–51 (1950) (finding that the APA’s drafters sought to “ameliorate the evils resulting from a combination of” prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions that marked some pre-APA agency adjudications). Similarly, the APA distinguished formal from informal rulemaking and prescribed different procedural requirements for each rulemaking type. See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 193.

Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA governed formal adjudications.1485 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57. Under these sections, agencies conducted “trial-type, adversarial hearing[s]” that were overseen by impartial decisionmakers, typically administrative law judges (“ALJs”).149Id.; Ben Harrington & Daniel J. Sheffner, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46930, Informal Administrative Adjudication: An Overview 6–7 (2021). Parties had certain procedural rights in formal adjudications, including the opportunity to appear with counsel, present evidence, and cross-examine adverse parties and witnesses.150See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 193, 204, 206–09. In enforcing ALJs’ independence, the APA prohibited prosecuting officers from supervising ALJs when they were involved in the same matters, and required that ALJs only communicate with interested parties “openly and upon notice” or on “[e]x parte matters authorized by law.”151Id. at 203; 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). ALJs had other duties under the APA, such as administering oaths, issuing subpoenas, receiving and weighing evidence, and making initial or recommended decisions.152S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 203, 207–08. An agency was required to conduct formal adjudications when a statute either “explicitly state[d]” that its hearings would be held “on the record” or that the agency would follow the procedures outlined by sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.153See Harrington & Sheffner, supra note 149, at 5–6 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48–50 (1950).

The APA also provided for judicial review of agencies’ actions.154S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 193; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. Under the APA, an individual who suffered a legal wrong that was caused by an agency action or as authorized by statute had a right of appeal.155S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 212. The APA precludes judicial review in limited circumstances: when a statute precludes review or when an agency has absolute discretion in a given matter. Id. at 194; 5 U.S.C. § 704 (requiring that judicial review be granted when a “final agency action [has] . . . no other adequate remedy in a court”). Often, these individuals were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before they could obtain judicial review, such as appealing an ALJ’s decision within the agency.1565 U.S.C. § 704. While the APA apparently requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Supreme Court has increasingly held otherwise. See infra Section II.B.1. Once a case came before an Article III court for review, the court was required to examine the administrative record according to certain standards of review.1575 U.S.C. § 706. Per section 706 of the APA, “the reviewing court” was required to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, . . . determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,” and “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that were

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;

(D) without observance of procedure required by law;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of th[e] [APA] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.158Id.

Under the APA, a reviewing court could apply more than one standard of review depending on the issues that came before it.159See 6 Jacob A. Stein & Glenn A. Mitchell, Administrative Law § 51.03 (2025). For example, while the “arbitrary and capricious” standard applied to appeals of all agency actions, an Article III court only applied the substantial evidence standard when it reviewed agency decisions made pursuant to formal agency adjudications or otherwise required by statute.160See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1971); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). This meant the level of judicial deference afforded to agency actions turned on the issues before Article III courts, in which a court applying de novo review engaged in a more searching examination of the record than a court applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.161See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 475, 479–80 (1988); Braden Currey, Note, Rationalizing the Administrative Record for Equitable Constitutional Claims, 133 Yale L.J. 2017, 2024 (2024) (“The degree of scrutiny a court chooses to place on the agency is reflected in the standard of review it decides to use for the case.”).

  1. The Substantial Evidence Standard of Review

The APA did not actually define the substantial evidence standard of review beyond instructing courts to apply it when reviewing formal adjudications.162See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). The APA requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to” formal hearing requirements under the APA “or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.” Id. § 706(2). Despite the APA’s minimal guidance to reviewing courts, legislative history offers some, albeit conflicting, clues on the meaning of this standard of review. As the Senate Judiciary Committee exalted in reporting the bill to the full Senate for consideration, “[t]he ‘substantial evidence’ rule . . . [was] exceedingly important” in the context of judicial review of agency decisions and administrative law generally because this standard embodied many of the concerns underlying the APA, such as ensuring a separation of an agency’s investigatory division from its adjudicatory division, streamlining agency procedures, and promoting fairness to all parties.163See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 187–89, 216–17 (1945). Per this view, the substantial evidence standard of review had some constitutional significance (especially as it related to separation of powers concerns) and was meant to make clear to courts that it was “the[ir] duty . . . to determine in the final analysis and in the exercise of their independent judgment[] whether[,] on the whole record[,] the evidence in a given instance [was] sufficiently substantial to support a[n agency] finding, conclusion, or other . . . action as a matter of law.”164Id. at 216 (emphasis added).

Yet, the committee’s emphasis on independent judgment seemed to contradict courts,165See infra notes 185–205. scholars, and even some parts of the Senate Report’s view of the substantial evidence standard, who argued it (1) required a considerable degree of judicial deference to agencies and (2) applied in limited circumstances, namely, to judicial review of agencies’ findings of facts.166Davis, supra note 161, at 477–79; Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1682 (pointing out that the attorney general’s “interpretation has prevailed”). A prominent proponent of this view was then-Attorney General Tom C. Clark, who wrote a letter in 1945 interpreting some of the APA’s provisions. Tellingly, his letter was appended to the official Senate Report, which complicates the idea that the substantial evidence standard accomplished the “important” goals articulated by the APA’s drafters, such as ensuring separation of powers through judges exercising independent judgment.167See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 223, 230.

In his letter, the attorney general argued the substantial evidence standard was “intended to embody” common law, defining it as “more than a mere scintilla[,] [that is,] . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”168Id. at 230 (citation omitted). In other words, the attorney general treated the substantial evidence standard of review for agency decisions as a corollary to the substantial evidence standard of review that appellate courts applied in evaluating jury determinations of fact.169See id.; Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1663–64.

In the jury context, the substantial evidence standard was a “highly deferential” one in which “[t]he verdict [would] stand unless [an] appellant c[ould] show that there [was] no substantial evidence to support it, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and with all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence drawn in support of the verdict.”170Davis, supra note 161, at 477. Judicial review of jury findings of fact was deferential given the Constitution expressly guaranteed resolution of civil and criminal disputes by juries.171See id.; U.S. Const. amends. V–VII. For the Founders, juries “protecte[d] American liberty” because they represented common interests, “guarding against arbitrary rule” marked by judges who could be prone to “develop[ing]” biases “in favor of government.”172John Kerkhoff & Oliver Dunford, Substantial Defects: Deference, Juries, and Agency Fact-Finding 4–6 (Apr. 2023) (working paper) (on file with the Southern California Law Review); see John Gibbons, Comment, Why Judicial Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding is Unconstitutional, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 1485, 1499 (2016) (arguing that “one of the great purposes of the jury trial was to prevent, or nullify, the actions of oppressive or biased legislatures, executives, and judiciaries”). Thus, the substantial evidence standard, in the jury context, preserved the Constitution’s respect for the jury’s unique, unbiased position. Moreover, judicial deference to juries’ findings of fact was warranted given that juries were closer to the evidence.173See Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1335, 1353 & n.102 (1994) (“The opportunity to observe firsthand testimony and demonstrations, and the subtleties that accompany such evidence, places jurors . . . in a much better position than appellate judges to assess the facts”).

Yet, if the APA codified the latter view, then the APA requires courts to apply a standard of review that might not necessarily reap the benefits or address the constitutional concerns the substantial evidence standard was designed to create or resolve, respectively. Perhaps a different standard would be warranted to capitalize on agencies’ unique, often technical, expertise or address the separation of powers concerns that agency adjudication may raise. For administrative law critics like Hamburger, the fact that “an administrative agency is not a jury” is another reason why agencies may be constitutionally defective.174Hamburger, supra note 4, at 311 & n.h. Whereas juries do not “have . . . precommitments” to the government, ALJs often do.175Id. at 318. Therefore, as agency skeptics’ theory goes, ALJs can actually threaten, rather than protect or promote, individual liberty. Other scholars counter Hamburger’s fears because, like juries, ALJs are close to the evidence that parties present.176Cf. Todd Phillips & Connor Raso, Debates over Agency Judges Should Focus on Functions, Not Job Titles, Brookings (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debates-over-agency-judges-should-focus-on-functions-not-job-titles [https://perma.cc/LY84-9F5D] (“Agency judges are tasked with providing an initial independent review of the facts . . . .”). Also, ALJs often have specialized knowledge and expertise that make them particularly suited to resolve the matters that come before them.177See Christopher J. Walker, CEI Report on Agency Adjudication Reform, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (Dec. 14, 2023), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/cei-report-on-agency-adjudication-reform [https://perma.cc/L9NQ-LALH]; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 496 (1951) (explaining that administrative law judges (“ALJs”) should be afforded due respect “in the light of judicial experience” and specialized knowledge they have). Meanwhile, a jury, which is comprised of laypersons, is less likely to understand the facts that come before agency tribunals.178See Walker, supra note 177. Thus, a jury may misinterpret technical facts, passing misguided (that is, biased) judgment.

No matter the concerns the latter view may raise, the attorney general’s characterization of the substantial evidence standard has won the day.179See Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 815 (2018). While recognizing that the attorney general’s “interpretation has prevailed,” George B. Shepherd argues that we should not afford the Senate committee or attorney general’s interpretations much weight since each account was recorded after Congress had concluded “months of private, off-the-record negotiations” and drafted the APA. Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1662–63, 1682–83. Indeed, for several decades after the APA’s passage, “agencies proceeded as if” the law had not “change[d] much of anything.”180Bernick, supra note 179, at 815–16. Around the 1960s, as agencies began to rely more heavily on an informal rulemaking procedure created by the APA called “notice-and-comment” rulemaking, courts began to develop common law doctrines to constrain this power.181Id. at 816–17. This Note uses the word constrain loosely since some common law doctrines required courts to defer to agencies’ decisions. See id. at 815, 817–21 (analyzing the common law doctrines that arose in the late twentieth century, including the “hard look” analysis, Chevron deference, and Auer deference). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has recently revitalized what Evan D. Bernick calls APA “originalism,” in decisions such as Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015); see Bernick, supra note 179, at 834. In that case, the Supreme Court held that precedent that had required agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemaking if they wanted to “depart[] from . . . interpretive rules that [had] represented their ‘definitive position’ ” was unlawful because it violated section 553(b)(A) of the APA, “which expressly exempt[ed] interpretive rules from notice-and-comment procedures.” Bernick, supra note 179, at 824 (citation omitted). This tracks with the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Loper Bright to overrule Chevron deference. See infra Section II.A.2. On the other hand, courts seldom addressed agencies’ adjudicatory powers, including clarifying what the substantial evidence standard required, given the trend toward notice-and-comment rulemaking.182See Bernick, supra note 179, at 816–17.

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB183Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). and Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB184Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). are two such cases that interpreted the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review. In both, the Supreme Court characterized the standard as akin to the standard applicable to jury findings of facts.

In Universal Camera, the Court reviewed a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) order that had found an employer’s dismissal of an employee was not retaliatory even though the dismissal followed the employee testifying against his employer in a collective bargaining matter.185Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 476–77; NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 750 (2d Cir. 1950). The relevant statute, the Wagner Act, merely said that reviewing courts were to treat the NLRB’s findings of fact as conclusive “if supported by evidence.” Although the words substantial evidence were absent from the Wagner Act, the Court, citing precedent, nevertheless determined this language meant that the relevant standard of review for NLRB orders was the substantial evidence standard of review.186Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477. To this end, the Court characterized substantial evidence as meaning “more than a mere scintilla. It mean[t] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind m[ay] accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”187Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). This characterization of the substantial evidence standard of review tracked with the substantial evidence standard used in jury trials, in which courts also treated it as a “reasonableness test.”188Davis, supra note 161, at 477 (“Could reasonable minds have reached the conclusion expressed by the jury in its verdict?”). To be sure, the Court went on to explain that substantial evidence meant, regarding judicial review of agencies’ findings of facts, as

[doing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of the fact[s] to be established. . . . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.189Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477 (fourth alteration in the original) (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)).

Yet, because section 706 of the APA required reviewing courts to analyze the whole record, the Court determined that Congress intended to reverse common law only with respect to the fact that “substantiality [had to] be determined in . . . light of” the whole record.190Id. at 488–89. This meant reviewing courts had to “take into account whatever in the record fairly detract[ed] from its weight.”191Id. at 488. The Court’s characterization of the substantial evidence standard of review contradicts some skeptics’ insistence that this standard compels reviewing courts to ignore evidence that undermines an agency tribunal’s findings of fact. See Hamburger, supra note 4, at 317–18 (“[J]udges . . . do not ask whether the record as a whole supports an administrative decision, but merely whether it contains evidence that could support it.”).

This rule was probably not much different from the substantial evidence standard in the jury trial context. Under the latter standard, courts had to draw “all reasonable inferences” in favor of the jury.192See Davis, supra note 161, at 477. Similarly, as noted above, the Universal Camera Court used the term “fairly detracting from its weight” in defining the substantiality test.193Supra note 191 and accompanying text; Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488. This suggests courts may not adopt the agencies’ findings of fact if doing so means ignoring relevant context. After all, drawing reasonable inferences requires courts to consider the validity of facts in light of other facts.194See Inference, Corn. L. Sch.: Legal Info. Inst. (Apr. 2025), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/inference [https://perma.cc/7ZXA-LQDR]; Cal. Evid. Code § 600(b) (West 2025). Also, Universal Camera did not require courts to draw inferences against the jury, only that courts must take conflicting facts into account.195See George A. Somerville, Understanding Standards of Appellate Review, VTLAppeal, 2013, at 1, 4 (explaining the substantial evidence standard permits a court to reject an “agency’s findings of fact ‘only if, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion.’ ” (emphasis in original) (quoting Va. Real Est. Comm’n v. Bias, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Va. 1983))).

Allentown Mack, decided forty years after Universal Camera, similarly suggested the APA’s substantial evidence standard operated like the substantial evidence standard applicable to jury findings of fact. In that case, a union successfully argued before the NLRB that a factory’s decision to no longer recognize the union after the factory conducted a poll gauging employee support for the union constituted an “unfair labor practice.”196Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361–63 (1998). The Court reviewed the NLRB’s order under the substantial evidence standard of review and held that the substantial evidence standard was an “objective test.”197Id. at 363, 377. As an objective test, a reviewing court employing the substantial evidence standard of review had “no room” to afford “deference to an agency’s eccentric view of what a reasonable factfinder ought to demand.”198Id. at 377 (emphasis omitted). Despite this limitation, Justice Scalia noted that the substantial evidence test still required considerable deference to an agency’s findings of fact: a court’s role was merely “to ensure” that an agency “achieve[d] minimal compliance with [its] obligation” to “draw all those inferences that the evidence fairly demand[ed] . . . , which [was] the foundation of all honest and legitimate adjudication.”199Id. at 378–79 (emphasis added). Using the same “fairly” language used in the Universal Camera decision, Allentown Mack confirmed that the substantial evidence standard of review was a reasonableness test.

Yet, Allentown Mack concluded that the NLRB’s findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence.200Id. at 380. For Justice Scalia, the NLRB improperly ignored some evidence before it, including an employee’s statement to the factory that he was not being adequately represented “for the [union dues that] he was paying.”201Id. at 369 (citation omitted). Taken together, these facts constituted “reasonable, good-faith grounds” on the factory’s part to doubt union support and therefore supported its decision to survey employee support of the union and revoke its recognition of the union.202Id. at 367, 369, 371. Allentown Mack’s holding that the factory’s decision to revoke its recognition of the union did not constitute an unfair labor practice, contrary to the NLRB’s finding, fits uncomfortably with the Court’s description of the substantial evidence standard of review.203See id. at 380. This suggests the Court may actually apply the standard less deferentially than it claims it should. This holding may also represent a growing trend toward judicial scrutiny of agency power, or it may simply embody a typical application of the substantial evidence standard of review. Whatever proposition Allentown Mack may stand for, however, is beyond the scope of this Note; what is clear is that the Court continues to recognize a duty to give agencies’ findings of fact some “benefit of the doubt” and that the substantial evidence standard of review largely mirrors the standard for reviewing jury findings of fact.204Id. at 377. In fact, as Justice Breyer argued in a separate opinion in Allentown Mack, the majority’s holding effectively changed the standard of review to one that “look[ed] like an ordinary jury standard that . . . reflect[ed] not an agency’s specialized knowledge of the workplace, but a court’s common understanding of human psychology.”205Id. at 390 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Agency skeptics have responded to Universal Camera and Allentown Mack’s endorsements of the deferential substantial evidence standard by raising several constitutional concerns. For one, agency skeptics worry that agency fact-finding may be limited since agencies have discretion over whether to permit discovery.206Hamburger, supra note 4, at 249–50. In dicta from Jarkesy, Justice Roberts echoed agency critics’ concern that the defendants “enjoy[ed] no general right to discovery” in agency proceedings. SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 2141 (2024). Furthermore, even when agencies grant discovery, they argue that discovery may be nominal, inequitable, or less effective as compared with discovery in Article III adjudications: in agency proceedings, although private parties “can ask an agency to issue a subpoena,” they have no guarantee that it will “be answered until the hearing”; meanwhile, an agency “can demand testimony and documents long before any hearing—even before [it] brings charges.”207Hamburger, supra note 4, at 249–50. This stands in contrast to Article III adjudication, in which civil litigants have “equal access to discovery,” and criminal prosecutors have a duty to share information with the defendants.208Id. at 268–69. Additionally, unlike federal courts, critics suggest that agencies are not required to adhere to federal rules of evidence or procedure, and can “make up certain rules as they go.”209Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 13. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has a “Commission[] Rules of Practice, [in which] hearsay is generally permitted, depositions are limited, discovery is generally not permitted,” and ALJs must make initial decisions within “aggressive timelines.”210A Brave New World: The Supreme Court Torpedoes the ‘Administrative State’, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (July 12, 2024), https://katten.com/a-brave-new-world-the-supreme-court-torpedoes-the-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/K6KJ-LFJG]. This is particularly alarming for these agency skeptics, since the purpose of evidence rules, for example, is to regulate the fact-finding process and improve its reliability.211Cf. Christopher B. Mueller, Laird C. Kirkpatrick & Liesa L. Richter, Black Letter Outline on Evidence 413 (5th ed. 2021) (chronicling the justifications for federal evidence rules). Compounding the issue is that parties might not have control over what agencies include in the factual record or be able to supplement it on appeal.212Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 13. This could be concerning because Article III courts’ review of agencies’ findings of facts are based on the administrative record.213See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Moreover, parties often have no opportunity for de novo review at any time in the appeals process, including during intermediate appeals at the agency level, since “many agencies operate under a presumption that . . . [its] internal appellate authority . . . will adopt the ALJ’s ruling.”214Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 13. Lastly, this process may be circular because “agencies have a vested interest in protecting their power”; as agency skeptics charge, anyone who challenges agencies’ procedures may be out of luck because “no agency is going to rule that its procedures or structure are unconstitutional.”215Editorial Board, Supreme Court 9, Administrative State 0, Wall St. J.: Op. (Apr. 14, 2023, at 18:41 ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-axon-v-ftc-sec-v-cochran-administrative-state-federal-court-elena-kagan-43f6b20 [https://web.archive.org/web/20230524184418/https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-axon-v-ftc-sec-v-cochran-administrative-state-federal-court-elena-kagan-43f6b20].

Since the rise of the appellate review model, the Supreme Court largely ignored these concerns and had instead actually expanded agency power in several respects. That all changed in 2024 when the Court first overruled a landmark 1984 decision that had held that courts had to defer to agencies’ findings of law in certain circumstances,216See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024). and then revived the public/private rights doctrine, finding that claims involving private rights must be resolved by a jury in an Article III court.217See SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2024). The next Part explores these developments.

II. THE SUPREME COURT ON ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on administrative law tends to fall into one of two categories depending on whether an agency’s actions can be characterized as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial in nature. This tracks the APA’s distinction of agency rulemaking from adjudication.218See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 193 (1945) (noting that one of the APA’s purposes is to distinguish rulemaking from adjudication, wherein the former is a legislative “function” and the latter is a judicial “function[] of administrative agencies”); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (setting out procedural requirements for agencies engaged in rulemaking); id. § 554(a) (requiring agencies to conduct hearings and follow other procedural requirements “in every case of adjudication required by statute”). While this Note is primarily interested in quasi-judicial power, given that appeals of formal adjudications under the APA trigger the substantial evidence standard of review,219See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). a line of cases dealing with judicial deference to agencies’ quasi-legislative power suggests constitutional limits to agencies’ fact-finding. Section II.A analyzes three deference doctrines that the Supreme Court has applied to judicial review of agencies’ findings of law and has subsequently refined or dismantled entirely. Section II.B then reviews recent quasi-judicial decisions that pave the way for this Note’s conclusion, that the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review is constitutional.

A. Quasi-Legislative Decisions

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which was decided while Congress debated the merits of administrative reform like the APA, was the first of three forms of deference220Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Some scholars and courts, including the Supreme Court, argue Skidmore deference should really be called Skidmore “persuasion” because it does not require courts to unquestioningly adopt agencies’ definitions of ambiguous statutory terms. See, e.g., Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2267. However, this Note argues Skidmore “deference” more accurately captures the Skidmore holding; it also helps conceptualize the substantial evidence standard of review. Merriam-Webster defines deference as “respect and esteem due a superior or an elder.” Deference, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deference [https://perma.cc/2PN6-SHZK]. Skidmore’s holding is partly based on a recognition that agencies have unique skills and experiences that warrant courts’ respect when also interpreting ambiguous statutes. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Similarly, the substantial evidence standard of review asks reviewing courts to respect agencies’ findings of fact because agencies have special expertise and proximity to the evidence. In short, the Skidmore doctrine and substantial evidence standard of review recognize agencies have informational advantages and expertise in certain matters, which in turn justifies respect by courts. to agencies’ findings of law that the Court has recognized.221See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138–40; Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1565–78 (cataloguing several legislative proposals to curtail agency power during the 1930s and 1940s). For Shepherd, it is unsurprising that the Court and Congress had different views regarding permissible allocations of agency power. Indeed, one reason why Congress continued to press the issue was because the Court was sympathetic to President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs and Congress itself was lobbied by anti–New Deal forces. See Shepherd, supra note 88, 1559–61, 1563–64. It is also the most enduring common law deference doctrine as it continues to be cited and applied by the Court today.222See, e.g., Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2267 (recognizing that the Skidmore doctrine helped courts decipher ambiguous statutes pre-Chevron). The other deference doctrines include Chevron deference, which was overruled in Loper Bright, and Auer deference, which the Court may also discard if one takes Loper Bright’s logic to its natural limit.223See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by, Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. 2244; Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); infra notes 274–80. At their most basic level, Skidmore, Chevron, and Auer deference doctrines answer the question of whether and when courts should take into account agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes and how much weight such interpretations should hold.224See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.

  1. Skidmore Deference

Skidmore involved a challenge to the meaning of “overtime” as set out by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).225Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135; 29 U.S.C. § 207. Here, the plaintiffs worked at a packing plant as daytime firefighters but also agreed to work several nights to respond to fire alarms.226Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135. Although the plaintiffs were paid each time they answered alarms, the alarms seldom went off; this meant the plaintiffs spent hours at the plant without compensation.227Id. at 135–36. The plaintiffs alleged this nighttime work qualified as “overtime,” and thus they were entitled to compensation for both waiting for and responding to fire alarms.228Id. Although the FLSA did not define overtime in this context, the Court looked to an interpretive bulletin promulgated by the administrator of the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division for guidance.229Id. at 136–38. According to the administrator, whether waiting time counted as working time (and therefore counted toward overtime compensation) depended “upon the degree to which [an] employee [was] free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness when he [was] subject to call and the number of consecutive hours that the employee [was] subject to call without being required to perform active work.”230Id. at 138. The Court held this interpretation was “entitled to respect” given the administrator’s “policies [were] made in pursuance of official duty,” one in which the administrator had much more extensive knowledge of labor issues than would “likely . . . come to a judge in a particular case.”231Id. at 138–40. However, the Skidmore Court recognized that judicial deference to an agency’s “interpretations and opinions” had limits: deference could be understood as a sliding scale, depending on a number of factors including (1) the “thoroughness evident in [an agency’s] consideration”; (2) the “validity of [an agency’s] reasoning”; (3) an interpretation or opinion’s “consistency with earlier and later pronouncements”; and (4) “all those factors which give [an interpretation or opinion] power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”232Id. at 140; see Litigation, Overview – Skidmore: Agency Persuasion, Not Deference Bloomberg L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X7RFJ404000000 [https://perma.cc/QYT5-4YJA] (noting the Skidmore factors are nonexhaustive and that some courts describe such factors as a “sliding-scale test” (quotation omitted)).

  1. Chevron Deference and the Loper Bright Response

Forty years later, the Court revisited the question of judicial deference to agency interpretations of the law in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. In what would become known as Chevron deference, the Court dramatically increased agencies’ power to expound on the meaning of ambiguous statutes by mandating that reviewing courts adopt agencies’ reasonable interpretations of such statutes when agencies defined the statutes through regulations.233Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984), overruled by, Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Whereas Skidmore deference was narrow (applying to nonbinding agency materials that interpreted ambiguous statutes) and flexible (giving courts discretion over how much weight they could afford agency interpretations), Chevron deference was wide (applying to agency regulations and orders) and inflexible (requiring courts to adopt agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes).234See id. at 864–65; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979–80 (2005) (applying Chevron deference to a Federal Communications Commission declaratory ruling).

Chevron dealt with a 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).235Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839. Under the CAA, “ ‘nonattainment’ States,” or states that had not fulfilled certain air quality requirements set by a previous statute, could authorize “ ‘new or modified major stationary sources’ of air pollution” only in certain situations.236Id. at 839–40, 850 (citation omitted). In enforcing the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) eventually promulgated a regulation that interpreted the meaning of a “stationary source” under the statute.237Id. at 840. The Environmental Protection Agency said nonattainment states could define a stationary source “grouping” of two or more “pollution-emitting devices” for the purposes of determining whether an applicant qualified for a permit. Id. In Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized the term stationary source as used in the CAA was ambiguous and thus answered whether the EPA could validly interpret such term through its regulation that would be binding on permit applicants.238See id. at 839, 842–44, 862. The Court concluded in the affirmative.239Id. at 841–42. Specifically, the Court held that regulations interpreting statutes “control[ed]” if two conditions were met: (1) Congress did not unambiguously express its intent regarding how a statute was to be construed, and (2) an agency’s construction of a statutory term was reasonable.240Id. at 842–44. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court pointed to a history of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes in cases involving technical knowledge and competing policy interests.241See id. at 843–44, 865. Like precedent, the CAA involved complex subject matter that agencies were uniquely qualified to address; the Court suggested that Congress may not have had the requisite expertise to adequately define stationary sources and wanted to delegate this task to a more knowledgeable body, the EPA.242See id. Moreover, in enacting the CAA, Congress sought to balance economic and environmental interests.243Id. at 844, 847. Congress may not have had the time, foresight, or votes to sort out minute details of contested legislation and so either intentionally or unintentionally left this gap to the EPA to fill.244See id. at 842–44, 847. Given these considerations, the EPA reasonably interpreted an ambiguous term because it promulgated the regulation pursuant to extensive agency studies and was consistent with a concern for “economic growth.”245Id. at 863. Thus, the Court upheld the regulation.246Id. at 866.

Shortly after Chevron, Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia further clarified the Court’s holding. According to the Justices, Chevron deference was not motivated by separation of powers concerns, or the idea that judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutory ambiguities “guard[ed] against judicial displacement of political judgments.”247Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 197 (2006). Rather, “Chevron . . . rest[ed] on [one] simple idea: Courts defer[red] to agenc[ies’] interpretations of law when, and because, Congress has told them to do so. . . . [In other words,] the national legislature retain[ed] control of the deference question.”248Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted).

Around the turn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court revisited the Chevron doctrine and created what would be known as Chevron “[s]tep [z]ero.”249Id. at 191. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (articulating Chevron step zero); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (setting the groundwork for Chevron step zero). Step zero of the Chevron doctrine required that, for an agency interpretation to be entitled to judicial deference, such interpretation needed to “carry the force of law.”250Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court explained that, as Congress authorized agencies to carry out specific but complex procedures, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, it followed that Congress probably did not intend that agencies could also conclusively bind individuals through less specific or simpler procedures, such as “policy statements, . . . manuals, and enforcement guidelines,” too.251See id. at 234 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587). Instead, these kinds of agency actions should be analyzed through the less deferential Skidmore lens.252See id. at 235.

Although Mead appeared to set the stage for overturning Chevron deference, the Court’s 2005 decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services actually reinforced and expanded it, marking the doctrine’s high-water mark. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that courts must always apply the Chevron analysis to agencies’ interpretation of statutes—even if prior court holdings interpreted the same statutes—unless prior courts found the relevant statutory terms were unambiguous.253Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). Justice Scalia dissented, arguing Brand X’s holding was “bizarre,” if not “unconstitutional,” in light of Mead.254See id. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that if an agency, for example, interpreted an ambiguous statute in a manual, but the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation because it lacked the force of law, this holding would not have stare decisis effect.255See id. at 1016–17. This was because the agency could simply issue a subsequent regulation or order (that is, an act that carried the force of law) interpreting the statute the same way, and a subsequent court applying the Chevron analysis would uphold it if the interpretation was reasonable, notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court previously held that same interpretation was unlawful.256See id. Justice Scalia noted that Brand X’s holding contradicts a previous Court decision that held that “[j]udgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned[,] or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.” Id. at 1017 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).

Justice Scalia’s dissent was a sign of future Chevron criticisms. Future decisions chipped away at the Chevron doctrine257See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015) (holding that Chevron deference was inapplicable when an agency interpretation involved “deep ‘economic and political significance’ ” (quotation omitted)); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 220–21 (2016) (holding that even if an action carried the force of law, it was not entitled to Chevron deference when an agency did not follow proper procedures in carrying out such action). until it was finally overruled in Loper Bright.258Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). In Loper Bright, the Court decided whether regional fishery management councils under the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) could require Atlantic herring fishermen to have observers aboard their vessels and to bear these costs.259Id. at 2254–55. Although the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act governed this situation because it enumerated certain situations in which the management counsels could impose observer-related costs on vessels, it was silent as to whether this option extended to Atlantic herring fishing operations.260Id. Rather than determine whether the NMFS reasonably interpreted an ambiguous statute, the Court threw out the Chevron analysis altogether. “Article III . . . assign[ed] to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ ” Chief Justice Roberts declared.261Id. at 2257 (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). This duty extended to interpreting the laws.262Id. The APA “incorporate[d] th[is] traditional understanding of the judicial function” because it codified that courts decided “all relevant questions of law, interpret[ed] constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine[d] the meaning or applicability of the terms of . . . agency action[s].”263Id. at 2261–62 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). That statutes were sometimes ambiguous did not mean agencies had the authority to clarify them.264See id. at 2258. Indeed, the Framers recognized that, although laws were thoroughly deliberated with “the greatest technical skill,” they would still contain ambiguities.265Id. at 2257. To address this, Article III of the Constitution vested courts with the authority—affirmed in Marbury and the APA—to serve as the final arbiter of the laws’ meaning.266Id. To the Court, Chevron deference subverted the Constitution and the APA’s directives by requiring courts to abdicate their responsibility to interpret the laws.267See id. at 2263–64 (noting that the Chevron Court did not cite the APA—nor use the APA to anchor its analysis—when it devised the Chevron test to determine whether a court should adopt an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute). In effect, the Constitution and the APA required courts to uncover a statute’s “best” meaning rather than one of many “reasonable” meanings.268Id. at 2263.

Loper Bright did not prohibit judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of law wholesale. It suggested Congress could still enact statutes delegating authority to agencies to “exercise [some] discretion.”269Id. In such a case, “the best reading of a statute” was that an agency had statutory authority to determine what certain statutory terms meant.270See id. Ultimately, a court still determined what a statute meant: it just decided in that scenario that a statute delegated discretionary power to agencies to carry out the laws.271See id. While reaching a different outcome, the Loper Bright Court ostensibly endorsed the justification offered in favor of Chevron deference by Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, that is, that Congress created legislation telling courts that they were to defer to agencies’ interpretations of statutes; here, the APA told reviewing courts that they were not to defer to agencies’ findings of law. Thus, Congress had power to create statutes, including modifying the APA, so that it delegated to agencies the responsibility to define statutory terms.272See Jonathan M. Gaffney, Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB10558, Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 (2024) (noting that the “APA provides the default rules for how and when courts may review agency actions,” meaning that “Congress can create statutory exceptions . . . for particular agencies or types of agency action”). Finally, the Court clarified that Skidmore deference was still good law since agencies’ interpretations and opinions “constitute[d] a body of experience and informed judgment” that could guide a court’s analysis of ambiguous statutes.273See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2259 (alteration in original).

  1. Auer Deference

While Loper Bright clarified the limits of Chevron and Skidmore deference, it did not discuss the fate of Auer deference. Creating a third form of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of law, Auer v. Robbins held that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation was “controlling unless [it was] ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ”274Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citation omitted). Arguably, Auer deference is still good law since the Supreme Court had the opportunity to overrule Auer in the 2019 case Kisor v. Wilkie but declined to do so.275Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). Rather, Kisor supplied a limiting principle to Auer deference, noting that a court could defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation only after concluding the regulation was “genuinely ambiguous.”276Id. at 2414. A regulation was genuinely ambiguous if a court “exhaust[ed] all [its] ‘traditional tools’ of construction” to no avail.277Id. at 2448 (citation omitted).

On the other hand, Auer deference could be on its way out if one considers Chief Justice Roberts’s reasons for overruling Chevron deference in Loper Bright. Whereas, for the Roberts Court, Chevron deference contravenes the APA’s command that courts independently determine questions of law, Auer deference also seems to contradict the APA because the APA “directs courts to ‘determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of . . . agency action[s],’ which includes regulations.”278Gaffney, supra note 272, at 4 (citation omitted). Another issue with Auer deference, like Chevron deference, involves separation of powers concerns. Justice Scalia questioned Auer deference because it “arrogat[ed]” executive power by enabling agencies to “write . . . law[s] and . . . interpret” such laws.279Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619–20 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, Chevron deference interfered with “judges[’] [ability] to exercise . . . judgment independent of influence from the political branches.”280Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2257 (2024). Justice Thomas argued that Chevron violated separation of powers because it “curb[ed] judicial power” and “expand[ed] agencies’ executive power beyond constitutional limits.” See id. at 2274 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that judicial power included the power to resolve legislative ambiguities, and Chevron prevented the court from checking the executive. Id. This could explain why Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia did not defend Chevron deference on separation of powers grounds.

B. Quasi-Judicial Decisions

Loper Bright represents the Roberts Court’s view that, regarding agencies’ quasi-legislative powers, agencies have little power to say what the law is. Meanwhile, as to agencies’ quasi-judicial powers, the Court tends to posit that agencies have little power to say who the law applies to: in Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, the Court held that agencies’ ability to channel certain claims through agency tribunals—in which ALJs promulgate orders subject to review by intra-agency appeals boards—before these claims are entitled to Article III review is limited in certain circumstances;281Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890, 897–98 (2023). SEC v. Jarkesy then found that the Seventh Amendment sometimes forbade agencies from binding individuals altogether.282SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 2127, 2139 (2024).

  1. Axon Enterprise and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Axon Enterprise traces its holding to Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich.283Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). In Thunder Basin, the Court considered a coal company’s challenge to a regulation under the Mine Act, which required mine operators to “post . . . information” indicating whom miners had selected to represent them during required site “safety inspections.”284Id. at 202–04. Initially, the coal company asked the Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) to find that the miners representative requirement violated the National Labor Relations Act’s collective-bargaining provisions, but the MSHA declined.285Id. at 204. Before the secretary of labor sought enforcement of the regulation, the company sought injunctive relief in a district court.286See id. at 205–06. Additionally, the company argued that the Mine Act’s judicial review scheme—in which ALJs under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission were supposed to resolve mine operators’ complaints, subject to review by the full Commission, before employers could seek review by Article III appeals courts—violated its Fifth Amendment due process rights.287See id. at 205, 207–08. Once before the Supreme Court, the Court held that Congress could channel certain claims through agency tribunals and preclude Article III jurisdiction until agencies had issued final orders.288Id. at 207. In so holding, the Court articulated three factors that should aid courts’ inquiry in determining whether Congress “inten[ded]” to preclude review: (1) whether “a finding of preclusion [would] foreclose all meaningful judicial review”; (2) whether a party’s “claims were ‘wholly collateral’ to a statute’s review provisions”; and (3) whether these “claims were ‘outside [an] agency’s expertise.’ ”289See Harold J. Krent, Situating Structural Challenges to Agency Authority Within the Framework of the Finality Principle, 98 Ind. L.J. 1, 5 (2023) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212–13).

Here, circumstances indicated that Congress intended the Mine Act to preclude district court jurisdiction.290Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 218 (affirming the appeals court’s holding that the “Mine Act’s comprehensive enforcement and administrative-review scheme precluded district court [review]”). For one, the Mine Act’s comprehensive review scheme applied to all Mine Act violations and did not “distinguish between pre-enforcement and post-enforcement challenges.”291See id. at 208. That the Mine Act provided for appellate court review suggested that the coal company, even if forced to bring its claim to the Commission first, could eventually obtain meaningful judicial review.292See id. at 215. Although the Commission probably could not resolve the company’s constitutional claim, the Court was satisfied that the company had recourse given the Mine Act’s appellate review provision.293Id. After all, Congress created the Commission to resolve all claims that fell under the Mine Act and, as such, had requisite jurisdiction and experience to handle the company’s miners representative’s claim.294See id. at 214–15. This meant that the company’s purpose for filing its suit in the district court, to ask a court to declare that they did not need to post information regarding the miners’ representative, meant it brought a claim that fell within the Mine Act’s review provisions and implicated the Commission’s expertise.295See id.

Axon Enterprise found the Thunder Basin factors counseled in favor of finding initial district court jurisdiction when individuals alleged the SEC and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) were structurally defective or that any intra-agency proceedings brought against them were unlawful.296Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890, 897 (2023). In this case, the Court handled claims brought by Michelle Cochran, whom the SEC charged with “fail[ure] to comply with” statutory “auditing standards,” and Axon Enterprise, which the FTC alleged violated its “ban on unfair methods of competition.”297Id. at 898–99. After the SEC and FTC initiated agency proceedings against Cochran and Axon Enterprise, Cochran and Axon Enterprise each brought lawsuits in federal district court alleging the agencies’ double-for-cause removal tenure protections for ALJs meant ALJs were unconstitutionally “insulate[d] . . . from presidential supervision.”298Id. at 897–98 (noting that ALJs were removable only by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), and MSPB members were removable by the president). Axon Enterprise also argued that the FTC’s dual “prosecutorial and adjudicative functions” violated the separation of powers principle as well.299Id. at 899.

The Court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which codified federal question jurisdiction, gave federal district courts jurisdiction to hear parties’ challenges to agency actions, and Congress could take away jurisdiction in whole or in part.300Id. at 900; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It thus explained that Thunder Basin was actually a two-step process in which courts first asked whether Congress created a “comprehensive review process” that deprived ordinary district courts of jurisdiction, and, if so, whether the claims brought before them were “of the type[s that] Congress intended to be reviewed within” such scheme.301Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 900 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 208 (1994)). It was during this second step that courts would apply the Thunder Basin factors.302Id.

The Court analyzed Cochran and Axon Enterprise’s claims by comparing its findings in Thunder Basin and other cases, Elgin v. Department of the Treasury303Elgin v. Department of the Treasury found that Michael Elgin, a civil service employee who was discharged because a law prohibited employment of individuals within federal agencies who “knowingly and willfully failed register” for the Selective Service, could not challenge the constitutionality of this law through bringing suit in district court without Elgin first seeking review of his termination by the MSPB. Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5–7 (2012). Only after an employee sought review of their termination by the MSPB could they seek review by the Federal Circuit Appeals Court. See id. at 6. and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board.304Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board involved a challenge by Beckstead and Watts, LLP and Free Enterprise Fund, in which the parties argued that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) was improperly established and therefore could not conduct proceedings against them. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) appointed and removed PCAOB members “for cause.” Id. at 484, 486. Members of the SEC were removable by the president for cause. Id. at 487. After the SEC reviewed PCAOB decisions, parties could challenge such decisions in an appeals court. Id. at 489. Unlike Thunder Basin and Elgin, in which the parties challenged agencies’ “specific substantive decision[s],” such as fining a company or firing an employee, here, Cochran and Axon Enterprise made generalized claims about the validity of the SEC and FTC’s “structure or very existence.”305Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 902. Thus, the Court reasoned Cochran and Axon Enterprise’s double-for-cause removal claim (and Axon Enterprise’s prosecutor-and-adjudicator claim) were likely not those that Congress sought to filter through the agencies’ tribunal systems.306Id.

To be sure, the Court applied the Thunder Basin factors and arrived at the same conclusion. Unlike Thunder Basin and Elgin, in which appeals courts could effectively reverse the harm suffered by the coal company and the discharged government employee in Elgin, Michael Elgin, by revoking the company’s fine or reinstating Elgin, here, an appeals court could not undo Cochran and Axon Enterprise’s harm of “having to appear in [potentially unlawful] proceedings.”307Id. at 903 (citation omitted). In other words, the Court found that Cochran and Axon Enterprise’s “here-and-now injury” precluded any meaningful review of their constitutional claims.308Id. at 903–04 (citation omitted). Moreover, like Free Enterprise, in which Free Enterprise challenged a tribunal’s existence, Cochran and Axon Enterprise’s constitutional claims were wholly collateral to the SEC and FTC’s proceedings because Congress established these agencies’ tribunals to merely adjudicate claims relating to auditing practices and business mergers, not constitutional issues.309Id. at 904–05. Finally, Cochran and Axon Enterprise’s claims “raise[d] ‘standard questions of administrative’ and constitutional law, detached from ‘considerations of agency policy,’ ” meaning such claims did not implicate the SEC or FTC’s expertise.310Id. at 905 (citation omitted). This was unlike Thunder Basin and Elgin, in which the coal company’s and employee’s claims were “intertwined with . . . matters on which the [agencies were] expert.”311Id. at 906.

The Axon Enterprise majority opinion did not actually rule on the merits of the constitutional claims brought by Cochran or Axon Enterprise. In fact, Justice Kagan expressly avoided answering whether the SEC or FTC tribunal structures violated the Constitution’s separation of powers principles.312Id. at 897. However, the Court ruled on Free Enterprise Fund’s constitutional claim, holding that “the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of [PCAOB] members contravene[d] the Constitution’s separation of powers.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010). However, Justice Thomas did address this issue in a concurring opinion.313Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 906 (Thomas, J., concurring). For Justice Thomas, Congress impermissibly encroached on Article III courts’ judicial power when it channeled adjudication of certain claims through administrative tribunals with deferential judicial review on the back end.314Id. Whether Congress could empower agencies to conduct hearings that would result in the “impos[ition of] orders and penalties on private parties” hinged on the types of rights it sought to regulate.315Id. at 906–07 (emphasis added). The types of rights Congress implicated when it empowered the SEC and FTC to adjudicate claims like those the agencies brought against Cochran and Axon Enterprise were private in nature, and therefore the only way such claims could be resolved was by complete Article III adjudication.316See id. at 910–11. Like Hamburger and Bernick, Justice Thomas looked to history for his analysis.317See id. at 907–09; supra notes 68–77, 89–122 and accompanying text. As Justice Thomas explained, courts historically adjudicated private rights, or rights invoking the Constitution’s guarantees of “life, liberty, and property,” from start to end; meanwhile, agencies could resolve matters involving public rights, or those “belong[ing] to the people at large.”318See Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 907–09 (quotation omitted). “[M]onetary fines,” including those that the SEC and FTC sought to impose on Cochran and Axon Enterprise, were historically regarded by courts as “property” interests; accordingly, “[a] civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in court[].”319Id. at 910–11 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987)). That the APA codified the appellate review model did not mean courts no longer had a duty to resolve claims involving private rights.320See id. at 909; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Rather, the Constitution obligated Article III courts to resolve these claims; Article II tribunals had no role in such proceedings.321See Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 909–10 (Thomas, J., concurring). This meant that deferential judicial review of agencies’ findings of fact in these cases was constitutionally questionable because it asked judges to exercise independent judgment in only some respects, that is, only as to matters of law.322See id. Yet, as Justice Thomas argued, the Constitution “treat[ed] factfinding [no] differently from deciding questions of law” because Article III explicitly granted appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court on matters of fact and law.323Id. at 910; U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. This suggested courts, like their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors, should not “defer to the executive record[s] or the facts supposedly established by it” in cases involving private rights.324See Axon Enter., 143 S. Ct. at 910 (Thomas, J., concurring).

  1. Jarkesy and the Seventh Amendment

Jarkesy responded to some of Justice Thomas’s concerns regarding agencies’ power to adjudicate claims involving private rights.325SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024). In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank Act, which gave the SEC the choice to adjudicate an “enforcement action” within the agency or “in federal court.”326See id. at 2125. In this case, the SEC opted to resolve securities fraud charges it brought against George Jarkesy, Jr. and Patriot28, LLC within the SEC.327Id. at 2126–27. The Court concluded that the SEC could not choose where it adjudicated securities fraud claims because these claims clearly implicated the Seventh Amendment and its guarantee of “trial[s] by jury” in Article III courts.328See id. at 2128, 2139; U.S. Const. amend. VII.

The Court noted that agencies could sometimes adjudicate claims in executive branch tribunals.329Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2127. Specifically, agencies could adjudicate claims it brought against third parties (and vice versa) if (1) such claims did not “implicate the Seventh Amendment” or, (2) if such claims did implicate the Seventh Amendment, such claims fell under the “ ‘public rights’ exception.”330See id. The Court explained the Seventh Amendment covered “[s]uits at common law,” which meant a claim implicated the Constitution’s

guarantee of a jury trial if the suit was “not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction.”331Id. at 2128 (alteration in original) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)).

Scholars have noted that “suits at common law” refers to the types of cases that courts heard at the time of the Seventh Amendment’s enactment, with the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 serving as a key reference point.332See Gibbons, supra note 172, at 1488–89 (quoting U.S. Const. amend VII). Section 9 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 gave district courts jurisdiction over “all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred,” and that “trial of issues in fact . . . in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction[] shall be by jury.”333Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. As John Gibbons pointed out, that “the Framers considered it appropriate for cases involving ‘penalties and forfeitures incurred . . . ’ to be heard by civil juries [was] powerful evidence that the common law presumption was that such cases would be brought in common law courts, rather than equity courts.”334Gibbons, supra note 172, at 1511 (citation omitted).

In addition to common law claims, the Jarkesy Court found that “statutory claim[s]” that were “legal in nature” also implicated the Seventh Amendment.335Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989)). A statutory claim was legal in nature if the cause of action and remedy, much like common law claims, “sound[ed] in . . . law.”336Id. at 2129. A claim’s remedy was the “ ‘more important’ consideration,” since some causes of action sounded in both law and equity.337Id. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987)). In Jarkesy, the statutorily created cause of action, securities fraud, resembled common law fraud since “[b]oth target[ed] . . . misrepresent[ation] or conceal[ment of] material facts” and also used similar terms, such as “fraud.”338See id. at 2130–31. Moreover, the SEC sought money damages against Jarkesy and Patriot28, which was a “common law remedy” because it served to “punish culpable individuals,” rather than to restore parties to the “status quo.”339See id. at 2129–30 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 422). Indeed, the relevant laws, the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act, “establish[ed] three ‘tiers’ of civil penalties” in securities fraud cases, in which each tier was a function of how culpable a defendant was.340See id. Thus, given that the securities fraud charges brought against Jarkesy and Patriot28 were punitive, the Court concluded that these claims implicated the Seventh Amendment.341See id. at 2131.

Since the SEC’s claims implicated the Seventh Amendment, the Court turned to its analysis of the public rights exception.342Id. at 2131–32. The Court noted the public rights exception was narrow and historically applied in cases involving “the collection of revenue[,] . . . foreign commerce[,] . . . immigration[,] . . . relations with [Native American] tribes, . . . the administration of public lands, . . . and the granting of public benefits such as payment to veterans, . . . pensions, . . . and patent rights.”343Id. at 2132–33. Typically, public rights traced their origins to some “government[] prerogative[]”; for example, in the context of tariffs, the political branches “traditionally held exclusive power over” whether to impose tariffs on other governments.344See id. at 2127, 2133. In effect, the Court adopted Oil States’ definition of public rights as those rights that belonged to the public at large along with other privileges given to individuals for public policy reasons.345See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text. Here, the SEC’s claim did not implicate this definition because it sought to “target the same basic conduct as common law fraud,” rather than regulate some matter implicating the legislature or executive’s prerogative powers.346Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2136. Thus, the Court held that the SEC was required to bring its claims against Jarkesy and Patriot28 in an Article III court lest it violate their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.347Id. at 2139.

 Importantly, this holding brought the Supreme Court’s understanding of Article II adjudication in line with pre-twentieth-century courts’ understanding, at least when Seventh Amendment interests are involved: when a claim implicates one’s private rights, an agency cannot adjudicate it. Only an Article III court can.

III.  MAPPING THE LIMITS OF THE APA’S SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD OF REVIEW

If Jarkesy held that claims that invoke the Seventh Amendment and involve private rights must be adjudicated by Article III courts, does that mean agency tribunals can hear claims that involve public rights? If agency tribunals have power to adjudicate at least some claims, can Article III courts hear appeals to such tribunals’ decisions? Moreover, how much deference should these courts accord these tribunals’ findings of fact? This Note argues that Jarkesy and Loper Bright, taken together, affirmatively resolve these questions: agencies may freely adjudicate matters involving public rights and their decisions are subject to review using the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review.

A. Resolution of Public Rights Claims by Agency Tribunals

Taking Jarkesy’s holding to its natural limit, it is clear that agencies may continue to adjudicate public rights claims. As Jarkesy recognized that the public rights exception attaches when Congress or the president have prerogative to act or bind individuals, such as in the tariffs realm,348Id. at 2133. it follows that such cases can be resolved by the executive or legislative branches since they have the requisite power to resolve them. For example, Oil States’s holding that a patent is a public right—and therefore, that the executive branch can freely grant or revoke it—fits nicely within this framework.349Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1368 (2018). As the Constitution granted Congress the power to issue patents, and Congress in turn passed legislation enabling executive officers to issue and revoke patents within certain statutorily defined limits, it follows that the inter partes review process constitutes a government prerogative.350See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Here, an Article III court need not involve itself in the inter partes review process because the executive branch has the necessary powers to determine whether to revoke a patent.

Not only may agency tribunals adjudicate claims involving public rights without violating the Constitution, but practical considerations also support this conclusion. The Social Security Administration, for example, handles over 650,000 social security benefits claims a year, meaning that it would be challenging for federal district courts to suddenly take on this caseload.351Hearings and Appeals, supra note 2; see Levels of the Federal Courts, Jud. Learning Ctr., https://judiciallearningcenter.org/levels-of-the-federal-courts [https://perma.cc/UXS5-4PWG] (“[F]ederal district courts hear over 300,000 cases a year.”). Additionally, transferring this caseload to Article III courts could harm litigants, since agency adjudication tends to promote consistency among decisions and leads to quicker and more affordable resolution of claims.352See Walker, supra note 177. Fortunately, social security benefits claims properly fall under the category of public rights since they are “public benefits.”353See Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2133 (explaining that the public rights doctrine encompasses the government’s “granting of public benefits”); Reining in the Administrative State, supra note 32, at 14. Note that it would not matter whether claims involving social security benefits implicated the Seventh Amendment because Jarkesy allows claims that implicate the Seventh Amendment to be adjudicated by agencies if the claims also involve public rights. Therefore, for Jarkesy to stand for the proposition that agency tribunals could not resolve these types of claims would be to create an unmanageable situation in Article III courts.

B. To Review or Not to Review: Agency Tribunals’ Findings of Fact in Public Rights Cases

Since agency tribunals can adjudicate public rights cases, the logical follow-up question is whether Article III courts can hear appeals to decisions made by agency tribunals. It is clear that these courts can. After all, the Supreme Court routinely weighs in on agencies’ decisions, including those made by agency tribunals, suggesting that it considers its jurisdiction over these matters a given.354See supra Section II.B. Consider the Thunder Basin line of cases: in determining whether Congress intended to deprive Article III courts of jurisdiction over certain claims, courts must consider whether preclusion would foreclose all meaningful judicial review.355Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994). This makes it clear that Article III courts must have some power to hear or review cases that agencies may also have an interest in resolving, especially when important constitutional issues are involved. After all, the Axon Enterprise and Free Enterprise Courts permitted original district court jurisdiction when the parties’ claims involved interpreting constitutional and statutory text to determine the validity of agencies’ structures and existences. Likewise, Thunder Basin assumed that Article III courts would have appellate jurisdiction over the coal company’s constitutional claims.356See id. at 215 (“[P]etitioner’s statutory and constitutional claims here can be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals.”).

Also, it would make little sense for courts to abdicate this kind of responsibility to review agency tribunals’ decisions, especially given the Court’s recent skepticism toward agency power. A more pressing question—with broader implications—is the extent to which reviewing courts should defer to agency tribunals’ findings of fact. This Section argues the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review, in light of the Court’s recent administrative law jurisprudence, should apply to claims involving public rights; otherwise, claims should be handled by Article III courts in the first instance, rendering the APA’s substantial evidence irrelevant in such cases.

  1. Revisiting the Appellate Review Model

As some scholars point out, before the twentieth century, courts treated agencies’ findings of fact as rebuttable, prima facie evidence, even in public rights cases.357See supra notes 113–22 and accompanying text. This indicates that, if history accurately describes constitutional limits, Congress cannot relax the applicable standard of review. In other words, if the agency skeptics’ argument is true, then the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review may be unlawful.

However, Loper Bright likely neutralizes this argument. In Loper Bright, to determine whether the Chevron doctrine could be reconciled with the Constitution, the Court surveyed judicial treatment of questions of fact and law during the New Deal era.358Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2258 (2024); see Goldstein, supra note 137 (manuscript at 30 n.147). This implies that, at least in the Court’s mind, the New Deal era faithfully adhered to and administered the Constitution regarding judicial review of agency decisions, and so how courts reviewed agency decisions then is how courts should review such decisions today.359Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2258. Specifically, the Court noted that, even amid relatively significant government expansion, New Deal–era courts reviewed questions of law de novo and questions of fact as “binding on the courts, provided that there was ‘[substantial] evidence to support the findings.’ ”360Id. (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51 (1936)) (explaining that agencies’ findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence if such findings arose out of agency proceedings that comported with “the requirements of due process,” that is, litigants had “fair hearing[s] and [agencies] act[ed] upon evidence . . . not arbitrarily”). Of course, this describes the appellate review model, which, as many agency skeptics posited, was not the model used by courts at the time of the Constitution’s adoption. So, perhaps the Court is incorrect. Perhaps the pre–appellate review model era, rather than the New Deal era, more faithfully adhered to the Constitution. But what matters is not history but the Court’s version of the law since it is its job to say what the law is.

More precisely, the “law,” as conceived by the Court, might be best captured by Crowell. To see how this may be true, it is important to note that Justice Roberts cited the 1936 decision St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States for his proposition that New Deal–era courts did (and should) apply the substantial evidence test to questions of fact. In St. Joseph Stock Yards, the Supreme Court contemplated the issue of whether the secretary of agriculture effected an unconstitutional deprivation of property in “prescrib[ing] maximum charges for” a stock yard’s services.361St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 45. In answering this question in the negative,362Id. at 72. the Court distinguished ordinary fact-finding from constitutional fact-finding: whereas courts could defer to agencies’ findings of fact made pursuant to agencies’ lawfully delegated quasi-legislative power, courts had to independently assess agencies’ findings of fact when “constitutional rights . . . [were] involved.”363See id. at 49–54 (emphasis added); id. at 76 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Goldstein, supra note 137 (manuscript at 25). This harkens back to Crowell, in which the Supreme Court concluded, four years earlier in 1932, that courts had to independently assess what facts had to exist for an agency action to be upheld as constitutional.364See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. Loper Bright’s reference to St. Joseph Stock Yards thus suggests that the appellate review model, specifically that envisioned by Crowell and applied in St. Joseph Stock Yards, offers the appropriate analysis.365Interestingly, Ari Goldstein hypothesized that the APA incorporated Crowell’s iteration of the appellate review model. See Goldstein, supra note 137 (manuscript at 38–43). Although Loper Bright did not explicitly distinguish ordinary facts from jurisdictional and constitutional facts (which may bolster scholars’ claim that de novo review of constitutional and jurisdictional facts is no more), its reference to St. Joseph Stock Yards, its suggestion that New Deal–era courts applied the appropriate standards of review to agencies’ findings of fact, and its general embrace of the substantial evidence standard challenges the view expressed by some scholars and Supreme Court Justices that agencies’ findings of fact cannot be accorded deference.

  1. Congress’s Power to Prescribe the Applicable Standard of Review

Elsewhere in the Loper Bright decision, the Court pointed out that when Congress exercised its discretionary powers, “its determinations” were “conclusive” in court proceedings.366Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2258 (2024) (quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 51). One area in which the government has discretion to act, as Jarkesy made clear, is in public rights cases. So, when Congress creates, limits, or revokes public rights, its determinations are controlling.367Or rather, Congress’s determinations are mostly conclusive, since due process considerations necessarily limit Congress’s fact-finding power. See id. But while discretion implies a right to do whatever one pleases, it also implies a right to constrain one’s own actions, delegate this power to constrain to others, and determine the extent to which oneself or one’s agent will be constrained.

Loper Bright took for granted that Congress can delegate its discretionary powers to agencies.368See id. So, when Congress delegates its discretionary powers to agencies, it can also decide how much agencies will be constrained.369See id.

Setting the standard of judicial review is one way Congress can constrain agencies’ actions. To understand how this works, suppose Congress wants to create a social assistance program and passes a law that establishes an agency and intra-agency tribunal to regulate these benefits. As social benefits would fall under the public rights doctrine, the political branches would have discretion to police them. Therefore, Congress could instruct courts to review agency tribunals’ findings of fact under the substantial evidence test since it has the power to constrain itself, via the agency’s actions. Here, a reviewing court merely “defers to the law,” to use Hamburger’s words (and the idea espoused by Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia in defending Chevron deference, for that matter), when it analyzes the agency’s findings of fact for substantial evidence because that is what the statute tells it to do.370See supra text accompanying notes 117–22, 248.

Of course, this is exactly what the APA does: it constrains Congress’s discretionary authority. Indeed, as Loper Bright explained, under the APA, courts decide “all relevant questions of law, interpret[ations of] constitutional and statutory provisions, and determin[ations of] the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”371Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2261–62 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). If Congress wanted agencies to have more or less authority to declare what the facts were in public rights cases with little interference from reviewing courts, it could. Apparently, the APA’s drafters opted to give agencies moderate discretion to find facts by holding that reviewing courts were to uphold such facts if supported by substantial evidence.

That the substantial evidence standard has its roots in judicial review of jury findings of fact is of no consequence here given that Congress has wide discretion to prescribe the applicable standard of review when it has discretionary power to act, such as in public rights cases. Thus, the substantial evidence standard of review can apply in public rights cases because Congress, through agencies, may regulate public rights and tell courts that the law is to review its findings of fact made pursuant to formal agency adjudications for substantial evidence. This remains true no matter how impractical this standard of review may be in the eyes of agency critics.372See Robert P. Charrow & Laura M. Klaus, Substantial Evidence – A Hodgepodge of Ambiguous Meanings Leading to Questionable Deference, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (Aug. 5, 2024), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/substantial-evidence-a-hodgepodge-of-ambiguous-meanings-leading-to-questionable-deference-by-robert-p-charrow-and-laura-m-klaus [https://perma.cc/C2T8-T97T] (arguing that the meaning of “substantial evidence” is “ambiguous” given that courts tend to define it differently, meaning that reviewing courts may treat agencies’ findings of facts nonuniformly).

On the other hand, if a claim implicates the Seventh Amendment and involves a private right, an agency has no power to decide it. This means that the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review would not apply in Seventh Amendment, private rights cases since appellate review would necessarily follow resolution by an Article III court, the only body capable of resolving such matters. In other words, the APA’s substantial evidence standard is triggered by review of an agency’s formal adjudication, but an agency cannot even formally adjudicate cases implicating the Seventh Amendment and private rights in the first place.

As for when the Seventh Amendment is not implicated but one’s private rights are involved, the current Supreme Court does not definitively answer the constitutionality issue. On one hand, Loper Bright could be interpreted to authorize review of agencies’ findings of fact for substantial evidence because (1) Loper Bright assumed St. Joseph Stock Yards correctly states the law, (2) St. Joseph Stock Yards relied on Crowell’s distinction of ordinary from jurisdictional and constitutional fact-finding, and (3) Crowell itself did not implicate the Seventh Amendment as it was an admiralty case and permitted agency adjudication of private rights.373Victoria Kelly, Crowell v. Benson: A Case Study in the Shaky Foundations of Modern “Public Rights” Doctrine, New C.L. All. (Aug. 8, 2025), https://nclalegal.org/crowell-v-benson-a-case-study-in-the-shaky-foundations-of-modern-public-rights-doctrine [https://perma.cc/5ACJ-3K72]. Other support for this position comes from Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Oil States: in that case, Justice Breyer noted that precedent, such as Stern v. Marshall, “should not be read to say that matters involving private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III courts.”374Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494 (2011) (“We recognize that there may be instances in which the distinction between public and private rights—at least as framed by some of our recent cases—fails to provide concrete guidance as to whether, for example, a particular agency can adjudicate legal issues under a substantive regulatory scheme.”). Stern held that a bankruptcy court, which is a non-Article III court, could not constitutionally resolve a counterclaim regarding a decedent’s estate. Stern, 564 U.S at 470, 503. But, on the other hand, the majority in Oil States pointed out that, “[w]hen determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of Article III judicial power, this Court’s precedents have distinguished between ‘public rights’ and ‘private rights,’ ” which could be read to either say the existence of private rights (1) is dispositive in determining whether agencies may adjudicate a matter or (2) merely a factor to consider.375Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson, 573 U.S. 25, 32 (2014)). Also consider that Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion for Oil States; he explicitly spelled out his views in a concurring opinion in Axon Enterprise—that courts cannot decide private rights cases. See supra notes 313–24 and accompanying text. Considering that Oil States permitted agency adjudication of patent cancellations because this involved public rights, (1) seems to be the more plausible reading. While this Note does not purport to answer this question in particular, it is clear that, at least in public rights cases, the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review is constitutional.

CONCLUSION

Judicial deference to agencies’ findings of law has been on the retreat since Loper Bright sounded the death knell on Chevron deference. However, the Supreme Court has not exhibited a similar level of distrust toward agencies’ findings of fact. Indeed, since the early days of the APA, the Court has maintained that courts are to uphold agencies’ findings of fact so long “as a reasonable mind might accept [these findings] as adequate to support a conclusion.”376Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Yet, an important constitutional issue arises when courts defer to agencies’ findings of fact when both the Seventh Amendment and private rights are implicated. In these cases, agencies have no authority to find facts because a jury must find such facts. Meanwhile, agencies may freely adjudicate public rights cases.

Therefore, when an agency adjudicates claims implicating individuals’ public rights, its findings of fact are entitled to some judicial deference because Congress has somewhat curtailed its discretionary powers through requiring reviewing courts, applying the APA, to analyze these findings according to the substantial evidence test. To the extent that Jarkesy nullified the APA’s substantial evidence standard, it did so when agencies adjudicated matters implicating the Seventh Amendment and private rights. This is because there can be no lawful agency proceeding to review. So, while the APA’s substantial evidence standard of review raises important constitutional questions, any concerns are probably limited to application of the standard in Seventh Amendment, private rights cases. The substantial evidence standard may also raise concerns in non-Seventh Amendment, private rights cases too. Otherwise, the substantial evidence standard of review is constitutional.

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 725

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* Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Political Science 2021, University of California, Los Angeles. Many thanks to my Note Advisor, Professor Jonathan Barnett, for his thoughtful suggestions and encouragement throughout the process. I am also grateful to the members of the Southern California Law Review for their helpful comments and care in preparing this Note for publication. To my family, thank you for your love and support, and for always believing in me.

PI + 9: A Modest Proposal to Protect Americans’ Individual Rights

INTRODUCTION

Civil liberties deserve better protection than the dubious doctrine of substantive due process. Fortunately, an underappreciated, yet significant, development is ripening within the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surrounding the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. At least two Supreme Court Justices1See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (expressing openness to revisiting the Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing support for incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Privileges or Immunities Clause). are willing to consider opening the Privileges or Immunities Clause door to incorporation that the Slaughter-House Cases slammed shut.2Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873); see Don R. Willett & Aaron Gordon, Rights, Structure, and Remediation, 131 Yale L.J. 2126, 2144 (2021) (reviewing Aziz Z. Huq, The Collapse of Constitutional Remedies (2021)) (describing the Slaughter-House Cases’ construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as only protecting “an insignificant subset of federally created rights”). What if three more Justices changed their minds and that door swung open?

This Note provides a new methodology called the “PI + 9 Framework.” The PI + 9 Framework combines the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause (“PI”) with the Ninth Amendment (“9”) to apply the Bill of Rights to the states in a more efficient, clear, and sturdy way. This proposition is a bold, yet modest, means by which to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states while securing unenumerated rights. The Framework is faithful to the original public meaning and original intent of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The PI + 9 Framework focuses on the procedures by which substantive rights are secured rather than seeking untested answers that could destabilize manifold areas of law. Instead, the PI + 9 Framework seeks to ground the Bill of Rights, including unenumerated rights, in something more robust than substantive due process. The emphasis on a proper mechanism addresses justified concerns about the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Ninth Amendment becoming a Pandora’s box.

This Note will begin by examining the only appropriate means for incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states: the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Part I conducts an in-depth textual analysis of the meaning of privileges and immunities in the context of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Part II analyzes the case law surrounding the Clause, with a particular focus on the Slaughter-House Cases and some pertinent concurrences and dissents by Justice Black and Justice Thomas, respectively. Part III makes the case for overruling Slaughter-House based on the Supreme Court’s recent application of stare decisis factors. This Part goes factor-by-factor to argue why stare decisis should not prevent Slaughter-House from being overruled. Part IV argues for an end to substantive due process due to its poor reasoning and inability to adequately secure rights. Part V discusses how the Court should recognize unenumerated rights and considers which Ninth Amendment methodology would best identify and secure those rights. Part VI applies the PI + 9 Framework to two hypothetical fact patterns—one involving an enumerated right and the other involving an unenumerated right. A helpful chart of the Framework is included in that Part. Part VII lays out the advantages the PI + 9 Framework has over the current substantive due process regime. This Note gives the Supreme Court a guide for replacing substantive due process while preserving incorporation of the Bill of Rights and protecting the unenumerated rights that the Court is anxious about safeguarding.

I.  TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Before analyzing the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s case law, the meaning of privileges and immunities—and the meaning of those words when used alongside one another—is worth examining.

A.  Interpreting Privileges and Immunities in Historical Context

The meaning of privileges and immunities is best explored by looking at the words’ meanings at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—while also keeping in mind the historical usage of those words in the Anglo-American legal tradition.

  1. A Few Meanings of Privilege

The meaning of privilege at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, 1868,3Landmark Legislation: The Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/senate-and-constitution/14th-amendment.htm [https://perma.cc/24GC-EML3]. offers a guide that may be considered independently or alongside the Framers’ intent when interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause. A leading dictionary from around the time of ratification provided three definitions of privilege: (1) “[a] particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or society, beyond the common advantages of other citizens”; (2) “[a]ny peculiar benefit or advantage, not common to others of the human race”; (3) “[a]dvantage; favor; benefit.”4Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 780 (1867). Two additional definitions are included, but they are for privilege in its verb form. Id. Those definitions are not pertinent to the instant inquiry because the word privileges is used as a noun in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The first and second definitions are plausible, but the third is too vague to offer meaningful guidance toward understanding the Privileges or Immunities Clause in context. The first two definitions are more precise. Additionally, the third definition does not contradict the preceding definitions; thus, its interpretive value diminishes. Therefore, two definitions of privilege remain.

  1. Privilege As a Benefit Beyond Those Held by Common Citizens

The first definition of privilege does not suit the Privileges or Immunities Clause and is better understood in the mode that privilege is used in the Speech and Debate Clause found in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.5See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Speech and Debate Clause guarantees that “Senators and Representatives” shall “be privileged from Arrest” during legislative sessions and when coming from and going to those sessions—except in cases of “Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace.”6Id. (emphasis added). This fits the first definition of privilege because the privilege granted to Senators and Representatives is not granted to common American citizens, who enjoy no such privilege.

Anglo-American jurists such as William Blackstone, Matthew Hale, and James Kent all occasionally used privilege to mean a benefit beyond those held by common citizens. For example, Blackstone described the “privilege of letters”71 William Blackstone, Commentaries *323. that allowed members of parliament to send and receive letters free of postage.8Id. Hale wrote about bishops and abbots who “had special privileges granted to them to have mints.”91 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown *200 (1736). Kent mentioned the privileges consuls are entitled to, “such as for safe conduct.”101 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 22 (Lonang Inst. 2006) (1826). James Kent also referred to the Speech and Debate Clause’s guarantee that members of Congress will be privileged from arrest during their attendance of sessions of Congress, and in coming and going from the same. Id. at 118. However, interpreting privilege in that manner in the context of the Privileges or Immunities Clause creates an incongruity. Under this inappropriate definition of privilege, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would guarantee that states could not abridge the benefits that citizens of the United States enjoyed beyond the benefits enjoyed by citizens of the United States. Inserting the first definition of privilege creates a contradiction. This preposterous result proves that privilege in the Privileges or Immunities Clause should not be interpreted as an advantage enjoyed beyond those enjoyed by common citizens.

  1. Privilege As a Peculiar Benefit or Advantage Not Common to Others of the Human Race

To determine whether a “peculiar benefit or advantage not common to others of the human race”11Webster, supra note 4, at 780. is within the Clause’s scope, the Court would need to consider which benefits or advantages of citizens of the United States fall within the Clause’s scope. Americans enjoy manifold privileges as citizens of a prosperous nation. However, regarding the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the legal privileges are the most suitable for judges to ascertain.

The writings of prominent Anglo-American jurists suggest that the second definition of privilege, as a peculiar benefit or advantage, encompasses rights. Anglo-American jurists sometimes used privilege interchangeably with rights. For example, Blackstone described “those civil privileges”121 Blackstone, supra note 7, at *129. as part of what constitutes a right found in “the declaration of our rights and liberties.”13Id. Kent mentioned the “right of trial by jury”141 Kent, supra note 10, at 182. in suits at common law, which the Seventh Amendment secures.15U.S. Const. amend. VII. Elsewhere, Kent referred to the jury trial right as a privilege. For example, Kent described some of “the inherent rights and liberties of English subjects, of which the most essential were the exclusive power to tax themselves, and the privilege of trial by jury.”162 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 3 (Lonang Inst. 2006) (1827).

Founding-era historical evidence offers additional proof that privilege’s second definition is the most appropriate one. At the time of the American Revolution, “[t]he words rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities, seem to have been used interchangeably.”17Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 64–65 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Indeed, as evidenced by Blackstone’s invocation of privilege and historical examples that predate or coincide with the American Revolution, the interchangeability of privilege and right is well-founded.18Justice Thomas provided a thorough and concise summation of the historical meaning of privilege and immunity in his concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 813–19 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recounting the historical usage of privileges, immunities, and rights in the Anglo-American legal tradition).

Viewing privilege as interchangeable with right, advantage, benefit, or immunity results in an interpretation aligned with privilege’s original public meaning at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Under that definition, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be understood to protect “the [rights, benefits, advantages] or [I]mmunities of citizens of the United States” from state abridgment.19U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

  1. A Few Meanings of Immunity

Around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, a leading American dictionary listed three definitions for immunity: (1) “[f]reedom or exemption from obligation”; (2) “[e]xemption from any charge, duty, office, tax, or imposition; a particular privilege or prerogative”; and (3) “[f]reedom.”20Webster, supra note 4, at 517. Like the three definitions of privilege, the first two are plausible on their faces, but the third is too vague. Moreover, like the third definition of privilege,21See discussion supra Section I.A.1. the third definition of immunity does not contradict the first or second definition. Thus, two definitions are ripe for examination.

  1. The Broader Immunity Definition Is the Best Match

The first definition of immunity is an incomplete match for how immunities is used in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.22A more fitting example of this usage of immunity—as a “[f]reedom or exemption from obligation”—is included in the second volume of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. Blackstone mentioned that some private subjects who had tended to the king’s land had been granted certain immunities. Among those immunities were immunity from “toll or taxes,” “be[ing] put on juries; and the like.” 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *99. The second and more capacious definition of immunities—“[e]xemption from any charge, duty, office, tax, or imposition; a particular privilege or prerogative”23Webster, supra note 4, at 517.—fits more naturally with other constitutional protections that existed at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. One example precedes the Bill of Rights.

Before the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Americans enjoyed an important immunity that remains in force. Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to decide how treason is punished but provides that “no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood.”24U.S. Const. art. III, § 3. Corruption of blood was a common-law penalty that disallowed a person adjudged of a felony or treason to inherit property or bequeath property to heirs. Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 727, 729 (1992). The Constitution does not define the prohibition of Corruption of Blood as punishment for treason as a right, immunity, or anything else. The punishment is simply prohibited. Any attempt by Congress to make treason punishable by Corruption of Blood would be voided due to its conflict with the Constitution.25Judicial review would dispose of such a law in short order because “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the [C]onstitution, is void.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Thus, Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution could reasonably be interpreted as providing immunity to American citizens from Corruption of Blood as a punishment for treason.

In a similar way, several provisions in the Bill of Rights provide for exemptions against certain charges and impositions. The Fifth Amendment prohibits double jeopardy and thus exempts a person from any charge of which they were already acquitted.26U.S. Const. amend. V; see also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (“[A] verdict of acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.”). The Eighth Amendment exempts or immunizes Americans from the imposition of excessive fines.27U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Even if the word rights were not synonymous with immunities, some provisions of the Bill of Rights could reasonably be interpreted as immunities.

B.  Rights, Privileges, and Immunities

Rights, privileges, and immunities were interchangeable words at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.28See Curtis, supra note 17, 64–65. One needs to look no further than a dictionary to see that privilege and immunity were words used to define the word right.29The tenth definition of right is a “[j]ust claim; immunity; privilege; as, the rights of citizens.” Webster, supra note 4, at 858. Justice Thomas recognized this reality in his concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago.30See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 813 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that privileges and immunities were both synonyms for rights). Absent a showing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause means something other than what it says, the plain meaning appears to cover at least those rights enumerated in the Constitution at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, namely those in the Bill of Rights.31Other rights are mighty enough on their own and do not require incorporation. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery does not distinguish between public/private action or federal/state government action. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII. The Bill of Rights originally established a baseline of rights that only applied to the federal government.32Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Despite the rights being limited to protection against federal government infringement, all citizens of the United States still nonetheless enjoyed those rights, albeit with application being limited to the federal government and not state governments.

The plain meaning of privileges and immunities in the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not ambiguous, but construing the Clause is trickier. Given that rights, privileges, and immunities were synonymous at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, one would need to determine whether the Bill of Rights is within the scope of rights enjoyed by citizens of the United States that no state shall abridge.

C.  “Citizens of the United States” Sets an Appropriate Limit on the Constitution’s Abridgment of State Power

Although several interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are reasonable,33In an article on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, John Harrison identified three general categories that one could use to understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a substantive provision: (1) incorporating the first eight amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) protecting some natural rights such as property and contract rights; or (3) providing for rights arising out of national citizenship, which would require additional judicial construction. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1393–94 (1992). the Clause must answer two questions. First, Are citizens of the United States the only persons whose privileges or immunities are protected from state abridgment? Second, Are states prohibited from infringing on those privileges or immunities that citizens of the United States hold? The first question asks who gets protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The second question asks which rights are protected.

Justice Thomas answered the first question satisfactorily in his concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago.34McDonald, 561 U.S. at 850 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “establishe[d] a minimum baseline of federal rights”). One need not search outside the same section in which one finds the Privileges or Immunities Clause to find another that operates as a more natural and efficacious anti-discrimination provision: the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.35The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court occasionally used the Equal Protection Clause to strike down discriminatory laws shortly after Slaughter-House was decided.36See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310–12 (1880) (striking down a West Virginia law that prohibited Black people from serving on juries), abrogated by, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that a law that was discriminatorily applied against Chinese people violated the Equal Protection Clause). Furthermore, suppose a state passed a law that only abridged the rights of noncitizens. Such abridgment may violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s commandment that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”37U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (striking down a New York statute that prohibited noncitizens from having jobs in civil service because the law violated the Equal Protection Clause). The Privileges or Immunities Clause is read more naturally as a clause that establishes a “minimum baseline of federal rights” that states may not abridge.38McDonald, 561 U.S. at 850 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Such a reading answers the aforementioned second question in the affirmative.

II.  PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE CASE LAW

Any examination of the jurisprudence surrounding the Privileges or Immunities Clause must begin with the Slaughter-House Cases.39Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The majority opinion and dissents illuminate Reconstruction Era views of the Clause. Since the Court decided Slaughter-House, the few Justices who have conducted extensive historical analysis of the Clause’s legislative history have arrived at a more expansive view of the Clause.40See infra Section II.B.

A.  Slaughter-House Shuts One Door for Incorporating the Bill of Rights

In 1873, the Supreme Court in Slaughter-House held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.41See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74. Since then, the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been relegated to obsolescence.42See Harrison, supra note 33, at 1387 (“[E]very student of constitutional law quickly learns that [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] was virtually read out of [the Constitution] by the Slaughter-House Cases.”). Once, in Saenz v. Roe, the Court used the Clause to recognize a right to travel43See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999). by striking down a California law44Id. at 492–95, 511. limiting welfare benefits for new California residents.45Id. at 492. In his Saenz dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented the Court’s revival of the Clause, in part because the Clause had been dormant for so long.46See id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was “relied upon by this Court in only one other decision,” Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), “overruled five years later” by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)). Eleven years after Saenz, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago reluctantly affirmed, or at least refused to revisit, Slaughter-House’s narrow construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.47A plurality of the Court “decline[d] to disturb” precedent that narrowly read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to cover only rights that owed their existence to the federal government. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (plurality opinion). The reluctant affirmation of a questionable precedent was unwarranted in light of the developments after Slaughter-House. Federalism concerns pervaded the majority opinion’s reasoning in Slaughter-House. The Court worried that the Constitution—and the Court expounding it—would become a “perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment.”48Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has incorporated most of the Bill of Rights against the states. The remaining unincorporated enumerated rights are the seldom-litigated Third Amendment,49“The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide a case that directly implicates the Third Amendment, and its jurisprudence includes only a few cases that even make passing reference to it.” Mark A. Fulks & Ronald S. Range, III, The Third Amendment’s Consent Clause: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Application, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 647, 650 (2015). the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause,50See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that “due process of law” in the Fourteenth Amendment does not require an indictment by a grand jury in a state prosecution for murder). and the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury in suits at common law.51Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 567 (7th ed. 2023). The resultant beefing up of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause has achieved an effect rivaling the censor that the Slaughter-House majority feared.52Cf. David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 Hastings L.J. 333, 337 (2003) (explaining that a broadly interpreted Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process combine to achieve a greater effect than the Privileges or Immunities Clause could have).

Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s construction in Slaughter-House stands as good law today, the dissenters’ views shed some light on other views of the Privileges or Immunities Clause around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Four Justices dissented in Slaughter-House.53Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 (Field, J., dissenting) (noting that Chief Justice Chase, Justice Swayne, and Justice Bradley concurred with his dissent). Justice Field—joined by Chief Justice Chase, Justice Swayne, and Justice Bradley—dissented and wrote that if the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause were interpreted as narrowly as the majority interpreted it, then the Privileges or Immunities Clause “was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.”54Id. at 96. Justice Field foresaw the superfluity of the new Clause if it were read so narrowly and wrote, “With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference.”55Id. Justice Field’s prediction has but one blemish more than 150 years after the Court decided Slaughter-House: Saenz v. Roe.56See Stephen Menendian, The Shadow Constitution: Rescuing Our Inheritance from Neglect and Disuse, 26 U. Pa. Const. L. 339, 384 (2024) (“To date, the Supreme Court has only applied this provision a single time to invalidate a state law . . . .”). That single time was in Saenz v. Roe. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Although Justice Field’s prediction proved prescient, Justice Bradley and Justice Swayne wrote broader dissents that explicitly advocated incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Justice Bradley criticized the majority’s decision by averring that “the Constitution itself” contains “some of the most important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”57Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). One problem with narrowly construing the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that it denigrates the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights as not fundamental or less fundamental. A judge’s place is not to decide which rights in the Bill of Rights are essential and which are not.58Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 799–800 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing Justice Stevens’s dissent for describing some Bill of Rights provisions as “critical to leading a life of autonomy, dignity, or political equality” and others as not critical to protecting the same (quoting id. at 893 (Stevens, J., dissenting))). Those who ratified the amendments comprising the Bill of Rights thought each was important enough to become part of the nation’s founding document. The people’s will, as expressed through their passage of the amendments, ought to be dispositive on the issue of whether a right in the Bill of Rights is fundamental. Justice Bradley grasped this flaw when he wrote that other rights, privileges, and immunities “of the greatest consequence were enumerated, although they were only secured, in express terms, from invasion by the Federal government.”59Slaughter-Houses Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). The Fourteenth Amendment changed the equation by protecting the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States from state abridgment.60U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Justice Swayne wrote a separate dissent and believed that the Reconstruction Amendments “may be said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta.”61Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting). Justice Swayne also thought the majority’s analysis served to obfuscate rather than clarify.62See id. at 126. Justice Swayne believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause was clear and wrote, “Elaboration may obscure, but cannot make clearer, the intent and purpose sought to be carried out.”63Id. Justice Swayne believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause concerned, “among other things, the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and also the rights which pertain to him by reason of his membership of the Nation.”64Id. This formulation would almost certainly cover each enumerated provision of the Bill of Rights and perhaps some rights not enumerated in the Constitution. After all, even the narrowly construed Privileges or Immunities Clause has already been held to protect at least one unenumerated right: the right to travel.65See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999). Justice Swayne acknowledged the objection that “the power conferred is novel and large.”66Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting). Justice Swayne had a simple answer to the objection:

The answer is that the novelty was known and the measure deliberately adopted. The power is beneficent in its nature, and cannot be abused. It is such as should exist in every well-ordered system of polity. Where could it be more appropriately lodged than in the hands to which it is confided? It is necessary to enable the government of the nation to secure to every one within its jurisdiction the rights and privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact, all are entitled to enjoy. Without such authority any government claiming to be national is glaringly defective.67Id.

Justice Swayne ended his dissent by expressing hope that the consequences of the majority’s decision would be “less serious and far-reaching than the minority fear they will be.”68Id. at 130. Justice Swayne’s fear was partially realized. On the one hand, most of the Bill of Rights is now incorporated.69See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 565. On the other hand, incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states proceeded tardily.70See id. at 565–66 (explaining which respective provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated against the states and the years in which each right was incorporated). The majority failed to create a precedent that provided a bulwark against the specter of the “perpetual censor”71Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78. of which the majority expressed great trepidation.72The majority also wrote, “[T]hese consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions.” Id. But see id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the novelty was known and the measure deliberately adopted”). However, the majority succeeded in crafting a precedent that dissuaded most future jurists from pursuing incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

B.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause’s Post-Slaughter-House Champions

Following Slaughter-House, few Justices have dared to broaden the construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The two most significant proponents of such a construction are Justice Black and Justice Thomas.

  1. Justice Black’s “Eminently Reasonable” Method of Incorporating the Bill of Rights Against the States

In 1947, Justice Black, an early practitioner of constitutional originalism,73Justice Black was the first Supreme Court Justice to use originalism as an overarching theory of constitutional interpretation. Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s Great Supreme Court Justices 144–45 (2010). concluded in his dissent in Adamson v. California that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to apply the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights to the states.74Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74–75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black also included an appendix documenting the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s legislative history to buttress his point. Id. at 92–123. But see Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 139 (1949) (rejecting Justice Black’s view of incorporating the first eight amendments against the states). In 1968, Justice Black, in a concurrence joined by Justice Douglas,75Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). doubled down on his Adamson dissent. Justice Black once again concluded that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “seem[ed] to [him] an eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the states.”76Id. at 166. Justice Black also dedicated part of his concurrence in Duncan to refuting Charles Fairman’s criticism of his dissent in Adamson. See id. at 165–66.

Experience as a prominent legislator guided Justice Black’s view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.77See id. at 165. Justice Black’s historical analysis of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—and the wholesale incorporation view that resulted therefrom—has value because of his decade-long experience as a United States senator.78Justice Black served as a United States senator from Alabama from 1927 to 1937. States in the Senate: Alabama Senators, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/states/AL/senators.htm [https://perma.cc/6J9R-785Y]. Although Justice Black’s opinions regarding incorporation lack the force of law, his experience as a legislator may guide current and future Justices in evaluating the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s legislative history. Regarding the value of prior opinions, Justice Gorsuch wrote, “Precedent is a way of accumulating and passing down the learning of past generations, a font of established wisdom richer than what can be found in any single judge or panel of judges.”79Neil Gorsuch with Jane Nitze & David Feder, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 217 (2019). The wisdom of former legislators who served as Justices can only be found in the past. No current Supreme Court Justice was ever a legislator. Justice O’Connor was the most recent Justice with any legislative experience,80Justice O’Connor was the most recent Supreme Court Justice with legislative experience. Justice O’Connor served in Arizona’s state senate. Peter Charles Hoffer, Williamjames Hull Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull, The Supreme Court: An Essential History 377 (2d ed. 2018). and Justice Black was the last member of Congress to serve on the Court.81Justice Minton was the last Congressperson to be appointed on the Supreme Court. Stuart Banner, The Most Powerful Court in the World: A History of the Supreme Court of the United States 497 (2024). However, Justice Minton retired in 1956, whereas Justice Black served on the Court until 1971. Justices 1789 to Present, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ZJD-WFJZ]. Justice Black’s perspective regarding the Privileges or Immunities Clause aids the argument that views the legislative history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as intending a full incorporation of the Bill of Rights.

Some have lamented when a judge heavily relies on history,82“It is not the role of federal judges to be amateur historians.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 910 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573, 595 (2000) (“Legal professionals are not competent to umpire historical disputes. Because they are not, inevitably they pick the side of the dispute that coincides with their preferences based on different grounds altogether.”). but Justice Black’s opinions offer helpful surveys of the Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history. The lived experience of a decade as a United States senator adds weight to his opinions regarding the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s legislative history. The fact that no current Justice on the Supreme Court has any experience as a legislator would be a problem if the Court had no previous opinion from a former legislator from which to draw. This is not the case. Justice Black passed down his learning about the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s meaning through his opinions in cases such as Adamson v. California83See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92–123 (1947) (appendix to dissent of Black, J.) (analyzing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment). and Duncan v. Louisiana.84See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164–67 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (defending the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history supports total incorporation of the Bill of Rights). No judge ought to be required to follow Justice Black’s jurisprudence on every matter that touches legislative history on account of his experience. However, his legislative experience and pioneering originalism lend a unique perspective to any jurist seeking the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

  1. Justice Thomas’s Revival of Privileges or Immunities in McDonald v. City of Chicago

In the past twenty years, Justice Thomas has led the charge for a potent Privileges or Immunities Clause in concurring opinions when a case arises in which the incorporation of a provision of the Bill of Rights is at issue.85See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 157–58 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would hold that the right to be free from excessive fines is one of the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the Constitution centers around a search for the Constitution’s original meaning.86See Gregory E. Maggs, How Justice Thomas Determines the Original Meaning of Article II of the Constitution, 127 Yale L.J.F. 210, 211 (2017). Justice Thomas employed this interpretive method in his concurring opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago.87“[T]he objective of this inquiry is to discern what ‘ordinary citizens’ at the time of ratification would have understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 813 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). Justice Thomas had wanted to revisit the Privileges or Immunities Clause since Saenz v. Roe. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would be open to reevaluating [the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s] meaning in an appropriate case.”). In McDonald, Justice Thomas concluded that the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.88McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). After a detailed treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history,89Justice Thomas’s extensive analysis surveyed the historical usage of the text, in addition to pertinent legislative debates surrounding the text and the public’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment after ratification. See id. at 806–37. Justice Thomas wrote the following about the Privileges or Immunities Clause as it relates to incorporating the Bill of Rights:

This evidence plainly shows that the ratifying public understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally enumerated rights, including the right to keep and bear arms. As the Court demonstrates, there can be no doubt that § 1 was understood to enforce the Second Amendment against the States. In my view, this is because the right to keep and bear arms was understood to be a privilege of American citizenship guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.90Id. at 837–38. But see id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he original meaning of the Clause is not as clear as [the petitioners] suggest . . . .”).

Justice Thomas recognized that the legislative history surrounding the Clause was “less than crystal clear.”91Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He also acknowledged the difficulties that interpreting the once-dormant Clause may pose. Still, he argued that interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was “far more likely to yield discernible answers[ ]than the substantive due process questions the Court has for years created on its own, with neither textual nor historical support.”92Id. at 855.

In McDonald, Justice Thomas was alone in his interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The plurality opinion stated that it “saw no need to reconsider” Slaughter-House and “therefore decline[d] to disturb the Slaughter-House holding.”93Id. at 758 (plurality opinion). The phrasing in that sentence is crucial. The plurality did not reject Justice Thomas’s view on the merits or defend Slaughter-House on the merits. Instead, they saw another path to incorporation—substantive due process. Because that path remained open, the plurality believed it was merely unnecessary—though perhaps not improper—to revisit Slaughter-House.

The dissents rejected Justice Thomas’s view for similar reasons. In his dissent, Justice Stevens acknowledged the “impressive amount of historical evidence”94Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting). that the petitioners compiled in support of their position that Slaughter-House’s narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was erroneous. Yet, Justice Stevens believed the original meaning of the Clause was “not nearly as clear as it would need to be to dislodge 137 years of precedent.”95Id. at 859–60. In a separate dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, Justice Breyer declined to defend Slaughter-House on the merits and instead wrote only that “the plurality today properly declines to revisit our interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”96Id. at 934 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The refusal to substantively engage with Justice Thomas’s opinion or to defend Slaughter-House on the merits is at least some evidence of the weak footing on which opposition to Justice Thomas’s conclusion rests. A maxim from Chief Justice Marshall is enough to support Justice Thomas’s conclusion and defeat Slaughter-House’s construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, such that the only justification for upholding Slaughter-House is stare decisis. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”97Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). The words of the Privileges or Immunities Clause do not require such a narrow construction. Slaughter-House ought to be overruled unless stare decisis justifies upholding the precedent.

  1. The Post-McDonald Future of the Privileges or Immunities Clause

Although Justice Thomas was unsuccessful in reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause in McDonald, he has continued to defend his interpretation of the Clause. In Timbs v. Indiana, Justice Thomas would have applied the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines to the states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause—not the Due Process Clause.98Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 157–58 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Justice Thomas argued for reconsidering every substantive due process precedent and deciding whether the rights protected by those precedents are protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.99See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2300–02 (2022) (Thomas, J., concurring). Since McDonald, Justice Thomas has found one potential ally to support his view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In 2019, Justice Gorsuch has emerged as a possible proponent of incorporation via the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a position he contemplated in Timbs.100“As an original matter, I acknowledge, the appropriate vehicle for incorporation may well be the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than, as this Court has long assumed, the Due Process Clause.” Timbs, 586 U.S. at 157 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

III.  STARE DECISIS FACTORS POINT TO OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE

Stare decisis is not an “inexorable command.”101Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). However, the rule of law rests on a measure of stability. Justice Brandeis was prudent to say, “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”102Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the oft-wise policy is weakest when the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution because changing a constitutional precedent can only be accomplished via constitutional amendment—an arduous process—or by overruling the precedent.103Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).

The Slaughter-House majority’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is wrong and should be overruled. To overrule it, the Court would need to find that stare decisis factors weigh in favor of overruling the case. The Court tends to rely on six stare decisis factors: (1) nature of the error; (2) quality of the reasoning; (3) workability of the rule established; (4) disruptive effect on other areas of law; (5) developments since the case was decided; and (6) reliance interests.104See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2265. All but one particular factor is either neutral or weighs in favor of overruling Slaughter-House. The factors as a whole weigh strongly in favor of overruling Slaughter-House and interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause as fully incorporating the Bill of Rights.

A.  The Nature of the Slaughter-House Majority’s Error

The first factor focuses on the degree of wrongness and the damaging effects of the decision rather than the reasoning itself.105See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2265 (describing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as “egregiously wrong and deeply damaging” in the first factor analysis).

The Slaughter-House majority’s opinion constituted the type of egregious and deleterious error106“A garden-variety error or disagreement does not suffice to overrule. In the view of the Court that is considering whether to overrule, the precedent must be egregiously wrong as a matter of law in order for the Court to overrule it.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). that makes the first stare decisis factor weigh in favor of overruling Slaughter-House. Suppose that each provision of the Constitution were interpreted as narrowly as the Privileges or Immunities Clause. If each constitutional provision were interpreted so narrowly as to be famous for having little or no effect,107See supra note 42 and accompanying text. what purpose would the Constitution serve? The judicial nullification of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is repugnant to a democratic people and disrespects the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority’s decision in Slaughter-House was nothing more than the “exercise of raw judicial power,”108Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). which in effect nullified part of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Decisions that invent “principles or values that cannot fairly be read into [the Constitution] usurp the people’s authority.”109Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Here, the Slaughter-House majority did the inverse of what the Dobbs majority criticized Roe v. Wade110Roe, 410 U.S. 113. and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey111Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). for doing. The Dobbs majority believed that Roe and Casey improvidently took a decision not yet made by the American people and made it for them via judicial pronouncement;112See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2265 (2022) (criticizing Roe and Casey for damming the democratic process from reaching the issue of abortion). the Slaughter-House majority took a decision already made by the American people, through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and revoked it via an impermissibly narrow interpretation113See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77–78 (1873) (explaining the Court’s holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states). of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that sapped the Clause of all might.

B.  The Quality of the Slaughter-House Majority’s Reasoning

Silence and evasion cry out for criticism. When nobody stands to defend a precedent’s reasoning, the quality of the reasoning is weaker.114Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (explaining that a precedent is weaker when “neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent”). In 2020, a plurality of the Court in Ramos v. Louisiana found the quality of the reasoning factor to weigh in favor of overruling a precedent, partly because “no Member of the Court today defend[ed] [the precedent] as rightly decided.”115Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (plurality opinion). Justices from across the spectrum have attacked the Slaughter-House majority’s reasoning by refusing to defend the merits of Slaughter-House’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.116Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“For many decades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We therefore decline to disturb the Slaughter-House holding.”), with id. at 934 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality today properly declines to revisit our interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). The Justices were right to refuse to defend the opinion on the merits because doing so is almost impossible. The consensus of constitutional scholars is that the Slaughter-House majority’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was wrong.117See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit 22 (2021); Charles L. Black, Jr., A New Birth of Freedom: Human Rights, Named and Unnamed 74–75 (1997).

The reasoning in Slaughter-House was “exceptionally weak.”118Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2266 (2022) (criticizing the quality of the reasoning in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). The reasons for the narrow construction were (1) a bald, results-based conclusion and (2) an absurd reading that ignores text and legislative history.

  1. A Bald, Results-Based Conclusion

Beginning with the bald conclusion, the Court stated, “There can be little question that the purpose of both [Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause] is the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same in each.”119Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873). In clear language, the Court admitted its result-oriented construction was “not always the most conclusive” argument.120Id. at 78. Nevertheless, the Court made its choice out of fear of a theory that “radically change[d]” the relationship between state and federal governments and about concerns that the Court would become a “perpetual censor” over state legislatures.121Id. The Court’s reasoning depended on avoiding a purportedly undesirable outcome, but that feared result has already been achieved.122See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 565–66 (listing the provisions in the Bill of Rights that have already been incorporated against the states). The reasoning undergirding Slaughter-House’s results-based conclusion has crumbled as substantive due process has grown.123See infra Section III.E.

To overcome its concerns about a radical change to the constitutional order, the Court asked for “language which expresse[d] such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.”124Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78. The Court adopted something akin to a beyond-reasonable-doubt standard for interpretation that had no basis in constitutional interpretation. The total concoction of a novel standard for constitutional interpretation is further evidence of an egregiously wrong opinion.

  1. An Absurd Reading That Ignores Text and Legislative History

In the majority opinion, Justice Miller set forth an anti-textual reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that distinguished between the privileges or immunities of citizens of a state and the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.125Curtis, supra note 17, at 175. According to Justice Miller, the privileges and immunities of the citizen of a state “embrace[] nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted.”126Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76. Conversely, the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States were limited to things like the right to travel to and from the seat of government and access to seaports.127Id. at 79. The dichotomy between state citizens’ rights and United States citizens’ rights is difficult to square with Justice Miller’s belief that the purpose and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment should be to protect Black Americans.128See Curtis, supra note 17, at 176. The plain language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause seems to desire some nationwide baseline for individual rights. If that baseline was as paltry as Justice Miller suggested, then the enactment truly was “vain and idle.”129Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).

Regarding legislative intent, Justice Miller did not believe that a broad Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended. Justice Miller summarily concluded that he was “convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.”130Id. at 78 (majority opinion). Justice Miller failed to conduct even a cursory survey of the legislative history. If he had done so, he would have found that leading Republicans in the Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment believed the capacious definition of privileges and immunities was appropriate for the federal government to prevent state infringement of the same.131See Curtis, supra note 17, at 176. Adding to the case against Justice Miller’s reading of the legislative history is the fact that Representative John Bingham, the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s primary draftsman, stated in a speech in Congress that the purpose of the Clause was to apply the Bill of Rights to the states.132McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 829 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The quality of the Slaughter-House majority’s reasoning was abysmal because it failed to heed the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s plain text or legislative history.

For the above reasons and many more, “[v]irtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that [the majority’s reading] is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”133Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 601, 631 n.178 (2001). The quality of the majority’s reasoning surpasses an excusable “garden-variety error”134Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). and makes the quality of the reasoning factor weigh strongly in favor of overruling the precedent.

C.  The Workability of the Rules Imposed on the Country

The workability factor asks whether the rule “can be understood and applied in a consistent and predictable manner.”135Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2272 (2022). To laud Slaughter-House for creating a workable rule would be a mistake. The opinion created a bright-line rule that refused to incorporate any provision of the Bill of Rights.136Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873). This rule is easy for lower courts to apply in the same way that the following absurd, bright-line interpretation would be easy to apply: Suppose the Court held that “Speech” in the First Amendment137U.S. Const. amend. I. context must be construed in the same manner as “Speech” described in Article I’s Speech and Debate Clause.138U.S. Const. art. I, § 6. That construction would be easy for lower courts to apply due to the narrow circumstances in which Speech and Debate Clause issues arise. However, workability through absurdity should not suffice.139Cf. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (admitting a precedent was workable but overruling it due to its disastrous consequences).

D.  The Disruptive Effect on Other Areas of Law

A precedent that has distorted other legal doctrines is more suitable for overruling.140See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2275. Although achieving substantially similar results, the closing off of incorporation via the Privileges or Immunities Clause caused jurists who did not want to overrule Slaughter-House to distort the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in order to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.141Cf. Bogen, supra note 52, at 337 (explaining that the Due Process Clause, rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause, has incorporated much of the Bill of Rights against the states). Due Process Clause distortion caused two nasty ailments.

First, the incrementalist incorporation route required Justices to inquire whether a provision of the Bill of Rights was “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” with “dee[p] root[s] in [our] history and tradition.”142Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019) (citation omitted). Part of the rationale for Constitution-related precedent being weaker is the high bar for amending the Constitution.143Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); see U.S. Const. art. V (describing the process for amending the Constitution). When a provision of the Constitution enumerates a right, it is self-evident that a great majority of American voters considered the provision sufficiently fundamental to make it part of the nation’s foundational legal document. Judicial inquiry into whether a provision is important enough to be elevated to fundamental status is improper. The entire Bill of Rights is fundamental to liberty. The Anti-Federalists who pressed for a bill of rights in the Constitution did so partly because they believed some liberties were so fundamental that their inclusion in the nation’s founding document was necessary.144See, e.g., Pennsylvania Minority, The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates 237, 247 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (describing a bill of rights as “ascertaining and fundamentally establishing those unalienable and personal rights of men, without the full, free, and secure enjoyment of which there can be no liberty”). “There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed . . . .” The Federal Farmer, Letters from the Federal Farmer, in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates 256, 266 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).

Second, the absorption of unenumerated-rights analysis into substantive due process145The current substantive due process analysis for unenumerated rights is the same as the analysis for enumerated rights. The inquiry has two prongs: (1) whether the right is “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”; and (2) whether the right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citation modified) (citations omitted). let the Ninth Amendment wither on the vine. Justices rarely refer to the Amendment. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg penned a concurrence that examined the Ninth Amendment at length.146See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (analyzing the Ninth Amendment’s text, history, and meaning). But aside from this single concurrence and occasional fleeting references,147See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality opinion) (citing the Ninth Amendment). the Court has ignored a provision of the Constitution that is no less deserving of interpretation and application than any other.148Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 225 (2014) (claiming the Court has treated the Ninth Amendment as “lost”). The absence of the Ninth Amendment in the Court’s unenumerated-rights jurisprudence is a consequence of the growth of substantive due process and neglect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.149See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2259–60 (2022) (analyzing unenumerated rights under substantive due process instead of the Ninth Amendment); cf. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 213 (2018) (statement of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh) (describing the Ninth Amendment, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and substantive due process as three ways of achieving similar results).

In sum, Slaughter-House has had the disruptive effect of implicitly disparaging some provisions of the Bill of Rights as nonfundamental while stunting the growth of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. Those two consequences have damaged the Constitution and counsel in favor of overruling Slaughter-House.

E.  Developments Since the Case Was Decided

A precedent is significantly weakened when the grounds for the decision have been “eroded” by the Court’s subsequent decisions.150United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995). A crucial aspect of the reasoning in Slaughter-House was its result-oriented approach that did not want incorporation to transform the Constitution into a “perpetual censor”151Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873). of state legislatures.152See supra Section III.B.1. However, the majority’s fear has already been realized due to substantive due process’s subsequent metastasis. The vast majority of the Bill of Rights is already incorporated against the states.153See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 565–66. At the 2018 oral argument for Timbs, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh were incredulous that Indiana’s solicitor general was contesting incorporation of any part of the Bill of Rights.154During oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch said to Indiana’s solicitor general, “[M]ost of these incorporation cases took place in like the 1940s . . . . And here we are in 2018 . . . still litigating incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really? Come on, General.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091). Shortly after, Justice Kavanaugh added, “Isn’t it just too late in the day to argue that any of the Bill of Rights is not incorporated?” Id. at 33. The subsequent legal developments of near-total incorporation have obliterated the result-oriented reasoning that grounded the Slaughter-House majority opinion. The ensuing legal developments counsel strongly in favor of overruling Slaughter-House.

F.  The Absence of Concrete Reliance

People have concrete reliance on the rights that substantive due process preserves, but this reliance is separate from reliance on the procedural mechanism itself. Their reliance would only be concrete if abrogating substantive due process would also mean that the Bill of Rights was not incorporated against the states. Adoption of the PI + 9 Framework would avoid such issues.

The primary concrete reliance interests that would be upset by Slaughter-House being overruled would be those that rely on the unincorporated parts of the Bill of Rights remaining unincorporated. Today, the Third Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause, and the Seventh Amendment are the only enumerated rights that remain unincorporated.155See Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 567.

The Third and Seventh Amendment present inconsequential reliance interests. The Third Amendment’s incorporation would be the least substantial because situations that lead to Third Amendment litigation are exceedingly rare.156The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case based on the Third Amendment, and there is only one significant federal court decision about the Amendment. Scott D. Gerber, An Unavoidably Brief Historiography of the Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 627, 627–28 (2015). The one case involved tenants who sued on Third Amendment grounds after National Guard troops evicted them to use the tenants’ residences for housing. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 958–61 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that national guardsmen are “Soldiers” for Third Amendment purposes and that the Third Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Similarly, the Seventh Amendment’s incorporation would change little. Only three states lack a right to a civil jury trial in their state constitutions: Colorado, Louisiana, and Wyoming.157See Colo Const.; La. Const.; Wyo. Const. However, the right to a civil jury trial can be found elsewhere in those three states. The rules of civil procedure for Colorado,158Colo. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (2025). Louisiana,159La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1731 (2025). and Wyoming160Wyo. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (2025). allow a party to demand a jury trial. Accordingly, incorporating the Third and Seventh Amendment would change little for states or private parties.

Incorporating the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause presents the greatest reliance-interest issues of the amendments that prescribe enumerated rights. States without a grand jury requirement have reliance interests in preserving the finality of criminal judgments and avoiding the costs associated with implementing an institution for criminal prosecutions—the grand jury.161See Robert W. Frey, Note, Incorporation, Fundamental Rights, and the Grand Jury: Hurtado v. California Reconsidered, 108 Va. L. Rev. 1613, 1654 (2022).

The finality of criminal judgments in state courts would likely remain intact despite incorporation of the Grand Jury Clause. In Edwards v. Vannoy, the Supreme Court refused to retroactively apply the Ramos jury-unanimity rule on federal collateral review.162Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1559 (2021). Given the refusal in Edwards to retroactively apply the unanimous jury verdict requirement from Ramos on federal collateral review,163Id. at 1552. it seems unlikely that the Court would rule differently if the Grand Jury Clause were incorporated. To apply the requirement retroactively, the Court would need to apply a rare exception that it described as “moribund” in 2021.164Id. at 1560.

A state’s reliance interest in avoiding the costs associated with grand juries is the most significant reliance interest jeopardized by total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. However, reliance-interests analysis usually concerns the costs borne by private parties, not the government.165Frey, supra note 161, at 1654. All but two states, Pennsylvania and Connecticut, still have grand jury indictment as part of their criminal procedure scheme—even if twenty-eight states do not require a grand jury indictment.166See id. at 1654–55. The familiarity with the grand jury as an institution and the existence of the institution in all but two states limit the extent to which incorporating the Grand Jury Clause would upset reliance interests. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly incorporated procedural protections against states despite the attendant costs.167See id. at 1655. Such decisions evince a belief in the relative unimportance of a state’s reliance interest in maintaining criminal laws and procedures that are inconsistent with the Constitution. As Justice Gorsuch wrote in Ramos, the most essential reliance interests are “the reliance interests of the American people.”168Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1408 (2020) (plurality opinion). Given the relatively meager reliance interests that would be affected by overruling Slaughter-House, the reliance interests factor weighs only slightly against overruling the precedent.

Weighing the stare decisis factors as a whole in a manner consistent with the Court’s recent application of those factors, Slaughter-House should be overruled. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause should incorporate every right in the Bill of Rights against the states.

IV.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS MUST END

Substantive due process is a doctrine with severe flaws. As will be explained below, the doctrine cannot justify itself with anything but a result-oriented conclusion. However, even that justification is unsatisfying because substantive due process is not the best means to protect individual liberties against state infringement—the Privileges or Immunities Clause is. The result is a disjointed Fourteenth Amendment and an ineffectual Ninth Amendment.

A.  Substantive Due Process Fails to Justify Itself with Reason and Impedes a Harmonious Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause seems, on its text’s face,169“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. to be an inapt mechanism to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. After all, the Due Process Clause describes process, not substance.170John Hart Ely famously quipped that “substantive due process is a contradiction in terms—sort of like green pastel redness.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 18 (1980) (citation modified). Over the years, several Supreme Court Justices have recognized the contradiction in terms for the folly that it is.171See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (warning against continued expansion of substantive due process to strike down a city ordinance); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Due Process Clause as “judicial usurpation”); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 692 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the Due Process Clause involves only process, not substance). Other Supreme Court Justices have employed substantive due process without defending the mechanism itself.172See, e.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687 (majority opinion) (explaining the two-pronged test for substantive due process without defending substantive due process itself); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759–66 (2010) (offering an overview of substantive due process precedents without defending the doctrine directly). Stranger yet, however, is when Justices who have openly expressed their distaste for substantive due process have nonetheless approved its use in applying the Bill of Rights to the states.173Compare Morales, 527 U.S. at 85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing substantive due process as “judicial usurpation”), with McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring) (defending the application of substantive due process with respect to the Second Amendment).

Despite substantive due process’s status as the favored means to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, the method has failed to justify itself by any means other than a result-oriented approach. This approach would be more understandable if a more apt provision of the Constitution could not accomplish the same objectives. The Privileges or Immunities Clause can achieve those objectives and would do so with greater force, clarity, and efficiency.

Furthermore, revitalizing the Privileges or Immunities Clause while curtailing substantive due process would harmonize the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Due Process Clause would consider only “procedural fairness.”174Ely, supra note 170, at 24. The Equal Protection Clause would address equality alone.175See id. The Privileges or Immunities Clause would set a baseline of substantive rights that no state may abridge.176See id. The failure to harmonize the three above-mentioned Fourteenth Amendment clauses puts rights on weaker footing.

B.  Substantive Due Process Shortchanges the Ninth Amendment

Any construction that renders a constitutional provision superfluous is “inadmissible, unless the words require it.”177Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall’s proscription against superfluous constructions was farsighted, and its logic extends to the wounds substantive due process has inflicted on the Ninth Amendment. The established doctrine the Court employs to evaluate whether the Constitution protects an unenumerated right is substantive due process.178See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2259–60 (2022) (describing the current doctrinal framework for unenumerated rights). The repeated179Prior Supreme Court opinions have repeatedly used the Due Process Clause to protect unenumerated rights instead of using the Ninth Amendment. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–86 (1965) (using the Due Process Clause to protect a right to contraceptives for married couples); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (using the Due Process Clause to protect a right to interracial marriage); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (using the Due Process Clause to protect a right to private sexual acts between consenting adults); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (using the Due Process Clause to protect right to same-sex marriage). resort to the Due Process Clause to achieve purposes for which it was never intended,180See supra Section IV.A. and to which it is ill-suited, shortchanges the Ninth Amendment and renders it superfluous.181The Amendment has become so superfluous that the mere suggestion of employing it has become risible. See Ely, supra note 170, at 34 (“In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a laugh.”). Furthermore, to render the Ninth Amendment superfluous does more than flout one of Chief Justice Marshall’s memorable axioms. The failure to ground unenumerated-rights jurisprudence in the constitutional provision most suited to that purpose puts jealously guarded individual liberties at risk.

The Ninth Amendment offers the protection that unenumerated rights deserve. Regarding one such precious unenumerated right, Chief Justice Warren wrote for a unanimous Court that, “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the state.”182Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The right to interracial marriage is one of many precious unenumerated rights that deserves better protection than what a procedural clause can offer. The Ninth Amendment can secure those rights better than substantive due process. Any defense of substantive due process to defend an unenumerated right disserves the very rights the doctrine purports to protect. Substantive due process must be abrogated so that Ninth Amendment jurisprudence can become the sentinel of unenumerated rights.

V.  UNENUMERATED RIGHTS: THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

The biggest challenge to adopting an expansive construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be getting Justices to agree on a test for whether the Constitution protects a particular unenumerated right. Fortunately, there is a consensus about protecting some unenumerated rights.183See infra Section V.A. This Part argues that the Ninth Amendment should protect unenumerated rights and considers which test is appropriate for accomplishing that objective.

A.  Justices Across the Spectrum Want to Protect Unenumerated Rights

The Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization majority was quick to emphasize that its elimination of an unenumerated constitutional right to abortion should not “be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”184Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2277–78 (2022). In his concurring opinion in Dobbs, Justice Kavanaugh expressed support for Supreme Court precedents concerning marriage and contraception.185See id. at 2309 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (reiterating that overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), did not weaken or threaten other precedents that protected unenumerated rights that did not concern abortion). The Dobbs dissenters believed that it was not possible to decouple the precedents concerning marriage and contraception from the precedents concerning abortion.186See id. at 2319 (Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). The fact that both sides agreed in Dobbs that at least some unenumerated rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is some evidence of the broad support for constitutional recognition of some unenumerated rights.

B.  The Ninth Amendment Is the Best Means to Protect Unenumerated Rights

The Ninth Amendment shares at least two things in common with the Privileges or Immunities Clause. First, both have been mostly read out of the Constitution.187Curtis, supra note 17, at 173 (explaining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had essentially been “read out of the Constitution” by the Supreme Court); see Barnett, supra note 148, at 236–37 (explaining that “courts have rarely been willing to rely upon [the Ninth Amendment] when assessing the constitutionality of statutes”). Second, substantive due process has haphazardly achieved some of each’s overarching goals.188Substantive due process has achieved, perhaps, more than the Privileges or Immunities Clause could have by itself. See Bogen, supra note 52 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s unenumerated-rights jurisprudence has taken shape almost exclusively within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663 (2015) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also protects liberties pertaining to “personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy”).

There is a broad consensus that the Constitution protects some unenumerated rights.189See supra Section V.A. And if the Constitution protects unenumerated rights, those rights ought to be safeguarded by a framework sturdier than the flimsy, contradictory substantive due process approach. Substantive due process’s embrace of unenumerated-rights jurisprudence would be more understandable if no part of the Constitution dealt explicitly with the issue of unenumerated rights. Fortunately, this is not the case. A provision that discusses unenumerated rights exists, and that provision is the Ninth Amendment, which states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”190U.S. Const. amend. IX.

The decision to craft a jurisprudence about unenumerated substantive rights in a procedural clause is confounding in light of the Ninth Amendment. The Supreme Court has traditionally declined to hold that the Ninth Amendment is the source of substantive rights.191“The Court does not use the Ninth Amendment as a tool for incorporating independent unenumerated rights or as an independent source of rights . . . .” Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169, 188 (2003). Indeed, the Ninth Amendment does not specify which rights were retained by the people. The only body with the power and qualifications necessary to decide which rights are retained by the people is the federal judiciary. The “province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”192Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). extends to expounding and interpreting which rights are “retained by the people”193U.S. Const. amend. IX. under the Ninth Amendment.

C.  Finding the Right Test for Identifying Protected Unenumerated Rights

The Supreme Court must choose a proper, workable rule of law for lower courts to apply when deciding Ninth Amendment cases if the Court were to adopt the PI + 9 Framework. The Ninth Amendment seems so open to interpretation that it could create Pandora’s box concerns that may produce workability problems.194See Ely, supra note 170, at 34. Indeed, the Court has recently cited unworkability in both constitutional195See, e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2272 (2022) (criticizing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), for the poor workability of the “undue burden” standard). and statutory196See, e.g., Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2270 (2024) (criticizing and overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) for the unworkability of the “ambiguity” standard). cases as a key reason for overruling precedents. However, substantive due process raises the same Pandora’s box predicaments,197See Ely, supra note 170, at 34. yet the Court has had little trouble applying substantive due process in recent years.198See, e.g., Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (analyzing whether there is a right to abortion under substantive due process); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687–89 (2019) (using substantive due process to analyze whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated). Indeed, when the Court overruled Roe and Casey, the Court insisted on being guided by “history and tradition” in order to avoid the “freewheeling judicial policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York.”199Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2248; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).

However, if the Court were to hand down a landmark Ninth Amendment decision, it would have ultimate authority to say what the law is and could choose any test it desired. The Court ought not to be frozen by a fear of political backlash or public outcry when deciding the cases and controversies that it has the power to decide under Article III.200See U.S. Const. art. III. In 2022, the Court acknowledged the importance of deciding cases based on principles, “not social and political pressures.”201Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2278 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)). A wise Justice once said of the Court, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”202Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). The Court ought to trust itself enough to exercise the power vested in it by the Constitution to interpret and construe the Ninth Amendment. Several options abound—ranging from ignoring the Ninth Amendment to presuming liberty—for the Court if it adopts the PI + 9 Framework.

  1. The Ink Blot Approach: Disregarding the Ninth Amendment

Judge Robert H. Bork infamously compared the Ninth Amendment to an “ink blot” that the Court should not interpret.203Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1987) (statement of Judge Robert H. Bork). Judge Bork’s conception should be rejected because it underestimates the judiciary’s abilities, ignores history, and is impractical.

Judge Bork’s interpretation should be rejected because it ignores a provision of the Constitution due to its potential for being difficult to interpret. Judge Bork underestimated the Court. The “task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights” is daunting.204W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). However, this task is the province and duty of the judges who comprise the federal judiciary.205See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). There is no exception to this province and duty in cases that raise complex and profound questions.

Furthermore, Judge Bork’s conception is not historically defensible from any conceivable originalist perspective.206For a pithy primer on the Ninth Amendment’s origin, see Barnett, supra note 148, at 236–44. For more expansive reading on the Ninth Amendment’s history, see generally Lochlan F. Shelfer, How the Constitution Shall Not Be Construed, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 331 (2017) (explaining the Clause’s Anti-Federalist side and its application to procedural, positive, and natural rights); Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983) (detailing the historical evidence of the Ninth Amendment’s meaning for unenumerated federal rights). For Anti-Federalists, enumerating any rights was dangerous because doing so could be construed to imply the nonexistence of other rights.207See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2006). James Madison acknowledged this criticism when he defended the Constitution’s ratification and offered a provision, which became the Ninth Amendment, that expressly guaranteed protection for unenumerated rights.2085 James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, in The Writings of James Madison 384–85 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). Although Ninth Amendment scholars have come to vastly different conclusions—from natural-rights readings209See generally Barnett, supra note 207 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment at enactment meant to say that unenumerated natural rights should be treated in the same manner as enumerated natural rights in the Bill of Rights). to readings emphasizing control for local governance210See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 331 (2004) (bringing to light previously missed or unrecognized evidence regarding the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment).—it appears there was more underneath the ink blot than Judge Bork thought.

Finally, Judge Bork’s conception is impractical. Some unenumerated-rights protections, including those for contraception and same-sex marriage, enjoy support from Justices across the ideological spectrum. The differences are in degree, not kind. For example, the Dobbs majority opinion, a concurring opinion, and the joint dissenting opinion all claimed to stand for unenumerated rights other than abortion.211Compare Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2280 (2022) (“[W]e have stated unequivocally that [n]othing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” (citation modified) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)), and id. at 2309 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I emphasize what the Court today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling of [precedents involving contraception or marriage], and does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents.”), with id. at 2319 (Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for undermining unenumerated rights to same-sex intimacy, marriage, and contraception). The idea of stripping all unenumerated rights of constitutional protection is simply unthinkable. For example, the right to interracial marriage is unenumerated.212The word marriage is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. See U.S. Const. However, any prominent person who suggests that it is not a right protected by the Constitution is instantly and vociferously rebuked.213In 2022, Senator Mike Braun (who is now Indiana’s governor) said interracial marriage ought to be left to the states, but he walked back his comments almost immediately after uttering them. Indiana Sen. Braun Walks Back Interracial Marriage Comments, Associated Press (Mar. 23, 2022, at 11:48 AM PST), https://apnews.com/article/ketanji-brown-jackson-us-supreme-court-race-and-ethnicity-racial-injustice-lifestyle-091656750d8685dbe19d3d5493785595 [https://perma.cc/9XLF-SHLF]. Aside from its indefensibility as a matter of history and principle, the idea that all unenumerated rights would be summarily stripped of constitutional protection is beyond the realm of realistic possibilities.

  1. The Presumption of Liberty Approach: Ninth Amendment Maximalism

Randy E. Barnett has written extensively on the Ninth Amendment214See Barnett, supra note 148, at 236–44 (explaining how the Ninth Amendment paired with the Privileges or Immunities Clause justifies a “[p]resumption of [l]iberty” for individuals to act freely unless the government can justify a restriction); Barnett, supra note 207, at 3 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment should be interpreted to presume liberty); Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 939–40 (2008) (criticizing Kurt Lash’s “[t]extual-[h]istorical” interpretation of the Ninth Amendment). and has his own grand Ninth Amendment theory. Under Barnett’s theory of unenumerated rights, one could first conduct an originalist analysis to determine which unenumerated rights get constitutional recognition.215See Barnett, supra note 148, at 257. However, Barnett conceded that originalist materials would be insufficient to recognize all the rights worthy of Ninth Amendment protection, so the sphere of unenumerated rights would be even more expansive than originalism could contemplate.216See id. at 261. Barnett advocated a framework that presumes liberty for unenumerated rights.217See id. at 262. Presuming liberty would place the burden on the government to establish why any government infringement on individual freedom is both necessary and proper, rather than assuming constitutionality when possible.218Id. In determining when liberty should be presumed, Barnett’s dividing line is a rightful/wrongful conduct distinction.219See id. at 264–68.

Barnett’s contributions to Ninth Amendment scholarship are admirable, but his solutions are quixotic. First, to presume liberty would be to undo fundamental canons of construction. Established canons of constitutional construction dating back to the early nineteenth century demand that “[n]o court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a construction to [a statute] which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the constitution.”220Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448–49 (1830). To reverse the paradigm to one in which the federal judiciary seeks to strike down laws that touch so-called “rightful activity”221Barnett, supra note 148, at 264. would be catastrophic. The current Court’s desire to take more issues out of constitutional law and insert them into the democratic process is at odds with Barnett’s framework.222Cf. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2265 (2022) (criticizing prior decisions for removing the issue of abortion from the democratic process).

Aside from the current Court’s probable unwillingness to adopt the kind of radical shift that Barnett supports, workability concerns are sufficient to reject Barnett’s framework. In recent years, the Court expressed frustration with unworkable rules of law and overruled precedents on that basis.223See, e.g., id. at 2272–74; Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2270–71 (2024). The idea that the Court would adopt a rightful/wrongful conduct test for trial and appellate courts to apply to every piece of legislation is fantasy.

To be sure, Barnett’s theory is far from the only Ninth Amendment framework. Many theories abound.224Lochlan F. Shelfer provided a thoughtful and expansive survey of Ninth Amendment scholarship that is better to cite than to imitate. See Shelfer, supra note 206, at 337–43. For example, Kurt T. Lash’s theory considers the Ninth Amendment through a federalism prism that emphasizes retained powers in addition to retained rights.225See Kurt T. Lash, On Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders’ View of Retained Rights: A Reply to Randy Barnett, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 969, 976–77 (2008). In any event, Barnett’s presumption-of-liberty theory represents the opposite of Judge Bork’s ink-blot theory. Between Barnett’s Ninth Amendment maximalism and Judge Bork’s Ninth Amendment ignorance lie too many possibilities to ponder in this Note.

An ideal rule for the Court to adopt in inaugurating its Ninth Amendment jurisprudence would be one that is workable, in line with current precedents, and moored by “respect for the teachings of history.”226Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). A workable rule of law would promote consistency and predictability to a constitutional provision that many may fear due to its unpredictability.227See supra note 194 and accompanying text. A rule of law in line with current precedents regarding unenumerated rights would prevent the instability that a brand-new rule might invite. A rule of law grounded in respect for history and tradition would avoid the open-ended judicial activism of the Lochner era.228See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2248.

  1. Glucksberg’s Goldilocks Test

Fortunately, there is an established test that is workable and guided by history. Further, this test is more than merely consistent with current precedents—it is current precedent.

The Court adopted a sensible unenumerated-rights framework in Washington v. Glucksberg.229Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). The framework requires a “careful description” of the asserted liberty interest.230Id. at 721 (citation omitted). The careful description provides a buffer against broad assertions of a liberty interest that could mean anything and everything. Additionally, adopting an approach that describes a liberty interest rather than a retained right231The Ninth Amendment mentions “rights” but not liberties. U.S. Const. amend. IX. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause speaks of “liberty” but not rights. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. is appropriate because liberty and right have been used interchangeably since the American Revolution.232See Curtis, supra note 17 and accompanying text. Then, there is a two-pronged test for deciding whether the Due Process Clause protects a right, and this framework applies to evaluating unenumerated rights.

First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”), and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”233Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (citations omitted) (citing another source).

The above framework gets at the heart of the Ninth Amendment, even though it brands itself as a Due Process Clause analysis. The language about a right needing to be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”234Id. (emphasis added) (citation modified) (citations omitted). is appropriate for evaluating which rights have been “retained by the people.”235U.S. Const. amend. IX. For a right to be retained, the right could not have recently come into existence—thus the deeply rooted phrasing. This approach shows proper respect for history’s teachings, prefers judicial restraint and caution,236Richard S. Myers, Pope John Paul II, Freedom, and Constitutional Law, 6 Ave Maria L. Rev. 61, 66 (2007). and averts the unrestrained judicial activism of the Lochner era.237See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2022). The history-and-tradition prong also ensures that the Ninth Amendment would preserve an existing right. Any analysis that claims the Ninth Amendment is not the source of substantive rights238See Schmidt, supra note 191 and accompanying text. is telling a lawyerly half-truth. The nation’s history and tradition are the source of the rights retained by the people in the Ninth Amendment.

The Glucksberg test also scores high in workability when lower courts have applied the test to purported unenumerated rights in various contexts.239For a broader survey of federal courts applying Glucksberg’s two-pronged test to unenumerated rights, see Alexander E. Hartzell, Comment, Implied Fundamental Rights and the Right to Travel with Arms for Self-Defense: An Application of Glucksberg to Anglo-American History and Tradition, 69 Am. U. L. Rev. F. 69, 83–87 (2020). For example, not long after the Court decided Glucksberg, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged test to reject a petitioner’s asserted unenumerated right to be free from unjust or arbitrary incarceration.240See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 747–50 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Glucksberg’s two-pronged analysis). In another case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had no difficulty applying Glucksberg to uphold an Iowa statute limiting where sex offenders could reside.241See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 713–14 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Glucksberg’s two-pronged analysis to reject petitioner’s argument that the right “to live where you want” is a protected unenumerated right). In 2024, a federal district court judge in Murphey v. United States had little issue applying Glucksberg’s two-pronged test to reject a plaintiff’s asserted right to grow, possess, and use psychedelic and other drugs.242See Murphey v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1053–54 (D. Ariz. 2024). Additionally, in the district court’s application of the test in Murphey, the court looked to Supreme Court decisions that counseled against recognizing additional rights because “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area [were] scarce and open-ended.”243Id. at 1052 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Lower courts have proven Glucksberg to be workable.

The second prong allows judges to ensure that sordid practices do not get constitutional protection merely for existing long enough to be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition. As Justice Stevens observed in Bowers v. Hardwick, “neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”244Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the right to interracial marriage is beyond doubt implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.245See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Moreover, there may be “room for play in the joints”246Walz v. Tax. Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). between the first prong and second prong.247Chief Justice Burger described the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause in this manner, and the tension between Glucksberg’s first and second prongs is somewhat analogous. Id. at 669–70. The first prong may act as a nonabsolute constraint on the second prong. Regarding the relationship between the prongs, Justice Kennedy wrote, “History and tradition guide and discipline [the second prong] but do not set its outer boundaries.”248Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015) (citation omitted).

To be sure, the second prong requires courts to “exercise reasoned judgment.”249Id. But the exercise of reasoned judgment is inherent to the judicial power. It is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”250Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Neither political branch has the power to identify constitutional rights.251See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (ruling that Congress has no power to interpret the Constitution or declare rights). Thus, the proper body for identifying rights in the context of the Ninth Amendment is the judicial branch.252See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .”). Through its substantive-due-process jurisprudence, the Court has already

recognized a number of unenumerated rights deemed to be fundamental.253See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (protecting the right to interracial marriage); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (protecting the right to private sexual acts between consenting adults). If it continues to do so, it ought to do so through the proper means: the Ninth Amendment. Doing so gives unenumerated rights a place in law that is more secure than substantive due process.

VI.  THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED

The PI + 9 Framework would apply amendments one through nine to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause and conduct its unenumerated-rights inquiry under the Ninth Amendment by using the two-pronged Glucksberg test. Figure 1 shows how amendments one through nine would apply to state governments under the PI + 9 Framework.

Figure 1.  The PI + 9 Framework

A.  The Framework for Enumerated Rights

The PI + 9 framework has the benefit of simplicity, especially as the framework applies to enumerated constitutional rights, such as the right to bear arms.254U.S. Const. amend. II. Under the PI + 9 Framework, the Second Amendment would apply to the states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause. There would be no need to consider whether the Second Amendment is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty because it would automatically be incorporated via the Privileges or Immunities Clause. A judge would only consider whether the state law violates the Second Amendment, which would get to the heart of the issue more quickly than a gratuitous rehashing about the wisdom or foolishness of substantive due process. Under the PI + 9 Framework, the state law would be analyzed in accordance with pertinent Second Amendment precedents, such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen255N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). and District of Columbia v. Heller.256District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

In any opinion concerning a state law’s alleged abridgment of the Second Amendment, the Court would quickly state what is clear from the text, legislative history, and original intent,257See supra Section II.B. which is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies every right in the Bill of Rights to the states. Then, the Court would decide whether the state law at issue violates the Second Amendment. In the Second Amendment context, the prevailing test remains the test from Bruen.258“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129–30. Any difficulties arising from applying Bruen259“Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem.” United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1925 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring). could be hashed out purely within the confines of the Second Amendment. Full incorporation takes distracting debates about substantive due process off the table and decreases judicial discretion as it relates to incorporation. The focus would be more on the right itself rather than the procedure by which the right in question is incorporated.

  1. PI + 9 Applied to a Hypothetical About an Enumerated Right

Assume the following hypothetical factual scenario:

After increasing pressure from the public, Iowa enacts Statute One,260Statute One is modeled after Iowa Code § 724.4B (2025). which criminalizes the “carrying, transportation, or possession of any firearm on the grounds of any public school in the state of Iowa.” After Statute One’s enactment, Tina attends a parent-teacher conference at a public school in Marion, Iowa, with a loaded Glock 17 pistol in a holster on her hip. After seeing the holstered pistol, a student at the school calls the police, and the police arrive at the school and arrest Tina. Tina is charged with violating Statute One, and a jury convicts her in Linn County District Court. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirms the conviction. Tina petitions for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, challenging her conviction and alleging that Statute One violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States grants certiorari.

Under these facts, a Court using the PI + 9 Framework would state that the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.261See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. No inquiry would occur into whether the Second Amendment right is deeply rooted or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Once incorporated, the Second Amendment would operate “identically to both the Federal Government and the States.”262Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (citation omitted). Given that, the Court would apply the pertinent Second Amendment precedents.

The Court would apply Bruen’s inquiry and make the government “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”263Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. Here, the Court could look to a precedent like Heller, which held that forbidding firearms in “sensitive places such as schools” was permissible and consistent with historical restrictions.264District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The Court could also conduct a historical analysis to confirm or reject the view set forth in Heller about the presumptively lawful nature of prohibitions against guns in schools.265Id. at 627 n.26. Under the hypothetical set of facts, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would mandate that the Second Amendment be applied to the Iowa government. The Supreme Court’s precedents on the Second Amendment would control, and the petitioner’s conviction would likely be upheld.

  1. The Framework for Unenumerated Rights

The PI + 9 Framework for unenumerated rights requires just a few more steps than the PI + 9 Framework for enumerated rights. First, the Court would incorporate the Ninth Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.266U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Then, the Court would carefully describe the liberty interest at stake in accordance with Glucksberg’s “careful description” mandate.267Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted). After formulating a careful description of the asserted unenumerated right at issue, the Court would analyze under the Ninth Amendment268See supra Figure 1. whether (1) the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”;269Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (citation omitted). and (2) whether the right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”270Id. at 721 (citation omitted). If the Court answered yes to those two questions, the Ninth Amendment would protect the right from infringement by the federal government and state governments.

  1. PI + 9 Applied to a Hypothetical About an Unenumerated Right

Assume the following hypothetical factual scenario:

After a public campaign against homeschooling, California enacts Statute Two, which mandates, “No parent may homeschool their child, and all children must attend an accredited private or public school. Parents who violate this statute are guilty of a felony.” Tom is a parent in Los Angeles, California who homeschools his son. After Statute Two’s enactment, Tom continues homeschooling his child because he believes he can provide a better education for his son than any nearby public or private school. After a neighbor reports Tom to the police for homeschooling, Tom is arrested and charged with violating Statute Two. Tom is convicted of violating Statute Two in the Los Angeles County Superior Court and appeals to the California Second District Court of Appeal, which affirms his sentence. Tom petitions for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, challenging his conviction and alleging a violation of his Ninth Amendment right to homeschool his child. The Supreme Court of the United States grants certiorari.

Under these facts, a Court using the PI + 9 Framework would first note that the right at issue here is not enumerated in the Constitution. Thus, a Ninth Amendment inquiry is apt. The Court would quickly explain that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies the Ninth Amendment to the states. Then, the Court would carefully describe the right at issue in the instant case, which is the right to homeschool one’s child. After carefully describing the right, the Court would answer each Glucksberg prong: (1) whether the right is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition; and (2) whether the right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

Under the first prong, the Court would be free to conduct an independent historical analysis. Homeschooling in America predates the American Revolution.271See Tanya K. Dumas, Sean Gates & Deborah R. Schwarzer, Evidence for Homeschooling: Constitutional Analysis in Light of Social Science Research, 16 Widener L. Rev. 63, 68 (2010). Many colonies passed laws in the seventeenth century that required parents to educate their children.272Milton Gaither, Homeschool: An American History 6 (2d ed. 2017). Colonial fathers were expected to teach their children reading and religion.273Id. at 11. Abigail Adams homeschooled her children, and the Adams family was not unique among New Englanders in this respect.274See id. at 25–26. Before the Civil War, enslaved people used home education as a means to defy racist anti-literacy laws.275Id. at 46. Today, homeschooling is legal in all fifty states,276Dumas et al., supra note 271, at 68. except for the fictitious California in the hypothetical.

Additionally, early-twentieth-century Supreme Court cases decided issues related to the right of parents to make decisions about their child’s education. If the Court decided that the early twentieth century was early enough to inform the history-and-tradition inquiry, the Court could cite Pierce v. Society of Sisters277Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). and reaffirm Pierce’s proposition that parents have a right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”278Id. at 534–35. The Court could also rely on Meyer v. Nebraska, which held that “[c]orresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.”279Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). The cases recognizing a right of parents to control the upbringing of their children are more than one hundred years old. Those cases, in addition to historical evidence, buttress the proposition that the right to homeschool one’s children is deeply rooted. The Court would answer (1) in the affirmative and move on to answering whether the right to homeschool one’s children is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

The Court would likely also answer (2) in the affirmative and hold that the right to homeschool one’s child is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. In Meyer, the Court held that the right to “establish a home and bring up children” was protected by the Constitution.280Id. at 399. Additionally, the right to homeschool one’s child could be drawn within the sphere of “related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education” that the Court has recognized.281Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 667 (2015). Under sufficiently analogous precedents and the exercise of reasoned judgment, the Court would hold that the right to homeschool one’s children is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. After carefully describing the right at issue and satisfying Glucksberg’s two prongs, the Court would hold that the Ninth Amendment protects the right to homeschool one’s children and would void Statute Two.

VII.  ADVANTAGES OF THE PI + 9 FRAMEWORK

The PI + 9 Framework has three main advantages: (1) it provides a stronger mechanism for protecting individual rights; (2) it is a more efficient, clear, and appropriate means by which to incorporate the Bill of Rights; and (3) it could lead to the development of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence.

A.  Putting Individual Rights on Stronger Footing

The primary advantage of the PI + 9 Framework is that it puts the precious civil liberties enshrined in the Constitution on stronger footing. Every single right recognized by substantive due process is always somewhat in doubt because of the dubious, wobbly nature of the doctrine. Why risk it? Those alarmed by Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Dobbs,282Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2301–02 (2022) (Thomas, J., concurring). which suggested that all substantive due process precedents ought to be reconsidered, have nobody to blame but themselves if they previously championed a flawed doctrine like substantive due process. Individual substantive rights are too important to leave behind the unlocked door of a process-related clause. The PI + 9 Framework gives substantive rights the defense they deserve by providing power to the text, history, and intent of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

B.  Efficiency, Clarity, and Respect for the People’s Amendments

The PI + 9 Framework offers a better approach to incorporation than substantive due process. Glucksberg’s application to enumerated rights is inappropriate, inefficient, and unclear. It is inappropriate because a judge should not answer whether an amendment to the Constitution is sufficiently important to qualify as a sort of “super right” to be incorporated against the states. Each provision of the Bill of Rights was important enough for two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states283See U.S. Const. art. V. to add the provision to the nation’s founding document. Furthermore, it is inefficient because it requires a two-pronged analysis for provisions that were clearly fundamental enough to liberty to be included in the Constitution and are part of the nation’s history and tradition since 1791. Finally, there is a lack of clarity as to why some amendments in the Bill of Rights are more vital to liberty than others. As Justice Thomas wrote in McDonald, a Privileges or Immunities Clause analysis is “far more likely to yield discernible answers” than substantive due process.284McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 855 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). If the Court were to adopt the PI + 9 Framework, there would be no more ink spilled or time wasted defending substantive due process. The Court could instead get to the business of interpreting what each provision of the Bill of Rights means and how it ought to be construed and applied to the facts of a case.

C.  Development of Ninth Amendment Jurisprudence

Another benefit of the PI + 9 Framework is the development of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. In carrying out its duty to “say what the law is,”285Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). the judicial branch ought to tell the American people what the Ninth Amendment means. Scholars may argue about the proper interpretation and construction of the Ninth Amendment, and this Note advocates Glucksberg’s two-pronged approach. Such words are wind. Only the judiciary can give meaning to the Constitution’s text. Perhaps this will mean freezing the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868.286Contra Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2306 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution does not freeze the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868.”). Perhaps this will mean a presumption of liberty that would drastically curtail the role of government in Americans’ lives.287See supra Section V.C.2. Perhaps this will mean adopting Glucksberg’s two-pronged approach. However, the first Court opinion that grounds itself in the Ninth Amendment could give birth to a new age of Ninth Amendment scholarship and jurisprudence aimed at discovering the proper meaning and construction of the Ninth Amendment. Each time the Court is tempted to defer interpretation of the Ninth Amendment and choose the more well-trodden path of substantive due process, the Court instead ought to heed the words of Chief Justice Marshall: “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”288Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.

CONCLUSION

The PI + 9 Framework secures rights in a more robust, efficient, and clear manner than substantive due process does. Substantive due process is worse than a mere contradiction in terms. The ever-expanding reach of substantive due process has robbed two provisions of the Constitution—the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Ninth Amendment—of the importance they deserve. Any stare decisis issues would be more well-founded if most of the Bill of Rights had not already been incorporated. Moreover, the substantive changes that replacing substantive due process with the PI + 9 Framework would cause are the incorporation of the Third Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause, and the Seventh Amendment, and using the current controlling framework for unenumerated rights. Thus, adopting the Framework would not cause a significant expansion or diminution in substantive rights. Far from an expansion or diminution, the PI + 9 Framework offers enumerated and unenumerated rights the durable, efficient, and clear protection that American privileges and immunities deserve.

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 359

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*Articles Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.S. 2023, Boston University. I thank my supervisor, Professor Rebecca Brown, for providing me with careful suggestions and guidance as I wrote this Note. I am grateful to the editors of the Southern California Law Review for their diligence in improving this Note. All errors are my own. 

Pants on Fire: How the Brinkmann Majority Forgot About the Takings Clause in a Takings Clause Case

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Ben and Hank Brinkmann (the “Brinkmanns”) embarked on a journey of building a hardware store on an empty, commercially zoned lot in the Town of Southold, New York (“the Town”).1Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6–7, Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, No. 2:21-cv-02468, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180199 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022).

In 2017 and early 2018, the Brinkmanns met with the Town Planning Department to “create and revise site plan applications” for the hardware store.2Brief in Opposition, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, No. 23-1301 (2d Cir. June 11, 2024). At the beginning of 2018, the Brinkmanns filed their first permit application.3Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 8–9. This application contained a site plan, which allegedly underwent two rounds of revisions while implementing the Planning Department’s requests.4Id. The Town denied the permit three months later. The Brinkmanns claimed that the Town informed them that “no site plan had been approved by the Planning Department.”5Id. at 9. In May 2018, the Brinkmanns again applied for site plan approval.6Id. In July 2018, the Town allegedly demanded that the Brinkmanns pay for a $30,000 Market and Municipal Impact Study.7Id. at 10–11. According to the Town, such a market study was required because the Brinkmanns wanted to “construct a big box hardware store in a small, semi-rural hamlet on eastern Long Island,”8Brief in Opposition, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at i. which was not in the best interest of the Town.

There are two sides to every story, and this is where the stories begin to significantly diverge. For their part, the Brinkmanns allege that the Town never conducted the $30,000 study they paid for, despite being legally required to do so.9Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 15–16. Yet the Town asserted that it had “complied procedurally and substantively with New York eminent domain law.”10Brief in Opposition, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 1.

The Brinkmanns argue that the Town chose to acquire their parcel despite the availability of an adjacent undeveloped plot of land, which the Town “never [even] considered acquiring.”11Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 13–14. The Brinkmanns further allege that in October 2018, the Town took even more “drastic measures,” “pressur[ing]” the bank to breach its own “purchase contract [with the Brinkmanns] for the vacant lot” and demanding that the bank enter into a purchase contract with the Town of Southold instead.12Id. at 14. The Brinkmanns were “[u]ndeterred” by the Town’s intimidation tactics.13Memorandum and Order at 5, Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, No. 2:21-cv-02468, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180199 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022).

In February 2019, the Town enacted a six-month moratorium on new building permits.14Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 15. The Brinkmanns argue that the moratorium was limited to a “one-mile stretch of road,” essentially targeting their lot.15Id. The Town claims, however, the six-month moratorium was on “any new building permits along one mile of Route 25, which included the Brinkmanns’ proposed site, among several other businesses.”16Brief in Opposition, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 5 (emphasis added).

The Town then twice extended the moratorium—first in August 2019 and then again in July 2020.17Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 16. The Brinkmanns allege that the Town extended the moratorium contrary to Suffolk County’s disapproval and despite lacking any evidentiary support for these moratoriums.18Id. at 16–17. The Town also generously gave out moratorium waivers, but not to the Brinkmanns.19Id. at 17–18. The Town emphasizes the Brinkmanns never applied for such a waiver in the first place—an application which the Brinkmanns “believed [would be] futile, as the moratorium was clearly target[ing them].”20Brief in Opposition, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 5; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 18. In May 2019, the

Brinkmanns sued the Town to end the moratorium.21Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 16. In June 2020, “[t]he state trial court denied the Town’s motion to dismiss.”22Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, No. 23-1301 (June 11, 2024).

In August 2020, the Planning Board “held a public hearing on the proposed project to build a public park” on the Brinkmanns’ lot.23Brief in Opposition, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 6. In September 2020, the Town issued a “Findings and Determination” in which it concluded that the “acquisition [of the Brinkmanns’ lot would] benefit the public” because a public park would allow “the residents of Mattituck and Southold . . . the opportunity to create . . . [a] community gathering place.”24Id. at 6–7. In May 2021, the Town “initiat[ed] condemnation proceedings on the [Brinkmanns’ lot].”25Id. at 7. The Brinkmanns note that the Town’s September 2020 announcement of the acquisition of their lot via eminent domain conveniently occurred shortly after the state trial court allowed the Brinkmanns to proceed with their moratorium claim against the Town.26Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 5. The Brinkmanns argue that with the Town of Southold’s “moratorium gambit on the rocks, the Town suddenly decided that it needed a new park.” The Brinkmanns also emphasize that the park the Town decided to build was a passive use park that lacks “any improvements” or facilities.27Id.

Moreover, a September 2020 article published in The Suffolk Times by Southold Town Board Member Sarah Nappa drew attention to the Brinkmanns. In the article, Nappa hints at there being good probability that the Town exercised its eminent domain power because it disliked the Brinkmann family.28Sarah Nappa, Guest Column: Eminent Domain Decision Sets a Dangerous Precedent, The Suffolk Times (Sept. 19, 2020), https://suffolktimes.timesreview.com/2020/09/guest-column-eminent-domain-decision-sets-a-dangerous-precedent [https://perma.cc/7YD2-XQ4X]. Nappa wrote: “I can’t help but wonder, if this application had been filed by anyone but an outsider, if this business was owned and operated by a member of the ‘old boys club,’ would the town still be seizing their private property? The use of eminent domain by Southold Town to take private property from an owner because it doesn’t like the family or their business model is a dangerous precedent to set.” Id. Nappa opined that the Brinkmanns’ fate would have likely been different had they been members of the Town of Southold’s “old boys club,” as opposed to being community “outsider[s].”29Id.

In a 2-1 decision in 2024, the Second Circuit’s Brinkmann majority affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the Town.30Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 210 (2d Cir. 2024). Even though the panel agreed that the Brinkmanns’ complaint alleged “facts sufficient to support a finding that the [Town’s] decision to create the park was a pretext for defeating the Brinkmanns’ commercial use”31Id. at 210 (emphasis added). and conceded that the Town exercised its eminent domain power only after the failure of its various “regulatory hurdles,”32Id. the Brinkmanns still lost. So, what went wrong for the Brinkmanns?

Apart from examining the Brinkmann majority’s reasoning to answer this question, this Note proposes a heightened scrutiny analysis for bad-faith takings via the tripartite burden-shifting framework. Although this evidentiary framework was put forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,33McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). an employment discrimination case, the application of the framework has not stopped there. The framework has also been applied by Daniel B. Kelly in the context of takings driven by “impermissible favoritism”: when a “favored private entit[y]” or person has a “benefit[]” conferred on them, “with only incidental . . . public benefits.”34Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

What happened to the Brinkmanns, however, is arguably the exact opposite of favoritism. Thus, this Note extrapolates the tripartite burden-shifting framework to takings arising out of disfavor, from reasons ranging from discrimination and animosity to outright bias. Such an inquiry has largely gone unexplored due to the common assumptions that (1) strict deference to the legislature should somehow justify or excuse bad-faith takings or (2) the Equal Protection Clause is sufficient to address discriminatory takings. This Note will address both of these arguments and also illustrate what is at stake if bad-faith takings continue to slip consequence-free through the cracks of American jurisprudence.

Section I briefly provides an overview of takings in general, largely focusing on the history of the rapid expansion of “public use.” Section II explores Brinkmann’s reasoning, highlighting its many legal conclusions, each of which exhibits flaws. Section III focuses on the Ninth and Seventh Circuits to discuss the federal circuit split. Finally, Section IV examines the tension between rational basis review and some unspecified form of heightened scrutiny proposed by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London.35Id. Section IV then uses Justice Kennedy’s heightened scrutiny suggestion as an entry point to examining the tripartite burden-shifting framework and its application to takings motivated by discrimination and bias. After extrapolating Kelly’s scholarship to bad-faith takings, Section IV examines the perils of adopting rational basis review instead. Section IV further underscores why the Equal Protection Clause and the doctrine of unconstitutional animus, while attractive solutions at first glance, are actually inadequate to the task in this context. Section IV concludes with an assessment of Brinkmann’s societal impact.

I.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: THE RAPID EXPANSION OF “PUBLIC USE”

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.36U.S. Const. amend. V. What the Takings Clause prohibits is governmental takings of private property without just compensation, not takings altogether.

So, what does “public use” encompass? Perhaps the more salient question, though, is what does “public use” exclude? Traditionally, the Takings Clause was used by governmental entities to “condemn and acquire property to be used by the public” in innocent, even useful, ways: for example, “building public roads or providing for utilities infrastructure” like electric transmission lines.37Kevin J. Lynch, Forced Pooling: The Unconstitutional Taking of Private Property, 75 U.C. L.J. 1335, 1342 (2024). Most people acknowledged, understood, and even “appreciate[d]” this eminent domain power to condemn private property for conversion into public use, provided there was just compensation.38Id. at 1352. Without this inherent power to appropriate land, the public would not have highways, courthouses, post offices, and railroads (the so-called clear instances of public use).39United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946). And without these amenities and structures, society would probably cease to function. The public was relatively content with this interpretation of public use because everyone got their share: all members of the public had access to these public uses and “benefit from the system” that provided the “basics of modern life.”40Lynch, supra note 46, at 1352. But then something happened—an expansion of the concept of public use beyond highway-building.

Public use became an “amorphous concept, resistant to precise definition”41Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. Env’t Aff. L. Rev. 45, 53 (2008). and—conveniently for the government—began to be defined broadly.42Id. From its humble beginnings as a non-contentious issue, eminent domain erupted into a “hotly contested” area of law.43Lynch, supra note 46, at 1344. In 1908, the Supreme Court held in Hairston v. Danville & Western Railway Company “that it is beyond the legislative power to take . . . the property of one and give it to another for what the court deems private uses,” despite “full compensation.”44Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908). This was likely comforting to hear; members of the public probably understood this statement as the Court saying that taking private party A’s property to give it to private party B was off-limits. But then, private corporations began to seek the “power to condemn property for their own objectives.”45Daniel B. Kelly, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 10 (2006). There had been a shift in takings jurisprudence.

In its 1925 Old Dominion Land Corporation v. United States decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that the legislative branch, as it pertains to public use, is “entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”46Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925). But the legislative branch’s limitless power to deem any non-impossible undertaking a public use was hardly the only facet of takings doctrine abused by both private and governmental entities.

In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Berman v. Parker.47Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Berman, the Court allowed an administrative agency to take a non-blighted department store and redevelop it “so as to . . . prevent slum . . . housing conditions.”48Id. at 26. The department store was also to be transferred to a “private development corporation for the purpose of curing blight.”49U.S. Comm’n on Civ. Rts, The Civil Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse iii (2014), https://www.usccr.gov/files/pubs/docs/FINAL_FY14_Eminent-Domain-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FWM-5P6D]. Petitioners argued that this would make it a “taking from one business [person] for the benefit of another.”50Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. The Court ruled, however, that the so-called “means” of “executing [a] project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine”51Id. and that the “public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise . . . or so the Congress might conclude.”52Id. at 33–34.

So long as Congress believes that an act of conferring a private benefit from party A to party B “may” or “might” serve the public, such a taking is Berman-blessed. Thus, Berman found constitutional the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945—which, among other things, authorized sales of “condemned [private] lands to [other] private interests.”53Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984) (discussing Berman). Under Berman, public use essentially became synonymous with everything under the sun, just as long as the taking was justified by some nominal argument citing “public health, safety, morals, [or] welfare.”54Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 (quoting § 2 of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945). But this Berman reiteration was hardly surprising in the context of Old Dominion. If anything, Berman was a case that truly legitimized hostility to private property owners, reinforcing public use as a broad concept that works to benefit governmental interests. Berman further underscored the irony that “public use” also serves to benefit private corporations that profit from such projects. This Note will return to Berman in Section IV.D to examine its catastrophic fallout.

In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, examining the validity of the Land Reform Act of 1967.55Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229. The Act authorized a transfer of titles from lessors to lessees, so as “to reduce the concentration of land ownership.”56Id. at 231–32. This blunt conveyance of private property from party A to party B (a private beneficiary) neither raised concern nor constituted a taking “as having only a private purpose.”57Id. at 230. So, although the Midkiff Court acknowledged that there was obviously some type of private purpose here (i.e., person B receiving person A’s private property), the Court emphasized that “[i]t is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion [of the community], . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order . . . to constitute a public use.”58Id. at 244 (quoting Rindge Co. v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).

Thus, under Midkiff the public use definition was even further expanded; a taking no longer even had to benefit a considerable portion of the community. This begs the question: how many members of the community would need to benefit for a taking to constitute a valid public use? Perhaps zero—if one subscribes totally to Berman-esque legislative deference where Congress might “conclude” that the public may be served in some way via a taking.

A basic overview of takings law cannot be complete without consideration of Kelo v. City of New London, a highly divisive 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court from 2005.59Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Oswald, supra note 50, at 54. Kelo plays a major role in the Brinkmann decision, the unfortunate North Star of this Note. The Kelo majority authorized the taking of Susette Kelo’s “non-blighted”60Oswald, supra note 50, at 55. little pink house in the name of a “speculative” economic development rationale.61Gregory S. Knapp, Maintaining Government Accountability: Calls for a “Public Use” Beyond Eminent Domain, 83 Ind. L.J. 1098, 1100 (2008) (“Another line of criticism focuses . . . on the speculative nature of economic development takings.”). The little pink house and several others like it were to be torn down so Pfizer Inc., a private pharmaceutical company, could erect a $300 million research facility in their place.62Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. The New London Development Corporation (“NLDC”) wanted to erect this $300 million Pfizer facility so as to attract new commerce, create jobs, generate tax revenue, and help to “build momentum for the revitalization of downtown New London.”63Id. at 474. This “momentum” also apparently included making New London more “attractive.”64Id.

Kelo’s most egregious overstep is that none of these public uses were actually reasonably expected to occur or even had to occur. They were merely alleged, and indeed, were “speculative” because neither Pfizer nor NLDC would be required to use the condemned property “in a way that [actually] bolsters the local economy.”65Knapp, supra note 70, at 1100. Viewed differently, not only is the conveyance of private benefit to a private party permissible under Kelo if there is embedded therein some whiff of public use, but this whiff of public use no longer even need be actualized. Instead, it can simply be hypothetical. And this line of criticism tracks with the Kelo majority, who emphasized the sufficiency of NLDC merely “believ[ing]” the development plan would benefit the community.66Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. The Kelo majority further disagreed with Susette Kelo that there needs to be “reasonable certainty” that the “expected public benefit[]” will actually “accrue.”67Id. at 487.

Where did this absolute faith in what NLDC was alleging come from? One can cite federalism, as did the majority in virtually every federal decision upholding a taking. Sure, the Kelo majority said that the “amount and character of land to be taken” and the “need” for specific land “rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”68Id. at 489. Sure, to negate these consequences of lack of oversight, checks and balances, and even de minimis accountability, states can impose public use requirements that are “stricter than the federal baseline.”69Id. But if states are the only ones who care about not “wash[ing] out” all distinctions between public and private uses, this will lead to a drastic discrepancy.70Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor warns that, thanks to the Kelo majority, some states now might as well replace all “Motel 6[s] with . . . Ritz-Carlton[s],” or other little pink houses with shopping malls, or farms with factories, simply because they might revitalize or possibly beautify a city.71Id. at 503. Justice O’Connor further posits that if the legislative branch is the “sole arbiter[] of the public-private [use] distinction, the Public Use Clause [will] amount to little more than hortatory fluff.”72Id. at 497. Judicial checks on interpretation of public use are necessary if the Public Use Clause, as a “constraint on government power[,] is to retain any meaning.”73Id.

Moreover, as Justice O’Connor further points out, the true impact of such radical deference to the legislative branch will, of course, be disparate.74Id. at 505 (“Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random.”). What happens when the government can take “private property currently put to ordinary private use,” such as homes and small family businesses, and “give it over” for new private use—a use that can, but does not have to, “generate some secondary benefit for the public”?75Id. at 501. The “beneficiaries” will likely be large entities, development firms, and people with “disproportionate influence and power in the political process” at the expense of those with less resources.76Id. at 505.

After Kelo was decided, newly discovered evidence revealed that NLDC “blocked” a competitive bidding process for the site to guarantee that Pfizer would get it.77Daniel S. Hafetz, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 3095, 3112 (2009). NLDC used eminent domain to “appease” Pfizer.78Id. So much so that the President of NLDC wrote a letter to Pfizer before Pfizer announced its plans, promising to “meet Pfizer’s requirements.”79Id. To this end, NLDC promised to “buy up all the[] properties [in Susette Kelo’s neighborhood], clearing the way for redevelopment in line with Pfizer’s wishes.”80Id. And NLDC ultimately did everything to “entice[] Pfizer to join the project by letting Pfizer dictate the contours of the [redevelopment], including the decision to condemn the properties in [Susette] Kelo’s neighborhood.”81Id. None of this was known at trial, and one could certainly speculate that the Kelo decision may have been different had the Kelo Court

known about the driving force behind these vague promises of economic revitalization—or perhaps not.

Although these are seminal cases in takings jurisprudence, they focus solely on the act of conferring a private benefit on another private party through the transference of property rights. They do not discuss takings which are inherently driven by discrimination, racism, homophobia, or animosity toward condemnees. That is, they do not tackle the issue of what happens when a governmental entity simply decides to condemn party A’s property out of hostility toward party A’s family, for instance. Although Brinkmann ostensibly seeks to address this question, the Brinkmann majority relied heavily on Kelo to show that Kelo imposes no requirement that the “government’s stated objective” be “genuine” and free from “pretext for some other, illegitimate purpose.”82Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 211 (2d Cir. 2024). Hence the importance of discussing Kelo at length before this Note could delve into an explanation of how the Brinkmann majority likely misinterpreted Kelo. This discussion will take place in Section II(C). Another crucial takeaway from Kelo resides in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, specifically Justice Kennedy’s reference to the possibility of some unknown form of demanding scrutiny and when it should be invoked.83Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005)(Kennedy, J., concurring).

II.  THE BRINKMANN CASE

The purpose of this Section is to examine some of the Brinkmann majority’s arguments in support of their decision to dismiss the Brinkmanns’ bad-faith takings claim. This Section demonstrates why the Brinkmann majority’s reasoning is, in many ways, flawed and therefore does not support its holding.

A.  The Impossible Inquiry That Is (Actually) Possible

According to the Brinkmann majority, looking beyond the Town’s stated purpose behind a taking is an exercise “fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties.”84Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 213. Such inquiry, holds the Brinkmann majority, is too demanding and would require courts to look into the “subjective motivation of every official who supported the [taking]”; this task is too demanding because motives are “rarely, if ever, pure.”85Id. at 213–14. True, examining the intentions of every single official involved in the condemnation process would indeed be an exercise that is, at best, impracticable. Nonetheless, the logical assumption underpinning the Brinkmann rationale—namely, that scrutiny of every official’s underlying motive is necessary to determine the presence of bad faith—is, to put it mildly, a bit flawed.

But the Brinkmann majority took it a step further: government officials can be outright “hostile,” and the Brinkmann majority would still deem the taking valid as long as there is merely an asserted valid public use.86Id. As openly admitted by the Town, even if the Town condemns homes of “disfavored minorities” purely “out of animus toward those minorities and a desire to drive them out of  [Town],” this, too, would constitute a valid taking if the park excuse is presented to disguise that animosity.87Id. at 233 (Menashi, J., dissenting) (“During oral argument in this appeal, the Town frankly acknowledged that, under its view of the public use requirement, the Town could seize the homes of disfavored minorities—out of animus toward those minorities and a desire to drive them out of Southold—as long as the Town said it would build parks where the minorities’ homes once stood.”).

By prioritizing judicial efficiency and simple-to-apply bright-line rules over ones that actually protect rights, the legal landscape in the wake of the Brinkmann decision is not merely grimly unfair; it verges on dystopian because bad faith slips through the cracks in the name of judicial efficiency.

Simple-to-apply, bright-line rules are not without their charms, however: they are easy to comprehend, produce consistent results, and are hard to misapply. But what happens when said consistency renders unfair outcomes? What happens when a condemnee has fistfuls of objective evidence that they have been wronged, but the court refuses to even consider any of it because doing so would apparently be too demanding an undertaking?

These simple-to-apply rules produce blatant injustices: as precedent, Brinkmann authorizes courts to deem a taking valid as long as there is any asserted public use, even if the condemnees could prove that the condemnation process was initiated and executed in bad faith.

Critically, none of these examples of conduct tackle the incentives or motives of any official. Instead, they come down to objective evidence. One need not delve into why the town officials enacted a moratorium over the protest of the county planning commission. One need not know why the town officials refused to send the county any evidentiary support concerning the supposed need for a moratorium. Similarly, one need not know the reason why the town never conducted an expensive market study that the condemnees had paid for, thereby expressly violating its own city code.88The Brinkmanns argued that the Town violated City Code § 280-45(B)(10)(b) (2025). See Town of Southold, N.Y., Town § 280-45(B)(10)(b) (2025) (“[T]he Planning Board shall conduct or hire a consultant to conduct a Market and Municipal Impact Study, at the expense of the applicant. The study shall be completed within 90 days of receipt of all requested materials . . . . ”). None of this evidence demands discernment of inscrutable motivations. This impossible inquiry is possible because it need not address the motivations of every official involved.

What is truly egregious in Brinkmann is the objective evidence provided. Hence why the Brinkmann majority had no difficulty in finding that the Town’s taking was pretextual.89Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 219 (Menashi, J., dissenting) (“The court acknowledges that the complaint in this case ‘alleges facts sufficient to support a finding that the decision to create the park was a pretext for defeating the Brinkmanns’ commercial use’ of their own property and that the Town decided to seize the Brinkmanns’ property for a park only ‘after varied objections and regulatory hurdles that the Town interposed and that the Brinkmanns did or could surmount.’ ”). The Brinkmann majority reached their conclusion via factual inquiry and managed to parse the evidentiary record. Other courts would similarly have no problem in conducting such inquiries on a routine basis.

B.  The Brinkmann Majority’s Disregard of Their Own Precedent, Goldstein v. Pataki

If the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence of a taking that is a pretext for private purpose or instead animus, dislike, or spite, courts can absolutely reject their claims and have done so in the past. But this ability to screen out plaintiffs who lack sufficient evidence is actually a good thing because it greatly streamlines the judicial process. No case better exemplifies this than Goldstein v. Pataki, a 2008 Second Circuit case that the Brinkmann majority, ironically, cites extensively.90See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). Why ironically? Because Goldstein in no way supports the Brinkmann majority’s position.

  1.  Significance of Objective Evidence

The Goldstein plaintiffs claimed that “the [alleged] public uses were pretexts for a private taking” because Mr. Ratner, the owner of the New Jersey Nets and the Project’s primary developer, was the project’s “sole beneficiary,” while all the invoked public uses were mere “pretexts advanced by corrupt . . . state officials.”91Id. at 54–55. The plaintiffs did not prevail for various reasons—each of which would likely be sufficiently dispositive when taken individually.

The plaintiffs failed to provide objective evidence of the corruption they alleged, or of any bad faith for that matter. Thus, beyond “far-reaching allegation[s]” the plaintiffs had nothing to offer the court.92Id. at 54 (“The heart of the complaint . . . and the centerpiece of the instant appeal, is its far-reaching allegation that the Project, from its very inception, has not been driven by legitimate concern for the public benefit on the part of the relevant government officials.”). The biggest error committed by the Goldstein plaintiffs was that they failed to allege “any specific examples of illegality . . . by which the Project was approved” or any “specific illustration of improper dealings between Mr. Ratner and . . . government officials.”93Id. at 64. Noteworthy here, however, is the fact that the Goldstein court was open to hearing such evidence in the first place. And, unlike the Brinkmann majority, the Goldstein court would not have considered the process of evaluating said evidence to be “fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties.”94Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2024). Instead, the Goldstein court actively sought such evidence. The Goldstein court wanted the plaintiffs to provide them with evidence of bad faith, so they could actually assess and analyze the bad faith that the plaintiffs alleged. Yet the plaintiffs provided the Goldstein court with essentially nothing beyond “mere suspicion[s].”95Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62. It is unsurprising, then, that the Goldstein court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim.

Further, as emphasized by Judge Menashi, the dissenting judge in Brinkmann, the Goldstein court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim “not because pretextual takings are permissible” but only because the allegations of pretext lacked specificity.96Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 228 (Menashi, J., dissenting). The Goldstein court’s concern was that a “reasonable juror” would simply not be able to conclude that the asserted laundry list of traditional public uses was mere pretext.97Id. (Menashi, J., dissenting). Now, contrast this with Brinkmann: The Brinkmann majority expressly admitted that the Brinkmanns’ “complaint . . . allege[d] facts sufficient to support a finding that the decision to create the park was a pretext.” Thus, evidence of pretext was definitely not lacking in Brinkmann.98Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 210.

  1. Possibility of Closer Objective Scrutiny

The Goldstein court also stated that they wished to “preserv[e] the possibility that a fact pattern may one day arise in which the circumstances” would so align that “a closer objective scrutiny” would be “required” in the context of pretextual takings.99Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63. To justify this closer objective scrutiny, the so-called “circumstances of the [condemnation’s] approval process” would have to “greatly undermine the basic legitimacy of the outcome reached.”100Id. Naturally, the Goldstein plaintiffs’ utter failure to provide facts supporting their allegations of bad faith, pretext, and illegality did not trigger that closer

objective scrutiny to which the Goldstein court alluded as a possibility in some pretextual takings cases.

The Goldstein fact pattern, however, is not present in all cases, and there are cases in which the plaintiffs can and do provide the court with ample evidence concerning pretext, thus triggering a closer objective scrutiny. Brinkmann presented precisely such a fact pattern. In Brinkmann, the “circumstances” surrounding the process of a passive park approval ranged from the Town’s alleged lawbreaking arising out of the Town’s refusal to conduct the $30,000 market study for which the Brinkmanns had paid to the allegedly baseless moratoriums. Such accusations must have, at a minimum, been supported by objective evidence that the Brinkmanns provided, as the Brinkmann majority even noted that the Brinkmanns’ complaint alleged “facts sufficient to support a finding that the [Town’s] decision to create the park was a pretext for defeating the Brinkmanns’ commercial use.”101Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 210.

But returning to the Goldstein rule, here the “approval” consisted of the Town authorizing the condemnation of the Brinkmanns’ parcel. And as to the “outcome” reached: one could plausibly argue that a regulation-abiding family business was shut down, and the parcel was condemned simply so others could enjoy a park without any amenities. The rule that Goldstein sets out, calling for a closer objective scrutiny, can therefore be applied to the Brinkmann facts. On its face, Brinkmann checks off all three elements of the Goldstein rule: circumstances, approval, and outcome. Of course, counterarguments could be made here, such as (1) building a hardware store in this specific location might further “increas[e] traffic in an area that is already dangerous” and (2) residents of the Town of Southold have numerous “concerns” about this hardware store and do not want the Brinkmanns to build it.102Nappa, supra note 37. But all of these accusations and counterarguments would likely require closer objective scrutiny—as opposed to automatically blessing a bad-faith taking because the condemner asserted some public use.

  1. Pretextual Taking: A Claim of Dubious Jurisprudential Pedigree?

One last aspect of Goldstein worth addressing is how the Brinkmann majority emphasized that, apparently, pursuant to Goldstein, “a pretext-based challenge to a taking has a ‘dubious jurisprudential pedigree.’ ”103Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 213. This is largely taken out of context and is an inappropriate generalization. The Goldstein court said that the “particular kind of ‘pretext’ claim the plaintiffs [raised] in this case . . . bears an especially dubious jurisprudential pedigree.”104Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 62. What has a dubious jurisprudential pedigree is the evidentiary underpinning of the Goldstein plaintiffs’ pretext claim, not all other pretext-based claims outside of the Goldstein realm; Mr. Ratner offered an extensive list of “well-established” public uses to counter the Goldstein plaintiffs’ claim.105Id. at 55. Contrast Goldstein’s “creation of affordable housing units,” “mass-transit improvements,” and “redress of blight” with Brinkmann’s 1.7-acre empty park.106Id. at 52–59. The difference is as starkly evident as it is profound, indicating that the Brinkmanns’ assertion of a pretextual taking was not of dubious jurisprudential pedigree.

C.  The Possibly Fatal Mistake of Kelo Misinterpretation

Before this Note addresses the Brinkmann majority’s possible misinterpretation of Kelo—or at least, its failure to consider alternative interpretations and dispose of them appropriately—an important question should be addressed: Why does it matter how the Brinkmann majority interpreted Kelo? The answer is simple: the Kelo misinterpretation alone likely cost the Brinkmanns their property.

The Brinkmann majority helped themselves to generous portions of Kelo—or, more specifically, the following Kelo passage—which is the key in this analysis: “[T]he [C]ity would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party . . . Nor would the [City] be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”107Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 212 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–78 (2005)) (emphasis added).

  1. An Unwarranted Inference Drawn by the Kelo Majority

The Brinkmann majority confidently asserted that the “mere pretext of a public purpose” language is not an “overarching prohibition against any and all purposes alleged to be ‘illegitimate.’ ”108Id. at 211; id. at 212 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–78 (2005)). Per the Brinkmann majority, Kelo imposed no requirement that the “government’s stated objective . . . be genuine, and not a pretext for some other, illegitimate purpose,” unless that purpose concerns bestowal of private benefit.109Id. at 211 (quoting Appellants’ Brief at 19). The Brinkmann majority concluded that, under Kelo, “the only impermissible pretext is bestowing a private benefit.”110Id. at 226 (Menashi, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). So only when there is an alleged private purpose (e.g., private party A conferring a private benefit on B, another private party) does the Brinkmann majority actually care to delve into whether the government’s stated objective is genuine. Other kinds of pretext such as prevention of a legal land use (think a family-owned hardware store), spite, and discrimination are permissible under Brinkmann—as long as there is an asserted valid public use.111Id. (Menashi, J., dissenting).

And in Brinkmann, bestowal of private benefit was not alleged, so the Brinkmanns were simply out of luck.112Id. at 213 (Per the Brinkmann majority, the Brinkmanns did not prevail because they did “not allege that the Town meant to confer [a] . . . private benefit,” and thus did “not point[] to any Town purpose that violate[d] the Takings Clause”). In Brinkmann, the issue was not that the government bestowed a private benefit upon some private party at the Brinkmanns’ expense. Nor was there some other permutation of the “private benefit” concern. Instead, at issue was a municipality taking private land for a pretextual public use (i.e., a passive use park)—not for purposes of giving the land to some other private party.

But here an interesting wrinkle emerges in the Brinkmann majority’s logic: when did Kelo say that the sole impermissible takings are those in which the government’s actual motive is to bestow a private benefit upon some private party? Similarly, when did Kelo say that takings driven by spite, discrimination, or animus are allowed and require no inquiry into both purpose and mechanics? These are trick questions because Kelo never said either, and yet the Brinkmann majority inferred that it did.

It would seem that the likely reason why Kelo’s “mere pretext of a public purpose” language is immediately followed by a bestowal of private benefit qualifier is because Kelo, as a case, focused exclusively on private use. At issue in Kelo was whether the city could seize private property from one private party in order to confer a benefit on another private party, all for the ostensible purpose of economic development. Accordingly, by what logic can the Brinkmann majority confidently decree which other pretextual takings are permissible or impermissible when the only issue before the Kelo court involved private use and nothing else? Or are we supposed to assume that because private benefit was the only kind of pretext mentioned by Kelo, this now suddenly means that all other kinds of pretext are excluded from this status of impermissibility, therefore making them permissible under all circumstances—even the most egregious?

  1. Two Ways of Interpretation: Examining New England Estates LLC v. Town of Branford

The Brinkmann majority interpreted “mere pretext of a public purpose” as stating that the only impermissible takings are those in which there is a conveyance of private benefit.113Id. at 226 (Menashi, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision interprets [Kelo] . . . to mean that the only impermissible pretext is bestowing a private benefit.”). The same language, however, can also be interpreted thusly: takings that convey a private benefit, along with other forms of pretextual takings (e.g., those arising out of spite, discrimination, or unfair prohibition of running a regulation-abiding family business) are all impermissible. This Kelo language does not necessarily close all doors to other claims stemming from other forms of pretext, as claimed by the Brinkmann majority. One can just as well argue that Kelo merely provided a single, non-exclusive example of pretext (i.e., conveyance of private benefit) and the reason why this example pertained to conveyance of private benefit and not something else is because Kelo is a case that narrowly addresses the private benefit issue. But this act of providing a single example of pretext does not deny protection to all other kinds of pretextual takings. The “mere pretext of a public purpose” language does not delineate what is excluded from the so-called “pretext.” Nor does Kelo place any restrictions or limits upon potential plaintiffs raising other types of pretextual takings claims, such as those involving discrimination or spite.

This idea of varying interpretation of the Kelo language was also examined in New England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, a 2010 Connecticut Supreme Court decision which is in direct opposition to Brinkmann.114See New England Estates, 988 A.2d 229. Notably, the Second Circuit (where Brinkmann was decided) includes Connecticut in its footprint.115Besides New York and Vermont, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, where Brinkmann was decided, also includes Connecticut. In New England Estates, New England Estates wanted to build an affordable housing development near the landfill.116New England Estates, 988 A.2d at 236–37. The Town committee then abruptly decided that the town had an urgent need for playing fields precisely where the affordable housing development was to be built.117Id. at 238.

Apart from the dire need to build a playing field, the town in New England Estates also decided to bolster its tenuous position via an alternative justification for the taking by citing environmental concerns surrounding the proposed development’s proximity to the landfill.118Id. at 236. And this justification would have probably worked had there been no evidence to the contrary: (1) an internal memorandum outlining which strategies had already been implemented by the town for the sole purpose of “protecting the town against affordable housing appeals” and (2) “internal communications” among town officials revealing just how much they did not want an affordable housing development.119Id. at 237.

To justify its environmental concerns, the town relied on a one-page sketch of the playing fields and a five-page letter, which outlined “generic” concerns regarding building residential developments near landfills.120Id. at 238. Beyond alluding to “possibilities” of such contamination, the letter said nothing substantive in regard to the specific landfill at issue.121Id. The incriminating internal communications, coupled with the town officials’ sudden environmental concerns at a time very convenient for them, followed swiftly by the exercise of eminent domain power to stop the affordable housing project, made it rather easy for the New England Estates court to properly halt the town’s bad faith actions.122Id. at 252–53.

The town argued that it did not violate the Takings Clause by being “dishonest” about its reasons for taking the land because the Takings Clause only prohibits takings for private use, not other kinds of pretextual takings.123Id. at 252 (The Town in New England Estates “argue[d] that the public use clause prohibits only a taking of private property for a use that is not a public use and does not provide a remedy for a taking that is undertaken in bad faith . . . . ”). If this argument sounds familiar, it is because this is precisely what the Brinkmann majority emphasized: the “[Brinkmanns’] complaint does not allege that the Town meant to confer [a] private benefit” and because an “unimproved” public park still constitutes public use, this makes the condemnation valid.124Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2024). Unlike the Brinkmann majority, however, which praised this reasoning, the New England Estates court rejected the town’s assertion that takings become violations solely when the government seizes private property for a private use.125New England Estates, 988 A.2d at 252. This assertion made by the town in New England Estates is identical to that of the Brinkmann majority126Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 217 (Per the Brinkmann majority, Kelo’s “current pronouncement on ‘pretext’ concerns only the pretext of non-public (that is, private) use.”). and also has its roots in a possible misinterpretation of Kelo, as examined in this Section.

The New England Estates court emphasized that the town’s reliance on Kelo “for the proposition that only a taking for the purpose of conferring a benefit on a private party constitutes a violation of the [Takings Clause]” is incorrect.127New England Estates, 988 A.2d at 253 n.27. Such a reading of Kelo’s “mere pretext of a public purpose” language interprets the Takings Clause in an unjustifiably “overbroad[]” manner.128Id. That is, it takes Kelo’s prohibition against bestowals of private benefits and extends it to say that the sole impermissible takings are those in which there is a bestowal of private benefit. Further, because the “issue of whether a bad-faith taking would violate the [Takings Clause]” was never before the Kelo court to begin with,129Id. (“Kelo did not involve any allegations that the city of New London acted in bad faith in taking private property.”). the inference that bad-faith takings should go unchecked cannot be made. Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court would disagree with the Brinkmann majority concerning the interpretation of the pretext language in Kelo.

It is the current reality of the takings landscape that whether a Connecticut resident loses or prevails on their pretextual taking claim now largely depends on choice of venue.130Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 12. In Connecticut state court, someone with a Brinkmann-esque fact pattern would likely prevail on the merits.131Id. Yet that same hypothetical person marching into federal court would summarily lose for lack of an alleged bestowal of private benefit.132Id.

III.  THE NINTH & SEVENTH CIRCUITS

This Section examines the reasoning of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in cases that resemble Brinkmann and tackle bad-faith takings analysis. Both circuits, to varying degrees, stand in contrast to the Brinkmann majority which conducted no such analysis.

A.  Analysis of the Ninth Circuit

In the 1966 Ninth Circuit decision, Southern Pacific Land Company v. United States, the Ninth Circuit stated that when administrative agencies engage in takings for an “authorized public purpose,” such takings are “not subject to judicial review,” with one crucial exception.133S. Pac. Land Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 161,162 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[T]he Supreme Court itself has declined to rule out the possibility of judicial review where the administrative decision to condemn a particular property or property interest is alleged to be arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith. And various courts of appeal, including this one, have said that an exception to judicial non-reviewability exists in such circumstances.”) (citations omitted). Takings for an authorized public purpose can be subject to judicial review if the administrative agency’s decision to condemn a property is “alleged to be arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith.”134Id. While easy enough to allege, this standard is deferential to administrative agencies, resulting in a low likelihood of success for plaintiffs. In fact, the Ninth Circuit even stressed how unlikely it is for plaintiffs in such cases to succeed: “in each instance in which a lower court set aside a federal agency’s determination that it was necessary to take [a] particular property . . . the lower court’s ruling was reversed on appeal.”135Id. There are many ways of challenging an arbitrary administrative action. For instance, a plaintiff can demonstrate that the agency has “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider [for purposes of executing an administrative action],” failed to consider “relevant factors” or an “important aspect of the problem” before engaging an administrative action, or failed to examine potential policy alternatives of “achieving the objectives.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Because this Note focuses on the Takings Clause, a comprehensive discussion of administrative law and arbitrary administrative actions is beyond its scope. The principle nevertheless stands: there are instances when the Ninth Circuit will examine alleged bad faith in takings claims, even though these allegedly bad-faith takings all bear expressly stated ostensible public uses.

A natural inquiry in this line of analysis is to examine what is required to clear the Ninth Circuit’s high bar for challenging administrative agencies’ “arbitrary” takings. The Ninth Circuit instead provides multiple examples of how not to satisfy it, which all come down to the quality of bad faith evidence. If the evidence of bad faith is insubstantial or nonexistent—especially coupled with very big, almost scandalous, but largely unsupported assertions—the Ninth Circuit will not invalidate the administrative agency’s taking.

In Southern Pacific, the Southern Pacific Land Company (“SPLC”) owned 4,600 acres of land, including the mineral rights.136Id. at 161. The U.S. Government wanted to condemn the land and the mineral rights for purposes of constructing a naval air station.137Id. SPLC thought it advantageous to essentially imply that the U.S. Government decided to profit off SPLC’s land and engage in an “outside land speculation.”138Id. at 163 (quoting Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 84 (1923)). When deposed, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy testified to the exact opposite of this assertion, stating that mineral extraction was actually “inconsistent with the establishment of the naval air station, and was not [even] contemplated when the declaration of taking was filed.”139Id. at 162–63. In fact, the primary reason for condemnation was so that the land and the associated mineral rights would be utilized to produce oil only “in the case of emergency.”140Id. at 163. And just like that, with absolutely no evidence to refute any of the U.S. Government’s aforementioned points, the plaintiffs did not prevail on their bad-faith taking claim.141Id.

A subsequent 1968 Ninth Circuit decision, Scott Lumber Company v. United States, is largely identical to Southern Pacific’s reasoning and, unfortunately, its outcome too.142Scott Lumber Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1968). Here, the United States (on behalf of the United States Forest Service) sought to condemn appellant’s estate in timber land “for the construction, maintenance and permanent use of highways . . . and for the use, conservation and protection . . . of [the] forests [on appellant’s land].”143Id. at 390. Similar to SPLC in Southern Pacific, the Scott Lumber appellant claimed that the “taking was not for a public purpose” but instead for the “purpose of benefitting certain competitors of appellant pursuant to an illegal agreement.”144Id. As in Southern Pacific, the assertion was as unsupported as it was bold.145Id. at 391–92. Moreover, the deposition of the Acting Secretary of the Department of Agriculture also revealed nothing suspicious.146Id. at 391. Accordingly, the Scott Lumber court ruled that it was “completely satisfied” that the government’s taking was for public use—given that the “facts alleged by [the appellant], [even] taken in the light most favorable to [the appellant]” still did not “show that the action of the officials ha[d] such an arbitrary, capricious or bad faith quality as to justify [judicial] interference.”147Id. Crucially, however, the Scott Lumber court did contemplate judicial interference and was even willing to possibly invalidate a bad-faith taking had the appellant actually produced sufficient evidence of bad faith, beyond claims that were as baseless as they were audacious.148Id. (“[A] limited power of review of an administrative decision exists where it is contended that the administrative decision was arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith . . . . ”).

The Scott Lumber court even agreed with the lower court’s declaration that “[t]his Court need not, and will not, stand idly by and allow administrative officials to take private property arbitrarily, capriciously, [or] in bad faith,” something that cannot be said about the Brinkmann majority.149Id. If anything, this “idle” manner is emblematic of Brinkmann’s reasoning: even when there is blatant evidence of bad faith coupled with some suspect public use, the Brinkmann majority would decline to look into any “alleged pretexts and motives.”150Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 211 (2d Cir. 2024). The Scott Lumber court was not only eager to conduct itself in a non-idle manner but also examined the facts in the light most favorable to the appellant. Yet, even with the Scott Lumber court largely cheering the appellant on and giving the appellant all the necessary tools to prevail, the appellant simply failed to provide evidence of bad faith.

Would a similar evidentiary framework, as employed by the Southern Pacific and Scott Lumber courts (specifically in the context of arbitrary takings by administrative agencies) make sense in the Takings Clause context? This is a ready-to-go framework that can be easily applied beyond cases where administrative agencies (such as Scott Lumber’s United States Forest Service) are accused of engaging in bad-faith takings.

Although it offers a potential solution, this framework has its pitfalls. One, it is similar to rational basis review, so much so that it even uses rational basis review’s “arbitrary” language. Such language is called for in rational basis review only because higher levels of scrutiny require something more than the regulatory action not being arbitrary. At the end of the day, it is a pretty low bar, offering little protection for condemnees’ interests; any legitimate interest (e.g., a passive use park) would suffice. Two, it is hard to define just what constitutes “good” evidence in a manner sufficient to demonstrate bad faith. And three, even if condemnees provide satisfactory evidence, the government can simply argue the following:

  • That only one or two members of the agency (or a municipality like in Brinkmann) had bad-faith intent in condemning the land (while the rest did not);
  • That it is not the province of the judicial system to disrupt a democratic process; and
  • That it is not bad faith but mere incidental disparate impact that was not actually intended.

B.  The Seventh Circuit & Question of Legislative Deference

The Seventh Circuit takes a similar approach to the Ninth Circuit: although some deference may be given to administrative agencies, evidence of arbitrariness and bad faith matters when a court evaluates whether an administrative agency’s taking was indeed for a public use. That is, the Seventh Circuit holds that there is no valid or legitimate public use if such public use stems from bad faith or pretext. So even if there is an alleged unimpeachable public use (such as a public park), the administrative agency’s taking is declared invalid if the plaintiff can prove bad faith or pretext associated with said public use.151See United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973). This is a stronger iteration of what the Ninth Circuit decided in Scott Lumber and Southern Pacific. The Ninth Circuit provided the condemnees with an opportunity to present evidence that could, in theory, demonstrate bad faith or arbitrariness by the administrative agency. But again, realistically, because the evidentiary bar is high and administrative agencies are (automatically) given much deference, such efforts will likely fail. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, made “public use” determinations conditional on there being no bad faith and reserved the judicial right to dig deeper to see if legislative deference is warranted.

In United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land—a 1971 Seventh Circuit decision—a husband and wife owned a 58.16-acre tract which primarily contained farmland on which the landowners’ home stood.152Id. at 1057. The United States wanted to take this farmland for purposes of flood control and reduction of flood crests.153Id. at 1056. The landowners then argued that the United States’ action was “arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious, vindicative, and in bad faith,” thus warranting a “valid defense to the condemnation proceeding.”154Id. at 1057. Or, in short, landowners contended that the asserted public use (to prevent flood control and reduce flood crests) was a pretext. To prove this, they cited their repeated complaints to the government regarding erosion and the government’s “failure to maintain proper water levels” from 1968 through 1970.155Id. The landowners went on to stress that “no [government] action had [ever] been taken to repair the damage or to prevent further erosion.”156Id. After three years of refusing to fix the issue and not responding to any of the landowners’ complaints, the government responded to the complaints in 1971, informing the landowners that condemning their property would be much cheaper than protecting it from erosion or floods.157Id.

It was unclear to the Seventh Circuit why the district court judge denied without merit the motion to vacate the order for possession.158Id. at 1058. The Seventh Circuit surmised that perhaps the reason the motion had been denied without merit (i.e., the motion was basically deemed frivolous) was that the district judge found against the landowners’ bad faith claim.159Id. Or, as the Seventh Circuit further posited, perhaps the district court ruled that way because the court thought that the administrative decision to condemn the land “was [simply] not judicially reviewable”—given that there was an alleged public use, regardless of the substantial pretext evidence.160Id.

The Brinkmann majority also greatly relied on a “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments” to rationalize inaction.161Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2024). Brinkmann is actually far from being the only court that emphasizes legislative deference in the takings context; it is neither a novel argument nor dispositive. For instance, even in 58.16 Acres of Land, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that “once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken . . . rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”16258.16 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d at 1058. But the Seventh Circuit does not use this discretion to justify its own inertia. To the contrary, while the Seventh Circuit acknowledges and even embraces legislative deference, it nevertheless considers it proper for the judicial branch to “materially . . . aid[]” public use analysis “by exploring the good faith and rationality of the governmental body in exercising its power of eminent domain.”163Id. Therefore, the two—that is, a substantive bad-faith takings analysis and deference to the legislative branch—are not mutually exclusive. According to the Seventh Circuit, the “determination of the extent, amount or title of property to be taken . . . rests wholly in legislative discretion,” assuming there is (1) an “absence of bad faith” and (2) the “determination” to condemn was “made in good faith.”164Id. (quoting United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1940)). These “restraints” that the Seventh Circuit cleverly placed serve as evidence of how bad-faith takings analysis can peacefully co-exist with legislative deference.165Id.

The main takeaway here is that the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the district court was “required to resolve . . . questions” of “bad faith, arbitrariness, and capriciousness,” all of which bore upon the “determination of public use.”166Id. at 1059 (“In sum, questions of bad faith, arbitrariness, and capriciousness, all bearing upon the determination of public use, having been raised by the [landowners], the district court was required to resolve those questions.”). The Seventh Circuit is firm that there is no valid public use without an absence of bad faith and a presence of “good faith and rationality of the governmental body in exercising its power of eminent domain,”167Id. at 1058. and this assertion runs directly counter to the Brinkmann majority.

While the Ninth Circuit was, in theory, willing to look at evidence of bad faith, which would potentially invalidate the taking, the Seventh Circuit made a pronouncement with which the Brinkmann majority would certainly disagree. Specifically, if there is strong evidence of bad faith or arbitrariness (and the Brinkmann majority acknowledged that there had been), there can be no legitimate public use, making the taking invalid. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit does not make a valid public use expressly dependent upon a lack of bad faith. Regardless, both circuits prioritize and actively consider evidence of bad faith, so they can draw an inference of a taking’s validity.

IV.  WHAT NOW?

The purpose of Part IV is to examine the Brinkmann fallout, while remaining solution-oriented with an eye toward the future. This Note examines which standard of review could be used to evaluate bad-faith takings on a federal level, focusing on the tripartite burden-shifting framework and also discussing the downsides of the Equal Protection Clause and the doctrine of unconstitutional animus in the context of bad-faith takings. This Section continues to imagine what could be, with the intention to move forward jurisprudentially from Brinkmann to a more fair, uniform, and dignified approach to bad-faith takings.

A.  The Dangers of Rational Basis Review

In the context of bad-faith takings, there is a conflict between rational basis review and the various forms of heightened review. While there exist various permutations of what heightened review can and should look like—and of course, much disagreement too—this Note will only closely examine the tripartite burden-shifting framework. But first, rational basis review.

One cannot talk about rational basis review in the context of property law without, yet again, mentioning Kelo. The Kelo majority “declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause,” just as long as it is “ ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’ ”168Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (analyzing the Kelo majority’s reasoning). This “deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test.”169Id. And rational basis review is extremely deferential to the legislative process—so much so that a “challenged law will be upheld if it could be rationally interpreted as advancing any conceivable legitimate public purpose.”170Hafetz, supra note 86, at 3103. In fact, “even the ‘flimsiest’ of reasons will survive [said] scrutiny.”171Id. at 3114. Courts are known to grant this legislative deference “even if there is nothing other than judicial speculation” to imply that the government was trying to advance a public purpose when enacting the law.172Id. at 3103. This is precisely what happened in Kelo.

Under Kelo, a mere prediction (or judicial speculation) that some public use will generate some secondary public benefit is enough.173Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Even the Kelo majority itself, likely sensing a risk for the potential abuse of eminent domain under rational review, suggested that states can and should place “further restrictions” upon the takings power.174Id. at 489. A large concern with this standard is that the embedded presumption of permissibility within the rational basis of review may “motivate[] trial judges to see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil” even in takings cases which “fail the smell test”175Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 2, 335, 362 (2006).—chief among them the Brinkmann case.

In the takings context, rational basis review can invalidate two types of condemnations: (1) when the “asserted purpose is not a cognizable public purpose” and (2) when there is a “clear intention to benefit a private party.”176Hafetz, supra note 86, at 3115. Takings driven by bad faith (such as discrimination or arbitrarily forbidding a property owner from running a regulation-abiding family business) do not fall into either category. Why? Because an asserted public purpose such as a park is a cognizable public purpose, and discrimination would likely not involve a conveyance of private benefit upon a private party. This is why Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo suggested that “a more stringent standard of review” might be suitable for a “more narrowly drawn category of takings,” though largely referring to takings marked with “impermissible favoritism.”177Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

To clarify, favoritism alludes to the governmental entity’s inherent reason “for favoring a certain party”; these reasons range from corruption to “a complex web of social and business relations.”178Hafetz, supra note 86, at 3108. One could arguably view favoritism as a particular form or sub-category of bad-faith taking, one that punishes a property owner to benefit someone else. Favoritism is prohibited “out of concerns for basic fairness.”179Id. The same exact logic, however, applies to takings which are marked by other kinds of bad faith, manifested in things like discrimination, racism, or animosity toward specific individuals—this, too, violates our inherent sense of fairness. Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence speaks to issues of favoritism in the takings context, the reasoning outlined in the concurrence can be extrapolated further to other kinds of bad faith.

Justice Kennedy made reference to a more heightened standard of review, but he did not actually delve into the logistics of this more “stringent” standard.180Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For instance, it remains unclear as to which situations warrant a “meaningful rational-basis review that in [Justice Kennedy’s] view is [always] required under the Public Use Clause” versus those meriting a “demanding level of scrutiny” which in some cases even justifies a “rebuttable” “presumption of [a taking’s] invalidity” if the “risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is [] acute.”181Id. at 492–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Would Justice Kennedy’s “demanding level of scrutiny” be akin to strict scrutiny? Rational basis plus? Justice Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence is vague on these questions. Justice Kennedy also failed to identify what evidence would trigger these standards or what exactly the court is supposed to do with said evidence of favoritism,182Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (Not only do the “details” of Justice Kennedy’s remain “undisclosed,” but Justice Kennedy also failed to “specify[] what courts should look for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it, and what to do if they do not.”). an omission for which he received much criticism.183Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 32, 95 (2005) (Justice Kennedy “casting the essential fifth vote for the [Kelo] ‘majority’ opinion while also writing a separate opinion qualifying the Court’s opinion is bad practice because it leaves the reader uncertain whether the majority opinion or the concurring opinion should be regarded as the best predictor of how the Court would decide a similar case in the future. Justice Kennedy’s action is a further example of the Court’s tendency . . . to disregard the consequences of its decisions for the lower courts that have to apply them. If Kennedy had reservations concerning the majority opinion that he was not willing to swallow, he should have concurred in the judgment only; then the lower court judges and future litigants would know where they stood.”) (footnote omitted).

This Note disagrees with the assertion that Justice Kennedy exclusively referred to “rational basis plus” review.184Cameron P. Hellerman, Misusing Eminent Domain: Pretextual Takings for a Traditional Public Use, 93 Fordham L. Rev. 2229, 2243 (2025) (“Accordingly, Justice Kennedy suggested that courts employ a rational basis plus standard of review . . .”). Justice Kennedy referred to multiple standards. And yes, while Justice Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence creates much unnecessary confusion, that is the nature of the contemplated standards. Thus, the extra layer of complexity should not be swept under the rug. In fact, certain scholars even argue that the criteria185Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criteria such as “testimony from government officials,” “documentary evidence of communications between these parties,” and presence of a “comprehensive development plan”). Justice Kennedy considers (which supposedly triggers some form of heightened scrutiny) directly “collid[e]” with the Kelo majority’s assertion that there should be no “intrusive scrutiny”186Hafetz, supra note 86, at 3118 (“It is thus difficult to meet Justice Kennedy’s criteria without ‘colliding with the no-heightened-level-of-review standard laid down by the [Kelo] majority.’ ”); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.—suggesting that Justice Kennedy indeed took it a step further than rational-basis-plus review. Accordingly, this Note posits that in addition to rational-basis-plus review, Justice Kennedy was also hinting at something even more demanding.

Furthermore, although not a focus of this Note, prudence demands a discussion, albeit brief, of rational-basis-plus review. Although Justice O’Connor characterizes it as a “more searching form of rational basis review,”187Thomas B. Nachbar, Rational Basis “Plus,” 32 Const. Comment. 449, 450 (2017). the Supreme Court “has never acknowledged its existence” and Justice Scalia downright denied it.188Id. Previous inquiries into this doctrine (such as the “justification” of its presence or the “underlying theory”) were “the equivalent of a constitutional snipe hunt, and about as productive.”189Id. Overall, there certainly exists the notion that the doctrine is “suspicious” and “problematic,” given that it “lack[s] an articulated basis in principle” and “is impossible to either apply or constrain in a principled way.”190Id. at 450–51. Also, on a more practical level, it is often difficult to identify which level of scrutiny the court actually applied (i.e., rational basis versus rational-basis-plus) and most of the time this distinction is rooted in mere speculation.

Contrast the rational-basis-plus review doctrine with the burden-shifting evidentiary framework first put forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, a 1973 Supreme Court case.191McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). This framework has frequently been used to analyze claims of discriminatory treatment such as discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title IX gender discrimination claims.192Kelly, supra note 9, at 215–16.

Thus, this Note will next explore the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting evidentiary framework for purposes of steering bad-faith takings analysis in a more uniform and fair direction.

B.  Heightened Review: The Tripartite Burden-Shifting Standard

In the context of takings, this standard was originally proposed by Daniel Kelly to examine takings which are rooted in favoritism only.193See Kelly, supra note 9. The goal of this Note is to see how this framework would operate in the context of takings driven by discrimination and bias.

  1. Direct Versus Indirect Evidence

In part one of the analysis, an allegedly wronged employee can either produce direct or indirect evidence of discrimination.194Id. at 217. Similarly, a condemnee would be required to demonstrate that a taking is tainted with favoritism via either producing direct or indirect evidence.195Id. Direct evidence could essentially act as a “smoking gun.”196Id. And in the context of favoritism, for example, direct evidence could be satisfied by an email exchange between some private developer and a municipal official in which it is clear that the “actual purpose of the taking [was] to benefit the [private] developer.”197Id. This is a high burden to satisfy, so the indirect evidence would be more practical. The condemnee (again, in the favoritism context) would need to prove two elements: (1) that the “project involves a private party” and (2) said private party “might obtain a distinct benefit” (given that “favoritism is only possible in a project in which a private party expects to obtain an advantage”).198Id.

In the context of other kinds of bad faith, the analysis would look something like this: If the condemnee who (allegedly) was on the receiving end of bad faith decides to take the direct evidence route, they would be required to demonstrate some form of smoking gun. For example, a documented exchange in which municipal officials exhibit disdain for the condemnee—whether it be discrimination, racism, homophobia, or something else. There are a few issues with the direct evidence route, however. For instance, how likely is it that a condemnee will obtain records of these discriminatory written exchanges from multiple municipal officials, and not just one? If the animosity toward the condemnee stems from just one municipal official, should this suffice as conclusive evidence of bad faith? For instance, other municipal officials on the same board may have voted for condemnation under a genuine belief that condemnation would promote an actual public interest. Another issue with direct evidence is that most conduct is simply not marked with blunt evidence of discrimination. Further, municipal officials can easily argue that something they said was taken out of context—which may raise evidentiary issues—or was misinterpreted. So, it is therefore unlikely that a condemnee would easily satisfy the direct evidence threshold.

As to indirect evidence, Brinkmann supplies a great example. In a nutshell, the Brinkmanns could argue that the Town of Southold engaged in multiple machinations to prevent construction of the Brinkmanns’ hardware store (allegedly ranging from pressuring the bank to breach its contract with the Brinkmanns199Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 14 (“Scott Russell, the Southold Town Supervisor, called the president of Bridgehampton National Bank, Kevin O’Connor. Russell pressured O’Connor not to sell the property to the Brinkmanns . . . Russell [then also] called the president of Bridgehampton National Bank to demand that the bank breach its real-estate contract with the Brinkmanns and not close on the Property.”). to inventing moratoriums).200Id. at 17 (“When the Town sought a second extension of its moratorium . . . [from] to the Suffolk County Planning Commission, the County produced a report noting that the Town of Southold never provided the County with the supporting evidence it requested for the Town’s first extension. Thus, for this second extension, Suffolk County staff again recommended that the moratorium be ‘disapproved.’ ”). So what kind of evidence would the Brinkmanns need to show to satisfy this indirect evidence standard and establish a prima facie case of bad faith, thus satisfying the first element of the tripartite burden-shifting framework and thereby shifting the burden onto the Town to prove that the taking was not driven by bad faith? Largely mirroring the requirements of a Title VII claim, the Brinkmanns would be required to show that:201See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that [they] belong[] to a racial minority; (ii) that [they] applied and w[ere] qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [their] qualifications, [they] w[ere] rejected; and (iv) that, after [their] rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”).

  • Either 
    • They are members of a protected group (think religion, race, pregnancy, sex, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, etc.) or
    • Their fundamental right was infringed upon (although the right to own and use property has not been deemed a fundamental right, certain scholars have argued that such rights “need to be protected with nothing less than the judiciary’s strictest level of scrutiny.”202Daniel William Russo, Protecting Property Rights with Strict Scrutiny: An Argument for the “Specifically and Uniquely Attributable” Standard, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 575, 595 (1998). This is certainly an

expansion of the framework, but an argument worth considering)

(2) That they have applied and complied with all requirements in their permit application;

(3) That, although the Brinkmanns complied with all regulatory requirements,

  • The Brinkmanns’ permit application was rejected and
  • The municipality decided to seize the Brinkmanns’ land via eminent domain; and

(4) That, after the rejection,

  • The municipality continued to grant permit applications to similarly situated individuals and
  • Did not seize property of similarly situated individuals (such as adjacent lots with virtually identical characteristics, for instance).

If the Brinkmanns successfully demonstrate indirect evidence, then the burden would shift to the governmental entity to articulate some “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for the permit’s rejection and subsequent taking.203Kelly, supra note 9, at 218.

  1. Beyond a Merely Cognizable Reason for Condemnation

As to the second element of the test, the burden would then be on the municipality to articulate a legitimate, non-bad faith driven reason as to why it rejected the Brinkmanns’ numerous permit applications and decided to take their land.204Id. (By analogy, in the favoritism context, assuming the “condemnee is able to satisfy step one [of this test], the burden would [then] shift to the condemner . . . [T]he condemner [would then be required] to articulate a legitimate justification for private involvement in the taking.”). In analyzing favoritism-motivated takings, Kelly emphasizes that a condemner’s mere articulation of some cognizable public purpose (such as “preserving open space” or “generating new jobs”) would be insufficient to satisfy this element.205Kelly, supra note 9, at 218. A condemner would instead be required to show why a specific kind of private involvement is required for the project to take place.206Id. at 219. For instance, perhaps said private party possesses some crucial information or expertise that other similarly situated experts do not.207Id.

The Town of Southold would satisfy this element by showing that their reason for rejecting the Brinkmanns’ permit and taking their land was not driven by bad faith. What would be that “reasonable basis” for taking the Brinkmanns’ land?208McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973). This could be a wide array of things. Perhaps the Brinkmanns’ business was not compliant with regulations, or their proposed business constituted a hazard, a nuisance, or a danger to others, compelling the municipality to act to protect the safety of its residents. But such claims would require actual empirical evidence (e.g., studies done by civil engineers who hold proper qualifications) suggesting that the construction of a hardware store in that specific location would lead to a significant increase in traffic and thus present a real danger to residents. Further, these experts should be subject to cross-examination.

  1. Elevated Risk of Pretext/Bad Faith

If the condemner (in this case, a municipality) meets the burden outlined in the previous element, the “presumption” of intentional bad faith would disappear.209Kelly, supra note 9, at 219. The condemnee can nevertheless prove “disparate treatment” by showing that a condemner’s explanation is pretextual.210Id. In the context of favorability, a condemnee would satisfy this element by demonstrating a heightened risk of impermissible favoritism.211Id. at 220. For instance, a condemnee could show that a municipality was “capable of selecting a private party through a competitive process but decide[d] not to do so.”212Id.

 By analogy, for purposes of demonstrating a heightened risk of pretext, the Brinkmanns could demonstrate any of the following (this list is non-exhaustive):

(1) An overwhelming majority of Town residents did not want a passive use park213Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 231 (2d Cir. 2024) (Menashi, J., dissenting) (Judge Menashi emphasizing how Sarah Nappa, “a member of the Southold Town Board . . . never even suggest[ed] anyone wanted a park at the location [where the Brinkmanns’ empty lot was].”). or actively advocated for the Brinkmanns’ hardware store;

(2) The Town had not considered any other alternatives before condemning Brinkmanns’ land and ignored the empty adjacent lot;214Id. (Judge Menashi stating that the Town was not “proposing the purchase [of the Brinkmanns’ lot] for the purpose of constructing a park because at that time the Town had not . . . [even] evaluated any alternative location for a new public park somewhere other than the property (including, for example, the possibility of purchasing the undeveloped land for sale next to the [Brinkmanns’] property) . . . . ”).

(3) The Town decided to condemn the Brinkmanns’ land only after the Brinkmanns announced their plans to build a regulation-abiding, family-owned hardware store;215Id. (Judge Menashi further pointing out that the “Town expressed no interest in acquiring the property for a park in 2011 when the property was up for sale or during the five years that the property sat vacant under the [b]ank’s ownership. [Further,] [t]hroughout the Brinkmanns’ discussions with the Town, no one communicated to the Brinkmanns any interest in placing a park on the property. No one mentioned such an interest during the meeting with the Civic Association, in communications with the Town Building Department, or when the Town required the Brinkmanns to pay $30,000 for the Market and Municipal Impact Study.”).

(4) The Town became interested in acquiring the Brinkmanns’ empty lot only after the court allowed the Brinkmanns to proceed with their claim against the Town’s moratorium;216Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 18–19 (“On June 22, 2020, the trial court in the Brinkmanns’ state court lawsuit denied the Town’s motion to dismiss, allowing their challenge to the moratorium to proceed . . . In September 2020, the Town authorized the acquisition of the Brinkmanns’ [p]roperty via eminent domain . . . . ”).

(5) The Town never hired any professionals to evaluate whether the Brinkmanns’ property was suitable for a park;217Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 231 (Menashi, J., dissenting) (Judge Menashi highlighting how the Town “had not retained any outside consultants to evaluate the [Brinkmanns’] property as a location for a new public park.”).

(6) The “projected . . . benefits” of a passive use park were and remain de minimis and “trivial.”218Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Now, the Town could argue that because a park is an established public use, it was allowed to take the Brinkmanns’ land, given that there is a presumptive benefit to the public.219Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 212 (“There can be no dispute that a public park, even an unimproved one, is a public use. Public parks have been recognized as a ‘public use’ for more than a century.”). This line of argumentation should not be allowed (just as it is not allowed in the second element of this test) because that would make this test regress back into rational basis review. Furthermore, because this test largely centers around the risk of ill motive, the condemnees (like the Brinkmanns) should not be required to establish actual ill motive. All they would be required to show is an elevated or substantial risk of bad faith conduct. So for purposes of this last element, it should be sufficient for the Brinkmanns to demonstrate that there is a heightened risk that the municipality’s taking is not justified; this can be achieved via a showing of 1-6, or some robust combination thereof.

C.  So What About the Equal Protection Clause?

The Brinkmann majority cited the Equal Protection Clause as an example of a hypothetical potential avenue available to those afflicted by governmental takings instead of the Takings Clause.220Id. at 217 (“Of course, courts may intercede if an exercise of eminent domain runs afoul of some other constitutional or statutory . . . provision which does permit an examination of motives, such as . . . the Equal Protection Clause.”). But the Equal Protection Clause is a trap because it largely falters at the level of rational basis review, despite the existence of two other standards for Equal Protection Clause analysis (intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny). Under rational basis review, most condemnees will simply never meet the burden of proving that there is an absence of any legitimate municipal interest in condemnation. A cheap park or an empty playing field will satisfy that legitimate municipal interest just fine, or so rational basis review will typically find.

  1. The Three-Tier Framework

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”221U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. When someone wants to argue that their equal protection rights were violated (in the context of challenging eminent domain takings), they are required to initiate suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.222Josh Blackman, Equal Protection from Eminent Domain: Protecting the Home of Olech’s Class of One, 55 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 697, 713 (2009). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the condemnee must successfully demonstrate two elements: (1) that their federal right was violated (that is, their right to “equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment”) and (2) the defendant “who violated [their] right did so under the color of state law.”223Id. The defendant who is alleged to have violated the condemnee’s equal protection rights can be a person or entity “who effectuated the condemnation proceeding.”224Id. Thus, “local governing bodies” and “local officials” can be sued under § 1983 when their alleged unconstitutional action essentially violated the condemnee’s equal protection rights.225Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660 (1978).

 Equal protection jurisprudence is analyzed under three tiers: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny.226Blackman, supra note 231, at 709. Rational basis review is the “default standard” and is the “lowest level of judicial scrutiny.”227Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 887, 896 (2013). Under rational basis review, the burden would be on the condemnee to show the absence of any legitimate municipal interest served by the condemnation.228Id. (“Under [rational basis review], the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the absence of any legitimate governmental interest served by the law.”). An overwhelming majority of equal protection cases are assessed under this very deferential standard.229Id. at 897. This means that plaintiffs overwhelmingly lose under rational basis review.230Id. at 898. In fact, the “number of rational basis cases in which plaintiffs have prevailed is so small that these cases have become an object of study in and of themselves.”231Id. For example, between 1971 and 1996, the Supreme Court “considered one hundred ten rational basis equal protection cases” and “of these cases the plaintiffs won only ten times,” rendering a nine percent success rate.232Blackman, supra note 231, at 716. The Brinkmanns, for instance, would never prevail under this standard: A park is a recognized public use and even a park that is devoid of any facilities could rationally be said to benefit Town residents. The Town residents could still hold picnics there or let their kids run around. So, under rational basis review, the Town would be viewed as having had some conceivable or possible interest in condemning the Brinkmanns’ land.233Id. at 710–11 (Rational basis review standard is “supremely deferential to the legislature, as courts employing this method almost always uphold actions as long as some possible, conceivable basis can justify it.”).

As to strict scrutiny, courts may depart from rational basis review in two instances: (1) when there is either a suspect or quasi-suspect classification or (2) a fundamental right at issue.234Pollvogt, supra note 236, at 895–96. A fundamental right at issue could trigger both a due process and an equal protection claim. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). These two are jurisprudential rabbit holes and thus beyond the scope of this Note, but the following are deemed examples of suspect classifications (thereby triggering strict scrutiny): race and national origin.235Pollvogt, supra note 236, at 895; Blackman, supra note 231, at 709. Please note that this is a non-exhaustive list of suspect classifications on the federal level. Further, some states such as California, recognize many other suspect classifications under the state constitution specifically. Age, disability, and economic disadvantage—among many others—do not qualify as suspect classifications and would only be subject to rational basis review.236See Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 Nova L. Rev. 407 (2010). In the takings context, the “suspicion” comes from the very fact that a government or municipality may have relied on one of these classifications when making the condemnation decision (in the takings context).237Pollvogt, supra note 236, at 895. Such reliance would indicate “prejudice or antipathy toward the named group rather than a basis for sound [decision].”238Id.

A fundamental right, on the other hand, has a much more confusing roadmap, or lack thereof: despite the fact that strict scrutiny “presupposes” so-called fundamental rights, the strict scrutiny formula gives absolutely “no guidance concerning how the identification [of rights violations] should occur.”239Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1321 (2007). Some of the recognized fundamental rights are the right to vote,240Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). the right to have children,241Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). and the right to travel interstate.242Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

Categories of suspect class and fundamental right are now considered to be “seemingly closed,” making strict scrutiny, therefore, “virtually inaccessible” unless there is an already recognized suspect classification or a fundamental right at play.243Pollvogt, supra note 236, at 898. The Supreme Court has not “conferred suspect status on any [new] group since the 1970s,” even for “groups widely acknowledged to have suffered invidious treatment.”244Blackman, supra note 231, at 710.

And the Brinkmanns, along with most other condemnees, would most likely not even make it to strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause in the first place. For instance, in Brinkmann, there was no alleged or potential suspect classification. And a property right is not a fundamental right in the eyes of substantive due process.

If a governmental action imposes a facially neutral classification (i.e., the law does not, on its face, single anyone out in particular, thereby implicating no suspect classification), condemnees could still argue that:

(1) The governmental action has a disparate impact (i.e., disadvantages a certain group of people) AND

(2) The governmental action was taken purposefully to harm this particular group of people (e.g., on the basis of race).

Although this would be an alternate pathway to strict scrutiny, most condemnees’ claims will likely fail prong #2’s discriminatory intent test and be given the short shrift of rational basis review instead.245William D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 435, 453–54 (2013). To demonstrate prong #2, condemnees (such as the Brinkmanns) would need to prove that a decision to condemn was because the government wanted to harm a certain group of people, not “in spite of” their decision to condemn having a disparate effect on a certain group of people.246Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also Araiza, supra note 254, at 454. That is, the Brinkmanns would need to prove that the Town initiated this bad faith condemnation action precisely because of the Town’s intent to cause “adverse effects” upon the Brinkmanns as members of an “identifiable group” (assuming that the Brinkmanns had been members of an identifiable group).247Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Proving such discriminatory intent is widely acknowledged as being “exceptionally difficult” to do,248Pollvogt, supra note 236, at 897. and this is another reason why most claims are subject only to rational basis review.

  1. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Animus

This Note also acknowledges the doctrine of unconstitutional animus, which is based largely on the Equal Protection Clause.249Daniel O. Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle and Judicial Prudence, 48 Stetson L. Rev. 195, 195 (2019). At first glance, it presents an attractive solution: If a municipality’s condemnation is motivated by animus, why can’t the court just strike it down? Why is the Takings Clause even necessary? But unconstitutional animus has some glaring problems.

Unconstitutional animus is basically a loophole that allows an equal protection claimant to possibly prevail under rational basis review.250Pollvogt, supra note 236, at 889 (“Proving that a law is based on unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way an equal protection plaintiff can prevail under this deferential and increasingly common standard.”). While that would be good news for the Brinkmanns, the bad news is that it is, at best, unclear what constitutes forbidden animus.251Conkle, supra note 258, at 201 n.38. A law (or a decision to condemn, for instance) is animus-based if it is “based on nothing more than bias, hatred, or dislike.”252Id. at 204–05 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has defined animus as “a bare . . . desire to harm” a person, which is a high burden to meet.253United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis added). For one, what if a condemnation is based on both animus and some animus-free “public-regarding objective”?254Conkle, supra note 258, at 202. For instance, in Brinkmann, both the Town residents and even the dissenting judge (pursuant to the Brinkmann majority’s snarky suggestion) could come to the park, “breathe its air” and

“spread [a] picnic.”255Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, 96 F.4th 209, 219 (2d Cir. 2024). A public park is, by definition, for the public to enjoy, and would thus constitute a public-regarding objective.

The definition of “animus” poses further issues. To illustrate, neither “religious belief[s]” nor “personal morality” are necessarily equated with animus.256Conkle, supra note 258, at 201. Take the 2015 Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, for instance.257See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). Although the Obergefell Court held that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying violated both the Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process, the Court also noted that it declines to “disparage” those who “deem same-sex marriage to be wrong . . . based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises.”258Id. at 672. So when is it a decent and honorable religious belief and when is it animus-based homophobia?259Conkle, supra note 258, at 206. How does the court draw a consistent or predictable line between prejudice and a decent and honorable personal belief? This absence of a framework on how to arrive at a decision that something indeed constitutes animus is the reason that lower courts have been “wary of relying on animus” in the first place.260Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183, 184 (2013).

Further, this doctrine necessitates an inquiry into subjective motivations of those officials who decided to condemn property. This takes us back to one of the Brinkmann majority’s concerns: that motivational inquiry is an “exercise as fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties.”261Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 213. And the Brinkmann majority, in the context of unconstitutional animus, would not be wrong because the unconstitutional animus doctrine has been criticized as “analytically empty, a conclusion clothed in argument.”262Carpenter, supra note 269, at 185. The unconstitutional animus doctrine largely sits on a famously shaky foundation of just four cases (the so-called “animus quadrilogy”).263Id. at 183. Some scholars even argue that three of these cases “could and should have relied instead on [the traditional] equal protection doctrine for suspect and quasi-suspect classifications,” thereby expanding the suspect and quasi-suspect classifications.264Conkle, supra note 258, at 207. The unconstitutional animus doctrine is simply not as robust as the Takings Clause or the three tiers of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In contrast to the doctrine of unconstitutional animus, various bad-faith takings frameworks (all directly arising from the interpretation of the “public use” language in the Takings Clause) were already employed by the Ninth Circuit in Southern Pacific and Scott Lumber, the Seventh Circuit in 58.16 Acres of Land, and even the Connecticut Supreme Court in New England Estates. Although future jurisprudential analysis may well be able to rely on a vigorous animus framework, the current lack of such a framework, along with its high bar for success, makes animus analysis a suboptimal solution.265This Note also acknowledges the presence of another potential solution: the class-of-one theory. The class-of-one theory essentially stands for the proposition that in the takings context, a condemnee can bring an equal protection claim, “alleging discrimination against [them] in [their] capacity as an individual.” Araiza, supra note 254, at 438. These claims are “hard to win,” partly because the class-of-one theory has a “disheartening” judicial record. Id. at 438–41. The whole theory essentially rests on the shoulders of two cases: the Supreme Court’s “short per curiam opinion,” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), and Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) where the Court declined to extend the class-of-one theory to the public employment context. Id. at 444. These two cases caused “extensive confusion in the lower courts” because it left “many matters unresolved,” including creating confusion as to how prevail on such a claim in the first place. Id. at 441; Blackman, supra note 231, at 727. Further, under this theory, a condemnee would still need to prove the “intent” element (similar to strict scrutiny under the traditional three-tier Equal Protection Clause framework) and show that a municipality (such as the Town of Southold) “singled out” the condemnee “because of” the condemnee’s “identity,” not merely “in spite of.” Araiza, supra note 254, at 455. This is, arguably, a high burden to meet. There is a great deal of debate fostering much scholarship concerning this theory, but it is largely beyond the scope of this Note.

D.  Brinkmann Implications

At its core, Brinkmann is more than just bad law. It is actually dangerous because it incentivizes governmental entities to lie when condemning someone’s land, which in turn denies basic accountability to the public. Under Brinkmann, any bad-faith taking can receive judicial blessing if the government or a municipality simply utters words like “passive use park” or “playing field.” Discrimination can be sanitized in this manner. Likewise, racism and outright hostility. In Brinkmann, the Town stated at oral argument that, under the Brinkmann majority’s interpretation of public use, it would be perfectly acceptable for the Town to “seize the homes of disfavored minorities out of animus toward those minorities and a desire to drive them out,” just so long as the Town “said it would build parks where the minorities’ homes once stood.”266Brinkmann, 96 F.4th at 233 (Menashi, J., dissenting). Frighteningly, the Town’s analysis is not incorrect under the Brinkmann rule. Even scarier is that this is now the law in the Second Circuit, and this is what the Second Circuit has authorized condemnors to do.

Law has real world consequences. For instance, Kelo expanded the concept of public purpose to “encompass any economically beneficial goal, guarantee[ing] that these losses [of property] will fall disproportionately on poor communities.”267Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Kelo gave a green light to “large corporations and development firms” to “victimize” people who are “less likely to put their lands to the highest . . . social use.”268Id. at 521–22. Kelo essentially “affirmed that a government may take the private property of one party and give it to another private party if the other pays more taxes.”269Hafetz, supra note 86, at 3101. It did not take long to confirm that Kelo “engendered fear across the nation”:270Id. at 3095–96. in the year immediately after Kelo was decided, the Institute for Justice “found that 5783 properties ha[d] been [either] threatened or condemned for private commercial development, roughly equal to the number of such condemnations in the five years preceding Kelo.”271Id. at 3105. Scholars also found that this Kelo-authorized “private involvement in the exercise of eminent domain” increased the risk of corruption and threat of relocation.272Id.

Berman serves as another notable example. Over 97% of the people “forcibly removed from their homes”273Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting). were Black—all for the declared sake of “public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order.”274Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Post-Berman, “public works projects [of the] 1950s and 1960s destroyed predominantly minority communities in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Baltimore, Maryland.”275Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting). And in 1981, “urban planners in Detroit, Michigan, [used eminent domain to] uproot[] the largely ‘lower-income and elderly’ Poletown neighborhood for the benefit of the General Motors Corporation.”276Id.

So, what will Brinkmann’s impact be? While it is uncertain to what extent it will inform the actions of governmental entities, the impact will certainly not be a societal positive. Instead, it will continue its catastrophic trajectory because Brinkmann encourages, and even rewards, municipalities to lie about their intentions behind condemnation decisions.

  CONCLUSION

Sometimes there are more questions than answers, but sometimes asking good questions is better than any answer—an endeavor that is by necessity limited in scope and applicability. And perhaps, this is the case here. The Brinkmann decision raises a lot of questions, ranging from the Brinkmann majority’s disregard of their own Goldstein precedent to a likely misinterpretation of Kelo, which cost the Brinkmanns their lot.

But Brinkmann also sparks an important conversation concerning what could and should be employed instead of the Brinkmann rule. After examining decisions rendered by the Connecticut Supreme Court and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, all of which stand in opposition (in varying degrees) to Brinkmann, this Note envisions an alternative to the Brinkmann rule via the tripartite burden-shifting standard. But that is not all. This Note also demonstrates the failings of rational basis review, the Equal Protection Clause, and the animus doctrine when applied to addressing bad-faith takings.

The Takings Clause can destroy lives, but it can also build and improve the society in which those same lives exist. Similarly, the Takings Clause can also preserve freedom and even “empower[]” people “to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world in which governments are always eager to do so for them.”277Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 394 (2017). It is all a matter of perspective, but also—and critically—cultivating good law.

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405

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*Articles Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. English 2022, University of California, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor Jacob Charles, Professor Jonathan Barnett, Lance Entrekin, and the wonderful Southern California Law Review staff for their thoughtful comments. Thank you also to my family for their continued love and support.

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: Labor & Privacy in the Age of Kidfluencers and the Internet’s Stage Mothers

  INTRODUCTION

In 2022, a group of minors sued Tiffany Smith, mother and producer of prolific child influencer Piper Rockelle, and her corporation Piper Rockelle Inc. (“PRI”), alleging nineteen claims in total, nearly all for violations of either state tort law or the California Labor Code.1Complaint for Damages for: 1. Violation of California Civil Code § 3344, 2. Violation of Common Law Right of Publicity, 3. Unjust Enrichment, 4. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, 5. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, 6. Civil Conspiracy, 7. Sexual Battery, 8. Battery, 9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 10. Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, Et Seq. at 1–2, Sawyer S. v. Smith, No. 22STCV01351 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2022) [hereinafter Complaint for Damages]; Second Amended Complaint for Damages for: 1. Violation of California Civil Code § 3344, 2. Violation of Common Law Right of Publicity, 3. Unjust Enrichment, 4. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, 5. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, 6. Civil Conspiracy 7. Sexual Battery, 8. Battery, 9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 10. Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, Et Seq., 11. Negligence, 12. Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, 13. Failure to Pay Minimum Wage (Labor Code §§ 216 and 1194 Et Seq.), 14. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation (Labor Code § 510), 15. Failure to Furnish Wage and Hour Statements (Labor Code § 226), 16. Waiting Time Penalties (Labor Code §§ 201–2013), 17. Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512), 18. Violation of Child Labor Laws, 19. Civil Penalties Under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Labor Code §§ 2698 Et. Seq.) at 1–2, Sawyer S. v. Smith, No. 22STCV01351 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2024) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint for Damages]. The minors had previously appeared in monetized content on Rockelle’s YouTube channel, which then boasted over 8.5 million followers,2Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 5. as part of a group of children self-nicknamed “the Squad.”3Id. at 2–3. According to their complaint, they devoted long hours—in some cases more than twelve hours a day for seven days a week4Second Amended Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 43–44.—over three years to producing “hundreds” of “highly lucrative” videos but were never compensated, were denied meal and rest breaks while filming, and did not receive regular on-set education.5Amy Kaufman & Jessica Gelt, Inside the Blockbuster Lawsuit Threatening One Teen YouTube Star’s Multimillion-Dollar Empire, L.A. Times (Dec. 18, 2022, at 22:24 PT) [hereinafter Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit], https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2022-12-18/piper-rockelle-youtube-child-labor-lawsuit [https://web.archive.org/web/20241009204928/https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2022-12-18/piper-rockelle-youtube-child-labor-lawsuit]. Following the suit’s initial filing, YouTube demonetized Rockelle’s channel, and venues where Rockelle had upcoming tour dates canceled her appearances.6Id. In 2023, Smith countersued for $30 million, accusing plaintiffs and their parents of defamation, fraud, and extortion; before plaintiffs responded, Smith dropped her lawsuit.7Id.; Angela Yang, YouTube Mom’s Child Abuse Scandal Ends in $1.85 Million Settlement, NBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2024, at 13:22 PT), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/piper-rockelle-mom-youtube-settlement-deal-rcna174615 [https://perma.cc/VL7B-2X74]. In March 2024, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge denied Smith’s motion for summary judgment, thus scheduling the case for trial.8Sawyer S. v. Smith, No. 22STCV01351, 2024 Cal. Super. LEXIS 51728, at *2, *19 (Dec. 18, 2024). By October 2024, the parties had settled for $1.85 million.9Yang, supra note 8.

The suit illustrates the potential for severe damage inherent in the world of child influencers—a world that is, as of now, largely unregulated. The plaintiffs in the suit, and Rockelle herself, represent a common demographic among child influencers (“kidfluencers”): children between ten and sixteen years of age with public, monetized accounts on large social-media platforms like YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, and talent and training in skills like dancing and singing as well as video editing and other skills required for content creation. Between 2017 and 2020, the plaintiffs appeared in content on Rockelle’s YouTube channel and on her accounts on other platforms; while Rockelle’s early postings were relatively innocuous (videos with titles like “My trip to the Los Angeles Zoo”10Piper Rockelle, My Trip to the Los Angeles Zoo || Piper Rockelle (YouTube, Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndZwmfmOcow [https://perma.cc/Z8KJ-3B4V]. and “Getting a pet turtle!!!”11Piper Rockelle, Getting a Pet Turtle!!! (YouTube, June 11, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OPQGKBJZTE [https://perma.cc/W6NH-DJZ8]. ), the channel’s tone quickly took a questionable turn, with videos featuring children performing skits, challenges, and pranks in various stages of undress and in suggestive situations accompanied by clickbait thumbnails and titles12Clickbait, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/clickbait [https://perma.cc/CXA3-W9XE] (last visited Dec. 17, 2024, at 12:14 PT). such as “24 HOURS HANDCUFFED to my ‘BOYFRIEND’ ” (featuring a then-ten-year-old Rockelle),13Piper Rockelle, 24 Hours Handcuffed to My “Boyfriend” | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, June 23, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jua-A0z6BL0 [https://perma.cc/CW3N-2XTE]. “11 YEAR OLD BELLY PIERCED **PRANK** (Can’t Say No 24 Hour Challenge) 🚫👌,”14Piper Rockelle, 11 Year Old Belly Pierced **Prank** (Can’t Say No 24 Hour Challenge)🚫👌 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, Jan. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Rockelle, Belly Pierced], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkF8_jxE16M [https://perma.cc/TP7S-FHWX]. and “Asking STRANGERS To Be My BOYFRIEND Challenge **1 DATE = $100** ❤️💵” (featuring a then-twelve-year-old Rockelle).15Piper Rockelle, Asking Strangers to Be My Boyfriend Challenge **1 Date = $100**❤️💵 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, June 23, 2019) [hereinafter Rockelle, Asking Strangers to Be My Boyfriend], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPymnxtTG-0 [https://perma.cc/ZTM5-FQA4].

Using the Piper Rockelle lawsuit (“the PRI lawsuit”) as a case study,16I acknowledge that use of the PRI lawsuit as a case study may have inherent limitations in supporting more general propositions about the kidfluencer phenomenon and related legal and policy concerns. this Note will focus on the growing number of kidfluencers and the need for standardized, federal laws ensuring their fair labor conditions and preservation of personal privacy. In particular, this Note will discuss the inadequacy of federal and state regulation of two forms of exploitation that present concerns in the kidfluencer context: (1) labor (exploiting a child’s work without compensation, meaningful consent, or regulation) and (2) privacy (exploiting a child’s image or likeness without compensation and meaningful consent).17In addition to both forms of exploitation, the PRI case also involved significant physical abuse; such abuse raises issues and laws that are not unique to kidfluencing and are not the focus of this Note. Part I of this Note presents an overview of the kidfluencer phenomenon and the evolution of stage parents from vaudeville and the early motion picture industry to the Internet and social media. Part II describes kidfluencers’ vulnerability to labor exploitation, discussing how measures protecting child performers remain largely unavailable to kidfluencers and require expansion to cover this new demographic of child workers. Part III details the rampant exploitation of kidfluencers’ privacy and analyzes how the increasing legal spotlight on protecting children as social-media users has yet to acknowledge kidfluencers’ privacy and publicity interests and must do so to adequately protect them. Part IV proposes that, in addition to enacting laws to protect the labor and privacy rights of kidfluencers, Congress should empower social-media platforms as enforcers of kidfluencer laws and impose liability on platforms that host content produced in violation of these recognized kidfluencer rights. Ultimately, this Note presents a holistic set of common-sense regulations, grounded in analogous, existing law, that are designed to close the critical gaps in kidfluencer protections as quickly and effectively as possible. This all-encompassing approach—covering both privacy and labor—to regulating children in monetized content is essential given the pervasiveness of their online presence and the reality of ever-advancing online technology that is here to stay.

I.  THE ARRIVAL OF KIDFLUENCERS

The influencer economy is worth over $250 billion worldwide18Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Michael H. Keller, A Marketplace of Girl Influencers Managed by Moms and Stalked by Men, N.Y. Times (Feb. 25, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/us/instagram-child-influencers.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20241116174149/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/us/instagram-child-influencers.html]. and is expected to swell to $480 billion before the year 2030.19Press Release, Steve Padilla, Sen., California Legislature Approves Senator Padilla Bill Updating Financial Protections for Youth Content Creators (Aug. 29, 2024), https://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/california-legislature-approves-senator-padilla-bill-updating-financial-protections-youth [https://perma.cc/8MCP-PWAU]. U.S. brands spend more than $5 billion on influencers each year.20Valentino-DeVries & Keller, supra note 19. Massive content-sharing platforms like YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok host millions of influencers who then share content to millions more subscribers.21Joe Gagliese, The Rise of the Influencer: Predictions for Ways They’ll Change the World, Forbes (July 8, 2022, at 7:30 ET), https://www.forbes.com/councils/theyec/2022/07/08/the-rise-of-the-influencer-predictions-for-ways-theyll-change-the-world [https://perma.cc/9SFW-UZJN]. On YouTube, influencers creating and sharing videos on their “channels” earn revenue based on the number of views their videos generate. When a YouTube channel is monetized, YouTube collects forty-five percent of advertising revenue from the creator’s videos, and the creator receives the remainder.22Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. With this formula, top creators earn tens of millions of dollars each year—and kidfluencers with at least one million followers can earn $10,000 or more for each sponsored post they share.23Press Release, Dave Koehler, Sen., Ill. Gen. Assemb., Koehler Law Ensures Child Vloggers Are Accurately Compensated (Aug. 11, 2023, at 16:22 PT), https://www.senatordavekoehler.com/news/28-press-releases/462-koehler-law-ensures-child-vloggers-are-accurately-compensated [https://perma.cc/PJ5K-JSBW]. Before the onset of the PRI lawsuit, PRI made between $4.2 million and $7.5 million annually from social-media advertising alone, and the PRI plaintiffs averaged up to $28,000 per month in YouTube revenue.24Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6; Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 21–23.

And kidfluencers are a fast-growing demographic in monetized social-media content.25Sapna Maheshwari, Online and Earnings Thousands, at Age 4: Meet the Kidfluencers, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/media/social-media-influencers-kids.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20250207002557/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/media/social-media-influencers-kids.html]. Social-media accounts listed in children’s names but managed by parents (typically with a moniker like “Managed by Mom” in the account biography) feature young children almost exclusively, with little to no regulations governing the children’s compensation, working conditions, or content output. Thus, children can work extensive hours, receive little to no formal schooling, and have their intimate details shared on the Internet at-large with essentially no recourse and no safeguarding of their earnings from parents or other adults controlling their accounts. Many kidfluencer accounts boast massive followings, with subscribers in the hundreds of thousands or even millions, and the financial payout is huge. Roughly a century ago, states began regulating labor conditions for child performers, many of whom were pushed into the entertainment industry by their parents and subsequently experienced extensive exploitation.26See infra Section I.A. Now, social media has given stage parents a new arena—one with novel and potentially catastrophic dangers if left unchecked.

A. A Brief History of Stage Mothers

The concept of “stage parents” and “stage mothers” enjoys a long and controversial history in American culture.27See generally Teresa Simone, Performing Performance Moms, in Aoise Stratford & Lynn Deboeck, (M)Other Perspectives: Staging Motherhood in 21st Century North American Theatre & Performance 220 (2023) (discussing depictions of stage mothers in reality television and various social debate thereof). Early discussion of overbearing and even abusive parents pushing their children into careers on stage and in film arose from personal anecdotes of early film stars. Legendary movie star Judy Garland often recounted growing up on a vaudeville stage in the 1920s and 1930s, and the intensity with which her mother, Ethel Gumm, pushed her to perform; in a 1967 interview, Garland, recalling her early days of performing onstage, stated, “[My mother] would sort of stand in the wings . . . and if I didn’t feel good, if I was sick to my tummy, she’d say, ‘You get out and sing, or I’ll wrap you around the bedpost and break you off short!’ So, I’d go out and sing.”28Jaycub Howard, Judy Garland Complete 1967 Interview, at 13:25–13:39 (YouTube, Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHJujYMvY30 [https://perma.cc/8DJV-FLV2]. Garland, cemented in American culture by her performance as Dorothy in 1939’s The Wizard of Oz, later characterized her mother as “the real Wicked Witch of the West” and described how Ethel began giving her pills to increase energy or to promote sleep before Garland’s tenth birthday.29Sara Kettler, Inside Judy Garland’s Troubled Youth, Biography (Oct. 1, 2020, at 14:12 ET), https://www.biography.com/actors/judy-garland-facts-bio [https://perma.cc/AK45-5UC9].

Nearly a century and the passage of much legislation for child performers later, stage parents like Ethel Gumm remain, motivated by many of the same interests—money, fame, power, attention—as their twentieth-century counterparts. These interests can easily collide with children’s needs, and the development of laws protecting child actors demonstrates a commitment by the traditional entertainment industry to limiting the effects of such conflict. Today, child actors in multiple states, including California and New York, and members of entertainer unions like SAG-AFTRA have protections that Judy Garland’s generation did not, such as guaranteed access to wages, adequate education, and limitations over working hours.30SAG-AFTRA, the primary labor union for American media professionals, provides extensive protections to child actors. See SAG-AFTRA, Young Performers Handbook 7 (2020), https://issuu.com/sag-aftra/docs/2020_youngperformers [https://perma.cc/5YUZ-F8F4]. Entertainers are eligible for membership upon being hired for a position covered by a SAG-AFTRA collective bargaining agreement, while minors under age four can work under SAG-AFTRA contracts without union membership. Id. at 5. SAG-AFTRA’s collective bargaining agreements mandate protected trust accounts for the compensation of minor actors working in California and New York, in addition to restricting work hours for minor actors anywhere in the United States and imposing requirements for on-set education and supervision. Id. at 9, 13, 17. Production companies employing minors must adhere to the responsibilities required by both SAG-AFTRA contracts and applicable state law. Id. at 17. These regulations acknowledge both the potential conflict of interest between stage parents and child performers as well as the reality of children as a key and enduring presence within the entertainment industry. But while child actors today are more protected from parents who squander their earnings or force them to work oppressively long hours, children are still at the mercy of their parents as to whether they ultimately pursue an entertainment career in the first place and, if they do, the relentlessness of that pursuit.

In 2022, former child star Jennette McCurdy released her memoir I’m Glad My Mom Died. Chronicling her ascent from poverty to fame on the highly successful Nickelodeon show iCarly, McCurdy detailed her late mother’s longstanding obsession with McCurdy’s success as a child actor, regardless of McCurdy’s own disinterest in such a career. Recalling the initial signing meeting with her first agent, McCurdy wrote,

“It’s important that Jennette wants to act, in order for her to do well,” [the agent] says.

“Oh, she wants this more than anything,” Mom says as she signs on the next page’s dotted line.

Mom wants this more than anything, not me. [Auditioning] was stressful and not fun, and if given the choice, I would choose to never do anything like it again. On the other hand, I do want what Mom wants, so she’s kind of right.31Jennette McCurdy, I’m Glad My Mom Died 14 (2022).

McCurdy emphasized her lack of agency and meaningful choice in embarking on her career as an actor, framing her mother’s eventual death from cancer as the catalyst that allowed McCurdy to leave behind the career she never wanted—though she could not as easily escape her fame.32See id. at 303.

When I was six years old, she pushed me into a career I didn’t want. I’m grateful for the financial stability that career has provided me, but not much else. I was not equipped to handle the entertainment industry and all of its competitiveness, rejection, stakes, harsh realities, fame. I needed that time, those years, to develop as a child. To form my identity. To grow. I can never get those years back.33Id.

B. Reality Television Bridges the Gap from Film and Television to the Internet

In 2011, the Lifetime reality series Dance Moms premiered, unwittingly marking the beginning of a new era and a new medium for twenty-first-century stage parents. Following a group of young competitive dancers and their intense and argumentative mothers, Dance Moms became an overnight sensation and launched the show’s young dancers into stardom. In the show’s early seasons, the dancers’ mothers spoke of their hopes for their children to achieve careers on a Broadway stage and in film.34See, e.g., Dance Moms: The Competition Begins (Lifetime television broadcast, aired July 13, 2011). In 2011, Instagram was in its infancy and the advent of TikTok was years away; a handful of hit reality shows featuring children, like Jon and Kate Plus 8 and the ill-fated 19 Kids and Counting,3519 Kids and Counting was a reality series on The Learning Channel (“TLC”) that ran from 2008 to 2015 and followed the lives of the Duggar family, a conservative Christian family with nineteen children. See Abby Ohlheiser, Sarah Pulliam Bailey & Elahe Izadi, Josh Duggar Apologizes Amid Molestation Allegations, Quits Family Research Council, Wash. Post (May 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/05/21/josh-duggar-apologizes-resigns-from-family-research-council-amid-molestation-allegations [https://web.archive.org/web/20150531005339/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/05/21/josh-duggar-apologizes-resigns-from-family-research-council-amid-molestation-allegations]. The show was canceled in 2015 after allegations surfaced that the family’s oldest son, Joshua Duggar, had sexually abused four of his younger sisters before the show’s run. Abby Ohlheiser & Elahe Izadi, TLC Pulls ‘19 Kids and Counting’ Citing ‘Heartbreaking Situation,’ Wash. Post (May 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/05/22/what-happens-to-tlcs-19-kids-and-counting-after-the-josh-duggar-allegations [https://web.archive.org/web/20150531162500/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/05/22/what-happens-to-tlcs-19-kids-and-counting-after-the-josh-duggar-allegations]. existed but the children on those shows were not positioned adjacent to entertainment careers and also had not built independent followings or fanbases—the concept of kidfluencers was entirely new. Dance Moms changed the game.36See generally Back to the Barre (Apple Podcasts) (discussing how the Dance Moms child cast evolved from popular reality-television personalities to some of the first kidfluencers on content-sharing platforms).

Today, the original Dance Moms dancers are in their early to mid-twenties and their primary careers are as social-media influencers.37See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. Instead of becoming “stars” in a traditional sense on stage and in film, the Dance Moms girls achieved stardom as themselves, beloved by young fans of their show who flocked to follow them on social media as Instagram and other platforms simultaneously took off.38Rebecka Schumann, ‘Dance Moms’ Online: 8 Former Cast Members to Follow on Instagram, Twitter and More, Int’l Bus. Times (July 2, 2015, at 14:15 ET), https://www.ibtimes.com/dance-moms-online-8-former-cast-members-follow-instagram-twitter-more-1994430 [https://perma.cc/V8SF-BWMX]. While the first Dance Moms dancers did not begin their time on the show imagining kidfluencer fame, cast members during the show’s later seasons arguably did. In 2016, a group of younger dancers joined the now-wildly successful Dance Moms cast; entering the show in the post-Instagram and Musical.ly (TikTok’s forerunner application) world, these new dancers had social-media pages ready when the show’s global audience began following them in droves. Now teenagers, many members of Dance Moms’ second generation work as kidfluencers today39See id.—and the world of kidfluencers and reality child stars is a small one. Dance Moms’ second generation includes seventeen-year-old Lilliana Ketchman and eighteen-year-old Elliana Walmsley. Ketchman was named by the PRI plaintiffs as a perceived competitor to Rockelle, “anger[ing]” Smith; the plaintiffs believed Smith subsequently used “dirty tactics” to cause a significant decline in Ketchman’s followers, viewership, and revenue in January 2021.40Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 15–16. Plaintiffs believed that Smith used the same tactics against Ketchman that they alleged that she did against the plaintiffs themselves after they stopped collaborating with Smith to develop content for Rockelle’s platforms. Such tactics included

using “bots,” paying to quickly add and then remove “subscribers” from a YouTube channel (which affects YouTube’s algorithm for recommended content), falsely flagging content as “inappropriate” on YouTube (which leads to the content being deemed “restricted,” thereby hurting viewership of the content), embedding [p]laintiffs’ videos into porn[ography] sites and working with an inside individual . . . at YouTube to help “restrict” [p]laintiffs’ videos.

Id. at 15.
Meanwhile, Walmsley is a former member of Rockelle’s Squad, though she was not a party to the PRI lawsuit.41See, e.g., Piper Rockelle, Last to Stop Massaging Their Boyfriend Wins **Couples Challenge** 💆‍♀️💕 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, Feb. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Rockelle, Last to Stop], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xSRoRwuVxX4 [https://perma.cc/EYF9-9PDA]; Piper Rockelle, Last to Leave the Bubble Bath!! (YouTube, Feb. 5, 2022) [hereinafter Rockelle, Last to Leave], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KHlTcf0e4s [https://perma.cc/5MHN-JCQ2].

Image 1.  Former Dance Moms Cast Member and Current Influencer Kendall Vertes’s Instagram42Kendall Vertes (@kendallvertes), Instagram, https://www.instagram.com/kendallvertes [https://web.archive.org/web/20240110032236/https://www.instagram.com/accounts/login/?next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.instagram.com%2Fkendallvertes%2F].

 

 

Image 2.  Former Dance Moms Cast Member and Current Influencer Chloé Lukasiak’s Instagram43Chloé Lukasiak (@chloelukasiak), Instagram, https://www.instagram.com/chloelukasiak [https://perma.cc/PFP7-FQ6K].

Barely a decade after Dance Moms’ premiere and Instagram’s launch, kidfluencing is now eclipsing the once-well-trodden paths to child stardom found on television and in film. Piper Rockelle exemplifies this phenomenon:

Paparazzi don’t wait outside Piper’s fuchsia-painted mansion in the San Fernando Valley, but among a young, YouTube-fixated demographic, the ebullient brunette is idolized. As a rising star on the most-watched video-content platform of her generation, Piper bypassed the traditional paths of Nickelodeon and Disney to become a millionaire through the monetization of her social media content.

Propelled by the force of millions of likes and heart emojis, Piper was making between $4.2 million and $7.5 million a year before the Squad’s lawsuit. Her YouTube videos had amassed over 1.87 billion views, and companies such as NBCUniversal, Disney and Amazon were paying her to promote their products on Instagram and TikTok. Super-VIP tickets on her tour—a live variety show that trades on the Squad’s online personas—went for $599.99. She was also selling merchandise on her website, offering personalized greetings via Cameo and making music. She has released seven singles.44Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6.

The PRI “empire[],” much like many YouTube money machines, “was built at home.”45Id. Smith’s live-in boyfriend, Hunter Hill, also a defendant in the PRI lawsuit, filmed and edited the Squad’s videos in the Smith home, and Smith planned video content and coordinated filming schedules for Squad members.46Id. Initially, Rockelle and other members of the Squad sought success as actors on stage and in film; after her social-media channels took off, however, Rockelle narrowed her focus solely to kidfluencing, while Smith “strongly discouraged” other Squad members from continuing to pursue work beyond their growing YouTube empire.47Id.

And though stage parents like Smith are pursuing fame for their children in a new medium, the same conflicts of interest between parents and children that persist in film and television recur in the Internet-child-stardom era. In the early 2000s, the challenges of living in poverty colored Jennette McCurdy’s high-stress journey into the television industry; just a few years later, PRI would allegedly take advantage of children also coming from limited means in order to profit from their involvement in the Squad. Said one PRI plaintiff, “[s]ingle mothers using YouTube to support the family—there’s a lot of those in the [Squad’s families].”48Id.

While the PRI lawsuit is seemingly unique (as of now) in terms of its size and the breadth of the allegations at-issue, Rockelle and the Squad are in good company as part of a vast, bankable movement of kidfluencer content creators. Kidfluencer accounts are undeniably popular: a 2019 study revealed that videos featuring a child younger than thirteen-years-old receive three times the views garnered by videos without children.49Patrick Van Kessel, Skye Toor & Aaron Smith, A Week in the Life of Popular YouTube Channels, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (July 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/07/25/a-week-in-the-life-of-popular-youtube-channels [https://perma.cc/59KQ-22TN]. And critics of the kidfluencer phenomenon say that platforms like YouTube, as well as brands that partner with kidfluencers for paid product placements, are deliberately skirting child labor laws because of kidfluencer accounts’ popularity and payoff; in their view, the legal gray area surrounding kidfluencers enables platforms and brands to make “billions” from kidfluencer content while avoiding the costs and coordination that film and television productions are legally required to undertake to work with child performers.50Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. YouTube currently makes it fairly easy, with strategic use of algorithmic tools like hash-tagging, to achieve monetized status, requiring that channels reach just 1,000 subscribers and 4,000 viewing hours within twelve months to become monetized; as of last year, YouTube hosted roughly two million monetized accounts.51Id.

Between YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, opportunities for children to build a massive online presence—and for adults to make serious money off their backs—are exploding. As the last century of developing adequate legal protections for child actors demonstrates, this level of financial promise coupled with children as the key moneymakers is a recipe for exploitative disaster. Now that the recipe has found a new home on the Internet, the potential for lifelong damage to the children behind the money machines has reached devastating levels. The baby steps that some lawmakers are beginning to take toward protecting, primarily, kidfluencers’ compensation are, to be sure, essential regulatory efforts. But the reality of the kidfluencer world demands a much more all-encompassing approach—one that treats kidfluencers as the professionals they are and treats the Internet as the uniquely permanent and wide-ranging medium it is. Making parents the unchecked shot-callers over their children’s labor conditions and privacy is an untenable arrangement because of the potential conflict of interest inherent in parents choosing between substantial monetary gain and their children’s best interests. Kidfluencers and the Internet (much like child film stars and the motion picture industry as seen a century ago) are not going anywhere. So, lawmakers must get serious about how to regulate them.

II.  REGULATING THE LABOR OF KIDFLUENCERS

While federal law does provide some protections for child labor, it expressly exempts child performers from those protections. Thus, to the extent that child entertainers receive protection from labor exploitation, those protections come either from state law or from unions for media professionals such as SAG-AFTRA. However, summarizing what relevant federal law is present in this area helps contextualize the gaps in child entertainer regulations that state laws and unions have had to attempt to fill. And while neither state laws (for the most part) nor unions protect kidfluencers’ labor rights, they do protect child entertainers and thus provide helpful and relevant models for what effective legal protections for kidfluencers’ labor should entail.

Only a handful of states have laws governing child entertainers, and the most stringent laws exist in California and New York; both states limit child entertainers’ working hours, regulate their education, mandate their on-set supervision and advocacy, and protect their wages. All of these regulations should be expanded to cover kidfluencers; further, because kidfluencers primarily work at home and thus are not restricted by a need to live within range of entertainment hubs like Los Angeles and New York City, these regulations should apply to kidfluencers in every state through federal legislation. Recent legislation in California, Illinois, Utah, and Minnesota protecting primarily kidfluencers’ wages, while helpful, is but one small piece of the comprehensive regulatory scheme needed to adequately protect kidfluencers’ labor.

A.  Existing Labor Regulations for Child Entertainers

1. Federal Measures for Child Workers: The Fair Labor Standards Act

In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) marked a new era for regulation of child workers. Setting the minimum age of employment for most non-agricultural work at sixteen,52Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(l). the act came on the heels of the United States Supreme Court striking down laws aimed at regulating commercial goods produced by child workers in Hammer v. Dagenhart53Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). and the Child Labor Tax Case.54Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922). These decisions were but one component of a long struggle by labor reformers to protect child workers—by the twentieth century, reformers heavily emphasized how child labor led to extensive health problems and the deprivation of adequate education.55Michael Schuman, History of Child Labor in the United States—Part 2: The Reform Movement, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stats.: Monthly Lab. Rev. (Jan. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/history-of-child-labor-in-the-united-states-part-2-the-reform-movement.htm [https://perma.cc/UWU8-NM2Y]. In developing their platform regarding child labor, advocates also had to reckon with the difficult but inescapable reality that many child workers came from immense poverty. Some reformers lobbed heavy criticism at parents who they claimed were “too lazy to work” and had “become accustomed to subsist[ing] by their children’s labor.”56Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hugh D. Hindman, Child Labor: An American History 174 (2002)).

The FLSA still has multiple exemptions, some critical to child entertainers and kidfluencers alike: the FLSA exempts from regulation “a parent employing his own child”5729 U.S.C. § 203(l). and does not apply to “any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions.”58Id. § 213(c)(3). The latter exemption is known as the “Shirley Temple Act” because without it, the then-wildly popular child star would have disappeared from movie screens.59Kimberlianne Podlas, Does Exploiting a Child Amount to Employing a Child? The FLSA’s Child Labor Provisions and Children on Reality Television, 17 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 39, 57–58 (2010). Further, the lawmakers behind the FLSA did not consider entertainment work especially hazardous or oppressive, unlike the dangerous factory and agricultural labor the FLSA was intended to address, and thus excluded minors in entertainment from coverage.60Katherine Wirvin, Note, A Star Is Born: Lack of Income Rights for Entertainment’s Newest Stars, “Kidtubers,” 76 Fed. Commc’ns L.J. 61, 63 (2023). Due to this exclusion of child performers from federal regulation, labor rights for child performers fall under state law, and states have adopted a variety of protections (including, in seventeen states, no protections at all) for this demographic.61Nila McGinnis, Note, “They’re Just Playing”: Why Child Social Media Stars Need Enhanced Coogan Protections to Save Them from Their Parents, 87 Mo. L. Rev. 247, 254 (2022).

2.  SAG-AFTRA, States’ Approaches & the Coogan Law

Some of the most comprehensive protections for child entertainers come from SAG-AFTRA, the primary union for media professionals in the United States. SAG-AFTRA’s collective bargaining agreements with production companies require that companies adhere to the standards delineated in SAG-AFTRA’s contracts as well as applicable state law regarding employment of minors.62SAG-AFTRA, supra note 31, at 17. Thus, SAG-AFTRA functions as the enforcer of its own standards for employing child performers; its collective bargaining agreements act as a bottleneck against potentially negligent or exploitative employment practices because production companies that are SAG-AFTRA signatories must comply with these standards in order to employ children with SAG-AFTRA membership.63SAG-AFTRA represents hundreds of thousands of media professionals. See About, SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/about [https://web.archive.org/web/20241212142216/https://www.sagaftra.org/about]. Countless production companies, including particularly prominent companies like The Walt Disney Company, are SAG-AFTRA signatories. See Signatory Search, SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/signatory-search [https://web.archive.org/web/20241213162220/https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/signatory-search]. SAG-AFTRA restricts the working hours of child entertainers working anywhere in the United States, stipulating that minors may not work before 5:00 a.m. or after 10:00 p.m. on days preceding a school day (and may not work after 12:30 a.m. on mornings of non-school days); SAG-AFTRA further limits total working hours per school day to four hours for children ages six to eight, five hours for children ages nine to fifteen, and six hours for children ages sixteen and seventeen.64SAG-AFTRA, supra note 31, at 22. On non-school days, school-age minors may work up to two additional hours. Id. School days for SAG-AFTRA contract purposes conform to the public school calendar for the district where the minor resides, and SAG-AFTRA requires that school-age minors receive an average of at least three hours of educational instruction on school days.65Id. Minors between six months and two years old may work up to two hours while minors between two and five years old may work up to three hours; only preschool-age minors do not attend on-set school.66Id.

SAG-AFTRA’s protections for child actors’ compensation also conform to applicable state law, where present.67Id. at 9, 16–17, 32–33. Originally passed in California in 1939, the Coogan Law now requires that fifteen percent of all minors’ earnings for entertainment work be placed in a blocked trust account (known as a “Coogan Account”) accessible only by the minor once they reach adulthood.68Coogan Law, SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/membership-benefits/young-performers/coogan-law [https://web.archive.org/web/20241213153939/https://www.sagaftra.org/membership-benefits/young-performers/coogan-law]. The law’s namesake, child actor Jackie Coogan, enjoyed a tremendously successful career in the 1920s after being discovered by Charlie Chaplin.69James Barron, Jackie Coogan, Child Star of Films, Dies at 69, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984 (§ B), at 5, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1984/03/02/026082.html [https://nyti.ms/3MjtcCP]. Coogan grew up on vaudeville stages, making his stage debut at sixteen months old. After his mother’s refusal to turn over more of his earnings, Coogan sued both her and his lawyer but eventually settled for only $35,000. Id. But despite Coogan’s millions of dollars in earnings as a child star, he only ever received a weekly allowance of $6.25 from his mother until, when Coogan turned twenty-one, she ultimately refused to ever turn over more of his earnings to him.70Id. Though intended to prevent exploitation like that Coogan suffered from befalling future young actors, the first iteration of the Coogan Law had critical gaps, including merely permitting, rather than mandating, trust accounts for child performers.71Coogan Law, supra note 69. It was precisely these gaps that enabled the parents of Shirley Temple herself to devote her earnings entirely to supporting their family of twelve even after the initial passage of the Coogan Law; after her acting career slowed down in her teenage years, the generation-defining star’s “only assets were a few thousand dollars and the deed to her dollhouse in the back yard [sic] of her parents’ Beverly Hills home.”72Peter M. Christiano, Saving Shirley Temple: An Attempt to Secure Financial Futures for Child Performers, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 201, 205 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). California closed the gaps in its Coogan Law in January 2000 following advocacy by SAG-AFTRA for unequivocal legal recognition that minors’ earnings from entertainment work are their own.73Coogan Law, supra note 69. Currently, New York, Illinois, Louisiana, and New Mexico all have trust-account mandates for child actors comparable to California’s Coogan Law.74Id.

Meanwhile, some states also have laws concerning child performers’ labor conditions in addition to compensation requirements and union protections. California mandates a maximum eight-hour workday for child entertainers in addition to three hours of on-set education for each weekday that children work; California also requires that a state-licensed teacher or welfare worker be present at all times on sets where child performers are working,75Jessica Gelt & Amy Kaufman, YouTube Star Piper Rockelle’s Mom Reaches $1.85-Million Settlement with Young Influencers, L.A. Times (Oct. 10, 2024, at 09:10 PT) [hereinafter Gelt & Kaufman, Settlement], https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2024-10-10/youtube-influencer-piper-rockelle-mother-lawsuit-settlement [https://web.archive.org/web/20241124201801/https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2024-10-10/youtube-influencer-piper-rockelle-mother-lawsuit-settlement]. and that adults obtain permits before employing children and ensure that a minor’s parent or guardian is within their sight and hearing range at all times that the minor is on set.76Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. In New York, employers of child entertainers working three or more consecutive days must provide a credentialed on-set teacher to ensure that state educational requirements for child entertainers are met.77SAG-AFTRA, supra note 31, at 20, 22.

3.  When Does the Home Become a Set?

State laws protecting child entertainers, however well-established, largely do not extend to kidfluencers—even in states like California, which has very strict regulations for child performers78Id. at 22–23. (PRI is located in Los Angeles and the Squad’s videos were filmed there79Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 5–6.). If we apply California and SAG-AFTRA’s labor regulations for child actors to PRI and the Squad, PRI—sometimes allegedly, other times admittedly—fell far short.80See SAG-AFTRA, supra note 31, at 20, 22–23. Smith did not obtain permits to work with the minors in the Squad.81Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. Some PRI plaintiffs claimed they worked up to twelve hours per day, seven days a week, without rest and meal breaks and without compensation.82Second Amended Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 43–44, 46. The mother of two plaintiffs, sisters, worried that one of her daughters “was falling behind in school because she wasn’t getting enough sleep” due to Smith’s demanding filming schedule.83Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. Some of the plaintiffs’ parents alleged that Smith “regularly forbade other adults from being on set”;84Id. Smith reportedly only ever “briefly” hired an on-set teacher for Squad members and “was uninterested in the children’s education,” even though none of the minors attended traditional in-person school during their years filming.85Id. After some of the plaintiffs’ parents hired a private tutor to work with the minors in Smith’s guesthouse, Smith “barged” into the guesthouse mid-lesson, “screaming” that the child currently studying needed to “report to set immediately” and that “she didn’t care whether the tutor’s hour wasn’t up.”86Id. The tutor left her position teaching the Squad after the incident.87Id. Plaintiffs also reported that Rockelle herself had significant educational gaps, claiming Rockelle, who has only ever been homeschooled,88Homeschooling in the United States is a largely unregulated practice, and some critics argue that the lack of oversight for homeschooling families threatens both children’s right to an effective education as well as their emotional and physical well-being. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Homeschooling: Parent Rights Absolutism vs. Child Rights to Education & Protection, 62 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (2020) (pointing to correlations between homeschooling and instances of child abuse to illustrate the risks potentially inherent in a deregulated homeschooling regime). had trouble reading and “never” did schoolwork.89Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6.

Commenting on the allegations in the PRI lawsuit regarding failure to provide compensation as well as the maintenance of an oppressive work environment, plaintiffs’ attorney Matthew Sarelson remarked, “Imagine if these kids had been on a movie set for Lionsgate . . . . People would go to jail if this had happened at a studio.”90Id. But kidfluencers occupy a legal gray area existing somewhere between professional child performers and the kids-next-door getting together to make a funny video.91See Id. And the PRI plaintiffs assert that that legal gray area has given rise to a “Wild West atmosphere of content creation” where adults can push children into extensive, high-profile content creation with little to no oversight.92Gelt & Kaufman, Settlement, supra note 76.

Throughout the PRI lawsuit, Smith emphasized that she “did not view her home as a workplace” nor herself as the plaintiffs’ employer; she described the Squad’s activities as “ ‘kids get[ting] together voluntarily to collaborate on making videos,’ ” a far cry, in her view, from a professional studio environment that would necessitate her compliance with state child labor laws.93Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. Smith’s lawyer commented, “There is tremendous uncertainty about what labor laws apply in the context of filming a YouTube video at home, with an iPhone . . . . At what point is that a professional production?”94Id. Meanwhile, Sarelson argued that “PRI should be treated no differently than a traditional production company” and expressed “hopes [that] the lawsuit sparks change in the social media space.”95Id. The PRI lawsuit also raised questions as to whether the plaintiffs’ parents should have obtained permits covering their children’s individual filming of their own content. Id. Some of PRI’s activities—including using a professional camera to film content and posting audition notices for young actors to film with Rockelle—could indicate that the corporation was effectively operating as a professional production company.96Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. But currently, no federal legislation exists delineating the line between making home videos and shooting professional social-media content.

B.  New Efforts: Expanding Child Labor Regulations to Cover Kidfluencers

A handful of states are beginning to enact labor protections for kidfluencers, underscoring the desire and need for a comprehensive, federal approach to kidfluencer regulation.97As of June 2025, sixteen states have introduced legislation to regulate kidfluencers in some form; this Note only addresses legislation already enacted at the time of writing. Kim Miller, Protecting Young Influencers: New Laws Protect Content Creators that Are Minors, MultiState (June 25, 2025), https://www.multistate.us/insider/2025/6/25/protecting-young-influencers-new-laws-protect-content-creators-that-are-minors [https://perma.cc/TD94-8TAF]. In July 2025, Minnesota enacted some of the most significant kidfluencer regulations so far: not only does the state now mandate protected trust accounts to safeguard kidfluencers’ earnings, but it also prohibits children less than fourteen years old from appearing in monetized content at all.98H.F. 3488, 93rd Leg., 93rd Sess. (Minn. 2024). Instead of designing its law solely as a means of “legitimizing” kidfluencers as akin to child entertainers, University of Minnesota Law School Dean William McGeveran said Minnesota “ ‘set [its law] up as almost a child labor law. . . . It’s about kids needing to be able to be paid for work that they do . . . . And if they’re 13 and under, kids can’t work in the ice cream shop and they can’t work in their parents’ content creation either.’ ”99Caroline Cummings, New Minnesota Law Sets Guardrails for Children of Content Creators Featured in Monetized Videos, CBS News (July 2, 2025, at 21:27 CT), https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/minnesota-law-children-content-creators-monetized-videos-guards [https://perma.cc/R9BU-68ST]. Minnesota’s statute does not enshrine any further labor regulations for kidfluencers over fourteen beyond protecting their earnings.

For the other six states that now protect kidfluencers’ labor, their measures are limited to regulating kidfluencers’ compensation. In July 2024, Illinois became the first U.S. state to enact laws expressly protecting kidfluencers’ earnings.100Katie Kindelan, Illinois Becomes 1st State to Regulate Kid Influencers: What to Know About the Law, ABC News (Aug. 14, 2023, at 14:36 PT), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Family/illinois-1st-state-regulate-kid-influencers-law/story?id=102259218 [https://perma.cc/N9G8-U2UA]. Content creators in Illinois must now set aside a portion of earnings in a protected trust account for all minors age sixteen and under who appear in at least thirty percent of their monetized content.101Id. Illinois Senator Dave Koehler, who introduced the law, took action after Shreya Nallamothu, a fifteen-year-old high school student in his district, alerted him to the issue of young children being featured extensively online with no labor protections for them in place.102Press Release, Koehler, supra note 24. “This new digital age has given us tremendous opportunities to connect with one another, but it’s also presented legal issues that have never existed before,” said Koehler.103Kindelan, supra note 101. “We need to work with our children to see the problems they face and tackle them head-on before any further harm is done.”104Id.

The Illinois law protects earnings for minors under the age of sixteen while stipulating that minors under sixteen who produce their own videos are not considered “vlogger[s]” subject to the compensation and record-keeping requirements established by the law.105820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 206/10 (West 2025). The law explicitly includes “famil[ies]” in its definition of “vlogger[s],” thus requiring parents who produce content featuring their own children (as well as any other children) to set aside the minors’ earnings if their inclusion reaches the specified threshold. The law also amends Illinois’ Child Labor Law by allowing teenagers who are at least eighteen years old to take legal action against their parents for failing to compensate them in accordance with the new requirements.106Amanda Anderson, Illinois Enacts Law Protecting “Child Influencers,” 4A’s (Aug. 23, 2023, at 11:38 PT), https://www.aaaa.org/illinois-enacts-law-protecting-child-influencers [https://web.archive.org/web/20240703060538/https://www.aaaa.org/illinois-enacts-law-protecting-child-influencers]. In response to the law, University of Alabama professor of digital media Jessica Maddox called the legislation “long overdue” and pushed for other states to take similar steps as well as expand protections to allow eighteen-year-olds to petition for the removal of social-media content that features them.107Kindelan, supra note 101. Emphasizing the need for regulations that adequately measure up to the reality of the kidfluencer phenomenon, Maddox commented:

[Kidfluencing and vlogging] are actual jobs, possible ways of earning income, that need protection . . . . Since there aren’t unions, there isn’t systemic protection in terms of laws, that is why Illinois law is super important for setting the precedent that this type of labor needs to be protected, especially for minors.108Kindelan, supra note 101 (errors in the original).

Meanwhile, on September 26, 2024, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed legislation expressly expanding the state’s Coogan Law to cover kidfluencers sharing content on YouTube and similar platforms.109Press Release, Gavin Newsom, Governor, Governor Newsom Joins Demi Lovato to Sign Legislation to Protect the Financial Security of Child Influencers (Sept. 26, 2024), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2024/09/26/governor-newsom-joins-demi-lovato-to-sign-legislation-to-protect-the-financial-security-of-child-influencers [https://perma.cc/WHW9-HU8A]. The bill in question, AB 1880, defines “content creator” as “an individual who creates, posts, shares, or otherwise interacts with digital content on an online platform,” including “vloggers, podcasters, social media influencers, and streamers”; “online platform” is defined as “any public-facing website, web application, or digital application.”110Assemb. B. 1880, 2023–2024 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Regarding Governor Newsom’s support for the bill, bill author Assemblymember Juan Alanis remarked:

I thank Governor Newsom for signing AB 1880 and for his commitment to addressing the unique challenges minors face as online content creators in the rapidly growing digital entertainment industry. Child content creators deserve the same protections under the Coogan Law as their counterparts in traditional entertainment. With this bill, California takes a significant step in protecting the financial rights and well-being of child online influencers by extending critical protections against exploitation and ensuring they receive a fair share of earnings from their content.111Press Release, Newsom, supra note 110.

Former child actor and successful musician Demi Lovato championed the bill as a critical step toward “grant[ing] agency” toward kidfluencers upon reaching adulthood.112Id.

Signed alongside AB 1880 was SB 764,113Id. the Child Content Creator Rights Act (“CCCRA”), authored by Senator Steve Padilla.114Press Release, Padilla, supra note 20. The CCCRA stipulates that video bloggers (“vloggers”) engage a minor “in the work of vlogging” when at least thirty percent of the vlogger’s monetized visual content includes “the likeness, name, or photograph of the minor.”115S.B. 764, 2023–2024 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Vloggers engaging minors in vlogging work under the definition of the CCCRA are required to keep detailed records of the minor’s age during the vlogging period and the extent of their appearance in and compensation for monetized content.116Id. Contracts for vlogging work between a minor and their parent must be approved by a court to avoid application of the bill’s terms; “[i]n determining whether to approve such a contract, the court shall consider whether the terms of the contract are at least as beneficial to the minor as the compensation the minor would otherwise receive under [the CCCRA].”117Id.

And as of May 2025, Utah now also mandates protected trust accounts for kidfluencers.118H.B. 322, 66th Leg., 2025 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2025). With similar provisions to those in California and Illinois, Utah’s law also lays out procedures for managing kidfluencers trusts and also requires that content creators “inform a minor’s parents that the minor is featured” in their content if, as in the PRI lawsuit, the creator is not themselves the minor’s parent.119Id. In the same vein, Virginia, Arkansas, and Montana all enacted kidfluencer laws in 2025, and each state focused its labor protections for kidfluencers on compensation safeguards, mandating Coogan Account-esque trusts for kidfluencers appearing in a certain percentage of creators’ content.120H.B. 2401, 2025 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2025); H.B. 1975, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2025); H.B. 392, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2025).

As lawmakers in California, Minnesota, Illinois, Utah, Arkansas, Montana, and Virginia have recognized, kidfluencing is a job, plain and simple. It demands the same safeguards against labor exploitation that are accepted throughout the United States for children in traditional entertainment jobs, along with additional protections that are necessary to address issues unique to kidfluencing. Thus, while the recent legislation in these states represents important progress, much more robust protections for kidfluencers—regulations modeled after California’s existing laws for child actors—are needed. Because of the geographic flexibility inherent in kidfluencer work, such protection is needed at the federal level to be fully comprehensive; further, kidfluencer regulations must not only mandate safeguards to compensation, but also ensure limits on working hours, guaranteed access to education, on-set supervision and advocacy, and the obtainment of permits to employ minors. As it stands today, even for kidfluencers now protected from financial exploitation in a handful of states, the rest of their working conditions remain largely unregulated—as does their privacy.

III.  REGULATING THE PRIVACY OF KIDFLUENCERS

Growing up in the pop culture spotlight compromises a child’s privacy and reputation in ways that can be painful and enduring. As child actor Jennette McCurdy put it, “Growing is wobbly and full of mistakes, especially as a teenager—mistakes that you certainly don’t want to make in the public eye, let alone be known for for the rest of your life. But that’s what happens when you’re a child star.”121McCurdy, supra note 32, at 121. And for kidfluencers, the extent to which their privacy and reputations are at stake is much greater. For Shirley Temple and Judy Garland, while the laws protecting them were still woefully inadequate, the personal information they shared with the public was limited to their performances as fictional characters, filmed on a soundstage by a camera that never followed them home. But for kidfluencers, the camera lives at home. Nothing is off-limits and every experience, every mistake, every embarrassment is potential content with dollar signs attached to it.

If labor regulations for kidfluencers are largely undeveloped, laws protecting kidfluencers’ privacy seem like less than an afterthought—perhaps even conceptually oxymoronic given that the point of kidfluencer content, in general, is to share children’s personal lives online. Even as lawmakers take steps to protect children as Internet users, kidfluencers are nowhere to be found in their policies. Though states have common law rights to privacy and publicity and a 1998 federal act regulates online platforms’ collection of children’s personal data, these rights can all generally be waived with consent—and for children, the consenting parties are their parents. Meanwhile, online platforms typically limit accounts to users aged thirteen and older, but given the numerous active kidfluencer accounts heavily featuring children under thirteen, platforms do not appear to restrict accounts that overwhelmingly feature children if the accounts are set up and managed by adults. These gaping loopholes in existing rights and policies allow kidfluencer accounts to thrive unchecked,122Notably, Piper Rockelle’s YouTube channel was only demonetized by YouTube in 2022 after the PRI lawsuit’s filing, despite the account being at least four years old by that point, having a significant viewership and presence on the platform, and having primarily featured children under the age of thirteen for an extended period. Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. leading to severe, long-term harm to and exploitation of kidfluencers that society is likely only beginning to reckon with.123See generally KUTV 2 News Salt Lake City, supra note 1 (depicting a former kidfluencer sharing her personal experience with the Utah Legislative Committee).

A.  Privacy Regulations for Children as Users Online

  1.  Existing and Proposed Federal Regulations for Children Online
i.  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998

The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”) is the primary set of federal regulations concerning children’s online privacy, covering consent and notice requirements for online platforms and entities that collect personal data from children.124Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6502. COPPA’s “primary goal . . . is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online,”125Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Jan. 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/S7LY-253R]. and it focuses on protecting children as users of online platforms as opposed to children appearing in online content. COPPA requires the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to regulate online collection of children’s data and was last amended in 2013 in an effort to keep up with advancing technology.126Id. Kidfluencers are not explicitly covered by COPPA or any other federal law.

As a protective measure for children who are merely consumers of online content, COPPA is reasonably comprehensive (though it needs continuous updates to remain effective). Its critical failure as a protective measure for kidfluencers, however, lies in its parental-consent-based structure—and in the fact that it makes no actual mention of kidfluencers at all. COPPA only applies to children under thirteen and requires that online entities obtain parental consent before collecting children’s personal data from children. COPPA prohibits “unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with the collection and use of personal information from and about children on the Internet.”12715 U.S.C. § 6502. The act applies to websites or online services “directed to children”; in determining whether a given platform qualifies under this standard, the FTC considers the platform’s “subject matter,” “use of . . . child-oriented activities and incentives,” and “presence of child celebrities” as among relevant factors.128Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2025). COPPA defines “collection” as “the gathering of any personal information from a child by any means, including . . . [r]equesting, prompting, or encouraging a child to submit personal information online,” “[e]nabling a child to make personal information publicly available,” and “[p]assive tracking of a child online.”129Id. “[P]ersonal information” under COPPA includes identifiers like first and last name, physical address, and a “photograph, video, or audio file where such file contains a child’s image or voice.”130Id. “Child” under COPPA includes only “individual[s] under the age of 13.”131Id.

Before online entities collect personal data from a child, COPPA requires that the child’s parent receive adequate notice about the information collected and its intended use and that the parent consent to such collection.132Id. Online platforms also must provide parents with a “reasonable means . . . to review the personal information collected . . . and to refuse to permit its further use or maintenance.”133Id. § 312.3. COPPA specifies that any means employed for parents to review collected information cannot be “unduly burdensome” to the parent and asserts that parents have the right to “at any time . . . refuse to permit . . . further use or future online collection of personal information . . . and to direct the [online platform] to delete the child’s personal information.”134Id. § 312.6. Platforms have the right to terminate a child’s use of its services if the child’s parent revokes consent and requests deletion of collected information.135Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 126. Platforms also must only retain children’s information for “as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected.”136Id.

Lastly, COPPA includes safe harbor provisions, allowing online entities that follow approved sets of self-regulatory guidelines to be deemed compliant with COPPA and eligible for safe harbor treatment shielding them from potential liability.13715 U.S.C. § 6503.

ii.  COPPA 2.0

In May 2023, U.S. Senator Edward Markey, the author of COPPA, alongside Senator Bill Cassidy, introduced a new version of COPPA, “COPPA 2.0.”138Press Release, Edward Markey, Sen., Senator Markey Celebrates COPPA 2.0’s Unopposed Advancement Through Commerce Committee, Leap Forward in Protecting Young Americans Online (July 27, 2023), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-celebrates-coppa- 20s-unopposed-advancement-through-commerce-committee-leap-forward-in-protecting-young-americans-online [https://perma.cc/VV9P-7WX7]. After the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee unanimously advanced COPPA 2.0 in July 2023, the Senate passed the bill in August 2024.139Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., Senate Overwhelmingly Passes Children’s Online Privacy Legislation (July 30, 2024), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/index.php/2024/7/senate-overwhelmingly-passes-children-s-online-privacy-legislation [https://perma.cc/2L8P-JBEW]. Senators Markey and Cassidy then reintroduced the bill in March 2025.140Press Release, Edward Markey, Sen., Senators Markey and Cassidy Reintroduce Children and Teen’s Online Privacy Protection Legislation (March 4, 2025), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-and-cassidy-reintroduce-children-and-teens-online-privacy-protection-legislation [https://perma.cc/EJH6-487W]. In early 2024, COPPA 2.0 cosponsor Senator Ted Cruz described the bill’s purpose as ensuring that no child leaves behind a digital footprint:

When Congress first passed the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, Americans were using dial-up to search “Ask Jeeves” instead of Google. Now, kids can access the Internet in the palm of their hands, and tech companies routinely surveil and target America’s youth. I’m proud to have worked with Sens. Markey, Cantwell, and Cassidy on bipartisan legislation to empower parents to safeguard their children’s online privacy and hold tech companies responsible for keeping minors safe from data collection. Every child deserves to grow up free of a digital footprint, and this bipartisan legislation is one step closer to achieving that goal.141Press Release, Ed Markey, Sen., Senators Markey, Cassidy Announce Chair Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz as Cosponsors of COPPA 2.0 Children’s Privacy Legislation (Feb. 15, 2024) [hereinafter Markey, Announce Chair] (emphasis added), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-cassidy-announce-chair-cantwell-and-ranking-member-cruz-as-cosponsors-of-coppa-20-childrens-privacy-legislation [https://perma.cc/RQ9V-3867].

Championed as a means of bringing “children and teen’s online privacy standards into the 21st century,”142Id. COPPA 2.0 enumerates additional categories of online platforms, including mobile applications,143Children and Teens’ Online Privacy Protection Act, S. 1418, 118th Cong. § 2(a)(1), (3) (2024). and forms of personal data, including biological and physiological information.144Id. § 2(a)(3). Most significantly, however, COPPA 2.0 creates an entirely new class of protected minors: teenagers between thirteen and sixteen years old.145Id. § 2(a)(6). Under COPPA 2.0, teenagers—not their parents—consent to collection of their own personal data and are empowered to request review of collected data as well as revoke consent for data collection.146Id. § 2(a)(4). COPPA 2.0 preserves the original COPPA’s structure in giving parents the right to consent to collection of data from minors younger than thirteen. See id. However, COPPA 2.0 does not permit teenagers to withdraw consent for their own data that was collected with their parents’ consent before they turned thirteen.147See id. The omission of this right, under either iteration of COPPA, is particularly sobering in the kidfluencer context because it prevents kidfluencers from compelling platforms to remove their data, collected before age thirteen, in the event that their parents cannot or will not do so.

2.  Online Platforms’ User Age Restrictions

The largest social-media platforms typically require users to be at least thirteen years old,148Catherine Page Jeffery, Opinion, Is 13 Too Young to Have a TikTok or Instagram Account?, U. Syd. (Feb. 10, 2023), https://www.sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2023/02/10/is-13-too-young-to-have-a-tiktok-or-instagram-account-.html [https://perma.cc/22EQ-UXZC]. This age restriction requirement stems from COPPA itself. though caveats to this rule exist. YouTube’s terms of service specify that users “must be at least 13 years old to use [YouTube]; however children of all ages may use [YouTube and YouTube Kids] . . . if enabled by a parent or legal guardian.”149Terms of Service, YouTube, https://kids.youtube.com/t/terms [https://perma.cc/M8UG-BPK9]. TikTok requires users to be at least thirteen years old,150Teen Privacy and Safety Settings, TikTok, https://support.tiktok.com/en/account-and-privacy/account-privacy-settings/privacy-and-safety-settings-for-users-under-age-18 [https://perma.cc/AX2B-WBGX]. and TikTok’s settings default accounts associated with minor users to private mode; TikTok users ages sixteen and seventeen can choose to make their accounts public.151Id.

Instagram also requires that users be at least thirteen;152About Instagram Teen Privacy and Safety Settings, Instagram Help Ctr., https://help.instagram.com/3237561506542117 [https://web.archive.org/web/20240905015036/https://help.instagram.com/3237561506542117]. on September 17, 2024, Instagram began defaulting all accounts created by users who indicated they are under eighteen to private mode.153Natasha Singer, Instagram’s New ‘Teen Accounts’: What Parents and Kids Need to Know, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/technology/instagram-teen-account-settings-safety.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20241208195819/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/technology/instagram-teen-account-settings-safety.html]. These changes, which Instagram says are being “rolled out on an individual basis,”154About Instagram Teen Privacy and Safety Settings, supra note 153. are part of Instagram’s new “Teen Accounts” initiative promoted as a means of increasing safety for minors using the platform.155Singer, supra note 154. Under the “Teen Accounts” setup, users ages sixteen and seventeen can change the default privacy setting themselves to make their accounts public; minors under sixteen need their parents’ permission to do so.156Id.

It is not clear whether Instagram’s recent changes will affect accounts that feature minors but are at least ostensibly managed by an adult (as most kidfluencer accounts typically are); however, Instagram makes no mention of such accounts in its communications about this new measure, while stipulating that the “Teen Accounts” setup applies to “users.” Thus, even as platforms begin rolling out age restrictions, kidfluencer accounts continue to

occupy a gray area outside of the growing spotlight on child social-media users.

B.  Relevance and Current Limitations of the Common Law Rights of Privacy and Publicity

In the United States, the common law rights of privacy and publicity are “distinct” from one another and “intended to vindicate different interests,” though the latter initially evolved out of the former.157Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Ky. 2001) (quoting Steven M. Fleischer, The Right of Publicity: Preventing an Identity Crisis, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 985, 988 (2000)). While the right of publicity enshrines the “right to control the commercial value of one’s identity,”158Id. the right of privacy “protects one’s right ‘to be let alone.’ ”159Id. (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890)); see also Haelan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). Haelan Laboratories was the first U.S. case to explicitly distinguish the rights to privacy and publicity and emphasized the differences between economic and personal privacy interests as necessitating separate rights for each. See Sophie Polo, Note, The Unregulated Digital Playground: Why Kids Need Right of Publicity Protections from Their Parents, 31 J. Intell. Prop. L. 138, 141–42 (2024). The common law right of privacy comprises four tort causes of action: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation.160Samuel Soopper, The First Amendment Privilege and Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 25 Cath. U.L. Rev. 271, 271 n.5 (1976).

The common law right of publicity developed out of both the right of privacy and intellectual property law, and has existed formally in the United States since the 1970s.161Mark Roesler & Garrett Hutchinson, What’s in a Name, Likeness, and Image? The Case for a Federal Right of Publicity Law, A.B.A. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2020-21/september-october/what-s-in-a-name-likeness-image-case-for-federal-right-of-publicity-law [https://web.archive.org/web/20241204093931/https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2020-21/september-october/what-s-in-a-name-likeness-image-case-for-federal-right-of-publicity-law]. While the United States Supreme Court recognized the existence of the right of publicity in 1977 in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,162Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564–65 (1977). there is no federal right of publicity; rather, the right of publicity exists at the state level and is currently recognized in thirty-five states, including California.163Roesler & Hutchinson, supra note 162. The right of publicity stipulates that individuals have a common law right against appropriation of “the commercial value of [their] identity . . . without consent”;164Polo, supra note 160, at 141 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (A.L.I. 1995)). inherent in the right is the recognition that “an individual’s likeness” is that individual’s “own property.”165Roesler & Hutchinson, supra note 162. The right of publicity is based on three core justifications: (1) the right to “reap the fruit of [one’s] labors,” connected to concerns about unjust enrichment;166Cristina Fernandez, The Right of Publicity on the Internet, 8 Marq. Sports L.J. 289, 314 (1998) (quoting Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 178 (1993)). (2) the “copyright-incentive theory” that the law must protect the individual’s persona so as to promote creative artistry; and (3) the need to protect “consumer[s] from advertising deception.”167Id. Section 3344 of the California Civil Code (“section 3344”) codifies California’s common law right of publicity and prohibits use of another’s image or “likeness” for profit without consent.168Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West 2023). For minors, however, it is precisely the element of “consent” that is likely to prove most challenging if and when section 3344 is invoked to protect their rights, for the law expressly recognizes consent by a minor’s parent or guardian as equivalent to the minor’s own consent.169Id.

While the PRI lawsuit is currently unique, it illustrates how disputes over consent are likely to be central to any efforts to protect kidfluencers’ privacy and publicity rights under the common law and corresponding statutes. Three plaintiffs in the PRI lawsuit alleged violations of both section 3344 and California’s common law right of publicity;170Second Amended Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 24–26. Smith argued that she could not be liable under section 3344 and the common law precisely because the parents of the three plaintiffs had consented to the use of their children’s likenesses for commercial purposes on Rockelle’s channel.171Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues at 5–7, Sawyer S. v. Smith, No. 22STCV01351 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2024). The plaintiffs disputed the fact of such consent172Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Issues at 3–5, Sawyer S. v. Smith, No. 22STCV01351 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2024). and, in denying summary judgment in March 2024, the Superior Court of California ruled that these claims created issues of triable fact. Presumably, parents of the other eight plaintiffs had consented to use of their children’s likenesses for profit by Smith and PRI. And given that no plaintiff ever alleged that their parent had no knowledge whatsoever of their appearance in videos on Rockelle’s channel, it follows that the parents of the three children alleging publicity violations simply may not have given meaningful consent.

At least for situations like the ones in which these three PRI plaintiffs found themselves, requiring that online platforms verify meaningful consent and notice by kidfluencers or their parents to use of the child’s likeness in monetized content would counteract harm. But still further, the lack of application of recognized privacy and publicity rights to the kidfluencer context as well as the parental-consent waiver’s potential for conflicts of interest in that context is representative of the current limitations of existing laws. Looking at the plain language and spirit of the recognized rights of privacy and publicity alongside the raw reality of the kidfluencer phenomenon, as typified by the PRI lawsuit, it follows not only that our society and legal system should care about protecting kidfluencers’ privacy and publicity rights, but that we in fact do care about it. However, our society has not yet recognized how our concern for privacy and publicity rights implicates kidfluencers due to their novelty; and it would likely take years of litigation—and kidfluencer exploitation—before the common law could produce a legal framework appropriate for the competing claims of parents and kidfluencers to control over the child’s rights to privacy and publicity.

C.  Falling Through the Gaps: Protecting Kidfluencers’ Privacy

1.  Kidfluencing’s Unique Threat to Privacy

The Senate’s passage of COPPA 2.0 indicates a strong desire on the part of lawmakers to protect children online. But thus far, kidfluencers are missing entirely from that conversation—and to disastrous results. The types of information COPPA and COPPA 2.0 mention specifically as constituting “personal” data worth protecting—full names, online contact information, photographs, video and audio files containing a child’s image or voice, geolocation information, and more—are available in droves on kidfluencer accounts. And even as social-media platforms place age restrictions on users, kidfluencer accounts need only include a few words claiming to be managed by a parent in their description to post massive amounts of kidfluencer content to vast online audiences without constraint.

And kidfluencers’ audiences grow more dangerous as their accounts gain traction: in early 2024, the New York Times published an in-depth investigation into kidfluencers’ follower demographics, and the results are sobering. The proportion of kidfluencer account followers who are adult males grows “dramatically” as accounts grow in popularity.173Valentino-DeVries & Keller, supra note 19. While men made up approximately 35 percent of kidfluencer audiences overall, “[m]any [accounts] with more than 100,000 followers had a male audience of over 75 percent,” while some had over 90 percent.174Id. The Times discovered men previously charged with or convicted of sex crimes among kidfluencer followers and found that some of these men participated in chat rooms with thousands of members, “treat[ing] children’s Instagram pages . . . as menus to satisfy their fantasies.”175Id.

While some parents are ignorant of the dangers posed by their children’s audiences,176See id. others have grown “numb” trying to beat back the unending tide of suspicious followers.177Id.

    “You are so sexy,” read one comment on an image of a 5-year-old girl in a ruffled bikini. “Those two little things look great thru ur top,” said another on a video of a girl dancing in a white cropped shirt, who months later posted pictures of her 11th birthday party.

    For many mom-run accounts, comments from men—admiring, suggestive or explicit—are a recurring scourge to be eradicated, or an inescapable fact of life to be ignored. For others, they are a source to be tapped.

    “The first thing I do when I wake up and the last thing I do when I go to bed is block accounts,” said Lynn, the mother of a 6-year-old girl in Florida who has about 3,000 followers from the dance world.

    Another mother, Gail from Texas, described being desensitized to the men’s messages. “I don’t have as much of an emotional response anymore,” she said. “It’s weird to be so numb to that, but the quantity is just astounding.”178Id.

Still other parents are taking knowing advantage of this population: men in the chat rooms that the Times uncovered “frequently praise[d] the advent of Instagram as a golden age for child exploitation” and “trade[d] information about parents considered receptive to producing and selling ‘private sets’ of images.”179Id. And among the allegations in the PRI lawsuit was a claim by one plaintiff that she accompanied Smith in mailing “several of Piper’s soiled training bras and panties to an unknown individual,” whereupon Smith told the plaintiff that “old men like to smell this stuff.”180Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 14. Plaintiffs also alleged that Smith often “boast[ed] . . . about being the ‘Madam of YouTube’ ” and a “Pimp of YouTube,” and about making “kiddie porn.”181Id. at 13.

Rockelle’s content and the PRI plaintiffs’ allegations paint a stark picture of the rampant sharing of invasive kidfluencer content carrying on unchecked throughout social media. For the members of the Squad, their experience working with PRI shares themes with Jennette McCurdy’s recollection of losing her childhood, autonomy, and privacy to child stardom. The Squad made countless videos centered around the group’s internal “crushes” and these videos performed much more strongly than the more innocent videos from Rockelle’s early days.182Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. Smith and Hill documented Rockelle’s first kiss on camera at age eleven183Piper Rockelle, Recreating Famous Instagram Couples Photos Challenge **First Kiss**💋💕 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, May 18, 2019) [hereinafter Rockelle, Recreating Famous Instagram Couples], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7ocyA76zfw [https://perma.cc/4YPN-7G69]. and filmed challenges among the Squad in which the minors competed to see who could kiss without stopping for the longest period of time.184Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. The mother of two PRI plaintiffs, who is also Rockelle’s aunt, claimed that Smith sent Rockelle “a daily iPhone checklist cataloging the attention she needed to pay to her boyfriend, including sending him heart emojis [and] giving regular kisses, hugs and loving touches.”185Id.

In addition to the suggestive video content on Rockelle’s channel, the thumbnail images for the videos themselves are clearly set up to provide shock value and drive an increase in viewership. The mother of one PRI plaintiff alleged that Smith “often urged [plaintiffs] to pose more provocatively for thumbnail photo shoots,” 186Id. and the lawsuit claimed that Smith, declaring that “sex sells,” “would frequently tell [the Squad members] to make ‘sexy kissing faces’ for thumbnails, to ‘push their butts out,’ to ‘suck their stomachs in,’ ‘wear something sluttier’ and would otherwise position [the p]laintiffs’ bodies in explicitly and sexually suggestive positions.”187Second Amended Complaint for Damages, supra note 2, at 13–14. As a result, minors are frequently depicted in provocative, revealing, or otherwise exploitative positions and situations in Rockelle’s thumbnails.

Image 3. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds188Piper Rockelle, I Spent 24 Hours Overnight in My Boyfriends Bedroom **Caught**💋 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJxmFsmwMOQ [https://perma.cc/82HR-QG2F]. As of November 2025, this video has 4.5 million views. Id.

Image 4. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds189Rockelle, Asking Strangers to Be My Boyfriend, supra note 16. As of this writing, this video has 9.9 million views. Id.

Image 5. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds190Rockelle, Recreating Famous Instagram Couples, supra note 184. As of November 2025, this video has 10 million views. Id.

Image 6. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds191Piper Rockelle, Handcuffed to My Boyfriend for 24 Hours Challenge *Bad Idea*❤️🗝 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lcCHCOrngjU [https://perma.cc/NS8J-PJGE]. As of November 2025, this video has 4.6 million views. Id.

The following YouTube video thumbnail images are merely described herein to protect the privacy of the minors featured in them:

Six teenagers (four female, two male), aged thirteen to seventeen, photoshopped to appear crowded together inside a bubble bath. The two male teenagers are shirtless, while the female teenagers appear to be wearing tank tops. The female teenager in the center has her hair arranged covering the straps of her tank top. The video is entitled “LAST TO LEAVE THE BUBBLE BATH!!” and has 2.3 million views.192Rockelle, Last to Leave, supra note 42.

Six teenagers (three female, three male), aged twelve to fifteen, arranged in co-educational pairs, each in one of three horizontal panels. Each female is touching her male counterpart. The male in the center panel is shirtless and his female counterpart is touching his bare torso. The video is entitled “LAST TO STOP MASSAGING THEIR BOYFRIEND WINS **Couples Challenge** 💆‍♀️💕” and has 1.9 million views.193Rockelle, Last to Stop, supra note 42.

One female aged eleven pictured in a cropped shirt pointing at her navel. A fake piercing is attached to her navel and a yellow circle is superimposed around her stomach while a zoomed-in image of her navel with the piercing appears in the right-hand side of the thumbnail. In the center of the thumbnail, the words “11 YEARS OLD!!” appear in large block lettering. The video is entitled “11 YEAR OLD BELLY PIERCED **PRANK** (Can’t Say No 24 Hour Challenge) 🚫👌” and has 4.6 million views.194Rockelle, Belly Pierced, supra note 15.

Two females, aged eleven and twelve, wearing fake “baby bumps” designed to look like a pregnant woman’s belly with their shirts raised to expose the bumps. The video’s description includes the note, “We are only 11 and 12 so [this is] a pretty crazy challenge for us.” The video is entitled “24 Hours Being PREGNANT Challenge in PUBLIC with TWINS **FUNNY REACTIONS** 🍼🎀” and has 14 million views.195Piper Rockelle, 24 Hours Being Pregnant Challenge in Public with Twins **Funny Reactions**🍼🎀 | Piper Rockelle (YouTube, July 20, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwUvDl85-oQ [https://perma.cc/9XRV-K5X2] (on file with the author).

According to the Los Angeles Times’ investigation of the PRI lawsuit, PRI’s videos chronicling the Squad’s “crushes” performed the best with Rockelle’s online audience.196Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. This data combined with the New York Times’ findings regarding dangerous followers of kidfluencers reflect the significant market that exists for kidfluencer content that is sensitive at best and criminal at worst. If, in the words of COPPA 2.0 cosponsor Senator Ted Cruz, “[e]very child deserves to grow up free of a digital footprint,”197Markey, Announce Chair, supra note 142. the law is currently failing kidfluencers to a staggering degree.

Further, even content that perhaps falls short of the hallmark suggestiveness of Rockelle’s brand victimizes kidfluencers—according to some kidfluencers themselves. In July 2023, Ruby Franke, former figurehead of the now-defunct YouTube channel “8 Passengers,” made headlines when her two youngest children, then ages nine and twelve, were found emaciated and wounded.198Caitlin Moscatello, The Truths and Distortions of Ruby Franke: She Broadcast Her Family’s Wholesome Life on YouTube. How Did She End Up Abusing Her Children?, The Cut (Sept. 24, 2024), https://www.thecut.com/article/ruby-franke-8-passengers-jodi-hildebrandt-connexions-children-jail-update.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20240925042742/https://www.thecut.com/article/ruby-franke-8-passengers-jodi-hildebrandt-connexions-children-jail-update.html]. The children had been imprisoned and suffered months of abuse by both Franke and her business partner Jodi Hildebrandt.199Id. Franke had stopped posting videos of her children over a year before, changing the name of her channel to “Moms of Truth” and posting solemn videos alongside Hildebrandt discussing parenting strategies and religion. But in the 8 Passengers heyday, Franke posted videos of her family of eight almost daily, chronicling her six children’s lives as they grew up in front of an audience of up to two million subscribers.200Id.

By 2022, 8 Passengers viewers had started to grow concerned about Franke’s behavior—while the harrowing nature of Franke’s eventual abuse would have been impossible for viewers to predict, many subscribers began to notice that Franke showed an indifference, at best, to her children’s privacy.201Id. Franke spoke at length in her YouTube videos about sensitive matters in her children’s lives; over the course of several videos, she described in-depth her and her husband Kevin’s decision to send their oldest son, then fourteen, to a behavioral modification camp in the Arizona wilderness. At one point, Franke played a voicemail for viewers that her son had left her while at the camp; her son cried throughout the voicemail as he described his experience.2028 Passengers, Answering Questions About Chad (YouTube), https://ia801604.us.archive.org/32/items/8-passengers/20190911%20Answering%20Questions%20About%20Chad.mp4 [https://perma.cc/J7FG-F258] (video is no longer available on YouTube). Another video featured the parents taking their preteen daughter to buy her first bra. After Kevin asked his preteen, “How come you’re all embarrassed?” his oldest daughter Shari spoke up off camera: “Because you’re filming her and you’re her dad?”203Moscatello, supra note 199.

2.  Adapting COPPA 2.0 and the Necessity of a Right to Removal

In October 2024, Shari, now twenty-one, addressed Utah’s Business and Labor Interim Committee; Utah Representative Doug Owens, who sponsored Utah’s subsequent bill regulating kidfluencers, introduced her testimony.204See H.B. 322, 66th Leg., 2025 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2025); Child Influencer Protections: Hearing Before the Interim Comm on Bus. & Lab., 2024 Leg., 65th Sess. (Utah 2024) (statement of Sheri Franke, Presenter), https://le.utah.gov/av/committeeArchive.jsp?mtgID=19498 [https://perma.cc/ADD4-UR3V]. Shari told lawmakers that she appeared before them “as a victim of family vlogging” in hopes of “shed[ding] light on the ethical and monetary issues that come from being a child influencer.”205KUTV 2 News Salt Lake City, supra note 1, at 00:56–01:05. Her words highlighted how adequate compensation is but one small component of a comprehensive regulatory scheme to protect kidfluencers; her experiences as a kidfluencer also evoke many of the same themes as Jennette McCurdy’s retelling of her time as a child actor—in particular, the sense that the compensation she received, while helpful, was simply not worth the loss of her childhood.

[Being a kidfluencer] is more than just filming your family life and putting it online. It is a full-time job with employees, business credit cards, managers, and marketing strategies. The difference between family vlogging and a normal business, however, is that the employees are all children. Children, from before they are born to the day they turn eighteen, have become the stars of family businesses on YouTube, Instagram, and most other social media platforms.

     . . . . 

At first, family vlogging is an alluring business that can bring high revenue. For my family, it became the primary source of income . . . . Many child influencers are paid for their work as I was, and this money has helped me in my adult life. However, this payment was usually a bribe. For example, we’d be rewarded $100 or a shopping trip if we filmed a particularly embarrassing moment or an exciting event in our lives. . . . Any payment that happens is under the table, with no paper trail. And how do we determine how much a child should make from appearing in family content? What price is worth giving up your childhood?

. . . Some of our most popular videos were when my eyebrow was accidentally waxed off, and the whole world saw a crying teenager when I just wanted to mourn in private. Or the time I was violently ill and got the leading role in the video for that day. My friends became scarce because dates were filmed and none of my friends wanted to be on camera. The camera never stops and there is no such thing as a [vacation] from filming.

     . . . . 

[A]s children, we do not understand the consequences of filming our lives and [having it] post[ed] for the world to see. We cannot give consent to our parents to post our lives. . . . I did not realize the impact that filming as a child would have on me now. . . . 

     . . . . 

If I could go back and do it all again, I’d rather have an empty bank account now and not have my childhood plastered all over the Internet. No amount of money I received has made what I’ve experienced worth it. . . . I promise you that my experiences are not unique and are happening to child influencers all over Utah and the country. Let’s tackle this issue before it becomes a bigger crisis than it already is.206Id. at 01:11–06:54. Shari’s full statement is included in the Appendix.

As Shari’s words illustrate, kidfluencing is currently too unchecked and too profitable—for parents—to be safe; thus, common-sense regulations aimed at deterring parents from overworking and oversharing their children for a financial payout are critically necessary. Just as labor protections for kidfluencers would be most effective if enacted at the federal level, protective measures for kidfluencers’ privacy need federal support. COPPA presents a key opportunity to begin developing that support by empowering kidfluencers to wield greater control over their digital footprints long term. While COPPA 2.0 takes an important step forward by expanding online privacy protections for teenagers, a truly comprehensive and effective COPPA amendment would also cover kidfluencers.

Protections for kidfluencers under a new version of COPPA would make explicit the right of teenaged kidfluencers to consent (or not) to sharing their personal information in monetized content and their right to revoke that consent at any time; this system would empower teenaged kidfluencers by allying them with the social-media platforms hosting their content—regardless of a parent’s role in producing kidfluencer content, platforms would require the kidfluencer’s consent before new content could be shared. For kidfluencers under thirteen, the consent that their parents give to sharing their children’s information and to commercial use of their likeness would become provisional only and revocable by the child upon reaching age thirteen. This change would allow kidfluencers to retroactively revoke consent to personal data their parents had agreed to share and compel platforms to remove it.207Thus far, the United States has not legally recognized the European Union’s “right to erasure” or “right to be forgotten,” which enshrines the right of individuals to the erasure of their personal data. Individuals protected under the right to be forgotten can demand erasure of their data under a variety of circumstances, including when they simply withdraw consent to their data’s collection and processing by another entity. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. Some U.S. lawmakers have contemplated but ultimately abandoned, at least as of now, legislation providing a similar right; in the drafting and ultimate passage of Illinois kidfluencer compensation law, that bill’s sponsor said such a provision was ultimately removed from the law because “there was really no way of enforcing it.” Anderson, supra note 107. Notably, however, those concerns did not stop lawmakers in one state: Montana’s 2025 kidfluencer law explicitly titles its section detailing takedown requirements for platforms, “Right to be forgotten.” H.B. 392, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Mont. 2025). And in situations where groups of kidfluencers create content together, as in the case of Piper Rockelle’s Squad, a kidfluencer-focused COPPA section would provide legal scaffolding to discourage casual content-sharing to large online audiences without informed consent by every parent or teenager involved. These amendments would be a first step in giving kidfluencers the privacy protections that they currently lack.

Four of the states that now regulate kidfluencers’ compensation have also taken steps in this direction: recent laws in Montana, Arkansas, Utah, and Minnesota include provisions aimed at empowering kidfluencers to request removal of content featuring them. In particular, Minnesota’s flat ban on children thirteen and under working as kidfluencers is well worth lawmakers’ consideration both in other states and at the federal level; such a ban would have automatically made much of the Squad’s early content unlawful due to the children’s ages, while also avoiding the challenges of enforcing more nuanced regulations. Yet gaps persist—Minnesota’s law provides that “[c]ontent containing the likeness of a child must be deleted and removed from any online platform by the individual who posted the content, the account owner, or another person who has control over the account when the request is made,” either by a kidfluencer at least thirteen years old or by a former kidfluencer who is now an adult.208H.F. 3488, 93rd Leg., 93rd Sess. § (4) (Minn. 2024). However, the law does not provide an explicit enforcement mechanism or a means for relief for kidfluencers whose requests for removal go unheeded; it also seemingly exempts social-media platforms from responsibility entirely as it has no “effect on a party that is neither the content creator nor the minor who engaged in . . . content creation.”209Id.

Meanwhile, Utah’s law does involve social-media platforms that host kidfluencer content explicitly in its removal provisions, requiring that platforms “provide a readily apparent process” for former kidfluencers who are now at least eighteen to request removal of content featuring themselves as minors.210H.B. 322, 66th Leg., 2025 Gen. Sess. § (4) (Utah 2025). But under Utah’s system, creators can still refuse to comply with removal requests. The law provides only an ex post, litigation-dependent right of action for former kidfluencers to challenge a creator’s refusal; at that point, a court would then consider the “emotional harm or substantial embarrassment” the challenged content poses to the former kidfluencer and both “the interests of the content creator” as well as “the public interest served by” that content.211Id. Thus, while Utah and Minnesota’s protections are certainly better than nothing, they are also critically limited; because kidfluencer exploitation is so rampant and systemic, an expensive, slow, after-the-fact system of relief available only on a state-by-state basis is simply not enough to protect them.

From that perspective, Arkansas and Montana have gone the furthest toward effecting an adequate legal solution: both states’ kidfluencer laws put responsibility on platforms, though with some caveats, to enforce kidfluencer protections, including removing kidfluencer content upon request. In Montana, creators are removed from the takedown process entirely; instead, Montana’s law triggers platforms’ responsibility to “take all reasonable steps to permanently delete” kidfluencer content as soon as former kidfluencers (who are at least eighteen) request removal.212H.B. 392, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(1)–(2) (Mont. 2025).

Arkansas’ kidfluencer law is arguably even more sweeping; under that law, platforms must allow for removal requests by kidfluencers and then notify content creators of their obligation to remove the applicable content within thirty days; if creators do not do so, platforms “shall review and take all reasonable steps to remove the content.”213H.B. 1975, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(4-88-1503)(c)(3)(B) (Ark. 2025). Unlike Montana, Arkansas does include caveats to platforms’ mandated removal, including for content that the platform finds “sufficiently newsworthy or of other public interest to outweigh the privacy interests” of the kidfluencer in question.214Id. § 1(4-88-1503)(c)(3)(B)(ii). However, Arkansas also elevates platforms’ responsibilities in an additional, consequential area: its law makes it “unlawful to financially benefit from knowingly producing or distributing publicly . . . any visual depiction of a minor with the intent to sexually gratify or elicit a sexual response in the viewer or any other person.”215Id. § 1(4-88-1504)(a)(1). This section mandates platforms to “develop and implement a risk-based strategy to help mitigate risks related to monetization of the intentional sexualization of known minors” in a content-creation context; the structure of such strategies is at platforms’ discretion and can include monetization policies, “automated system[s] to identify and enforce against potentially problematic content and accounts,” and “[q]uality assurance processes” to monitor the effectiveness of platform’s policies in this area.216Id. § 1(4-88-1504)(d)(1)–(2)(iii), (v). While the precise standard for determining whether content has “the intent to sexually gratify or elicit a sexual response” under Arkansas’ law are unspecified, much of the PRI Squad’s content could likely qualify. Thus, in addition to placing responsibility on social-media platforms to effectuate kidfluencer content removal, Arkansas also made the critical first step, at the state level, toward mandating that platforms develop ongoing procedures to monitor for at least some kinds of problematic kidfluencer content, and, ideally, prevent exploitation before it occurs.

Overall, both Arkansas and Montana’s regulatory approaches—situating platforms as the enforcers of newly-recognized kidfluencer privacy and publicity rights—represent the most effective way forward for a comprehensive federal scheme to protect kidfluencers.

IV.  THE SOLUTION—FEDERAL LABOR AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND REQUIRING SOCIAL-MEDIA PLATFORMS TO ENFORCE KIDFLUENCER RIGHTS

Kidfluencers need comprehensive labor and privacy protections, and because the Internet transcends the geographical limits that made state-specific labor regulations for child actors practical, adequate kidfluencer labor and privacy regulations must be set at the federal level. But once enacted, these comprehensive federal protections will require an effective enforcement mechanism—and the social-media platforms that host kidfluencer content are likely the entities best situated to moderate and enforce kidfluencer regulations. Thus, a robust set of federal kidfluencer labor and privacy protections would include an imposition of liability on platforms that feature kidfluencer content on monetized accounts (thereby creating revenue for the platform itself as well as for those managing the kidfluencer accounts) when that content is produced under conditions that violate kidfluencer laws. So far, only two states, Montana and Arkansas, have placed legal responsibility squarely on platforms to remove kidfluencer content upon request; lawmakers seeking to adequately protect kidfluencers must follow these states’ lead by pushing for federal measures that regulate kidfluencers’ labor and privacy and enable platforms to enforce those laws.

A.  Section 230 and Techlash

Any conversation surrounding potential liability for online platforms based on a platform’s third-party content implicates section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“section 230”). Recognizing how “[t]he rapidly developing array of Internet . . . services available to individual Americans represent[s] an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources,”217Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1). and how the Internet “ha[s] flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation,”218Id. § 230(a)(4). section 230 provides limited immunity to any online platform for content posted by third-party users.219See id. § 230. In the nearly thirty years since section 230’s passage, its supporters have credited it with enabling some major online platforms to grow from start-ups into global giants,220Diverging Paths for Platform Liability: The Impact of Section 230 and the Choice for America’s Digital Future, Internet Governance F. USA, https://www.igfusa.us/diverging-paths-for-platform-liability [https://web.archive.org/web/20240520193755/https://www.igfusa.us/diverging-paths-for-platform-liability]. particularly with regard to the largest companies commonly referred to as a whole as “Big Tech.”221Kean Birch & Kelly Bronson, Big Tech, 31 Sci. as Culture 1, 1 (2022). And many of those supporters have defended section 230 in the last ten years as an increasing number of detractors began voicing concerns over Big Tech’s ever-growing and seemingly unchecked power, a phenomenon dubbed “techlash.”222Robert D. Atkinson, Doug Brake, Daniel Castro, Colin Cunliff, Joe Kennedy, Michael McLaughlin, Alan McQuinn & Joshua New, A Policymaker’s Guide to the “Techlash”—What It Is and Why It’s a Threat to Growth and Progress 1 (2019), https://www2.itif.org/2019-policymakers-guide-techlash.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYL3-U5T3]; Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First Amendment. Now Both Republicans and Democrats Want to Take It Away, reason (July 29, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-now-both-republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away [https://perma.cc/E2FZ-3HEW].

Kidfluencers are glaringly missing from this increasingly heightened debate over the virtues and dangers of section 230 and, more broadly, about the responsibilities or lack thereof that Big Tech owes to users. Any federal proposal to impose liability upon platforms who violate laws designed to prevent kidfluencer exploitation will prompt questions about whether imposing such liability would infringe platforms’ rights under section 230 and their constitutional rights to freedom of expression. Crucially, however, section 230 itself already includes limiting language: in addition to protecting the right of platforms to “voluntarily” and “in good faith” “restrict access to or availability of material that [the platform] considers to be obscene, lewd, . . . or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,”22347 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). section 230 dictates explicitly that it has “[n]o effect on intellectual property law.”224Id. § 230(d)(2). Thus, new kidfluencer regulations, if modeled after this exception for intellectual property law, could be fully consistent with section 230.

B.  Contributory Liability as a Basis for Platform Enforcement

In keeping with section 230’s unrestricted exception for intellectual property concerns, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), passed two years later, empowers copyright owners to compel online entities to remove infringing material hosted on their platforms or otherwise face liability.225The Digital Millenium Copyright Act, U.S. Copyright Off., https://www.copyright.gov/dmca [https://web.archive.org/web/20241214044325/https://www.copyright.gov/dmca]. Under the DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown system,” online platforms can qualify for limitations on liability, known as safe harbor provisions, provided that they comply with an owner’s takedown request.226Id. Thus, the system enables copyright owners to safeguard their work from infringement while avoiding litigation and also ensures, via its safe harbor provisions, that online platforms are not impeded in their industrial development by these intellectual property protections. The DMCA has roots in common law contributory liability doctrine in recognizing partial responsibility on the part of online entities for infringement happening on their platform.227See generally 5 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 17 (2024) (discussing the common law origins and development of contributory infringement doctrine). In this way, the DMCA serves as an analog for a potential liability model for platforms hosting kidfluencer content produced in violation of expanded regulations.

In the kidfluencer context, online platforms also go a step further than inadvertent sharing of objectionable material—they profit directly from kidfluencer content by collecting a percentage of advertising revenue from the accounts they monetize.228Kaufman & Gelt, Blockbuster Lawsuit, supra note 6. Thus, under expanded labor and privacy protections for kidfluencers, adapted from existing laws for child actors and child social-media users, platforms hosting monetized kidfluencer accounts would more than meet the criteria for contributory liability for profiting off of content produced in violation of these new regulations. Yet at the same time, platforms are also likely the most well-situated party to enact protocols that can effectively monitor and enforce updated kidfluencer laws.

Platforms can develop a more robust application process for kidfluencer account monetization requiring that adults running kidfluencer accounts to comply with the same laws regulating studios employing traditional child entertainers: obtaining permits to employ minors, tracking and reporting kidfluencers’ working hours and staying within working hour limits, providing proof of regular education and on-set supervision, and setting up protected trust accounts to safeguard kidfluencers’ compensation. Under this regulatory system, would-be kidfluencer accounts would have to meet these requirements as part of applying for account monetization, and existing kidfluencer accounts would have to provide documentation showing that they are maintaining these mandates to retain their monetized status on a continuing basis. Further, if federal protections for kidfluencers’ privacy were enshrined in an expansion of COPPA, online platforms could also be required to actively monitor kidfluencer accounts’ adherence to COPPA’s expanded mandates; specifically, platforms must obtain consent by teenagers and provisional consent by parents of children under thirteen to appear in monetized content and provide a means to revoke consent and compel removal upon request. Just as proof of continuing adherence to expanded kidfluencer labor regulations should be required for kidfluencer accounts to achieve monetization, so too should kidfluencer accounts be required to demonstrate compliance with privacy protections in order to keep gaining revenue. Online platforms already have established procedures to conform with COPPA’s existing mandates for children’s data collection that are similar to DMCA’s safe harbor criteria—in particular, COPPA includes its own self-regulatory guidelines for platforms to keep themselves eligible for COPPA’s longstanding safe harbor provisions. Thus, platforms are poised with a foundation to further develop protocols that monitor compliance with kidfluencer regulations. And despite the ongoing debate over the fate of section 230, imposing liability for online platforms in the kidfluencer context arguably need not threaten section 230, or platforms’ free expression more broadly, at all; such liability would not be without precedent given section 230’s blanket exception for intellectual property infringement, the DMCA’s subsequent imposition of the notice-and-takedown system, and COPPA’s longstanding restrictions on how online platforms interact with child users.

  CONCLUSION

While some former kidfluencers like Shari Franke have explicitly called for a ban on kidfluencing entirely, such a drastic measure would be remarkably difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. At the same time, though the PRI lawsuit is unique, as of this writing, in its involvement of kidfluencers personally suing adult content producers, the PRI plaintiffs are part of an ever-growing cohort, the oldest of whom are only beginning to reach adulthood. As the first generation of kidfluencers comes of age while regulations to protect kidfluencers remain, at best, in their infancy, courts could see a rise in litigation by former kidfluencers only now independent enough to seek legal recourse. Rather than Shari’s proposed all-out ban on kidfluencing or a slew of merely reactive, post-exploitation lawsuits in the spirit of the PRI lawsuit, the more promising approach to addressing kidfluencer exploitation lies in enacting strict labor and privacy regulations at the federal level; once these regulations are created or expanded, lawmakers can then explore mechanisms for imposing liability on social-media platforms that host kidfluencer content produced in violation of these expanded regulations. If kidfluencers are to remain a fixture of the content-creator world (and they likely will, given the pervasiveness of their online presence as well as their financial value to the platforms that feature them), their career field needs to be regulated like the bona fide occupation that it is. Thus, federal law must ensure the right of kidfluencers in every state to limits on their working hours, guaranteed access to education, on-set supervision and advocacy, and compensation safeguards—the same protections that the most stringent states afford to professional child actors.

But merely applying labor regulations for child actors to kidfluencers as an overall protective measure still falls short because the nature of kidfluencing itself presents an unprecedented privacy intrusion. Child actors have built-in privacy protections by virtue of conducting their work on a set, away from home, playing characters. Their work, by and large, is only seen by people who pay to see it and is only broadcast subject to intellectual property and other licensing agreements between production companies and distributors. In contrast, when kidfluencers’ parents say, “Action!” the entire world immediately has an unrestricted window directly into their personal, private life. Thus, just as federal law must be expanded to regulate kidfluencers’ labor, COPPA should be amended to explicitly cover kidfluencers and also to make parental consent to collection of kidfluencers’ personal data provisional only—once children turn thirteen, they must be able to retroactively withdraw consent for data their parents turned over on their behalf. Under this new regulatory system, social-media platforms would be charged with monitoring kidfluencer accounts’ adherence to these requirements and suspending accounts in violation, drawing upon their existing safe harbor guidelines that currently ensure their compliance with COPPA and the DMCA as a model. This all-encompassing approach will serve to close the gaps in kidfluencer protections as quickly and effectively as possible, preventing future generations of kidfluencers from needing to wait to reach adulthood before they can pursue legal recourse after years of exploitation. It defies common sense that, as far as kidfluencers’ labor and privacy are concerned, the younger—and more vulnerable—they are, the fewer rights they have.

APPENDIX

My name is Shari Franke. My mother, Ruby Franke, is the prominent family vlogger arrested last year for child abuse. I don’t come today as the daughter of a felon, nor a victim of an abnormally abusive mother. I come today as a victim of family vlogging. My goal today is not to present any idea of a solution to this problem, but to shed light on the ethical and monetary issues that come from being a child influencer.

When children become stars in their family’s online content, they become child influencers. It is more than just filming your family life and putting it online. It is a full-time job with employees, business credit cards, managers, and marketing strategies. The difference between family vlogging and a normal business, however, is that the employees are all children. Children, from before they are born to the day they turn eighteen, have become the stars of family businesses on YouTube, Instagram, and most other social media platforms.

Utah is specifically a hotspot for family content due to the LDS culture around family and the goal to share the church with the world. We also have large families which makes family content more lucrative. Specifically, many parents film their regular family life as an online video blog, called a vlog. But I want to be clear that there is never, ever a good reason for posting your children online for money or fame. There is no such thing as a moral or ethical family vlogger.

At first, family vlogging is an alluring business that can bring high revenue. For my family, it became the primary source of income as is often the case for full time family vloggers. Many child influencers are paid for their work as I was, and this money has helped me in my adult life. However, this payment was usually a bribe. For example, we’d be rewarded $100 or a shopping trip if we filmed a particularly embarrassing moment or an exciting event in our lives. Or other times, simply going on vacation was expected to be payment enough—because most kids don’t get to go on regular and expensive trips. Never mind the fact that the child’s labor is actually what paid for the vacation or trip. There is no law in place to guarantee that child influencers get any money from their work. If a family account does not become an LLC, parents are taxed heavily for paying their children. But parents receive tax write offs for the regular clothes they wear, the gas money used to drive places, and even the houses they live in—anything that is filmed can be written off. And even after registering their business as an LLC, there is no guarantee that children will get paid. Any payment that happens is under the table, with no paper trail. And how do we determine how much a child should make from appearing in family content? What price is worth giving up your childhood?

But despite any monetary payment children may receive, don’t let this excuse the 24/7 labor that these children are subjected to. As a child, I was fully aware that I was an employee. The business was successful when I was happy or when I shared my hardships with the world. Some of our most popular videos were when my eyebrow was accidentally waxed off, and the whole world saw a crying teenager when I just wanted to mourn in private. Or the time I was violently ill and got the leading role in the video [for] that day. My friends became scarce because dates were filmed and none of my friends wanted to be on camera. The camera never stops and there is no such thing as a [vacation] from filming.

At the time, I’d tell you that I had a choice in what was filmed. But I’ve come to learn that every child influencer, in a way, suffers from Stockholm syndrome. Most child influencers would probably tell you they have full control over what is posted; but the reality is that their parents bribe and shame them into posting their most vulnerable moments. In fact, many child influencers may tell you they enjoy their work because of the monetary perks they receive, or the fun experiences that they can have. After all, what child would say no to a fun vacation or shopping spree if all they needed to do was film [a mental breakdown or] an embarrassing moment?

But as children, we do not understand the consequences of filming our lives and [having it] post[ed] for the world to see. We cannot give consent to our parents to post our lives. In any other context, it is understood that children cannot give consent—but for some reason, people think family vlogging is different. I did not realize the impact that filming as a child would have on me now. My social media became flooded with rumors of having sexual relations with my own brother, to being called a baby birthing machine at the age of thirteen. All these things have stuck with me, and I will forever live between the ages of thirteen to seventeen in many of my viewer’s minds. In addition, pedophiles stalk the internet, specifically seeking out child influencers. I promise you that the parents are aware of these predators and choose to post their children anyway.

I understand that this a big issue to tackle. I am not asking you to ban family vlogging, though that is my end goal. I also understand that as Utahns, we don’t appreciate big government overreach. But when it comes to protecting children, it should be a bipartisan issue. The only people harmed by child influencer laws are the parents exploiting their children. While this may not seem like an issue now, as child influencers in Utah continue to grow up, I foresee there will be legal crises with these children realizing that vlogging has brought severe emotional distress. Or these kids may realize they don’t have an appropriate amount of money to show for their [forced] labor. After all, how does that child know how much they should have made versus what their parents may or may not have paid them? Let’s deal with this now, before we reach that point. But even despite a good paycheck, I want to be absolutely clear that there is no amount of money can justify selling your soul, as a child, to the world. In no other industry would we justify unregulated child labor with a huge paycheck, and we should not do that here.

If I could go back and do it all again, I’d rather have an empty bank account now and not have my childhood plastered all over the Internet. No amount of money I received has made what I’ve experienced worth it. While I don’t have all the answers, nor many feasible solutions for this problem, I am proud to be one of the first child influencers in the state of Utah to speak against this issue. I don’t want people to look at me and blame my unique circumstances, with a mother in prison, to the Franke criminal case. Family vlogging ruined my innocence long before Ruby committed a crime. I promise you that my experiences are not unique and are happening to child influencers all over Utah and the country. Let’s tackle this issue before it becomes a bigger crisis than it already is. Thank you.229KUTV 2 News Salt Lake City, supra note 1.

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 449

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*Executive Postscript Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate, 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Law, History, and Culture, 2016, University of Southern California. This Note is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother Nan Johnson. Thank you to my advisors Professors Jonathan Barnett and Jef Pearlman for their support and guidance; to Cristopher Swain for his unconditional encouragement; to Mark E. Haddad for his faith and wisdom; to Miranda Johnson-Haddad for her unwavering support; to Madeline Goossen and Robyn Kazemaini for their loyal mentorship; and to Kelcey Sholl, Isabella Flaherty, Nicholas Considine, and the staff of the Southern California Law Review for their thoughtful and dedicated editing.

Controlling the Narrative: Government Speech and Book Bans in the Public Library

  INTRODUCTION

Books bring personal joy and potential for individual growth. “The right book put in the right hands at the right time, could change the course of a life or many lives.”     1Evan Friss, The Bookshop: A History of the American Bookstore 6 (2024). But access to books is not just a matter of personal enrichment: books are essential sources of knowledge, and free access to that knowledge is fundamental to a successful, thriving democracy. Michael J. Barsanti, the former director of the Library Company, the first American library, pointed out that the Founders “knew that democracies were inherently fragile and that the only way you could sustain a democracy was by having an educated populace.”2Elizabeth Webster, How Ben Franklin Invented the Library as We Know It, Smithsonian Mag. (Apr./May 2024), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-ben-franklin-invented-library-as-we-know-it-180983983 [https://perma.cc/RP6J-D37Z].

Access to literature thus empowers individuals to engage thoughtfully in public life and fosters critical thinking and informed decision-making. Sociological studies have identified that literature introduces students to current cultural issues, which can help them develop global awareness.3Marianne Grasso, The Importance of Multicultural Literature, Connections, 2016, at 4, 4. Further, when readers vicariously experience the lives of others through literature, they gain the ability to look critically at the world by engaging with other points of view.4Id. The saying “knowledge itself is power,” first published in 1597,5Leonard Azamfirei, Knowledge Is Power, 2 J. Critical Care Med. 65, 65 (2016). has endured over the centuries because its truth is undeniable—and it is precisely this truth that drives some individuals in governments and communities to fight to keep certain books, and the power books hold, out of the public’s hands in an effort to control public discourse.

Libraries have become battlegrounds for partisan agendas. The concerted effort by State legislatures and citizen “activist” groups to ban certain books in schools6See Mary Ellen Flannery, Book Bans Are ‘Common and Rampant.’ So Are Educators and Parents Fighting Them., neaToday (Oct. 3, 2025), https://www.nea.org/nea-today/all-news-articles/book-bans-are-common-and-rampant-so-are-educators-and-parents-fighting-them [https://perma.cc/AW4H-6CUX]. is no longer confined to school classrooms but is spilling over into public libraries.7See Casey Kuhn, Library Book Ban Attempts Are at an All-Time High. These Librarians Are Fighting Back, PBS SoCal (Apr. 11, 2024), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/attempts-to-ban-books-are-at-an-all-time-high-these-librarians-are-fighting-back [https://web.archive.org/web/20251006144007/https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/attempts-to-ban-books-are-at-an-all-time-high-these-librarians-are-fighting-back]. This expansion of book bans from schools to libraries reflects an increasing desire to control public discourse and limit the availability of ideas that challenge the status quo. And by limiting access to certain books, these groups aim to control the public narrative and prevent the spread of ideas they perceive as threatening.

Efforts to ban books are rooted in fear—fear of ideas that challenge the status quo, of diverse perspectives, and of the power knowledge gives individuals to question public discourse, think critically about societal issues, and advocate for change.8See generally Paul T. Jaeger, Allison Jennings-Roche, Natalie Greene Taylor, Ursula Gorham, Olivia Hodge & Karen Kettnich, The Urge to Censor: Raw Power, Social Control, and the Criminalization of Librarianship, 6 Pol. Libr. (2023) (providing an overview of the current landscape of censorship and motivations that drive such censorship). They are at the center of an ongoing culture war around “woke” ideology, and it is a serious constitutional concern.9Ishena Robinson, How Woke Went From “Black” To “Bad,” Legal Def. Fund (Aug. 26, 2022), https://www.naacpldf.org/woke-black-bad [https://perma.cc/A5Z8-9Y83]. J.B. Pritzker, Governor of Illinois, has stated, “There are few perils to our democracy as dangerous as book bans” because “[t]hey threaten the very freedom of thought and speech that underpin our republic.”10Press Release, JB Pritzker, Governor, Illinois, Gov. Pritzker Signs Bill Making Illinois First State in the Nation to Outlaw Book Bans (June 12, 2023), https://www.illinois.gov/news/press-release.26575.html [https://perma.cc/9HJG-UHX6]. Book bans and censorship, therefore, threaten more than a personal freedom to read: they undermine the foundation of our democratic society by stifling an exchange of ideas that stem from the freedom to engage with diverse selections of ideas held within books.

This freedom of thought and speech is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution, which not only enshrines the rights to speak and publish, but also protects a wide range of mediums, including books, newspapers, art, music, clothing, and online content from political interference.11First Amendment and Censorship, Am. Libr. Ass’n (Oct. 2021), https://www.ala.org/advocacy/intfreedom/censorship [https://perma.cc/K3ML-PMY4]. The U.S. Supreme Court and other lower courts have also established that the right to receive information is a fundamental extension of the right to free speech.12Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”). Book bans, which directly restrict access to ideas and information, therefore warrant close examination under the First Amendment.

This Note will focus on cases that have addressed book bans, including the 2025 Fifth Circuit case of Little v. Llano County and the 2024 Eighth Circuit case of GLBT Youth in Iowa Schools Task Force v. Reynolds. These cases are critically important because they are two of the first cases to make their way to federal courts of appeal amid a recent surge in litigation surrounding the proliferation of book bans. In addition, the defendants in both cases argued that library book curation constitutes government speech, which would render the government immune from First Amendment claims.

Little is particularly important due to its potential to severely limit First Amendment protections in the context of public libraries—spaces that historically play a vital role in providing access to diverse ideas and expression. The case is notable because after the Fifth Circuit panel originally ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and granted them an injunction due to the likelihood that they would prevail on the merits of a First Amendment violation, the decision was vacated to be heard en banc,13On Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Little v. Llano Cnty., 106 F.4th 427, 427 (5th Cir. 2024). with a plurality of the panel ruling on May 23, 2025, that library book curation is indeed government speech.14Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121, at *3 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025). The Little ruling created a circuit split on the issue, as the Eighth Circuit held in GLBT Youth that such an action is not government speech.15GLBT Youth in Iowa Sch. Task Force v. Reynolds, 111 F. 4th 660, 667–68 (8th Cir. 2024). The Fifth Circuit is widely viewed as one of the most conservative circuits in the nation that is willing to overturn longtime precedents,16For example, Dobbs originated from the Fifth Circuit before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 234 (2024); Jeevna Sheth & Devon Ombres, The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Is Spearheading a Judicial Power Grab, Ctr. for Am. Progress (May 15, 2024), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-5th-circuit-court-of-appeals-is-spearheading-a-judicial-power-grab [https://perma.cc/R78Z-SWQB]. and in reaching its decision in Little, it has overturned Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, a thirty-year precedent that held books cannot be removed from libraries solely due to disagreement with the ideas they contain.17Little, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS at *13.

With Little poised to make its way to the Supreme Court after plaintiffs petitioned the case for review, this Note will argue why the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and hold that library book curation is not government speech. The Supreme Court has not heard a book banning case since its 1982 non-binding, plurality decision in Board of Education v. Pico.18Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1981). The Court has recently heard Mahmoud v. Taylor, holding that parents may opt their children out of being present for instruction involving books related to LGBTQ+ themes; however, despite being similar, Mahmoud is not precisely a book banning case. Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 528–30 (2025). This Note explores how the Pico decision could be strengthened. Specifically, it will advocate for distinguishing the important difference between public libraries and public-school libraries, confirming that book removal cannot be motivated by viewpoint discrimination, and providing guidance for determining when an action is motivated by viewpoint. This Note will then examine Little, arguing that the actions at issue in Little are, in fact, motivated by viewpoint discrimination. Finally, this Note will address the serious concerns and dangerous consequences of holding that library book curation is government speech—a new issue not presented in the Pico case—and will argue that the Court should clearly assert that it is not government speech.

This Note will refer to terminology including “bans” and “censors.” A book being “banned” traditionally and commonly refers to a book as being “removed from school curriculums [or] public libraries.”19David Oliver, What Happens to Our Culture When Books Are Banned: ‘A Chilling Effect,’ USA Today (Mar. 1, 2023, 11:25 A.M. ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/health-wellness/2023/02/22/book-bans-what-happens-culture/11262643002 [https://perma.cc/6B74-33RW]. Censor, used as a verb, means to “examine in order to suppress” or “delete anything considered objectionable”; further, censor, used as a noun, is “a person who supervises conduct and morals.”20Censor, merriam-webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/censor [https://perma.cc/6JKB-CGLV]. There are various methods in which a censor can censor or ban a book: (1) redaction, (2) restriction, and (3) relocation.21Smith College, Book Banning and the Culture Wars, YouTube (Oct. 3, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GNSPJQOxTDc [https://perma.cc/7X3L-EK72]. Redaction refers to removing information within a book but keeping the book available for patrons. Restriction refers to removing the book altogether. Relocation refers to requiring a book to be shelved in a separate area that often requires permission to access.22Id. Overall, this Note will use the term “ban” to refer to a combination of restriction and relocation but does not focus on instances in which books have been redacted.

I. Board of education v. PICO

Although the Supreme Court has heard numerous First Amendment challenges, those addressing the restriction of access to books are limited.23See generally Suzanne Eckes, Where the Supreme Court Stands on Banning Books, Free Speech Ctr. at Middle Tenn. St. U. (Oct. 4, 2023), https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/post/where-the-supreme-court-stands-on-banning-books [https://perma.cc/VQD4-J359]. Other examples of cases involving books include A Quantity of Copies of Books. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208 (1963) (“[T]he procedures followed in issuing the warrant for the seizure of the books, and authorizing their impounding pending hearing, were constitutionally insufficient because they did not adequately safeguard against the suppression of nonobscene books.”). The Court’s 1982 decision in Pico is the only opinion in which the Court has directly addressed the issue of book banning in libraries—particularly a school library.

The case revolves around a decision by the Island Trees school board to remove several books from its middle and high school libraries after obtaining a list of “objectionable” books from an organization called Parents of New York United (“PONYU”).24Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856 (1981) (plurality opinion). PONYU was a conservative organization of parents focused on education legislation in New York State.25Id. The “objectionable” books included popular titles such as Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut and Go Ask Alice.26Id. at 856–57 n.3. The school board characterized these books as “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-[semitic], and just plain filthy,” and concluded that it was the board’s “moral obligation” to “protect the children in [their] schools from this moral danger as surely as from physical and medical dangers.”27Id. at 857. Several students in the district, led by Steven Pico, challenged the removal of these books, arguing that the school board violated students’ First Amendment rights. They contended that the desire to suppress ideas that were politically and socially controversial was a form of viewpoint discrimination.

In its 5-4 plurality decision, the Court held that a school board’s removal of books could not be based on a desire to suppress ideas.28Id. at 853, 871–72. The Court did reason, however, that school boards have significant discretion in regulating the content of materials in their schools,29Id. at 869. although this discretion was not unlimited.30See id. at 870 (“Petitioners rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. But that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner.”). The Pico decision was narrow in several respects: notably, it lacks the establishment of a standard to determine when book removals are in violation of the First Amendment because of viewpoint-based restriction. The Court left open the vague possibility that books could be removed for reasons such as vulgarity or lack of educational value, without offering guidance on how those reasons could be distinguished from pretextual justifications. While Pico was important for affirming that students have the constitutional right to receive information, and that school boards do not have unlimited authority to remove books, it leaves unanswered questions about when book removals violate the First Amendment.

Additionally, the case leaves open questions about whether the Pico school board’s actions—which closely resemble the actions Llano County took in its public library in Little—did in fact violate the First Amendment, given that the case was remanded and then settled with no holding based on the facts. Despite these limitations, Pico is an important precedent in the ongoing debate over book banning. Lower courts that have decided on similar issues have closely followed the Pico holding.31See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025) (No. 25-284). For example, in the Fifth Circuit case Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, in which a school board removed books such as Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, the Court held that public schools cannot censor books merely because they contain controversial or offensive content.32Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 185, 189–90, overruled by Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025) (petition for cert. pending).

Considering the increasing number of book bans in the United States, there is a growing reason for strengthening the Pico decision. This Note will argue, as detailed above, that to strengthen the holding of Pico, the Court must distinguish the important difference between public libraries and public-school libraries. Additionally, given that Pico was a plurality opinion, the Court must reaffirm that book removal cannot be motivated by viewpoint discrimination in the context of libraries, and it must more clearly define the types of actions that constitute a violation of the First Amendment principle on viewpoint-based discrimination.

II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment has been greatly revered over the course of American history and is considered by many to be the most influential and important amendment in the Bill of Rights.33Linda R. Monk, The First and Second Amendments, PBS SoCal, https://www.pbs.org/tpt/constitution-usa-peter-sagal/rights/first-and-second-amendments [https://perma.cc/PE6X-VH7P]. The First Amendment guarantees “the people” freedom from government intervention in their right to free speech, which ensures the exchange of free ideas.34U.S. Const. amend. I. As with all rights, the First Amendment is not absolute; however, its central purpose lies in protecting the expression of unpopular ideas.35Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).

One of the key rationales behind vigorously protecting various forms of expression, including unpopular ideas, is the “marketplace of ideas.”36David Schultz, Marketplace of Ideas, Free Speech Ctr. at Middle Tenn. St. U. (July 9, 2024), https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/marketplace-of-ideas [https://perma.cc/5WFB-3F9Q]. The phrase was first popularized by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States.37Id.; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). The concept is grounded in the belief that for society to progress, “truth” will emerge only from the free exchange of ideas, which necessarily includes unpopular ones.38See Schultz, supra note 37. Ensuring that society can critically engage with competing viewpoints is therefore essential for individuals to evaluate the merits of different ideas and ultimately arrive at a better understanding of these “political truth[s].”39Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Importantly, the marketplace only functions when there is open debate and a free flow of information.40See Schultz, supra note 37 Holmes argued that the government should not have the power to suppress speech on the grounds that the speech is controversial or unpopular. In his view, the government should only step in when the speech poses a clear and imminent danger to the public or national security.41Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28. Nearly a decade after his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes joined Justice Brandeis in the latter’s concurring opinion for the famous 1927 case Whitney v. California, highlighting why the Founders believed strongly in protecting free speech:

[The Founders] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.42Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.

Book bans are fundamentally incompatible with Holmes’s marketplace of ideas theory and the First Amendment protections that safeguard the right to create, distribute, and access written works without government interference. Public libraries play an important role in maintaining an open marketplace of ideas. Because libraries are institutions that provide knowledge and information to “the people,” they must contain a wide range of ideas available for exploration, free from government interference based on ideological or political preferences. Unchecked government interference in the marketplace of ideas will manipulate the flow of knowledge and ensure that only certain ideas are permitted to reach “the people.”

A. Viewpoint Discrimination

Part of the First Amendment’s speech-protecting safeguards is the protection against efforts to restrict speech based on the speech’s content or viewpoint.43U.S. Const. amend I; Amdt1.7.3.1: Overview of Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech, Const. Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-3-1/ALDE_00013695 [https://perma.cc/8YVF-JPLN]. The government is, in nearly all circumstances, prohibited from engaging in viewpoint discrimination.44See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 695, 695–96 (2011). In 1989, the Court held in Texas v. Johnson that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”45Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

A law is considered viewpoint-based if it restricts speech due to a specific ideology, opinion, or perspective expressed by its speaker, rather than regulating speech based on content-neutral criteria.46U.S. Const. amend I; Amdt1.7.3.1: Overview of Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech, Const. Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-3-1/ALDE_00013695 [https://perma.cc/8YVF-JPLN]. Viewpoint discrimination is particularly dangerous because if permitted, the government is able to silence certain viewpoints based solely on subjective disapproval, which undermines the foundational prohibition on government censorship of speech with which the government disagrees.

In the context of book bans, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government actors remove or restrict access to books because they disagree with the ideas those books express, rather than because of neutral concerns such as age-appropriateness or educational relevance. This often happens when books are targeted for addressing topics that some find controversial, such as race, politics, or sexuality. For example, the removal of books that discuss LGBTQ+ identities or systemic racism reflects viewpoint discrimination when those books are excluded specifically to suppress those perspectives, while books expressing more politically favored viewpoints remain available.

B. Government Speech

Despite the Court interpreting the First Amendment to prohibit viewpoint discrimination, the government-speech doctrine exempts the government from the usual First Amendment restrictions on content- and viewpoint-based speech limitations, allowing it to engage in such discrimination.47G. Alex Sinha, Government-Speech Doctrine, Free Speech Ctr. at Middle Tenn. St. U. (Sept. 12, 2024), https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/government-speech-doctrine [https://perma.cc/43V2-EV8F]. The concept of government speech was articulated in the 1991 case Rust v. Sullivan, even though the term “government-speech” was not utilized in the opinion.48Id.

In Rust, the Court upheld a government regulation that any healthcare professional receiving Title X funding was prohibited from providing information about abortion, consequently limiting what healthcare professionals were permitted to say to their patients about abortion.49Id. The Court reasoned that because the government is not obligated to fund all viewpoints, and because it has the ability to select which programs to fund (here, family-planning that excluded abortion), the government’s actions would inevitably conflict with the perspectives of other programs it chooses to promote.50Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1990) (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the same problem in another way.”). Essentially, the government should be able to communicate its own messages or express its own policies and particular viewpoints without violating the First Amendment.51Sinha, supra note 48. Two decades later, in the 2009 case Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Court identified government speech when actions are “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.”52Id. In 2022’s Shurtleff v. City of Boston, the Court applied various factors to determine if governmental action is in fact government speech: (1) “the history of the expression at issue”; (2) “the public’s likely perception as to who (the government or a private person) is speaking”; and (3) “the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled the expression.”53Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 252 (2022) (citation omitted).

While there may be some truth to the idea that effective governance would be impossible if the government were unable to support or oppose certain viewpoints when implementing programs,54U.S. Const. amend I; Amdt1.7.8.2: Government Speech and Government as Speaker, Const. Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-8-2/ALDE_00013545 [https://perma.cc/8YVF-JPLN]. scholars have noted an inherent contradiction between the government speech doctrine and the First Amendment:

To satisfy traditional First Amendment tests, the government must show that it is not discriminating against a viewpoint. And yet if the government shows that it is condemning or supporting a viewpoint, it may be able to invoke the government speech defense and thereby avoid constitutional scrutiny altogether. Government speech doctrine therefore rewards what the rest of the First Amendment forbids: viewpoint discrimination against private speech.55Blocher, supra note 45, at 695.

Seemingly for this reason, the Court has warned that courts should “exercise great caution before extending . . . government-speech precedents.”56Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 235 (2017).

C. Minor’s Right to Free Speech

An individual’s status as a minor cannot serve as a blanket justification for censorship. The Supreme Court has recognized that minors enjoy a degree of expressive liberty under the First Amendment, although it is not as expansive as that of adults.57Memorandum from Jenner & Block on Minors’ Rights to Receive Information Under the First Amendment, Am. Libr. Ass’n (Feb. 2, 2004), https://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=jennerblockmemo&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=67542 [https://perma.cc/3PRX-VNMB]. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court famously held that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”58Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968). Also, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Court held that lawmakers cannot suppress speech for the sole purpose of shielding minors from ideas they do not find appropriate.59Memorandum, supra note 58 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).

III.  HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PUBLIC LIBRARIES

Libraries have long stood as pillars of American civic life, serving the public as “forums for information and ideas.”60Library Bill of Rights, Am. Libr. Ass’n, https://www.ala.org/advocacy/intfreedom/librarybill [https://perma.cc/AQV9-C2ZZ]. Founding Father Benjamin Franklin championed the first iteration of the American library system in 1731 with the founding of the Library Company of Philadelphia, which permitted individuals to borrow books for a fee.61Webster, supra note 3; A History of US Public Libraries, Digit. Pub. Libr. Am., https://dp.la/exhibitions/history-us-public-libraries/beginnings [https://perma.cc/UT2X-SS9X]. By 1800, this concept grew in popularity, and there were over forty fee-based libraries established across the United States.62Webster, supra note 3. In his autobiography, Franklin highlighted the important role libraries play in the furtherance of democracy, noting how the Library Company “improved the general conversation of the Americans” and “made the common tradesmen and farmers as intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries.”63Id.

Today, there are more than 9,000 libraries in the United States.64Tom McGrath, Why We Need Public Libraries Now More than Ever, Bos. Mag.: City Life (Nov. 12, 2023, 7:00 A.M.), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2023/11/12/public-libraries-boston [https://perma.cc/BJR6-RQWY]. Although libraries had long served a public civic role, the role was formally embedded in public life through tax-funded libraries, beginning in 1833, when the Peterborough Town Library in New Hampshire became the first such institution in the United States.65Early History, Peterborough Town Libr., https://peterboroughtownlibrary.org/history-and-renovation-9330/location/peterborough [https://perma.cc/T768-VSMX]. While the libraries of Franklin’s era were far from the inclusive institutions we strive for today, the heart and soul of the library’s purpose has remained and grown. Libraries serve our society as equalizers, ensuring access to knowledge for all regardless of background or circumstances while strengthening the democratic foundation of society.66Palaces for the People, AIA Pittsburgh: Columns (Sept. 12, 2019), https://aiapgh.org/palaces-for-people-review [https://perma.cc/4BWU-T9NG].

For instance, consider libraries in the mid-19th century. As industrialization and urbanization took shape during this period, there was a significant expansion of subscription libraries and public library systems, fueled in part by demand from the working class and their employers for self-education.67The Library in America, L.A. Pub. Libr. (Mar. 29, 2024), https://www.lapl.org/collections-resources/blogs/lapl/library-america [https://perma.cc/XJ3K-QTWC]. Employers funded libraries as investments in an “efficient . . . working class,” and trade-specific libraries such as the Mechanics’ Institute opened to “stretch the mind and teach new skills.”68Id. One such proponent of expanding libraries to the working class was Andrew Carnegie, who provided an employee library at one of his steel plants in Pennsylvania.69Id. Carnegie became one of the richest men in the world for his role in oil, steel, and railroads, and used much of his wealth for philanthropic endeavors70Philanthropy of Andrew Carnegie, Colum. U. Librs.: Rare Book & Manuscript Libr., https://library.columbia.edu/libraries/rbml/units/carnegie/andrew.html [https://perma.cc/923Y-695G].—one of which was the creation of a free public library system. He referred to libraries as “palaces for the people”71Palaces for the People, supra note 67. and spent more than $56 million to create more than 2,500 libraries.72Philanthropy of Andrew Carnegie, supra note 71. He worked with local governments to establish government-funded libraries, for which he donated buildings through a grant. Localities then instituted taxes to fund the libraries’ operations and acquisitions of books.73The Library in America, supra note 68.

Emily Knox, a professor at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign who researches censorship and library science, has stated that a guiding principle embraced by librarians is the “right of every individual to both seek and receive information from all points of view without restriction.”74Smith College, supra note 22. This commitment to receiving information has been evident for more than a century. In a brief New York Times article from 1918 titled Not a Public Library Ban, the director of the New York Public Library (“NYPL”) sought to dispel any suggestion of censorship by responding to claims cited in an earlier article that a patron had been denied access to The Unpardonable Sin. He clarified that the book was available and requested identifying information about the individual who had suggested otherwise.75E.H. Anderson, Not a Public Library Ban, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 1918), at 10 (accessible via The N.Y. Times TimesMachine at https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1918/09/04/issue.html [https://perma.cc/ND83-W3C5]). This early defense of open access underscores the long-standing dedication of libraries to resisting censorship and ensuring the public’s right to access information. Later, in response to “growing intolerance, suppression of free speech, and censorship affecting the rights of minorities and individuals,” the American Library Association adopted its first Library Bill of Rights in 1939, emphasizing that libraries are neutral spaces for the free exchange of ideas.76First Library Bill of Rights?, Am. Libr. Ass’n, https://www.ala.org/tools/first-library-bill-rights [https://perma.cc/2TWZ-Q4S5]. David Leonard, President of the Boston Public Library (the third largest library behind the Library of Congress and the NYPL) states that “Free to All”—as is inscribed on many of the library buildings—“encapsulates what we [are] all about.”77McGrath, supra note 65.

The evolution of libraries from small lending collections to vast public institutions reflects a commitment to ensuring that information remains accessible to all, without government interference or ideological gatekeeping. At their core, libraries represent a belief in the power of knowledge to uplift individuals and strengthen society. However, this very openness and inclusivity have made them a target for those who seek to control the flow of information. The ongoing battle over book removals and censorship in libraries threatens to undermine these fundamental principles that have endured since this country’s founding. The fight to keep libraries truly “free to all” is not just about books—it is about preserving the foundational freedoms on which this country was built.

IV. HISTORY OF BOOK BANS AND CENSORSHIP

The banning of books and the censorship of ideas are not new phenomena. Both have persisted throughout the course of human history. In 213 B.C., Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang ordered various books of poetry and history to be burned;78Lorraine Boissonealt, A Brief History of Book Burning, From the Printing Press to Internet Archives, Smithsonian Mag. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/brief-history-book-burning-printing-press-internet-archives-180964697 [https://web.archive.org/web/20251001164331/https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/brief-history-book-burning-printing-press-internet-archives-180964697]. Ovid, a Roman poet, was banished from Rome in A.D. 8 for his The Art of Love; in 1526 England, thousands of copies of the New Testament were burned; for more than 400 years from 1564 to 1966, the Catholic Church maintained the Index Librorum Prohibitorum—Index of Prohibited Books—that forbade Catholics from reading books by authors such as Victor Hugo, John Locke, and Jean-Paul Sartre; and from 1788 to 1820, King George banned Shakespeare’s King Lear from stage performance.79Modern History Sourcebook: Index Librorum Prohibitorum, 1557–1966 [Index of Prohibited Books], Fordham U., https://origin-rh.web.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/indexlibrorum.asp [https://perma.cc/YJJ4-74TT]; Bannings and Burnings in History, Book & Periodical Council: Freedom to Read, https://www.freedomtoread.ca/resources/bannings-and-burnings-in-history [https://perma.cc/ZXZ6-9GQS]. In modern times, book banning has steadily continued. In 1939, John Steinbeck’s novel The Grapes of Wrath was removed from a Kansas City library for being “indecent”;80Library Bans Steinbeck Book, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 1939), at 8 (accessible via The N.Y. Times TimesMachine at https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1939/08/19/issue.html [https://perma.cc/G8FN-PQYP]). during the Nazi regime, thousands of books including Jack London’s The Call of the Wild and numerous Ernest Hemmingway titles were banned and burned;81Bannings and Burnings in History, supra note 80. in the 1980s, Beatrix Potter’s The Tale of Peter Rabbit was banned from schools in London County, England; in 1987, at a North Carolina high school, Maya Angelou’s I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings was removed from the required reading list;82Id. lastly, Toni Morrison’s Beloved has been included in the American Library Association’s top ten most challenged books of the year list seven times since 2006.83Top 10 and Frequently Challenged Books Archive, Am. Libr. Ass’n, https://www.ala.org/bbooks/frequentlychallengedbooks/top10/archive [https://perma.cc/ZX74-3E27]. While justifications for banning books may evolve to reflect the politics and ideologies of a particular time, those who seek to control what others can read share similar claims of acting in the interest of morality, public order, or protecting children as their reasons for book banning.

Although bans are not new, “[they are] definitely getting worse.”84Claire Armitstead, “It’s A Culture War That’s Totally Out of Control”: The Authors Whose Books Are Being Banned in US Schools, Guardian (Mar. 22, 2022, 2:00 P.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/22/its-a-culture-war-thats-totally-out-of-control-the-authors-whose-books-are-being-banned-in-us-schools [https://perma.cc/ER4L-GRB3]. The American Library Association’s Office for Intellectual Freedom documented 4,240 unique titles challenged in 2023, making it a 65% increase from 2,571 titles in 2022.85Censorship by the Numbers, Am. Libr. Ass’n, https://www.ala.org/bbooks/censorship-numbers [https://perma.cc/U4C7-ECW8]. This was the highest level since the organization began tracking twenty years ago.86Id. Comparatively, the number of unique titles challenged in 2014, just over 10 years ago, was 235.87Id. In 2020, the number of unique titles was still less than 300, but that number shot up to 1,858 in 2021 and has been growing since.88The 2024 analysis is pending, but to see an interactive map that shows the progression of total censorship attempts, total books challenged, and number of unique books challenged from 2014 to 2023, see the American Library Association’s website. Id. Between July 2021 and June 2023, PEN America reported that 5,894 books have been banned across 41 states.89Elizabeth Sanders, State Laws on Book Bans, Free Speech Ctr. at Middle Tenn. St. U. (Sept. 20, 2024), https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/state-laws-on-book-bans-and-challenges [https://perma.cc/WA23-VFCJ]. The trend is most prominent in “Republican-leaning” states—Florida and Iowa had the most book bans from 2023 to 202490Anna Merod, New Jersey Becomes Latest State to Prohibit Book Bans, K-12DIVE (Dec. 11, 2024), https://www.k12dive.com/news/new-jersey-latest-state-prohibit-book-bans/735230 [https://perma.cc/3R52-2JR7].—reflecting an increasingly organized and politically motivated effort to control access to literature.

The motivations behind banning books often stem from deeply rooted psychological and sociological factors—“an act of control[] driven by . . . fear.”91Paul T. Jaeger et al., supra note 9. Emily Knox, who studies book banning and censorship, reported that communities try to ban books because words have power, and words can change who an individual is.92Smith College, supra note 22. Throughout history, censorship has been a tool for controlling narratives.93JLG Marketing, Banned Book Week: The Psychology of Book Censorship, Junior Libr. Guild (Oct. 3, 2023), https://www.juniorlibraryguild.com/blog/post/banned-book-week-the-psychology-of-book-censorship [https://perma.cc/P5C8-68W7]. Economic and social turmoil often lead to widespread efforts to restrict the rights of marginalized individuals,94Paul T. Jaeger et al., supra note 9. and silencing their voices by restricting their access to books is a powerful tool for accomplishing this goal. There is a desire to preserve societal norms, and restricting books keeps them away from readers whom censors fear might be “changed” by their content.95Smith College, supra note 22. Encountering ideas that may conflict with an individual’s deeply held beliefs can create a mental discomfort that many avoid by challenging books that challenge their worldview.96JLG Marketing, supra note 94. “Activist” groups pushing for parents to challenge books often use the term “indoctrination” to describe book content they object to—instead of the word “education”—to emphasize that their worldview does not comport with the worldview expressed by the challenged book.97Smith College, supra note 22. Because books introduce unfamiliar and challenging ideas that may be uncommon in certain communities or regions, the differing views and lives represented in the pages of the challenged book are often seen as a threat.98Paul T. Jaeger et al., supra note 9. Thus, individuals justify restricting these ideas as a desire to protect readers from radical ideas.99JLG Marketing, supra note 94.

V. PROLIFERATION OF BANS AND LEGISLATION

The rise in book bans has become a significant national issue, sparking debate regarding parental rights and minors’ First Amendment rights. As of 2022, more than one-hundred bills have been proposed for various forms of book banning at the state level.100Oliver, supra note 20. Florida’s HB 1557, also known as the “Parental Rights in Education” law and referred to by opponents as the “Don’t Say Gay” law, restricts discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity in certain grade levels.101Sanders, supra note 90. With respect to book banning, the Florida law increases the ease with which parents, or any resident, can object to books used in classrooms and school libraries.102What You Need to Know About Florida’s Law on Classroom Instruction on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Book Bans, and Other Curriculum Restrictions, Nat’l Ed. Ass’n (Apr. 25, 2025), https://www.nea.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/fl-kyr-updated-apr2024.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20250214084322/https://www.nea.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/fl-kyr-updated-apr2024.pdf]. It requires school districts to house an “objection form” on the school district’s homepage website, and directs districts to remove books objected to as “pornographic” within five days of receiving an objection.103Id. Charlotte County school district, acting on the law, prohibited books with LGBTQ+ characters in all schools with limited exceptions for high schools; Charlotte’s superintendent and school attorney stated, “These characters and themes cannot exist.”104Terry Spencer, Florida School District Orders Removal of All Books with Gay Characters Before Slightly Backing Off, AP News (Sept. 27, 2023, 1:14 P.M. PST), https://apnews.com/article/lgbtq-florida-dont-say-gay-books-bed1a412f3efaa0f371da8e8c89f4975 [https://perma.cc/N9Q7-XSEX]. Two years after the enactment of this law, Florida was required through a settlement to provide direction to schools regarding the scope of the legislation; subsequently, it has been clarified that the law does not apply to libraries in which no educational instruction is taking place.105Ronald K. L. Collins, Moms for Liberty: The Anti-Liberty Book Banning Group, FIRE: First Amend. News (Mar. 13, 2024), https://www.thefire.org/news/blogs/ronald-kl-collins-first-amendment-news/moms-liberty-anti-liberty-book-banning-group [https://perma.cc/U3TN-UV2T].

In addition, Texas’ HB 900, the READER Act, attempted to enact stringent guidelines on educational materials by requiring school book vendors to rate books that contain “sexually explicit” or “sexually relevant” content in order to restrict access to these books.106Sanders, supra note 90. Specifically, the Act required book publishers, bookstores, and internet-based book retailers to rate books in active use that they sold to public schools.107Laura Prather, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms That Texas Book Rating System is Unconstitutional, Haynes Boone (May 15, 2024), https://www.haynesboone.com/news/publications/fifth-circuit-court-of-appeals-affirms-that-texas-book-rating-system-is-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/38GT-3MAV]. These independent, private entities received minimal guidance on how to implement the ratings despite the fact that books labeled by the sellers as “sexually explicit” would consequently be removed from public school libraries.108Id. In May of 2024, the Fifth Circuit in Book People v. Wong upheld a district court injunction that held the READER Act to be unconstitutionally vague and compelled speech.109Id. The legislation in Florida and Texas have served as models for similar measures in other states such as Arizona, Missouri, Tennessee, and Idaho, signaling a broad trend.110Collins, supra note 106.

Much of the book banning debate has focused on public school libraries and academic curriculum choices, but there has been a growing trend in regulation and litigation regarding public community libraries. For instance, Llano County in Texas and Pasco County in Florida have begun expanding book banning efforts from school libraries to community libraries. For example, in September of 2024, Pasco County removed 130 children’s books with LGBTQ+ content from its community library.111Jeffrey S. Solochek, Pasco Libraries “Suppress” More than 100 Children’s Books with LGBTQ+ Themes, Tampa Bay Times (Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/2024/09/13/pasco-libraries-suppress-more-than-100-childrens-books-with-lgbtq-themes [https://perma.cc/J44S-SN5P]. In January of 2025, South Carolina introduced a bill in its state senate requiring libraries to certify each quarter that they “do not offer books or materials in children’s, youth, or teen sections that might be considered sexually inappropriate” in order to receive state funding they need.112SC S0104 Library Funding, Bill Track 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1757977 [https://perma.cc/BJH5-A8AK]. In April of 2024, Idaho passed House Bill 710 to require that books deemed harmful to children be relocated to “adult only” areas in public community libraries,113Kyle Pfannenstiel & Mia Maldonado, “We Are Not Getting Rid of Books”: How Libraries Across Idaho Are Implementing New Materials Law, Idaho Cap. Sun (July 15, 2024, 4:30 A.M.), https://idahocapitalsun.com/2024/07/15/we-are-not-getting-rid-of-books-how-libraries-across-idaho-are-implementing-new-materials-law [https://perma.cc/8QJ3-XJ4Y]. causing some rural libraries to respond by prohibiting children’s access to libraries altogether because their libraries are too small for a separate section.114Id.

Critics of the laws that restrict access to books contend that they infringe upon First Amendment rights, including the right to receive information. They argue that these regulations constitute censorship and limit readers’ exposure to diverse perspectives. The debate centers on whether a state government’s interest in shielding children from content it deems inappropriate outweighs a broader societal commitment to the free exchange of ideas.115Sanders, supra note 90. States that are traditionally more liberal are responding to this increase in bans by enacting “anti-book ban” laws for both school and community libraries.116Merod, supra note 91. California, Illinois, Minnesota, Maryland, and New Jersey have all enacted protective laws,117Id. and in June of 2023, Illinois became the first state to enact legislation that outlaws book bans.118Naaz Modan, Democratic-Leaning States Move to Curb Book Bans, K-12DIVE (Apr. 10, 2024), https://www.k12dive.com/news/freedom-to-read-divisive-concepts-anti-crt-book-bans/712805 [https://perma.cc/V45R-P2AG]. The Illinois law requires libraries to create formal policies or adopt the American Library Association’s Bill of Rights that asserts books could not be removed because of partisan disapproval.119Press Release, supra note 11. More states are beginning to introduce protective measures. In February of 2025, for example, a bill was introduced in the New York State Assembly to prohibit libraries from banning books based on “partisan or doctrinal disapproval.”120NY A05995, Bill Track 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1845127 [https://perma.cc/EFH5-76RK].

This proliferation of legislation and regulation has received federal attention, with hearings in both the House Committee on Oversight and Reform in 2022 (entitled “Free Speech Under Attack”) and in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2023 (called “Book Bans: Examining How Censorship Limits Liberty and Literature”).121Sanders, supra note 90. Supporters of states’ legislation and regulation limiting access to books argue that governments have the authority to regulate access to content deemed inappropriate and to protect children from material they consider harmful.122Id. These arguments often frame the issue as one of parental rights.123Free Speech Under Attack: Book Bans and Academic Censorship Before the H. Oversight and Reform Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 117th Cong. (2022); Book Bans: Examining How Censorship Limits Liberty and Literature Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. (2023). In the 2023 Senate Judiciary hearing, the committee heard from five “witnesses” with varying points of view on the issue. Nicole Neily, one of the hearing’s witnesses and President of “Parents Defending Education,” stated before the committee that “families’ concerns about books in schools is not ‘book banning.’ ”124Book Bans: Examining How Censorship Limits Liberty and Literature Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. (2023) (statement of Nicole Neily, President Parents Defending Education). She indicated that their concern with “age appropriate[ness]” is not “radical,”125Id. and stated that the debate around book banning “is a manufactured crisis that distracts from families’ valid concerns about the quality of their children’s education and whether students are safe from drugs, assaults, and bullying in schools today.”126Id. Neily, betraying her own argument that this is about children’s safety and not her own disapproval of LGBTQ+ content, concluded, “Please listen to the concerns of families who want their children to learn basic grammar, rather than be policed on pronouns.”127Id. (emphasis added).

On the other hand, those against the book ban legislation and regulation argue that it is a violation of First Amendment rights and a threat to democracy. Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias spoke about his initiation of House Bill 2789, which proposed that Illinois libraries will not receive funding if they ban books:

This legislation is important because both the concept and the practice of “banning books” contradicts the very essence of what our country stands for and what our democracy was founded on. It also defies what education is all about: [t]eaching our children to think for themselves. If the book banners care to, they can go to our libraries and check out the Federalist Papers, the U.S. Constitution and even Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment. What they will learn is that our democracy depends on the “marketplace of ideas.” That “marketplace of ideas” will not function if we ban books—because we will be banning ideas and preventing our children from thinking for themselves and having the ability to debate [and] learn [and] understand different perspectives.

[ . . . ]

I could never imagine a world where I would tell another family what books their kids should or should not be allowed to read.128Book Bans: Examining How Censorship Limits Liberty and Literature Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. (2023) (statement of The Honorable Alexi Giannoulias, Secretary of State of the State of Illinois) (emphasis omitted).

This surge in book bans is an extension of broader culture wars currently gripping the nation, particularly around issues of “wokeism,” so-called “traditional” family values, and the targeting of transgender individuals by conservative politicians.129See Robinson, supra note 10. These bans reflect a systematic effort to reshape public discourse by restricting access to materials that address topics such as LGBTQ+ identities, systemic racism, or gender diversity. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights announced the elimination of its book ban coordinator position, which had been established in June of 2023 to investigate complaints regarding school removals of books claimed to be “racially divisive.” Along with eliminating the position, the department dismissed eleven related complaints, stating that the concerns over book bans were a “hoax” and a “false narrative” perpetuated by then-President Biden.130Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Ed., U.S. Department of Education Ends Biden’s Book Ban Hoax (Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/us-department-of-education-ends-bidens-book-ban-hoax [https://perma.cc/YDU6-V3N9]. Additionally, on February 7, 2025, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) announced that it would be reviewing books “potentially related to gender ideology or discriminatory equity ideology topics” in DoD-funded schools located in seven states and eleven countries.131Ed Pilkington, Pentagon Schools Suspend Library Books for “Compliance Review” Under Trump Orders, Guardian (Feb. 13, 2025, 1:24 P.M. EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/13/pentagon-schools-closed-libraries-trump [https://perma.cc/S3MM-ZFJM]. The DoD removed books from these school classrooms and libraries, including titles such as Freckleface Strawberry written by actress Julianne Moore about a young girl learning to accept her freckles and No Truth Without Ruth, a biography about Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.132Julianne Moore’s “Freckleface Strawberry” and JD Vance’s ‘Hillbilly Elegy’ Among Books Caught in Defense Department Review, PEN America (Feb. 19, 2025), https://pen.org/julianne-moore-freckleface-strawberry [https://perma.cc/WW5H-42VG].

One of the activist groups leading the charge on book restrictions is Moms for Liberty.133Although the desire to ban books typically comes from more conservative states and “activist” groups like Moms for Liberty, it is important to note that some human rights organizations associated with liberal causes have also called for censorship of books in schools and public libraries. For example, in 2019, the NAACP proposed a resolution in which several works by Dr. Seuss were to be censored, not just in school curriculums but in public libraries as well. NAACP Calls for Censorship of all Dr. Seuss Books/Works in all Public Schools/Institutions and Public Libraries, NAACP (2019), https://naacp.org/resources/naacp-calls-censorship-all-dr-seuss-booksworks-all-public-schoolsinstitutions-and-public [https://perma.cc/7NPK-54VG]. Moms for Liberty was founded in 2021 and began by speaking out against mask mandates and COVID vaccination requirements in schools. It later shifted gears to focus on the ways in which topics related to LGBTQ+ individuals, racism, and religion are presented in schools.134Collins, supra note 106. The group is similar to that of PONYU discussed earlier in regard to the Pico case, and the Southern Poverty Law Center has compared Moms for Liberty to “pro-segregationist parent groups that flourished in the wake of . . . Brown v. Board of Education.”135Id. The group’s influence, for example, led to a parent in South Carolina sending a list of ninety-seven books to her child’s school district for removal in early 2024. The list of books was obtained from a site called “Book Looks,” which was created by a former member of Moms for Liberty to enable parents to “find out what objectionable content may be in [their] child’s book before they do.”136Scott Pelley, Aliza Chasan, Henry Schuster & Sarah Turcotte, See the Full List of 97 Books Parents Tried to Ban from Beaufort, South Carolina School Library Shelves, CBS News (Mar. 3, 2024, 7:00 P.M. EST), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beaufort-south-carolina-97-books-ban-attempt-full-list [https://perma.cc/VS6J-9Y5F]; BookLooks, https://booklooks.org [https://perma.cc/C59Q-N8ND]. The school librarian was subjected to numerous threats from parents who wanted to turn the librarian in to the police and the FBI for distributing pornography, despite the school having a program in which parents could fill out an opt-out form so their children would not be able to access the book.137Pelley et al., supra note 137. Similarly, in the year preceding the enactment of the Idaho House Bill 710 discussed earlier, the Idaho Falls Library received twenty-one complaints from a group called “Parents Against Bad Books.”138Pfannenstiel & Maldonado, supra note 114.

Although framed by supporters and activist groups as measures to protect children and uphold parental rights, these laws reflect fears that exposure to certain ideas undermine “traditional” family values. Critics argue that these actions amount to censorship, threaten and violate First Amendment rights by limiting access to diverse perspectives, and politicize public spaces like libraries that are supposed to function as neutral fora for freedom of thought and expression. Art Spiegelman, a Pulitzer Prize winner and author of widely banned book Maus, a graphic novel depicting his father’s survival of the Holocaust, says of the current situation, “It [i]s a culture war that [i]s totally out of control.”139Armitstead, supra note 85.

VI. PROLIFERATION OF LAWSUITS

There have been numerous legal challenges to legislation and book removals in schools and libraries. However, this Note focuses on two cases that have specifically raised government speech arguments and have gone before the appellate courts: the Eighth Circuit case of GLBT Youth in Iowa Schools Task Force v. Reynolds and the Fifth Circuit case of Little v. Llano County. Notably, a newer case, PEN America Center, Inc. v. Escambia County School District, has been ongoing in front of the Northern District of Florida, in which the school district is also advancing a government speech argument.140PEN Am. Ctr., Inc. v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 711 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (N.D. Fla., 2024); PEN America v. Escambia County School District, Pen Am. (Oct. 9 2024), https://pen.org/pen-america-v-escambia-county [https://perma.cc/5EKT-J27Z]. This represents a possibility for this argument to now make its way through the Eleventh Circuit.

A. Eighth Circuit: GLBT Youth in Iowa Schools Task Force v. Reynolds

In 2023, Iowa enacted Senate File 496 (“SF496”), a contentious law that reshaped policies governing public school libraries and classrooms.141GLBT Youth in Iowa Sch. Task Force v. Reynolds, 111 F. 4th 660, 665 (8th Cir. 2024). The legislation introduced significant restrictions and prohibitions such as requirements to remove books deemed age-inappropriate from school libraries.142Id. at 666. Two lawsuits emerged in response to SF496. The first was brought by GLBT Youth in Iowa Schools Task Force, a group of students who asserted that SF496 violated the First Amendment. The second lawsuit was brought by Penguin Random House, authors, and educators, who raised similar First Amendment violations. Because “both cases related to the same legislation . . . and had considerable overlap such that the cases would benefit from joint administration,” the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa consolidated the cases.143Id.

In response to the plaintiffs, the State argued that the removal of books from school libraries constituted government speech, which is not subject to First Amendment viewpoint-neutrality requirements when the government speaks on its own behalf.144Id at 667. The District Court then issued a preliminary injunction on SF496 due to the likelihood that the law violated the First Amendment.145Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court’s injunction but, importantly, rejected the application of the government speech doctrine while noting that the Supreme Court has not held that library curation is government speech.146Id at 667, 671. Also, applying the Shurtleff factors, discussed earlier in Section II.B, the Eighth Circuit stated that the public does not typically associate this activity with government action, as the library usually hosts a broad and diverse set of materials instead of a curated set of government-endorsed messages.147Id at 668. Additionally, Iowa has not historically exercised significant control over the selection and removal of books from libraries, and the Supreme Court has directed the use of caution when extending the doctrine of government speech.148Id.

B. Fifth Circuit: Little v. Llano County

In August of 2021, three Llano County, Texas, residents, Rochelle Wells, Eva Carter, and Jo Ares, filed complaints with Judge Ron Cunningham, head of Llano County Commissioners Court, which supervises the Llano County library system, about children’s library books that they found to be “pornographic and overly sexual.”149Little v. Llano Cnty., 103 F.4th 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 2024), overruled by On Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Little v. Llano Cnty., 106 F.4th 427 (5th Cir. 2024). Wells, in order to prevent others in the community from checking out books she deemed unacceptable, checked them out continuously for months. Cunningham then directed the librarian to remove these books from Llano County library shelves.150The books in question were described as “butt and fart books” and included titles such as I Broke My Butt! and Larry the Farting Leprechaun. Little, 103 F.4th at 1144.

Several months later, another community member sent Cunningham a list of books that she found objectionable, calling them “pornographic filth.”151Id. Cunningham further instructed the librarian to remove these additional books. In total, the library removed seventeen books by the end of 2021, and these books became accessible only if an individual asked the librarian for them. However, the books were not listed in the catalog system, making it impossible to know if the books were available for checkout.152Id.

In 2022, the library board dissolved, and Cunningham appointed Wallace and Wells to the new board. The new board prohibited the Llano County librarian from attending the board’s meetings and required her to obtain approval for any new books she sought to include in the library.153Id. at 1145. Subsequently, plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and alleged that their First Amendment rights had been violated because the book removals occurred based on the defendants’ disagreement with the content of the books.

In March of 2023, Judge Robert Pittman of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim based on viewpoint discrimination. The Court mandated the return of the book titles in question and prohibited further removal of books while the case proceeded.154Andrew Albanese, On Appeal, Llano County Seeks Book Ban Ruling That Would Upend Public Libraries, Publishers Wkly. (Sept. 25, 2024), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/libraries/article/96015-on-appeal-llano-county-seeks-book-ban-ruling-that-would-upend-public-libraries.html [https://perma.cc/9H6J-CG8R]. The decision was initially affirmed by a 2-1 Fifth Circuit panel but was quickly vacated and ordered to be heard en banc.155Id. Notably, the panel dissent endorsed the government speech argument.156Little, 103 F.4th at 1161 (Duncan, J., dissenting).

Oral arguments before the en banc court took place in September of 2024 and opened with the lawyer for Llano County, Jonathan Mitchell, arguing that the Court should overturn Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, previously discussed in this Note’s Section I. Campbell held that the constitutionality of removing books from a library hinges on the substantial motivation of officials involved. Specifically, Campbell ruled that decisions driven by a desire to suppress certain viewpoints or ideas violate the First Amendment. This holding closely aligns with the plurality’s reasoning in Pico.

Mitchell and the County argued that library decisions to acquire, retain, or remove books are choices that should be categorized as government speech—and thus should be exempt from restrictions on viewpoint discrimination.157Oral Argument at 0:48–2:11:, Little v. Llano County (2024) (No.23-50224), (downloaded from courtlistener.com, https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/94137/little-v-llano-county [https://perma.cc/C2ER-8FMG]). Drawing on Moody v. NetChoice LLC,158Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). the County compared the library’s book collection to “speech that belongs to the curator,” asserting that the inclusion or exclusion of particular materials is expression.159Oral Argument, supra note 158, at 2:15. They compared the content selected in libraries to a curated broadcast or a social media page, which is deemed expressive activity.160Attorneys for the plaintiffs, in their petition for certiorari, distinguished Little from NetChoice by arguing that a “[p]ublic library is fundamentally different from [a] social media platform[]”: First, a public library is not a “private entity offering an expressive product,” and second, the library has not previously curated its book selection by “preferring certain viewpoints and suppressing others.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121, at *3 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025) (No. 25-284). The defendants argued that by exercising discretion over library content, the government is communicating its own message about what is appropriate for the community it serves. Under this framework, the decision regarding the removal of books would be insulated from a First Amendment challenge.

Plaintiffs countered that holding library curation to be government speech would “recast government censorship as protected affirmative speech” and “expand the government’s power to extinguish controversial ideas.”161En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees at 1, Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2024). They argued that the act of curating library books is not government speech because it does not meet the Supreme Court’s test from Shurtleff v. Boston. Specifically: (1) the county has not historically censored books based on viewpoint; (2) the public does not perceive the government to be speaking because the books provide for conflicting views; and (3) the county has not engaged in viewpoint curation for every book in the library.162Id. at *2.

The en banc panel overruled Campbell and a plurality held that library book curation is government speech in their final ruling on May 23, 2025.163Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121, at *3 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025). On September 9, 2025, the attorneys for plaintiffs, now notably including Elizabeth Prelogar, the former Solicitor General of the United States, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.164Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025) (No. 25-284).

VII.  BOOK BANNING CASES ARE HEADED TO THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in Little because of the unresolved legal questions stemming from Pico, the steady rise in legislation targeting book removals, and the newly divided circuits on government speech. Pico established that school boards cannot remove books solely because they disagree with their ideas, but the fractured nature of the ruling left room for interpretation—especially regarding the distinction between school and public libraries. Now, with a circuit split on whether library book curation constitutes government speech, the need for Supreme Court clarification is even greater. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Little directly contradicts the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in GLBT, which held that library curation is not government speech. If courts allow the government to claim that book removals are a form of government speech, it will fundamentally reshape public libraries by transforming them from spaces of free inquiry into spaces of government-endorsed messages. Given the implications for First Amendment rights and the increasing legal battles over library censorship, the Supreme Court will likely need to resolve these critical constitutional issues.

A. Decades-Old Nonbinding Supreme Court Plurality Opinion In Pico, Revisited

As previously discussed in Section I, Pico involved the removal of several books from a public school library, in which the school board argued that the books were “anti-American” and “vulgar.”165Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 857 (1981). In its plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the school board’s removal of the books violated the First Amendment.166Id. at 872. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, held that the books could not be removed solely because of the government’s disagreement with the ideas contained in the books. A plurality of the Justices also reaffirmed that students have a right to receive information protected by the First Amendment, even in a school setting.167Id. at 868. However, the Pico decision left room for discretion on the part of the schools, in that they could remove books deemed educationally unsuitable. As in, removal would be permissible if it was based on educational suitability rather than ideological disapproval.

The Justices differed on the legal standard for determining when a school could remove books. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but did not agree that the right to receive information was a necessary consideration.168Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice White concurred in the judgment only and would have held that there was a genuine issue of material fact without identifying the viewpoint limitation on school boards.169Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring). As mentioned throughout this Note, the fractured nature of the Pico ruling—in addition to the rise in legislation on book banning—indicates that lower courts will now need clarification from the Supreme Court on the standards of book removal in school and public libraries.

B. The Supreme Court Has Not Yet Differentiated Between School Libraries And Public Libraries

School libraries and public libraries both play essential roles in supporting free speech, but they differ in scope when it comes to book removal challenges. Public libraries are community institutions that serve people of all ages and provide access to a vast array of viewpoints and information. In contrast, school libraries function within an educational setting, where materials are evaluated based on curricular goals and suitability for students. Because of this distinction, parents have a greater influence over school libraries as they have a recognized right to direct their children’s upbringing.170Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (recognizing the “power of parents to control the education of their own [children]”). However, this parental right does not extend to controlling what is available in a public library, where individuals—children and adults alike—retain personal autonomy over what they choose to read.

Public libraries operate on the principle of voluntary access. Unlike schools, in which students may be required to engage with certain materials, public library users have complete discretion over what they may choose to check out. If a parent does not want their child reading a particular book, they can simply prevent their child from borrowing it without imposing that decision on the rest of the community. This opt-in nature of public libraries makes government-imposed book removals particularly troubling, as these removals do not merely reflect an effort to structure a child’s education, but also limit access to information for everyone in the community.

Pico narrowly addressed book removals in school libraries, but the differences between school and public libraries demand a more nuanced legal approach. The dissent in Pico expressed concerns about a school board’s ability to maintain control over the educational environment, but that is not relevant here.171Pico, 457 U.S. at 885 (Burger, J., dissenting). How might the dissent have ruled had this been a community library? The fact that Pico left these unresolved questions highlights the need for clearer guidance from the Supreme Court on how book removal standards apply to public libraries. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should uphold an even stronger determination against viewpoint discrimination than it did in Pico, given the dangers posed by an expanded understanding of the government speech doctrine, as discussed in Section D below.

C. Llano County’s Book Removals Are Viewpoint Discrimination

Although Pico held that books cannot be removed from school libraries solely because of disagreement with the ideas they contain, the case was remanded for further proceedings, and subsequent proceedings never determined whether the school board’s actions constituted viewpoint discrimination. After the remand, the school board faced pressure from 1,200 parents who petitioned to end the case and return the books to the library shelves.172Michael Winerip, L.I. School Board Ends Its Fight to Ban Books, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 1983), at B7 (accessible via The New York Times TimesMachine at https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1983/01/31/issue.html [https://perma.cc/87ZT-LGGF]). In response, the board reinstated the books and implemented a parental notification requirement for checking out these books. However, the Civil Liberties Union challenged this notification policy, arguing that it violated laws protecting confidentiality of library records.173Id. Facing continued public pressure, with some parents even leaving the district over the issue, the school board eventually abandoned its efforts and restored all books to the shelves.174Id.

Book bans are unconstitutional when they are based on viewpoint discrimination.175Pico, 457 U.S at 854. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to articulate a clear standard for identifying when book removals cross the constitutional line. Supporters of book bans often claim that they are motivated by concerns about age appropriateness, but modern challenges overwhelmingly focus on specific themes and perspectives—particularly those related to race, gender, and sexuality176Alex Eble, Sonya Douglass, Michael Rebell, & Ansley Erickson, What You Need to Know About the Book Bans Sweeping the U.S., Col. U. Tchrs. Coll., (Sept. 6, 2023), https://www.tc.columbia.edu/articles/2023/september/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-book-bans-sweeping-the-us [https://perma.cc/D3ES-Q52Y].—suggesting they are driven by ideological opposition rather than neutral educational concerns. For instance, in Georgia, a challenger criticized a book featuring a same-sex couple, stating, “Books like this [are] where teens get the idea that [same-sex relationships are] okay”177Hannah Natanson, Objections to Sexual, LGBTQ Content Propels Spike in Book Challenges, Wash. Post. (June 9, 2023) https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2023/05/23/lgbtq-book-ban-challengers [https://perma.cc/BWJ4-Z5XD].—a clear expression of disagreement with the viewpoint that same-sex relationships are acceptable. Similarly, in Tennessee, a branch of Moms for Liberty opposed a book detailing the story of civil rights activist Ruby Bridges, written by Bridges herself, as teaching “anti-American values.”178Moms For Liberty, S. Poverty L. Ctr., https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/moms-liberty/#:~:text=Moms%20for%20Liberty%20was%20originally,that%20the%20organization%20deems%20inappropriate [https://perma.cc/83ND-Q8LQ]. In Idaho Falls, most of the twenty-one complaints that its public library received in 2023 were for books that dealt with LGBTQ+ characters or race.179Pfannenstiel & Maldonado, supra note 114. LGBTQ+ books are frequently mischaracterized as being about sex, even when the content is entirely age-appropriate—such as the children’s picture book And Tango Makes Three, which tells the true story of two male penguins raising a chick together.180Smith College, supra note 22.

The rapid rise of book bans over the past several years is directly connected to the broader political efforts used to suppress discussions of race and gender. This trend is underscored by Donald Trump’s executive orders targeting diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) initiatives, which frequently incorporate books on these subjects. DEI programs are being vilified as promoting “antiwhite racism” and undermining “national unity.”181Paul M. Collins Jr. & Rebecca Hamlin, Anti-DEI Guidance from Trump Administration Misinterprets the Law and Guts Educators’ Free Speech Rights, Conversation (Feb. 26, 2025, 3:24 P.M.), https://theconversation.com/anti-dei-guidance-from-trump-administration-misinterprets-the-law-and-guts-educators-free-speech-rights-250574 [https://perma.cc/M2LA-CAMG]. Schools that receive federal funding are being threatened with withholding of those funds if they do not abandon their DEI programs.182Id. The 2025 DoD directive to remove books from DoD schools based on “gender” and “discriminatory equity” ideologies makes explicit the political-and viewpoint-based motivations behind the legislation targeting books in schools and libraries. The directive, echoing the Trump administration’s hostility toward DEI, is obviously rooted in content- and viewpoint-based discrimination. It is difficult to justify restricting access to children’s picture books about a girl with freckles or the life of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as anything but obvious partisan viewpoint censorship.

The same viewpoint-based targeting is evident in Little v. Llano County, making it an ideal case for the Supreme Court to clarify when book removals constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The books removed from Llano County libraries overwhelmingly focus on LGBTQ+ identities and racial equity. County officials referred to these books as “pornographic filth” and “disgusting.” Similar to the school board defendants in Pico who used a list of books from an outside source to recommend books for removal because they disagreed with the contents, here, the defendants in Little created a list of books they “personally opposed,” including books that had been identified by an outside party as about “politics, race, sexuality, and gender.”183En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees, supra note 162, at 17. These books included Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, They Called Themselves the KKK: The Birth of an American Terrorist Group, Being Jazz: My Life as a (Transgender) Teen, and Freakboy, among others.184Little v. Llano Cnty., 103 F.4th 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 2024), overruled by On Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Little v. Llano Cnty., 106 F.4th 427 (5th Cir. 2024).

Several factors in Little make clear that the book removals were based on viewpoint discrimination. First, the targeted books overwhelmingly dealt with themes that have been politically contentious, indicating the removals were not neutral but ideological. Second, officials ignored standard library weeding procedures and instead relied on personal opposition and lists of objectionable books obtained from outside sources to justify removals.185En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees, supra note 162, at 20. Third, internal emails show that librarians did not agree with several of the removals and thought they might be “illegal.”186Id.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government cannot suppress speech simply because it disagrees with its message. Yet, the rise of book bans driven by ideological opposition demonstrates the need for a more explicit and enforceable standard. Little may present the Court with an opportunity to provide that clarity and reaffirm that viewpoint-based censorship in public libraries is unconstitutional. The Court must make clear that the specific targeting of LGBTQ+ and racial equity themes is a constitutional violation, and that not all books containing these themes are inherently age-inappropriate.

D. The Dangerous Rise of the Government Speech Argument

An issue that was not raised in the Pico case, but remains a serious and dangerous argument gaining prominence, is that of government speech. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to Little, affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision to overrule Campbell, and hold that library book selection is government speech, the outcome of Little could have profound consequences. Holding that library book curation is government speech would fundamentally distort the marketplace of ideas, which is a fundamental building block of our country’s democracy.

As mentioned, the Eighth Circuit held in GLBT that library book curation is not government speech. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s plurality holding in Little that library book curation is government speech and its overturning of Campbell, which closely aligns with the Pico holding, make it very likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. In the original Fifth Circuit opinion that was vacated, dissenting Judge Stuart Kyle Duncan wrote, “There is a simple answer to the question posed by this case: [a] public library’s choice of some books for its collection, and its rejection of others, is government speech.”187Little, 103 F.4th at 1159 (Duncan, J., dissenting). This split with the Eighth Circuit and divergence from Pico, the latter of which has been adhered to across circuits, requires clarification from the Court.

Seventeen states signed onto an amicus brief on behalf of Llano County endorsing defendants’ argument that library book curation is government speech. The states wrote, “The county’s decisions over which books to offer its patrons in its public libraries, at its own expense, are its own speech.”188Douglas Soule, Florida Attorney General’s Office Heading Out of State to Defend Texas Library Book Bans, Tallahassee Democrat (Sept. 19, 2024, 5:11 A.M. ET), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/politics/2024/09/19/florida-to-argue-for-texas-book-bans-in-federal-court-out-of-state/75251546007 [https://perma.cc/VX3A-ERW4]. In April of 2024, Florida made the government speech argument in PEN America v. Escambia County School District, in which a district judge held that whether library curation decisions are government speech is an unsettled matter.189PEN Am. Ctr., Inc. v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 711 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1331 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2024). Florida, one of the states to sign the amicus in Little, traveled to the Fifth Circuit to make the argument for government speech after Llano County yielded some of its speaking time to Florida.190Soule, supra note 189. In a social media post, The Florida Freedom to Read Project alerted followers to “pay attention” to the Little case; it stated that Florida would keep presenting this argument “until they find a friendly court.”191Id.

Legal scholars have raised concerns about the ambiguous scope of the government speech doctrine and its potential to undermine First Amendment rights.192Sinha, supra note 48. Cases such as Little and GLBT are prime examples illustrating these scholars’ justified fears. The consequences of states characterizing library book curation as government speech would turn spaces dedicated to the free exploration of ideas into “silos of partisanship.”193En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees, supra note 162, at 13. Government speech is particularly serious in this context because, in the case of libraries, there are few other places where individuals can access such a breadth of ideas freely. Libraries are physical manifestations of the marketplace of ideas, where people can go to find information on nearly any topic they might think of with little to no cost. Allowing the government to pick and choose what ideas line the shelves based on viewpoint is directly removing those ideas from the marketplace. For instance, while Rust v. Sullivan (previously discussed in Section B of this Note) allowed the government to restrict healthcare professionals from putting information about abortion into the marketplace, families could still turn to other sources—like libraries—to find information on abortion. For many members of the public, the library is the last stop to gather information on these politically restricted ideas.

Libraries are unique in that they offer a wide array of materials, often without any cost or significant barriers to access. Bookstores and online research can be expensive, and in many areas, libraries are the only option for communities to obtain information. For seniors or those who might not be tech-savvy, the library is a place where they can easily access ideas that may not be readily available elsewhere. Calling library book curation government speech is therefore particularly risky because it grants the state power to limit the flow of information in spaces dedicated to public knowledge, thereby undermining the core purpose of that space.194Heidi Kitrosser, The Government Speech Doctrine Goes to School, Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. (Oct. 11, 2024), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-government-speech-doctrine-goes-to-school [https://perma.cc/4LWA-UATP].

Further, library book curation is not government speech as analyzed by the test in Shurtleff. The Little plaintiff pointed out that Llano County has not historically engaged in viewpoint-based censorship and echoed GLBT in that the government “has not historically spoken by censoring books at public libraries.”195En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees, supra note 162, at 34 (emphasis omitted). Libraries have historically stood in contrast to censorship, providing the public with free access to ideas.196See supra discussion at Section III. Defendants, in response, focused on “curation,” which they argued has “always been the prerogative of government employees.”197En Banc Reply for Def.-Appellants at 20, Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2024).

The Little defendants’ argument is wrong. Curation does not equal government speech in the context of libraries. One aspect of a librarian’s job duties is to review the library collection. Many libraries, including those in Llano County, follow a standardized process of “Continuous Review, Evaluation and Weeding” (“CREW”).198Id. Librarians are tasked with removing—weeding—books deemed outdated or duplicated. This removal is subject to neutral criteria, most typically by following “MUSTIE” factors.199En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees, supra note 162, at 18. MUSTIE stands for: (1) “misleading” (factually inaccurate); (2) “ugly” (worn out and unfixable); (3) “superseded” by a new edition (or better source); (4) “trivial” (of no literary or scientific merit); (5) “irrelevant” to the needs and interest of the community; and (6) “elsewhere” (material can be easily borrowed elsewhere).200Id.

A book satisfying one factor alone would likely not be weeded; instead, it would require meeting a combination of these factors for removal. In fact, Llano county required two MUSTIE factors to be met before removal.201Id. at 19. Libraries engage in MUSTIE practices to weed out certain library books, and of course, such weeding involves making some selection choices because libraries do not have unlimited physical space. However, MUSTIE relies on relevance, demand, and educational value to make removal decisions and include various (and likely opposing) viewpoints. These choices are not made to represent a government-endorsed message. As Little plaintiffs pointed out in their brief, “any regulation of speech could be reframed as the government” if choices about quality are considered government messages.202Id. at 37.

Second, the public does not perceive the government to be presenting a message or speaking through the combination of books they are presented with in a library. Libraries are meant—and understood by the public—to facilitate access to a diverse range of perspectives, not to endorse or suppress ideas. As plaintiffs in Little argued, the public does not perceive the government to be endorsing the messages of each book in the library.203Id. at 38. They point to the Eighth Circuit decision in GLBT to highlight that libraries contain books with a “wide range of conflicting views”204Id. at 39. and that it is not possible for the public to believe the government is endorsing them all. Otherwise, the government would be “babbling prodigiously and incoherently.”205Id. Defendants in Little countered this argument by insisting that the issue in GLBT is not about the endorsement of the speech within the library books, but rather about the status of the person who selected them (i.e., a government employee or a private citizen).206En Banc Reply for Def.-Appellants, supra note 198, at 22. They argue that it is “inconceivable” that anyone would attribute this speech to the actions of a private citizen.207Id. at 21. While it is likely true that the public would view a librarian as acting in their scope of employment, rather than acting as a private citizen, defendants’ argument is dangerous and greatly expands the reach of the government speech doctrine, contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s warning in Matal v. Tam that government speech should be applied with caution.208Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 235 (2017).

The mere fact that government employees are involved in a process does not automatically transform the process into one of government speech. For example, contrary to Little’s majority opinion, just because museum curators choose exhibits does not mean their actions are viewed and understood by the public as government messaging.209See Little v. Llano County, No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121, at 43, (5th Cir. May 23, 2025) (Duncan, J., stating that curation of a museum’s collection is a government message of “[t]hese works are worth viewing”). Shifting the debate from the public perception of government endorsement of a message to that of the identity of the selector would give the government near immunity from First Amendment violations. When the government issues a press release or policy, it is widely recognized as an official message because it comes from a government employee and explicitly communicates the government’s position. Unlike an official government-issued report or press release, a library’s collection does not serve as a direct communication of any particular message.210See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24–25, Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 13121 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025) (No. 25-284). Further, when a person checks out a book from the library, they do not view the book as a message from the government. Library patrons do not understand the selection of books in a library to be a message from the government saying, “we think this is a good book” or “we approve of this book.” While it is understood that the librarians have selected the book for inclusion in the library’s collection, the message is not the librarian’s personal endorsement of the viewpoints contained in the book, but rather of the ideas presented by the author. The library’s role is not to act as a representative for government messages, but to facilitate access to diverse ideas. Thus, the public sees the speech within the book as belonging to the author, not as a government-endorsed message.

Third, libraries do not extensively engage in viewpoint discrimination when selecting books for their library shelves. Little plaintiffs correctly argue that the weeding process that libraries engage in is based on a neutral set of criteria and is not an effort to remove books based on viewpoint.211En Banc Suppl. Br. for Pls.-Appellees, supra note 162, at 11. The plaintiffs analogized this work to that of maintenance, not intentional control of specific content.212Id. at 43. Again, here, the defendants argue that this is based on the public status of the librarian’s employment, stating that the selection and removal decisions “will always be shaped and controlled by . . . government employees.”213En Banc Reply for Def.-Appellants, supra note 198, at 22. Defendants missed the point here. Per aforementioned reasons, there is no viewpoint discrimination involved in the weeding process and the point of weeding is not to shape a particular expression.

The Court should make it unequivocally clear that the curation of public library collections by professional librarians is not government speech. Librarians are trained professionals guided by ethical standards. Their role in selection and curation of books is fundamentally about serving the public’s needs by providing them with unrestricted access to diverse perspectives. Libraries follow the principles of the Library Bill of Rights, which was created in response to censorship. Librarians are not curating a government message; they are curating a space where individuals can “seek and receive information from all points of view without restriction.”214Smith College, supra note 22.

 CONCLUSION

The First Amendment serves as a foundation of democracy, protecting access to information and the free exchange of ideas. Throughout the nation’s history, it has been vigorously defended as a means of fostering an informed citizenry. Democracy thrives when individuals can explore, challenge, and expand their understanding of the world around them through exposure to wide-ranging perspectives. This right is not reserved for adults alone—children, as future stewards of our society, are also entitled to these fundamental protections.

Community libraries embody the First Amendment’s principles in their purest form. Libraries are not merely collections of books, but institutions dedicated to providing neutral spaces where people of all backgrounds can engage with a variety of perspectives, free from political bias or government interference. Politicizing libraries by framing the curation of their collections as government speech would fundamentally undermine the heart of the marketplace of ideas exemplified and provided by libraries.

The Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Pico rightly recognized that students have a constitutional right to access information. However, given the increasing frequency of book bans and the evolving legal landscape, the Court must reaffirm and strengthen the Pico decision. Librarians are trained professionals who adhere to ethical standards, and their role in curating books is centered on ensuring unrestricted access to knowledge, not advancing political agendas. Treating library curation as government speech would open the door to political ideological control over library collections and erode public trust in government institutions.

Upholding the First Amendment’s protection over access to library books is essential to maintaining a society that values open inquiry and free expression. Libraries are not arenas for partisan agendas, but sanctuaries for knowledge and intellectual growth. As the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression put it, “Regardless of whether book banning campaigns target the Bible or Judy Blume, politicized efforts to restrict access to information cannot be reconciled with the Founders’ faith in the free exchange of ideas and our national commitment to freedom of expression.”215Br. of Amicus Curiae Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression in Supp. of Pl.-Appellees at 33–34, Little v. Llano Cnty., 103 F.4th 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 2024).

Editor’s Note:

After publication of this issue, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Little v. Llano County, making it easier for government officials in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi to engage in viewpoint discrimination with respect to the removal of books from public libraries.

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 203

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*Editor-in-Chief, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; M.A. 2016, California State University, Northridge; B.A. 2013, California State University, Long Beach. I thank my advisor, Professor Rebecca Brown, for her support and guidance; Professor Rebecca Brown and Professor Lee Epstein for the opportunity to serve as a research assistant, which sparked my interest in the First Amendment; and the editors of the Southern California Law Review for their hard work and thoughtful suggestions on this Note.

Artificial Incompetence? Unpacking AI’s Shortcomings in Contract Drafting and Negotiation

INTRODUCTION

This Note was inspired by my time as a data center procurement contracts intern during the summer after my first year of law school. In this role, I assisted contract analysts and attorneys with their procurement of space in data center facilities by contracting with data center suppliers. I regularly reviewed contract redlines from suppliers, identified non-market or disadvantageous terms in those contracts, and suggested changes for the next “turn of the redlines,” or when the company would return the contract to the supplier with new edits to the document. An impactful conversation with my manager about artificial intelligence’s potential as a useful tool in a transactional lawyer’s toolbelt inspired a deeper dive into the benefits and drawbacks of applying artificial intelligence (“AI”) to the contract drafting, redlining, and negotiation space—ultimately leading to the development of this Note.

After the internship concluded, I began my second year of law school. While the most noticeable change upon my return was that I was no longer a first-year student, I also immediately observed a greater emphasis on AI in legal education than before. My law school offered a course on AI’s legal applications, peers used AI to supplement their studies, and professors emphasized the importance of mastering AI during law school, as it would be an essential tool in future legal practice. Similarly, students at other law schools honed their negotiation skills against AI chatbots1Facing Off with a Chatbot, Univ. of Mo.: Show Me Mizzou (Sept. 26, 2024), https://showme.missouri.edu/2024/facing-off-with-a-chatbot [https://perma.cc/ZC85-FHXU]. and even developed their own AI-driven case briefing technology.2A law student at George Washington University developed “Lexplug,” a library of case briefs powered by OpenAI’s GPT-4 AI model. Lexplug includes two aptly named features: “Gunnerbot,” which enables students to have conversations with cases, and “Explain Like I’m 5,” which translates case briefs into simplified and easily digestible language. Bob Ambrogi, Law Student’s Gen AI Product, Lexplug, Makes Briefing Cases a Breeze, LawSites (Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.lawnext.com/2024/02/law-students-gen-ai-product-lexplug-makes-briefing-cases-a-breeze.html [https://perma.cc/8UKF-PBLZ].

As with the implementation of any new technology, however, there are some points of contention that arise when applying AI to the law—especially in the context of contract drafting, formation, and negotiation. This Note covers four main challenges to applying AI to contract drafting: (1) contract law principles, (2) equity concerns, (3) accuracy issues, and (4) legal profession challenges. Additionally, this Note presents the results of a novel empirical study designed to test AI technology’s tendency to discriminate when tasked with negotiating a contract on behalf of different types of clients. Interestingly, ChatGPT, a popular AI chatbot,3John Naughton, ChatGPT Exploded into Public Life a Year Ago. Now We Know What Went on Behind the Scenes, Guardian (Dec. 9, 2023, at 11:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/09/chatgpt-ai-pearl-harbor-moment-sam-altman [https://perma.cc/29CS-T7TS]. appears to favor corporations and nonprofit organizations over individuals when acting as a negotiation assistant.4See infra Section VII.D. This finding suggests that the excitement surrounding AI’s potential uses in the legal field5See infra notes 58–77 and accompanying text. is premature, and professionals should hesitate to implement this technology in contract drafting and negotiation until algorithmic discrimination is adequately addressed.

Part I of this Note introduces the historical development of AI technology and its rise to stardom that began with the public release of ChatGPT in 2022.6Kyle Wiggers, Cody Corrall & Alyssa Stringer, ChatGPT: Everything You Need to Know About the AI-Powered Chatbot, TechCrunch (Nov. 1, 2024, at 10:45 AM PDT), https://techcrunch.com/2024/11/01/chatgpt-everything-to-know-about-the-ai-chatbot [https://web.archive.org/web/20241108112033/https://techcrunch.com/2024/11/01/chatgpt-everything-to-know-about-the-ai-chatbot]. Part I then describes early applications of AI technology to the contracting space, such as Spellbook, Harvey, and LegalSifter.7See infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text. After that, Part I discusses fundamental contract law principles, such as mutual and constructive assent, that AI contract drafting may not readily align with.8See infra Section I.B. Finally, Part I concludes by orienting the reader with basic legal profession concepts, such as the lawyer’s duties of confidentiality, communication, competence, and diligence.9See infra Section I.C; Model Rules of Pro. Conduct rr. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.6 (A.B.A. 1983).

Part II introduces several illustrative examples of AI in contract drafting and negotiation that pose unique questions about the key differences between human and AI-driven contracting. These differences make it difficult to apply existing contract law to AI and raise important concerns about AI’s potential to discriminate when contracting and negotiating on behalf of different clients.10See infra Part II. Part III of this Note expands upon AI’s usurpation of traditional contract law principles. Fundamental contract law concepts, such as the “meeting of the minds” required to form a valid contract, do not readily apply to wholly AI-driven contracting.11See infra Part III. Principally, AI’s application in contract drafting and negotiation can present novel complications when determining whether or not the parties to a contract mutually agree on its terms. These issues persist regardless of whether a party performs some of its obligations under an AI-driven contract and despite the controversial doctrine of constructive assent.

Part IV covers the equity concerns that arise when applying AI technology to contracting. In general, applications of AI technology in the contracting space raise concerns about “algorithmic discrimination”—AI’s tendency to produce discriminatory outputs as a consequence of being trained on tainted data.12See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1023, 1034–36 (2017). AI in contracting also raises ethical issues regarding enforcement of fully automated contracts. A pervasive issue in the AI space is ensuring proper alignment between an AI model’s goals and those of its operator.13Jack Clark & Dario Amodei, Faulty Reward Functions in the Wild, OpenAI (Dec. 21, 2016), https://openai.com/research/faulty-reward-functions [https://perma.cc/AK6K-CXCA]. Given that AI technology regularly suffers from misalignment problems, would it be ethical and equitable to enforce contracts drafted by these models? Another ethical dilemma that arises in the AI contracting context concerns legal liability and accountability if a party is injured by an AI-formulated contract. If harm results from an AI-drafted contract, who should be held accountable for these harms? Between the AI model itself, its designer, its user, and other parties, there is no readily apparent answer. Finally, the implementation of AI in contracting—a setting that involves a plethora of sensitive information—presents serious data privacy and security concerns.14See infra Part IV.

In Part V, this Note reviews the accuracy issues apparent in current and potential applications of AI technology. Simply put, AI technology can behave unpredictably and output inaccurate results known as “hallucinations.”15John Roemer, Will Generative AI Ever Fix Its Hallucination Problem?, A.B.A. (Oct. 1, 2024), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/journal/articles/2024/will-generative-ai-ever-fix-its-hallucination-problem [https://perma.cc/RF9L-W3HY]. In the litigation context, several lawyers, including Michael Cohen’s attorney, have recently been sanctioned or publicly admonished for citing fabricated cases generated by ChatGPT in their filings.16Lauren Berg, Another AI Snafu? Cohen Judge Questions Nonexistent Cases, Law360 (Dec. 12, 2023, at 11:57 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/1776644 [https://perma.cc/VNJ8-Z2V2]; Sara Merken, Texas Lawyer Fined for AI Use in Latest Sanction over Fake Citations, Reuters (Nov. 26, 2024, at 5:20 PM PST), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/texas-lawyer-fined-ai-use-latest-sanction-over-fake-citations-2024-11-26 [https://perma.cc/7C3U-CRS2]; Robert Freedman, Judge Asks Michael Cohen Lawyer If Cited Cases Are Fake, LegalDive (Dec. 13, 2023), https://www.legaldive.com/news/judge-furman-michael-cohen-lawyer-cites-fake-cases-schwartz-chatgpt-ai-hallucinations-legaltech/702422 [https://perma.cc/8XYQ-SXTV]. In the contracting space, in which exact language and minor details can govern the legal meaning of an agreement, AI’s tendency to hallucinate can cause major problems.

Part VI presents the challenges to the legal profession that arise when using AI technology in contract drafting and negotiation. For example, overreliance on AI technology to draft and negotiate contracts may violate an attorney’s professional duties of competence and diligence—much like the actions of the lawyers who cited fabricated cases in their court filings. Overreliance may also violate an attorney’s professional duty of communication if they cannot explain their reasoning for a recommended course of action to a client due to reliance on ChatGPT in their decision-making. Additionally, since AI models operate as “black boxes,” their use may raise concerns about duty of confidentiality violations if client information is input into these systems without proper safeguards.17See Lou Blouin, AI’s Mysterious ‘Black Box’ Problem, Explained, Univ. of Mich.-Dearborn: News (Mar. 6, 2023), https://umdearborn.edu/news/ais-mysterious-black-box-problem-explained [https://perma.cc/A86U-MQ3D].

Part VII discusses the empirical findings that resulted when the author “hired” ChatGPT to assist various types of fictitious clients with negotiating a standard commercial real estate lease. These research findings suggest that ChatGPT discriminates against individual clients by tending to recommend renegotiation less often and to a smaller degree when advising individual clients than when assisting corporate or nonprofit clients. These findings have immense equity implications for contract drafting and negotiation in an AI-driven world, as AI models that disfavor individual clients may exacerbate existing market power or resource inequalities between individuals and more sophisticated corporate or nonprofit clients.18See infra Section VII.D. Finally, Part VIII discusses some strengths and potentially useful applications of AI technology in legal work in light of this Note’s theoretical discussion and empirical findings. Part VIII posits that, although AI technology excels at summarization,19John Herrman, The Future Will Be Brief, N.Y. Mag.: Intelligencer (Aug. 12, 2024), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/chatgpt-gmail-apple-intelligence-ai-summaries.html [https://perma.cc/3p66-rn4b]. concerns about its ability to exercise discretion and judgment suggest that it may be best suited for administrative tasks.

I. A CRASH COURSE IN AI AND RELEVANT LEGAL THOUGHT

A. What Is Artificial Intelligence and How Can It Contract?

There is no widely accepted definition of what constitutes artificial intelligence, which is partially a byproduct of how technological capabilities have rapidly improved in recent years.20Ryan McCarl, The Limits of Law and AI, 90 U. Cin. L. Rev. 923, 925 (2022). To oversimplify, computer programs were historically classified as artificial intelligence if they successfully mimicked human rational thought.21See id.; Stuart J. Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 19–20 (4th ed. 2021). An early example of this concept is the Turing test for artificial intelligence, which was developed by the “father of modern computer science,” mathematician Alan Turing.22Graham Oppy & David Dowe, The Turing Test, Stan. Encyc. of Phil. (Oct. 4, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-test [https://perma.cc/4V7H-QB8X]; Alan Turing, The Twickenham Museum, https://twickenham-museum.org.uk/learning/science-and-invention/alan-turing-2 [https://perma.cc/Y9UA-ZXUY]. The Turing test assesses how well a machine can imitate human thought and behavior via a competition that Turing called the “Imitation Game.”23Oppy & Dowe, supra note 22. In the game, a machine and human compete by answering questions asked by a human interrogator; at the end of the game, the interrogator must identify which competitor is a human and which is a machine.24Id. If the interrogator gets it wrong—i.e., says that the machine is the human—then the machine is thought to demonstrate human-level thought and intelligence.25Id.

This Note utilizes a relatively expansive definition of artificial intelligence that is reminiscent of the Turing test. For the purposes of this Note, artificial intelligence is any computer software program that demonstrates human-like behavior or intelligence. As discussed below, the focal point of artificial intelligence in this Note is large language models, which are some of the best modern examples of AI that would likely pass Turing’s test for artificial intelligence, given their language-based design and applications.26Helen Toner, What Are Generative AI, Large Language Models, and Foundation Models?, Ctr. for Sec. & Emerging Tech. (May 12, 2023), https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/what-are-generative-ai-large-language-models-and-foundation-models [https://perma.cc/6QGB-UVKA].

  1. Artificial Intelligence’s Rise to Prominence: The “AI Boom”27Beth Miller, The Artificial Intelligence Boom, Momentum, Fall 2023, at 12, https://engineering.washu.edu/news/magazine/documents/Momentum-Fall-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU8W-GJAR].

Artificial intelligence has taken the public consciousness by storm since the release of ChatGPT, OpenAI’s text-generating chatbot, in November 2022.28Wiggers et al., supra note 6. ChatGPT is an AI model trained to engage in natural language conversations, which means that when users interact with ChatGPT, it converses with them by generating textual responses comparable to that of a human.29Konstantinos I. Roumeliotis & Nikolaos D. Tselikas, ChatGPT and Open-AI Models: A Preliminary Review, Future Internet, 2023, at 1, https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15060192 [https://perma.cc/4QCW-ZYQ4]. The model’s successful imitation of human-sounding speech captured the public’s imagination,30Karen Weise, Cade Metz, Nico Grant & Mike Isaac, Inside the A.I. Arms Race That Changed Silicon Valley Forever, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/05/technology/ai-chatgpt-google-meta.html [https://perma.cc/GUG6-PYRT]. prompting increased interest in potential applications of AI technologies from the general public31Id. and software developers32Editorial, What’s the Next Word in Large Language Models?, 5 Nature Mach. Intel. 331, 331 (2023). alike.

ChatGPT can complete a variety of academic tasks in a matter of seconds, such as writing essays, generating ideas, and answering mathematical problems.33Megan Henry, Nearly a Third of College Students Used ChatGPT Last Year, According to Survey, Ohio Cap. J. (Sept. 25, 2023, at 4:50 AM), https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2023/09/25/nearly-a-third-of-college-students-used-chatgpt-last-year-according-to-survey [https://perma.cc/3QVZ-AFGM]. It is no surprise, then, that students from primary school to collegiate grade levels were some of the model’s most prevalent initial users, asking ChatGPT to write papers and complete homework assignments on their behalf.34Id. Students’ widespread use of ChatGPT to complete assignments led many schools and universities to initially ban the AI model altogether,35Id. although it was difficult, if not impossible, to enforce AI bans—especially outside of the classroom.36Lexi Lonas Cochran, What Is ChatGPT? AI Technology Sends Schools Scrambling to Preserve Learning, The Hill (Jan. 18, 2023, at 6:00 AM ET), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/3816348-what-is-chatgpt-ai-technology-sends-schools-scrambling-to-preserve-learning [https://perma.cc/5CDD-82XQ]. A new industry of tools meant to detect the use of AI in students’ writing emerged to combat this issue, but their accuracy remains widely disputed.37Jackie Davalos & Leon Yin, AI Detection Tools Are Falsely Accusing Students of Cheating, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 18, 2024, at 8:00 AM PDT), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/private-equity/ai-detection-tools-are-falsely-accusing-students-of-cheating [https://perma.cc/D5V4-6NEQ].

Although initial widespread applications of ChatGPT were somewhat rudimentary in nature, such as students’ use of the tool to complete assignments,38See Henry, supra note 33. OpenAI’s introduction of the model to the public sphere was instrumental in prompting other AI developers to invest in the creation and public release of their own large language models (“LLMs”).39Weise et al., supra note 30; Editorial, supra note 32. After witnessing OpenAI’s successful launch of ChatGPT, prominent tech industry leaders such as Google and Meta immediately sought to turn AI technologies into tangible, profitable products that they could sell to individuals and companies.40Weise et al., supra note 30. Although these major technology companies had already been developing (and, in some cases, even released, to little success41Id.) their own AI technologies before November 2022, ChatGPT’s successful public launch prompted an expansion of the AI industry like never before.42Id. By the following spring, a flurry of new LLMs had emerged on the market: Meta’s LLaMA model, Google’s PaLM-E, and even OpenAI’s newest iteration of its LLM: GPT-4.43Editorial, supra note 32.

In essence, large language models are AI models designed to interact with and produce language.44Toner, supra note 26. “Large” refers to the increasing trend to train these models on large quantities of data stored in massive data sets that are usually housed in collocated data centers.45Id.; What is a Data Center?, Amazon Web Servs., https://aws.amazon.com/what-is/data-center [https://perma.cc/24EH-GTSH]. While ChatGPT, LLaMA, PaLM-E, and GPT-4 are all generally considered LLMs, much like AI more broadly, a concrete definition of what constitutes a large language model remains an open question.46Toner, supra note 26. There are no exact parameters for how large an AI model must be or how it must interact with language in order to be categorized as an LLM.47Id.

On the other hand, LLMs are generally considered to be a subset of generative AI.48Id. Generative AI is defined as artificial intelligence capable of producing new creations, such as graphic images, text, and audio, based on training data inputted into the model.49Id.; Thomas H. Davenport & Nitin Mittal, How Generative AI Is Changing Creative Work, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Nov. 14, 2022), https://hbr.org/2022/11/how-generative-ai-is-changing-creative-work [https://perma.cc/7LC7-MW24]. Therefore, generative AI enables a user to generate substantial quantities of work product with minimal effort by prompting a generative AI model and letting it create content for them based on the query. This is partly why ChatGPT became wildly popular in a short period of time50Naughton, supra note 3.—and why the generative model caused concerns about students using it to complete homework and other assignments on their behalf.

Beyond their avocational applications as homework helpers51Henry, supra note 33. and joke writers,52Emily Gersema, Think You’re Funny? ChatGPT Might Be Funnier, Univ. of S. Cal.: USC Today (July 3, 2024), https://today.usc.edu/ai-jokes-chatgpt-humor-study [https://perma.cc/9USY-RR64]. LLMs are being increasingly used by industry professionals to improve and expand the potential of their products and services.53Carina Perkins, Generative AI Chatbots in Retail: Is ChatGPT a Game Changer for the Customer Experience?, Emarketer (June 21, 2024), https://www.emarketer.com/content/generative-ai-chatbots-retail [https://perma.cc/KT68-RH9W]. For instance, Amazon Web Services implemented an externally facing AI chatbot on its Amazon.com retail site designed to handle returns, provide shipment tracking information, and generally improve the site’s customer service capabilities54Jared Kramer, Amazon.com Tests Customer Service Chatbots, Amazon Sci. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.amazon.science/blog/amazon-com-tests-customer-service-chatbots [https://perma.cc/XS3D-MJDZ]. (albeit the chatbot has garnered mixed reviews55Shira Ovide, We Tested Amazon’s New Shopping Chatbot. It’s Not Good., Wash      . Post (Mar. 5, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/03/05/amazon-ai-chatbot-rufus-review [https://perma.cc/AW9L-FZ42].). Similarly, in 2024, Target Corporation launched an internally facing generative AI model, called Store Companion, to assist with employee training, store operations management, and general problem-solving tasks.56Press Release, Target Corp., Target to Roll Out Transformative GenAI Technology to Its Store Team Members Chainwide (June 20, 2024), https://corporate.target.com/press/release/2024/06/target-to-roll-out-transformative-genai-technology-to-its-store-team-members-chainwide [https://perma.cc/4KUY-CC7B]. Meanwhile, social media platforms such as Instagram use AI models to filter content and craft feeds that are better personalized to users’ individual preferences.57Cameron Schoppa, How the 5 Biggest Social Media Sites Use AI, AI Time J. (Aug. 6, 2025), https://www.aitimejournal.com/how-the-biggest-social-media-sites-use-ai [https://perma.cc/C9XD-TNAM].

  1. Early Applications of Artificial Intelligence to Legal Contracting

Naturally, the ever-increasing implementation of LLMs in a variety of businesses, industries, and settings includes applications in the legal field as well.58Nicole Black, Emerging Tech Trends: The Rise of GPT Tools in Contract Analysis, A.B.A.: ABA J. (May 22, 2023, at 9:49 AM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/emerging-tech-trends-the-rise-of-gpt-tools-in-contract-analysis [https://perma.cc/9ZJL-TQQN]. For example, AI has already been used to create legal workflow companions with suites of legal skills,59Matt Reynolds, vLex Releases New Generative AI Legal Assistant, A.B.A.: ABA J. (Oct. 17, 2023, at 9:39 AM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/vlex-releases-new-generative-ai-legal-assistant [https://perma.cc/GH3K-WNL6]; Danielle Braff, AI-Enabled Workflow Platform Vincent AI Expands Capabilities, A.B.A.: ABA J. (Sept. 12, 2024, at 10:06 AM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/the-latest-upgrade-vincent-ai [https://perma.cc/4NFZ-2QVM]. contract lifecycle management software programs,60Nicole Black, Increasing Contractual Insight: AI’s Role in Contract Lifecycle Management, A.B.A.: ABA J. (Sept. 25, 2023, at 12:29 PM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/increasing-contractual-insight-ais-role-in-contract-lifecycle-management [https://perma.cc/7TXW-8VX8]. and contract redlining and drafting assistants.61Spellbook, https://www.spellbook.legal [https://perma.cc/CK8K-PWJR]. A simple Google search for AI contracting services yields a plethora of (interestingly named) AI-powered software programs that purport to assist an attorney with redlining (e.g., Harvey,62Assistant, Harvey, https://www.harvey.ai/products/assistant [https://perma.cc/D883-DL2E]; Harvey, OpenAI, https://openai.com/index/harvey [https://perma.cc/PJC4-X23G]. Lawgeex,63Lawgeex, https://www.lawgeex.com [https://perma.cc/6ZU8-GYJA]. Superlegal,64Superlegal, https://www.superlegal.ai [https://perma.cc/P7WL-VDPX]. Ivo,65Ivo, https://www.ivo.ai [https://perma.cc/XV6T-LTVL]. Screens,66Screens, https://www.screens.ai [https://perma.cc/SKX8-8UPY]. and Spellbook67Spellbook, supra note 61.) or managing (e.g., Evisort,68Evisort, https://www.evisort.com [https://perma.cc/8R2W-LY6K]. Ironclad,69AI-Powered Contract Management Software, Ironclad, https://ironcladapp.com/product/ai-based-contract-management [https://perma.cc/DFJ7-BJ99]. Sirion,70Sirion, https://www.sirion.ai [https://perma.cc/MF9Y-J3K9]. and LegalSifter71LegalSifter, https://www.legalsifter.com [https://perma.cc/M9TC-V4UT].) their legal contracts. Even companies that operate widely used legal research databases, such as LexisNexis and Thomson Reuters, have created and marketed their own generative AI-powered legal assistants.72Thomson Reuters, the company that owns and operates Westlaw, developed CoCounsel, an AI tool intended to “accelerate[] labor-intensive tasks like legal research, document review, and contract analysis.” CoCounsel 2.0: The GenAI Assistant for Legal Professionals, Thomson Reuters, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/cocounsel/generative-ai-assistant-for-legal-professionals [https://web.archive.org/web/20250113041800/https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/cocounsel/generative-ai-assistant-for-legal-professionals]. Similarly, LexisNexis released Protégé, its own legal assistant that can “support[] daily task organization, . . . draft[] full documents, and conduct[] intelligent legal research.” LexisNexis Announces New Protégé Legal AI Assistant as Legal Industry Leads Next Phase in Generative AI Innovation, LexisNexis (Aug. 12, 2024), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/pressroom/b/news/posts/lexisnexis-announces-new-protege-legal-ai-assistant-as-legal-industry-leads-next-phase-in-generative-ai-innovation [https://perma.cc/N88F-D5JW].

Legal professionals are generally excited about new and potential future applications of AI to the legal world.73See Braff, supra note 59. Many believe the technology will increase efficiency in a time-intensive industry by synthesizing documents and reducing the time a human attorney needs in order to perform certain legal tasks.74Josh Blackman, Robot, Esq. 1 (Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198672 [http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2198672]; Matt Pramschufer, How AI Can Make Legal Services More Affordable, The Nat’l Jurist (July 23, 2019), https://nationaljurist.com/smartlawyer/how-ai-can-make-legal-services-more-affordable [https://perma.cc/F2S6-R9WM]. Some hopefuls even view AI as infallible—capable of outperforming humans, whose work is prone to errors, because AI can craft perfectly completed and accurate work product.75Adam Bingham, Mitigating the Risks of Using AI in Contract Management, Risk Mgmt. (Sept. 3, 2024), https://www.rmmagazine.com/articles/article/2024/09/03/mitigating-the-risks-of-using-ai-in-contract-management [https://perma.cc/AT6Z-ZXNC]. Finally, AI is thought by some to make legal services more affordable and accessible to the general public76Pramschufer, supra note 74. by reducing the number of billable hours an attorney must dedicate to any given task, enabling individuals to access legal services without hiring a human attorney, or both. In fact, Utah and Arizona have already implemented pilot programs that allow non-lawyer entities, such as AI chatbots, to provide legal services, and Washington may be the next state to institute such a program.77Debra Cassens Weiss, Nonlawyer Entities Could Provide Legal Services in Washington in Proposed Pilot Program, A.B.A.: ABA J. (Sept. 11, 2024, at 2:36 PM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/nonlawyer-entities-could-provide-legal-services-in-washington-state-in-proposed-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/UTP2-TMZP].

Despite this enthusiasm about AI, the immediate application of LLMs to the legal space has not been without its challenges. Some attorneys have wrongfully used LLMs to shirk their responsibilities by asking AI models to conduct legal research or write briefs on their behalf.78Benjamin Weiser, Here’s What Happens When Your Lawyer Uses ChatGPT, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/27/nyregion/avianca-airline-lawsuit-chatgpt.html [https://perma.cc/249Y-4LTS]. This practice has resulted in massive sanctions and fines for attorneys who cited “bogus” cases that were fabricated by ChatGPT in documents that they later submitted to a judge.79Sara Merken, New York Lawyers Sanctioned for Using Fake ChatGPT Cases in Legal Brief, Reuters (June 26, 2023, at 1:28 AM PDT), https://www.reuters.com/legal/new-york-lawyers-sanctioned-using-fake-chatgpt-cases-legal-brief-2023-06-22 [https://perma.cc/7KR5-LL5A]; Weiser, supra note 78. Furthermore, as discussed later in this Note, issues regarding lawyers’ ethical and professional duties, algorithmic discrimination, AI’s inaccuracies, and the subversion of traditional contract law principles also arise when large language models are applied to the legal field.

B. A “Meeting of the Minds” Regarding Contract Law Theory

An orientation into the foundational principles underlying contract law theory is needed before one can take a proper deep dive into the applications of AI in contracting. A great place to start is the traditional contractual theory of mutual assent, colloquially known as the “meeting of the minds.”80Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1119, 1119–20, 1122–23 (2008) (“[D]etermining whether the parties both agreed on the same thing . . . is at the heart of contract law.”). Mutual assent is one of many requirements that must be demonstrated for a court to hold that a given contract is legally valid and enforceable.81Hanson v. Town of Fort Peck, 538 P.3d 404, 419 (Mont. 2023). “Meeting of the minds” refers to the idea that both parties must mutually agree to the terms of a contract in order for the agreement to be legally binding.82Barnes, supra note 80. That is, the parties’ minds must, in a sense, “meet in the middle” at the moment when the contract is formed. For that reason, mutual assent may not be found when one or both of the parties to a contract entered into the agreement based on a misunderstanding or a mistake of law or fact.83See generally Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906 (establishing that there is no mutual assent to an agreement when it contains a latent ambiguity—such as, in Raffles, the two parties intending different ships named “Peerless”). Intuitively, this makes sense; it would not be good public policy to bind people to a contractual agreement if they did not fully understand the obligations and consequences they allegedly agreed to when the agreement was executed. Beyond equity justifications, it may also be inefficient to hold a party accountable for obligations that they did not intend to undertake and may not be equipped to fulfill. Relatedly, to create a binding agreement, the parties to the contract must specifically mutually assent to the material terms of the contract.84Jack Baker, Inc. v. Off. Space Dev. Corp., 664 A.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. 1995) (“[F]or an enforceable contract to exist, there must be . . . agreement as to all material terms . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Georgetown Ent. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 496 A.2d 587, 590 (D.C. 1985))). Without a “meeting of the minds” between the parties to any given contract regarding the essential provisions of the agreement, the contract is invalid and not legally binding on the parties.

In some instances, courts have imputed assent to a party based on their conduct even if they did not explicitly agree to or approve of the terms of an agreement.85See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.”). This doctrine is known as “constructive assent,”86Id. at 1176–77. and it is common among online transactions.87See Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666, 671 (Ct. App. 2024). For example, if a user of an online webpage affirmatively acknowledges the page’s terms of use by clicking an “I accept” or “I agree” button without actually reading the agreement, the user is usually found to have constructively assented to the terms of the agreement despite not actually being aware of its contents.88Id.; Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“The plaintiffs in this case were free to scroll through the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts before clicking their agreement . . . [and] the [challenged] clause was presented in exactly the same format as most other provisions of the contract,” so the court found no reason to hold that the plaintiffs did not see and agree to the provision in question.).

Although many people make light of the fact that nobody ever reads various websites’ terms of use or, more notably, Apple’s Terms and Conditions,89See South Park: HumancentiPad (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011); Check Out Apple’s iOS 7 Terms & Conditions (PICTURE), HuffPost (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/09/20/apple-ios7-spoof-terms-and-conditions_n_3960016.html [https://perma.cc/6AZ4-YH59]. constructive assent is no laughing matter. In these types of situations, constructive assent can be used to essentially waive the traditional contract theory requirement of a “meeting of the minds,” instead holding individuals accountable for the contracts that they sign even if they do not fully understand or have knowledge of the terms that they allegedly agreed to.90For instance, internet users are often assumed to have constructively assented to a website’s terms of use when the site constitutes a “browsewrap” agreement. Browsewrap agreements typically include a site’s terms of use in a hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage. Courts have held internet users to have constructively assented to a website’s terms of use by merely browsing a webpage designed in this way. See In re Juul Labs, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 3d 932, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Unsurprisingly, the doctrine of constructive assent is controversial—especially its application to consumer contracts91See generally Andrea J. Boyack, The Shape of Consumer Contracts, 101 Denv. L. Rev. 1 (2023) (suggesting constructive assent is detrimental in the consumer contract setting because a consumer’s decision to transact with a business is fundamentally distinct from their assent to the company’s terms). and form contracts more broadly.92See generally Donald B. King, Standard Form Contracts: A Call for Reality, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 909 (2000) (arguing that assent in the context of a negotiated agreement is fundamentally different from assent in the standard form contract setting). Further, the ethics of constructive assent are hotly debated among scholars, with some arguing that applying constructive assent to a contested contract unfairly disadvantages the weaker party (e.g., the consumer) to the benefit of the dominant party (e.g., the retailer) whose greater market power enables them to force the weaker party to consent to the dominant party’s preferred terms.93See Boyack, supra note 91; King, supra note 92, at 911–14. For a lighthearted (and, thankfully, fictional) example of the dangers of constructive assent, the author recommends an episode of the popular television show Parks and Recreation in which a small town’s government grapples with unwanted data mining and privacy invasions resulting from a convoluted Internet service contract the town entered into with Gryzzl, a large technology company. Parks and Recreation: Gryzzlbox (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 2015).

C. Attorneys as Ethical and Professional Fiduciaries

Another important factor to consider when analyzing the potential applications of AI to the contracting space is the ethical and professional complications that arise due to attorneys’ special fiduciary duties to their clients. In general, attorneys are held to a higher standard than those who work in many other professions.94Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, 8am MyCase (Aug. 26, 2025), https://www.mycase.com/blog/client-management/lawyer-professional-conduct [https://perma.cc/G75A-82XR]. Specifically, attorney conduct is governed by each state’s bar association, many of which have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—the generic rules promulgated by the American Bar Association.95See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct [https://perma.cc/4ZV6-AATQ]. The Model Rules serve as a fundamental guideline for attorney conduct by prescribing various professional and fiduciary duties to attorneys, such as client confidentiality, competence, diligence, and communication.96See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct (A.B.A. 1983). The Model Rules also address various topics relating to an attorney’s practice—like conflicts of interest, the formation of an attorney-client relationship, the scope of one’s representation, and how to interact with unrepresented persons97See id.—and explain how model attorneys should approach these issues. Importantly, the Model Rules detail practices that constitute misconduct, like engaging in dishonesty or fraud, violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or committing a criminal act.98Id. r. 8.4. For the purposes of this Note, it is important for one to keep the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in mind when considering how an attorney may use AI technology in drafting or negotiating contracts, as certain applications of AI may subvert the underlying goals that the Model Rules were designed to support in more traditional applications.

II. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Several ethical, practical, and theoretical questions arise when one considers various applications of AI to contract drafting, formation, and negotiation. To better illustrate the issues that arise from applying AI to the contracting space, consider the following numbered examples and the questions they raise regarding their implications for the contract law principles and legal profession concepts that we have discussed:

Example #1: Laypeople Using AI to Draft a Contract99Real-world instances analogous to this example are becoming increasingly common. Many people use generative AI for contracting-adjacent tasks and skills such as idea generation, text editing, document drafting, and, most notably, “generating a legal document.” Marc Zao-Sanders, How People Are Really Using GenAI, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Mar. 19, 2024), https://hbr.org/2024/03/how-people-are-really-using-genai [https://perma.cc/5SLX-SL9F].

Two laypeople (i.e., not attorneys) are doing business together. Interested in summarizing their deal in a written form, they “draft” a contract by asking ChatGPT to do so for them. Once ChatGPT has drafted the contract, the two parties both read and sign the contract, despite not understanding the agreement’s legalese or terms. Later, something goes wrong, and the contract’s validity and enforceability are disputed.

Was there a “meeting of the minds,” or mutual assent, here?

Is this a case of AI-assisted human contracting, or was this effectively an entirely AI-created contract?

Is the contract enforceable?

Should society want the contract to be enforceable?

Example #2: AI as a Contract Drafting Tool for Attorneys100As noted in the Introduction, the use of AI as a drafting tool for attorneys is becoming increasingly common. Just as lawyers have used ChatGPT for writing court filings, they are likely to use it for drafting other legal documents, such as contracts. See Berg, supra note 16.

As is industry practice, a lawyer in a corporate law firm normally uses a standard form contract from prior deals as a starting point when drafting new contracts. However, for a particular deal, she decides to use ChatGPT to draft the initial form contract instead.

Is this an example of AI as a tool that assists humans in contract drafting, or is this a wholly AI-drafted agreement?

Does this distinction have important implications for the contract’s validity and enforceability?

Is there any significant difference between this attorney using AI to create a form contract or pulling a precedent contract out of her firm’s database?

Would this amount to a breach of the attorney’s professional duties of competence, diligence, or anything else?

Example #3: Human Error Versus AI-Drafted Terms

Overwhelmed with his busy workload, a lawyer mistakenly inserts a clause in a contract he is drafting for his client. Both his client and the other party to the contract sign the agreement; neither party nor the attorney knows at the time the agreement is executed that the accidental provision is included in the contract.

Is the extra provision in the agreement enforceable (i.e., did the parties mutually assent to the term)?

Is this scenario any different from if AI completely drafts and executes a contract without humans involved in the contracting process?

How are these two examples reconciled in terms of mutual assent? Are they the same, or fundamentally different in any way?

Example #4: AI Automatically “Agreeing” to Online Terms

Annoyed with websites’ many Terms of Service and Cookies pop-ups, an inventor creates an AI-driven “ad blocker” software that automatically clicks through and “agrees” to these pop-ups on the software user’s behalf so that they never have to see them again.

Would this constitute the user’s assent to various websites’ Terms of Service?

Does the answer to this question depend on how long the user has had the software, or whether they knew or reasonably should have known that specific websites had Terms of Service or Cookies pop-ups?

 

* * *

There are two possibilities when applying AI technology to contract drafting and negotiation: (1) AI effectively functions as an assistant, aiding humans with their contracting, and (2) fully automated decision-making, in which AI completely takes over contracting, from start to finish, with no humans involved in the process. Under either scenario, four categories of problems arise when implementing AI in contract drafting and negotiation: the subversion of contract law principles, equity concerns, accuracy issues, and legal profession challenges.

III.  AI’S SUBVERSION OF CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES

If AI functions as a mere contract drafting and negotiation assistant, mutual assent concepts would apply in the same manner that they do for purely human-conducted contracting. An underlying principle of the mutual assent requirement for a valid contract is the notion that the parties to a given contract must understand the terms of the agreement and have a “meeting of the minds,” or mutual agreement, that they find the terms acceptable.101Barnes, supra note 80. If AI technology merely assists an attorney with drafting or negotiating a contract, this does not affect the portion of the dealmaking process that mutual assent concerns. The only point in time that is relevant for mutual assent is when the parties come to a consensus that the contract’s terms are agreeable and subsequently execute the agreement.102See Ray v. Eurice, 93 A.2d 272, 276–78 (Md. 1952). By that point in time, the drafting and negotiating phases of the process are complete (and, truthfully, long gone)—the agreement is in its final drafted form and will not undergo further redlines or revisions. Thus, the implementation of AI as a mere assistant in the contracting and negotiation process is not within the timeline or contextual scope that mutual assent concerns. AI’s use as a contracting assistant is therefore akin to any personal opinions the drafting attorney may have (outside of their thoughts and duties as a fiduciary of their client) regarding the deal at hand—i.e., irrelevant to questions about mutual assent.

While some may argue that the cyclical drafting, redlining, and negotiation process drives the parties to a contract toward the ultimate goal of mutual assent at the end of the contracting cycle, it is not a necessary component of mutual assent that agreements are modified and negotiated by the parties. If one party presents a complete agreement to another party, who signs it without criticizing its contents or insisting on revisions, it is still a valid contract. Furthermore, in many instances, an attorney drafts and negotiates on behalf of their client, who signs the final contract without a comprehensive legal understanding of the negotiations and redlines that were made during the dealmaking process. This is arguably like Example #1 in Part II, in which the two laypeople used AI to draft a contract that they then signed. Although the individuals did not negotiate between themselves, mutual assent was arguably satisfied because the humans—not ChatGPT—assented to the agreement at the end of the contracting process.

On the other hand, if contracting is entirely managed by AI—without humans involved in the process—then the contract law requirement of mutual assent is not satisfied. Arguably, if the laypeople in Example #1 did not understand the contract because ChatGPT performed a substantial portion of the legal lift for them (which is possible, considering that they did not understand the AI-drafted agreement’s legalese or terms), then the mutual assent requirement may not be satisfied because the contracting process was effectively completed without human involvement. Example #4 details a more abstract example of this concept. In Example #4, the inventor’s software “agrees” to websites’ terms of use on its users’ behalf. In this situation, the human user never sees, let alone reads, the terms of service that they allegedly agreed to through the AI-driven software. Although some might argue that there is mutual assent because a person who installs the software knows that it will “agree to” the terms on any site that the person visits, this argument does not hold up to pragmatic scrutiny. Given how often and extensively people surf the Internet, it is highly likely that, over time, the person would not know which websites had pop-up advertisements or terms of use that the AI bot “agreed” to on their behalf, let alone the content of those agreements.

Therefore, the contract law requirement of mutual assent goes unsatisfied when AI fully takes over the contracting process. This flaw in solely AI-executed contracting becomes even more apparent when considering contracts that involve multimillion- or multibillion-dollar transactions, fundamental changes in a company’s structure or dealings, or changing the client’s financial or business practices in any substantial way. Without providing notice of these changes to the client and securing their informed assent to new and material contractual terms, solely AI-driven contracting is unlikely to satisfy traditional contract law principles.

Some might argue that a party’s performance of its obligations under a fully AI-driven contract would justify its validity and waive the mutual assent requirement, much like the traditional contract law enforcement principles surrounding the Statute of Frauds.103Certain requirements that an agreement be documented in writing can be waived if a party fully and completely performs its obligations under the agreement. Koman v. Morrissey, 517 S.W.2d 929, 936 (Mo. 1974) (“[T]he statute of frauds has no application where there has been a full and complete performance of the contract by one of the contracting parties . . . .”). However, a fully automated contracting process differs from classic applications of the Statute of Frauds—such as when a party denies a prior verbal agreement, claiming that they never agreed to the deal because no written proof of it exists.104See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Studies in Contract Law 434–35 (9th ed. 2017). Rather, if AI completely drives the contracting process, then the parties to a contract would likely never be aware of, let alone read, the AI-drafted and executed agreement. Due to this disconnection, it is highly unlikely that the parties would completely perform their obligations under the agreement—simply because they would not know what their obligations are. Even if the parties were generally aware of their performance obligations (e.g., because the AI model contracted an extension of an existing purchase agreement between a purchaser and supplier), they would still not know the specifications of the agreement to a high enough degree for public policy to justify holding them to the transaction.

Furthermore, although some may argue that the doctrine of constructive assent can waive the mutual assent requirement in the purely AI-driven contracting setting, this argument is specious. Constructive assent is a highly controversial doctrine in its current limited uses, such as form contracts.105See generally King, supra note 92. Scholars have raised particular concerns about constructive assent eliminating the need for mutual assent in online transactions, such as clickwrap agreements,106See Matt Meinel, Requiring Mutual Assent in the 21st Century: How to Modify Wrap Contracts to Reflect Consumer’s Reality, 18 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 180, 180 (2016) (“Intention to manifest mutual assent is increasingly becoming a legal fiction in cyberspace.”). because the doctrine can infer an Internet user’s assent from their decision to click “I agree”—regardless of how “ill-informed and not well considered” that decision might have been.107Daniel D. Haun & Eric P. Robinson, Do You Agree?: The Psychology and Legalities of Assent to Clickwrap Agreements, 28 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 623, 649–56 (2022). Therefore, because constructive assent is thought by many to subvert traditional contract law theory, especially in online transactions, it provides a weak justification for waiving the mutual assent requirement in a purely AI-driven contracting setting.

Therefore, the distinction between AI as a contracting assistant and wholly AI-driven contracting carries significant contract law implications. In Example #2 in Part II, the legal difference between an attorney using a precedent contract from prior deals and relying on an AI-generated form contract is crucial, even though practicing attorneys may see little to no practical difference between the two. As AI technology continues to advance, the line between human-driven and AI-driven contracting will increasingly blur, raising questions about contract validity, enforceability, and an attorney’s professional obligations. Whether AI serves merely as a drafting tool or takes on a more autonomous role could have far-reaching legal consequences.

IV. EQUITY CONCERNS

A. Algorithmic Discrimination

Algorithmic discrimination occurs when ostensibly impartial AI technology produces discriminatory results because it was trained on tainted inputs.108See Chander, supra note 12. Put more simply, algorithmic discrimination is a perfect example of “Garbage In, Garbage Out.”109Robert Buckland, AI, Judges, and Judgment: Setting the Scene (Harvard Kennedy Sch. M-RCBG Assoc. Working Paper Series, No. 220, 2023), https://dash.harvard.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/98187fff-8a7a-4ca6-8123-3049e417f088/content [https://perma.cc/27RB-YUKA]. Proponents of AI argue that even if algorithmic discrimination occurs, automated decision-making is preferable to human decision-making because humans are biased.110See Daniel J. Solove & Hideyuki Matsumi, AI, Algorithms, and Awful Humans, 92 Fordham L. Rev. 1923, 1924–27 (2024). However, algorithmic discrimination can perpetuate and amplify existing biases or stereotypes in an AI model’s training data, with the dangerous added implication that the tainted model appears facially objective and neutral.111Chander, supra note 12. Furthermore, because of their reliance on human inputs, algorithms will arguably never be fully bias-free and nondiscriminatory, but perpetually flawed as “partially human.”112Catarina Santos Botelho, The End of the Deception? Counteracting Algorithmic Discrimination in the Digital Age, in The Oxford Handbook on Digital Constitutionalism (Sept. 19, 2024) (manuscript at 1), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198877820.013.28 [https://perma.cc/P5X4-UPKF]. Additionally, due to its highly advanced pattern-detection abilities, AI technology has the potential to develop new forms of discrimination by extracting patterns from its inputted data that humans alone would not have been able to detect.113Solon Barocas, Moritz Hardt & Arvind Narayanan, Fairness and Machine Learning: Limitations and Opportunities 1–20 (2023).

Algorithmic discrimination is also concerning because current legal theories do not supply satisfactory remedies for discrimination by AI systems.114See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671 (2016) (discussing algorithmic discrimination and the inapplicability of existing legal remedies to its harms). For example, imagine that an online job search site, such as LinkedIn, uses an AI-driven algorithm to “match” employers with potential interview candidates on the site by recommending certain user profiles to employers.115In reality, LinkedIn does have an algorithmic system that suggests potential employees to employers, called “Talent Match.” Id. at 683. If a user believed that the algorithm discriminated against them in choosing not to suggest their profile to employers, they would have limited options to seek legal redress. In the employment space, discrimination claims are separated into two categories: (1) disparate treatment and (2) disparate impact.116Id. at 694. Disparate treatment is focused on combating explicit discrimination, which requires a finding of intent.117Barnes v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 778 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Since this is a disparate treatment case, . . . the plaintiff is still required to prove discriminatory intent.”). In a traditional, non-AI setting, explicit discrimination may be demonstrated by a qualified job candidate who was denied employment by a firm that refused to hire her by proving that the refusal was based on one of the candidate’s protected characteristics, such as race or gender.118See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”). Conversely, to claim disparate treatment in the case of an AI algorithm, the disgruntled LinkedIn user would have to demonstrate that the algorithm had the intent to discriminate, which may be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to prove in the case of a nonhuman entity. Thus, algorithmic discrimination is likely thought to be a product of unintentional or incidental discrimination.

Alternatively, disparate impact claims do not require the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent;119Barnes, 778 F.2d at 1101 (“The intent requirement is an element differentiating the analysis for disparate treatment cases from that of disparate impact cases. Although sometimes either theory may be applied to a given set of facts, disparate impact analysis does not demand that a plaintiff prove discriminatory motive.”). rather, the doctrine considers whether there is a disparate impact on members of a protected class, any business necessity for the impact, and a less discriminatory alternative means of achieving the same result.12042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). Therefore, given the aforementioned difficulty of ascribing any particular cognitive motivations to an AI model, disparate impact discrimination is the only potential mode of existing discrimination law that

might provide legal redress for members of protected classes who experience algorithmic discrimination in the employment context.

In the contracting space, algorithmic discrimination has the potential to create disastrous consequences. If an AI model is trained on discriminatory data or its algorithm is improperly weighted by its human developers, it may tend to favor one type of party over another, such as men over women.121See generally Alejandro Salinas, Amit Haim, & Julian Nyarko, What’s in a Name? Auditing Large Language Models for Race and Gender Bias (Sept. 25, 2024) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Southern California Law Review) (describing an empirical study that found GPT-4 to systematically disadvantage names commonly associated with women and racial minorities). This bias may then prompt the AI model to negotiate more favorable deals for certain parties than it would for others. This potential for AI to act as a discriminatory advocate may exacerbate existing inequalities, especially if the model’s reliance on tainted training data causes it to reinforce biases that disproportionately harm certain groups. Particularly sensitive communities include women, racial or ethnic minorities, and people who are socioeconomically disadvantaged. In the contracting setting, where every word in a contract has an important implication for the meaning of the agreement, a tainted AI model could selectively include unfavorable terms—or simply choose terms that are not the most favorable—in an agreement when “hired” by a party that the model’s data disfavors. The individual who experiences discrimination by receiving the “short end of the stick,” or undesirable contract terms, would likely never know that they were discriminated against by the model they used to contract. Even if the disadvantaged individual later became aware of the discriminatory term selection, it is likely that they would not have the ability or resources to advocate for themselves.

Furthermore, the contracting setting presents a multitude of consequential and important situations in which a person’s livelihood depends on the degree of favorability they are able to negotiate for themselves in a given contract. For example, in an employment contract, the starting salary, amount of paid family leave, and inclusion of any noncompete provisions may have huge implications for a prospective employee’s financial stability and future wellbeing. If an AI model poorly negotiates on a potential employee’s behalf, that potential employee may experience a lower quality of life than they would have otherwise—and if the reason for AI’s poor performance is discriminatory conduct, these disadvantaged outcomes will only exacerbate existing inequalities in our society.

B. Ethics of Enforcing Automated Deals

Another serious concern that arises when using AI in contracting is the ethical dilemma of deciding when to enforce completely automated deals. If we get to the point in which contracting is an entirely AI-driven task, do we feel comfortable holding humans accountable for the deals that an AI model entered into on their behalf?

A critical consideration when determining accountability in this circumstance is AI (mis)alignment. Broadly speaking, direct alignment refers to the ability to program an AI system so that it pursues goals consistent with the goals of its operator.122Anton Korinek & Avital Balwit, Aligned with Whom?:Direct and Social Goals for AI Systems 2 (Brookings Ctr. on Regul. & Mkts. Working Paper No. 2, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Aligned-with-whom-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/48BN-547C]. There are a plethora of difficulties in ensuring proper direct alignment, including (1) determining the operator’s goals, (2) conveying those goals to the AI software, and (3) getting the AI model to correctly translate those goals into actions.123Id. at 6. It is often incredibly difficult for an AI user to overcome these challenges, and efforts to do so sometimes cause AI programs to take unexpected actions that result in adverse consequences.124Clark & Amodei, supra note 13.

In the contracting context, holding the user of an AI contracting software to an agreement that the AI model drafted on their behalf can have especially inequitable consequences. Much like Example #3 in Part II, in which the human attorney mistakenly added language to the contract he was drafting, if an AI program is misaligned with its user’s goals, then it may draft contracts that do not reflect those goals. Both general intuition and contract law theory suggest that in a scenario like Example #3, the parties to the contract should not be bound by terms to which they did not assent. Similarly, in the case of misaligned AI contracting software, intuition suggests that it would be unethical to bind a party to an agreement if the AI model that contracted on their behalf did so in a manner that did not align with the user’s intentions.

C. Who Is Liable or Accountable?

If and when AI-assisted or wholly automated contracting goes wrong, who should we hold liable for breached contracts? Would we want to differentiate between the AI developer, the human who “hired” the AI to contract on their behalf or otherwise used the model to contract, and the AI model itself?

These questions are especially difficult to answer because traditional liability frameworks are designed with an inherent assumption that a human decisionmaker caused the alleged harm.125See F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1803, 1819–43, 1850–69 (2014). In the contracting setting, we would hold this human decisionmaker accountable for their breach of a contractual promise. If AI functions as a contracting agent, however, a human may not have made decisions that directly caused the complaining party’s harm. If an AI contracting program enters into agreements on a human’s behalf, that may not be enough under traditional liability frameworks to justifiably say that the human caused the alleged harm and hold them liable for it.

For similar reasons, it also appears unreasonable to hold an AI developer liable for breaches of contracts that its AI contracting software simply aided in drafting. To oversimplify, in order to prove causation of harm due to a breached contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s breach was more than just an actual cause of the plaintiff’s harm.126Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Leading Ins. Grp. Ins., 76 N.Y.S.3d 79, 81 (App. Div. 2018) (“Proximate cause is an essential element of a breach of contract cause of action.”). Rather, the plaintiff has a higher burden: they must prove that the defendant’s act was the proximate cause of their harm.127Id. To demonstrate proximate cause, the plaintiff must show that the harm was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s breach of contract.128See id. (“[C]onsequential damages resulting from a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be asserted, ‘so long as the damages were within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting.’ ” (quoting Panasia Ests., Inc. v. Hudson Ins., 886 N.E.2d 135, 137 (N.Y. 2008))). In the AI context, a developer and its AI software may be actual, or but-for, causes of the harm suffered by a party who contracts with the software. However, the broad applicability of AI contracting software and its limitless potential uses suggest that, in many cases, the developer’s creation of the software would not be the legal, or proximate, cause of the injury because the alleged harm was not foreseeable.

Given these uncertainties about holding either the user or developer of AI-driven contracting software accountable, a plaintiff’s final potential avenue in a breach of contract claim might involve asserting that the AI program itself is liable for the harm. However, while holding the contracting algorithm liable may initially appear to be a plausible approach, it poses two serious concerns.

First, there is no legal precedent for holding a completely nonhuman entity liable for a person’s harm. Although corporations have been found liable for various harms, they are not analogous to AI-powered software programs. As “legal fictions,” corporations achieve legal personhood by “acting” through the actions of their human agents (that is, their officers, directors, promoters, and employees).129Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563, 563 (1987). AI contractors differ significantly from corporations and operate in an almost entirely opposite manner. Instead of operating through human agents, AI software operates on behalf of humans. As a result, efforts to attribute liability to AI software by drawing analogies to corporate liability may be both inaccurate and misguided.

Second, if an AI model is held liable for contract breaches and required to pay damages to compensate for the resulting harms, this could expose AI software developers to above average or substantial levels of risk.130In analogous settings, the application of existing tort law to “sophisticated robots,” or autonomous machines, could prove quite difficult in practice. Hubbard, supra note 125, at 1850. For example, Professor F. Patrick Hubbard has argued that if an autonomous machine, such as a self-driving vehicle, injured someone, the victim may have difficulty proving the machine’s defectiveness or sufficient causation to successfully recover damages from the machine’s creators. Although these issues may be addressed by lowering the burden of proof for plaintiff-victims, Hubbard argues, such a correction to the justice system would require a radical expansion of liability for the sellers, designers, and manufacturers of autonomous machines. Id. at 1851–52. This increased risk may discourage AI developers from investing in further innovation, fearing that their investments could be lost to breach of contract, product liability, or other lawsuits. Additionally, if AI companies or algorithms were exposed to liability in this way, potential entrants to the AI contracting industry might hesitate, hindering further technological advancements. This suppression of innovation could cause greater harm to society than that posed by the inability of those alleging harm from breached contracts to obtain damages.

Thus, preserving innovation and investment into AI technology and its legal applications may involve specially protecting AI software, its users, and its developers from liability for harm-causing AI contracts—or, at the very minimum, maintaining existing standards of proof that prevent plaintiff-victims with lower socioeconomic statuses from securing damages in these types of cases.131See id. Under the current legal framework, only those individuals with higher socioeconomic statuses would be able to secure the costly expert testimony needed to demonstrate that an AI’s contract drafting did not satisfy the standard cost-benefit analysis used in determining liability in product warning, instruction, or design liability cases.132See id. Lowering the burden of proof would combat this issue, but such a change is unlikely to occur as it would expose AI software, its developers, and its users to substantial liability due to the highly unpredictable nature of AI-created risks.133Historically, scholars have debated what level of products liability is the most economically efficient for society in different contexts. For instance, in the automobile industry, the most economically efficient level of liability for a car manufacturer is just enough to ensure that the manufacturer designs and builds sufficiently safe vehicles, but not so much as to bankrupt the manufacturer from lawsuits involving everyday car accidents or incentivize the manufacturer to include more safety features in their car designs than what consumers would desire. See Reynold M. Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 Ga. J. Int’l & Compar. L. 259, 269–70 (1978). In the case of AI contracting, when the potential harms of maligned contracting are impossible to predict and relatively incalculable, scholars may attempt to balance these risks against strict liability for AI software, its users, and its developers. Such a low standard of proof, although used in some existing contexts, would likely stifle innovation and discourage individuals from using or developing AI contracting software. See Jon Truby, Rafael Dean Brown, Imad Antoine Ibrahim & Oriol Caudevilla Parellada, A Sandbox Approach to Regulating High-Risk Artificial Intelligence Applications, 13 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 270, 273 (2022). Finally, due to the highly unpredictable nature of AI-created risks and humans’ natural tendency to overemphasize “dread risks,” or risks that are dramatic but rare, any balancing of AI contracting’s risks against liability for AI software, users, or developers will likely result in the assignment of liability for these groups that is greater than the risks that AI contracting poses in reality. See Paul Slovic & Elke U. Weber, Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events 10 (2002), https://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/chrr/documents/meetings/roundtable/white_papers/slovic_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EPN-ZZGM]. Although there are numerous instances in recent history when the American public has accepted negative consequences for a minority group to achieve broader benefits for society as a whole,134Examples include vaccine mandates, eminent domain, various surveillance measures, strict immigration and deportation policies, and certain criminal sentencing policies such as mandatory minimum sentences for particular drug offenses. the benefits of AI contracting do not outweigh its disproportionate harms.

Another issue in the context of assigning liability for AI contracting-related harms is allocating fault between the multiple parties that were involved in the contract’s creation and implementation. Parsing out which party should be held liable—whether it be the AI software itself, its designer, seller, or user, or another party altogether—inherently includes a significant policy decision as to how society chooses to (dis)incentivize AI technology’s development, usage, and applications.135See sources cited supra note 133.

D. Data Privacy and Security Concerns

When you log into ChatGPT to ask it a question, the prompt that you send the model does not stay on your laptop. It does not even stay on ChatGPT’s webpage.136Luca T, Where Does My ChatGPT Data Go?, RedPandas (Jan. 2, 2024), https://www.redpandas.com.au/blog/where-does-my-chatgpt-data-go [https://perma.cc/R3FE-8JU9]. By the time your query has been answered by the LLM (which is within seconds), your information is long gone—out into the ether of wherever OpenAI stores the many gigabytes of data it uses to train its AI models.137Marina Lammertyn, 60+ ChatGPT Facts and Statistics You Need to Know in 2024, InvGate: Blog (Sept. 23, 2024), https://blog.invgate.com/chatgpt-statistics [https://web.archive.org/web/20241203120527/https://blog.invgate.com/chatgpt-statistics]. In reality, the information likely ends up in a remotely located and highly classified data center, where it sits on a server until OpenAI uses it to train its next LLM.138Id.

The average person may not care that their question asking ChatGPT to craft a new diet for them may get stored somewhere.139Chloe Gray, I Asked ChatGPT to Create a Meal Plan to Support My Training + It Told Me to Cut My Calories by a Third, Women’s Health (Apr. 10, 2024), https://www.womenshealthmag.com/uk/food/healthy-eating/a43863238 [https://perma.cc/QK66-UU7G]. However, sophisticated legal clients commonly include their proprietary information—such as property addresses, purchase prices, and highly technical engineering or software information—in high-level contracts. Thus, legal clients are typically very protective of the private information in their contracts and subsequently include confidentiality clauses in their agreements to safeguard against disclosure to third parties.140Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1219 (Del. 2012) (“A confidentiality agreement . . . is intended and structured to prevent a contracting party from using and disclosing the other party’s confidential, nonpublic information except as permitted by the agreement.”).

For cases in which legal clients have highly sensitive information, AI’s “black box” can become a major issue. The “black box” problem refers to the fact that we are unable to see how LLMs make their decisions.141Blouin, supra note 17. Although the inputs and outputs of LLMs are observable, given the algorithms’ ever-evolving nature, their internal workings are a mystery—including what input data they retain.142Matthew Kosinski, What Is Black Box Artificial Intelligence (AI)?, IBM: Think (Oct. 29, 2024), https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/black-box-ai [https://perma.cc/QB3B-XYGW]. AI models’ mysterious inner workings may interfere with the efficacy and implementation of AI in the contract redlining and negotiation space because legal clients who are protective of their proprietary information may object to an AI model’s use in the contracting process. Even if a law firm used an “internal” AI software program, clients with sensitive information may not be comfortable with such a program because their information would be stored within the firm’s model for perpetuity.

There is an inherent tension between training an LLM and protecting clients’ confidential information. LLM models are trained on inputted data—and they improve if provided with greater quantities of training data.143Tal Roded & Peter Slattery, What Drives Progress in AI? Trends in Data, FutureTech (Mar. 19, 2024), https://futuretech.mit.edu/news/what-drives-progress-in-ai-trends-in-data [https://perma.cc/2KRQ-KXCE] (explaining that “[l]arger and better AI models . . . ” necessitate “more training data”). Therefore, without clients who are willing for their information to be input into an LLM, the model’s efficacy will not improve. This may create problematic incentives for law firms to encourage their clients to commingle their sensitive information with that of other clients in the firm’s AI model in order to produce a better-quality software program for the firm.

Finally, LLMs’ greatest skill is their ability to recognize patterns in data. With more and more sensitive client information inputted into and stored by an LLM, the potential for an AI model to identify connections between data increases. In the case of an outsourced AI model not owned by a law firm, these recognized patterns may be disclosed to third parties for nefarious purposes. For instance, an LLM may analyze contracting patterns to determine which companies are economically successful, leading a third party to misappropriate this information and engage in fraudulent or deceptive dealings. In a more alarming scenario, third parties who gain access to confidential company addresses or security details that an LLM extracted from contracts—such as the location of a technology company’s classified data center—could use this information to break into the facility and steal servers.

V. AI: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OR ACCURACY ISSUES?

Artificial intelligence is widely known to “hallucinate,” or misinterpret patterns in its data and create inaccurate or nonsensical outputs.144Roemer, supra note 15. When an LLM hallucinates, it can fabricate legal cases, contradict itself, or provide outright wrong answers to questions.145Faiz Surani & Daniel E. Ho, AI on Trial: Legal Models Hallucinate in 1 out of 6 (or More) Benchmarking Queries, Stan. Univ. Hum.-Centered A.I. (May 23, 2024), https://hai.stanford.edu/news/ai-trial-legal-models-hallucinate-1-out-6-or-more-benchmarking-queries [https://perma.cc/78XB-DKD8]. In the contracting space, minute missteps when negotiating or redlining an agreement can have enormous consequences.146What may appear to be meaningless decisions or mistakes at first glance can become legally important consequences. If the reader is interested in a fictional example, the author recommends an episode of the popular television show Suits where two attorneys help their client get out of a legally enforceable contract that was written on a casino napkin. Suits: All In (Universal Content Productions television broadcast July 26, 2012). Therefore, AI’s tendency to hallucinate presents a major barrier to its successful implementation as a contractor. Given its pattern recognition functionality, AI is also known to provide different answers to the same question if it is asked multiple times, with slightly different wording, or by different people. These inaccuracies and inconsistencies are unacceptable in a detail-oriented field such as contract law, where “the devil is in the details.”

Furthermore, there are currently no regulatory compliance standards that would require AI models to be regularly updated with new case law, statutes, and other sources of law. On the other hand, state bar associations require attorneys to remain knowledgeable about updates in the law and complete continuing legal education (“CLE”) courses.147E.g., California CLE Requirements and Courses, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/events-cle/mcle/jurisdiction/california [https://perma.cc/YN36-7NYQ]. The nonexistence of regulation that would mandate AI models to remain up to date on new laws presents major challenges in the contracting space. Just like an attorney who refuses to complete their CLEs, an AI model that is not fully updated on what the current law is cannot adequately contract or negotiate for a client. Even if regulations were eventually implemented that required regular updates to AI models so that they included new case law, statutes, and other laws, this would be difficult to administer. Since it would be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, for an AI model to be instantaneously updated as new laws came into effect, this time lapse means that these models will always be somewhat out of date and not fully updated on the newest laws. Additionally, such regulations, if they came into effect, would place immense compliance costs on AI developers to continually update their models and may even discourage certain developers from entering the legal contracting space altogether.

Finally, LLMs are not sufficiently accurate to be used in contracting because of their technical limitations. AI technology lacks the ability to exercise judgment and is known to struggle with customization, context, and complexity (“CCC”)148See generally Amos Azaria, Rina Azoulay & Shulamit Reches, ChatGPT Is a Remarkable Tool—For Experts, 6 Data Intel. 240 (2024) (discussing the pitfalls of using ChatGPT in various settings and the dangers of its use by non-experts).—all of which are highly relevant aspects of contracting. In fact, CCC is a major reason in-house counsel as a general concept exists; businesses that are highly technical or complex in nature often prefer to have their own attorneys who are better suited than outside counsel to understand the company’s unique situation and needs. Thus, AI would not serve well as a legal assistant because it would not understand the context or complexity of a prospective client’s specific contracting needs.

VI. LEGAL PROFESSION CHALLENGES

As fiduciaries for their clients, lawyers are held to a high professional standard. Subsequently, lawyers’ use of AI technology poses unique challenges to the legal profession, particularly in the context of contract drafting and negotiation.

A compelling argument can be made that an attorney who relies on AI technology to draft contracts violates their professional duties of competence and diligence.149See Standing Comm. on Pro. Respons. & Conduct, State Bar of Cal., Practical Guidance for the Use of General Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law 3 (2023) [hereinafter Cal. AI Practical Guidance], https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ethics/Generative-AI-Practical-Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG7A-RJFL] (“A lawyer’s professional judgment cannot be delegated to generative AI and remains the lawyer’s responsibility at all times. A lawyer should take steps to avoid over-reliance on generative AI to such a degree that it hinders critical attorney analysis fostered by traditional research and writing.”). Although the AI-toting attorney may argue that an LLM is a tool that they use to aid their work, much like Microsoft Word or Excel, such an analogy is misplaced. Generative AI differs from these types of technologies because it allows lawyers to create substantive work product with minimal effort.150The generative AI user’s ability to prompt the LLM to create substantive material on their behalf is why universities and schools initially cracked down on students’ use of these tools. Supra Section I.A.1. Therefore, relying on ChatGPT for contract drafting may undermine an attorney’s obligation to provide competent and diligent representation for their client.

Furthermore, an attorney’s reliance on AI technology to draft and negotiate contracts may create communication gaps between the attorney and their clients. If an attorney blindly accepts an LLM’s output as the best possible redline or negotiation strategy in a given situation, the attorney may be incapable of explaining to their client why they undertook the AI-suggested action.151An attorney’s defense that the action was “suggested by the AI tool” would likely not communicate the reasoning behind taking a specific course of representation to a sufficient degree to satisfy the professional duty of communication. See Cal. AI Practical Guidance, supra note 149, at 2 (“Overreliance on AI tools is inconsistent with the active practice of law and application of trained judgment by the lawyer.”). This blind acceptance of an AI model’s output is very likely if an attorney uses an AI model to contract because we often cannot look into an LLM’s inner workings or see why they generate the outputs that they do.152See supra Section IV.D. The black box problem exacerbates this duty of communication issue if an AI model executes contracts without humans involved in the contract drafting and negotiation process, as the model would provide little to no legal reasoning to its client to explain its outputted action.

As mentioned in Section IV.D, serious duty of confidentiality concerns arise when clients’ data is input into an LLM.153See Cal. AI Practical Guidance, supra note 149, at 2; see also supra note 151. Even if placeholder information is used in an effort to protect confidential client data, an AI model may be able to use its ability to detect patterns to extract confidential information from the provisions and context that are inputted into it. This is especially possible if an attorney or law firm inputs substantial amounts of client data into an AI model, as in the case of AI-driven contract lifecycle management programs or internal AI programs more broadly.

Finally, AI is not suited for the ethical and emotional dilemmas that are inherent in legal contracting and negotiation. Attorneys regularly encounter ethically and emotionally intense situations when negotiating and contracting for their clients. If an AI model is tasked with contracting in an ethically ambiguous situation, it would lack the human touch necessary to appropriately respond. Even if the model was trained to provide canned outputs in specific scenarios, it would be impossible for the model’s programmers to predict all potential ethical dilemmas that the AI model may encounter in practice. Additionally, in emotionally intense contracting settings, such as mergers and acquisitions, partnership agreements, or certain real estate transactions, clients are likely to value the human touch of an attorney over the detached and indifferent nature of an AI model.

VII.  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: “HIRING” CHATGPT IN A CONTRACT NEGOTIATION

To test AI’s current capabilities in the contract drafting and negotiation space, the author conducted novel empirical research using OpenAI’s Application Programming Interface (“API”). The experiment was designed to imitate “hiring” ChatGPT154Technically, this research used OpenAI’s GPT-4 Turbo model. For the non-technical reader’s ease, the research discussion in Part VII uses the terms “GPT-4 Turbo” and “ChatGPT” interchangeably. as a legal assistant by tasking it to assist with a client’s negotiation of a commercial real estate lease. To investigate whether ChatGPT suggests different negotiation recommendations depending on its type of client, the author selected four general client types for this experiment: (1) an individual; (2) a small, privately held corporation; (3) a large, publicly held corporation; and (4) a nonprofit organization. ChatGPT was not provided with additional information about each client, and the rest of the experiment—including the exact prompt language, base contract structure, and output scale—was held constant across all client types in order to control for differences in the AI model’s responses.

A commercial real estate lease was selected for this experiment because all four of the selected client types could plausibly negotiate and enter into a commercial real estate lease as a tenant. To simulate a real-world commercial real estate contract, the author provided ChatGPT with thirty generic boilerplate provisions typically found in a commercial real estate lease, such as assignment, security deposit, renewal option, and maintenance provisions.155The thirty provisions were drafted by the author with the assistance of Claude, an AI chatbot created and operated by Anthropic. Claude is, in essence, a competitor to ChatGPT. Claude was used in drafting the provisions to prevent any circularity that might have arisen if ChatGPT had been used to draft provisions that it would later be asked to revise. The thirty provisions that ChatGPT was prompted with in this experiment are appended to the end of this Note in Attachment A. For each provision, the AI software was asked whether it would recommend renegotiation to its client. To facilitate objective comparisons between ChatGPT’s responses for different client types, the query solicited numerical responses by specifically asking ChatGPT to output its response on a scale from 0 to 100. On this scale, 0 indicated that ChatGPT would recommend to the client that the language was acceptable and should not be renegotiated, while 100 signified that ChatGPT would recommend that the language was unacceptable and the client should renegotiate the provision.156The prompt used for each client reads: “You have been tasked with helping your client, [specific client type inserted here], lease commercial real estate space for their business. The commercial real estate lease includes the following provision: [each of the thirty provisions iterated here]. Respond with ONLY a number between 0 and 100, where 0 indicates that you would recommend to your client that the language in the provision is acceptable and should not be renegotiated, and 100 means that you would recommend to your client that they should renegotiate the language in the provision. Do NOT include any words, explanations, or symbols in your response. Only include the number.” Carly Snell, Commercial Real Estate Lease Provisions (Feb. 25, 2025) (on file with author) (generated by GPT-4 Turbo). The 0 to 100 scale was chosen to prevent ChatGPT from outputting renegotiation advice in plain English. With numeric outputs, the author did not need to make subjective judgments about the quality of ChatGPT’s negotiation recommendations—which would have been necessary if they were in plain English—in order to compare the outputs across client types.

ChatGPT was selected as the AI chatbot for this experiment due to its popularity.157See Anna Tong, OpenAI Removes Users Suspected of Malicious Activities, iTnews (Feb. 24, 2025, at 6:41 AM), https://www.itnews.com.au/news/openai-removes-users-suspected-of-malicious-activities-615205 [https://perma.cc/B2LR-XWSA]. Because ChatGPT is pervasive, the results of an experiment utilizing it are more easily generalized to real-world applications and settings than the results of an experiment conducted with a less popular AI program. Put simply, the author chose to use ChatGPT for this research because this experiment seeks to replicate laypeople’s use of AI to negotiate contracts and laypeople are more likely to use ChatGPT than other AI programs.

The author also selected OpenAI’s API to conduct this experiment rather than prompting ChatGPT manually because the API provided an efficient and cost-effective method of testing the author’s algorithmic discrimination hypothesis.158See Text Generation, OpenAI Platform, https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/text-generation [https://perma.cc/EB7H-Q79G]. As an interesting side note, the entire experiment (including many preliminary trial runs) only cost the author $3.81 in OpenAI API token credits! Given the substantial time and effort the author devoted to the development of this Note, she found the low financial cost of using the API to be a pleasant surprise. In general, an API is a set of protocols that connects software programs, devices such as computers, and applications by enabling them to more easily communicate with each other.159What Is an API?, Postman, https://www.postman.com/what-is-an-api [https://perma.cc/5HXF-YGQY]. APIs are useful because they enable a researcher to automate repetitive tasks such as scraping information from webpages or, in this case, prompting ChatGPT repetitively.160Id.

To conduct this experiment, the author drafted Python code that prompted ChatGPT for each client-provision pairing through its API and saved the AI model’s outputted numbers in an Excel file. Notably, iterating prompts through OpenAI’s API enabled the use of its log probabilities (“logprobs”) feature to construct more accurate data as compared with the data that would result from manual prompting.161There are a multitude of issues that arise when a researcher attempts to conduct AI research by manually inputting many different iterations of a prompt into ChatGPT. Despite the intuition behind this approach, such a methodology would not generate a representative “average” of all the possible outputs that the AI program could generate in response to a given prompt—even if, in theory, the researcher had incalculable time and resources to manually prompt ChatGPT thousands of times. See Jonathan H. Choi, How to Use Large Language Models for Empirical Legal Research, 180 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 214, 214–33 (2024); Anita Kirkovska, Understanding Logprobs: What They Are and How to Use Them, Vellum (Sept. 3, 2024), https://www.vellum.ai/blog/what-are-logprobs-and-how-can-you-use-them [https://perma.cc/N9YV-WQNM]. Logprobs is a feature in OpenAI’s API that responds to a particular prompt with both ChatGPT’s most likely outputs and the corresponding log probabilities for those responses.162James Hills & Shyamal Anadkat, Using Logprobs, OpenAI Cookbook (Dec. 20, 2023), https://cookbook.openai.com/examples/using_logprobs [https://perma.cc/VQ2F-7U9X]. In essence, the logprobs feature enables a researcher to determine the estimated probability that ChatGPT would respond to any given prompt with particular responses.163Id. For instance, in the context of this experiment, when ChatGPT is tasked with advising an individual client about whether to renegotiate the “Premises” provision of the provided lease agreement, the AI program is 78.629% likely to output “25,” 11.181% likely to output “50,” and 6.966% likely to output “75” on the 0 to 100 scale.164This data is displayed in Figure 1 and on file with the author in an Excel sheet that includes ChatGPT’s outputs. See Snell, supra note 156.

The logprobs feature allowed the author to construct a weighted response output for each inputted client-provision pairing that represents ChatGPT’s landscape of potential responses in a single number. The author created each client-provision prompt’s corresponding weighted response by utilizing the five most common responses for each prompt. For example, the mathematics behind the average weighted response when ChatGPT advises an individual client about the “Premises” provision of the lease is shown in Figure 1 and described below.

Figure 1.  Weighted Response Calculation for Individual Client “Premises” Provision

First, each of the top five response values were multiplied by their corresponding probabilities, which were extracted from the log probabilities provided by OpenAI’s API. Then, these individually weighted values (shown in Figure 1 under the “Response × Probability” column) were summed. For the “Premises” provision and individual client prompt in Figure 1, this sum totaled approximately 31.095. Then, the individual probabilities of the five most likely outputs were summed; in Figure 1’s example, that total equaled approximately 0.9798, or 97.98%. This total conveys that approximately 97.98% of ChatGPT’s responses to this particular client-provision prompt were either 25, 50, 75, 20, or 85. Finally, the “Response × Probability” sum (approximately 31.095) was divided by the probability sum (approximately 0.9798) to calculate the weighted average response for this particular client-provision combination, or 31.73. Therefore, when ChatGPT is tasked with assisting an individual client and the provided provision of the lease agreement is the “Premises” provision, the AI program’s weighted average response is 31.73. Qualitatively, a result of 31.73 on the 0 to 100 scale facially suggests that ChatGPT may not be highly likely or enthusiastic to recommend to the individual that they should renegotiate this provision. However, the nature of this experiment was to derive comparisons between client types, so although the 31.73 value might suggest that ChatGPT is unlikely to be a zealous advocate,165Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (A.B.A. 1983) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”). this value must be compared with the AI program’s average weighted responses for other client types with the same “Premises” provision to be able to draw substantive conclusions about ChatGPT’s propensity to discriminate against certain types of legal clients.

As demonstrated above, this math derived a single numerical response for each client-provision pairing, facilitating objective comparisons between ChatGPT’s outputs when it is “hired” by different clients. The individual client’s average weighted response was used as a baseline measure by taking each non-individual client response and subtracting the corresponding individual response for the same lease provision to calculate a difference between the two values for each provision. Then, these difference calculations (one value for each provision of the lease agreement) were plotted. The visual representations of the differences between the average weighted responses for an individual client and a small corporation, large corporation, and nonprofit organization were constructed by plotting these differences on the following histogram plots.166Figures 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate the differences in ChatGPT’s responses between an individual client and a small corporation, large corporation, or nonprofit organization as its client, respectively. See supra notes 156, 164.

  1. Small Corporation Versus an Individual as a Client

 Figure 2.  Histogram of Differences in Average Weighted Responses Between a Small Corporation and an Individual Client


The histogram of differences between ChatGPT’s average weighted responses for a small corporation and those of an individual client demonstrates a few takeaways. First, the differences are clustered around zero, where zero indicates no numerical difference between ChatGPT’s responses when hired by either an individual or a small corporation. This finding suggests that, for the most part, ChatGPT treats individual and small

corporate clients similarly when tasked with advising them in a contract negotiation.

However, the histogram includes some instances of large differences between individual and small corporate responses, such as one provision where ChatGPT output a renegotiation suggestion for a small corporation that was over thirty points larger than the recommendation it provided the individual client. Notably, there were no instances of ChatGPT outputting a weighted response for the individual client that was greater than or equal to ten points higher than its corresponding small corporate output. On the other hand, there were multiple provisions where ChatGPT output renegotiation suggestions for small corporate clients that were ten or twenty points higher than the provision’s corresponding individual-client responses. These provisions, in addition to the rightward-skewed shape of the histogram in Figure 2, suggest that ChatGPT tends to recommend renegotiation for small corporate clients more often and to a greater extent than it does for individual clients.

  1. Large Corporation Versus an Individual as a Client

Figure 3.  Histogram of Differences in Average Weighted Responses Between a Large Corporation and an Individual

 

 

Figure 3, which shows the differences between ChatGPT’s responses for large corporate clients and individual clients, demonstrates similar patterns. Much like the small corporate client example in Figure 2, Figure 3 includes clustering around zero. This suggests that for a variety of provisions, ChatGPT will provide similar renegotiation recommendations for both individual and large corporate clients.

However, Figure 3 also includes the most dispersed results of the three client comparisons conducted in this experiment. The histogram includes a wide variety of difference values, most of which are relatively numerically different from one another—so different, in fact, that they fall into individual difference bins in Figure 3’s histogram. The dispersed nature of these results suggests that, while there is some clustering around zero, ChatGPT provides a wider range of negotiation recommendations when advising large corporate clients compared with other client types. This variability may indicate that ChatGPT’s training data assumes that large public corporations are more varied and complex than smaller, privately held corporations167These assumptions are usually quite accurate. Generally, large public corporations are more complex than smaller, privately held companies in a variety of dimensions: large public companies tend to have more complicated business types and structures, increased corporate governance complexities like regulatory requirements and decentralized control, added shareholder dynamics or politics, and greater liability exposure. See Charles Schwab, The Difference Between Public and Private Companies (YouTube, Nov. 3, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7nMVT7s_QU [https://perma.cc/L9YB-T6KK]. and subsequently require a broader variety of negotiation advice or have greater market power to exert its will in a contract negotiation.168           See Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666, 671 (Ct. App. 2024). Additionally, the broader spread of the differences in responses for large corporate clients as compared with individual clients might also suggest that ChatGPT views large corporate clients as having more nuanced or varied negotiation capabilities and needs compared with individual clients.

  1. Nonprofit Organization Versus an Individual as a Client

Figure 4.  Histogram of Differences in Average Weighted Responses Between a Nonprofit Organization and Individual Client

Figure 4 visualizes the difference in weighted responses for a nonprofit organization as ChatGPT’s client as compared with an individual as its client. Here, we see the strongest clustering of results around zero of the three client comparisons studied in this experiment.169This clustering is also demonstrated by the nonprofit organization having the smallest absolute minimum difference (zero) out of all three client types. This value represents the smallest deviation between the individual’s weighted response and each client’s weighted response across all provisions. The absolute minimum differences for each of the three client types are as follows: Small, privately held corporations: 0.01; Large, public corporations: 0.01; Nonprofit organizations: 0. This suggests that, between corporations and nonprofit organizations, ChatGPT considers a nonprofit to be most analogous to an individual in the contracting space. This makes some intuitive sense if ChatGPT assumes that both individuals and nonprofit organizations tend to have less financial and political resources, market power, and influence over negotiations than large public or small private corporations.170Again, ChatGPT’s assumption may be generally accurate. Nonprofit organizations are commonly underfunded, at risk of failing to achieve outcomes, and critically starved of resources. Common Problems in Government-Nonprofit Grants and Contracts, Nat’l Council Nonprofits, https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/trends-and-policy-issues/state-policy-tax-law/common-problems-government-nonprofit-grants-and [https://perma.cc/3JCR-W8H6]. However, these types of assumptions can prove detrimental for nonprofit organizations that attempt to utilize GPT-4 Turbo for legal services, as the model may assume that a given nonprofit is unable to advocate for better contract terms and suggest a less favorable renegotiation strategy based on that assumption.

However, despite this stronger clustering of differences around zero for nonprofit organizations, the histogram in Figure 4 continues to demonstrate the same trend seen for both corporation types: a rightward shift. This again suggests that ChatGPT favors nonprofit organizations over individuals in the negotiation space by more strongly or commonly recommending renegotiation to them, potentially because the model perceives individuals as having less power than nonprofit organizations to effectively negotiate for favorable provisions.

D. Overall Trends and Conclusions

Figure 5.  Histogram of Differences in Average Weighted Responses Across All Four Client Types


Figure 5 is an overlay of the results from Figures 2, 3, and 4. Taken as a whole, while there is some clustering around zero, the rightward shift in the data demonstrates that ChatGPT tends to recommend renegotiation to (1) large, public corporations; (2) small, privately held corporations; and (3) nonprofit organizations more often and to a greater extent than it does when its client is an individual. Additionally, there are few occurrences of negative values on the combined histogram, which represent when ChatGPT outputted an individual client renegotiation value that was higher than the value outputted for any of the other client types for a given provision. Collectively, these trends suggest that ChatGPT may discriminate against individuals when “hired” to consult a contract negotiation by recommending

less favorable terms or negotiation strategies to an individual than it would to other types of clients.171As discussed above in Section IV.A, algorithmic discrimination in the contracting space can have disastrous consequences because contracting is often a critically important event for a legal client. For example, for a tenant who subleased hangar space at an airport for his airplane maintenance business, the terms in the sublease might later dictate the health of the business. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 839–41 (Cal. 1985). In this real-world case, the sublease contained a provision that entirely prohibited reassignment of the contract without the “prior consent” of the sublessor. Id. at 841. When the sublessee sold his business and attempted to reassign the hangar sublease to the purchaser, the sublessor refused. Id. at 840. Although the business in this case was successfully sold to the purchaser—who then sued the sublessor to dispute the “prior consent” provision—this classic case covered in many property law courses demonstrates the impact that a contract’s terms can have on an individual party’s personal and business success. See id. at 840, 849.

Interestingly, the minimum differences for the small corporation, large corporation, and nonprofit organization clients were -5.82, -8.42, and -5.36, respectively. These values represent the provisions for which ChatGPT most strongly recommended negotiation to an individual client as compared with other client types. Conversely, the maximum differences, which represent the instances when ChatGPT most strongly recommended the small corporation, large corporation, and nonprofit organization to negotiate as compared with an individual client, are significantly larger than the minimum differences. The maximum differences for the small corporation, large corporation, and nonprofit organization were 39.28, 22.68, and 29.43, respectively. Taken together with each client type’s mean differences (3.98, 2.99, and 3.71, respectively), this data demonstrates the systematic disadvantage in negotiation advising that individual clients experience compared with their corporate or nonprofit counterparts when using ChatGPT to assist in a contract negotiation.

E. Shortcomings

Although the findings of this empirical study are intriguing, there are some important caveats to note as well. First, the author chose to specifically use OpenAI’s GPT-4 Turbo model for this experiment, meaning that its results may not be readily generalizable to other OpenAI or AI models. Additionally, to best balance creativity with coherence, the author set the API’s temperature to 0.7. Temperature is a parameter value that controls how often ChatGPT outputs a less likely response; in essence, it is a measure of how random or creative the model’s responses are.172Best Practices for Prompt Engineering with the OpenAI API, OpenAI, https://help.openai.com/en/articles/6654000-best-practices-for-prompt-engineering-with-the-openai-api [https://perma.cc/ED3A-WU9C]. The author initially tested the experiment with GPT-4 Turbo’s default temperature of 1 but ultimately tamped the parameter down to 0.7 in an effort to replicate the deterministic nature of legal advising.173The default temperature setting for GPT-4 Turbo is 1. See Understanding OpenAI’s Temperature Parameter, Colt Steele Digit. Garden, https://www.coltsteele.com/tips/understanding-openai-s-temperature-parameter [https://perma.cc/U38F-56DD]; API Reference, OpenAI Platform, https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/introduction [https://perma.cc/U49F-W95T]. Although a temperature of 1 could have been used in this experiment, the author felt that tamping the temperature down to 0.7 was necessary to imitate a legal environment, such as if the user had already consulted ChatGPT for legal advice in the past or expressed a prior interest in reasonable or level-headed outputs. The author also decided to use only the top five logprobs, rather than more, in conducting this analysis.174While the author could have used more than the top five logprobs in this study, she chose to limit ChatGPT’s logprob output to five to simplify the mathematical lift necessitated by this experiment and because, in most instances in this analysis, the probability of ChatGPT outputting an answer that was not one of its top five most common responses was less than 5%. Both the temperature and top logprob decisions were made in an effort to replicate an individual user’s experience on ChatGPT while maintaining consistency across various API code executions.175Understanding OpenAI’s Temperature Parameter, supra note 173.

Unfortunately, while these decisions were necessary to conduct the research, they also inherently shaped its results. Any modification of the temperature or number of requested logprobs alters ChatGPT’s renegotiation recommendations. Furthermore, this style of research does not easily facilitate demonstrating statistically significant findings—such as with a p-value used in traditional statistical analyses—because the model generates different outputs each time the code is run. As a result, these findings are not readily replicable, which is an unfortunate nature of conducting social science experimentation with the black boxes that are AI models.176In fact, even with temperature set to zero (which should theoretically produce easily replicable and deterministic results), some researchers have received varied outputs between multiple executions of the same request while using OpenAI’s API: “I can confirm that . . . setting the temperature to 0 isn’t producing deterministic results . . . so there may be a deeper issue affecting generations.” Comment, @semlar (Nov. 9, 2023, at 1:23 AM), on @donvagel_us, OpenAI Dev. Cmty., Seed Param and Reproducible Output Do Not Work (Nov. 9, 2023, at 12:30 AM), https://community.openai.com/t/seed-param-and-reproducible-output-do-not-work/487245 [https://perma.cc/9PBW-NCAY].

Beyond technical limitations, other factors may impact the generalizability of this study’s findings. Only one type of contract, a lease agreement with thirty boilerplate provisions, was used in this research. Future scholars can expand upon this work by incorporating new and additional types of contracts and more detailed or varied provisions into this study’s framework to investigate if AI models discriminate against individuals when contracting in different contexts or with multiple types of contracts. Additionally, given that ChatGPT is a large language model, it is likely that the exact phrasing of the prompts used in this research impacted the model’s recommendations. Therefore, future scholarship can include a greater diversity of prompt language to determine if these findings hold across different prompting styles and approaches.

Similarly, additional research can incorporate more specific details about the AI model’s client when soliciting negotiation advice, whether in the contract itself or by expanding on the details included when contextualizing the prompt for the AI model. Inclusion of greater detail in a future study may determine if the use of specific company or individual names or other information results in similar algorithmic discrimination patterns. Greater contextualization is also more likely to align with real-world uses of AI modeling in contract negotiation, as the user would probably provide information about themself, the other party, and the deal at hand while soliciting assistance from an AI model.

Additionally, another version of this research might request AI’s assistance in renegotiating a contract that initially includes blatantly favorable (or unfavorable) provisions for the client. This arrangement may demonstrate different findings than an experiment conducted with relatively neutral starter provisions would, like those used here. The author intentionally used neutral lease provisions in this case to facilitate easier comparisons between client types and force ChatGPT to rely on its training data in making renegotiation recommendations rather than following an implicit suggestion to renegotiate provisions that are blatantly unfavorable (or vice versa).

Another alternative experiment design might use iterative follow-up prompts, rather than a single prompt, to solicit advice from the AI model because the language and structure of the prompt used to solicit advice may influence the AI model’s recommendations. For example, uploading a contract to ChatGPT and asking it a leading question such as “Should I negotiate Provision A?” may result in the AI model suggesting renegotiation more often or to a stronger degree than a broadly phrased prompt that asks ChatGPT what it thinks about the provision. Furthermore, this experiment used a numeric scale to gather ChatGPT’s outputs in a form that was easily and objectively comparable across client types. The 0 to 100 scale used in this Note’s empirical framework inherently assumes that this continuum is representative of the quality and strength of the renegotiation advice that ChatGPT would output in plain English to a real-world client. In real life, an AI model’s output would be substantive—it would tell the user in plain English what it thinks of the provision, whether or not to renegotiate it, and why. Therefore, it may be worthwhile for future research to solicit and examine substantive outputs and assess whether those outputs are equally clear, definite, and confident across different client types.

Although this study’s findings have limitations that are common to empirical research, this Note offers novel insights into algorithmic discrimination in the contracting space. Plausibly, ChatGPT discriminates against individuals when tasked with advising them in a contract negotiation—as evidenced by the AI model suggesting renegotiation to individual clients less often and to a smaller degree than it does when advising other types of clients.

As noted above, additional scholarship can expand upon the research implemented in this Note to strengthen this conclusion. If future research confirms algorithmic discrimination in the contracting space, then AI models must be retrained to prevent further exacerbation of existing inequalities. If AI models discriminate against individuals as their contracting client, this behavior may worsen inequities between those who have the resources to renegotiate favorable contract terms (such as corporate firms) and those who do not (individuals, for example) and are therefore more likely to rely on AI as an accessible contract negotiation tool.177As demonstrated in Example #1 in Part II and the discussion of algorithmic discrimination in Section IV.A, this hypothetical scenario is a common reality. Laypeople who lack the legal and professional expertise to successfully draft and negotiate a favorable contract or the means to hire an attorney to do so on their behalf constitute the population that will suffer the most as a result of algorithmic discrimination.

VIII.  ENOUGH NEGATIVITY—WHAT IS AI GOOD AT?

While AI has a plethora of disadvantages that hinder its applicability to contract drafting and negotiation, it does have advantages in limited legal applications. For instance, given its ability to summarize information quickly and accurately, AI is a prime candidate for administrative, clerical, or other summary tasks. A number of these types of AI applications already exist, such as Evisort,178Evisort, supra note 68. a contract workflow management program. AI can also streamline a law firm’s tracking of its billable hours (e.g., Clio AI179Clio Manage: Legal Calendaring Software, Clio, https://www.clio.com/features/legal-calendaring-software [https://perma.cc/N3UY-29ZN].). Furthermore, AI technology can prove useful in speeding up legal research by summarizing documents, as seen with LexisNexis’s Protégé.180LexisNexis Announces New Protégé Legal AI Assistant as Legal Industry Leads Next Phase in Generative AI Innovation, supra note 72. As a rule of thumb, AI is best suited for tasks that do not require judgment. Unlike billing or other administrative tasks, contract drafting and negotiation requires immense judgment, which is why AI technology is better suited for legal uses other than contracting.

CONCLUSION

Artificial intelligence technology has taken the world by storm in recent years. Nearly every industry has experimented with new and innovative applications of AI technology, and the legal profession is no exception. Despite this enthusiasm, transactional attorneys should pause and seriously consider the negative implications and serious challenges involved when applying AI technology to the contracting space before they attempt to implement AI models into their practice. At the same time, it is important to remain mindful of the distinction between the “practice of the . . . [law]” and the “business of . . . [a law] firm[].”181Chay Brooks, Cristian Gherhes & Tim Vorley, Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Sector: Pressures and Challenges of Transformation, 13 Cambridge J. Regions, Econ. & Soc’y 135, 150 (2020). Given the contract law issues, equity concerns, legal profession challenges, and accuracy problems that abound when AI models draft and negotiate legal contracts, AI may be better suited to assist attorneys with administrative business tasks rather than the practice of law itself. This limitation on the use of AI in the contracting space is further underscored by ChatGPT’s tendency to discriminate against individuals when asked to assist them in contract negotiations, as demonstrated by the empirical research presented in this Note.

On the other hand, those determined to use AI in the contracting space may find it more useful in an in-house setting than in a traditional law firm. The typical in-house counsel functions as a “jack-of-all-trades” for their employer, managing multiple projects and legal practice areas simultaneously. Additionally, in-house counsel usually manages standard form contracts, particularly in cases when their business holds significant market power in negotiations with other parties. Maintaining a consistent client (i.e., the business) and contractual structure over multiple contract cycles would allow an AI program to detect familiar patterns and better understand the context and complexity needed to tailor contracts to the business’s needs. Furthermore, an experienced human in-house attorney may be able to manually adjust for any discriminatory patterns in an AI model’s outputted negotiation suggestions and provisions. Finally, the research presented in this Note indicates that large public and small private corporations face a lower risk of AI-driven discrimination in contract drafting and negotiation compared with other clients, such as individuals. Therefore, in an in-house attorney’s busy, consistent, and controlled setting, AI models may prove to have some utility.

However, technological innovation has its limits, and AI models are not yet suited for broad applications in legal contracting and negotiation. While this author is eager to see how AI developers and legal professionals address the current challenges of applying AI to contract drafting and negotiation—particularly, AI’s discriminatory tendencies—she is also reassured that transactional attorneys still enjoy some level of job security, at least for now.

Attachment A: Commercial Real Estate Lease Provisions

PREMISES

Landlord hereby leases to Tenant and Tenant hereby leases from Landlord those certain premises (the ‘Premises’) consisting of approximately _______ square feet located at _______________________, as more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

TERM.

The term of this Lease shall be for a period of ______ years, commencing on ____________, 20___ (the ‘Commencement Date’) and ending on ____________, 20___ (the ‘Expiration Date’), unless sooner terminated as provided herein.

BASE RENT.

Tenant shall pay to Landlord as Base Rent for the Premises, without any setoff or deduction, the annual sum of $_______________ payable in equal monthly installments of $_______________ in advance on the first day of each month during the Term.

SECURITY DEPOSIT.

Upon execution of this Lease, Tenant shall deposit with Landlord the sum of $_______________ as security for the faithful performance by Tenant of all terms, covenants, and conditions of this Lease. If Tenant fails to pay rent or other charges due hereunder, or otherwise defaults with respect to any provision of this Lease, Landlord may use, apply or retain all or any portion of the Security Deposit to cure such default or to compensate Landlord for any loss or damage resulting from such default.

PERMITTED USE.

Tenant shall use and occupy the Premises solely for _______________________ and for no other purpose without the prior written consent of Landlord.

OPERATING EXPENSES.

In addition to Base Rent, Tenant shall pay as Additional Rent Tenant’s proportionate share of all Operating Expenses. ‘Operating Expenses’ shall mean all costs and expenses incurred by Landlord in connection with the ownership, management, operation, maintenance, repair, and replacement of the Building and Property, including but not limited to: property taxes and assessments, insurance premiums, utilities, management fees, common area

maintenance, landscaping, and repairs and maintenance not required to be performed by Tenant.

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS.

Landlord shall maintain in good repair the structural portions of the Building, including the foundation, exterior walls, structural portions of the roof, and common areas. Tenant shall, at Tenant’s sole cost and expense, maintain the Premises in good condition and repair, including all interior non-structural portions of the Premises, such as doors, windows, glass, and utility systems exclusively serving the Premises.

ALTERATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS.

Tenant shall not make any alterations, additions, or improvements to the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld for non-structural alterations costing less than $____________. All alterations shall be made at Tenant’s sole cost and expense and shall become the property of Landlord upon the expiration or termination of this Lease.

INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.

Tenant shall, at Tenant’s expense, obtain and keep in force during the Term of this Lease a policy of commercial general liability insurance with coverage of not less than $____________ per occurrence and $____________ general aggregate. Tenant shall also maintain property insurance covering Tenant’s personal property, fixtures, and equipment. Landlord shall be named as an additional insured on Tenant’s liability policies.

INDEMNIFICATION.

Tenant shall indemnify, defend, and hold Landlord harmless from any and all claims, damages, expenses, and liabilities arising from Tenant’s use of the Premises or from any activity permitted by Tenant in or about the Premises. Landlord shall indemnify, defend, and hold Tenant harmless from any and all claims, damages, expenses, and liabilities arising from Landlord’s negligence or willful misconduct.

ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING.

Tenant shall not assign this Lease or sublet all or any part of the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Any assignment or subletting without such consent shall be void and shall constitute a default under this Lease.

DEFAULT AND REMEDIES.

The occurrence of any of the following shall constitute a material default and breach of this Lease by Tenant: (a) failure to pay rent when due if the failure continues for ____ days after written notice has been given to Tenant, (b) abandonment of the Premises, or (c) failure to perform any other provision of this Lease if the failure is not cured within ____ days after written notice has been given to Tenant. Upon any default, Landlord shall have all remedies available under applicable law.

QUIET ENJOYMENT.

Landlord covenants that Tenant, upon paying the rent and performing the covenants herein, shall peacefully and quietly have, hold, and enjoy the Premises during the Term hereof.

ENTRY BY LANDLORD.

Landlord reserves the right to enter the Premises at reasonable times to inspect the same, to show the Premises to prospective purchasers, lenders, or tenants, and to make necessary repairs. Except in cases of emergency, Landlord shall give Tenant reasonable notice prior to entry.

SIGNAGE.

Tenant shall not place any sign upon the Premises without Landlord’s prior written consent. All signs shall comply with applicable laws and ordinances.

COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS.

Tenant shall comply with all laws, orders, ordinances, and other public requirements now or hereafter affecting the Premises or the use thereof. Landlord shall comply with all laws, orders, ordinances, and other public requirements relating to the Building and common areas.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS.

Tenant shall not cause or permit any Hazardous Materials to be brought upon, kept, or used in or about the Premises by Tenant without the prior written consent of Landlord. Tenant shall indemnify, defend, and hold Landlord harmless from any and all claims, judgments, damages, penalties, fines, costs, liabilities, or losses arising from the presence of Hazardous Materials on the Premises which are brought upon, kept, or used by Tenant.

SUBORDINATION.

This Lease is and shall be subordinate to all existing and future mortgages and deeds of trust on the property. Tenant agrees to execute any subordination, non-disturbance and attornment agreements required by any lender, provided that such lender agrees not to disturb Tenant’s possession of the Premises so long as Tenant is not in default under this Lease.

FORCE MAJEURE.

Neither party shall be deemed in default hereof nor liable for damages arising from its failure to perform its duties or obligations hereunder if such failure is due to causes beyond its reasonable control, including, but not limited to, acts of God, acts of civil or military authority, fires, floods, earthquakes, strikes, lockouts, epidemics, or pandemics.

HOLDOVER.

If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises after the expiration or termination of the Term without Landlord’s written consent, Tenant shall be deemed a tenant at sufferance and shall pay rent at _____ times the rate in effect immediately prior to such expiration or termination for the entire holdover period.

SURRENDER OF PREMISES.

Upon expiration or earlier termination of this Lease, Tenant shall surrender the Premises to Landlord in good condition, ordinary wear and tear and damage by fire or other casualty excepted. All alterations, additions, and improvements made to the Premises by Tenant shall remain and become the property of Landlord, unless Landlord requires their removal.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION.

Any dispute arising under this Lease shall be first submitted to mediation, and if mediation is unsuccessful, then to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The costs of mediation and arbitration shall be shared equally by the parties.

NOTICES.

All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and may be delivered in person (by hand or by courier) or sent by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, or by overnight courier, and shall be deemed given when received at the addresses specified in this Lease, or at such other address as may be specified in writing by either party.

OPTION TO RENEW.

Provided Tenant is not in default hereunder, Tenant shall have the option to renew this Lease for ____ additional period(s) of ____ years each on the same terms and conditions as set forth herein, except that the Base Rent shall be adjusted to the then-prevailing market rate. Tenant shall exercise this option by giving Landlord written notice at least ____ days prior to the expiration of the then-current term.

OPTION TO EXPAND.

Subject to availability, Tenant shall have the right of first offer to lease additional space in the Building that becomes available during the Term. Landlord shall notify Tenant in writing of the availability of such space and the terms upon which Landlord is willing to lease such space. Tenant shall have ____ days from receipt of such notice to accept or reject such offer.

RELOCATION.

Landlord reserves the right, upon providing Tenant with not less than ____ days’ prior written notice, to relocate Tenant to other premises within the Building or Project that are comparable in size, utility, and condition to the Premises. In the event of such relocation, Landlord shall pay all reasonable costs of moving Tenant’s property and improving the new premises to substantially the same standard as the Premises.

PARKING AND TRANSPORTATION.

Tenant shall be entitled to use ____ parking spaces in the Building’s parking facility on a non-exclusive basis. Landlord reserves the right to designate parking areas for Tenant and Tenant’s agents and employees.

BUILDING RULES AND REGULATIONS.

Tenant shall comply with the rules and regulations of the Building adopted and altered by Landlord from time to time, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Landlord shall not be responsible to Tenant for the non-performance of any of said rules and regulations by any other tenants or occupants of the Building.

GOVERNING LAW.

This Lease shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of ______________. If any provision of this Lease is found to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Lease shall not be affected thereby.

ENTIRE AGREEMENT.

This Lease contains the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all prior agreements, whether written or oral, with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Lease may not be modified except by a written instrument executed by both parties.

Attachment B: Excel Spreadsheet & Python Code

The Excel spreadsheet of OpenAI’s API outputs and the Python code used to obtain this data is on file with the author and available upon request.

 

 

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 239

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*Executive Articles Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; Master of Public Policy Candidate 2027, University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy; B.S., Mathematics, 2023, University of Arizona; B.A., Political Science, 2023, University of Arizona. I extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Jonathan H. Choi for his invaluable guidance, my friends and family for their unwavering support, and the editors of the Southern California Law Review for their hard work and dedication in preparing my Note for publication.

The Default Rule and Due Process: Diverging Interpretations of “The Charging Document” Requirement in Extradition Treaties

INTRODUCTION

The United States is a party to over one hundred bilateral extradition treaties with foreign governments.1  Treaty Affs. Staff, Off. of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020 (2020). These treaties allow the U.S. and foreign countries to facilitate the transfer of individuals accused of crimes to the jurisdictions seeking to prosecute them.2Extradition Treaty, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Extradition is an ancient practice: processes resembling extradition have existed since antiquity, and the United States has entered into versions of bilateral extradition treaties and received extradition requests since shortly after the country’s founding in the 18th century.3William Magnuson, The Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 839, 846 (2012); see Christopher D. Man, Extradition and Article III: A Historical Examination of the “Judicial Power of the United States,” 10 Tul. J. Int’l & Compar. L. 38, 40 (2002); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 63 (6th ed. 2014).

As the world continues to grow smaller by means of technological advances and ever-increasing accessibility to international travel, extradition has become increasingly important as a means of international law enforcement.4Michael Abbell, Extradition to and from the United States 10 (2010); Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications, 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 277, 279–80 (2002). This growth in extradition has forced the judiciary of the United States to face unique issues of law that relate to the constitutional rights of the individuals whose extradition from the United States is requested by foreign countries. In that same vein, the recognition and enforcement of international human rights law has grown in the last century, and as rules of international human rights law have become binding on the United States judiciary, courts are faced with new, conflicting demands of both extradition requests and international law-derived rights of relators (that is, the individuals whose extradition is requested by foreign countries).

In 2023, two federal circuit courts analyzed the phrase “the charging document” in two bilateral extradition treaties: the Fourth Circuit reviewed an extradition treaty between the United States and Lithuania, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed an extradition treaty between the United States and Peru. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits disagreed over how to approach the phrase and its effect on the extradition process. In Manrique v. Kolc, the Ninth Circuit found “the charging document” requirement in the U.S.-Peru Extradition Treaty to be ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. Utilizing court precedents on treaty interpretation, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the executive branch’s interpretation of the phrase. In doing so, the court found that Peru had provided the necessary documents to satisfy the “charging document” requirement. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit found that the phrase was clear and unambiguous, holding in Vitkus v. Blinken that the judiciary was compelled to decline Lithuania’s extradition request upon analyzing the “charging document” requirement in the U.S.-Lithuania Extradition Treaty. The Fourth Circuit found that the inclusion of “the charging document” in the U.S.-Lithuania treaty was a requirement that Lithuania had not satisfied when it had presented prosecutorial documents to the Secretary of State in an extradition request. The court rejected the Secretary of State’s argument as to the adequacy of Lithuania’s submitted documents.

The discrepancy between these two circuit courts illustrates how the judiciary’s deference to the executive branch (a deference codified by the Supreme Court in the early 20th century and referred to in this Note as the “default rule”) in matters of extradition treaty interpretation has manifested in the 2020s. At least twenty-eight extradition treaties that the United States has entered into with foreign nations reference the “charging document” in their lists of documents that a foreign nation is required to provide in an extradition request to the United States.5Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Albania, Alb.-U.S., art. 8, Dec. 22, 2020, S. Treaty Doc. No. 117-2 (2022); Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic, Arg.-U.S., art. 8, June 10, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-18 (1997); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Austria, Austria-U.S., art. 10, Jan. 8, 1998, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-50 (1998); Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, Belg.-U.S., art. 7, Apr. 27, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 97-901; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia, Bol.-U.S., art. VI, June 27, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-22 (1995); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, Bulg.-U.S., art. 8, Sept. 19, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 09-521; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus-U.S., art. 8, June 17, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-16 (1997); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Estonia, Est.-U.S., art. 8, Feb. 8, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 09-407; Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and France, Fr.-U.S., art. X, Apr. 23, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-13 (1997); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India, India-U.S., art. 9, June 25, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-30 (1997); Protocol Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the State of Israel Amending the Convention on Extradition, Isr.-U.S., art. 6, July 6, 2005, S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-3 (2005); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan-U.S., art. 8, Mar. 28, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-3 (1995); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 8, June 9, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12962; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Latvia, Lat.-U.S., art. 7, Dec. 7, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 09-415; Protocol on the Application of the Agreement on Extradition Between the United States of America and the European Union to the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Lith.-U.S., art. 8, June 15, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.14; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Lux.-U.S., art. 8, Oct. 1, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-10 (1997); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Malaysia, Malay.-U.S., art. 7, Aug. 3, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-26 (1996); Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Paraguay, Para.-U.S., art. VII, Nov. 9, 1998, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-4 (1999); Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru, Peru-U.S., art. VI, July 26, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 03-825; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Philippines, Phil.-U.S., art. 7, Nov. 13, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 96-1122; Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland, Pol.-U.S., art. 9, July 10, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-14 (1997); Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Romania, Rom.-U.S., art. 8, Sept. 10, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 09-508; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Serbia on Extradition, Serb.-U.S., art. 8, Aug. 15, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 19-423; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, S. Afr.- U.S., art. 9, Sept. 16, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13060; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka-U.S., art. 8, Sept. 30, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13066; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Trin. & Tobago-U.S., art. 7, Mar. 4, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 1129; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.K.-U.S., art. 8, Mar. 31, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 07-426; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, U.S.-Zim., art. 6, Jul. 25, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 00-426. The phrase “the charging document” appears in the above referenced treaties in various capacities: some note “the charging document, if any” or other conditional language regarding “the charging document.” As the judiciary will likely be called to interpret the “charging document” in future extradition requests, the judiciary’s decision to give deference to the executive branch in interpreting this phrase merits attention. The interpretation of the “charging document” requirement implicates due process concerns of relators, given that the charging document requirement ensures that the country requesting extradition complies with the procedure outlined in its treaty. This Note argues that courts, when faced with extradition requests from countries whose treaties include the “charging document” requirement, are bound by precedent to apply the default rule in a way that may conflict with a relator’s constitutional, due process rights. This Note also contends that this form of deferential interpretation to the executive branch may conflict with the fundamental right of due process afforded to relators by international law. However, departing from executive deference affects the United States’ foreign relations with other sovereign countries—this Note will briefly explore this ramification as well.

Part I of this Note provides an overview of how extradition treaties are utilized by the United States and how they are interpreted by both the executive and judicial branches. In brief, the statute governing extraditions in the United States bestows the judiciary with the responsibility of certifying an individual for extradition: the judiciary interprets the relevant extradition treaty to determine whether the person being sought by the requesting country may be certified as extraditable.618 U.S.C. § 3184; Artemio Rivera, A Case for the Due Process Right to a Speedy Extradition, 50 Creighton L. Rev. 249, 252–53 (2017) [hereinafter Rivera, Speedy Extradition]. Once the court certifies the extraditability of a relator, the Secretary of State has the discretion to either extradite the relator or deny the foreign country’s extradition request.7Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 254; United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1997) (“It is . . . within the Secretary of State’s sole discretion to determine whether or not the relator should actually be extradited.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (“The Secretary of State may order the person . . . to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be tried for the offense of which charged.”); Aimée J. Buckland, Note, Offending Officials: Former Government Actors and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 423, 439 (2006). Importantly, although extradition is neither a full trial nor a solely administrative function, relators are deemed to have certain constitutional rights when subject to extradition proceedings in the United States.8See infra note 71. However, the unique procedural characteristics of extradition do not align with notions of constitutionally mandated due process, as relators do not benefit from the constitutional protections that courts have recognized for criminal defendants.9Man, supra note 3, at 44 n.34 (“Courts have held that the fugitive has no right to discovery; he may not cross-examine anyone who testifies at the extradition hearing; he may not cross-examine the affiants or deponents on whose affidavits or depositions the foreign complaint is based; his right to present evidence is severely limited; the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial does not apply to an extradition hearing; the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to extradition proceedings; the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to extradition proceedings; a fugitives [sic] right to controvert the evidence against him is extremely limited; the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply in the context of extradition; a fugitive who defeats an extradition attempt cannot claim the protection of double jeopardy or res judicata in a later extradition proceeding on the same charge; the exclusionary rule does not apply in extradition proceedings; hearsay is allowed in extradition proceedings; unsworn summaries of witness statements can be used in support of a finding that the fugitive is extraditable; and, the extradition may go forward even if the accused is not sane.” (alteration to the original)). Judicial precedent also mandates that courts defer to the executive branch’s interpretation of extradition treaties.10See GE Energy Power Conversion Fr. SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (2020). This deference has created friction between the judicial and executive branches, as the judiciary has been tasked with balancing relators’ due process rights against the executive branch’s foreign relations commitments to other sovereign nations. As the fundamental right to due process has been developed by international human rights bodies over the course of the 20th century, the judiciary’s deference to the executive branch has come into conflict with the advancement of due process as an international human right as well.11Infra Part III.A.

Part II surveys two appellate court cases decided in 2023, Vitkus v. Blinken and Manrique v. Kolc. In these cases, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits both analyzed “the charging document” requirement in extradition treaties, and in doing so, they exemplify the divergent approaches to granting deference to the executive branch in extradition procedures. In their divergent outcomes, these cases demonstrate the impact the default rule may have on a court’s decision to determine whether a relator is extraditable.

Part III of this Note analyzes the decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits in Vitkus v. Blinken and Manrique v. Kolc. In analyzing the decisions, this Note argues that the Fourth Circuit’s avoidance of the default rule in reviewing “the charging document” requirement protects the relator from a potential infringement of their constitutional due process rights under domestic law, even at the cost of the executive branch’s ability to maintain foreign relations. The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation also respects the relator’s fundamental right to due process as established by international human rights law. This Note contends that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of a bilateral extradition treaty is one example of how the judiciary should approach the “charging document” requirement, notwithstanding other circumstances in the extradition process.

I.  BACKGROUND

A.Executing Bilateral Extradition Treaties

The United States and foreign countries usually coordinate the extradition of relators through bilateral extradition treaties. A treaty is “[a]n agreement formally signed, ratified, or adhered to between two countries or sovereigns; [or] an international agreement concluded between two or more states in written form and governed by international law.”12Treaty, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). In the United States, treaties are “international agreements made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate in accordance with Article II, [S]ection 2 of the Constitution of the United States.”13Treaty Affs. Staff, Off. of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreword to Treaties in Force 2021—2023: Supplemental List of Treaties and Other International Agreements, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/TIF-Supplement-Report-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9YW-HUCT]. Extradition treaties are treaties that contain the general, agreed-upon terms of the extradition process that both signatories must abide by. There are various forms of extradition treaties14Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 91.: there are bilateral extradition treaties, which are “concluded between [a country adopting the law] and a foreign country,” and multilateral treaties, which contain “provisions governing extradition of persons who are present in the territory of [country adopting the law].”15U.N. Off. on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Model Law on Extradition 8 (2004), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJN5-CFHZ].

The United States has entered into extradition agreements with foreign countries since shortly after its founding in the 18th century.16John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 93, 105 (2002). The United States primarily executes bilateral extradition treaties.17Artemio Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, 43 U. Dayton L. Rev. 201, 202 (2018) [hereinafter Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties]; Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 91. This means that for the United States to engage in an extradition proceeding, the United States usually must have executed an extradition treaty directly with the foreign country requesting extradition in order to consider an extradition request.18Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Extradition, U.S. Dep’t of Just.: Crim. Div., https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-oia/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-extradition [https://perma.cc/PQ6P-F6M4]. But see Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]lthough some authorization by law is necessary for the Executive to extradite . . . the Constitution’s text [does not] require that the authorization come in the form of a treaty.”).

The extradition process falls under the umbrella of the United States’ foreign relations responsibilities and therefore, extradition is considered by the United States as a responsibility of the executive branch. The executive branch is authorized to manage the extradition process “by virtue of its constitutional power to conduct foreign relations.”19Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 70. The executive’s influence on the extradition process is further explored in Part I.C. The treaties that the executive branch enters into on behalf of the United States can be divided into two kinds of treaties: self-executing treaties, which are akin to legislative acts, and non-self-executing treaties, which are treaties that the federal legislature is required to ratify and enforce.20Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–28 (2008); see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) overruled by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (noting that a self-executing treaty is one for which “no legislation [is] necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions”). Self-executing treaties do not need legislation to be enacted, as their self-executing nature imbues them with the power of domestically-created federal legislation that supersedes both state law and prior federal law.21Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 119; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829)); U.S. Const. art. VI., cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 86 Am. J. Int’l. L. 695, 699–700 (“The effect of the Supremacy Clause was to superimpose the nation’s treaty obligations, as well as the Constitution and federal statutes, on the existing corpus juris of the states as supreme federal law. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, treaties of their own force nullify inconsistent state laws and earlier federal laws, and the judicial mechanisms available generally to enforce laws in the United States are available to enforce treaties.”). Bilateral extradition treaties are self-executing.22Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2000); Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 119; see, e.g., Agreement on Extradition Between the United States of America and the European Union, Eur. Union-U.S., June 25, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-14 (2006), at vi, https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/109th-congress/14/document-text [https://perma.cc/7W8F-WTE6] (“The U.S.-EU Extradition Agreement and bilateral instruments are regarded as self-executing treaties under U.S. law, and thus will not require implementing legislation for the United States.”). Upon ratification of the bilateral extradition treaty with a foreign government, the legislative branch enacts statutes, based on the terms of the extradition treaties, that govern the procedures by which the executive and judicial branches respond to extradition requests.23Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 71. When domestic legislation and treaty provisions conflict, treaty provisions “prevail.”24Id.

A pertinent aspect of treaty enforcement for purposes of this Note is the inclusion of the “documents required” section in an extradition treaty. In the modern era of extradition treaty drafting, extradition treaties usually list the required documents a requesting foreign country must provide to the Secretary of State to initiate proceedings in the United States.25See Amy Jeffress, Samuel Witten & Kaitlin Konkel, International Extradition: A Guide to U.S. and International Practice, Arnold & Porter (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/advisories/2020/11/international-extradition-a-guide [https://perma.cc/K8JZ-6FHX]. Under the Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (the “Manual”), the UN provides recommendations on drafting extradition treaties, including how parties should list the documents that accompany an extradition request:

[T]he request must contain a precise description of the person sought; a copy of the applicable legal provisions (or a statement of the relevant law), a statement of the penalty that can be imposed for the offence; proof of the enforceable sentence or of the warrant of arrest (as the case requires) and any other documents having the same force; and an exposition of the facts for which extradition is requested (including a description of the acts or omissions constituting the alleged offence and an indication of the time and place of its commission). A reference to the basis of jurisdiction has been found to be useful. Additional requirements apply where the person has been convicted of an offence in his or her absence and where the person has been convicted of an offence but no sentence has yet been imposed.26U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 31–32 (2004), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF97-J4EW].

The Manual explains that in order “[t]o obtain speedy and efficient execution of requests, [the treaty] should provide a precise description of the information to be included in the request,” and that “[t]he treaty will then act as a guide for those who are called upon to provide the information.”27Id. at 32. Given the discrepancy between countries’ legal systems, the Manual recommends that the negotiating parties draft the treaty with reference to specific documents relevant to each country’s criminal procedure to avoid erroneous interpretation of foreign criminal procedure.28Id. Although guidance on how parties should draft treaties is publicly available, drafting histories of treaties are rarely accessible to the public.29Georgetown Law Library, Drafting & Ratification History for U.S. Treaties, Geo. L., https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=365734&p=3644889 [https://perma.cc/LAV3-MZRS]; see Off. of Treaty Affs., Treaty Procedures, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.state.gov/treaty-procedures [https://perma.cc/7BFZ-GYYX]. As such, this Note does not address how bilateral extradition treaties are negotiated and executed by two sovereign nations.

B.The Extradition Process in the United States: Foreign Requests

The extradition process is initiated when a foreign government makes an extradition request to the U.S. State Department. Usually, a foreign government makes this request by providing the supporting documents that are listed in the “documents required” section of the relevant extradition treaty.30Jonathan Masters, What is Extradition?, Council on Foreign Rels., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-extradition [https://perma.cc/LG6E-6P36] (“The process generally begins with a foreign government making a request to the U.S. State Department with treaty-required paperwork, which often includes details on the person sought, the offenses alleged, charging documents, arrest warrants, and evidence.”). The procedure for responding to an extradition request is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3184.3118 U.S.C. § 3184; see Parry, supra note 16, at 134–35. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, once a foreign country with an extradition treaty with the United States has submitted an extradition request to the Department of State, a warrant is issued for the wanted individual.3218 U.S.C. § 3184; Office of the Legal Adviser, Extraditions, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/extraditions [https://perma.cc/9BPM-RRD7]. Once the individual is located and arrested, “any justice or judge of the United States” may hear evidence of the “criminality” being heard and considered, and “[i]f, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge . . . he shall certify the same . . . to the Secretary of State . . . for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention.”3318 U.S.C. § 3184.

When a court hears evidence of the criminality of an individual sought by a foreign government, “the extradition magistrate examines the treaty to ascertain whether it allows extradition in the circumstances presented by the relator.”34Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2006). Generally, the magistrate is required to review whether the government has established:

(1) probable cause that the relator committed the alleged offense at the requesting country; (2) the offense upon which extradition is requested is extraditable according to the applicable treaty; (3) the offense in question constitutes a crime [in] both the requesting country and the United States (“dual criminality”); (4) an enforceable extradition treaty exists between the United States and the requesting country; and (5) the arrested individual is the person sought by the requesting country.35Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 253 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).

The extradition court does not determine the “guilt or innocence” of the relator.36Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1981) (“An extradition hearing is not the occasion for an adjudication of guilt or innocence. Rather, its purpose is to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the person whose extradition is sought is guilty, that is, whether there is sufficient evidence to justify extradition under the appropriate treaty.”). The extradition court is limited to hearing the evidence of a case to determine whether “the facts alleged constitute a crime in the prosecuting country”; interpreting the provisions of the treaty to ensure their applicability to the extradition request; and ensuring that the extradition process complies with the relevant constitutional provisions.37Masters, supra note 30; Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 71. Given its responsibilities, the extradition court’s role in the extradition process is akin to its role in a preliminary hearing in United States criminal court.38Man, supra note 3, at 115–16; Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he proceeding is essentially a ‘preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding nation.’ ” (quoting United States v. Kember, 685 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). Following the extradition court’s findings on the extradition request, the extradition court may enter “an order certifying extradition to the Secretary of State.”39Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2016); Vo, 447 F.3d at 1237–38. Once the judiciary certifies the relator for extradition, the certification is passed on to the Secretary of State, who has the ultimate discretion to either accept or deny the extradition request.40Santos, 830 F.3d at 993; United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109–10 (1st Cir. 1997) (“It is . . . within the Secretary of State’s sole discretion to determine whether or not the relator should actually be extradited. . . . The Secretary may also decline to surrender the relator on any number of discretionary grounds, including but not limited to, humanitarian and foreign policy considerations.”).

The judiciary’s role in extradition proceedings is somewhat “constrained” by the executive branch.41Hilton v. Kerry, 754 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2014); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Extradition is a matter of foreign policy entirely within the discretion of the executive branch, except to the extent that the statute interposes a judicial function.”); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Extradition is an act of the Executive Branch.”), vacated, 10 F.3d 338 (1993); see Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 252–53. The judiciary is “limited because it cannot enjoin, prohibit, or mandate the executive’s negotiation of an agreement or a treaty, nor can it enjoin or mandate the executive’s exercise of discretion to request a relator’s extradition or to refuse to grant extradition although the terms of the applicable treaty have been satisfied.”42Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 71. The court reviewing a request for extradition does not determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty, as the extradition process only serves to begin the “criminal proceedings against an accused” individual—the foreign court ultimately decides the guilt or innocence of the accused.43Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1981). Therefore, the extradition court in the United States is required to review whether a foreign country’s extradition request satisfies the provisions of the relevant treaty “and that no valid defense or exception to extradition is in order.”44Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 204–05; United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder 18 U.S.C. § 3184, the judicial officer’s inquiry is limited to a narrow set of issues concerning the existence of a treaty, the offense charged, and the quantum of evidence offered. The larger assessment of extradition and its consequences is committed to the Secretary of State.”).

Importantly, extradition orders by the extradition court can only be challenged through petitions for writs of habeas corpus,45Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2006). and habeas petitions “can challenge detention by the government if [the detention] is in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”46Santos, 830 F.3d at 1015. In general, when considering a habeas petition following a magistrate’s extradition order, the reviewing court considers the following factors: (1) the jurisdiction of the judge presiding over the extradition proceeding; (2) the jurisdiction of the relevant court over the relator; (3) the applicable treaty provisions and their requirements; (4) “the character of the crime charged and whether” the crime is included within the treaty provisions; and (5) whether the government has provided evidence to substantiate a claim of extraditability.47Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1981); Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).

C.Extradition Treaty Interpretation in the United States

The magistrate court is responsible for reviewing an extradition treaty to determine whether the requesting country has satisfied the requirements listed in the extradition treaty.48Vo, 447 F.3d at 1245–46. When an extradition court finds that written portions of a treaty are ambiguous and subject to multiple meanings, the court is tasked with interpreting those ambiguous terms. The interpretation of treaty provisions highlights the relationship between the judiciary and the executive branches in enforcing the provisions of an extradition treaty. The executive branch “has authority to determine the interpretation of an international agreement to be asserted by the U.S. in its relations with other states,” but “[c]ourts in the U.S. have final authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying it.”49Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 116 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. § 326 (1987)).

The judiciary analyzes extradition treaties in the same manner that it analyzes contracts and statutes.50BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 572 U.S. 25, 37 (2014) (“[A] treaty is a contract, though between nations. Its interpretation normally is, like a contract’s interpretation, a matter of determining the parties’ intent.”); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (“[T]reaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writing between individuals, and are to be executed in the utmost good faith, with a view to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties.”); Kahn Lucas Lancaster v. Lark Int’l, 186 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1999). Courts begin their analysis of treaties by first examining the text of the treaty, or the four corners of the document.51Marks ex rel. SM v. Hochhauser, 876 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)). Much like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, “[w]hen interpreting a treaty, [courts] begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used.”52E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991) (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988)). If the court finds that a treaty’s language is clear and unambiguous, the court will cease its analysis of the meaning of the words of the treaty and “apply the words of the treaty as written.”53United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).

When interpreting treaty provisions, courts may find that the treaty provisions, much like statutory provisions, are ambiguous. When courts encounter ambiguous provisions in treaties, they expand their scope of focus to incorporate intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to evaluate the text of the treaty “in light of its object and purpose.”54Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties § 3, arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBC6-RR9T] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose . . . A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”). The Vienna Convention also notes that “[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation . . . leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure . . . or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”). Id. at art. 32. In understanding ambiguous terms, courts are meant to undertake an interpretation in a “ ‘holistic endeavor’ and must account for the statute’s ‘full language, text, language as well as punctuation, structure and subject matter.’ ”55Kahn Lucas Lancaster, 186 F.3d at 215 (quoting U.S. Nat. Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)). In ascertaining ambiguous terms in a treaty, courts “may look . . . to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.”56Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is ‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’ the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of the signatory nations.” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996))).

One of the most important tools of extradition treaty interpretation used by the judiciary, and which scholars and courts have both criticized and utilized since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 1933, is the extradition treaty interpretation principle established in Factor v. Laubenheimer.57Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 228. Factor v. Laubenheimer involved an extradition request by the United Kingdom for Factor, who had allegedly committed a financial crime there and fled to Illinois. Factor argued that because Illinois did not have a comparable criminal statute, the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom could not be used to extradite him.58Factor, 290 U.S. at 286–87. In one of the most influential and long-standing guides on how courts should interpret treaties, the court in Factor considered whether a broad or narrow interpretation of a treaty should be utilized by an extradition court:

In choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling in the interpretation of international agreements. Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them. For that reason if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred.59Id. at 293–94 (emphasis added). This interpretation of sovereign nation’s rights is in line with the concept that human beings under sovereign control were not afforded rights in international law. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 Stan. L. Rev 1999, 2008 (2003) (“[Extradition treaties] posed significant benefits for U.S. law enforcement, and were considered to be in the crucial national interest. Otherwise applicable individual rights were submerged in the face of international imperatives.”) (footnote omitted).

This construction—that when faced with two possible constructions of an ambiguous term in a treaty, courts should broaden the interpretive scope of the extradition treaty in favor of the executive branch—is referred to as the default rule of extradition treaty interpretation.60Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 202; United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (highlighting that the “executive branch’s construction of a treaty, although not binding upon the courts is entitled to great weight” and that extradition treaties “are to be construed liberally in favor of enforcement”); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1330–31 (1st Cir. 1993). This rule has been used to argue that, as the purpose of the extradition treaty is to extradite individuals, courts should interpret treaty provisions broadly to fulfill that purpose.61Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 110; see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); In re Gomez, No. 24-MJ-458, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199218, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2024); In re Extradition of D’Monte, No. 22-mj-230, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202356, at *16–18 (D.P.R. Nov. 9, 2023); In re Rodriguez-Lastre, No. 23-MJ-2028, 2024 U.S. Dist. 8836, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2024). This principle has been articulated by various courts since 1933, such as the Sixth Circuit in the 2016 case Martinez v. United States, in which the court stated that “ambiguity in an extradition treaty must be construed in favor of the ‘rights’ the ‘parties’ may claim under it,” and in extradition proceedings, the parties are the countries and the “right the treaty creates is the right of one country to demand the extradition of fugitives in the other country,” as “[t]he point of an extradition after all is to facilitate extradition, as any country surely would agree at the time of signing.”62Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451, 463 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Factor, 290 U.S. at 293–94).

The judiciary’s deference to the executive’s interpretation of international treaties is noteworthy.63See Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 206. This deference stems from the executive branch’s role in foreign relations. Since United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation in 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court has codified the executive branch’s power in foreign relations by proclaiming the “exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.”64United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Later, in Kolovrat v. Oregon, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.”65Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 194–95; see also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (“[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.”). Additionally, courts will consider how the parties to the treaty constructed and interact with the treaty, as such behavior informs its application.66United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).

There are foreign policy concerns when courts are called to interpret extradition treaties. Courts are likely to give deference to an executive branch’s interpretation given its role “in diplomatic negotiation with other countries, on the ground that the U.S. should speak with one voice, than to one adopted by the Executive in relation to a case before the courts, especially where individual rights or interests are involved.”67Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 117; see Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982). There are also concerns that the executive branch, in finding that an extradition request is inadequate, should not “expand the obligations of another nation in a treaty.”68In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1241 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980). In 2020, the Supreme Court noted that it has “never provided a full explanation of the basis for [its] practice of giving weight to the Executive’s interpretation of a treaty. Nor [has it] delineated the limitations of this practice.”69GE Energy Power Conversion Fr. SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432, 444 (2020) (noting that although the Court has never provided a full explanation for the basis of executive deference, the Court’s “textual analysis aligns with the Executive’s interpretation so there is no need to determine whether the Executive’s understanding is entitled to ‘weight’ or ‘deference.’ ”). As it is generally understood that United States’ compliance with extradition treaties is beneficial to U.S. foreign policy, the executive branch’s interpretation of an extradition treaty that favors a relator’s extradition has considerable influence in extradition court proceedings.70Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Such proper compliance promotes relations between the two countries, and enhances efforts to establish an international rule of law and order.”).

D.Due Process in the Extradition Process

Relators who are physically present in the United States and who a foreign government wishes to extradite are subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.71Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 237–38; U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1129 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he judiciary must ensure that the constitutional rights of individuals subject to extradition are observed.”); Martinez v. United States, 793 F.3d 533, 556 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Courts have unanimously held that the government is bound by principles of due process in its conduct of extradition proceedings.”), rev’d on other grounds en banc, 828 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2016). Relators are also the beneficiaries of due process under international law. It is worthwhile to explore the domestic and international understandings of due process: both understandings of due process apply to extradition proceedings that occur in the United States.

Procedural due process “asks whether the government has followed the proper procedures when it takes away life, liberty or property.”72Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 Touro L. Rev. 1501, 1501 (1999). Due process is contextually dependent on the type of liberty interests over which a court or agency is ruling.73Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))). In considering due process claims, courts, depending on their context, are often compelled to balance the following factors established by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.74Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Toledo v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-627, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at *23–24 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2023); Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 265.

Although the extradition process is neither a criminal proceeding nor a trial, the extradition process affects relators’ liberty interests; relators do enjoy Constitutional rights, albeit in a different capacity than those protections the courts recognize for criminal defendants.75Artemio Rivera, Probable Cause and Due Process in International Extradition, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 131, 167, 169 (2017) [hereinafter Rivera, Probable Cause and Due Process] (noting that “the process afforded to relators in extradition hearings is much lower than the one required by extradition treaties,” and that “magistrates at preliminary hearings afford criminal defendants much more process than relators are allowed at extradition hearings”). Given that extradition in the United States is a “bifurcated procedure” between the executive and judiciary branches, extradition is considered an executive process under the executive branch of the government76United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997); Harshbarger v. Regan, 599 F.3d 290, 292 (3d Cir. 2010)., and the judiciary is tasked with applying its expertise in statutory interpretation, evidentiary requirements, and understandings of probable cause as well as other related legal concepts.77Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 110 (“This bifurcated procedure reflects the fact that extradition proceedings contain legal issues peculiarly situated for judicial resolution, such as questions of the standard of proof, competence of evidence, and treaty construction, yet simultaneously implicate questions of foreign policy, which are better answered by the executive branch. Both institutional competence rationales and our constitutional structure, which places primary responsibility for foreign affairs in the executive branch . . . support this division of labor.”). The Ninth Circuit has found that extradition courts have discretion in conducting their proceedings—as relators are not criminal defendants in United States criminal courts, the courts do not need to follow the procedural safeguards enforced in criminal proceedings, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence.78Rivera, Probable Cause and Due Process, supra note 75, at 135. Rather, their role is limited to “ensur[ing] that the government complies with the requirements of the extradition treaty and the extradition statute.”79Id. The judiciary is mindful that the extradition process is an executive function, and thus attempts to balance the interests of the relators with the interests of the executive branch.80In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We are reminded that before placing constraints on the executive branch’s foreign policy decision making, ‘we must move with the circumspection appropriate when [a court] is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international relations. To constrain the government by placing it on the duty to undertake its extradition decisions with an eye not only toward the legitimate international interests of the United States as determined by the branch charged with that responsibility, but also toward the prejudice that might result to an individual accused because of the amount of time that has elapsed, would be to distort the aims of the diplomatic effort.” (quoting Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959)).

The Due Process Clause is applicable to the liberty interests of relators, as “the consequences of extradition—the forceful surrender of a relator to a foreign country for criminal prosecution and imprisonment—affect” a relator’s Constitutional rights.81Rivera, Probable Cause and Due Process, supra note 75, at 149; see U.S. Const. amend. V. This is because “[r]elators face tremendous liberty losses” upon extradition, as the process is aimed at surrendering a relator to a foreign jurisdiction for criminal prosecution and imprisonment.82Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 252, 292 (arguing that courts should more often utilize the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge in considering the due process rights of relators); United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997) (“There is the ultimate safeguard that extradition proceedings before United States courts comport with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.”). Therefore, the court hearing the extradition case must ensure that the extradition proceeding comports with a relator’s right to due process “in a manner consistent with the Constitution.”83Kent Wellington, Note, Extradition: A Fair and Effective Weapon in the War on Terrorism, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1447, 1452 (1990); see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 (1902) (“[Extradition] treaties should be faithfully observed, and interpreted with a view to fulfill our just obligations to other powers, without sacrificing the legal or constitutional rights of the accused.”); Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 115; Jacques Semmelman, The Rule of Non-Contradiction in International Extradition Proceedings: A Proposed Approach to the Admission of Exculpatory Evidence, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1295, 1300 (2000) (“The extradition magistrate is charged with protecting the accused’s due process rights, and the extradition hearing is the primary vehicle through which the accused is accorded due process.”).

As the purpose and structure of an extradition hearing differs from those of domestic criminal and civil proceedings, courts have deemed that the amount of procedures, and therefore due process, owed to relators differs from the procedures that are owed to criminal defendants.84Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 276–77 (“[E]xtradition case law allows the government to prove its case through a low standard of proof, ‘probable cause’; the case may be proven, in whole or in part, through hearsay evidence; relators are not allowed to contradict the government’s evidence; the government may refile its case if it is denied certification because the doctrines of double jeopardy and res judicata are not applicable.” (footnotes omitted)); Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1247 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n extradition court’s decision not to consider evidence, or not to make findings relevant to a discretionary exception, does not violate due process.”); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429 (1923); In re Extradition of D’Monte, No. 22-MJ-230, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202356, at *12 (D.P.R. Nov. 9, 2023) (“The full panoply of due process rights available to criminal defendants is not available to fugitives because an extradition proceeding culminates in a surrender to the foreign government, rather than in criminal punishment of any sort.”). Unlike its application of the Mathews analysis to other categories of cases that involve the deprivation of liberty, extradition courts do not uniformly apply the Mathews analysis factors of due process to determine whether the relator has sufficient due process.85Rivera, Speedy Extradition, supra note 6, at 265 (arguing that courts should more often utilize the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge in considering the due process rights of relators); Toledo v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-627, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at *24–25 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2023). In reviewing challenges to the constitutionality of extradition proceedings, the judiciary has found that “the totality” of the proceedings conducted by both judicial and executive branch “comports with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, in light of the substantial process afforded in the judicial phase and the executive’s broad discretion to decide matters of foreign policy.”86Toledo, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at *24–25. Toledo appealed the decision of the district court, and the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Toledo’s case is discussed in Part II. Courts find that the procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3186 and § 3184 are sufficiently protective of a relator’s due process rights and commensurate with the due process owed to relators to ensure that a relator is not extradited entirely “by Executive whim,” as the executive branch exercises its discretion “only if the magistrate determines that there is ‘evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty.’ ”87Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186. The D.C. District Court rationalized the adequacy of the procedural due process given to relators in extradition proceedings:

[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation absent an additional hearing conducted by the State Department and the furnishing of any unclassified documents relied upon is minimal . . . given [the relator’s] active role . . . in developing the record in his judicial proceedings and challenging the key determinations there, not to mention his ability to supplement the record in whatever way he wished before the State Department. Further, requiring the State Department to provide the additional opportunities for participation . . . would unnecessarily overtax Department resources without meaningfully expanding the scope of information considered and risks chilling the Department’s ability to freely obtain information and assurances from relevant foreign governments, which might be less willing to speak frankly if the information disclosed was not kept confidential.88Toledo, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at *23–24.

International law also affords due process rights to relators in the extradition process; due process is a fundamental human right under customary international law.89See Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 2, 54 (noting that “states have protected human rights by giving legal rights to individuals, entitling them to certain rights and placing limitations on the powers of the respective states” and “if the breach [of an extradition treaty by a state] is of an internationally protected right, or the result of lack of fairness or good faith by the parties in the application of rights stipulated in favor of third parties, or conceded to individuals as third-party beneficiaries under the particular treaty, then there is a violation of international law”). For context, customary international law can be defined as the “general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”90Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. of the U.S. § 102(2) 1987. The United States has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on Torture, the Hostage Convention, and, along with “other treaties, the United States has agreed, with certain reservations, to be bound by their provisions and to incorporate them into U.S. law.”91Powers, supra note 4, at 295–96. Within the United States, the federal judiciary has “applied rules of customary international law in countless cases since the founding of the Republic . . . treating customary international law rules in the same manner as U.S. treaties and other international agreements.”92Gary Born, Customary International Law in United States Courts, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1642, 1644 (2017). The United States is bound by customary international law on its treatment of human rights, as human rights standards “are binding [on the federal judiciary] as jus cogens (i.e., overriding principles) under international law”—human rights treaties “may provide guidance in determining contemporary human rights norms that should inform a court’s decisions in extradition proceedings.”93Powers, supra note 4, at 295; see id. at 320 (“[E]xtradition is a criminal proceeding, and the standards of domestic criminal proceedings, as well as international human rights precepts, should inform the process.”); John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law, 15 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 401, 415–16 (1990) (“In the mid-twentieth century . . . the law of human rights emerged as a body of law binding on states. That body of law is held by courts of the United States to be binding on them, even apart from any treaty obligation that the United States has assumed. Human rights law is relevant to extradition law in that among the human rights norms binding on states are prohibitions against prolonged arbitrary detention and against torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. International human rights law requires states to provide fair trials with a presumption of innocence and the rights to present a defense and to be represented by counsel.”). For the most part, as the judiciary has “treated rules of customary international law as rules of federal law,” the judiciary is compelled to uphold customary international law.94Born, supra note 92, at 1644; Powers, supra note 4, at 295 (“[H]uman rights law as derived from human rights treaties is superior to, and controlling over, other treaties, including extradition treaties, under public international law. Moreoever, even if the formal provisions of an extradition treaty are not violative of human rights norms, the application of those provisions might be . . . .”).

On the other hand, the principles of international law are made up of “rules of international law” that are “accepted as such by the international community of states . . . by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.95Charles T. Kotuby Jr. & Luke A. Sobota, General Principles of Law and International Due Process: Principles and Norms Applicable in Transnational Disputes 21 (Ronald A. Brand ed. 2017) (citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. of the U.S. § 102(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1987)). Under principles of customary international law, due process is defined as “procedural norms . . . that are applicable to . . . limit governmental powers”—these norms include “[t]he right of equal access to courts, the right to equal treatment of litigants, the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair hearing.”96Andrea Marilyn Pragashini Immanuel, Did Shamima Begum Receive Her Due Process under International Law?, OpinioJuris (Apr. 13, 2021), https://opiniojuris.org/2021/04/13/did-shamima-begum-receive-her-due-process-under-international-law [https://perma.cc/V2DN-GLAW]. Other aspects of the due process under international law include that “there shall be no common interest between the parties and the judge”97Kotuby & Sobota, supra note 95, at 71. and that each party has a “reasonable opportunity of presenting [their] case . . . under conditions which do not place [them] at substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis [their] opponent.”98Kaufman v. Belgium, App. No. 10938/84, 50 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 98, 115 (1986). Importantly, as explored in Part III, another element of international due process is the “assurance that ‘the judiciary [is not] dominated by the political branches of government or by an opposing litigant . . . .’ ”99Charles T. Kotuby Jr., General Principles of Law, International Due Process, and Modern Role of Private International Law, 23 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 411, 427 (2013) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. § 482 cmt. b (1987)); see infra Part III. Charles T. Kotuby, Jr. and Luke Sobota, in General Principles of Law and International Due Process, outline the human rights conventions that affirm the obligation of sovereign nations to uphold the fundamental due process right of individuals:

The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR)—building upon the principles set forth in “the Charter of the Organization of American States, in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”—imposes upon States the obligation to “respect the rights and freedoms” it enshrines “without any discrimination.” Included is the “right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law.” The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms follows a similar pattern, providing . . . that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”100Kotuby & Sobota, supra note 95 , at 61.

Within the U.S., the intersection of extradition and due process is especially poignant under the rule of non-inquiry. Non-inquiry is the concept that the judiciary is not compelled to inquire into the adequacy of the foreign proceedings to ensure that the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction preceding the extradition request comport with “fundamental rights to due process”—this rule raises concerns about the judiciary’s role in complying with international due process requirements when responding to extradition requests from foreign jurisdictions.101Powers, supra note 4, at 314–16. But see Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 700–01 (2008) (“[I]t is for the political branches, not the judiciary, to assess practices in foreign countries . . . .”). In reviewing the procedures of the requesting country, the Ninth Circuit has said that it gives “credence to foreign proceedings” and that it declines “to rule on the procedural requirements of foreign law out of respect for other nations’ sovereignty.”102Sainez v. Venables, 588 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has understood the risk of “erroneous interpretation” of a foreign country’s legal system.103Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987). Courts generally see that the Secretary of State’s understanding of the treaty and of foreign criminal procedure should be considered as part of its considerations when interpreting a treaty document. This becomes especially important when questions regarding the foreign country’s political intentions for extraditing individuals are brought before the U.S. judiciary.

Relators often argue that the extradition proceedings lack due process even though the extradition process is not considered a full-fledged criminal trial.104See Sridej v. Blinken, No. 2:23-cv-00114, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117727 (D. Nev. July 10, 2023) (dismissing relators’ argument that the extradition process is an “unfair adversarial process” that violates due process). These complaints relate to the statutes of limitations of crimes committed in foreign countries, the discretion of the court to consider whether the requesting country might torture the relator, the admissibility of hearsay evidence in extradition proceedings, and other findings that the procedure owed to relators is inadequate.105See id.; Emami, 834 F.2d at 1446–47; Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2019); Powers, supra note 4; In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We hold that no standards of fair play and decency sufficient to trigger due process concerns are automatically implicated when, in undertaking its foreign policy mission, a governmental extradition decision subjects a citizen accused of committing crimes in a foreign jurisdiction to prosecution in the foreign state after a substantial time has elapsed since the commission of the crime.”); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012). However, relators have little redress when they argue that extradition proceedings are violative of due process, as the standard for finding a procedural defect in the process is high: this is due to the unique nature of an extradition proceeding as a proceeding akin to a preliminary hearing. The judiciary often finds that extradition processes should not be encumbered by more procedure.106See Sridej, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117727, at *17–19; Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 204. The judiciary has found that,

[S]o long as the United States has not breached a specific promise to an accused regarding his or her extradition, and bases its extradition decisions on diplomatic considerations without regard to such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or political beliefs, and in accordance with such other exceptional constitutional limits as may exist because of particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction, those decisions will not be disturbed.107In re Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, as the discretion to extradite lies with the executive branch, “[t]he judiciary has no authority to impose requirements on the decision-making process that go beyond the scope of what is required under the Constitution.”108Venckiene, 929 F.3d at 863–64 (7th Cir. 2019).

II. INTERPRETING THE “CHARGING DOCUMENT”

A.Overview of the Circuit Split

Part II of this Note explores the difference in treatment of the phrase the “charging document” which the U.S. has included in at least twenty-eight bilateral extradition treaties.109See the list of treaties, supra note 5, for a complete overview. Part I outlined the history and reasoning behind the different tools of interpretation courts utilize in interpreting extradition treaties, and the due process rights that relators are afforded in the extradition process. Part II will cover how these interpretation tools have been implemented by the judiciary in its treatment of extradition treaties that include “the charging document” requirement in 2023.

In 2023, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits were charged with interpreting the phrase “the charging document” in two bilateral extradition treaties: the Ninth Circuit analyzed a bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and Peru, and the Fourth Circuit analyzed a bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and Lithuania.110Vitkus v. Blinken, 79 F.4th 352 (4th Cir. 2023); Manrique v. Kolc, 65 F.4th 1037 (9th Cir. 2023). These cases, Vitkus v. Blinken and Manrique v. Kolc, involved foreign nationals residing in the U.S. who were wanted by foreign countries for crimes allegedly committed by the foreign nationals in their respective countries of nationality. Both cases rose to the federal circuit courts after the foreign nationals petitioned for stays and preliminary injunctions on their extradition requests. The relators in each case argued that they were not extraditable as the foreign countries did not provide “the charging document,” a document listed under the required documents section of the relevant extradition treaties that a requesting country must provide in its extradition request. The two courts diverged over how to interpret the phrase, or even whether there was a need to interpret the phrase and apply the default rule. The implications of this divergence will be explored in Part III of this Note.111Infra Part III.

B.Manrique v. Kolc

In 2023, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a petition filed by former president of Peru, Alejandro Toledo Manrique,112Individuals often have two last names in Latin America. When referred to by only one of the last names, the first of the two last names is used. Accordingly, this Note refers to Alejandro Toledo Manrique as Toledo. to stay Toledo’s extradition from the U.S. to Peru while appealing the denial of his petition for writ of habeas by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.113Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1040. Peruvian prosecutors sought to extradite Toledo to Peru from the United States after they alleged that Toledo had committed money laundering and collusion, specifically “taking $20 million in bribes from Odebrecht, a giant Brazilian construction company that has admitted to U.S. authorities that it bribed officials to win contracts throughout Latin America for decades.”114Olga R. Rodriguez, US Judge Orders Peru Ex-leader Detained for Extradition, AP News (Apr. 19, 2023, 2:16 PM) https://apnews.com/article/peru-expresident-extradition-court-aedb5ca6e502e505648944ebddea523d [https://perma.cc/U64Z-SU5L]; see Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1040. The Peruvian investigators had investigated or put on trial almost every living former president of Peru while conducting sweeping investigations of those who might have participated in the bribery with the Odebrecht company.115Rodriguez, supra note 114.

Peru brought the accusations against Toledo in “two Prosecutor’s Decisions, documents that summarize the ongoing investigation, and in an Acusación Fiscal, a document produced at the end of an investigation that lays out the crimes allegedly committed and supporting evidence.”116Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1040. After the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru approved an extradition request for Toledo, the Peruvian government filed an extradition request with the United States in 2018 and sent a supplemental request in August 2020.117Id.

In July 2019, a United States federal prosecutor filed a criminal complaint against Toledo, and two years later, a United States magistrate judge in the U.S District Court for the Northern District of California certified Toledo’s extradition.118Manrique v. O’Keefe, No. 21-CV-08395, 2022 WL 1212018, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2022); Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1040. Separately, Toledo filed suit in the D.C. District Court to enjoin the U.S. Department of State from extraditing him to Peru, claiming that his extradition was politically motivated and that the decision to extradite him violated due process because the Secretary of State “did not ‘disclose the unclassified bases for its decisions’ or ‘afford Dr. Toledo and his counsel an opportunity to rebut those bases in a full and fair exchange of views.’ ”119Toledo v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-627, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at *1, 6, 15–16 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2023) (quoting Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Toledo, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at ¶¶ 55, 59). The District Court rejected Toledo’s arguments and wrote that the Secretary of State’s decision to extradite Toledo was based on considerations of international law on political extradition and that Toledo had been afforded adequate due process in the proceedings prior to the Secretary of State’s decision to extradite Toledo.120Id. at *7–8, 24–25. Following multiple appeals, the Ninth Circuit heard Toledo’s appeal of the denial of his writ of habeas corpus in April 2023.121Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1040.

Toledo asserted that “he was not ‘charged with’ an extraditable offense because the extradition treaty requires a formal charge” and that “the ‘charging document’ Peru submitted was insufficient.”122Id. at 1041. In reviewing Toledo’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a holistic approach to Toledo’s assertions regarding the charging document requirement within the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty. First, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the purpose of the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty, noting that “Article I of the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty provides for extradition of ‘persons whom the authorities in the Requesting State have charged with, found guilty of, or sentenced for, the commission of an extraditable offense.’ ”123Id. (citing Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru, Peru-U.S., July 26, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 03-825). Next, the Ninth Circuit provided background on Peruvian criminal procedure:

[A] Peruvian criminal proceeding has three phases: (1) preliminary or investigative, (2) intermediate or examining, and (3) trial. First, during the investigative phase, a prosecutor examines the facts and presents allegations to a judge of the Preliminary Investigation Court. When the investigation ends, the prosecutor must decide whether to dismiss the case or to issue an Acusación Fiscal and then seek a formal charge. Once a formal charge is sought, the prosecutor cannot further investigate. Second, during the examining phase, a judge of the Preliminary Investigation Court holds a preliminary hearing, during which the accused may object and present exculpatory evidence. At the end of this hearing, if the judge believes a formal charge is warranted, the judge issues an Orden de Enjuiciamiento. Finally, if an Orden de Enjuiciamiento issues, the parties proceed to a trial presided over by the Criminal Judge or the President of the Collegiate Court.124Id. at 1041–42.

As Peru had issued an Acusación Fiscal in the corruption case against Toledo, the parties fought over “whether the accusations contained in the Acusación Fiscal suffice to ‘charge’ Toledo ‘with’ an extraditable offense under the Treaty.”125Id. at 1042. Toledo argued “that the United States-Peru treaty . . . requires ‘a copy of the charging document’ in addition to an arrest warrant.”126Id.; Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru art. VI(3), Peru-U.S., July 26, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 03-825. In rebutting Toledo’s assertion that a charging document was necessary and was not satisfied by the Acusación Fiscal, the U.S. government supported its argument by noting that the provision “charged with” elsewhere in the treaty was sufficient for the extraditing country to argue that a relator could be extradited without providing any specific document or official charge—therefore, the Acusación Fiscal satisfied the charging document.127Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1043.

The Ninth Circuit looked at the text of the treaty to determine the significance of the “charging document” provision within the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty in its entirety. The court found that the addition of “the charging document” was not necessary to find that Peru satisfied the requirements of the extradition treaty, finding support in Emami v. United States District Court for the Northern District and In re Assarsson. In both Emami and Assarsson, there was no “formal charge” listed in the U.S.-Sweden and U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany treaties to find that a relator might be extraditable, and as such, the requirement that there be “formal charges” in the foreign jurisdiction before the foreign country filed an extradition request was not a necessary requirement to find that the relators were extraditable.128Id. at 1042–43; Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1982). The court utilized these cases even though neither case dealt with a “charging document” requirement. In Toledo’s case, the court found that “the Treaty does not mention formal charges or the Orden de Enjuiciamiento anywhere. And the requirement of a ‘copy of the charging document’—which specifies no particular document—does not define the level of formality [they] should read into ‘charged with.’ ”129Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1043. The court found that such a reading would allow the Acusación Fiscal to be permitted as a “charging document” given that language elsewhere in the U.S.-Peru treaty equated “charged with” to “sought for prosecution,” and that the documents indicating an individual was “sought for prosecution” could encompass documents submitted before the Orden de Enjuiciamiento in Peruvian criminal proceedings—that is, the Acusación Fiscal—therefore satisfying the treaty’s requirements.130Id. at 1042.

The Ninth Circuit furthered its analysis, finding that if “the charging document” was ambiguous, then the treaty’s drafting history and judicial precedents would assist the court in determining how to interpret the provision. The court stated that “charged with” could be broadly interpreted to mean any warrant-backed accusation presented by the Peruvian or United States governments, essentially making “the charging document” requirement null.131Id. at 1043. The court looked to the Technical Analysis of the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty, which stated:

[T]he negotiating delegations intended that “charged” persons include those who are sought for prosecution for an extraditable offense based on an outstanding warrant of arrest, regardless of whether such warrant was issued pursuant to an indictment, complaint, information, affidavit, or other lawful means for initiating an arrest for prosecution under the laws in Peru or the United States.132Id. (citing S. Exec. Doc. No. 107-12, at 4 (2002), https://www.congress.gov/107/crpt/erpt12/CRPT-107erpt12.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCE7-74BX]).

The court further noted that “[their] rules of interpretation militate against reading in a requirement of particular formal charges where the treaty makes no such specification.”133Id. Critically, the Ninth Circuit applied the default rule of treaty interpretation to Toledo’s case. Utilizing support from Supreme Court precedents, the court found that it should defer to the government agencies who were charged with negotiating and enforcing the treaty, as “such a construction enlarges the rights of the signatories and respects the interpretations given by [the] Executive Branch and the Peruvian government.”134Id.; E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982). The court found that because the treaty does not require that the requesting country provide formal charges to satisfy the extradition treaty’s requirements when submitting an extradition request, the Acusación Fiscal was sufficient to satisfy “the charging document” mandate. Moreover, in analyzing Peruvian criminal procedure, the court found that the Acusación Fiscal was a “charging document” as it provided a plethora of evidence, serving “the important purpose in the Peruvian system of signaling the end of discovery and moving the case from the prosecutor’s office to a judge of the Preliminary Investigation Court.”135Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1043. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Manrique v. Kolc hints at a break from its “giving credence to foreign proceedings.” Sainez v. Venables, 588 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the court was unwilling to “analogize a Mexican arrest warrant to an American indictment,” as the Court believed it was “adhering to [its] established approach of giving credence to foreign proceedings. . . . [It has] declined to rule on the procedural requirements of foreign law out of respect for other nation’s sovereignty.”).

In summary, the Ninth Circuit found that “the charging document” was an ambiguous term; properly interpreting it required extrinsic evidence and consideration of the two sovereign countries’ rights. Accordingly, the court relied on the draft treaty provisions and the Peruvian government’s standards around criminal procedure to analogize the Acusación Fiscal to a document that would satisfy “the charging document” requirement of the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty. It did so under the standard default rule. Because the Treaty was meant to expand the rights of the parties involved (in this case, the United States and Peru) to encourage extradition and the Treaty did not specify what document was required to extradite Toledo under the “charging document” requirement, Acusación Fiscal could be construed to be the charging document. However, as mentioned earlier in this Note, the Ninth Circuit had historically found that this approach might be prone to error.136Sainez, 588 F.3d at 717.

Notably, as previously discussed, the Ninth Circuit utilized two cases regarding two treaties which did not include “the charging document” requirement to find that the Secretary of State had satisfied the requirements to extradite Toledo. By doing so, the court diminished the requirement that Peru provide a “charging document” when it found that the treaty had allowed for the extradition of individuals who were simply “charged with” extraditable offenses. Ultimately, this approach to “the charging document” requirement in the United States-Peru Extradition Treaty hints at the judiciary’s use of the default rule to ensure that the rights of sovereign nations are not infringed upon when they file an extradition request with the United States. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Toledo surrendered to be extradited to Peru in April 2023.137Peru Ex-Leader Toledo Surrenders to be Extradited from US, AP News (Apr. 21, 2023, 11:01 AM), https://apnews.com/article/peru-expresident-extradition-court-417bb6255a550ed01ddded474b3de47b [https://perma.cc/R2CR-UAEE].

C.Vitkus v. Blinken

In 2023, the Fourth Circuit heard an appeal of a denial of preliminary injunction brought by Darius Vitkus, a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania.138Vitkus v. Blinken, 79 F.4th 352, 352 (4th Cir. 2023). Vitkus sought to prevent Lithuania from extraditing him for crimes he allegedly committed in 2008 and 2009 by filing for preliminary injunctive relief and a petition for writ of habeas corpus.139Id. at 354–56. Vitkus owned a real estate business in Lithuania, and after it fell into bankruptcy proceedings, the Lithuanian authorities investigated him for various financial crimes between 2008 and 2010.140Id. at 355–56. Notably, following the Lithuanian authority’s summons for questioning, Vitkus testified “that the Lithuanian police officers tied him to a chair, beat him, deprived him of water . . . , burned him with cigarettes” and asked about his political activities.141Id.

Vitkus received three “Notification of Suspicion” documents during Lithuania’s criminal investigations, which all separately informed Vitkus that (1) he was a suspect in the Lithuanian authorities’ investigation of him, (2) he allegedly violated specific “Lithuanian code provisions,” and (3) he had engaged in “suspected criminal conduct.”142Id. at 356. After Vitkus left Lithuania, the Lithuanian authorities issued two orders of arrest for Vitkus.143Id. The Lithuanian prosecutors created a document called a “Decision to Recognize D. Vitkus as a Suspect,” which “described Vitkus’s suspected criminal conduct and identified the implicated provisions of the Lithuanian criminal code”—this was allegedly decided based on the evidence the Lithuanian prosecutor gathered.144Id. After moving to the United States, Vitkus applied for asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture given his treatment by the Lithuanian government, which the Board of Immigration Appeals certified.145Id. at 356–57.

In May 2015, the Lithuanian government requested that the United States extradite Vitkus to Lithuania, advising the Department of State that Vitkus was a suspect in a criminal investigation and “wanted for prosecution in Lithuania in connection” with the various criminal investigations.146Id. at 357. Lithuanian prosecutors provided supporting documents for their allegations against Vitkus that “summarized evidence gathered during the three investigations, along with copies of three orders for Vitkus’s arrest issued in connection with those investigations.”147Id. Lithuania provided three Notifications of Suspicion and two Suspect Decisions to the United States, which later became the subjects of debate in the Secretary of State’s argument for extraditing Vitkus.148Id.

In response to Lithuania’s request, “the Secretary of State filed an extradition complaint in the Southern District of Florida, where Vitkus was then residing,” and extradition proceedings commenced in the Southern District of Florida.149Id. During the proceeding, Vitkus argued that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decision did not “satisfy the charging document mandate” of the United States-Lithuania Extradition Treaty.150Id. at 357–58. Vitkus also utilized the evidence provided by a Lithuanian attorney “who testified that, under Lithuanian law, only one document—an ‘indictment’—can be a ‘charging document’ for purposes of the charging document mandate.”151Id. Additionally, in a footnote in the opinion, the Lithuanian attorney “testified that only an indictment could initiate a prosecution in Vitkus’s case.” Id. at n.5. The extradition court found that “deference was warranted to the Treaty interpretation of the Secretary of State and supported by Lithuania” and “ruled that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions ‘are sufficient to meet the requirements of’ the charging document mandate.”152Id. at 358. The court analyzed the extradition treaty between Lithuania and the United States, and utilized the executive branch’s argument to deny Vitkus’s argument that Lithuania did not comply with “the charging document” requirement of the extradition treaty:

The Secretary argued that the only purpose of the charging document mandate is to identify the charges for which Lithuania seeks to extradite Vitkus, and that the mandate does not require the initiation of any criminal charges. According to the Secretary, the charging document mandate is satisfied by the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions. The Secretary supported that position with an affidavit of an attorney at the Department of State . . . and with a letter from a Lithuanian official called the Prosecutor General . . . . The State Department Affidavit averred that the Notifications of Suspicion and the Suspect Decisions are sufficient to satisfy the charging document mandate. And the Prosecutor General Letter maintained that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions ‘would be the equivalent of the charging documents referred to in’ the charging document mandate. The Letter also asserted that the proof required to identify a person as a suspect—and thus issue a Notification of Suspicion or Suspect Decision—‘should not be of the same level as necessary to substantiate the judgment of conviction or bringing charges (this occurs at a later stage of the criminal proceedings).’ ”153Id.

In a separate procedure following his transfer to Virginia, Vitkus filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the Eastern District of Virginia. The court rejected Vitkus’s charging document argument, as it stated “that it gave ‘great weight’ to the Treaty interpretation presented by the Secretary of State,” and found that, along with the affidavits provided by the State Department and Prosecutor, the charging document mandate “can be satisfied by a document identifying ‘the violations of Lithuanian law that form the basis of Mr. Vitkus’s extradition, and . . . describ[ing] the facts underlying those alleged violations.’ ”154Id. at 360 (alteration in the original).

The Eastern District of Virginia summarized the Secretary of State’s argument in support of Vitkus’s extradition:

Lithuania has complied with the charging document mandate. Similar to Vitkus, the Secretary maintains that the language of the charging document mandate is plain and unambiguous. The Secretary maintains, however, that the charging document mandate does not require production of any particular type of charging document, and that it does not demand production of an indictment or something similar. According to the Secretary, the charging document mandate only requires the Requesting State to produce documents that sufficiently detail the alleged criminal violations and conduct, such as the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions. The Secretary argues that the federal courts have consistently interpreted other treaties made by the United States to allow for extradition of persons who have not actually been criminally charged. Finally, the Secretary insists that, if the relevant text of the Treaty is ambiguous, his proposed construction thereof—that the charging document mandate requires only a document detailing suspected criminal conduct—adheres to the Treaty’s requirements and is entitled to deference.155Id. at 361.

The Fourth Circuit overturned the Eastern District of Virginia’s judgment. The majority of the Fourth Circuit found that “the Secretary’s construction of the charging document mandate does not ‘follow from the clear Treaty language’ ” and, therefore, the district court erred in utilizing it in its decision to reject Vitkus’s petition for a preliminary injunction.156Id. at 362. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first looked to the text of the treaty, finding that “if the [treaty’s] textual meaning is plain and cannot reasonably bear the government’s construction, then [the court] must reject that construction.”157Id. (citing Aguasvivas v. Pompeo, 984 F.3d 1047, 1058 (1st Cir. 2021)). The court looked to Article 8 § 3 of the Treaty, which requires that the Requesting State produce “a copy of the charging document.”158Id. at 363; Protocol on the Application of the Agreement on Extradition Between the United States of America and the European Union to the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Lith.-U.S., art. 8, June 15, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.14. The Fourth Circuit noted that the “Secretary of State is not entitled to extradite Vitkus unless Lithuania first produces . . . a copy of ‘the charging document.’ ”159Vitkus, 79 F.4th at 363. Looking at the grammatical structure of the phrase “the charging document,” the court found that the treaty required a “discrete document that initiates criminal charges” and that “the charging document mandate is plain and unambiguous, and it cannot be fulfilled by some document (or set of documents) that fails to perform the charging function—even if it or they contain similar information to ‘the charging document.’ ”160Id.

Moreover, the court utilized extrinsic evidence and looked to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to analyze the “charging document” requirement in the treaty between the United States and Lithuania and analogize documents that the Lithuanian prosecutors produced in their investigation of Vitkus to relevant documents in U.S. criminal procedure.161Id. at 363–64. The Fourth Circuit found that the charging document mandate required that a requesting country produce a document “that performs the same function as an indictment, information, or complaint” in the United States.162Id. at 364. The court found that the documents that the Lithuanian government produced were akin to the “subject letters” and “target letters” which are used by federal prosecutors in the United States to inform individuals that they “are either a ‘subject’ or a ‘target’ of a federal criminal investigation.”163Id. The Fourth Circuit summarized their findings on the matter by stating:

Critically, those identified as federal “subjects” and “targets” of criminal investigations have not been charged—unless and until they become defendants by virtue of an indictment, an information, or a complaint. The Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions relied on by the Secretary of State did not initiate criminal charges against Vitkus. They simply characterize him as a suspect, and thus do not satisfy the plain and unambiguous language of the Treaty’s charging document mandate.164Id.

The court also relied on the evidence provided by the Lithuanian attorney supporting this argument, noting that the documents provided by the Lithuanian government “remain in a pretrial investigation stage” and that there is a difference “between the sufficiency of evidence needed to confer the status of ‘suspect’ and that needed to ‘bring[] charges,’ which ‘occurs at a later stage of the criminal proceedings.’ ”165Id. at 365 (alteration in the original). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the Secretary of State’s argument that the United States had extradited individuals who had not been formally charged in the requesting country prior to the extradition request.166Id. The Fourth Circuit compared the United States-Lithuania treaty to other treaties which show either the absence of “the charging document” requirement—in a form of expressio unius interpretation—or contain the requirement that requesting countries produce “a copy of the charging document, if any” to indicate the importance of a specific charging document in extradition proceedings between Lithuania and the United States.167Id. at 365–66. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit found that the inclusion of the charging document requirement was intentional, and that “the Treaty language agreed to by the parties must be adhered to and carry the day.”168Id. at 366. The Fourth Circuit stated that Lithuania could not proceed with the extradition without producing the charging document, as Lithuania “cannot produce ‘the charging document’ when no criminal charges have been filed.”169Id.

The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “the charging document mandate ‘makes no difference’ ” given its arguments regarding the grammatical structure of the phrase, the evidence provided by both parties, and the text of the treaty.170Id. The Fourth Circuit also denied the Secretary of State’s interpretation of the treaty, arguing that as the charging document mandate was clear and unambiguous, the court “do[es] not owe deference to the Secretary.”171Id. at 367. In doing so, it found that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions produced by the Lithuanian prosecutors did not initiate criminal charges against Vitkus and were insufficient to satisfy the extradition treaty’s requirements.

Judge Quattlebaum, writing the dissenting opinion in Vitkus v. Blinken, highlighted the majority’s unwillingness to utilize the default rule. Judge Quattlebaum noted that “the district court’s decision to side with the Secretary’s interpretation over Vitkus’ faithfully applies Supreme Court precedent requiring deference to the Secretary.”172Id. at 369 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting). Judge Quattlebaum found that “the Secretary produced evidence supporting a broader interpretation of [the charging document] in the context of an international extradition treaty,” by providing context regarding the nature of the Lithuanian prosecutor’s documents in support of its extradition of Vitkus to Lithuania.173Id. Judge Quattlebaum also appeared to be persuaded by an affidavit written by a State Department attorney, who noted that the treaty between Lithuania and United States includes provisions for extraditing individuals who are “sought for prosecution,” and “that a formal indictment cannot be sought under Lithuanian law until the prosecution receives Vitkus’ position on the notification of suspicion documents.”174Id. at 370–71.

Judge Quattlebaum found both the Secretary’s interpretation of the treaty and Vitkus’s interpretation of the treaty plausible.175Id. at 371. He found that within the extradition treaty between the United States and Lithuania,

Article 8, the section setting forth the required documentation that must accompany an extradition request, refers to individuals ‘sought for prosecution.’ [W]hile . . . ‘charged with’ may suggest a formal charge, ‘sought for prosecution’ is broader. It could also be plausibly read . . . to include persons wanted for prosecution by Lithuania, such as Vitkus, who are wanted to stand trial for specific crimes, but for whom a formal charging document akin to the ones used in the United States may not have been issued.176Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted).

In stating that the Secretary’s argument was plausible, Judge Quattlebaum utilized the default rule to argue that the judiciary should defer to the executive branch’s interpretation of a treaty when two possible interpretations are apparent.177Id. at 369. Judge Quattlebaum found that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Manrique v. Kolc was persuasive, given that the Ninth Circuit similarly analyzed “the charging mandate” within the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru, and that Vitkus presented the same argument that Toledo presented to the Ninth Circuit.178Id. at 372–73. Judge Quattlebaum noted that the court denied Toledo’s argument, as the treaty between Peru and the United States did not have explicit language mentioning “formal charges or the Orden de Enjuiciamiento,” and that the court “noted that documents submitted by Peru sufficiently identified the crimes that the petitioner was accused of and summarized the supporting evidence.”179Id. at 372. Judge Quattlebaum also found the court’s deference to the executive branch indicative of how the treaty between Lithuania and the United States should be interpreted.180Id. at 372–73. Finally, in concluding, Judge Quattlebaum stated, “the Secretary’s view that documents submitted by Lithuania satisfy the treaty’s charging document requirement is, at the very least plausible. When that is the case, we must defer to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of treaties that it has been charged with negotiating and enforcing.”181Id. at 373.

Given the discrepancy between the foreign criminal court procedures in Peru and Lithuania, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would have found that Peru satisfied the requirements of its extradition request. However, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion sheds light on the relationship between the executive and judiciary branches in extradition proceedings: it is apparent that the Secretary of State’s influence on extradition is substantial, especially when the judiciary analyzes treaty agreements. When the court in Vitkus v. Blinken acknowledged the default rule, it noted the competing interests at stake in Lithuania’s extradition request, namely the executive’s interest in maintaining foreign relations and the public’s interest “in seeing its governmental institutions follow the law.”182Id. at 368 (citing Roe v. Dep’t of Def., 947 F.3d 207, 230–31 (4th Cir. 2020)). Nevertheless, by determining that the “charging document” lacked the requisite ambiguity to apply the default rule, and accordingly, finding the executive’s interest did not outweigh the public’s interest in seeing the government follow the law, the Fourth Circuit upheld Vitkus’s fundamental due process rights by following the procedures outlined in the treaty as written and ensuring that the extradition proceeding was fair. The Fourth Circuit’s decision and its implications will be explored further in Part III.

III.  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DUE PROCESS

A.Due Process and Treaty Interpretation

Although not directly stated in the circuit courts’ opinions, the analyses of the Lithuania-United States and Peru-United States extradition treaties shed light on the due process rights afforded to relators in the United States. The constitutional rights of relators, vested in them by their presence in the United States, are at odds with the executive branch’s responsibility to uphold relations between the United States and foreign nations.183See supra Part I. The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “the charging document” upheld Vitkus’s due process rights—the Fourth Circuit deferred to the plain language of the treaty, and finding the executive branch’s argument unpersuasive, ensured that the executive’s influence did not overshadow the judiciary’s role in the extradition process.

Legal scholars have analyzed the intersection of due process and the extradition process, focusing on the rule of non-inquiry, the possibility of double jeopardy, the rule of specialty, and hearsay exceptions. Additionally, due process concerns intersect with the appropriateness of a court’s use of the default rule to interpret provisions of extradition treaties because broadening of the rights of the nations who sign extradition treaties affects the liberty of a person sought for extradition.184See Rivera, Probable Cause and Due Process, supra note 75, at 159.

International due process encompasses “the assurance that ‘the judiciary [is not] dominated by the political branches of government,’ ”185Kotuby, supra note 99, at 427 (2013) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. § 482 cmt. b (1987)). and implicitly in accordance with this principle, the Fourth Circuit limited the executive’s political objective by enforcing its statutorily granted power to deny extradition. Powerless to change the structure of the United States-Lithuania treaty, the Fourth Circuit, in its decision in Vitkus v. Blinken, highlights not only the importance of specificity in extradition treaties but also the risk of harming an individual’s fundamental right to due process by giving undue deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of extradition treaties.

The default rule of treaty interpretation, as addressed in Part I of this Note, has been criticized by scholars for being outdated: it was formed before human rights concerns of relators were properly addressed by courts in considering whether to certify the relators’ extradition to the requesting country.186Supra Part I; see Rivera, Interpreting Extradition Treaties, supra note 17, at 202. The judiciary implemented the default rule at a time when human beings were not subjects of international law—when the Supreme Court issued its Laubenheimer decision in 1933, sovereign countries, not individuals, were considered the beneficiaries of rights that flowed from treaties.187See Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law 26 (2011); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1999, 2001 (2003) (“The nature of treatymaking . . . has changed, moving in a direction that should systematically protect against the diminishment of rights. Where international law was once blind to individuals as such, today we find an increasingly consequential umbrella of individual rights protections in the form of international human rights norms. . . . Where states were once free to bargain away individual rights . . . they now must account for them under other treaty and nontreaty norms.”). The default rule upheld the sovereign signatories’ right to extradite individuals wanted for prosecution, and continues to be upheld in some form by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.188See supra note 54. The default rule continues to exert influence over the extradition interpretation process even as the human rights of relators have become a prominent and important consideration in the extradition process.189Parlett, supra note 187, at 36–37.

The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of Peruvian criminal procedure and the deference it afforded the United States executive branch bring to light the potential risks of applying the default rule. The court in Manrique v. Kolc considered the evidence provided by both the Peruvian prosecutors and the State Department to understand “the charging document” requirement in the Peru-United States Extradition Treaty, and in doing so, the court contextualized the requirements of the treaty.190Manrique v. Kolc, 65 F.4th 1037, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2023). This analysis favored the Secretary of State’s interpretation—as noted previously, extradition proceedings are distinct from criminal trials, and the judiciary may be comfortable with some bias in a proceeding that does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.191United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 113 (1852)). However, the court’s deference to the Secretary of State’s interpretation of the “charging document” could be read as the court’s inclination to uphold foreign relations with Peru at the potential expense of Toledo’s liberty rights. As the court acknowledged, the risk of misinterpreting the requirements of the treaty was great: Toledo would be sent to Peru to face trial and be imprisoned, and his ability to file a habeas petition would be nullified by his presence in the Peruvian criminal justice system.192Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1041.

Vitkus v. Blinken implicitly renounces the traditional application of the default rule: the Fourth Circuit alludes to the pressure the executive branch places on the judiciary to comply with the Secretary of States’s understanding of a provision of a treaty—especially when the judiciary finds that the provision in question is clear and unambiguous.193Vitkus v. Blinken, 79 F.4th 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he Secretary of State maintains that we are obliged to defer to his interpretation of the Treaty, even if we would not adopt that construction de novo.”). In finding that “the charging document” mandate was clear and unambiguous in its requirement that a discrete document was to be produced by the Lithuanian government, the Fourth Circuit protected Vitkus from a questionable extradition request when it found that the treaty required that the requesting country produce a specific document charging him with a crime. By doing so, the Fourth Circuit found clarity in the procedural requirements established in the extradition treaty and potentially upheld Vitkus’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. However, it is important to note that should the majority of the Fourth Circuit have found that “the charging document” requirement was an ambiguous provision in the treaty, then there would have been a possibility that the court would have applied the default rule.

The Fourth Circuit also implicitly respected principles of international law on due process by ensuring that the political branch did not dominate the proceeding by compelling the court to recognize its interpretation of “the charging document” requirement.194Kotuby, supra note 99, at 427 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. § 482 cmt. b (1987)). International due process requires that trials are “fair” and are not “dominated” by the political branch.195See id.; Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 2, 54 (“[S]tates have protected human rights by giving legal rights to individuals, entitling them to certain legal rights and placing limitations on the powers of the respective states” and “if the breach [of an extradition treaty by a party] is of an internationally protected right, or the result of lack of fairness or good faith by the parties in the application of rights stipulated in favor of third parties, or conceded to individuals as third-party beneficiaries under the particular treaty, then there is a violation of international law.”); Powers, supra note 4, at 415–16. However, as discussed previously, extradition proceedings are not trials, and a challenge against an extradition proceeding for being “unfair” was notably discounted by a Nevada District Court in 2023 in Sridej v. Blinken, in which the court referenced two cases from the 19th and early 20th centuries to note that the extradition procedure did not require the formalities of other judicial proceedings.196See Sridej v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-00114, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117727, at *18 (D. Nev. July 10, 2023) (“Extradition proceedings are neither criminal trials nor full blown civil actions; they are administrative in character, and . . . are not burdened with legalism and formalities with which American courts are familiar.” (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903) and In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1853))). This case also underscores contemporary federal judiciary’s deference to understandings of international law codified before the duties of upholding international due process became binding on the American judiciary. Accordingly, although Vitkus might have been able to raise that the executive branch’s interpretation of “the charging document” would not be “fair,” it would be unlikely to be held as a viable argument against the certification of his extradition by the judiciary.

The interpretive dissonance surrounding “the charging document” requirement could be remedied by diminishing deference to the executive branch in treaty interpretation: the judiciary is tasked with interpretation in the extradition process specifically because its legal acumen regarding interpretation is more developed than the executive branch’s legal acumen. By not affording as much deference to the Secretary of State’s interpretation of “the charging document” as the Ninth Circuit had afforded, the Fourth Circuit’s approach to interpreting the U.S.-Lithuania treaty was more consistent with its obligations under international law: it sought to provide a fair hearing to Vitkus and did not near the point of acting “at the whim” of the executive branch.

Another consideration for remedying this tension between the judiciary and executive branch, with some limitations, would be to include more specific language in bilateral extradition treaties regarding a sovereign nation’s criminal procedure. Although, as stated in Part I of this Note, the judiciary has no authority to alter bilateral extradition treaties that the United States executes with foreign governments, Vitkus v. Blinken exemplifies the kind of case that could incentivize the executive branch to negotiate extradition treaties that have specific language relevant to the parties’ criminal procedures. By doing so, the U.S. and a sovereign signatory to a bilateral extradition treaty could prevent interpretive friction in the United States judiciary and allow for more expeditious extradition processing. Specifying the documents that better ascertain the level of probable cause established in a foreign proceeding could not only protect relators from extradition that invades their constitutional and international human rights but also the judiciary from breaching rules of non-inquiry and incorrectly interpreting a foreign country’s criminal procedure.197The court in Manrique v. Kolc deliberated over whether an Acusación Fiscal or an Orden de Enjuiciamento satisfied “the charging document” requirement, opening a pandora’s box of issues regarding the court’s review of foreign criminal procedure. Manrique v. Kolc, 65 F.4th 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The parties dispute whether the accusations contained in the Acusación Final suffice to ‘charge[]’ Toledo ‘with’ an extraditable offense under the Treaty. The United States claims it does. Toledo argues that the Treaty requires an Orden de Enjuiciamiento before extradition.”). See In re Application for an Ord. for Jud. Assistance in a Foreign Proc. in the Lab. Ct. of Brazil, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“American courts should treat foreign law the way American courts want foreign courts to treat American law: avoid determining foreign law whenever possible.”); In re Bravo, No. 19-23851, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177916, at *40–41 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2023) (“[A] foreign government should not be required to prove to a U.S. judge that it is properly construing its own laws.”). However, this would not be a salve to the protection of international human rights of relators: a country without an independent judiciary could likely still satisfy the document requirement even if it were specified, and the risk of violating a relators’ due process rights might still be an issue, albeit in a different form than the one at issue in this Note.

B.Relevant Background

The two circuit opinions may also differ for reasons not explicitly stated by the published decisions. Although Toledo raised the possibility of maltreatment and suffering while awaiting trial in a Peruvian prison, his argument failed to trigger a humanitarian concern by the court.198Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1041 (“Toledo has explained that he could be detained in Peru up to three years pending formal charges and that the conditions in Peruvian prisons are dire. Given his advanced age and preexisting health conditions, Toledo risks contracting a fatal illness or experiencing other serious health declines.”); Toledo v. United States Dep’t of State, No. 23-627 (BAH), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53048, at *7–8 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2023). Notably, courts in the United States may disavow the rule of non-inquiry should the relator raise the possibility of meeting human rights abuses by the requesting state in the event the extradition court certifies extradition—Toledo’s argument regarding his ill health does not align with the circumstances the court considers in extradition.199Powers, supra note 4, at 315 (“The United States has recognized that, in some circumstances, it has an obligation to inquire into the treatment which an individual will receive if transferred to another nation.”). Powers notes that as the United States ratified the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, extradition cannot be completed by the requested country if the requested party has “substantial grounds for believing: (a) That the request [for extradition] has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion . . . .” Id. (quoting International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 9, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. I-21931). On the other hand, Vitkus’s testimony about his arrest in Lithuania does support a contention that he could be tortured should the U.S. certify Lithuania’s extradition request, given that while applying for asylum, the “Board of Immigration Appeals (the ‘BIA’) found in 2014 that Vitkus’s ‘credible testimony established that he was beaten, burned, and nearly asphyxiated by [Lithuanian] police officers, who inquired into his contributions to a political party.”200Vitkus v. Blinken, 79 F.4th 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2023) (alteration in the original). The findings of the Board of Immigration Appeals did not preclude the extradition court from certifying Vitkus for extradition.201Id. at 358 n.6. Vitkus’s torture in Lithuania—allegedly related to his political involvement in Lithuania with a political group called “the Russia party”202Id. at 355.—may have implicitly prompted the court to consider that the Lithuanian criminal proceedings would violate Vitkus’s human rights upon returning to Lithuania. This concern might have informed the Fourth Circuit’s view that “the charging document” requirement was a clear and unambiguous requirement that Lithuania provide a discrete charging document.

C.Foreign relations and the interpretation of “the Charging Document” requirement

The United States uses extradition treaties to prevent U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens alike from utilizing the United States as a safe haven when they have committed crimes on foreign soil, and are tools used by the United States to uphold its relationships with foreign countries.203Emily Edmonds-Poli & David Shirk, Extradition as a Tool for International Cooperation: Lessons from the U.S.-Mexico Relationship, 33 Md. J. Int’l L. 215, 217 (2018) (“[C]ountries are expected to abide by a treaty’s established terms because failing to do so could undermine the prospect of future extraditions or cooperation in other areas of the international relationship.”). The default rule of treaty interpretation supports the executive branch’s role of upholding its treaty obligations as the governmental body responsible for foreign relations. Extradition treaties are entered into by the executive branch in its process of conducting foreign relations, creating international agreements regarding extradition unifies countries in a common, collaborative law enforcement apparatus.204Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“By virtue of wielding the power to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, and recognize foreign governments, all part of the President’s extensive power to conduct foreign relations, the President is necessarily entrusted by the structure of the Constitution with the power to determine who makes a proper treaty partner.”). In Wang v. Masaitis, the petitioner argued that the Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2) did not include agreements made between the United States and Hong Kong, which is a non-sovereign state. Id. at 993–94. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument in finding that “the United States’ history of treaties with nonsovereign Indian nations fills in the silence of the Treaty Clause and the extradition statute with respect to the term ‘treaty.’ ” Id. at 999. In rejecting the court’s reasoning to justify the constitutionality of the treaty, the dissent noted that the “question of whether Hong Kong is a constitutionally cognizable treaty partner is committed to the political branches because it is inextricably linked to the President’s broad authority in the field of foreign relations.” Id. at 1001. There are many reasons for entering into a collaborative law enforcement apparatus, including “ensuring that fugitive criminals do not go unpunished for their alleged crimes, discouraging crime throughout the world, and protecting nations from fugitive criminals by eliminating the possibility of safe havens for fugitive criminals.”205David L. Gappa, Note, European Court of Human Rights – Extradition – Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (SER. A) (1989), 20 Ga. J. Int’l & Compar. L. 463, 479 n.121 (1990). Allowing countries to extradite individuals strengthens the relationship between the two countries, while not cooperating with an extradition request, especially when issues regarding erroneous treaty interpretation arise, hampers international relations between the countries.206Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, supra note 203, at 217 (“[C]ountries are expected to abide by a treaty’s establish terms because failing to do so could undermine the prospect of future extraditions or cooperation in other areas of the international relationship.”); see Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 174 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Extradition proceedings are grounded in principles of international comity, which would be ill-served by requiring foreign governments to submit their purposes and procedures to the scrutiny of United States courts.”); Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he public interest will be served by the United States complying with a valid extradition application . . . . Such proper compliance promotes relations between the two countries, and enhances efforts to establish an international rule of law and order.”). When considering the factors for staying a pending appeal (“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; “and (4) where the public interest lies”),207Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). courts have noted that noncompliance with extradition requests diminishes the “force” of extradition treaties, and that “[i]f other countries lose confidence that the United States will abide by its treaties, the United States risks losing the ability to obtain the extraditions of people who commit crimes here and flee to other countries.”208Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 865 (7th Cir. 2019). This may be the reason why the Secretary of State, who ultimately decides whether to proceed with an extradition request once the court certifies a relator for extradition, does not often refuse to surrender those sought by a foreign country for prosecution.209Parry, supra note 16, at 96 (“The Secretary of State is ‘the ultimate decisionmaker’ and has discretion to refuse surrender. In practice, however, the Secretary rarely exercises his discretion, perhaps because the needs of diplomacy outweigh the concerns of individuals who may have committed crimes.”).

In denying Lithuania’s extradition request, the Fourth Circuit may have chipped at the United States’ relationship with the Lithuanian government by rejecting the default rule.210See Venckiene, 929 F.3d at 865. Although the U.S. government does not rescind the entire extradition treaty when the requestor country fails to extradite an individual, failing to extradite prohibits the flow of criminals between countries, and can encourage the impression that the U.S. can be held as a safe haven for criminals.211Gappa, supra note 205, at 479 n.121. Moreover, international comity would be ill-served by the uncertainty a requesting country may face when summoning an individual from the United States, should the relevant treaty have a “charging document” requirement.

CONCLUSION

As the two circuit court opinions in 2023 demonstrate, the default rule of treaty interpretation continues to influence the judiciary’s role in determining whether to certify a foreign nation’s extradition request. In the Ninth Circuit opinion in Manrique v. Kolc, the court was partial to the Secretary of State’s interpretation of “the charging document” requirement in its extradition of Toledo—the court found the “charging document” requirement to be relatively inconsequential in finding that the Peruvian government had satisfied its extradition request by providing an Acusación Fiscal. However, in Vitkus v. Blinken, the court was more dubious of the Secretary of State’s interpretation of the treaty and disagreed that the documents that the Lithuanian government had provided to extradite Vitkus satisfied the requirements listed in the U.S.-Lithuania Extradition Treaty.

By continuing to find opportunities to utilize the default rule in interpreting extradition treaties, the judiciary is more likely to impinge on the constitutional due process rights of relators in an effort to appease the executive’s concern with maintaining foreign relations with sovereign countries.212See Powers, supra note 4, at 320 (“In the United States we have developed strong constitutionally based protections for those accused of crimes, and those norms should not be unquestioningly transgressed because of foreign-policy concerns. Instead, notions of due process and fundamental fairness should always guide the court.”). The divergence in interpretation of “the charging document” highlights the possibility of two diametrically opposite outcomes for those who face extradition, with important implications: the removal of an individual from the United States to a requesting country, and therefore, the removal of the constitutional rights afforded to them when they are physically in the United States. Vitkus v. Blinken, in acknowledging the default rule, noted that although there is a legitimate public interest in extraditing criminals to the countries that request them, the executive’s obligations to follow the law should not be outweighed by its duty to maintain foreign relations; doing so honors the procedural safeguards written into a treaty.

The judiciary’s continued use of the default rule is in tension with the development of international human rights. Manrique v. Kolc embodies the risk to internationally recognized due process rights when courts cite to the default rule of treaty interpretation: the court in Manrique appeared to interpret “the charging document” to conciliate the executive branch. Toledo is not the only relator who has argued that the extradition process did not comport with due process: relators have raised arguments about various components of the extradition process that violate fundamental due process rights. As precedents almost require that the judiciary does not consider these arguments, the judiciary should gradually reduce the weight of the default rule of treaty interpretation so that extradition proceedings align more closely with the fairness and juridical equality requirements of the fundamental human right to due process.

Because the United States is a party to at least twenty-eight bilateral extradition treaties that contain “the charging document” requirement, arguments as to its ambiguity will likely arise again. Accordingly, to better uphold the due process rights of relators, courts should defer to the executive branch and the plain text of the relevant extradition treaty proportionally to ensure that decisions are in line with customary international law on due process. By critically analyzing the default rule, the courts will be better equipped to uphold their obligations to the rights of relators: rights granted by the Constitution and by international law on the fundamental right to due process.

98 S. Cal. L. Rev. 761

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* Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 98; J.D. Candidate 2025, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. 2017, Science in Society Program, Wesleyan University. All views and conclusions expressed in this Note are solely my own and do not express the opinions or positions of my employer. Many thanks to Professor Marcela Prieto for her invaluable guidance throughout the drafting process. I also want to thank the talented Southern California Law Review staff and editors for their work throughout the publication process.