Fiduciary Loyalty, Inside and Out – Article by Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib

From Volume 92, Number 1 (November 2018)
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Fiduciary Loyalty, Inside and Out

Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib[*]

Introduction

A fiduciary is someone with a certain form of discretion, power, or authority over the legal and practical interests of a beneficiary.[1] As a result of this arrangement, the beneficiary is vulnerable to predation by the fiduciary. Fiduciary relationships trigger a suite of duties, at the core of which is the duty of loyalty. In a sense, the fiduciary relationship is oriented around the possibilities of trust and betrayal. One point of fiduciary duties is to prevent betrayal or, failing that, to assure that betrayals are rectified insofar as possible. What constitutes loyalty or betrayal in fiduciary law, however, is not always clear.

Consider Item Software (UK) Ltd. v. Fassihi.[2] Messrs Fassihi and Dehghani were corporate directors of a small software distribution company called Item Software, whose main business was selling software developed by Isograph. Dehghani was the managing director, and Fassihi was the sales marketing director. In November 1998, Dehghani decided to renegotiate the terms on which Item sold Isograph’s products. Fassihi urged Dehghani to drive a hard bargain with Isograph, so Deghani negotiated aggressively. Ultimately, the negotiations between Item and Isograph broke down, and Isograph terminated its contract with Item.

Fassihi’s advice to Dehghani, although plausibly in Item’s best interest, had the air of duplicity. Unbeknownst to Dehghani, during the negotiations Fassihi had approached Isograph with a proposal to establish an independent company to market Isograph’s products. At the same time Fassihi counseled Dehghani to engage in brinksmanship, he also urged Isograph to terminate its relationship with Item. In a subsequent lawsuit, Item alleged that Fassihi only urged Dehghani to negotiate aggressively in order to increase the prospects of undermining the negotiations and subsequently obtaining Isograph’s business for himself.

Was Fassihi disloyal? The answer, of course, depends on what loyalty means. It seems clear that Fassihi was disloyal to his partner in the ordinary sense of that term. Fassihi’s conduct bears a striking resemblance to that of Iago in Shakespeare’s Othello and of Littlefinger in George R.R. Martin’s A Song of Ice and Fire novels, arguably the preeminent historical and contemporary literary examples of treachery. Yet as a legal matter, whether Fassihi violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty is not as obvious. This discrepancy might be explained on the grounds that the notion of loyalty applicable in life (let alone Elizabethan tragedy and genre fiction) differs from the standard that leads to legal liability against fiduciaries like corporate directors, trustees, and attorneys.

Cases like Fassihi implicate a lively scholarly debate concerning how the legal notion of loyalty relates to the notion applicable outside the law. Although the terms of this debate are not always clear, some see a deep connection between the legal and non-legal notions of loyalty. Call this position “moralism.” For the moralist, this connection to the moral or ordinary notion of loyalty informs the legal requirements that apply to fiduciaries, as well as the determination of whether a fiduciary has violated duties to a beneficiary in any particular case. By contrast, a position we can call “amoralism” denies that there is any meaningful connection between the loyalty that applies to fiduciaries and its moral counterpart. To be sure, the amoralist does not (and cannot) deny that judges sometimes invoke moralized language to describe fiduciary concepts. However, for the amoralist, any such connection is rhetorical flourish rather than real law. We more fully describe the parameters of the debate between moralists and amoralists in Part I.

The debate between moralists and amoralists is a species of a much broader dispute about the comparative importance of legal materials and broader normative principles in theorizing the private law. Consider the connections between the morality of promise and the law of contract, or the role the concepts of “wrong” and “duty” play in tort law. Much private law litigation and scholarship concerns whether legal concepts resemble and operationalize concepts from ordinary morality. Within fiduciary law, this debate about loyalty has particularly important practical implications, since it bears on how to elaborate standards in areas where fiduciary norms already apply and on whether fiduciary norms should apply to a particular legal domain in the first place.

The debate between moralists and amoralists is long running and perhaps intractable. We propose to finesse, if not resolve, this impasse by focusing on what we term the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty. On this view, whether someone satisfies the requirements of fiduciary loyalty depends, at least in part, on how she deliberates and how her deliberation is connected with her actions. Fiduciary loyalty also imposes demands on a person’s commitments: a fiduciary does not satisfy her duty of loyalty toward a person or cause if her commitments to that person or cause prove themselves too flimsy. These standards apply to loyalty both inside and outside of law. For the most part, they apply irrespective of whether the best understanding of fiduciary loyalty is moralist or amoralist. We elaborate and defend these claims in Part II, drawing on doctrines in corporate law, trust law, agency law, bankruptcy law, and the law governing lawyers that are, we argue, best explained by the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty.

Part III then clarifies our conclusions regarding cognitivism and fiduciary loyalty, highlighting some of the implications of our analysis for fiduciary law. Cognitivist accounts can catalyze both doctrinal and policy innovations. Regardless of whether loyalty has an identical meaning inside and outside of legal institutions, fiduciary loyalty, like ordinary loyalty, imposes important standards on a fiduciary’s cognition. Appreciating this structural feature of loyalty will enable judges and scholars to transcend many debates about moralism and to resolve practical questions that do not turn on whether moralism is true.

I.  Loyalty In Law

What is the best way to understand the fiduciary duty of loyalty? Is the loyalty demanded of fiduciaries identical to or deeply connected with the notion of loyalty applicable in the real world? Or is fiduciary loyalty a purely juridical concept, one with no important connection to the concept as it applies outside the law? Sections I.A and I.B describe an ongoing debate between two positions that can (somewhat misleadingly) be called “moralism” and “amoralism.” Section I.C explains why breaking the impasse between moralism and amoralism is especially difficult and identifies some practical consequences of this stalemate.

A.  Moralism” About Fiduciary Loyalty

The moralist position is that fiduciary loyalty references the notion of loyalty that applies outside of legal institutions.[3] A moralist view need not contend that the legal and non-legal conceptions of loyalty are identical, only that they have some deep connection. Moralism appears in debates about the nature of fiduciary law,[4] as well as in debates about substantive areas of law that are oriented around fiduciary duties.[5] We follow the convention in describing this position as moralist, although the term itself is something of a misnomer.[6] A more accurate description would be that the legal notion of loyalty is substantially connected to the non-institutional (that is, the “ordinary” or “genuine”)[7] notion of loyalty.

Moralism raises a number of important questions about the nature of loyalty. A moralist need not resolve all of these general questions in order to analyze fiduciary loyalty. Nor need the moralist accept that every aspect of “ordinary” or “genuine” morality is automatically incorporated into fiduciary loyalty. Variants of moralism might well differ over which dimensions of ordinary morality are implicated in fiduciary law.

Moralism has a long history in fiduciary law. In the United States, the most prominent example of, and citation for, moralism is Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon.[8] The court there affirmed a lower court’s holding that Salmon breached a fiduciary duty to Meinhard, his co-participant in a joint venture for managing and leasing a building. Salmon failed to disclose to Meinhard a re-leasing opportunity that rightfully belonged to the joint venture. In finding that Salmon had breached his fiduciary duty, Justice Cardozo wrote that

[j]oint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.[9]

The language of Meinhard is the high-water mark of moralism about fiduciary loyalty. The case contemplates a standard for fiduciaries that invokes (and may exceed) the requirements of moral loyalty and honor. To be sure, the standard that Cardozo’s rhetoric describes was not and is not the general legal definition of fiduciary loyalty, nor has it been incorporated into partnership law in particular.[10] However, a moralist might contend that the rhetoric of Meinhard and similar cases indicates that fiduciary loyalty tracks ordinary or genuine loyalty.

Moralism is also implicated, either expressly or implicitly, in many other judicial opinions in a variety of jurisdictions and legal contexts. Courts sometimes resemble Meinhard in embracing moralism explicitly.[11] Other courts embrace moralism implicitly by invoking moralized concepts like “utmost good faith” and “fidelity”[12] or appealing to commonsense moral precepts[13] to resolve questions of fiduciary law.

Many academic commentators deploy moralism as a descriptive or interpretive claim, a way of explaining how moral precepts matter for understanding what fiduciary law is. As part of this interpretive task, ordinary moral notions might be held to illuminate a number of features of fiduciary law. For example, a moralist might see moral precepts as elucidating the point of fiduciary duties—that is, why non-fiduciary mechanisms of accountability are insufficient for fiduciary relationships, and what special features explain the grounds of fiduciary duties. Ordinary moral precepts might also be thought to illuminate the content of fiduciary duties, not only explaining widely recognized dimensions of fiduciary duties (such as the prohibitions on a fiduciary’s conflicts of interest or profiting from the relationship), but also explaining the standards of conduct that apply to fiduciaries. A moralist could also invoke ordinary moral notions in order to explain the standards of liability that apply to fiduciaries, including the criteria for determining when fiduciary duties have been violated. Furthermore, moralism might be thought to explain the remedies for violating fiduciary duties, including the determination of which remedies are justified for fiduciary breaches as such and which remedies are appropriate in any particular case. To be sure, a moralist need not contend that ordinary morality supplies answers to all of these questions or answers any of them completely. Rather, if moralism is correct, then legal actors can (or should be able to) appeal directly to at least some aspects of ordinary morality in debates about at least some legal questions related to fiduciary law.

However, moralism may extend beyond descriptive and interpretive claims into purely normative terrain. Moralists have offered a variety of justifications for the incorporation of ordinary moral precepts into fiduciary law. For example, Tamar Frankel sees moralism as “exert[ing] pressure on the fiduciary to fulfill his obligations once he has agreed to enter into the [fiduciary] relation” and “elevating the purpose for which the fiduciary’s power is granted to a position of priority over other values which may guide the fiduciary.”[14] Another prominent justification for moralism is more instrumental: fiduciary law’s incorporation of moral notions might be defended as promoting better behavior by fiduciaries.[15] Or, perhaps, morality supplies the grounding or justification for the juridical relational duties within fiduciary law, exerting a gravitational pull on fiduciary law in marginal cases even if most of the development of fiduciary law is mainly driven by institutional, rather than moral, considerations.

Moralism, then, can be framed as both a descriptive and a normative thesis. The descriptive thesis is that moral (or other non-institutional) considerations are deeply connected to understanding what fiduciary law is, and especially to understanding fiduciary loyalty. The normative thesis is that there are good reasons for this arrangement.

B.  Amoralism” About Fiduciary Loyalty

Many judges and commentators on fiduciary law reject moralism. The common element of such amoralist views is a denial that fiduciary law makes reference to ordinary moral precepts or tracks in any deep way concepts from moral life. In particular, the amoralist contends that the ordinary understanding of loyalty cannot explain fiduciary relationships or the content of fiduciary duties in more than a superficial way. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel put it, “[f]iduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing . . . .[16] The amoralist might also deny that ordinary moral notions are relevant to important legal questions, for example when a fiduciary duty has been violated or what remedies should be available for such a violation. The amoralist would contend that the standards applicable to fiduciaries in, say, Delaware Chancery Court or a bar disciplinary hearing can differ wildly from (and contradict) the standards used in the evaluation of soldiers, friends, or literary characters.

Judges and commentators have espoused many varieties of amoralism. Some commentators deny moralism on empirical grounds. This empiricist position bases its conclusions on evidence that courts eschew or reject moralized notions in actually deciding fiduciary law cases. For example, the empiricist might point to Lord Herschell’s opinion in Bray v. Ford, which explicitly rejects a moralized understanding of fiduciary loyalty:

It is an inflexible rule of the Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position . . . is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule.[17]

This empirical strategy might deploy an inductive methodology of legal theorizing.[18] Furthermore, because decisions in fiduciary law routinely utilize moralized language and invoke “ordinary” understandings of loyalty, the empiricist needs to provide an explanation for why this language does not capture anything essential about fiduciary law. Perhaps, an empiricist might argue, the moralized rhetoric of fiduciary law opinions should be subordinated to assessments of how judges actually resolve particular cases, rather than the language in which they announce their resolutions.[19]

Few, if any, argue for amoralism solely on empirical grounds. Rather, most amoralists offer principled justifications for an amoralist understanding of fiduciary loyalty. One such principled version of amoralism is “pluralism.”[20] Many commentators have noted the wide variation in how fiduciary duties are formulated across legal contexts.[21] For example, the standards for determining whether an attorney has lived up to her fiduciary duties are different from the standards applicable to trustees or corporate directors.[22] Some pluralist approaches extend this insight to deny that any non-trivial propositions about fiduciary loyalty generalize across fiduciary contexts.[23] Others are willing to specify a core of fiduciary loyalty, but insist that this core must be very thin in order to apply across types of fiduciary relationships.[24]

Pluralist positions about fiduciary loyalty often import a dose of empiricism. Gold, for example, argues that the non-generalizability of fiduciary norms turns on the empirical proposition that at least some courts in some fiduciary contexts reject a moralized understanding of loyalty. Gold focuses on the case of Jordan v. Duff & Phelps,[25] in which a majority opinion (written by Judge Frank Easterbrook) deployed a hypothetical bargaining methodology to conclude that fiduciary duties were owed to an employee of a closely held corporation who owned shares in the firm. The Court found that these duties were violated when the corporation failed to disclose information about an upcoming merger prior to the employee’s resigning to take a position at another firm and selling back his shares. A dissenting opinion by Judge Richard Posner deployed the same methodology to reach the opposite result.[26] Gold argues that, while moral precepts might play some explanatory or justificatory role in some legal contexts, other jurisdictions and areas of fiduciary law do not invoke moralized explanations of fiduciary concepts.[27] Moreover, pluralism suggests that insights from one fiduciary context have no intrinsic force across contexts (for example, to different domains of fiduciary law within the same jurisdiction, as well as to the same domain of fiduciary law across jurisdictions). Pluralism might also rule out criticizing particular areas of fiduciary law jurisprudence (for example, Delaware corporate law) on the grounds that it deviates from the “essence” or “core” of fiduciary law. An extreme version of pluralism holds that that there is no essence or core of fiduciary loyalty.[28]

Another amoralist approach is an argument from incompatibilism. The incompatibilist contends that certain aspects of “moral” or “ordinary” loyalty render these ideas inapplicable to fiduciary law and prevent them from being legitimately imposed by legal institutions.[29] In light of these aberrant elements, the legal definition of fiduciary loyalty does not and should not incorporate the moral definition of loyalty. Incompatibilism is rooted in both a specific understanding of the purposes of fiduciary law and a liberal account of the limits of state power. For the incompatibilist, many aspects of “ordinary” loyalty are irrelevant to the law and, in any case, inappropriate to enforce. For example, an incompatibilist might contend that “ordinary” loyalty has an affective dimension: someone is only loyal to another person or a cause if she is disposed to have appropriate emotional responses based on how the object of her loyalty fares.[30] However, legal obligations (including those imposed as part of fiduciary law) do not and should not turn on considerations related to the manifestation of emotion or affect. Determining whether someone has lived up to a legal duty should be a question of how he acted, not what he felt. Indeed, it would be illegitimate for legal institutions to impose duties on people to feel certain ways.[31] How someone feels while discharging his fiduciary responsibilities is irrelevant to the most important normative question of fiduciary law, namely whether he actually abused his power while doing so. Thus, fiduciary loyalty diverges from “ordinary” loyalty in that the affective dimension that ex hypothesi characterizes the latter is inapplicable to the former. The incompatibilist argues for amoralism on the grounds that the moral notion of loyalty does not fit well within legal institutions generally, and within the various domains of fiduciary law specifically.

Another strain of amoralism, which we have previously called “proscriptivism,” asserts that fiduciary loyalty can be fully described in terms of the prohibitions (in particular, the no-profit and no-conflict rules) that apply to fiduciaries.[32] For the proscriptivist, fiduciary obligations do not require or prescribe any particular way of acting or deliberating. So long as the fiduciary avoids behaving in ways that violate these proscriptions, she has lived up to her fiduciary duties. Proscriptivism might be defended on empirical grounds (for example, that courts sometimes formulate fiduciary duties entirely in terms of proscriptions),[33] on normative grounds,[34] or on both.[35] The proscriptivist typically draws a clear distinction between fiduciary duties (which are solely a function of the fiduciary relationship) and “nominate” duties (which apply to both fiduciary and non-fiduciary relationships).[36] Although these nominate responsibilities might apply to the fiduciary in virtue of her fiduciary relationship, they are not core aspects of fiduciary loyalty because they do not apply uniquely to fiduciary relationships.

Several principled arguments might be offered on behalf of the proscriptivist position. For example, proscriptivism’s narrow reading of fiduciary loyalty ensures non-interference by the state, where interference might undermine the development of mutual trust between the fiduciary and beneficiary. Another argument for proscriptivism could be based on effectiveness: imposing narrow constraints on the fiduciary’s actions empowers her to exercise her discretionary power on the beneficiary’s behalf and avoid risk-aversion that would be counterproductive to advancing the interests of the beneficiary. Proscriptivism might also be justified non-instrumentally, on grounds of autonomy: limiting fiduciary duties to the no-profit and no-conflict duties prevents the state from violating the sanctity of an ongoing fiduciary relationship.

Proscriptivism’s narrow notion of fiduciary loyalty evokes Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s figure of the “bad man.”[37] Holmes’s bad man is rational, self-interested, and cynical. He is only motivated to conform to the law in order to avoid negative consequences that might arise from non-conformity.[38] As such, the Holmesian bad man sees potential legal sanctions as the most important aspect of law; only when the costs of non-conformity with a legal directive are higher than those associated with conformity can the bad man be expected to conform. Many theorists contend that a primary goal of law is to speak to the bad man.[39] On this approach, the clarity of a legal standard and the certainty with which it will be enforced are important questions because they would matter to the bad man’s calculations. Fiduciary law, with its moralistic rhetoric and open-ended responsibilities, might seem a difficult language in which to communicate with the bad man. However, this problem is avoided if the vagueness of fiduciary jurisprudence can be formulated more precisely. The proscriptivist offers exactly this precisification: the bad man can know exactly what behavior is expected of him (for example, “do not engage in a conflicted transaction” and “do not derive inappropriate profits from your work as a fiduciary”) and what will happen if his behavior deviates from this expectation. Proscriptivism, then, is fiduciary loyalty for the bad man.

A final type of argument for amoralism, prominent among legal economists, is “contractarianism.”[40] Contractarians contend that fiduciary loyalty should be understood as a species of contractual obligations, since both types of obligations typically arise from voluntary interactions. The version of contractarianism most relevant to amoralism sees fiduciary duties in terms of hypothetical bargaining: the standards that should apply to fiduciaries are those that would arise as part of an ideal negotiation between the fiduciary and the beneficiary.[41] Many in the law-and-economics tradition who advocate for contractarianism also contend that behavior is the fundamental unit of analysis relevant to legal norms[42] and that contractual performance is ultimately a function of behavior.[43] Therefore, many contractarians also embrace the idea that fiduciary obligations ultimately concern a fiduciary’s behavior: the duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary either to behave in specific ways or else to pay damages.[44]

As noted above, the contractarian position might be defended on empirical grounds, as some courts rationalize their fiduciary law decisions in contractarian language.[45] However, the most powerful normative argument for the contractarian approach is based on efficiency. For the contractarian, fiduciary duties arise as a response to legal relationships in which the agent is vested with discretionary power to act on behalf of the principal. This arrangement creates high agency costs and raises the prospect that (1) the agent might exercise power to benefit the agent and not the principal; and (2) alternative mechanisms of monitoring the agent’s actions will be unavailable.[46] In these contexts, fiduciary duties deter the principal from misconduct and opportunism. On the contractarian paradigm, the fiduciary duty of loyalty (which prohibits the agent’s opportunistic behavior and requires action in the interest of the principal) also has a disclosure effect: it “induce[s] the fiduciary to avoid . . . conflict[s of interest] or to disclose the material facts of how [such conflicts] might compromise the fiduciary’s judgment.”[47] The fiduciary duty of care, by contrast, applies a loose but objective standard for assessing the agent’s work on behalf of the principal.[48] The duties of loyalty and care together provide broad standards for the functioning of an efficient fiduciary relationship. Gaps in the application of the standards can be filled in by subsidiary doctrinal rules[49] and, if necessary, judicial interpretation, which should be oriented around the question of what the fiduciary and beneficiary would have agreed to ex ante as part of a hypothetical bargaining process.[50]

The contractarian position, then, provides a unified explanation of why fiduciary duties matter (namely, to reduce agency costs by deterring agential misconduct, while enabling agents to exercise discretionary authority), the content of fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, and the character of remedies for breach of fiduciary duties (which are broad and prophylactic in order to effectively deter misconduct in the wake of monitoring problems). The position is amoralist because the moral or “ordinary” notion of loyalty plays no meaningful role in any part in this contractarian story.

The above list does not exhaust the possible versions of amoralism. Nor are these types of amoralism mutually exclusive. For example, some commentators combine the contractarian and proscriptivist positions.[51] The unifying theme is that some amoralists would deny that moral precepts are generally or uniformly relevant to understanding fiduciary loyalty, while others would deny that they should be relevant, and still others would deny both propositions.

C.  Breaking the Impasse?

How does and should fiduciary law incorporate the “moral” or “ordinary” understanding of loyalty? Is fiduciary loyalty merely a technical term, applicable only within legal institutions? The divide between moralists and amoralists regarding fiduciary loyalty resembles similar divides in other areas of law over the connection between moral and legal concepts. For example, scholars of tort and criminal law debate whether the notion of causation at issue in law is identical to the metaphysical notion of causation.[52] Similarly, debates about the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment turn on whether “cruelty” should be understood commonsensically or, alternatively, in a more technical way.[53] Perhaps the closest cousin to the debate between moralists and amoralists occurs in contract law, where some scholars contend that there is a deep connection between contract law and promissory morality[54] and others see no necessary connection.[55] Thus, the debate between moralists and amoralists about fiduciary law might be understood as a species of a broader genus of discussions about whether legal concepts with apparent referents in moral life have a specialized institutional meaning.[56]

As such, the debate between moralists and amoralists implicates deeper questions about legal theorizing. One barrier to resolving this debate about fiduciary loyalty is that, in many respects, the moralist and amoralist positions are so capacious that they can reach the same conclusions in most cases. It is also difficult to provide an empirical resolution to the debate, since moralists and amoralists might disagree about the relevant unit of empirical assessment. To be sure, many courts analyzing fiduciary duties employ moralist language. However, some courts reject it outright, and others deploy moralized language differently across domains of fiduciary law. It is possible that a thorough-going moralism applies in some pockets of fiduciary law in some relational contexts but not trans-substantively. Moreover, the moralized rhetoric of fiduciary law opinions strikes some amoralists as mere rhetoric, and therefore, an unreliable predictor of what courts and relevant legal actors will do in actual cases.[57]

The empirical disagreements between moralists and amoralists in turn implicate broader jurisprudential disagreements. Resolving the debate between moralists and amoralists might be simple with a relatively well-developed theory about what law is and how past cases figure into the existence of legal standards. Yet such theories of law are notoriously difficult to formulate and defend.

The impasse between moralists and amoralists also turns on a variety of contested substantive and normative issues. For example, moralists and amoralists might disagree about the fundamental point of fiduciary relationships. There is no uniformity on these issues, even among proponents of amoralist views. Although nearly all who study fiduciary law worry about predation and opportunism, these concerns do not resolve most core differences between moralism and amoralism. Breaking the impasse about the proper understanding of fiduciary loyalty would not only require overcoming the empirical, jurisprudential, and substantive disagreements between moralists and amoralists, but also transcending these same disagreements among different versions of moralism and amoralism.

Our goal in what follows, then, is not to resolve the debate between moralists and amoralists. Instead, in Part II, we expose a cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty that we argue is part of positive fiduciary law. Therefore, it can be appreciated from a variety of amoralist perspectives. And this cognitive dimension can provide common ground from which moralist and amoralist theories can debate substantive questions of fiduciary law, since most moralists should also be able to see the roots of a cognitive dimension of loyalty in ordinary morality.

II.  Cognitivism About Loyalty[58]

Our main goal in this Part is to demonstrate that there is a cognitive dimension to fiduciary loyalty. A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty posits that a fiduciary’s cognition bears on whether she satisfies her fiduciary duties. By contrast, non-cognitivist accounts (for example, the existing versions of proscriptivism and contractarianism that we discussed in Part I) interpret fiduciary loyalty entirely in terms of how a fiduciary behaves or, perhaps, a combination of the fiduciary’s behavior and the results of its action or inaction. Cognitivism is neither moralist nor amoralist per se. Rather, it provides a way to traverse the impasse between these positions.

Our case for cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty is largely indirect. In Section II.B, we identify several propositions that generalize across a wide range of fiduciary law contexts. Each of these propositions is consistent with a cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty. Further, cognitivism provides a unified and powerful way to explain these propositions. If our reasoning is sound, then our conclusions regarding fiduciary loyalty’s cognitive dimension can be accepted by any moralist or amoralist who aims to describe the law as it is. Section II.A briefly explores the cognitive dimension of “ordinary” loyalty. Section II.B shows how a cognitivist account of loyalty explains fiduciary law as well.

A.  Cognitivism About “Ordinary” Loyalty

What is the nature of “ordinary” loyalty? What makes a person loyal? What follows from identifying a person as loyal? Centuries of reflection on these questions have not produced a consensus. Nearly every candidate for the essential consideration constitutive of loyalty has been disputed.[59] Moreover, the very moral significance of loyalty is also sharply contested among philosophers.[60]

We cannot here resolve these longstanding philosophical debates. However, some requirements relating to the cognitive dimension of loyalty appear to generalize across accounts of “ordinary” loyalty. In other words, the conclusion that a person is loyal or acted loyally is, in part, based on an assessment of her cognition. Satisfying the cognitive aspects of loyalty vis-à-vis the object of one’s loyalty is necessary, but not sufficient, to be loyal to that object. Although this cognitive dimension might not appear explicitly in accounts of loyalty that focus on affect, perceptual bias, habit, or unthinking partiality, the best candidates for a theory of loyalty (rather than, say, devotion or allegiance or fealty) have a cognitive dimension. In previous work,[61] we have identified three different cognitive aspects of loyalty: deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness. Rather than reiterate our arguments here, a trio of examples might better illustrate them.

Consider Shakespeare’s Iago, the quintessential literary example of treachery. Iago is a longtime adviser to Othello. Jealous at Othello’s promotion of Cassio,[62] another soldier in the company, to the rank of lieutenant, Iago plots to bring about Othello’s downfall. Iago fabricates evidence and manipulates conditions in order to lead Othello to believe that Cassio is having an affair with Desdemona, Othello’s wife. At the same time, Iago purports to provide Othello and Cassio unvarnished advice about what to do, some of which is even credible. As Iago puts it, he leads each man down a “parallel course” that is “directly to his good.[63] Iago’s handiwork is so skillful that Othello seems to convince himself of each step down the road of murdering Desdemona.[64]

One insight from Iago’s perfidy is that “ordinary” loyalty imposes requirements on deliberation. If your deliberation regarding the object of your loyalty does not satisfy these requirements, then you are not loyal. At least two aspects of Iago’s disloyalty bear mentioning. First, although Iago’s behavior toward Othello (lying, manipulating evidence) is objectionable in its own right, Iago would not be so reviled if he had merely given bad advice or misled his captain. There is something about the way that Iago uses Desdemona, Cassio, and Othello that strikes many readers as particularly objectionable. Second, Iago’s disloyalty is evident long before he gives his fateful advice to Othello—indeed, long before Iago announces his treacherous orientation in an opening soliloquy.

The cognitive dimension of loyalty explains both of these aspects of Iago’s treachery. Independently of the quality of his advice to Othello, Iago’s deliberation was defective because his plan to bring about Othello’s downfall prioritized his own lust for revenge and disregarded the interests of Othello, to whom he owed duties of loyalty. This conclusion implies that loyalty imposes requirements on how someone deliberates. It also suggests that these requirements can be violated regardless of how someone actually behaves. Furthermore, Iago betrayed Othello by formulating his treacherous plan. Counseling Desdemona’s murder and engineering Cassio’s imprisonment were downstream effects of Iago’s prior betrayal.

A second insight is that “ordinary” loyalty requires conscientiousnessthat is, a certain type of connection between deliberation and actionregarding the putative object of loyalty.[65] You are not loyal to a person or idea if you lack this conscientiousness toward them. Consider the saboteur, another paradigmatic example of disloyalty. The saboteur feigns allegiance to an ostensible object of loyalty while simultaneously working to undermine it. A saboteur might have another object of loyalty (in which case she is a double agent), or she might simply work to frustrate the success of the ostensible object. The saboteur has an interest in behaving and deliberating in ways that mimic loyalty, as did Iago. Doing so might help the saboteur or the Machiavellian lieutenant evade detection and provide greater opportunities for subversion. If the saboteur is disloyal even though she behaves and deliberates exactly as a loyal person would, then loyalty must implicate more than loyal behavior and deliberation. This additional element is conscientiousness: given certain motivational profiles, someone can act disloyally despite deliberating and behaving exactly as a loyal person would have done.

Third, loyalty is a function of the robustness of one’s commitments to the object of loyalty.[66] If you are committed to a particular object, but your commitment is too flimsy, then you are not loyal to that object. Consider Petyr Baelish, nicknamed “Littlefinger,” from George R.R. Martin’s A Song of Ice and Fire novels and the television show Game of Thrones. Littlefinger is an ambitious nobleman from an insignificant family. In order to transcend his station, he employs techniques such as ingratiating himself with members of more powerful houses, catering to other nobles in a set of brothels that he owns, and forming secret alliances with still other nobles. Many of these efforts sow civic unrest and lead to the deaths of innocents (and, to be fair, some not-so-innocents).[67] However, as the character notes in an Iago-esque soliloquy, all are in the service of acquiring power:

Chaos isn’t a pit. Chaos is a ladder. Many who try to climb it fail and never get to try again. The fall breaks them. And some are given a chance to climb, but they refuse. They cling to the realm, or the gods, or loveillusions. Only the ladder is real. The climb is all there is.[68]

As an example of his climb, Littlefinger facilitates an alliance between the warring Tyrell and Lannister families that would be secured by intermarriage between members of both families. Later, he plots with the matriarch of the Tyrell family to arrange for the murder of Joffrey Lannister before the consummation of his marriage to Margaery Tyrell, one of the very marriages that Littlefinger brokered.

What makes Littlefinger such a powerful example of disloyalty? Although like Iago he is fueled in part by jealousy, few, if any, of Littlefinger’s plans involve the type of sustained fixation on and malice toward a specific other that characterize Shakespeare’s villain. Rather, Littlefinger is distinguished by his contingency: regardless of how committed he is to a person or cause now, he will abandon them without compunction in order to pursue a future, aggrandizing option. A strategically contingent commitment is not genuine loyalty. If the flimsiness of Littlefinger’s commitment is evidence of disloyalty, then it follows that robustness is a hallmark of “ordinary” loyalty. A loyal commitment must be capable of withstanding at least some changes in circumstances.

B.  Cognitivism in Fiduciary Law

Even if there is a cognitive dimension to ordinary loyalty, it does not follow that this dimension also applies to fiduciary loyalty. Although a number of fiduciary law concepts or doctrines (for example, “good faith,” “fidelity,” the “duty to disclose,” and even certain ways of construing the “duty of care”) seem to implicate cognitive considerations, these concepts and doctrines are not explicitly a part of every jurisdiction’s fiduciary law. Nor do they necessarily apply to every domain of fiduciary law within any particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, an amoralist might well contend (following Easterbrook and Fischel) that these doctrines are little more than window dressing.

In the remainder of this Part, we provide an indirect argument for a cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty. We first identify a series of propositions that describe fiduciary loyalty in a variety of legal contexts. A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty provides a straightforward explanation of each proposition and a unified explanation of all of the propositions together. To be sure, some of these propositions might also be explained by non-cognitivist accounts of fiduciary loyalty, especially if they are revised to account for the propositions of fiduciary law that we identify below. The explanation provided by non-cognitivist accounts is, by comparison, less complete, less parsimonious, and less persuasive.

Our analysis here, if correct, does not definitively resolve the debate between moralists and amoralists. However, it reduces the scope of disagreement between these positions. Varieties of both amoralism and moralism that aim to explain existing legal materials should accept that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension. So-called “pluralist” accounts should also embrace cognitivism to the extent that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension across jurisdictions and fiduciary contexts. Finally, our case for the cognitivist dimension of fiduciary loyalty should allay many of the most significant concerns of incompatibilists.

In what follows, we show how the law routinely acknowledges the relevance of cognitive dimensions to fiduciary obligation. Along the way, we demonstrate the explanatory power of a cognitivist account by contrasting it with two prominent versions of amoralism described in Part Iproscriptivism and contractarianismthat cannot satisfactorily explain all of the legal propositions we identify. These versions of amoralism are the most popular among jurists and commentators, and proponents of these views tend to formulate fiduciary loyalty exclusively in terms of behavior.

P1. Someone can breach her obligation of fiduciary loyalty even if the results of her actions are consistent with those of a loyal course of action and she behaves in exactly the way that a loyal fiduciary would have behaved.

Whether a fiduciary has lived up to her duty of loyalty depends on more than the results of her actions. A fiduciary’s actions can violate her fiduciary duty of loyalty even though the beneficiary is not harmed by them—that is, even when the beneficiary’s position is not made worse off by the fiduciary’s action. Likewise, a fiduciary can violate her duty of loyalty even though she behaves in exactly the way that a loyal fiduciary would have behaved.

Some might doubt that P1 actually describes U.S. law. For example, in many U.S. jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the tort of breach of fiduciary duty imposes a harm requirement: the fiduciary is only liable to the beneficiary for “harm resulting from a breach of [fiduciary] duty . . . .[69] However, it does not follow that loss causation is part of the fiduciary duty itself, such that a fiduciary whose treachery is harmless has lived up to the duty of loyalty. Rather, harm is best seen as an independent, redress-related inquiry that arises in specific legal domains. In other words, the question of harm might be relevant to whether the fiduciary is liable in tort or for professional malpractice, but it is not integral to the notion of fiduciary loyalty itself.[70]

A fiduciary’s harmless disloyalty violates her fiduciary duty. Put differently, harmless disloyalty can have the same legal significance as harmful disloyalty. This principle of fiduciary law applies at least within the law governing lawyers,[71] agency law,[72] and trust law.[73] To illustrate, consider an example from the law governing lawyers. Elliot Friedman was an attorney acting for a group of plaintiffs in a tort suit that sought compensation for victims of a sunken vessel near Kodiak Island, Alaska.[74] Friedman put $81,000 of settlement money from one defendant into a trust account for his plaintiff-client while awaiting a payment of $662,400 from other defendants. Although Friedman had authority to put that first contribution into his client’s trust account, the rest of the plaintiffs could not agree how the remaining contributions should be distributed within the plaintiff group. Indeed, it took approximately a year to come to terms about the distribution of the settlement monies and to collect the whole sum. Four days after the first contribution was made, and without permission from the other plaintiffs or their attorneys, however, Friedman wrote himself a check for $15,000 to cover some of his fees and outlaid costs. Subsequently, he wrote a check for $10,000 to his client and paid himself another $3,000 in fees out of the trust account.

In disciplining Friedman, the hearing committee “noted that Friedman correctly believed [his client] would be entitled to substantially more than the amount he had advanced to it and that [Friedman’s] total fees . . . exceeded the fees he paid himself” out of the original $81,000 deposit.[75] The Alaska Supreme Court noted that “no client of Friedman’s suffered actual injury [and] [t]he potential for financial injury . . . was minimal, because Friedman had sufficient personal funds to cover any demand for money any client or [plaintiff] might have made.”[76] Yet even though the results for Friedman’s clients were the same as if he had not misappropriated funds from them, the Friedman court found that Friedman had breached his fiduciary obligations to his clients.[77] There is nothing remarkable about this conclusion. Friedman took money from a trust account too soon, and this action was no less a breach of trust because it (fortuitously) did not harm his clients.

The fiduciary’s course of action can also violate fiduciary loyalty even when it is identical to the behavior that a loyal fiduciary would have undertaken. Consider the case of In re Nine Systems Corp. Shareholders Litigation, in which the Delaware Chancery Court was asked to evaluate a board’s discharge of its fiduciary duties in connection with the recapitalization of a media start-up company.[78] The 2002 recapitalizationwhich valued the company at $4 millionenabled controlling shareholders to increase their equity in the company, diluting the plaintiffs’ ownership interest from 26% of the company to 2% of it. When the company was sold in 2006 for $175 million, plaintiffs sought $130 million in damages on the grounds that, because the 2002 recapitalization was unfair, the board’s approval of this transaction constituted a breach of fiduciary duties.

The Nine Systems court held that, although the price paid during the 2002 recapitalization was fair, the directors still breached their fiduciary duties because they did not follow a fair process. According to the court, the board and independent sources were insufficiently involved in the valuation, which was done as a “back of the envelope” calculation with “handwritten scribbles.”[79] The plaintiffs were not fully aware of the recapitalization until after it was implemented. As such, they were unable to participate in the valuation process. The only director who sought to dissent from the recapitalization (who was also the sole independent director) was deliberately excluded from deliberations: the controlling group chose to hold meetings on the Sabbath or other Jewish holidays when they knew he could not attend because of his religious commitments.[80]

The court found that the value of the company in 2002 was actually close to $0.[81] Thus, the 2006 transaction was even more generous to plaintiffs than a loyal fiduciary would have provided to them. However, the directors were still found to have breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in an inadequate procedure.[82] An animating idea in Vice Chancellor Noble’s opinion in Nine Systems is that behavior otherwise identical to that of a careful and loyal fiduciary can be deficient due to defects in “process.”[83]

A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty can explain why both aspects of P1 make sense. Harmless treachery violates fiduciary loyalty, not merely because the beneficiary is made worse off by it (as in Friedman) or because a loyal fiduciary would have behaved differently (as in Nine Systems). Rather, some aspects of fiduciary loyalty cannot be reduced to results or behavior. Cognitivism posits an irreducibly cognitive aspect of fiduciary loyalty: fiduciary loyalty, like ordinary loyalty, imposes standards on how the fiduciary should deliberate about what to do. These deliberative requirements are freestanding. Failure to satisfy them is sufficient to constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty. The cognitivist can thus provide a unified explanation why Friedman violated his fiduciary duty to his clients and why the Nine Systems board violated its fiduciary duties. Both Friedman’s behavior and deliberation were defective, even though the results of his behavior did not harm his clients. The Nine Systems board’s deliberation was defective, even though the results of their actions did not harm the corporation and a loyal board might have reached exactly the same decision.

Proscriptivism cannot explain both aspects of P1. To be sure, a proscriptivist can straightforwardly account for the possibility of a harmless breach of fiduciary duties by invoking the prophylactic nature of fiduciary duties.[84] On proscriptivism, Friedman’s performance was deficient (even if his clients were not harmed) because he violated the no-conflict and no-profit rules. However, the proscriptivist cannot easily explain how fiduciary loyalty could be violated when a fiduciary behaves in exactly the way that a loyal fiduciary would. The Nine Systems board had no conflict of interest and did not extract any direct profit from the 2002 recapitalization. Nevertheless, it violated its duty of loyalty because its deliberative process was defective. The proscriptivist cannot explain a violation that does not involve a transgression of either the no-profit or no-conflict rules. Even if a fiduciary’s decisional process could be reframed as a kind of conduct, proscriptivism could not capture the significance of a deliberative command as cognitivist accounts can.

The contractarian position also has difficulty explaining both aspects of P1. For the contractarian, gaps in the fiduciary relationship should be filled ex post by inquiring what the parties would have bargained for ex ante. This hypothetical bargaining methodology might explain why a fiduciary might violate the duty of loyalty even when she behaves in the way that a loyal fiduciary would. In Nine Systems, for example, the board’s decision procedure regarding the 2002 recapitalization might have been judged unnecessarily risky, since it imperiled the interests of minority shareholders in a way that increased the possibility that the value of their shares would be diminished in some future transaction. This exposure to risk could be appreciated from the contractarian’s ex ante perspective.[85] However, the contractarian cannot easily explain the possibility of a harmless violation of fiduciary loyalty in general, or the Friedman case in particular. Friedman’s clients were not harmed by his temporary misappropriation; moreover, because Friedman’s personal wealth exceeded the amount of the settlement funds, they could not have been harmed by his pre-payment (so long as Friedman would have been liable to cover any losses from his personal account). Under the contractarian picture of hypothetical bargaining, if there is no prospect of harm from an action, then that action cannot be part of the content of fiduciary duties. Cognitivist accounts, then, can more straightforwardly explain both aspects of P1 than either proscriptivism or contractarianism.

P2. Ceteris paribus, a fiduciary whose deliberation and behavior are both deficient more seriously violates fiduciary loyalty than one whose behavior or deliberation alone is deficient.

At first, the cognitivist position appears difficult to reconcile with the seemingly “strict” nature of fiduciary liability. In criminal law, violations usually require both a prohibited course of action and a specified mental state. By contrast, breach of fiduciary duty is sometimes said to be a matter of “per se” or strict liability: the fiduciary’s behavior is sufficient to support the conclusion that she has breached her duty.[86] Given the prophylactic nature of fiduciary rules, establishing a fiduciary’s culpable mental state is generally not required to show that she is subject to liability. Likewise, a fiduciary who behaves in a prohibited way cannot generally evade liability on the grounds that the fiduciary’s mental state was innocent or that the fiduciary made an honest mistake.

Despite this apparent tension, however, the strict nature of fiduciary liability is consistent with the cognitivist picture of fiduciary loyalty. That deviant behavior is sufficient for fiduciary liability does not imply that it is also necessary. Even if good intentions don’t exculpate otherwise deviant behavior, bad intentions (of a certain type, at least) might inculpate otherwise innocuous behavior.[87] To draw a parallel with criminal law, the existence of some strict liability crimes does not rule out the possibility that other, more serious crimes might have a mental state component.

Across a range of legal contexts, courts differentiate breaches of fiduciary liability in which the fiduciary lacks a culpable mental state from those in which the fiduciary has a mens rea. Both types of case involve a breach of fiduciary duty. However, courts deem the latter type of breach to be more serious and assign more substantial collateral consequences to it than the former. This logic is captured in P2.

As a first example, take the Friedman case considered above. Although the Friedman court noted that “fiduciary violations do not require subjective awareness of wrongdoing,”[88] Friedman’s “mental state,”[89] his “conscious intention,”[90] his “state of mind,”[91] and his “dishonest” and “selfish motive”[92] were relevant to determining how serious his breach of fiduciary duty was. This framework is consistent with both ABA standards and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Indeed, some analysts conclude that considerations of fault generally explain how courts and other bodies enforce the rules of professional responsibility that govern lawyers, even if many rules of professional conduct can be violated without regard to a lawyer’s culpability.[93] Thus, although “fault” is not required to find a breach of fiduciary obligation as a matter of fiduciary law, it is relevant to considerations about how to classify specific violations of fiduciary duty.

Courts provide a similar (and indirect) kind of scrutiny to the intentional stance of fiduciaries in U.S. bankruptcy law. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted § 523(a)(4) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code[94]which lists “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” as a non-dischargeable debtto include a “culpable state of mind requirement.”[95] Notwithstanding that the underlying debt may have been imposed with indifference to the state of mind of the fiduciary, the dischargeability of that debt in bankruptcy turns on whether the fiduciary’s actions “involve[d] knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.”[96] As far as the Court is concerned, “conscious[] disregard[]” of a risk of violating a fiduciary duty is enough to trigger non-dischargeability.[97] This conclusion supports P2, in that a breach of fiduciary obligation with mens rea is more serious and has a different legal status than a negligent or unwitting breach.

In both the United States[98] and other jurisdictions,[99] an assessment of the fiduciary’s state of mind bears on important questions, such as the availability of defenses and the seriousness of collateral consequences of the fiduciary’s breach, even if a fiduciary can violate the duty of loyalty without a culpable mental state. As the attorney discipline and fiduciary defalcation standards illustrate, the more culpable the fiduciary’s mental state, the more serious the breach of her fiduciary duty will be.

P2 is clearly consistent with cognitivism. The cognitivist can contend that behavior and cognition are both aspects of fiduciary duty. Deficient behavior is sufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, regardless of whether it is the product of deficient cognition. Thus, the cognitivist can explain the “strict” character of fiduciary liability in terms of institutional considerations—for example, that the discretion fiduciaries have in paradigmatic fiduciary relationships complicates any effort to distinguish malicious actions from benign ones. Fiduciary rules primarily implicate assessments of a fiduciary’s behavior because legal institutions are ill-equipped to conduct routine retrospective assessments of the complex judgments and mental states that constitute fiduciary loyalty. Yet despite the ostensibly behaviorist orientation of many fiduciary rules, actions involving both prohibited behavior and a discernable mens rea are treated as more serious than actions involving only prohibited behavior.

Non-cognitivist accounts of fiduciary loyalty have greater difficulty explaining P2. Existing versions of proscriptivism not only define fiduciary liability entirely in terms of the no-profit and no-conflict rules, but also define both of these prohibitions largely in terms of behavior. As we explained in Part I, construing fiduciary loyalty in terms of behavior is part of what makes proscriptivism akin to fiduciary law for the Holmesian bad man. In light of its implicit behaviorism, proscriptivism cannot attribute any significance to mental states in answering questions related to fiduciary law. Therefore, proscriptivism rules out in advance the possibility of the mens rea-based standards described by P2.[100] P2 also seems inconsistent with existing versions of contractarianism. Contractarians usually see issues of fault and mens rea as irrelevant to questions regarding breach of contract.[101] To the extent that P2 identifies ways that mental states matter to specific questions of fiduciary law, it is inconsistent with existing versions of proscriptivism and contractarianism.[102] Any path to explaining P2 would seem to invoke cognitivism then.

P3. Efforts toward betrayal can violate fiduciary loyalty, regardless of whether these efforts are completed or successful.

In western criminal law, an “inchoate” or incomplete crime is one for which a person can be liable, despite not engaging in prohibited behavior or bringing about a prohibited result. Inchoate crimes include attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. The most powerful justifications for inchoate crimes presuppose that the criminal law is concerned with a person’s cognition: attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to engage in prohibited behavior or bring about a prohibited result indicates a defendant’s culpably defective deliberation.[103]

As in criminal law, fiduciary law prohibits inchoate efforts to betray a principal. A fiduciary’s attempt to betray a principal—for example, where the fiduciary, with the goal of betraying the principal, takes some significant action towards realizing that goalconstitutes a violation of her fiduciary duty. Solicitations of betrayalfor example, where the fiduciary has the goal of betraying the principal and seeks the help of another in order to realize that goalalso violate the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty. The same conclusion also applies to conspiracies to betray, in which the fiduciary and another agree on a course of action to betray the principal. P3 captures each of these inchoate ways of violating fiduciary loyalty.

Existing fiduciary law supports the idea that attempts, solicitations, or conspiracies to betray the principal can constitute a violation of fiduciary duty. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers announces that “a lawyer is . . . subject to professional discipline . . . for attempting to commit a violation” of the lawyer’s obligations to her client[104] and the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) deems it professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.”[105] Likewise, inchoate efforts at betrayal (including solicitations and conspiracies) have been found to violate the duty of loyalty in a variety of other domains of U.S. fiduciary law, for example in agency law,[106] corporate law,[107] and elsewhere.[108] The same conclusions also apply to the law governing fiduciaries in other jurisdictions.[109]

The criminal law of many jurisdictions distinguishes between attempts to commit a crime and “mere preparation” towards committing a crime. The former are criminally prohibited, while the latter are not. In both, a defendant has a plan or conscious objective to act in a prohibited way or bring about a prohibited result. However, “merely preparatory” plans are remote and therefore not appropriately criminalized.[110] Here, fiduciary law diverges from criminal law: some “merely preparatory” efforts of a fiduciary to betray her principal can still constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty.[111]

To summarize, P3 indicates that a broader variety of activity that does not involve prohibited behavior can nevertheless violate fiduciary loyalty. As in criminal law, fiduciary loyalty can be violated by inchoate attempts, solicitations, or conspiracies. However, unlike criminal law, fiduciary loyalty can be violated by a fiduciary’s “merely preparatory” actions toward betraying the principal.

A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty can straightforwardly explain P3. If fiduciary norms concern the fiduciary’s cognition (in particular, her deliberation and conscientiousness), then certain patterns of deficient or deviant cognition can constitute violations of fiduciary norms.[112] Cognitivism can explain why a fiduciary’s deviant behavior is unnecessary to violate fiduciary norms, even if it is sufficient to do so. Trying to betray someone is a way of betraying them, even if the treachery does not succeed and, indeed, even if it does not proceed very far down the path toward success.

Proscriptivism, by contrast, cannot easily explain P3. Proscriptivism interprets the no-conflict and no-profit rules in terms of results. Proscriptivism thus reduces the requirements of fiduciary loyalty to two rules: the fiduciary cannot “act[] with a conflict between duty and interest” and she cannot “mak[e] a profit off of the fiduciary position.”[113] If the fiduciary does not have a conflict of interest, then she does not violate the no-conflict rule. Likewise, if the fiduciary does not make an inappropriate profit from a relationship, then she does not violate the no-profit rule. The clarity of these standards is another basis for our assertion that proscriptivism is fiduciary law for the Holmesian bad man: the fiduciary and others can easily determine whether there has been a violation of fiduciary duty at any time. Yet requiring prohibited results in order to find a violation of fiduciary loyalty is inconsistent with P3, since this requirement rules out the possibility that fiduciary loyalty can be violated by attempted, solicited, conspired, or prepared treachery.

To be sure, proscriptivism might be revised to capture P3. In particular, a proscriptivist might expand the understanding of the no-profit and no-conflict rules to prohibit both successful and inchoate violations. Such a cognitivist revision to proscriptivism seems more defensible than existing versions. After all, whatever makes it wrong for a fiduciary to take profits from a beneficiary would also make it wrong to try or conspire to take these profits. Indeed, we conjecture that courts in jurisdictions that explicitly endorse proscriptivism (“even in Australia,” to paraphrase a popular children’s book from our youth)[114] would adopt something like this cognitivist formulation if confronted with cases of inchoate treachery. But these revisions would reduce the clarity that makes proscriptivism so appealing as fiduciary law for the bad man.

Contractarianism also has difficulty explaining P3. There is no cause of action for an attempted breach of contract; an unsuccessful effort to breach a contract is not a breach.[115] If fiduciary loyalty were merely a species of contract law, then we would expect that fiduciary loyalty could not be breached through attempts. Yet P3 denies exactly this implication. A contractarian might respond to this criticism by construing a prohibition on attempted betrayals as an implicit term that would be agreed upon as part of a hypothetical bargaining process. But this move would concede that fiduciary norms are not fully explicable in terms of contractual norms, that a fiduciary’s deliberation and cognition matter more than a typical contractual counterparty’s do. Moreover, recognizing a cognitive dimension of fiduciary duties would violate one of the basic tenets of the law-and-economics tradition out of which contractarianism arises—namely, that behavior is the fundamental unit of analysis. In sum, both proscriptivism and contractarianism have difficulty explaining P3 because they are not formulated in cognitivist terms.

P4. At least some connections between a fiduciary’s deliberation and action can constitute violations of fiduciary loyalty.

P1, P2, and P3 address some of the deliberative demands the law imposes on fiduciaries. Aside from these deliberative demands, fiduciary loyalty can also implicate the fiduciary’s motivations.[116] In other words, it is possible for a fiduciary to behave and deliberate in appropriate ways, yet to violate her fiduciary duty of loyalty because of inappropriate motivations. Which motivations can violate the duty of loyalty? It is difficult to answer this question in the abstract. However, the point can be illustrated by focusing on some paradigmatic examples.

One type of inappropriate motivation is that of the double agent. A double agent pledges her allegiance to a principal, while simultaneously operating on behalf of another (adverse) principal.[117] Because of the prophylactic nature of the conflicts of interest rules applicable to fiduciaries, the double agent obviously violates fiduciary loyalty regardless of how she deliberates and behaves. That said, perhaps the best explanation for the prophylactic nature of the conflict of interest rule rests on the subtle influence of motivation. The fiduciary’s conflicted interest raises the possibility of changes in her actions, changes so subtle that others (and even the fiduciary herself) might not appreciate them.

Like the double agent, the classic self-dealer clearly violates the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Given the prophylactic character of the no-profit rule, no further assessment of the fiduciary’s motivations or behavior is needed to reach this conclusion. Here too, the prophylactic character of the rules might be justified by a worry about the difficulty of discerning what, exactly, motivates any particular course of action by a fiduciary.

Yet the double agent and the self-dealer do not exhaust the parameters of disloyalty. Consider the saboteur, who acts in order to undermine the projects of her principal rather than to promote her own interests or those of a third party. The saboteur seems at least as treacherous as the double agent. As the U.S. Supreme Court once recognized, “[h]e who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur.”[118] The main difference between the cases concerns the structure of the treacherous motivation: the double agent subverts in order to advance the interests of a third party, while the saboteur might lack such an ulterior inspiration. There is no good reason, however, for fiduciary law to treat the saboteur differently from the double agent. To be sure, the prophylactic nature of conflict of interest rules makes proving someone to be a double agent easier than proving her to be a saboteur. Yet across a range of fiduciary law domains[119] and jurisdictions,[120] sabotage constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty.

Consider Commonwealth v. Washington,[121] a case concerning effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Vinson Washington was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, Washington argued that his counsel at trial was constitutionally ineffective, a claim that requires showing that counsel’s performance was deficient and also that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant—in particular, that there was a “reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different” if the defendant had “been represented by adequate counsel.”[122] Washington alleged that his trial counsel hated him.[123] This antipathy, Washington contended, prompted the trial counsel to sabotage Washington’s defense, which (according to Washington) violated counsel’s duty of loyalty toward Washington.[124] Washington argued first that “prejudice” should be presumed “upon proof of animosity between an attorney and client”[125] and (alternatively) that Washington actually suffered prejudice because trial counsel’s animosity led him to perform deficiently on Washington’s behalf.[126] The state countered that Washington’s trial counsel vigorously represented his interests at trial, for example, by extensively cross-examining key witnesses and arguing that Washington’s confession was invalid.[127]

The Washington Court accepted Washington’s argument in part. The animosity of Washington’s trial counsel was not directly relevant to his ineffective assistance claim, as “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not govern the feelings that flow between an attorney and his client.”[128] However, proof of such animosity was relevant to the extent that it indicated trial counsel’s sabotage: “[i]f counsel abrogates his obligation to his client because of personal animosity that the accused will be deprived of his right to a fair trial, such action will support a claim for a violation of the Sixth Amendment,” so long as a client can establish both a direct connection between “the animosity expressed by counsel and the actions of counsel taken on behalf of [the client]” and that “but for the actions of counsel, the outcome of the matter would have been different.”[129] The Washington Court rejected the state’s argument that an entirely objective standard should determine whether the attorney has met his duty of loyalty to the client. Rather, the sabotage alleged in this case (if true) would indicate “a total disintegration of the function of trial counsel, implying a violation of the ethical standards of the profession, a dereliction of counsel’s duty to the court, and a profound failure to the client.”[130] The lesson of Washington is that sabotage violates fiduciary loyalty, while hatred alone is not necessarily inconsistent with fiduciary loyalty. Washington, then, not only illustrates the (legitimate) relevance of cognition to fiduciary obligation, but also shows how cognitive inquiries might devolve into the (illegitimate) policing of the fiduciary’s affect and emotions.

If the saboteur violates a fiduciary duty, then fiduciary law imposes standards regarding the fiduciary’s conscientiousness. However, courts could disagree in how to classify the problem that such a lack of conscientiousness presents. On a more direct analytic route, sabotage might be seen as a violation of fiduciary loyalty itself. This is consistent with the famous Delaware case of Stone v. Ritter, in which the court found the duty of good faith applicable to fiduciaries to be part of the classic fiduciary duty of loyalty.[131]

There are, however, more circuitous routes to ground the legal liability of the saboteur. One such indirect route evaluates the saboteur in light of the rules that implement fiduciary loyalty by “elaborat[ing] the application of loyalty . . . to recurring circumstances.”[132] The saboteur’s lack of conscientiousness could be considered to violate one or more of these implementing rules. Recall Item Software (UK) Ltd. v. Fassihi,[133] discussed in the Introduction. Fassihi, while a director of Item Software, encouraged Dehghani, Item Software’s managing director, to negotiate very aggressively with Isograph. Like Iago, Fassihi had an ulterior motive: to sabotage these negotiations in order to swoop in and obtain Isograph’s business for Fassihi’s own (future) company. The trial court found that Fassihi’s advice was colorable; Fassihi, like Iago, counseled his compatriot down a “parallel course, directly to his good.” In any event, Fassihi’s advice did not influence Dehghani’s conduct. Yet the Fassihi Court upheld the trial court’s finding that Fassihi’s efforts did not violate his duty of loyalty toward Item Software. Rather, Fassihi was liable for violating his fiduciary “duty to confess” by “failing to disclose his intention and attempt to compete with” Item Software.[134] The Fassihi Court took a circuitous strategy because the fiduciary’s conscientiousness was evaluated as part of an implementing rule (namely, the “duty to confess”), rather than as part of the duty of loyalty itself.

The postulation of a fiduciary “duty to confess” has made the Fassihi decision controversial.[135] The decision in Fassihi might have been justified more straightforwardly on the grounds that Fassihi’s efforts violated the “fundamental duty to which a director is subject, that is the duty to act in what he in good faith considers to be the best interests of the company.”[136] In other words, the Fassihi Court could have ruled (consistent with P3) that Fassihi’s unsuccessful attempt to usurp business from Item Software by recommending harsh negotiating tactics against Isograph was a breach of loyalty, even though (consistent with P4) Fassihi’s actual recommendation for this course of advice would not have violated his fiduciary duty if it had been motivated to advance the interests of Item Software.

We do not mean to champion either the direct or circuitous routes for evaluating the conscientiousness of fiduciaries. Under either strategy, whether the fiduciary has lived up to her duty depends not only on how she behaves and deliberates, but also on how that behavior and deliberation fit together. On either strategy, P4 is best explained in terms of a fiduciary’s conscientiousness. The double agent and the saboteur violate their fiduciary duty because the structure of their motivation is inappropriate. The former acts to serve another master, while the latter acts to subvert the beneficiary.

This argument leaves open an important question. If a fiduciary lacks conscientiousness when she acts for inappropriate reasons, then what are appropriate reasons for a fiduciary to act? An unsatisfying (Potter Stewart-esque) response is that one needn’t articulate the parameters of the right kind of reasons for action in order to prove that actions for the wrong kind of reasons are problematic. In any event, courts typically define the right kinds of reasons for action broadly, for example in terms of “good faith” or “honest efforts to advance the beneficiary’s interest.” This broad definition might be justified by the institutional limits to discerning a fiduciary’s motives, as well as from concern with inhibiting the discretion or flexibility of the fiduciary. The conscientiousness norm operates whatever shape the implementing rules take.

What of a fiduciary who has animosity towards his beneficiary? As discussed above in connection with Commonwealth v. Washington, hating a beneficiary seems reconcilable with acting in good faith to advance their interests. Animosity would matter only when it exerts motivational force. That said, evidence of sabotage is difficult to detect, especially after the fact. Many discretionary actions are open to multiple interpretations, some of which are consistent with fiduciary loyalty and others of which are not. A lawyer’s failure to investigate a potential alibi witness might be a strategic decision, or it might be a way for the lawyer to ensure that a reviled client gets what he deserves. Therefore, even though a fiduciary’s hatred of the beneficiary is insufficient to establish a violation of fiduciary loyalty, it is a good place to look for evidence of sabotage, which does violate fiduciary loyalty.

What of a fiduciary whose posture resembles what Harry Frankfurt called wantonness, a complete ambivalence for the interests or ends of the beneficiary?[137] Although genuine wantonness is difficult to find in the world, such a thoroughgoing disregard would seem to violate fiduciary loyalty. Consider the Restatement (Third) of Agency’s discussion of the “General Fiduciary Principle” in section 8.01.[138] Comment (b) posits that “[w]hen an agent’s agreement with a principal confers discretion on the agent to take action in the agent’s sole discretion, the agent has a duty to exercise the discretion in good faith,” regardless of whether the agreement specifies such a duty.[139] As an example, the Restatement contemplates a scenario in which a fiduciary exercises discretionary authority by “flipping a coin,” rather than seeking out information most relevant to the decision. Such an action would violate the fiduciary’s duty to act in good faith, even though the agent would have satisfied this obligation by acting in the same way after “making an honest attempt to make an informed decision” about how to act.[140]

Another example of wantonness as a violation of fiduciary loyalty arises in Delaware corporate law. As Delaware judge Leo Strine and his co-authors put it, “good faith has long been used as the key element in defining the state of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary.”[141] A Delaware corporation may not waive damages for actions that are taken “not in good faith.”[142] And as the Delaware Supreme Court has held, the “failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith is a . . . condition of the . . . duty of loyalty.[143] The notion of good faith under Delaware law works not only to target those (like the saboteur) who are “motivated by a dishonest purpose or ill will towards the corporation and/or its shareholders,” but also two other defective motivational arrangements: fiduciaries acting for “(1) a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the corporation; or [their] (2) intentional disregard of [their] fiduciary duties to the corporation.”[144]

Some of the legal standards for assessing the duty of good faith arose from litigation surrounding the severance pay that the Walt Disney Company negotiated with its outgoing CEO Michael Ovitz. Shareholders argued that, when deciding on Ovitz’s contract, the board was not acting in the best interests of the corporation so much as doing a favor for Michael Eisner, the CEO who hired Ovitz.[145] In Disney, the relevant directors were not accused of having proscribed conflicts of interest, but were instead alleged to have been bad faith stewards of the corporation’s best interests.[146] At issue, however, was not “classic” or “subjective bad faith” requiring ill will or intent to do harm.[147] Rather, the bad faith involved was the directors’ “intentionally act[ing] with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interest of the corporation.”[148] The court found it actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty when directors “adopt[] a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude.”[149] When directors make “material decisions without adequate information and without adequate deliberation,”[150] they are in derogation of their fiduciary obligation. To be sure, the legal elaboration of the duty of good faith under Delaware corporate law is highly complex.[151] Yet the Disney Court’s “we don’t care about the risks” standard identifies the same wantonness that is also condemned in the Restatement (Third) of Agency’s example of coin flipping. In both cases, the (hypothesized) motivational posture violates the conscientiousness that fiduciary loyalty requires.

To summarize, a cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty can explain why a fiduciary’s motivation matters to the performance of her fiduciary duties, either directly through appraisal in terms of a duty of loyalty or more circuitously through appraisal in terms of some implementing rule or doctrine, such as the duty to confess orperhapsthe duty of good faith. Cognitivism can also begin to explain which motivations are inappropriate: sabotage definitely, wantonness probably, and hatred only insofar as it motivates actions that are inconsistent with the beneficiary’s interests or ends.

On the other hand, P4 is difficult to reconcile with either the contractarian or proscriptivist positions. Extant versions of both views define loyalty solely in terms of how a fiduciary behaves. Thus, both views would deny that the sorts of motivational considerations described in P4 are relevant to assessing whether a fiduciary has violated the duty of loyalty.

The contractarian might further respond to our critique by denying that P4 is analytically distinct—that is, by asserting that each of our examples of conscientiousness can be accounted for by positing that a distinctive motivational component to fiduciary loyalty would have been bargained for ex ante. For example, the contractarian rules out the fiduciary saboteur from a hypothetical bargaining perspective. The hidden saboteur who plans from the outset of the fiduciary relationship to undermine the beneficiary’s interests could be said to commit promissory fraud.[152] Yet the saboteur whose effort to undermine arises only after the commencement of the fiduciary relationship could not be ruled out from this ex ante perspective. Thus, the contractarian position could conclude that the hidden saboteur violates his fiduciary duties only at the cost of denying that the subsequent saboteur does so as well. Yet there seems to be no meaningful difference between the loyalty of the hidden saboteur and the loyalty of the subsequent saboteur. Nor is there any principled basis for a legal system to treat these cases differently.

Likewise, contractarianism might rule out the wanton fiduciary on the grounds that some sort of performance standard would be agreed on as part of a hypothetical bargain between the fiduciary and beneficiary. To the extent that the wanton falls short of this performance standard, he violates his fiduciary duty toward the beneficiary. Yet this contractarian strategy would have difficulty distinguishing wanton inaction—for example, inaction as a matter of coursefrom prudent inaction—for example, inaction based on a strategic calculation that it is the best option for advancing the beneficiary’s interests. In contrast to the hidden and subsequent saboteurs, the difference between wanton and prudent inaction does seem meaningful. There is very good reason for a legal system to treat these two cases differently. Yet due to its behaviorist assumptions, contractarianism could not readily explain this disparity.

Proscriptivism has similar difficulties explaining the defectiveness of both the saboteur and the wanton fiduciary, although an advocate of this position might concede that both cases violate fiduciary loyalty.[153] Neither the saboteur nor the wanton serve another master, so neither runs afoul of the no-conflict rule. Further, by hypothesis, neither the saboteur nor the wanton derives any inappropriate profit from the fiduciary relationship. If these rules exhaust the content of fiduciary loyalty, then proscriptivism must deny that either case constitutes a violation of fiduciary loyalty. This conclusion is not only normatively indefensible, but also contrary to existing fiduciary law.[154]

P5. The insensitivity or flimsiness of a fiduciary’s commitment to the beneficiary’s interests or ends can constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty.

The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty encompasses more than how she happens to behave and deliberate, and more than whether she happens to act for the right kinds of reasons. Fiduciary duties automatically impose demands that are more robust than the default duties imposed by other types of legal norms. A fiduciary must exhibit a special sensitivity towards and a sturdy commitment to the interests or ends of the beneficiary. Fiduciary loyalty can be violated when a fiduciary is insensitive to the beneficiary’s interests or ends or when the fiduciary’s commitment to these interests or ends is too contingent.

First, fiduciary loyalty requires the fiduciary to be sensitive to the interests or ends of the beneficiary.[155] The sensitivity we have in mind here resembles an epistemic notion of sensitivity, according to which someone’s belief in a proposition is sensitive only if he would not have believed that proposition if the proposition had been false.[156] Consider the example of a non-functioning grandfather clock whose hands are stopped at 8:00. The clock’s reading is correct twice a day. It does not follow that someone observing the broken clock at 8:00 PM knows what time it is. One explanation for why not is that the clock is an insensitive mechanism. The clock’s reading does not ground knowledge, even when it is correct, because if the time had been different, the clock still would have read 8:00. Thus, sensitivity acts as a counterfactual constraint on true belief: the clock’s epistemic defects exist at both 7:00 PM and at 8:00 PM.

Courts often invoke the notion of insensitivity to explain why a fiduciary’s actions breach his or her duty of loyalty.[157] However, the parallel with epistemic sensitivity allows for a more precise articulation of the term in legal settings. In the same way that the requirements for accurate time telling vary based on changes in the external world, so too do the requirements on fiduciaries change based on changes to the situation of the beneficiary.

Some characterize these changes in terms of the open-endedness of fiduciary duties.[158] We have described this phenomenon in terms of “morphing”—the requirements applicable to a fiduciary change automatically based on changes to the interests or ends of the beneficiary.[159] On either formulation, fiduciary loyalty can be violated by a fiduciary’s failure to monitor relevant changes to the interests or ends of the beneficiary.[160] For example, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that director-fiduciaries must monitor the ongoing operations of a company and must “exercise appropriate attention” to what is going on within the corporation in order to fulfill their duty of loyalty.[161] Thus, the duty of loyalty can also be violated by a fiduciary’s failure to update his understanding of his responsibilities that apply to him based on such changes, or by a failure to revise his course of action based on the changes to the beneficiary’s interests or ends.[162] Moreover, as with epistemic insensitivity, there can be purely counterfactual violations of fiduciary duties—that is, violations of fiduciary loyalty based on defects of performance that are based on features that are not realized in the actual world but that would have been realized in close possible worlds.[163] This possibility is contemplated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of a conflict-of-interest statute as being “more concerned with what might have happened in a given situation than with what actually happened.”[164] These requirements of sensitivity are best seen as implications of fiduciary loyalty, even if courts do not always classify all of them in this language.

A second aspect of the robustness of fiduciary duties is that they can be violated when a fiduciary’s commitment to the beneficiary is too flimsy or contingent. There is a modal constraint on the fiduciary duty of loyalty. For example, while the fiduciary need not stick with the beneficiary through thick and thin, he may not simply leave the beneficiary in order to pursue a more lucrative relationship. The flimsiness of the fiduciary’s commitment to the beneficiary can therefore constitute a violation of the duty of loyalty.[165]

The so-called “hot potato” doctrine in the field of professional responsibility[166] illustrates how sturdiness is an aspect of fiduciary loyalty. Suppose that Alice Attorney, a general practitioner, represents Claude Client on a routine estate planning matter. Pete Patron retains Alice for a potentially lucrative tort suit against number of defendants, including Claude. The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) prevent an attorney from representing one client when that representation will be “directly adverse to another client,” even if (as in our scenario) the representation of one client is substantially unrelated to the representation of the other, unless both clients consent.[167] On the current-client conflict rule, then, Alice could not represent Pete in the tort suit unless Claude consented to the representation. However, a more lenient rule applies to suits against a former client: so long as the lawyer’s representation of the current client is not substantially related to the lawyer’s representation of the former client, the lawyer may represent the current client even if the former client does not consent to the arrangement.[168] On this former-client conflict rule, then, Alice could represent Pete in the tort suit without needing Claude’s consent if Claude were Alice’s former (rather than current) client. Finally, the Model Rules provide wide latitude for terminating the representation of a client: a lawyer may conclude a representation for any reason, so long as the termination of a representation does not have a “material adverse effect” on the interests of a client.[169] The intersection of all three of these rules suggests that Alice could obviate the need for Claude’s consent to her representation of Pete in the tort suit by dropping Claude “like a hot potato”[170]—that is, by terminating her representation of Claude and thereby converting a current-client conflict into a former-client conflict.

Many courts resolve these “hot potato” scenarios by prohibiting the lawyer from “firing” the current client in order to represent the more lucrative client, even though this move (however unseemly) is licit under the professional conduct rules. This restriction is typically justified in terms of the lawyer’s overarching duty of loyalty to the client. Although the language of many opinions in these cases is phrased in terms of “undivided loyalty,” the most relevant factors cited by courts concern the flimsiness of the lawyer’s commitment to the less-remunerative client. For example, one court argued that a lawyer’s termination of a relationship only triggers the former-client conflict rule if “the lawyer’s primary motivation for terminating” the representation “was not his desire to represent” a new, more lucrative client.[171]

A cognitivist account can straightforwardly explain why both insensitivity and flimsiness violate fiduciary loyalty. Insensitivity is problematic, regardless of whether it leads to problematic results, because it violates an independent requirement of fiduciary loyalty. The flimsiness of a fiduciary’s commitment is also problematic, independent of performance, because it suggests a similar defect regarding these considerations.

On the other hand, contractarian accounts cannot explain why insensitivity is problematic. As noted above, extant versions of contractarianism define loyalty in terms of behavior and expected results. Although contractarianism might deem insensitivity to be problematic insofar as it leads a fiduciary to engage in problematic behavior or produce substandard results, it cannot constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty on its own. Yet P5 contemplates that insensitivity is sufficient to violate fiduciary loyalty. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile a modal constraint like insensitivity within the contractarian framework. In contract law, unrealized contingencies do not typically constitute breaches of contractual duty. From the perspective of an ex ante bargain, such contingencies might be seen as priced into the bargain. Therefore, a contractarian couldn’t easily explain why purely counterfactual considerations (like unrealized but “possible” conflicts of interest) could constitute a breach of a contractual duty. Yet the insight behind insensitivity is that purely counterfactual considerations can be sufficient to constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.

Proscriptivism faces similar challenges accounting for P5. Mere insensitivity cannot violate a fiduciary duty if no explicit fiduciary rule requires sensitivity or prohibits insensitivity. Proscriptivism cannot explain why the flimsiness of a commitment might run afoul of fiduciary duties, since the relevant proscriptions are framed in terms of actual events rather than in terms of modal operators.

* * *

Our case for cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty has been both empirical and interpretive, albeit largely indirect. A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty provides a unified explanation for all of the legal propositions we have identified in this Part. Accounts of fiduciary law that deny cognitivismfor example, contractarian and proscriptivist approachesmight be able to explain some of these legal propositions, but they fail to provide a unified explanation for all of them. Moreover, the explanations offered by contractarianism and proscriptivism are ad hoc, perhaps due to the implicit commitment of these views to assess fiduciary loyalty entirely in terms of behavior. The best interpretation of fiduciary law, then, is that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension.

III.  Objections and Replies

This Part articulates and responds to several concerns about cognitivism regarding fiduciary loyalty. These responses both summarize our conclusions and highlight some important implications of our analysis.

A.  Does Cognitivism Actually Resolve the Dispute Between Moralism and Amoralism?

Our initial inquiry was framed in terms of the seeming impasse between moralist and amoralist accounts of fiduciary loyalty. Appreciating the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty does not fully resolve the debate between moralism and amoralism. Indeed, many of the most pressing questions in this debate remain disputable. For example, cognitivism has little to say about the disclaimability of fiduciary obligation. Nor does it yield any clean insights about important questions such as whether ordinary moral considerations are relevant to understanding fiduciary liability or remedies for breach of fiduciary duties. Rather, we see cognitivism as a potential common ground for moralist and amoralist positions.

To be sure, we are not wholly agnostic between the moralist and amoralist positions. On our definition, a moralist account holds that fiduciary loyalty references at least some aspects of the ordinary notion of loyalty. If, as we argued in Section II.A, ordinary loyalty has a cognitive dimension, then cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty could entail a weak form of moralism: that at least one aspect of ordinary loyalty (namely, its cognitive dimension) applies directly to fiduciary loyalty. (We leave open whether other structural features of the ordinary concept of loyalty might illuminate fiduciary loyalty.) No stronger form of moralism follows from cognitivism, however. It is possible to accept that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension while denying, for example, that the ultimate justification for fiduciary and ordinary loyalty are identical, or that ordinary moral considerations inform the appropriate remedies for violations of fiduciary loyalty. Furthermore, the kinds of deliberation, conscientiousness, and sensitivity appropriate for fiduciaries almost certainly diverge from the requirements as they apply to loyal friends, lovers, and compatriots. Indeed, the minimal standards of deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness are likely to vary significantly across fiduciary contexts. If so, then the structural requirements of loyalty are unlikely to be identical across moral life and fiduciary types. Ultimately, amoralists can embrace cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty as an explanation for the legal propositions identified in Section II.B, since none of these propositions directly invokes the “ordinary” notion of loyalty.

Appreciating the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty, then, does not fully resolve the debate between moralism and amoralism. And both sides in this debate might find our analysis unsatisfying. The amoralist might find our conclusion distasteful because it points to some substantial structural similarity between fiduciary loyalty and ordinary loyalty. On the other hand, the moralist might see our conclusion as too concessive, since it admits the possibility of explicating large swaths of fiduciary law in purely conventional or institutional terms. We see this lack of resolution as appealing, rather than problematic. Accepting that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension still leaves open many interesting theoretical questions about fiduciary law. Yet the common ground provided by cognitivism provides a new basis for addressing policy and design questions regarding fiduciary law generally, and corporate law, trust law, and the law governing lawyers, in particular.

For example, cognitivism has implications for debates about the applicability of fiduciary duties to investment advisers and brokers. An investment adviser engages “primarily in advisory activities, including portfolio selection, asset allocation, portfolio management, selecting and monitoring other advisers, and financial planning.”[172] A broker provides investment advice to an investor, while also “executing trades, selling securities, lending money to investors to invest on margin, [and] maintaining custody of funds and securities.”[173] As a matter of U.S. law, investment advisers have long been held to operate under “federal fiduciary standards,” including affirmative duties of good faith and care.[174] Recent legal developments have also applied a “fiduciary standard” to actions by brokers, although this application is more contested.[175] The controversy surrounding the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Fiduciary Rule[176] is, in the main, about whether both investment advisers and broker-dealers should be subject to fiduciary standards.[177]

Cognitivism can support those who argue for the application of fiduciary duties to investment managers and brokers, as well as those who support the DOL Fiduciary Rule. Investment advice invites the possibility of betrayal generally, as well as concerns with each of the cognitive elements of loyalty that we have identified above. The client of an investment manager or broker has reason to be concerned with potential defects in the deliberation, conscientiousness, or commitment of an investment adviser, regardless of how the adviser actually behaves (that is, independently of the content of the advice that she provides).[178] Broker-client relationships implicate all of the same concerns with cognition that arise in the advice-giving context, while also inviting the possibility of betrayal in the context of a broker’s acting on behalf of clients in the purchase of securities for their accounts. All of these concerns with betrayal apply regardless of whether the broker has a recognized conflict of interest and independently of an objective assessment of the broker’s advice or behavior. Therefore, a cognitivist understanding of fiduciary loyalty can be marshaled to hold advisers and brokers to fiduciary standards.

A further question concerns whether fiduciary duties should apply to so-called “robo-advisers,” automated services that provide financial advice (usually concerning investment, but sometimes about insurance and banking) to clients on the basis of algorithms.[179] Here, too, cognitivism provides support to those who favor applying fiduciary duties. However, this support is more contingent. A cognitivist might contend that fiduciary duties should apply to the extent that algorithms invite the possibility of betrayal—in particular, betrayal by the humans who formulate, market, or implement the algorithm. For example, an algorithm programmed to favor investment vehicles that promote the adviser’s products over superior products from other firms would seem to violate the duty of loyalty. As Baker and Dellaert note, “the human/machine handoff provides significant opportunities to take advantage of consumers . . . .[180]

However, cognitivism suggests that different standards might apply to so-called “black-box” algorithms, which utilize “opaque computational models to make decisions” about what to advise or implement.[181] Such models are “non-transparent,” in that the “relationships they capture cannot be explicitly understood” by either customers or programmers “and sometimes cannot even be explicitly stated.”[182] While “black-box” robo-advisers might be evaluated in terms of the quality of their advice, they do not seem to invite the same possibilities of betrayal as human-based (or human-algorithm coordinated) investment management. As such, cognitivism does not clearly provide additional support for applying fiduciary duties to “black box” robo-advisers, although other kinds of considerations might support the application of fiduciary duties in connection with these products.[183]

Our goal here is not to definitively resolve these ongoing debates about fiduciary duties. However, our analysis might be utilized in these debates. Cognitivism not only helps to explicate what responsibilities fiduciaries have, but also supports arguments about when specific legal relationships are or should be governed by fiduciary duties.

B.  Is Cognitivism a Conceptual Claim About the Nature of Fiduciary Loyalty?

Our conclusions about cognitivism are not only empirical and interpretive. They are also normative—that is, they offer a specific vision about what fiduciary law ought to be. However, our conclusions are not conceptual. We do not claim that cognitivism is a necessary truth about fiduciary law.

As demonstrated in Section II.B, the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty is part of fiduciary law across legal contexts in a variety of jurisdictions. The normative costs of denying cognitivism would likely be steep. The tenets of cognitivism are consistent with the intuitive understanding of ordinary loyalty, and they are part of many fiduciaries’ self-understanding. Moreover, the costs of rejecting cognitivism exceed the normal drawbacks of defining legal terms in technical ways that deviate from common sense and positive law. A non-cognitivist fiduciary loyalty would have difficulty explaining why the saboteur or the schemer has breached her fiduciary duty. More broadly, a non-cognitivist understanding of fiduciary loyalty would subject beneficiaries to the kinds of predation and exploitation that fiduciary duties generally are supposed to prevent. Whatever the ultimate goals of fiduciary law are, they are likely better served by attributing at least some cognitive dimension to fiduciary loyalty.

However, just because it would be unwise for a legal system to deny the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty does not mean that doing so is impossible. Although cognitivism is part of fiduciary law in the jurisdictions and legal contexts we have examined, it is logically possible for a jurisdiction to define fiduciary loyalty entirely in non-cognitive terms. It is an intelligible position that fiduciary loyalty is entirely a matter of how the fiduciary behaves and/or what results from his actions. Our case for cognitivism does not rise to the level of a Fullerian claim about the internal morality of law. In a legal system genuinely concerned with limiting opportunism and predation, it would be unwise, but not incoherent, to reject cognitivism. Nor do we deny that there might be some advantages to such a non-cognitivist understanding of fiduciary loyalty.[184] These benefits, however, would likely not outweigh the costs of rejecting cognitivism. In any event, such a legal system would be very different from any that we have observed.[185]

C.  Can Cognitivism Be Reconciled with the Systematic Underenforcement of Fiduciary Duties? (Or: If Fiduciary Law Is Cognitivist, How Come It’s so Lax?)

In many legal contexts, the enforcement of fiduciary loyalty is relatively rare.[186] This laxity of enforcement is often thought to arise from divergence between the more exacting standards of conduct and the more forgiving standards of review. If fiduciaries are only occasionally held to any standard of loyalty (let alone the rarefied, cognition-based standard that we have identified here), then is cognitivism a meaningful part of fiduciary law?

To be sure, implementing rules diverge from primary norms in many other areas besides fiduciary law.[187] However, if fiduciary law ignored the cognitive dimensions of fiduciary loyalty, then saboteurs would be treated differently than double agents and unsuccessful betrayals would fulfill the duty of loyalty. Such an arrangement would contradict the propositions of fiduciary law that we have identified here and run afoul of the norms against opportunism and predation that seem fundamental to fiduciary law on both moralist and amoralist views. That said, the systematic underenforcement of the deliberative, motivational, and robustness aspects of fiduciary loyalty might be explained in at least two principled ways. Both of these explanations concede that non-cognitivist accounts of fiduciary loyalty have some power to describe and shape the institution of fiduciary law. However, both ultimately vindicate cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty.

One kind of explanation is a version of Meir Dan-Cohen’s “acoustic separation” thesis, which posits that law speaks simultaneously to multiple audiences.[188] On Dan-Cohen’s formulation, conduct rules speak to those who are governed by the positive law, while decision rules communicate information to legal officials. A slightly different separation seems applicable to fiduciary law. To wit, on Henry Smith’s understanding of equity law, fiduciary law might be seen to speak simultaneously to the Holmesian “bad man” and to the “good person.” If law is construed as dealing with the good person (one who internalizes a legal norm and its cognitive implications), then the ambiguity of a legal standard can actually increase the likelihood that people will adhere to that standard.[189] In these cases, ambiguity about the dictates of a legal standard regarding enforcement serves to “crowd in” fiduciaries whose prior orientation is toward norm-adherence.[190] For this group, the vague standards of conduct applicable within extant fiduciary law can be expected to reinforce and promote deliberation about what to do and about what their fiduciary responsibilities require.[191]

For the Holmesian bad man, however, fiduciary law aims to police opportunism. On the acoustic separation story, “the same literal message” regarding fiduciary law’s clear proscriptions “can serve as an antievasion device for bad-faith actors while not interfering with (or even while promoting) the intrinsic [orientation] [] of the goodfaith actors.”[192] This acoustic separation helps reconcile the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty with the systematic underenforcement of fiduciary duties regarding deliberation, motivation, and commitment: more aggressive policing of these dimensions would undercut much of the value of fiduciary loyalty for the good person. On this strategy, then, we would expect judicial relief only in the most egregious cases of deliberative, motivational, and commitment failure.

As discussed in Section II.B, this is the pattern that the cases reveal. For example, in Commonwealth v. Washington, the contempt exhibited by Washington’s lawyer might have indicated disloyalty, even though the more prosaic antipathy that many lawyers sometimes feel toward their clients would not have provided any evidence of disloyalty. The systematic underenforcement of cognitive aspects of fiduciary loyalty, then, might allow fiduciary law to speak to both the good person and the bad man at the same time.

A second, and related, explanatory strategy for lax enforcement is rooted in what one might call a paradox of loyalty at the center of the incompatibilist’s insight. Loyalty in life (as in law) requires someone to act for the right kinds of reasons. If someone is motivated to act solely because of fear of legal enforcement, then (depending on the context) her motivational structure might constitute acting for the wrong kind of reason. Too tightly specifying the rules governing the cooperation and trust between fiduciary and beneficiary might inhibit the formation of genuine trust.[193] Thus, combining lax enforcement policies with the uncertainty generated by hortatory language (as in Meinhard v. Salmon) establishes legal incentives that can facilitate the development of intrinsic motivations, even for the bad man. On this explanation, then, the case for underenforcement is itself prophylactic: extensive enforcement of the cognitive aspects of fiduciary loyalty would be self-defeating.

In sum, if cognitivism is true, then the standards for living up to fiduciary loyalty are often far more demanding than the legal standards of accountability that courts and officials apply to fiduciaries. However, both the “acoustic separation” and “self-defeating” stories can explain this divergence between legal norms and legal enforcement.

Conclusion

Loyalty is, at least in part, a matter of cognition: how someone deliberates, what motivates her, the sturdiness of her commitments. This cognitive structure to loyalty in the world is as intuitive as it is important. To disregard the thoughts and plans of Iago and Littlefinger is to understate their treachery.

The same is true about fiduciary loyalty. Behavior is, of course, the most important concern of legal rules. However, a purely behavioral understanding of fiduciary duties is incomplete. Many widely-held legal propositions are difficult to explain without referencing a fiduciary’s cognition. Cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty challenges the most prominent amoralist accounts of fiduciary duties, especially proscriptivism and contractarianism, which define fiduciary duties solely in terms of how a fiduciary behaves.

Cognitivism does not necessarily resolve the longstanding debate between moralists and amoralists about fiduciary loyalty, let alone in other areas of law where similar debates arise.[194] Rather, it provides a common ground from which proponents of both positions might better understand the central norms of fiduciary law. Both inside the law and out, loyalty makes demands on the inside of you.


[*] *. Stephen R. Galoob is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law; Ethan J. Leib is the John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. For comments and questions on the draft, we thank Aditi Bagchi, Alan Brudner, Hanoch Dagan, Deborah DeMott, Chris Essert, Mark Gergen, Andrew Gold, John Goldberg, Jeff Gordon, Rob Kar, Dmitry Karshtedt, Larissa Katz, Greg Keating, Sung Hui Kim, Daniel Markovits, Lauren Scholz, Henry Smith, Steve Smith, Ben Zipursky, and, especially, Paul Miller and Zoë Sinel. We presented an earlier version of this paper at the North American Workshop on Private Law Theory at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

 [1]. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 136 (Can.) (“Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation ha[s] been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.”); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (“A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency. . . . [T]he beneficiary of the relation may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property of one sort or another. Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property to serve the ends of the fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to appropriate the property for his own use.”); Paul Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 McGill L.J. 235, 261–62 (2011) (“In my view, a sound definition of the fiduciary relationship [is that] a fiduciary relationship is one in which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).”) (emphasis omitted).

 [2]. Item Software (UK) Ltd. V. Fassihi [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244 (Eng.).

 [3].               See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law 180, 181 (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith, eds., 2018) (noting that “moralist” interpretations of fiduciary loyalty suggest that “fiduciary loyalty incorporates moral standards of loyalty or that it expresses moral ideals of selflessness”); Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law 261, 261 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds., 2014) (“Fiduciary duties are expressed in moral language of exacting honor, which is treasured by some as the essence of the area and as a flowery show by others. The moralists see in fiduciary law a fixed and mandatory system . . . .”); Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing our Money: The Law of Financial Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra, at 91, 103 (describing as “moralist” accounts of fiduciary loyalty that beneficiaries “are owed the highest degree of altruism” and/or that fiduciary law “should be particularly concerned with motives in the context of fiduciary relationships”).

 [4]. Examples of moralism about fiduciary law might include Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 Isr. L. Rev. 3, 15–17 (2000); Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 303, 338 (1999) (“Fiduciary relationships are not creatures only of law and lawyers. Fiduciary relationships and fiduciary duties reflect the precepts of social morality and practice.”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 795, 829–30 (1983) (“Courts regulate fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary.”); Matthew Harding, Trust and Fiduciary Law, 33 Oxford. J. Legal Studs. 81, 82 (2013) (arguing that “moral duties referring to trust play a role in the justification of fiduciary duties”); Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 3, at 126 (“By importing the loaded concept of loyalty from ethics and sociology, equity endeavors to encapsulate a subtle and complex aspect of the fiduciary relationship.”); Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged To Be Selfless?, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 3, at 142 (“[T]here is a legal requirement of loyalty, which is found in the positive law of fiduciary obligations and which is consistent with the requirements of the law’s philosophical foundations.”).

 [5].               Examples of scholarship that incorporate direct connections to moral concepts include Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 27, 47–55 (2003) and Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 655 (2010). The most prominent example in the field of legal ethics is Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1975). Recent examples of trust law moralism include Melanie Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 Geo. L.J. 67 (2005) and Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 2579 (2010).

 [6]. To call this position moralist is to beg important questions about the moral or normative significance of loyalty in the first place. See Simon Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (2007). As noted below, someone might adopt the moralist position about fiduciary loyalty while denying that loyalty has specific hallmarks of moral significance—for example, the capacity to change what someone is morally permitted or required to do.

 [7]. Andrew Gold, Interpreting Fiduciary Law, in Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law, supra note 3, at 37–38 [hereinafter Gold, Interpreting].

 [8]. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).

 [9]. Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).

 [10]. For example, sections 103(b) and 404(e) of the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) indicate that conflicted transactions can be authorized by a vote of partners and that a partner’s benefitting from conduct is not, per se, a violation of fiduciary duty. Elsewhere, the UPA specifically denies that the standards applicable to trustees are applicable to partners. See Uniform Partnership Act
§ 404, cmt. 5.

 [11]. See, e.g., In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1994) (“The conduct of attorneys is not measured by how close to the edge of thin ice they skate. The measure of an attorney’s conduct is not how much clarity can be squeezed out of the strict letter of the law, but how much honor can be poured into the generous spirit of lawyer-client relationships.”); Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 1992) (“There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than those of attorney and client . . . [and] few governed by sterner principles of morality and justice.” (quoting Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232, 247 (1850))); Darby v. Furman Co., 513 S.E.2d 848, 849 (S.C. 1999) (“Real estate agents occupy a fiduciary relationship with their clients and are under a legal obligation as well as a high moral duty to give loyal service to the principal.”); Owen v. Shelton, 277 S.E.2d 189, 192 (Va. 1981) (finding that fiduciary duties “illustrate[] the high regard the law holds for the fiduciary relationship, founded as it is upon one man’s trust in the integrity and fidelity of another”); Zastrow v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 60 (Wis. 2006) (“A breach of the duty of loyalty imports something different from mere incompetence; it connotes disloyalty or infidelity.” (internal citations omitted)).

 [12]. E.g., Wis. Stat. § 112.01(c) (2018) (“A thing is done ‘in good faith’ within the meaning of this section, when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or not.”); Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. 1978) (“Since the relationship of attorney-client is one fiduciary in nature, the attorney has the duty to exercise in all his relationships with this client-principal the most scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client’s interest.”). Lusina Ho summarizes developments in English company law as elevating “good faith” from “an exonerating circumstance in specific contexts to a general duty.” Lusina Ho, Good Faith and Fiduciary Duty in English Law, 4 J. Equity 19, 21 (2010).

 [13]. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003) (“[E]lementary trust law . . . confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch.”); United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“A lawyer’s duty to avoid conflict of interests arises from agency law. The ancient principle is that ‘no man can serve two masters.’ Matthew 6:24.”).

 [14]. Frankel, supra note 4, at 831.

 [15].               See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Must Salmon Love Meinhard? Agape and Partnership Fiduciary Duties, 17 Green Bag 2D 257, 270 (2014) (contending that moralized rhetoric of fiduciary law has instrumental value because, “[p]artners who love one another can trust one another. In turn, partners who trust one another will expend considerably less time and effort – and thus incur much lower costs – monitoring one another.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1675, 1696 (1990) (“The language expressing [fiduciary] norms is aspirational and studiously imprecise. The very ambiguity of the language conveys its moral content as the court’s refusal to set lines is designed to discourage marginal conduct by making it difficult for a fiduciary to determine the point at which self-serving conduct will be prohibited, and thus to encourage conduct well within the borders.”).

 [16]. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & Econ. 425, 427 (1993).

 [17]. Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding the duty of good faith in carrying out a contract “is, as it were, halfway between a fiduciary duty (the duty of utmost good faith) and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud. Despite its moralistic overtones it is no more the injection of moral principles into contract law than the fiduciary concept itself is”).

 [18]. Gold, Interpreting, supra note 7, at 38–42 (citing, inter alia, William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law, 52 McGill L.J. 605 (2007)).

 [19]. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 429 (“[W]e seek knowledge of when fiduciary duties arise and what form they take, not a theory of rhetoric—a theory of what judges do, not of explanations they give.”).

 [20]. See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of Ownership, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 3, at 339, 341; Andrew Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 3, at 176, 192 [hereinafter Gold, Loyalties].

 [21]. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. Corp. L. 43, 49n.16 (2008) (explaining that fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and obedience “vary in their particular content and contours among various kinds of fiduciary relationships”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 879 (“Although one can identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force in different contexts involving different types of parties and relationships.”).

 [22]. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 432.

 [23]. See, e.g., Gold, Loyalties, supra note 20, at 193–94 (“Loyalty duties are an essential feature of fiduciary relationships, but no specific conception of loyalty appears to carry the day. . . . [P]erhaps part of what is special about fiduciary law is that it requires different kinds of loyalty for different kinds of relationship[s]. Loyalty varies in our social experiences—it also varies in the law.”). Stronger and weaker versions of the pluralist position are possible. On the weaker version, certain aspects of fiduciary norms (for example, the standards for living up to the duty of loyalty or the implications of violating the duty of loyalty) differ across jurisdictions or domains of law, while others (for example, the overall justification for fiduciary duties and the remedies available to beneficiaries for violations by fiduciaries) might overlap. On a stronger version of pluralism, no aspects of fiduciary norms necessarily generalize across legal contexts.

 [24]. E.g., Hanoch Dagan, Fiduciary Law and Pluralism, in Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., forthcoming 2019).

 [25]. Jordon v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).

 [26]. Gold, Interpreting, supra note 7, at 39–42. Gold observes that a variety of other judicial opinions, “perhaps most notably . . . Delaware corporate law,” also employ hypothetical bargaining analysis. Id. at 41.

 [27]. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“For every case in fiduciary law that applies an efficiency-focused, hypothetical bargain approach to ascertaining fiduciary duties, there is another case that applies a morally resonant, deontological alternative.”).

 [28]. A weaker form of pluralism—which acknowledges a thin core—might allow that core to cross-reference moral norms. Since our definition of moralism requires a deeper connection of fiduciary law to ordinary loyalty, it is likely that even such a weak pluralism would be amoralist on our terms. Not much, however, turns on this classification.

 [29]. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law Without Loyalty, in Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law 213 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2017); J.E. Penner, Is Loyalty a Virtue, and Even If It Is, Does It Really Help Explain Fiduciary Liability?, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, 159 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller ed., 2014); Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. Toronto L.J. 570 (2013); Miller, supra note 3. One common element among all of these views is that crucial structural features inherent in fiduciary relationships are not necessarily realized in non-legal relationships, and vice versa.

 [30]. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 29, at 161–62. This incompatibilist logic might be extended to a variety of other dimensions of “moral” or “ordinary” loyalty, such as the concern with devotion or motivation. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 925, 926 (2006) (“Loyalty for the law’s purposes, unlike Josiah Royce’s, does not mandate an all-embracing “thoroughgoing devotion” to the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty. Its demands neither disregard for the autonomy of an actor subject to fiduciary duties nor require an all-encompassing subordination of the actor’s interests to those of the beneficiary. Instead, within the scope of their relationship, the fiduciary duty of loyalty proscribes self-dealing by the actor and other forms of self-advantaging conduct without the beneficiary’s consent.”); Miller, supra note 3, at 20 (“Notwithstanding the moralizing rhetoric of judges in select fiduciary cases, the law rarely, if ever, requires of fiduciaries the kind of devotion that we expect of persons with moral loyalties.”).

 [31]. Alternatively, the incompatibilist might contend that these requirements are self-defeating when they are backed by the threat of legal sanction. See discussion infra Section III.C (exploring this argument from self-defeat at greater length).

 [32]. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 Legal Theory 106, 129 (2014). Examples of proscriptivism include Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 Law Q. Rev. 452 (2005); Robert Flannigan, The Core Nature of Fiduciary Accountability, 2009 N.Z. L. Rev. 375; Darryn Jensen, Prescription and Proscription in Fiduciary Obligations, 21 King’s L.J. 333 (2010); and Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 899 (2011). Other views adopt a proscriptivist understanding of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, but not of the (arguably) fiduciary duty of care. See generally, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law 197 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).

 [33]. See generally, e.g., Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (2011); Jensen, supra note 32.

 [34]. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 32, at 903–06.

 [35]. See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note 32 passim.

 [36]. See, e.g., Conaglen, supra note 33. Darryn Jensen draws a similar distinction between fiduciary obligations and “logically prior” responsibilities, which are not essentially fiduciary. Jensen, supra note 32, at 336.

 [37]. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).

 [38]. Id. (construing the bad man as caring “only for the material consequences which . . .  knowledge [of the law] enables him to predict”).

 [39]. See Yuval Feldman, The Law of Good People: Challenging States’ Ability to Regulate Human Behavior (2018); Hanoch Dagan, Between Rationality and Benevolence: The Happy Ambivalence of Law and Legal Theory, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 191, 191 (2010); Rebecca Stone, Legal Design for the “Good Man”, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1767, 1767 (2016).

 [40]. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1 passim (1990); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 424; James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L.Q. Rev. 324, 326 n.173 (2010); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 627 (1995).

 [41]. See Kelli Alces, The Fiduciary Gap, 40 Iowa J. Corp. L. 351, 375 (2015) (“To determine the hypothetical bargain, we must reach a conclusion about what the parties would have agreed given their requirements and expectations of the relationship.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 431; Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 537, 541 (1997).

 [42]. See Stephen R. Galoob & Adam Hill, Norms, Attitudes and Compliance, 50 Tulsa L. Rev. 613, 622–26 (2015) (summarizing “reductive behaviorism” that characterizes law-and-economics understanding of social and legal norms).

 [43]. Richard McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, in Handbook of Law and Economics 1573, 1576 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (defining norms as “behavioral regularities supported at least in part by normative attitudes” and conventions as “behavioral regularities that lack such normative attitudes”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 747, 751 (1998) (“[A]n operative legal norm characterizes the behavior to which legal sanctions will attach.”).

 [44]. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 41, at 353 (“That duty of loyalty to the other party guides courts in deciding what the parties would have agreed about how the fiduciary should behave in unanticipated circumstances.”); Langbein, supra note 40, at 658 (“Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody the default regime that the parties to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for regulating the trustee’s behavior in these settings in which it is impractical to foresee precise circumstances and to specify more exact terms.”).

 [45]. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987).

 [46]. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1046–49 (1991).

 [47]. Sitkoff, supra note 32, at 201.

 [48]. Id. at 202. To assess the fiduciary’s satisfaction of the duty of care solely in “objective” terms is to presuppose behaviorism in several ways. Due to their relative ease of monitoring, behavioral considerations are the most relevant to reducing agency costs. Further, the modal beneficiary can be expected to care ex ante about the fiduciary’s behavior, especially given a prior methodological assumption that the beneficiary is agnostic between the fiduciary’s performing or paying damages. Moreover, given the possibility of contracting around default terms, a contractarian account can deny any inherent problems with presuming an objective standard. If a beneficiary has strong preferences regarding the fiduciary’s cognition, then the parties could bargain for adoption of a more subjective standard.

 [49]. Id. at 202–03.

 [50]. Alces, supra note 41, at 356.

 [51]. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 40, at 71–72.

 [52]. Compare Michael Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics 5 (2010) (“It is better to think that ‘cause’ is univocal; it means the same thing in contexts of attributing responsibility as in contexts of explanation: it refers to a natural relation that holds between events or states of affairs. . . . [W]hat criminal law and the law of torts mean by ‘cause’ is what we ordinarily mean by ‘cause’ as we explain the world, viz some kind of natural relation.”), with Jane Stapleton, An ‘Extended But-For’ Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations, 35 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 697, 697 (2015) (“Legal enquiries . . . differ from philosophical ones in terms of the character of factors [that] law is prepared to recognize as appropriate candidates for being a ‘cause’ of the existence of a particular phenomenon. . . . [L]aw is not constrained by . . . metaphysical commitments and so it seamlessly accommodates as ‘causes’ factors variously characterised as specific events, facts, states of affairs, aspects of conduct events or things, absences, omissions, information, and
reasons . . . .”).

 [53].               Compare John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 Geo. L.J. 441, 450–51 (2016) (positing that the legal definition of “cruel” punishment should be assessed entirely in terms of a punishment’s effects, in contrast to ordinary notion according on which the punisher’s intention is also relevant to assessing cruelty), with Meghan Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 81, 124 (2010) (positing that legal definition of “cruelty” overlaps with ordinary notion of term, according to which cruel punishment is “exceptionally brutal” and involves “inflicting pain for a purpose other than punishment”).

 [54]. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 708 (2007); Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 1 (1980).

 [55]. See Michael Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 801, 802 (2008) (“[T]he law of contract is not concerned with promises as such and . . . contract and promise do not diverge in a way that calls for justification.”).

 [56]. See Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Term?, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 501, 502–03 (2015).

 [57]. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 429.

 [58]. Our use of the term “cognitivism” differs from Gregory Alexander’s “cognitive theory of fiduciary relationships.” Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 767 (2000). Alexander’s approach focuses on the likely cognitive biases of judges and fact-finders interpreting fiduciary law. Our interest is with more fundamental questions about the nature of fiduciary relationships and the cognitive requirements of fiduciary loyalty. Nor does our use of the term implicate the metaethical position known as “cognitivism,” which holds that moral statements express genuinely cognitive phenomena and are truth-apt. See Alexander Miller, Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction 3 (2d ed., 2013). Apologies to Ben Zipursky, who advised us to jettison “cognitivism” because of its connotation in metaethics. We almost certainly did not attribute the requisite significance to his advice in our practical deliberations.

 [59]. For example, some commentators argue that loyalty has an inextricably affective dimension: if someone does not feel specific feelings on behalf of a person or cause, then she is not loyal to that person or cause. See Keller, supra note 6, at 21. Others deny that loyalty has such an affective component, contending that someone can be loyal to a person or cause without feeling specific emotions (or even being disposed to). See John Kleinig, Loyalty, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (rev. ed. 2017) (“[F]eelings of loyalty are probably not constitutive of loyalty, even if it is unusual to find loyalty that is affectless.”).

 [60]. On these accounts, someone’s loyalty to a person or cause might require her to act in ways that are otherwise optional, or even permit her to act in ways that are otherwise forbidden. See, e.g., David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape 251 (2012) (“[T]he special value of friendship derives in part from the bonds of loyalty that it entails. The involvement of obligation in friendship is part of what makes friendship the great good that it is and the same is true of many other valuable relationships. Thus our interest in friendship evinces a normative interest, an interest in obligation for its own sake.”). Other accounts dispute the normative significance of loyalty either in part (for example, by denying that loyalty can generate permissions) or in whole (for example, by denying that loyalty can generate reasons or obligations). See, e.g., Keller, supra note 6, at 144–45. A similar divide arises in debates over the normative significance of patriotism: for example, whether loyalty provides a basis for political obligation.

 [61]. See Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 Yale L.J. 1820, 1828 (2016); Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, The Core of Fiduciary Political Theory, in Research Handbook of Fiduciary Law 401, 40712 (2018); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Principles and Public Office, in Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 24, at 20–25.

 [62]. And perhaps, enraged by the rumor that Othello had conducted an affair with Emilia, Iago’s wife. William Shakespeare, Othello act 1, sc. 3, 1. 380–83 (Burton Raffel ed., Yale Univ. Press 2005) (1622). (“[I]t is thought abroad that ‘twixt my sheets/He’s done my office. I know not if’t be true/But I, for mere suspicion in that kind/Will do as if for surety.”). One disturbing interpretation of Iago’s shifting rationalizations is that they reflect “motive-hunting,” an “attempt to bring intellectual speculation to bear on a malignity that [Iago] does not really understand himself.” Laurence Lerner, The Machiavel and the Moor, 9 Essays in Crit. 339, 342–44 (1959).

 [63]. Shakespeare, supra note 62, act 2, sc. 3, 1. 325–26.

 [64]. For example, Iago leads Othello to notice the most compelling evidence of Desdemona’s (supposed) treachery in the following passage, during which he feigns to argue for her fidelity:

Iago: Her honour is an essence that’s not seen:

They have it very oft that have it not;

But for the handkerchiefs—

Othello: By heaven, I would most gladly have forgot it:

Thou said’st O, it comes o’er my memory,

As doth the raven o’er the infected house,

Boding to all he had my handkerchief.

Shakespeare, supra note 62, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 19–22. The “he” in the last sentence refers to Cassio, who has Desdemona’s handkerchief only because Iago had given it to him.

 [65]. See Keller, supra note 6, at 2–3.

Just because someone deliberatively follows a principled pattern of behavior, or is committed—perhaps fiercely—to a cause, does not mean that she is loyal. . . . [T]he facts about how a person acts are not in themselves enough to tell us whether, or to what, she is loyal. If I reliably keep my promises to you, then that might be because you are someone to whom I am loyal. Or, it might be because I believe that people should always keep their promises, . . . or because I promised your father that if I made you any promises I would keep them.

Id.

 [66]. See Philip Pettit, The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect 84–85 (2015); Henry S. Richardson, Moral Entanglements: The Ancillary-Care Obligations of Medical Researchers 65, 85, 95–96 (2012) (arguing that moral duties can morph and arise incidentally based on new information generated from types of interactions); Nicholas Southwood, Democracy as a Modally Demanding Value, 49 Noûs 504, 505 (2015).

 [67]. William P. MacNeil, Machiavellian Fantasy and the Game of Laws, 57 Critical Q. 34, 41 (2015) (For Littlefinger, “[s]urvival entails being ready, willing and able to advance one’s cause through any and all means, including . . . taking the life of his not-so-fair lady wife, . . . all the while further plotting to exterminate his pathetic little stepson, Lord Robert, the heir to the Eyrie and the guardianship of the West.”).

 [68]. Game of Thrones: The Climb (HBO television broadcast May 5, 2013).

 [69]. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (Am. Law Inst. 1979); see also Longaker v. Evans, 32 S.W.3d 725, 733 (Tex. App. 2000).

 [70]. For example, the “prejudice” requirements in “ineffective assistance of counsel” or collateral relief contexts do not indicate that non-prejudicial betrayals are not themselves juridical or legal betrayals.

 [71]. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999) (“It is the agent’s disloyalty, not any resulting harm, that violates the fiduciary relationship . . . .”).

 [72]. See, e.g., Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (Am. Law Inst. 1958).

 [73]. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1959); see also In re Bradish’s Estate, 8 Pa. D. 38, 42 (Orphans’ Ct. 1898) (“It is no answer to say, that after all there may be no loss upon the judgments; this is little more than a plea, that a negligent trustee should be allowed a further opportunity to take risks, because the inexcusable risks he has already taken have not yet fallen out against him.”).

 [74]. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 622–23 (Alaska 2001).

 [75]. Id. at 624.

 [76]. Id. at 631.

 [77]. It does not follow that issues of harm are irrelevant to the assessment of Friedman’s misconduct. Then-applicable disciplinary rules (which tracked the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions) directed the court to assess any injury caused by Friedman’s misconduct, and the Friedman Court found that Friedman’s actions inflicted “actual injury to the public, because ‘the public suffers injury whenever a lawyer fails to maintain personal integrity by improperly handling funds held in trust.’” Id. However, the issue of harm was relevant to the secondary question of the kind discipline (suspension or disbarment) that Friedman should have been subjected to for having violated his fiduciary duties to clients. It was not relevant to the primary question of whether Friedman violated his fiduciary duties in the first place.

 [78]. In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171 (Sept. 4, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Fuchs v. Wren Holdings, LLC, 129 A.3d 882 (Del. 2015).

 [79].               Id. at *5, *25.

 [80]. Id. at *13, *21, *42.

 [81]. Id. at *140.

 [82]. Although the Nine Systems court did not award disgorgement or rescission on account of the finding of a fair price, it granted attorney’s fees to plaintiffs for successfully establishing that defendants had breached their fiduciary duties. See id. at *160. For another case—this time a trust law example—in which a court found a breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of damage to the plaintiff and then remediated through awarding of attorney’s fees, see In re Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

 [83]. See In re Nine Sys., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171, at *145–46. A companion opinion in Ross Holding & Management Co. v. Advance Realty Group, C.A. No. 4113-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 173, at *60 (Sept. 4, 2014) similarly reinforces that fair dealing and fair process is a part of fiduciary obligation, even when the relevant transaction produces a price that loyal fiduciaries would have reached.

 [84]. See Conaglen, supra note 33, at 70–71, 74.

 [85]. This approach would require the contractarian to abandon the methodological commitment to behaviorism, which (as noted above) many legal economists posit as a core tenet of the contractarian position. Or it would require thinking about process as just another kind of behavior.

 [86]. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Strict Character of Fiduciary Liability, 2006 N.Z. L. Rev. 209 passim (2006); Penner, supra note 29, at 175; Smith, supra note 29 passim. In some jurisdictions, the character of fiduciary liability is less-than-strict, in that it is subject to exceptions (for example, “entire fairness” review under Delaware corporate law). Yet even these types of exceptions are consistent with the “strict” character of fiduciary liability in that questions of neither liability nor exception turn on aspects of the fiduciary’s cognition.

 [87]. An example of this dynamic in the private law might be found in Hollywood Silver Fox Farm, Ltd. v. Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 (Eng.), in which the court found that although a neighbor had a right to shoot a gun off on his own property, it would be actionable if the neighbor intended this shooting to disturb the breeding activities of the fox farm next door.

 [88]. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 630 n.37 (Alaska 2001).

 [89]. Id. at 625–26, 630, 632.

 [90]. Id. at 632.

 [91]. Id. at 630, 633.

 [92].               Id. at 632–33.

 [93].               See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 20 (2010). Although Moore’s conclusions about the presumption against strict liability in these contexts seem motivated by policy considerations pertaining to the consequences of lawyer discipline on the lawyer, one might see these cognitive requirements as themselves flowing from fiduciary obligation, thus requiring no explicit codification. See Charles Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 689 (2006). But see Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics, 186–87 (7th ed. 2005) (finding many fiduciary obligations to trigger “absolute liability” with no mens rea requirement).

 [94]. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).

 [95]. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 269 (2013).

 [96]. Id.

 [97]. Id. at 273–74.

 [98]. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 243, cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1959) (compensation ordinarily denied to trustee who misappropriates trust property or “intentionally or negligently mismanages the whole trust”); DeMott, supra note 30, at 929 (“[A] fiduciary may forfeit commissions or other compensation paid or otherwise due during a period of disloyal service, although, at least in the agency context, courts qualify the availability of forfeiture by requiring that the breach have had a deliberate character, often that it have been ‘wilful’ or ‘egregious.’”).

 [99]. For example, the UK’s law controlling trustees, Trustee Act 2000 § 31(1) (UK), protects trustees, indemnifying them for expenses—even if those expenses are unauthorized—when the trustee acts in “good faith.” Evidence regarding the fiduciary’s deliberation therefore even provides immunity against liability in certain circumstances. See also Trustee Act 1925 § 15 (Gr. Brit.); In re Smith’s Estate [1937] Ch. 636 (Eng.); Vyse v. Foster (1872) LR 8 Ch. App. 309, 336–67 (Eng.). This feature of UK trustee law is discussed in Ho, supra note 12, at 17–18.

 [100]. The proscriptivist might respond by defining the dynamics identified in P2 as deviant or, alternatively, by contending that these are “nominate,” rather than distinctively “fiduciary,” aspects of fiduciary duties. This strategy is not a promising way to identify what is distinctive about fiduciary duties, since it pre-commits to defining the distinctiveness of fiduciary responsibilities in terms of their unique aspects. By conflating distinctiveness and uniqueness, this strategy rules out in advance the possibility that what is distinctive about fiduciary responsibilities is a unique combination of “nominate” duties, none of which are themselves unique to fiduciary relationships. To analogize, other hockey players might be able to pass, shoot, skate, evade checks, score goals, and set up assists as well as Wayne Gretzky could. Gretzky, however, was a unique hockey player because of his combination of these (non-unique) talents. Yet if distinctiveness were defined entirely in terms of the uniqueness of specific components, as many proscriptivists suggest we should do to establish the fiduciarity of a duty, then one could reach the risible conclusion that Wayne Gretzky was not a distinctive hockey player.

 [101]. On the role of fault in contract law, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword: Fault in American Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1341, 1346–47 (2009).

 [102].               Neither of these incompatibilities is based on a conceptual commitment. One possible version of proscriptivism might see a fiduciary’s mental state as relevant to the formulation of how to provide relief for violations of the no-profit and no-conflict rules, either of which could turn on cognitive considerations. Likewise, one could imagine a version of contractarianism on which mental states mattered to performance—that is, in which both the behavior and cognition of a counterparty were modeled as relevant to a hypothetical bargainer. However, most theorists who embrace proscriptivism and contractarianism would likely reject these modifications, since advocates of these views see their implicit behaviorism as a strength, rather than as a weakness.

 [103].               See R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts 133–34 (1997); Gideon Yaffe, Attempts 21–25 (2010).

 [104]. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 5(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (emphasis added). The comments explain that the same standards for assessing the charge of attempt in criminal law also apply in the lawyer disciplinary context—namely, whether the lawyer had the requisite intent to violate the provision and took a substantial step in the course of conduct that was planned to culminate in the commission of the offense (and that, on the whole, strongly corroborates this purpose). Id. § 5(2) cmt. e.

 [105]. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1983); see also Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 746, 772 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating attorney’s unsuccessful attempts to take over company constituted violations of fiduciary duty); Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 212–13 (Ct. App. 1997) (stating attorney’s attempted and unsuccessful betrayal of client interests by selling out client for a personal payment was a breach of fiduciary duty).

 [106]. Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stating an agent’s unsuccessful attempt to harm the principal was a breach of fiduciary duty); Town & Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 189 A.2d 390, 392–94 (Conn. 1963) (stating an agent’s solicitation of principal’s clients is a breach of fiduciary obligation); Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 1958) (same). But see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.04 (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (disallowing solicitation of clients but providing narrow window for “preparation” to compete with the principal).

 [107]. E.g., Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 188–89 (3rd Cir. 1981) (“A merger intended solely to ‘freeze out’ or ‘cash out’ minority equity holders from their positions may be enjoined as an attempted breach of that fiduciary duty”); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (“[A]ny attempt to ‘squeeze out’ a minority shareholder must be viewed as a breach of . . . fiduciary duty.”).

 [108]. Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 284–85 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding employees who attempted to sell their employers business can be found to have violated “the most basic norms”).

 [109]. E.g., Item Software (UK) Ltd. v. Fassihi [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244, para 41 (Eng.) (holding that unsuccessful attempt to usurp a business opportunity violated director’s duty to confess, which was entailed by the “fundamental” fiduciary duty to “act in what he in good faith considers to be the best interests of his company”); Shepherds Invs. Ltd. v. Walters [2006] EWHC 836 (Ch).

 [110]. The different standards for determining remoteness are reflected in different ways of specifying the actus reus required for attempt liability. See, e.g., Duff, supra note 103, at 33–75; Yaffe, supra note 103, at 255–83.

 [111].               E.g., Mattern & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Seidel, 678 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 n.10 (D. Del. 2010) (recognizing an action for attempted breach of fiduciary duty in a “preparations to compete” case); Shepherds Invs. Ltd. v. Walters [2006] EWHC 836 (Ch) (suggesting that preparatory steps to breach fiduciary obligation is itself a betrayal). But see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.04 (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (suggesting that some room for permissible preparation is part of the law of agency).

 [112]. To be sure, cognitivists might be concerned with imposing too onerous standards on fiduciaries. The concern might arise out of fairness (the notion that controlling one’s own motivations and deliberation, if not impossible, is far more difficult than controlling one’s behavior) or as a potential defeater to the ostensible benefits of discretion. To allay this concern, the cognitivist might draw a further parallel to the criminal law distinction between liability for completed and attempted crimes. For result or status crimes, liability can be grounded on satisfying the behavioral and/or result elements (for example, by bringing about a prohibited result or behaving in a prohibited way), even though the defendant does not have a highly culpable mental state. Yet a highly culpable mental state is required in order to establish liability for an attempt of the same crime. For example, someone who has a mental state of negligence or recklessness can be liable for battery, but liability for attempted battery requires a purposive mental state. On this logic, the cognitivist might concede that liability for a successful breach of fiduciary duty can be based on low-grade mental states like negligence or even without a mens rea, while still maintaining that a higher-order mental state is required to ground liability for inchoate violations of fiduciary duty.

 [113]. Conaglen, supra note 33, at 459–60.

 [114]. Judith Viorst, Alexander and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day (1972).

 [115].               To be sure, an attempted breach of contract might give a promisee a justification for demanding an assurance from her promisor—but it would not be itself treated as a breach of the underlying contractual commitment. That said, some courts might see an announced intent to breach or anticipatory breach as a kind of “attempted breach of contract.” See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 933 F.2d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 1991).

 [116]. Lionel Smith concludes that fiduciary duties require the fiduciary to act with an appropriate motivation, even though (he argues) this requirement is not and should not be legally enforceable. See Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in Rationalizing Property, Equity, and Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn 53 passim (J. Getzler ed., 2003). But see Smith, supra note 4, at 152; Strine et al., supra note 5, at 633 (“[Under Delaware law] good faith has long been used as the key element in defining the state of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary.”).

 [117]. See, for example, Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 31 F. Supp. 3d 237, 259–60 (D.D.C. 2014) and the discussion of this case in Deborah A. DeMott, The Poseur as Agent, in Agency Law in Commercial Practice 35, 44–45 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2016).

 [118]. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).

 [119]. See MiMedx Grp., Inc. v. Fox, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121801, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017) (“A corporate officer who sabotages the company may do so for no personal gain, but nevertheless breach a fiduciary duty owed to firm.”); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2008) (holding that allegations of sabotage is a violation of fiduciary duty).

 [120]. See Ho, supra note 12, at 50; Lusina Ho & Pey Woan Lee, A Director’s Duty to Confess: A Matter of Good Faith?, 66 Cambridge L.J. 347, 360–61 (2007).

 [121]. Commonwealth v. Washington, 880 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2005).

 [122]. Id. at 544.

 [123]. In support of this conclusion, Washington noted a letter to a potential defense psychiatric expert in which trial counsel stated that Washington “may epitomize the banality of evil.” Id. at 541.

 [124]. Id. at 541–42.

 [125].               Id. at 544.

 [126].               Id. at 541.

 [127].               Id. at 542.

 [128].               Id. at 543. In support of this point, the Washington Court cited Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1294–98, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding a cognizable, but not dispositive, Sixth Amendment claim where attorney failed to investigate potential alibis or relevant information, did nearly no preparation for case, and admitted afterward in affidavit that he abhorred homosexuals—like his client—and believed that these feelings affected his representation) and Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1994) (cognizable, but not dispositive, ineffective assistance claim where attorney called client “a stupid . . . son of a bitch” and opined that client should be imprisoned for life).

 [129].               Washington, 880 A.2d at 545; see also Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (lawyer violated the duty of loyalty through “a total failure to actively advocate his client’s cause” and “repeated expressions of contempt for his client for his alleged actions”).

 [130]. Washington, 880 A.2d at 545.

 [131]. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).

 [132]. Sitkoff, supra note 32, at 202. Under this standard, the duty of good faith, the duty of honesty, the duty of fidelity, the duty to confess, the “fraud on a power” doctrine, and the “proper purposes” doctrine might all be classified as implementing rules.

 [133]. Item Software (UK) Ltd. V. Fassihi [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244 (Eng.).

 [134]. Ho & Lee, supra note 120, at 350.

 [135].               Brandeaux Advisers (UK) Ltd. v Chadwick [2010] EWHC (QB) 3241 [47]; P & V Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Porto, [2006] V.S.C. 131 [23], [42].

 [136]. Fassihi, [2004] EWCA (Civ), at [41].

 [137]. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. Phil. 5, 11 (1971).

 [138].               Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).

 [139].               Id. § 8.01 cmt. b.

 [140].               Id. (citing Greenwood v. Koven, 880 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), which hypothesizes that an auctioneer’s decision about whether to rescind a sale made by a coin-toss was paradigmatic case of an action taken in bad faith). Of course, many fiduciary duties arise in relationships that also involve contractual duties. Wantonness might violate not only a fiduciary duty, but also specific contractual duties (like the duty of good faith). See Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law 209, 209–10 (2014). Yet in such relationships, fiduciary loyalty is not superfluous to a contractual duty of good faith; rather, fiduciary loyalty picks out a range of behaviors and motivations that would not (obviously or directly) be condemned by contract law alone. We discuss this issue more extensively in Galoob & Leib, supra note 32, at 128–29.

 [141]. Strine et al., supra note 5, at 633.

 [142]. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).

 [143]. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).

 [144]. Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 859, 863 (2015) (emphasis removed).

 [145]. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 760 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Disney III).

 [146]. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769, 1781 (2007) (emphasizing that the claim in Disney was not that the board was conflicted but that it was “simply rubber-stamping” Eisner’s proposals).

 [147]. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) (Disney IV); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Mattter?, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1027, 1047 (2013) (“[G]ood faith is fundamentally about state of mind—the quality of a director’s intentions vis-à-vis the company.”).

 [148]. Leahy, supra note 144, at 867. Fiduciary loyalty also prohibits a director from acting for “greed, hatred, lust, envy, revenge . . . shame or pride.” Disney III, 907 A.2d at 754 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

 [149]. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Disney II).

 [150]. Id.

 [151]. For the purposes of our argument, it does not matter how much “good faith” or “bad faith” in corporate law is meant to be evaluated objectively or subjectively. Compare Strine et al., supra note 4, at 655 (arguing for a subjective understanding), with Melvin E. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (2006) (advocating a more objective approach). Nor does it matter whether the duty of good faith should be subsumed under the duty of loyalty. Nor does it matter whether the duty of loyalty is disclaimable or how infrequently Delaware courts have upheld claims of bad faith. See Leahy, supra note 144, at 875–76, 880–82. Rather, Delaware courts’ explanations of the standards for fiduciary faithfulness indicate, consistent with P4, that some motivational structures are inconsistent with fiduciary obligation, which is enough to show that P4 is part of fiduciary law.

 [152]. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent 96–97 (2005) (contending that “blank promises,” in which one party intends at the time of agreement not to act in the way that he or she promises, lack mutual value).

 [153]. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 393, 397 n.15 (2007) (“[W]hat may appear to be low effort may actually be the result of sabotage by another agent (e.g., at a bottleneck point) attempting to mask relative effort. In that instance, the sabotaging agent commits the fiduciary breach.”). For the reasons described above, Flannigan’s conclusion cannot be reconciled with his embrace of proscriptivism.

 [154]. Perhaps, the proscriptivist might contend, the saboteur and the wanton violate a duty to the beneficiary, but not a fiduciary duty. On an alternative reading of the proscriptivist position, one might see the saboteur and the wanton as violating (nominate) duties of care, rather than duties of fiduciary loyalty. However, this solution does not resolve the normative or descriptive gaps in proscriptivism. For one thing, it is not clear that the saboteur or the wanton violates an objective duty of care; in the Fassihi case, for example, Fassihi’s advice would satisfy an objective duty of care, and yet it still violated a fiduciary duty owed to the entity.

 [155]. Elsewhere, we have argued that sensitivity is a component of ordinary loyalty as well. See Leib & Galoob, supra note 61, at 1843.

 [156]. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 179 (1981); Fred I. Dretske, Epistemic Operators, 67 J. Phil. 1007 passim (1970). See generally Sherrilyn Roush, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science (2005); Keith DeRose, Insensitivity Is Back, Baby!, 24 Phil. Perspectives 161 (2010); David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 557 (2015).

 [157]. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court found that a trustee bank violated its duty of loyalty based on “insensitivity . . . in the performance of its duty of loyalty to the trust’s beneficiaries” by retaining the trustee bank’s own stock in the trust. First Ala. Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v. Spragins, 515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987). Similarly, in cases involving professional discipline of a lawyer for violation of applicable rules of professional conduct, courts often distinguish the lawyer’s insensitivity to fiduciary duty as a basis for finding a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., In re Evans, 578 A.2d 1141, 1151 (D.C. 1990); In re Lupo, 851 N.E.2d 404, 414 (Mass. 2006); Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 926 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).

 [158]. E.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in Principals and Agents 55, 7576 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). See generally Markovits, supra note 140.

 [159]. See Leib & Galoob, supra note 61, at 1843–44.

 [160]. See, e.g., Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts. Inc.), 385 B.R. 586, 591–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (finding a failure to monitor claim cognizable as a breach of fiduciary duty).

 [161]. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 967, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). A critic might note the extreme burdens to grounding liability for corporate directors solely on Caremark factors. Id. at 967 (“The theory here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”). Our main contention here, however, is that Caremark’s monitoring duty is a component of the duty of loyalty, regardless of whether or how the duty to monitor figures into litigation strategies or standards of review.

 [162]. See FDIC ex rel. Wheatland Bank v. Spangler, 836 F. Supp.2d 778, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (refusing to allow the business judgment rule to insulate defendants who “disregarded regulatory warnings of unsafe lending practices and monthly reports reflecting dangerous loan concentration and excessive growth . . . and took no action to reform underwriting practices in response to criticism.”).

 [163]. An example here might be possible conflicts of interest in trust law—not actual conflicts but the mere “possibility of conflict.” See Penner, supra note 29, at 168 (citing Keech v. Sandford, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 741, Cas. Ch. 61, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726)). A similar set of considerations apply to positional conflicts of interest of lawyers, which “occur[] when a law firm adopts a legal position for one client seeking a particular legal result that is directly contrary to the position taken on behalf of another present or former client, seeking an opposite legal result, in a completely unrelated matter.” John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1993). Positional conflicts are problematic when

there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. . . . If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt 24 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1983). In other words, a positional conflict can violate a lawyer’s duty of loyalty on the grounds that it might harm the client’s interest or inhibit the lawyer’s representation of the client, regardless of whether the conflict has or actually does have these effects.

 [164]. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549–50 (1961) (emphasis added).

 [165]. See, e.g., Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 807, 856 (2017) (“The value of a lawyer’s loyalty is often expressed from the perspective of the client: [It]  . . . ensures that a lawyer will not abandon a client as soon as a more lucrative opportunity arises.”). The possibility that a flimsy commitment can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty does not imply that fiduciary loyalty is inevitably “maximal,” in the sense that George Fletcher uses that term, see George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships 61–77 (1995), or what Matthew Harding calls a “thick” form of interpersonal trust, see Harding, supra note 4, at 83. Allowing some form of contingency in the fiduciary’s commitment to the beneficiary is necessary to make sense of the possibility that, for example, employees might have fiduciary duties toward employers in an age of at-will employment. See Matthew I. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 Geo. L.J. 819, 847–54 (2016); Marian Riedy & Kim Sperduto, At-Will Fiduciaries: The Anomalies of a Duty of Loyalty in the Twenty-First Century, 93 Neb. L. Rev. 267, 272–79 (2014). Our point is not that the requisite sturdiness is uniform across fiduciary relationships; rather, in contexts where fiduciary duties arise, some kinds of flimsy commitments would be sufficient to constitute a violation of fiduciary duty. For example, even among at-will employees, an untriggered, secret plan to betray would constitute a breach of fiduciary loyalty. Such a violation of fiduciary loyalty might be appraised either in terms of planned treachery (which runs afoul of P3) or in terms of the flimsiness of commitment that is evinced by such a plan (which runs afoul of P5).

 [166]. See generally John Leubsdorf, Conflicts of Interest: Slicing the Hot Potato Doctrine, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 251 (2011).

 [167]. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7(a)(1) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1983).

 [168]. Id. at r. 1.9(a).

 [169]. Id. at r. 1.16(b)(1).

 [170]. Picker Int’l., Inc. v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987); see also Ex parte AmSouth Bank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715, 721–22 (Ala. 1991) (“[A] law firm should not be allowed to abandon its absolute duty of loyalty to one of its clients so that it can benefit from a conflict of interest that it has created.”).

 [171]. ValuePart, Inc. v. Clements, No. 06 C 2709, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98167, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2006).

 [172]. Arthur R. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 707, 710 (2012).

 [173]. Id. at 709–10.

 [174]. Several U.S. Supreme Court opinions have found that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 creates fiduciary duty for advisers. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–80 (1977); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181–82 (1963). Although this legal question is settled, there is a dispute among scholars of fiduciary law about whether fiduciary duties should apply to financial advisers. For example, Paul Miller, one of the preeminent theorists of fiduciary law, contends that financial advisers do not have the kind of discretionary authority that grounds fiduciary duties. On Miller’s “fiduciary powers” view, advisers “are not fiduciaries . . . by virtue of giving advice. Instead, they are fiduciaries only where they exercise discretionary power over the practical interests of their clients. In such cases, provision of advice is incidental to the exercise of discretionary power.” Paul Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 3, at 63, 84.

 [175]. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 1993); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 1989).

 [176]. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–.21 (218). On May 22, 2017, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2017-02, providing temporary non-enforcement of the new fiduciary rules.

 [177]. See generally The DOL Fiduciary Rule Explained,  Investopedia (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/updates/dol-fiduciary-rule  (explaining the history and status of the DOL’s rule). The courts have not been univocal on whether the rule is valid. Compare Market Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 676, 685–86 (10th Cir. 2018) (upholding the rule), with Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2018) (invalidating the rule).

 [178]. E.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711–12 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that advisers to a duty of investigation about the advice they peddle).

 [179]. See, e.g., Scott MacKillop, First Ascent Asset Management, LLC, Can a Robot Be a Fiduciary? 35 (2016), http://firstascentam.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/FA-Position-Paper-Can-Robot-Be-Fiduciary_FINAL.pdf; Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as Confidant: Digital Investment Advice and the Fiduciary Standard, Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 141, 156–60 (2018); Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisers Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1543, 156371 (2018); Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisers: A Closer Look, SSRN (June 30, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2658701; Robert Powell, Can a Robo Adviser Really Act in Your Best Interest?, MarketWatch (Apr. 28, 2016),  http://www.marketwatch.com/story/can-a-robo-adviser-really-act-in-your-best-interest-2016-04-28.

 [180]. Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advisers Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 740 (2018).

 [181]. W. Nicholson Price, Black-Box Medicine, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 419, 421 (2015).

 [182]. Id.

 [183]. To wit, since we might want the programmer writing the code for the “black box”—or the salesperson selling the code—to have a proper commitment to the interests of the end-user, there still may be sense in applying fiduciary obligations upstream from the “black box.” We also cannot rule out the possibility that the “black box” itself could engage in undetectable betrayal.

 [184]. A non-cognitivist interpretation of fiduciary loyalty would be much easier to administer than one that inquired about the fiduciary’s deliberation and/or motivation, not to mention the robustness of her commitment to the beneficiary. Furthermore, a purely behavioral definition of loyalty would provide the kind of clear guidelines that appeal to Holmes’s “bad man.” Therefore, to the extent that fiduciaries in a legal domain more closely resemble the Holmesian bad man, a non-cognitivist interpretation of fiduciary loyalty might be justified in terms of efficiency (for example, as reducing transaction, information, enforcement, and error costs).

 [185]. A version of amoralism about fiduciary loyalty based solely on normative arguments (for example, the one advocated by Easterbrook and Fischel) might dispute whether a cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty is ultimately justified. Our empirical claim that extant fiduciary law implicates cognitive concerns might be appraised as normatively misguided. Perhaps courts lack institutional competence to appraise cognitive considerations. Perhaps behaviorist and cognitivist approaches can be expected to produce similar results, but the behaviorist understanding imposes lower expected costs. Our case for cognitivism does not rule out the possibility of such a normative argument against cognitivism. However, abandoning cognitivism would enable several forms of abuse and exploitation that fiduciary law is designed (and uniquely suited) to protect against. Moreover, such a purely normative argument would be highly revisionist, since it would require denying many (and perhaps all) of the legal propositions identified in Section II.B.

 [186]. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 519, 521–22, 526–27 (2012); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437 passim (1993).

 [187].               See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 54, at 722–27.

 [188]. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 630–34 (1984).

 [189]. Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 137, 145 (2014).

 [190]. Id. at 148.

 [191]. Id. at 147 (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1214, 1222–25 (2010)). This story is, in broad strokes, consistent with the explanation for the combination of lax enforcement and widespread compliance in Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant Take?, in Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law And Government in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals 46, 55 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) and Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1754–55, 1782–83, 1785 (2001).

 [192]. Feldman & Smith, supra note 189, at 150.

 [193].               See generally Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 159 (2000) (arguing that explicit incentives can “crowd out” voluntary cooperation and intrinsic motivation).

 [194]. For example, a cognitivist approach to contract theory might resemble Daniel Markovits’s work, which focuses less on the divergence between contract and promise and more on the structural morphology between the two. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1473 (2004); see also Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1, 58, 18–20 (2005).

What’s in a Claim? Challenging Criminal Prosecutions Under the FTAIA’s Domestic Effects Exception – Note by Jay Kemper Simmons

From Volume 92, Number 1 (November 2018)
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What’s in a Claim? Challenging Criminal Prosecutions Under the FTAIA’s Domestic Effects Exception

Jay Kemper Simmons[*]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

I. Legal Background

A. Historical Foundations of Extraterritoriality
in U.S. Competition Law

1. Extraterritorial Criminal Liability Under the
Sherman Act: Exploring the Shift from
Territoriality to Effects

2. Principles of International Comity and Fairness

B. The FTAIA’s Domestic Effects Exception

C. Hui Hsiung, Motorola Mobility, and Beyond

II. The FTAIA Does Not Authorize Extraterritorial Criminal Prosecutions

A. Textualism Foundationally Supports a Narrow Construction of the Domestic Effects Exception’s
“Claim” Language

B. Narrow Interpretation of the FTAIA Comports with International Comity Principles and Applicable
Canons of Construction

C. Distinct Remedies Reflect Distinct Treatment
of Civil and Criminal Actions Under the FTAIA

III. Implications for an Interconnected Global Political Economy

Conclusion

 

Introduction

O be some other name!

What’s in a name? That which we call a rose

By any other word would smell as sweet . . . .

                            William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 2

Americans recently awoke to a startling revelation: “Our country is getting ripped off.”[1] Indeed, the purportedly deleterious effects of international trade on the United States domestic economy have claimed top billing in President Donald Trump’s nascent “America First” agenda.[2] As the White House publicly excoriates international free trade for the first time in recent memory, global trade deals and domestic tariffs are cast in stark relief.[3] China and Mexico, along these lines, are cast as chief culprits in a system of international exchange allegedly designed to subjugate American workers to nefarious foreign interests.[4] Overall, recent politics underscore the practical importance of, and interdependence between, competition and cooperation in international economic regulation.[5]

In the arena of hard-nosed international competition, it’s all fun and games––until somebody starts a trade war.[6] But beyond the scope of trade deals and tariffs, sovereign states’ domestic antitrust laws are also critical regulatory levers. Americans at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have the power to influence incentives in markets across the globe. For example, although domestic by nature, U.S. antitrust laws do not exclusively apply to conduct in domestic markets—the Sherman Act may extend far beyond American shores to activities conceived and executed abroad.[7]

Although it is understood that extraterritorial antitrust liability may exist with respect to certain foreign conduct, courts, businesses, and practitioners have struggled to concretely define the contours of this liability in practice.[8] Judicial construction of the Sherman Act’s “charter of freedom”[9] currently permits civil actions and criminal prosecutions against foreign anticompetitive conduct based solely on American domestic law. In the United States, liability may attach to foreign conduct even if the allegedly anticompetitive acts occur entirely beyond the territory over which the United States exerts sovereign control.[10]

Moreover, given its impact on the interests of market participants and sovereign states, extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act remains highly controversial in academic and professional legal circles.[11] In part due to the emergence of modern global supply chains, which often span several sovereign jurisdictions,[12] debate about extraterritoriality in U.S. competition policy has reached a fever pitch.[13]

Enter the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA” or “the Act”).[14] In 1982, Congress passed the FTAIA, putatively in order to clarify the limits of the Sherman Act in reaching certain foreign and export activities.[15] In early 2015, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the convictions of a Taiwanese electronics-manufacturing firm, AU Optronics, and its executives for criminal price fixing, in part based on the FTAIA’s so-called “domestic effects” exception.[16] In a decision assessing several independent challenges to the defendants’ extraterritorial criminal convictions, the panel ruled that an “effects” theory was independently sufficient to support criminal price-fixing charges under the FTAIA, absent an allegation that any acts in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in the United States:

The defendants . . . urge that . . . the nexus to United States commerce was insufficient under the Sherman Act as amended by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 . . . . The defendants’ efforts to place their conduct beyond the reach of United States law and to escape culpability under the rubric of extraterritoriality are unavailing. . . . The verdict may . . . be sustained under the FTAIA’s domestic effects provision because the conduct had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce.”[17]

From one perspective, the defendants’ foreign collusive activities were fairly traceable to U.S. markets, and thus fully within the purview of American antitrust laws, based on its direct connection to some qualifying “effect” on nonimport domestic commerce.[18] This rationale rendered the defendants in United States v. Hui Hsiung subject to the weight of criminal antitrust penalties under the Sherman Act, although the entirety of the defendants’ underlying conduct occurred overseas. The court suggested that this criminal punishment was only fair, as the defendants’ wholly foreign anticompetitive activities entailed some “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce,”[19] which was legally cognizable through overcharges paid by Americans for electronic goods that had incorporated the defendants’ price-fixed LCD-panel component parts.[20]

Regrettably, however, the final panel decision affirmed the defendants’ criminal convictions without substantively evaluating a critical merits inquiry[21]: whether the FTAIA’s “domestic effects” exception even authorizes the underlying extraterritorial criminal prosecution as a “claimunder the Sherman Act.[22] This Note posits, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s amended decision in Hui Hsiung, that the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception does not authorize American regulators to prosecute wholly foreign conduct under the Sherman Act. In the three years since Hui Hsuing, both the Supreme Court and Congress have failed to meaningfully address how to properly read the FTAIA.[23]

This Note builds on published legal decisions, practitioner resources, and academic commentaries to paint a fuller picture of the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception and, in particular, its proper scope in the context of extraterritorial criminal prosecutions.[24] Part I explores the historical development of extraterritorial antitrust jurisprudence in the United States, the FTAIA’s substantive requirements, and recent cases evaluating extraterritorial enforcement under the Act. Part II evaluates the prevailing approach under Hui Hsiung and makes the case that the FTAIA does not independently authorize extraterritorial criminal antitrust prosecutions. Part III discusses criminal liability implications under Hui Hsiung and related antitrust jurisprudence for international businesses and their agents. In sum, through discussion of the FTAIA’s history, text, and teleological aspects, this Note aims to clarify the proper scope of extraterritorial criminal antitrust actions under the Sherman Act, as amended by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.[25]

I.  Legal Background

A.  Historical Foundations of Extraterritoriality in U.S. Competition Law

Before diving into the current state of criminal prosecutions under the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception, it is first critical to trace the development of American criminal antitrust prosecutions beyond the territorial borders of the United States. Prior to passage of the FTAIA (and arguably even after its codification),[26] courts—rather than legislators—primarily defined the extraterritorial contours of the Sherman Act. The following sections trace a series of seminal decisions regarding the proper scope of the Sherman Act in international commerce prior to and following the passage of the FTAIA. This historical foundation informs a narrow interpretation of the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception in criminal prosecutions.[27]

1.  Extraterritorial Criminal Liability Under the Sherman Act: Exploring the Shift from Territoriality to Effects[28]

The Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and unlawful restraints on “commerce . . . with foreign nations.”[29] Thus, the statute unambiguously applies to conduct with foreign actors and opens the possibility of government prosecutions for “bad apples” in the high-stakes game of global competition. Historically, however, federal courts hesitated to apply the Sherman Act’s provisions—along with related laws, such as the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act—to conduct that occurred beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.

Traditional notions of sovereignty largely informed the dominant, territorial conception of American courts’ narrow jurisdiction over foreign anticompetitive conduct. The territorial location of the underlying conduct, rather than the site of its fairly traceable effects, served as the relevant standard for determining jurisdiction over foreign anticompetitive conduct. Justice Holmes’ decision in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., for example, reflects the historic presumption against extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act:

Words having universal scope, such as every contract in restraint of trade, every person who shall monopolize, etc., will be taken, as a matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch. In the case of the present statute, the improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to sue. We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned.[30]

Although this prima facie territorial presumption applied seemingly to “all legislation” passed by Congress under Justice Holmes’ view, the jurisprudential tide steadily shifted to embrace the imposition of antitrust liability for conduct conceived or executed beyond U.S. borders.[31] Over time, the Supreme Court came to stray from a strict territoriality standard and adopted a much broader standard that granted courts antitrust jurisdiction over activities with certain “effects on competition in the United States.”[32]

Judge Learned Hand’s approach in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”) definitively established that foreign anticompetitive acts involving import commerce could be criminally prosecuted in American courts.[33] A unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a Canadian corporation to be in violation of Sherman Act section based on its agreement with European aluminum producers not to compete in the American market for virgin ingot.[34] The decision marked a notable shift in extraterritorial interpretation of the Sherman Act; Hand’s majority opinion not only served as the final decision in lieu of Supreme Court review,[35] but also significantly expanded the global reach of American antitrust laws to include activities with effects on import commerce.[36]

Rather than territoriality, the touchstone of extraterritorial antitrust liability shifted decidedly toward the tangible effects of foreign anticompetitive conduct on domestic markets. With respect to such effects, Judge Hand candidly noted, “[a]lmost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, . . . or in South America, may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the two.”[37] Shifting to an effects standard required reasonable limits; otherwise, American courts would adjudicate seemingly every global competition dispute.[38] Although the court in Alcoa embraced an effects test for extraterritorial Sherman Act violations, it also warned, “[w]e should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.”[39] Despite concerning only conduct directly involving import commerce, Alcoa’s non-territorial, effects-centered rationale has been generally incorporated into criminal antitrust precedents after passage of the FTAIA.[40]

Thus, courts historically hesitated to apply domestic law to activity beyond U.S. territorial borders, which traditionally delineated the outer bounds of American sovereignty. After Alcoa, however, courts’ antitrust jurisdiction would expand considerably to encompass criminal penalties for anticompetitive conduct involving direct import trade and commerce.[41]

2.  Principles of International Comity and Fairness

Another judicial innovation concerns the doctrine of international comity.[42] Despite finding sufficient anticompetitive effects targeting domestic commerce to support domestic jurisdiction, courts may nevertheless decline to apply U.S. law to foreign conduct under the judicial constructs of “international comity and fairness.”[43] To determine the propriety of invoking comity to bar an antitrust action, courts widely consider several factors, including: (1) the parties’ nationality, allegiance, or principal locations; (2) the relative importance of domestic and foreign conduct in the allegations; (3) the relative effects on all countries involved; (4) the clarity of foreseeability of a purpose to affect or harm domestic commerce; (5) foreign law or policy and degree of conflict with American policy or law; and (6) compliance issues.[44]

For example, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, international comity factors suggested that the court “should refuse to exercise jurisdiction,” in part because “[t]he potential for conflict with Honduran economic policy and commercial law [was] great,” and “[t]he effect on the foreign commerce of the United States [was] minimal.”[45] The “jurisdictional rule of reason” embodied in the Timberlane opinion attempted to balance domestic concerns with the interests of foreign states in adjudicating legal disputes. Thus, in American antitrust law, the comity doctrine adds greater nuance to courts’ treatment of the domestic effects that stem from foreign anticompetitive conduct.[46]

The comity doctrine reinforces a norm of reasonableness when applying domestic laws to foreign actors—agents who, in many cases, may not be fair targets for enforcement actions under the Sherman Act. In that vein, the third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law of the United States characterizes comity as a “principle of reasonableness” that applies to a court’s authority to adjudicate disputes and enforce remedies.[47] The comity doctrine has historically empowered federal courts with a measure of discretionary authority over how far domestic authorities can reach abroad to target foreign defendants, as well as how far private plaintiffs can project domestic claims across national borders. These considerations remain critical even after passage of the FTAIA.[48] Without considering fairness and foreign sovereignty in applying domestic laws, U.S. courts would risk dangerously overreaching into the affairs of international partners, as well as upsetting the constitutionally ingrained separation of powers between judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government.[49]

The Timberlane test has been widely embraced by courts in extraterritorial antitrust actions.[50] The Ninth Circuit’s analysis built a compelling case for declining to extend domestic antitrust laws to a foreign transaction in which an American corporation, Bank of America, allegedly manipulated the Honduran national government to prevent its competitor, Timberlane, from exporting lumber into the United States.[51] Beyond the facts of Timberlane, however, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California suggests an alternative approach.[52]

In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court—without deciding whether federal courts may ever decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims concerning foreign conduct—determined that principles of international comity are not relevant in the absence of a “true conflict” between domestic and foreign law.[53] The petitioners in Hartford Fire claimed error based on the district court’s failure to decline to exercise antitrust jurisdiction under the principle of international comity.[54] As the petitioners did not allege that British law mandated that they act in violation of the Sherman Act, however, the Court found no direct conflict of law and therefore quickly concluded that there was “no need . . . to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.”[55]

The Court further ruled that the plaintiffs’ civil antitrust action could proceed, despite concerns regarding the application of domestic laws to the defendants’ foreign acts, so long as such foreign acts “[were] meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”[56] It remains unclear to what degree the rule in Hartford Fire governs comity decisions in extraterritorial criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act. In the absence of clear guidance on this aspect of international comity in federal courts, principles of comity and fairness continue to play integral roles in extraterritorial antitrust analysis under either the Hartford Fire or Timberlane standards.

B.  The FTAIA’s Domestic Effects Exception

Although it remains unclear whether the FTAIA “amend[ed] existing law or merely codifie[d] it,”[57] courts have construed the statute to comport with the Sherman Act’s historical scope. The statute operates along with case law concerning how far plaintiffs may extend federal courts’ extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction.[58] Prior to assessing the efficacy of the prevailing construction of the FTAIA’s “claim” language, however, it is helpful to discuss the language of the domestic effects exception, the intended purposes of the provision, and the early cases that largely ignored the statute in extraterritorial antitrust analysis.

The FTAIA facially excludes most foreign conduct from the scope of the Sherman Act. Two narrow exceptions bring wholly foreign activity back within the scope of domestic antitrust law.[59] Under the FTAIA’s “domestic effects” exception, the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations,” unless: (1) “such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic trade or commerce, and that effect (2) “gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman Act.[60] Courts have clarified that conduct involving direct “import trade or import commerce” unambiguously falls within the scope of the Sherman Act under the FTAIA.[61]

In practice, the FTAIA applies when anticompetitive conduct is foreign in nature.[62] Courts have consistently noted since its passage, however, that lawmakers passed the Act primarily to “facilitat[e] the export of domestic goods by exempting export transactions that did not injure the United States economy from the Sherman Act and thereby reliev[e] exporters from a competitive disadvantage in foreign trade.”[63] Ironically, then, the FTAIA aimed to clarify when foreign anticompetitive conduct gives rise to domestic antitrust liability primarily in order to clarify that American firms can behave anticompetitively—so long as they only target foreign markets.[64] The notion that the FTAIA enables criminal prosecutions to remedy competitive harms in U.S. markets is notably absent in congressional findings related to the Act’s purpose, although the legislative history does broadly mention “Department of Justice enforcement.”[65]

The Act was further designed to provide appropriate “legislative clarification” of the antitrust laws, which presented “an unnecessarily complicating factor in a fluid environment” of international exchange, and allegedly caused many “possible transaction[s] [to] die on the drawing board.”[66] Despite endorsing the “situs of effects standard authoritatively articulated in Alcoa, the legislative history uncovers debate concerning the “precise legal standard to be employed” for assessing the requisite “effects” on domestic or import trade or commerce.[67] Lawmakers generally acknowledged, “it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the effects as opposed to the conduct, that determines whether United States antitrust law applies.”[68] In line with judicial precedents, Congress intended to “enact[] . . . a single, objective test—the ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ test” to clarify precisely which effects trigger extraterritorial antitrust liability for “businessmen, attorneys and judges as well as foreign trading partners.”[69]

The legislative history suggests primary consideration of domestic commercial interests in export markets—interests that were increasingly complicated by the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.[70] Yet the statute has by no means proven simple and straightforward for antitrust practitioners. In that vein, prevailing academic commentary strongly suggests that the Act, falling just short of an outright failure worthy of repeal,[71] has demanded more from the federal courts—tribunals that must now apply the complicated statute in tandem with an expansive terrain of Sherman Act precedents.[72]

The Supreme Court first tackled the FTAIA in Hartford Fire. The majority declined to apply the statute in an analysis of civil claims under the Sherman Act.[73] The Court declined to rest its section 1 ruling on the FTAIA’s effects language, and instead relied entirely on Sherman Act precedents.[74] Nevertheless, the effects-centered rationale imbued in the FTAIA’s legislative history and prior precedents carried into decisions rendered after passage of the Act, as in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries and F. Hoffman-La Roche, Limited v. Empagran S.A. Although Hartford Fire only addressed the limited role of the FTAIA in civil antitrust proceedings, these later decisions grappled with the thornier issue of how to interpret the FTAIA and Sherman Act in the context of criminal prosecutions.

The district court in Nippon Paper (Nippon I) reviewed the defendants’ motions to dismiss a criminal antitrust indictment.[75] The indictment targeted a Japanese fax paper manufacturer for participating in meetings, agreements, and monitoring activities that took place entirely in Japan.[76] Notably, the court “disagree[d] with [the U.S. government’s] suggested equating of the Sherman Act’s civil and criminal application” with respect to wholly foreign conduct.[77] Given a “strong presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes” in criminal matters, the district court reasoned that “the line of cases permitting extraterritorial reach in civil actions is not controlling” in determining whether the Sherman Act’s criminal provisions can reach wholly foreign conduct.[78]

Citing prior judicial treatment of the language of the Sherman Act, academic commentary on its extraterritorial reach, policies underlying antitrust and criminal law, and relevant legislative history, the court concluded that the “criminal provisions of the Sherman Act do not apply to conspiratorial conduct in which none of the overt acts . . . take place in the United States.”[79] Thus, on first impression, the court in Nippon I differentiated between the requirements of an extraterritorial civil claim and an extraterritorial criminal prosecution under the FTAIA.

The district court’s holding remained intact for 165 days. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit swiftly reversed the judgment, holding in Nippon II that, under Hartford Fire, the defendants could be criminally liable for agreeing to employ retail price maintenance strategies with various firms that distributed paper in the United States (notwithstanding the FTAIA’s terms).[80] The court sidestepped Hartford Fire’s civil posture by emphasizing that “in both criminal and civil cases, the claim that Section One applies extraterritorially is based on the same language in the same section of the same statute.”[81]

Despite pausing to note the “inelegantly phrased” FTAIA, the panel’s decision nevertheless declined to “place any weight on it,” following Hartford Fire.[82] The majority also reasoned that, without meaningful distinction in the Sherman Act’s treatment of civil and criminal liability, “it would be disingenuous . . . to pretend that the words had lost their clarity simply because this is a criminal proceeding.”[83] The decision explained how

Hartford Fire definitively establishe[d] that Section One of the Sherman Act applies to wholly foreign conduct which has an intended and substantial effect in the United States. We are bound to accept that holding. Under settled principles of statutory construction, we also are bound to apply it by interpreting Section One the same way in a criminal case. The combined force of these commitments requires that we accept the government’s . . . argument, reverse the order of the district court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings.[84]

In addition, despite ultimately arriving at the same conclusion regarding the applicability of the Sherman Act’s criminal provisions to wholly foreign conduct, the detailed concurrence in Nippon II provided greater historical context for courts’ broad “interpretive responsibility” in adjudicating Sherman Act claims:

The task of construing [the Sherman Act in a criminal context] is not the usual one of determining congressional intent by parsing the language or legislative history of the statute. The broad, general language of the federal antitrust laws and their unilluminating legislative history place a special interpretive responsibility upon the judiciary. The Supreme Court has called the Sherman Act a charter of freedom for the courts, with a generality and adaptability comparable to that found . . . in constitutional provisions.[85]

Thus, by the turn of the century, the FTAIA’s substantive provisions were manifested as mere legislative gloss on prevailing judicial principles. Both the district court and the appellate court in Nippon Paper declined to find the FTAIA dispositive of extraterritorial criminal antitrust prosecutions, instead falling back to traditional conceptions of liability under the Sherman Act.

Nevertheless, the notable contrast in the district court’s and the appellate courts treatments of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial criminal provisions underscores a key development in extraterritorial antitrust jurisprudence. Although Nippon II stands for the proposition that wholly foreign conduct may give rise to criminal liability under the Sherman Act based on the plain language of the statute and its “common sense” application,[86] reasonable minds differ with respect to the proper extraterritorial limits on the antitrust jurisdiction of federal courts. For example, the district court’s reasoning in Nippon I stands against the dominant, casual assumption that indictments are interchangeable with civil “claims” when anticompetitive conduct occurs beyond U.S. borders, based on reasonable application of similar tools of statutory interpretation as the court in Nippon II. The fact that the appellate panel declined to endorse the district court’s handiwork, and instead crafted its own interpretive edifice with its preferred tools, is by no means dispositive of the merits of the district court’s reasoning.[87]

In 2004, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception in F. Hoffman-La Roch, Ltd. v. Empagran. Two decades after the passage of the Act, the Court reasoned that its “claim” language refers directly to the “plaintiff’s claim, or the claim at issue.”[88] In Empagran, the Court held that foreign purchasers of vitamins could not recover under the FTAIA based merely on allegations that their own foreign harms from international price-fixing activity coincided with some domestic injury.[89] Thus, foreign purchaser plaintiffs in a civil antitrust action must now prove that the alleged anticompetitive effect on domestic trade or commerce itself gives rise directly and proximately to their own foreign injuries.[90] Foreign plaintiffs cannot “piggyback” on an indirect domestic effect to get into American courts on antitrust claims under the FTAIA. Following Empagran, the requisite domestic effect must proximately cause an antitrust plaintiff’s claimed injuries[91]—and it is the plaintiff’s burden of proof and persuasion to demonstrate proximate causation with respect to a domestic effect and his or her “claim.”

C.  Hui Hsiung, Motorola Mobility, and Beyond

Recent circuit court judgments in United States v. Hui Hsiung[92] and Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.[93] endorse criminal prosecution of foreign anticompetitive conduct based on the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong. Further, in denying certiorari for these conspiracy cases,[94] the Supreme Court let the final circuit decisions lie undisturbed, even in light of potential analytical deficiencies.[95] Careful consideration of both decisions sets the stage for analysis of the FTAIA’s “claim” language.[96]

Hui Hsiung and Motorola Mobility stem from the same conspiracy to fix prices for liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panels,[97] component parts incorporated into electronics products sold in the United States and elsewhere.[98] Specifically, between 2001 and 2006, “representatives from six leading [LCD] manufacturers,” including defendant AU Optronics, met in Taiwan for a “series of meetings” that “came to be known as the ‘Crystal Meetings.’”[99] The Ninth Circuit explained that after these meetings,

participating companies produced Crystal Meeting Reports. These reports provided pricing targets for TFTLCD sales, which, in turn, were used by retail branches of the companies as price benchmarks for selling panels to wholesale customers. More specifically, [AU Optronics Corporation of America] used the Crystal Meeting Reports that [AU Optronics] provided to negotiate prices for the sale of TFTLCDs to United States customers including HP, Compaq, ViewSonic, Dell, and Apple.[100]

The government alleged that the foreign conspiracy constituted a textbook example of a concerted agreement among direct competitors to restrain trade: “[s]pecifically, the indictment charged that ‘the substantial terms’ of the conspiracy were an agreement ‘to fix the prices of TFTLCDs for use in notebook computers, desktop monitors, and televisions in the United States and elsewhere.’”[101] From 2001 to 2006, the United States constituted “one-third of the global market for personal computers incorporating [LCD panels],” and sales by conspirators into the U.S. market generated “over $600 million in revenue.”[102]

After being indicted in the Northern District of California for price fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the defendants twice unsuccessfully attempted to dismiss the charges before proceeding to trial.[103] The panel suggests that “the reach of the Sherman Act to conduct occurring outside of the United States” marked “a contentious subject” in pretrial proceedings.[104] The district court instructed the jury that it may uphold the charges upon finding that the government proved “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the conspiracy had a substantial and intended effect in the United States,” even without a single action taken by a single member of the conspiracy in furtherance of the conspiracy within the United States.[105] The district court also instructed that the jury could uphold the charge separately upon finding that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one member of the conspiracy took at least one action in furtherance of the conspiracy within the United States.”[106] Ultimately, the jury convicted the defendants and determined that combined gains derived from the conspiracy were in excess of $500 million.[107] Individual and corporate defendants appealed their convictions, and AU Optronics appealed imposition of a $500 million fine.[108]

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially declined to determine whether the government had satisfied its burden to convict based on the domestic effects prong, instead concluding narrowly that “the FTAIA did not bar the prosecution because the government sufficiently proved that the defendants engaged in import trade.”[109] The panel subsequently amended their initial opinion (“amended opinion”) and noted that whenever a case involves nonimport trade with foreign nations, the Sherman Act presumptively does not apply—unless the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong applies.[110]

But the panel’s amended analysis did not stop there. The decision independently sustained the defendants’ convictions based on “domestic effects.”[111] Despite a dearth of meaningful discourse regarding the FTAIA’s “claim” language,[112] the panel independently authorized criminal penalties amounting to $500 million against AU Optronics (matching “the largest fine imposed against a company for violating U.S. antitrust laws”), individual fines totaling $400,000, and a total of six years in federal prison.[113] In this sense, the amended opinion reasoned to the same conclusion as the initial opinion, but with considerably broader precedential scope.

The Ninth Circuit aimed to include within the scope of the Sherman Act only those acts that actually have a direct and proximate “effect” on domestic markets. The panel explains in great length that an effect must be “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” to trigger Sherman Act jurisdiction on the basis of alleged “domestic effects.”[114] Yet despite noting that the FTAIA presents additional substantive elements for a Sherman Act prosecution involving international commerce with domestic effects,[115] the panel declined to warrant its conclusion that the government proved an essential element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt––that AU Optronics’ conduct “[gave] rise” to the government’s so-called “claim” under the antitrust laws.[116]

A subtle aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s amended opinion underscores an important development in post-FTAIA extraterritorial antitrust jurisprudence: “[t]o allege a nonimport trade claim under the Sherman Act, the claim must encompass the domestic effects elements.”[117] Under the domestic effects exception, the government must now prove the existence of (1) a domestic effect that (2) “gives rise to” a “claim” as substantive elements of a criminal charge. Hui Hsiung reinforces the dominant interpretation of the FTAIA as providing additional substantive requirements of antitrust claims in the extraterritorial context, concomitantly placing additional burdens on all plaintiffs in such actions.[118] Viewing the FTAIA’s elements as substantive, rather than jurisdictional, requires that government plaintiffs’ allegations and, ultimately, direct proof must satisfy each of the “domestic effects” elements in cases not involving direct import commerce.[119]

In Motorola Mobility, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a judgment entered in a suit brought by Motorola, along with “its ten foreign subsidiaries,” which purchased liquid-crystal display panels and incorporated them into cellphones.[120] The panel first briefly explained the nature of the disputed panel sales in the civil action:

[a]bout 1 percent of the panels sold by the defendants to Motorola and its subsidiaries were bought by, and delivered to, Motorola in the United States for assembly here into cellphones; to the extent that the prices of the panels sold to Motorola had been elevated by collusive pricing by the manufacturers, Motorola has a solid claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The other 99 percent of the cartelized components, however, were bought and paid for by, and delivered to, foreign subsidiaries (mainly Chinese and Singaporean) of Motorola. Forty-two percent of the panels were bought by the subsidiaries and incorporated by them into cellphones that the subsidiaries then sold to and shipped to Motorola for resale in the United States. Motorola did none of the manufacturing or assembly of these phones. The sale of the panels to these subsidiaries is the focus of this appeal.[121]

Ultimately, the court concluded that Motorola’s “derivative” competitive claims were barred under the indirect-purchaser doctrine.[122] AU Optronics and related conspirators were therefore immunized from civil antitrust liability to indirect customers, like Motorola and its customers, although its subsidiaries could still pursue independent civil claims overseas.

The court stated that under the FTAIA’s “domestic effects” exception “[t]he first requirement, if proved, establishes that there is an antitrust violation; the second determines who may bring a suit based on it.”[123] Implicitly, the panel reasoned that Motorola—a party directly affected on its balance sheet by overcharges from the panel sales, despite integrating these technologies into final consumer products through foreign subsidiaries—was, unlike the United States government, not among the select few “who may bring a suit” involving foreign commerce under the Sherman Act.

The decision concluded by suggesting, “[i]f price fixing by the component manufacturers had the requisite statutory effect on cellphone prices in the United States, the Act would not block the Department of Justice from seeking criminal . . . remedies.”[124] Although this statement stands as non-binding dicta with respect to the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong, its implications are straightforward: federal criminal prosecutions are “claims” under the domestic effects exception and may support a conviction under the antitrust laws if the government can satisfy proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Obtusely, however, the court barred civil recovery for an American corporation harmed directly by the conspiracy, reasoning that Motorola could better pursue such claims through its subsidiaries “direct” claims in foreign jurisdictions.[125]

The final circuit opinions include analytical deficiencies, particularly with respect to the threshold requirements for invoking “domestic effects.”[126] Neither decision identifies a clear reason for concluding that the “domestic effects” test supports criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act, as both leave untouched the question of whether a criminal action may ever “give rise to” a “claim” under the antitrust laws. In that vein, Part II posits that the FTAIA’s “claim” language should be narrowly interpreted in line with its original meaning, which did not authorize international criminal prosecutions.

II.  The FTAIA Does Not Authorize Extraterritorial Criminal Prosecutions

Congress passed the FTAIA to limit the criminal justice authority of American antitrust authorities over nonimport foreign commerce—not to expand it. Part II argues the case for narrow construction of the FTAIA’s “claim” language with respect to extraterritorial criminal prosecutions. After presenting a case for departure from the approach laid out in Hui Hsiung, Part III considers various implications of the current state of the law on international businesses, multinational corporate executives, and their agents.

A.  Textualism Foundationally Supports a Narrow Construction of the Domestic Effects Exception’s “Claim” Language

Courts frequently begin an assessment of apparent ambiguities in statutory meaning based on “pure textual reliance.”[127] In some cases, American courts divine the “meaning of a statute . . . entirely from the words used in the law under consideration.”[128] The plain statutory language, authoritative definitions of terms in secondary source materials, and the ordinary or common usage of terms or phrases in the statute, as well as related sections of the law, may illuminate statutory meaning in the absence of clear legislative intent.[129] These engrained methods suggest that the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong does not support criminal prosecutions.

The Act ought to be interpreted in line with its unambiguous terms. Fortunately, the words “claim” and “prosecution” are terms with distinct meanings in the legal lexicon. At the outset, it is useful to note that the more general term “action” may encompass civil and criminal redress under the Sherman Act. By contrast, at least in the American legal system, plaintiffs asserting a “claim” under a given statute ordinarily would do so only with respect to the civil aspects of the statute––as where a civil plaintiff alleges “claims” against a civil defendant in adversary legal proceeding. This textual distinction is not accidental; it is reflective of fundamental underlying differences between civil and criminal actions under the FTAIA. The courts should treat it as such.

The Act does not expressly define the term “claim,” however. Thus, legal practitioners and jurists should typically import the plain or ordinary meaning of the term, as defined in secondary source materials. One source commonly relied upon is an authoritative definition in a legal dictionary. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a claim may entail the “assertion of an existing right,” a “right to payment or to an equitable remedy,” or a “demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right, esp[ecially] the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.”[130] By contrast, criminal “prosecutions” ordinarily entail “criminal proceeding[s] in which an accused person is tried.”[131] From a textual standpoint, then, these terms entail distinct proceedings in statutory parlance. This observation strongly suggests that it would be erroneous to casually equate the term “claim” with any “criminal proceeding.”

Moreover, the sharp contrast between authoritative legal definitions of the terms “claim” and “prosecution” is accentuated by ingrained uses for the terms in distinct legal proceedings. In ordinary use, surely, the word “claim” would not be used to describe highly specialized terms in criminal procedure, such as “prosecution,” and “indictment,” and “plea.” Broad usage of “claim” would, in fact, more likely lead to greater confusion than clarity in the course of criminal proceedings. In other words, loosely speaking, the government may allege “claims” against alleged perpetrators in criminal proceedings. However, stretching the term “claim” so far as to encompass the government’s entire “prosecution” against the defendant would appear facially obtuse in most contexts—in large part based on the ordinary usage of the terms in distinct legal settings.

Such judgments about “plain meaning” and “ordinary usage” are naturally disputed. Yet the foregoing discussion rapidly approaches an alternative conclusion from that rendered by the panel in Hui Hsiung: the plain terms of the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception are unambiguous, but they authorize only civil “claims” under the Sherman Act. And, turning beyond the black letter of the statute, ordinary usage of the words “claim” and “prosecution” lends further credence to this view. Thus, claims and prosecutions can and should be understood to entail distinct legal meanings; criminal “prosecutions” do not fall within “claims” based on a textualist analysis of the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong.

To the extent that the Act’s terms are subject to multiple reasonable meanings, however, other interpretive canons suggest that its domestic effects prong does not extend to criminal actions under the Sherman Act where wholly foreign acts are concerned. The remainder of this Part evaluates arguments for and against extending the FTAIA to authorize extraterritorial criminal prosecutions based in non-textual interpretive canons, including: (1) extraterritoriality principles of comity and fairness; (2) applicable canons of statutory construction; and (3) consideration of the varied remedy schemes for criminal and civil Sherman Act violations.

B.  Narrow Interpretation of the FTAIA Comports with International Comity Principles and Applicable Canons of Construction

Extraterritoriality principles further counsel departure from the prevailing interpretation of the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong. Notions of comity and fairness undergird extraterritorial antitrust jurisprudence. These adjudicatory principles also clarify U.S. competition policy for foreign governments and firms, as courts share legal authority with the executive and legislative branches where extraterritorial liability is involved. This discussion reflects that adherence to these principles would be best advanced by interpreting the FTAIA to presumptively prohibit domestic criminal prosecutions of wholly foreign conduct under the domestic effects prong.

The international comity doctrine historically served a central role in limiting the extraterritorial jurisdiction of federal courts. And today, even under the far narrower “direct conflict” standard set forth in Hartford Fire,[132] American courts regularly invoke “reasons of international comity” while describing the FTAIA as limiting “the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.”[133] Judge Posner’s statement is characteristic:

[A]re we to presume the inadequacy of the antitrust laws of our foreign allies? Would such a presumption be consistent with international comity, or more concretely with good relations with allied nations in a world in turmoil? . . . Why should American law supplant, for example, Canada’s or Great Britain’s or Japan’s own determination about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign companies?[134]

Comity similarly counsels courts in criminal matters under the FTAIA. American laws should not presumptively supplant foreign governments’ judgments concerning criminal liability, particularly in an interconnected global marketplace. Application of criminal punishment thus warrants hesitation upon consideration of “good relations with allied nations in a world in turmoil.”[135] The principles of fairness and reasonableness help to outline a doctrinally consistent conception of the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong, as these principles have historically aided federal courts in crafting remedies and resolving international conflicts.[136]

Alternatively, however, comity may counsel in favor of enabling criminal remedies for extraterritorial antitrust violations. For example, leading antitrust commentator Robert Connolly notes, “there is a difference between actions brought by the DOJ and private class action damages,” particularly with respect to the extent to which government and private plaintiffs consider “comity considerations.”[137] Arguing that[n]o nation has objected to the DOJ’s successful prosecution of foreign companies and even citizens of that country in the LCD panel investigation,” and that “the DOJ seriously considers the views of foreign nations before bringing cases,” Connolly, an experienced practitioner with decades of experience at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, projects confidence that past practice makes perfect.[138] This conception of the comity doctrine clearly influenced the court’s decision in Motorola Mobility:

[T]he . . . court should reach a decision that preserves the ability of the DOJ to protect American consumers and continue to lead the way in prosecuting international cartels—including appropriate component cartels. The court could also acknowledge the comity concerns of foreign nations and find application of [the indirect purchaser doctrine] a bar to foreign component civil damage cases.[139]

This view of comity appears highly limited, however, when cast against the principles underlying the doctrine and the weighty penalties associated with criminal antitrust actions under the Sherman Act. Neither the opinion in Motorola Mobility nor Connolly’s commentary acknowledge the limited nature of justifying the extension of American criminal penalties abroad based upon foreign states’ as-of-yet unstated approval of a single case arising from a single foreign conspiracy involving only several nations.

Under this view, to defend extraterritorial prosecutions beyond the Crystal Meetings conspiracy, something affirmative or principled is needed—something more than silence from foreign governments in the face of American action. Although coordination with foreign governments provides prima facie evidence that prosecutors can avoid chafing foreign sovereigns while applying the Sherman Act to wholly foreign conduct, the mere acquiescence of foreign states to such conduct should not temper characterization of American prosecutions as potential overreaching.[140] A more reasonable standard would presumptively limit the criminal domain of American prosecutors to domestic markets. This would encourage enhanced criminal enforcement activity by foreign governments, whose interests and authority are often more directly implicated in cases involving disputed extraterritorial conduct.

Fortunately, this is not a new concept. International comity already reflects an ingrained presumption against extraterritorial prosecutions under the Sherman Act. Generally, criminal law reflects social judgments regarding the proper magnitude of punishment acceptable for given violations in market competition and to consumer welfare. Different sovereign jurisdictions may make different judgments regarding whether to criminalize the same putatively anticompetitive conduct.[141] Moreover, different states punish offenders in different ways for the same crimes.[142] Variation in criminal punishment among developed nations reflects concomitant variation in social judgments regarding individual moral culpability and foundational precepts to systems of criminal justice. In this vein, from one dominant theoretical perspective, criminal liability confers a judgment of community condemnation of moral culpability.[143]

Amidst political uncertainty regarding norms of free trade and global economic cooperation,[144] American competition law should privilege the principles of reason and fairness imbued in the comity doctrine. Fairness lies at the heart of American criminal law––particularly when applied in the extraterritorial and criminal contexts.[145] Historical weighing of domestic and foreign sovereignty, which generally informs courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction, should be imported into analysis of the FTAIA’s “claim” language in the context of criminal penalties. Certainly, the antitrust laws should not apply extraterritorially in criminal contexts when: (1) the parties are wholly foreign and foreign conduct constitutes the basis for the allegations; (2) direct effects are principally centered abroad; (3) there is a lack of foreseeable purpose to affect or harm domestic commerce; (4) foreign laws and policies conflict with American laws and policies to a high degree; and (5) simultaneous compliance with U.S. and foreign law is impossible.[146] The FTAIA’s “claim” language therefore naturally compliments the historically entrenched comity doctrine by barring criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act against foreign acts with effects on nonimport domestic commerce.[147]

Moreover, the strong presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law clearly applies in the case of criminal actions under the FTAIA. Courts presume that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially in the absence of express legislative intent to the contrary.[148] To avoid this presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, a plaintiff typically must bring a significant showing before the court of some “clear” expression of legislative intent to invoke the law beyond U.S. sovereign control.[149]

Relatedly, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. provides that the test of territoriality must look to the “focus” of a federal statute in determining the scope of a law.[150] In Morrison, for example, the Court held the territorial connections related to a statute’s “focus” may overcome the statutory presumption against territoriality.[151] Here, similarly, the focus of the FTAIA should guide federal courts in divining the extraterritorial scope of the statute’s criminal dimensions. Moreover, United States v. Bowman held that ambiguous criminal statutes generally should not apply extraterritorially, at least absent an extraterritorial intent clearly inferred from the nature of the offense itself.[152] Overall, these canons of construction reinforce comity considerations and counsel against interpreting the FTAIA to independently authorize criminal actions.

C.  Distinct Remedies Reflect Distinct Treatment of Civil and Criminal Actions Under the FTAIA

A final consideration concerns the distinct remedies that the overall statutory scheme envisions for civil and criminal antitrust violations. According to regulators’ conception of the Sherman Act and its penalties, violations “may be prosecuted as civil or criminal offenses,” and punishments for civil and criminal offenses vary.[153] For example, available relief under the law encompasses penalties and custodial sentences for criminal offenses, whereas civil plaintiffs may “obtain injunctive and treble damage relief for violations of the Sherman Act.”[154] Regulators also recognize that the law envisions distinct means of enforcing criminal and civil offenses under the Sherman Act. For example, the DOJ retains the “sole responsibility for the criminal enforcement” of criminal offenses and “criminally prosecutes traditional per se offenses of the law.[155] In civil proceedings, private plaintiffs and the federal government may seek equitable relief and treble damage relief for Sherman Act violations.[156]

These recognized remedial distinctions matter when assessing the FTAIA’s meaning. Along with the interpretive argument that the Sherman Act’s various provisions ought to be enforced in a way that is internally consistent, practical assessment of the varied remedies and parties that may pursue such remedies reinforces a narrow conception of the FTAIA’s language. The weighty power to seek imprisonment of offenders critically distinguishes criminal and civil remedies under the Sherman Act. The federal government alone retains such authority, predicated on principles of legality and sovereignty. For many reasons, it remains reasonable to permit civil redress—encompassing the full range of injunctive and damage relief—in extraterritorial proceedings under the Sherman Act. Aggrieved consumers and competitors targeted in American markets by foreign activities can sue for injunctive and treble damage relief under the Sherman Act’s civil provisions. Notably, the FTAIA permits as much by its own terms, at least where substantive elements under the Act are satisfied with respect to the requisite effect on domestic or direct import commerce.

In this sense, American law maintains a strong deterrent to foreign actors through a robust system of civil, as opposed to criminal, redress. Extraterritorial competitive injuries are left to the civil sphere under the FTAIA. Such civil remedies are more than sufficient to advance the objectives of the American competition regime abroad—namely, to prevent through legal means artificial distortions on the price and output of goods and services. American courts play a major role in the adjudication of disputes spanning distinct sovereign jurisdictions; that role is best maintained through established civil remedies. But criminal remedies—being reserved to the sovereign aloneshould not extend extraterritorially. The remedial distinctions under the Sherman Act reflect the aims of criminal and civil competition law—criminally, to vindicate public wrongs, and civilly, to remedy private injuries.

Criminal antitrust remedies are logically limited in the context of foreign sovereign jurisdiction. By contrast, the Sherman Act’s civil remedies provide injunctive and damage relief that may compensate victims despite traditional notions of foreign sovereign authority. Far from one sovereign intervening in the backyard of another, a civil action enables individually aggrieved parties to receive compensation from an antitrust offender. This is an intuitive remedial extension of basic principles of legality and sovereignty. Thus, far from the government’s current position—that the FTAIA’s claim prong empowers prosecutors to independently seek criminal remedies for extraterritorial antitrust offenses—the overall remedy scheme for antitrust offenses reinforces a limited conception of criminal redress, particularly where the FTAIA provides the basis for government action.

The preceding discussion substantiates a narrow interpretation of the FTAIA as cabining the extraterritorial criminal antitrust jurisdiction of federal courts. Based on the factors cited––along with substantial historical evaluation of the Sherman Act and FTAIA––this interpretation is consistent with the plain letter of the Act, engrained legal norms, and applicable canons of construction. The current state of U.S. antitrust law tacitly endorses potential executive overreach into criminal judgments of co-equal sovereigns, which is questionable even under consensual arrangements with such governments.[157] Such sovereigns’ domestic political and legal processes properly decide criminal judgments, absent American influence or legal process. In light of growing economic globalization, Part III briefly considers various implications of the prevailing construction of the FTAIA as independently supporting criminal prosecutions of foreign anticompetitive conduct.

III.  Implications for an Interconnected Global Political Economy

The foregoing analysis makes clear that the FTAIA was never intended to apply to criminal activity. Its drafters did not design the Act to reinforce American hegemony in the political economy of global competition policy. Rather, the statute provides express legislative guidance regarding the extraterritorial limits on criminal liability under the Sherman Act.

To date, the Supreme Court remains notably silent on the issue. In the meantime, Hui Hsiung and Motorola Mobility suggest that international businesses that participate in certain anticompetitive acts anywhere in the world should beware potential criminal redress in American courts. The chief implication of the “Crystal Meetings” cases is that anticompetitive conduct presents a massive criminal liability risk that may attach to commercial transactions that in many ways appear removed from American sovereignty. In particular, firms with foreign headquarters that deal significantly in American domestic commerce while operating abroad should consider the wide range of criminal remedies available to American prosecutors under the FTAIA.

In that vein, contractual agreements among segments of global supply chain networks should be drafted to avoid traditional areas of American criminal antitrust enforcement, such as price-fixing and bid rigging, territorial allocation mechanisms, and other naked collusive activities. Given thatat least in recent timesU.S. criminal enforcement actions are far more likely to stem from agreements between firms, rather than agreements enacted within a single entity, international businesses should factor antitrust enforcement concerns into assessing the relative risk of commercial dealings with partners. Owning subsidiaries, rather than dealing with others, may be a preferable alternative.[158]

Although vertical integration may shield firms from horizontal liabilities under section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 2 proscribes certain single-firm activities. Section 2 prohibitions include bans on attempted monopolization and the illegal maintenance or acquisition of monopoly power.[159] There are tensions inherent between self-dealing and dealing with others under U.S. antitrust law. Ironically, foreign firms may feel paralyzed by the vast scope of American antitrust law under courts’ expansive reading of the FTAIA in the criminal context—thus the Act may in fact fuel the type of commercial chilling effect bemoaned by legislators before its passage.[160]

Whereas the petitioners in Hui Hsiung failed to raise challenges to the criminal application of the domestic effects prong based on the FTAIA’s plain language and related arguments, future businesses and individuals targeted by criminal indictments should put the government to the test.[161] Multinational businesses play a major role in addressing the current conception of the FTAIA’s criminal dimensionsmost notably by challenging the U.S. government to prove the Act should apply to extraterritorial criminal acts. The plain text of the statute should give new life to extraterritoriality jurisprudence by reasonably limiting the domain of American authorities. This development is only possible, however, if foreign defendants raise facial challenges to the Act’s extraterritorial criminal application.

In the meantime, beyond reflecting the risk of criminal antitrust liability in international business transactions, multinational businesses should consider the panoply of behavioral and structural remedies available to federal prosecutors. In particular, behavioral remedies encompass fines, penalties, and potential prison time, as well as long-term monitoring and compliance regimes.[162] Foreign firms like AU Optronics, if caught in the crosshairs of a criminal prosecution, could lose control of certain areas of corporate governance altogether, in order to ensure such firms continuing compliance with American law.[163]

The range of behavioral remedies available to American competition authorities underscores the importance of avoiding criminal liability altogether by embracing a culture of prospective caution regarding potentially collusive conduct.[164] Foreign executives intending to maintain full control of corporate affairs and eschew long-term compliance monitors should craft deals as though American competition law operates globally, or otherwise entirely avoid collusive activities that could reasonably wash up on American shores.[165] Given the depth of consumer demand in American markets, caution appears to be the best policy at present for the vast majority of major global businesses.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion indicates that domestic antitrust laws play a major role in modern global trade regulation. Arguably more than any time since the passage of the FTAIA, today the international dimensions of competition policy warrant careful consideration by lawmakers, businesses, and legal practitioners. Markets are increasingly global, and the application of domestic competition law to international business has necessarily become more complex.

Although global trade can unlock market efficiencies and enhance consumer welfare, it must be managed diligently among co-equal sovereign collaborators.[166] The FTAIA clarifies that U.S. antitrust law plays a limited role in managing foreign anticompetitive activities. Moving forward, the FTAIA’s effects exception should therefore not be permitted to independently support extraterritorial criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act. The plain language of the FTAIA, in tandem with other traditional tools of statutory interpretation, suggests a limited range of legal redress for competitive harms stemming from wholly foreign acts. Such activities are cabined to the domain of civil redress and should not be subject to criminal prosecution under the FTAIA.

An interpretation of the FTAIA that would reduce reliance on American criminal law enforcement in favor of civil redress and enhanced criminal action by foreign governments in the competition sphere would be preferable, as this approach would reduce the risk of impolitic prosecutorial overreach. Spirited arguments can be made for rigorous domestic criminal enforcement where Americans face competitive injuries, but these arguments become less clearcut in the global marketplace. Yet one thing is clear: The FTAIA—a pronouncement designed by Congress to clarify the limited range of extraterritorial claims under the Sherman Act—did not speak clearly enough for federal courts. Absent judicial action, Congress should enunciate that criminal penalties are in fact authorized by the FTAIA’s plain terms.

In the meantime, American competition authorities are prepared to exercise every ounce of extraterritorial authority meted out by the federal judiciary.[167] This portends potential conflict where rigorous international competition is involved. Although the litigants in Hui Hsiung failed to fully raise arguments challenging a Sherman Act criminal prosecution under the FTAIA, the decision remains instructive. Criminal penalties under the Sherman Act are currently available to American prosecutors under a domestic effects theory.[168] Sherman Act remedies are structural and behavioral. Thus, international businesses and their agents may face U.S. competition remedies that directly interfere with corporate governance structures, including, but not limited to, compliance monitors, deferred-prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution agreements.[169]

This portends trouble in a world already plagued by political uncertainty surrounding global trade.[170] Businesses and individuals facing the current legal regime should challenge criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act under the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception. Given a lack of a clear controlling precedent, a domestic effects theory should not permit U.S. authorities to pursue criminal sanctions against wholly foreign activities, which fall more reasonably within the domain of foreign governments’ competition authorities.[171] By challenging the law in this way, businesses might topple the edifice of judicial inference that has resulted in uniform treatment of civil claims and criminal actions under the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial dimensions.

Given the proliferation of domestic competition laws worldwide in recent decades,[172] in particular, the Sherman Act should not be elevated to the status of global doctrine.[173] Nor should American jurists desire it to be treated as such.[174] The application of domestic criminal law to foreign activities demands propriety, which, in the immediate context, is best achieved by presumptively tempering domestic executive authority. To the extent short-term underdeterrence follows from respecting foreign governments’ criminal antitrust regimes, American law offers a robust range of civil redress.[175]

Trade talk has shifted from an overall cooperative tenor to a chorus of conflict.[176] The amended panel decisions will stand as good law for the time being. However, presumptive equivocal treatment of the civil and criminal provisions of the Sherman Act after the FTAIA demands meaningful justification from U.S. courts in the immediate future. For although American antitrust laws play a significant role in the contemporaneous global political economy, words matter: A rose by any other name may smell as sweet,[177] but an indictment does not a claim make.


[*] *.. Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 92; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.S., summa cum laude, Political Science and Economics 2016, Bradley University. I thank my mother, Barbara J. Simmons, for her steadfast support and dedication to the memory of my father, Brian S. Simmons. I also thank USC Professors Brian Peck and Jonathan Barnett for sparking my interest in transnational competition law. Lastly, I thank the Law Review staff and editors for their thoughtful work. All errors are my own.

 [1]. See Jason Margolis, Trump’s Trade Policies Worry Economists, USA Today (July 25, 2016, 10:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/25/donald-trump-trade-policies-china
mexico/87521852. In one of many regrettable juxtapositions in American history since June 16, 2015—the day Donald Trump announced his presidential candidacy—Mr. Margolis’s article portended calamitous results relatively well. See also David J. Lynch et al., U.S. Levies Tariffs on $34 Billion Worth of Chinese Imports, Wash. Post (July 6, 2018), https://wapo.st/2lTv5qz?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.b5b9bb69b3be (“The conflict over U.S.-China trade has been brewing for years but has intensified rapidly in 2018. On April 3, the United States released a list of targets for proposed tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports, taking aim at high-tech and industrial goods. On April 4, China fired back.”). Entering October 2018, the United States and China, two leading jurisdictions in terms of the international sale of goods, have engaged in a disturbing series of retributory tariffs. Anna Fifield, China Thinks the Trade War Isn’t Really About Trade, Wash. Post (Sept. 24, 2018), https://wapo.st/2OMNyC7?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.35afb21f7722 (reporting, in wake of announcement that China will “retaliate with tariffs on $60 billion of U.S. goods” in response to U.S. decision to “slap tariffs on an additional $200 billion worth of Chinese goods,” that Chinese officials view combative trade policy as part of a larger geopolitical threat from the United States); see also Robyn Dixon, China Accuses the U.S. of Holding a Knife to Its Neck and Rules Out New Talks to Resolve the Trade War, L.A. Times (Sept. 25, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-china-trade-war-09-25-18-story.html (reporting Chinese officials considered “U.S. tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese goods . . . so massive that it made trade talks impossible”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 24, 2018, 8:29 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1021719098265362432 (“Tariffs are the greatest! Either a country which has treated the United States unfairly on Trade negotiates a fair deal, or it gets hit with Tariffs. It’s as simple as that – and everybody’s talking! Remember, [the United States is] the ‘piggy bank’ that’s being robbed. All will be Great!”).

 [2]. Margolis, supra note 1; see also Dixon, supra note 1. See generally Issues: Foreign Policy, WhiteHouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (“The promise of a better future will come in part from reasserting American sovereignty and the right of all nations to determine their own futures.”).

 [3]. Remarks by President Trump to the World Economic Forum, WhiteHouse.gov (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-world-economic-forum (“We cannot have free and open trade if some countries exploit the system at the expense of others. We support free trade, but it needs to be fair and it needs to be reciprocal. Because, in the end, unfair trade undermines us all.”); see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 4, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/970451373681790978 (“We are on the losing side of almost all trade deals. Our friends and enemies have taken advantage of the U.S. for many years. Our . . . industries are dead. Sorry, it’s time for a change!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 2, 2018, 2:50 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump
/status/969525362580484098 (suggesting, in light of U.S. trade deficit of billions of dollars, “trade wars are good, and easy to win” (emphasis added)).

 [4]. See Margolis, supra note 1 (“Trump’s major policy positions [on trade] are primarily focused on two countries: China and Mexico.”); see also Phil Levy, Dumping, Cheating and Illegality: Trump Misleads the Public on Steel Tariffs, Forbes (Mar. 12, 2018, 2:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/phillevy/2018/03/12/dumping-cheating-and-illegality-trump-misleads-the-public-on-steel-tariffs; accord Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jun. 10, 2018, 6:17 PM), https://twitter.com
/realDonaldTrump/status/1005982266496094209 (“Why should [the United States] allow countries to continue to make Massive Trade Surpluses, as they have for decades, while our Farmers, Workers & Taxpayers have such a big and unfair price to pay? Not fair to the PEOPLE of America!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jun. 2, 2018, 2:23 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
/status/1003024268756733952 (“The U.S. has been ripped off by other countries for years on Trade, time to get smart!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 5, 2018, 7:47 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/970626966004162560 (“We have large trade deficits with Mexico and Canada.”).

 [5]. Pankaj Ghemawat, Globalization in the Age of Trump, Harv. Bus. Rev., July–Aug. 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/07/globalization-in-the-age-of-trump (“The myth of a borderless world has come crashing down. Traditional pillars of open markets—the United States and the UK—are wobbling, and China is positioning itself as globalization’s staunchest defender.”); see also Josh Zumbrun & Bob Davis, Trade Tensions Intensify as Allies Rebuke U.S., Testing Trump Ahead of G-7, Wall St. J. (June 3, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-trade-tensions-intensify-1528070538; cf. Gao Shangquan, U.N. Comm. for Dev. Policy, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/2000/CDP/1, Economic Globalization: Trends, Risks, and Risk Prevention 1–4 (2000), http://www.un.org/en
/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp2000_1.pdf (asserting economic globalization trends are “irreversible,” and forecasting developmental risks posed by economic globalization).

 [6]. Lynch et al., supra note 1; cf. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 2, 2018, 2:23 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1003024268756733952 (“When you’re almost 800 Billion Dollars a year down on Trade, you can’t lose a Trade War!”).

 [7]. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); see also Ian Simmons et al., Where to Draw the Line: Should the FTAIA’s Domestic Effects Test Apply in Criminal Prosecutions?, 29 Antitrust 42, 42–46 (2015) (evaluating debate over extraterritorial contours of Sherman Act in criminal context).

 [8]. See, e.g., Melinda F. Levitt & Howard W. Fogt, International Trade and Antitrust: Clarity Put on Hold as FTAIA Conflict/Confusion Continues, Foley (July 30, 2015), https://www.foley.com
/international-trade-and-antitrust–clarity-put-on-hold-as-ftaiaconflictconfusion-continues (“Maybe the ball is back in Congress’s court. . . . However, given the present level of functionality with the United States Congress, I don’t think we are going to see that in the near future, unfortunately. And so, anybody who treads in these waters needs to continue to be very careful and monitor the situation as we go forward.”) (Melinda F. Levitt, at 1:01:12–1:01:48). But see Simmons et al., supra note 7, at 46 (suggesting plain language and clear legislative intent permit only civil liability for foreign actors under the FTAIA’s “domestic effects” exception).

 [9]. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (“As a charter of freedom, the act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”); see also Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs Competition Com., Roundtable on the Extraterritorial Reach of Competition Remedies – Note by the United States 3–4 (Dec. 4–5, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international-competition-fora/et_remedies_united_states.pdf (“[The Antitrust Division and DOJ] require relief sufficient to eliminate identified anticompetitive harm that has the requisite connection to U.S. commerce and consumers, even if this means reaching assets or conduct in a foreign jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).

 [10]. See, e.g., United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 758–59 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (upholding criminal sentence under FTAIA for foreign price-fixing conspiracy with “effect” on United States).

 [11]. Cf. Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8 (detailing ongoing debate over extraterritoriality in American antitrust jurisprudence after FTAIA).

 [12]. Concerns surrounding extraterritoriality in U.S. competition policy are heightened in light of businesses’ widespread embrace of lean methodology and global supply-chain management strategies, which increasingly distribute goods and services throughout a single firm’s transnational network to maximize profit and minimize waste. See generally Michael H. Hugos, Essentials of Supply Chain Management (3d ed. 2011). Specifically, the emergence of global supply chain networks has unleashed a variety of associated complications with respect to commercial regulations. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation 16–25 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/926481/download [hereinafter International Guidelines] (describing agencies’ extraterritorial prerogatives under the FTAIA); Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 Me. L. Rev. 3, 5 (2012).

While there is extensive disagreement about the specifics with respect to what behavior and structure the antitrust laws should seek to prohibit or permit, there is broad, general consensus on the goals of the antitrust laws. . . . [E]nhancement of consumer welfare, the promotion of competition, and compensation of the victims of antitrust violations. . . . [T]he FTAIA has significantly undermined the achievement of these goals.

Bauer, supra, at 5.

 [13]. Phillip Areeda et al., Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases ¶¶ 168–69 (7th ed. 2013) (“With ever-expanding globalization, instances of conflicting—as well of complementary—interests among jurisdictions involving multinational business activity will become increasingly frequent. . . . [I]n many individual cases an anticompetitive practice may well benefit some jurisdictions . . . [however,] the reciprocal nature of foreign trade suggests the existence of opportunities for mutual gain.”); see also Jennifer B. Patterson & Terri A. Mazur, Kaye Scholer, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws (2014), https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files/ks-imported/20140813_r
_pattersonmazurinsidecounselarticleaugust132014pdf; Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8.

 [14]. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2018). The statute’s language is overly formalistic and consequently complicated. Accord United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. (Nippon II), 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing the FTAIA as “inelegantly phrased”). In effect, its terms cabin the Sherman Act’s scope to activity beyond U.S. borders, providing that such conduct gives rise to domestic antitrust liability only if it: (1) involves “import commerce;” or (2) has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic trade or commerce, which “gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (emphasis added).

 [15]. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) (“[T]he FTAIA’s language and history suggest that Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce.”).

 [16]. See United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 738, 756–60 (9th Cir. 2015).

 [17]. Id. at 743 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a).

 [18]. See id.

 [19]. Id. at 743, 748, 750–53, 756–60 (providing the required test under the first prong of the “domestic effects” exception, as articulated under the FTAIA).

 [20]. See, e.g., id. at 743 (“Crystal Meeting participants stood to make enormous profits from TFT–LCD sales to United States technology retailers. . . . [T]he United States comprised approximately one-third of the global market for personal computers incorporating TFT–LCDs, and sales . . . generated over $600 million in revenue.”). For example, the conspiracy targeted commercial electronics retailers, like Motorola and Apple, which incorporated the price-fixed panel technologies in overseas production processes earlier in the supply chain. See id.

 [21]. See id. at 751–53 (“The FTAIA . . . provides substantive elements under the Sherman Act in cases involving nonimport trade with foreign nations.” (emphasis added)). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (“[S]uch effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman Act] . . . .” (emphasis added)).

 [22]. The court’s final analysis lacks any substantive discussion of whether a criminal indictment may give rise to a domestic antitrust “claim” within the meaning of the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong, while concluding that the question of “what conduct [the FTAIA] prohibits is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one.” Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted). Colorable arguments exist to support a broad interpretation of the FTAIA as authorizing both civil and criminal “claims” if wholly foreign conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect on nonimport domestic commerce, see, for example, infra text accompanying notes 6772, but the panel decision offers none. See, e.g., Simmons et al., supra note 7, at 42 (“[T]he amended opinion upheld the convictions . . . without any significant discussion of whether [the “domestic effects” prong] can independently support a criminal prosecution [under the Sherman Act].”). At the very least, the panel owed the public a legal justification for its implicit ruling that a criminal indictment constitutes a “claim” under the “domestic effects” exception. In reality, a more efficacious reading of the FTAIA’s exception would limit the reach of the Sherman Act to only civil claims, at least where nonimport “domestic effects” form the basis of an extraterritorial competition “claim.” See, e.g., infra Part II (arguing that the FTAIA facially prohibits extraterritorial criminal prosecutions on the independent “domestic effects” theory, in part because neither prosecutions nor indictments actually amount to “claims” within the plain meaning of the “domestic effects” exception).

 [23]. Accord Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8.

 [24]. See generally supra notes 723 (reviewing FTAIA’s “domestic effects” exception and Hui Hsiung).

 [25]. Moreover, in light of the proliferation of highly integrated global supply chain networks, see generally Hugos, supra note 12, as well as the emergence of a tense global political economy surrounding free trade and international competition, see supra notes 15, this subject appears increasingly relevant to federal courts, legal practitioners, and the tens of thousands of firms doing business in America.

 [26]. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993) (noting disagreement regarding whether the FTAIA’s “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” standard amends existing law or merely codifies it, but declining to take up the issue).

 [27]. See infra Part II.

 [28]. For rich academic discussion of foreign commerce and the complex relationships forged between foreign commerce and domestic antitrust laws, see generally Wilbur L. Fugate & Lee H. Simowitz, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (5th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2018). Sections I.A.1–2 are designed to provide useful historical context for the FTAIA’s substantive provisions and recent judicial decisions; they are not intended to provide exhaustive review of the Sherman Act in international commerce.

 [29]. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (criminal antitrust violations). See also Areeda et al., supra note 13, ¶ 168 n.101 (discussing definitions of “commerce” and the extraterritorial reach of various antitrust provisions, including sections 1, 2, and 7 of the Sherman Act, as well as the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act).

 [30]. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (Holmes, J.) (holding the Sherman Act does not apply to acts taken in Panama and Costa Rica, which fall beyond territorial borders of United States); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Claims by Foreign Plaintiffs Under State Law, 26 Antitrust L.J. 43, 43–44 (2011) [hereinafter Cavanagh, The FTAIA]; Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: The New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2151, 2153–56 (2003) [hereinafter Cavanagh, The New Frontier].

 [31]. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 440–45 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (“[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”); Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962) (approving of the Second Circuit decision in Alcoa and finding jurisdiction where foreign defendants’ conduct abroad had an “impact within the United States and upon its foreign trade”).

 [32]. Bauer, supra note 12, at 8.

 [33]. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443–44. The panel noted, “[b]oth agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within the United States; and it follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them.” Id. at 444. Although the case is famous for its domestic implications and market share analysis, the decision also marks a key moment in extraterritorial antitrust jurisprudence. Under the panel’s view, criminal liability under the antitrust laws historically attached to wholly foreign conduct involving imports; foreign conduct that affected nonimport domestic commerce was historically only subject to civil liability, not criminal prosecution. Alcoa therefore provides only limited authority for extraterritorial criminal liability in nonimport contexts, as when foreign actors are prosecuted on the basis of downstream effects on domestic commerce.

 [34]. Id. at 443–44.

 [35]. An interesting aspect of the Alcoa case was simply its procedural posture. In 1944, the Supreme Court announced that it would not have a quorum to hear the case. Congress subsequently designated the case to the Second Circuit through a special act that stands to this day. See generally Act of June 9, 1944, 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2018).

 [36]. See, e.g., Areeda et al., supra note 13, ¶ 168.

 [37]. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.

 [38]. Cf. id. This inference appears reasonable given federal courts’ position as legal custodians in the United States, one of the foremost consumer markets in the developed world. Cf. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting “Crystal Meetings” conspiracy targeted leading firms in American consumer electronics market); Shangquan, supra note 5.

 [39]. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added).

 [40]. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 2, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1997). Indeed, this widely-adopted standard for extraterritorial antitrust analysis has been referred to as the “effects doctrine” or “effects test” in civil and criminal actions. See John W. Head, Global Business Law: Principles and Practice of International Commerce and Investment 643 (3d ed. 2012); Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1226, 1269–74 (2011).

 [41]. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (adopting Alcoa effects test following passage of FTAIA where it could be shown that conduct “was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States”); accord Filetech S.A. v. Fr. Telecom, S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1998) (following Hartford Fire’s construction of the prevailing Alcoa effects test).

 [42]. See generally Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 Am. J. Int’l L. 280 (1982) (describing role of the comity doctrine in extraterritorial application of domestic laws). The Supreme Court recently clarified the doctrine of “international comity” with respect to a foreign government’s official statement concerning the meaning of its own domestic law. See generally Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018), vacating and remanding In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016). The Court suggested American courts are “not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government’s statements,” in such instances, but declined to undertake the analysis itself and instead remanded the case for further consideration consistent with its opinion. Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1869, 1875 (“The correct interpretation of Chinese law is not before this Court, and we take no position on it.”).

 [43]. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1977) (court may refrain from asserting “extraterritorial authority,” despite finding of some actual or intended effect, upon presence of factors implicating international comity concerns in rendering judgment), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2018), as recognized in McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F. 2d 802, 813 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988).

 [44]. Areeda et al., supra note 13, ¶ 168(b) (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985)). The Timberlane court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s claim based on the legitimacy of the defendant’s foreign acts under Honduran law, as well as the meager effects on competition within the United States. Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 1384–86.

 [45]. Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 1386.

 [46]. Cavanagh, The New Frontier, supra note 30, at 2154. But see id. (“While one cannot fault these courts for attempting to develop comprehensive jurisdictional standards, it is undeniable that infusing the issue of comity into the jurisdictional analysis has generated more confusion than certainty and has created significant unpredictability in the law.” (emphasis added)).

 [47]. Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 402–03, § 403 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1987) [hereinafter Restatement].

 [48]. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165–69 (2004) (discussing prescriptive comity considerations in connection with FTAIA’s domestic effects exception and concluding that the Act did not apply given Congress’s adherence to principles of comity in international commercial relations).

 [49]. See Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 19, 36, 38 (2008) (noting that courts’ application of comity doctrine reflects concerns for separation of powers, historical experience, and respect for foreign sovereignty in context of extraterritorial antitrust disputes).

 [50]. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 813 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting Timberlane standard and noting that the FTAIA “did not change the ability of courts to exercise principles of international comity” in antitrust actions); see also Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming Timberlane and listing ten comity factors relevant to “balancing process”); Pillar Corp. v. Enercon Indus. Corp., 694 F. Supp. 1353, 1360–61 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (discussing “concerns raised” by Mannington Mills and Timberlane courts); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (following Mannington Mills analysis of ten factors relevant to comity analysis). But see Hartford Fire, Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796–99 (1993) (principles of international comity are only raised upon a “true conflict” between U.S. and foreign law).

 [51]. Timberlane v. Bank of Am. N.T.& S.A., 749 F.2d 1378, 1384–86 (9th Cir. 1984).

 [52]. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796–99.

 [53]. Id. at 798–99.

 [54]. Id. at 797.

 [55]. Id. at 799.

 [56]. Id. at 796.

 [57]. See id. at 796 n.23.

 [58]. However, it is essential to note at the onset of this discussion that, despite judicial treatment of the Act’s thornier components, compelling commentary has called for repeal of the FTAIA altogether. See generally Robert E. Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA! (Or at Least Consider It as Coextensive with Hartford Fire), CPI Antitrust Chron. (Sept. 2014), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/ConnollySEP-141.pdf [hereinafter Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA!] (noting “[a] primary motivation behind the FTAIA was to give immunity to American exporters to engage in anticompetitive conduct—as long as it negatively affected only foreign consumers,” and arguing the FTAIA should not govern the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act). Connolly reiterates and extends portions of his argument in a companion article. Robert E. Connolly, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA, CartelCapers (Sept. 30, 2014), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-ftaia.

 [59]. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2018).

 [60]. Id. (emphasis added).

 [61]. See id.; accord United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2015); Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 71 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)) (noting the implication that the Sherman Act applies to “import trade and import commerce is unmistakable”). The import commerce prong likely applies where a defendant sells a finished product directly to American consumers in the United States. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 935 (2013).

 [62]. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163 (2004).

 [63]. See Carpet Grp. Int’l, 227 F.3d at 71.

 [64]. See Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA!, supra note 58.

 [65]. H.R. Rep. No. 97–686, at 2–3 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2491; see also 15 U.S.C. § 4001 (2018) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to increase United States exports of products and services by encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services to United States producers and suppliers, in particular by . . . modifying the application of antitrust laws to certain export trade.”).

 [66]. H.R. Rep. No. 97–686, at 6 (1982).

 [67]. Id. at 5.

 [68]. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 704–05 (1962) and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952)).

 [69]. H.R. Rep. No. 97–686, at 2–3 (1982).

 [70]. Of critical importance to subsequent analysis in this Note—an unstated desire to protect U.S. commercial interests also pervades modern judicial interpretations of the FTAIA, at least with respect to civil actions. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 12, at 24 (“Arguably, the courts are seeking to protect the interests of American companies doing business abroad and of foreign companies doing business in the United States, with the unstated assumption that somehow this will result in a net benefit to the American economy.”).

 [71]. See, e.g., Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA!, supra note 58 (proposing outright repeal of the Act).

 [72]. See, e.g., Cavanagh, The New Frontier, supra note 30, at 2159 (“It has therefore fallen to the courts to determine the precise meaning and scope of the FTAIA.”). Indeed, given prolonged legislative inaction on the subject, federal courts arguably must define the scope of the FTAIA to yield some measure of clarity for litigants. See Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8 (suggesting legislative revision of FTAIA is unlikely but may be necessary).

 [73]. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796–97, 796 n.23 (1993); see also supra Section I.A.2 (discussing comity concerns in Hartford Fire).

 [74]. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796–97.

 [75]. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. (Nippon I), 944 F. Supp. 55, 57–58 (D. Mass. 1996) (dismissing criminal antitrust indictment for lack of jurisdiction under Sherman Act).

 [76]. See id. at 58. The thrilling basis for the government’s prosecution stemmed from Nippon Paper Industries’ corporate predecessor, “Jujo Paper,” allegedly agreeing with unnamed Japanese firms to “fix prices of jumbo roll thermal facsimile paper (‘fax paper’) sold in the United States,” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.

 [77]. Id. at 64.

 [78]. Id. at 65 (emphasis added) (construing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1922) as holding the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law “carries even more weight when applied to criminal statutes”).

 [79]. See id. at 64–66.

 [80]. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. (Nippon II), 109 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1997) (detailing the essential “Fax” underlying the panel’s decision); Raymond Krauze & John Mulcahy, Antitrust Violations, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 241, 278–79 (2003) (“[T]he First Circuit reinstated the indictment of a foreign-based defendant for conduct occurring wholly outside of the United States, and the case looks to be a harbinger of the Antitrust Division’s growing ability to combat international price-fixing.”); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (criminal antitrust violations for horizontal restraints of trade and monopolization practices).

 [81]. Nippon II, 109 F.3d at 5 (emphasis added).

 [82]. Id. at 4.

 [83]. Id. at 6. The panel further noted that although Nippon and its expert witnesses argued that this was “the first criminal case in which the United States endeavor[ed] to extend Section One to wholly foreign conduct,” an “absence of earlier criminal actions is probably more a demonstration of the increasingly global nature of our economy than proof that Section One cannot cover wholly foreign conduct in the criminal milieu.” Id. In the court’s view, the mere lack of precedent imposing criminal liability to wholly foreign conduct did not bar prosecutors from bringing charges under section 1. Id. Critically, in the view of the court, the language of the FTAIA itself also did not impact the ability of U.S. authorities to bring criminal prosecutions against solely extraterritorial conduct. See id. at 4–6.

 [84]. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).

 [85]. Id. at 9 (Lynch, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933)).

 [86]. Id. at 4–6.

 [87]. Rather, along with the language and history of the FTAIA, Nippon I provides a helpful interpretive model for understanding the boundaries of U.S. law in the extraterritorial criminal context. In many ways, Nippon I challenges convention, as many courts have inferred substantially similar treatment of the Sherman Act’s criminal and civil provisions after Hartford Fire—a case in which only civil antitrust claims were at issue.

 [88]. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174–75 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2018)).

 [89]. Id.

 [90]. Id. at 173–75 (“Respondents concede that this claim is not their own claim; it is someone else’s claim. . . . “[T]hat is, the conduct’s domestic effects did not help to bring about that foreign injury.”); see also Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting on remand that the FTAIA codifies a proximate cause standard for Sherman Act claims involving foreign trade or commerce).

 [91]. See Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1270–71.

 [92]. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2015).

 [93]. Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015).

 [94]. Motorola Mobility, 135 S. Ct. at 2837 (denying petitions for certiorari in Motorola Mobility and Hui Hsiung). However, independent state-law actions have proceeded parallel to federal litigation surrounding the “Crystal Meeting” conspiracy. For example, consumer plaintiffs in the State of Washington will receive a total of $41.1 million in “overcharge” damages stemming from the conspiracy’s agreement to manipulate the supply of LCD panels to artificially increase prices. See Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Attorney Gen., More Than $41M Headed to Consumers in AG Ferguson’s LCD Price-Fixing Case (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/more-41m-headed-consumers-ag-ferguson-s-lcd-price-fixing-case.

 [95]. But see Robert E. Connolly, Why the Supreme Court Refused to Hear the FTAIA Appeals, Law360 (June 16, 2015, 10:22 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/668031/why-the-supreme-court-refused-to-hear-the-ftaia-appeals (arguing that Hui Hsiung and Motorola Mobility were correctly decided and that the cases were sufficiently factually dissimilar to avoid facial contradiction between the final Circuit opinions).

 [96]. See infra Part II.

 [97]. LCD panels sold above competitive prices were incorporated in laptops, desktops, and television screens purchased by American consumers. See Brandon Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations 235–36 (2014) (describing “Crystal Meetings” conspiracy, harms to American consumers, and federal prosecution). One definition of “LCD” describes the technology as “an electronic display (as of the time in a digital watch) that consists of segments of a liquid crystal whose reflectivity varies according to the voltage applied to them.” LCD, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2017). LCD panels are increasingly incorporated into handheld technologies, such as smartphones, watches, telephonic displays, as well as computer screens and televisions, among many other products. See generally Joseph A. Castellano, Liquid Gold: The Story of Liquid Crystal Displays and the Creation of an Industry (2005) (tracing history of LCD panel technology and modern applications of technology).

 [98]. See Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 743 (outlining “Crystal Meetings” conspiracy). The final judgment notes that affected panels were purchased by market leaders, including “Dell, Hewlett Packard (‘HP’), Compaq, Apple, and Motorola for use in consumer electronics.” Id.

 [99]. Id.

 [100]. Id.; accord Brent Snyder, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes 6 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/826721
/download (“High-level executives were also prosecuted in the . . . LCD investigations, including two chairmen/CEOs, four presidents, more than 20 vice presidents, and a number of managers and directors. Among these were the president and executive vice president of the third largest LCD maker in the world. . . . [A] jury convicted these two, and they are currently serving 36-month jail terms—the longest sentences ever imposed on foreign-national defendants for antitrust offenses.”); Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Primer for Federal Law Enforcement Personnel 4 (2018) [hereinafter Antitrust Primer], https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1091651/download (discussing LCD-panel price-fixing conspiracy proceedings in U.S. federal courts).

 [101]. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 757.

 [102]. Id. at 743.

 [103]. Id. at 744.

 [104]. Id.

 [105]. Id.

 [106]. Id.

 [107]. Id. at 745; accord Snyder, supra note 100, at 6; Antitrust Primer, supra note 100, at 4 (noting final fines in the LCD antitrust investigation and prosecutions “led to criminal fines totaling more than $1.39 billion and charges against 22 executives,” the majority of whom pleaded guilty or were convicted at trial before U.S. tribunals).

 [108]. H              ui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 745.

 [109]. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1095 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (2015).

 [110]. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 743, 751, 756.

 [111]. Id. at 743, 751, 760.

 [112]. See, e.g., supra notes 2122.

 [113]. Press Release No. 12-1140, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Antitrust Div., Taiwan-Based AU Optronics Corp. Sentenced to Pay $500 Million Criminal Fine for Role in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/taiwan-based-au-optronics-corporation-sentenced-pay-500-million-criminal-fine-role-lcd-price. In total, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) reported that “eight companies have been convicted of charges arising out of the . . . ongoing investigation” into the LCD-panel price-fixing conspiracy, which “have been sentenced to pay criminal fines totaling $1.39 billion.” Id. (emphasis added). As of September 2012, the DOJ boasted that twenty-two executives had been charged in the foreign conspiracy; twelve had been convicted and “sentenced to serve a combined total of 4,871 days in prison” in the United States. Id. (emphasis added). These weighty penalties associated with criminal antitrust prosecutions particularly warrant heightened judicial scrutiny of the FTAIA’s language, purpose, and scope in the criminal context. Accord Antitrust Primer, supra note 100, at 3–4 (summarizing total fines and penalties in LCD-panel cases).

 [114]. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 758–60 (evaluating defendants’ sufficiency of evidence challenges to government’s alleged “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect on U.S. nonimport trade or commerce).

 [115]. Id. at 752–53.

 [116]. See id. at 756–60. The court notes that “even disregarding the domestic effects exception, the evidence that the defendants engaged in import trade was overwhelming” and demonstrated that the defendants participated in direct import commerce under 15 U.S.C. § 6a, and that this “import trade theory alone was sufficient to convict the defendants of price-fixing.” Id. at 760. However, the court’s discussion notably lacks any analysis of the second substantive element of the FTAIA’s domestic effects prong. See id. at 756–60.

 [117]. Id. at 757.

 [118]. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466–69 (3d Cir. 2011). The dilemma of whether the FTAIA presents additional merits or jurisdictional elements for extraterritorial Sherman Act claims is contentious, with different lower courts adopting different rules since the 1990s. See Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 751–52, 752 n.7, 753 (holding that the FTAIA is “not a subject-matter jurisdiction limitation on the power of the federal courts but a component of the merits of a Sherman Act claim involving nonimport trade or commerce with foreign nations,” and reviewing cases adopting and rejecting this rule); see also Edward Valdespino, Note, Shifting Viewpoints: The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, a Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 Tex. Int’l L.J. 457, 457 (2009) (noting a shift from jurisdictional to substantive view). The source of contention is the burden-shifting effect of viewing the FTAIA’s terms as substantive elements: the “[e]xpense and shifting burdens of proof greatly increases settlement pressure.” Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8. Rather than being challengeable on the pleadings through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a merits question requires courts to evaluate evidence and legal arguments, see Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8. Thus, viewing the FTAIA as a matter of “substantive liability” requires “resolution through motion[s] for summary judgment after . . . discovery or trial,” which may be extremely expensive in the context of extraterritorial antitrust actions. Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8. With that in mind, the trend in recent years is decidedly in favor of viewing the FTAIA as additional substantive elements. See id.

 [119]. See Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 752.

 [120]. Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing procedural posture and factual basis of case). The panel decision, penned by economist and now-retired Judge Richard Posner, noted the criminal convictions entered in Hui Hsiung at the onset of its analysis. Id. (“We’ll drop ‘allegedly’ and ‘alleged,’ for simplicity, and assume that the panels were indeed price-fixed—a plausible assumption since defendant AU Optronics has been convicted of participating in a criminal conspiracy to fix the price of panel components of the cellphones manufactured by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries.”).

 [121]. Id. (emphasis added).

 [122]. Id. at 821–25. Under the indirect-purchaser doctrine, only direct purchasers harmed by overcharging have cognizable antitrust claims under federal law. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 723–26 (1977). Thus, the panel noted, “Motorola’s subsidiaries were the direct purchasers of the price-fixed LCD panels” whereas “Motorola and its customers [were the] indirect purchasers of the panels.” Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 821 (emphasis added).

 [123]. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).

 [124]. Id. at 825 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit’s final opinion noted that the FTAIA has historically been interpreted to limit the extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws, in line with considerations of international comity, id. at 818, yet impliedly concluded that the Act’s “claim” language should be broadly construed to encompass civil claims and criminal indictments, see id. at 825.

 [125]. Id. at 824–25 (“The foreign subsidiaries can sue under foreign law—are we to presume the inadequacy of the antitrust laws of our foreign allies? Would such a presumption be consistent with international comity, or more concretely with good relations with allied nations in a world in turmoil?”). In response to Judge Posner—it seems readily discernible that American antitrust law does in fact presume the inadequacy of the competition laws of foreign collaborators, at least insofar as American prosecutors increasingly pursue criminal enforcement prosecutions involving foreign commerce. Moreover, in the wider array of international transactional regulation, the United States frequently dispatches with consideration of “good relations with allied nations” in pursuit of national economic objectives. See generally Head, supra note 40 (broadly surveying the role of U.S. law in regulation of international trade and investment).

 [126]. Notably, here, no petitioner raised this “claim” of error in Hui Hsiung or Motorola Mobility. Nevertheless, particularly if the FTAIA is to be construed as a series of additional substantive, non-jurisdictional requirements for Sherman Act claims, a full analysis of both parts of the two-part conjunctive domestic effects test is certainly warranted.

 [127]. Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1971, 1971 (2013) (citing Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339, 339 (2005)). For authoritative discussions of the interaction between textualism and other recognized statutory interpretive methodologies in American judicial opinions, see generally Cross, supra and Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992). Part II begins from a textualist foundation and in subsequent sections, see infra Sections II.B–D, also considers alternative rationales for strictly interpreting the domestic effects exception to not authorize extraterritorial criminal prosecutions. Cross briefly notes that “[d]escriptive statistics reveal that textualism and legislative intent are [the] most common [interpretive methodologies], but all the approaches find material use in Court opinions.” See Cross, supra, at 1972; cf. id. at 1973–74 (“Textualism is broadly accepted as an interpretive methodology, the controversy is over its exclusivism. . . . Critics argue that there are many cases in which the plain meaning of the text does not offer a clear resolution and these difficult cases are . . . most likely to be taken by the . . . Supreme Court.” (citing Breyer, supra, at 862)).

 [128]. Cross, supra note 127, at 1972 (citing John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 434 (2005)).

 [129]. See id. at 1972–74.

 [130]. Claim, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

 [131]. Prosecution, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

 [132]. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).

 [133]. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 273(c)(2) (3d ed. 2006)).

 [134]. Id. at 825 (quoting F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)). Of course, the court in Motorola Mobility dealt with civil claims. Comity holds the same, if not greater, weight in criminal prosecutions, where judgments of community condemnation and moral culpability are implicated to far greater degrees than in civil actions. Accord International Guidelines, supra note 12, at 49–51 (highlighting “Special Considerations” in connection with criminal investigations and prosecutions undertaken against international price-fixing cartels).

 [135]. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 825 (emphasis added).

 [136]. See Restatement, supra note 47 §§ 402–03, § 403 cmt. a.

 [137]. Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA!, supra note 58, at 3. Connolly seems to suggest that American federal prosecutors will always have a greater concern for international relations, foreign sovereignty concerns, and other attendant comity considerations, than will civil plaintiffs. See id.

 [138]. See id. at 4.

 [139]. Id. at 7. Notably, Judge Posner cited Connolly’s article at length in the final opinion, including the relevant portion cited herein. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 826–27 (citing Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA!, supra note 58). This suggests that Connolly’s colorable conception of comity had at least a persuasive impact on the panel’s reasoning with respect to the domestic effects prong.

 [140]. Connolly relies in part on the fact that, as DOJ prosecutors noted in their Motorola Mobility briefs, before commencing with a case, the DOJ contemplates the views of foreign nations, whereas, in his view, “the comity considerations with private plaintiffs are quite different.” Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA!, supra note 58, at 4. For example, Connolly contends that private individuals seeking civil damage remedies may fail to exercise the “degree of self-restraint and consideration of foreign governmental sensibilities generally exercised by the U.S. Government.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added) (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 171 (2004)). In defense of Connolly and the Court in Empagran, this praise of “self-restraint” and “consideration of foreign government sensibilities” in the American executive branch came prior to January 2017.

 [141]. In fact, “substantial differences . . . exist among various countries in respect of competition laws.” Head, supra note 40, at 643–45; see also id. at 634–54 (outlining American, Japanese, and EU competition regimes, multilateral competition policy efforts, and bilateral and regional competition policy efforts). In sharp contrast to imposition of criminal penalties for violations of competition policy, most countries of the world do agree on near-universal condemnation of “core international crimes,” such as “war crimes, crimes against the peace or aggression, crimes against humanity, and genocide.” Beth Van Schaack & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 205 (3rd ed. 2015). See id. at 205–581 (describing internationally recognized mechanisms for condemnation of war crimes, crimes against the peace, crimes against humanity, genocide).

 [142]. For instance, recent research suggests that criminal punishment in the United States is increasingly “harsh,” relative to peer nations. See generally James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe (2003).

 [143]. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 693, 693–95, 698–710 (1993) (discussing interdependence between civil and criminal law, contrasting reasons for civil and criminal commitment, and arguing that “the distinctiveness of criminal law is its focus on moral blameworthiness”); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, An Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, in Law and Economics 454–84 (6th ed. 2016) (contrasting “traditional,” retributivist justifications for criminal punishment with utility-based “economic” approaches). Robinson traces first principles surrounding civil and criminal commitment to provide a robust take on the association between community values and the type of culpability associated with criminal condemnation. See Robinson, supra, at 693–95. Ultimately Robinson arrives at the conclusion that “it would be better to expand civil commitment to include seriously dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal liability as blameless for any reason,” in part because American laws frequently set high standards for criminal commitment based upon offenders’ mental states and associated blameworthiness, as opposed to dangerousness. Id. at 716–17.

 [144]. See supra notes 16 and accompanying text (discussing the currently fractious political economy of international trade and international economic cooperation).

 [145]. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).

 [146]. Cf. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 749 F.2d 1378, 1384–86 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting international comity factors traditionally applied by federal courts to assess propriety of exercising jurisdiction). But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993) (suggesting comity factors only relevant in assessing jurisdiction upon finding of “direct” conflict between American law and foreign law).

 [147]. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (noting comity reflects “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation”).

 [148]. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248, 252 (“We assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality. . . . [U]nless there is ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,’ we must presume it ‘is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.’” (citations omitted)); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (quoting Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248) (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (citations omitted)); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388–89 (2005) (noting the “legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application” (emphasis added)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203 (1993); cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825) (“The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”); United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255).

 [149]. See Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992) (suggesting burden of overcoming presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law lies with the party asserting application of U.S. law to events that occurred abroad); United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing burden on party seeking extraterritorial application vis-à-vis legislative intent). But see United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 101–03 (1922) (suggesting there is no presumption against extraterritoriality when dealing with statutes prohibiting crimes against the U.S. government); Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995) (holding Bowman should be read narrowly to only apply to “criminal statutes . . . and . . . only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs committed against it” and exempt such actions “from the presumption [against extraterritoriality]”).

 [150]. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266–67 (citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 255 and Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 283, 285–86 (1949)) (suggesting the mode of analysis the Court applied concerned the “‘focus’ of congressional concern”).

 [151]. Id. at 266–67 (holding that the “focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States,” so section 10(b) of the Exchange Act only regulates “domestic transactions in other securities”); cf. Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. of Am. L. 137, 159–60 (2011) (noting, in the civil context, “cases like [Arabian Am. Oil Co.] have made it harder to overcome the presumption,” and “Morrison seems to have made it harder to avoid the presumption with claims of territoriality”).

 [152]. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97–98; see also Clopton, supra note 151, at 161 (“Bowman and its progeny do not question the power of Congress to enact extraterritorial criminal laws. Instead, these cases ask whether a court should apply an ambiguous criminal statute extraterritorially. For centuries, the answer . . . was flatly ‘no.’” (emphasis added)). But see Clopton, supra note 151, at 166 (suggesting lower courts have interpreted Bowman as “merely restat[ing] the American Banana rule that statutes are presumed to apply territorially unless Congress has indicated otherwise,” while other courts have “suggested that Bowman created a limited exception to the presumption” (footnotes omitted)).

 [153]. International Guidelines, supra note 12, at 5.

 [154]. Id.

 [155]. Id.

 [156]. Id.

 [157]. There is a wide divergence in the “substance and enforcement” of competition law among leading jurisdictions—including the United States, Japan, and the European Union (“EU”). See Head, supra note 40, at 648–49. Leading commentary suggests that the values undergirding competition policy in the EU and United States “differ significantly,” in that the EU does not follow the United States’ unilateral “focus on ensuring competitive markets through limitations on abusive business practices.” Jerold A. Friedland, Understanding International Business and Financial Transactions 295–96 (4th ed. 2014). Moreover, Japanese law “does not begin with the premise of U.S. law that private agreements to regulate trade are injurious,” and, for many decades “cartels of the largest Japanese businesses were encouraged to stabilize the economy through practices that prevented unemployment and focused private economic activity on public goals.” Id. at 296.

 [158]. Nevertheless, the DOJ may maintain a focus on “individual accountability” in criminal antitrust enforcement, even in extraterritorial cases. Snyder, supra note 100, at 3–5.

 [159]. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).

 [160]. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 97–686, at 6 (1982) (noting how extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act prior to the FTAIA caused many international business transactions to “die on the drawing board”).

 [161]. The government’s emphasis on “individual accountability” is underscored in the LCD investigation and eventual prosecutions. See Snyder, supra note 100, at 3–5; Antitrust Primer, supra note 100, at 4.

 [162]. Snyder, supra note 100, at 6 (“AU Optronics . . . pa[id] a then-record fine of $500 million and accept[ed] a compliance monitor, after the same jury convicted it.”). The former Deputy Assistant Attorney General’s remarks reinforce the importance of compliance monitors to maintain a long-term culture of antitrust enforcement—even cases involving foreign companies and extraterritorial application of criminal antitrust law. Id.

Corporate accountability is important as well because it incentivizes compliance with our laws. The Antitrust Division emphasizes that compliance with antitrust laws must be ingrained in a corporation’s culture—one that is established from the top down. And we insist on probation and corporate monitors in criminal resolutions, where corporate offenders fail to demonstrate serious compliance efforts.

Id. at 1–2.

 [163]. Id. at 6.

 [164]. See generally id. The fact that leaders among the DOJ antitrust enforcement community view compliance monitors and cultures of corporate compliance as essential to the U.S. criminal antitrust regime generally reinforces this point.

 [165]. Regrettably, this response arguably both reflects and reinforces American hegemony in competition policy.

 [166]. At least at present, the prospects for a truly global competition regime appear scant. See Head, supra note 40, at 641­–54 (discussing regimes regulating anticompetitive conduct beyond domestic laws). Since the 1990s, nearly 150 sovereign states have enacted competition regimes; these are predominately molded from American common law principles. See Levitt & Fogt, supra note 8. States, rather than intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental actors, simply retain principal authority over this aspect of international trade policy. Thus, efforts toward effective transnational regulatory frameworks should proceed from principles of collaborative management between coequal sovereigns. Accord id.

 [167]. See, e.g., International Guidelines, supra note 12, at 16–19 (broadly interpreting domestic effects standard based on cited precedents).

 [168]. Although in both cases the courts applied the direct import commerce prong as an independent basis for their respective decisions, each also noted that the domestic effects prong—if independently relied upon—would support the same outcome. These results are just as analytically problematic, albeit in a more attenuated sense, as a decision rendered solely upon application of the domestic effects prong.

 [169]. For example, in the case of AU Optronics, a criminal remedy included a long-term compliance monitor, on site at the company, to tackle a perceived culture of criminal corruption at the firm. See Antitrust Sanctions 2.0 – Evolving Views on Behavioral Remedies, Allen & Overy LLP, http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/lrrfs/us/Pages/Antitrust-sanctions-2.0-%E2%80%93-evolving-views-on-behavioral-remedies.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2018). Behavioral obligations for foreign individuals may be the next phase of the Antitrust Division’s shift toward behavioral remedies, as at least one major international law firm currently advises. Id. Given remedies available to prosecutors, foreign individual defendants may be more inclined to settle with U.S. authorities directly, in order to craft personally tailored monitoring remedies in lieu of more punitive mechanisms, such as a custodial sentence in the federal prison system. Id.

 [170]. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 12.

 [171]. Notably, Judge Posner substantively agreed with this observation in Motorola Mobility, drawing upon the seminal Empagran decision to suggest that it would be highly improper for courts to “presume the inadequacy of the antitrust laws of our foreign allies” and that doing so may constitute “unjustified interference with the right of foreign nations to regulate their own economies.” Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)). Certainly, this logic should be imported into the criminal antitrust analysis to prevent interference with the rights of foreign sovereigns.

 [172]. International Guidelines, supra note 12, at 28 (“[M]ore jurisdictions have adopted and enforce antitrust laws that are compatible with those of the United States . . . .”).

 [173]. But see Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, supra note 40, at 1279. In the alternative, extensive criminal enforcement under the Sherman Act may be viewed as a positive, given

[t]he decrease in civil jurisdiction and the increase in criminal prosecution do more than cancel out each other’s downsides: the beneficial synergies between them can further the purposes of antitrust law. When viewed as a single trend instead of two, this shift involves the courts’ deferring to institutional competence and disengaging from foreign relations, more optimal deterrence attained by encouraging the preferred types of enforcement, and more international cooperation achieved without damaging reciprocity-based trade and foreign relations interests. . . . [I]t may represent a more coherent development in the law.

Id. Yet this proposed interpretation ignores the facial incongruence in “cutting back on protections afforded by the antitrust laws” in the civil context, see, for example, Bauer, supra note 12, at 26, while casually endorsing enhanced extraterritorial criminal enforcement under the FTAIA, see Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, supra note 40, at 1274–78 (describing increased criminal prosecutions of extraterritorial conduct under the Sherman Act in recent years).

 [174]. International Guidelines, supra note 12, at 16–19 (broadly interpreting domestic effects standard based on cited precedents) (citations omitted).

 [175]. As previously outlined, criminal laws and remedies canonically apply to delinquency that, within a given community, is adjudged morally deserving of condemnation. Cf. Robinson, supra note 143 (discussing justifications for punishment). This is not the case with respect to competition violations, at least in most instances.

 [176]. See, e.g., supra notes 17.

 [177]. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 2.

Quid Pro No: When Rolexes, Ferraris, and Ball Gowns Are Not Political Currency – Note by Daniel Brovman

From Volume 92, Number 1 (November 2018)
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Quid Pro No:
When Rolexes, Ferraris, and Ball Gowns Are Not Political Currency

Daniel Brovman[*]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

II. The Supreme Court’s Decision in
McDonnell v. United States and its
Misguided Theories

III. The Court Erred: Why, How, and What This
Means for its Democracy-Reinforcing Role

A. Why the Court’s View on Access Is Incorrect

B. Why Contradictory Public Opinion Problematizes
the Court’s Holding

C. How the Amici Blinded the Court to Public Opinion

D. How the Court’s Actions Relate to the
Usefulness (or Lack Thereof) of Amicus Briefs

E. In Deferring to Amici and Neglecting
Inequalities and Public Opinion, the Court
Failed to Reinforce Democracy

IV. Possible Solutions

A. Rectifying the Court’s Failure to Reinforce
Democracy

B. Rectifying the Court’s Reliance on Amicus Briefs

C. Rectifying the Basis of the Court’s Failure:
A Statute Ill-Equipped to Tackle Corruption

Conclusion

 

INTRODUCTION

The misfortune of a republic is when intrigues are at an end; which happens when the people are gained by bribery and corruption: in this case they grow indifferent to public affairs, and avarice becomes their predominant passion. Unconcerned about the government and everything belonging to it, they quietly wait for their hire.[1]

In its recent decision in McDonnell v. United States, a case concerning corruption charges against the former Governor of Virginia, Robert McDonnell, the Supreme Court faced a seemingly simple question of statutory interpretation: what constituted an “official act” for the purposes of the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).[2] In reality, not only did it answer a question far more complicated, but also, it provided far more than a simple answer.

In its attempt to reinforce democracy, the Court failed. Instead, it validated a pernicious definition of access, in which paid-for access, pay-to-play schemes, and bribery are the norm. Specifically, in claiming that this maligned form of access was necessary for a functioning democracy, the Court endorsed political norms that are, in fact, corrosive to society: stratified access to politicians and by association, democratic institutions. The Court ignored the reality of pervasive and systemic inequalityranging from political, economic, social, and racialin contemporary American society and the effect that inequality has on access. However, the Court did not arrive there alonethe many amici filing on behalf of the petitioner blinded itat least partiallyto the aforementioned realities and public opinion.

In short, in McDonnell, the Court claimed that its concern was not with the “tawdry tales” of a pay-to-play political culture in which Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns carry political currency, but rather “with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute.”[3] However, while so claiming, the Court narrowed not only the definition of what could constitute an “official act,” but also overturned hundreds of years of jurisprudence on corruption law to democracy’s and the public’s detriments.[4] Although a valid exercise of statutory interpretation, the Court nonetheless acted with ignorance to the realities of political bribery.

Part I of this Note provides a brief explanation of the instant case, including a discussion of its factual background and procedural history, as well as a brief discussion on the bribery statute used in the Eastern District of Virginia’s prosecution of McDonnell.

Part II then focuses on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the case. Although briefly reviewing the Court’s interpretation of the bribery statute, this Part focuses primarily on the dicta in the Court’s opinion. Here, I argue that the Court relied heavily on amici, implicitly assumed an equal playing field regarding access to politicians, and predicated its opinion on that equality, thus preserving that access. In this section of its opinion, the Court espoused a number of fears regarding the lower courts’ interpretation of what constituted an “official act,” almost all of which Governor McDonnell and other amici also discussed. Since statutory interpretation is an inexact science, the dicta showcases the Court’s real motivation behind its decisionmaking.

Part III then discusses where, why, and how the Court’s reasoning went wrong. First, I argue that the Court failed to consider social, political, and economic inequalities, all of which result in unequal access to politicians and public servants. Next, I argue that public opinion supports this notion that stratified access exists and ascribes a number of reasons for it, including, for example, campaign finance issues. Because that public opinion exists, I also argue that the Court could have examined stratified access in its opinion. After problematizing the Court’s perception of what constitutes access, I examine why the Court ultimately decided the way it did, arguing that amici blinded the Court to public opinion. Therefore, as a result, I contend that the Court attempted, but failed, to reinforce democracy by discussing access in dicta after having already established what constituted an “official act” earlier in its opinion. In summary, in attempting to promote democracy and reinforce it, the Court failed. Instead, it promoted something inherently corrosive to democracy.

Part IV of this Note suggests possible solutions. It suggests remedies to rectify what this Note problematizes in Parts II and III: the Court’s failure to reinforce democracy; the Court’s overreliance on amici and more generally, the problem of amicus briefs in Supreme Court jurisprudence; and finally, the problematic and limiting wording of the bribery statute used to prosecute Governor McDonnell. First, this Note suggests a limited rapprochement between the Court and public opinion, suggesting various methods for the Court to assess public opinion and prevent walling itself off as an elite institution. Second, this Note also suggests a number of remedies related to the role of amicus briefs in Supreme Court jurisprudence, including, but not limited to, limiting the actual number of amici that may file, while also providing rules and guidelines for ensuring novel arguments from amici. Finally, this Note suggests various ways that Congress could amend the bribery statute to mirror public sentiment by tracking ethics and public corruption reforms in New York as a baseline for nationwide reform efforts.

Beyond providing valuable insight into how the Supreme Court interacts with amici and amicus briefs and how those interactions may affect the Court’s role as a democracy-reinforcing institution, the instant case also provides an interesting outlook on the current state of public corruption prosecutions. In the Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”), where the U.S. Attorney’s Office has relentlessly tackled public corruption in the state capital and elsewhere, numerous convictionsmost notably, those of Dean Skelos,[5] the former Majority Leader of the New York State Senate and Sheldon Silver,[6] the former Speaker of the New York State Assemblyhave been overturned. Although the Second Circuit maintained that sufficient evidence existed to prove that both defendants committed the crimes alleged, it was still was forced to overturn the respective convictions because of the erroneous jury instructions.[7] The U.S. Attorney’s Office for S.D.N.Y. later retried these cases, winning convictions on both of them.[8] The McDonnell decision has also affected other corruption cases, like that of U.S. Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.),[9] in which the judge declared a mistrial.[10] The Supreme Court’s actions have had real consequences as the Court “has slowly eroded the country’s body of corruption laws” and resulted in a prosecutorial inability to challenge public corruption.[11] Therefore, the Court’s decision may not only affect the public, but also prosecutorsboth to their respective detriments.

As a result of the rising public opinion viewing government as inefficacious or corrupt,[12] coupled with pervasive and systemic inequality in the United States and the possible harmful effects the Court’s decision may have on democratic institutions, examining McDonnell and the Court’s underlying reasoning behind its decision is extremely valuable.

I.  Factual and Procedural Background

On January 21, 2014, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Virginia’s Governor, Robert McDonnell,[13] along with his wife, First Lady Maureen G. McDonnell, for their alleged roles in a “scheme to violate federal public corruption laws.”[14] The U.S. Attorney’s Office charged the couple with one count of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, six counts of obtaining property under color of official right, three counts of honest-services wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to obtain property under color of official right, and one count of making false statements to a federal credit union.[15]

The core of the indictment related to a relationship the couple had with the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of a major pharmaceutical firm conducting business with the state, Star Scientific.[16] Prior to McDonnell’s election in 2010 and over the course of his campaign, Star Scientific’s CEO, Jonnie Williams Sr. (“JW”), and McDonnell and his wife developed an amicable relationship, meeting numerous times over the course of his campaign.[17] McDonnell and JW became friendlier, as McDonnell even began using JW’s private planes to shuttle between political events.[18] At one point, their relationship began to lay the foundation for the charged offenses, slowly discussing the “potential health benefits of anatabine and the need for scientific studies of these potential health benefits,” with McDonnell then placing JW in contact with other politicians and administrative officials.[19]

Even though McDonnell was elected governor in 2010, he continued to aid Star Scientific and received personal financial benefits from April 2011 until March 2013.[20] McDonnell received numerous forms of financial benefits, including luxury shopping trips, in return for arranging meetings for Star Scientific’s CEO with various high-ranking Virginian administrative officials and politicians, hosting events for the company as a means of promoting its products to Virginia state universities so that those universities would study the products and eventually refer new patients to those products.[21] Over the course of their relationship, McDonnell received at least $135,000, including shopping trips ($10,999 at Oscar de la Renta, $5,685 at Louis Vuitton, and $2,604 at Bergdorf Goodman),[22] loans for his daughter’s wedding (approximately $50,000 at an exceedingly low interest rate),[23] wedding gifts (approximately $15,000),[24] golf trips (at which McDonnell and his family charged approximately $2,380 to JW’s account),[25] and other forms of enrichment.[26] Not only did McDonnell receive that money, but also, he received it after he helped JW.[27] In return for all of the gifts McDonnell and his wife received, prosecutors argued that McDonnell arranged meetings and other opportunities for JW to market his company and products to other government officials.[28] The indictment also alleged numerous other instances of a seemingly quid pro quo relationship.[29]

On September 4, 2014, after a fiveweek trial and merely three days of jury deliberations, a unanimous jury, believing the law to be clear on the issues, found McDonnell guilty of extortion under color of official right, obtaining property under color of official right, and honest services wire fraud.[30] The jury also found his wife guilty of honest services wire fraud, extortion under color of official right, obtaining property under color of right, and obstruction of a federal proceeding.[31] In total, the jury found McDonnell guilty on eleven of the thirteen charges and his wife guilty on nine of the thirteen.[32]

McDonnell appealed his decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.[33] The appeal centered on the definition of official act. The trial court had used the government’s proposed jury instruction and defined an official act accordingly:

The term official action means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such public official’s official capacity. Official action as I just defined it includes those actions that have been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official’s position, even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law. In other words, official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs, even if those actions are not described in any law, rule, or job description. And a public official need not have actual or final authority over the end result sought by a bribe payor so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes that the public official had influence, power or authority over a means to the end sought by the bribe payor. In addition, official action can include actions taken in furtherance of longer-term goals, and an official action is no less official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.[34]

McDonnell argued to the Fourth Circuit that these jury instructions were in error,[35] claiming “the court’s definition was overbroad, to the point that it would seem to encompass virtually any action a public official might take while in office.”[36] According to McDonnell, the definition in the jury instructions would result in the inclusion of all acts of governance as “official acts,” because “[f]or public figures such as a governor, who interact with constituents, donors, and business leaders as a matter of custom and necessity, these activities might include such routine functions as attending a luncheon, arranging a meeting, or posing for a photograph.”[37] Essentially, McDonnell argued that the possible deleterious effects of the district court’s decision should drive the decisionmaking of the court of appeals.[38]

The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict.[39] In arriving at that decision, the court of appeals reviewed and focused on McDonnell’s claims regarding the jury instructions on what constituted an “official act” for the purposes of the federal bribery statute,[40] which both sides agreed defined the “official act” or “official action” for the purposes of the honest services wire fraud statute and the Hobbs Act, respectively.[41] The court affirmed the lower court’s instructions to the jury that an “official act” constituted “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”[42] The court also emphatically rejected McDonnell’s arguments and fears associated with an expansive definition of “official act.”

The court refused to acknowledge McDonnell’s argument that the district court’s decision would have a harmful effect on politics and democratic institutions, and even rejected his proposed jury instructions, believing them either to misstate the law or to subject the jury through jury instructions to the defendant’s core legal arguments.[43] Finally, the court even entertained broadening the scope of what constituted an “official act” in spite of McDonnell’s plea to narrow it, thus firmly denying McDonnell’s argument.[44]

Taking his appeal to the Supreme Court, McDonnell again challenged the definition of an “official act”arguing it should be limited to exercising some form of government power or struck down as unconstitutional for being overly broad.[45] In that petition, McDonnell argued the Supreme Court had never defined “official acts” in such a broad manner.[46] To the contrary, McDonnell argued,

[n]ot only has this Court held that actions like a visit, speech, or meeting are not, standing alone, official acts, it has even held that paying for such access—through campaign contributions or independent expenditures—is constitutionally protected. While the government can forbid true corruption—i.e., the direct exchange of an official act for money—it may not target . . . the political access such [financial] support may afford.”[47]

According to McDonnell, paying for access—the ability to get a call answered or a meeting scheduled—is constitutionally protected and an intrinsic part of our political system.[48] Paying for access, therefore, constituted politics as usual and a fundamental part of the democratic system, which is protected much like other aspects of our democratic institutions such as voting and campaign finance.

The United States rejected McDonnell’s fears and reaffirmed its position that such quid pro quo agreements are unlawful poses no threat to legitimate political activity.”[49] It also noted that affecting a specific part of governmentor having a determinative effect on governmental policy or administrative outcomewas unnecessary for the purpose of applying the statute.[50]

II.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in McDonnell v. United States and its Misguided Theories

After McDonnell filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, eleven amici filed briefs in support of it.[51] On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court granted McDonnell’s petition.[52] Shortly after the grant, the same amici filed again as did a number of others on behalf of McDonnell. Five amici eventually filed in support of the United States.[53] A mere six months later, on July 29, 2016, in a unanimous opinion, the Court vacated McDonnell’s conviction and remanded it to the district court.[54]

In that decision, the Court overturned the district court and court of appeal’s view on what constituted an “official act” and instead held that it “is a decision or action on a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.[55] The aforementioned question or matter “must involve a formal exercise of governmental power,” and “must also be something specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official.”[56] In arriving at its decision, the Court analyzed the bribery statute, employing a quintessential form of statutory interpretation.[57] The Court first “examined the bribery statute’s text” and “next turned to § 201(a)(3)’s requirement of a decision or action.[58] As such, the Court used statutory interpretation to narrow what constituted an “official act” and to side with McDonnell’s interpretation rather than the Fourth Circuit’s. Finally, in deciding which definition applied, the Court also employed a familiar canon in Supreme Court jurisprudence: “a word is known by the company it keeps.”[59]

However, the Court also devoted a significant portion of its opinion to discussing, much like McDonnell did in his appeal and petition, the adverse effect on politics as usual if it were to support the government’s position and endorse the opinion of the lower courts.[60] Such commentary was provided in dicta[61]as discussed, the Court had already provided, through statutory interpretation, its belief that the court of appeals and the district court had erroneously defined what constituted an “official act.”

However, since “statutory interpretation is not a science but an art,”[62] understanding the Court’s motivations provides some clarity into what is otherwise an opaque analysis. Further, the Court discussed its concerns with the lower courts’ perspective on what constituted an “official act” only after using statutory interpretation to determine its definition and exploring that issue in fourteen pages of text.[63] For this reason and because “unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate precision,” examining the background of a decision involving statutes is especially important.[64] The presence of that dicta in McDonnell can therefore reveal the Court’s reasoning in how it extracted precision from the relevant statute or with what motivations it undertook that task.

The Court embraced McDonnell’s discussion on the deleterious effects of the court of appeal’s assessment of what constituted an “official act” in three interconnected fears in dicta.[65] In doing so, the Court examined its desires to promote democracy by promoting access to politicians and allowing constituents and public servants to interact, to provide clear guidelines for politicians and public servants to avoid corrupt behavior, and finally, to preserve democracy by limiting the ability of overzealous prosecutors to target all public servants.

In discussing these fears and desires, the Court explicitly stressed the underlying importance of access to politicians in any democracy. So much so, it argued that access and interactions with public servants constituted a “basic compact underlying representative government” that assumed that “public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately on their concernswhether it is the union official worried about a plant closing or the homeowners who wonder why it took five days to restore power to their neighborhood after a storm.”[66] Therefore, JW’s access to McDonnellperhaps aboard his private jetwas necessary for democracy to operate effectively or at least with some marginal forms of representation. Accordingly, the Court validated paying for audiences with elected officials.[67] However, implicitly, the Court also granted those with the ability to pay for those audiences greater visibility with those that wield political power, out of a perceived necessity.[68]

In discussing its first fearof halting democracythe Court discussed the deleterious effects the lower courts’ decisions would have on governance and on any interactions constituents would have with their representatives. In discussing how the public engages their public officials, the Court noted that, “conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time.”[69] Regardless of socioeconomic status, race, or other statuses, the Court believed that politiciansas fundamental to their roleorganize and work on behalf of their constituents, which sometimes requires arrangements like the one in McDonnell. More importantly, the Court believed that these public officials would always respond to the calls and requests to meet with any of their constituents. Thus, the Court wanted to avoid a situation in which “citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink from participating in democratic discourse.”[70] Without the aforementioned access or interactions being possible, the Court feared that democracy would falter.

The Supreme Court espoused a second concern: that the lower courts decisions would create vagueness and difficult guidelines for politicians and public officials to follow. Specifically, in discussing this secondary concern, the Court noted, “under the Government’s interpretation, the term official act is not defined with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, or in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.[71] Such vagueness would occur because it would not be clear which conduct was legal and which conduct could result in an overly eager prosecutor in a U.S. Attorney’s Office taking note of a politician’s supposedly benign actions and subsequently issuing an indictment.[72] According to the Court, people in generaland not just politicianswould be unclear as to what constituted legal interactions with governing officials. This possibility could also feed into the Court’s first fear, namely, that the vagueness would have a chilling effect on governance.

The Court espoused a third fear as well. Along with the aforementioned theme of emboldening prosecutors, the Court also feared that supporting the court of appeals’ holding would bestow an unrivaled power on the government against defendants in criminal public corruption cases. The Court espoused this final fear, noting that “[u]nder the standardless sweep of the Government’s reading . . . public officials could be subject to prosecution, without fair notice, for the most prosaic interactions.”[73] As a result of the vagueness created by the lower courts reading of the statute, the Court adamantly believed that prosecutors would exploit the now broadened statute to target behavior that may or may not be corrupt. Despite the system of checks that exists for any public corruption prosecution, which requires numerous forms of approval from various Department of Justice officials,[74] the Court feared that federal prosecutors may, on the faintest trace of information suggesting corruption, prosecute with wild abandon.[75]

Accordingly, the Court perceived itself as a democracy-reinforcing institution because it believed that by upholding the trial courts decision, democracy would suffer. Specifically, upholding that decision would wreak havoc on the ability of government to function, perhaps bringing democracy to a screeching halt. Even in doing so, however, the Court did find the instant facts of McDonnell’s case problematic or even troublesome. It admitted that it condoned a maligned form of access acknowledging that the “governor’s activities were distasteful and crass and dishonest.[76] The Court even acknowledged that, at minimum, McDonnell provided JW with repeated access to governmental decisionmakers crucial to his business interests.[77] Thus, even though it interpreted statutes and applied dictionary definitions in that process, the Court still expressed some opinions regarding the facts of the case. Therefore, examining how the Court arrived at a point of both awareness that it promoted a disparaged concept of access while still voicing and premising its decision on the deleterious effects of that concept of access is of value.

III.  The Court Erred: Why, How, and What This Means for its Democracy-Reinforcing Role

Although the Court used statutory interpretation to decide the instant case, it discussed its motivating factors in dicta shortly after interpreting the relevant statutes. In doing so, it made implicit assumptions regarding political access, as indicated via the discussion in Part II. However, it is extremely worrying that the Court disregarded certain inequalities in the United States. First, in neglecting the pervasive inequalities that permeate American society, the Court also disregarded the widespread public opinion regarding public corruption and unequal access to politicians. Second, the Court overemphasized both the role of the amici and their voices. Its error here is especially problematic, as those amici did not expressly represent public opinion but rather emphasized and reemphasized McDonnell’s fears of the possible deleterious effects the lower courts decision may have on democratic institutions. These amici therefore provided a biased view on the issue. Finally, as a result of the above, the Court failed to reinforce democracy, one of its keystone roles.

A.  Why the Court’s View on Access Is Incorrect

As indicated above, preserving access to politicians motivated the Court’s decisionmaking.[78] Embracing a theory of participatory democracy, the Court believed that by promoting access to politicians and public servants, it advocated allowing constituents to play a role in the laws that govern society.[79] However, issues relating to inequality pervade American society, propounding a view to the contrary: the Court subscribed to a utopian democracy absent in American society.[80] The translation of a lack of access to democratic institutions into powerlessness, subsequently exacerbated by socioeconomic, racial, and economic inequalities, brings the Court’s aforementioned implicit assumptions into question. Access to politicians constitutes power, but when highly unequal access permeates any society, that inequality is corrosive to democracyand the Court’s decision ultimately perpetuated that highly unequal access.[81]

Inequality translates across the American political experience, from political inequalities that limit the ability for certain individuals to vote to economic inequalities limiting access to higher education and other social goods. All told, far from being a society in which all men are created equal, the American experience is one of harsh and pervasive inequality.[82] Although an inequality in access to politicians exists between donors to campaigns and non-donor constituents,[83] a review of other inequalities and how those inequalities translate to political experiences is of value when examining how extensive inequality is in modern America. However, despite numerous distinguishing and confounding factors that affect minority group experiences in the United States, the general experience is that “[g]roups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ . . . are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.”[84] These systemic inequalities also can affect the success or lack thereof of specific groups in advancing their political agendas, again questioning the image of access the Court implicitly referenced.[85]

The Court also disregarded the role racial inequality may play in political access. Racial discrimination occurs in a wide variety of settings, including, but not limited to, financial lending and housing,[86] employment,[87] within the criminal justice system,[88] and education.[89] Alarmingly, these instances of discrimination are not limited to a purely non-political sphere, but rather pervade society. In testing the responsiveness rate of politicians to constituents based on varying the race of the constituent, researchers found that “U.S. state legislators were less responsive to requests from blacks than from whites for help with registering to vote when no signal about partisanship was given.”[90] In other instances and at a different level of government, the tone in response communications for public housing requests revealed “racial differences,” with “Hispanic housing applicants were 20 percentage points less likely to be greeted by name than were their black and white counterparts.”[91] At varying levels of governance and for differing requests, race plays a role in the contemporary American political experience, harming some while benefitting others. Despite the harmfulness of the possibility of race having a role in service provision, it is but one of the many factors that affects access.

Beyond the perniciousness of racial inequalities, economic inequality also affects access to politics and democracy in contemporary American society. At base, “[c]ampaign donations buy access to politicians” and “politicians themselves have admitted that big donors get special treatment.”[92] However, even removed from the explicit instances involving campaign donations, money, wealth, or income all have an effect on one’s role within American democracy. As wealthier individuals are more likely to vote, “[e]conomic inequality also feeds the political kind, driving everything from the actions of our political representatives to the quality and quantity of civic engagement.”[93] Beyond wealth having a positive effect on participation, economic inequalities also drive down the participation of those who are less advantaged, limiting access to those stricken by poverty.[94] Specifically, such inequalities result in “[d]eclining political interest,” which in turn suggests that “issues on which a consensus exists among richer individuals . . . become increasingly unlikely even to be debated within the political process regardless of whether poorer citizens would care to raise them.”[95] Accordingly, even with a desire to participate, some individuals lack the ability to do so because their financial statuses have already foreclosed any access to certain aspects of democracy.

Finally, other aspects of basic political inequalities that inherently stratify access exist as well, like felon voter disenfranchisement and voter identification laws. These forms of inequality directly limit certain individuals’ ability to participate in democracy by outlawing basic aspects of their participation in democratic systems. Although “the days of outright exclusion from the voting process are mostly behind us in the United States, there remains a steady stream of initiatives to limit participation.”[96] These methods include “inadequate voter outreach to poor or immigrant neighborhoods, poorly staffing polling places, [and] preventing some felons from voting,” thus almost eliminating the line between “neglect” and “willful disenfranchisement.”[97] Voter identification laws have a similar effect, at least inasmuch as the “laws skew democracy toward those on the political right” and “have a differentially negative impact on the turnout of racial and ethnic minorities in primaries and general elections.[98] Therefore, voter disenfranchisement limits an essential aspect of access to democratic institutions: the right to vote.[99] Regardless of the methods deployed to limit accessand if they are direct disenfranchisement or identification lawsthe effect is the same, as “the voices of some citizens are not heard” and lessens the “long-accepted principle that all citizens have effective access.”[100] In such instances, political access is not limited, but rather absent, with some individuals missing some of the essential forms of participating in a democracy.

In summary, a number of variables affect political access, all limiting the access of specific minorities or those with certain socioeconomic backgrounds. This inequality, of course, exists even without delving into the significant intersectionality of race, socioeconomic status, and other factors in contemporary American societythe reality that for certain groups, the intersection of minority status only serves to multiply their powerlessness.[101] The Court failed to consider the role of stratified access in the United States, as it simply validated the necessity of access without qualifying who actually has access and who does not. Although the reality of stratified access should be sufficient in showing the Court erred, public opinion indicating disapprobation towards that reality further underscores that the Court erred.

B.  Why Contradictory Public Opinion Problematizes the Court’s Holding

Inasmuch as the Court felt it reinforced democracy, it did so erroneously. The Court embraced a concept of access it believed to be crucial to a thriving democracy, but one that the public abhorred. Widespread public opinion regarding campaign finance reform, money in politics, and finally government corruption questions the theory of access the Court espoused. It further indicates that the Court may have been cognizant of how the public would perceive its theory regarding access, especially considering that the Court often responds to public opinion.[102] Yet in no place in its McDonnell opinion did it discuss public opinion.

Public opinion regarding government corruption indicates that, from the perspective of the general public, some inequality of access exists. Recent polling suggests that as much as 75% of Americans view their government as corrupt, and that “[t]his alarming figure has held steady since 2010, up from 66% in 2009.”[103] When presented with an option to choose between the federal government, the news media, banks and financial institutions, the police, and organized religions, a plurality of 38% of respondents chose the federal government as the most corrupt institution in the United States (leading the news media, which placed second, by more than 20 points).[104] Not only is the opinion that public corruption exists prominent in the United States, but also, it exists at a much higher percentage than in other Western countries, like the United Kingdom (46%), Canada (44%), Germany (38%), and Sweden (14%).[105]

The public’s perspective on campaign finance reform indicates that the public generally views disdainfully how politicians and administrative officials fundraise, and subsequently, the access afforded to the wealthy by politicians and administrative officials alike. Although the Court claimed that donating to campaigns in return for access does not constitute a quid pro quo relationship,[106] public opinion rejects that view. A poll from the Pew Research Center found that 76% of Americans believe that money has a greater influence on politics now than it has before, running across party lines.[107] Similarly, Americans, in a N.Y. TimesCBS News survey, viewed the political system as requiring change85% believed that a change to the way political campaigns are funded is necessary, with 46% also saying that a complete rebuild is necessary.[108] Such results are common across several research agencies and are hardly limited to specific individualsrather, this perspective is shared by almost all Americans who participated in the polls.[109] Of course, such perspectives also assume or implicitly imply another factor: money has an effect on political access.

Even though the Court dismissed discussing the aforementioned widespread opinion, further probing the source of that opinion indicates that a majority of Americans believe that an inequality of access to politicians, administrative officials, and public servants contributes to its perception as a legitimate issue. Access is stratified, in the opinion of many Americans, as 66% claim that the wealthy have more access, compared to 31% who believe equal access to politicians exists.[110] This belief that the wealthy have more access exists beyond an abstract notion of access and contributions: 85% of Americans believe that “candidates who win public office promote policies that directly help the people and groups who donated money to their campaigns.”[111]

These beliefs are bipartisan as well, given that “[l]arge majorities of Americans believe that members of Congress will favor the interests of those who donate to Super PACs over those who do not—and that Super PAC donors can pressure elected officials to alter their votes.”[112] When moneyed interests and the interests of an electorate diverge, “[m]ore than three-quarters of all respondents—77%—agreed that members of Congress are more likely to act in the interest of a group that spent millions to elect them than to act in the public interest.”[113] Bipartisan support exists for that claim too79% of Democrats compared to 81% of Republicans polled believed in that divergence.[114]

Americansregardless of political affiliationbelieve that their government is corrupt, more corrupt than other countries, and that this corruption is on the rise. They also believe that bought-for access constitutes a basis, or at least is partially responsible, for that perception. Therefore, at least from the public’s perspective, a general corruption pervades government, subverting a major theory that the Court used in arriving at its decision. These studies showing that American society is plagued by systemic and pervasive social inequalities, coupled with the public opinion indicating that the Court erred, problematize the Court’s perception of what constitutes politics as usual.

Yet in the face of overwhelming and inundating public opinion decrying the status quo of the contemporary American political system, the Court held that a maligned access is a required factor for any democracy and vindicated McDonnell’s actions on that theory. But as is shown, that is rarely the casestratified access exists according to a majority of Americans, and Americans believe that contributions or donations result in access. Although the Court implicitly supported a theory of equality of parity of access, it did not arrive there alone. Rather, it was aided by the flood of amicimost of whom were in fact, politicians, administrative officials, or public servantswho all supported McDonnell’s position and shared his fears.[115]

C.  How the Amici Blinded the Court to Public Opinion

The Court erred because instead of acknowledging the aforementioned public opinion and inequality, it deferred to the opinion of the amici writing on behalf of the Governor, as is evident by its almost rote repetition of the fears espoused by those amici as well as the fears espoused by the former Governor. Numerous amici wrote to the Court, mostly supporting the petitioner, McDonnell.[116] These amici all decried the supposedly deleterious effects of the court of appeals’ ruling, supporting McDonnell’s claims.[117] This Section focuses on the role some of those amici played, with an understanding that a caveat may exist in discussing their importance because they wrote or filed against the United States.

The Republican Governors Public Policy Committee’s (the “Committee”) amicus brief reinforced the centrality of access in any functioning democracy. First, the Committee noted that “facilitating ‘access’ is a central part of any modern elected official’s job” and then cited to instances by former Governor of Florida Jeb Bush, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and former President of the United States Barack Obama that could be seen as corrupt or engaging money for influence under the court of appeals’ definition of an “official act” that the United States sought to affirm, mirroring the fear that the Court later expressed in their opinion—that the lower court decisions would punish normal acts of governance.[118] The Committee also believed that the decision would embolden prosecutors, much like the Court feared as well. Elucidating that argument, the Committee pivoted and reinforced the harmful ramifications on democracy of affirming the conviction, noting that “if other courts adopted this understanding of official act, potentially every elected official in the nation would be in danger of indictment by an overzealous federal prosecutor. To be sure, the prosecutor would be required to show the existence of a quid pro quo to obtain a conviction.”[119] As no public official or public servant would know if his or her conduct was lawful, he or she would fear acting at all, and ultimately, according to the Committee, democracy would suffer.

In addition, a group of Former Virginia Attorneys General strongly supported the Court’s first fear, namely, that the decision could harm governance and possibly weaken democracy. Citing to their vast experience, “including providing legal advice,”[120] these Former Virginia Attorneys General notedin line with both the Court’s eventual opinion and McDonnell“[t]he overly-expansive interpretation of official action in the decision below will disrupt the public life of Virginia and the other states within the Fourth Circuit, and it would create a different rule for participatory democracy in the Fourth Circuit than the one that applies in other circuits.[121] According to these amici, upholding the lower courts’ perspective on what constituted an “official act” would strike such a strong blow to public life as to disrupt it. Not only did these amici reinforce the argument of the possibly deleterious effects of the lower court’s decision, but also, much like the Court itself did, they discussed the necessity of access in a democracy.

Other politicians supported the aforementioned theory of access and the Court’s fears. Sixty Former State Attorneys General from states other than Virginia also supported McDonnell, and argued (in an exercise of hyperbole meriting mention) the deleterious effect of defining an “official act” as the court of appeals did.[122] Those former Attorneys General even noted that “it could chill the delivery of those services altogether,” and that even other individuals connected to governors and public officials would refrain from discussing political or policy issues out of fear of prosecution.[123] In this instance, the former State Attorneys General supported the Court’s first fear, but instead focused on the possibility that constituents would hesitate becoming politically involved.

In summary, amici, writing on behalf of McDonnell, flooded the Court with briefs, all indicating similar issuesthe overall deleterious effects of the court of appeals’ ruling. These amici hardly hid their stake or interest in the litigation, as well, directly indicating that they feared prosecution, again implicitly referencing that such conduct is politics as usual.[124] Referring back to the Court’s opinion, it becomes clear that the Court had these individuals in mindrather than the plethora of public opinionin arriving at its decision. Given that the Court then discussed those effects in its decision,[125] despite having already used statutory interpretation to arrive at its decision, an examination of the role the amici played in the Court’s decision is of value.

D.  How the Court’s Actions Relate to the Usefulness (or Lack Thereof) of Amicus Briefs

The Court’s use of amici provides insight into the possibly pernicious role that amicus briefs can play when they fail to represent public opinion or do not adequately represent both sides in any given case before the Supreme Court. Such a result indicates a general problem of elevating concentrated interests at the expense of diffuse ones and having an inability to protect minority groups or those without strong political voices.

Perhaps the possibility of amici providing a biased understanding of the issue in any case before the Court is unsurprising, given the rise in the role of amici over the past century in Supreme Court jurisprudence.[126] Not only have amici submitted more briefs, but also “[t]here is no question . . . that the frequency of such references [to amici] has been increasing over time.”[127] In many instances, the Court utilizes amici as a means of gaining insight into a specific matter before it, either providing alternative views on issues, “important technical or background information,” or at times, simply reinforcing the perspectives of the already existing parties.[128] Undoubtedly, therefore, amicus briefs are “an institutional part of U.S. court systems.”[129] However, they can also have a destructive effect of either misrepresenting or failing to represent parties in a Supreme Court decision.[130] For example, these briefs sometimes provide no value to the Court, instead reiterating what has already been argued and, therefore, providing no new information.[131] Regardless, these briefs have become so common“[i]ndeed. . . . so common that some judges are looking for ways to limit them”that a brief review of their limitations is of use.[132]

The Court can fall victim to a flood of one-sided amicus briefs, either due to the lack of proponents on one side of an issue or because of an inability to convey the opinions of one side effectively. Justice Scalia referred to this possibility in his dissent in Jaffee v. Redmond, in which, despite the adversarial nature of the American court system and the possibility of having multiple amici file on behalf of both parties, “[n]ot a single amicus brief was filed in support of petitioner.”[133] That was no surprise, according to Scalia, because “[t]here is no self-interested organization out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal courts.”[134] A similar situation is at play in McDonnell, as few vehicles exist for the representation of public opinion in the form of amicus briefs beyond the non-profit organizations and think tanks that participated as amici and then Justices being cognizant of general public opinion. Here, much like in Jaffee, individuals could not represent themselves in a fashion similar to public officials. Although no formal organization existed to represent public opinion, the Court nonetheless could have considered that information, either because the Justices are “social beings confronted with the plethora of stimuli emanating from American culture, media and politics,”[135] or out of concern “about their legitimacy in the short and long-terms.”[136]

Beyond the plausibility of few organizations existing to actively represent public opinion before the Court,[137] the Court was also inundated with more than a dozen amicus briefs on behalf of McDonnell from the time he filed his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to when he argued before the Court.[138] Only five organizations filed in support of the respondents, and all were filed only after the petition had been granted.[139] Regardless of whether that stark difference is due to the role the United States played as the respondent, “[i]n order to maximize their own public reputations or the reputation of the Court, the Justices need information about public opinion.”[140] In many instances, public opinion is unavailable on an issue before the court.[141] However, as discussed in Section III.B, that was not the case in McDonnell. Rather, the “groups most affected by [the] decision . . . likely [had] very pronounced views about how these issues should be resolved as a policy matter”[142] that contradicted the Court’s holding.

Accordingly, in McDonnell, the amici failed to provide the Supreme Court with an adequate representation of public opinion, instead blinding the Court to what the public truly believed. Rather than referring to the interests of all parties and the public, as Justice Scalia suggested in Jaffee was the interest “that this Court will have . . . prominentlyindeed, primarilyin mind,[143] the Court abrogated that responsibility. Although amicus briefs can play “an important role in the democratic process, . . . not just as an element of interest group lobbying in today’s society . . . but rather as an integral part of participatory democracy,”[144] public opinion did not factor into the voices of the amici.[145] Therefore, Justices were unable to look to “amicus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both sides of the issue;[146] instead, they were only presented one side. As a result, the voice of the one-sided amici overpowered the general American public’s collective voice.

E.  In Deferring to Amici and Neglecting Inequalities and Public Opinion, the Court Failed to Reinforce Democracy

As a result of the stark contrast between public opinion and the opinions presented to the Court by the amici as well as the Court’s heavy reliance on the opinions of the amici, the Supreme Court falsely believed it was acting as a democracy-reinforcing institution and actually promoted something wholly corrosive to democracy. Beyond the fact that it deferred to the voice of amici over the voice of the public, the Court failed to act as a democracy-reinforcing institution because of the plausibility or likelihood that its decision will actually hurt democracy and the public.

The concept of the Court acting as a democracy-reinforcing institution is best described by John Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.[147] Ely, in a particularly trite comment, referenced the role of the Supreme Court in contemporary society, noting, “[t]he Constitution may follow the flag, but is it really supposed to keep up with the New York Review of Books?”[148] This view is particularly valuable for understanding the role of the Court: specifically, as an adaptive branch of government that can respond to contemporary ideals, opinions, or sentiments, while still keeping with the general theme of the Constitution.[149] Here, academic opinion agrees that Ely proposes “a notion of representation which . . . forms the general theory of our entire constitution” and that the Supreme Court, in construing the more open-ended provisions of the constitution, should solely concern itself with preserving the ideal of representation . . . .”[150] In this sense, Ely’s theories uphold or describe a basic tenet that the Court should reinforce democracy by protecting minority populations while still upholding the importance of majority government.[151] The primary role of the Supreme Court, then, has been to protect “geographical outsiders,” the “literally voteless,” and the “functionally powerless.”[152] Here, the Court neglected that duty.

The Court failed to intervene in support of public opinion or represent the public’s interests, instead kowtowing to the voices of the elite few who submitted briefs as friends of the Court. The Court did not act in support of a neglected population, even though it should have intervened because the “market [was] malfunctioning.”[153] The market malfunctioned not solely because of an unideal outcome, but rather, because “the in’s [were] choking off the channels of political change to ensure they will stay in and the out’s will stay out . . . .[154] Here, individuals, already ingratiated with public servants as a result of their wealth, gained better and considerably more access. Further, the Court yielded to the voice of the few (the amici, who predominantly were past public servants either from Virginia or elsewhere) instead of the general public. As a result of yielding to a distinct and already empowered voice, a limited interestand not the public interestguided the Court’s decisionmaking.

Finally, the Court failed to act as a democracy-reinforcing institution because of the harmful effects of the Court’s decision on the general public. Although the Court’s actions may be largely invisible to most people, its “rulings have enormous impact on people in the most important, and sometimes the most intimate, aspect of their lives.”[155] The scourge of public corruption affects the very functioning of any democracy, including adversely affecting investment projects, causing a diminution of economic activity, encouraging inefficiency, contributing to a misallocation of human resources, creating uncertainty, and generally adversely affecting the poor more so than the rich.[156] Because public corruption has such a broad and injurious effect on democracies, the public stands to suffer from the Court’s decision.[157] Therefore, by supporting those firmly entrenched in government and those already benefitted, the Court acted “at the expense of individuals whom the Constitution is designed to protect.”[158]

The Court abrogated its role as a democracy-reinforcing institution not only because it acted against public opinion, but also, because as a result of its decision, the public stands to suffer. As a result of the Court supporting a specific (and already powerful) subset of the population and not the majority, as well as the plausibility of those actions actually harming both democracy and the general public, the Court failed in its role as a democracy-reinforcing institution.

IV.  Possible Solutions

This Note has explored a number of divergent areas where the Court erred in its McDonnell decision, including, but not limited to, its neglect of pervasive public opinion regarding government corruption and the reality of systemic inequalities (political and otherwise) in the United States, its overreliance on biased amici, and finally, an analysis of the bribery statute that, at base, is ill-equipped to handle contemporary prosecutions of public corruption. This Part assesses possible solutions for each one of those areas and is divided into three broader categories: (1) the Court’s failure to reinforce democracy resulting from its failure to recognize those inequalities and public opinion; (2) the Court’s reliance on amici briefs; and (3) the statute of concern in McDonnell.

These solutions not only tackle the issues at hand in McDonnellspecifically, how the Court failed as an institutionbut also attempt to remedy general issues surrounding contemporary public corruption law. With regards to the changes to the Court’s operations, this Note advocates enhancing certain democratic features of the Supreme Court and ensuring that the voice of the public heard throughout its halls, albeit with a deference to the Court’s inception as a politically insulated branch of government.

Further, policy remedies are necessary, as the McDonnell decision has already impacted prosecution strategy and other corruption cases across the Countrythis is far from a settled issue. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for S.D.N.Y. retried Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos. Elsewhere in the hallowed Chambers of the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, the trial of Joe Percocoa top aide to New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, another subject of ethics investigationswas affected by the changes resulting from McDonnell.[159] Seemingly, this decision has not affected this particular office significantly given successful retrials and convictions.[160] However, just across the Hudson River, the decision has had negative effects: the District of New Jersey U.S. Attorney’s Office, having faced a mistrial, now dismissed all charges against Senator Robert Menendez.[161] This is far from a Northeastern problem, either. Across the country, prosecutors at all levels of government tackle corruption, regardless of the level of government at which it occurs or the type of illicit acts engaged in.[162] As a direct result of the McDonnell decision, prosecutors have strategized and developed new theories of prosecution, but not all of them have been successful. Therefore, the policy changes proposed here are necessary to empower prosecutors across the Country to battle the scourge of public corruption and restore efficacious governance.

A.  Rectifying the Court’s Failure to Reinforce Democracy

As established above, the Supreme Court failed to reinforce democracy by ignoring widespread public opinion that sees extensive government corruption in addition to ignoring societal and political inequalities. The source of such failures could arise from a number of areas, like the Court’s role as an elite institution or its self-perception as such, or even from the rules governing amici briefs.

In writing that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”[163] Justice John Marshall ensured that the Court would be the final arbiter of executive and legislative actions.[164] The Supreme Court, therefore, can act as an institution designed to ensure majority rule while still safeguarding the rights of minority groups. Some take this theory to an extreme, arguing that the Court best analyzes the law when assessing legal questions with close scrutiny of public opinion.[165] Judges undertake emphatically democratic tasks, creating new law through their interpretation of statutes or prior common law.[166] How exactly the Supreme Court should actor under what mechanismsin order to validate public opinion in its decisionmaking is still a valuable question worth exploring.

First, judges must consider that they operate within a system which requires that “[t]he rules applied to the decision of individual controversies cannot simply be isolated exercises of judicial wisdom.”[167] In turn, recognizing that one operates within a vast chain of precedent and within society as a whole requires transparency, as “[a] judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does it will breed understanding.”[168] The flipside of requiring transparency, of course, is a limitation of insulation from the public. The Court, operating within a transparent system, requires awareness not only of its role relative to the people it effectively governs, but also, of its role relative to other institutions within government.[169] Doing so breaks the Court’s role solely as an interlocutor between the Constitution and contemporary legal questions, but does not totally abrogate it; rather, the Court still exhibits fidelity to features within the Constitution, but does so cognizant of its role relative to other documents, institutions, and peoples.

Second, and almost as a corollary to the first rule, judges must also keep abreast of information regarding the society they effectively govern through their decisionmaking. As “one cannot bridge the gap between society and law without having reliable information about society,” judges should strive to understand public opinion.[170] In arriving at such an end, “the Court must determine the public mood, develop a mode of rhetoric that the public finds acceptable, and make decisions that the public at least tolerates.”[171] Finding “any easy method, any three-prong test, to determine which definitions of public opinion should be admitted into constitutional adjudication and how much weight those definitions should be given” is not of significant importance, but rather, public opinion “should enter the multi-factored, balancing equation” of judicial decisionmaking.[172]

Such an entente between the Court and public opinion would empower the public to see itself as a legitimate actor of change. David Cole, in Engines of Liberty, provides a clear explanation of how the public could avail itself of a democracy-reinforcing Supreme Court. Cole argues that “[m]ost of the work of constitutional law reform takes place outside the federal courts” because “[o]verlapping state, federal, and international legal systems offer multiple possibilities for doing the groundwork necessary for constitutional change, whether in city councils, state legislatures, state courts, Congress, the executive branch, or international forums.”[173] As Cole posits, the public sets democratic actions in the Supreme Court in motion. Constitutional law, therefore, is innately and intensely democratic, and the result of political processesinasmuch as constitutional principles matter, so do advocates.[174]

As a caveat, an acknowledgement of public opinion does not connote an abandonment of all precedent and other forms of interpretation.[175] Rather, “[c]onstitutional law is designed to stand above ordinary politics, and it is notand should not bedirectly responsive to political pressure in the way that legislation or executive action is.”[176] Although “[t]he justices’ role is not to represent constituents,” some obeisance towards public opinion is evident.[177] Therefore, although the Supreme Court, under this approach, makes wholly new law and must in some way be insulated from political movements and politics more generally, it can and should respond to failures of democratic institutions and democracy more generally.

The Court should return to its role as a democracy-reinforcing institution, doing so by recognizing the system in which it operates and by acknowledging public opinion. Such an acknowledgment does not require an abrogation of using other forms of analysis in its decisionmaking, but rather, requires that the Court at least exhibit an awareness to the public mood. By recognizing the importance of public opinion in its decisionmaking, or at least by exhibiting an awareness to it, the Court can reinforce democracy by, as Ely mentioned, inserting itself where the political market malfunctions and limits access to representation to some.

B.  Rectifying the Court’s Reliance on Amicus Briefs

As discussed in Sections III.C and III.D, amicus briefs form a vital part of Supreme Court decisionmaking: in short, and at their best, they provide the Court with new and innovative approaches to understanding legal issues and allow for parties interested in the litigation, but not necessarily part of it, to express opinions. As Justice Black opined, “[m]ost cases before this Court involve matters that affect far more people than the immediate record parties,”[178] and amicus briefs allow for that representation. However, as mentioned in Sections III.C and III.D, amicus briefs can often represent a distorted or impartial view of a specific issue, and as a result, some attention to how the Court handles or processes amicus briefs may be of value.

The Court has come to rely heavily on amicus briefs, as in the 20142015 term, Justices cited amicus briefs in 54% of all signed opinions.[179] Beyond a heavy reliance on amicus briefs in general, the Court also relies on a specific subset of elite lawyers to both argue before the Court and file amicus briefs.[180] Both the heavy reliance on amicus briefs and on specialized lawyers are unlikely to change, especially as the “new hunger for information outside the record” grows.[181] However, the Court can scrutinize the motivations behind amicus briefs and institute certain rules regarding their admissibility.

First, the Court could benefit from assessing the motivations of amici. For example, a recent article by Allison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins found that quite often, when amici file briefs it is not a result of a self-interest, but rather at the behest of the parties in the pending litigation.[182] Essentially, “[w]hen the Court grants certiorari (or cert), these very lawyers strategize about which voices the Court should hear and they pair these groups with other Supreme Court specialists to improve their chances with the Court.”[183] Often, as a result, what is presented before the Court is not a culmination of individual actors attempting to provide background, clarity, or innovative approaches to a complex legal question, but rather something “orchestrated and intentional” by the litigating parties.[184] Accordingly, assessing the motivations behind an amicus brief would allow the Court to contextualize the brief in its entirety, as, for example, in McDonnell, where politicians filing briefs on behalf of another politician may not provide a wholly unbiased view. Although a primary purpose behind amicus briefs is to provide a specific view on an issue, contextualizing those views may provide the Court better perspective on the legal question as a whole.

Second, the Court can institute requirements regarding what amicus briefs must provide in order to be admitted. As mentioned above, these briefs can provide a useful insight into complex legal questions, but oftentimes fall prey to simply rehashing the opinions set forth in the briefs by the respective parties. Although a non-exhaustive list of what possible remedies exist to solve this amicus problem, the Court could explore the following options. Judge Posner suggests the following possibilities and allows amicus briefs

only when (1) a party is not represented competently or not represented at all; (2) the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by the decision in the case before the court; or (3) the amicus has unique information or a unique perspective that can provide assistance to the court beyond what the lawyers for the parties can provide.[185]

Although providing myriad reasons for such a limitation, Judge Posner also hesitates at allowing interest group politics to pervade the Supreme Court and distort the judicial decisionmaking process.[186]

 Amicus briefs benefit the Court greatly, but also have the possibility of manipulating the Court’s perspective on an issue and adversely affecting a party in the case. By scrutinizing this process, the Court will ensure that amicus briefs that reach it actually aid it in its decisionmaking, rather than producing an echo chamber as was the case in McDonnell, in which amici merely repeated other amici or the petitioner and provided no new insight on the legal question before the Court. These suggestions would also assuage the problem evident in McDonnell, namely that amici flooded the Court to support the petitioners and grossly outnumbered the amici on behalf of the respondents.

Further, these suggestions would prevent the aforementioned fears espoused by Justice Scalia, namely, that certain groups fundamentally interested in the outcome of a certain case, but unable to organize and present their opinions, would be absent from consideration in the decisionmaking process.

C.  Rectifying the Basis of the Court’s Failure: A Statute Ill-Equipped to Tackle Corruption

Congress should also pass legislation that would reinforce contemporary public opinion’s broad perception of what constitutes corruption, countering the Supreme Court’s actions in McDonnell. Since the Court narrowly construed what constituted an “official act” for the bribery statute, Congress should defer to public opinion and repudiate that narrow construction. Finally, in harkening back to what the framers perceived as corrupt behavior, Congress should look to New York state (and its corruption legislation) as a means of providing some guidance.

The main statute designed to target public corruption explicitly, the bribery statute18 U.S.C. § 201is limited by language, and therefore is prone to interpretation by the Court, as in McDonnell. The statute defines the quo of the quid pro quo relationship as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity.”[187] Beyond the bribery statute, few other statutes or codes at the federal level are concerned exclusively with public corruption prosecutions. Enacted in 1946, Congress created the Hobbs Act with the intent of managing labor disputes.[188] However, the Department of Justice’s Justice Manual notes how “the extortion statute is frequently used in connection with cases involving public corruption.”[189] Beyond these statutes, the honest services fraud statute,[190] as well as the Travel Act,[191] have also been used as vehicles for prosecution. Finally, passed in 1970, with the Congressional intent of empowering prosecution of mob activity,[192] the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) now empowers prosecution of public corruption, assuming that a person be involved in an enterprise that operates through a pattern of racketeering activity.[193] All of the aforementioned statutes empower federal prosecutors to tackle public corruption;[194] however, none of these acts or statutes reference public corruption prosecution, as case law has illuminated that specific area of law.

Given that the federal statutes that cover public corruption rarely if ever directly refer to it, Congress should look to New York state for both clarifying the statute on what constitutes an “official act” and for determining if any new legislation could be passed that would better reflect the realities of political dealings and public opinion. In 2013, New York revisited its bribery statutes, with Governor Cuomo proposing the Public Trust Act which criminalized directly, without need for other statutes, the bribery of a public servant,[195] corrupting the government,[196] and the failure to report corruption.[197] The Public Trust Act, as ultimately enacted in 2014,[198] included the latter two proposed provisions as well as enhanced prosecutorial powers through changing the statute of limitations and evidentiary standards.[199] New York provides an opportune study, not only because of how pervasive public corruption is in the state,[200] but also because the New York statute accurately reflects public opinion on corruption and therefore is broadly worded.

Section 496 of New York’s Penal Law provides a model for public corruption legislation, providing statutes regarding what constitutes public corruption generally, and then also what constitutes corrupting the government.[201] Its bribery lawsenshrined in Section 200 of the Penal Lawalso provide some valuable guidance for possible federal laws, with Sections 200.10 through 200.12 specifically addressing quid pro quo relationships.[202] Specifically, the New York State Penal Law criminalizes bribery when any public servant receives any benefit “upon an agreement or understanding that his or her vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced . . . .”[203] Such an open definition of what constitutes the quo in a quid pro quo (that it could be any “vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion”) better relates to the reality of contemporary American politics.

Such legislation would better reflect the realities of public corruption at the national stage, understanding how public opinion factors into how to tackle the issue while also recognizing the benefits in perceiving it as an abuse of the public’s trust. Over the past thirty years, “convictions of federal officials and employees . . . [comprised] about 56% of all convictions.”[204] The majority of these charges come under Title 18, as mentioned above, “with the most common specific charges being related to bribery, conspiracy, embezzlement, false statements, and theft.”[205] However, divided at the federal level, for the 9,101 indictments filed over the same period, the charges come from a diverse range of acts, spanning across at least four different titles of the U.S. Code.[206] Because of the wide variety of statutes used to target public corruption, the public could benefit from a singular statute harmonizing these factors and construing it as an abuse of the public trust.

Defining corruption similarly to the New York state statute would also approximate the public’s view of what constitutes corrupt behavior. Public opinion, as indicated above, regards the intent and context of the corrupt actors, rather than on whether the items exchanged actually constituted something bestowed on a politician by the virtue of the politician’s public office. Essentially, if a public servant used “his public office primarily to serve his own ends,” the servant engaged in corrupt behavior, and more importantly, “[t]his understanding of corruption focuses the discussion on the intent and context of the potentially corrupt actor (or actors).”[207] Under this approach, it was not so much the form or specific acts carried out by the politician or public servant, but rather, the simple fact that by doing so, the politician served his or her own ends and not his or her constituents.

If Congress is unable to pass new legislation concerning public corruption, it at least should support a clarification of the statute. Currently, two members of CongressTom Suozzi (D-N.Y.) and Brian Fitzpatrick (R-Pa.)have proposed bipartisan legislation to clarify the statutory defect that resulted from the Court’s decision. Suozzi, saying that “[w]e can’t allow corruption convictions to be overturned based on legal technicalities,” unveiled the Close Official Acts Loophole Act, which would borrow language from the federal conflicts of interest statutes and apply that language to what constitutes an “official act.”[208] Explaining the rationale behind the bill, Fitzpatrick, a former Supervisory Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the national supervisor for its Public Corruption Unit, noted, “[c]orruption can and does take many different forms, and we must provide investigators and prosecutors with all the tools they need to combat [its] erosive effects . . . .”[209] The bill would elaborate what constituted the “quo” of a quid pro quo relationship, indicating that acting on “any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit” in return for some pecuniary benefit would constitute bribery.[210]

Of note, passing such amendments as opposed to passing new legislation mirroring New York’s would also allay the Court’s concerns of overeager prosecutions and criminalizing all forms of governance. This list, proposed by Suozzi and Fitzpatrick, mirrors the one in New York, in some capacity, expanding what constitutes an “official act” to matters related to the discretion of the public servant.[211] However, it still draws on language from already existing statutes, which the Court passively approved in its opinion. Further, the petitioner differentiated the bribery statute from the already existing statutes on the basis of these semantic differences, but did not denigrate those specific statutes.[212]

Such legislation is necessary because it better covers the nefarious aspects of access explored by this Note. By expanding what constitutes an “official act” and bringing it line with aforementioned public opinion and certain realities of access, Congress can ensure that the public’s perspective on what constitutes corruption is enshrined in law. Further, by enshrining that definition in law, Congress will rectify the situationof a limited definition of what constitutes corruptioncreated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell.

Conclusion

A number of possible caveats exist to the arguments made in this Note. I did not explore whether the Court’s decision would ultimately benefit the publicperhaps the decision and its logical results would allow for public servants to more freely interact with their constituents with no fear of prosecutionor harm it. Beyond that, I also assumed that the presence of multiple amici on behalf of the petitioner caused an uneven playing field against the respondent, the United States, which may also not be the case. The instant case is also factually contingent on amici not representing public opinionmany instances may exist where amici do represent public opinion (and do so very well), thus questioning another argument made here. Despite these caveats, the Court’s decision has already had real effects on democracy.

As mentioned earlier, the Court’s decision, affected a number of other decisions in a small amount of time. The deleterious effect mentioned, however, by the Court, amici, and McDonnell, might be misplaced. In the wake of the decision, various courts of appeal have overturned convictions, reversing and remanding them for reconsideration in line with McDonnell. Yet the U.S. Attorney’s Office for S.D.N.Y.a powerhouse of public corruption prosecutionsand other U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country announced they would retry them, succeeding in winning convictions.[213] In fact, at the time of reversal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals even noted that the evidence submitted in two prominent S.D.N.Y. casesthose of Dean Skelos and Sheldon Silverwas sufficient to convict.[214] The Court’s fear of giving prosecutors a carte blanche may have been misplaced, as prosecutors continue their zealous attempt to rid statehouses, bureaucracies, and Congress of corruption.

Additionally, the writing of this Note occurred as the Special Counsel Investigation into Russia’s influence on the 2016 presidential election was underway.[215] Various public officials, non-profit organizations, and politicians raised numerous allegations regarding President Trump’s and his aides’ relationships with Russian officials and representatives. In these allegations, these public officials, non-profit organizations, and politicians accuse the President and his aides of some type of corruption.[216] In such a context, the importance of McDonnell’s outcome increases, especially as corruption became a politicized issue in the 2016 election.[217] With a limited scope on what constitutes corruption, it is possible that some acts could go unnoticed and unprosecuted.

However, even if “[a] means can be justified only by its end”[218] and the ultimate effect of the holding is limited, the Court’s process of arriving at its decision is also worrisome. That the Court deferred to amici, in spite of overwhelming public opinion opposing the views of those amici, ultimately calls into question the role of amici, or at least how the Court interacts with them and the public. A majority of those Americans surveyed, cutting across tense political lines, viewed, and still view, the Court’s reasoning as problematic, suggesting that the Court’s motivations should not go unquestioned.

A further question at play in the litigation, and one this Note touches tangentially, is how to manage the Supreme Court when it fails to police itself. Despite its design as an institution insulated from politicking, as described above, the Court must eschew devolving into an elitist institution completely unaware or ignorant to realities of contemporary social ills. Of course, the Court is not wholly insulated to public opinion. Jurisprudence on a number of legal issuesincluding privacy rights related to gay marriage, the right to contraception, school integration, and other issuesindicate the Court’s willingness to contemplate social developments and public opinion in its decisionmaking.[219] Further, the Supreme Court is often most powerful when it follows public opinion because “justices often delay or minimize their interventions” when “[s]ensitive to the possibility of backlashes. . . .[220] Given that public opinion ra              n counter to the Court’s holding, the question of what possible backlash exists emerges and further problematizes the Court’s holding.

Accordingly, from an open snub to public sentiment to an unabashed, almost sycophantic, restatement of the many amici (representing public servants, politicians, or former versions of the two) who filed on behalf of McDonnell, the Court narrowed the definition of what constituted an “official act.” By doing so, it also limited what constituted quid pro quo behavior and propagated a theory of access wholly corrosive to democracy. Finally, if doing so were not enough, the Court’s reasoning in McDonnell shows no deference to understanding (let alone assuaging) the systemic political, economic, and social inequalities in the United States, or to public opinion supporting change regarding the Court’s view on access. As a result, in its decision in McDonnell, the Court repudiated its role as a democracy-reinforcing institution.

 


[*] *..              Executive Postscript Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 92; J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. 2016, Columbia University. My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Sam Erman for his guidance, to Professor Judith Russell, and Alexis Grenell. Lastly, thank you to my family, my friends, and the fine editors and staff of the Southern California Law Review for their excellent work.

 [1]. Baron De Montesquieu, 1 The Spirit Of The Laws 12–13 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner               Press 1975) (1748).

 [2]. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016).

 [3]. Id. at 2375.

 [4].               Id.

 [5].               United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 735 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing how sufficient evidence existed to convict Skelos, but that the Second Circuit had to vacate and remand the case because of the erroneous jury instructions).

Upon independent review of the record, and for the reasons principally set forth in the district court’s orders and judgments, we conclude that all of defendants’ remaining challenges to their convictions are without merit. Nevertheless, because we identify charging error on the ‘official act’ elements of the crimes and conviction, which we cannot conclude is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we VACATE the district court’s May 16, 2016 judgments and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Id.

 [6].               United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2017) (similarly discussing how sufficient evidence existed and erroneous jury instructions created by the McDonnell decision forced the court of appeals to vacate and remand).

Though we reject Silver’s sufficiency challenges, we hold that the District Court’s instructions on honest services fraud and extortion do not comport with McDonnell and are therefore in error. We further hold that this error was not harmless because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same conclusion if properly instructed, as is required by law for a verdict to stand.

Id.

 [7]. Id.

 [8]. Vivian Wang, Guilty, Again: Dean Skelos, Former Senate Leader, Is Convicted of Corruption in Retrial, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2JALyJw; Benjamin Weiser, Sheldon Silver Is Convicted in 2nd Corruption Trial, N.Y. Times (May 11, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Ic83Zm.

 [9]. Matt Ford, Has the Supreme Court Legalized Public Corruption?, Atlantic (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/menendez-mcdonnell-supreme-court/543354 (discussing how the decision in McDonnell v. United States hung over the prosecutor’s case).

 [10]. Nick Corasaniti & Nate Schweber, Corruption Case Against Senator Menendez Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hEl6a6.

 [11]. Alan Feuer, Why Are Corruption Cases Crumbling? Some Blame the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hJtkhl.

 [12]. Niall McCarthy, Corruption of Government Officials Ranked Americans’ Top Fear of 2017, Forbes (Oct. 19, 2017, 8:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/10/19/corruption-of-government-officials-ranked-americans-top-fear-of-2017-infographic.

 [13]. Matt Zapotosky et al., Prosecutors Will Drop Cases Against Former Va. Governor Robert McDonnell, Wife, Wash. Post (Sept. 8, 2016), http://wapo.st/2cakuAZ.

 [14]. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the E.D. Va., Former Virginia Governor and Former First Lady Indicted on Public Corruption and Related Charges (Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Former Virginia Governor and Former First Lady Indicted], https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/former
-virginia-governor-and-former-first-lady-indicted-public-corruption-and-related.

 [15]. Id.

 [16]. Id.

 [17]. See Indictment at 4–5, United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12 (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2014), ECF No. 1.

 [18]. Id. at 6.

 [19]. Id.

 [20]. Id. at 6–7.

 [21]. Press Release, Former Virginia Governor and Former First Lady Indicted, supra note 14.

 [22]. Indictment, supra note 17, at 8.

 [23]. Id. at 26.

 [24]. Id. at 9.

 [25]. Id. at 11.

 [26]. See Indictment, supra note 17, at 7–32, for a full account of the enrichment, returns, and quid pro quo relationship between Star Scientific and Governor Bob McDonnell.

 [27]. Id.

 [28]. Id.

 [29]. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 488 (4th Cir. 2015).

Two days after this private dinner—on May 1, 2011—Mrs. McDonnell received an email via Williams. The email included a link to an article entitled “Star Scientific Has Home Run Potential,” which discussed Star’s research and stock. Mrs. McDonnell forwarded this email to Appellant at 12:17 p.m. Less than an hour later, Appellant texted his sister, asking for information about loans and bank options for their Mobo properties. Later that evening, Appellant emailed his daughter Cailin, asking her to send him information about the payments he still owed for her wedding.

The next day, May 2, Mrs. McDonnell and Williams met at the Governor’s Mansion to discuss Anatabloc. However, Mrs. McDonnell began explaining her family’s financial woes—thoughts about filing for bankruptcy, high-interest loans, the decline in the real estate market, and credit card debt. . . .

Three days later, on May 5 at 11 a.m., Appellant met with Secretary Hazel and Chief of Staff Martin Kent to discuss the strategic plan for the state’s health and human resources office. Shortly after the meeting, Appellant directed his assistant to forward to Hazel the article about Star that Mrs. McDonnell had earlier brought to Appellant’s attention.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

 [30]. Rosalind S. Helderman & Matt Zapotosky, Ex-Va. Governor Robert McDonnell Guilty of 11 Counts of Corruption, Wash. Post (Sept. 4, 2014), http://wapo.st/1vSbW8x (“Three jurors who spoke about the verdict said the decision was an emotional one, particularly considering Robert McDonnell’s long career of public service. But they said they believed that the facts and the law were clear and that the verdict had not, in the end, been a difficult one to reach.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the E.D. Va., Former Virginia Governor and Former First Lady Convicted on Public Corruption Charges (Sept. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Former Virginia Governor and Former First Lady Convicted], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-virginia-governor-and-former-first-lady-convicted-public-corruption-charges.

 [31]. Frank Green et al., Bob and Maureen McDonnell Convicted in Historic Corruption Trial, Richmond Times-Dispatch (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/state-regional/virginia-politics/bob-mcdonnell-convicted-on-of-counts-maureen-mcdonnell-on-of/article_7b9b6118-343c-11e4-bef2-001a4bcf6878.html; see also Press Release, Former Virginia Governor and Former First Lady Convicted, supra note 30.

 [32]. Green et al., supra note 31.

 [33]. McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 486.

 [34]. Id. at 505–06.

 [35]. Id.

 [36]. Id. at 505.

 [37]. Id. at 506.

 [38]. See id.

 [39].                             Id. at 520;               Travis Fain, McDonnell Appeals Again, Stays Free for Now, Daily Press (July 24, 2015, 9:40 AM), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-mcdonnell-appeals-again-stays-free-for-now-20150724-story.html.

 [40]. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2018) (bribery of public officials); id. § 201(a)(3) (“official act” definition).

 [41]. McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 504 (noting that “in their proposed instructions for honest-services wire fraud, both parties sought to import the definition of bribery set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) . . . the parties [also] agreed that a charge of extortion under color of official right has four elements” one of which requires the defendant to have “‘obtained a thing of value’ . . . ‘knowing that the thing of value was given in return for official action.’”). The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s use of § 201(b)(2)’s definition of bribery in its instructions to the jury regarding the honest services wire fraud statute. The court also affirmed the lower court’s jury instructions for the charge of extortion under color of official right. Id. at 504.

 [42]. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)) (internal quotations omitted).

 [43]. Id. at 513 (“Even if this were so, it is not a statement of law. Rather, it seems to us a thinly veiled attempt to argue the defense’s case. . . . Taken as a whole, Appellant’s proposed instruction on the meaning of ‘official act’ failed to present the district court with a correct statement of law.”) (discussing the defendant, Governor Bob McDonnell’s jury instructions which proposed that no settled practices or routine behavior could constitute official acts for the purpose of the statutes under which he was indicted).

 [44]. Id. at 510–11 (“We further observe that an ‘official act’ may pertain to matters outside of the bribe recipient’s control. . . . [M]ere steps in furtherance of a final action or decision may constitute an ‘official act.’ . . . [There is] no difficulty recognizing that proof of a bribe payor’s subjective belief in the recipient’s power or influence over a matter will support a conviction for extortion under color of official right.”).

 [45]. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) (discussing the primary issue of concern of the appeal).

Under the federal bribery statute, Hobbs Act, and honest-services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1346, 1951, it is a felony to agree to take “official action” in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. The question presented is whether “official action” is limited to exercising actual governmental power, threatening to exercise such power, or pressuring others to exercise such power, and whether the jury must be so instructed; or, if not so limited, whether the Hobbs Act and honest-services fraud statute are unconstitutional.

Id.

 [46]. Id. at i, 27–30.

 [47]. Id. at 14 (citing McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014)).

 [48]. Id. (citing McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51).

 [49]. Brief for Respondent at 12, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).

 [50]. Id. at 13–14 (“It has thus been settled for more than a century that the federal bribery statute ‘cover[s] any situation in which the advice or recommendation of a Government employee would be influential,’ even if the employee does not ‘make a binding decision.’ (citations omitted)).

 [51]. The list for the Petitioner included the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Republican Governors Public Policy Committee, a group of “Former Federal Officials,” the American Center for Law and Justice, a group of “Public Policy Advocates and Business Leaders,” a group of “Law Professors,” a group of “Former Attorneys General,” a group of sixty non-Virginian “Former State Attorneys General,” a group of “Virginia Law Professors,” members of the Virginia General Assembly, and Benjamin Todd Jealous, Delores L. McQuinn, and Algie T. Howell Jr. See McDonnell v. United States, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states (last visited Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter McDonnell v. United States, SCOTUSblog].

 [52]. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Review Corruption Conviction of Former Va. Governor Robert McDonnell, Wash. Post (Jan. 15, 2016), http://wapo.st/1Zq6fsP?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=
.c9eeac23da58.

 [53]. The list for the Respondents included the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law, Judicial Watch, Inc. and the Allied Educational Foundation, Public Citizen, Inc. and Democracy 21, and the Campaign Legal Center. See McDonnell v. United States, SCOTUSblog, supra note 51.

 [54]. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).

 [55]. Id. at 2371.

 [56]. Id. at 2372 (emphasis added).

 [57]. Id. at 2367 (“The issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the term ‘official act.’ Section 201(a)(3) defines an ‘official act’ as ‘any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.’”).

 [58]. Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition of “Official Act”—McDonnell v. United States, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 470 (2016) (discussing the role of statutory interpretation in the Court’s decisionmaking).

 [59]. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2368 (“To choose between those competing definitions, we look to the context in which the words appear. Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’” (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))); see also id. at 2368–69 (containing a review of the Court’s analysis of various dictionaries).

 [60]. Id. at 2372–73.

 [61]. Ryan S. Killian, Comment, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 2013 Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2013) (“Classically, dicta is regarded as any portion of the opinion that is inessential to the outcome.” (footnote omitted)) (discussing how dicta plays a role in a Court opinion, being unnecessary towards the reasoning or logic behind the actual holding).

 [62]. Jerome N. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1259, 1259 (1947); see also Justice Felix Frankfurter, Sixth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture Delivered Before the Bar Association of the City of New York: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (Mar. 18, 1947), in 2 Rec. Ass’n B. City N.Y. 213, 216–17 (1947), reprinted in 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 530 (1947) (similarly concluding).

 [63]. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–73.

 [64]. Justice Frankfurter, supra note 62, at 214, reprinted in 47 Colum. L. Rev. at 528.

 [65]. In a sense, the fears espoused by the Court in this instance were not new. In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999), the Court discussed the relevant “absurdities” in creating a clear-cut rule regarding corruption or quid pro quo exchanges in that case, because doing so would criminalize “a complimentary lunch for the Secretary of Agriculture.” Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Narrows Definition of “Official Acts” in Public Corruption Laws, Educ. Week (Jun. 27, 2016, 12:08 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2016/06/supreme_court_narrows_definiti.html. See Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United (2014), for a discussion of prior court precedence on the issue of public corruption and for a discussion on the role that fears of criminalizing politics as usual play in Supreme Court decisions.

 [66]. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.

 [67]. Tara Malloy, Symposium: Is It Bribery or “The Basic Compact Underlying Representative Government”?, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2016, 4:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06
/symposium-is-it-bribery-or-the-basic-compact-underlying-representative-government (“As all Hamilton fans know, it pays to be in ‘The Room Where It Happens.’ Taken to its logical end, the Court’s approach permits officials literally to put ‘access’ up for sale . . . .”) (analogizing how the concept of access approved or validated by the Court goes beyond a general access).

 [68]. Id.

 [69]. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.

 [70]. Id.

 [71]. Id. at 2373 (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 402–03 (2010)).

 [72]. Id. (“[W]e decline to ‘construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards’ of ‘good government for local and state officials.’” (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987))).

 [73]. Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 358 (1983)).

 [74]. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-85.210 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam
/usam-9-85000-protection-government-integrity#9-85.210.

Consultation with the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division is required in all federal criminal matters that focus on violations of federal or state campaign financing laws, federal patronage crimes, and . . . . These include . . . prosecutive theories that focus on election fraud or campaign fund raising violations using 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346; 18 U.S.C. § 1952; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957.

Id. See generally McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2355.

 [75]. From the Court’s opinion, it is unclear whether the Justices were aware of this process. However, no mention of it is made in the opinion. See generally McDonnell, 136 S. Ct at 2355.

 [76]. Malloy, supra note 67; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.

 [77]. See generally McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361–64 (describing the various engagements and events organized); Malloy, supra note 67.

 [78]. See supra Part II.

 [79]. For a discussion on what constitutes a participatory democracy, as well as for a philosophical basis on the social contract, governance, democracy more broadly, and other theories underpinning American society, see Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract & Discourses (G.D.H. Cole ed. & trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1913) (1782), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/638/0132_Bk.pdf.

 [80]. The reasons for such inequality are broadly discussed in this Note, but are not explored heavily.

 [81]. See Jeffrey R. Brown & Jiekun Huang, All the President’s Friends: Political Access and Firm Value, CATO Inst.: Res. Briefs in Econ. Pol’y, Aug. 2017, at 1–2, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org
/files/pubs/pdf/rb83.pdf (“First, political access may enable firms to secure contracts to provide goods or services to government. . . . Second, companies with direct access to politicians can seek regulatory relief and influence political decision-making. . . . Third, access to politicians may enable companies to gain an informational advantage about government policies and actions . . . .”) (discussing how access constitutes a competitive advantage and power for organizations).

 [82]. 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know, Pathways Mag. (2011), http://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-us-inequality-everyone-should-know (discussing wage inequality, CEO pay inequality, homelessness, education wage premium inequality, gender pay gaps, occupational sex segregation, racial gaps in education, racial discrimination, child poverty, residential segregation, health insurance, intragenerational income mobility, bad jobs inequality, discouraged workers, wealth inequality, intergenerational income mobility, deregulation of the labor market, job losses, immigration, and incarceration).

 [83]. Tara Siegel Bernard, A Citizen’s Guide to Buying Access, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1vnwgyR (“The findings are far from shocking: Those emails that offered the prospect of a donor meeting were three times as likely to result in a meeting than those offering the prospect of a constituent meeting, [with] a far greater chance of securing meetings with more senior officials, including . . . members of Congress.”) (discussing a study that cold-called or wrote politicians with the experiment testing the different responses for active donors versus local constituents).

 [84]. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 724 (1985) (discussing the role that minority status plays in access, whether it may be discrete minorities or diffuse ones).

 [85]. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. Pol. 154, 174–75 (2002).

 [86]. Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, For People of Color, Banks Are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, Reveal news (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color
-banks-are-shutting-the-door-to-homeownership.

 [87]. Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 Ann. Rev. So. 181, 187 (2008).

 [88]. Ronald Weich & Carlos Angulo, Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, in Rights at Risk: Equality in an Age of Terrorism 186 (Dianne M. Piché et al. eds., 2002).

 [89]. Kim Rueben & Sheila Murray, Racial Disparities in Education Finance: Going Beyond Equal Revenues passim (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr., Paper No. 28, 2008), https://www.taxpolicycenter
.org/publications/racial-disparities-education-finance-going-beyond-equal-revenues/full.

 [90]. Daniel M. Butler & David E. Broockman, Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators, 55 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 463, 472 (2011).

 [91]. Katherine Levine Einstein & David M. Glick, Does Race Affect Access to Government Services? An Experiment Exploring Street Level Bureaucrats and Access to Public Housing, 61 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 100, 100 (2017).

 [92]. Bernard, supra note 83.

 [93]. Christina Pazzanese, The Costs of Inequality: Increasingly, It’s the Rich and the Rest: Economic and Political Inequities Are Interlaced, Analysts Say, Leaving Many Americans Poor and Voiceless, Harv. Gazette (Feb. 8, 2016), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-costs-of-inequality-increasingly-its-the-rich-and-the-rest.

 [94]. See Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 48, 53–58 (2008).

 [95]. Id. at 57–58.

 [96]. Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future 130 (2012).

 [97]. Id.

 [98]. Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. Pols. 363, 363 (2017).

 [99]. Christopher Uggen et al., Felony Voting Rights and the Disenfranchisement of African Americans, 5 Souls 48 (2003).

 [100]. Stiglitz, supra note 96, at 164.

 [101]. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1242 (1991) (“The embrace of identity politics, however, has been in tension with dominant conceptions of social justice. Race, gender, and other identity categories are most often treated . . . as vestiges of bias or domination—that is, as intrinsically negative frameworks in which social power works to exclude or marginalize those who are different.”).

 [102]. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 14–15 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court often follows public opinion on matters deemed especially contentious).

 [103]. Jim Clifton, Explaining Trump: Widespread Government Corruption, Gallup News (Jan. 6, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/opinion/chairman/188000/explaining-trump-widespread-government-corruption.aspx.

 [104]. 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair Poll: Corruption, CBS News: 60 Minutes (June 9, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutesvanity-fair-poll-corruption.

 [105]. 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, Gallup News (Sept. 19, 2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx.

 [106]. See supra Part II.

 [107]. Drew DeSilver & Patrick Van Kessel, As More Money Flows into Campaigns, Americans Worry About Its Influence, Pew Res. Ctr.: Fact Tank (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/07/as-more-money-flows-into-campaigns-americans-worry-about-its-influence.

 [108]. Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. Times (June 2, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2kajjpi; Nicholas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor an Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N.Y. Times (June 2, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1HIaEhH.

 [109]. Daniel Hensel, New Poll Shows Money in Politics Is a Top Voting Concern, Issue One (June 29, 2016), https://www.issueone.org/new-poll-shows-money-in-politics-is-a-top-voting-concern.

 [110]. Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, supra note 108.

 [111]. Id.

 [112]. National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, Brennan Ctr. for Just.
(Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-super-pacs-corruption-and-democracy.

 [113]. Id.

 [114]. Id.

 [115]. See supra note 51 (listing all the amici who filed in support of McDonnell).

 [116]. Compare supra note 51 (listing groups filing amicus briefs on behalf of petitioner), with supra note 53 (listing groups filing amicus briefs on behalf of respondent).

 [117]. Brief for Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Former Federal Officials as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Former Va. Atty’s Gen. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Jealous et al. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for James Madison Ctr. for Free Speech as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Members of Va. Gen. Assemb. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Republican Governors Pub. Policy Comm. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Pub. Policy Advocates & Bus. Leaders as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for Seventy-Seven Former State Att’ys Gen. (Non-Va.) as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474); Brief for U.S. Justice Found. et al. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).

 [118]. Brief for Republican Governors Pub. Policy Comm. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner at 12–14, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).

 [119].               Brief for Republican Governors Pub. Policy Comm. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8–9, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).

 [120]. Brief for Former Va. Att’ys Gen. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner at 2, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).

 [121]. Id. at 4, 12–15.

 [122]. Brief for Sixty Former State Att’ys Gen. (Non-Va.) as Amici Curiae for Petitioner at 17–18, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) (“Dangling the threat of criminal liability over every lunch with a lobbyist and every meeting with an interest group would impede the proper functioning of state and local governments.”).

 [123]. Id. at 17–20.

 [124]. Brief for Members of Va. Gen. Assemb. as Amici Curiae for Petitioner at 2, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) (referring to the interest of amici).

The conviction of Governor Robert McDonnell on a uniquely broad interpretation of the federal corruption statutes blurs the line between honest political interactions with constituents and public corruption. It now appears that accepting gifts from a constituent—even in the absence of the legislator’s promising or undertaking an official act—may lead to federal prosecution should the constituent request even the slightest assistance from the legislator.

Id.

 [125]. See supra Part II.

 [126]. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 744 (2000) (“In one respect, however, there has been a major transformation in Supreme Court practice: the extent to which non-parties participate in the Court’s decision-making process through the submission of amicus curiae, or friend-of-the-court, briefs. Throughout the first century of the Court’s existence, amicus briefs were rare.”); see also Andrew Jay Koshner, Solving the Puzzle of Interest Group Litigation 7–11 (1998) (exploring the increasing role of public interest participation before the Supreme Court).

 [127]. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 126, at 757.

 [128]. Id. at 745.

 [129]. Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 Fl. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 319 (2008).

 [130]. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 126, at 746–47, 784–87.

 [131]. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).

After 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be good to scrutinize these motions in a more careful, indeed a fish-eyed, fashion. The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants’ briefs, in effect merely extending the length of the litigant’s brief. Such amicus briefs should not be allowed.

Id. (Posner, J., in chambers).

 [132]. Garcia, supra note 129, at 316.

 [133]. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

 [134]. Id. at 36.

 [135]. Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 468, 471 (1997).

 [136]. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 263, 281 (2010).

 [137]. Although perhaps, myriad amici briefs flooding the Court in support of granting a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and again in the Court’s decision would indicate a number of stakeholders in the pending decision, and thus illustrate the importance of the issue, as mentioned throughout this Section, that flood poses problems when an imbalance exists between those filing for the petitioner and the respondent. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) for a discussion on the possible effects that imbalances in amicus briefs may have on Supreme Court jurisprudence and why such imbalances ultimately pose significant problems for strong adversarial litigation. Another issue of note, but one not explored here, is the effect of amicus briefs in Supreme Court jurisprudence when one party is the United States.

 [138]. See supra note 51 (listing groups filing amicus briefs on behalf of petitioner).

 [139]. See supra note 53 (listing groups filing amicus briefs on behalf of respondent).

 [140]. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 126, at 785.

 [141]. Id.

 [142]. Id.

 [143]. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

 [144]. Garcia, supra note 129, at 320.

 [145]. See supra note 117 (listing all amicus briefs on behalf of petitioner).

 [146]. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 126, at 786.

 [147]. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980) (arguing for the Supreme Court’s role as reinforcer of democracy).

 [148]. Id. at 58.

 [149]. See id. at 12.

 [150]. Richard W. Burgh, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, Book Review 1 L. & Phil. 481, 482 (1982).

 [151]. Ely, supra note 147, at 12.

 [152]. John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 Md. L. Rev. 451, 466 (1978).

 [153]. Id. at 486 (“A referee analogy is also not far off: the referee is to intervene only when one team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the ‘wrong’ team has scored.”) (describing another possible analogy to the political market theory, in which the Court must insert itself and rectify market inequalities or asymmetries in power to yield more beneficial outcomes, but can insert itself only when such inequalities exist).

 [154]. Id.

 [155]. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the Academic Commentator, 40 S. Tx. L. Rev. 943, 955 (1999).

 [156]. Augusto Lopez-Carlos, Nine Reasons Why Corruption Is a Destroyer of Human Prosperity, World Bank (Mar. 31, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/nine-reasons-why-corruption-destroyer-human-prosperity; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State, 120 Yale L.J. Forum (2010), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corruption-greed-culture-and-the-state.

 [157]. What We Investigate: Public Corruption, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/public-corruption (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).

Public corruption . . . poses a fundamental threat to our national security and way of life. It can affect everything from how well our borders are secured and our neighborhoods protected to how verdicts are handed down in courts to how public infrastructure such as roads and schools are built. It also takes a significant toll on the public’s pocketbooks by siphoning off tax dollars—it is estimated that public corruption costs the U.S. government and the public billions of dollars each year.

Id.

 [158]. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against The Supreme Court 10 (2014).

 [159]. Jimmy Vielkind & Laura Nahmias, Cuomo’s Ambitions at Risk as Former Aide Goes to Trial, Politico (Jan. 22, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/01/19
/cuomos-ambitions-at-risk-as-former-aide-goes-to-trial-199286.

 [160]. See infra notes 21314.

 [161]. Corasaniti & Schweber, supra note 10.

 [162]. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office S.D. Tex., Former Webb County Commissioner Convicted (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/former-webb-county-commissioner-convicted; Michael R. Blood & Julie Watson, US Rep Duncan Hunter, Wife Indicted on Corruption Charges, Associated Press (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com
/9e63df7d58f549f5a034589a08036ee2.

 [163]. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).

 [164]. See Robert J. Harris, Book Review, Robert McClosky. The American Supreme Court, 336 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 179, 179 (1961) (“In the first, from 1789 to 1860, the Court under the shrewd guidance of John Marshall, was primarily interested in devising a system of constitutional law which would establish judicial power . . . .”).

 [165]. See Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 367–85 (2009).

 [166]. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 19, 23 (2002) (“The meaning of the law before and after a judicial decision is not the same. Before the ruling, there were, in the hard cases, several possible solutions. After the ruling, the law is what the ruling says it is. The meaning of the law has changed. New law has been created.”).

 [167]. Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law 94 (Greenwood Press, Inc. 1976) (1968).

 [168]. Justice William O. Douglas, 8th Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture Delivered Before the Association of the City of New York: Stare Decisis (Apr. 12, 1949), in 4 Rec. Ass’n B. City N.Y. 152, 175–76 (1949), reprinted in 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 754 (1949).

 [169]. See id. at 172–76, reprinted in 49 Colum. L. Rev. at 752–55.

 [170]. Barak, supra note 166, at 33.

 [171]. James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1037, 1083.

 [172]. Id. at 1134.

 [173]. David Cole, Engines of Liberty 223–24 (2016).

 [174]. Id. (“The advocates featured here pursued their claims wherever they found a promising forum.”).

 [175]. See Wilson, supra note 171, at 1127–28.

 [176].               Cole, supra note 173, at 225.

 [177]. Id.

 [178]. Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346 U.S. 945, 947 (1954) (statement of Black, J.).

 [179]. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, In Unusual Term, Big Year for Amicus Curiae at the Supreme Court, Law.com: Supreme Court Brief (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.law.com
/supremecourtbrief/almID/1202767950930.

 [180]. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1487–88 (2015) (“During the past two decades, the Supreme Court has witnessed the emergence of an elite private sector group of attorneys who are dominating advocacy before the Court to an extent not witnessed since the early nineteenth century.”).

 [181]. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1901, 1906 (2016).

 [182]. Id. at 1904–06.

 [183]. Id. at 1903–04.

 [184]. Id. at 1904.

 [185]. Eugene Volokh, Judicial Attitudes Towards Amicus Briefs, Volokh Conspiracy (July 23, 2009, 1:51 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/07/23/judicial-attitudes-towards-amicus-briefs.

 [186]. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003).

[J]udges have heavy caseloads and therefore need to minimize extraneous reading; amicus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be used to make an end run around court-imposed limitations on the length of parties’ briefs; the time and other resources required for the preparation and study of, and response to, amicus briefs drive up the cost of litigation; and the filing of an amicus brief is often an attempt to inject interest group politics into the federal appeals process.

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2000)).

 [187]. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2018) (defining “official act”).

 [188]. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual, Crim. Resource Manual § 2404 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2402-hobbs-act-generally (“[T]he Hobbs Act was enacted in 1946 to combat racketeering in labor-management disputes . . . .”).

 [189]. Id.

 [190]. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-43.100 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-43000-mail-fraud-and-wire-fraud.

 [191]. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2018).

 [192]. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-110.100 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-85000-protection-government-integrity.

 [193]. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2018); see also Ctr. for the Advancement of Pub. Integrity, Columbia Law Sch., A Guide to Commonly Used Federal Statutes in Public Corruption Cases: A Practitioner Toolkit 12–13 (2017) [hereinafter Commonly Used Federal Statutes in Public Corruption Cases], https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/a_guide_to_commonly_used_federal_statutes_in_public_corruption_cases.pdf.

 [194]. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-85.000 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam
/usam-9-85000-protection-government-integrity. Although statutes exist that cover bribery of federal officials and interfering with the integrity of elections, few statutes have the explicit purpose of criminalizing quid pro quo activities, and most of this law has been clarified by case law. Commonly Used Federal Statutes in Public Corruption Cases, supra note 193.

 [195]. Press Release, Office of the Governor of N.Y., Governor Cuomo Proposes New Class of Public Corruption Crimes (Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-proposes-new-class-public-corruption-crimes (“Under the new Public Servant Bribery provision, a prosecutor would only have to prove that the person paying the bribe intended to influence the public official or that the person receiving it intended to be so influenced . . . .”).

 [196]. Id. (“The proposed legislation would hold accountable anyone whether or not they are a public official who is found to have engaged in defrauding the government. . . . Under the new law, anybody, whether acting in concert with a public servant or not, who engages in a course of conduct to defraud a state or local government would be guilty of a crime . . . .”).

 [197]. Id. (“The proposed legislation would for the first time make it a misdemeanor for any public official or employee to fail to report bribery.”).

 [198]. Press Release, Office of the Governor of N.Y., Governor Cuomo and Legislative Leaders Announce Passage of 2014–15 Budget (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-and-legislative-leaders-announce-passage-2014-15-budget [hereinafter Press Release, 2014–2015 Budget] (“The Budget includes further reforms to ensure New Yorkers have confidence that their elected officials are serving them honestly and with transparency.”).

 [199]. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 30.10 (McKinney 2016) (Statute of Limitations); N.Y. Penal Law § 200.00–.56 (McKinney 2016) (Bribery); id. §§ 496.01–07 (Corrupting the Government); see also Press Release, 2014–2015 Budget, supra note 198 (summarizing the enacted Public Trust Act provisions).

 [200]. Alan Greenblatt, Congratulations, New York, You’re #1 in Corruption, Politico (May 5, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/how-new-york-became-most-corrupt-state-in-america-117652 (“Other states have plenty of corruption, but it’s hard to beat New York when it comes to sheer volume . . . . New York doesn’t so much have a culture of corruption as an entire festival.”).

 [201]. N.Y. Penal Law § 496.01–.07 (McKinney 2016).

 [202]. Id. § 200.10–.12.

 [203]. Id.

 [204]. Adriana S. Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions, 18 Pub. Integrity 127, 137 (2016).

 [205]. Id.

 [206]. See id. at 138 (including in Title 18: § 201 Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, § 371 Conspiracy to Commit Offense or Defraud the United States, § 641 Public Money, Property or Records, § 666 Theft or Bribery in Programs Receiving Federal Funds, § 1001 Fraud and False Statements or Entries Generally, § 1028 Fraud and Related, ID Documents, § 1341 Mail Fraud, Frauds and Swindles, § 1709 Theft or Destruction of Mail by Officers or Employees, § 1951 Hobbs Act, and § 1962 RICO Prohibited Activities; in Title 21: § 841 & § 843 Manufacture and Distribution of Drugs, § 844 Simple Possession of Drugs, and § 846 Attempt and Conspiracy; in Title 26: § 7201 Tax Evasion and § 7206 Fraud and False Statements; and in Title 42: § 408 SSDI Penalties and § 1973 Denial or Abridgement of Right to Vote).

 [207]. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 374 (2009).

 [208]. Kenneth Lovett, L.I. Congressman Seeks to Close Corruption Loophole with New Bill After Dean Skelos Conviction Tossed, N.Y. Daily News (Sept. 27, 2017, 11:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/congressman-unveils-bill-prosecuting-corrupt-pols-easier-article-1.3525148.

 [209]. Press Release, Office of Congressman Thomas Suozzi, Suozzi Proposes Legislation to Close “Official Acts” Loophole that Resulted in Overturned Political Corruption Convictions (Sept. 27, 2017), https://suozzi.house.gov/media/press-releases/suozzi-proposes-legislation-close-official-acts-loophole-resulted-overturned.

 [210]. Close Official Acts Loophole Act of 2017, H.R. 3843, 115th Cong. (as introduced by H. Reps. Brian K. Fitzpatrick and Thomas R. Suozzi, Sept. 26, 2017).

 [211]. Id.

 [212]. Brief of Petitioner at 13–14, 35–36, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474). Notice that the petitioner accused respondents of importing a definition from another statute, but reserved judgment as to the “better” definition. See id. at 49–55.

 [213]. See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the S.D.N.Y., Statement on Second Circuit Decision, United States v. Sheldon Silver (July 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/statement-acting-us-attorney-joon-h-kim-second-circuit-decision-united-states-v-sheldon (“While we are disappointed by the Second Circuit’s decision, we respect it, and look forward to retrying the case. . . . Although it will be delayed, we do not expect justice to be denied.”) (statement of Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Joon H. Kim, in response to the Second Circuit’s decision to overturn the conviction); see also Wang, supra note 8 (Skelos convicted); Weiser, supra note 8 (Silver convicted).

 [214]. See United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 739 (2d Cir. 2017); U.S. v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 124 (2d Cir. 2017).

[T]he evidence presented by the Government was sufficient to prove the Hobbs Act extortion and honest services fraud counts of conviction against Silver[,] . . . [and] the evidence presented by the Government was sufficient to prove the money laundering count of conviction against Silver because the Government was not required to trace criminal funds that were commingled with legitimate funds under 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

Silver, 864 F.3d at 124.

 [215]. See, e.g., Marshall Cohen et al., Tracking the Russia Investigations, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/russia-investigations (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election, N.Y. Times (Sept. 20, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2NmUclP.

 [216]. See Shane & Mazzeti, supra note 215.

 [217]. See Sarah Chayes, It Was a Corruption Election. It’s Time We Realized It, Foreign Pol’y (Dec. 6, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/06/it-was-a-corruption-election-its-time-we-realized-it-trump-united-states.

 [218]. Leon Trotsky, Their Morals and Ours, New Int’l, June 1938, at 163, 172.

 [219]. See Michael Klarman, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Most Powerful When It Follows Public Opinion, N.Y. Times (July 6, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2CQ3AYL (“Rulings such as Brown v. Board of Education and Obergefell were inconceivable until enormous changes in the surrounding social and political context had first occurred.”).

 [220]. Id.

Volume 91, Number 6 (September 2018)

Volume 91, Number 6 (September 2018)

Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble – Article by John W. Welch & James A. Heilpern

From Volume 91, Number 6 (September 2018)
DOWNLOAD PDF


RECOVERING OUR FORGOTTEN PREAMBLE

John W. Welch[*] and James A. Heilpern[†]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

I. The Preamble: From Inception to Jacobson

A. Beginnings of the Preamble in the Articles of Confederation

B. The Preamble and the Constitutional Convention

C. Drawing Strength from Public Voices: State
Constitutions and Charters

D. Evoking Authority from King James Vocabulary

E. The Preamble and its Eighteenth-Century
Understanding of Rights

F. The Legal Import of Statutory Preambles in the
Common Law

G. The Preamble in the State Ratification Process

I. Corpus Linguistics of Early American English in the Preamble

1. Domestic Tranquility

2. Common Defence

3. General Welfare

4. Blessings of Liberty

J. Early Supreme Court Decisions Citing the Preamble

K. Use of the Preamble by Political Actors in the
Nineteenth Century

1. The 1830 Debate on the Nature of the Constitution

2. Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the
Constitution (1833)

3. Former President John Quincy Adams and Others

4. President Abraham Lincoln

L. Preambles in State Constitutions in the
Nineteenth Century

II. Limiting Jacobson’s Statements Regarding the Preamble

A. Facts and Arguments in Jacobson

B. The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court

C. Judicial Options for Limiting Jacobson’s Statements
About the Preamble

III. The Preamble in the Twentieth Century

A. Jacobson in the Federal Courts

B. Legal Scholarship and the Preamble

C. Preambles in Comparative Constitutional Law

1. South Africa

2. Germany

3. India

IV. Taking the Preamble More Seriously

A. Legal Roles of the Preamble in Constitutional Law

B. Responding to Objections against Legal Roles for the Preamble

 

Introduction

This Article argues that the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America deserves a primary place in constitutional law, in federal judicial decision-making, and in the nation’s civic discourse. The Preamble does more than set forth general, vague aspirations. It epitomizes the particular purposes behind the adoption of the Constitution that were desperately needed to repair and replace the faltering Articles of Confederation. The Preamble’s words were specifically and methodically chosen, both in the Preamble itself and often within the body of the Constitution. Based on their prompt affirmative vote, all members of the Constitutional Convention, which drafted the version of the Constitution that was submitted to the thirteen states for ratification, readily embraced the Preamble.[1] Some delegates stated explicitly that it should be used as the key to interpreting the Constitution, its meanings, intentions, purposes, and limitations.[2] Indeed, it is doubtful that the Constitution would have been ratified without the text of the Preamble prominently standing at the top of the proposed document, and the Preamble occupied a dominant and valuable position at the head of constitutional analysis throughout the nineteenth century.[3]

In 1905, however, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.[4] This case has been rarely discussed at any length and is only cited summarily.[5] Perhaps somewhat unwittingly, the Court used language that has been understood to relegate the Preamble to a minor, insubstantial role: “Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United States or on any of its Departments.”[6] The Court then went on summarily to treat the Preamble as irrelevant to the case.

As will be demonstrated here, the Court’s unnecessarily broad language should be seen as dicta or should otherwise be narrowed or recalibrated. Although in some senses the Preamble may not be a “source of any substantive power” conferred upon the federal government by the people of the United States, this does not mean that the Preamble does not serve any legal functions, as has been consequently generally thought. Instead, the Preamble is a collective source of unifying objectives for the operation of the American democratic republic. It is a formative statement of guiding principles to be used in interpreting the meaning of the words and structures found in the body of the Constitution. It is a body of authorizing statements of purpose that regulate the reasons behind the organic operations of the federal government. And it constitutes a selected list of limits that set boundaries beyond which the federal government is not authorized to go. The 1905 assertion by the Supreme Court and its application in Jacobson was based on little, if any, substantive research, briefing, discussion, argument, or consideration. Moreover, this opening point in the Jacobson opinion was not material to the holding of the case. Consequently, this dicta should be clarified or otherwise revised.

Jacobson’s dicta has gone down in subsequent judicial history and political thought as a controlling dismissal of the idea that the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States has much if any legal power or effect,[7] and it has most likely contributed to the popular idea that the Preamble has little or no legal value or judicial usefulness. As a result, the Preamble has been largely forgotten, and developments during the intervening century of American constitutional law and politics since Jacobson have left constitutional law in the United States in an odd position of unnecessary weakness, lacking purposeful guidance. The Preamble is rarely mentioned in federal court opinions, in constitutional law treatises, or in leading law school constitutional textbooks. Increasingly, the Preamble is taught or memorized less often in primary or secondary school curricula. At a time when constitutional courts could use principled guidance more than ever before in drawing upon the fundamental purposes that give American constitutional jurisprudence its unifying coherence and authority, it is unfortunate that the Preamble’s primary written articulation of those leading civic values and defining governmental purposes goes almost entirely unmentioned.

In order to lay a foundation for assessing Jacobson’s unsupported claim that the Preamble had “never been regarded as the source of any substantive power” and also to expand Jacobson’s glancing reference to Justice Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentary on the Constitution, Part I of this study begins at the inception of the American Republic and examines the legal and textual history of the Preamble from the founding era of the United States of America until the end of the nineteenth century. This Part develops several lines of inquiry and analysis in order to broaden and strengthen any understanding of the Preamble. This study aims to appeal both to those who favor a more authoritative originalist approach and to those who prefer a more organic living approach. It will be shown that the Preamble was intended to be and functioned as an important statement of specific and exclusive purposes to be undertaken by the federal government.

Questions raised here will include: What problems had arisen under the Articles of Confederation? What words from the Articles of Confederation were retained by the Preamble in addressing those problems? What purposes did the members of the Constitutional Convention see in the Preamble, based on their use of language from preambles in earlier state constitutions and the use of “whereas clauses” or prologues in legal documents under the Common Law in the late-eighteenth century? Other questions explore the importance of the Preamble in the ratification of the Constitution and how the Preamble relates to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, especially the lack of the word “expressly” in the latter.

Using the latest technology and the Corpus Linguistics data base, the contemporaneous late-eighteenth century meanings of main terms in the Preamble will be explored. Part I then goes on to consider how people understood and used the Preamble during the Early American Republic and through the end of the nineteenth century leading up to Jacobson. It will be shown that the principles embedded in the Preamble were viewed as articulating the essence of the Constitution and that the Preamble was considered by some to be, in theory, the key of constitutional law. Although debated, the dominant view allowed for the Preamble to be seen as providing implied powers as well as purposeful guidance to all of the operations of the United States.[8] Questions include: How was the Preamble understood by the Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century? How was the Preamble used in the great 1830 debate over the nature of the Constitution, understood in the 1833 commentary by Harvard professor and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, celebrated by John Quincy Adams in the 1837 constitutional jubilee, and crucially invoked by President Abraham Lincoln and others in the mid-nineteenth century? Finally, the development of preambles in state constitutions throughout the nineteenth century shows that the individual state constitutional preambles carefully made use of language from the federal Preamble, affirming the legal import of constitutional preambles generally. All of this sheds light on how the Preamble contributed legally to Constitutional law in many ways.

Part II of this article then offers a detailed examination of the 1905 Supreme Court opinion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. It will be argued, on several grounds, that this case should not be cited for the propositions that the Preamble is not law or that it is not part of the Constitution, as some courts and public discourse have in effect taken that case to mean. Since the holding of this case turned on other factual grounds irrespective of the Preamble, its characterization of the Preamble should be limited or otherwise dismissed as dicta without affecting or overturning the actual holding of that case. Indeed, this general understanding of Jacobson should be modified, as it represents an unwarranted departure from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American jurisprudence of the Preamble, which actually placed meaning in the Preamble.

Part III then surveys how Jacobson has been interpreted by federal courts since 1905. At first, Jacobson’s marginalizing of the Preamble was readily accepted, but in many subsequent cases, Jacobson has been ignored.

The relatively few law review articles or essays about the Preamble will be surveyed to show that the Preamble is rightly seen as more than aspirational or wishful (or dangerous) thinking. The Preamble has instead served a number of legal purposes and has helped constitutional law stay responsive to major social changes and legal developments during the years since Jacobson. Comparative constitutional law also shows that preambles generally are treated as legally important in the jurisprudence of several countries. International legal experience shows that the terms in preambles are no broader or any less important than other important foundational terms in constitutions.

Part IV draws together several strands running through this article, pondering what constitutional law in the twenty-first century might look like if our overlooked Preamble were to be referenced more often for authoritative guidance. Possible legal functions for the Preamble will be sketched. It can serve well to clarify, interpret, define, limit, oblige, balance, unite, direct, motivate, persuade, guide, and legitimize any action of the federal government, and to provide the foundation for determining the scope of substantive rights established and secured by the Constitution as a whole.

Very different from the perception left by Jacobson, this view of the Preamble aligns with James Monroe’s 1788 publication calling the Preamble “the Key of the Constitution” and declaring, “[w]henever federal power is exercised, contrary to the spirit breathed by this introduction, it will be unconstitutionally exercised, and ought to be resisted by the people.”[9] Altogether, this Article encourages citizens, lawyers, officials, judges, scholars, diplomats, educators, and politicians throughout America to take the Preamble more seriously than it was taken in the twentieth century under the chilling effects of Jacobson. But before the Preamble can be used generally, its legal force and effects need to be recovered, remembered, and reinstated. For reference throughout this article, the words of the full text of the 1787 Preamble, with its parties, verbs, nouns, and adjectives, reads as follows:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

I.  The Preamble: From Inception to Jacobson

Any assessment of Jacobson’s dismissive claim that the Preamble has “never been regarded as the source of any substantive power”[10] needs to begin with an extensive examination of the textual and legal history of the Preamble. The fifty-two words of the Preamble formed the single constitutional shot that, in 1787, was heard ‘round the world. It could easily take fifty-two weeks, or maybe years, to unpack everything that the Preamble says, what it stands for, and how it has been used over the intervening years. The following pages strive to show that the Preamble was intended and understood to functionand that it did indeed function for its first centuryas an important principled statement of the specific legal purposes to be undertaken by the federal government.

A.  Beginnings of the Preamble in the Articles of Confederation

It is common knowledge that problems quickly arose under the Articles of Confederation during the final stages of the American struggle for independence from Great Britain. It is less known that significant terms of the Preamble were derived from the Articles as the Founders responded to those particular problems.

Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the colonies were governed by the “Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States.[11] Created on November 15, 1777 and signed in July of 1778, the Articles of Confederation were officially ratified by the colonies on March 1, 1781.[12] They served as the only governing document of the United States until the era of the Constitution began in 1787.[13] The Articles were intentionally weak in certain respects, but hoped to bind the colonies in what was termed a “firm league of friendship.”[14]

The Articles began nothing like the Preamble. Beginning with an opening salutation that declared that the Delegates had signed the following agreement, they then simply announced: “Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America in Congress assembled, did . . . agree to certain Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the states of . . .,” and then went on to name—twice—each of the thirteen states. But beyond its unimpressive “whereas” clause, the Articles of Confederation lacked a preamble. And yet, that governing document paved the way for the Preamble to the Constitution in two ways: in some of its wording and in several of its failings.

Article I of the Articles of Confederation gave the central government the name of “The United States of America,” the national title that would be retained in the Preamble to the Constitution.[15]

Article III set forth the three specific purposes for the league of confederation in serving its members and their citizens: “for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare . . . .[16] The confederation saw these purposes as setting mutually binding legal obligations (“binding themselves”) to the duty to, “assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.”[17] Several noticeable words in these obligating phrases in Article III were retained in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States.

While these provisions united the colonial states under a common name, they made it clear that each state retained its own status as a sovereign entity. In doing so, the Articles declared that the states retained each and every power beyond those purposes that were not “expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled,”[18] thus expressly limiting and curtailing the powers and functions of the central regime.

With respect to foreign relations, Article VI allowed the states to make treaties, develop navies, or engage in war, but only with “the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled.”[19] Articles VII and VIII likewise established the expectation that states raise their own armies, while any expenses “incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in Congress assembled,” were to be “defrayed out of a common treasury,” but that common pool was to be funded by the states in proportion to the total values of their lands and properties.[20] The words “common defense or general welfare” would be included, as a pair, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution, and also would be placed, with slight separation, in the Preamble.

Articles V, VI, VII, and IX established rules by which the central authorities would coordinate affairs between the states, laying out the central governing process, as well as prescribing policies and procedures for conducting foreign affairs and military matters.[21] Again, limitations and exceptions were stated. For example, Congress was given the power to be “the last resort on appeal” of all disputes between two or more states, so long as an elaborate procedure was followed for empaneling the court for hearing the matter and provided also that “no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States.”[22] Concerns were ever present to define, protect, and curtail grants of authority given to the central government.

While the Articles of Confederation provided for a loose bond between the states and although it was intended “that the Union shall be perpetual,”[23] too many necessary powers and ideals were missing to create a lasting form of government. Only ten years after it was drafted and six years after its 1781 ratification, the Constitutional Convention began with the deliberate purpose of revising and improving the document.[24] The need for this revision stemmed primarily from three overarching problems with the document.

First, the central government established by the Articles of Confederation lacked crucial components. For example, the Articles of Confederation did not establish a federal executive branch or a federal judicial branch,[25] as many state constitutions had already established state-level executive and judicial branches.[26]

Second, and relatedly, the central government under the Articles of Confederation was ill designed. The Congress established by the Articles of Confederation was ill equipped. The simple, single chamber Congress, with a one-vote-per-state design, did not account for the population differences amongst the states. Additionally, the super-majority requirement for passing any new legislation was too difficult to achieve and therefore stalled any legislation being considered in Congress. The Articles of Confederation did not give its Congress the ability to tax[27] nor the ability to regulate commerce. Therefore, when great debt befell the nation during and following the Revolutionary War, there were no mechanisms for the federal government to receive additional funds to pay down the debt.[28]

And third, the several states retained too much independence. While a level of federalism exists under the Constitution, the Articles allowed states to pursue independent foreign policies and trade and to establish their own separate monetary systems,[29] making it nearly impossible to centrally govern. It soon became clear that that the “firm league of friendship” between the states was insufficient to sustain a growing population and economy.

Although the Articles of Confederation had not distilled and brought together a salient statement of its foundational purposes and binding goals, its terminology included fundamental words such as “united,” “union,” “justice,” “common defense,” “general welfare,” “secure,” and “liberties.” The fact that these words were perpetuated from the body of the Articles of Confederation into the United States Constitution through the Preamble reinforces the view that the Preamble was not only an integral part of the Constitution, but also served valuable substantive legal purposes.

B.  The Preamble and the Constitutional Convention

The Constitutional Convention began in May of 1787 with the purpose of revising and amending the Articles of Confederation. The initially stated reason for the Convention was to “correct[] & enlarge[]” the Articles so as “to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely ‘common defense, security of liberty and general welfare.’”[30] Ultimately, the Convention did not merely alter and enlarge the Articles of Confederation but produced a significantly new frame and form of government.

While the Articles of Confederation would cease to be the governing document of the United States, several aspects of those Articles, and at times direct terms from that document, were included in the ratified version of the Constitution. One of the clearest of these borrowings is found in the Preamble. Article III of the Articles of Confederation had stated: “The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare.”[31] The heart of the Preamble to the Constitution similarly states that the Constitution is established to “provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare,” and “secure the blessings of liberty.”[32] While the Constitution laid out many more specifics and created a stronger central government, the core legal goals of the two documents are overlapping.

Very few statements in the records of the Constitutional Convention report on the actual drafting of the Preamble. The only substantive mention of the Preamble in the records of the Convention came in the assignment given to the Committee of Detail regarding their review of draft one. The Committee of Detail was created on July 24, 1787, and was charged “to prepare & report a Constitution conformable” to “the proceedings of the Convention.”[33] From July 26, 1787 to August 6, 1787, the Convention adjourned to provide the Committee of Detail time to draft the initial document.[34] The Committee of Detail was a five-member committee led by Chairman John Rutledge (South Carolina), Edmund Randolph (Virginia), Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), James Wilson (Pennsylvania), and Nathanial Gorham (Massachusetts).[35] On August 6, after the recess, the Committee of Detail reported their efforts, including a reading of their draft of the Preamble. That initial version of the Preamble proclaimed:

We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, RhodeIsland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, NewYork, NewJersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, NorthCarolina, SouthCarolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.[36]

This version of the preamble was not debated by delegates of the Convention and was unanimously accepted.[37]

An early Randolph draft reflects his thinking about preambles in general. He contrasted what he viewed as the purpose of state constitution preambles with the much more limited role that a preamble should play in the federal constitution. Regarding what a preamble should not be:

A preamble seems proper not for the purpose of designating the ends of government and human politics—This []business[] i[s] [probably] . . . fitter for the schools, . . . [and] howsoever proper in the first formation of state governments, . . . is unfit here; since we are not working on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights, modified by society, and . . . interwoven with what we call . . . the rights of statesNor yet is it proper for the purpose of mutually pledging the faith of the parties for the observance of the articlesThis may be done more solemnly at the close of the draught, as in the confederation. . . .[38]

“Political theory, in short, was not thought to be a proper concern of a preamble,”[39] and neither should be the solemnization of the adoption of duties. What, then, should the federal Constitution’s Preamble contain, according to Randolph? The Preamble to the federal Constitution should, he continued,

briefly . . . declare, that the present federal [sic] government is insufficient to the general happiness, [and] that the conviction of this fact gave birth to this convention; and that the only effectual (means) . . . which they (could) . . . devise for curing this insufficiency, is the establishment of a supreme legislative[,] executive[,] and judiciary.[40]

Except for the reading of the Preamble before the entire Convention, followed by its unanimous vote, Randolph’s suggestions are the only mention in the records of the Constitutional Convention concerning the purposes of preambles in general, let alone of the wording of the Preamble that was finally adopted. Remarkably, it was precisely the four roles of preambles which Randolph thought would be apropos to the new Constitution—namely to recite historical backgrounds, distressing problems, glaring previous inadequacies, and to make bold assertions of certitude about the solutions offered in the newly proposed document—that the Committee of Style, on September 10 or 11, 1787, apparently rejected as they drafted the Preamble.

While the Committee of Detail was responsible for drafting the initial preamble, the Preamble that was actually included with the Constitution during ratification was drafted by the Committee of Style, which was responsible for revising and finalizing the language of the Constitution.[41] The current Preamble was proposed by the Committee of Style on September 12, 1787.[42] To the pleasure of Randolph, and no doubt meeting the expectations of most of the delegates, its version did not exude a display of sophisticated theory; it did not attempt the Herculean task of balancing the rights of individuals with the rights of states; nor did it prescribe a formal pledge of faithfulness on behalf of those who would ratify the Constitution. Instead, it offered something different and original but at the same time familiar-sounding and readily embraceable.

The Committee of Style was led by Chairman William Johnson (Connecticut), with Alexander Hamilton (New York), Rufus King (Massachusetts), James Madison (Virginia), and Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylvania).[43] While all of these delegates had responsibilities in drafting portions of the Constitution, it is thought that Gouverneur Morris was responsible for drafting the new version of the Preamble.[44] As reported, it read:

WE the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.[45]

While this new version of the Preamble was neither objected to nor brought to a specific vote of the delegates,[46] after it was read, the word “to” was deleted from the clause “to establish justice,” and this version of the Preamble was included in the final document.

In drafting the Preamble, the Committee on Style was clearly influenced by several sources. All of these political, legal, and cultural sources strategically added needed power to the rhetorical voice of the Preamble. The Committee’s draft honored the concerns expressed in Morris’s and Randolph’s resolution, moved on May 30, 1787 that “a Union of the States merely federal []will not accomplish the objects proposed by the [A]rticles of Confederation, namely, common defence, security of liberty, [and] gen[eral] welfare.”[47]

In addition to retaining those three originally charged objectives, the Committee on Style was also influenced by the Declaration of Independence, in one important respect in particular.[48] Consistent with the root of authority asserted over the king in the Declaration of Independence, the Framers began the Preamble with the phrase “We the People.”[49] This idea of popular authority, as opposed to the authority of the colonies or their resultant states, was reinforced in the Declaration by the further assertions that governments must “deriv[e] their . . . powers from the consent of the governed,” and that they must secure “certain unalienable Rights . . . among [which] are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”[50] It is normally hypothesized that “We the People” was substituted in the final draft of the Preamble to take the place of the names of the thirteen states enumerated in the August 6 draft because it was unknown at that time which nine of the states would come forward first to ratify the document;[51] by saying simply “We the People,” there would be no need to later alter the document to reflect which states comprised the ratifiers. But more than that, to evoke these three powerfully enduring words from the Declaration that had emanated from Philadelphia eleven years earlier was a masterstroke of public relations and political genius.

The records of the Constitutional Convention give little further insight as to why the Preamble was reformulated by the Committee of Style at the very end of the Convention, though that was a natural time for someone to summarize the final work product of the Convention and to draw together the entire contents of the Constitution. The Preamble also satisfied those who wanted to be sure that the federal government would have authorization to achieve its specifically stated purposes, the task that prompted the formation of a Constitutional Convention. The Preamble also assured those who wanted to be certain that the federal government could not drift or wander beyond a limited set of specific duties and responsibilities. The Preamble harmoniously presented the Convention’s purposes and brought a unifying closure to its tedious debating and drafting processes.

C.  Drawing Strength from Public Voices: State Constitutions and Charters

Not pausing long to enjoy a sense of accomplishment, the writers of the Preamble and all of the members of the Convention were already looking ahead, with anxiety, to the next hurdle that the Constitution needed to face: ratification. Here again, frequent stylistic reference to previously used language would help to form, out of the dust of chaos and impending collapse, a more perfect union—a union of all the people, a unity of all their autonomous states, and a united operation of all the branches and departments of the federal government, all checked and balanced. The Preamble built upon the rhetorical voices of several previous foundations. It thereby saved face for those who had supported the Confederation by supportively reviving its three objectives: providing for the common defense; promising the security of liberty; and promoting the general welfare.[52] Speaking to those who wanted to be sure that the duties of state governments were reinforced, other words in the Preamble resonated consonantly with words in the preambles of state constitutions, striking some of the most highly cherished chords in the American political register. By drawing upon several reservoirs of popular rhetorical expressions, the Preamble rang true in the ears of its listening publics. Its vocabulary and cadence sounded familiar and reassuring.

Research has detected in the records of the Constitutional Convention certain phraseologies used by the delegates that may have spawned the need for the additional and revised Preamble language introduced by the Committee of Style. For example, Himmelfarb points to quotidian language that may have inspired the additions of “establish justice” and “ensure domestic tranquility.”[53] Early in the Convention, Roger Sherman, from Connecticut, had posited that the Union had but four objectives: to defend against foreign danger; to defend against internal disputes; to create treaties with foreign nations; and to regulate foreign commerce.[54] While James Madison had objected that Sherman’s list was not comprehensive enough, believing that the Union also had the responsibility to “provid[e] more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice,”[55] the Preamble eventually would nearly quote these and other commonplace propositions. Himmelfarb proposes that the words “ensure domestic tranquility” could stem from point two on Sherman’s list, “to defend against internal disputes.”[56] Likewise, delegate Edmund Randolph had expressed a similar sentiment when he pointed out that one of the main failings of the Articles of Confederation was the inability to regulate “quarrels between states.”[57]

But beyond these parallels coming out of the records of the Convention, additional language found in several of the states’ constitutions can also be suggested as having contributed to the wording of the Preamble. Some scholars, studying the language in the preamble that was added by the Committee of Style, have hypothesized that Gouverneur Morris may have been influenced by language from governing documents of his home state of Pennsylvania.[58] Indeed, the Constitution of Pennsylvania at that time spoke of “posterity” and “blessings of liberty.”[59]

Other state constitutions may have influenced the Preamble’s drafters. For example, the 1780 preamble of the Constitution of Massachusettsthe home state of committee member Rufus Kingfeatured words and phrases such as “to secure,” “safety and tranquility,” “the blessings of life,” “governed by certain laws for the common good,” “provide for,” “for ourselves and posterity,” and “ordain, and establish, the following Declaration of Rights, and Frame of Government, as the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.”[60]

And the opening section of the freshly redrafted 1786 Vermont Constitution advanced the “indispensable duty to establish such original principles of government as will best promote the general happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity, and provide for future improvements, without partiality,” and in order to accomplish such ends “do . . . ordain, declare and establish” that 1786 revision of the Green Mountain State’s Constitution.[61]

Other earlier colonial and state constitutions and their declarations of rights reveal yet further possible origins for key provisions of the Preamble. In the central states of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, declarations of rights spoke of preserving the “blessings of liberty.[62] Pennsylvania’s earlier 1776 constitutional preamble spoke of “promot[ing] the general happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity.[63] Several constitutions also spoke of rights designed to provide for the “common defence,”[64] as that word was commonly spelled in those days. The concept of justice and its importance to societal order was expressly repeated in multiple constitutions.[65]

While only the state of Massachusetts had used the word “preamble” at the beginning of its constitution, introductory “whereas” clauses had long been used in the legal drafting of land grants and organizational charters for the colonies.[66] Indeed, the introductory sections of several of the early state constitutions consisted exclusively of whereas clauses reciting the grievances that had led up to the separation of the colonies from England. These historical recitations often spoke of abuses and deprecations the colonists had suffered, but sometimes they expressed hope for a peaceful reconciliation of the conflict with Great Britain, their parent state.[67] It is particularly striking, therefore, that the drafters of the Constitution of the United States no longer saw any need to justify in its Preamble the existence of the United States, the peace with England having been agreed upon in the Treaty of Paris in 1781. It was also, of course, an option to begin the Constitution of the United States without a preamble or any other kind of preview or preface. No preamble or any set of whereas clauses was used in the 1777 Constitution of Delaware or in several bills of rights adopted by some of the states.

But introductory statements traditionally were used to set forth the purposes to be accomplished by public organic documents. Some of the very early colonial charters had mentioned at their outset certain goals to be achieved and duties to be fulfilled by the newly formed local government, articulating among other objectives the government’s duty to preserve “liberty,” “peace,” and “tranquility.”[68] Perpetuating that tradition, many of the constitutions of the newly formed states likewise articulated the objectives and purposes with which their state governments were charged to achieve.[69] Drawing upon the precedential force and effect of such statements, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States used language that was fairly similar to, if not the same as, the statements of purpose found in eight state constitutions. As a rule, these statements of purpose were set forth in state constitutions in order to recognize and define the constitutional duties of government.[70] They spoke inclusively—individually and collectively—of “the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular and America in general,”[71] as they sought to “secure the existence of the bodypolitic” as well as “to furnish the individuals who compose it” their “natural rights” and “blessings of life.”[72]

Also, like the Preamble, state constitutions, at their outset, often mentioned the authority by which the state government was being established. Some constitutions explicitly asserted that “all government of right originates from the people,” using various phrases to invoke the sovereign power of the people,[73] which would be the drafting choice preferred by the writers of the Preamble. Alternatively, many state constitutions traced their authority to the representatives duly elected to serve as delegates from the people.[74] One constitution, that of Massachusetts, went further to acknowledge “with grateful hearts, the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe, . . . imploring His direction,”[75] following an older form used in formative colonial documents to remember God as an ultimate source of authority.[76] Five states bolstered their legal position by tracing their legitimacy to the recommendation that had been issued by the Continental Congress.[77] Nothing in the way of prior historical problems or of remote imprimaturs was implied in the Preamble’s sole authorizing reference to “We the People.”

It was also common for charters, grants, and organic governing documents in the colonial period to speak of their intended open-ended legal duration. Sometimes the wording spoke of rights running to “posterity” in general,[78] but more often, this legal language was patterned after the common law wording of a fee simple absolute property right being alienable to heirs, assignees, and successors forever, inasmuch as the charters usually dealt with land grants.[79] But the state constitutions of Pennsylvania and Virginia set a new pattern in bestowing not just property but constitutional rights and privileges upon “the people . . . and their posterity,”[80] explicitly affirming “which rights do pertain to them and their posterity.”[81] The Preamble would prefer the phrase “the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity,” over other formulations, including a simple reference to futurity, as the Constitution of Georgia had done.[82]

Following long-standing drafting conventions, a variety of consensual or enactment clauses are found in about half of the state constitutions, which use words such as “do will,” “agree,” “ordain,” “declare,” “appoint,” “establish,” or “determine.”[83] Using even sparser, yet highly effectual wording, the Preamble simply set forth its creative purpose, namely to “form a more perfect union,” and to that end did “ordain and establish” the Constitution.

The fact that the Preamble generated rhetorical power and legitimizing strength through all of these legal associations with wordings and functions of organic colonial charters and state constitutions proves that more was being intentionally signaled and signified by the Preamble than an empty formality or mere procedural protocol.

D.  Evoking Authority from King James Vocabulary

It is also noteworthy that several of the words in the Preamble are congruent with biblical phraseology, for the King James language was a significant part of common American language of that day. Whether consciously or subconsciously, biblical elements added yet another voice of recognized authority and enduring reassurance to the overall brilliance of the Preamble. Without any doubt, religion and the Bible were strong factors that justified and emboldened the American colonists and revolutionaries.[84]

Numerous verbatim texts and express legal provisions in the Bible, especially in the authorized King James English, had found their ways into colonial statutes. Beginning with the adoption of the first Capital Laws in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641, such borrowings or adaptations persisted in the enactment of various colonial laws in the 1800s.[85] The Continental Congress was so deeply concerned with the morale and spiritual condition of its troops that, in 1777 and 1780, it supported the printing and importing of Bibles in order to provide them to civil and military officers, since it was trusted that “an unfailing antidote to immorality was Bible reading;” and in 1787, Congress asserted in the Northwest Ordinance that religion “was one of the principal elements ‘necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind.’”[86] Christian religious literature and values provided much of the ordinary pallet of colors from which the Preamble was painted.

Popular religion and political government occupied their separate spaces, but they often worked pragmatically together. Even Thomas Jefferson’s heavily weighted 1802 Danbury Letter likely did not see the wall of separation between church and state as a wall devoid of any interconnecting windows or doors. Jefferson’s draft of this letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut originally read “a wall of eternal separation between church and state,” before Jefferson crossed out the word “eternal.”[87] As Alexis de Tocqueville perceptively observed in 1835:

Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of it. . . . [T]hey hold [religion] to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions.[88]

Among the Founders who esteemed the Bible highly were John Adams, who said of the Bible: “It is the most Republican Book in the World;” and Benjamin Rush, who asserted: “All systems of religion, morals, and government not founded upon it must perish.”[89] Benjamin Franklin recommended, and Thomas Jefferson undertook, their own revisions of the Bible to bolster its contemporary comprehension and public esteem.[90] In one of his landmark studies of society and rhetoric in the early American republic, Harry Stout astutely concluded that while

the classical and Puritan rhetorical worlds had much in common, . . . [i]n the early years of the republic, these differences were largely inferential and philosophical—more matters of emphasis and priority than mutually exclusive categories. . . . The clergy oriented their speech and commentary around the vernacular Bible—read and internalized by most New England inhabitants for one and a half centuries. For most of the framers, the Bible stood to the side of political oratory as a more or less licit guest that could be brought in to legitimate truths that enlightened reason made clear. . . . The Bible supplied . . . metaphors and analogies, both religious and political.[91]

Understanding these cultural backgrounds sheds light on the meaning and power of the words and purposes set forth in the Preamblethe bold opening of the Constitution. While in some cases, wordings are no more than merely suggestive, the following examples show that being mindful of the force of the King James language behind several words in the Preamble brings to light an important dimension of rhetoric and meaning to this text that was intended, and needed, to be influential. From these words, the Preamble drew and evoked subtle signifiers of authority.

Consider the verb “to form,” in the directive “in order to form a more perfect union.” It is a strong, active term, grammatically in the infinitive mood, conveying connotations of shaping or creating something new, purposeful, and enduring. In the King James Version of Genesis, the word “form” stands prominently in the creation account: “the earth was without form . . .; God formed man . . .; God formed every . . . .”[92] Echoes of this creational term resonate, as a bookend, at the conclusion of the Torah in Deuteronomy: “that God formed;[93] and also in Isaiah, the leading book among the Hebrew prophets: “thou art my servant, I have formed thee, . . . I formed the light and created, . . . formed the earth, . . . formed me from the womb.”[94] In the Noah Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, the first of fourteen meanings for the verb “to form” is a “To make or cause to exist. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground. Gen. ii.”[95] In addition, the English translation of the Hebrew Bible speaks 121 times of Jehovah acting to “establish” his people: it was the “Lord that formed it to establish it.”[96] Again, the first of eight meanings given by Webster was “to set and fix firmly or unalterably; to settle permanently,” citing Genesis 17.[97] These well-known usages confer exalted authority upon “We, the People,” who now undertake to “form” and “establish” this new order of governance.

Also mentioned in formative biblical texts, but not as prominently, are other words. The word “justice” occurs thirty-eight times as an ideal of judgment, goodness, and happiness.[98] For example, it was known that Abraham would command his children and that they will “do justice and judgment,” and Deuteronomy admonished, “[t]hat which is altogether just thou shalt follow.”[99]

With the word “perfect,” Bible-literate early Americans would think readily of the New Testament’s invitation, “be ye therefore perfect,” even if in weakness,[100] and also of Paul’s directive that the purpose of ecclesiastical leaders was to serve their people to help them grow “unto the perfect man.”[101]

Beyond that, the Preamble’s phrase “more perfect” might seem like an oxymoron: how can there be degrees of perfection? The biblical idiom, however, allows the use of the comparative, in the sense of being closer to being more finished, or more worthy, as in “having more perfect knowledge,”[102]or “by a greater and more perfect tabernacle.”[103]

Union, or unity, was also a salient biblical ideal, in passages ranging from the Psalms, to the New Testament epistles, to the last words of Jesus: that the people might “dwell together in unity;”[104] “endeavouring to keep the unity . . . [t]ill we all come in the unity of the faith;”[105] “that they be made perfect in one.”[106] The word “union” had several connotations in American English, both political and ecclesiastical.[107]

Holding and using collected resources in “common” for the community was a virtuous ideal of the new followers of Jesus in the book of Acts.[108] The word was widely used in early American law and society, including common law, courts of common pleas, common recovery, and common appendant, as well as common prayer.

The desire to obtain and insure “blessings” notably evoked the language of Genesis, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, in which numerous references can be found to the stipulation that the blessings of peace and prosperity will follow orderliness, while catastrophes follow lawlessness.[109] Religious uses of the words “bless” and “blessing” are copious and predominant.[110]

The word “ordain,” to any eighteenth-century ear, might have reminded people of an obscure statement in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline: “Mulmutius[,] [the legendary first English king,] . . . ordained our laws. Mulmutius made our laws.”[111] But this word might have most readily called to mind the more familiar meanings of ordaining of ministers with sacerdotal power by those in authority,[112] or certain biblical passages affirming that a law could be ordained by God legitimately through Joseph in Egypt,[113] and that God will “ordain peace for us.”[114]

With the word “posterity” appearing nine times in all three biblical groupings of textsthe law, the prophets, and the writings[115]initial hearers of the solemn language of the Preamble might well have thought of the blessings promised to Abraham of “seed” (posterity) as numerous as the sands of the sea.[116]

Regarding the blessings of “liberty,” the top line of the inscription on the Liberty Bell, which hung in and rang out from Independence Hall, the building in which the Constitutional Convention was held, reads, “Proclaim Liberty throughout the Land unto All the Inhabitants thereof. Lev. XXV X.[117] This banner originates from the introduction of the jubilee law found in Leviticus 25:10. That compelling biblical ideal of beginning anew every fifty years held out promises to the poor of debt forgiveness, release from slavery and servitude, rights of redemption of family lands that had been sold under duress, relief for the oppressed, and, in short, care for the general welfare.[118]

These words used in the Preamble were obviously not found exclusively in the Bible, but some of these wordings were more distinctively biblical than others. And in addition, even the more generic words augmented the general biblicisms standing behind the Preamble. This is not to suggest that the Founders were making intentional allusions to specific passages of the Bible, but rather were writing in a particular dialect or style, with formalistic cadences and structure that conveyed moral and sacred implications,[119] which reinforced political applications. Working together, whether consciously or subliminally, they evoked traditional or even divine sources of approval for the adoption of the new Constitution as a whole. They imbued it with an aura of solemnity.

The need for such overarching authority was critical for multiple reasons. This authoritative register stood in place of the unifying authority previously provided by the existence of the monarchy, and it reassured the colonists, calming the anguish of treason and of post-war traumatic stresses. The new Constitution was not to be seen as a revision of the old Articles of Confederation. As George Washington said in his call for the Constitutional Convention, “all attempts to alter or amend” would not solve the problems, “like the propping of a house which is ready to fall.”[120] Concisely stated, “[w]hat was needed was replacement,”[121] and in an atmosphere when the very legality of such an effort was in question, what that replacement crucially needed was the rhetorical reinforcement and ethical footing that the Preamble alone provided.

How each of the words and phrases in the Preamble were fully understood in the United States at this time remains a question for much more research. A “corpus linguistics” analysis of the usages of each of the Preamble’s words—biblical or ordinary, before and after 1787—has already begun, pointing to the several rhetorical modes and contexts in which these words most commonly appeared, and is discussed below.[122] That information, together with further examination, provides further understanding of the general meanings and specific usages of these words in common public discourse in the early American Republic. But for present purposes, the Preamble’s biblical voice adds strength and context to the choir of legal purposes that the Preamble and the Constitution were intended to serve.

E.  The Preamble and its Eighteenth-Century Understanding of Rights

While it exceeds the scope of this Article to retrace the origins of “rights” in Roman and western thought, a brief summary of the intellectual history of rights shows how they were conceived in 1787 (and as recently as shortly before the mid-twentieth century) not as privileges but as “moral powers.”[123] As is skillfully documented by James Hutson, Director of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, “the current presumption that the idea of a right was an unchanging feature of American society ‘from the beginning’ conflicts with evidence that, at the dawn of American history, a ‘modern’ understanding of rights was absent or, at best, inchoate.”[124]

Rights, as understood in Roman law, entitled people to their “just share” of society’s “benefits and burdens,” and rights (jura) conferred benefits but at the same time burdens and obligations to create “a just and harmonious order.”[125] Understood this way, rights were “objective” and naturally imposed duties, both to be proactive and preventative. Rights thus came to be seen as powers, most famously in Ockham’s persuasive arguments on behalf of the Franciscans that the Pope’s plan for them to have rights over property, which they did not want, stood just as contrary to the Franciscan the vow of poverty as did possessing the property itself. But with this development, rights shifted from being “objective” to being “subjective”; that is, not referring to some “share of an external object,” but as a “power inherent in an individual.”[126] And, being “conferred upon man” by his Creator, subjective rights carried with them not only the old notions of burdens and duties but also were “grounded in religion” in general and “on Christian morality” in specific.[127]

In the ensuing centuries, philosophical and legal developments elaborated the contours of subjective rights, until in eighteenth-century America, John Locke, following Grotius, derived all “rights from duties.”[128] John Dunn “stressed that Locke’s concept of rights must be understood in the context of his religious belief,” and asserted “all the rights humans have . . . derive from, depend upon and are rigidly constrained by a framework of objective duty, [which constitutes] God’s requirement for human agents.”[129] So understood, subjective rights were necessary to perform the duties that God, nature, or society had imposed upon them. “A right, therefore, in the new United States meant, in its fullest sense, power inherent in and owned by an individual to act in a way consistent with Christian morality.”[130] In the words of Vattel, a right was “nothing more than the power of doing what is morally possible.”[131] It was in this sense that rights were axiomatic for the founding generation of the Constitution.

Responding to Rousseau’s claim that Americans had invented the science of rights, John Adams argued they had simply “found it in their religion.”[132] Whether this clever statement of Adams represents a majority or minority view among the Founders or not, it is clear that the popular view of the science of subjective rights as based on duties—the view which prevailed in Adams’ day—has been largely forgotten since the middle of the twentieth century.

By losing that bearing, American jurisprudence has also lost touch with the eighteenth-century communitarian foundations and civic functions of the Preamble, for it is in the Preamble that particular duties of the people, which are delegated to their representative governments, are to be found. Those duties are the purposes obligingly undertaken by all, “We the People,” in recognition of the powers given to each to do what is possible to form a more perfectly united nation, to establish social justice, to ensure collective tranquility, to provide cooperatively for the common defense, to promote and facilitate the well-being of the nation, and to permanently secure and maintain the blessings of liberty for themselves and also for generations to come.

These duties, which would have been seen as necessarily latent in the language of the Preamble, are detected especially through the lens of its biblical and moral terminology. In the eighteenth-century view, the Preamble—a bill of duties—is, of logical necessity, the origin of the subjective rights bestowed upon each subject. Concurrently, constitutionally granted powers—that is, rights, privileges, and protections—also reciprocally include the enumeration of conditions and abilities needed to accomplish the attendant moral obligations.

F.  The Legal Import of Statutory Preambles in the Common Law

Recognizing the cognate texts in the history of deliberations over the Constitution, in the preambles of state constitutions, and in the solemn language of faithful commitment that prevailed in the shared rhetoric of the early American Republic is just the beginning in the quest to unpack, deconstruct, or reconstruct, for legal purposes, the meanings of the words and phrases in the Preamble. To gain yet another sense of the Preamble’s possible intended legal effects, the following section adds one more consideration, namely, how statutory preambles were legally understood in eighteenth century English law.

The Constitution is not the only legal document to begin with a purpose statement. Many statutes have preambles that establish the goals and purposes of the legislation. These preambles have long been given authoritative weight in construing statutes and, more particularly, when resolving statutory ambiguities. Specifically, around the time of the Ratification, courts regularly turned to statutory preambles to better understand and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Thus, ignoring the Constitution’s Preamble would be a significant departure from the original methods of interpreting public law as would have been understood by the Framers and the delegates in the state ratification conventions.

Much of our understanding of the interpretive enterprise is derived from English law traditions. Leading up to the American Revolution, colonial law was largely a product of English law principles.[133] One such principle was that statutory preambles ought to be given at least some weight when making sense of laws. For pre-colonial English courts, preambles provided a window to the legislature’s intent, in turn allowing courts to interpret the law in a manner that addressed the evils the law sought to remedy.[134] Leading legal commentators of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries captured this principle of interpretation in their writings. Thomas Hobbes advised lawmakers to concisely state “why the Law was made,” for “the Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator.”[135] Edward Coke likewise stated that preambles are a “good mean to find out the meaning of the statute” and “key” to having an open understanding of the law.[136] Likewise, William Blackstone wrote that, “the proem, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament.”[137]

This interpretive rule generally persisted throughout the eighteenth century[138] and found its way into American courts.[139] However, at the time when the Constitution was being ratified, the general rule was tempered. One of the parties in Paca’s Lessee v. Forwood articulated this principle in 1787 in terms of the then well-established rule of statutory interpretation:

Though it is true, as a general rule, that the preamble of a statute is the key to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are intended to be remedied by the statute, yet this rule must not be carried so far as to restrain the general words of the enacting clause by the particular words of the preamble.[140]

In 1790, in Hubley’s Lessee v. White, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that although a statutory preamble should be given “considerable weight in discovering [the statute’s] meaning,” the preamble cannot “control the clear and positive words of the enacting part.”[141] “[I]t may [only] explain them if ambiguous.”[142]

Thus, preambles in the eighteenth century played a valuable role in statutory interpretation. To ignore the preamble to any legal document of that day, let alone any state or national constitution, is to turn one’s back on an original method of interpreting legal texts. To trace next how the Constitution’s Preamble was actually understood and received by its first essential audience—the delegates at the state ratifying conventions—it is helpful to review the ratification debates amongst the states and consider what role or roles they envisioned the Preamble playing.

G.  The Preamble in the State Ratification Process

The public ratification process began in earnest when the Constitution was first presented to the American people in the Philadelphia newspaper, Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser, on September 19, 1787.[143] It was front-page news. The Preamble was set conspicuously in very large font, while the rest of the Constitution was the fine print.[144] Within weeks, the Constitution was printed as a sixteenpage pamphlet, again with the Preamble prominently typeset as the title page, followed by the text of the Constitution’s body set in smaller, regular type.[145] Thus, from the beginning, the public perception of the Constitution was captured by the Preamble; it boldly epitomized what the Constitution promised to deliver. Accordingly, one might well wonder: was it the Preamble, more than anything else, that finally tipped the voters’ scales and secured the successful adoption of the Constitution?

Recognizing that the Preamble might bear great sway, some opponents attacked it. Wisely, most proponents simply let the Preamble speak for itself, and thus little was said about the Preamble in the ratification process in the various states. Nevertheless, through those occasional debates, one can learn more about how the Foundersboth Federalists and Anti-Federalistsviewed the Preamble. The arguments in favor of or against the Preamble in the state ratification conventions were consistently based on the same concerns. The broad, sweeping language of the Preamble was a cause for concern with many Anti-Federalists. Worried that the expansive language gave virtually unchecked and unlimited power to the federal government, some Anti-Federalists feared the central government would absorb the states.

Brutus, the pen name for a well-known Anti-Federalist, wrote: “This constitution gives sufficient colour for adopting a[] [broad] construction, if we consider the great end and design it professedly has in view—these appear [in] its preamble . . . . The design of this system is here expressed, and it is proper to give such a meaning to the various parts, as will best promote the accomplishment of the end.”[146] He later repeated his fear of the over-breadth of the Preamble: “If the end of the government is to be learned from [the Preamble’s] words, which are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which is embraced by any government . . . .”[147]

Another opponent of Ratification, Maryland delegate Luther Martin, argued a year after the Constitution was signed that the Preamble sought to obliterate state governments:

As altered, every appearance of the existing governments, under their respective Constitutions, is relinquished, the very names struck out, general purposes and powers given extending to every purpose of the social compact, and then this Constitution including all these purposes, is made the Constitution of the United States, without any reserve of the several States or their Constitutions then existing; and then this Constitution enacted for these unlimited purposes, we afterwards find is expressly declared paramount to all Constitutions, and laws existing in the States.[148]

Proponents of the Preamble often allowed the document to speak for itself, but at times pointed out the clear role the Constitution outlines for States. Specifically, they argued that the Preamble actually serves as a restraint, limiting the exercise of the Constitution’s enumerated powers and thus preserving state powers and individual rights. James Madison, a strong Federalist and often considered the “Father of the Constitution,” authored a direct response to these Anti-Federalist arguments in Federalist No. 41.

It has been urged and echoed that the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,” amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. . . . Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.[149]

Madison argued that the broad language of the Preamble (along with other broad language in the Constitution) is not as sweeping as Anti-Federalists contended it was; the Preamble’s language is narrowed (but not necessarily eliminated) by the specific enumerations of powers and the more specific uses of Preamble language later in the Constitution. He had previously made a similar argument in a letter written to Robert S. Garnett:

The general terms or phrases used in the introductory propositions, and now a source of so much constructive ingenuity, were never meant to be inserted in their loose form in the text of the Constitution. Like resolutions preliminary to legal enactments it was understood by all, that they were to be reduced, by proper limitations and specifications . . . .[150]

Supporting and adding to Madison’s writings, Alexander Hamilton stressed that the Preamble does not abrogate the people’s retention of their individual rights.

[T]he people surrender nothing, and as they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations. “[W]e the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.” Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.[151]

Considering isolated discussions surrounding the Preamble that occurred during the Ratification process provides some sense of how various Founders interpreted its language. But this information does not provide any concrete answers to the legal weight carried by the Preamble. While Anti-Federalist’s clearly were concerned that the Preamble had great legal weight sufficient to expand the federal government’s size, the Federalists seemed to view the Preamble as a purpose statement, limited by the enumerated powers within the Articles of the Constitution, without legal force on its own—except, as one might additionally argue, to restrict the areas of power granted by the Constitution so as to include only the particular objectives and duties undertaken in the Preamble and no more.

In addition to the foregoing statements from national figureheads, the records of seven of the state ratifying conventions provide insights into how people at the time envisioned the Preamble being used.[152] Based on our review of the state constitutional ratification conventions, it does not appear that the Preamble was necessarily the center of debate. Its “We the people” opening aside, the details of the Preamble’s language were not contested. Rather, the Preamble was a source of various arguments with regards to (1) principles of federalism and (2) questions as to whether a bill of rights was a necessary appendage to the Constitution.

Pennsylvania. On Wednesday, November 28, 1787, the Pennsylvania Convention took up the lively topic of the Preamble.[153] James Wilson opened the debate by stressing the Preamble’s empowerment of the people. It is “the People,” that “ordain and establish” the Constitution. Because the Constitution derives its power from the people, the people explicitly have the power to amend and implicitly have the right to repeal and annul.[154] Mr. Wilson hoped that this implied power would “give ease to the minds of some, who ha[d] heard much concerning the necessity of a bill of rights.”[155]

In response to Mr. Wilson’s comments, John Smilie addressed the convention and declared the Preamble to be an inadequate substitute for an express bill of rights. Mr. Smilie contrasted the simple language of the Preamble with the grand declarations of equality and liberty permeating the Magna Charta and the Declaration of Independence.[156] To secure the people’s rights, Mr. Smilie believed a bill of rights was necessary.[157]

Robert Whitehill joined Mr. Smilie in his criticism of the Preamble, but expanded the critique and raised concerns about creating a strong, centralized government. “‘We the people of the United States’ is a sentence that evidently shows the old foundation of the Union is destroyed, the principle of confederation excluded, and a new unwieldy system of consolidated empire is set up upon the ruins of the present compact between the states.”[158] Mr. Whitehill was seriously concerned that the Preamble abolished the independence and sovereignty of the states. And if the states were going to surrender such power, a bill of rights was necessary.[159]

Connecticut. The Preamble was rarely mentioned during Connecticut’s ratification debates. One of the lone, significant mentions of the Preamble came from an anonymous letter purportedly written in reply to a letter from a New Haven correspondent.[160] The letter spoke of positively of the Preamble’s high aspirations as proper aims of government and goals that would eventually be achieved, thanks to the framework established by the Constitution.[161] It expressed confidence that the guiding purposes set forth in the Preamble would be achieved: “[B]y a wise administration under [the Constitution], it will do all that a wise and good form of government can do. It will by degrees, and in due time, answer all the purposes expressed in the Preamble . . . .”[162]

Massachusetts. The day after the convention was seated, “Samuel,” an author writing in the Independent Chronicle, echoed a concern emanating from other state ratification debates, namely that the “We the People” language of the Preamble was “expressly repugnant to the confederation.”[163] He argued that the choice to use the phrase “We the People” instead of the specific states cast the citizen’s allegiance to the federal government over their own states.[164]

The Republican Federalist, at the end of the second week, expressed similar concerns to Samuel regarding the loss of state identity. He interpreted the “We the People” language to mean: “[we] do effectually put an end in America, to governments founded in compact—do relinquish that security for life, liberty, and property, which we had in the Constitutions of these states and of the Union—do give up governments which we well understood, for a new system which we have no idea of.”[165]

In the last week of the convention, Mr. Dench went so far to argue that the Preamble would result in an “actual consolidation of the States—and that, if he was not mistaken, the moment it took place, a dissolution of the State governments will also take place.”[166] General Brooks, in response, suggested that the fears shared by Mr. Dench were ill-founded. First, “the Congress under this Constitution cannot be organized without repeated acts of the legislatures of the several states—and therefore, if the creating power is dissolved, the body to be created cannot exist.”[167] Second, “it is impossible the general government can exist, unless the governments of the several States are for ever existing, as the qualifications of the electors of federal representatives are to be the same as those to the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”[168] Apparently satisfied both overall and that the operation of the Preamble would not threaten the existence of the states, about ten delegates decided to change their votes, and the motion to ratify finally carried on February 6, 1788, by a vote of 187 to 168.[169]

Maryland. In Baltimore, a similar frustration was expressed in the Baltimore Maryland Gazette over the revised Preamble that had emerged at the very end of the Constitutional Convention.[170] Whereas the original Preamble had listed the states individually, the revised Preamble began with “We the People.” For some, that revision threatened the very existence of state governments.[171] Nevertheless, not enough delegates saw this as a problem, and on April 28, 1788, Maryland became the seventh state to ratify the Constitution.

New Hampshire. Writing under the pen name of “Afredus,” Samuel Tenney defended the lack of a bill of rights in the Constitution in part by referring to the language of the Preamble.[172] Responding to “A Farmer,” Afredus reassured readers that the powers of the federal government are limited by the purposes of the Preamble. “To prevent any interference between the federal and state governments, the objects of the former are pointed out in the preamble to the Constitution.”[173] The Constitution’s enumerated powers exist for the “accomplishment of [the Preamble’s] purposes.”[174] And “every thing not expressly given up is retained by the states.”[175]

Virginia. Perhaps the most significant comment about the Preamble coming out of the ratification debates in Virginia, which met in June 1788, was in a publication circulated by James Monroe in which he famously called the Preamble “the key of the Constitution.”[176] When this Convention began, only eight states had ratified the Constitution, one short of the required nine.

As a moderate Anti-Federalist, Monroe published two lengthy explanations of the newly proposed Constitution in 1788.[177] Styling himself “a native of Virginia,” where individual and state rights were highly esteemed, he was concerned about granting the federal government too much power. His first pamphlet began by justifying, historically and legally, why the Constitution did not have, and should not have, a written bill of rights: In 1776, the American people needed no bill of rights “to choose the form [of government] most agreeable to themselves. . . . [S]uch [a] declaration [of rights] tends to abridge, rather than preserve their liberties.” Instead, his reasoning went on to assure: “[I]n all disputes respecting the exercise of power, the Constitution or frame of government decides. If the right is given up by the Constitution, the governors exercise it; if not, the people retain it.”[178]

In this context, Monroe proceeded to give observations about each part of “The Plan of the Federal Constitution.” For him, that plan began with and necessarily included the Preamble. After quoting it in full, Monroe commented: “The introduction, like a preamble to a law, is the key of the Constitution. Whenever federal power is exercised, contrary to the spirit breathed by this introduction, it will be unconstitutionally exercised, and ought to be resisted by the people.”[179] From his guarded perspective, Monroe saw the Preamble as vitally and substantively limiting the exercise of power by the federal government, preserving all the rights of the people not “given up” by them to the federal government. As a key, he would have understood the Preamble as properly and purposefully aligning all the pins, latches, bars, levers, and moving parts inside the lock mechanism, so that the bolt would slide open or closed, either allowing proper passage or protecting against unwarranted entry. Reassuring arguments such as these no doubt helped tip the scale in the close eighty-nine to seventy-nine vote by the Virginia Convention in favor of ratification.

New York. Speeches in the New York ratification conventions mentioned the Preamble many times. A customer of the New York Journal expressed the concern that Congress had the power to make amendments to the Constitution without requiring them to get approval of the people because of the language of the Preamble.[180]

An author of a letter published in the New York Journal believed that the “We the People” language was a mockery to the members of the several states. Citing John Locke, he wrote that “sovereignty consists in three thingsthe legislative, executive, and negotiating powers, all of which your constitution takes absolutely away from the several states.”[181] This concern was shared by many citizens of New York.[182]

Some expressed concern that the Preamble’s general purposes were overly broad and would serve to empower the federal government. Writing under the pseudonym Brutus VI, a citizen of New York wrote:

I would ask . . . to define what ideas are included under the terms, to provide for the common defence and the general welfare? Are these terms definite, and will they be understood in the same manner, and to apply to the same cases by everyone? No one will pretend they will. It will then be a matter of opinion, what tends to the general welfare; and the Congress will be the only judges in the matter.[183]

George Clinton, in advocating against ratification, summarized what many of New York’s citizens felt about the power the Preamble gave to the federal government.

The objects of this government as expressed in the preface to it, are to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty”—These include every object for which government was established amongst men . . . .[184]

In short, some citizens of New York did not see the Preamble as vacuous, but instead were concerned that the Preamble gave the federal government too much power. Notwithstanding these concerns, New York ratified the Constitution on July 26, 1788.

Rhode Island. On May 29, 1790, Rhode Island became the last state to ratify. Debates were carried on in newspapers as well as in meetings. On March 3, 1790, General Joseph Stanton raised the issue of slavery and argued that the practice was incompatible with the noble aims of the Preamble. He could not “but observe what a Beautiful Introduction the Constitution commences with.”[185] In light of that language, “Why in the Name of Common [Sense] should not this Liberty [spoken of in the Preamble] be extended to the Africans?”[186] Others were less convinced that the Preamble compelled abolition of slavery. As Mr. G. Hazard stated, “[i]f we totally abolish Slavery it will Ruin many persons.”[187] Given society’s current structures, it was not “possible to effect the Full Abolition of Slavery.”[188] Yet no one argued that the Preamble’s praiseworthy aims were compatible with slavery.

In the Newport Herald, A. Freeman explained why the Preamble was a necessary part of the Constitution. The years leading up to the Constitutional Convention were marked by “confusion and disorder . . . in several States” marred by “jealousy and suspicion” and lacking unanimity.[189] “[T]his feebleness and incompetency” attributed to the “great and rapid decline of trade and commerce, and those consequential distresses which are deeply felt throughout the United States.”[190] In light of this “melancholy situation,” it was the duty of the state legislatures to frame a “government calculated with the express design[s]” mentioned in the Preamble.[191] For Mr. Freeman, the Preamble—fraught with . . . benevolent and noble ideas”—provided reassurance that the union could succeed.[192]

Though the ratification debates do not reveal exactly what meaning early Americans assigned the Preamble, one things is clear: everyone presumed that whatever the Preamble was deemed to mean, it meant something significant. The Anti-Federalists could only have viewed the Preamble as a threat if they, and all others, saw it as functioning in some way to define the powers granted under the Constitution more broadly than those powers would otherwise have been understood. And no one answering the concerns of the Anti-Federalists ever suggested that the Preamble was not a threat because it was not a part of the Constitution, or that it bestowed no power, or that it could serve no purpose other than to resolve patent ambiguities. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists debated the Preamble not because it was meaningless, but precisely because it was a relevant and key part of the Constitution.

Thus, as the nation approached the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Constitution had been ratified and was functioning. It had enjoyed George Washington’s illustrious presidency, and it had proudly resisted the extremisms that had led France into the Reign of Terror and had ushered in Napoleon to the throne. But serious challenges still stood ahead for the Constitution in the nineteenth century, including its near collapse in the Civil War (1861–1865). Through all these decades, the Preamble was regarded by federal courts and political actors as a source of strength, purpose, and legal guidance.

H.  The Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments

Very little has been said regarding the relationship between the Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (ratified in 1791). But the concerns giving rise to these Amendments were already raised in the ratification debates.[193] Under the Ninth Amendment, “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,” is not to be “construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,”[194] as Monroe had worried that any bill of rights would tend to do. In other words, the Ninth Amendment seeks to protect rights of the people from being narrowed by the specific enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution. That protected breadth should be potentially discoverable in several places: natural rights; state constitutions; state laws; or anywhere else, including the words of the Preamble. The federal government may choose to recognize or respect those rights, but may not deny or disparage them, even if they are not mentioned in connection with the enumeration of powers granted under the Articles of the Constitution.

In the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”[195] This language tracks Monroe’s assurance that the spirit breathed by the Preamble would respect the reservation of undelegated powers. Conspicuously in this regard, the Articles of Confederation had provided that each state retained “every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States.”[196] Without the word “expressly,” the Tenth Amendment allows that there may be implied powers—powers not expressly delegated—that have not been reserved exclusively to the states or the people.[197] Thus, as Justice Story argued in 1833, by removing the word “expressly” from this reservation clause, the Tenth Amendment apparently intended to leave room for implied powers:

The attempts, then, which have been made from time to time, to force upon this language [of the Tenth Amendment] an abridging, or restrictive influence [on the powers delegated to the federal government] are utterly unfounded. . . . Stripped of the ingenious disguises in which they are clothed, they are neither more nor less, than attempts to foist into the text the word expressly, to qualify what is general, and obscure what is clear, and defined.[198]

When this amendment was debated before Congress,

it was remarked, that it is impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express powers. There must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the Constitution descended to the most minute details. . . . [I]t could not have been the intention of the framers of this amendment to give it effect as an abridgment of any of the powers granted under the Constitution, whether they are express or implied, direct or incidental.[199]

Not only does this reading make the Tenth Amendment more than a mere tautology—that which is delegated is delegated—but it also allows more breathing room for the Preamble in constitutional theory. Things may always be implied from the enumerated powers themselves, as may be reasonable, necessary, and proper. But, a fortiori, why should necessary incidental powers and reasonably defining purposes not be implied, just as well, from the words of the Preamble?

In addition, the Preamble (as a part of the Constitution) can also be said to have delegated to the United States as a whole—and not just to one of its branches—certain powers, objectives and purposes. In assigning or delegating the accomplishment of those six purposes, the Preamble is directly a part of what the Tenth Amendment had in mind. Might it then also be said that the Preamble, by not including other things in its six “in order to” phrases, actually speaks—by being silently omitted—to the identification of which powers and purposes “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” namely any that go beyond the six explicitly stated?

This reading gives the Tenth Amendment more meaning and content than simply stating the obvious. The Tenth Amendment (being the last of the original Bill of Rights) can thus be understood as referring back to the entire Constitution, to the very beginning of its whole plan and frame. With the Preamble at least partially in mind, the Tenth Amendment protectively says, in effect, that any other general purposes not so named and thus delegated to the federal government by the Preamble are reserved to the states or are left to “We the People.” The Preamble, together with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, strikes a unifying balance, neither giving too much power to the federal government nor redirecting too much power back to the people.[200] Connor Ewing has so argued, likewise seeing the Preamble as plausibly serving as a “level-one” constraint on the Tenth Amendment: “An argument to this effect would hold that the Preamble articulates the ends for which the national government was established and, as such, should guide the interpretation of national powers vis-à-vis state powers,”[201] not necessarily as distinct sovereignties but as a union in which the states and the federal government are integral and vital parts of either other.[202]

I.  Corpus Linguistics of Early American English in the Preamble

To understand the Preamble historically, it is essential to investigate the original meanings and uses attached to its words in everyday language. What role historical linguistic analysis should play today regarding the interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions is currently debated, but modern judges and lawmakers cannot know how far they have departed or deviated, for better or worse, from the original meanings and purposes of the Constitution until they know as much as possible about the breadth or specificity of the Framers’ intentions to begin with.

Even among originalist scholars, there is a disagreement about the appropriate methodology and theoretical framework that should be employed to discover the meaning of the Constitution. “Original intentions” originalists look to the Founding Fathers, believing that the meaning of the text is “fixed by the intentions of the framers of the text.”[203] These scholars view statements and commentaries about the Constitution by people such as George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison―found in sources such as the Federalist Papers and the minutes of the Constitutional Convention―as authoritative. By contrast, “New Originalists” give priority to the original public meaning of the text, which was “necessarily determined in large part by the conventional semantic meanings of the words and phrases that make up the text and the regularities of usage that are sometimes summarized as rules of grammar and syntax,” over the views of any particular Founder.[204] John McGinnis and Mike Rappaport have also advanced a variation of this approach known as “original methods” originalism, arguing that, as a legal document, the Constitution was written in the “dialect” of eighteenth-century law. In this view, meanings should only be interpreted using the canons of construction typically employed by judges and legal practitioners of the time period.[205]

Each of these originalist methodologies necessarily rely on what Larry Solum calls the “fixation thesis”―the assumption that “the communicative content of the constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified.”[206] As such, each assumes that “[a]ny attempt to give legal meaning to the words of the [Constitution] begins with the linguistic meaning. . . . If the communicative content of the law is clear we give that content controlling legal significance.”[207] But the would-be interpreter faces a conundrum: the English language has changed over time. How are modern outsiders unfamiliar with many aspects of eighteenth-century English to discover original linguistic meanings?

“This is the problem of linguistic drift―the notion that language usage and meaning shifts over time.”[208] Sometimes these changes can be quite dramatic and occur for no apparent reason.[209] Consider the following (possibly apocryphal) account of the rebuilding of St. Paul’s Cathedral in 1675, taken from a linguistics column published during the early twentieth century:

When architects’ drawings for the rebuilding of St. Paul’s Cathedral after the fire were submitted, Sir Christopher Wren was told that his design had been chosen because it was “at the same time the most awful and the most artificial.” A modern architect would hardly think such a verdict complimentary. Far from being disparagement, it was the highest praise. “Awful” correctly meant inspiring awe, and “artificial” designed with art.[210]

Such shifts can―and have―occur with words and phrases contained in the Constitution. For example, Article IV, Section 4 states that “[t]he United States . . . shall protect each of [the states] . . . against domestic violence.”[211] At the time of the founding, “domestic violence” referred to local civil unrest and public upheaval rather than the abuse of one’s spouse or children as it does today.[212] Not all such shifts are as obvious to the modern reader. For example, while the Supreme Court has limited the phrase “Officers of the United States” in Article II, Section 2 to only those “appointees who wield ‘significant authority,’” it is likely that in “the Founding era, the term ‘officer’ commonly was understood to encompass any individual who had ongoing responsibility for a government duty.”[213]

Because the emerging field of corpus linguistics can help mitigate the problems associated with linguistic drift, this Section will briefly describe the science of corpus linguistics and set out parameters that make it useful in understanding the Preamble for present purposes. A “corpus” is a vast electronic collection of texts that provides searchable, representative samples of speech and writing patterns within a particular community during a particular period of time. These texts are said to occur “naturally” because they “were not elicited for the purpose of study. . . . Instead the architect of the corpus assembles her collection of speech and writing samples after the fact, from newspapers, books, transcripts of conversations, or interviews, etc.”[214]

These electronic databases (or “corpora”) can be searched the same way one might use Google or Westlaw, producing contextualized examples of real-world uses―called concordance lines―of any word or phrase that appears in the corpus. By analyzing these concordance lines,[215] the user can generate an empirical snapshot of how the queried term was actually used during the time period in question.

Over the last few years, some judges have cautiously begun applying corpus linguistic tools and techniques to issues of statutory interpretation. For example, in 2011 Justice Ginsburg cited corpus data (provided to the Court in an amicus brief submitted by the Project on Government Oversight) during oral arguments for FCC v. AT&T, Inc.[216] The case boiled down to whether the word “personal” as used in the Freedom of Information Act was “merely the ‘adjectival form’ of the noun person” so that the phrase “personal privacy” encompassed corporate privacy.[217] While the opinion did not cite corpus linguistics directly, its reasoning largely tracked the amicus brief, which did.[218] The following year, Judge Posner used Google to perform a corpus-like analysis to discern the ordinary meaning of the word “harbor” as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a).[219] Although his methodology was flawed, his desire to seek empirical data to inform his ordinary meaning analysis mirrored the concerns raised by law and corpus linguistics advocates.[220]

Justice Thomas Rex Lee of the Utah Supreme Court became the first judge in the country to actually use corpus linguistics in an opinion.[221] Since then, a number of other state supreme court justices have followed suit.[222] But all of these cases concerned the interpretation of modern statutes. They therefore relied on corpora built from modern source material that would be unhelpful for constitutional analysis.

Until recently, no nineteenth-century American English corpus existed. In late 2017, Brigham Young University (“BYU”) J. Reuben Clark Law School launched a beta version of the Corpus of Founding Era American English (“COFEA”). COFEA currently contains approximately 150 million words. The texts were mined from the Evans Early American Imprint Series (featuring books, pamphlets, and broadsides covering a broad array of subjects), Hein Online’s Legal Database, and the papers and correspondence of George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, as contained in the National Archives Founders Online Project.[223] Future versions of COFEA will broaden the scope of text to include sources such as colonial newspapers, the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, and the Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution.

While COFEA is not perfect,[224] it provides an invaluable starting point for any inquiry into the communicative content of constitutional terminology.[225] Below, we will use it to investigate the original linguistic meaning of four key phrases in the Preamble, both before and after ratification. In doing so, we do not endorse any particular method of constitutional interpretation. We recognize that non-originalists may find such data irrelevant. But if, as James Monroe argued, the preamble “is the key of the Constitution,” and thus federal power exercised “contrary to the spirit breathed by this introduction” is unconstitutional, scholars must have some starting-point from which to discuss responsibly its meaning. In that spirit and as a first step in that direction, we will focus here on the phrases “domestic tranquility,” “common defence,” “general welfare,” and “blessings of liberty.”

We have bifurcated the analysis of each of these terms into two time-periods. The first spans from 1754 to 1786from the start of the French and the Indian War to the year before the Constitution was created. These dates were chosen to provide a snapshot of usage among the colonists once they began to consider themselves “Americans” in an independent political sense, but before the phrases were impacted by the ratification debates. The second time period spans from 1787, the year the Constitution was written, to 1807, the end of the corpus.[226]

1.  Domestic Tranquility

“Domestic tranquility” appears in the corpus only five times prior to 1787. Three of the concordance lines, or 60% of the sample, use the phrase in a way that clearly refers to the private comforts of an individual’s home, as in quote (1) below. Two of these three hits are in public orations, lauding General George Washington at the time of his (first) retirement from public service, as in quote (2) below. The remaining concordance lines, or 40%, refer to an absence of civil unrest, as in quote (3) below.

(1) A yeomanry like the American . . . are but ill prepared to support the fatigues, dangers and wants of long campaigns; they would soo[n] miss those solaces which domestic tranquility afforded them, and would revert to their pristine avocations and delights.[227]

(2) In your Retirement to the peaceful and pleasing Scenes of domestic Tranquility may America long experience the benign Influence of your Example and benefit by the salutary Suggestions of your Wisdom[.][228]

(3) . . . character is disclosed in the warm affections of whole countries to each other―affections which, it is devoutly to be wished, a just sense of social happiness and national safety may long continue to cherish and preserve, as the most certain means to secure domestic tranquility and foreign respect.[229]

The phrase was used more frequently after 1787, appearing in the corpus sixteen times. That said, just under half of all of these instances were direct quotations of the Preamble itself, as in John Adam’s 1797 inaugural address shown in quote (4) below.

(4) [T]he People of America, were not abandoned, by their usual good Sense, presence of Mind, resolution or integrity.―Measures were pursued to concern a Plan, to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and Secure the blessings of Liberty.[230]

The nine remaining concordance lines are split equally between the private and public senses described above, with the personal benefits of private life being slightly more common. That said, it would be unwise to adopt the “frequency thesis” that corpus skeptics falsely assume corpus linguists advocate for,[231] and assume that the sense that appears most commonly in the corpus data is automatically the ordinary meaning of the phrase, especially when, as here, there are two or more competing senses that are both well-attested to. Contextual information must be taken into consideration. Here, it seems logical to interpret the Preamble’s reference to domestic tranquility alongside the “domestic violence” clause in Article IV and conclude that it refers to public peace.

2.  Common Defence

During the pre-Constitution era, the phrase “Common Defense”―or as it was more commonly spelled during that time period “Common Defence”―appeared in the corpus ninety times. Just under 9% of these hits were quoting all or part of Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation, which reads, “[a]ll charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury . . . ,” and an additional three hits referenced Article VII of the same document: “[w]hen land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each State respectively . . . .”[232]

More helpful are the concordance lines drawn from documents not referencing federal charters, but instead using the phrase “common defence” in everyday discourse. By far, the term was most frequently used to describe the military obligation of individual polities within a broader alliance or confederation to mutually defend one another, as in quote (5) below. This sense appears in nearly two-thirds―65.55% to be exact―of all the concordance lines.

(5) The Canaanites were destroyed by reason they were petty Monarchies, that had no union, no confederacy for their common defence.[233]

The phrase appears to have been a British idiom used to describe a colony or province’s duty to furnish troops and pay for its fair share of the military expenditures to defend the British Empire at large. The House of Commons’ examination of Benjamin Franklin in 1760 epitomizes this usage, as shown in quote (6).

(6) Q: Did you never hear that Maryland, during the last war, had refused to furnish a quota towards the common defence?

A: Maryland has been much misrepresented in that matter. Maryland, to my knowledge, never refused to contribute, or grant aids to the Crown. The assemblies every year, during the war, voted considerable sums, and formed bills to raise them.[234]

Use of this idiom in the colonies surged in 1775, but a careful examination of these concordance lines reveals that they are almost all quoting (and responding to) Lord North’s Conciliatory Proposal which reads:

[W]hen the Governor, Council, and Assembly, or General Court of any of his Majesty’s Provinces, or Colonies in America, shall propose to make provision, according to the condition, circumstance, or situation of such Province or Colony, for contributing their proportion to the common defence . . . it will be proper if such proposal shall be approved by his Majesty and the two Houses of Parliament;[235]

Once the revolution began, however, the term is used in this sense almost exclusively to describe efforts of the individual states to work and fight in tandem against the British, as in quote (7).

(7) What spirit, short of an heavenly enthusiasm, could have animated these infant colonies, boldly to renounce the arbitrary mandates of a British parliament, and instead of fawning like suppliants, to arm themselves for their common defence?[236]

The second most frequent sense of the term “common defence”―comprising about 15% of all concordance lines―references the duties of individuals to defend the polity, as in quote (8). This nomenclature appears in state analogues to the Second Amendment, as in quote (9)

(8) The first and great principle of all government, and of all society, is, that support is due in return for protection; that every subject should contribute to the common defence in which his own is included.[237]

(9) The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.[238]

Clearly, these two senses―the polity’s duty to the confederation and the individual’s duty to the polity―overlap considerably.[239] Both use the word “common” as a synonym for the collective. In fact, COFEA produced only one concordance line, quote (10), which used “common defence” in a way that implied “ordinary defence.”

(10) In civilized nations, and where civil government hath been established, many cities and places of importance may be found without walls, without guards, and even without weapons or any preparations for common defence.[240]

Post-1787, the landscape gets a little more complex. “Common defence”[241] appears in the corpus 109 times during this time period. A plurality of those 109 instances―about 42% of the total―are directly quoting the new federal Constitution. Nearly two-thirds (28%) of these quotations are to Section VIII of Article I: “The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”[242] The remaining third (14%) quote the Preamble. For obvious reasons, quotations of the Articles of Confederation almost completely disappear, appearing just three times.

As during the pre-Constitutional era, “common defence” most frequently referred to the shared military operations of two or more allied political entities, as in quote (11). This sense appeared in 30% of concordance lines overall, and in about 57% of those that did not specifically quote either the Constitution or Articles of Confederation. While almost all of these were references to the States’ united military efforts, as in (12), it was occasionally used metaphorically, as in (13).

(11) Two monarchies may form an alliance on a like principle, their common defence against a powerful neighbouring republic.[243]

(12) [The States] had the sole exclusive right of governing themselves, in such manner as they should choose, not repugnant to the resolves of Congress; and that they were ready to contribute their proportion to the common defence.[244]

(13) They likewise demonstrate that from causes which are natural, the several branches [of government], instead of forming a perfect check upon each other . . . are to a certain degree impelled in a contrary direction, and forced together, into a constrained and politic harmony, for common defence.[245]

The individualistic sense of “common defense”―that is the citizen’s duty to defend the polity―was used far less frequently than it was before 1787, appearing in just 8% of the concordance lines. One of these, quote (14), was a provision in the constitution of the new state of Tennessee, which mirrored the language of the Massachusetts Constitution quoted above. There were no examples of “common defence” being used to describe “ordinary defence.”

(14) That the freemen of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.[246]

It is worth noting that 37% of all of the hits generated by COFEA were authored or co-authored by Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton had a more expansive view of the federal government than many of his contemporaries. While this is more apparent in the debates about the “general welfare” clause discussed below, it can be seen occasionally in his thoughts about the phrase “common defense.” For example, he argued that the phrase common defence “implies a power of war offensive & defence,”[247] which requires “[m]oney for domestic Police and the civil Government.”[248] The weight given to these statements largely depends on one’s theoretical framework for constitutional interpretation. Because Hamilton was both a signer of the Constitution and the principal author of the Federalist Papers, original intentions originalists may give more credence to these statements than those interested in the original public meaning, who may view the Secretary’s comments as an aberration from the more widely accepted meaning.

3.  General Welfare

The term “general welfare” is coupled with “common defence” in both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, Article I, Section VIII, clause 1. In fact, the terms co-occur in COFEA 24.1% of the time that either appears individually,[249] with the terms occurring right next to each other 15.1% of the time and “common defence” almost always being listed first.[250] This suggests that the terms may have become what linguists refer to as a “linguistic multinomial”―terms that occur together in the same context so frequently that they begin to be thought of as a single concept.[251]

Prior to 1787, the phrase “general welfare” appears in COFEA forty times. Four of these instances, or 10%, are references to the same provision of the Articles of Confederation mentioned above: “All charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled . . . shall be defrayed out of a common treasury.” Another 7.5% quote Benjamin Franklin’s 1775 draft of the Articles of Confederation:

The said united colonies hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other binding on themselves and their posterity for their common defence against their enemies for the security of their liberties and properties, the safety of their persons and families and their mutual and general welfare.[252]

Franklin’s 1754 Plan of Union―along with his personal commentary―also appears in the corpus, as seen in quote (15).

(15) The power proposed to be given by the plan to the grand council is only a concentration of the powers of the several assemblies in certain points for the general welfare.[253]

Almost all of the remaining concordance lines―87.5% to be precise―use the phrase “general welfare” to refer to the wellbeing of some mass-noun, whether it be a country, army, society, or family, as in quote (16). Nearly a third of these instances reference the general welfare of the whole British Empire, inclusive of the colonies, as in quote (17).

(16) I do not see that he can be spared from that Station without great Detriment to our Affairs and to the general Welfare of America.[254]

(17) But the latter have frequent Communications, for the purpose of dropping their private Misunderstandings, and uniting in the public Cause, which at present needs all their joint Assistance, since a Breach with America . . . may be ruinous to the general Welfare of the British Empire.[255]

Interestingly, before 1787 no examples used the phrase “general welfare” to refer to the well-being of individuals, or even the well-being of individuals within a larger group, as we often imagine it today. In this respect, it appears that “general,” like “common,” was used in a collective rather than generic sense. Ten percent of the concordance lines had too little contextual information to code.

After 1787, use of the phrase becomes far less uniform, becoming something of a linguistic black hole. Of the 100 concordance lines generated in the corpus, three quote the Articles of Confederation. Another clearly argues that the term should be construed the same under the Constitution as it was under the old charter. In addition, 27% of the concordance lines quote or paraphrase the Constitution. Fifty-six percent of these (15% of the total) cite the Preamble, while the remainder quote Article I.

In many cases, the phrase seems to have maintained its collective connotations. For example, 23% of the time it clearly refers to the well-being of a mass-noun, usually the “country” or “nation” as a whole, as in quote (18). Nearly half of these carefully distinguish the “general welfare” from the private or parochial interests of those holding office, as in quote (19).

(18) [A]n energetic Government, must doubtless stimulate the Genius of every Citizen to exert those means, by which not only his own Interests will be increas’d, but at the same time will be secur’d with the general welfare [and] Strength of his Country.[256]

(19) As it respects myself, I have no object separated from the general welfare to promote. I have no predilections, no prejudices to gratify, no friends, whose interests or views I wish to advance at the expence of propriety[.][257]

But in some contexts, “general welfare” comes to mean almost the exact opposite after 1787―the well-being not of the whole, but of the individuals or subunits that make up the whole. For example, one source discusses the cities of Richmond and Philadelphia entering into an agreement to speed up the delivery of mail between them for their “general welfare.” This sense is especially common when “the people” are discussed, as in quote (20).

(20) [I]t was expressly assumed that the general government has a right to exercise all powers which may be for the general welfare, that is to say, all the legitimate powers of government: since no government has a legitimate right to do what is not for the welfare of the governed.[258]

This shift may have its origins in the language of the Preamble. Unlike the Articles of Confederation in which the states were the actors, the Constitution was written and ratified by “We the People.” If the “blessings of liberty” flow to “ourselves” as individuals, why shouldn’t the general welfare be concerned with “us” too?

This was definitely a minority understanding, representing a little more than 5% of all of the concordance lines. The exact number is hard to pin down because some of the examples could cut either way, depending on how one interprets the use of the first-person plural, as in quote (20). If it is simply the royal-we, it could still refer to the welfare of the collective body. If not, it refers to the well-being of society’s individuals.

(21) That interests of primary importance to our general welfare are promoted by [Jay’s Treaty].[259]

The concordance lines reveal an even greater disagreement about the meaning of the general welfare clause―how wide was its scope? As with “common defence,” Hamilton was at the forefront of the debate, arguing that it bestowed nearly limitless power on the federal government. Among other things, he and his followers argued that the phrase was “as comprehensive as any that could have been used” and extended to all cases”―whatever concerns the general interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce, are within the sphere.”[260] These arguments were specifically designed to justify the creation of the controversial Bank of the United States.

In opposition to Hamilton were the Madisonians, who argued that Article I did not bestow a general power to legislate for the general welfare, but was limited to only those specific powers enumerated in the Constitution, as in quote (22), they argued that this “true and fair construction” was too “obvious to be mistaken.”

(22) No argument could be drawn from the terms “common defence, and general welfare.” The power as to these general purposes, was limited to acts laying taxes for them; and the general purposes themselves were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined.[261]

This debate continues to this day and demonstrates some of the limitations of corpus linguistics. COFEA is not a silver bullet for every interpretive problem. Sometimes opaque constitutional provisions will remain vague or ambiguous even when subjected to empirical analytics. In such instances, judicial construction may still be necessary to operationalize the passage. But, while COFEA cannot answer every question about the original or intended meaning of the phrase “general welfare,” it can limit the range of possibilities. Given both its close association with “common defence” and its typical usage, it seems clear that like the word “common,” the word “general” referred to the collective. Thus, whatever the extent of Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to this clause may have been, it was to be directed at the well-being of the United States as an entity, rather than for individuals or states.

4.  Blessings of Liberty

Unlike “common defence” and “general welfare,” the phrase “blessings of liberty” was not borrowed from the Articles of Confederation. Nevertheless, the phrase still appears in the corpus thirty-one times before 1787. Of these, only four actually enumerate specifics. For David Brooks, the blessings of liberty were simply “safety and [p]eace.”[262] Phillip Payson’s description was a bit more grandiose, even if somewhat opaque―“to be freed from the jaws of tyranny, to live in freedom ourselves, and leave our posterity after us free.”[263] Pamphleteer Silas Downer listed, “[r]eligion, learning, arts, and industry”[264] as blessings of liberty, while Benjamin Rush, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, even credited liberty for eradicating disease.[265]

The meaning of the word “liberty” in this phrase varies between concordance lines. Most frequently, it refers to freedom from tyranny or oppression, as in quote (23). This constitutes 35% of all examples contained in COFEA. Interestingly enough, 63% of the time liberty is used in this context, it is coupled with metaphorical language evoking slavery, oppression, or bondage, as in (24).

(23) You have hitherto risen superior to a thousand difficulties, in giving freedom to a great and oppressed people. . . . Proceed therefore, and let the footsteps of victory open a way for blessings of liberty, and the happiness of well-ordered government, to visit that extensive dominion.[266]

(24) They have perswaded [sic] themselves, they have even dared to say, that the Canadians were not capable of distinguishing between the Blessings of Liberty and the Wretchedness of Slavery.[267]

A quarter of the time, “liberty” refers to the accumulated freedoms, personal rights and civic duties, passed from one generation on to another, as a product of living in a democratic society, as in quote (25). In addition, there were two examples of “liberty” meaning freedom from restraint or slavery, as in quote (26). The remaining concordance lines were too ambiguous to code.

(25) Upon this plan, and with these principles, we set out, and intend to proceed, that the present (if not too far degenerated) and future generations may enjoy undiminished all the blessings of liberty.[268]

(26) Shall we ever wish to change Countries; to change conditions with the Africans and the Laplanders for sure it were better never to have known the blessings of Liberty than to have enjoyed it, and then to have it ravished from us.[269]

Post-1787, the phrase becomes more popular, appearing in the corpus eighty-two times. Unsurprisingly, more than a third of these―about 37%―are quoting the Preamble of the Constitution directly. Like with the pre-Constitutional era, the concordance lines are light on specific “blessings.” Samuel Rockwell provides the only examples in this concordance line: “Your Independence, your Rights and Liberties, [and] your Government.”[270] Whether this is what other writers had in mind is anybody’s guess.

Unlike during the pre-Constitutional era, the inherited rights sense of the word “liberty” predominated during this time period, appearing in just under a fifth of all concordance lines, followed by freedom from tyranny at 15%. A smaller percentage of concordance lines used liberty to describe freedom from slavery, but the ones that did were more overt, as in quote (27).

(27) Seven more were now added to our number to . . . partake with us the horrors of unspeakable slavery, and bemoan the loss of the blessing of liberty, dragging out the unwelcome existence of a slave, on Barbary’s hostile coast, and to be persecuted by the hands of merciless Mahometans.[271]

There were also three times the word liberty was used in reference to a nation’s freedom from foreign control, as in quote (28), and two instances of the word specifically referring to religious liberty, as in quote (29).

(28) [George Washington] continued as commander in chief till Dec. 23, 1783; when having by acts of the greatest wisdom and fortitude, vanquished the enemies of his country and thus procured for it the blessings of liberty and independence, he delivered his commission to the President of Congress at Anapolis.[272]

(29) I would farther direct you to remember, that though the Revolution was a great work, it was by no means a perfect work; and that all was not then gained which was necessary to put the kingdom in the secure and complete possession of the blessings of liberty.—In particular, you should recollect, that the toleration then obtained was imperfect. It included only those who could declare their faith in the doctrinal articles of the church of England.[273]

From this data, it is difficult to peg down any particular “blessing” of liberty the Founders may have had in mind, but the reference that the blessings were to be secured for the Founding generation’s “posterity” as well suggest that the term should be understood through the “inherited rights and duties” lens.

The analysis in this section is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a foundation upon which future scholarship and judicial opinions can build. Future scholarsespecially those partial to Fourteenth Amendment Originalismmay wish to use corpus linguistics to chart how the meaning of these terms changed during the Antebellum period. Living constitutionalists may be interested in using corpus linguistics to identify how the terms are used today. We chose to focus on the founding era because we believe that any discussion of what these terms should mean must by necessity begin with an analysis of what they did mean.

J.  Early Supreme Court Decisions Citing the Preamble

Although the Preamble played a limited role in the Supreme Court’s early jurisprudencewhen the Court cautioned against using the Preamble to find explicit powersthe Preamble certainly influenced the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s enumerated powers, and it played a role in shaping the contours of federalism. Sometimes, the Preamble was merely mentioned as a passing aside, but the Preamble was also used to help in the tough task of interpretation. The following paragraphs review the five main cases in which the Court relied on the Preamble as a guide in its decision making.

One of the earliest significant opinions of the Court, Chisholm v. Georgia, sparked a constitutional debate that eventually culminated in the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798.[274] Alexander Chisholm, the executor of Robert Farquhar’s estate, attempted to sue the state of Georgia, seeking payments for goods supplied by Mr. Farquhar—a South Carolinian—to the state of Georgia during the Revolutionary War.[275] The state of Georgia claimed sovereign immunity and the Circuit Court at Augusta decided that Georgia could not be sued by a citizen of another state.[276] The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which ultimately determined that federal courts have the power to hear cases in which a state was sued by a private citizen of another state.[277] The Court first stressed that the plain text of Article III, Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases between “a State and Citizens of another State.”[278] Having “the advantage of the letter on [its] side,” the Court proceeded to consider the broad purposes and other wordings in the Constitution to see if there was support or limitation to be found for its ruling.[279]

After reviewing the general history of the Constitution,[280] the Court focused on two parts of the Preamble. First, the phrase “We the People” revealed that the people were “acting as sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their will, that the State Governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made to conform.”[281] Second, the Court relied on the phrase “establish justice” to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case:

[W]hen we view th[e] object [of establishing justice] in conjunction with the declaration, ‘that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts; we shall probably think, that this object points, in a particular manner, to the jurisdiction of the Court over the several States. What good purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling [sic] judiciary power?[282]

From the Court’s perspective, the Preamble authorized a broad understanding of Article III which empowered federal courts to regulate the sovereignty of the states to the benefit of the people.

This early understanding and use of the Preamble spilled over into the Marshall Court. Here again, the phrase “We the People” played an important role. Beginning with Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Preamble was used by the Supreme Court to support conclusions that the federal government was designed to have power to review actions of the states and their governments.[283] In this case, the Court was asked to review a constitutional challenge to Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court power to review decisions of the states’ highest appellate courts.[284] Justice Story, writing for the Court, stated:

The constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by ‘the people of the United States.’ There can be no doubt that it was competent to the people to invest the general government with all the powers which they might deem proper and necessary; to extend or restrain these powers according to their own good pleasure, and to give them a paramount and supreme authority.[285]

In other words, because the Constitution was established by “the People” and not the states, granting the federal government power over the states was wholly consistent with the Constitution.

This application of the Preamble was used again in 1830 in Craig v. Missouri.[286] The State of Missouri had passed a statute allowing for the issuance of paper money to debt-burdened farmers as a loan. Hiram Craig, the beneficiary of such a loan, was unable to make his payments and defaulted. In the suit that followed, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that Craig must fulfill his debt obligations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the loan-certificate statute was in violation of Article I, Section X of the Constitution.[287] Before reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall resolved that the Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court. Quoting Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Marshall stated, “‘[T]he constitution of the United States was ordained and established,’ not by the United States in their sovereign capacities; but, as the preamble declares, ‘by the people of the United States.’”[288] It was therefore appropriate for the people to confer upon the Court jurisdiction to review decisions of state appellate courts.

Along similar lines, Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia that the Preamble supported the conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of a state’s highest court interpreting a matter of federal law.[289]

The framers . . . were convened for the purpose of strengthening the confederation by enlarging the powers of the government, and by giving efficacy to those which it before possessed, but could not exercise. They inform us themselves, in the instrument they presented to the American public, that one of its objects was to form a more perfect union. Under such circumstances, we certainly should not expect to find, in that instrument, a diminution of the powers of the actual government.[290]

To “form a more perfect union,” the Framers recognized the need for a central government that could review the decisions of state courts, particularly with regards to questions of national law.

Chief Justice Marshall also used the Preamble to promote the power of the states. In Barron v. Baltimore, private citizens of Baltimore sued the mayor, claiming the city owed them for an uncompensated taking.[291] The Court held that the Bill of Rights—including the Fifth Amendment—only applied to the federal government.[292]

The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated. . . . The powers [the people] conferred on [the federal] government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.[293]

Thus, the Preamble’s opening phrase—“We the People”—played an important role in defining the boundaries of federalism, both in some ways enhancing and in other ways restraining the power of the federal government.

K.  Use of the Preamble by Political Actors in the Nineteenth Century

The Supreme Court was far from the only body discussing the role of the Preamble in constitutional law. Nineteenth century legal writers and political actors helped shape the Preamble’s meaning in constitutional law. Their thoughts shed important light on the early understanding and intended scope of the Preamble. As a rule, all people at this time assumed the correctness of James Monroe’s characterization of the Preamble as the key of the Constitution. For example, in the 1820s, William Rawle published his influential book, A View of the Constitution. He spoke of the Preamble as a “distinct exposition of principles” which reveals the motives and intentions that guide readers “in the construction of the instrument,” which reading, he insisted, “can only mean the ascertaining the true meaning of an instrument,” stressing the importance of deducing the meaning of each provision in the Constitution by taking cognizance of “its known intention and its entire text, and to give effect, if possible, to every part of it, consistently with the unity, and harmony of the whole.”[294] Rawle’s view prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, that the proper interpretation of any part of the Constitution requires references to the Preamble and the document as a whole.

1.  The 1830 Debate on the Nature of the Constitution

In January of 1830, one year into the presidency of Andrew Jackson, a prolonged debate erupted in the United States Senate, first between two Senators, Daniel Webster and Robert Hayne, but soon involving nearly the entire Senate.[295] This high-level and high-stakes debate tells much about how the Preamble was understood and used in the early Republic. The immediate issues at hand arose over a resolution concerning federal policies on the sale of public lands and out of concerns about high federal tariffs on imports that hurt Southern exports and protected Northern manufacturing.[296]

This soon embroiled the Senate in polarized constitutional debates over federal debt, sectional interests, conflicts between various understandings of state sovereignty and the federal union, disputes over the presidential veto and removal powers, questions about Supreme Court jurisdiction over claims between the federal government and the states, and arguments about who actually authorized the Constitution. The debate essentially became “a dispute over the nature of the union,”[297] ranging from nationalist arguments to erudite defenses of state sovereignty, and many others seeking “to define positions in the middle ground,” reflecting legislative “responsibility for constitutional construction and commitment to constitutional values” at a high level of ethical conviction.[298]

Throughout this important debate, both sides often quoted and appealed to language from the Preamble. The main words and phrases used were “We the People,” “justice,” “domestic tranquility,” “general welfare,” and “securing the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.” These words were often used in selective, self-serving ways. Usually the debaters did not base their interpretations on detached political or linguistic information, whether or not they were based on either their current or the original usage of these terms. Nonetheless, this extensive use of the Preamble demonstrates the important role it played in construing the meaning of the principles and spirit of the Constitution. A few examples are illustrative.

Having introduced the Preamble’s language into the debate by arguing against the idea that the National debt “has an effect in binding the debtors to the country, and thereby serving as a link to hold the States together,” Hayne contended:

[T]he link which binds the public creditors, as such, to their country, binds them equally to all governments, whether arbitrary or free. In a free government, this principle of abject dependence, if extended through all the ramifications of society, must be fatal to liberty. . . . If this system is carried much further, no man can fail to see that every generous motive of attachment to the country will be destroyed . . . . I would teach them to cling to it by dispensing equal justice, and, above all, by securing the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.[299]

While Hayne used alarmist generalities to reject the idea of national debt, his point shows how language from the Preamble could be used to build the bonds of unity between the people and their government, in the present and for future generations as well.

Hayne then launched into a discussion of slavery and how the actions of the North, in relation to slavery, had violated principles of the Preamble. He stated:

Sir, all our difficulties on this subject have arisen from interference from abroad, which has disturbed, and may again disturb, our domestic tranquillity, [sic] just so far as to bring down punishment upon the heads of the unfortunate victims of a fanatical and mistaken humanity.

There is a spirit, which, like the father of evil, is constantly “walking to and fro about the earth, seeking whom it may devour.” It is the spirit of false philanthropy. The persons whom it possesses . . . are employed in lighting up the torches of discord throughout the community. . . . Then it is that he indulges in golden dreams of national greatness and prosperity. He discovers that “liberty is power;” and not content with vast schemes of improvement at home, . . . he flies to foreign lands, to fulfil obligations to “the human race,” by inculcating the principles of “political and religious liberty,” and promoting the “general welfare” of the whole human race. It is a spirit which has long been busy with the slaves of the South, and is even now displaying itself in vain efforts to drive the Government from its wise policy in relation to the Indians.[300]

Here again, Hayne conveniently narrows the words “domestic tranquility” and then exaggerates the words “general welfare” to refer to situations to which they need not apply. Although not necessarily a convincing style of argument, his use of language from the Preamble here shows again how readily the Preamble was accepted as an authoritative source for constitutional interpretation in the nineteenth century.

Hayne also defended his position on state sovereignty by, once again, using the Preamble:

The object of the framers of the constitution, as disclosed in that address, was not the consolidation of the Government, but the consolidation of the Union. It was not to draw power from the States, in order to transfer it to a great National Government, but, in the language of the constitution itself, to form a more perfect union; and by what means? By establishing justice, promoting domestic tranquility, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. This is the true reading of the constitution. But, according to the gentleman’s reading, the object of the constitution was to consolidate the Government, and the means would seem to be, the promotion of injustice, causing domestic discord, and depriving the States and the people of the blessings of liberty forever.[301]

Here, Hayne attacked the idea, put forth by Webster, that one of the purposes of the Constitution was consolidation of the Government. Webster had quoted President Washington’s words to support that notion.[302] Both Webster and Hayne, however, may be overstating their cases. Neither a central consolidation nor a maintenance of state powers need be seen as unlimited or uncontained.

Arguing against the tariff, Hayne, quoting Webster, suggested that Congress might be acting, “somewhat against the spirit and intention of the Constitution, in exercising the power to control essentially the pursuits and occupations of individuals, not as incidental to the exercise of any other power, but as a substantial and direct power.”[303] But, he did not detail what he meant by “the spirit” of the Constitution, which in this case could be a relevant concern, since the phrase “general welfare” appears not only in the Preamble but also in Article I, Section 8, clause 1.

On the issue of state sovereignty, some argued that “the Constitution was not formed by the States, in their sovereign capacity, but by the People, and it is therefore inferred that the Federal Government, being created by all the People, must be supreme . . . .”[304] Hayne rejected that argument and used the Preamble to attack the argument’s source, insisting that the Constitution

was framed by the States acting in their sovereign capacity. When, in the preamble of the Constitution, we find the words we, the People of the United States, it is clear, they can only relate to the People as citizens of the several States, because the Federal Government was not then in existence.[305]

Hayne then took aim at the idea that states must submit to unconstitutional laws until an appeal is made “to her sister States, by a proposition to amend the Constitution.”[306] Hayne argued that when there is a difference in opinion on the proper exercise of federal power between a state government and the federal government, an appeal should be made to the “common superior,” which he defined as three-quarters of the states.[307] In cases that involved state action that was “deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of our obligations,” Hayne wanted the other states, instead of the Supreme Court, to act as an arbitrator between, what he viewed as, two equal sovereigns, the federal government and the state government, for the idea that the federal government, as he say it set forth in the Preamble, “was intended to be a government of limited and specific, and not general powers, must be admitted by all; and it is our duty to preserve for it the character intended by its framers.”[308]

In this assertion, Hayne quoted Andrew Jackson, then President of the United States, who had used the term “general welfare” from the Preamble, when discussing the importance of adhering to the written Constitution. Jackson, later in his speech, warned against the encroachment of the federal government into the realm of state power and reaffirmed that the federal government was one of limited powers.[309]

Others in the debate explored the meaning of forming a “more perfect Union.” John Rowan, a Senator from Kentucky, entered the debate to support the sentiments of Hayne and to directly speak against Webster. Rowan argued that “The Constitution is not adapted to the People, in any condition, which as one People they could occupy, while it is admirably adapted for their use, in their State capacities–the purpose for which it was formed.”[310] Interestingly, Rowan also used parts of the Preamble to rebut Webster’s use of the Preamble. Rowan continued:

The word Union can relate to nothing but the States. The object, as I have before stated, was to unite them, not the People, more perfectly: Besides, a more perfect union of the People cannot be produced by a constitutional, than by the social compact. It is not the object of a Constitution to unite the people.[311]

William Smith, a Senator from South Carolina, also joined the debate.[312] Smith pointed out that “the division between the Federalists and the Republicans first took place” over a controversy concerning language partly found in the Preamble, namely “to provide for the public good and general welfare.”[313] Smith went on to explain that the Republicans had attacked the expansion of federal power, gained power themselves, and then used the “general welfare” language to do the same thing the Federalists had been doing.[314] Near the end of his speech, seeing achieving unity as the main objective, Smith stated, “I was not sent here to enlist under party banners, but to serve my country upon the principles of the Constitution, from which I hope General Jackson will never depart.”[315]

John Clayton, a Senator from Delaware, added his input specifically on the topic of the Supreme Court’s reputed inability to properly settle disputes between a state government and the federal government.[316] He argued that the states had ceded some of their rights to the United States in order “to provide for the general welfare.”[317] Regarding the President’s removal power, Clayton used this same language from the Preamble to argue for a strict limitation and distinct definition of the removal power, to be used only when really necessary for the general welfare” and not for “party uses, or for personal aggrandizement.”[318]

Also finding middle ground, this time in the sovereignty discussion, Edward Livingston, from Louisiana, attacked the view that the Preamble supports the notion that the federal government is strictly a “popular Government.”[319] Regarding the words, “We the People:

[I]t never has been imagined or asserted that the people of the United States collectively, as a whole people, gave their assent or were consulted in that capacity; the people of each State were consulted to know whether that State would form a part of the United States under the articles of the Constitution, and to that they gave their assent, simply as citizens of that State.

This Government, then, is neither such a federative one, founded on a compact, as leaves to all the parties their full sovereignty, nor such a consolidated popular government, as deprives them of the whole of that sovereign power. It is a compact by which the people of each State have consented to take from their own Legislatures some of the powers they had conferred upon them, and to transfer them, with other enumerated powers, to the Government of the United States, created by that compact; these powers, so conferred, are some of those exercised by the sovereign power of the country in which they reside.[320]

Ultimately, this classic debate covered a number of topics outside of the legislation that was in front of the Senators. However, the topics discussed are not nearly as important for present purposes as are the numerous times the Senators appealed to the language of the Preamble to support their various understandings of the legal operation and requirements of the Constitution. Interestingly, people tried—some more successfully than others—to use the Preamble to support their side of the issues. While developing a strong jurisprudence of the Preamble is an important task which still lies in the future, the fact that the Preamble’s language was readily appealed to in this 1830 debate shows that it has been and can be used in order to arrive, by a preponderance of well-reasoned perceptions, at the most plausible application of the law in a number of situations. The Preamble carried such weight that in his eulogy of George Washington, delivered on February 22, 1832, the centennial of Washington’s birth, Daniel Webster did not pass up the opportunity to attribute the first President’s immortal success to his adherence to his North Star for the whole nation, namely the Preamble, whose six specific objectives Webster quoted in full.[321]

2.  Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution (1833)

Born on September 18, 1779,[322] Joseph Story was exactly eight years old when the Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787.[323] He graduated from Harvard Law in 1801 and subsequently practiced law in Massachusetts.[324] He was appointed to the United States Supreme Court by James Madison in 1811 and began teaching at Harvard in 1829. While a member of the Supreme Court, Story worked alongside Chief Justice John Marshall for twenty-four years until Marshall’s death in 1835. Upon Marshall’s death, Story assumed the title of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.[325] Based on his background, Story’s long chapter on the Preamble and his interpretation of its purposes provide can provide authoritative insights in how the early founders and prominent legal minds viewed the proper role of the Preamble in constitutional interpretation.

Joseph Story’s writings on the Preamble are found in his well-known Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.[326] This magnum opus, written in 1833, is widely viewed as one of the more authoritative treatises on the Constitution ever written.[327] Story’s coverage of the Preamble is extensive, covering sixty paragraphs with sixty-eight footnotes.

Because Story’s writing about the Preamble is referenced briefly in Jacobson v. Massachusetts’s opinion and because this Article argues below that the Preamble should be restored to the role it historically held, the key points in Story’s writings on the Preamble will be quoted and explained in some detail to bring to light his understanding of the Preamble’s legal roles as an integral part of the Constitution.

Before he discussed the historical context and legal meanings of each of the words and phrases in the Preamble, Story explained important roles that preambles typically play in statutory interpretation:

The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all juridical discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute . . . . [T]he will and intention of the legislature is to be regarded and followed. It is properly resorted to, where doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part; for if they are clear and unambiguous, there seems little room for interpretation, except in cases leading to an obvious absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention expressed in the preamble.[328]

Story believed that preambles provided a key that could unlock the framers’ intentions and could also serve as a salutary limit on any excessive exercise of power. Story was, in modern terms, an originalist who believed that a statute’s or constitutional provision’s meaning should be determined by looking at the intention of the framers. He explains, “[t]here does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, as stated in the preamble.”[329]

Upon this foundation, Story made the following statement on how the Preamble should not be used:

The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se; it can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them.[330]

And it is this statement, in isolation, that was cited in Jacobson as support for Justice Harlan’s brief statement that the preamble should not be used to interpret the Constitution.[331]

Far from saying that the Preamble serves no purpose when interpreting the powers the Constitution grants, Story explains that the Preamble is to be used to “expound” on and find the “extent” of the powers granted. Story then concluded his overall observations about the Preamble:

We have the strongest assurances, that this preamble was not adopted as a mere formulary; but as a solemn promulgation of a fundamental fact, vital to the character and operations of the government. The obvious object was to substitute a government of the people, for a confederacy of states; a constitution for a compact. . . . The people therein declare, that their design in establishing it comprehended six objects: (1.) To form a more perfect union; (2.) to establish justice; (3.) to insure domestic tranquility; (4.) to provide for the common defence; (5.) to promote the general welfare; (6.) to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.[332]

Without rehearsing all of his points, Story obviously saw the Preamble serving many functions in constitutional law. Although writing from an avowed Federalist position, he gave full and fair exposition of opposing views. Overall, he saw the Preamble as providing the needed cohesion and hope necessary to hold the whole constitution together, cementing the extensive domestic and geostrategic debates of the convention. In section 462, while warning against resorting to the Preamble to enlarge confided governmental powers, Story stressed its importance in construing and resolving ambiguities, even allowing the interpreter liberty to reject a restrictive meaning which would defeat an avowed purpose of the constitution. He insisted that all of the six objects of the Preamble were to be fully honored and that legal interpreters should trace the relations that each of these objects bears to the others, recognizing that they comprise collectively everything necessary for popular prosperity and happiness. In sections 466, 467 and 483, he maintained it was necessary to revisit the Preamble in order to maintain the union in the face of those who stir up disaffection, exaggerate unavoidable inequalities, and promote division and disunion that are caused by prejudices, disappointments, ambition, party strife, rivalries, local pressures, and corruption, because thinking about the Preamble will “induce each state to sacrifice many of its own objects for the general good.”[333] Although he addressed at some length each of the Preamble’s six stated objectives, he spent most time on the mandate “to form a more perfect union.” Regarding “securing the blessings of liberty,” he was most interested in how these blessings and liberties will be secured, by a strong central government protecting against foreign invasions and state subversions.

Consequently, for Story, the Preamble was purposefully placed at the beginning of the Constitution to not only emphasize the type of government formed by the Constitution, but to solemnly and efficaciously delimit purposes of that Constitution to the adopted six. Thus, the purpose of the Preamble was seen, and is to be seen, as vital in understanding and interpreting its provisions and as a check on the several purposes and attendant powers given to the federal government.

3.  Former President John Quincy Adams and Others

Marking the Fiftieth Anniversary in 1839 of George Washington’s Inauguration in 1789, John Quincy Adams further reflected this lofty view of the Preamble at the end of a lengthy speech about the purposes and development of the Nation since the Constitution’s ratification. Adams referred frequently to the “principles” of the Constitution and reflected on the Preamble and its relevance:

The first object of the people, declared by the Constitution as their motive for its establishment, to form a more Perfect Union, had been attained by the establishment of the Constitution itself; but this was yet to be demonstrated by its practical operation in the establishment of justice, in the ensurance of domestic tranquility, in the provision for the common defence, in the promotion of the general welfare, and in securing the blessings of liberty to the people themselves, the authors of the Constitution, and to their posterity.

These are the great and transcendental objects of all legitimate government. The primary purposes of all human association. For these purposes the confederation had been instituted, and had signally failed for their attainment. How far have they been attained under this new national organization?[334]

President Adams clearly viewed the Preamble as declaring “the first object of the people” and “their motive” for establishment of the Constitution, namely “to form a more Perfect Union,” but he also soberly observed that this declaration in 1787 still left this primary goal to be demonstrated and attained in “practical operation” by carrying out the Preamble’s five further provisions.[335] Thus, Adams not only saw the principles of the Preamble as theoretical ideals, as “the great and transcendental objects of all legitimate government” and “the primary purposes of all human association,” but he also insisted on the practical attainment of these goals. For him, the Preamble was the measuring stick against which the behaviors of government could be assessed, and he celebrated many reasons for his belief that the innovative American “national organization” was “triumphantly accomplish[ing]” these aims.[336]

In the second half of his lengthy jubilee speech, Adams drew attention to unprecedented prosperity, westward expansion, harmonizing command, and meekness in the model set by George Washington, who strengthened the virtue of the people, perpetuated the states’ league of friendship, negotiated international treaties, and limited the powers of the federal government “to concerns interesting to the whole people.”[337] Any challenges to this continuing success, Adams declared, would need to be met by “reverting to the precedents” that led to the adoption of the Constitution as found in the Preamble, “to form a more perfect union,” and “to establish justice,” which he noted was defined “as the constant and perpetual will of securing to everyone his right,” which necessarily “includes the whole duty of man in the social institutions of society, toward his neighbour.”[338]

In his conclusion, former President Adams saw the Constitution as a “return to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and the exclusive constituent power of the people” which “was the work of the ONE PEOPLE of the United States.”[339] And then, returning to the biblical origins of the concept of Jubilee, Adams ended his passionate address with a consonant ancient allegory to the principles of the Constitution: “Fellow-citizens, the ark of your covenant is the Declaration of Independence. Your Mount Ebal, is the confederacy of separate state sovereignties, and your Mount Gerizim is the Constitution of the United States.”[340] All of “the blessings and cursings” foretold in the formation of the ancient Israelite state are to be suffered or enjoyed by “your posterity,” contingent upon “your and their adherence to, or departure from, the principles of the Declaration of Independence, practically interwoven in the Constitution of the United States.”[341]

In this same post-Jacksonian era, other examples of the ready use of the Preamble in public discourse come from Senator Calhoun from South Carolina, who spoke in the Senate on February 28, 1842 against the President’s use of the veto power. He claimed that an improper use of the veto would violate the substantive foundational legal principles, operations, and purposes of the entire constitutional government, articulated especially in the Preamble.[342] And likewise, Joseph Smith, an influential presidential candidate in 1844,[343] used the Preamble as the heart of his campaign pamphlet, General Smith’s Views of the Powers and Policy of the Government of the United States.[344] Its first page quoted the Preamble in full, and then, it went on to argue for the sovereign voice of the united people, mentioning most of the words in the Preamble at least once and some of them (especially “the people,” “union,” and “liberty”) numerous times, finding in the Preamble reasons to decry disunity, partisan discord, and sectional politics. At the same time, he also insisted on federal duties to “provide for the common defense” and the “common welfare” and to “secure” the people in “their rights properly respected,” while also setting “limitations” upon the government’s powers and authorities.[345]

4.  President Abraham Lincoln

To this selected list of references to the Preamble in the nineteenth century, one can rightfully add the following statements by President Abraham Lincoln. They require little comment.

In a speech on the campaign trail in Cincinnati, Ohio, September 17, 1859, he used the Preamble to create a legally compelling duty upon the federal government:

This government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare. We believe, nay, we know that that is the only thing that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union itself. The only think which has ever menaced the destruction of the government under which we live, is this very thing. To repress this thing, we think is providing for the general welfare.[346]

In his First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), Lincoln continued his finding of legal authority in the Preamble:

And finally, in 1787 one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing by the Constitution was “to form a more perfect Union.” But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void . . . .[347]

In Lincoln’s Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), he pointed out the eradication of the legal authority of the people by the Confederate southern states:

Our adversaries have adopted some declarations of independence in which, unlike the good old one penned by Jefferson, they omit the words “all men are created equal.” Why? They have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which, unlike our good old one signed by Washington, they omit “We, the people,” and substitute “We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States.” Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view the rights of men and the authority of the people?[348]

And at the end of his Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863), Lincoln turned once again to the Preamble at that poignant moment of unthinkable death but in hopes of life and rebirth: [T]hat this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.”[349] His immortal words call out for a second formation of the ideal union, based on popular sovereignty by the people, for the purpose of acting for the common benefit of the people, that will be ordained and established not to perish from the earth.

L.  Preambles in State Constitutions in the Nineteenth Century

Just as many aspects of the federal Constitution were derived in 1787 from then-existing state constitutions,[350] in reciprocal fashion, nineteenth century state constitutions, and especially their preambles, were often based on the federal Constitution.[351] Though most state constitutional preambles do not perfectly mirror the federal Preamble, they often share similarities. Their differences in language, along with state courts decisions interpreting them, can shed further light on the received significance and meanings of words and phrases in the federal Preamble.

Variation in terminology among state preambles shows that people viewed them as serving a particular function. They were not included as idle mantras; rather, they functioned as the Federal Preamble, which stressed national interests and aims.[352]

Some follow the United States’ Preamble closely (Alabama, Maine, Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin), but many include other various words and phrases, often accentuating regional or local cultural preferences.

Thirty-eight begin “We, the People,” usually with the comma. Only two begin with historical “Whereas” clauses (Virginia contains three; South Carolina has two).

No need is ever expressed in any of these state constitutions to form “a more perfect union,” evidence that the “union” in the United States’ Preamble was understood to refer to the union of the thirteen original states. Five state preambles, however, speak of forming a “more perfect government” (Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).

“Establish justice” appears only in eight state preambles (Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota), and curiously “justice” alone never appears in any.

“Domestic tranquility” shows up three times (Nebraska, Nevada, and Wisconsin), with “tranquility” alone three times (Alabama, Massachusetts (1780), and South Dakota). This may be relevant in confirming that “domestic” refers primarily to the national peacefulness, as opposed to international, since the states generally do not see it as their purpose to promote domestic tranquility.

The word “welfare” is found in twelve state preambles: four have the unmodified word “welfare” (Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio); two “our common welfare” (Idaho and Maine); one speaks of “our mutual welfare and happiness” (Oklahoma); and five preambles follow the U.S. Preamble, using the phrase “general welfare” (Alabama, Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin). This finding fairly strongly indicates that “general welfare” in the U.S. Preamble speaks of something nationalon a wider scale—rather than welfare within state or smaller political units.

Common defense” is even rarer (only in Alabama, Colorado, and South Dakota), indicating that the common (usually national) defense was not typically a responsibility of individual states.

Interestingly, the word “blessings” appears in twenty state preambles. Seven of those refer to securing or preserving the “blessings of liberty” (“secure:” Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, and Ohio; “preserve:” South Dakota and New Jersey). The other thirteen preambles aim to secure many other kinds of blessings, which may be civic, secular, personal, or religious.

Some, as in the Federal Preamble, speak of “liberties” in the plural (Arizona, Connecticut, North Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming), but five mention protecting or securing “liberty,” as in “life, liberty, and property,” following the original formula of John Locke (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Michigan).

Many state preambles adopt from the Federal Preamble the operative enacting language “do ordain and establish” (thirty-three states).

How all these words might be understood yet remains to be explored. But it appears that some degree of purposefulness went into the drafting and adopting of these state preambles, as was also the case with the U.S. Preamble. Furthermore, given their reliance on the Federal Preamble, it seems the states viewed it as having some substantive value and merit.

Nineteenth-century state courts had very little to say about their states’ constitutional preambles. Although litigants sometimes referenced their preamble to bolster legal arguments,[353] only a couple of state courts have relied on constitutional preambles to affirm their decisions. In Ex parte Martin, the Arkansas Supreme Court read into the state constitution a prohibition barring the taking of private property without just compensation.[354] “The preamble to the constitution of this State, declares the purpose of the people . . . in the ordaining of a constitution for their government, to secure to them and their posterity, the enjoyment of all the rights of life, liberty, and property, and the free pursuit of happiness.”[355] The court reasoned that these purposes—along with other purposes detailed in the constitution’s declaration of rights—imply that the taking of private property without just compensation is unconstitutional.[356] In short, the preamble was used to secure rights and decide an important constitutional question.

In Maine, in In re Opinion of the Justices, the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to decide whether the state legislature had the authority to pass laws enabling towns to tax citizens to assist the manufacturing efforts of private parties.[357] The court responded in the negative. In support of its reasoning, the court noted that the preamble corrals the powers of the legislature, “[a]ny object which cannot be classed under one or other of [the preamble’s purposes] is beyond the proper scope of legislation.”[358] Lawyers in the Jacobson case, as it was arising in Massachusetts, one of Maine’s sister states, could well have noted this language from the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, offering them some ground for arguing that at least in certain cases the power of a state legislature needs to be located within one of the objects set forth and adopted in the preamble to the state’s constitution.

In sum, preambles in state constitutions carried some legal status in the nineteenth century. People used them to guard against governments overstepping their roles or powers. If any government action contradicted the general principles announced in a preamble, it could be seen as ineffectual and even be deemed unconstitutional. Additionally, when drafting their state preambles, the states drew inspiration from the Federal Preamble, suggesting they viewed it as playing an important role in preserving constitutional restraints and protections.

II.  Limiting Jacobson’s Statements Regarding the Preamble

In light of the foregoing legal history of the Preamble, readers may be surprised, if not distressed, by the 7-2 majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.[359] In Jacobson, the Supreme Court, with minimal consideration and no written dissents, ignored and departed from the previously consistent applications and understandings of the Preamble as an important legal part of the Constitution. Whether intended this way or not, the typical upshot of Jacobson is found in a widely used student guide to the Constitution, which teaches: “it is worth noting that the Preamble itself, unlike the rest of the Constitution, is not regarded as part of the supreme law of the land. It is merely an introduction.”[360] Whatever else it may be, it is not merely an introduction.

To assess Jacobson’s precedential value with respect to the Preamble, this study now turns to an examination of what was actually argued in the briefs, in the District Court, in the Circuit Court, and in the Supreme Court.[361] Because this opinion has exerted seminal force in marginalizing the Preamble, the following analysis provides greater discussion of this case than has ever been given before. Because the legal status and meaning of the Preamble was not briefed or argued at all, and because the facts and issues actually addressed in Jacobson were deemed irrelevant to the Preamble, the Supreme Court’s Preamble language is dicta. The court has several options it could, and should, follow in limiting or clarifying the force and effect of its cursory paragraph about the Preamble found only on the opening page of this lengthy opinion.

A.  Facts and Arguments in Jacobson

In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a Massachusetts statute empowered any municipality, at its discretion, to “enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof, and shall provide them, with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit $5.”[362] On February 27, 1902, the Cambridge city board of health, acting under color of this statute, adopted a resolution to eliminate smallpox that read in part, “be it ordered, that all the inhabitants of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1st, 1897 be vaccinated or revaccinated.”[363] Henry Jacobson, the defendant, refused to be vaccinated. Consequently, he was indicted and found guilty by the Third District Court of Massachusetts for violating the regulation.[364] The district court ordered that “he stand committed until this sentence be performed” and that he pay the fivedollar fine.[365] The defendant appealed the ruling, and the case was brought before the Massachusetts Superior Court.

In superior court, the defendant made a plethora of superficial arguments in the hope that the court would accept one of them. He attempted to put forth evidence supporting a number of theories: vaccines can cause injury or death; it is impossible to know the results of a vaccine before it is given; the smallpox vaccine consists of introducing to the human system another disease known as cowpox; vaccines are ineffective at preventing the spread of contagious diseases; the defendant has previously endured extreme pain as a result of a vaccine; and the defendant’s son had suffered a number of adverse effects as a result of a vaccine.[366] However, the superior court ruled that all such facts were immaterial and excluded them.[367] The defendant also asked the court to give the jury the following instructions: “[t]hat section 137 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws is unconstitutional and void, and the refusal by defendant to comply with the requirements of the board of health here in evidence, constituted no offence [sic] . . . .[368] As support for this requested instruction, the defendant argued that the state statute upon which the Cambridge ordinance was based violated the

rights secured to the defendant by the preamble to the Constitution, . . . Article V[] of the amendments of the Constitution, . . . Article XIV[] of the amendments of the Constitution, . . . articles I, X, and XIV of Part the First of the Massachusetts Constitution, . . . [and] article IV of chapter one [of the Massachusetts Constitution].[369]

The defendant also argued four other reasons, including that it violated the spirit of the Massachusetts Constitution and that it was unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Massachusetts.[370] The superior court saw through the smoke and disregarded all of these arguments. They refused to give any of the requested instructions.[371] The defendant was found guilty,[372] and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.[373]

On appeal, the defendant’s assignment of errors repeated the same superficial claims from the lower court and asserted that the superior court erred in refusing to instruct the jury “that section 137 of the Revised Laws chapter 75, under which section said complaint was brought, was unconstitutional and void” because

said section is in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the preamble, . . . said section violates and infringes the rights secured to the defendant by article 5 of the amendments, . . . said section is in derogation of the rights secured by the defendant by article 14 of the amendments,
. . . [and] said section was repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States.[374]

Additionally, the defendant claimed the superior court erred in ruling that the facts the defendant offered to prove were immaterial. The defendant argued the facts were material because they demonstrated that the statute infringed on the defendant’s constitutional rights. Specifically, the defendant claimed the facts demonstrated a violation of “article 5 and section 1 of article 14 of the amendments of said Constitution” because the law was not applied equally to children and adults.[375]

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also saw through the smoke and rejected all of these arguments. It held, without commenting on or mentioning the preamble directly, that the act was constitutional and the facts the defendant wanted to prove were immaterial to the analysis.[376] The Supreme Judicial Court explained the act in question was enacted for the prevention of smallpox” and “[t]hat such an object is worthy of the intelligent thought and earnest endeavor of legislators is too plain for discussion.”[377] The court then held: “Under the police power there is general legislative authority to make laws for the common good. Article 4 of chapter 1 of the constitution of Massachusetts states more fully than most constitutions the nature of this power” and that “this power extends to the protection and preservation of the public health is not questioned.”[378] The court explained that “the liberty of the individual may be interfered with whenever the general welfare requires a course of proceedings to which certain persons object because of their peculiar opinions or special individual interests.”[379] Interestingly, in mentioning “liberty” and “general welfare,” the Massachusetts Supreme Court was implicitly balancing the impact of two key words in the Preamble to the United States Constitution. Regarding the defendant’s proffer of evidence, the court reasoned that even if experts would testify against the vaccination, the judge would still have “considered this testimony of experts in connection with the facts that for nearly a century most of the members of the medical profession have regarded vaccination, repeated after intervals, as preventative of small pox” and therefore, “if the defendant had been permitted to introduce such expert testimony as he had in support of these several propositions, it could not have changed the result.”[380] Thus the court ruled that there was “no reason for regarding the present statute as outside the legislative authority to enact it.”[381] In regards to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court simply held that the argument was “not well founded” and that “the statute is constitutional.”[382] The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the defendant’s brief to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued again that the statute was unconstitutional because “it is contrary to the preamble of the Constitution of the United States . . . .” and “it is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.”[383] However, despite the preamble’s prominent position at the beginning, it was mentioned only one other time in the defendant’s thirty-one page brief. Furthermore, there was no case law cited that related to the preamble of the Constitution and no affirmative argument made that the preamble possessed independent substantive authority to limit or expand government action. Instead, the brief focused heavily on the police power of the state and argued extensively that compulsory vaccination was not within the state’s police power.[384] Admittedly, within the defendant’s police power argument, he did rely on the Constitution; however, it is the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the preamble, that is quoted and used to defend his position.[385]

The one time the Preamble is mentioned, after the introduction, is short and is quoted here in full.

The preamble of the Constitution declares it to be one of the purposes of the instrument to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. Liberty of citizen in the very first analysis is immunity of his person from seizure or injury, except for the commission of an offence against the state, and the vaccination law of Massachusetts is a violation of his fundamental right to liberty as guaranteed to English speaking people from the Magna Charta, through the Constitution of the United States to the Fourteenth Amendment.[386]

It is evident from this quote that the argument for or against any independent substantive or other authority of the Preamble was not developed, or even argued, by the defendant. The defendant’s real constitutional arguments concerned the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was exclusively on this basis that the case was heard in federal court. The last sentence in the defendant’s brief asserts, “[a]s the Fourteenth Amendment has so often been appealed to for the protection of property, this plaintiff appeals to it with confidence for the protection of his freedom.”[387] The Preamble was only being used to inform the spirit or purpose of the Constitution in a way that would support the defendant’s position that was fully-debated in the briefsthat this vaccination law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

In response, Massachusetts, understanding what was being argued, offered no case law arguing or showing that the Preamble has no independent substantive authority to grant or restrict government action. Instead, Massachusetts responded to the Preamble argument made by the defendant, stating, “[i]t is no argument that the conviction was repugnant to the spirit or to the preamble of the constitution.”[388] Massachusetts then cites case law to explain that an appeal to the spirit of the Constitution would be fruitless and moved onto the real issues involving the Fourteenth Amendment and the state’s police power.

Appealing to the spirit of the Constitution and informing what that spirit is through the language of the Preamble is not tantamount to arguing that the Preamble grants or limits government authority. Although some language within the briefs may point to a substantive rights argument,[389] when taken as a whole, it quickly becomes apparent that neither party was so arguing. Indeed, the final sentence of the Massachusetts’ brief sums up the real argument in the case very well: “[s]ince the statute authorizing vaccination, the order of the board of health in conformity with the statute and the discretionary administration of the order, so far as appears, were all free from arbitrary or unequal operation, the judgment of the Superior Court of Massachusetts ought to be affirmed.”[390] The words arbitrary and unequal demonstrate that the gravamen of the argument was focused on the police power and the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, it can be concluded that the substantive authority of the preamble to grant rights or to limit government action was not fully debated in this case. Indeed, it was not debated in the briefs at all.[391] Any opining by the Court on the Preamble’s grant of rights or substantive governmental authority or power is thus appear to be dicta.

B.  The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court

Just as the briefs in Jacobson completely lacked any reasoned analysis of the legal status and functions of the Preamble, so Justice Harlan’s opinion itself also yields no indication that the legal roles, powers, or functions of the Preamble were ever materially considered. On several grounds, the statements in this opinion about the Preamble lack authority and should be discounted.

The opinion actually says very little about the Preamble. Only in its first two brief paragraphs is it even mentioned. Harlan’s opinion begins by summarily stating: “[w]e pass without extended discussion the suggestion that the particular section of the statute of Massachusetts now in question (section 137, chap. 75) is in derogation of rights secured by the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States.”[392] Indeed, the Court moved on with hardly any discussion at all. As has been demonstrated in the foregoing discussion, the mentioned “suggestion” was never truly advanced or developed in the briefs. More accurately, what the defendant had actually suggested was only that the Preamble supported his particular argument that the Massachusetts’s statute should be found in derogation of his rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.[393] Instead of addressing that supportive use of the Preamble, Harlan immediately and universally proclaimed:

Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States, or on of any of its departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution, and such as may be implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to that end by the United States, unless, apart from the preamble, it be found in some express delegation of power, or in some power to be properly implied therefrom.[394]

That this statement represents the opinion of Justice Harlan, and probably the Justices who joined him, cannot be doubted. However, this statement is problematic in several ways.

As shown above, never in any of the briefs or lower court opinions was it argued that the Preamble grants, or was needed to grant, substantive authority to the federal government in this case. Instead, the defendant argued that the Preamble informs the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict, not grant, the authority given to the government.[395] Harlan’s logic seems to be that because (A) the Supreme Court (like any other department of the United States government) must look to express power-granting sections of the Constitutions—such as Article III or the Fourteenth Amendment—to find federal power, and, in this case, to overturn a state statute, it then follows that (B) the Preamble can have nothing to do with Jacobson’s petition or, for that matter, neither can the Preamble have anything to do with any other case. But conclusion (B) does not follow from premise (A). The defendant was asserting that rights had been promised or secured to him by the Preamble, not that judicial powers needed to be found there by the federal court system.

Moreover, Harlan’s logic in this opening paragraph is circular. It assumes its conclusion and contains overstatements. It reasons that because the Preamble has (supposedly) never been seen in any way as a “source of any substantive power,” then any power to be exerted by the United States must be found in some other source of power in the body of the Constitution “apart from the preamble.”[396] But is it true that the Preamble “has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power,” or that it never might or should be so used?[397] Is it true that the Preamble is not a legal part of the Constitution from which powers to achieve its purposes can never be implied? In support of this premise, Harlan only selectively cites Joseph Story. But as has been explained above and will be mentioned below, Story’s lengthy discussion of the Preamble in his Commentaries of the Constitution does not fully support this questionable premise.[398] Furthermore, this is the only time that the Preamble is even mentioned in this opinion.[399]

Several observations and questions should and could have been explored and considered by the Court before speaking categorically about the Preambleabout what rights it may or may not grant; which purposes and roles it may or may not serve; how it might function to limit or aid in defining federal government authority and power; and under what circumstances the retained right of liberty secured by the Constitution can or cannot be restrained in this particular case. Consequently, the first half of Harlan’s opening paragraph regarding the Preamble goes beyond the scope of this case. As dicta it may be respected, but is not controlling.

Moreover, the holding regarding the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute did not require any discussion of the Preamble. It only required answers to the two questions that were actually argued:[400] (1) did its requirement of vaccination come within the authority of the state’s police power, and (2) did it contravene the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States?[401] These two questions are discussed in the rest of the Supreme Court’s lengthy Jacobson opinion.[402] In answering the first question, Justice Harlan concludes, “[a]ccording to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”[403] In framing the second question, Harlan explained, “[t]he possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community.”[404] Applying the facts of this case to the statements above, the Court ruled in favor of the state, holding that this statute was within its police power and that “this legislation has [not] invaded any right secured by the Federal Constitution.”[405]

Returning to Justice Harlan’s opening paragraph about the Preamble, he supports his view simply by citing generally one section (Section 462) from Joseph Story. However, other parts of Story’s treatise actually support the use of the Preamble in the way it was understood and used in the briefs, especially by the defendant Jacobson. In Section 459, Story says, “the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished.”[406] In Section 460, he explains:

There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, as stated in the preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has been constantly referred to by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its provisions.[407]

In Section 462, after the line quoted by Harlan, Story continued: “[The Preamble] can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred . . . .[408] Far from attempting to remove the Preamble from a position of importance in constitutional analysis and interpretation, Story advanced the idea that the Preamble can enlighten one’s understanding of the framer’s intentions and should be used in several ways on par with any other section of the Constitution in deciphering the meanings of provisions within the Constitution as a whole, including the Fourteenth Amendment.

Somewhat ironically, Justice Harlan himself supports this general interpretive proposition when he uses the preamble of the Massachusetts Constitution within the Jacobson opinion. Five pages into the text of the opinion, in explaining the police power and that appropriate restrictions on liberty are necessary to live within a society, Harlan supports his ruling by stating:

In the Constitution of Massachusetts adopted in 1780 it was laid down as a fundamental principle of the social compact that the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good, and that government is instituted “for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interests of any one man, family, or class of men.” The good and welfare of the commonwealth, of which the legislature is primarily the judge, is the basis on which the police power rests in Massachusetts.[409]

Here, Harlan quotes the Massachusetts preamble, as well as other sections, of the Massachusetts Constitution. Not using this state preamble to grant any government entity substantive authority, he instead uses it to support his opinion regarding the contours of Massachusetts’s police power. At the same time, neither did the defendant attempt to use the federal Preamble to grant any government entity substantive authority, but to support his view of the contours of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, Harlan’s supportive use of the preamble of the Massachusetts Constitution is similar to the defendant’s desired use of the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution. It would seem that this use by Harlan cuts against his opening dismissal of any possible legal use of the Preamble in defining and limiting the powers of the government its constitution controls.

In the second paragraph of the Jacobson opinion, Justice Harlan added one passing comment about the “spirit of the Constitution,” saying:

We also pass without discussion the suggestion that the above section of the statute is opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, as observed by Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court in Sturges v. Crowninshield, “the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not less than its letter; yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words.” We have no need in this case to go beyond the plain, obvious meaning of the words in those provisions of the Constitution which, it is contended, must control our decision.[410]

But Harlan’s dismissive statement here assumes that, when John Marshall spoke of “its words,” Marshall meant to exclude the words of the Preamble and consider only the words found “in those provisions” in the Articles of the Constitution. Once again, Harlan’s reading is historically dubious.[411] While it is true that any court’s decision should strive to look chiefly to “the plain, obvious meaning of the words in those provisions . . . which . . . must control [that case],[412] it is not self-evident which collection of “words” and “provisions” bear on that decision or not, and how much weight each word should be given.

Moreover, later in the opinion, when Harlan needed to define “the liberty secured by the Constitution,” he made sure that liberty was not understood as “an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint,” but must be restrained “for the common good . . . in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.”[413] Without Harlan saying so, it would appear, somewhat ironically, that he found his authority for this understanding of liberty in the Preamble’s communitarian promotion of common goods and of the general welfare.

Perhaps most controlling of all, Harlan himself restricted the scope of his holding in Jacobson, although this important language is completely overlooked by those who wish to see in Jacobson a controlling precedent. In his final paragraph, Justice Harlan states: “[w]e now decide only that the statute covers the present case, and that nothing clearly appears that would justify this court in holding it to be unconstitutional and inoperative in its application to the plaintiff in error.”[414] Even though this concluding statement seems to be aimed at limiting this holding to this one petitioner in this one statutory matter, this restricting language has achieved no such effect regarding the received perception of the Preamble’s non-binding legal status.

Unconvinced or uncomfortable, two of Justices, Brewer and Peckham, dissented, but filed no dissenting opinion. Thus, it is unknown whether they found the compulsory vaccination law to be unreasonable as applied to Jacobson or thought that the majority’s dismissal of the Preamble was premature and preemptive. Because the reasonableness of the statute was strongly supported throughout the opinion, one might suspect that their concerns involved the larger constitutional issues arising out of Harlan’s cursory statements about the Preamble.

C.  Judicial Options for Limiting Jacobson’s Statements About the Preamble

Having shown above that Justice Harlan’s opening language in Jacobson is flawed, if not meaningless, one must consider what options the Supreme Court has today in clarifying or rectifying this past situation. In attempting to avoid or overcome one of its past precedents, the Court has several options: (1) it can narrow the precedent or distinguish it;[415] (2) overturn it; or (3) declare it to be dicta (and thus of no precedential value to begin with).[416] Each of these options can be used at the Court’s discretion with varying amounts of pushback and social costs. While overturning a case can be quite dramatic and lead to sweeping changes in the legal community, distinguishing a case on the facts or identifying a statement as dicta can be done with little to no ripple effect. In an effort to demonstrate the paths the Court can take with its language in Jacobson, the following Section considers each of these options using examples from the Court’s own jurisprudence.

Narrowing the interpretation of past precedent happens when the Court simply “declines to apply a precedent, even though, in the court’s own view, the precedent is best read to apply.”[417] In Boumediene v. Bush,[418] the Court reviewed Johnson v. Eisentrager’s broad language, which explained that the writ of habeas corpus is not a right granted to a foreign combatant who “at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.”[419] While accepting that Eisentrager informed the analysis by applying, what they perceived as, its rule, the Boumediene Court held that Eisentrager was not a categorical bar against habeas corpus claims by foreign combatants on foreign soil.[420] Instead, they viewed the geographical location language in Eisentrager as one of the “practical considerations” of the time period.[421] When looking at practical considerations in Boumediene, the Court came to the opposite conclusion and held habeas corpus did apply to foreign combatants who had not been within the territorial jurisdiction.[422] This is a clear example of the Court taking straightforward language from a previous case, acknowledging that the best reading of the precedent points to a certain outcome,[423] and then refusing to reach that outcome in its application of identical facts.[424] It is possible that the Court could narrow Jacobson’s words that the Preamble is not a “source of any substantive power” so that this language only applies to cases where the Preamble is being used to expand the federal government’s enumerated powers or the powers of any of its departments, as granted expressly in the Constitution.

Distinguishing occurs when the Court does not apply past precedent because certain facts in the case make the best reading of the precedent inapplicable.[425] For example, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court rejected the proposition that a regulatory taking fell under the same analysis as a physical taking.[426] The Court explained, “[t]his longstanding distinction between acquisition of property for public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory taking, and vice versa.”[427] The Court here did not attempt to apply past precedent, as it normally does when it is narrowing; rather, it simply stated that the facts of the case do not fit within the precedent’s framework and disregarded it completely. Distinguishing Jacobson from most other cases in a similar manner would not be difficult, because the case can be easily limited to its facts regarding due process, state legislation, and police powers. But if the problematic language is going to be easily distinguished in virtually all cases, little value remains in retaining it, without further clarification of some kind.

Overturning a case is the Court’s most extreme option. In these cases, the Court does not attempt to navigate around the past precedent but simply rejects it and deems it no longer controlling. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court addressed the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty upon defendants who had committed a capital crime while they were juveniles.[428] The court acknowledged that it had previously addressed this question in Stanford v. Kentucky[429] and had deemed the practice constitutional.[430] However in Roper, the Court explained that Stanford “should be deemed no longer controlling on this issue” because times had changed.[431] Thus, the holding in Stanford is no longer binding or good law. This approach would not cleanly apply to Jacobson, since it correctly found that the Cambridge board of health had taken reasonable care and exercised amply due process in issuing its vaccination ordinance. Therefore, the outcome of that case need not be overturned.

Regarding dicta, when the Supreme Court expressly or implicitly rejects dicta, it becomes “dead dicta” and has no more controlling or persuasive authority.[432] In United States v. Salerno, the court identified and expressly rejected dicta from one of its earlier cases, Stack v. Boyle.[433] In Salerno, the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act was challenged because it allowed a judge to take into account a defendant’s future dangerousness when setting bail.[434] Historically, a judge could set the bail amount based only on the flight risk a defendant posed and the Court, in Stack, had endorsed that limitation. The Stack court stated that “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”[435] In rejecting that language, the Court in Salerno explained:

While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts’ role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dictum in Stack v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater than that necessary to ensure the arrestees’ presence at trial.[436]

Here the Court not only identifies and rejects its dicta in a previous case, it explains why it qualified as dicta. The language went beyond the specific question presented, and consequently the language was not controlling when the “very point [was] presented for a decision.”[437] In finding language to be dicta, the Court does not use language in a previous opinion to get around a problematical precedent, but essentially holds that the precedent does not exist. The Supreme Court has explained, “[w]e are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated.”[438] Chief Justice Marshall established this point early on in Supreme Court jurisprudence when he stated,

[i]t is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.[439]

Statements within Supreme Court opinions that are found to be dicta are not controlling in subsequent cases if the point had not been “fully debated” or if the statement goes “beyond the case.” All of this applies to the Preamble language in Jacobson, since the issue was clearly raised by the parties in their briefs, but was not dealt with at all, let alone fully debated.

Dicta from the Supreme Court can also be “killed” by lower courts. In Bartkus v. Illinois, a defendant challenged his conviction on double jeopardy grounds.[440] He had been charged for the same crime under a federal and state robbery statute, but the Court rejected the claim under the dual sovereignty exception.[441]

However, after doing so, the Court went onto state:

The record . . . does not support the claim that the State of Illinois in bringing its prosecution was merely a tool of the federal authorities, who thereby avoided the prohibition . . . against a retrial of a federal prosecution after an acquittal. It does not sustain a conclusion that the state prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another federal prosecution.[442]

This language implied that if there had indeed been facts showing a “sham” prosecution, then the dual sovereignty exception may not have applied. Subsequent to this ruling, multiple circuit courts rejected the sham exception dicta. The Seventh Circuit stated its rejection poignantly, when it explained, “[i]n Bartkus the Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested that it would be impermissible for one sovereign to use the other as a tool to bring a successive prosecution, thereby making the second persecution a sham and a cover for the first prosecution . . . . [W]e have uniformly rejected such [a statement.]”[443] Multiple other circuits have also recognized this Court’s language as dicta and have declined to follow it.[444] Consequently, the effect of dicta—even Supreme Court dicta as in Jacobson—can be eliminated by a sufficient number of lower courts.

III.  The Preamble in the Twentieth Century

A.  Jacobson in the Federal Courts

Though Jacobson has been cited in a number of prominent Supreme Court cases,[445] the dicta concerning the Preamble and its place in constitutional jurisprudence has rarely been referenced explicitly or reinforced overtly.[446] More specifically, the Supreme Court rarely, if ever, has cited Jacobson for the idea that the Preamble cannot be used to make sense of the Constitution’s enumerated powers and limitations. To the contrary, members of the Court somewhat regularly—albeit often in dissenting and concurring opinions—mention the Preamble as if it can be used in support of their opinions or views.[447]

In lower courts, however, some opinions have cited Jacobson. Some cite its dicta in passing, while others discuss the role of the Preamble in adjudication more generally. All of these cases seem to treat Jacobson’s dicta as controlling authority, but most courts do not see Jacobson’s dismissal of the Preamble as useless rhetoric. Rather, they acknowledge Jacobson to argue that the Preamble does not confer any substantive powers on the federal government. Given the overall thesis that the Preamble does not grant substantive powers, but still may serve other legal roles, these circuit court opinions do not detract from our overall thesis.

Most cases that cite Jacobson usually use it to dismiss an argument that the Preamble somehow confers substantive powers or individual rights. For example, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court reasoned that Congress is a body endowed only with enumerated powers.[448] The Constitution’s drafters were careful when deciding what powers to give and not give Congress; they “made no grant of authority to Congress to legislate substantively for the general welfare, and no such authority exists, save as the general welfare may be promoted by the exercise of the powers which are granted.”[449] Though the Court cited Jacobson in support of this proposition, it did little more to expound on the Preamble’s relevancy.

In Tinsley v. Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc., the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional claim. “According to Tinsley, Methodist Hospital denied her the ‘Blessings of Liberty’ and infringed her ‘general Welfare,’ thereby violating her constitutional rights.[450] But, according to this court, the Preamble “does not guarantee any rights; instead, it describes the goals and aspirations behind the text of the Constitution.”[451] The text of the Constitution, and not the Preamble, is the source of rights or restraints. Again, Jacobson served as nothing more than case support for the court’s limited analysis.

Jacobson has also been referenced to support a limited reading of state constitutional preambles. For example, in In re Opinion of the Justices, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts responded to a request from the legislature regarding the constitutionality of pending legislation prohibiting married women from public service employment.[452] The court ultimately declared such laws were generally not constitutional, but before doing so, it addressed the specific question of whether the Preamble barred the state legislature from enacting the prohibitions.[453] “Without considering whether the Preamble constitutes either a grant of power or a limitation upon its exercise,” the justices quickly dismissed the question in the negative, in part relying on Jacobson and reasoning that “no grant of power or limitation thereon is to be found in the Preamble that is not embodied in the other provisions of the Constitution.”[454]

A few other courts have referred to Jacobson, but likewise do so only in passing.[455]

Two of the more prominent cases in which Jacobson is discussed and expounded upon are United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co. and Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing Board. In Kinnebrew, the deciding court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the National Industry Recovery Act. Under that Act, the President was vested with the power to establish codes fixing the prices of certain goods.[456] One such code established the price at which new cars could be sold, and Kinnebrew, an auto dealer, had allegedly sold a car at a different price.[457] The court ultimately concluded that the enforced code represented an exercise of “power not possessed by Congress nor contemplated by Congress in the National Industry Recovery Act.”[458] Ruling in the defendant’s favor, the court relied on Jacobson to reject the government’s argument that the Welfare Clause of the Preamble gave Congress certain powers. Speaking frankly, the court declared that there was “no such thing as the ‘Welfare Clause’ of the Constitution.”[459] Although the Preamble states that the Constitution was established to “Promote the general Welfare,” the court noted that in the Jacobson, the Supreme Court had rejected the idea that the Preamble could be supply the government with substantive powers.[460] And to the court, Jacobson’s Preamble analysis was more than just dicta; it “is the accepted construction placed upon the Preamble to the Constitution by our highest court.[461]

The Hockett court took a similar approach to the Preamble and Jacobson. There, the plaintiff alleged that a controversial “Home Rule Amendment,” which allowed local municipalities to regulate liquor, was unconstitutional.[462] As part of his argument, the plaintiff argued that the Welfare Clause of the Preamble nullified the amendment.[463] The court flatly disagreed with the plaintiff; it was “unable to find a single citation or authority which would authorize any court to declare any statute or provision of any state Constitution invalid because the same was held contrary and repugnant to the preamble of the federal Constitution.”[464] To the court, the Preamble was nothing more than a “generic” statement of “the great cardinal purposes of government.”[465] The court cited a number of authorities in support of this conclusion, including Jacobson, before concluding, “inasmuch as we have no delegation or denial of power in the preamble, how can it be said that any exercise of governmental power by the state by virtue of its state Constitution can be violative of any grant of power or denial of power in the preamble of the federal Constitution?[466] What follows is a discussion regarding the “spirit” of the Constitution, but suffice it to say that the court was unconvinced that the Preamble could be used to restrict the application of state constitutional amendments.

In Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, Jacobson was cited to support the court’s related, but independent, analysis. Defending against plaintiffs’ claims that certain orders passed in accordance with the National Industrial Recovery Act were unconstitutional, the government—in related actions—argued that its exercise of power was, among other things, “an exercise of the inherent power of the national government to accomplish the purposes set forth in the Preamble.”[467] The court dismantled this argument:

It would hardly seem necessary to demonstrate the fallacy of the claim that there is any inherent or general power unmentioned in the Constitution to accomplish the purposes set forth in the preamble to that instrument. It would seem perfectly apparent that the objects set forth in the preamble were intended by the fathers to be attained through the exercise of the powers granted to the national government in the Constitution; otherwise the national government is not one of limited delegated powers, but of unlimited powers, with Congress free to accomplish the purposes set out in the preamble in whatever way may appeal to the judgment of that body. Of course, the statement of this proposition carries with it its own refutation.[468]

Jacobson alone was then cited and quoted in support of this reasoning.[469]

While the foregoing survey of lower court usage of Jacobson seems to strengthen the precedential mandate of that case, it is remarkable that Jacobson has been conveniently ignored, rather than distinguished or overruled, in at least nine Supreme Court opinions since 1946, especially prominently in Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the Preamble added value to the Court’s opinion, but it was not discussed specifically.[470] In Douglas’s Doe v. Bolton concurrence, the Preamble was invoked as potentially speaking of certain rights that should be protected by the Ninth Amendment.[471] Although used most often in dissenting opinions, such references to the Preamble have not been thought to be precluded by Jacobson, as it is often not mentioned in these cases.[472] In certain cases, the Preamble serves in a role that goes beyond merely interpreting the meaning of other provisions in the body of the Constitution.[473] And this same pattern of simply ignoring Jacobson also appears in federal circuit court opinions[474] and district court opinions.[475] This vacuum may explain the sparse but steady stream of articles advocating possible substantive uses for the Preamble, based on its venerable history and utility, Jacobson notwithstanding.

B.  Legal Scholarship and the Preamble

In the aftermath of the overstatement of Jacobson in 1905, the Preamble has fared a better in the scholarly literature than it has in court, although not at first. As early as 1929, Willoughby’s treatise on Constitutional law absolutely stated “[t]hat the Preamble may not be resorted to as a source of Federal authority is so well established as scarcely to need the citation of authorities,” echoing the familiar line that its only value arises “in cases of ambiguity, where the intention of the framers does not clearly and definitely appear.”[476]

But after the heyday of the New Deal and the victories in World War II, people were beginning to expect something more from the Preamble, especially on the eve of the Civil Rights era. In 1953, Crosskey saw through the implications of empty rhetoric when he rightly observed: “[t]he suggestion that the preamble is ‘universally regarded as an empty verbal flourish’ seems plainly wrong.”[477] By the mid-1960s, many people had begun asking, “[w]ho are the ‘“People’” at the top of the Preamble?”[478]

Yet it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that a first wave of productive thinking began to roll in about the Preamble. In 1985, Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction began to be a little more encouraging and permissive about welcoming use of the Preamble. Although cautionary reservations and Jacobson’s dictum were not far behind: “When considering the purpose of the legislation, purposes stated in the preamble are entitled to weight, although they are not conclusive. . . . The function of the preamble is to supply reasons and explanations and not to confer power or determine rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope or effect of a statute,”[479] but “in case any doubt arises in the enacted part, the preamble may be resorted to help discover the intention of the law maker.”[480] Nevertheless, during the bicentennial of the drafting of the Constitution, instead of seeing the Preamble as the main interpretive guide to the purposes of the Constitution, a 1987 book argued that the Constitution must be understood in light of principles of the Declaration of Independence.[481]

By the early 1990s, the Cold War had ended and all the states in the former Soviet Union and its spheres of influence were vigorously engaged in the process of drafting and adopting constitutions. The developments of that time may have spawned a cluster of articles recognizing the foundational relevance and formative potentials of the Preamble. The first of this quartet was a remarkable plea in 1990 by Milton Handler and his coauthors for courts and legal authors to think again about the relevance and materiality of the Preamble. This legacy article, written by an emeritus law professor and two coauthors, argued that “the fate of the preamble in constitutional jurisprudence is inexplicably anomalous when compared to the well-established interpretive significance accorded preambles and preamble-like provisions in the construction of other legal instruments.”[482] Suggesting that all readers of the Constitution—whether explicit language “interpretivists,” ethical “contextualists,” or historical “originalists”—should find a common-law approach to the Preamble to be congenial, this dynamic and elastic approach would allow for “inclusion and exclusion, expansion and contraction, case-by-case determination” to “cope with new problems, arising at different times under ever-changing conditions and circumstances.”[483]

Despite these authors’ probing look at Jacobson, at the use of preambles in contracts and treaties, the principles and spirit of statutory construction, early American directives for construing the Constitution, and into some applications in four Constitutional areas, their conclusion, however, fades: “[i]f the preamble to the Constitution were given the status we advocate, the course of our constitutional jurisprudence would not change drastically,” for the Preamble makes no demands but simply “serves as a signpost, marking the course of constitutional common law.”[484] While the authors may have thought that this cautious understatement was necessary at that time to even get a foothold into the minds of people who thought that the classic statement in Jacobson rendered the Preamble completely insubstantial, it also might explain why this article did little to move the Preamble out of its relegated obscurity.

That same year, however, a stronger argument appeared, arguing for the concept of “unalienable right” as the footing beneath the Preamble and the spirit of the entire Constitution.[485]

Then two years later in 1992, Dan Himmelfarb produced a substantial work, concluding that “the best view probably lies somewhere between the ‘legal realist’ and ‘constitutional common law’ extremes (though closer to the former).[486] Himmelfarb’s treatment embraces Jacobson and favors a limited, non-originalist, role for the Preamble. He argued that the unique procedural stature of the Preamble makes it substantively unique and so different from the remainder of the document that it cannot be said to grant substantive rights.[487] His survey of the basic historical documents led him to conclude that the framers “gave little thought to the preamble,” which was neither debated nor voted on by the delegates of the Constitutional convention,[488] which means that that the drafters viewed it as something different from the actual Constitution.[489] He also argued that the Preamble is too vague to be of any use in interpretation, although recognizing that its phrases are just as “abstract and open-ended as the due process and equal protection clauses.”[490] Offering an extensive survey of the ways in which all of the phrases of the Preamble have been variously construed by courts, Himmelfarb saw the Preamble as having little value. Its terms are so broad that they “can be used to support both sides of almost any constitutional issue. This is so not only because the Preamble’s language is so abstract and open-ended, and hence susceptible of more than one plausible interpretation, but also because the six objects of government enumerated in the preamble are often in conflict.”[491] While the readings promoted by this article are not always persuasive, this study served a cautionary role in encouraging the many countries adopting constitutions at that time to be deliberate and explicit in the formulation and adoption of their naturally influential preambles.

Not dissuaded by any potential weaknesses in the Preamble, another article appeared the year later attempting to make strong use of the Preamble’s mention of “posterity” in opposing Roe v. Wade.[492] In 2000, a second article on the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment began to expand the Preamble’s value, seeing in it (in conjunction with specific amendments or provision) non-enumerated rights of the people, specifically rights of privacy.[493] Its author, Eric M. Axler, acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding in Jacobson, while he (for the first time) questioned its validity.

In 2005, still deep in national traumas of 9/11, an article by Dean McGrath turned to the Preamble for power in mobilizing the war on terror.[494] In his article, McGrath emphasized that the Preamble provides useful insights into the aspirations of the Founders that can “guide our government in the use of its enumerated powers.”[495] As the war on terrorism then took the battle for freedom into political arenas in war-torn and politically unstable areas of the world, interest soared in preambles and their role in stabilizing popular, national governmentsLiav Orgad’s groundbreaking work on preambles in comparative constitutional law appeared in 2010,[496] followed soon by Justin Frosini’s treatise on the political and legal roles of preambles in constitutions around the world.[497]

At home in 2013, the health care battle raged, and liberal causes generally turned to the Declaration of the Independence—but also to the Preamble—for liberal equality.[498] Also that year, Kenneth Shuster, in an article discussing American’s right to health care, argued that a government attempting to bring about the Preamble’s mandatory purposes could not fail to provide health care for its citizenry.[499]

After the opening of the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, with the words of the Preamble prominently lettered on its towering front wall, the tide seems to have shifted somewhat toward a recognition of stronger roles for Preamble. A recent three-part essay by Erwin Chemerinksy and Michael Stokes Paulsen about the Preamble, posted on the Center’s interactive text about the Preamble, may yet be strengthened, but still is helpful. For each of them, the Preamble embodies more than just “aspirations,” and the word “Preamble” means more than “an opening rhetorical flourish or frill without meaningful effect.”[500]  As they both agree, “[t]he boundaries of what may be said and done in the name of the Constitution are marked by the words, phrases, and structure of the document itself,” and they find little reason why the words of the Preamble, as part of the wording of the Constitution, should not be included in Constitutional analysis, as much as any other part of the Constitution.[501] Chemerinsky rightly laments that the Preamble’s role as a guide “has been largely ignored” and “overlooked,” but he concedes that Jacobson has firmly held that no laws can “be challenged or declared unconstitutional based on the Preamble” and that the Supreme Court has actually “denied its relevance to constitutional law.”[502] Paulsen sees even less daylight for the Preamble, other than in its formal role in enacting the written body of the Constitution by the people and in its limited legal force in assisting in interpreting the specific powers listed in the Articles.[503]

While differing on the exact role the phrases of the Preamble should play, scholars and many others agree that “[i]f the Preamble is read carefully and taken seriously, basic constitutional values can be found within it that should guide the interpretation of the Constitution.”[504] While contrary opinions exist, legal scholars in increasing numbers are expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of current use of the Preamble in constitutional interpretation. It has more valuable and important roles than are currently assigned or availed of by the courts, in the United States as well as abroad.

C.  Preambles in Comparative Constitutional Law

As Liav Orgad has rightly noted—and as this Article has sought to make clear—despite the Preamble’s legendary status, it has largely been ignored in the study of constitutional theory and interpretation.[505] But though ignored domestically, the Preamble has served as a template for several constitutional preambles across the globe.[506] And often, these prologues are substantively utilized in constitutional analysis. The following comparative constitutional survey suggests similar possibilities for the U.S. Preamble.

The United States was the first country to adopt a written constitution, let alone one with a preamble.[507] Of the almost 200 constitutions in nations around the world today, only about thirty-five have no preamble.[508] In many of these countries, preambles are not only used to aid courts in the task of constitutional interpretation, but serve as a source for un-enumerated rights.[509] A few questions can and should be asked regarding the preambles of other countries: Are they similar to the U.S. Preamble? Can these numerous preambles be categorized? Do these categorizations shape how preambles are viewed by adjudicative bodies? What sort of weight are preambles given by countries’ constitutional courts? Though the answers to these questions do not create legal mandates for how the United States should treat its Preamble, they give reason to reconsider the Preamble’s possible roles in federal constitutional law.

While it is clear that the United States Constitution has exerted influence in many countries, it is difficult to conclude how many preambles follow or share language found in the U.S. Preamble.[510] “We the People” is the most common phrase among preambles (found in 14.7% of all preambles).[511] “Establish justice” is used in the preambles of Iraq and Spain; “blessing of liberty” or “secure the blessings of liberty” appears in Argentina, Bhutan, Ghana, and Japan; the preambles of Argentina. Bhutan, the Philippines, and Venezuela use “ordain” as the performative verb of enactment. Many other close similarities can be found (e.g., many preambles include the word “justice”). While it is hard to categorize and capture all such relationships, the Preamble seems to be taken as an integral part of the substance of the Constitution when it is being used as a model.

Preambles vary significantly in length, language, and purpose. For example, the preamble of Greece is merely eighteen words.[512] In contrast, Iran’s preamble stretches on for 3,002 words.[513] Some preambles refer heavily to deity.[514] Others read as historical narratives.[515] Given this variety, it is difficult to categorize preambles.

That being said, a few attempts at classification have been made. Liav Orgad has grouped preambles into five categories: 1) preambles that concern the concept of sovereignty; 2) preambles that contain a historical narrative; 3) preambles that describe supreme goals; 4) preambles that establish national identity; and 5) preambles that discuss deity.[516] And Justin Frosini has categorized preambles into the following groups: 1) preambles that serve as a gateway of entry for other sources of law; 2) preambles that stress the sovereignty of the people; 3) preambles that establish the form of state and form of government; 4) preambles rich in historical references; 5) preambles that reference God; and 6) preambles that establish territorial identity.[517] As Professor Frosini rightly notes, many preambles will fall into multiple categories,[518] not only due to ambiguity but also because some clearly serve more than one of these purposes. He adds, “[t]he truth of the matter is that these classifications are useful for knowing more about what preambles contain, but their usefulness essentially stops there,”[519] for it does not appear that a preamble’s language or length significantly shapes what weight preambles are given by societies and courts.[520]

Though a preamble’s classification may do little to uncover its relevancy to the courts, some of their identifiable functions are clearly substantively legal. A review of select countries’ constitutional decisions quickly reveals that some courts place significant legal emphasis on preambles in deciding questions of constitutionality, and that “preambles do not simply contain flowery introductory language, but are present to remind the reader why the constitution was approved in the first place.”[521]

1.  South Africa

South Africa’s current constitution was adopted in 1996, replacing the 1993 interim constitution. The newer constitution contains a provision that requires courts to “promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” when interpreting the Bill of Rights.[522] A similar aim is discussed in the 1996 and 1993 preambles,[523] and both preambles have been given authoritative weight by the South African Constitutional Court.[524] For example, in Mhlungu—referencing the 1993 preamble—Justice Sachs stated:

The Preamble in particular should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational and throat-clearing exercise of little interpretive value. It connects up, reinforces and underlies all of the text that follows. It helps to establish the basic design of the Constitution and indicate its fundamental purposes.[525]

In Makwanyane, where the court struck down capital punishment as unconstitutional, the court reaffirmed this principle:

In broad terms, the function given to this court by the Constitution is to articulate the fundamental sense of justice and right shared by the whole nation as expressed in the text of the Constitution. . . . The preamble, postamble and the principles of freedom and equality espoused in sections 8, 33 and 35 of the Constitution, require such an amplitude of vision.[526]

South Africa’s preamble sets forth a paramount agenda for the government. The constitutional court will no doubt be asked in future cases to measure the strengths and weaknesses of many claims based on its mandates. Those opinions may well show how preambles can be judicially used for controlling legal guidance in developing an explicit and more perfecting preamble jurisprudence.

2.  Germany

Although the preamble to Gundgesetz, the constitution of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany), plays a lesser role in German constitutional interpretation, it has been used to support court holdings. Quite early in its history, the German Court held that the Basic Law’s preamble was binding and justiciable law. In 1956, for instance, the Court held the concluding line of this preamble, which called upon “the entire German people . . . to accomplish, by free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany”[527] to constitute a formal “reunification command” (Wiedervereinigungsgebot) that was binding on all organs of government.[528] In 1973, the Court clarified that the preamble required the federal government to make reunification an explicit, non-negotiable aim of its foreign policy.[529] Even before the Berlin Wall came down, the Court similarly invoked the preamble in support of its holding that anyone holding German citizenship in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was a “German citizen” under the West German constitution as well.[530]

Although German reunification is now a well-established fact, the Court continues to invoke the preamble as binding law in other contexts such as European integration. In 2009, the Court referenced the preamble and thereby reasoned that it was the will of the German people to be part of the EU. Relevant language in the preamble included: “not only the moral basis of responsible self-determination but also the willingness to serve world peace as an equal partner of a united Europe.”[531] Relying on that language, the Court determined that Germany’s constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon (clarifying and solidifying the basis for the European Union) were not in conflict, alieving Germany of the need to pursue a constitutional amendment.[532]

3.  India

The Supreme Court of India has regularly turned to its preamble to make sense of its constitution. When the preamble was adopted, one of the members of the Assembly, Thakurdas Bhargava, famously said, “[t]he Preamble is the most precious part of the Constitution. It is the soul of the Constitution. It is a key to the Constitution. It is a jewel set in the Constitution.”[533]

As a general rule of interpretation, India’s Supreme Court has announced that “if the terms used in any of the articles in the Constitution are ambiguous or are capable of two meanings, in interpreting them some assistance may be sought in the objectives enshrined in the preamble.”[534] In the lengthy opinion of Kesavananda, the court detailed the basic structures of the constitution en route to holding that constitutional amendments were subject to judicial review.[535] As part of his opinion, Chief Justice Sikri contrasted statutory preambles in general with the Constitution’s preamble:

Regarding the use which can be made of the preamble in interpreting an ordinary statute, there is no doubt that it cannot be used to modify the language if the language of the enactment is plain and clear. If the language is not plain and clear, then the preamble may have effect either to extend or restrict the language used in the body of an enactment. . . .

We are, however, not concerned with the interpretation of an ordinary statute. As Sir Alladi Krishnaswami, a most eminent lawyer said, “so far as the Preamble is concerned, though in an ordinary statute we do not attach any importance to the Preamble, all importance has[] to be attached to the Preamble in a Constitutional statute.” Our Preamble outlines the objectives of the whole Constitution. It expresses “what we had thought or dreamt for so long.”[536]

The Chief Justice continued: “[i]t seems to me that the Preamble of our Constitution is of extreme importance and the Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble vision expressed in the Preamble.”[537]

Although foreign judicial decisions such as these do not bind the courts of the United States, the fact that so many countries find value and responsibility in emphasizing the preamble in their constitutional jurisprudence gives good reason for the people of the United States to pause and ask if federal and state courts in the United States might not do well to follow suit. Claimants and litigants should have confidence in making well-reasoned arguments based on the Preamble and on the meanings of its words as recognized by historical considerations, ordinary language analysis, and established judicial precedents. Such argumentation style is common around the globe. There is no reason it should not become more welcomed and commonplace in America, of all places, where the idea of a constitutional preamble was born.

IV.  Taking the Preamble More Seriously

The impetus behind this article was to critique the 1905 Supreme Court decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts and how it has been generally interpreted. For many reasons, including those which that court could have and should have thought of, its dicta that the Preamble makes no substantive legal contribution to the Constitution should be expressly corrected and counteracted. Its oft-quoted mantra should not be allowed to chill the numerous important legal uses that the Preamble was intended to serve in Constitutional law and politics.

There can be no question that the Preamble has been largely ignored, and it is rarely cited or discussed in legal literature. As Akhil Amar has lamented, “[t]he modern Supreme Court has had almost nothing to say about the Preamble, and modern law students likewise skate past this text with Olympic speed. Earlier generations paid far more attention to the document’s grand opening.”[538] “By lavishing some fifty pages on a single constitutional sentence,” Amar hoped, as do I, “to restore the Preamble to its proper place as the Founder’s foundation.”[539] It is much more than window-dressing, empty rhetoric, or vague aspirational idealism. This study has so demonstrated, using a number of approaches: historical; textual; political; judicial; linguistic; religious; rhetorical; and comparative.

A.  Legal Roles of the Preamble in Constitutional Law

Throughout this article, several possible legal roles for the Preamble have been identified or intimated. Some are obvious, others not so obvious. Some were intended by the framers, others have come to light as times and needs have changed. The possibility of actualizing any of these legal roles exposes the short-shrift given to the Preamble by the Jacobson court. Briefly drawn together, the Preamble can and should serve many legal functions.

In a clarifying or interpretive role, it serves as “a signpost, marking the course of constitutional common law.” All words in the Constitution are potentially ambiguous; they need context and purpose in order for their meanings to be discerned and for the living spirit of Constitution to be “construed dynamically.”[540] Where else is that spirit and its principles to be found except in the Preamble?

At the same time, each term in the Constitution must at some point also be constrained. Definitions—by definition—must go far enough, but not too far. The Preamble establishes a defining list of purposes that restrain how constitutional powers should or should not be applied in order to accomplish the purposes of the Constitution. As a mission statement, the Preamble sets forth the overriding purposes and undergirding foundations for the government of the United States of America, stating what the nation as a whole stands for.

In the Preamble’s limiting function, any interpretation of any section of the Constitution not consonant with this key should be resisted. In this regard, the Preamble limits what can be done. These tasks, and no more, are the duties that the federal government is charged to accomplish, and the people have committed themselves to support.

Because all the purposes set forth in the Preamble are, in theory, equally important, the Preamble also sets forth the elements of a legally balancing function. Public actions in support of one of the Preamble’s purposes should not to impinge unnecessarily or improperly on its other purposes. Just as every word of the Constitution carries weight, so does every word of the Preamble.

Recognizing that polarization is natural in the world—hot and cold, left and right, states and union, the individual and the majority—the Preamble sets out to harmonize a matrix of competing civic virtues and values. Its more perfect union embraces both defense and welfare, justice and compassion, individual liberty and general order, present needs and future well-being, inherent rights and legislative determinations. This coalescing is found in the connective tissues, channels, and bridges implicit in the Preamble.

Serving a uniting function, the Preamble puts in first place the overriding goal of creating “one out of many” (e pluribus unum). As the word “union” denotes, a union must somehow unite previously disparate parts; and as the word “parties” connotes, parties are only parts of a whole, partial, incomplete, and partisan. Both the one and the many are essential.

The Preamble engenders this unity by its performative function. Its enacting speech-act does something more than simply declare. By it the People bind and commit themselves to each other. By it, they ordain. By it, they establish the United States of America for these specific purposes.

And in doing this, the Preamble serves obliging functions. It obligates all its parties: the people, as they act individually and collectively; the states, as they ratify; and the entrusted officers of the federal government, as they undertake the charge given them to accomplish these purposes. The words “in order to” introduce the specific purposes that are to be achieved by the federal government. The Preamble can thus be understood as a quasi-Bill of Duties. Just as there are no rights without powers, and no powers without duties, the Bill of Rights presupposes a set of correlative duties.[541]

Even should the Preamble not bestow, in so many words, enumerated substantive powers upon any branch of government, it serves a guiding purpose, directing and ensuring that the legitimate objectives of government are achieved, as well as the good conduct and civic sentiments of every citizen and public servant. Not insignificantly, the Preamble stands as the creative beginning of the Constitution, just as the fulfilling Bill of Rights comes at its end.

In addition to these formative functions, the Preamble also serves persuasive functions. It is more than a single-phrase motto or bumper sticker. It engenders cohesion. All can all look at the Preamble, and at each other, in the United States and say this is who we are and what we are striving to achieve together. Preambles serve to motivate, inspire, and focus people on good purposes. As Plato expounded, every constitution of any city-state—both the permanent body of laws and the individual subdivisions”—must be supplied with preambles; preambles should not be dictatorial nor prescriptive, but persuasive, so as “to make the person to whom the legislator promulgated his law accept his orders.”[542]

As the primary self-expression of the people, the Preamble serves to shape the national character, to build civic identity, and to define citizen rights and duties. Its ennobling and hopeful spirits are the values of civic virtue which are taken for granted in its communitarian words such as “we the people,” “perfect union,” “common,” “general,” and “and our posterity.” The importance of public virtue was persuasively acknowledged by Aristotle, John Locke, John Winthrop, Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Smith, and Abraham Lincoln.[543] Thus, the Preamble should be taught, memorized, and implemented in public schools at all levels. In the Preamble, civic virtue is prominently on display. It should well be posted on governmental buildings, civic monuments, post offices, and all kinds of public facilities.

B.  Responding to Objections against Legal Roles for the Preamble

Of course, despite these many legal purposes, objections can be (and have been) raised against seeing the Preamble as a legal part of the Constitution. These detractions, however, are not dispositive.

The Preamble was a brilliant headline to the Constitution and should be counted today as an integral part of the Constitution.[544] Justice Harlan, however, declined to “exert any power . . . unless, apart from the Preamble, it be found in some express delegation of power or in some power to be properly implied therefrom,”[545] as if the Preamble were not a part of the Constitution. But it is possible that the purposes of the Preamble might properly serve as the basis for defining implied powers necessary and proper to accomplish the purposes to be achieved through the use of powers granted in the Articles of the Constitution.[546] What these implied powers or duties might look like is hard to imagine, since we have not even entertained this possibility. Might we come to realize that we have been playing card games with only forty-six cards in our deck?

The assertion that the Preamble is not law and is not “the source of any substantive power”[547] should also be rethought. This objection derives from the restricted views of legal positivism and legal realism that prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Of course, the Preamble is not a set of commands issued by a sovereign coupled with sanctions—the rubric used at that time to define “law.” The concept of law today, however, is seen as broader and more complex than was assumed under the rigidity of legal realism at the time of Jacobson. The Americans’ understanding of law and nature in 1787, however, was “considerably richer, more subtle, and more informed by experience” than was the more strictly rational theories that guided the French Revolution[548] or views of the early twentieth century. Of necessity, the objectives of the Preamble need to be read in concert with the powers granted in the Articles of the Constitution, but at the same time, so should the enumerated powers not be read except in conjunction with the legitimizing objectives undertaken in the Preamble. Textual interpretation should be based, first and foremost, on the text itself. The burden of persuasion should fall on the party arguing that the Preamble should be ignored. The presumption should run in favor of the Preamble’s relevance, even if the weight it should bear remains to be determined.[549]

Anti-Federalists and others in the ratification debates feared that the Constitution would give too much power to the central government, and that the Preamble would only open the floodgates of power further.[550] Logically, those concerns assumed that the Preamble would have some legal role that could (like any other provision of the Constitution) be overextended. But practically, those worries have not materialized. Giving the Preamble its rightful role need not open any floodgates of judicial over-expansionism or turn the law into a “purposivists’ playground,” for permissible readings of ambiguous terms cannot go beyond meanings “that they cannot bear.”[551] Any powers implied from or imputed to the Preamble only need to be recognized commensurate with the duties it articulates, and seeing the Preamble as limiting the purposes of the United States to its expressly stated goals also guards against it overstepping its stated roles. Thus, this objection is far from establishing that the Preamble should play no legal role at all. Indeed, as the key of the Constitution,” the Preamble was counted on to serve several legal purposes. If any government action contradicted the general principles announced in the Preamble, it was to be seen as ineffectual and resisted as unconstitutional.

Some have wished that the Preamble was based more on factual “whereas” clauses.[552] But the Preamble is what we have to work with. Introductions to several other constitutions in the world are based more on factual “whereas” clauses. But it has been argued that factually based preambles can be more problematic than general preambles: “The fact is that unwritten constitutions often give rise to less argument than those that are written down. It is easier to prove an antecedent fact than to discern the intention of a legislator and the spirit of the written law.”[553]

Others might object that the terms of the Preamble are too vague, broad, and general to be of legal value, but these concepts are no broader than the ideas of equal protection, separation of powers, due process, free speech, establishment of religion, and many other Constitutional terms. The semantic range of each noun and verb in the Preamble has a discernable linguistic history and a contained legal pedigree to be studied and explicated. Over the course of the past century, Constitutional law has developed workable definitions for many terms relating to civil rights. One should expect it to take a similar time to develop a jurisprudence of the Preamble. Accomplishing that end will not be easy, but it will happen only if the nation keeps that goal clearly in sight. Even if we wander around a bit, one does not throw a compass away just because it only points in one orienting direction.

In sum, the Preamble was carefully composed to include each of its fifty-two words. It served as the unifying legal banner raised confidently and decisively in 1787. Its principles reverberate through the preambles of states and nations around the world. It should not be forgotten or ignored.

 


[*] *.. Robert K. Thomas University Professor of Law at the BYU J. Reuben Clark Law School and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the University of Southern California. He recognizes his law assistants Andrew Hoffman, Morgan Hoffman, and Brenden Stuart for their excellent research, writing, and analytic insights.

[†] †.. Law and Corpus Linguistics Fellow at the BYU J. Reuben Clark Law School. He recognizes his law assistant, Jacob Crump, for his contributions and support.

 [1]. See infra text accompanying note 46.

 [2]. See, e.g., James Monroe, Observations on the Federal Government, in 1 The Writings of James Monroe 349, 356 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1898).

 [3]. See infra Section I.G.

 [4]. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

 [5]. See infra notes 445–75 and accompanying text (discussing Jacobson’s effects).

 [6]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).

 [7]. See infra notes 445–75 and accompanying text (discussing Jacobson’s effects).

 [8]. See infra Section I.H. and accompanying notes.

 [9]. Monroe, supra note 2, at 356.

 [10]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.

 [11]. Articles of Confederation of 1781.

 [12]. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 397, 403 (2017) (discussing the process by which the Articles came to be).

 [13]. There is some debate as to exactly when the Articles of Confederation ceased functioning as law. Compare Vasan Kesavan, When Did the Articles of Confederation Cease to be Law?, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 35, 44 (2002), with Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (2001).

 [14]. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. III.

 [15]. Id. art. I.

 [16]. Id. art. III (emphasis added).

 [17]. Id.

 [18]. Id. art. II.

 [19]. Id. art. VI.

 [20]. Id. art. VIII (emphasis added); see id. art VII.

 [21]. Id. art. V–VII; id. art. IX.

 [22]. Id. art. IX, §. 2.

 [23]. Id. art. XIII (emphasis added).

 [24]. The Constitution’s Preamble itself makes this purpose clear when it states, “in order to form a more perfect union.” U.S. Const. pmbl. See also 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 20 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1911).

 [25]. See generally Articles of Confederation of 1781.

 [26]. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XVII (establishing the executive branch); id. art. XXIV–XXXII (establishing rules and guidelines governing the judicial branch).

 [27]. This power was specifically reserved for the states. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII, § 2 (stating that taxes were to be “levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states”).

 [28]. See Keith L. Dougherty, Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation 51, 175–76 (2001).

 [29]. Id. at 80.

 [30]. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 24, at 20 (quoting from the document commonly referred to as “The Virginia Plan”).

 [31]. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. III.

 [32]. U.S. Const. pmbl.

 [33]. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 95 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1911).

 [34]. William Ewald, The Committee on Detail, 28 Const. Comment. 197, 203 (2012). See also Philadelphia: July 30, 1787, Pa. Packet and Daily Advertiser, July 30, 1787, at 3.

 [35]. Ewald, supra note 34, at 202.

 [36]. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 33, at 177.

 [37]. Id. at 193. See also id. at 196, 209.

 [38]. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 33, at 137–38.

 [39]. Dan Himmelfarb, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 2 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 127, 132–33 n.16 (1991).

 [40]. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 33, at 138.

 [41]. Id. at 553 (“A Committee was then appointed . . . to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House.”).

 [42]. See September 12 Draft of the Constitution, U.S. Const., https://www.usconstitution
.net/draft_sep12.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2018).

 [43]. See 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 33, at 553.

 [44]. Raymond B. Marcin, ‘Posterity’ in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38 Am. J. Juris. 273, 285 (1993).

 [45]. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 33, at 590.

 [46]. Id.

 [47]. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 24, at 33.

 [48]. “[T]he ‘thin’ Constitution of the United States is anchored in the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the preamble.” Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 Int’l J. Const. L. 714, 721 (2010) (citing Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 181–82, 188–93 (1999)).

 [49]. U.S. Const. pmbl. In contrast, the Articles of Confederation began, “We, the undersigned Delegates.” Articles of Confederation of 1781, pmbl.

 [50]. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See also Himmelfarb, supra note 39, at 132 n.13.

 [51]. Mahoney, Preamble, in 3 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 1435 (L. Levy et al. eds., 1986).

 [52]. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. III.

 [53]. Himmelfarb, supra note 39, at 134 n.20.

 [54]. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 24, at 133 (declaring that the “objects of the Union” were “1. defence agst. foreign danger. 2. agst. internal disputes & a resort to force. 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4. regulating foreign commerce, & drawing revenue from it”).

 [55]. Id. at 134.

[Mr. Madison] differed from . . . Mr. Sherman[] in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Govt. Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity, of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than anything else, produced this convention.

Id.

 [56]. Himmelfarb, supra note 39, at 134 n. 20.

 [57]. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 24, at 19 (“[Under the Articles of Confederation, the] federal government could not check the quarrals [sic] between states, nor a rebellion in any not having constitutional power Nor means to interpose according to the exigency.”).

 [58]. See generally Pa. Const. of 1776.

 [59]. Id. pmbl.; id. art. I, § 14.

 [60]. Mass. Const. of 1780 pmbl. (emphasis added).

 [61]. Vt. Const. of 1786 pmbl. (emphasis added).

 [62]. N.C. Const. of 1776; Pa. Const. of 1776; Va. Const. of 1776.

 [63]. Pa. Const. of 1776 pmbl.

 [64]. Mass. Const. of 1780, art. XVII. Cf. N.C. Const. of 1776 (discussing defense as something the constitution helps provide for); Pa. Const. of 1776 (same); Va. Const. of 1776 (same).

 [65]. See generally Mass. Const. of 1780; Md. Const. of 1776; Pa. Const. of 1776; Va. Const. of 1776.

 [66]. For example, in Connecticut, the 1662 grant by King Charles II began with a whereas clause recognizing such things as the good behavior of his loving servants. Charter of Connecticut, in Federal and State Constitutions 1:529 (Francis Thorpe ed. rev. ed. 1993) (1909). Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the 1696 official declaration entitled “Frame of Government” began with a whereas that some people cannot, for conscience sake, take an oath. Id. at 5:3070.

 [67]. Seven of the original state constitutions began in this way, namely Georgia (1777), New York (1777), North Carolina (1776), New Hampshire (1776), New Jersey (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), and South Carolina (1776 and 1778), all presenting lists of all kinds of infractions and grievances.

 [68]. Charter of Del. (1701) (to provide “the greatest enjoyment of civil liberties”); Frame of Government of Pa. (1682) (stating in its preface that God had chosen man “his Deputy to rule . . . but lust prevailing against duty” it became fitting “to terrify evil doers” and “to cherish those that do well”); The Fundamental Agreements of the Freeholders, and Inhabitants of the Province of West N.J. (1681) (“[F]or the preservation of the peace and tranquility.”); The Fundamental Orders of Conn. (1638) (“[T]o maintain and preserve the liberty and purity of the gospel.”).

 [69]. Nine states included statements of such purposes and objectives. Ga. Const. of 1777 (“[B]est conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular and America in general.”); Md. Const. of 1776 (“[F]or the sure foundation and more permanent security thereof . . . [and] founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole.”); N.J. Const. of 1776 (“[M]ore effectually to unite the people and enable them to exert their whole force in their own necessary defence.” (emphasis added)); N.C. Const. of 1776 (establishing civil and criminal rights “to preserve the blessings of liberty” that are “most conducive to their happiness and prosperity”) (emphasis added); Pa. Const. of 1776 (asserting “our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of government, as will best promote the general happiness of the people of this state,” “instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man . . .”) (emphasis added); S.C. Const. of 1776 (“[F]or the good of the people [who are] the origin and end of all governments, for regulating the internal polity of this colony.”); N.Y. Const. of 1777 (“[T]o secure the rights and liberties of the good people of this State, most conducive of the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and of America in general.”) (emphasis added); Mass. Const. of 1780 (“[T]o secure the existence of the body-politic, to protect it; and to furnish the individuals who compose it, with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their natural rights, and the blessings of life.”) (emphasis added). Of the remaining states, three did not adopt a constitution before 1787.

 [70]. N.C. Const. of 1776, art. I, § XXXV (“[A] frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary, to preserve the blessings of liberty.”) (emphasis added); Mass. Const. of 1780, pmbl. (“The end of the . . . government, is to secure . . ., to protect . . ., to furnish . . . . It is the duty of the people, therefore, . . . to provide for an equitable mode of making laws . . . that every man may, at all times, find his security in them.”).

 [71]. Ga. Const. of 1777. See also N.Y. Const. of 1777.

 [72]. Mass. Const. of 1780 pmbl.

 [73]. Md. Const. of 1776. See also Mass. Const. of 1780 (“[I]t is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good. . . . We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts . . . ordain and establish the following.”); N.C. Const. of 1776 (“[A]ll political power is vested in and derived from the people only.”); Pa. Const. of 1776 (“[T]he people of this State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing.”).

 [74]. Del. Const. of 1776 (“representatives being chosen by the Freemen”); Ga. Const. of 1777 (“representative of the people, from whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended”); N.H. Const. of 1776 (“members of the Congress of New Hampshire, chosen and appointed by the free suffrages of the people of said colony”); N.J. Const. of 1776 (“[W]e, the representatives of the colony of New Jersey, having been elected by all the counties.”).

 [75]. Mass. Const. of 1776.

 [76]. Const. for the Council and Assembly in Va. (1621) (invoking “divine assistance”); Fundamental Orders of Conn. (1639) (invoking the “name of God”).

 [77]. N.H. Const. of 1776 (“[A] recommendation to that purpose having been transmitted to us from the said [Continental] Congress.”); N.J. Const. of 1776 (“[A]s the honorable the continental Congress, the supreme Council of the American colonies, has advised . . . .”); S.C. Const. of 1778 (being “dissolved by the declaration of the honorable the Continental Congress”).

 [78]. Fundamental Orders of Conn. (1639) (“for posterity”); The Fundamental Agreements of the Freeholders, and Inhabitants of the Province of West N.J. (1681) (“for the good and welfare of our posterity to come . . . to us and our posterity”).

 [79]. Conn. Charter of 1662 (“perpetual Succession . . . for us, our heirs and successors”); The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669) (“ourselves, our heirs and successors, in the most binding ways that can be devised”); Charter of Del. (1701) (“heirs and assigns forever”).

 [80]. Pa. Const. of 1776.

 [81]. Va. Const. of 1776 (emphasis added).

 [82]. Ga. Const. of 1777 (noting rights to be protected by the “future government of this State”).

 [83]. Conn. Charter of 1662 (“we will and ordain . . . do declare and appoint”); N.C. Const. of 1776 (“do declare . . . shall be established”); Pa. Const. of 1776 (“do . . . ordain, declare, and establish”); Ga. Const. of 1777 (“ordain and declare”); N.Y. Const. of 1777 (“this convention . . . doth ordain, determine, and declare”); Mass. Const. of 1780 (“We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts . . . do agree upon, ordain, and establish the following.”).

 [84]. James H. Hutson, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic 55–57, 121–30 (1998); Patrick M. O’Neil, Bible in American Law, in Religion and American Law 30, 30 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000).

 [85]. John W. Welch, Biblical Law in America: Historical Perspectives and Potentials for Reform, 2002 BYU L. Rev., 611, 620–29 (2002). On the influence of biblical law on American law, see John W. Welch, Bible in American Law, in Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties 125, 125–31 (2006); Edward McGleynn Gaffney, Jr., The Interaction of Biblical Religion and American Constitutional Law, in The Bible in American Law, Politics, and Political Rhetoric 89 (James Turner Johnson ed., 1985).

 [86]. James H. Hutson, Church and State in America: The First Two Centuries 101, 103 (2008).

 [87]. Hutson, Religion and the Founding, supra note 84, at 85 (document illustration and caption).

 [88]. The Tocqueville Reader: A Life in Letters and Politics 63 (2002).

 [89]. James H. Hutson, The Founders on Religion: A Book of Quotations 23, 26 (2005).

 [90]. Id. at 32–33, 36–37.

 [91]. Harry S. Stout, Rhetoric and Reality in the Early Republic, in Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present 65, 69 (2007).

 [92]. Genesis 1:2; id. 2:7, 19. All biblical references are to the King James Bible, the version used almost universally in the late eighteenth century.

 [93]. Deuteronomy 32:18.

 [94]. Isaiah 44:21; id. 45:7, 18; id. 49:5.

 [95]. Form v.t., Noah Webster, 1 American Dictionary of the English Language 86 (1828) (emphasis in original). By 1828, additional meanings of the verb “form” included other associated preamble words, such as “to unite individual into a collective body,” “to establish,” “to enact,” “to ordain; as, to form a law or an edict.” Id.

 [96]. E.g., Jeremiah 33:2. See also James Strong, The Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible 311 (1890).

 [97]. Establish, v.t., Webster, supra note 97. The biblical instance cited is “I will establish my covenant with him for an everlasting covenant.” Genesis 17 (emphasis in original).

 [98]. Strong, supra note 96, at 558; Webster, supra note 95 (using no biblical examples in defining “justice,” but rather remaining strictly legal, defining it along Classical lines as either distributive or commutative).

 [99]. Genesis 18:19 (ṣedekah and mishpat); Deuteronomy 16:20 (sedekah sedekah—“justice, justice” in the Hebrew— and dikaiōs to dikaion diōxēi—“pursue justice justly” in the LXX Greek).

 [100]. Matthew 5:48. Two of the four definitions given by Webster for “perfect” as an adjective come from the Bible, in Matthew 5:48, and 2 Corinthians 12:9, “made perfect in weakness.” As a verb, the first meaning for Webster came from 2 Chronicles 8:16, “[s]o the house of the Lord was perfected,” speaking of the central public institution in ancient Israel.

 [101]. Ephesians 4:13.

 [102]. Acts 24:22.

 [103]. Hebrews 9:11.

 [104]. Psalms 133:1.

 [105]. Ephesians 4:13.

 [106]. John 17:23.

 [107]. Union, Noah Webster, 2 American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) gives eight meanings, one going back to the Union of Scotland and England in 1707 and another detailing the three ways in which two or more churches could be combined or consolidated into one.

 [108]. See Acts 2:44; id. 4:32.

 [109]. See, e.g., Genesis 49:25–26; Leviticus 26; Deuteronomy 28:2; Joshua 8:34; Proverbs 10:6, 28:20.

 [110]. For dozens of examples from biblical passages, see, for example, Bless, v.t., Webster, supra note 95 and Blessing, n., Webster, supra note 95.

 [111]. William Shakespeare, Cymbeline act 3, sc. 1. “You must know, till the injurious Romans did extort this tribute from us, we were free. We do say to Caesar, our ancestor was that Mulmutius which ordained our laws,” the first King of Britain. Id.

 [112]. Ordain, v.t., Webster, supra note 95 (citing biblical passages in Mark 3 and Isaiah 30, among others).

 [113]. See Psalms 81:5.

 [114]. Isaiah 26:12.

 [115]. E.g., Genesis 45:7; Amos 4:2; Psalms 49:13.

 [116]. Genesis 22:17, 32:12. The human race was regularly referred to as “the posterity of Adam.”

 [117]. The Liberty Bell, Nat’l Park Serv., https://www.nps.gov/inde/learn/historyculture/stories-libertybell.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (quoting Leviticus 25:10).

 [118]. See id. 25:14, 25:27–28, 25:35, 25:39–42.

 [119]. The six central lines in the Preamble can be seen as a list of extended parallel alternates, and the overall framework hints at being faintly chiastic: (a) United States, (b) establish, (c) insure, (d) provide / / (d) promote, (c) secure, (b) establish, (a) United States. These stylistic flavors facilitate memorization.

 [120]. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Mar. 10, 1787), in Christian G. Fritz, American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War 131 n. 34 (2008).

 [121]. Id. at 131.

 [122]. See discussion infra Section I.I; infra notes 203–68 and accompanying text.

 [123]. For a persuasive historical analysis of “rights as moral powers” in connection with political thought at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, see James H. Hutson, Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic 73–110 (2003), which is summarized, paraphrased, and quoted in the following paragraphs.

 [124]. Id. at 76.

 [125]. Id. at 76–77.

 [126]. Id. at 78.

 [127]. Id. at 79.

 [128]. Id. at 95.

 [129]. Id. (citing James Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. Am. Hist. 16 (1987)).

 [130]. Id. at 100.

 [131]. Id. (citing Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nations, at x (1811)).

 [132]. Id.

 [133]. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 4–5 (3d ed. 2005).

 [134]. See, e.g., Stowel v. Lord Zouch (1569), 75 Eng. Rep. 536, 560 (C.B.) (“And for the better apprehension of the purview, the preamble of the Act is to be considered . . .  a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress.”).

 [135]. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 242–57 (1651).

 [136]. Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 79 (1628).

 [137]. William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 59–60 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765).

 [138]. See, e.g., Brett v. Brett (1716), 162 Eng. Rep. 456, 458–59 (“[I]t is the Preamble more especially that we look for the reason or spirt, of every statute; rehearsing, . . . as it ordinarily does, . . . in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or intention of the legislature.”); Copeman v. Gallant (1716), 24 Eng. Rep. 404, 404–07.

 [139]. See, e.g., Cox v. Edwards, 14 Mass. 491, 493 (1782) (“But it is said we are to consider the preamble, which is a key to the sense and meaning of the legislature.”); Lynch’s Ex’rs v. Horry, 1 S.C.L. 229, 230 (1792); Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x, 8 Va. 234, 235–36 (1792).

 [140]. Paca’s Lessee v. Forwood, 2 H. & McH. 175, 191 (Md. 1787).

 [141]. Hubley’s Lessee v. White, 2 Yeates 133, 146–47 (Pa. 1796).

 [142]. Id. For an exposition of similar current uses of preambles or other prefatory materials in legal texts, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 35, 218–20 (2012) (with thanks to Jarred Shobe and with anticipation of his forthcoming article on the legal force of statutory prologues).

 [143]. Constitution of the United States Printed in the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, September 19, 1787, Identifier: 2812, Hist. Soc’y of Pa., https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php
/Gallery/72# (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (image 6/10).

 [144]. This followed but accentuated the printing format of the printed draft of the Constitution. See Jacob Broom Draft of the United States Constitution, 1787, Identifier: 2765, Hist. Soc’y of Pa., https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Gallery/72# (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (image 7/10).

 [145]. Typeset and printed by Nathaniel Patten as “WE THE PEOPLE, of the United STATES, In order to form a more perfect union . . . .” Copy of the U.S. Constitution Printed and Sold by Nathaniel Patten, Identifier: 6151, Hist. Soc’y of Pa., https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Gallery/72# (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (image 2/10). Another printing that year was prepared for use of the State of Pennsylvania in General Assembly, comparing the proposed constitution with the present Articles of Confederation, along with copious state-by-state notes of proposed revisions.

 [146]. Essays of Brutus No. XI: 31 January 1788, in 1 The Complete Anti-Federalist 417, 420–21 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).

 [147]. Essays of Brutus XII: 7 February 1788, in 1 The Complete Anti-Federalist 422, 424 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).

 [148]. Supplement to Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 291–92 (James H. Hutson, ed., 1987) (emphasis in original). Professor Raymond Muscin said the following regarding Luther’s criticism:

It seems probable that Luther Martin regarded all the clauses of the present Preamble as amounting together to something like a national bill of rights preempting of all the states’ declarations and bills of rights, when he wrote of the Preamble’s “general purposes and powers . . . extending to every purpose of the social compact,” i.e., every reason why people form governments, and tied that reference in with a latent reference to the Supremacy Clause.

Raymond B. Marcin, ‘Posterity’ in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38 Am. J. Juris 273, 286 (1993).

 [149]. The Federalist No. 41, at 262–63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

 [150]. Letter from James Madison to Robert S. Garnett (Feb. 11, 1824), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 176, 176–77 (G. Hunt ed., 1910).

 [151]. The Federalist No. 84, at 578–79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

 [152]. In the other six state conventions, the Preamble seems to have been taken as given.

 [153]. The Pennsylvania Convention Wednesday 28 November 1787, in 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Pennsylvania 382, 382 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976).

 [154]. Id. at 383.

 [155]. Id.

 [156]. Id. at 384–86.

 [157]. See id. at 386.

 [158]. Id. at 393. See also id. at 408; The Pennsylvania Convention Saturday 1 December 1787, in 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 153, at 444, 445–47 (“‘We the People’ not ‘We the States.’ From this we could not find out that we were United States. . . The Constitution offered to us is a consolidated government and not a confederate republic. It will swallow up eventually all state governments.”).

 [159]. See The Pennsylvania Convention Wednesday 28 November 1787, in The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 153, at 398.

 [160]. Commentaries on the Constitution 17 October–12 November 1787, in 3 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Connecticut 372, 373 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978).

 [161]. See Letter from New York, 24, 31 October, in 3 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 160, at 380, 386.

 [162]. Id.

 [163]. Independent Chronicle, 10 January, in 5 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by States: Massachusetts 683 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1998).

 [164]. Id.

 [165]. “The Republican Federalist” V, Massachusetts Centinel, 19 January, in 5 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 163, at 748.

 [166]. Convention Debates, 24 January, P.M., in 6 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by States: Massachusetts 1339 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2000). Others shared this concern. See Convention Debates, 1 February, A.M., in 6 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 166, at 1397.

We the people of the United States, do. If this, sir, does not go to an annihilation of the state government, and to a perfect consolidation of the whole union, I do not know what does. . . We are under oath; we have sworn that Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent state—How then, can we vote for this Constitution, that destroys that sovereignty?

Id.; Convention Debates, 1 February, A.M., in 6 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 166, at 1285.

The latter is a mere federal government of states. Those, therefore that assemble under it have no power to make laws to apply to the individuals of the states confederated; and the attempts to make laws for collective societies, necessarily leave a discretion to comply with them or not.

Id.

 [167]. General Brooks, Jan. 24, 1778, in 6 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 166, at 1397.

 [168]. Id. As an interesting aside, one member of the convention—Mr. Turner—“made an observation that there ought to have been made some mention of Religion [in the preamble].” Monday, 14 January, A.M. and P.M., in 7 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by States: Massachusetts 1801 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2001).

 [169]. See Winthrop Sargent to Henry Knox, Boston, 6 February, in 7 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 166, at 1583.

 [170]. Baltimore Maryland Gazette, 3 June 1788, in 12 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Maryland 742, 742 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015).

 [171]. Id.

 [172]. Alfredus, Exeter Freeman’s Oracle, 18 January 1788, in 28 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: New Hampshire 86, 86 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2017).

 [173]. Id. at 89.

 [174]. Id.

 [175]. Id.

 [176]. James Monroe, Observations, supra note 2, at 356.

 [177]. Neither Monroe nor his law teacher, Thomas Jefferson, were one of two delegates from Virginia to the Constitutional Convention. Monroe had served under the Confederation as a member of the Continental Congress. Beginning in 1790, he served as a U.S. Senator from Virginia, and in 1799 became Governor. See generally, Harlow Giles Unger, The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation’s Call to Greatness (2009).

 [178]. James Monroe, Observations, supra note 2, at 355. This statement is included in, 2 The Founders’ Constitution 14 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987).

 [179]. James Monroe, Observations, supra note 2, at 356.

 [180]. New York Journal 23 November 1787, in 19 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by States: New York 293, 295–96 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003).

 [181]. Cincinnatus V: To James Wilson, Esq. New York Journal, 29 November 1787, in 19 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 180, at 324.

 [182]. See George Clinton’s Remarks, 27 June 1788, in 22 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by States: New York 1974 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008); George Clinton’s Remarks, 11 July 1788, in 22 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 182, at 2144 (“‘We the people of the United States’ hence the government must be considered as an original compact, annulling the State Constitutions as far as its powers interfere with them and thus far destroying their rights.”); Cato III, New York Journal, 25 October 1787, in 19 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 180, at 126.

The recital, or premises on which this new form of government is erected, declares a consolidation or union of all thirteen parts, or states, into one great whole, under the firm of the United States, for all the various and important purposes therein set forth.—but whoever seriously considers he immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits of the United States, together with the variety of its climates, productions, and commerce, the difference of extent and number of inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth that a consolidated republican form of government therein can never form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to these objects it must be directed; this unkindred legislature therefore composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in their nature will in its exercise, emphatically be, like a house divided against itself.

Id.

 [183]. Brutus VI, New York Journal, 27 December 1787, in 19 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 180, at 470.

 [184]. George Clinton, Remarks Against Ratifying the Constitution, 11 July 1788, in 22 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 182, at 2146.

 [185]. The Rhode Island Convention Wednesday 3 March 1790, in 26 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Rhode Island 916, 926 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2013).

 [186]. Id.

 [187]. Id.

 [188]. Id.

 [189]. A. Freeman, Newport Herald, 3 April 1788, in 24 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Rhode Island 220, 222 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2011).

 [190]. Id.

 [191]. Id.

 [192]. See id.

 [193]. See, e.g., James Monroe, Observations, supra notes 2, 176–79 and accompanying text.

 [194]. U.S. Const. amend. IX.

 [195]. U.S. Const. amend. X.

 [196]. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II (emphasis added).

 [197]. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and Expressly Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1938 (2008).

 [198]. Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries of the Constitution of the United States § 1908 (1833).

 [199]. Id. §§ 1907–08.

 [200]. For a discussion that tends to overemphasize popular sovereignty, but contains helpful commentary, see Akhim Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the People: What the Constitution Really Says About Your Rights 12–14 (1998); Mike Maharrey, The Preamble to the Constitution: What It Tells Us and What It Doesn’t, Tenth Amend. Ctr. (June 13, 2017), http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2017/06/13/the-preamble-to-the-constitution-what-it-tells-us-and-what-it-doesnt. For a discussion of Kansas v. Colorado, connecting the Preamble and Tenth Amendment, see Himmelfarb, supra note 39, at 147–48.

 [201]. Connor M. Ewing, Structure and Relationship in American Federalism: Foundations, Consequences, and “Basic Principles” Revisited, 51 Tulsa L. Rev. 689, 699 (2016).

 [202]. See generally David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 Cap. U. L. Rev. 399 (1996) (breathing some new life into the Tenth Amendment).

 [203]. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 7 (2015).

 [204]. Id. at 28.

 [205]. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Originalism and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 751, 767 (2009).

 [206]. Solum, supra note 203, at 7.

 [207]. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3036206.

 [208]. Id. at 4. See generally Rodica Hanga Calciu, Semantic Change in the Age of Corpus Linguistics, 3 J. Humanistic & Soc. Stud. 45 (2012).

 [209]. Lee & Phillips, supra note 207, at 4.

 [210]. Arthur Ponsonby, The King’s English, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 18, 1928, at M15.

 [211]. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).

 [212]. See Lee & Phillips, supra note 207. Some scholars have also argued that the “domestic violence” clause protected the states against slave revolts. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 785, 791 (1995); Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 Akron L. Rev. 423, 429 n.23, 469 (1999).

 [213]. Jennifer Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”? 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 447, 450 (2018).

 [214]. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1915, 1954–55 (2010).

 [215]. Or if too many hits are returned, a random sample sufficiently large to ensure statistically significant results.

 [216]. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279).

 [217]. Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279) [hereinafter Brief for the Project on Government Oversight].

 [218]. See FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011); Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, supra note 217.

 [219]. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (2012). Rather than use an actual corpus, Judge Posner did a series of Google searches for “several terms in which the word ‘harboring’ appears” including “harboring fugitives,” “harboring enemies,” and “harboring Jews,” believing “that the number of hits per term is a tough index of the frequency of its use.” Id.

 [220]. See State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1280 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 Yale L.J. 788, 852–56 (2018).

 [221]. In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 724–26 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J. concurring).

 [222]. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmans, 2017 UT 81, ¶ 57 n.9 (2017) (Durham, J. concurring) (“[Corpus linguistic] tools for empirical analysis are readily available for lawyers and should be used when appropriate.”); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Mich. 2016).

 [223]. See Lee & Phillips, supra note 207.

 [224]. Building COFEA has been difficult for a number of reasons―chief among them the difficulty of securing digital copies of eighteenth century documents with usable digital text; the complexities of developing the necessary filters to capture particular thought communities from the data set; the lack of standardized spelling during the eighteenth century; and the lack of inexpensive optical character recognition technology for handwritten texts. As of today, the beta version still contains a number of duplicate sources that Brigham Young University (“BYU”) is actively working towards identifying and eliminating. As BYU works through and overcomes these difficulties, future versions of COFEA will be released that will introduce new analytical tools that will lead to more accurate results.

 [225]. We recognize the work of many colleagues at BYU in developing COFEA, especially Gordon Smith, Justice Thomas Rex Lee, Wayne Schneider, James Phillips, Sara White, Carolina Núñez, David Moore, Curtis Thacker, Charles Draper, and David Armond.

 [226]. We recognize that 1807 is a somewhat arbitrary date. Future researchers may want to further investigate the meaning of the words through the end of the Monroe presidency―the last of the Founder Presidents―using BYU’s Corpus of Historical American English (“COHA”) which contains documents from 1810 to 2009. The COHA could also be used to see if the meaning of these words shifted during the Antebellum period, which could impact 14th Amendment originalists.

 [227]. Henry Barry, The Strictures on the Friendly Address Examined, and a Refutation Attempted 5 (1775), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N10951.0001.001?view=toc.

 [228]. Letter from J. Foy Chase on behalf of the Mayor Recorder Alderman and Common Council of the City of Annapolis to George Washington (Dec. 22, 1783), https://founders.archives.gov/?q=In
%20your%20Retirement%20to%20the%20peaceful%20and%20pleasing%20Scenes%20of%20domestic%20&s=1111311111&r=1.

 [229]. James Campbell, Oration to Commemorate the Independence of the United States of North-America (July 4, 1786), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N15855.0001.001?view=toc.

 [230]. John Adams, Inaugural Address March 4, 1797, in 1 Statesman’s Manual: Presidents’ Messages 103 (Edwin Williams ed., 1849).

 [231]. See, e.g., Ethan J. Herenstein, Comment, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing Ordinary Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 112, 114–16 (2017).

 [232]. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII.

 [233].  John Warren, Oration Celebrating the Anniversary of American Independence Delivered in Boston (July 4, 1783), in Edward Warren, The Life of John Warren, M.D. 546 (1874).

 [234]. Benjamin Franklin, Examination Before the Committee of the Whole of the House of Commons, 13 February, 1766, Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Franklin/01-13-02-0035 (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).

 [235].  Lord North in the House of Lords, Feb. 27, 1775, in 5 Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1754–1783, at 432–51 (R.C. Simmons and P.D.G. Thomas, eds., 1982–1987).

 [236]. Jonathan Loring Austin, Oration at the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston, in Celebration of the Anniversary of American Independence (July 4, 1786), https://quod.lib.umich.edu
/e/evans/N15351.0001.001?view=toc.

 [237]. Letter from Charles Lloyd to the Lords of Trade (Aug. 15, 1767), https://quod.lib.umich.edu
/e/evans/N08350.0001.001/1:6.12?rgn=div2;view=fulltext.

 [238]. Mass. Const. of 1780, art. XVIII.

 [239]. In fact, some of the concordance lines discovered in COFEA could go either way. For example, in a private letter, William Sharpe stated, “[f]rom my particular knowledge of that part of the country I can venture to say that in the fall of [General Davidson] we have lost more than 500 men in the common defence.” Letter from William Sharpe to George Washington (Feb. 27, 1781), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-05034.

 [240]. Jonas Clark, Pastor for the Church in Lexington, Sermon Preached Before the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Election Sermon (May 30, 1781), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e
/evans/N13550.0001.001?view=toc.

 [241]. Interestingly enough, “common defense”―spelled with an “s”―disappears from the corpus all-together.

 [242]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

 [243]. Memorandum from Alexander Hamilton & Henry Knox to George Washington (Apr. 18, 1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-14-02-0262-0002.

 [244]. Jeremy Belknap, 2 The History of New Hampshire: Comprehending the Events of Seventy Five Years 337 (1812).

 [245]. John Taylor, An Examination of the Late Proceedings in Congress, Respecting the Official Conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury (Mar. 8, 1793) https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans
/N20034.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;view=fulltext.

 [246]. Tenn. Const. of 1796, art. XXVI. The reference to “freemen” in the Tennessee Constitution made it clear that this right did not extend to slaves.

 [247]. Alexander Hamilton, Address at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 27, 1788), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-05-02-0012-0036. See also The Federalist No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).

 [248]. Letter from John McKesson to Alexander Hamilton (Jun. 27, 1788), in 5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, June 1788–Nov. 1789, at 105, 106 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962).

 [249]. COFEA cannot yet do multinomial collocate searches. To find this number, the raw “.txt” files used in COFEA were loaded into a freeware corpus linguistic platform known as Antconc. Searches were then performed to determine the number of times the word “general” or “welfare” appeared in a source within ten words of “common defence.” The results were then reviewed manually to eliminate any instances in the sample that did not contain the whole phrase “general welfare.” The inverse was then performed for “common” or “defence” within ten words of the phrase “common defence.” The total was then divided by the total number of times “general welfare” or “common defence” appeared individually in the data set, with sources with close collocation only counting once.

 [250]. I.e., the phrases “common defence and general welfare” and “common defence or general welfare.”

 [251]. Joanna Kopaczyk & Hans Sauer, Binomials in the History of English: Fixed & Flexible 1–2 (2017).

 [252]. Jefferson’s Annotated Copy of Benjamin Franklin’s Proposed Articles of Confederation (June–July 1775), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0109 (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).

 [253]. Benjamin Franklin, The Albany Plan of Union, 1754, https://founders.archives.gov
/documents/Franklin/01-05-02-0104 (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).

 [254]. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Cadwalader Evans (Jul. 18, 1771), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-18-02-0115.

 [255]. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing (Sept. 27, 1774), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-21-02-0166.

 [256]. Letter from William Drayton to George Washington (Sept. 20, 1788), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-06-02-0466.

  [257]. Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Apr. 23, 1799), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-02-02-0003.

 [258]. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-24-02-0330 (emphasis added).

 [259]. Alexander Hamilton, A Defence of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Entered into Between the United States of America & Great Britain, as it has Appeared in the Papers Under the Signature of Camillus 7 (1795), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N21866.0001.001?view=toc.

 [260]. Francis G. Caffey, A Brief History of the United States Department of Agriculture 24 (1916).

 [261]. Rep. James Madison, Address Before the House of Representative (Feb. 2, 1791), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/a1_8_1s20.html.

 [262].  Letter from David Brooks to George Washington (Nov. 11, 1783), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-12050.

 [263]. Phillips Payson, A Memorial of Lexington Battle, and of Some Signal Interpositions of Providence in the American Revolution. A Sermon Preached at Lexington, on the Nineteenth of April, 1782, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N13956.0001.001/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).

 [264]. Silas Downer, Son of Liberty, Discourse Delivered in Providence at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty (Jul. 25, 1768), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N08514.0001.001?view=toc.

 [265]. Benjamin Rush, Doctor, Oration Before the American Philosophical Society: An Enquiry into the Natural History of Medicine Among the Indians in North-America, and a Comparative View of their Diseases and Remedies, with those of Civilized Nations (Feb. 4, 1774), https://quod.lib.umich.edu
/e/evans/n10722.0001.001?view=toc.

 [266]. Letter from John Hancock to Phillip Schuyler (Nov. 26, 1775), in 3 American Archives: A Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs, 1717–18 (Peter Force ed., 1840).

 [267]. George Washington, Address to the Inhabitants of Canada (Sept. 14, 1774), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-01-02-0358.

 [268]. Thomas Paine, The Crisis, Number I, at 4 (1775), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans
/N10979.0001.001/1:1?rgn=div1;view=fulltext;q1=Great+Britain+–+Colonies+–+America.

 [269]. Letter from Abigail Adams to Isaac Smith Jr. (Apr. 20, 1771), https://www.masshist.org/publications/apde2/view?id=ADMS-04-01-02-0058.

 [270].  Samuel Rockwell, Oration Delivered at the Celebration of American Independence, at Salisbury (July 4, 1797),  https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N24735.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext.

 [271]. John Foss, A Journal, of the Captivity and Sufferings of John Foss 121–22 (1795), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N25429.0001.001/1:3.5?rgn=div2;view=fulltext.

 [272]. James Hardie, The American Remembrancer 37 (1795), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e
/evans/N21868.0001.001/1:7?rgn=div1;view=fulltext.

 [273]. Richard Price, A Discourse on the Love of our Country 35 (1789), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/price-a-discourse-on-the-love-of-our-country.

 [274]. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

 [275]. Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J. Am. His. 19, 20–21 (1967).

 [276]. Id. at 23.

 [277]. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 420.

 [278]. Id. at 420–21.

 [279]. Id. at 421 (“[L]et us now advert to the spirit of the Constitution, or rather its genuine and necessary interpretation.”). The Court did acknowledge that treading into the “spirit of the Constitution” comes with risks. Id. (“I am aware of the danger of going into a wide history of the Constitution, as a guide of construction; and of the still greater danger of laying any important stress upon the preamble as explanatory of its powers.”).

 [280]. Id. at 421–23.

 [281]. Id. at 471.

  [282]. Id. at 465.

 [283]. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816)              .               

 [284]. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)).

 [285]. Martin, 14 U.S. at 324–25.

 [286]. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. 410 (1830).

 [287]. Id. at 437–38.

 [288]. Id. at 416 (internal quotations omitted).

 [289]. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 316–18 (1821).

 [290]. Id. at 416–17.

 [291]. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 246 (1833).

 [292]. Id. at 247

 [293]. Id.

 [294]. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 29–32 (1829).

 [295]. See Stefan M. Brooks, The Webster-Hayne Debate: An Inquiry into the Nature of Union 59 (2009).

 [296]. Id.

 [297]. Id.

 [298]. Herman Belz, The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union, at xiii (Herman Belz ed., 2000). The debate technically ended on January 27, 1830, but many Senators continued to comment on its topics for months, even decades to come.

 [299]. Robert Hayne, U.S Senator from S.C., Speech in the U.S. Senate (Jan. 25, 1830), in The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 35, 43 (Herman Belz ed., 2000) (emphasis added).

 [300]. Id. 48–49 (emphasis added).

 [301]. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).

 [302]. Id. at 24.

 [303]. Robert Hayne, U.S Senator from S.C., Speech in the U.S. Senate (Jan. 27, 1830), in The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 155, 163 (Herman Belz ed., 2000) (emphasis in original).

 [304]. Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).

 [305]. Id. (emphasis added).

 [306]. Id. at 175.

 [307]. Id.

 [308]. Id. (emphasis added).

 [309]. See id.

 [310]. John Rowan, U.S Senator from Ky., Speech in the U.S. Senate (Feb. 4, 1830), in The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 206, 268 (Herman Belz ed., 2000) (emphasis added).

 [311]. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).

 [312]. William Smith, U.S Senator from S.C., Speech in the U.S. Senate (Feb. 25, 1830), in The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 307 (Herman Belz ed., 2000).

 [313]. Id. at 337–38. It is not clear that “public good” and “general welfare” are synonymous.

 [314]. Id. at 340–41.

 [315]. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).

 [316]. John Clayton, U.S Senator from Del., Speech in the U.S. Senate (Mar. 4, 1830), in The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 349 (Herman Belz ed., 2000) [hereinafter Clayton Speech].

 [317]. Id. at 359.

 [318]. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).

 [319]. Edward Livingston, U.S Senator from La., Speech in the U.S. Senate (Mar. 9, 1830), in The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union 409, 462 (Herman Belz ed., 2000).

 [320]. Id. at 462–63.

 [321]. Daniel Webster, U.S. Senator from Mass., Speech at Public Dinner in Honor of Washington (Feb. 22, 1832), in The Speeches of Daniel Webster and His Master-Pieces 247, 257 (1880).

 [322]. Joseph Story, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Story (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).

 [323]. On this Day, the Constitution Was Signed in Philadelphia, Const. Daily (Sept. 17, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/it-was-229-years-ago-today-the-constitution-was-signed-in-philadelphia.

 [324]. Joseph Story, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Story (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).

 [325]. Id.

 [326]. Joseph Story, Commentaries of the Constitution of the United States (1833).

 [327]. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote of Justice Story’s work, “I have finished reading your great work, and wish it could be read by every statesman, and every would-be statesman in the United States. It is a comprehensive and an accurate commentary on our Constitution, formed in the spirit of the original text.” Joseph Story, 3 Chi. L. Times 1, 6 (1889). Justice Story’s Commentaries has been cited in hundreds of cases dealing with important questions of constitutional law. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Introduction, in Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, at xix (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833).

 [328]. Story, supra note 326, § 459 (emphasis added).

 [329]. Id. § 460 (emphasis added).

 [330]. Story, supra note 326, § 462 (emphasis added).

 [331]. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).

 [332]. Id. § 463 (emphasis added).

  [333]. Id.               § 483.

 [334]. John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse 46–47 (1839), https://archive.org/details/jubileeofconst1839adam (based on a speech given by Adams on April 30, 1839).

 [335]. Id.

 [336]. Id. at 47–48.

 [337]. Id. at 60.

 [338]. Id. at 69–70 (emphasis in original). For his definition of justice, Adams draws here upon the Institutes of Justinian.

 [339]. Id. at 118.

 [340]. Id. at 119 (referring to Deuteronomy 11:29).

 [341]. Id. at 119.

 [342]. John C. Calhoun, U.S. Senator from S.C., Speech delivered to Senate (Feb. 28, 1842), in Speeches of John C. Calhoun 74, 81 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1883).

 [343]. Josiah Quincy, Figures of the Past 317 (1883). See also Jed Woodworth, Josiah Quincy’s 1844 Visit with Joseph Smith, 39 BYU Stud. Q. 71, 71-87 (2000); Margaret C. Robertson, The Campaign and the Kingdom: The Activities of the Electioneers in Joseph Smith’s Presidential Campaign, 39 BYU Stud. Q. 147, 148 (2000); Brian C. Cannon, John C. Calhoun, Jr., Meets the Prophet Joseph Smith Shortly Before the Departure for Carthage, 33 BYU Stud. Q. 773, 774 (1993).

 [344]. These views were either originally his or were approved by him. Joseph Smith, Journal, December 1842–June 1844; Book 3, 15 July 1843–29 February 1844, The Joseph Smith Papers, http://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/journal-december-1842-june-1844-book-3-15-july-1843-29-february-1844/265 (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (material located on pp. 256, 258, 259). This brochure was published both separately and in a Nauvoo newspaper, Times & Seasons, Feb. 15, 1844, at 441.

 [345]. See generally John W. Welch, Joseph Smith and the Constitution, in Jeffrey N. Walker et al., eds., Sustaining the Law: Joseph Smith’s Legal Encounters 1–38 (2014).

 [346]. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio, September 17, 1859, in 3 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 438, 460 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).

 [347]. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp.

 [348]. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69802.

 [349]. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), https://www.britannica.com/event/Gettysburg-Address.

 [350]. See Richard Beeman, Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity 3, 18 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds., 1987); Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 128–29, 203–04 (1913).

 [351]. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 46 (1998).

 [352]. The following analysis concerning the state preambles was accomplished by looking at the first state constitution adopted by a given state—for all fifty states—after the Federal Constitution went into effect; however, some states still use a state constitution adopted prior to the Federal Constitution, and in those cases, we used the latest constitution available. See generally Ala. Const. of 1819; Alaska Const. of 1959; Ariz. Const. of 1912; Ark. Const. of 1836; Cal. Const. of 1849; Colo. Const. of 1876; Conn. Const. of 1818; Del. Const. of 1792; Fla. Const. of 1839; Ga. Const. of 1789; Haw. Const. of 1959; Idaho Const. of 1890; Ill. Const. of 1818; Ind. Const. of 1816; Iowa Const. of 1846; Kan. Const. of 1859; Ky. Const. of 1792; La. Const. of 1812; Me. Const. of 1819; Md. Const. of 1851; Mass. Const. of 1780; Mich. Const. of 1835; Minn. Const. of 1857; Miss. Const. of 1817; Mo. Const. of 1820; Mont. Const. of 1889; Neb. Const. of 1866; Nev. Const. of 1864; N.H. Const. of 1784; N.J. Const. of 1884; N.M. Const. of 1911; N.Y. Const. of 1821; N.C. Const. of 1868; N.D. Const. of 1889; Ohio Const. of 1802; Okla. Const. of 1907; Or. Const. of 1857; Pa. Const. of 1790; R.I. Const. of 1843; S.C. Const. of 1778; S.D. Const. of 1889; Tenn. Const. of 1796; Tex. Const. of 1845; Utah Const. of 1895; Vt. Const. of 1793; Va. Const. of 1830; Wash. Const. of 1889; W. Va. Const. of 1863; Wis. Const. of 1848; Wyo. Const. of 1889.

 [353]. People ex rel. Caldwell v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. (1 Gilm.), 9 (1848) (“The legislative power of the State is limited by the nature of our State constitution, and the restrictions thereby imposed. . . . It is limited by the general objects mentioned in the preamble.”).

 [354]. Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 198 (1853).

 [355]. Id. at 207.

  [356]. Id.                           

 [357]. In re Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 590–91 (1871).

 [358]. Id. at 607.

 [359]. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

 [360]. Timothy Harper, The U.S. Constitution 15 (2007). One of Random House’s Idiot’s Guides, this publication dismisses the Framers as, “by our standards today . . . not especially enlightened,” and as “old, rich, white guys,” who wrote the Constitution “for themselves” and people like them who ran the country. Id. Nevertheless, the preamble which they produced managed to “emphasize the democratic nature of the new nation;” as they were “obviously thinking about their legacy,” it “was written to offer hope, both in 1787 and today.” Id.

 [361]. Previously difficult to obtain, the briefs in this case are now available on line. See Transcript of Record, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (No. 70-175) (accessed through the “Making of Modern Law Digital Archive: U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832–1978” database, hosted by the Princeton University Library). As far as we have been able to determine, no law review article or other examination of Jacobson has ever been published.

 [362]. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).

 [363]. Id. at 12–13.

 [364]. Transcript of Record at 3–4, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (No. 70-175).

 [365]. Id. at 4.

 [366]. Id. at 6–7.

 [367]. Id.

 [368]. Id. at 7.

 [369]. Id. at 7–8.

 [370]. Id. No mention of the Massachusetts Preamble is made. Id.

 [371]. Id. at 8.

 [372]. Id. at 8–9.

 [373]. Id. at 11.

 [374]. Id. at 12.

 [375]. Id.

 [376]. Id. at 19.

 [377]. Id. at 16.

 [378]. Id.

 [379]. Id. at 17.

 [380]. Id. at 18.

 [381]. Id. at 19.

 [382]. Id.

 [383]. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (No. 70-175) (although not mentioned in the transcript’s index, the briefs for this case, both Petitioner and Respondent, are appended to the transcript of record on The Making of Modern Law database). The petitioner dropped his challenges involving the Massachusetts Constitution after the Massachusetts Supreme Court found the law did not violate the state’s constitution. See supra notes 374–78 and accompanying text.

 [384]. See generally id.

 [385]. Id. at 12.

 [386]. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).

 [387]. Id. at 31.

 [388]. Brief for the Defendant in Error at 3, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (No. 70-175).

 [389]. Arguably, the introduction of the defendant’s brief which states that “[the statute] is contrary to the preamble” implies a substantive argument of rights. However, that implication is eliminated because the defendant only used the Preamble to argue the purpose and spirit of the Constitution. See generally id.

 [390]. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

 [391]. Records of oral arguments were not kept by the Supreme Court at the time this case was argued, so it is impossible to know how much was argued about the Preamble in oral arguments.

 [392]. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).

 [393]. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 383, at 31.

 [394]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22 (citing Story, supra note 326, § 462) (emphasis added).

 [395]. See supra notes 388–90 and accompanying text.

 [396]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.

 [397]. Id.

 [398]. See supra Section I.K.2.

 [399]. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11–39.

 [400]. It is worth noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when it wrote its opinion in this case, was able to resolve the issue by answering these two questions and not referring to the Preamble, although it was brought up in the arguments submitted to them as well. See supra notes 376–82 and accompanying text.

 [401]. Id.

 [402]. There is also a brief discussion about the evidence that the defendant attempted to put forth to support his position, but Justice Harlan simply defers to the lower court’s judgment that such evidence was immaterial to the analysis. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23–24.

 [403]. Id. at 25.

 [404]. Id. at 26 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).

 [405]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.

 [406]. Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries of the Constitution of the United States § 459 (1833).

 [407]. Id. § 460 (emphasis added).

  [408].               Id. § 462.

 [409]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27 (quoting Mass. Const. of 1780, pmbl., art. VII, pt. I.). This preamble further explains that laws “for the common good” must be adopted by “an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an impartial interpretation and faithful execution of them.” Mass. Const. of 1780, pmbl.

 [410]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22 (internal citations omitted).

 [411]. For the comments of Monroe, Rawle, and others, see supra Sections I.G. and I.K.1.

 [412]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.

 [413]. Id. at 26.

 [414]. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).

 [415]. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1861, 1869 (2014).

 [416]. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).

 [417]. Re, supra note 415, at 1861. Some scholars categorize narrowing precedent as “stealth overruling.” See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (2010). However, for the purposes of this paper, overturning or narrowing precedent are viewed as two distinct options the Supreme Court has when overcoming precedent.

 [418]. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762 (2008).

 [419]. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950) (emphasis added).

 [420]. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762.

 [421]. Id. at 761.

 [422]. See id. at 798.

 [423]. See id. at 762 (“True, the Court in Eisentrager denied access to the writ, and it noted the prisoners ‘at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and [that] the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.’”) (internal citation omitted).

 [424]. Richard M. Re boldly defends this practice and argues it “promot[es] traditional stare decisis values like correctness, fidelity, and candor [and] legitimate narrowing represents the decisional-law analogue to the canon of constitutional avoidance.” Re, supra note 415, at 1861.

 [425]. See id. at 1869.

 [426]. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).

 [427]. Id. at 323.

 [428]. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).

 [429]. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

 [430]. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (“[T]he Eight and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of offenders over 15 but under 18. . . .”).

 [431]. Id. at 554.

 [432]. See Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 Willamette L. Rev. 161, 188 (2010). Arguably, before dicta is expressly rejected, it may be so persuasive on the Court and lower courts that it is perceived as controlling. See id. at 185.

 [433]. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–53 (1987) (rejecting dicta from Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)).

 [434]. Salerno, 481 U.S at 744 (quoting Stack, 342 U.S. at 5).

 [435]. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (alterations in original).

 [436]. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753.

 [437]. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821).

 [438]. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).

 [439]. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821).

 [440]. Bartkus v. Illinois 359 U.S. 121, 122–23 (1959).

 [441]. Id.

 [442]. Id. at 123­–24.

 [443]. United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 1997).

 [444]. See e.g., United States v. Moore, 370 F. App’x. 559, 560 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert denied, 562 U.S. 898 (2010).

[I]t is unclear whether such an exception to the dual-sovereignty exists in this circuit. This exception originated from Barkus v. Illinois, where the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that there may be an exception the dual-sovereignty doctrine when one sovereign is ‘merely a tool’ of the other in bringing a second prosecution that . . . would otherwise be barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. We have not formally recognized or applied the exception; when confronted with issue, we have held that, even if the exception exists, the facts do not merit its application.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

 [445]. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354 (1997); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943).

 [446]. Using Westlaw, forty-four cases were found that both cited Jacobson and used the word “preamble.” Of those forty-four, only thirteen cases discussed Jacobson’s dicta concerning the Constitution’s Preamble.

 [447]. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 562 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissent); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 267 (1983) (Powell, J., dissent); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168–70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurrence) (surveying the meaning of the word “liberty”); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969) (Black, J., concurrence).

 [448]. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 292 (1936).

 [449]. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905)).

 [450]. Tinsley v. Methodist Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 70 F.3d 1275, 1995 WL 695960 at *2 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table opinion).

 [451]. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905)).

 [452]. In re Opinion of the Justices, 22 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Mass. 1939).

 [453]. Id. at 57.

 [454]. Id.

 [455]. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood Cty., 10 F. Supp. 854, 870 (W.D.S.C. 1935), supplemented by, 12 F. Supp. 70 (W.D.S.C. 1935) (overturned on other grounds); Miss. Utilities Co. v. City of California., Mo., 8 F. Supp. 454, 459 (W.D. Mo. 1934); Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 5 F. Supp. 639, 647–48 (E.D. Tex. 1934) (overturned on other grounds); Nat’l Pride At Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 539 (Mich. 2008); Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ind. 1972); Ace Bus Transp. Co. v. S. Hudson Cty. Boulevard Bus Owners’ Ass’n, 177 A. 360, 368–69 (N.J. Ch. 1935).

 [456]. United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 535, 535 (W.D. Okla. 1934).

 [457]. Id. at 535–36.

 [458]. Id. at 544.

 [459]. Id. at. 539.

 [460]. Id.

 [461]. Id.

 [462]. Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing Bd., 110 N.E. 485, 486 (Ohio 1915).

 [463]. Id. at 489.

 [464]. Id.

 [465]. Id.

 [466]. Id.

 [467]. Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16, 26 (W.D. Ky.), vacated, 74 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1934).

 [468]. Id. at 27.

 [469]. Id.

 [470]. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).

 [471]. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973).

 [472]. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 246 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 338 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting).

 [473]. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948) (Burton, J.).

 [474]. Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812, 818 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (dissent), aff’d, 485 U.S. 264 (1988) (using the Preamble to support the argument that military officials on trial were ensuring domestic tranquility); Wiggins Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 88 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (noting that “the federal rule permits and requires consideration of preambles in appropriate cases” when interpreting the Constitution, statutes, or regulations); NLRB v. Highview, Inc., 590 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1979) (using the Preamble to support its holding that the NLRB has jurisdiction over a nursing home, substantively to “promote the general welfare”); Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 1977) (concurrence), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978) (in arguing that double prosecutions are unconstitutional); LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 955 (5th Cir. 1970) (dissent) (asserting that the Preamble, “serves as a key to an interpretation” of responsibilities and rights conferred by the Bill of Rights); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948) (the Preamble has substantive value, imposing duties on Congress). None of these cases mention Jacobson.

 [475]. See, e.g., Berry v. School Dist., 467 F. Supp. 695, 709 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (reasoning that its holding helps fulfill the goals of the Preamble); In re DeToro, 247 F. Supp. 840, 843 (D. Md. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. DeToro v. Maryland, 390 U.S. 992 (1968) (arguing that the Preamble substantively assures that the “blessings of Liberty” will be secured to all, though not dispositive to this case’s outcome).

 [476]. Westel Willoughby, 1 The Constitutional Law of the United States 62 (2nd ed., 1929).

 [477]. William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 374 (1953).

 [478]. Morris D. Forkosch, Who Are the “People” in the Preamble to the Constitution? 19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 644, 644 (1968).

 [479]. 1A Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction § 20.03 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1985) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

 [480]. 2A Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.04 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

 [481]. See generally Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously (1987).

 [482]. Milton Handler et al., A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 117, 118 (1990).

 [483]. Id. at 119.

 [484]. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).

 [485]. Gilbert Paul Carrasco & Peter W. Rodino, Jr., “Unalienable Rights,” the Preamble, and the Ninth Amendment: The Spirit of the Constitution, 20 Seton Hall L. Rev. 498, 523 (1990) (“Those responsible for governing and interpreting the Constitution are subject to the commands of the Preamble to help in the establishment of a more perfect union and to help secure the blessings of liberty.”).

 [486]. Dan Himmelfarb, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 2 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 127, 160–66, 193–201 (1992).

 [487]. Id. at 132–35.

 [488]. Id. But see supra Section I.B.

 [489]. Himmelfarb, supra note 486, at 135. But see supra Section I.B.

 [490]. Himmelfarb, supra note 486, at 203.

 [491]. Id. Himmelfarb continues: “[I]n addition to the problem of determining with any degree of confidence the precise meaning of ‘Justice’ or ‘general Welfare,’ there is the problem of deciding whether to uphold a law because the ‘common defence’ requires it or to invalidate the law because it is inconsistent with the ‘Blessings of Liberty.’” Id.

 [492]. Raymond Marcin, “Posterity” in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38 Am. J. Juris. 273, 281, 283 (1993) (“In light of the case law on Preambles in general and on the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States in particular, it would seem that some limited use may be made of the ‘Blessings of Liberty to . . . our Posterity’ clause in shedding light on the spirit behind the fifth and fourteenth amendments’ rights to life and liberty.”).

 [493]. Eric M. Axler, Note, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated Rights, 24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 431, 435–37 (2000).

 [494]. C. Dean McGrath Jr., The Genius of the Constitution: The Preamble and the War on Terror, 3 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 13, 18 (2005).

 [495]. Id. at 13, 18 (“The Preamble provides clear guidance concerning the underlying aspirations that the Constitution’s framers had for the Constitution and the new United States of America. Those aspirations have continued to guide our government in the use of its enumerated powers . . . .”).

 [496]. Orgad, supra note 48. This article is discussed in the following Section.

 [497]. Justin O. Frosini, Constitutional Preambles: More than Just a Narration of History, 2017 Ill. L. Rev. 603.

 [498]. Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the Common Good, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1609 (2013).

 [499]. Kenneth Shuster, Because of History, Philosophy, the Constitution, Fairness & Need: Why Americans Have a Right to National Health Care, 10 Ind. Health L. Rev. 75, 89–91 (2013) (“[The Preamble] does explain the ‘why’ of the Constitution, namely, the six ends for which the Constitution was created. . . . It is inconceivable that Americans, who possess constitutional rights to speak freely and assemble, have speedy and public trials, and vote, do not have a constitutional right to have their government provide them with health care.”).

 [500]. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Preamble, Nat’l Const. Ctr., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/preamble/the-preamble-by-erwin-chemerinsky-and-michael-stokes-paulsen/interp/37 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).

 [501]. Id.

 [502]. Erwin Chemerinsky, Giving Meaning to the Preamble, Nat’l Const. Ctr., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/preamble/giving-meaning-to-the-preamble-by-erwin-chemerinsky/interp/37 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).

 [503]. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Preamble’s Significance for Constitutional Interpretation, Nat’l Const. Ctr., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/preamble/the-preambles-significance-for-constitutional-interpretation-by-michael-sto/interp/37 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).

 [504]. Chemerinsky, supra note 502.

 [505]. Orgad, supra note 48, at 714.

 [506]. See generally Oxford Constitutions of the World, Oxford Const. L., http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/home/OCW (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).

 [507]. In 1849, the constitutional monarchy of Denmark was the first to use the written United States Constitution as a model, although with no preamble. See generally The Constitutional Act of Denmark, Danish Parliament, https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/democracy/the-constitutional-act-of-denmark (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).

 [508]. Though sources differ as to the exact number of countries whose constitutions begin with a preamble, the number is well over one hundred. Vladan Kutlesic, Preambles of Constitutions: A Comparative Study of 194 Current Constitutions, Const. Making & Const. Change (Nov. 1, 2016), http://constitutional-change.com/preambles-of-constitutions-a-comparative-study-of-194-current-constitutions (stating that 134 of the 194 studied countries have constitutional preambles). See also Wim Voermans et al., Constitutional Preambles: A Comparative Analysis (2017) (noting that 85% of studied constitutions have a preamble; 158/190); Robert L. Maddex, Constitutions of the World (2014); Tom Ginsburg et al., “We the Peoples”: The Global Origins of Constitutional Preambles, 46 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 101, 106, 109 (2014) (finding that of a sample of 742 coded constitutions, 596 contained preambles; 80% of all constitutions have a preamble).

 [509]. Orgad, supra note 48, at 715.

 [510]. Ginsburg et al., supra note 508, at 119.

 [511]. This study identified 596 preambles in 742 coded constitutions. This total includes repeat countries, or revisions of preambles from the same country.

 [512]. 1975 Syntagma [Syn.] [Const.] pmbl. (Greece).

 [513]. Qanuni Assassi Jumhurii Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] pmbl. [1980]. See also Ginsburg et al., supra note 508, at 110.

 [514]. See, e.g., Bundesverfassung [BV] [Const.] April 18, 1999, pmbl. (Switz.); pmbl., Constitución Nacional [Const. Nat’l] (Arg.).

 [515]. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const. of 1996; Конституція України [Constitution] June 28, 1996, pmbl. (Ukraine).

 [516]. Orgad, supra note 48, at 716–18.

 [517]. Frosini, supra note 497, at 605.

 [518]. Id. (“Indeed, it can often be very difficult to make the distinction, for example, between references to the identity of a nation or territory and a historical narration.”).

 [519]. Id.

 [520]. As will be shown below, there are exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of South Africa’s preamble, which contains specific commands and a rich historical narrative, clearly has influenced the court’s decision making.

 [521]. Frosini, supra note 497, at 603.

 [522]. S. Afr. Const. of 1996.

 [523]. Id.

We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to: Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.

Id. S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993.

Whereas there is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms.

Id.

 [524]. Anne Hughes, Human Dignity and Fundamental Rights in South Africa and Ireland 17–21 (2014); Lourens M. du Plessis, The Evolution of Constitutionalism and the Emergence of a Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa: An Evaluation of the South African Constitutional Court’s Approach to Constitutional Interpretation, 62 Sask. L. Rev. 299, 314–15 (1999) (noting that the constitution’s preamble is “consulted quite readily”).

 [525]. S v. Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA (CC) at 867 para. 112 (S. Afr.).

 [526]. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA (CC) at 391 para. 362–63 (S. Afr.). For a more recent example where the Constitutional Court discussed the value of the Preamble, see City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v. Afriform and Another 2016 ZACC 19 (S Afr.).

 [527]. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law]. In the original: “Das gesamte Deutsche Volk bleibt aufgefordert, in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands zu vollenden.”

 [528]. Communist Party Case, BVerfG, Aug. 17, 1956, 5 BVerfGE 85, 128–29 (Ger.). In that case, the Court concluded that banning the German Communist Party would not violate the preamble’s command to pursue reunification.

 [529]. Basic East-West Treaty Case, 1973 BVerfG, 36 BVerfGE 1, 17–18 (Ger.). For more on this case, see Justin Collings, Democracy’s Guardians: A History of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1951–2001, at 134–44 (2015).

 [530]. BVerfG, Oct. 21, 1987, 77 BVerfGE 137, 148–53 (Ger.). See also Collings, supra note 529, at 219–22.

 [531]. Id. See Grundgesetz Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] pmbl., translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg. Though the court could have reached its decision without reference to the preamble. See Micheal Silagi, The Preamble of the German Grundgesetz: Constitutional Status and Importance of Preambles in German Law, 52 Acta Juridica Hungarica 54, 60–61 (2011). For a discussion involving the preamble’s relevancy in German constitutional law, see Collings, supra note 529, at 134–44.

 [532]. BVerfG, June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, translated at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de‌/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. I thank Justin Collings for drawing these German cases to my attention and for his expertise in helping formulate these two paragraphs.

 [533]. Colonel M.M Nehru, Is Preamble a Part of the Constittuion, No Frills Academy, http://nofrillsacademy.com/preamble-part-constitution.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (attributing the quote to Thakurdas Bhargava). See also Shubham Borkar, Nat’l L. Inst. Univ., Role of Preamble in the Interpretation of Constitution 12 (2012), https://www.slideshare.net/ShubhamBorkar3/role-of-preamble-in-the-interpretation-of-constitution-55890820.

 [534]. Berubari Union & Others v. Unknown, (1960) 3 SCR 250 para. 32 (India).

 [535]. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).

 [536]. Id. para. 100–01 (internal citations omitted).

 [537]. Id. para. 124. For further discussion on the substantive roles of preambles in other countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Columbia, see Frosini, supra note 497, at 618–23.

 [538]. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 471 (2005).

 [539]. Id.

 [540]. Handler, supra note 482, at 163.

 [541]. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text. See generally John W. Welch, The 21st Century as the Century of Duties? Clark Memorandum, Spring 2013, at 32–33.

 [542]. Plato: The Laws 723a at 139 (Penguin Books, Trevor J. Saunders trans., 1970). It is possible that this dialogue was known to some of the framers, but unlikely. Either way, Plato’s prescription can carry weight in constitutional theory today.

 [543]. See supra notes 128–30 (on Locke), 322–30 (on Story), 334–40 (on Founding Fathers), 343–45 (on Joseph Smith) and accompanying text. On others, see Matthew S. Holland, Bonds of Affection: Civic Charity and the Making of America—Winthrop, Jefferson, and Lincoln (2007); Aristotle: Politica 3:1275a–1278b, at 1176–1184 (Random House, Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941); Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).

 [544]. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.

 [545]. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (emphasis added).

 [546]. See supra Section I.H. (relevant to the Tenth Amendment).

 [547]. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.

 [548]. Ralph C. Hancock, Conclusion: Two Revolutions and the Problem of Modern Prudence, in The Legacy of the French Revolution 257 (Ralph C. Hancock & L. Gary Lambert eds., 1996). “The American understanding of self-government was buttressed by a rational understanding of natural rights but also grounded in practical political experience and limited by inherent moral and religious beliefs,” including seeing the Creator (and not rationality or the legislated will of the people) as “the very source of man’s natural equality and liberty.” Id. at 268. The French were impatient “with the American doctrine of separation of powers,” with its “inelegant limiting and balancing” that to them “made no sense,” id. at 264, but which is the essence of civic virtue as reflected in the Preamble.

 [549]. Scalia, supra note 142, at 218.

 [550]. See, e.g., supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.

 [551]. Scalia, supra note 142, at 35, 218.

 [552]. As the Committee on Detail had initially preferred.

 [553]. Alexis de Tocqueville, On Common Law, on the Mississippi, in The Tocqueville Reader: A Life in Letters and Politics 63 (Oliver Kunz, ed., 2002).

 

Why the “Demolition Derby” That Seeks to Destroy Investor-State Arbitration? – Article by Judge Charles N. Brower & Jawad Ahmad

From Volume 91, Number 6 (September 2018)
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Why The “Demolition Derby” That Seeks To Destroy Investor-State Arbitration?[*]

Judge Charles N. Brower[† ]and Jawad Ahmad[‡]

Introduction

For nearly six decades, States have entered into approximately 3,000 bilateral investment promotion and protection treaties (“BITs”) and some multilateral treaties (“MITs”), which possess the same dual purposes as the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”). They have been signed, ratified, and entered into force for mutual benefit: investment in the States party to the BIT or MIT is mutually encouraged, in good part by each State party guaranteeing the other State party’s investors an acceptable level of legal protection, usually consisting of “fair and equitable treatment” (“FET”), “full protection and security” (“FPS”), specific rules governing compensation for expropriation, and, via a “most-favored-nation clause” (“MFN”), the same overall level of legal protection as is accorded to nationals of other States with whom the respondent State party to the BIT or MIT has similar treaties in force.

Key to the nationals of each State party who invest in the other State is the mechanism for enforcing those protections, which is known as investor-State arbitration, or investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”). As most treaty parties do not wish their nationals investing abroad to be compelled to dispute with the host State over whether the involved treaty has been breached decided by a national court of the host State, the parties agree in the BIT or the MIT that any dispute between a national of one party investing in the other party will be decided by, typically, a three-person arbitral tribunal, to which each party to the dispute—the investor and the host State—appoints one arbitrator. The third person, who is to chair the arbitration, is appointed by the other two arbitrators, or by the parties to the dispute, or—failing success in that effort for a stated period of time—by an agreed “appointing authority.” All three members of the arbitral tribunal are required and pledge to be independent and impartial to the arbitrating parties.

“Demolition Derby”[1]takes several forms:

States, particularly those which have lost ISDS arbitrations or are appalled at the notion that the host States’ national policies can be judged by foreigners even though the host States are acting pursuant to a treaty in force between them and the States of foreign investors, in recent years have:

(1) “Interpreted” a MIT in a way that effectively removed an essential protection and was decried “as an attempted amendment” by a former President of the International Court of Justice (bilateral “interpretations” of BITs are also pursued);[2]

(2) Denounced the Washington Convention, which established a World Bank International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) as a special regime for ISDS to which 162 States are today Signatory and Contracting Parties[3] and is written into many BITs and some MITs;[4]

(3) Denounced BITs and MITs to which they have been parties;[5]

(4) Offered and negotiated new BITs and MITs that went so far as to eliminate FET or reduce the scope of its protection to the presumably lesser level of protection afforded to aliens by customary international law; eliminate MFN; limit FPS to physical protection, thus excluding “legal” protection; or eliminate ISDS altogether;[6] and

(5) Reserved to the host State the ability to prevent implementation of ISDS even where it is included in a BIT and allowed the two States to abort the process where an arbitral tribunal has already been constituted.[7]

I.  Why Do The Strongest Rule-of-Law States Insist On Destroying The Rule Of Law Protecting Their Nationals Investing Abroad?

A.  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada

Perhaps what opened the eyes of the international arbitration community the earliest was what happened in the NAFTA case of Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada. The American Claimant commenced arbitration against Canada, claiming that Canada had violated the NAFTA Chapter 11 requirement that investment in Canada be given “fair and equitable treatment.”[8] Actually, as Professor Kenneth J. Vandevelde, a former attorney in the Legal Adviser’s Office of the U.S. Department of State who was much involved in negotiating treaties on behalf of the United States, has stated in his book, U.S. International Investment Agreements,

Full protection and security had been identified as an element of customary international law since the interwar FCNs, [that is, treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation] though it was then called “most constant protection and security.” During the 1950s, with the concept of an international minimum standard under attack, the United States had moved away from references to customary law in its FCNs and sought to establish new standards of a requirement of fair and equitable treatment and a prohibition on arbitrary and discriminatory treatment to complement the most constant protection and security standard.[9]

However, the Canadian Government argued to the Pope & Talbot Tribunal that, as written in NAFTA, FET could mean no more than the lower level of treatment accorded to alien investors under customary international law.[10] The Tribunal, deciding whether or not Canada had breached its NAFTA obligation to accord Pope & Talbot “fair and equitable treatment,” ruled unanimously for the Claimant, expressly rejecting Canada’s argument as “patently absurd.”[11] Just over three months later, that “patently absurd” interpretation was adopted by the three NAFTA State parties as an official interpretation binding under NAFTA[12] pursuant to Articles 2001 and 1131, which promptly was denounced by Judge Sir Robert Jennings, then recently President of the International Court of Justice, “as an attempted amendment that has no binding effect.”[13]

In the end, very little, if anything, was achieved by the NAFTA State parties adopting the official interpretation prompted by the Pope & Talbot case. Both “fair and equitable treatment” and “customary international law” are what Professor W. Michael Reisman has described as “‘evaluation rules, . . . . [which] establish a goal that is expressed at some level of generality.”[14] Evaluation rules are contrasted with “[v]erification rules:”

[B]inary, “either-or rules.” Beyond that binary information, the factual and normative universe to which the person charged with applying the rules may turn is strictly confined to a few explicit variables, none of which includes general evaluative concepts such as fairness, equity, justice, minimum order, efficiency, or even common sense.[15]

Professor Reisman further concluded that “[b]ecause each instance of application of evaluation rules such as FET and MST [that is, minimum standard of treatment] re-instantiates them in different contexts, they can scarcely avoid evolving, a fortiori, as social, economic, technological, moral, and ethical variables change.”[16] In other words, the community of States is constantly making and remaking customary international law. Subsequent NAFTA ISDS tribunals have felt bound to pay official lip service to the so-called “interpretation.”[17] But as was said later in Mondev v. United States by Professor James Crawford, Judge Stephen Schwebel, and The Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen—an unusually distinguished Tribunal—customary international law evolves:

The Respondent noted that there was some common ground between the parties to the present arbitration in respect of the FCT’s [sic] interpretations, namely, “that the standard adopted in Article 1105 was that as it existed in 1994, the international standard of treatment, as it had developed to that time . . . like all customary international law, the international minimum standard has evolved and can evolve . . . the sets of standards which make up the international law minimum standard, including principles of full protection and security, apply to investments.” Moreover in their written submissions, summarised in paras. 107–108 above, both Canada and Mexico expressly accepted this point. . . .

The Tribunal agrees. For the purposes of this Award, the Tribunal need not pass upon all the issues debated before it as to the FTC’s interpretations of 31 July 2001. But in its view, there can be no doubt that, by interpreting Article 1105(1) to prescribe the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party under NAFTA, the term “customary international law” refers to customary international law as it stood no earlier than the time at which NAFTA came into force. It is not limited to the international law of the 19th century or even of the first half of the 20th century, although decisions from that period remain relevant. In holding that Article 1105(1) refers to customary international law, the FTC interpretations incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped by the conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties of friendship and commerce. Those treaties largely and concordantly provide for “fair and equitable” treatment of, and for “full protection and security” for, the foreign investor and his investments. Correspondingly the investments of investors under NAFTA are entitled, under the customary international law which NAFTA Parties interpret Article 1105(1) to comprehend, to fair and equitable treatment and to full protection and security.[18]

In fact, as will be seen, Canada, the United States, and the European Union (“EU”) are the chief sponsors today of the ISDS “Demolition Derby.”

B.  Anti-ISDS Activities Around the World

First, however, there are further examples of various other States’ contributions to the ISDS “Demolition Derby.”

In Bolivia, the Evo Morales government rejected investor-State dispute settlement at its core, and in 2007, Bolivia became the first State to withdraw from the ICSID Convention.[19] In 2009, language was introduced into the country’s Constitution authorizing the denunciation of all international treaties contrary to the constitutional text within a four-year period.[20] And, as promised, by 2013, all twenty-one of Bolivia’s BITs had either expired or been denounced.[21]

Venezuela, the second most frequent Respondent State in ISDS cases[22] since the rise of the Hugo Chávez (now Maduro) regime, denounced the ICSID Convention on January 24, 2012.[23] Prior to that, it denounced its BIT with the Netherlands on November 1, 2008.[24]

In 2017, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as Mercosur members, signed a Protocol on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation, which contains no ISDS provision, leaving their foreign investors to the tender mercies of the host States’ national courts, State-to-State negotiations or, ultimately, State espousal of their nationals’ claims in State-to-State arbitration.[25] For the first time in 15 years, Argentina has negotiated a new BIT, however, with Qatar, which, while providing for ISDS,[26] expressly restricts FET and FPS to the customary international law standard of such protection.[27]

Australia has eschewed the inclusion of ISDS in its Free Trade Agreements (“FTA”) with Japan,[28] Malaysia,[29] and the United States,[30] but has included it in BITs with both China[31] and Korea.[32] Moreover, a case has been reported of a U.S. investor requesting the Government of Australia to agree to ad hoc arbitration, despite the absence of ISDS provisions in the U.S.-Australia FTA.[33]

Brazil, which has a long history of never entering into BITs, has started to negotiate Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements that do not provide ISDS.[34] It recently negotiated one BIT with India that eliminates FET and MFN.[35]

In contrast, Indonesia has remained a Contracting Party to the ICSID Convention but publicly announced in 2014 that it would terminate or renegotiate its investment treaties.[36] To date, Indonesia has terminated or let expire twenty-nine of its eighty-three BITs.[37]

Ecuador, perhaps the most extreme case, denounced the ICSID Convention in 2009.[38] In addition, it has denounced twenty-six BITs.[39] Its most recent wave of BIT denunciations was based on a 668-page report the Ecuadorian government had requested on the subject from the Ecuadorian Citizens’ Commission for a Comprehensive Audit of Investment Protection Treaties and of the International Arbitration System on Investments (“CAITISA”), a “‘citizens’ commission’ established by President Correa in 2013 to perform an audit of the country’s BITs.”[40] The CAITISA report recommended the termination of all of Ecuador’s BITs. The report noted that Ecuador has not benefited from the BIT regime and has been held liable to pay investors billions of dollars in damages. The BITs in their current form, according to the report, were biased toward investors. The report also recommended the exclusion of ISDS from new treaties, creation of a permanent investment court, exclusion of FET, FPS, and MFN from new treaties, and the inclusion of substantive obligations of investors to respect international human rights and social rights.[41]

CAITISA’s findings may be questioned, especially considering that at least two members of the commission are renowned critics of ISDS.[42] The commission was chaired by none other than Cecelia Olivet, a non-Ecuadorian who co-authored Profiting from Injustice (a 2012 anti-ISDS diatribe of Dutch and Belgium non-governmental organizations). Another member of CAITISA, Professor Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, is an Australian national, a notoriously anti-ISDS academic, and the C. J. Koh Professor at the National University of Singapore.[43]

Ecuador’s recent move to terminate its BITs “does not, of course, sweep away pending arbitration claims against the government.”[44]

Commentators have criticized the legal justifications behind Ecuador’s recent move to terminate its BITs. In 2008, Ecuador enacted a new Constitution that included Article 422: “Treaties or international instruments where the Ecuadorian State yields its sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration, in contractual or commercial disputes, between the State and natural persons or legal entities cannot be entered into . . . .”[45]

Ecuador’s new constitution and local law require both a binding favorable opinion of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court and approval by the State’s National Assembly in order for Ecuador to denounce certain treaties.[46] According to Jaramillo and Muriel-Bedoya, “[t]his process was followed and the Constitutional Court considered that all the BITs were incompatible with article 422, a flawed conclusion that would apparently legitimize the termination proceedings.”[47] Article 422 forbade Ecuador from entering into international treaties that relinquished jurisdiction to international arbitration, but only with respect to “contractual or commercial disputes.”[48] Thus, according to Jaramillo and Muriel-Bedoya:

[T]he Constitutional Court did not consider that international investment arbitration is a very different animal from international commercial or contractual arbitration. In general terms, the former addresses breaches of international law, particularly of international standards protected by a BIT (e.g. fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, most-favored-nation treatment, etc.), while the latter focuses on contractual breaches of a commercial nature, which do not necessarily derive in breach of international law. Tribunals have historically pointed out these differences in several awards.

. . . . 

The National Assembly replicated the Constitutional Court’s unconstitutionality argument without distinguishing that the Constitution does not forbid international investment arbitration. Likewise, the National Assembly considered that the 2008 Constitution represents a fundamental change of circumstances and, misunderstanding article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it also justified the termination of the BITs under that provision.[49]

Jaramillo and Muriel-Bedoya note that, contrary to the National Assembly, local Ecuadorian law “does not entirely replace the international obligations that a treaty protects, even if similar standards are conceived.”[50] Furthermore, they argue that “a neutral dispute resolution mechanism is of utmost importance for foreign investors and, when it comes to Ecuadorian courts, unfortunately they are not particularly known for their celerity, and neither for not being politicized or interventionist.”[51]

There are signs that Ecuador now is backpedaling. Ecuador’s new Minister for Foreign Trade, Pablo Campana, has said: “[i]n order to secure private direct investment, we must have BITs.”[52] Thus, Ecuador has sent a proposal to fifteen countries inviting them to renegotiate the cancelled bilateral investment treaties “and urging them to accept a new model BIT that requires resolution of disputes by arbitration in the region.”[53] Also, Ecuador launched a website that highlights the damages it has avoided in every arbitration since 2008:[54] “[f]rom 2008 to date, the state says it has avoided 83% of the total amount claimed against it – a total of US$14.7 billion.”[55] The extent to which Ecuador will reverse its investment protection policy remains to be seen.

India reacted quickly to its loss in White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of India, which determined that the Indian judicial system had not afforded the Australian coal mining claimant “effective means” for enforcing an approximately US$6 million award from an International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitral tribunal.[56] Most recently, a slew of claims concerning retroactive tax measures have garnered much attention.[57] India is currently defending twenty-four investment cases as respondent.[58]

India sent “notices of termination” to fifty-eight countries with which it has BITs and proposed to twenty-five other State Parties with which it also has BITs that they issue a “joint interpretation” of those BITs so as to align them with a new Indian Model BIT formulated in 2015.[59] The Indian Model BIT eliminates FET, applies instead the customary international law standard of treatment of aliens, limits FPS to physical protection (not legal security), and permits ISDS only if local remedies are exhausted and produced no result within five years.[60] To date, twenty-two Indian BITs have been effectively terminated.[61]

India’s move to terminate its network of BITs arguably conflicts with the current administration’s campaign to attract foreign investment. India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, announced his “Make in India” campaign in September 2014, which was pitched as “a new major national programme designed to transform India into a global manufacturing hub.”[62]

South Africa, a respondent in only two ISDS proceedings,[63] has denounced nine BITs[64] with Western European countries while looking to revise its policy regarding such treaties. In December 2015, the South African President approved the Protection of Investments Act, 2015 (No. 22) as part of its new policy regarding foreign investments,[65] raising parallels with the ongoing European debate concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”).

While South Africa has moved to terminate its BITs with Western European countries, such actions should not necessarily be interpreted as a broader revolt against investor-State arbitration. Thus far, no termination policy has been adopted in respect of South Africa’s BITs currently in force with other African States including the South Africa-Zimbabwe BIT,[66] the South Africa-Mauritius BIT,[67] the South Africa-Nigeria BIT,[68] the South Africa-Senegal BIT,[69] and the SADC Investment Protocol.[70] There are also a number of South African BITs signed with other African countries that at present have not entered into force.[71] The South African Government has not, to date, announced a negative position regarding these BITs either.

Because South Africa is a heavy capital-exporter to neighboring countries,[72] its Government may conclude that its investors in the African region should have the right to investor-State arbitration. These considerations may not be the same with respect to the Western European treaties it terminated because it may have feared being on the receiving end of an investment treaty claim. In this regard, the South African Government’s behavior does not differ from some of the historically strongest capital-exporting States that have made an “about-face” and are now abandoning the investment legal system they always supported prior to themselves becoming respondents in investor-State arbitrations. This shift exemplifies a larger Zeitgeist with States across the macroeconomic spectrum now adopting a “bunker” mentality and denouncing the entire notion of international dispute resolution solely to ward off potential liability.[73]

EU Member States also have retreated from their dispute settlement obligations under investment promotion and protection treaties. In May 2015, the Italian Government announced its withdrawal from the ECT effective January 1, 2016.[74] Italy’s withdrawal coincided with an increasing wave of ISDS claims against Italy under the ECT challenging modifications to Italy’s solar energy programs.[75] In February 2016, Poland, which has sixty BITs in force[76] and was at the time involved in eleven reported ISDS arbitrations with claims against it totaling as much as US$2.3 billion,[77] announced that it was seeking to cancel its BITs with other EU Member States on the ground that such treaties drive up legal costs.[78] In March 2016, Denmark, which has forty-seven BITs in force[79] and which is not involved in any reported arbitrations, proposed mutual termination to its European BIT counterparties.[80] News reports indicate that Denmark is motivated by fear of future cases against it and that the Danish business community does not, to a large extent, depend on BITs for its foreign investments.[81] So far, both Estonia and Slovenia have indicated that in principle they are agreeable to mutual termination of their BITs with Denmark.[82]

C.  The 2012 United States Model BIT

Going back to the chief villains in this “Demolition Derby,” we have already mentioned the egregious action of the United States, Canada, and Mexico in issuing the famous “interpretation” calculated to bind NAFTA tribunals to apply the interpretation of FET that was unanimously rejected as “patently absurd” by the Pope & Talbot Tribunal.

The United States also produced a new Model BIT in 2012 notwithstanding the fact that it has never (thus far) lost a NAFTA arbitration.[83] Annex B, titled “Expropriation,”[84] covers an entire page and defines “direct expropriation,”[85] “indirect expropriation,”[86] and what “cannot constitute an expropriation.”[87] Moreover, while Article 21(2) titled, “Taxation,” provides that “Article 6 [Expropriation] shall apply to all taxation measures,”[88] claimants alleging that a taxation measure constitutes expropriation are barred from arbitrating their claim unless they first submit the dispute to the two State parties’ respective “competent . . . . authorities”[89] (in the case of the United States, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy)), and those authorities fail to “agree that the taxation measure is not an expropriation” within 180 days.[90] In other words, if the two States agree within 180 days that the claimant has not been subject to expropriation, that is the end of the claim and the claimant is wholly deprived of impartial and independent third-party arbitration of its claim.

Furthermore, Article 14 invites each State Party to list in Annexes I, II, and III any existing measures in that State that do not conform to the BIT’s requirements of most-favored-nation treatment and national treatment, its prohibition of certain performance requirements, and its prohibition of certain interferences with senior management and boards of directors.[91] Those listed measures then are exempted from application of the BIT. Worse still, Article 31, labeled “Interpretation of Annexes,”[92] provides that a tribunal “shall, on the request of the respondent, request the interpretation of the Parties on the issue” whenever “a respondent asserts as a defense that the measure alleged to be a breach is within the scope of an entry set out in Annex I, II or III.”[93] The Article further provides that the Parties “shall submit in writing any joint decision declaring their interpretation to the tribunal within 90 days”[94] and that any such joint decision “shall be binding on the tribunal”[95] whose “decision or award . . . must be consistent”[96] with it. Thus, once more, the power of decision is returned to the States. Finally, Article 30(3) allows the States party to the BIT to issue a “joint decision” through each State’s respective representative “declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty [that] shall be binding on a tribunal, and [which] decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.”[97] And those are only three of the more egregious anti-investor provisions in that Model BIT.[98]

D.  The European Union and Canada

Canada and the EU are responsible for giving life to the proposed Investment Court System employing fifteen “Judges,” all to be appointed by the States party to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”)—so far, other than Canada, only Vietnam has agreed to this type of court with the EU. Of the fifteen Judges, five must be from Canada, five from EU Member States, and five from other States. Moreover, only those five from other States are eligible to serve as President and Vice President. The Investment Court System would include a tribunal of first instance whose decisions on the law and the facts would be subject to review by an appeals tribunal. The tribunal of first instance would consist of three Judges, all selected by the President of the Tribunal—not by the litigants—from the roster of fifteen Judges. There would be increasingly strict requirements for those arbitrators selected to serve on the roster—including a requirement that candidates refrain from participating in other arbitrations in most capacities—and additional third-party rights, including the right to intervene through amicus curiae submissions.[99]

Not all Canadians believe that this entirely State-appointed Court is a good idea. Investors have preferred ISDS for decades because they have an equal voice with the Respondent State in composing the tribunal that will decide their claim. As the Honorable Marc Lalonde, holder successively of four Ministerial portfolios in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (who is the father of Canada’s current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau), declared in 2015,

Canada, which is very keen to achieve a major trade agreement between the EU and Canada before the U.S.—TTIP.  And Canada caved in before the EU demands for structural reforms in the decision-making process regarding foreign investors’ claims under investment treaties. . . . For Canada, trade trumped investments.[100]

Not all States are enchanted by a permanent court either. For example, according to a Factsheet published by the European Commission on July 10, 2017, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) “has agreed to initiate work on possible multilateral reform of investment dispute settlement including the possible establishment of a multilateral investment court.”[101] In an unofficial report of the Fiftieth Session of the UNCITRAL on July 10, 2017 in Vienna, Nikos Lavranos reported that the United States “and in particular Japan, strongly questioned the need for such urgent work on reforming the ISDS in such a radical manner.”[102] Japan views the proposed permanent court as “a ‘world legislator’ being in a position to decide highly sensitive and important issues without any accountability.”[103] Besides the United States and Japan, there were a handful of States “that, while not openly opposing the mandate, were lukewarm—at least at this point in time—about the idea of moving towards a MIC [Multilateral Investment Court].”[104] These States were “China, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, New Zealand and Australia,” and they “all stress[ed] that the outcome of the efforts of the UNICTRAL [sic] Working Group should not be prejudged towards the MIC and that all options should be considered.”[105] Russia and South Korea cautioned against throwing away years of ISDS experience, only to replace it with “something which may create new problems.”[106] The United Kingdom (“U.K.”), while not opposing the new UNCITRAL mandate, “was considerably more cautious towards moving forward the reform efforts compared to the other EU member states.”[107]

It should be pointed out that the selection of international judges by States or a combination of States is an intensely political affair. In the EU’s overall concept of an International Investment Court, as reflected in CETA, the EU appoints five judges, its treaty partner appoints five, and together they appoint five from other countries. In CETA itself, with ten Provinces in Canada, from the Maritimes to the intensely francophone Québec, through Ontario to the prairie Provinces, all the way to Vancouver, the jockeying for “one’s own” to be appointed, the political trade-offs potentially involved, and the incidental connections that may propel a candidate of little suitability for the appointment to the fore, all bespeak a highly political process. How much more so when the EU’s twenty-seven (after Brexit is complete) Member States compete for five seats on the Court? And the rest of the world, namely, all the countries that are neither Member States of the EU nor its treaty partner? Where will those judges come from? The fact that only the five appointees from outside the EU Member States and the EU’s treaty partner can serve as President or Vice-President of the Court or preside over the three-member tribunals of first instance, gives to such countries a powerful hand within the Investment Court. Make no mistake about it: if you are an investor, you prefer your traditionally equal role in the formation of the tribunal that will judge your case, and do not want your case decided by the retired national judges, retired civil servants, out-of-office politicians, and their friends, who, in the authors’ considered view, are the persons most likely to be selected by States at the end of the process.

 

II.  Cutting off the nose to spite the face

On May 31, 2017, in the British Virgin Islands, John Beechey, a former Secretary-General of the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, described the efforts by himself and Lord Goldsmith QC—representative of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) and the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, as well as a former Attorney General of the United Kingdom—to persuade the EU institutions to give consideration to the arbitral community’s views on ISDS. Paraphrasing Lord Goldsmith QC’s remarks, Beechey said,

a “depressing feature” of the debate was that “no one at the European Commission or at the European parliament was even prepared to give the arbitral community a hearing. Their minds were closed. Any solution was weighted in favour of the clamour of an anti-arbitration lobby long on inflammatory rhetoric and emotion and very short on fact and substance.”[108]

So why is all of this happening? Why are States selling out their own nationals desirous of traditional legal protections when they invest abroad? The answer is that this is a populist trend inspired by fear, by some countries’ and their citizens’ objections to a rule of law that is not “home-grown,” and determinedly by left-wing intellectuals and allied non-governmental organizations who are proceeding in the face of the established facts.

There is also much ado about “fake news” of late that exacerbates certain issues. To be accurate, one must define their terms if they expect to be understood with precision. So-called “fake news” is a label attached to an undeniable truth by a person who refuses to accept that truth. There is also “genuinely fake news” that aims to distract the public as well as legislators and treaty negotiators from the real truth by advancing myths and fairy tales that all too frequently plague the ISDS reform dialogue. Before addressing those tall tales, however, what are the established facts?

A.  Statistics Show that States Win a Majority of ISDS Cases

From 1987 through 2017, 548 ISDS cases were concluded.[109] Of those cases, 37% were decided in favor of the State (the claims were dismissed either for lack of jurisdiction or on the merits) and 28% were decided in favor of the investor.[110] Furthermore, 23% of the 548 cases were settled, 10% were discontinued, and in 2% of the cases there was a finding of liability, but no damages were awarded.[111]

Statistics from ICSID based on cases it administered in the half-century from the first case it registered in 1972 until June 30, 2017 reveal a similar result. Of all of the disputes submitted to ICSID under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules, claims were upheld in part or in full in 30.6%, all claims were dismissed on the merits in 17%, jurisdiction was declined in 16.2%, the claims were found to be manifestly without legal merit in 0.6%, the parties settled by way of an agreement which was embodied in an award in 5%, the proceedings were discontinued at the request of both parties in 16.8%, the proceedings were discontinued at the request of one party in 9.1%, the proceedings were discontinued for lack of payment of the required advances in 3.2%, the proceedings were discontinued at the initiative of the Tribunal in 0.2%, and 1.3% of the cases were discontinued for failure of the parties to act.[112] Thus States came away scot-free in 33.8% of the cases, claimants succeeded (wholly or partially) in 31.3% of cases, while the remaining 35.6% of the cases submitted either resulted in settlements (5%) or were discontinued (30.6%) (which in some cases may have reflected a settlement).

The statistics are even more favorable for EU Member States. Of all of the disputes submitted to ICSID under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules involving an EU Member State as of April 30, 2017, the tribunal dismissed all claims in 36.6%, the tribunal upheld claims in part or in full in 24.4%, the tribunal declined jurisdiction in 17.1%, the proceedings were discontinued at the request of both parties in 7.3%, the proceedings were discontinued at the request of one party in 2.4%, a settlement agreement was embodied in an award at the parties’ request in 4.9%, the proceedings were discontinued for lack of payment of the required advances in 4.9%, and in 2.4% of disputes the proceedings were discontinued for failure of the parties to act. In other words, in 53.7% of disputes the respondent-EU State succeeded in persuading the tribunal either to decline jurisdiction or to dismiss the claims on their merits, whereas claimants succeeded in less than half that number of cases (24.4%), while 21.9% were either settled (4.9%) or discontinued (17%) (which in some cases also may have reflected a settlement).[113]

B.  Overreacting to Cases

Despite these statistics confirming that States win in a majority of investment cases, there frequently is an overreaction whenever a State is sued under an investment agreement. One example of such an overreaction was the first NAFTA arbitration under Chapter 11 against Canada, Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada. That case involved a bill that was introduced in the Canadian Parliament in May of 1995 and was enacted as the Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl (“MMT”) Act on April 25, 1997. It prohibited the commercial importation of, and interprovincial trade in, MMT, a fuel additive. Ethyl commenced NAFTA arbitration proceedings in April 1997, arguing that the measure was illegitimate and discriminatory. Canada argued that while MMT was designed to increase octane in gasoline, it affected emission control on automobiles, thereby presenting an environmental hazard due to manganese becoming airborne.[114]

The arbitration was short-lived. Following the Tribunal’s unanimous ruling in June 1998 confirming its jurisdiction,[115] the case was settled for US$13 million.[116] The decision confirming the Tribunal’s jurisdiction came less than two weeks after a domestic Canadian panel convened under Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade (“AIT”) (concluded by the national Government with its Provinces and Territories) undermined Canada’s position in defending the Ethyl case. The Government of Alberta had commenced proceedings under the AIT alleging that the MMT Act failed to comply with Canada’s obligations under the AIT. The Governments of Québec, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan intervened as complainants in support of Alberta. A majority of the AIT panel hearing the case ruled that the MMT Act was inconsistent with certain provisions of the AIT and recommended that Canada remove the inconsistencies and, pending such removal, “that [Canada] suspend the operation of the Act with respect to interprovincial trade.”[117] Canada was left without a leg on which to stand vis-à-vis Ethyl. Hence, it entered the US$13 million settlement.

Despite that fact that it was the AIT panel’s preceding decision adverse to the Canadian Government that made the case effectively indefensible, the Ethyl case attracted widespread media attention and evoked a vociferous public backlash at the time. The Financial Post described the reactions of the supporters of the MMT Act as follows:

Ethyl’s opponents in the auto sector were more forthcoming. The NAFTA claim is “a bullying tactic,” said Mark Nantais, president of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association. “It’s an attempt [by Ethyl] to intimidate the cabinet of Canada.”[118]

The Globe and Mail wrote in 2001 in How Free Trade Threatens Democracy,

[t]hey’re going to be marching on the streets at Quebec City’s Summit of the Americas within a couple of weeks because, among other things, they oppose “investor-state rights.” To free-trade critics, nothing more starkly illustrates the imbalance of power that transnational corporations have acquired over democratically elected governments.

The investor-state rights provision, Chapter 11, of the North American free-trade agreement, permits corporations to challenge governments’ sovereignty to make policy regarding public health, the environment, labour standards and other public services.

. . . .

Here is how Chapter 11 works:

The U.S. Ethyl Corp. sued the Canadian government for $250-million (U.S.) and obtained, in 1998, a settlement of $13-million for the government’s ban on the gasoline additive MMT, labelled a known nerve toxin by reputed scientists. The ban was reversed.[119]

In another article in The Globe and Mail, NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings were blamed for the settlement:

The chapter has also been used by Virginia-based Ethyl Corp. to force Canada to overturn a ban on gasoline additive MMT that had been motivated by environmental concerns. The Canadian government also paid Ethyl $13-million in an out-of-court settlement.[120]

At the time, the media maintained that NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings constituted a “regulatory chill” restricting Canada’s sovereignty, as demonstrated by the settlement with Ethyl and the repealing of the MMT Act. Contrary to this widespread misconception, Canada was motivated to settle the Ethyl case because the MMT Act was inconsistent with the AIT. The complaint against the MMT Act was maintained by four provinces. Faced with the AIT’s decision scuttling the MMT Act, Canada had no alternative but to settle with Ethyl. This is confirmed by Canada’s official governmental website in which it describes the outcome of the Ethyl case as follows:

Settlement of the claim

Further to a challenge launched by three Canadian provinces under the Agreement on Internal Trade, a Canadian federal-provincial dispute settlement panel found that the federal measure was inconsistent with certain provisions of that Agreement. Following this decision, Canada and Ethyl settled all outstanding matters, including the Chapter Eleven claim.[121]

Despite the Canadian Government’s straightforward explanation as to why it settled the Ethyl case, local politicians have continued, even decades later, to “remember” the ordeal differently. Elizabeth May, leader of the Green Party of Canada and MP for Saanich-Gulf Islands, held a press conference in September 2012 in which she warned against the adoption of the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement.[122] During the press conference, she highlighted the controversy that the Ethyl case had caused in Canada:

We know the experience of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Everyone believed and including all the groups fighting NAFTA, that Chapter 11 was innocuous. It was never raised in the fight over NAFTA and yet the investor-State provisions of NAFTA have proven to be the most corrosive of democracy, the most undermining of Canadian laws. It’s only under Chapter 11 of NAFTA that a U.S. corporation had the right to claim damages against Canada and cause our Governments to repeal laws passed in our Parliament. It was bad enough when it was a US multinational, like Ethyl Corporation of Richmond, Virginia, getting laws against its toxic gasoline additive MMT cancelled. But how much worse is it to imagine that the Communist Chinese Government out of Beijing through its various tentacles of Sinopec and PetroChina and CNOOC will be able to trump Canadian law through complaints in this process that set out in this agreement.[123]

Despite Elizabeth May’s efforts, the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement retained an ISDS provision, and was signed and entered into force on October 1, 2014.[124]

As explained above, Canada settled the Ethyl case because of the AIT decision. “Genuinely fake news” about the Ethyl case nonetheless has persisted, twenty years after the event, in a report published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (“CCPA”) in January 2018 in which it revived the same mythical hue and cry against NAFTA that followed the Ethyl case.[125] The report warns against the “chilling effect” NAFTA’s ISDS has on public policy and regulation,[126] describes Canada’s 1998 settlement with Ethyl Corporation as “regrettable”[127]and dispenses the following misinformation to buttress its outlandish claims:

In one of the starkest examples, the Canadian government repealed its ban on the import and interprovincial trade of the gasoline additive MMT (a suspected neurotoxin) after being sued by the Ethyl Corporation. After a preliminary NAFTA tribunal judgment sided with the company, the Canadian government reversed the MMT ban, paid Ethyl $19.5 million to settle the case and formally apologized.[128]

As laid out above, this description of Ethyl is fatally incomplete, incorrect, and grossly misleading. It is simply baffling that the same truly fake news continues to be regurgitated and circulated two decades later.

Importantly, no ISDS tribunal has ever found that a legitimate environmental or health law or regulation of a State breached a BIT or a MIT. We of course know why the Ethyl case was settled. In SD Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Canada issued an order banning the export of polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”), and of substances containing PCBs, an environmentally hazardous chemical compound. The American company, S.D. Myers, Inc.—which engaged in the disposal of PCBs found in other substances—commenced NAFTA proceedings in October 1998 against Canada. The Tribunal ruled that Canada had breached Article 1102 (“National Treatment”) and Article 1105 (“Minimum Standard of Treatment”) of NAFTA, concluding that Canada’s prohibition of PCB exports was motivated not by environmental considerations, but rather to protect the then-budding Canadian PCB disposal industry from its more experienced U.S. competitors:

193. Having reviewed all the documentary and testimonial evidence before it, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Interim Order and the Final Order favoured Canadian nationals over non-nationals. The Tribunal is satisfied further that the practical effect of the Orders was that SDMI and its investment were prevented from carrying out the business they planned to undertake, which was a clear disadvantage in comparison to its Canadian competitors.

194. Insofar as intent is concerned, the documentary record as a whole clearly indicates that the Interim Order and the Final Order were intended primarily to protect the Canadian PCB disposal industry from U.S. competition. CANADA produced no convincing witness testimony to rebut the thrust of the documentary evidence.

195. The Tribunal finds that there was no legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban. Insofar as there was an indirect environmental objective—to keep the Canadian industry strong in order to assure a continued disposal capability—it could have been achieved by other measures.[129]

Further comfort that legitimate environmental measures of States are respected by ISDS tribunals can be found in Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, in which a unanimous NAFTA Tribunal composed of Cambridge University Professor James Crawford, now a titular Judge of the International Court of Justice, Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler of Switzerland (as Presiding Arbitrator), and a co-author of this Article (Judge Brower) ruled that Canada had in no respect breached any provision of NAFTA when it banned the pesticide lindane from use in respect of canola.[130]

The results of the tobacco labeling cases—Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay and Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Commonwealth of Australia—further confirm that no health-protection legislation or regulation has been found by any ISDS tribunal to have breached any provision of any investment treaty. The tobacco cases have attracted particular attention from critics of investor-State arbitration despite the fact that both States—Australia and Uruguay—won those cases. Even when cases come out in favor of States, the critics disregard the result and emphasize the alleged bias toward investors in the ISDS system. When a majority of the tribunal in Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay found in favor of the State, rather than recognize that ISDS works, the critics turned their attention to the hefty fees collected by ISDS lawyers and how the case should not have been brought in the first place.[131] They look right past the unchallengeable fact, as illustrated by the NAFTA cases cited above and the tobacco cases, that States’ “policy space” universally has been preserved by ISDS tribunals.

Nevertheless, prominent people and publications have spoken out emphatically against ISDS.[132] The EU itself has not been honest about the situation. In June 2013, EU Member States formally mandated that the EU Trade Delegation include investment protections and ISDS in TTIP.[133] All the while, however, opposition to ISDS was gaining ground. By January 2014, the outgoing EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht responded to this growing opposition by deciding to “pause” the TTIP negotiations concerning ISDS in order to prepare a public consultation on the issue.[134] In presenting the results of the consultation approximately one year later, the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström asserted that “[t]he consultation clearly shows that there is a huge skepticism against the ISDS instrument.”[135] That “consultation,” however, could hardly be called representative. It was accurately described to Reuters by two EU officials as follows:

[O]ver 95 percent [of the almost 150,000 responses] were from supporters of a small group of organisations hostile to a deal with Washington and who submitted identical or very similar responses . . . . [This was a] hijacking of the online consultation . . . . Many responses to the EU survey appeared to be automated or generated by forms filled in on campaign websites, encouraging EU citizens to reject arbitration policy in [TTIP].[136]

III.   Leading International arbitration actors Encourage This “Demolition Derby”

What is doubly baffling is that prominent international arbitrators who have led the field for years appear to encourage this “Demolition Derby” and currently do so in league with the UNCITRAL Commission, whose Working Group III considered the pros and cons of a permanent investment court at its session in Vienna from November 27 to December 1, 2017. According to the UNCITRAL Commission Report on the Fiftieth Session in July 2017, Working Group III was entrusted to consider ISDS reform “so as not to burden Working Group II unduly while it continued to fulfil its mandate [of its work on the enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation].[137] It is curious that this task has been assigned by UNCITRAL to Working Group III—which previously has dealt with international legislation on shipping, transport law, and, only most recently, online dispute resolution—and not to Working Group II, which for decades has dealt extensively with arbitration, conciliation, and dispute settlement, and in which, inter alia, the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law were incubated. Furthermore, the Commission emphasized that delegations to Working Group III should be government representatives, not the technicians and professionals traditionally attending Working Group meetings, which are largely charged with technical work.[138] One asks: What is the reason that the UNCITRAL Commission has assigned consideration of the EU-inspired International Investment Court proposal, not to the Working Group with by far the most extensive experience with international arbitration, but rather to one whose exposure to the field has been limited to online arbitration, along with shipping and transport law? Why is it charged to have predominately government delegations? Are the dice being loaded?

It would appear so, as a close look at the relevant UNCITRAL Commission report reveals. The UNCITRAL Commission report of its Fiftieth Session held in July 2017 states:

While a few suggested that Working Group II should be tasked with investor-State dispute settlement reform upon completion of its work on the enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation, it was generally felt that it would be preferable to assign that work to another working group so as not to burden Working Group II unduly while it continued to fulfil its mandate.[139]

Working Group II, however, at that moment was on the verge of completing that mandate at its session held in February 2018. Thus, the UNCITRAL Commission proudly has announced the following:

Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) completed its work on the preparation of a draft convention and a draft amended Model Law on international settlement agreements resulting from mediation. Both draft instruments will be considered for finalization by the Commission at its upcoming session in New York (25 June–13 July 2018).[140]

So, what was the rush? Why did the UNCITRAL Commission “support for work to be undertaken with priority in 2017”?[141]

Indeed, Working Group III’s Vienna session from November 27 to December 1, 2017 revealed a telling picture that the work now is political rather than technical—the traditional domain of Working Groups. In two of the five days, the meeting attendees fought over who should chair the meeting, an issue hitherto always resolved by consensus.[142] Incredibly, the many EU Member State Delegations present carried the day for the election of a senior official of Canada,[143] who by definition is bound to CETA, and hence to the EU International Investment Court imbedded in CETA. There can be no doubt that the dice, in fact, have been loaded. Nevertheless, reluctant delegates grappled with the monumental task of reforming ISDS, and Part I of the Working Group III Report from that session emphasized concerns of some States over the cost and duration of the proceedings.[144] Several of the more sober-minded participants in the session argued that deliberations relating to duration and cost should be fact-based.[145] Working Group III ultimately settled on a compromise, recording that perceptions are also relevant in maintaining the “legitimacy” of ISDS, the ubiquitous buzzword that Professor Christoph Schreuer recently decried as “one of those Humpty Dumpty words designed to arouse pleasurable emotions without conveying meaning” in his keynote address at the Investment Treaty Arbitration Conference in Prague on October 26, 2017.[146] Some less radical reforms, including those clarifying a tribunal’s powers of cost apportionment and to order claimants to post security for costs in certain scenarios, were also discussed,[147] mirroring recommendations by Professor Schreuer in his speech.[148]

The proposal to eliminate ISDS arbitration, which gives investors an equal voice with host States in forming a tribunal to decide their treaty dispute, began with Professor Jan Paulsson, a former President of both the London Court of International Arbitration and the International Council on Commercial Arbitration. In his Inaugural Lecture as holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair at the University of Miami School of Law in April 2010, he proposed the abolition of party-appointments of co-arbitrators (and, at least inferentially, abolition of investors’ and host States’ equal roles in the appointment of tribunal chairpersons). Subsequently, he published his article titled Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution[149] (the “Moral Hazard article”) based on that lecture. Professor Paulsson’s arguments were addressed in the article titled The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded[150] (the “Nightingale article”) that was co-authored by one of the authors of this Article, Judge Brower, and his former law clerk, Charles B. Rosenberg. In a public discussion of an earlier draft of the Nightingale article under the auspices of the Institute for Transnational Arbitration, Professor Paulsson commented on the article. The Global Arbitration Review report of the event revealed Professor Paulsson retreating from his original position:

Paulsson also said that he does not dispute the right of parties to agree to appoint arbitrators if they so choose. His primary suggestion, he explained, is that the existing LCIA rules should be emulated across the board “to the effect that if the parties stipulate unilateral appointments that is what they get, but otherwise the default rules [sic] is that all three are chosen by the LCIA”.[151]

Since then, Professor Paulsson published his book titled The Idea of Arbitration in 2013[152] and recently delivered two lectures further fanning the flames of the debate over unilateral appointments by arbitrating parties and the investors’ equal role in selecting a tribunal chairperson.[153]

Professor Paulsson’s latest example of why unilateral appointments are undesirable concerns the dissenting opinion of the arbitrator appointed by the claimant in Supervisión y Control, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, Joseph P. Klock, Jr., who was sitting in his first ICSID arbitration ever. The dissenter took issue with the ICSID party-appointment procedure, apparently citing his own sensation as a first-timer at ICSID, that party-appointed arbitrators face an awkward tension in distancing themselves from the party that appointed them. The relevant parts of his dissent are set out below:

[A]s far as the impartiality of the panel is concerned, I believe that ICSID should more carefully consider the issue of panel selection. . . . [T]he arrangement whereby two of the panel members are selected by the parties to the agreement creates an uncomfortable aura of conflict which permeates, in my view, the proceedings. It creates a true ethical burden on these other two parties [that is, “panel members”] to separate themselves from the interest of those who have selected them to serve. I know that I have worked hard to neutralize this factor as I am sure my esteemed colleague [co-arbitrator] has done.

 However, the dignity and integrity of an ICSID proceeding would be much better served by the selection of panelists from lists where the selection is made wholly by ICSID and where careful screening is done to make sure that any selected panelists do not have conflicts, not only real conflicts which should be identified in the screening process done, but perceived conflicts as well, either by issue or relationship. It ill-behooves ICSID to have anyone unfairly suggest that it is a club where the result can be influenced by relationships that exist by those who serve variously as advocates or arbitrators.

 Composition Of The Panel. This panel was assembled in accordance with the terms of the agreement between the parties, with one panelist appointed by each of the parties and the third, by the Chair of ICSID. To the extent that ICSID has the ability to direct the composition of panels that are to arbitrate its claims, I believe that it should consider prohibiting this arrangement. Of the three of us, the only panelist who did not have an inherent conflict was [the Tribunal President], and I know that both of the remaining two of us were honored to serve under his chairmanship. He also was the only panelist who did not labor under any type of conflict burden.

 However, as someone who has served on a number of arbitral panels, I find an appointment by a party of a judge to rule on the party’s claim creates an unnecessary barrier to pure objectivity, except in situations where a high degree of technical or scientific skill and knowledge of a discipline is needed. That clearly is not the case in terms of a contract dispute. If the desire is to have three judges decide an issue, then there should be three completely impartial judges appointed, judges who are no [sic] related to the parties or to their counsel. Those procedures were not in effect in this case, and if they were, perhaps the painful process of reviewing conflict could have been avoided.[154]

Professor Paulsson finds that the arbitral community should take the dissenter’s comments “to heart, recognize [them] as not being an isolated phenomenon, and take [them] as a compelling reason to consider ways in which this kind of unease can be alleviated.”[155] It would seem more pertinent to conclude that the dissenting arbitrator should have resigned from that Tribunal as soon as he became uncertain as to whether he could, fully and without reservation, comply with the mandate laid on him by Articles 14 and 40 of the ICSID Convention[156] and Rule 6 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which required him to “be relied upon to exercise independent judgment.”[157] Considering that the dissenter had, as he wrote, “served on a number of arbitral panels,” presumably commercial ones formed in the same way as ICSID tribunals, he should have stopped accepting party-appointments as co-arbitrator long before he accepted appointment to the ICSID Tribunal.

Despite Professor Paulsson’s continued push, “[s]even years on, arbitration users have responded to Professor Paulsson’s call for the practice of unilateral appointments to be removed with a resounding no: far from being removed, the practice of unilateral appointments remains standard practice in international arbitrations,”[158] as the arbitral community continues to regard the unilateral right of appointment as the preferred method of appointment. The 2012 International Arbitration Survey by Queen Mary University of London revealed that, for three-member tribunals, 76% of those responding to the survey (consisting of arbitrators, private practitioners, and in-house counsel) preferred the “selection of two co-arbitrators by each party unilaterally. This method of selection was favoured by all three categories of respondents, but more by private practitioners (83%) than by in-house counsel (71%) and arbitrators (66%).”[159] The same survey was conducted in 2015, in which respondents were asked “[w]hat are the three most valuable characteristics of international arbitration?” in response to which “‘enforceability of awards’ and ‘avoiding specific legal systems/national courts’ were most frequently chosen, followed by ‘flexibility’ and ‘selection of arbitrators’.”[160] The support for the right of party-appointment was affirmed in the 2017 Berwin Leighton Paisner survey of 151 participants consisting of “arbitrators, corporate counsel, external lawyers, academics, users of arbitration and those working at arbitral institutions.”[161] 66% of the participants found the “retention of party appointments to be desirable”[162] and 59% of the participants “believed that not all institutions can be trusted to maintain an inclusive and well-qualified list of arbitrators from whom all appointments to the tribunal can be made.”[163]

All the signs point to the value of the unilateral right of appointment. So “how then can it be said that this practice undermines the legitimacy of the arbitral process or its outcome?”[164] Maintaining the unilateral right of appointment allows “all parties to enter international arbitration with an equal sense of confidence in the neutrality of the system.”[165] Arbitration has become truly international to the extent that no arbitral institution, no group of governments, and no international organization could ever fully appreciate the intricate cultural, societal, and political sensitivities that go into the selection of arbitrators. It is thus artificial to imagine a single list of arbitrators from which all appointments would be made that would be acceptable to all arbitral disputants. This is especially so for those parties who have no knowledge of or familiarity with those on the list.[166]

In fact, there has been serious opposition to the ICC’s recent incorporation into its Arbitration Rules of Expedited Procedure Provisions effective as of March 1, 2017 of a new provision enabling the ICC to override the parties’ agreement on appointments to the tribunal.[167] These procedures shorten the deadlines for the filing of submissions and the scheduling of hearings, apply to arbitration agreements concluded after March 1, 2017,[168] and apply automatically to disputes involving US$2 million or less.[169]

The new Article 2(1) of Appendix VI of the ICC Arbitration Rules permits the ICC Court to override the parties’ agreement on the number of arbitrators: “The Court may, notwithstanding any contrary provision of the arbitration agreement, appoint a sole arbitrator.”[170]Such expedited procedures have become “the flavor of the year” with other arbitral institutions worldwide.[171]

Fabian Bonke, for example, opines that the ICC’s reform “took a step too far when empowering the ICC Court to override a contrary agreement between the parties in expedited proceedings.”[172] Overriding party agreement may prompt set-aside proceedings that risk prolonging the final resolution of the dispute, which defeats the purpose behind expedited procedures.[173] This exemplifies—as does the 59% of participants distrusting institutions’ ability “to maintain an inclusive and well-qualified list of arbitrators” in the 2017 Berwin Leighton Paisner survey discussed above—Professor Paulsson’s “Kryptonite,” which he describes as follows:

[T]he one argument [that] will defeat me every time . . . . [Y]ou look me in the eye and sayI don’t trust the institution, and so long as I can name one of the arbitrators I feel that I will reduce the risk of a runaway tribunal doing something crazy—but unappealable.”[174]

Ancillary to the assault of Professor Paulsson on unilateral appointments, Professor Albert Jan van den Berg, likewise a past President of the International Council on Commercial Arbitration and General Editor for many years of its Annual Yearbook, has called on “party-appointed arbitrators [to] observe the principle: nemine dissentiente.”[175] Professor Van den Berg maintains this view on the ground that in the 22 of 150 published awards and decisions in investment arbitration cases he surveyed in which a dissenting opinion had been issued, it almost invariably had been issued by the arbitrator appointed by the losing Party. He concluded that “dissenting opinions [in investment arbitration] barely serve a legitimate purpose in a system with unilateral appointments”[176] and that “investment arbitration would function better and be more credible if party-appointed arbitrators observe the principle: nemine dissentiente.”[177] Professor Van den Berg believes that dissents should be “reserved for those cases where serious procedural misconduct or a violation of fundamental principles occurs; for example, where an arbitrator commits fraud.”[178]

The Nightingale article, which was published three years later in 2013, responded to Professor Van den Berg’s observations on dissenting opinions.[179] Two years later, in 2015, Van den Berg published his réplique titled Charles Brower’s Problem with 100 Per Cent—Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration.[180]

While Professor Van den Berg took issue with a variety of the arguments in the Nightingale article, his key response is that the Nightingale article has been “unable to give a convincing explanation for the fact that 100 per cent [sic] of the separate opinions issued in investment arbitrations by party-appointed arbitrators have been rendered by the arbitrator appointed by the losing party.”[181]

Essentially, our response has been “so what?” As the Nightingale article explained, 78% of the approximately 150 cases reviewed by Van den Berg resulted in no dissenting opinions at all, thus “[t]his figure alone serves to minimize any concerns regarding dissenting opinions in investment arbitration.”[182]

The newest and most directly serious threat to ISDS as presently known and favored overwhelmingly by its users, however, comes in the form of a 115-page “research paper . . . prepared for . . . UNCITRAL [at its request] within the framework of a project of the Geneva Center of International Dispute Settlement (“CIDS”)”[183] (“CIDS Report”) by Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, the Center’s Co-Director, and Dr. Michele Potestà, a Senior Researcher at the Center. The CIDS Report was presented to the UNCITRAL Commission on May 24, 2016,[184] and was discussed extensively at the UNCITRAL Commission’s Fiftieth Session in Vienna, held July 3–21, 2017[185] following the holding of an “UNCITRAL-CIDS Government Expert Meeting” in Geneva March 2–3, 2017.[186] Doubtless it will continue to provide a critical frame of reference for the meetings of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, to which the subject of “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform” only very recently has been assigned. The first sessions, following receipt of the Commission’s mandate, was held from November 27 to December 1, 2017.[187]

The opening paragraph of the Executive Summary of this “research paper” summarizes its mission as follows:

This research paper seeks to analyze whether the Mauritius Convention on Transparency could provide a useful model for broader reform of the investor-State arbitration framework. To this end, it proposes a possible roadmap that could be followed if States were to decide to pursue a reform initiative aimed at replacing or supplementing the existing investor-State arbitration regime in international investment agreements (IIAs) with a permanent investment tribunal and/or an appeal mechanism for investor-State arbitral awards.[188]

Notwithstanding the “research” character of the CIDS Report commissioned by UNCITRAL, it appears to lend considerable support in substance to the “Demolition Derby” threatening ISDS as it presently exists and to point toward the EU’s goal of establishing an Investment Court System, otherwise termed a fifteen-Judge International Investment Court.[189] Specifically, the CIDS Report focuses primarily on whether an award by a hypothetical permanent court could be enforced under the New                mentions awards by “permanent arbitral bodies.”[190] By considering the travaux préparatoires of “permanent arbitral bodies” under Article I of the N.Y. Convention, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”) and sports-based “arbitral” institutions, the CIDS Report opines that awards by such institutions may be enforced under the N.Y. Convention despite the fact that those bodies were not formed by appointments of the respective nationals who presented the vast bulk of the claims subject to the IUSCT’s jurisdiction and of athletes whose complaints are subjected to the jurisdiction of special sport-based arbitral institutions.[191]

Turning, then, from what had been posed as an enforcement issue, the CIDS Report concludes that because the IUSCT is an example of “arbitration” in which the U.S. claimants had no say in the appointment of the arbitrators deciding their cases,[192] it justifies more broadly the envisaged International Investment Court. Enforcement of IUSCT awards did not raise issues “about the fact that [the Tribunal’s] composition did not reflect traditional methods of appointment in international arbitration.”[193] Rather, it was debated whether the IUSCT awards were rendered under the Dutch lex arbitri or were “a-national” and whether there was an arbitration agreement in writing.[194] The CIDS Report notes that

[i]f anything, the nature of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as true arbitration could have been disputed—and has indeed been disputed—in connection with the element of compulsion it entailed, as American claimants had no other choice than to pursue their claims before the Tribunal and were barred from initiating or continuing actions in U.S. courts. But the Tribunal’s arbitral nature was never disputed for reasons linked to its composition.[195]

This leap from enforceability to per se justification of investor-State arbitration as presently known (not being changed by its replacement by an International Investment Court), however, wholly disregards the fact that the IUSCT was established through negotiations to solve a major international crisis that began only in early November 1980 and ended just two and a half months later with the conclusion of the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981. The negotiations were conducted via Algeria (as intermediary) and involved English, French, Arabic, and Farsi languages—the principal object of the negotiations was the release of fifty-two American hostages who were held captive for 444 days and all but two of whom were U.S. diplomatic or consular officers.[196] Iran’s seizure of the hostages had resulted in two United Nations Security Council Resolutions,[197] an order of the International Court of Justice[198] compelling the hostages’ release but ignored by Iran, and a failed U.S. Army Delta Force raid at Desert One in Iran which had been mounted to free the hostages.[199] This hostage seizure triggered the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries. To rely on such a hurried solution of a serious international crisis as a model for normal investor-State arbitration is beyond reason.

It is equally true that neither the American merchant shipowners whose vessels were sunk by Confederate States’ armed raiders during the Civil War, in particular by the CSS Alabama, nor the American cargo owners whose goods were thereby lost, were allowed to appoint any of the arbitrators in the post-Civil War “Alabama Arbitration” between the United States and the United Kingdom. That arbitration forestalled incipient hostilities between the two countries provoked by the United Kingdom’s having allowed those raiders to be built in England in patent violation of the laws of neutrality—the United Kingdom having declared itself neutral in the Civil War.[200] Similar to the IUSCT, the United States and the United Kingdom appointed one arbitrator each and agreed that three others would be appointed from Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland.[201] It is simply illogical and unreasonable to cite a tribunal formed to resolve an ongoing international crisis between two nations at daggers’ points to justify the deprivation of arbitrating parties’ historic enjoyment of the right to appoint arbitrators and collaboration in the selection of a tribunal chairperson.

No less inapposite is the CIDS Report’s reliance on certain rules that “provide for the institution’s sole power to appoint the arbitrators, without any input from the parties.”[202] As examples, however, the CIDS study cites only[203] the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, which state that the President of the ad hoc Division will appoint one or three arbitrators from a preselected list without the disputing parties’ input[204] and the Arbitration Rules of the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (“BAT”), which provide that “all disputes before the BAT will be decided by a single Arbitrator appointed by the BAT President on a rotational basis from the published list of BAT arbitrators.”[205] The CIDS Report states that

[a]lthough the parties have no say in the composition of the panels either before the CAS ad hoc division or before the BAT, it is undisputed that these mechanisms are in the nature of arbitration, which was actually confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which is competent to review their awards as a consequence of their seat being in Switzerland.[206]

With respect, these are regulatory and disciplinary bodies whose authority the athletes involved necessarily accept as a condition of competing in the relevant sporting events. They are much like the national or regional authorities regulating the conduct of lawyers, physicians and other professionals. Obtaining a professional license or entering into a competitive sporting event subject to the regulation of CAS or BAT, brings with it automatic subjection of oneself to the relevant regulatory authority. Those subject to CAS or BAT have no more expectation of enjoying the benefits of ISDS as presently known than does a member of the Bar of any country to be able to appoint someone to the disciplinary authority that exists for the profession when that body considers a grievance lodged against that professional. All in all, the CIDS Report dwells principally on what can be termed “arbitration,” rather than on the distinctions of genesis, character, and subject matter of the various fora.[207]

Within the context of enforcement under the N.Y. Convention, the CIDS Report concludes that the unilateral right of appointment is not as important as the parties’ consensual submission to arbitration.[208] There is no denying that party freedom is paramount and if parties choose to do away with their right of appointment, that is their prerogative. But the CIDS Report’s conclusion in relation to enforceability does nothing to undermine the long-established right of unilateral appointment, which is a fundamental—if not crucial—feature of arbitration, especially of investor-State arbitration.

The CIDS Report also draws its conclusions within the confines of the N.Y. Convention, which is an important treaty in the history of arbitration but cannot be representative of all that is regarded as “arbitration.” There are a litany of treaties and rules demonstrating the value of the unilateral right of appointment. The N.Y. Convention’s scope being limited to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements, it “does not provide for any obligation to be met by the parties as to the number of arbitrators or the method of their appointment.”[209] Facilitating the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements is undoubtedly vital if arbitration is to have teeth. What constitutes “arbitration” and how the tribunal is to be constituted are, however, equivalently important. These were intentionally left open in the N.Y. Convention. To go from awards by “permanent arbitral bodies” being enforceable under the N.Y. Convention, to concluding that party-appointment is not an essential feature of arbitration goes too far. The party-appointment procedure—let alone other features of the arbitral process—were simply not in the contemplation of the drafters of the N.Y. Convention.

This is supported by the drafting history of the N.Y. Convention. The Secretary-General of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) recognized that the N.Y. Convention was only one aspect of international arbitration and more work had to be done on arbitration procedures:

It should be noted, however, that the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is but an aspect of international commercial arbitration. It has long been recognized that progress in the development of arbitration as a means to settle international commercial disputes between persons has been hampered mainly by the existing differences in the legislation of the various countries on the subject of arbitration procedures and the effect of arbitration, the lack of uniformity in the rules of arbitral tribunals, and the complications deriving from conflict of laws in this area. Thus, in addition to dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, several public and private organizations interested in the increased use of arbitration in international trade have been actively engaged in promoting the unification of arbitration laws, encouraging the conclusion of arbitration treaties and advocating the standardization or at least the co-ordination of the rules and procedures of existing arbitral bodies.[210]

The N.Y. Convention was one initiative amongst others spearheaded by the ECOSOC and others. “The evolution of an effective and trustworthy private international arbitration system over the last half a century has had three major strands,”[211] of which the N.Y. Convention was but one. The 1976 (and 2010) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration were the others,[212] and both expressly provide for the unilateral right of appointment by disputing arbitrants.[213]

To its credit, the CIDS Report recognizes the fact that appointment of judges to an International Investment Court solely by States or the EU alone necessarily raises justified doubts on the part of investors as to the true impartiality of such judges, and, therefore, emphasizes that the process should not be politicized. They query whether it is desirable that only States participate in the election process or whether the investors should also have a say:

Starting with the election of the members of the ITI, several considerations must come into play. First, speaking of a multilateral tribunal, it is important to provide for an election procedure acceptable to the greatest number of States while preserving the workability of the ITI. In other words, while every State will not have “its” member on the ITI, the composition should nevertheless be acceptable to all States joining the system. One could thus contemplate entrusting the election to a body that is representative of the international community as a whole, so in particular the U.N. General Assembly. In that sense the election would then resemble that of the ICJ judges.

This said, one should mention in this respect the risk that such an election system may become affected by political considerations. This would constitute a step back from the often-praised depoliticization of investment arbitration, one facet of which is the decision-makers’ distance from politics. In this connection, it would also seem important that the selection process be transparent and susceptible of being clearly monitored by the various constituencies. Keeping in mind the criticism towards the alleged democratic and transparency deficit of investor-State arbitration, solutions avoiding to the greatest extent possible any opacities in the selection process should be favored. Indeed, transparency in the process would also reduce the risks for politicization.

Furthermore, one can ask whether it is desirable that only States participate in the election process or whether investors should also have a say. Without reintroducing the system of party appointment of arbitrators, which is currently considered objectionable, a consultation of business organizations, i.e. organizations representative of investor interests, may have its advantages. Indeed, it would mitigate the risk of shifting from the current model that resembles commercial arbitration to the other extreme, that is to an interstate paradigm. This shift would neglect the fact that investor-State dispute settlement is asymmetric, i.e. the disputes are between an investor and a State and not between two States.

Such a solution would also strengthen the view that the dispute settlement body meets the characteristics of arbitration and must be treated as such especially for purposes of enforcement.[214]

With respect, the CIDS Report wrongly presumes that the United Nations General Assembly or any other international organization, including the EU, will act utterly devoid of political considerations, in contrast to States themselves making the appointments to an International Investment Court.

One of the co-authors of this Article, apart from experience in the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Department of State, and the White House, has for decades, in The Hague and at the United Nations in New York City, been observing elections to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which in fact are highly political and, hence, do involve tradeoffs and “deals.” From its establishment as the judicial branch of the United Nations in 1946 until the 2017 elections, it was an unbroken practice that each of the five Permanent Members of the Court would have a seat on it. In the last election, however, even that sacred (if unwritten) rule was broken, with the failure of the sitting U.K. Judge to be re-elected.[215] Thus it is, now more than ever, an illusion to think that the process can be de-politicized.

It is equally misguided to think that “a consultation of business organizations, i.e., organizations representative of investor interests,” will have a significant influence that will reduce the political character of such appointments. There is no obligation on States to follow any recommendation by such organizations on the composition of the hypothetical permanent investment court. It is further presumptuous to think that these organizations would give any consideration to the issue in the first place. Arbitral disputes are not at the top of these organizations’ agendas vis-à-vis their respective governments and any international organizations—let alone individual investors. Disputes may not even transpire until many years later, and there is nothing to suggest that any of the recommendations of business organizations now would be representative of the putative investor that may end up before the permanent investment court in the future. While investors themselves may have a degree of influence, it is not worth much. A right to be consulted is equivalent to a ballot paper with a disclaimer that the vote may not be counted.

In November 2017, the authors of the CIDS Report published a Supplemental Report (“Supplemental Report”). The authors of the Supplemental Report augment their initial paper by providing further analysis of the composition of a hypothetical permanent court.[216] In their Supplemental Report, the authors explain that their proposal in their initial CIDS Report “presuppose[s] the creation of multilateral permanent adjudicatory bodies, the ITI [i.e., International Tribunal for Investments] and/or the AM [i.e., Appeals Mechanism], whereby the former would provide an alternative to the current ad hoc system of investor-State arbitration and the latter would supplement it.”[217]

The Supplemental Report identifies three consequences of transitioning from the current “ad hoc system”—which is understood to refer to a dispute resolution body constituted on a case-by-case basis for a single dispute[218]—to a permanent or semi-permanent body on the arbitrator-selection process. Of those three, the first is relevant for our purposes. The Supplemental Report acknowledges that the unilateral right of party-appointment would be eliminated if the appointing power rests on exclusively on States:

The first consequence is the transition from a disputing party framework to a treaty or contracting party framework. Transitioning from an ad hoc system that allows virtually complete control over composition by the disputing parties to a permanent or semi-permanent system necessarily reduces the role for disputing parties and conversely increases that of treaty parties. As the dispute resolution body must exist before the investment dispute arises, it must necessarily be established ex ante by the treaty parties. This entails moving beyond the “historical keystone” of arbitration, namely disputing party appointment, to a different selection method placed entirely or predominantly in the hands of the parties to the instrument establishing the new adjudicatory bodies. Such dilution of powers concerns all disputing parties, including respondent States who lose the “right” to influence the composition of the body as disputing parties. However, in practice, it will be perceived as affecting the investor-party more heavily, as States will be able to contribute to the composition of the body in their capacity of treaty parties.[219]

The Supplemental Report acknowledges that the tilting of the scales in favor of States is in no way diminished by the fact that the respondent-State in an investment dispute is also deprived of the opportunity to select an arbitrator once the dispute is afoot.

Furthermore, the Supplemental Report seems to acknowledge more clearly the particular hurdles involved in a “selection” process of this type and magnitude:

The guarantees for judicial independence in existing courts provide helpful starting points in this respect. However, they may not be sufficient or at least not entirely transposable as such to investor-State dispute settlement, in which the asymmetric nature is such that only one type of the future disputing parties controls the selection process. Designing an appropriate selection process that, inter alia, ensures the requisite independence of the adjudicators thus appears to be of even greater concern in a setting of this kind.

As the practice at existing permanent international courts and tribunals shows, the involvement of States (and, within the State apparatus, in particular of State governments) may lead to risks of politicization of the selection process. . . . Appointment on the basis of political considerations rather than competence and merit may undermine the quality of the decisions and, ultimately, the perception of the adjudicatory body’s independence, credibility and legitimacy.[220]

Ensuring that the “selection” process is multi-layered, open to all stakeholders, and transparent sounds good in theory, until one realizes that in substance what is being proposed is that States constitute an advisory panel to sign off on the qualifications of potential candidates and “consult[] . . . national parliaments” to “reinforce the democratic element in the process.”[221]

IV.  The Future

A.  The European Union and Its Battle Against ISDS

The “Demolition Derby” targeting ISDS is flourishing, doubtless confident of victory thanks to the UNCITRAL Commission’s welcoming attitude toward the EU’s relentless campaign to sell to the world its Investment Court System. In our view, however, it is questionable whether this “Demolition Derby” will result in a successful International Investment Court. As Nikos Lavranos’s unofficial report of the Fiftieth Session of the UNCITRAL Commission of last July 2017 confirmed, the proposal to replace the current ISDS regime with a permanent investment court has not to date received the glowing endorsement of all States as the EU and Canada have hoped.[222]

On September 13, 2017, the Council of the EU “authorised [sic] [the European Commission] to open negotiations, on behalf of the [EU], for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes.”[223] Recent developments, however, suggest that there may be some insurmountable obstacles ahead for the EU Commission.

For example, the European Commission experienced a setback in respect to the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”). As initially with CETA, the European Commission was confident that the EU-Singapore FTA and all future EU trade and investment treaties would fall within its exclusive competence (Article 207 of the Treaty of the European Union (“TFEU”)). This appears no longer to be the case in light of an opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) that issued in May 2017. The issue before the CJEU was “whether the envisaged agreement [that is, the EU-Singapore FTA] [could] be signed and concluded by the European Union alone or whether, to the contrary, it will have to be signed and concluded both by the European Union and by each of its Member States (a ‘mixed’ agreement).”[224] The CJEU “handed a significant victory to the European Union” insofar as it found that the EU had “exclusive competence over almost all aspects of the EU-Singapore FTA, which paves the way for them to enter into such agreements without requiring the approval of all of the Member States.”[225] The CJEU, however, carved out two notable exceptions: First, the EU has exclusive competence over direct foreign investment, but not over indirect investments, which are investments undertaken without the intention to influence the management of a company.[226] Second, and most significantly, the EU and its Member States share competence of, inter alia, Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) of Chapter 9 of the EU-Singapore FTA.[227] The CJEU noted that the ISDS regime removes disputes from the jurisdiction of the national courts of the Member States and thus is not “of a purely ancillary nature . . . and cannot, therefore, be established without the Member States’ consent.”[228] The outcome of the opinion, in the view of one commentator, makes “[o]ne thing . . . clear: the European Commission did not obtain the full exclusive competence [for] which it was hoping.”[229] The ruling means that EU free trade treaties containing provisions for an International Investment Court “must now be ratified not only by the national parliaments of the 28 EU Member States, but also by nearly a dozen regional parliaments.”[230]

On July 6, 2017, the EU and Japan signed an agreement in principle on the main elements of the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (known as “JEEPA”), which was finalized on December 8, 2017.[231] The agreement in principle excludes investment,[232] noting that no agreement has been reached on the whole chapter and that ISDS remains fully open.[233] The agreement in principle notes that the EU has tabled its permanent investment court proposal in its negotiations with Japan and that “[t]he EU continues to insist that there can be no return to old-style ISDS. Under no conditions can old-style ISDS provisions be included in the agreement.”[234] In a factsheet published on July 1, 2017 by the EU, it added “[f]or the EU ISDS is dead.”[235]

Such rhetoric by the European Commission should be taken with a pinch of salt. Japan has included conventional ISDS in its investment agreements. For example, in 2016 Japan signed BITs with Kenya[236] and the Islamic Republic of Iran[237] and, on January 23, 2018, following negotiations in Tokyo, Japan announced its agreement with ten countries for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership (“CPTPP”).[238] Moreover, Japan may be reluctant to pay for the European Commission’s permanent investment court, which may set a precedent for future treaties whereby State-appointed judges may rule on claims by Chinese or Korean investors against Japan.[239] Japan, thus, may not be easily persuaded to sign up to the European Commission’s proposal in its current form.

We can expect more from the EU’s existential crisis on ISDS. On September 6, 2017, Belgium formally asked the CJEU to assess the compatibility of the CETA’s “Investment Court System” with EU law. Specifically, Belgium has asked whether the “Investment Court System” is compatible with EU citizens’ right of access to courts, the “general principle of equality,” and the CJEU’s exclusive competence over EU law and how the proposed court would affect the “right to an independent and impartial judiciary.”[240]

After a little more than two weeks following Belgium’s formal request to the CJEU, the EU Advocate General Melchior Wathelet rendered a non-binding (but persuasive) opinion in a parallel proceeding that likely will weigh heavily in the disposition of Belgium’s request. The Advocate General’s opinion was rendered with respect to a request for a preliminary ruling brought by the German Federal Court of Justice in May 2016 before the CJEU concerning the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.[241] The German court had referred a series of questions concerning the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law. The German court’s questions arose in the context of an application by the Slovak Republic to annul an arbitral award issued in favor of Achmea (formerly Eureko), a Dutch investor, under the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.[242]

The Advocate General opined that the ISDS provision in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was compatible with EU law,[243] which, if confirmed by the CJEU, could have implications for numerous intra-EU BITs.[244] The intriguing features of the opinion, however, were the Advocate General’s observations on the European Commission’s and some EU Member States’ contradictory ISDS practices.

First, the Advocate General noted that several EU Member States intervened in the proceedings and made both oral and written submissions. He noted that the intervening EU Member States could be divided into two groups. The first group consists of States that “are essentially countries of origin of the investors and therefore never or rarely respondents in arbitral proceedings launched by investors.”[245] These States are the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, and the Republic of Finland. The second group consists of States that “have all been respondents in a number of arbitral proceedings relating to intra-EU investments.”[246] These States are the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.

The Advocate General noted that it was “hardly surprising” that the second group of EU Member States “intervened in support of the argument put forward by the Slovak Republic, which is itself the respondent to the investment arbitration at issue in the present case.”[247] Yet he found it “surprising” that the same States, with the exception of Italy, had not moved to terminate their respective intra-EU BITs, which, thus, remained in force in whole or in part.[248] When Slovakia was asked at the hearing why it had not terminated its other BITs with the States in the second group, Slovakia admitted “that its objective was to ensure that its own investors would not be the victims of discrimination by comparison with investors from other Member States in the Member States with which it would no longer have BITs.”[249]

Second, the Advocate General noted the European Commission’s inconsistent position on ISDS. He noted that “the argument of the EU institutions, including the Commission, was that, far from being incompatible with EU law, BITs were instruments necessary to prepare for the accession to the Union of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.”[250] The Advocate General was unmoved by the European Commission’s attempt to explain its inconsistent position at the hearing:

At the hearing, the Commission attempted to explain that change in its position on the incompatibility of BITs with the EU and FEU [i.e., Treaties on the Functioning of the European Union] Treaties, maintaining that the agreements in question were necessary in order to prepare for the accession of the candidate countries. However, if those BITs were justified only during the association period and each party was aware that they would become incompatible with the EU and FEU Treaties as soon as the third State concerned had become a member of the Union, why did the accession treaties not provide for the termination of those agreements, thus leaving them in uncertainty which has lasted more than 30 years in the case of some Member States and 13 years in the case of many others?[251]

Third, the Advocate General opined that “the systemic risk” that, according to the European Commission, “intra-EU BITs represent to the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law is greatly exaggerated.”[252] For support, the Advocate General referred to UNCTAD statistics that revealed “that out of 62 intra-EU arbitral proceedings which, over a period of several decades, have been closed, the investors have been successful in only 10 cases.”[253] Moreover, the Advocate General also noted that the EU Member States in the second group and the European Commission could only name a single example “which resulted in an arbitral award that was allegedly incompatible with EU law,”[254] namely, the Ioan Micula v. Romania ICSID matter, which is still ongoing. The Advocate General noted that “the fact that there is only a single example reinforces [his] opinion that the fear expressed by certain Member States and the Commission of a systemic risk created by intra-EU BITs is greatly exaggerated.”[255]

Yet, the Advocate General’s opinion fell on deaf ears as the CJEU ruled on March 6, 2018 that ISDS provisions in intra-EU BITs are incompatible with EU law.[256] The decision prompted the Netherlands—one of the States falling under Advocate General Wathelet’s first group[257]—to announce reluctantly its decision to terminate all twelve of its intra-EU BITs.[258]

The full implications of the CJEU’s opinion in Achmea are unclear, but it could be viewed as the CJEU forcing EU investors in other EU Member States to accept the EU Commission’s proposal to resolve all investment disputes through the permanent investment court. Other EU actors may have heard the rallying cry because their efforts to establish the permanent court were amped up following the Achmea decision.

Two weeks after the Achmea decision, the Council of the EU issued a negotiating directive for establishing a permanent investment court for the settlement of investment disputes with the EU Commission designated as the authorized representative.[259] All analysis and discussion concerning the proposal, according to the directive, “should be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).”[260]

Less than a month later, the EU Commission presented a final text of its agreement with Singapore to the Council of the EU as well as a new FTA, the latter of which displaces the previously agreed ISDS provision with the Investment Court System promoted by the EU and adopted in CETA.[261] The Council of the EU will now adopt and sign the agreements before obtaining the EU Parliament’s consent.[262] While the FTA will take effect in 2019, the investment protection agreement will take effect following the ratification by each EU Member State[263]—a move necessary in light of the CJEU’s ruling concerning the EU-Singapore FTA discussed earlier.

On the heels of announcing the final EU-Singapore agreements, the EU and Mexico unveiled an “agreement in principle” in which the Contracting Parties agreed to establish a permanent investment court to resolve investment disputes.[264]

It may be wrong to presume that the CJEU is a promoter of the EU Commission’s permanent investment court. As discussed earlier, the CJEU has yet to issue an opinion on the compatibility of the CETA’s “Investment Court System” with EU law. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the CJEU truly joins its fellow EU institutions in preferring the EU-proposed permanent court.

Moreover, the TTIP talks between the EU and the United States are currently on hold pending further clarity from the new U.S. administration on the position of Washington’s trade policy priorities.[265]

B.  The United States’ Place in the ISDS Debate

The United States’ efforts to renegotiate NAFTA may well result in the removal of ISDS from the treaty. Despite early indications from the current administration that ISDS is here to stay,[266] doubts among affected businesses have grown, and on August 8, 2017, a score of associations “representing millions of small, medium and large companies across every major sector of the U.S. economy employing tens of millions of U.S. workers” wrote to the Administration urging it to retain ISDS.[267] Moreover, minor attacks on ISDS in NAFTA have been intensifying in frequency as renegotiation talks concluded their penultimate round in late January 2018. In addition to the CCPA report debunked above, 230 Professors and six U.S. Senators have added themselves to the phalanx against ISDS. Specifically, on October 25, 2017, 230 law and economics professors sent a letter to President Trump urging him to remove ISDS from NAFTA.[268] Their plea was shared and advanced by six U.S. Senators in a February 2, 2018 letter to President Trump in which they stated the “[ISDS] system and the foreign investor protections it enforces . . . must be eliminated.”[269]

The above letter reveals an alarming collective nationalistic bias to bring investment in-house without considering its consequences. The professors suggest that American investors “purchase risk insurance or look for safer jurisdictions” when investing abroad.[270] Not only does this stunt international growth and development by restricting available venues, it embraces elitism by ensuring that only the financially best endowed corporations can afford to invest in high-risk territories while simultaneously shutting the front door to foreign investment for certain developing countries. The Senators’ stilted argument similarly wobbles under closer scrutiny. The crux of their argument against ISDS in NAFTA is stated as follows:

The investor outsourcing protectionism at the heart of NAFTA incentivizes companies to relocate production to low wage venues by locking in preferential treatment. These terms empower multinational corporations to sue governments before tribunals of three private-sector lawyers who can award the corporations unlimited sums to be paid by America’s taxpayers, including for the loss of expected future profits, when corporations claim that our environmental and health policies undermine their NAFTA privileges. Already multinational corporations have extracted hundreds of millions from North American taxpayers using the ISDS regime.[271]

Treaties such as NAFTA reduce investment risk by protecting investment abroad. There is no preferential treatment as the same level protection is afforded equally to all covered foreign investors and investments. Furthermore, NAFTA does not restrict the tribunal’s composition to “private-sector lawyers.” Public figures, in so far as they satisfy the good character and expertise requirements necessary of arbitrator, are welcome to sit on the bench. Notably, Respondent States consent to all or the majority of any uneven number of appointed arbitrators.[272] Moreover, it is plainly preposterous that a tribunal could award “unlimited sums,” as awards of damages adhere to party agreement or basic principles of international law.[273] Furthermore, insofar as the United States is concerned, it is flatly untrue that “multinational corporations have extracted hundreds of millions from North American taxpayers under the ISDS regime,” as not one NAFTA arbitration case against the country has been lost.[274] As stated earlier, too, no ISDS tribunal has ever found a legitimate environmental or health law or regulation of a State to breach an international investment agreement. Accordingly, NAFTA does not grant “privileges” to corporations.

Amusingly, one of the six U.S. Senators mentioned above, Senator Elizabeth Warren, has directly benefited from ISDS, earning in the neighborhood of US$90,000, while acting as an Expert Witness on bankruptcy law for the U.S. Government in the Loewen v. United States NAFTA case.[275]

More alarming is the effect these attacks may be having on NAFTA ISDS renegotiations. In advance of the November 2017 round, the United States uncharacteristically introduced a second set of objectives on ISDS,[276] which promoted an enhanced skeptical view toward ISDS, including a proposal to introduce an “opt-in” system and a culling of the substantive standards of protection.[277] Following this fifth round of negotiations, Mexico proposed a permanent investment court mirroring the one found in CETA. Mexican Economy Minister Ildefonso Guajardo explained that Mexico is “considering alternatives by putting the European model on the table to see if it works in North America.”[278] Canadian foreign minister Chrystia Freeland similarly acknowledged differences between Canada and the United States on a number of key chapters and stated Canada’s position is to “hope for the best and prepare for the worst.”[279]

In advance of the sixth round of negotiations in Montreal during  January 23–29, 2018, President Donald Trump called NAFTA a “bad joke”[280] on his Twitter account and stated to the media that “if [NAFTA] doesn’t work out, we’ll terminate it.”[281] In turn, Mexico strengthened its position by becoming the 162nd country to sign the 1965 ICSID Convention[282] and Canada signaled that NAFTA was not an exclusive source for trade protection, making public its December 2017 World Trade Organization complaint aimed at the United States’ use of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties.[283] The political charges against inclusion of ISDS in NAFTA have reached a critical point, and Canada is set to propose its elimination, with the expectation that the United States will echo this pitch.[284]

Despite this NAFTA ISDS renegotiation rollercoaster, Mexico and Canada are now flirting with the notion of excluding the uncooperative United States from their own ISDS arrangement,[285] and Canada has demonstrated its willingness to move forward without the United States when it concluded the CPTPP on January 23, 2018, just one year after the United States withdrew its participation in the negotiations of the mega-regional treaty.[286]

C.  The Permanent Investment Court Will Hamper Investment

Even if the proposal for a permanent court were to become an opt-in institution along the lines of the Mauritius Convention on Transparency, it is possible that not many States would opt in.[287]

In any event, a permanent court to replace the current ISDS regime would be unlikely to succeed, as major investors would reject it. They would find other ways to protect themselves when negotiating foreign investments. They would return to the days of the 1960s and ‘70s, even to earlier days, negotiating contracts that would provide satisfactory dispute resolution mechanisms. Or they would not make any investments at all, or would make them at a higher price to the host country in order to cover the risk involved, all to the disadvantage of host States. It is only smaller investors who, lacking the negotiating strength to conclude contracts with host States containing the protection of conventional ISDS clauses, would be materially disadvantaged by their potential subjection to their fate being decided by an International Investment Court composed solely of State-appointed judges. Like so many radical movements devoid of a proper understanding of just how the world really works, the EU’s permanent investment court, if it comes about, will not affect the wealthy investors, but will work hardship on “the little guys,” who under conventional ISDS are given the treaty right of direct access to international arbitration before tribunals that they have an equal right to constitute. Why does anyone think this is just?

 


[*]*. This Article is an extended and updated version of the Annual Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture given by Judge Brower at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law on October 12, 2017. It also includes portions of Judge Brower’s Keynote Address delivered at the Twelfth Annual Fordham International Arbitration Conference on November 17, 2017. . The authors express deep appreciation to A. Devin Bray, Milena Tona, and Ivaylo Dimitrov for their contributions to this Article              .

[† ] †.. Judge ad hoc, International Court of Justice; Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal; Member, 20 Essex Street Chambers, London; and former Judge ad hoc, Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

[‡] ‡.. Associate of Mayer Brown International LLP in London. Previously, he was a private law clerk for Judge Charles N. Brower, 20 Essex Street Chambers, London, and was physically based in Washington, D.C., where he acted as a tribunal assistant in both investor-State and commercial arbitrations. He was previously Judge Brower’s Legal Adviser at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague, where he worked on State-to-State arbitrations. He is an Associate Editor of the Kluwer Arbitration Blog and an Editor of Arbitration International. He co-authored this Article prior to joining Mayer Brown International LLP. The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the co-author, and they do not reflect in any way that of the law firm with which he is affiliated. Any errors remain those of the co-authors.

 [1]. “Demolition Derby” is defined as “a motorsport . . . . [typically consisting] of five or more drivers competing by deliberately ramming their vehicles into one another. The last driver whose vehicle is still operational is awarded the victory.” Demolition Derby, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Demolition_derby (last updated Sept. 14, 2018, 1:41 AM) (footnotes omitted).

 [2]. See Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C. at 6, Methanex Corp. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Sept. 10, 2001); NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, North American Free Trade Agreement: Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, SICE Foreign Trade Info. Sys. (July 31, 2001), http://sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp (“The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”); infra Section I.A.

 [3]. Database of ICSID Member States, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement Inv. Disps., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).

 [4]. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26(4), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 381; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1120(1), Dec. 17, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289; infra Section I.B.

 [5]. See infra Section I.B.

 [6]. See infra Section I.B.

 [7]. See infra Section I.C.

 [8]. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 105 (Apr. 10, 2001), 7 ICSID Rep. 102 (2001).

 [9]. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements 263 (2009). See also Todd Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context 250–75, 129–240 (2013).

 [10]. Pope & Talbot Inc., 7 ICSID Rep. ¶¶ 108–09.

 [11]. Id. ¶ 118.

 [12]. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, supra note 2.

 [13]. Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C. at 4, Methanex Corp. v. United States, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Sept. 10, 2001).

 [14]. W. Michael Reisman, Canute Confronts the Tide: States vs. Tribunals and the Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International Law, 109 Am. Soc. of Int’l L. Ann. Meeting Procs. 125, 125 (2015).

 [15]. Id.

 [16]. Id. at 127.

 [17]. See, e.g., ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 178, (Jan. 9, 2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 470 (2003); Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. V. United States, Award, ¶¶ 175–76, (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf; Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶¶ 9.3–9.4 (Aug. 25, 2014), IIC 661 (2014).

 [18]. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 124–25 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004) (footnotes omitted).

 [19]. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Luke Eric Peterson & Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, bilaterals.org (May 9, 2007), https://bilaterals.org/?bolivia-notifies-world-bank-of&lang=fr.

 [20]. Constitución Política del Estado Feb. 7, 2009, transitory provision IX (Bol.) (“The international treaties existing prior to the Constitution, which do not contradict it, shall be maintained in the internal legal order with the rank of law. Within the period of four years after the election of the new Executive Organ, the Executive shall renounce and, in that case, renegotiate the international treaties that may be contrary to the Constitution.”), translated in Constitute: Bolivia (Plurinacional State of)’s Constitution of 2009, Constitute Project (Jan. 17, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.constituteproject.org
/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf?lang=en.

 [21]. Aldo Orellana López, Network for Just. Global Inv., Bolivia Denounces Its Bilateral Investment Treaties and Attempts to Put an End to the Power of Corporations to Sue the Country in International Tribunals 6 (2014), http://justinvestment.org/wp-content
/uploads/2014/07/Bolivia-denounces-its-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-and-attempts-to-put-an-end-to-the-Power-of-Corporations-to-sue-the-country-in-International-Tribunals1.pdf.

 [22]. UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry (last visited Sept. 21, 2018). As of August 2018, Venezuela has appeared as the respondent in forty-four cases, exceeded only by Argentina, which has appeared as the respondent in sixty cases. Id.

 [23]. Vera De Brito de Gyarfas & Alberto F. Ravell, Venezuela’s Exit from the ICSID Convention Casts a Shadow on Foreign Investment, Lexology (Sept. 1, 2012), https://lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=5ed0fd84-f857-4935-ab6f-d011b7eb8a93.

 [24]. UNCTAD, Netherlands – Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of BIT (1991), Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/2668 (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).

 [25]. Damien Charlotin & Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: In New Mercosur Investment Protocol, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina Radically Pare Back Protections, and Exclude Investor-State Arbitration, Inv. Arb. Rep. (May 4, 2017), https://iareporter.com/articles/analysis-in-new-mercosur-investment-protocol-brazil-uruguay-paraguay-and-argentina-radically-pare-back-protections-and-exclude-investor-state-arbitration.

 [26]. The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Argentine Republic and the State of Qatar, Arg.-Qatar, art. 14, Nov. 6, 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org
/Download/TreatyFile/5383.

 [27]. Id. art. 3(4)–(5).

 [28]. Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, Austl.-Japan, July 8, 2014, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/jaepa/full-text/Documents/jaepa-chapters-1-to-20.pdf.

 [29]. Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Malay., May 22, 2012, https://dfat.gov.au
/trade/agreements/in-force/mafta/Documents/Malaysia-Australia-Free-Trade-Agreement.pdf.

 [30]. Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf.

 [31]. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, art. 9, June 17, 2015, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/chafta/official-documents/Documents/chafta-agreement-text.pdf.

 [32]. Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-S. Kor., ch. 11, Apr. 8, 2014, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/official-documents/Documents/KAFTA-chapter-11.pdf.

 [33]. Douglas Thomson, Florida Investor to Ask Australia to Arbitrate, Global Arb. Rev. (Oct. 6, 2016), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1069026/florida-investor-to-ask-australia-to-arbitrate.

 [34]. Paulo Macedo Garcia Neto, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: The Landscape of Investment Arbitration in Brazil and Why Brazil Should Become a More Important Player in the Investment Arbitration Arena, in Investment Protection in Brazil 3, 4–8 (Daniel de Andrade Levy et al. eds., 2013).

 [35]. Joel Dahlquist, Brazil and India Conclude Bilateral Investment Treaty, Inv. Arb. Rep. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://iareporter.com/articles/brazil-and-india-conclude-bilateral-investment-treaty.

 [36]. Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, Fin. Times (Mar. 26, 2014), https://ft.com/content/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.

 [37]. UNCTAD, Indonesia: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/97 (last visited Sept. 21, 2018). Indonesia is, however, revising its model BIT and has maintained several negotiations for bilateral and multilateral economic agreements. See Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Trade, Indonesia – 2-Bilateral Investment Agreements, export.gov (Aug. 1, 2017), https://export.gov/article?id=Indonesia-bilateral-investment-agreements.

 [38]. Tom Jones, Ecuador Bids Goodbye to BITs, Global Arb. Rev. (May 17, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1141801/ecuadorbidsgoodbyetobits [hereinafter Jones, Bids Goodbye].

 [39]. See id. In 2008, Ecuador “terminated BITs with Romania and eight Latin American and Caribbean states.” Id. On May 16, 2017, Rafael Correa, the former President of Ecuador, signed a series of decrees that terminated sixteen BITs with Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. Id. Correa had also previously terminated a BIT with Finland in 2013. Id. See also Javier Jaramillo & Camilo Muriel-Bedoya, Ecuadorian BITs’ Termination Revisited: Behind the Scenes, Kluwer Arb. Blog (May 26, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/26/ecuadorian-bits-termination-revisited-behind-scenes.

 [40]. Jones, Bids Goodbye, supra note 38.

 [41]. Id.

 [42]. Id.

 [43]. For examples of Olivet’s and Sornarajah’s anti-ISDS views, see generally Pia Eberhardt & Cecelia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice (Helen Burley ed., Nov. 2012) and Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Case Against a Regime for International Investment Law, in Regionalism in International Investment Law 275 (Leon E. Trakman & Nicola W. Ranieri eds., 2013).

 [44]. Zoe Williams, Ecuador Round-up: As Remaining Bilateral Investment Treaties Are Terminated, New Developments Come to Light in ICSID and UNCITRAL Cases, Inv. Arb. Rep. (May 22, 2017), https://iareporter.com/articles/27453.

 [45]. Jaramillo & Muriel-Bedoya, supra note 39.

 [46]. Id.

 [47]. Id.

 [48]. Id. (emphasis in original).

 [49]. Id.

 [50]. Id.

 [51]. Id.

 [52]. Tom Jones, Ecuador in Treaty U-turn Under New Leader?, Global Arb. Rev. (Oct. 17, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1149016/ecuador-in-treaty-u-turn%E2%80%8E-under-new-leader [hereinafter Jones, U-turn].

 [53]. Tom Jones, Ecuador Begins Talks Over New BITs, Global Arb. Rev. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1159285/ecuador-begins-talks-over-new-bits [hereinafter Jones, Begins Talks].

 [54]. Procesos Internacionales: Arbitrajes de Inversión; Comerciales y Juicios Internacionales, Procuraduría General del Estado, http://www.pge.gob.ec/index.php/2014-10-01-02-32-39/cifras-relevantes-2 (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).

 [55]. Id.; Jones, Begins Talks, supra note 53.

 [56]. White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, IIC 529 (2011), Final Award, ¶¶ 11.4.19–20, 16.1.1(a) (Nov. 30, 2011).

 [57]. Alison Ross, India’s Termination of BITs to Begin, Global Arb. Rev. (Mar. 22, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1138510/indias-termination-of-bits-to-begin.

 [58]. UNCTAD, supra note 22.

 [59]. Ross, supra note 57.

 [60]. Id.; Gov’t of India Ministry of Fin. Dep’t of Econ. Aff. Inv. Div., Office Memorandum (Feb. 8, 2016), http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/upload/Consolidated_Interpretive-Statement.pdf; Joel Dahlquist & Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: In Final Version of Its New Model Investment Treaty, India Dials Back Ambition of Earlier Proposals—But Still Favors Some Big Changes, Inv. Arb. Rep. (Jan. 3, 2016), https://iareporter.com/articles/analysis-in-final-version-of-its-new-model-investment-treaty-india
-dials-back-ambition-of-earlier-proposals-but-still-favors-some-big-changes.

 [61]. UNCTAD, India: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).

 [62]. Modi’s “Make in India”: Bold Policy or a Mere Rebranding?, Economist: Intelligence Unit (Oct. 31, 2014), http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1862448770&Country=India
&topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Nicholas Peacock & Nihal Joseph, Mixed Messages to Investors as India Quietly Terminates Bilateral Investment Treaties with 58 Countries, HSF PIL Notes (Mar. 16, 2017), http://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2017
/03/16/mixed-messages-to-investors-as-india-quietly-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-58-countries.

 [63]. Engela C. Schlemmer, An Overview of South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Policy, 31 ICSID Rev. 167, 188–89 & n.108 (2016) (identifying these proceedings as a confidential arbitration in terms of the Switzerland–South Africa BIT, terminated 31 August 2014, and Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award (August 4, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C90/DC1651_En.pdf)

 [64]. UNCTAD, South Africa: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). Africa terminated BITs with Austria on Oct. 31, 2014, with Belgium-Luxembourg on Mar. 13, 2013, with Denmark on Aug. 31, 2014, with France on Oct. 31, 2014, with Germany on Oct. 31, 2014, with the Netherlands on Apr. 30, 2014, with Spain on Dec. 22, 2013, with Switzerland on Oct. 31, 2014, and with United Kingdom on Oct. 31, 2014.

 [65]. UNCTAD, Protection of Investment Act Approved, Inv. Pol’y Hub (Dec. 13, 2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IPM/MeasureDetails?id=2828&rgn=&grp=&t=&s=&pg=&c=&dt=&df=&isSearch=false.

 [66]. UNCTAD, South Africa, supra note 64 (entered into force on Sept. 15, 2010).

 [67]. Id. (entered into force on Oct. 23, 1998).

 [68]. Id. (entered into force on July 27, 2005).

 [69]. Id. (entered into force on Dec. 29, 2010).

 [70]. UNCTAD, South Africa: Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs), Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/195#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (entered into force on Apr. 16, 2010).

 [71]. UNCTAD, South Africa, Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/iia
/countrybits/195#iiainnermenu (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). South Africa has signed BITs that have not yet entered into force with Mozambique, Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Congo, United Republic of Tanzania, Gabon, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Tunisia, Rwanda, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, and Ghana. Id.

 [72]. GAR Know-How: Investment Treaty Arbitration 2016 South Africa, Global Arb. Rev. § 11, http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/2000154/south-africa (last visited June 26, 2018).

The termination process will likely follow a regional pattern, starting with BITs with EU States. BITs with Austria, Denmark, France, the UK, Belgium/Luxembourg, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland have recently been terminated and terminations of other EU BITs are expected. There is, however, uncertainty over the fate of South Africa’s BITs with other African States as South Africa is a capital exporter to Africa. A political decision on its African BITs has not yet been made.

Id.

 [73]. See generally Charles N. Brower & Sarah Melikian, “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us!” Is the Industrialized North “Going South” on Investor-State Arbitration?, 31 Arb. Int’l 1 (2015) for the proposition that the current atmosphere of fear and hysteria recalls the New International Economic Order movement, which caught hold but then quickly dissipated over forty years ago.

 [74]. Gaetano Iorio Fiorelli, Italy Withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty, Global Arb. News (May 6, 2015), http://globalarbitrationnews.com/italy-withdraws-from-energy-charter-treaty-20150507; Italy No Longer Member of Energy Charter Treaty, Hopes to Avoid More Arbitrations, Global Inv. Protection (June 1, 2016), http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/italy-no-longer-member-of-energy-charter-treaty-hopes-to-avoid-more-arbitrations.

 [75]. Fiorelli, supra note 74.

 [76]. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreement Navigator, Inv. Pol’y Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).

 [77]. Marta Waldoch & Maciej Onoszko, Poland Plans to Cancel Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU, Bloomberg (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/poland-seeks-to-end-bilateral-investment-deals-with-eu-members.

 [78]. Id.

 [79]. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreement Navigator, supra note 76.

 [80]. Joel Dahlquist & Luke Eric Peterson, Investigation: Denmark Proposes Mutual Termination of Its Nine BITS with Fellow EU Member States, Against Spectre of Infringement Cases, Inv. Arb. Rep. (May 2, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/investigation-denmark-proposes-mutual-termination
-of-its-nine-bits-with-fellow-eu-member-states-against-spectre-of-infringement-cases.

 [81]. Id.

 [82]. Id.

 [83]. See generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012).

 [84]. Id. Annex B.

 [85]. Id. Annex B, para. 3.

 [86]. Id. Annex B, para. 4.

 [87]. Id. Annex B, para. 2.

 [88]. Id. art. 21(2).

 [89]. Id. art. 21(2)(a).

 [90]. Id. art. 21(2)(b).

 [91]. Id. art. 14.

 [92]. Id. art. 31.

 [93]. Id. art. 31(1).

 [94]. Id.

 [95]. Id. art. 31(2).

 [96]. Id.

 [97]. Id. art. 30(3).

 [98]. See generally Brower & Melikian, supra note 73.

 [99]. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu
/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm.

 [100]. Marc Lalonde, Address at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting: Arbitrating the Public Interest, (Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.asil.org/resources/audio/2016-annual-meeting.

 [101]. European Comm’n, Factsheet 1 (2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/July
/tradoc_155744.pdf. See also Douglas Thomson, UNCITRAL to Examine Further Reforms of ISDS, Global Arb. Rev. (July 12, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1144340/uncitral-to-examine-further-reforms-of-isds.

 [102]. Nikos Lavranos, The Outcome of the UNCITRAL July 2017 Meeting: The First Steps Towards a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), Wöss & Partners Newsletter (Wöss & Partners, Washington, D.C.) Aug. 7, 2017, at 5.

 [103]. Id. at 6.

 [104]. Id.

 [105]. Id.

 [106]. Id.

 [107]. Id. at 7.

 [108]. Dark and Light Mood Music, Global Arb. Rev. (June 20, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1143291/dark-and-light-mood-music.

 [109]. UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2017, at 5 (2018), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2018d2_en.pdf.

 [110]. Id. at 6.

 [111]. Id.

 [112]. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement Inv. Disp., The ICSID Caseload – Statistics: Issue 2018-2, at 14 (2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202018-2%20(English).pdf.

 [113]. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement Inv. Disp., The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Special Focus –European Union: April 2017, at 14 (2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources
/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%20EU(English)April%202017.pdf.

 [114]. Luke Eric Peterson & Kendra Magraw, Looking Back: Ethyl v. Canada Case Drew Early Public Attention to Previously Obscure Arbitration Process, and Settled After Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Ruling, Inv. Arb. Rep. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/looking-back-ethyl-v-canada-case-drew-early-public-attention-to-previously-obscure-arbitration-process-and-settled-after-tribunals-jurisdiction-ruling. See also John Geddes, Ethyl Sues Ottawa for US$200M over MMT Ban, Fin. Post, Sept. 11, 1996, at 6.

 [115]. See generally Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), 7 ICSID Rep. 12 (1998) (affirming jurisdiction over Canada’s objections).

 [116]. Michael Valpy, How Free Trade Threatens Democracy, Globe and Mail (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/how-free-trade-threatens-democracy/article760604.

 [117]. Agreement on Internal Trade: Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act 13 (1998) [hereinafter Agreement on Internal Trade], https://www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/8_eng.pdf (emphasis in original).

 [118]. Geddes, supra note 114.

 [119]. Valpy, supra note 116.

 [120]. Mark Mackinnon, NAFTA Members to Talk Reform, Globe and Mail (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/nafta-members-to-talk-reform/article1179774.

 [121]. NAFTA – Chapter 11 – Investment: Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Global Aff. Can., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng#archived (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). The authors note that the official Canadian Government website describing the Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada case identifies “three Canadian provinces.” But according to the AIT Panel decision, four provinces were Complainants:

The Government of Alberta (the Complainant) contends that the Act fails to comply with Canada’s (the Respondent) obligations under the Agreement on Internal Trade (the Agreement), and that the inconsistencies cannot be justified by reference to the Agreement’s provisions for measures associated with legitimate objectives. The Complainant contends that the Act has impaired internal trade, caused injury to Alberta refiners, and is inconsistent with general and specific provisions of the Agreement. The Governments of Québec, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan (also Complainants) intervened in support of Alberta. The Government of Nova Scotia did not file a written submission or present oral arguments.

Agreement on Internal Trade, supra note 117, at 1 (emphasis in the original and added).

 [122]. Since Elizabeth May’s statement, the treaty entered into force on Oct. 1, 2014 and retained an investor-State arbitration provision. See Trade and Investment Agreements, Global Aff. Can., https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index
.aspx?lang=eng&country_pays=China&menu_id=147 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).

 [123]. Green Party of Canada, Elizabeth May: Red Carpet for China (Press Conference Q and A), YouTube (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjwjBe8tlAo. The authors have transcribed the block quotation manually by listening to the YouTube clip. Thus, the block quotation is not an official transcription.

 [124]. Trade and Investment Agreements, supra note 122.

 [125]. Scott Sinclair, Canada’s Track Record Under NAFTA Chapter 11: North American Investor-State Disputes to January 2018, at 11 (2018), http://res.cloudinary.com
/lbresearch/image/upload/v1516620972/nafta_dispute_table_report_2018_220118_1137.pdf; Lacey Yong, NAFTA Claims Have Cost Canada More Than US$300 Million, Says Report, Global Arb. Rev. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1152937/nafta-claims-have-cost-canada-more-than-ususd300-million-says-report.

 [126]. Sinclair, supra note 125, at 8–10.

 [127]. Id. at 10.

 [128]. Id. at 11.

 [129]. SD Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 193–95 (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs
/disp-diff/myers-18.pdf (footnote omitted).

 [130]. Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, pt. V (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff
/chemtura-14.pdf.

 [131]. See Cecilia Olivet & Alberto Villareal, Who Really Won the Legal Battle Between Philip Morris and Uruguay?, Guardian (July 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/28/who-really-won-legal-battle-philip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-adverts.

 [132]. See Behind Closed Doors, Economist (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.economist.com
/node/13527961; Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, Wash. Post (Feb. 25, 2015), http://wapo.st/1BwJA7H?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.2dad5c8d1898; Bill Moyers, Trading Democracy: A Bill Moyers Special, PBS (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.pbs.org
/now/transcript/transcript_tdfull.html (“Today, foreign companies are exploiting Chapter 11 to attack public laws that protect our health—and our environment—even to attack the American judicial system.”).

 [133]. Council of the European Union, Directives for the Negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Between the European Union and the United States of America ¶¶ 22–23 (2013), https://www.laquadrature.net/files/TAFTA%20_
%20Mandate%20_%2020130617.pdf.

 [134]. Press Release, European Comm’n, Improving ISDS to Prevent Abuse – Statement by EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht on the Launch of a Public Consultation on Investment Protection in TTIP (Mar. 27, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-85_en.htm.

 [135]. Press Release, European Comm’n, Report Presented Today: Consultation on Investment Protections in EU-US Trade Talks (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm
?id=1234.

 [136]. Robin Emmott & Philip Blenkinsop, Online Protest Delays EU Plan to Resolve U.S. Trade Row, Reuters (Nov. 26, 2014), https://reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-trade/exclusive-online-protest-delays-eu-plan-to-resolve-u-s-trade-row-idUSKCN0JA0YA20141126.

 [137]. United Nations, Gen. Assembly, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Fiftieth Session (3-21 July 2017)  260 (2017), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/commissionsessions/unc-50/A-72-17-E.pdf.

 [138]. Id. ¶¶ 250–51, 264.

 [139]. Id. ¶ 260.

 [140]. New Instruments on Settlement Agreements from an UNCITRAL Working Group, UNCITRAL (Feb. 14, 2018), http://uncitralrcap.org/en/new-instruments-settlement-agreements-uncitral-working-group/?ckattempt=1.

 [141]. United Nations, Gen. Assembly, supra note 137, ¶ 261.

 [142]. Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Not Business as Usual, EJIL: Talk! (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-not-business-as-usual (“In the whole history of UNCITRAL [established in 1966], only one issue had ever been put to the vote and that was the decision [by the Commission, not by a Working Group] on whether to move the headquarters of UNCITRAL to Vienna [from New York City]. The premium placed on consensus meant that voting enjoyed somewhat of a mystical taboo. That was, at least, until this meeting when the spell was broken for a second time.”).

 [143]. United Nations, Gen. Assembly, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session (Vienna, 27 November–1 December 2017) ¶ 14 (2017), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V18
/029/83/PDF/V1802983.pdf?OpenElement.

 [144]. Id. ¶¶ 30–48.

 [145]. Id. ¶ 35.

 [146]. Marie Talašová et al., There’s “No Alternative” to Investment Arbitration, Says Schreuer, Global Arb. Rev. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151619/theres-no-alternative-to-investment-arbitration-says-schreuer.

 [147]. United Nations, Gen. Assembly, Report of Working Group III, supra note 143, ¶¶ 46–48, 59–60.

 [148]. Talašová et al., supra note 146.

 [149]. Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID Rev. 339, 339 (2010).

 [150]. Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy Is Wrongheaded, 29 Arb. Int’l 7, 7 (2013).

 [151]. Alison Ross, Paulsson and van den Berg Presume Wrong, Says Brower, Global Arb. Rev. (Feb. 6, 2012), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1030954/paulsson-and-van-den-berg-wrong-says-brower (emphasis added).

 [152]. Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (2013).

 [153]. On March 2, 2017, Professor Paulsson delivered a lecture at the Annual Meeting of the CPR Institute at the Baltimore Hotel, Coral Gables, Florida, titled Shall We Have an Adult Conversation About Legitimacy? Soon afterward, on March 17, 2017, he delivered a lecture titled Sore Losers and What to Do About Them at the Second Annual ADR Symposium, University of Southern California Gould School of Law, Los Angeles, California. The authors received notes on the latter lecture, which is unpublished, from Professor Paulsson. Professor Paulsson’s arguments in his book and lectures are largely repetitive of his original points contained in Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution (the “Moral Hazard article”). Many of these points have been addressed in The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded (the “Nightingale article”) and there remain few that deserve a response. The points he makes in his book and lectures overlap somewhat, but they are not identical and cover different grounds.

 

 [154]. Supervisión y Control, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/4, Dissenting Opinion of Joseph P. Klock Jr. 13–15 (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw8231.pdf (emphasis in original and added).

 [155]. Jan Paulsson, Shall We Have an Adult Conversation About Legitimacy? CPR Speaks (Mar. 15, 2017), https://blog.cpradr.org/2017/03/15/shall-we-have-an-adult-conversation-about-legitimacy.

 [156]. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules 15, 23 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English
.pdf.

 [157]. Id. at 78.

 [158]. Andrew Battisson & Cheryl Teo, The Call to Remove Unilateral Appointments: Seven Years On, Kluwer Arb. Blog (July 3, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/07/03/call-remove-unilateral-appointments-seven-years.

 [159]. Queen Mary Univ. of London, 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process 5 (2012), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk
/media/arbitration/docs/2012_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf.

 [160]. Queen Mary Univ. of London, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration 6 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2015_0.pdf.

 [161]. Berwin Leighton Paisner, International Arbitration Survey: Party Appointed Arbitrators – Does Fortune Favour the Brave? 4 (2018), https://res.cloudinary.com/lbresearch
/image/upload/v1515581879/BLP_Survey_xasu5i.pdf.

 [162]. Id. at 6.

 [163]. Id.

 [164]. Battisson & Teo, supra note 158.

 [165]. Alfonso Gómez-Acebo, Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration 43–44 (2016).

 [166]. Id. (“The parties with no acquaintances on the list would probably find it more difficult to choose someone they trust.”).

 [167]. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Expedited Procedure Provisions, https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/expedited-procedure-provisions (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).

 [168]. International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules art. 30(3)(a).

 [169]. Id. art. 30(2)(a), Appendix VI 1(2).

 [170]. Arbitration Rules: Appendix VI – Expedited Procedure Rules, ICC, https://iccwbo.org/dispute
-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_expeditedprocedure2 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).

 [171]. See Singapore International Arbitration Centre, SIAC Rules 2010, http://www.siac.org.sg/our
-rules/rules/siac-rules-2010 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Expedited HKIAC Arbitration, http://www.hkiac.org/arbitration/process/expedited-hkiac-arbitration (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).

 [172]. Fabian Bonke, Overriding an Explicit Agreement on the Number of Arbitrators – One Step Too Far under the New ICC Expedited Procedure Rules?, Kluwer Arb. Blog (May 22, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/22/overriding-an-explicit-agreement-on-the-number-of-arbitrators-one-step-too-far-under-the-new-icc-expedited-procedure-rules.

 [173]. Id.

 [174]. Paulsson, supra note 155 (emphasis in original).

 [175]. Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman 821, 834 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).

 [176]. Id. at 831.

 [177]. Id. at 834.

 [178]. Id. at 831.

 [179]. See generally Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 150.

 [180]. Albert Jan van den Berg, Charles Brower’s Problem with 100 Per Cent—Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 31 Arb. Int’l 381 (2015).

 [181]. Id. at 383.

 [182]. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 150, at 28, 32. Moreover, the Nightingale article rhetorically asked:

[D]oes not the 78% non-dissent rate in van den Berg’s survey amply suggest that, contrary to his assumption that party-appointed arbitrators are not neutral, the vast majority demonstrably are, by his own definition? Given these facts, it would seem that dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators should more properly be viewed as ‘the reflection of their shared outlook with the party who appointed them, rather than dependency or fear to alienate such party’.

Id. (footnotes omitted). Van den Berg responded:

It is also argued in the Nightingale article that ‘[t]his figure alone serves to minimize any concerns regarding dissenting opinions in investment arbitration’. My survey of approximately 150 awards and decisions showed that in thirty-four cases the party-appointed arbitrator of the party that had lost the case had issued a separate opinion. That is, 22% of the surveyed investment cases. In the Nightingale article, this figure is presented differently: ‘78% of the approximately 150 cases reviewed by van den Berg produced no dissenting opinions whatsoever.’ This manner of presenting overlooks the fact that 22% compares badly with commercial arbitration, where the percentage is around 8%. It also overlooks the increase of the percentage in investment arbitration, as compared with a decrease in commercial arbitration. The trend in investment arbitration is particularly worrying as it seems to lead to ‘mandatory dissents’.

. . .

The ‘shared outlook’ may be an explanation for a number of dissenting opinions, but is it an explanation for the 100% score? From that perspective, the expression ‘shared outlook’ becomes a doubtful euphemism.

Van den Berg, supra note 180, at 384–86.

 [183]. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Geneva Ctr. for Int’l Dispute Settlement, Can the Mauritius Convention Serve as a Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in Connection with the Introduction of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism? Analysis and Roadmap 5 (2016).

 [184]. Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Presentation of a Research Paper on the Mauritius Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration as a Possible Model for Further Reforms of Investor-State Dispute Settlement ¶¶ 3–5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/890 (May 24, 2016).

 [185]. United Nations, Gen. Assembly, supra note 137, ¶¶ 240–65; Lavranos, supra note 102.

 [186]. Geneva Ctr. for Int’l Dispute Settlement, UNCITRAL-CIDS Government Expert Meeting (May 2, 2017), https://www.cids.ch/events/uncitral-cids-government-experts-meeting.

 [187]. United Nations, Gen. Assembly, supra note 137, ¶ 260; Lavranos, supra note 102.

 [188]. Kaufmann-Kohler & Potestà, supra note 183, at 4.

 [189]. Id. ¶ 93.

 [190]. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I (New York, June 10, 1958) [hereinafter N.Y. Convention] (emphasis added) provides,

1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.

2. The term “arbitral awards” shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.

  There is an open query as to whether the IUSCT is a “permanent arbitral bod[y]” under Article I(2) of the N.Y. Convention. The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the U.S. of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Claims Settlement Declaration”) sets a deadline for filing claims with the IUSCT both by nationals of the U.S. against Iran and nationals of Iran against the U.S., as well as by claims by either of the two States Party to that Declaration against the other based on contracts for the purchase and sale of goods and services. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the U.S. of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Claims Settlement Declaration 9, 9–12 (1981). Article III(4) of the Claims Settlement Declaration states:

No claim may be filed with the Tribunal more than one year after the entry into force of this Agreement or six months after the date the President is appointed, whichever is later. These deadlines do not apply to the procedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981.

Id. at 10.                           

  Since the President was appointed on June 4, 1981, the last day on which the noted claims could be filed was January 19, 1982. See Refusal to Accept the Claim of Mr. Victor E. Pereira, Decision No. DEC 2-Ref 5-2 (10 Mar. 1982), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 3; Charles N. Brower & Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 95 (1998).

  The exception to the January 19, 1982, deadlines are interpretive disputes (or “A” claims) between the United States and Iran (see paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria dated January 19, 1981 (“General Declaration”)).

 [191]. Kaufmann-Kohler & Potestà, supra note 183, ¶¶ 95–96, 148–54.

 [192]. Id. ¶ 94.

 [193]. Id. ¶ 95.

 [194]. Id.

 [195]. Id.

 [196]. Charles N. Brower & Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 4–5 (1998).

 [197]. See S.C. Res. 457 (Dec. 4, 1979); S.C. Res. 461 (Dec. 31, 1979).

 [198]. Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Order on Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. Rep. (Dec. 15, 1979); Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. (May. 24, 1980).

 [199]. Mark Bowden, The Desert One Debacle, Atlantic (July 2006), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803.

 [200]. The Alabama Claims, 1862–1872, Off. of the Historian, https://history.state.gov
/milestones/1861-1865/alabama (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).

 [201]. V.V. Veeder, Essex Court Chambers, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The Party-Appointed Arbitrator – From Miami to Geneva, Inaugural Charles N. Brower Lecture on International Dispute Resolution at 391 (Apr. 5, 2013), in 107 Am. Soc’y Int’l Proc. 387, 391 (2013).

 [202]. Kaufmann-Kohler & Potestà, supra note 183, ¶ 96.

 [203]. Id. ¶¶ 97–98.

 [204]. CAS Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, art 11.

 [205]. Basketball Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitration Rules (2014), art. 8.

 [206]. Kaufmann-Kohler & Potestà, supra note 183, ¶ 96

 [207]. Given the large number of doping-related disputes in sport arbitrations, one commentator has even queried whether such disputes fall under the N.Y. Convention given their non-commercial nature. Roger Alford, Are CAS Arbitrations Governed by the New York Convention? (Mar. 8, 2009) http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/03/08/are-cas-arbitrations-governed-by-the-new-york-convention/?_ga=2.156422331.1237221282.1499359155-1066329609.1481846792. This may explain, according to another commentator, how enforcement under the N.Y. Convention of sports-based arbitral awards is not as important as for commercial-based arbitral awards “because the sport governing bodies have internal enforcement mechanisms that are highly effective.” Daniel Girsberger & Nathalie Voser, International Arbitration: Comparative and Swiss Perspectives ¶ 1875 (3rd ed. 2016). The Swiss Supreme Court criticized “the lack of transparency of who nominated the arbitrators for their position on the list.” Id. ¶ 1942. Commentators have described the lack of arbitrators “that represent athletes’ interests, but without transparency, an athlete has no way of knowing who those arbitrators are.” Id. This only adds more credence to the significance of unilateral appointments.

 [208]. Kaufmann-Kohler & Potestà, supra note 183, ¶ 97–98.

 [209]. Gómez-Acebo, supra note 165, ¶ 2-40.

 [210]. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ¶ 5 (1956), http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=e/2840&Lang=E (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (The Secretary-General prepared a memorandum for the ECOSOC on the draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and whether a conference should be called to address the topic).

 [211]. David D. Caron & Lee M. Caplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary 1–2 (2nd ed. 2013).

 [212]. Id.

 [213]. 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 9(1) (“If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the arbitral tribunal.”) (emphasis added); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 11(3)(s) (“Failing such agreement, (a) in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator; if a party fails to appoint the arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in article 6.”) (emphasis added); 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 7(1) (“If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal.”) (emphasis added).

 [214]. Kaufmann-Kohler & Potestà, supra note 183, ¶¶ 166–69 (emphasis added).

 [215]. Owen Bowcott, No British Judge on World Court for First Time in Its 71-Year History, Guardian (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/20/no-british-judge-on-world-court-for-first-time-in-its-71-year-history.

 [216]. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Geneva Ctr. for Int’l Dispute Settlement, The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court and of an Appeal Mechanism for Investment Awards: CIDS Supplemental Report ¶ 2 (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/CIDS_Supplemental_Report.pdf.

 [217]. Id. ¶ 6.

 [218]. Id. ¶ 7.

 [219]. Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added).

 [220]. Id. ¶¶ 107–08 (emphasis added).

 [221]. Id. ¶¶ 111–16.

 [222]. Lavranos, supra note 102.

 [223]. European Comm’n, Council Decision: Authorizing the Opening of Negotiations for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, art. 1, 8 (2017) http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-493-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. See also Lacey Yong, European Commission Seeks Leave to Begin Negotiations for Multilateral Court, Global Arb. Rev. (Sept. 13, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1147314/eu-to-begin-negotiations-for-multilateral-investment
-court.

 [224]. Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court), Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU ¶ 29, EU:C:2017:376 (May 16, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=190727&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=520958.

 [225]. Anthea Roberts, A Turning of the Tide Against ISDS?, EJIL: Talk! (May 19, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-turning-of-the-tide-against-isds.

 [226]. Opinion 2/15, supra note 224.

 [227]. Id. ¶¶ 227, 305.

 [228]. Id. ¶ 292.

 [229]. Nikos Lavranos, The CJEU’s Opinion on EU-SING FTA: More Confusion Than Clarity, Kluwer Arb. Blog (May 30, 2017), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/30/cjeus-opinion-eu-sing-fta-confusion-clarity.

 [230]. Douglas Thomson, ECJ Says Member States Must Sign Off on ISDS, Global Arb. Rev. (May 16, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1141765/ecj-says-member-states-must-sign-off-on-isds.

 [231]. In Focus – EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, European Comm’n: Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).

 [232]. EU-Japan EPA – The Agreement in Principle 1 (2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib
/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155693.doc.pdf.

 [233]. Id.

 [234]. Id.

 [235]. EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: A New EU Trade Agreement with Japan 6 (2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155684.pdf.

 [236]. Japan-Kenya Bilateral Investment Treaty, Japan-Kenya, art. 15 (June 28, 2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5374.

 [237]. Islamic Republic of Iran-Japan Bilateral Investment Treaty, Islamic Republic of Iran-Japan, art. 18 (signed February 5, 2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3578.

 [238]. Ceremonial signing of the CPTPP is scheduled for March 2018. Transpacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 9 (February 4, 2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile
/3573.

 [240]. Douglas Thomson, ECJ to Rule on CETA Investment Court, Global Arb. News (Sept. 6, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1147140/ecj-to-rule-on-ceta-investment-court. See also Damien Charlotin, Analysis: EU’s Highest Court Is Asked Once More to Weigh in on International Investment Law Questions—This Time by Belgium in Relation to CETA’s “Investment Court System”, Inv. Arb. Rep. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-eus-highest-court-is-asked-once-more-to-weigh-in-on-international-investment-law-questions-this-time-by-belgium-in-relation-to-cetas-investment-court-system.

 [241]. Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, Case C-284/16, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet (Sept. 19, 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CC0284.

 [242]. Advocate General of EU Court of Justice Rejects Contentions That Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty is Incompatible with EU Law, Inv. Arb. Rep. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/28492.

 [243]. Slovak Republic, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet 273:

Articles 18, 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding the application of an investor/State dispute settlement mechanism established by means of a bilateral investment agreement concluded before the accession of one of the Contracting States to the European Union and providing that an investor from one Contracting State may, in the case of a dispute relating to investments in the other Contracting State, bring proceedings against the latter State before an arbitral tribunal.

 [244]. Sebastian Perry, ECJ Adviser Gives Thumbs-up to Intra-EU BITs, Global Arb. Rev. (Sept. 19, 2017), http ://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1147460/ecj-adviser-gives-thumbs-up-to-intra-eu-bits.

 [245]. Slovak Republic, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet ¶ 34.

 [246]. Id.

 [247]. Id. ¶ 36.

 [248]. Id. ¶ 37. The Advocate General did, however, note that Italy was the only EU Member State falling within the second group that had moved to terminate its intra-EU BITs, with exception of the Italy-Malta BIT. Id.

 [249]. Id. ¶ 38.

 [250]. Id. ¶ 40.

 [251]. Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added).

 [252]. Id. ¶ 44.

 [253]. Id.

 [254]. Id. ¶ 45.

 [255]. Id.

 [256]. See Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, Case C-284/16, Judgment, ¶ 56 (2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CJ0284 (ruling that such arbitration clauses are incompatible with EU law because they, inter alia, threaten the “full effectiveness of EU law”).

 [257]. Slovak Republic, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet  34.

 [258]. Letter of Sigrid A.M. Kaag, Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister (Apr. 26, 2018). See Lacey Yong, Netherlands to Terminate BIT with Slovakia in Wake of Achmea, Global Arb. Rev. (May 2, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1168905/netherlands-to-terminate-bit-with-slovakia-in-wake-of-achmea.

 [259]. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council for the European Union to Delegations, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 12981/17 ADD 1 DCL 1 (Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Negotiating Directives]; Sebastian Perry, EU Council Gives Go-Ahead for Talks on Multilateral Court, Global Arb. Rev. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1167071/eu-council-gives-go-ahead-for-talks-on-multilateral-court.

 [260]. Negotiating Directives, supra note 259, 4.

 [261]. See EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (Authentic Texts as of April 2018), European Comm’n (Apr. 18, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961; Lacey Yong, EU Unveils New Investment Agreements with Singapore, Global Arb. Rev. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1168166/eu-unveils-new-investment-agreement-with-singapore.

 [262]. Lacey Yong, supra note 261.

 [263]. Id.

 [264]. See New EU-Mexico Agreement: The Agreement in Principle and Its Texts, European Comm’n (Apr. 26, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1833.

 [265]. EU’s Malmström Makes Global Investment Court Pitch to Stakeholders, Int’l. Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev.: Bridges (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eus-malmstr%C3%B6m-makes-global-investment-court-pitch-to-stakeholders.

 [266]. Benjamin Button-Stephens, NAFTA Negotiations: US Signals Will Keep ISDS, Global Arb. Rev. (July 18, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1144686/nafta-negotiations-us-signals-will-keep-isds.

 [268]. Letter from Law and Economics Professors to President Trump (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf.

 [269]. Letter from U.S. Senators to U.S. President 2 (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.sanders.senate.gov
/download/senate-nafta-letter-to-trump?id=C3E61283-46F3-4004-853A-D497F7539BAA&download
=1&inline=file.

 [270]. Letter from Law and Economics Professors to President Trump, supra note 268, at 3.

 [271]. Letter from U.S. Senators to U.S. President, supra note 269, at 2.

 [272]. ICSID Arbitration Rules, art. 37(2).

 [273]. See generally, e.g., Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 1928, P.C.I.J. (ser. A.17) No. 13 (Germany versus Poland).

 [274]. William Mauldin, Canada, Mexico Reject Proposal to Rework Nafta Corporate Arbitration System, Wall St. J. (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/canada-mexico-reject-proposal-to-rework-nafta-corporate-arbitration-system-1517179473.

 [275]. Edward-Isaac Dovere & Doug Palmer, Warren Was Paid up to $90,000 as Witness in 2000 Trade Case, Politico (May 21, 2015), https://politico.com/story/2015/05/warren-was-paid-up-to-90000-as-witness-in-2000-trade-case-118199.

 [276]. Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, (2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/Nov%20Objectives%20Update.pdf.

 [277]. Tom Jones, NAFTA Talks Make Little Headway as US Updates Objectives for ISDS Reform, Global Arb. Rev. (Nov. 22, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1150788/nafta-talks-make-little-headway-as-us-updates-objectives-for-isds-reform.

 [278]. Cosmo Sanderson, Mexico Proposes Permanent Dispute Resolution Body for NAFTA, Global Arb. Rev. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/print_article/gar/article
/1151247/mexico-proposes-permanent-dispute-resolution-body-for-nafta.

 [279]. John Paul Tasker, Canada ‘Prepared for the Worst’ Amid Squabbles over NAFTA, Freeland Says, CBC News (Nov. 21, 2017), http://cbc.ca/news/politics/freeland-nafta-fifth-round-prepare-for-worst-1.4412673.

 [280]. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 18, 2018, 3:25 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/953951365532876800?lang=en. See also Kevin Cirilli, Trump Says NAFTA Is a ‘Bad Joke!’, Bloomberg (Jan. 18, 2018), https://bloomberg.com/news/videos
/2018-01-18/trump-says-nafta-is-a-bad-joke-video.

 [281]. David Ljunggren & Anthony Esposito, NAFTA Negotiators Open Key Round of Talks Amid Upbeat Signs, Reuters (Jan. 23, 2018), https://reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta/nafta-negotiators-open-key-round-of-talks-amid-upbeat-signs-idUSKBN1FC242.

 [282]. Alison Ross & Tom Jones, Mexico Signs ICSID Convention, Global Arb. Rev. (Jan. 12, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1152707/mexico-signs-icsid-convention.

 [283]. Id.

 [284]. Will the Renegotiated NAFTA Scrap ISDS?, Global Arb. Rev. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1159283/will-the-renegotiated-nafta-scrap-isds.

 [285]. Lacey Yong, Canada Goes Rogue with NAFTA Proposal, Global Arb. Rev. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1153129/canada-goes-rogue-with-nafta-proposal.

 [286]. Trump Rejects TPP on First Working Day in Office, Global Arb. Rev. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1080391/trump-rejects-tpp-on-first-working-day-in-office.

 [287]. Douglas Thomson, ECJ Says Member States Must Sign off on ISDS, Global Arb. Rev. (May 16, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1141765/ecj-says-member-states-must-sign-off-on-isds.

“The Constitutional Lion in the Path”: The Reconstruction Constitution as a Restraint on Empire – Article by Sam Erman

From Volume 91, Number 6 (September 2018)
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“The Constitutional Lion in the Path”: The Reconstruction Constitution as a Restraint on Empire

Sam Erman[*]

INTRODUCTION

In 1897, a half-dozen great powers claimed sovereignty over nearly half the world’s land and souls, and these empires were expanding.[1] The British Empire alone had grown by fifty million souls and two million square miles since 1891.[2] The eminent naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan feared that the United States was dangerously secluded, in comparison, and sidelined in the global land rush underway. He also worried that the Atlantic Ocean no longer adequately protected the U.S. against European powers in an age of steamships.[3] Like his fellow Republicans Theodore Roosevelt and Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Mahan influentially advocated U.S. expansionism.[4] He envisioned the United States ruling acquired lands as colonies. Their residents were as politically unfit for rule as children, criminals, women, and African Americans, he believed.[5] But the Constitution presented a problem.[6] Nearly three decades had passed since the last U.S. annexation. As Mahan complained, “any project of extending the sphere of the United States, by annexation or otherwise, is met by the constitutional lion in the path.”[7]

Making sense of Mahan’s claim that law forestalled his colonial vision requires excavating a forgotten understanding of the Constitution. Its roots lay in the constitutional transformations wrought by the Civil War and Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Those events produced the constitutional regime that I term the Reconstruction Constitution, which dramatically moved the racially heterogeneous United States towards rights, membership, and equality. Hotly debated from the outset, whatever the Reconstruction Constitution’s original limits and protections were, they narrowed considerably in ensuing decades. The steepest declines were those for African Americans, a tragedy that has been thoroughly and skillfully told by other historians.[8] Less familiar is this Article’s focus: the operation of the Reconstruction Constitution as a durable and consequential constraint on the kind of imperial expansion that Mahan proposed.

Before the Civil War, the United States was ever expanding, annexing lands and then killing, displacing, subordinating, or assimilating those already living there. By 1860, U.S. international borders spanned the continent. Then, following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, one strand of U.S. expansion vanished. The removal, domination, and integration of peoples within U.S. borders continued. Annexations of new lands, however, suddenly stopped.

The freeze continued into 1898, in part because it was widely understood that annexation would bring newly acquired lands and their populations into the Reconstruction Constitution’s regime of near-universal citizenship, federally enforceable individual liberties, and eventual statehood. Specifically, all Americans other than Indians,[9] regardless of race, were citizens. All citizens present on lands over which the United States extended its sovereignty had full constitutional rights that for men potentially included voting rights. All U.S. lands other than the District of Columbia were or would become states.[10] Thus, to annex was to accept the fact that the resident population would one day wield potentially decisive votes in the Electoral College, Congress, and proposals to amend the Constitution.

Opponents and advocates of annexation recognized the dynamic, as did Democrats and Republicans. Republican expansionists of the 1860s touted the extension of citizenship, rights, and eventual statehood that accompanied annexation during their unsuccessful bid to acquire the Danish West Indies and the Dominican Republic. As they soon learned, the widespread racism of the day led most U.S. officials to prefer no annexation of lands that held overwhelmingly nonwhite populations over the potential participation by such additional people of color in national governance. In 1893, 1897, and 1898, Democratic anti-annexationists raised the specter of citizenship, rights, and statehood to counter attempts to annex Hawai‘i. While pro-expansion Republicans now downplayed the applicability of the Reconstruction Constitution to new territory, they did not dispute or deny it.

Today, this prior meaning of the Reconstruction Constitution is largely unknown, as is the pitched battle that overthrew it. That early-twentieth-century effort culminated when the restraints that the Reconstruction Constitution imposed on imperial annexations were displaced by the doctrine of territorial nonincorporation. Unlike the Reconstruction Constitution, that doctrine has not guaranteed citizenship, full rights, or statehood to residents of annexed lands. My forthcoming book, Almost Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire, details the shift, which began with the 1898 war between Spain and the United States; accelerated with the U.S. annexations across 1898–1900 of Hawai‘i, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and American Samoa; and reached fruition in a series of early-twentieth-century Insular Cases and federal policies.[11] The shift was hard fought because, as this Article relates, the Reconstruction Constitution had previously demanded otherwise, notwithstanding the Constitution’s ample accommodation of many other late-nineteenth-century imperial and colonial practices.

The United States that returned to annexation in 1898 was decidedly imperial.[12] Women, Mormons, Catholics, African Americans, American Indians, individuals of Chinese descent, residents of a host of independent Caribbean and Pacific islands, and many others had long experience with the gap between the conduct of the United States and its ostensible legal, democratic, egalitarian, and anticolonial ideals. Relentless westward expansion powered by conquest, carnage, expropriation, dispossession, and subordination produced territories whose inhabitants were subject to the whims of a federal government in which they had no vote. The United States coerced and financially exploited neighbors as it competed with the world’s other powers for predominance in the American hemisphere. In Asia, its officials exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction. Domestically, women and members of racial and religious minority groups faced widespread and largely unchecked discrimination that relegated them to second-class stations.

In accepting much subordination and preventing some, the Reconstruction Constitution displayed a self-reinforcing duality. By discouraging the archetypal mode of colonial-imperial aggrandizement—annexation—it encouraged U.S. leaders to pursue expansion and subordination by other means. Racism and law thus interacted to channel the United States’ imperialistic impulses. Where the Reconstruction Constitution permitted domination of ostensibly inferior peoples, federal and state officials moved aggressively to do so. Where the Reconstruction Constitution made citizenship, rights, and political participation the price of governing populations of color, the United States stayed its hand.[13]

The effectiveness of the Reconstruction Constitution as an obstacle to formal expansion also helps explains why that role was later forgotten. Because annexations did not occur, litigation concerning the constitutional consequences of them did not reach courts. Judges had few occasions to analyze the questions such litigation would have presented. Though judicial opinions were crucial authorities underlying the Reconstruction Constitution, treatise writers found few postCivil War precedents to cite concerning its application to newly annexed lands.[14] Largely absent from these mandarin legal authorities, the restraints that the Reconstruction Constitution imposed on empire received explication and determined outcomes in the political arena instead.[15] Lawmakers, presidents, and executive branch officials described how the Reconstruction Constitution restrained empire. They felt bound by these constitutional strictures and shaped their policies accordingly. To recover this constitutional common sense[16] means turning to sources familiar to political historians: treaty negotiations, newspapers, diplomatic records, military files, presidential statements, congressional debates, and so on.

By examining the durability of the Reconstruction Constitution as a restraint on empire, this Article also joins a broader scholarly engagement with the long half-life of the postCivil War settlement. Perhaps the most important aspect is the unceasing resistance of African Americans to the system of racial caste solidifying around them.[17] But even among whites, the commitments of Reconstruction did not fully unravel until after 1897. War with Spain in 1898 kindled racist and nationalist impulses that dampened northern opposition to southern white supremacy. Cross-sectional reconciliation among whites followed, to African Americans’ detriment.[18] Some legal doctrines that impeded discrimination survived a decade beyond the Supreme Court’s approval of segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.[19] Implementation of black disfranchisement and Jim Crow was not complete until the second decade of the twentieth century.[20] The most influential white-supremacist accounts of post–Civil War federal efforts to reconstruct the South appeared in fiction, film, monuments, and academic history long after the 1890s.[21] Similarly, the effort to disentangle imperial annexations from Reconstruction and set them on firm constitutional footing only began in earnest after 1897.[22] By then, as this Article recounts, U.S. law, policy, and thought on empire and Reconstruction had intertwined for thirty years.

This Article proceeds in four parts. The first recounts how the emancipatory promise of the Civil War and Reconstruction was followed by a white-supremacist counterassault that dramatically narrowed African Americans’ horizons by 1898. By contrast, the freeze on annexations endured as the Reconstruction Constitution continued to make citizenship, rights, and eventual statehood the inevitable consequences of annexation. But that dynamic, which is the subject of Part II, was exceptional. As Part III describes, domination, expansion, aggrandizement, and inegalitarianism were defining traits of federal power throughout the late nineteenth century. By the century’s end, doctrinal strands had also formed that were capable of being recombined into an alternative to the Reconstruction Constitution’s restraints on empire. In 1898 and 1899, war and a string of associated annexations provided the impetus to undertake that recombination, as Part IV explains. The Conclusion peeks forward to the territorial nonincorporation doctrine, which replaced the Reconstruction Constitution as the dominant constitutional framework for empire.

I.  The Post–Civil War United States

In 1898, the United States was still struggling with the legacy of its Civil War, which had ended thirty-three years earlier. The conflict had abolished slavery and spawned a more powerful and centralized federal government.[23] Initially, the Republican majority in Congress pursued a policy of Reconstruction aimed at recasting the nation as a republic with formal equality among self-governing male citizens.[24] Their far-reaching statutory and constitutional innovations could credibly be argued to guarantee former slaves a full, permanent citizenship with expansive “privileges” and “immunities,” and equal civil and political rights.[25] Disfranchisement, even if achieved, would cost states federal representation.[26] Radical Republicans were committed to expanding and enforcing the new guarantees.[27]

The emancipatory promise of the Civil War and Reconstruction buckled under counterassaults during and after the 1870s. The Supreme Court articulated increasingly cramped interpretations of the Reconstruction Constitution. Of perhaps greatest interest to federal lawmakers, the Court moved quickly to limit federal racial antidiscrimination enforcement to voting and cases where state officials interfered with civil or political rights or systematically failed to punish private interference with them.[28] As Republicans’ commitment to African Americans’ rights waned in Washington, Southern white-supremacist Democrats unleashed unprecedented domestic terror and voter fraud. This caused the remaining electorates in formerly Confederate states to “vote” uniformly Democratic in presidential elections after 1876.[29] Republicans’ lack of political will to defend equal rights reached a new low from 1889 to 1891, when the party won control of the White House and Congress but failed to enact new federal election protections. Republicans also never enforced the constitutional mandate to reduce federal representation for southern states that disfranchised African American voters. When Democrats assumed control of the political branches in 1893, they repealed Reconstruction-era election protection statutes en masse. With some distinct exceptions, national elected Republicans had all but abandoned African Americans.[30]

To consolidate the gains of the white-supremacist onslaught, Southern Democrats denigrated Reconstruction, removed African Americans from political life, and enfeebled the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. They also propounded a false history in which tyrannical northern radicals imposed upon the South governments of incompetent and barbaric blacks, corrupt Northern carpetbaggers, and opportunistic Southern scalawags.[31] The resultant misrule emptied state coffers and unleashed black mens sexual violence against white women until white Democrats “redeemed” their states with the help of the Ku Klux Klan, or so the story went. “Redemption,” the myth concluded, had restored the constitutional balance between the state and federal governments and returned the South to clean government and its proper racial order under white men’s rule.[32] In reality, Redemption was unstableand challenged from 1892 to 1896 by the Populist Party’s uneasy coalition of black and white farmers and workers. Only renewed violence and fraud preserved Democratic dominance.[33]

In the 1890s Southern Democrats sought permanent power via Jim Crow and African American disfranchisement. This constitutionally dubious scheme required Supreme Court acquiescence. To secure it, Louisiana’s Separate Car Act (1890) thinly veiled the racial domination and segregation with a requirement of “equal but separate” facilities.[34] Likewise, rather than explicitly disfranchise African Americans, Mississippi granted discretion to registrars, who then found African Americans wanting.[35] The Supreme Court upheld both schemes.[36]

By this time, a significant body of academic and popular literature reinforced white supremacist distortions of Reconstruction.[37] British historian James Bryce’s acclaimed text, The American Commonwealth (1888), and Columbia historian William Dunning’s collected essays (1897) laid the groundwork for an academic consensus that condemned Reconstruction.[38] A popular school of southern historical fiction romanticized slavery and the Confederacy, memorializing the “Lost Cause” and justifying white supremacy.[39] As the United States lingered at empire’s edge, southern white supremacists targeted Reconstruction’s remnants.

II.  The Reconstruction Constitution as a Restraint on Empire

Clearly, by early 1898, the Reconstruction Constitution was vulnerable; but its specific restraints on imperial annexation remained fearsome even as the rest of the Reconstruction project crumbled. The Constitution required statehood for all annexed lands and citizenship with accompanying rights for their populations. Those results were an application of the more general principle that all Americans, except American Indians, held full constitutional rights as citizens of the United States and as citizens of their respective states or states-in-waiting.[40] That principle was still intact largely because it was an irrelevant part of the constitutional menagerie for white Southern Democrats, who were focused on depriving African Americans of the benefits of Reconstruction.[41]

Somewhat protected by the indifference of white Southern Democrats, the Reconstruction Constitution commitment to inclusive citizenship and eventual statehood was also bolstered by a longer, unbroken, and still influential tradition that all inhabited U.S. lands would eventually become states. The Northwest Ordinance (1787), which predated the Constitution, had influentially promised statehood for the territories it governed.[42] In 1857 the Supreme Court’s infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision crystallized that norm into doctrine by declaring that the Constitution only permitted territories to be acquired as future states, not as perpetual colonies.[43] The Union victory against Southern secession established on the battlefield the proposition of once in, never out. That prohibition clearly applied to states seeking to depart unilaterally, but conceivably also bound the federal government and applied to territories. Those two rules would bar any acquired land from later becoming independent through a grant of national sovereignty. So eventual statehood would become the inevitable consequence of annexation.[44] As one senator explained in 1871, because “divorce is impossible,” annexation was an “irrevocable” promise that territory “be admitted in due time as a State.”[45]

The other key component of this constitutional regime was the guarantee of rights-rich citizenship for all Americans other than American Indians. After the Thirteenth Amendment ended legal slavery within the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment provided the first constitutional definition of U.S. citizenship:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.[46]

Together, these constitutional provisions and interpretations obliterated Dred Scott’s notorious deprivation of African American citizenship—but they did not obliterate Dred Scott’s bar on perpetual colonies, and could be reconciled with it easily enough.

The declaration in the Slaughter-House Cases, that birth within territories was birth within the United States, clarified that all Americans other than American Indians were citizens with associated privileges and immunities.[47] However, the rights attached to such citizenship had long been subject to competing lines of authority. One view was that citizenship was highly consequential. Dred Scott argued as much when it declared citizenship so substantive and so linked to voting that its extension to African Americans was unthinkable.[48] The Fifteenth Amendment (1870) could be read to work from the same premise, but to opposite ends; it potentially associated citizenship with suffrage when it barred racial discrimination in voting. The other view was that citizenship conferred few rights inherently. The Slaughter-House Cases took this approach in all but nullifying judicially enforceable privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship in cases not involving race discrimination.[49] In rejecting a woman’s suffrage test suit, the Court in Minor v. Happersett (1875)[50] added that U.S. citizenship did not provide voting rights specifically. Conversely, some rights existed independently of citizenship. Wong Wing v. United States (1896)[51] and Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)[52] respectively protected the jury rights and anti–racial discrimination rights of noncitizens of Chinese descent.[53] Though the two views of citizenship existed in considerable tension, officials and jurists generally just held both simultaneously. They judged citizenship too valuable to be extended via annexation to people of color and understood that it brought those who already held it little advantage in court.

The Reconstruction Constitution—fortified by these earlier constitutional interpretations—had occasioned an unprecedented hiatus in annexation. Presidents had repeatedly contemplated annexation, confronted resistance to its constitutional consequences, and stopped short. Before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a U.S. annexation had occurred at least every fifteen years; in 1897 more than thirty years had passed since Alaska was annexed in 1867.[54] Republican President Ulysses S. Grant (1869–1877) promoted the benefits of annexation within the Reconstruction Constitution framework when he sought ratification of treaties to annex the Danish West Indies and the Dominican Republic. Though the West Indians were overwhelmingly of African descent,[55] Secretary of State William Seward pressed for ratification of a treaty that would provide islanders all “liberties and rights of American citizens” and place the islands among lands “preparing to be States.”[56] Under the Dominican treaty, Dominicans, most of whom were of mixed race, would be immediately protected as U.S. citizens. Their nation would join the Union, perhaps even within a decade.[57] The unspoken corollary was that statehood would bring new privileges such as full participation in U.S. governance, including senators, representatives, presidential electors, and a say on constitutional amendments. Though citizenship, eventual statehood, and rights each derived from a distinct mix of pre–Civil War precedents, Civil War transformations, and Reconstruction Amendment prescriptions, U.S. officials envisioned all three as a legal bundle that instantly accompanied annexation.

Debates about annexation at this time focused not on whether rights of citizenship would be extended to alien peoples—that was assumed to be true—but on the desirability of that prospect. For his part, President Grant happily envisioned 150,000 citizens of color dominating a State of Dominica that would reinforce and bolster Reconstruction.[58] But as the London Spectator observed, many U.S. senators balked at a further “increase of the dark electorate;the prospect of a Dominican vote that would “cancel that of a million whites in the House of Representatives” aroused many senators’ “dread of the negro.”[59] Equating Americanness and whiteness, one senator objected to any eventual “share in governing us” for Dominicans “wholly incapable to governing themselves.”[60] Republican Senator Carl Schurz of Missouri feared annexations begetting annexations. He foresaw the addition of “ten or twelve tropical States” whose “ten or twelve millions” of “people of the Latin race mixed with Indian and African blood” would elect senators and representatives capable of tipping “the scale of the destinies of this Republic.”[61] The treaties to annex the Danish West Indies and the Dominican Republic never won ratification.

Subsequent attempts to assert U.S. control abroad met with the same kind of resistance from those who feared that annexation would trigger eventual statehood for acquired lands and immediate citizenship for the inferior peoples resident there. In 1893, a group of American businessmen and planters overthrew the Hawaiian government and sought U.S. annexation.[62] Stateside opponents complained that such acquisition was irreversible––a “step into the abyss” that could “never be retraced.”[63] The “interference of the Fourteenth Amendment” would pollute citizenship by bringing it to Hawaiians who were “incompetent,” “incapable of self control,” “ignorant, vicious,” “degraded,” “incongruous,” and lacking in “education,” “ability,” and “mental and moral faculties.”[64] If further annexations followed, the result would be a “polyglot House” whose speaker might “recognize ‘the gentleman from Patagonia,’” Cuba, Santo Domingo, Korea, Hong Kong, Fiji, Greenland, or, “with fear and trembling, ‘the gentleman from the Cannibal Islands,’ who will gaze upon you with watering mouth and gleaming teeth.”[65]

Proponents of annexation changed tactics. Rather than celebrate the extension of the Reconstruction Constitution to new territories and the peoples present there, they downplayed it. But they did not dispute or deny the consequences of annexation.[66] To suggest that the Constitution permitted the United States to hold overseas colonies came perilously close to condoning the re-imposition of racial caste in the U.S. South. As the Democratic Senator from Louisiana, Donelson Caffery, would put it years later when Republicans sought to annex lands without extending them the Reconstruction Constitution, such attempts “most amply vindicated the South” by laying so “outside of the spirit of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution.”[67] For now, proposed treaties remained silent on citizenship, voting rights, and future statehood.[68] Executive-branch advocates of expansion punted these matters to Congress. Pro-annexation lawmakers argued that Hawai‘i’s small population could be safely naturalized and that the prospect of such a small state gaining two senators could be averted by admitting the polity as a new county of California instead.[69] But other lawmakers were not assuaged or reassured. And Hawai‘i remained outside U.S. borders. In 1896 leading Republicans eyed the Danish West Indies, Hawai‘i, and “all the English speaking parts” of the Americas.[70] They renewed their contention that the benefits from expansion would outweigh its costs, but were stymied once again.[71]

III.  Beyond the Reconstruction Constitution: American Indians, Territories, and Alien Lands and People

Lack of annexations, however, did not make the United States an anti-imperial paragon. Between 1868 and 1898, U.S. officials projected power abroad, consolidated power at home, and subordinated peoples on both sides of the border. Their actions followed the Reconstruction Constitution, but also circumscribed and limited its reach. Doing so paved the way for more direct challenges to it at century’s end.

Internationally, the United States traded, defended, postured, and wielded as much influence as before. Only annexations had disappeared from the nation’s quiver. In lieu of annexation, the United States deployed workarounds to extend U.S. economic and military interests that left foreign sovereignty in place. For instance, the United States negotiated a uniquely favorable trade agreement with the Dominican Republic and gained significant control over its finances after a U.S. syndicate purchased its outstanding debt.[72] In the Danish West Indies, the United States took advantage of the free port, enjoying access to the valuable coaling and naval harbor there on terms equal to those of other great powers.[73] Hawai‘i gave the United States preferential access to its ports, trade, and territory. In the words of a U.S. secretary of state, the islands were “practically members of the American zollverein” (a form of customs union without political unification that bound together north German states) and “an outlying district of the State of California.” Internationally, the United States claimed the Hawaiian islands within its sphere of influence. Yet formally the kingdom was as “remote from our control as China.”[74]

In other cases, U.S. officials rejected the annexation option in favor of other forms of control. Rather than accept a proposal that Germany, Britain, and the United States each annex different portions of Samoa, the United States insisted on a fractious cosupervision arrangement.[75] The United States protected its citizens’ interests in parts of Asia through extraterritoriality agreements, which let citizens facing prosecution or civil suits abroad receive adjudication by U.S. officials who applied U.S. law.[76]

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States used trade to assert predominance. A reciprocal United States–Spanish agreement underlay the U.S. role as the leading market for the Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico and Cuba. The United States also aggressively asserted its Monroe Doctrine rule that no European power would be allowed to expand its footprint in the Americas. Doing so was another way for the United States to broaden control without extending U.S. borders.[77] In 1895, the United States declared itself “practically sovereign” in the Americas and insisted that Great Britain submit a border dispute with Venezuela to arbitration. This “twenty-inch gun,” as the demand became known, signaled a willingness to resort to arms if Britain refused. The British pointed out the inconsistency of asserting “interests” in a country for which a nation “assumes no responsibility,” but acceded to U.S. demands all the same.[78]

Through most of the late nineteenth century, then, the United States pursued a variation of imperialism in the American hemisphere unlike many European models insofar as it involved no formal extension of borders. U.S. supremacy and control in the Americas grew, but U.S. territory and sovereignty did not. The United States stood down only where the tripwire of the Reconstruction Constitution might get triggered.

Domestically, the military pursued large-scale warfare to defeat autonomous native nations and expropriate their land. The Reconstruction Constitution accommodated such violence, but at the cost of sacrificing theoretical coherence. Recall that the Fourteenth Amendment extended citizenship to those “born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”[79] A major function of the “jurisdiction” requirement was to exclude American Indians from citizenship. The clause analogized tribes to foreign nations. An Indian who owed primary loyalty to a tribe at birth was homologous to a foreign ambassador’s child whose primary loyalty at birth was to the ambassador’s home country. The analogy might have been somewhat apt in 1868, but not after 1871, when the United States abandoned treaty relations with American Indians in favor of direct congressional rule by statute.[80] United States v. Kagama (1886)[81] recognized inherent and plenary federal power over American Indians.[82] By the time of the U.S. Army massacre of Lakota Indians at Wounded Knee in 1890, American Indians’ military power no longer posed a credible threat to U.S. dominance.[83] Nonetheless, the Court held in Elk v. Wilkins (1884)[84] that the Constitution did not extend citizenship to American Indians who forswore tribal allegiance in favor of U.S. jurisdiction. This ruling left many American Indians with citizenship neither in the United States nor in a foreign country. If those who disassociated from their tribes did not become U.S. citizens, then they would have no nationality.[85]

Beginning in the 1880s, the United States swapped one betrayal for another. Rather than withhold citizenship to deny rights to American Indians, they imposed it to compel the assimilation of Native peoples. U.S. officials dissolved tribal governments, alienated collectively held tribal lands, implemented coercive education programs to extinguish Native American cultures, naturalized Indians en masse, and expanded states’ jurisdiction over Indians.[86] Often envisioned as a shield for individuals against governmental overreach, citizenship had become its sword.

The Reconstruction Constitution did not prevent the expansion of U.S. power and control, domestically or internationally. Nor did it prevent federal officials from establishing broad latitude to act within territories. Quite the opposite: A strong national government grew stronger. Southern white-supremacist Democrats abided such aggrandizement of federal power because they had the least to fear from the federal behemoth when it exercised its powers beyond state borders. In Utah Territory, the Constitution hardly hindered the federal campaign against Mormon polygamy, which was often condemned as another form of slavery.[87] Before the Civil War, by contrast, Dred Scott protected slaveholders in the territories from federal interference. The promise of eventual statehood also did little to impede federal power. As overwhelmingly Catholic New Mexico passed the half-century mark as a territory, federal lawmakers routinely cited residents’ race and monolingual Spanish when they rejected statehood measures.[88] Inevitable statehood, they realized, could be indefinitely delayed.

Federal officials’ freedom to act was unrestrained by the Reconstruction Constitution in particular kinds of lands and territories, as these examples show. It was also unrestrained in cases that involved particular groups of people: namely, aliens within U.S. borders, or U.S. citizens living abroad. Officials enjoyed all but unreviewable discretion if they could convince a court that an action targeted foreign lands or actors. In re Ross (1891),[89] for example, involved the trial of a U.S.citizen defendant accused of committing crimes abroad. The U.S. official who conducted the overseas trial had applied U.S. law and yet denied him jury rights. The Supreme Court upheld the resultant conviction.[90] The Reconstruction Constitution drew high-stakes lines between citizens and aliens. This was evident in two Supreme Court decisions, Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889)[91] and Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893).[92] Both cases involved virulently anti-Chinese federal statutes that flatly forbade naturalization of Chinese individuals and sharply limited their entry, reentry, and residence in the United States. Decisions in the two cases established an absolute, inherent federal power to bar aliens’ entry into the United States and to deport them after they arrived.[93] These rulings contrast with United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898),[94] which declared the United Statesborn ethnic Chinese Wong Kim Ark to be a citizen with the right to reenter the United States. The Court rejected the race-based claim that Wong’s birth to Chinese parents was birth not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Such judicial unwillingness to bend the Reconstruction Constitution to the dictates of racism was just what many opponents of annexation feared and predicted. The crux of the matter was the decision’s emphasis on Wong’s subjection to federal power regardless of his ties to China: “Jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”[95]

By 1898 all of these shifts in federal power had weakened individual rights and strengthened those of the states. This had occurred across thirty years of official interactions with African Americans, American Indians, people of Chinese descent, and members of other disfavored communities. It occurred through matters concerning national borders, irregular locales, territories, and U.S. consular courts abroad. Simultaneously, the Court had sharply delimited the reach of the Reconstruction Constitution. Constitutional rights could abruptly vanish upon crossing U.S. borders, as in In re Ross, or where an alien rather than a citizen was concerned, as in Fong Yue Ting. Though the restraints that the Reconstruction Constitution imposed on empire were still standing, the elements of a doctrinal alternative had been fulminating for thirty years. Specifically, federal power was getting defined—and transformed—by distinctions between foreign and domestic; alien and citizen. Later events would demonstrate the malleability of these distinctions.[96] What was missing before 1898 was the impetus to synthesize and then deploy the alternative doctrine.

Iv.  The U.S. Imperial Turn

Despite having weakened as a broad restraint on governmental power, the Reconstruction Constitution remained a fearsome obstacle to territorial annexation at century’s end. Another demonstration came after April 1898, when years of tensions between Spain and the United States over the future of the Spanish colony of Cuba finally boiled over into open conflict.[97] The ensuing war between the two countries provided advocates of acquiring new lands with fresh ammunition. They needed it. The constitutional rule attaching citizenship, rights, and statehood to annexation, which still shaped U.S. officials’ actions, remained a strong argument against renewed expansion.[98]

Active naval warfare permitted long-thwarted expansionists finally to gain a victory in Hawai‘i . Facing constitutional objections that they could not convincingly rebut, they cited Hawai‘i’s naval value instead: “I should like to know whether these fine, silken, glossy arguments about the Constitution” are to “obstruct the war” and “put to peril the troops.”[99] The implication was that Hawai‘i was worth the constitutional price, whether it be adherence to the Reconstruction Constitution or its violation.[100] In early July 1898, annexation of the Pacific islands was complete.[101]

The United States made a similar calculation to stomach the constitutional consequences of acquiring Spain’s small island colony of Puerto Rico, which lay at a key access point to the Caribbean Sea and to potential sites for a trans-Isthmian canal.[102] With it clear that the war with Spain would soon end decisively in the United States’ favor, U.S. forces invaded Puerto Rico in late July 1898. U.S. officials declared their intent to annex the island[103] and began governing there in anticipation of the impending applicability of the Reconstruction Constitution. In words calculated to evoke rights and membership, the general at the head of the invasion, Nelson A. Miles, promised “the liberal institutions of our government” to islanders.[104] Future military governor Guy Henry then declared: “The forty-five States . . . unite in vouchsafing to you prosperity and protection as citizens of the American union.”[105] Henry’s successor in office, George Davis, declared his purpose to be to prepare Puerto Ricans for “American Citizenship”[106] and “statehood.”[107] Officials within the State Department opined that naturalization inevitably followed annexation under international law.[108]

The impetus to alter the application of the Reconstruction Constitution to new territories, rather than simply to avoid or accept its application, finally arrived in late 1899. Shortly after active fighting with Spain ended, President McKinley exercised his prerogative as the military victor and sought annexation of the Philippines. With other imperial powers ready to fill any vacuum that the United States might leave behind, McKinley asserted that any course of action short of annexation would entail “more serious complications.”[109] Like most white mainlanders, he judged neither Filipinos fit for rights-bearing U.S. citizenship nor the Philippines fit for eventual statehood. As one lawmaker expressed the nearly universal anti-Filipino racism within official Washington, the Philippines housed a uniquely large, ill-led, “utterly alien,” and racially inferior population of “Malays, Tagals, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, Negritos, and various more or less barbarous tribes . . . .[110] McKinley argued that Filipinos could neither govern themselves nor assimilate into U.S. society.[111] He also subscribed to the widely-held view that tropical climates were unsuitable to white settlers, which alone could make colonies eligible for self-government.[112]

Though McKinley little relished extending the Reconstruction Constitution to Filipinos, he could offer no clear constitutional alternative. Instead, he groped for and improvised solutions. McKinley’s initial instinct was to honor the Reconstruction Constitution, while minimizing its impact. He proposed provisions to deny U.S. citizenship to “uncivilized” tribal people and to “Mongolians and others not actually subjects of Spain.”[113] The first exclusion had appeared in the treaty annexing Alaska, which provided that “uncivilized native tribes” there would have the same status as other Indians;[114] the second had roots in Chinese exclusion, a variant of which formed part of the resolution annexing Hawai‘i.[115] Spain recognized the jus soli citizenship rulethat birth within its territory generally made one a Spaniard[116]so these exceptions meshed with the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment permitted denials of U.S. citizenship to members of Indian tribes and also to people neither born nor naturalized within the nation.

Ultimately, McKinley ducked questions about the political status of residents of the ceded islands. He negotiated a peace treaty with Spain that handed off these issues to Congress, with the Constitution only as a backstop.[117] McKinley did not declare the Reconstruction Constitution inapplicable to the Philippines, but he seemed to sense its vulnerability and maintained the prerogative to make such an argument in the future.

When McKinley submitted the treaty to annex the Philippines to the Senate for ratification, opponents howled at what they depicted as the extension of the Reconstruction Constitution there.[118] Drawing on deep wells of white-supremacist ideology, they protested that the treaty would bring Filipinos U.S. citizenship, full constitutional rights, and eventual statehood.[119] Jurists stressed that nontribal people born within the United States were citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.[120] Citizens enjoyed such rights as freedom of movement, equal franchise to whites, opportunities to compete for stateside jobs, and free trade with the mainland.[121] The spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment required universal manhood suffrage.[122] Portions of the Dred Scott decision not repudiated by the Reconstruction amendments––together with other precedents––established that the Bill of Rights operated in U.S. territories and that statehood would follow.[123] Anti-imperialist Senate Democrats thundered against any plan to annex the Philippines as a permanent dependency. To deny citizenship and statehood would violate the Constitution, which Democrats interpreted as a bulwark against tyrannical federal overreach.[124] A federal government that could rule its islands as colonies was perilously close to one that could re-impose Reconstruction on the South.

As the vote to approve the treaty with Spain neared, a bipartisan majority of senators united behind a plan to ratify without annexing. Democrat Augustus Bacon of Georgia proposed that the Senate treat the Philippines like Cuba and disclaim any purpose to hold the archipelago permanently or to naturalize its inhabitants.[125] Foraker agreed that there was no support for permanently holding the Philippines.[126] In early February 1899, all but two voting Republicans and a sizeable minority of Democrats approved the treaty, a decision the Senate explicitly stated was “not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor . . . to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States.”[127] But the treaty explicitly ceded the Philippines to the United States,[128] regardless of how the Senate sought to spin it. If the Senate’s proviso was to have any operation, it would be as a call to arms against the constitutional lion whose slumber was soon to be disturbed.

Conclusion

With the extension of U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines, the U.S. imperial turn entered full swing. Events now vindicated naval strategist Alfred Mahan’s prediction that if annexations were hazarded, the Constitution would be changed to accommodate them: “As sentiment strengthens, it undermines obstacles, and they crumble before it.”[129]

 At some point between 1898 and 1901, the contingent survival of the constraints imposed by the Reconstruction Constitution on empire yielded to their inevitable decline. For the thirty prior years, nonjudicial officials had understood the Reconstruction Constitution to make citizenship, rights, and statehood the inevitable consequences of annexation. This conventional legal wisdom hindered empire builders and empowered anti-expansionists. The international borders of the United States remained frozen, notwithstanding expansionists’ political clout and constitutional shifts that strengthened governmental power and weakened individual rights. Then the Reconstruction Constitution’s increasingly brittle restraints did indeed begin to crumble under the strain of revitalized expansionist sentiment. Erosion was not necessarily collapse, however. Whether and in what form the Reconstruction Constitution would continue to influence empire was to be another generation in the settling.[130]

 Across the first quarter of the twentieth century, a new conventional legal wisdom of empire crystallized.[131] Like its predecessor, it formed within and beyond courts. Across a series of decisions in the Insular Cases of 1901 to 1925 concerning recently acquired lands, the Supreme Court pivoted away from the Reconstruction Constitution and toward a new doctrine of “territorial nonincorporation. Administrators, lawmakers, and presidents seized leading roles in formulating, driving, clarifying, and implementing the new approach. Its core tenets remain highly influential today. The United States may annex lands without incorporating them into the nation.[132] Those present in such unincorporated territories receive less than full constitutional rights.[133] Such lands need neither become states nor remain permanently within U.S. sovereignty.[134] Citizenship may be withheld from Americans born in unincorporated territories.[135] Together, the innovations were crucial to accommodating the Constitution to early-twentieth-century imperial realities.

 By contrast to those early-twentieth-century constitutional innovations, which receive careful treatment in my forthcoming book, Almost Citizens, the Reconstruction Constitution embodied more inclusive ideals in its application to formal expansion. This Article has recovered how––for three decades––it stood as a constitutional lion barring the path of imperial annexation. When the acquisition of new colonies did occur, remnants of the former regime stalked their governance for decades more.[136] Then largely forgotten, the constitutional lion was never quite slain.[137] What was sacrificed to the U.S. imperial turn was its former glory: wide acceptance that the Constitution commanded rights and citizenship for all wholly allegiant Americans and eventual statehood for all U.S. lands other than the nation’s capital.


[*] *.. Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I thank Susanna Blumenthal, Rebecca Brown, David Cruz, Sally Gordon, Ariela Gross, Pamela Haag, Mike Klarman, Grey Osterud, K-Sue Park, Reuel Schiller, and Franita Tolson; the editors of the Southern California Law Review; participants in law school workshops at Columbia University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Yale University and in the Vanderbilt Legal History Colloquium; and my research assistants. I have the opportunity to thank many others in my book Almost Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire (forthcoming 2018), and because that assistance often also benefited this Article, I enthusiastically incorporate those acknowledgements here.

 [1]. Compare The World Almanac 16, 232 (1891), with The World Almanac and Encyclopedia 51, 335 (1898).

 [2]. Compare The World Almanac 16, 232 (1891), with The World Almanac and Encyclopedia 51, 335 (1898).

 [3]. A.T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future 137–72, 224–25, 234, 256, 302–14 (1897).

 [4]. Philip A. Crowl, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian, in Makers of Modern Strategy 447–48, 462–65, 471 (Peter Paret ed., 1986); Suzanne Geissler, God and Power 99–133 (2015); Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, at xi (1977); Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command 2 (1997); Richard W. Turk, The Ambiguous Relationship (1987); Peter Karsten, The Nature of “Influence”: Roosevelt, Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power, 23 Am. Q. 585 (1971).

 [5]. Thomas Bender, The American Way of Empire, 23 World Pol’y J. 46, 54 (2006). See also Walter LaFeber, Review, 64 J. Am. Hist. 744, 746 (1977).

 [6]. Among many works on the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments as a constitutional moment or second founding, see generally Bruce Ackerman, We the People (2000).

 [7]. Mahan, supra note 3, at 257.

 [8]. Classic accounts of the promise and rollback of Reconstruction and of the fortunes of African Americans during the period include, inter alia: W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America (1935); Eric Foner, Reconstruction (1988); and C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877–1913 (rev. ed. 1999) (1951). See also Richard White, The Republic for Which It Stands (2017) (providing a synthesis of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age).

 [9]. On the non-citizenship of American Indians, see infra notes 8086. I use the term “Americans” to refer to all nationals of the United States, whether such nationals are citizens or not.

 [10]. On Reconstruction, equality, and the peculiar status of Washington, D.C., see Kate Masur, An Example for All the Land (2010). For ease of exposition, and because I have uncovered little use by those I study of the District of Columbia as a precedent for empire, I trust the reader to recall that the District of Columbia was an exception to the Reconstruction Constitution’s rule that all U.S. lands would eventually become states. I do not expressly repeat the point.

 [11]. Sam Erman, Almost Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire (forthcoming 2018).

 [12]. Of course, the imperial history of the United States long predated the Reconstruction Constitution. See generally, e.g., Jack Ericson Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires (1968). On the imperialism of the late-nineteenth-century United States, see, for example, Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (2004); Thomas Bender, The American Way of Empire, World Pol’y J. 45–61 (2006), and Paul A. Kramer, Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World, 116 Am. Hist. Rev. 1348–91 (2011).

 [13]. This Article builds on and departs from Eric Love’s groundbreaking Race over Empire (2004). Observing that race was always an argument against annexation throughout his period of study, Love posited an opposition between racism and empire. But elsewhere, as in the Jim Crow South, and at other times, as during the slave trade or after 1898, the United States opted for racial subjugation over disengagement. It was only racism, as constrained by the Reconstruction Constitution, which motivated the three-decade halt to annexations. On other causes of the hiatus, see id., at 20–23, 153. See also Robert L. Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865–1900, at 14, 50, 106 (2d ed. 1986); Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865–1900, at ch. 3, 10 (1976); Isaac Dookhan, A History of the Virgin Islands of the United States 253–54 (Canoe Press 1994); Thomas J. Osborne, Empire Can Wait 107 (1981); Erik Overgaard Pedersen, The Attempted Sale of the Danish West Indies to the United States of America, 1865–1870, at 75–76, 80, 112, 170–72 (1992); Charles Callan Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish West Indies 146, 151 (1968); Cyrus Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism 33 (2002); Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba Between Empires, 1878–1902, at 59–65 (1983); Alfred L. Castle, Tentative Empire: Walter Q. Gresham, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Hawai‘i, 1893–1895, 29 Haw. J. Hist. 83, 87–88 (1995); Tennant S. McWilliams, James H. Blount, the South, and Hawaiian Annexation, 57 Pac. Hist. Rev. 25 (1988). The causes historians identify include party politics, turnover in office, corruption charges, competing domestic and budgetary concerns, militarism fatigue, fear of military vulnerability and hard-to-incorporate alien peoples, adequate existing markets, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, commitment to self-determination, reaction against Reconstruction, industrial and labor opposition, and no need to preempt other empires’ annexationist designs.

 [14]. See Carman F. Randolph, The Law and Policy of Annexation with Special Reference to the Philippines Together with Observations on the Status of Cuba (1901); Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1899).

 [15]. The articulation and interpretation of constitutional meaning by presidents, lawmakers, and administrators are aspects of executive, legislative, and administrative constitutionalism. On presidents shaping constitutional meaning, see Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy (2007). Judge Cornelia T.L. Pillard reviews theoretical defenses of executive constitutionalism in, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676 (2005). The classic statement of presidential power as the power to persuade is, Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (1960). George C. Edwards, The Strategic Presidency: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership (2009), argues that presidents succeed by spotting and exploiting opportunities. For a description and defense of one form of legislative constitutionalism, see Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 (2003). Gillian E. Metzger provides an incisive introduction to administrative constitutionalism in her aptly named article, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1897 (2013). For further discussion, see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (2014); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 Va. L. Rev. 801 (2010); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (2015).

 [16]. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law 241–64 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcom Thorburn eds., 2016) (reprising the argument that constitutional common sense changes in response to politics and suggesting that political actors’ influence on constitutional common sense may be greater in the absence of judicial opinions). This Article joins Balkin in using constitutional common sense as a guide to what arguments were off-the-wall at particular moments. This Article switches to the term “conventional legal wisdom” when describing historical actors’ shared beliefs that the Constitution imposed specific obligations.

 [17]. Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore’s groundbreaking text, Gender and Jim Crow (1996), describes early-twentieth-century activism by African American women.

 [18]. Accounts of reconciliation that focus on politics include Xi Wang, The Trial of Democracy 216–66 (1997) and Woodward, supra note 8, at 324–25. For examples from cultural history, see David W. Blight, Race and Reunion 291, 345 (2001) and Nina Silber, The Romance of Reunion 178–85 (1993). By conjoining constitutional histories of empire and Reconstruction, this Article takes up an approach whose promise has been expounded by Christina Duffy Burnett. See Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797 (2005). See also Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 Const. Comm. 241, 241–66 (2000). See generally Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom (2005); Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico (1985).

 [19]. See generally Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction (2011); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 Const. Comm. 295 (2000).

 [20]. See generally Michael Perman, Struggle for Mastery (2001); C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (comm. ed. 2002).

 [21]. On white southerners’ post-1898 cultural productions, see W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past (2005). On post-1898 Civil War remembrance, see, for example, Thomas J. Brown, Civil War Remembrance as Reconstruction, in Reconstructions 207, 218 (Thomas J. Brown ed., 2006). The academic consensus against Reconstruction was known as the “Dunning school” after its leading figure, William Archibald Dunning, the author of Reconstruction, Political and Economic 1865–1877 (1907).

 [22]. See Erman, supra note 11.

 [23]. Foner, supra note 8. See generally Ira Berlin et al., Slaves No More (1992); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (1970).

 [24]. Charles W. Calhoun, Conceiving a New Republic (2006).

 [25]. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Brandwein, supra note 19, at 30; Foner, supra note 8, at xxv, 602–03; Scott, supra note 18, at 8, 43–45, 265–67.

 [26]. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.

 [27]. Foner, supra note 8, at 251–61. See also Calhoun, supra note 24; Wang, supra note 18.

 [28]. Calhoun, supra note 24, at 10, 12–13, 22, 25. See generally Wang, supra note 18.

 [29]. Brandwein, supra note 19, at 9–10, 126, 143, 153. See also Calhoun, supra note 24, at 207; Foner, supra note 8, at 279, 342–43, 425–44; Scott, supra note 18, at 47–48, 53; Wang, supra note 18, at 49, 79, 82, 92, 94, 96, 105, 113–14, 188, 227, 254, 267–300; Woodward, supra note 8, at 289.

 [30]. Calhoun, supra note 24, at 4, 226–67. See also Mark Elliott, Color Blind Justice 248 (2008); J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics 31 (1974); Scott, supra note 23, at 87; Woodward, supra note 8, at 322; Wang, supra note 18, at 216–66, 300.

 [31]. Blight, supra note 18, at 111–12, 138–39, 394–97. See also Foner, supra note 8, at xix, 582, 609–10; Woodward, supra note 8, at 51–74; Woodward, supra note 20, at 56–61.

 [32]. Blight, supra note 18, at 4–5, 102, 110–112, 394–397. See also William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics, at vii–viii (2d ed. 1904) (1897); Dunning, supra note 21, at 205–10; Foner, supra note 8, at xix, 582, 609–10; Woodward, supra note 8, 51–74; Woodward, supra note 20, 56–61.

 [33]. Pildes, supra note 19, at 301. See also Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South 214–309 (1992); Kousser, supra note 30, at 3, 11, 243–44; Joseph Gerteis, Class and the Color Line 23, 33–34, 127–28, 146–47 (2007); Matthew Hild, Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and Populists 1, 3–4, 150–51, 174–75, 201 (2007).

 [34]. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). See also Gerald J. Postema, Introduction: The Sins of Segregation, 16 Law & Phil. 241–42 (1997); Scott, supra note 18, at 88.

 [35]. Perman, supra note 20, at 83–90.

 [36]. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222, 221 (1898). See also Perman, supra note 20, at 117–21; Woodward, supra note 8, at 321–22.

 [37]. Contrary voices had not yet left the field. See Silber, supra note 18; Mark Elliott, Race, Color Blindness, and the Democratic Public: Albion W. Tourgée’s Radical Principles in Plessy v. Ferguson, 67 J. Southern Hist. 287, 309–12 (2001). See generally Barbara A. Gannon, The Won Cause (2011).

 [38]. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics, supra note 32. See also Marilyn Lake & Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line 49–74 (2008); Woodward, supra note 8, at 440–43.

 [39]. Blight, supra note 18, at 216. See also Cecilia Elizabeth O’Leary, To Die For 121–28 (1999); Silber, supra note 18, at 185–95; Woodward, supra note 8, at 431–34.

 [40]. The classic overview of American Indian history remains Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father (1995).

 [41]. When annexation of the Philippines in 1899 caused Southern Democrats to focus on the Reconstruction Constitution as a constraint on empire, they were of two minds. Initially, they valued doctrines that limited federal power. But as Reconstruction grew more distant and Democrats’ stranglehold on Southern politics tightened, many welcomed empire as a new field for white-supremacist governance. See Erman, supra note 11.

 [42]. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LVII–LIX (2012). See also Eblen, supra note 12, at 1–51; Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case 74–77, 142 (1978).

 [43]. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1857).

 [44]. Burnett, supra note 18, at 802–03. On U.S. authority over uninhabited guano islands as a precursor to empire, see Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano Islands, 57 Am. Q. 772, 779–803 (2005).

 [45]. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 524 (1871).

 [46]. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.

 [47]. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72–73 (1872). See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 197 (2002).

 [48]. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393. In a reflection of how jurists often held inconsistent visions of citizenship without acknowledging the tension, the justices were also well aware that women and children held U.S. citizenship and yet lacked voting rights. Id.

 [49]. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 36. See also id. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting); Leo S. Rowe, The United States and Porto Rico 87–89 (1904). But cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).

 [50]. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). See also Austin Allen, Origins of the Dred Scott Case 168, 179, 217–219 (2006); Fehrenbacher, supra note 42, chs. 6, 15. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s lead opinion in Dred Scott rested on several additional premises: states could not grant U.S. citizenship; Congress had not naturalized African Americans; and citizenship in a state and in the United States must generally coincide. For an example of antebellum jurists’ competing accounts of who held citizenship and what it meant, see State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838), and Rights of Free Virginia Negroes, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 506 (1821).

 [51]. Wong Wing v. United States 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

 [52]. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

 [53]. See Brandwein, supra note 19, at 28–31, 57, 98–104.

 [54]. David Healy, US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s, at 50–52 (1970). See also Beisner, supra note 13, at 46–47. Both sources identify the hiatus in annexations as a problem. The annexation of Alaska demonstrated that the contiguity of the territories to be acquired did not distinguish the two periods. As Matthew Karp elaborates in This Vast Southern Empire (2016), antebellum U.S. expansion had a pro-slavery flavor that did not survive the Civil War. The Alaska treaty extended citizenship to all inhabitants who remained except members of “uncivilized native tribes.” Treaty with Russia, art. 3, 15 Stat. 539, 542 (Mar. 30, 1867). Population counts of 1863 and 1890, respectively, both reported Alaska’s population to be overwhelmingly indigenous. See Ivan Petroff, Population and Resources of Alaska 40 (1882); Petroff, Report on Population and Recourses of Alaska at the Eleventh Census: 1890, at 3 (1893).

 [55]. Pedersen, supra note 14, at vii, 162–67. See also Nicholas Guyatt, America’s Conservatory: Race, Reconstruction, and the Santo Domingo Debate, 133 J. Am. Hist. 974, 981 (2011). See generally Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic (1998); William Javier Nelson, Almost a Territory (1990).

 [56]. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 1st to 56th Cong., Claims of Citizens of the United States Against Foreign Governments, S. Doc. No. 231, at 218 (Comm. Print 1901).

 [57]. Love, supra note 13, at 41; Allison L. Sneider, Suffragists in an Imperial Age 47 (2008).

 [58]. Guyatt, supra note 55, at 976–81.

 [59]. St. Domingo and the United States, Spectator (Jan. 29, 1870), in Littell’s Living Age 635–36 (1870).

 [60]. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 526 (1871).

 [61]. Id. app’x 30 (1871). See also Love, supra note 13, at 59.

 [62]. Castle, supra note 14, at 83.

 [63]. 31 Cong. Rec., H5,936.

 [64]. 26 Cong. Rec., at app’x 481–82; 31 Cong. Rec., S5,842, S5,921, S5,938, S5,998; George S. Boutwell, Hawaiian Annexation, Address Before Boot and Shoe Club of Boston (Dec. 22, 1897), in 60 Advocate of Peace 19 (1898); James Bryce, The Policy of Annexation for America, Forum Dec. 1897, at 385; Love, supra note 13, at 103, 150; Stephen M. White, The Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, Forum, Aug. 1897, at 731; Carl Schurz, Manifest Destiny, Harper’s Mag., Oct. 1893, at 737. Although residents of Japanese and Chinese descent formed a substantial minority of the population, they were overwhelmingly foreign born and thus potentially excludable from citizenship upon annexation. See Report of the General Superintendent of the Census, 1896, at 31, 34 (1897).

 [65]. 31 Cong. Rec., H5,790, H5,792, H5,777–78, H5,903, H5,921, H5,937. See also 26 Cong. Rec., H1,821–22; Thomas M. Cooley, Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, Forum, June 1893, at 399; Why Should We Annex Hawaii, N.Y. Herald (Feb. 23, 1893); E.L. Godkin, How Are We to Govern Hawaii?, Nation, Dec., 2, 1897, at 432–33; Love, supra note 13, at 104, 129–30; Eric Love, White Is the Color of Empire: The Annexation of Hawai‘i, in 1898, in Race, Nation, and Empire in American History 84 (James T. Campbell et al. eds., 2007); Schurz, supra note 64; Hawaii, Nation, Feb. 9, 1893, at 96.

 [66]. Love, supra note 65, at 95. For express acknowledgements of consequences of annexation, see Statement of Gen. Schofield, N.Y. Trib., Mar. 15, 1893, at 2, in Lorrin A. Thurston, A Hand-Book on the Annexation of Hawaii 72 (1897); 31 Cong. Rec., at app’x. 612; More American Talk: Senator Morgan’s Speech in Honolulu – Strong Utterances, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1897, at 5.

 [67]. 32 Cong. Rec., S639 (1899).

 [68]. Foreign Relations of the United States 1894: Affairs in Hawaii 201 (1895); William McKinley, The President’s Message, in Evening Star Almanac and Hand-Book 1898, at 436–37 (1898).

 [69]. A Voice from Hawaii, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 28, 1897, at 8; Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. Rep. No. 1355, 55th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 1, at 61 (May 17, 1898); 31 Cong. Rec., H5,788, H5,998.

 [70]. Republican Party Platform of 1896, Am. Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/?pid=29629 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).

 [71]. Osborne, supra note 13, at 84, 104–05; Love, supra note 13, at xvii, 106, 146, 154. Several dynamics contributed to the renewed pressure for expansion. See Healy, supra note 54, at 12 (noting that expanding territorial empires dominated the broader world); Beisner, supra note 13, at 14 (citing rising tariff walls); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire (35th anniv. ed. 1998) (building on work by William Appleman Williams to emphasize the desire to access foreign markets). On growing U.S. investment in naval capacity, see Jedidiah J. Kroncke, The Futility of Law and Development (2016); Healy, supra note 54, at 43–44; and Mahan, supra note 3. Kristin L. Hoganson perceives a martial spirit haunting 1890s officialdom. See Fighting for Manhood 3–4, 10, 24, 81 (1998). Trade and international relations are treated in Beisner, supra note 13, at 4–5, 14, 19, 23–24, 78, 81, 87–89, 95, 98–131; Kroncke, supra note 71, at 73; George Herbert Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa 519, 555 (1933); and Veeser, supra note 13, at 4–5, 33. On preemptive annexation as a Monroe Doctrine response to other empires’ designs, see Beisner, supra note 13, at 4, 10–12, 79, 99, 102–03, 108–14, 123, 131; Healy, supra note 54, at 26–27; Kroncke, supra, at 73; Love, supra note 13, at 153; and Tansill, supra note 13, at 200.

 [72]. Veeser, supra note 13, at 30–42.

 [73]. Claims of Citizens, supra note 56, at 309–12. See also W.D. Boyce, Advantages of Making the Canal Zone a Free City and Free Port, 5 J. Race Dev. 68, 81 (1914); Isaac Dookhan, Changing Patterns of Local Reaction to the United States Acquisition of the Virgin Islands, 1865–1917, 15 Caribbean Stud. 50, 50 (1975); Gordon K. Lewis, An Introductory Note to the Study of the Virgin Islands, 8 Caribbean Stud. 5, 12 (1968).

 [74]. Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842–1898, at 157–58, 126–27, 170 (1945). See also Schurz, supra note 64.

 [75]. Nicholas Thomas, Islanders 272–81 (2010); Ryden, supra note 71, at xii–xvii, 555, 574–75.

 [76]. Teemu Ruskola, Canton is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial Sovereignty, 57 Am. Q. 889, 860–61, 870–72, 876–77 (2005).

 [77]. Veeser, supra note 13, at 30–32; Pérez, supra note 13, at 66–67, 171–86.

 [78]. R.A. Humphreys, Presidential Address: Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895, 17 Trans. of Royal Hist. Soc. 131, 150, 153 (1967). See also Beisner, supra note 13, at 12; Jennie A. Sloan, Anglo-American Relations and the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, 18 Hisp. Am. Hist. Rev. 486, 494 (1938).

 [79]. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

 [80]. Prucha, supra note 40, at 676.

 [81]. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

 [82]. Prucha, supra note 40, at 679; Cleveland, supra note 47, at 61–63.

 [83]. Prucha, supra note 40, at 560–61; Heather Cox Richardson, Wounded Knee (2010).

 [84]. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).

 [85]. Id. at 121–22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Cleveland, supra note 47, at 58.

 [86]. David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction 22–24 (1995); Jacqueline Fear-Segal, White Man’s Club, at xi–xii (2007); Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise, at x, 42, 44, 50, 52, 70–71, 74–75, 79–80, 152–54 (2001); Prucha, supra note 40, at 609–758; Cleveland, supra note 47, at 63.

 [87]. Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question 1, 47, 77, 81, 85, 90, 98, 114–16, 120, 129, 219 (2002). See also Gerald L Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the Territories, in Foreign in a Domestic Sense 184–87 (Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus] & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). Full constitutional rights did not stop the bureaucratically weak federal government from regulating organized and active workers via criminal prosecutions, anti-labor injunctions, and violence. See Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic 44–51, 61–63 (1993). See also Josiah Bartlett Lambert, If the Workers Took a Notion 10, 13, 22, 44–51, 56, 58, 65 (2005); William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 61–65, 77–78, 83, 108, 111, 125–26 (1991); David Ray Papke, The Pullman Case, at xiii, 33–35, 38, 41, 49, 75–76, 98 (1999); Richard Schneirov et al., Introduction, in The Pullman Strike and the Crisis of the 1890s, at 1 (Richard Schneirov et al. eds., 1999); Melvyn Dubofsky, The Federal Judiciary, Free Labor, and Equal Rights, in Pullman Strike, supra note 87, at 162–65; David Montgomery, Epilogue,” in Pullman Strike, supra note 87, at 238. Sarah Barringer Gordon describes how federal anti-polygamy laws imposed shared state norms on territories. See Gordon, supra note 87, at 5, 134, 219, 225. In Public Vows (2000), Nancy F. Cott observes the racial associations opponents drew between polygamy and racial degradation.

 [88]. John Nieto-Phillips, Citizenship and Empire: Race, Language, and Self-Government in New Mexico and Puerto Rico, 1898–1917, 11 J. Ctr. P.R. Stud. 51, 53–56 (1991). See generally David Van Holtby, Forty-Seventh Star (2012) (explaining that anti-Catholic sentiment impeded statehood for New Mexico into the 1890s).

 [89]. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).

 [90]. Cleveland, supra note 47, at 206.

 [91]. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

 [92]. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

 [93]. Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504; Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate 1 (1998); Cleveland, supra note 47, at 129–34, 149.

 [94]. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).

 [95]. Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest over Birthright Citizenship, in Immigration Stories 51–85 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). Erika Lee identifies Chinese exclusion with U.S. transformation into a self-defined racial “gatekeeping” nation in At America’s Gates 6 (2003).

 [96]. See generally Erman, supra note 11.

 [97]. See generally Pérez, supra note 13.

 [98]. Republicans could not renounce the rule without facing potent charges of hypocrisy. For an example, see Lauren L. Basson, Fit for Annexation but Unfit to Vote? Debating Hawaiian Suffrage Qualifications at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 29 Soc’l Sci. Hist. 575, 583, 589–90 (2005).

 [99]. 31 Cong. Rec., S6,344 (statement of Sen. Morgan).

 [100]. Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. Rep. No.1355, at pt. 2 (1898); Tom Coffman, Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawai’i 308 (rev. ed., 2009).

 [101]. Newlands Resolution, J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898). Mary Dudziak addresses the relative lack of restraint on federal power during wartime in War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (2012). Thomas Osborne deemphasizes the war as a driver of the annexation. See supra note 13, at 121–26.

 [102]. For a contemporary example of the case for taking a strategically located Caribbean island, see Mahan, supra note 3, at 302–14.

 [103]. A.D. Hall, Porto Rico 98 (1898).

 [104]. Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1898: Report of the Secretary of War, Miscellaneous Reports 41 (1898).

 [105]. General Henry’s Words of Wisdom, S.F. Call, Oct. 19, 1898, at 1.

 [106]. Headquarters Department of Porto Rico, Circular No. 15, MD NARA 350/5A/81–12 (June 17, 1899).

 [107]. Headquarters Department of Porto Rico, Circular (Corrected), MD NARA 350/5A/168–16 (Aug. 15, 1899).

 [108]. Citizenship of the Porto Ricans, S.F. Call, Oct. 19, 1898, at 1.

 [109]. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day (Oct. 26, 28, 1898), in Papers Relating to the Treaty with Spain, S. Doc. No. 148, 56th Cong., 2d sess., at 35, 37 (1901). See also Love, supra note 13, at 159–78.

 [110]. Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government 117 (2006) (quoting Carl Schurz, American Imperialism: An Address Opposing Annexation of the Philippines, January 4, 1899, in American Imperialism in 1898, at 77–84 (Theodore P. Greene ed. 1955)).

 [111]. Love, supra note 13, at 181.

 [112]. Id.

 [113]. Papers Relating to the Treaty with Spain, supra note 109, at 61.

 [114]. Treaty with Russia, art. 3, 15 Stat. 539, 542 (Mar. 30, 1867).

 [115]. Newlands Resolution, J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750, 751 (1898).

 [116]. Constitution of the Spanish Monarch—Madrid, June 30, 1876, in 67 British and Foreign State Papers 118 (1883).

 [117]. Papers Relating to the Treaty with Spain, supra note 109, at 8–9.

 [118]. On the Senate debates, see generally Michael Cullinane, Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism (2012); Love, supra note 13.

 [119]. See, e.g., 32 Cong. Rec., S436, S438, S639, S641, S837; Cullinane, supra note 118, at 35, 58.

 [120]. See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 406–07; Carman F. Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 291, 299–301, 309–10 (1898). That tribal Filipinos might be denied U.S. citizenship, Randolph wrote, did not solve the problem, for millions of other racially inferior Filipinos would still become U.S. citizens. See Randolph, supra note 120, at 305, 309–10.

 [121]. See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 407–09; Randolph, supra note 120, at 308, 310.

 [122]. See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 407–09; Randolph, supra note 120, at 310.

 [123]. See Baldwin, supra note 14, at 400–04; Randolph, supra note 120, at 292–93, 297–98.

 [124]. 32 Cong. Rec., S93–96, S432–36 (1899).

 [125]. Id. at S561.

 [126]. Id. at S571.

 [127]. Id. at S1,845–48. See also Cullinane, supra note 118, at 32; Love, supra note 13, at 187–88, 194–95; How the Vote Was Taken, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1899, at 1.

 [128]. Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755 (1899).

 [129]. Mahan, supra note 3, at 257.

 [130]. On the autonomy of law, short–and medium-term regularities in understandings and applications of legal rules, and the fundamental unpredictability of the long-term path legal change will take, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984). On the post-1897 U.S. turn toward long-term, non-settler colonialism, see Lanny Thompson, Imperial Archipelago 22–25 (2010), and Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Puerto Rico and the Origins of U.S. Global Empire passim (2015).

 [131]. The material in this paragraph is drawn from Erman, supra note 11. See also Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 1181 (2014); Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire (2006); Reconsidering the Insular Cases (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015); Foreign in a Domestic Sense, supra note 87.

 [132]. See generally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).

 [133]. Id.

 [134]. The granting of independence to the Philippines in 1946 established the points.

 [135]. The federal political branches hold this view, and though no express Supreme Court holding confirms the point, justices have strongly signaled their acquiescence. See Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925); Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 430–31 (1957); Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 639 n.1 (1954); Brief of Citizenship Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (2015) (No. 13–5272); Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the Last U.S. Nationals, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 71 (2013).

 [136]. Erman, supra note 11.

 [137]. Id.

Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising – Article by Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel

From Volume 91, Number 6 (September 2018)
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Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and other Online Advertising

Abby K. Wood[*] and Ann M. Ravel[†]

A lack of transparency for online political advertising has long been a problem in American political campaigns. Disinformation attacks that American voters have experienced since the 2016 campaign have made the need for regulatory action more pressing.

Internet platforms prefer self-regulation and have only recently come around to supporting proposed transparency legislation. While government must not regulate the content of political speech, it can, and should, force transparency into the process. We propose several interventions aimed at transparency. First, and most importantly, campaign finance regulators should require platforms to store and make available (1) ads run on their platforms, and (2) the audience at whom the ad was targeted. Audience availability can be structured to avoid privacy concerns, and it meets an important speech value in the “marketplace of ideas” theory of the First Amendment—that of enabling counter speech. Our proposed regulations would capture any political advertising, including disinformation, that is promoted via paid distribution on social media, as well as all other online political advertising. Second, existing loopholes in transparency regulations related to online advertising should be closed. Congress has a role here as it has prevented regulatory agencies from acting to require disclosure from so-called dark money groups. Finally, government should require that platforms offer an opt-in system for social media users to view narrowly-targeted ads or disputed content.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

I. Documenting and Framing the Problem

A. Fake News is Political Advertising

B. How Disinformation Can Weaken Democracy

II. First Amendment, Political Speech, and
Choice of Regulator

A. Constitutional Framework for Campaign Advertising Regulation

B. Choice of Regulator

1. Industry Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation

2. Government Regulation

III. Our Current, Insufficient, Regulatory
Framework for Online Political Advertising

IV. Constitutionally-Permissible Regulations
to Address Disinformation Advertising

A. Improve Transparency

1. Require Platforms to Keep and Disclose all Political Communications and Audiences

2. Close the Loophole for Disclaimers in Online Ads

3. Eliminate Donor Anonymity for LLCs and
501(c) Organizations

B. “Nudge” and Educate Sharers and Viewers

C. Considerations for Platform Efforts to Reduce Disinformation

V. Task Assignment and Action Across Multiple Jurisdictions

A. Federal Agency Competencies and Task Assignment

B. The Role of State and Local Government

Conclusion

APPENDIX

 

 

Introduction

During the 2016 Presidential campaign, the average adult saw at least one “fake news” item on social media.[1] The people distributing the articles had a variety of aims and operated from a variety of locations. Among the locations we know about, some were in Los Angeles, others in Macedonia, and, yes, others were in Russia. The Angelenos aimed to make money and sow chaos. The Macedonians wanted to get rich. And the Russians aimed to weaken Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for president, foster division around fraught social issues, and make a spectacle out of the U.S. election.[2] To these ends, the Russians mobilized trolls, bots, and so-called “useful idiots,” along with sophisticated ad-tracking and micro-targeting techniques to strategically distribute and amplify propaganda.[3] The attacks are ongoing.[4]

Cheap distribution and easy user targeting on social media enable the rapid spread of disinformation. Disinformative content, like other online political advertising, is “micro-targeted” at narrow segments of the electorate, based on their narrow political views or biases.[5] The targeting aims to polarize and fragment the electorate. Tracing the money behind this kind of messaging is next to impossible under current regulations and advertising platforms’ current policies. Voters’ inability to “follow the money” has implications for our democracy, even in the absence of disinformation. And of course, an untraceable flood of disinformation prior to an election stands to undermine voters’ ability to choose the candidate that best aligns with their preferences.

Untraceable online political advertising undermines key democratic values, and the problem is exacerbated by disinformation. Scholars and analysts are writing about fake news and the failures of platforms to contain it. Some have focused on evaluating the impact of fake news on voter behavior and beliefs[6] or on political agenda setting.[7] Others focus on legal fixes, such as direct platform regulation by restoring (or modifying) a statute that exempts platforms from liability arising from others’ speech on their platforms.[8] Still others offer media-based solutions[9] or emphasize that platforms are the only entities who can, or should, correct the problem while staying within the existing First Amendment framework.[10] A few are ready to re-interpret the First Amendment in light of the new imbalance between speakers and listeners.[11] Yet other scholars have suggested that platforms should be regulated in a way that fits a pre-existing regulatory framework, such as the way we regulate media organizations[12] or public utilities.[13]

We add to this conversation that fake news and other online political advertising should be addressed with existing regulatory tools developed for older kinds of political advertising. Our argument begins with the simple observation that fake news is not “news.” It is political advertising. Like other kinds of political advertising, fake news seeks to persuade, mobilize, or suppress voters and votes. And like other kinds of political advertising, it involves costs for production and distribution. Fake news is an especially confusing type of political advertising for two reasons. It is native, meaning that it poses as editorial or reporting content, and it is disinformative. Fake news is not the only format in which disinformation advertising occurs. Disinformation advertising is also distributed in the form of memes, videos, and images. The common themes among disinformation advertising are that it is false, it aims to affect people’s political opinions and the probability that they will turn out to vote, and the advertiser pays to produce or distribute it.

The First Amendment provides clear limits on the government’s ability to regulate politically-related messaging. However, the Constitution allows for more regulation than currently exists for political speech on social media. Courts have repeatedly upheld campaign finance disclaimers and disclosure of the funding behind political spending. At a minimum, the sources of disinformation advertising should be transparent.

Our campaign finance laws are riddled with gaps and loopholes, which exclude a large portion of online advertising from disclosure and disclaimer requirements. The lack of transparency for online ads facilitates violations of the ban on foreign spending in U.S. elections,[14] and even where the source of the political communication is domestic, the public’s inability to “follow the money” may impact voters’ ability to make the right choice for them.[15] Adding disinformation to the mix further damages voters’ ability to make the choice that best aligns with their preferences. While regulations responding to this problem have been proposed, the agency tasked with regulating is unlikely to enact anything in the near term.

The government should not rely upon the platforms to regulate themselves. While each platform is making proposals to increase transparency for online political advertising, the lack of transparency originated with the platforms, and for at least a decade, it appeared to serve their profit interests. Nevertheless, constitutional limits mean that only the platforms are able to implement some potential fixes. If platforms are unable or unwilling to act in those areas, government cannot step in.

In this Article, we propose three regulations to increase transparency of political advertising and begin to address the problem of disinformation advertising. Our proposed regulations are all modest extensions of the way the federal government already regulates political advertising, and they will help make visible the sources of political messaging online. Part I of this Article explains disinformation advertising as it existed in 2016—unregulated, from unknown sources, and aimed to fragment our politics—and how it creates a problem for our democracy. In Part II, we explain the constitutional framework in which additional regulation would occur. We also explain the tradeoffs between regulation by government and regulation by platforms. In Part III, we discuss the loopholes in our existing regulatory system for online political advertising. The loopholes have enabled disinformation advertising to be distributed without regulation even when paid for by a foreign government. Part IV proposes several regulatory solutions that could reduce disinformation advertising and, short of reducing it, would make enforcement and following the money much easier. We also suggest guidelines for platform self-regulation to attack the problem. A brief review of regulations in several foreign jurisdictions, which concludes Part IV, demonstrates that social media platforms are already willing and able to comply with stricter regulations in other countries. Finally, in Part V, we consider task assignment within the federal bureaucracy, as well as actions taken at other levels of government. Federal inaction on the threat posed by Russian disinformation is not the whole story; rather, disinformation campaigns have the potential to impact city and state elections too, causing local government to begin regulating platforms for their own elections.

I.  Documenting and Framing the Problem

“Fake news,” or fabricated news articles or blog posts that are intentionally false or misleading, have received a lot of attention since the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Fake news articles are distributed via social media to drive web traffic to websites.[16]

We argue that the problem of “fake news” is better framed as a problem of native political advertising and that the phenomenon benefits from lack of campaign finance transparency online. In this Section, we describe the fake news phenomenon, tie fake news to campaign advertising in ways that allow for regulatory traction, and explain how disinformation presents challenges to democracy.

A.  Fake News is Political Advertising

Fake news stories inundated social media networks during the 2016 election, sometimes generating millions of comments and reactions from users.[17] Sophisticated disinformation is persuasive because it looks like credible journalism.[18] But fake news is not “news.” It is native advertising and should be regulated as such.[19] In the same way that commercial advertisers seek to persuade by projecting a particular image of a product, purveyors of political disinformation ads use fabricated information to persuade voters that a candidate is untrustworthy or unfit for office,[20] or to sow division among Americans.[21] During the 2016 presidential election, many disinformation ads were strategically targeted at select groups to either encourage or suppress votes.[22] Persuasion and targeting are the cornerstones of advertising. We therefore reject the label “fake news” and adopt “disinformation advertising.”

Plenty of disinformation advertising was produced in the United States. Indeed, a company called “DisInfoMedia,” which was the source of several fake news articles during the election, lists its address in suburban Los Angeles.[23] But the public’s attention has been captured by fake news placed by foreign actors, especially Russians aiming to intervene in U.S. elections. Russia’s attack occurred (and continues) on social media platforms.[24] Expert estimates of the number of shares of Russian-sourced “fake news” on Facebook vary widely, from over 100 million to “into the billions.”[25] These estimates include content ranging from fake news articles to generic ideological statements from foreign sources with no disinformative content. The fact is, lack of disclosure of online political spending means that no one captured the entire universe of political ads. The best evidence we have so far, from a user-generated ad collection of 5 million ads by 10,000 Facebook users,[26] suggests that 86% of the groups running paid ads on Facebook in the last six weeks before the election were suspicious groups (53%),[27] astroturf movement groups (17.1%),[28] and questionable news outlets (15.8%).[29]

For a small fee, anyone can distribute content and generate impressions on social media.[30] Using Facebook as an example, political ads, including disinformation ads, could be promoted, or boosted, for a fee, just like any other ad.[31] Boosted ads appear higher on users’ newsfeeds. When boosting an ad, the creator selects which audience to target using filters like location, age, gender, or even interest. Some disinformation advertisers used Facebook’s “Custom Audiences” feature, which allows for much more sophisticated targeting than other methods, because it allows advertisers to place cookies on the browsers of those who click on their ads and then re-target people who clicked through.[32] Russian meddlers used Custom Audiences to create websites and Facebook Pages with political sounding names that focused on socially divisive issues such as undocumented immigrants or African-American activism. The operatives later re-targeted people who had visited their sites with further political messaging.[33] The Trump campaign, itself, also used Custom Audience’s “diabolical little brother,” Lookalike Audiences, to target people that “look like” their custom audiences, based on their online habits.[34] If these tools remain available to advertisers in future elections, it is likely that disinformation advertisers will use them in the future as well.

Russia also deploys tens of thousands of “sock puppets,” trolls, cyborgs, and bots to amplify and distribute their messages. Mass posting causes hashtags to trend, amplifying the bots’ messages.[35] Social media users can easily build a large social media following using cheap third-party services to promote their Twitter or Facebook accounts.[36] Helping distribute the propaganda are so-called “useful idiots,” American social media users who unwittingly support the Russian disinformation campaign by reacting to, commenting on, and sharing the sensational stories with their social media networks.[37]

There is spending at many steps of this process, including in salaries and production costs to make the content in the first place.[38] Some of this spending triggers the existing rules. Once aggregate expenditures reach the threshold to trigger registration, the advertiser is subject to regulations like any other group regulated by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). While communications distributed on the Internet for free are generally exempt from FEC regulations, many political ads—including many disinformation ads—are placed into our newsfeeds for a fee and, therefore, are subject to regulation under existing rules.[39] We also know that some of the advertisers violated the ban on foreign expenditures in connection with a U.S. election because they were paid for by foreign sources, providing another example of existing rules applying to disinformation ads.[40] Disaggregated ads and audiences, disappearing ads, and other difficulties would complicate enforcement efforts, even for a motivated agency. The problem is data availability to establish the fact of the violation and facilitate enforcement. Therefore, at a minimum, effective enforcement of existing rules requires retaining data and advertising content. And in order to allow groups to counter disinformation against them or their preferred candidates, we must also retain the audience targeting information, which we discuss in Part IV.

* * *

Media organizations are exempt from campaign finance regulations. Even if we are correct that “fake news” is better thought of as advertising, is it also “news” that should be exempted from the rules? The FEC lacks a coherent regulatory approach to implementing the Federal Election Campaign Act’s press (or “media”) exemption from campaign finance regulation.[41] The exemption allows legitimate media sources to avoid registration with the FEC and compliance with campaign finance regulations. The Commission walks a tightrope in interpreting the exemption. If it defines “press” too broadly, the exemption will swallow the statute and allow all advertisers to claim exemptions as “press entities.” With an overly narrow definition, however, the FEC would run afoul of the First Amendment by burdening the speech of legitimate news media.[42]

In determining whether an item should be subject to the press exemption, the FEC asks whether the entity is “a press entity,” and “whether [it] is acting in its ‘legitimate press function.’”[43] To determine whether a publication or organization is a press entity, the FEC asks “whether the entity in question produces on a regular basis a program that disseminates news stories, commentary, and/or editorials.”[44] When analyzing whether a press entity is acting “in its legitimate press function,” the FEC looks at “(1) whether the press entity’s materials are available to the general public, and (2) whether the materials are comparable in form to those ordinarily issued by the press entity.”[45] The Commission does not analyze whether the materials are produced by trained journalists, whether the organization employs a fact checker or conducts fact checking functions, or any other typical indicia of a legitimate media organization. As such, the test may be too lax: because it does not consider indicia of traditional journalism when granting the exemption, the Russian government propaganda outlet, Russia Today, was deemed a “legitimate press entity” by the FEC.[46]

Even under this minimalist test, the FEC would not consider much of the disinformation on social media to be the product of a “press entity.”[47] Take the Denver Guardian as an example. It existed only briefly before running a story about a murder-suicide committed by “an FBI agent believed to be responsible for the latest [DNC] email leaks.”[48] Its registered address is actually a parking lot.[49] The site had ads, Denver’s weather, and no more than two news stories during its entire existence.[50] Similarly, Facebook Pages that disseminated content and memes, like the “Blacktivist” page, would not be considered press entities. They were created in the months before the election and claimed to be activists, not journalists.[51]

B.  How Disinformation Can Weaken Democracy

Lack of transparency for online political advertising pre-dates the 2016 election, but the disinformation attacks have given the problem new urgency. Disinformation attacks threaten democracy, because:

[F]actual knowledge about politics is a critical component of citizenship, one that is essential if citizens are to discern their real interests and take effective advantage of the civic opportunities afforded them. . . . [K]nowledge is a keystone to other civic requisites. In the absence of adequate information neither passion nor reason is likely to lead to decisions that reflect the real interests of the public.[52]

Disinformation advertising works like other kinds of propaganda, by sowing doubt about institutions.[53] Here, the propaganda uses a fake media source to undermine trust in the media. The flood of false, hyperbolic, repetitive, and divisive information is difficult for its viewers to resist over time and can distort the information environment.[54] Voters are left trying to select the candidate that is right for them, or to form opinions about policy, in the face of a “media fire hose which has diluted trusted sources of information . . . .”[55] As Tim Wu explains, “[w]hen listeners have highly limited bandwidth to devote to any given issue, they will rarely dig deeply, and they are less likely to hear dissenting opinions. In such an environment, [information] flooding can be just as effective as more traditional forms of censorship.”[56]

Scholars have argued that an informed electorate is a constitutional value and that we should recognize a canon of “effective accountability” which relies upon an informed electorate.[57] Many voters are poorly informed about the candidates and issues on the ballot. Most also lack a basic understandings of government structure and policies.[58] Indeed, the “limited effects” found by Alcott and Gentzkow of disinformation in the 2016 election may be floor effects that result from the already low level of information among the electorate.[59] Of course, uninformed voters are not unteachable: some studies show that providing voters with information increases voter competence, or their ability to vote in line with their preferences.[60] More generally, voters have informational workarounds. They use heuristics, or informational shortcuts, to help them reach a decision.[61] Uninformed voters can also take cues from elites they trust. If the cues from elites, or the information they provide, are disinformative, voters are left worse off than if they had not paid attention in the first place. Corrections to disinformation do not help much, either. It is hard to “un-ring the bell” of misinformation—the effects of misinformation remain even after corrections are issued and even when they are issued right away.[62] Moreover, corrections can be misremembered and serve to further entrench the faulty information.[63]

Disinformation campaigns share a targeting strategy with more run-of-the-mill political advertising on social media: microtargeting. Microtargeting small groups of voters with content that appeals to their pre-existing biases can deepen the democratic problem by subdividing the electorate, creating an endless number of potential cleavages among voters. As Elmendorf and Wood warn:

[I]t seems reasonable to fear that as broad, public appeals to the common good and national identity are supplanted by microtargeted appeals to the idiosyncratic beliefs, preferences, and prejudices of individual voters, voters will come to think of politics as less a common project than an occasion for expressing and affirming their narrow identities and interests. . . . Voters with out-of-the-mainstream and even abhorrent beliefs (such as overt racism) may find their beliefs legitimated and reinforced by micro-targeted messaging.[64]

Microtargeting stands to fragment the electorate into countless groups. When disinformation is microtargeted, each group has its own set of unreliable “facts” about our civic life. Moreover, because more extreme voters are more easily targeted for turnout or suppression, a vast, moderate center is left out of the discussion of issues surrounding the election, undermining a key First Amendment value that campaigning enhances the “marketplace of ideas.”

Online “echo chambers” are asymmetric and more common among conservatives than liberals.[65] Cass Sunstein proposes that a diversity of information and views are necessary to fix the problem of group polarization.[66] But diversifying one’s information is harder than it seems, even if voters want to do so. Platform algorithms are designed to give users more of what they have liked in the past, creating so-called “filter bubbles.”[67] The more frequently a social media user clicks on disinformation advertising or visits a hyperpartisan website, the more frequently similar content will be promoted on their Facebook newsfeeds or Internet search auto completions.[68]

In sum, disinformation hurts our democracy by undermining our faith in our institutions, weakening voter competence, and splintering the electorate. The nature of social media, with its affinity groups and algorithms, makes it likely that disinformation will echo among one’s social media networks and that countervailing information will not reach the user. The lack of transparency in online political advertising has long been a problem, and the recent disinformation attacks have made shedding light on online political advertising more urgent.

II.  First Amendment, Political Speech, and Choice of Regulator

Political opinions and information posted online are indisputably political speech and thus protected by the First Amendment. Activities that are less obviously “speech” have also been constitutionalized by courts deregulating in the name of the First Amendment. This includes political expenditures. The “constitutionalization” of campaign finance has implications for regulation of online political advertising, including disinformation advertising. Government regulation of online political advertising, including disinformation advertising, is on firmest constitutional ground when it requires disclosure of who is speaking to whom, when, and about what. A lot of the remaining responsibility for reducing disinformation on social media falls to social media platforms. This is because doing so involves banning or restricting speakers or their speech—actions that would be unconstitutional for the government to require. Yet here’s the rub: however much the platforms claim they want to self-regulate, their short-term profit motives suggest platforms will be, at best, unreliable and inconsistent self-regulators.

Here, we explain the current state of play in First Amendment jurisprudence and discuss the merits of platform self-regulation and government regulation.

A.  Constitutional Framework for Campaign Advertising Regulation

First Amendment protections for political speech are strong in the United States, enhanced by conservative-libertarian rhetoric among First Amendment scholars.[69] Campaign finance cases analyze regulations differently depending on whether they ban speech or merely burden it in some way. Courts apply strict scrutiny to content regulation of political speech.[70] Several legislative attempts to regulate the content, amount, or source of political speech have met their demise under this standard.[71] In order to survive strict scrutiny, the government must show that a regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.

The Court has granted “compelling interest” status to a limited set of campaign and election-related interests that governments try to protect via regulation. Preserving fair and honest elections and preventing foreign influence in our elections are compelling government interests.[72] Courts have acknowledged that the government “indisputably” has a compelling interest[73] in protecting election integrity and have upheld narrowly-tailored government regulations of some kinds of speech around elections. For example, the Court has upheld restrictions on our right to political speech in physical proximity to an election place such as requiring a physical setback for political activities near polling places, and banning campaign signs and clothing that advocates for a candidate or initiative near people who are voting.[74] And in Bluman v. FEC, the Supreme Court voiced strong views that the government has a compelling interest in limiting direct campaign contributions by foreign nationals, though the language is somewhat uncertain about other involvement of foreign nationals.[75]

When it comes to the government’s interest in preventing fraud on the electorate, the Court has stopped short of calling the interest “compelling,” saying that it “carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large.”[76] Nevertheless, given the existing case law permitting restrictions in space, if not yet time (campaign season), the possibility remains open (though admittedly quite distant) that a narrowly-tailored prohibition on fraudulent online political speech could survive constitutional scrutiny where prior prohibitions on fraudulent speech have failed.[77] In the meantime, the Court has said that the answer to false speech is not a blanket rule either allowing or prohibiting censorship. Rather, the answer to false speech is counter-speech.[78]

Where government regulation of political speech falls short of a ban or a limit, as is the case with campaign finance disclosure and disclaimer regulations, it is subject to exacting scrutiny. To survive exacting scrutiny, the government must identify an overriding[79] or sufficiently important[80] government interest, which is substantially related,[81] or even narrowly tailored,[82] to meet it.[83] The primary government interest supported by the disclosure regulations the Court upheld in Citizens United, McConnell, and Buckley, is the “informational benefit,” which is about improving voter competence by “[e]nabling the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”[84]

The Buckley Court fleshed out the assumption, saying, “[d]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office.”[85] It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.[86]

Social science findings support the Buckley court’s hypothesis that disclosure informs voters. In a series of experiments, Dowling and Wichowsky have shown that campaign finance transparency affects voter opinion.[87] Adam Bonica has shown, using campaign finance data from decades of elections and legislator voting records at the state and federal level, that campaign finance contributions are as strong a predictor of legislative behavior—as informative, in other words—as incumbent legislators’ prior votes.[88] We also have evidence that voters demand disclosure and learn from a group or candidate’s decision to not disclose.[89]

While there is little judicial guidance on the constitutionality of government actions we propose in Part IV, the courts should uphold government efforts to educate voters and social media users about disinformation and fact-checking. Similarly, the courts would likely uphold a regulation requiring platforms to provide an opt-in or opt-out system allowing social media users to control whether they view content previously flagged as false.[90]

* * *

Under the existing jurisprudential framework, government’s main involvement to combat disinformation advertising will be related to transparency. But it may be time to re-visit the foundations of our First Amendment jurisprudence. The cases fleshing out First Amendment protection of political speech are a relatively late addition to our constitutional jurisprudence, and like all law, they were created in a specific historical context.[91] The jurisprudence developed at a time when listeners were plentiful and speech less so. Recent Supreme Court majorities have interpreted the First Amendment to protect speakers, not listeners. Our transparency proposals fit this existing framework comfortably. But should government be able to do more to protect listeners from the “flood” of disinformation advertising before elections?

The Internet platforms themselves lack a coherent theory of the First Amendment.[92] Platforms are not merely a venue for debates in the “marketplace of ideas,” in which truth can eventually win out. The truth stood little chance against the volume of disinformation advertising and other false political messaging that flooded the “marketplace” in the weeks leading up to the 2016 election.[93] Nor are the platforms exclusively supportive of speakers’ personal autonomy to say whatever they want—another theory of the First Amendment. Terms of service for even the most libertarian platforms forbid behavior that is offensive, despite not being illegal. Platform users are speakers and listeners; and platforms should want to balance their interests. Unfortunately, only speakers pay platforms for their services, leading platforms to cater their terms of service to speakers rather than listeners. The platforms also have not taken a collectivist, or deliberation-enhancing approach to speech on their platforms, under a theory that the First Amendment should promote political engagement and public discourse.[94] At best, they have adopted an inconsistent amalgam of these ideas.[95]

As Volokh explains, with the advent of “cheap speech” online, intermediaries are weakened.[96] Speakers, freed from editorial gatekeeping, have become less trustworthy. Listeners are better able to select speakers that affirm, rather than challenge, their ideologies; and political advertisers are better able to target them “to make arguments to small groups that they would rather not make to the public at large.”[97] Tim Wu argues that First Amendment jurisprudence should adapt to our current conditions, in which speakers are plentiful and listeners receive so much messaging that it is harder for speakers to “break through” than ever.[98] In the age of cheap speech, the flood of disinformation advertising distributed by bots works to dilute human political speech, biasing the playing field in favor of machine-generated echoes of highly amplified, reckless, or even malevolent, speakers. Policing non-human speakers would help to promote a “robust speech environment surrounding matters of public concern.”[99] This collectivist-oriented shift would allow for government to at least backstop the platforms in their efforts to root out disinformation advertising.

Like Hasen, we see that a headwind may be building against government regulation requiring transparency of online political advertisements, even where the regulation would stop disinformation.[100] Nevertheless, prior libertarian efforts to build a case for a “substantial overbreadth” doctrine would be less likely to succeed in the wake of the 2016 election campaign. Regulators can now show demonstrable damage,[101] intent by meddlers (both foreign and domestic) to mislead and to affect elections, and involvement by two entities with little First Amendment protection: foreigners and non-humans.[102]

B.  Choice of Regulator

Negative market externalities justify regulation. Market externalities are often conceived of as negative effects from market activity on our environment or public health—say, from air pollution. Here, the market activities are platforms chasing profits without exercising gatekeeping or transparency responsibilities, and the externalities are costs borne by social media users in their roles as voters and participants in civic life. The platforms have so far not internalized the cost that their ad placement systems impose.

Here we discuss the relative merits of industry self-regulation and government regulation, each within their own constitutionally permissible spheres of action.

1.  Industry Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation

It is not a forgone conclusion that government must be the main regulator to address the disinformation advertising problem. Platforms have long resisted government regulation. Nate Persily has argued that “the principal regulator of political communication will not be a government agency but rather the internet portals themselves.”[103] The platforms are well situated, technologically, to minimize the amount of disinformation advertising that reaches their users and have already experienced some success in that regard.

Facebook and Twitter were the locations of most of the “attacks” in the 2016 election, so this Article focuses on them. After dragging their heels,[104] both companies have taken steps to prevent future attacks, actions that are also aimed at heading off government regulation. The platforms have also continued to experience disinformation attacks.

The problem with leaning on platforms to self-regulate is their conflicts of interest and political vulnerabilities that push them away from strong action to combat the problem. Platforms make money from advertising, including disinformation advertising. The more ads they sell, the more content that is promoted on their platforms, the scarcer the space for ads, and the more they can charge per ad. The more users that click through on any pay-per-click ad, the higher the platforms’ ad revenues. Disinformation advertising headlines are refined to attract the most clicks, accruing money for the platforms in the process. The presence of bots and other non-human accounts inflates the number of users on the platforms, increasing the amount they can charge to sell ads to all users, not just to foreign interlopers in our democracy. While bots and disinformation advertising can degrade the user experience and damage long-term revenues of the platforms, their short-term bottom line increases because of advertising and inflated user counts.

Platforms are also politically vulnerable. After Mark Zuckerberg initially announced the self-regulatory measures Facebook plans to implement, within a week, he had softened his stance and had begun to “both-sides” the issue, saying “[b]oth sides are upset about ideas and content they don’t like.”[105] Professor Zeynep Tufekci, who researches online disinformation and authoritarianism, was quick to point out that his reaction reflected a common fear of social media companies: that they be depicted as “anti-conservative.”[106] In other words, the social media companies will feel pressured to over-correct: even though the disinformation advertising that currently circulates online is overwhelmingly anti-liberal or pro-conservative, the political vulnerability of the platforms means that they will under-address the problem. Their political vulnerability leads them to be an unreliable self-regulator.

To the extent that the platforms do self-regulate, their current efforts are still far from the typical model of industry self-regulation or co-regulation. Industry self-regulation requires an industry-level organization that regulates its members by setting rules and standards about how they should conduct their business.[107] Industry self-regulation is almost never “pure” self-regulation, but involves a nexus to a government co-regulator. Government agencies provide legal backstops to the self-regulation negotiated by industry participants, along with imposition of civil or criminal penalties on violators.[108] Co-regulation stands the best chance of success when certain conditions exist. Most importantly, industry actors must be committed to the purpose of the regulation.[109] The government must also be able to extract information from industry—here, the platforms—as to how the self-regulation efforts are succeeding. The state requires both “expertise and capacity to assess the performance of nongovernmental regulators; and those nongovernmental regulators must face a credible threat that their public overseers will assume regulatory jurisdiction if they do not meet their obligations.”[110]

An analogy to co-regulation by an industry group closely related to the issue at hand illustrates industry self-regulation with government backstops. The Digital Advertising Alliance runs an opt-out program from online advertisements based on cookie-tracking.[111] The industry enforcement process consists of confidential review of complaints by a committee, followed by board-level censure, membership suspension or expulsion, referral to the Federal Trade Commission or law enforcement, and publicity for non-compliance.[112] By comparison, the platforms’ initial offerings to address disinformation advertising are paltry. It took Facebook over a year to even suggest it would reach out to other companies to “share information on bad actors and make sure they stay off all platforms.”[113] We are a long way from effective and comprehensive industry self-regulation or co-regulation. Therefore, we must consider ways the government can constitutionally, and effectively, regulate in this area.

2.  Government Regulation

Government regulation is coordination-facilitating and symbolically important. It facilitates coordination between industry members in mundane, but important, ways. For example, government can require platforms to collect information and provide it to the government or directly to the public in a uniform format. Standardized reporting allows the public, watchdog groups, journalists, and scholars to compare across platforms and over time in their data analysis. Moreover, shared information across platforms would be useful for platforms wanting to ban identifiable bad-actors who use the same accounts to buy, place, and promote ads. Government regulations also facilitate coordination through disclosure and audits to ensure compliance.

Government action in the realm of online political advertising is also symbolically important. In areas of national security and elections, signaling matters. The fact that our policymakers have been so quiet in the face of disinformation advertising and multiple strong statements by national security experts sends important signals to the attackers and the public. The attackers learn that they may continue with impunity. The public may perceive that government does not take the attacks seriously.

Government regulation also matters because law has expressive value.[114] Law itself has special gravity, and adopting a policy into law signals the importance of the policy to the government. Codifying a policy can affect citizen expectations and behavior.[115] It also signals that all members of a regulated industry must play by the same rules, an important rule-of-law value. In deciding on a regulatory approach, policymakers should keep in mind that

[p]olicy choices do not just bring about certain immediate material consequences; they also will be understood, at times, to be important for what they reflect about various value commitments—about which values take priority over others, or how various values are best understood. Both the material consequences and the expressive consequences of policy choices are appropriate concerns for policymakers.[116]

Therefore, even in areas of regulation where the industry could self-regulate (or co-regulate with government), sometimes the government should still act to signal its seriousness in protecting important values.

Government is constitutionally prohibited from anything resembling censorship, and moreover, the platforms are in a better position to experiment with interventions that address the disinformation problem head-on. Nevertheless, where, as here, the platforms’ incentives and the public’s social welfare are misaligned in a way that would prevent the platforms from self-regulating (or prevent them from credibly committing to a self-regulation scheme), government should do what it can within constitutional limits, to help re-align actors’ incentives.

All of this political disinformation flooded into social media at a time when the FEC lacked an effective framework for regulating any political advertising online, regardless of content. When political advertising occurs on television, cable, satellite, and radio, government disclosure requirements are comprehensive, and compliance is high. Due to gaps in the regulatory regime and clever lawyering by political attorneys, the same advertisement that would be subject to disclaimer and other transparency requirements on television can go without them if it instead appears online. We explain these gaps in Part III.

III.  Our Current, Insufficient, Regulatory Framework for Online Political Advertising

In the years leading up to the 2016 election, voters learned about the inadequacy of the federal campaign finance regulatory framework to handle the coming flood of money and advertising, both online and off. Insiders, such as former FEC lawyers quoted in the media, called campaign finance in the United States the Wild West and reported that [c]andidates and political groups are increasingly willing to push the limits . . . and the F.E.C.s inaction means that theres very little threat of getting caught.[117] All of the regulatory and institutional weaknesses that drove this kind of reporting are even more extreme in the narrow regulatory regime we consider here—that of online advertising. Online political advertising differs from older forms of political advertising in important ways and deserves a regulatory framework that accounts for the differences. First, it is more likely to be disguised as informational content, or “native.” Second, it is more likely to contain disinformation. Third, it is more likely to be untraceable by the public or candidates hoping to speak to the same audience. And fourth, it is much cheaper. All of these features matter to shaping a regulatory framework that helps the public trace the source of the (dis)information they view online and the government keep foreign influence out of our elections. In this Part, we describe the current regulatory framework and its gaps.

Public Communications.” Most FEC transparency requirements attach to “public communications.” Public communications include messages displayed on broadcast television, in print, on billboards, etc. It also includes all committee websites and emails whenever a committee sends more than 500 “substantially similar” messages.[118] Importantly, the current definition excludes Internet ads “except for communications placed for a fee on another person’s or entity’s website.”

Disclaimers. The law requires disclaimers for many kinds of political advertisements. They say “Paid for by the XYZ State Party Committee and authorized by the Sheridan for Congress Committee,” or “Paid for by the QRS Committee (www.QRScommittee.org) and not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee.”[119] On broadcast, cable, and satellite political messages, the FEC requires disclaimers on all public communications (1) made by a political committee, (2) expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a “clearly identified” candidate, or (3) soliciting contributions.[120] Disclaimers are also required on (4) electioneering communications, which are publicly distributed communications that refer to a “clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and are distributed sixty days or fewer before a general election or thirty days or fewer before a primary.[121] When we apply these four disclaimer triggers to Internet communications, regulatory coverage and disclaimer requirements decrease substantially. The first three triggers, for communications from political committees, containing express advocacy or solicitations, apply only where the communication is “placed for a fee.”[122] The fourth, electioneering communications, is completely inapplicable, because electioneering communications are defined to exclude political messaging on the Internet.[123]

As noted in Part I, in the weeks leading up to the election, well within the electioneering communications window, disinformation ads explicitly naming presidential candidates generated more attention than news articles from leading national newspapers. Among the disinformation ads that did not expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate, many still mentioned candidates by name or showed their images. Were they on broadcast, satellite, or cable, our regulations would have required disclaimers as electioneering communications. Because they were placed online, we do not know who paid for them.[124]

When we combine the current definition of political communications with the current disclaimer requirements, we end up with the following: A paid ad distributed via social media (on the Internet) must carry disclaimers like any other public communication if it advocates for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. However, anything posted for free, like a blog post, a Tweet, or even disinformation that one generates personally from their personal profile or page, requires no disclaimer, even if it mentions a candidate by name right before the election, and even if it is amplified by a paid “bot army” or purchased “shares” on Facebook.

Many communications placed online for a fee—which would otherwise require disclaimers—have not had them. Presumably, the advertiser is either willing to disregard the regulatory requirements, is spending below the threshold requiring regulatory compliance, or would claim an exemption under the “small items” or “impracticable” exceptions to disclaimer requirements.[125] The small items exception applies to communications on physical items, such as bumper stickers, buttons, and pens, which were considered too small to bear a disclaimer.[126] The impracticable exception applies to communications in skywriting, water towers, and clothing, where it would be too difficult to include a disclaimer.[127] However, applying these exceptions to political advertising would have been disingenuous. Because of landing pages on click-through political advertisements, it has never truly been impracticable for an advertiser to provide a disclaimer. They could always have provided one at the landing page. That fact did not stop platforms from asking the FEC whether the exceptions apply to character-limited ads on their platforms. In 2011, the FEC could not decide whether Facebook ads with fewer than 200 characters of text could qualify under either exception;[128] a 3-3 vote resulted that was long interpreted as an exemption.[129] The FEC has since clarified that a disclaimer is required, but they could not agree on the rationale.[130] The FEC has also recently failed to decide whether nonconnected political committees[131] may use Twitter without placing a disclaimer on their Twitter profiles.[132] This opinion gives the green light to groups that want to hide behind Twitter handles and not reveal even the group’s website or physical address.

Disclosure. In addition to gaps in our disclaimer requirements, our disclosure rules are also fraught with holes and exceptions that have led to untraceable money pumping through our elections.[133] Campaigns, party committees, and PACs must all submit regular reports to the FEC, disclosing their contributions and expenditures.[134] However, since Citizens United, over half a billion dollars has flowed through 501(c) tax-exempt non-profits, which are typically organized as 501(c)(4) or 501(c)(6) “social welfare” organizations, to either make independent expenditures or to support groups that do.[135] These “dark money” groups are not required to publicly disclose their donors.[136] Funds can be donated to 501(c)s by individuals, corporations (including LLCs), unions, and anyone seeking anonymity—including foreign sources. (Foreign spending “in connection with an election” is illegal, but would be easy to do via these avenues, as we discuss below.)[137]

The groups do disclose their contributions to the IRS. But with an audit rate of 1% for tax-exempt non-profits, the IRS is unlikely to investigate the sources behind donations to so-called “dark money” organizations, even where they use their resources to spread disinformation.[138] Congress has prohibited the Securities and Exchange Commission from using appropriated funds to draft or implement rules requiring the corporations it regulates to disclose political spending.[139]

Transaction-level disclosures are important. In order to aid enforcement on broadcast, cable, satellite, and radio ads, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) requires reporting of the financial details of a transaction purchasing an ad, as well as the station, time, and programming during which the ad ran. The ads themselves, while not required to be retained by broadcasters, are captured by the public in all the ways the public records live programming. There is currently no requirement at the federal level that online political ads or the data around their placement be retained, making enforcement virtually impossible.

Foreign influence. Some political disinformation ads may also violate the FEC’s ban on spending by foreign nationals “in connection with any federal, state, or local election in the United States” and making any disbursement for an electioneering communication.[140] The restriction was upheld in Bluman v. Federal Election Commission.[141] At least some disinformation ads violate the ban on foreign spending for independent expenditures. Independent expenditures advocate for the election or defeat of a “clearly identified candidate” in express terms.[142]

Of course, some disinformation ads are merely “issue ads.” They seek to influence voters by shifting public perception, but do not advocate for the election of or defeat of any particular candidate or even mention a candidate. Under our current regulatory framework, a hostile foreign government can disseminate divisive information about fraught social issues or spread disinformation about a candidate without violating American campaign finance law, even if they are placed right before the election.[143]

In sum, because of outdated loopholes, we face the reality that disinformation advertisements, which often mention or display candidate names and images and would be considered electioneering communications if placed elsewhere, are distributed online with no disclaimers, little disclosure, and, sometimes, with foreign money. Online advertising has become exponentially more important for political campaigns since the FEC adopted its outdated regulations in 2006, and it will become the most important way for politicians to communicate with voters in the very near future.[144] Excluding a large portion of online advertising from disclosure and disclaimer regulations is problematic, particularly in light of the studies reviewed in Part II suggesting that disclaimers and disclosures provide information that affects voter decisions, and the court’s longstanding belief that using disclosure to inform voters is a compelling government interest.

IV.  Constitutionally-Permissible Regulations to Address Disinformation Advertising

We now turn to our proposals. We focus on transparency, education, and “nudges” that government can constitutionally implement. The reforms we propose would reach any political advertising that is placed, promoted, or produced for a fee. Viral disinformation without paid shares or re-tweets, memes made by individuals at home for free and posted to personal social media sites, and similar low-cost and low-volume activity, would not be subject to the regulations we propose.

We recognize that defining which advertisements deserve regulation is a persistent and sticky problem in campaign finance regulation. Our definition has two main components: (1) cost and (2) intent to influence peoples’ votes. Political ads cost money to produce, post, or disseminate—including payments for microtargeting, any off-platform payments to “bot farms,” and paid “likes” and “shares” for distribution. Political ads also aim to influence elections. Evidence that an ad aims to influence the election, rather than merely discuss “issues” is a particularly thorny category. The current line between an ad aiming to influence the election and one merely discussing “issues” includes “express advocacy” or, within a certain window before the election, reference to a clearly identified candidate. This line is hard to police, and the window is meaningless in the online setting, in which an ad can persist over time.

An example may help illustrate the definitional challenge. Suppose that a group called “Liberals Against Forced Motherhood” has spent more than the minimum threshold on political advertising and is registered with the FEC. Consider three scenarios.

1. Suppose the group posts a meme online and pays Facebook to promote it in the newsfeeds of its followers. The text of the meme says, “Hands off our birth control!” With no other words or imagery, this would be considered an issue ad under the current federal rules, no matter when it runs, and would not require a disclaimer.

2. Now suppose the group posts the meme and pays Facebook to promote it in the newsfeeds of its followers, and the text of the meme overlays a photograph of a Republican presidential candidate. Under the current federal rules, that advertisement would not be subject to disclaimer requirements unless it ran right before the election, during the “electioneering communications” window, because the photograph shows a “clearly identified candidate.” Of course, given the nature of social media, it can be posted well before the “electioneering communications” window opens, and members of the group can continue sharing and circulating it, disclaimer-free, right before the election.

3. Finally, suppose the group posts a meme online and pays Facebook to promote it in the newsfeeds of its followers, and the text of the meme says “Hands off our birth control! Vote against Candidate X!” Under the current federal rules, this meme requires a disclaimer no matter when it is posted because it contains “express advocacy.”

Now change the facts. What if the meme is posted “for free” on the group’s Facebook Page, and fake Facebook users have been paid, off-platform, to share it? The group does not pay Facebook for promotion, but the ad circulates, nevertheless. The current federal rules have been interpreted in a way that would not require disclaimers on any of them. But we believe this interpretation, made in the days before bots and fake “shares,” should be updated to account for our new reality.

Finally, consider one more distributional change. Suppose now that, instead of paying Facebook to promote only to page subscribers, the group pays Facebook to promote the ad to anyone who “looks like” its subscribers and any women who are between the ages of 18–45, who have a college education, who are White, who “like” Planned Parenthood, and who live in swing states. Does this kind of micro-targeting turn the issue ad in the first scenario into a political ad? We think it does—particularly the “swing state” targeting. Even if disclaimers should not be required, the ad itself should be retained so that targeted users can know who is attempting to persuade them.

Before social media, most ads appeared on television, radio, or in print. They were fewer in number, limited in time, and targeted large groups of the electorate. In that context, it was easier to police the line between electioneering advertising and issue speech. In light of the realities and challenges of political advertising online, issue speech has become so politicized and so microtargeted that we need to have a national conversation on where to draw the line.

Our proposal follows. It is modest, it is constitutional, and it will not solve the problem of online disinformation. It is, however, a necessary and important step in the right direction. After discussing our proposal, we briefly provide self-regulatory considerations for platforms wanting to take real steps to reduce the quantity of disinformation advertising on their platforms.

A.  Improve Transparency

As more political advertising moves online, without regulatory changes, the likelihood that voters see untraceable ads increases. Without transparency, we cannot “follow the money” behind political advertising we see online. Most relevant to the world of disinformation advertising, we cannot know how much of the messaging we see online is foreign-funded or distributed. It took almost a year for Facebook to make public some of the foreign-funded ads it displayed to its users. If online advertising, including disinformation advertising, were subject to transparency regulations, we would have seen these funding sources in real time.

In order to subject online political advertising to disclaimer and disclosure requirements, the groups producing large amounts of it should be required to register with election administrators, just as they do when making political expenditures offline.[145] A regulation adopting disclosure and disclaimer rules for online advertisements would be a step in the right direction. We also propose a repository to facilitate real-time transparency of all online political ads as well as ex post enforcement of campaign finance rules. In this Section, we discuss three transparency-related regulatory changes for online political advertising.

1.  Require Platforms to Keep and Disclose all Political Communications and Audiences

Government should require political advertisers on large social medial platforms to save and post every version of every political communication placed online, whether video, print, or image, and whether placed “for a fee” or not. The communications should be placed on a dedicated and easy-to-locate page on the campaign’s or group’s website or user page on the platform, as well as on a dedicated page created by the platform. The communications should be stored in their entirety, and they should be posted along with a uniform set of data stored in a uniform format for easy analysis and comparison across campaigns, across platforms, and over time. The FEC should also retain this data, for longer term storage, and to ensure that it exists even when platforms change or cease to operate.

In addition to the communication itself, the online political advertising repository should contain the following data: when the communications ran; how much they cost to place and promote; candidates to which the communications refer; contested seat/issues mentioned; targeting criteria used; number of people targeted; and a platform-provided Audience identifier (“Audience ID”). For example, if a communication was aimed at women Facebook has identified as Democrats (from their profile pages), who “like” the show “Blackish” and also “like” Black Lives Matter, that information should be disclosed with the communication. Similarly, if the advertiser used outside consultants or internal data to generate a list of names, including through Custom or Lookalike Audiences on Facebook or similar services on other platforms, the advertiser must provide an Audience ID that will enable groups to engage in “counter speech” to the same audience. The Audience ID will be linked within the platform to a list of user names, but the platform should not disclose the audience names to anyone but the FEC.

The repository we propose is simply an improved version of the Political File for television commercials. The design of the Political File is outdated,[146] and our political advertising repository will better serve our current technological abilities and democratic needs, with which political advertisers already comply, and which reveals their targets.[147] Of course, political advertisers will protest that this disclosure burdens their speech by requiring that they disclose their microtargeting strategies. The objection is weak, considering they reveal targets via the Political File already. Crucially, the Political File contains targeting information, because the broadcaster, time of day, and programming are all disclosed. A media company’s audience at a certain time of day for a certain program is a particular set of people the advertiser is targeting.

Consider an example to illustrate how television advertising already embeds audience information. When a campaign runs a television ad during an 8:30 p.m. airing of “Blackish” on the ABC affiliate in the St. Louis market—all of which is information that is disclosed in the Political File—the campaign’s targeting strategy is revealed.[148] Online targeting can be “narrower,” in that the communications can be targeted to a smaller group of people, but just because online targeting strategies are more precise does not grant the speakers more First Amendment protection. The size of the audience is irrelevant to the constitutional question of whether or not targeting criteria should be disclosed. If anything, communications targeting a narrower audience may be more damaging to civic values because they are aimed at suppressing or mobilizing voters, rather than making broad persuasive appeals. Narrow targeting may therefore deserve less, rather than more, constitutional protection. Finally, posting targeting criteria and Audience IDs for online ads facilitates counter speech in the same way that disclosure of the date, time, station, and program in which a television ad runs facilitates counter speech to the same audience.[149]

The repository is particularly helpful when it comes to enforcement. Advertisers peddling disinformation—particularly those located abroad—have little incentive to make truthful and timely disclosures and disclaimers. Penalties occur long after the election after all. The current enforcement mechanism is triggered with a complaint to the FEC. It is a purely reactive system, and it relies on a complainant actually seeing the offending content. The advertising repository we propose facilitates decentralized enforcement by allowing groups to flag disclaimer violations after they occur. It is therefore crucial that the repository hold communications for a reasonable length of time. Television stations and cable and satellite companies are required to maintain the Political File for two years. The Honest Ads Act, a Senate bill introduced in 2017—which calls for a repository—would require platforms to retain the communication for four years.[150] Facebook’s current advertising archive holds ads for seven years. Maintaining the repository for the duration of the campaign plus a reasonable amount of time post-campaign is important.[151]

It is also important that reporting be coordinated across all online platforms. Platforms and political advertisers must use a uniform reporting format for all advertisers and distributors to report their activity. Gone are the days of handwritten and scanned forms, like we see in the Political File. Platforms can offer repository reporting and storage as a service to ad buyers and distributors, and reporting can happen as soon as the ad begins to appear in users’ feeds. Regulators, researchers, civil society watchdogs, and data journalists can analyze the data, act based on it, and report to the public the current state of affairs in online political advertising. And yes, opposing campaigns can run counter-messaging based on it, just as they can with disclosures to the Political File for television.

These transparency requirements should also have the effect of reducing the incentives to produce disinformation advertising and other any divisive advertising microtargeted at small subsets of the population. Microtargeting is not, in itself, bad. But modern day campaigns are best able to target extreme voters. Microtargeting skews the demographics of the voting population away from the district itself and contributes to elite political ignorance about the political preferences of constituencies.[152] As individual microtargeting possibilities increase, campaigns and groups will want to give slightly different messages to different people. Indeed, one particular ad buy containing disinformation advertising (and paid for by Russians) was aimed in exactly this way, targeting people who had expressed interest in “LGBT community, black social issues, the Second Amendment, and Immigration.”[153] If advertisers are required to post every version of every ad on the same site, along with targeting information, voters could detect when a group is trying to “divide and conquer” parts of the electorate. The message will reach voters via informational intermediaries. Opposition researchers can use their opponents’ divisive strategies against them. Smart data analysts can create tools that voters can use to see what their newsfeed would look like with a different configuration of “likes” and information. A user who sees ads in favor of guns, against abortion, and in support of Republican candidates could use the tool to see how her feed would look if she lived in a different zip code, “liked” Planned Parenthood and Everytown, or identified herself as a Democrat on her profile. Knowing the kind of advertising (and disinformation) our fellow voters receive can help aid deliberation in democracy.[154]

i.  Triggering Conditions

Which online messages should be subject to transparency rules? Three, non-exclusive options are possible: (1) the traditional bright line rule of candidate or ballot initiative mentions; (2) a more-easily automated rule of identifying political content by targeting; and (3) classifying the advertisers as political or not, gating their access to the platforms for advertising buys, and requiring repository storage of everything they run. We think all three can be deployed together, where any ad that fits any of the three rules would be included in the repository.[155] Inclusion in the repository does not mean that disclaimers and disclosure are required. That is a separate determination to be made based on a loophole-free version of our existing regulations and described more fully in Section IV.C.

 a.  References to Candidates or Ballot Propositions

The cleanest regulatory line tracks the current regulatory requirements for disclaimers in other contexts: ask whether the ad advocates for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or ballot initiative; or whether the ad mentions or shows a candidate or proposition and airs within a certain specified time before the election. We believe an ad belongs in the repository if it mentions or shows a candidate or issue any time after a candidate declares her candidacy or the issue is approved for the ballot. Given that disinformation advertising preceded the 2016 election by more than a year, we believe this modest temporal expansion for electioneering communications is wise given the realities of campaigning. We also believe that tying the expansion to declarations of candidacy and ballot qualification—when campaigning heats up—helps its chances against a First Amendment challenge.[156] Our proposal is also gameable, encouraging groups to place as many ads as they can without repository capture before their preferred candidate declares, in hopes that they will still be circulating as the election approaches. Nevertheless, without more research into the realities of online political messaging over time, our proposal is as far as we think policymakers can confidently go within the bounds of the First Amendment.

Facebook already monitors ad content in order to minimize the amount that violates its terms of service.[157] It prohibits or restricts advertising for tobacco, drugs (illegal or prescription), weapons, adult content, “sensational content” (“[a]ds must not contain shocking, sensational, disrespectful, or excessively violent content”), misleading or false content, and many other categories that the platform already tries to identify and reject before it goes live as an advertisement. The advertising review process—until the post-2016 disinformation advertising political maelstrom—was entirely automated, though Facebook has begun to include humans in advertising review. Our broader point is that reviewing ads for mentions of candidates and political issues is not difficult, particularly with human involvement.[158]

As a back-up method, the platforms should require advertisers to indicate whether the ad mentions a candidate. The platforms can attach penalties (refuse to sell ad space, raise prices, temporarily suspend accounts, report to government regulators) on advertisers who lie about the content of their ads. A system that is based on ad content will require spot checks and a way for advertisers to object to their inclusion in the repository as well as for viewers to report whether an ad that should contain a disclaimer actually does.

 b.  Political Targeting Categories

Another triggering criteria would be easy for social media companies to automate. We can require ad disclaimers and inclusion in the repository when an ad is targeted at explicitly political groups or contains “suspect classes.” Targeting categories might include political parties; “likes” or “follows” of political parties, candidates, issues, or groups that have parties, candidates or issues in the group’s name (like “Texans for Hillary” or “Minnesotans Against Abortion”); a racial category combined with any other listed criteria; and other similar categories. Even if this is the only trigger, the likelihood that a consumer advertisement would be swept up in a repository requirement is probably slim, as consumer data is not very predictive of political persuasion and not very useful for campaigns.[159]

 c.  Identify Political Ad Content by the Speaker (and Know the Speaker)

Facebook has a political advertising sales and operations team—indeed, it has teams “specialized by political party, and charged with convincing deep-pocketed politicians that [Facebook does] have the kind of influence needed to alter the outcome of elections.”[160] There are teams assigned to campaigns for each major party. Antonio García Martínez, a former Facebook product manager who ran the targeted ads program, argues that Facebook is already set up to adopt a “know your customer” type approach, similar to those used in the banking sector to prevent money laundering. Platforms should be required to “log[] each and every candidate and SuperPAC that advertises on Facebook. No initial vetting means no right to political advertising.”[161] For the platforms, the “know your customer” approach is useful for creating a “gate” that allows platforms to avoid obvious foreign money and to intercept and stop foreign disinformation advertising in our elections. A similar intervention could require a U.S. bank account to purchase ads, which will not stop foreign intervention, but will ease enforcers in tracing the source of advertisements.[162]

Facebook does not currently gate political account creation from the beginning.[163] Political advertising is targeted in such a way that the platforms could identify Pages that attempt to circumvent the additional check on political content by passing off their advertising as commercial advertising. Subjecting political advertisers to a source check can be done by Facebook with little difficulty. In the interest of national security, government should require that the platforms report when an ad is obviously funded by a foreign source, in real time, or as soon as the platform becomes aware of it.

 

                            ii.  Limits to a Repository Requirement

The repository requirement cannot solve all challenges of online political advertising. We imagine a challenge to the scope of the repository—perhaps it is underinclusive. What is special about the online context—why not require a repository for offline messaging as well, such as mailers and print ads? Some cities, like Los Angeles, require that all campaign and independent expenditure communications be retained and disclosed, which includes any “message that conveys information or views in a scripted or reproduceable format, including but not limited to paper, audio, video, telephone, electronic, Internet, Web logs, and social media.”[164] Requiring retention and disclosure of printed communications is helpful and important, but it is less urgent than creating a repository for online ads, because printed materials do not disappear like online ads currently can. Enforcement of our disclosure, disclaimer, and substantive campaign finance rules for online political advertising is almost impossible without the repository.

An administrability concern lies in another game-able aspect of the current regulatory framework, and it should be updated for the age of social media and viral ads. Some ads are placed for free, but promoted via bots, sock puppets, and inauthentic social media users (machine or human). Their promotion “services” are designed to appear organic, and payment to secure the ad shares and re-tweets occurs off-platform. Platforms are now able to identify suspicious activity from accounts that have an outsized impact, so some of these faux-organic posts are detectible now.[165] Payments for ad promotion by humans and non-humans alike are important expenditures, and they should trigger reporting requirements once they reach a minimum threshold.[166] In brief, political ads that would otherwise be subject to disclaimers if they were placed for a “fee” under the current regulations, but which are placed for “free” and promoted via paid bots should contain disclaimers. They aren’t “free” content. This is only administratively difficult where the group making the payments is inclined to avoid reporting payments to services providing bots, trolls, and other inauthentic users in order to boost their messages. Nevertheless, its violation provides an important enforcement “hook” to reduce disinformation online.

iii.  Current Efforts to Aggregate Ads

Facebook is the most advanced of the platforms in its efforts to collect political communications, but its efforts still fall short of what its users deserve. In May 2018, Facebook posted an Archive of Ads with Political Content. The Archive discloses the Page that paid for the ad, all ads run by the Page, and the audience makeup, but not the targeting criteria.[167] While the Facebook’s Archive addresses several reforms we have requested publicly in the past eighteen months, their design falls short in several important ways.[168] First, because it does not require information about the true source of the communications, voters still do not know who is speaking to them. Rather, they know who paid to boost an ad into their feeds. Second, the Facebook Archive does not provide the targeting categories or an audience ID for a list of users that were targeted with the political communication. The Archive reveals age and gender distribution of the audience, as well as the state in which they reside, but those are certainly not the only targeting criteria used. For any given ad, the women and men of various ages were not targeted merely because of their age, sex, and location; they were targeted because of other information that Facebook knows about them, such as what issue-oriented groups or other candidates they like or follow on the platform. A candidate who is the subject of a disinformation campaign would not be able to speak to the same audience unless she spoke to the entire population in the geographic areas targeted by the disinformative campaign. This is no remedy for disinformation attacks on social media. Moreover, the First Amendment does not require this level of protection for disinformative political speech. Facebook should make targeting criteria plain, to enable counter speech. Third, the Archive affects only one corner of the vast world of social media, when we know industry-wide coordination is needed.

Looking around the industry, each platform has suggested its own “fixes,” all of which suffer the ills of not providing targeting criteria and not requiring information about the true source of the communication.[169] Moreover, the platforms’ proposals are not coordinated, but will create an overlapping web of platform-specific fixes. Voters want to know who is trying to influence them, and to accomplish this, they need one online “file” for all political communications, which is easily searchable, and which is divided into categories of who was targeted and for what reason.

The Honest Ads Act contains a rough description of a set of transparency requirements that would apply to any person or group spending more than $500 (aggregate) to make electioneering communications online and would require that the platform maintain a public file.[170] The current draft of the bill is vague on whether the system is disaggregated, like the FCC’s Political File, where users must search station-by-station and year by year. If the current proposal’s design is also disaggregated, then members of the public wanting to view the ads would be stymied by having to search advertiser-by-advertiser to find the ads they seek. This early design can be improved. First, disclosure should be standardized across platforms. Second, the $500 aggregate spending trigger is probably at the upper limit of what will be effective. It may be politically pragmatic to include a spending trigger, but the Constitution does not require one, and the Political File does not have one. Five-hundred dollars is well below the campaign contribution limit and the registration thresholds with the FEC, but it has enormous advertising reach on Facebook. A numerical example illustrates. Imagine a Super PAC called Vermonters for Bernie. Vermont has around 500,000 voting-aged residents. Suppose that 400,000 of them are on Facebook. For less than $4,000 and the current cost-per-impression price of less than a penny, the group could show all voting-age residents of Vermont the ad. Of course, a group would only target voters that it knew it wanted to turn out to vote or that it knew it wanted to suppress—in other words, a much smaller number than the 400,000 or so registered voters on Facebook.[171] For $250, an ad will have 25,000 “impressions,” appearing in the newsfeeds of 25,000 people.[172] Considering the last election came down to fewer than 80,000 voters in three states, we believe the threshold triggering regulation should be fairly low.[173] The platforms can also advise the advertisers of their obligation to register with and report to the FEC once they hit a certain threshold, to avoid a situation in which unsophisticated actors are swept up in the regulatory regime for very small expenditures.

2.  Close the Loophole for Disclaimers in Online Ads

Despite its recent embrace of it, Facebook has long opposed transparency in online political advertising. Political advertising placed “for free” is still political advertising, and the public has a right to know who paid for its creation or distribution.[174] To enforce disclaimer requirements, platforms can deputize users to report disclaimer violations, in the same way that the platforms allow users to report violations of the terms of service. They can also perform random spot-checks to help enforce the requirement (and deter attempts to circumvent it), by asking users after the ad is shown whether it contained a disclaimer.

The FEC is again feeling public pressure to close the loophole for disclaimers in online ads.[175] It held a hearing about online advertising disclaimers,[176] but given the political and institutional realities of that body in 2018 (with a bare quorum and inability to agree on many issues), it seems unlikely that the FEC itself will make much progress in the near term.

As for the content of disclaimers, at a minimum, the disclaimers should reveal the same information required when ads are run on television or radio.[177] Since Citizens United, legislators and activists have urged that disclaimers on all ads (online or not) contain the names of the top donors to the entity running the ad. This strikes us as reasonable, and political science research has shown aspects of these more detailed disclosures to be effective.[178]

3.  Eliminate Donor Anonymity for LLCs and 501(c) Organizations

Under our current disclosure and disclaimer framework, the public only sees the actual names of donors under certain circumstances, such as when the donors give to a campaign, party, SuperPAC, or other outside group subject to disclosure requirements. Even if the loophole for online advertising disclaimers is closed, the broader problem of LLC and 501(c) disclosure will remain. This loophole matters for disinformation advertising, because even if the disclaimer requirements are extended to online ads run and distributed by LLCs and 501(c) groups, voters cannot “follow the money” without extending disclosure requirements to corporations making independent expenditures.

Why does this matter? For starters, the holdings in Citizens United and SpeechNow combine to imply that limits on independent expenditures are unconstitutional. Mega donors to outside groups can—and do—seek anonymity by making their independent expenditures through either their own anonymous LLCs or through 501(c) groups.[179] Money is passed from group to group in a “daisy chain” of limited transparency.

We do not know what share of online ads is currently run by groups without disclosure requirements. The current legal regime means that there is no limit to the amount of political messaging that could come from anonymous sources. Moreover, corporate anonymity can hide foreign influence in our elections. Saving ads run by corporations in the repository without requiring disclosure of their funders truncates voters’ ability to follow the money to learn about candidates and policies that matter to them.

B.  “Nudge” and Educate Sharers and Viewers

We now turn our attention to ways the government can help reduce the spread of disinformation advertising. User education is paramount. Scholars call efforts to preempt disinformation via education “inoculation.” There are various successful forms of inoculation, such as educating users about the “potentially misleading effect of false-balance media coverage,”[180] preemptive warnings to people about tactics used to spread misinformation,[181] and even online games that teach the main strategies of disinformation.[182]

A simple education campaign on platforms can inoculate users, helping them learn how to avoid spreading disinformation. For example, users can be taught how to tighten their security settings and reminded not to interact with disinformation in their newsfeeds, because the algorithms promote content based on interactions with it. Whether this requirement would invite a challenge as “compelled speech” under normal circumstances, it seems unlikely that platforms would protest it in this political climate. On firmer constitutional ground, though much more expensively, the government could pay to place inoculating ads on the platforms.

Viewing less disinformation in the first place is important, because we are bad at recognizing and remembering corrections to false information. Disinformation, especially when repeated, persists in our minds. Users can view less disinformation if platforms provide an opt-out or opt-in system to viewing disinformation and viewing content from sources that have regularly spread disinformation.[183] An opt-out system for consumer and service advertising already exists. AdChoices, run by Digital Advertising Alliance, allows Internet users to opt out of being tracked by advertisers who are members of the alliance, who use “cookies” and tracking to present ads to Internet users based on previous internet activity. Default settings can be sticky.[184] For example, under the AdChoices program, only a small number of people actually opt out.[185] If government required platforms to default users to not view narrowly targeted political or issue ads, and instead platforms offered to users the choice to opt-in to viewing that content, low up-take would reduce the amount of disinformation that each viewer encounters. An opt-in (or out) system would reduce ad revenues for platforms selling political ads, but political ads are a miniscule part of platforms’ overall advertising revenue. As for the constitutionality of a government-imposed opt-in or opt-out requirement, there is no case directly on point.[186] Government action is not strictly required here, if platforms are willing to sacrifice a bit of profit. They can create an opt-in system voluntarily.

These interventions will not stop everyone who shares political disinformation. Some people are particularly motivated to share it. Partisan perceptual bias and motivated reasoning present additional challenges to efforts to convince people to stop spreading disinformation advertising.[187] Partisan perceptual bias is distortion of “actual-world information” in the direction of “preferred-world states,” which can occur when a fact has positive or negative implications for one’s party.[188] Motivated reasoning, observed here as directionally motivated reasoning, “leads people to seek out information that reinforces their preferences (i.e., confirmation bias), counterargue information that contradicts their preferences (i.e., disconfirmation bias), and view proattitudinal information as more convincing than counterattitudinal information (i.e., prior attitude effect).”[189] Partisan bias and motivated reasoning mean that it may be difficult to affect the utility calculations of people “under the sway” of disinformation that agrees with their preferred policy positions.[190] Some social media users do not care that the items they share on social media have been debunked by third-party fact checkers. Political scientists Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler have observed that corrections to factual misperceptions can backfire to the point that “corrections actually increase misperceptions” among the group whose ideology is threatened by the correction, an effect observed (so far) among those who describe themselves as “very conservative.”[191] In sum, our politics may be so group-based that users could happily circulate news with contested content as long as it supports their candidate.

Therefore, platforms may need to be very active to reduce sharing of disinformation. A one-time opt-in (or out) process would be a helpful start, but the amount of disinformation that persists may still be damaging to democracy. That brings us to general approaches that the platforms can use, which probably would not survive a constitutional challenge if the efforts were required by government regulators.

C.  Considerations for Platform Efforts to Reduce Disinformation

Disinformation is “sticky.” A series of papers by Nyhan and coauthors suggest that “political myths are extremely difficult to counter.”[192] Reducing the amount of disinformation that voters are subjected to is useful from a human cognition standpoint, and as we have argued, from the standpoint of a thriving democracy. After an early period of minimizing its role,[193] Facebook has begun to address its disinformation problem.[194] It has experimented with using third-party fact checkers to identify and label disinformation, with mixed results.[195] It has also experimented with offering “related” stories that serve as fact correctives, polling users on which news sources they trust most, and suppressing all news in its users’ newsfeeds.[196] Finally, it has begun to move away from including news in newsfeeds.[197] That is a move away from publishers, but not necessarily a move away from disinformation, since so much disinformation seems to have emerged from Pages set up by so-called astroturf groups[198] and amplifying fake media sites.

Three general considerations will help any private regulatory framework to be effective. First, any efforts to label and identify questionable (or trustworthy[199]) stories or sources should be consistent across platforms. All voters should be able to quickly identify untrustworthy content across platforms and trust that all platforms use the same standards to classify it. Second, the platforms should aim at incentives. They can do so in overt ways, such as Facebook’s plan to temporarily ban advertisers who repeatedly share disinformation advertising that has been marked by fact checkers as “false news.”[200] They can also aim at incentives in deeper ways, such as the way Facebook’s algorithm demotes ads that provide “low quality” experiences when users click through.[201] Third, the platforms can turn down the volume of disinformation advertising by enforcing their terms of service, which prohibit bots and “inauthentic likes.”[202]

D. A Note About Feasibility

As much as the social media companies argue that the best answer is self-regulation, a broader look around the world shows that social media companies comply with fairly tight regulations in other countries. Some of these regulations would not survive First Amendment muster or might not be otherwise desirable in the United States. Nevertheless, platform compliance with regulations elsewhere belies platforms’ claim that the U.S. government regulations would be overly-burdensome.

Consider several examples from European regulations. First, Germany passed a law that fines media platforms for failure to delete “illegal, racist or slanderous comments and posts within 24 hours of being notified to do so.”[203] Because disinformation ads are often slanderous, a lot of disinformation ads will expose the platforms to penalties if not removed. The fines are steep: up to €50 million ($57 million), and estimates are that it will cost the platforms around €530 million ($622 million) a year to increase monitoring to avoid fines.[204] Germany has apparently seen a decline in disinformation on Facebook since the law was implemented in summer 2017.[205]

In the Czech Republic, the government is particularly concerned about Russian efforts to destabilize their democracy. Its interior ministry has launched a Center Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats “tasked with identifying and countering fake news.”[206] Dozens of jurisdictions worldwide observe “election silence,” or a media blackout, in the time leading up to voting day, or during voting day itself.[207] These blackouts range from not allowing the mention of candidates aside from the fact that the candidate voted (France) to halting advertising except online and billboard advertising placed before the blackout period and not altered during it (Ontario, Canada).[208]

Many of these regulations would be considered government censorship beyond that which is tolerated for political speech in the United States. It is certainly true that autocratic leaders may use “combatting disinformation” as a convenient excuse for a crackdown on speech and expression. However, the broader point, for our purposes, is that social media platforms are subject to regulations worldwide and tolerate a good deal of regulation in order to enjoy the benefits of doing business in other countries. Therefore, they can certainly handle some government-imposed transparency requirements here in the United States.

V.  Task Assignment and Action Across Multiple Jurisdictions

Who should implement the government regulations? In this Part, we briefly survey existing federal regulator capabilities, as well as identify cities and states that have started to act in the absence of federal government regulation.

A.  Federal Agency Competencies and Task Assignment

Administrative agencies have a wide variety of missions, specializations, and clients.[209] The FEC’s core mission is to “protect the integrity of the federal campaign finance process by providing transparency and fairly enforcing and administering federal campaign finance laws.”[210] Its clients are comprised of voters (beneficiaries) and the candidates, parties, outside groups who finance messaging, and elected officials (regulated entities). Its position is complex because the regulated entities also control its funding. Perhaps as a result, the FEC’s mission statement is heavy on transparency and tepid on enforcement and administration. Nevertheless, it moves slowly, is gridlocked by partisan balance, and its skills are no match for sophisticated disinformation agents.

FEC enforcement is slow. By law, the FEC is a bipartisan agency and can have no more than three out of six commissioners from one political party. Partisan gridlock frequently prevents enforcement actions from progressing.[211] The FEC’s enforcement procedures require multiple rounds of voting: to proceed to an investigation; to allow the general counsel to conduct formal discovery and issue subpoenas;[212] to determine whether there is “probable cause” to believe a violation has occurred; and to litigate the matter in court if a settlement cannot be reached.[213] Resolving a matter can take years.

FEC suffers from partisan gridlock.[214] For a decade, Republican commissioners have resisted updating campaign finance laws and enforcing the existing ones.[215] Even as Facebook disclosed that Russian-linked trolls had purchased political ads on its platform during the 2016 election, the Republican FEC commissioners expressed worry that changing its policies would hinder “First Amendment rights to participate in the political process.”[216]

FEC’s jurisdiction and its employee skills do not match those needed to combat disinformation. It is charged with enforcing the ban on foreign contributions and expenditures, though its jurisdiction only extends to civil penalties.[217] Tracking down disinformation advertisers will require skills with money tracing. The FEC lawyers who conduct investigations are not expert in tracing money to its source using sophisticated computer-assisted tracing and data investigations. Even if it could escape partisan gridlock, the FEC is probably not the best fit for pursuing enforcement actions against disinformation advertising.

Our election security would be better served by placing investigation and enforcement capabilities in other agencies. One candidate is the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which has a core mission entirely related to financing, national security, and intelligence: “safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.”[218] Other candidates to aid in investigation and enforcement are the FBI’s Cyber Crimes Division and the FCC. The FCC is ostensibly the regulator of social media companies. They keep the Political File for television ads, but have shown no interest in regulating political advertising on social media.

B.  The Role of State and Local Government

Regulation occurs at all levels of government. Individual cities and states control their own elections and can—and do—regulate the financing of those elections. Some states have already regulated disclaimers for online ads, for example, to provide more transparency than the federal regulatory regime requires.[219] These state laws currently target the advertiser and not the platforms, but if the states are comfortable departing from the low bar set by the federal government in this realm, they should also be comfortable doing so to keep disinformation out of their state and local elections. In the same way that the platforms are already accustomed to dealing with multiple regulatory jurisdictions across the world, they can handle a diversity of regulations domestically. If an overarching regulatory framework that protects voters in all elections does not emerge soon, local and state governments will continue to create new frameworks to protect voters in their own elections from disinformation.[220]

As of this writing, the main state-level action has been in New York and Maryland. New York’s Democracy Protection Act requires disclosure of all online ads, advertiser verification and registration with the NY Board of Elections, and an online archive.[221] The State of Maryland has enacted legislation requiring the platforms to retain all ads and audiences.[222] The California legislature is considering a similar bill.[223] Washington State and the city of Seattle are enforcing a longstanding legal requirement that “commercial advertisers” disclose the “exact nature and extent” of ads, the “names and addresses” of ad purchasers, and specific payment details.[224] The Seattle enforcement body is interpreting the ordinance to require copies of the ads in question and information about their intended and actual audiences—in other words, Seattle is requiring a repository very similar to the one we recommend for all jurisdictions.[225] Los Angeles already requires candidates to store all political communications.[226] Along with Chris Elmendorf, we have urged the City of San Francisco to adopt our model.[227]

Conclusion

Fake news is not news; it is native advertising to spread disinformation, and it belongs to the broader category of “disinformation advertising.” We have proposed a menu of ways for government to regulate online political advertising, including disinformation advertising. We believe that signaling matters and that the government must act, rather standing by while Facebook slowly comes around to partial self-regulation and attempts to drag a couple of its competitors along. The platforms have too many conflicts of interest and are too politically vulnerable to be trusted to carry out comprehensive self-regulation. Within the constraints of the First Amendment, the government must regulate, and while the jurisprudence may need updating in light of the rapid change in our communications, our proposed regulations should pass muster under the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence.

Most of what scholars have studied and courts assume about the effects of campaign finance regulations developed with “offline” political advertisements as the motivating example. The underlying behavioral expectations around regulating political advertising online should hold in a broad sense, but the 2016 election drove home four features of online advertising that distinguish it from television advertising. Online political advertising is more likely to be native advertising, more likely to contain disinformation, more likely to be untraceable (preventing counter-speech), and much cheaper. Our current regulatory framework is insufficient to fully address disinformation advertising online.

Government must extend and update existing campaign finance transparency regulations for use online. Our proposals will facilitate enforcement, improve voter competence, and facilitate counter-speech. They have the ancillary benefit of reducing the attractiveness of online political microtargeting. It defies logic that political ads run on television, cable, and radio, and are accessible to the public long after they run, but we have such large transparency deficits when it comes to online political advertising.

Whether government can constitutionally require platforms to inoculate users or provide opt-in and opt-out regimes are both open questions under the First Amendment. Of course, nothing (except their financial conflict of interest) is preventing the platforms from instituting these reforms without being required to by government. Direct content regulation should under no circumstances be performed or required by the government. If the platforms are unable or unwilling to reduce disinformation advertising in these ways, government cannot step in.

Democracy in the United States is at a crucial point. A foreign regime attempted to destabilize our democracy using disinformation, and their attacks are ongoing. Opportunists, foreign and domestic, are also producing political disinformation to make a quick buck. Transparency for online political advertising will shed light on a dark process and enable enforcement against people attempting to sow conflict and discord.

 

APPENDIX

Since we finalized this Article, the platforms have continued to battle political disinformation. None has provided audience identifiers to enable counter speech. Nor have they joined together or formed a co-regulatory arrangement with the government. Some are attempting to “nudge” users, but none has provided an opt-in or opt-out for narrowly-targeted political content. As it stands, without co-regulation or comprehensive industry self-regulation, any positive reforms they make may be changed at any time, with no accountability.

 


[*] *.. Associate Professor of Law, Political Science, and Public Policy at University of Southern California (awood@law.usc.edu).

[†] †.. Senior Fellow, Maplight Digital Deception Project and former Chair of the Federal Election Commission and California Fair Political Practices Commission. This article has benefited from insights from Rebecca Brown, Chris Elmendorf, and Rick Hasen. Daniel Brovman, Samantha Hay, Justin Mello, Brandon Thompson, and Caroline Yoon provided fantastic research assistance. Teresa Delgado and Alex Manzanares joyfully created the time and space required to focus on the project. We also appreciate the following students for sharing their seminar papers from Wood’s Money in Politics class as we built the early drafts of this project: Oliver Wu, Sean Stratford-Jones, Mei Tuggle, Lauren Fishelman, Adrian Mahistede, and Edward Prouty.               Irina Dykhne’s seminar paper-turned-note on native political advertising was particularly influential for this piece, and we are grateful to her for her thoughts on our drafts.

 [1]. Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. Econ. Persp. 211, 227 (2017).

 [2]. Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 27 (2017) (statement of Peter Doran, Executive Vice President, Center for European Policy Analysis).

 [3]. Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 72–76 (2017) (statement of J. Alex Halderman, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan). See also id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Mark Warner); id. at 17 (statement of Bill Priestap, Asst. Dir. Counterintelligence Div.).

 [4]. See, e.g., Homeland Security Threats, C-SPAN (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.c-span.org
/video/?434411-1/senior-officials-testify-homeland-security-threats (statement of Sen. James Lankford, Member, S. Comm. on Intelligence); Devlin Barrett, Lawmaker: Russian Trolls Trying to Sow Discord in NFL Kneeling Debate, Wash. Post (Sept. 27, 2017), http://wapo.st/2xeZkQY.

 [5]. Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel I: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 30–42 (2017) (statement of Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute).

 [6]. Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign (Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf; Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck & Erik C. Nisbet, Fake News Did Have a Significant Impact on the Vote in the 2016 Election: Original Full-Length Version with Methodological Appendix (2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://u.osu.edu/cnep/files/2015/03/Fake-News-Piece-for-The-Conversation-with-methodological-appendix-11d0ni9.pdf.

 [7]. Chris J. Vargo, Lei Guo & Michelle A. Amazeen, The Agenda-Setting Power of Fake News: A Big Data Analysis of the Online Media Landscape from 2014 to 2016, 20 New Media & Soc’y 2028, 2028 (2018).

 [8]. See, e.g., Mark Verstraete et al., Identifying and Countering Fake News 22–24 (Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 17-15, Aug. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3007971 (proposing a re-interpretation of section 230 of the Common Decency Act).

 [9]. See, for example, the Trust Project’s standardized disclosures that provide clarity on a news organization’s ethics. Sally Lehrman, What People Really Want from News Organizations, Atlantic (May 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/what-people-really-want-from-news-organizations/526902.

 [10]. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy) 28 First Amend. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3017598; Nathaniel Persily, The Campaign Revolution Will Not Be Televised, Am. Int. (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/10/the-campaign-revolution-will-not-be-televised.

 [11]. Tim Wu, Knight First Amend. Inst., Emerging Threats: Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 11 (2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats
%20Tim%20Wu%20Is%20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf.

 [12]. Anders Åslund, Regulate Social Media—Just Like Other Media, The Hill (Oct. 5, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/354006-regulate-social-media-just-like-other-media.

 [13]. Jonathan Taplin, Is It Time to Break Up Google?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 22, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2p7Emhp.

 [14]. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012) (discussing contributions and donations by foreign nationals); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2017) (prohibiting contributions, donations, expenditures, independent expenditures, and disbursements by foreign nationals).

 [15]. Michael Gilbert’s work points out that there is a tradeoff between the loss of information from speech that may be “chilled” by disclosure and the loss of information where disclosure is unavailable. See Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 1847, 1858–61, 1866–69 (2013). Chilling and informational effects are difficult to measure. Our best estimates of chilling are that the effect is negligible. The information benefit from voters using heuristics is measurable and should outweigh any chilling effect, though no study has attempted to simultaneously measure both at the same time. See generally Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. (forthcoming Oct. 2018), https://www-annualreviews-org.libproxy1.usc.edu/doi
/pdf/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113428 [hereinafter Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure] (highlighting various opportunities to expand the literature on campaign finance disclosure).

 [16]. See Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 1, at 213.

 [17]. See generally, e.g., id. at 211–36.

 [18]. See Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, RAND Corp., The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It 7 (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html (summarizing literature in experimental psychology).

 [19].  To our knowledge, the first law review publication noting the potential legal issues involved in native political advertising online is the award-winning student note by Irina Dykhne. See generally Irina Dykhne, Note, Persuasive or Deceptive? Native Advertising in Political Campaigns, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (2018).

 [20]. See Adam Entous, Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Russian Operatives Used Facebook Ads to Exploit Divisions Over Black Lives Matter and Muslims, Wash. Post (Sept. 25, 2017), http://wapo.st/2fM3sNh?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.dbb227bc4754.

 [21]. Indictment ¶ 6, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477. Ads aimed at sowing division and not necessarily mentioning candidates would be more akin to issue advertising than campaign advertising or electioneering communications. Issue advertising is subject to fewer disclosure requirements, generally.

 [22]. See id. 46.

 [23]. Eric Lubbers, The Man Behind Denver Guardian (and Many Other Fake News Websites) Is a Registered Democrat from California, Denver Post (Nov. 24, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/23/the-man-behind-denver-guardian.

 [24]. The Alliance for Securing Democracy continues to track Russian social media activity in the United States. See GMF Alliance for Securing Democracy https://dashboard.securingdemocracy
.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). See also Molly K. McKew, How Twitter Bots and Trump Fans Made #ReleaseTheMemo Go Viral, Politico (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018
/02/04/trump-twitter-russians-release-the-memo-216935.

 [25]. Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Elections: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Sen. Richard Burr, Chair, Sen. Intelligence Comm.); Craig Timberg, Russian Propaganda May Have Been Shared Hundreds of Millions of Times, New Research Says, Wash. Post (Oct. 5, 2017), http://wapo.st/2y279rP?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term
=.e611f39c610e (citing Jonathan Albright, Itemized Posts and Historical Engagement—6 Now-Closed FB Pages, Tableau, https://public.tableau.com/profile/d1gi#!/vizhome/FB4/TotalReachbyPage (last updated Oct. 5, 2017)).

 [26]. Young Mie Kim et al., The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind Divisive Issue Campaigns on Facebook, Pol. Comm. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 9), https://doi.org/10.1080
/10584609.2018.1476425

 [27]. A group is coded as “suspicious” if its page was taken down by Facebook because it was linked to Russian ads or the Internet Research Agency, if its website “exists but shows little activity since Election Day and no information about the group exists elsewhere,” or if its page is accessible, but there is no other information online about the group. Id. at 11. The Russian groups, which comprised 8.3% of total groups running ads over the time period, were identified as such by Facebook and the House Intelligence Committee. Id.

 [28]. The authors define these as groups that have not registered with the National Center for Charitable Statistics, GuideStar, or the FEC. Id.

 [29]. These groups regularly produce “news,” are “unaffiliated with any existing non-news groups such as a nonprofit,” have “little self-identification with a group,” and are “often identified by a fact-check (e.g., PolitiFact, Factcheck.org, Snopes, Media Bias/Fact Check) or media watchdog organization (e.g., Media Matters for America) as a group generating false information (so called ‘fake news’).” Id. at 12.

 [30]. See Tess Townsend, Why Political Ads Are Regulated but Fake News on Facebook Isn’t, Inc. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/facebook-fake-news-political-ads.html.

 [31]. How to Boost Your Posts, Facebook Business, https://www.facebook.com/business/a
/online-sales/promoted-posts (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). See also Townsend, supra note 30.

 [32]. Elizabeth Dwoskin et al., Russians Took a Page from Corporate America by Using Facebook Tool to ID and Influence Voters, Wash. Post (Oct. 2, 2017), http://wapo.st/2xPIDZ6.

 [33]. Id. Facebook reported that only 1% of the ads they turned over to Congress from the 2016 election used Custom Audiences. Elliot Schrage, Hard Questions: Russian Ads Delivered to Congress, Facebook Newsroom (Oct. 2, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/hard-questions-russian-ads-delivered-to-congress. We do not know how many disinformation ads from other sources, domestic or foreign, used it, and we do not know how common its use is now.

 [34]. Antonio García Martínez, How Trump Conquered Facebook—Without Russian Ads, Wired (Feb. 23, 2018, 10:06 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-trump-conquered-facebookwithout-russian-ads. In its recent proposals, Facebook has recognized aspects of this problem and proposed changes. See Shutting Down Partner Categories, Facebook Newsroom (Mar. 28, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/shutting-down-partner-categories.

 [35]. See Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel I: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 48 (2017) (statement of Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute). See also Indictment ¶ 44, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
/file/1035477; Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims, Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 30 (2017) (statement of the Hon. Daniel Baer).

 [36]. Ten thousand Twitter followers cost $39.89; 500 Facebook shares cost less than $25. See Buy Twitter Followers, Sozialy, https://www.sozialy.com/buy-twitter-followers (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). See also The Most Reliable Place to Buy Facebook Shares, Buy Real Marketing, https://www.buyrealmarketing.com/buy-facebook-shares (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).

 [37]. See Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 11 (2017) (prepared statement of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, former President of the Republic of Estonia); Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 30 (2017) (statement of the Hon. Daniel Baer).

 [38]. See Checks and Balances for Economic Growth, MUR 6729 (FEC Oct. 24, 2014) (statement of Vice Chair Ann M. Ravel), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363872.pdf (“Since its inception, this effort to protect individual bloggers and online commentators has been stretched to cover slickly-produced ads aired solely on the Internet but paid for by the same organizations and the same large contributors as the actual ads aired on TV.”).

 [39]. A Facebook Advisory Opinion has long been interpreted to allow an exemption from disclaimers under the “small items exemption,” though the FEC’s recent advisory opinion on the issue requires disclaimers for Facebook ads with express advocacy placed for a fee. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Dec. 15, 2017), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2017-12.pdf.

 [40]. 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(f) (2018).

 [41]. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (2012) (exempting costs associated with producing news from the definition of “expenditure”); id. § 30101(4) (defining a “political committee” in terms of contributions collected and expenditures made); id. § 30120 (disclaimer requirements for political committees); id. § 30104 (requiring disclosure for political committees).

 [42]. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 659 (1994). See also Note, Defining the Press Exemption from Campaign Finance Restrictions, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1384, 1385–86 (2016).

 [43]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2016-01, at 3 (Apr. 8, 2016). See also Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

 [44]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2010-08, at 5 (June 11, 2010), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO
%202010-08.pdf.

 [45]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-11, at 7 (June 30, 2011), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos
/76329.pdf (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986)); FEC Advisory Opinion 2000-13 (June 23, 2000) (concluding that a website was “viewable by the general public and akin to a periodical or news program distributed to the general public”).

 [46]. See RTTV America, Inc., MUR 6481 (May 27, 2014) (dismissing action against RTTV and Ron Paul 2012 Presidential Campaign Committee in a letter), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR

/14044354314.pdf.

 [47]. The disinformation at issue is not “clickbait” headlines with spins on true (or mostly true) stories, like those from the partisan-leaning media. That speech, though biased, is protected. We are instead discussing complete political hoaxes like those that we saw in the 2016 election.

 [48]. FBI Agent Suspected in Hillary Email Leaks Found Dead in Apparent Murder-Suicide, Snopes (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.snopes.com/fbi-agent-murder-suicide.

 [49]. Eric Lubbers, There Is No Such Thing as the Denver Guardian, Despite that Facebook Post You Saw, Denver Post (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/05/there-is-no-such-thing-as-the-denver-guardian.

 [50]. This is based on our research in the Internet Archive. Internet Archive: Wayback Machine, http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://denverguardian.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).

 [51]. See generally Donie O’Sullivan & Dylan Byers, Exclusive: Fake Black Activist Accounts Linked to Russian Government, CNN (Sept. 28, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017
/09/28/media/blacktivist-russiafacebook-twitter/index.html.

 [52]. Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters 3, 5 (1996). Scholars of deliberative democracy also list information as paramount. See, e.g., Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 307, 309, 319–20 (2003); James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion, 40 Acta Politica 284, 285 (2005).

 [53]. Jason Stanley, In Defense of Truth, and the Threat of Disinformation, in Can Public Diplomacy Survive The Internet? Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation 71 (Shawn Powers & Markos Kounalakis eds., 2017).

 [54]. Paul & Matthews, supra note 18, at 3. See also Wu, supra note 11, at 15.

 [55]. Hasen, supra note 10, at 2.

 [56]. Wu, supra note 11, at 15.

 [57]. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 1051, 1076–93 (2009). See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 1858–61, 1866–69 (discussing voters’ interest in relevant information accountability in relation to campaign finance). See also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).

 [58]. There is a tremendous amount of literature in political science on these points. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 194 passim (1996). See also James Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?, 22 Pol. Comm. 515, 515–17 (2006) (summarizing the academic literature).

 [59]. See Alcott & Gentzkow, supra note 1, at 229.

 [60]. Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1533, 1539–41, 1587 (1999). Additional information has varying sized effects, and more work is needed in the area. For example, party endorsements result in an increase in vote share of about eight percentage points. Thad Kousser, Seth Masket & Eric McGhee, Kingmakers or Cheerleaders? Party Power and the Causal Effects of Endorsements, 68 Pol. Res. Q. 443, 453–54 (2015). The marginal effect of additional campaign finance information is harder to establish, at least in an information-saturated environment. See David M. Primo, Information at the Margins: Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, Ballot Issues, and Voter Knowledge, 12 Elect. L.J. 114, 127–28 (2013). See generally Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, supra note 15.

 [61]. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63, 63–64, 72 (1994).

 [62]. Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation, 33 Pol. Comm. 460, 462 (2015).

 [63]. Ian Skurnik et al., How Warnings About False Claims Become Recommendations, 31 J. Consumer Res. 713, 722–23 (2005).

 [64]. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby K. Wood, Elite Political Ignorance: Law, Data, and the Representation of (Mis)Perceived Electorates, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev (forthcoming Dec. 2018) (manuscript at 35) (footnote omitted), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3034685.

 [65]. Pablo Barberá et al., Tweeting from Left to Right: Is Online Political Communication More Than an Echo Chamber?, 26 Psychol. Sci. 1531, 1531–42 (2015) (arguing that echo chambers are more prevalent among political issues, like a presidential election, than issues described as a “national conversation,” like the Boston Marathon Bombing).

 [66]. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 175 passim (2002).

 [67]. See Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing & Lada A. Adamic, Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook, 348 Science 1130, 1131 (2015).

 [68]. See Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook, Buzzfeed News (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook.

 [69]. Hasen, supra note 10, at 17 (citing Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. Rev. 231 (2014)).

 [70]. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”) (internal citations omitted). See also 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014).

 [71]. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (striking down aggregate individual contribution limits); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down a ban on independent expenditures from corporations’ treasuries); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (discussing judicial issue-related speech).

 [72]. See Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231–32 (1989); Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).

 [73]. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 230.

 [74]. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193–94, 197, 199 (1992). The Court recently struck down a vaguely-worded Minnesota law banning “political” apparel at polling stations. See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891–92 (2018). The Court analyzed it as a restriction in a nonpublic forum, and restrictions in such forums are reviewed only for reasonableness. Id. at 1885–86.

 [75]. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the government may “bar foreign citizens . . . from participating in the campaign process”), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). See also Oversight of Federal Political Advertisement Laws and Regulations: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Info. Tech. of the Comm. on H. Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. 5–12 (2017) (statement of Ian Vandewalker, Senior Counsel, Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law) (discussing the different steps Congress could take to regulate foreigner-sponsored political advertisements online), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Testimony-IT-Subcom-U.S.House-Vandewalker-10.24.17.pdf; Alyssa Markenson, What’s at Stake: Bluman v. Federal Election Commission and the Incompatibility of the Stake-Based Immigration Plenary Power and Freedom of Speech, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 209, 228–37 (2014). Rick Hasen points out a potential tension here with dicta in Citizens United, which, read at its broadest, could say that “the identity of the speaker does not matter for First Amendment purposes.” See Hasen, supra note 10, at 19. That would be a particularly aggressive read of Citizens United, effectively overturning Bluman. The prohibition upheld in Bluman was interpreted to exclude issue advocacy by foreign nationals. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 284.

 [76]. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).

 [77]. We do not need to regulate fraudulent political speech for our proposed regulations; we merely note that the question is an open one. The Eighth Circuit struck down a regulation as being overbroad and specifically declined to decide whether preventing fraud on the electorate is a compelling government interest. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2014). (“Today we need not determine whether, on these facts, preserving fair and honest elections and preventing fraud on the electorate comprise a compelling state interest because the narrow tailoring that must juxtapose that interest is absent here.”). United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714–16 (2012), is often cited for the proposition that government cannot regulate fraudulent political speech. In Alvarez, the speech at issue was Alvarez’s misrepresentation that he had won the Congressional Medal of Honor; it was not campaign-related speech. Id. at 714. If Alvarez’s fraudulent speech was deemed protected by the Supreme Court, it is possible that fraudulent speech that is more directly political, like disinformation advertising about campaign-related issues, would also be protected, but the result is not inevitable. The degree of harm, which here is very high, is a crucial consideration in the inquiry. See generally Rebecca Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 953 (2016).

 [78]. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721–22, 727 (“Some false speech may be prohibited even if analogous true speech could not be. This opinion does not imply that any of these targeted prohibitions are somehow vulnerable. But it also rejects the notion that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected.”) (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”). Of course, with regard to some efforts to reduce false speech, if the platforms do not act, government cannot step in. For example, the government may be able to require that platforms use neutral fact checkers, but it probably could not perform the fact-checking function itself or specify which fact checkers the platforms should use.

 [79]. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).

 [80]. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).

 [81]. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).

 [82]. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.

 [83]. See Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, 551 U.S. 449, 451 (2007) (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978)).

 [84]. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. The cases also involved discussion of other interests, such as the government’s interest in preventing corruption or its appearance and the government’s interest in enabling enforcement of the campaign finance laws. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. One of us has argued elsewhere that a broader set of benefits is at play with campaign finance disclosure. For example, the government has an interest in securing the data necessary to evaluate its own campaign finance policies. Without knowing who is contributing and spending in campaigns, the government cannot know the distributional effects of policy changes. See Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 Ind. L.J. 315, 330 (2014). See also Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, supra note 15.

 [85]. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67.

 [86]. Id. While some of its opinions upholding disclosure have turned on the anti-corruption rationale, the Court has remained convinced of the informational benefits of disclosure in the intervening forty years. See, for example, the majority opinion in Citizens United, which emphasizes that the information provided by disclosure is even more powerful in the age of the Internet, “because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative,” and that “this transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010).

 [87]. Connor M. Dowling & Amber Wichowsky, Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 41 Am. Pol. Res. 965 passim (2013) [hereinafter Dowling & Wichowsky (2013)]; Connor M. Dowling & Amber Wichowsky, Attacks Without Consequence? Candidates, Parties, Groups, and the Changing Face of Negative Advertising, 59 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 19 passim (2015) [hereinafter Dowling & Wichowsky (2015)]; Travis N. Ridout et al., Sponsorship, Disclosure and Donors: Limiting the Impact of Outside Group Ads, 68 Pol. Res. Q 154 passim (2015).

 [88]. Adam Bonica, Inferring Roll Call Scores from Campaign Contributions Using Supervised Machine Learning, Amer. J. Pol. Sci. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732913.

 [89]. See generally Abby K. Wood, Show Me the Money: “Dark Money” and the Informational Benefit of Campaign Finance Disclosure (Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Research Paper No. CLASS17-24, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029095. We acknowledge again Gilbert’s theory that disclosure can cause loss of information due to the chilling effect that the court assumes exists (but which scholars have found scant evidence of). Gilbert, supra note 15.

 [90]. For more on the constitutionality of an opt-in or opt-out requirement, see Elmendorf & Wood, supra note 64, at 40 (“Also pertinent is Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., which invalidated a consent-to-use-of-personal-data requirement that disfavored particular speakers and types of speech. The consent requirements we propose would be viewpoint neutral, but they would disfavor a kind of speech (micro-targeted political advertising), and they advance only a limited privacy interest.”) (footnotes omitted).

 [91]. Wu, supra note 11 (“As scholars and historians know well, but the public is sometimes surprised to learn, the First Amendment sat dormant for much of American history . . . . As the story goes, the First Amendment remained inert well into the 1920s.”) (footnotes omitted).

 [92]. Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for Platform Governance, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 337, 342–43 (2017).

 [93]. False information reaches more people than true information, and it spreads faster. Political disinformation spreads even faster than other kinds of false news. See Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of False and True News Online, 359 Science 1146, 1146–51 (2018).

 [94]. Public discourse theory is not prominent in this libertarian age of free speech, but cases that fit its paradigm are not entirely unheard of. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 367–68 (1969) (upholding broadcast fair time requirement on coverage of issues of public importance). See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2000) (describing the theory and referring to several other works about it).

 [95]. Syed, supra note 92, at 342–45.

 [96]. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale L.J. 1805, 1834–38 (1995).

 [97]. Id. at 1834–38, 1843.

 [98]. Wu, supra note 11, at 13.

 [99]. Id. at 23. Wu also says that the “captive audience” doctrine might be extended into the social media realm to provide a rationale for new regulation to protect listeners. Id. at 25. The opt-in/opt-out provisions we discuss in Part IV aim at not having a captive audience for disinformation. The existence of the opt-in/opt-out provision would therefore slightly weaken the government’s case in defending its regulation, to the extent that the “captive audience” line of cases would apply to disinformation advertising. Nevertheless, we think the benefit offered to voters from regularly being reminded they can opt in or out of seeing disputed content far outweighs the risk that a court might use the provision against the state in defending regulations.

 [100]. Hasen, supra note 10, at 19–23.

 [101]. These are serious harms. See generally Brown, supra note 77. (describing an approach to free speech which takes into account the actual manner in which expression is alleged to cause harm). Disinformation caused real-world damages as well. One serious event was the so-called “Pizzagate” scandal, in which disinformation advertising spread a rumor that a pizza shop had a Clinton-run pedophilia ring in it. The shop’s business was hurt, and its owners were harassed for months. Cecilia Kang, Fake News Onslaught Targets Pizzeria as Nest of Child-Trafficking, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2f0L9G9. After the election, a man entered the pizza shop and fired three shots. Spencer S. Hsu, Comet Pizza Gunman Pleads Guilty to Federal and Local Charges, Wash. Post (Mar. 24, 2017), http://wapo.st/2mZBNtT.

 [102]. Bots are essentially code, and whether code is speech is not yet clear. See Neil Richards, Apple’s “Code = Speech” Mistake, MIT Tech. Rev. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.technologyreview
.com/s/600916/apples-code-speech-mistake (arguing that the Government can and should regulate bots, as distinct from speech). However, even if it is speech, the level of scrutiny to be applied to computer code speech is not set in stone. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Following Reimerdes, the court in Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 450 (2d Cir. 2001) found that code could have both speech and non-speech components, such that the functional (but not expressive) elements of the code may be targeted.

 [103]. Persily, supra note 10.

 [104]. Id.

 [105]. Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Zuckerberg’s Preposterous Defense of Facebook, N.Y. Times (Sept. 29, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yxUydy.

 [106]. Id. See also Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, Inside the Two Years that Shook Facebook—and the World, Wired (Feb. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell.

 [107]. Lisa L. Sharma et al., The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to Promote Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures, 100 Am. J. Pub. Health 240, 242 (2010), (citing Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective. 19 Law & Pol’y 363 (1997)).

 [108]. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 Law & Pol’y 363, 401–02 (1997).

 [109]. Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, in New Perspectives on Regulation 128 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009), https://www.tobinproject.org/sites
/tobinproject.org/files/assets/New_Perspectives_Ch6_Balleisen_Eisner.pdf.

 [110]. Id. at 129.

 [111]. Online Behavioral Advertising Compliance, Data & Marketing Ass’n, https://thedma.org
/resources/compliance-resources/online-behavioral-advertising-compliance (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).

 [112]. The “failure to correct” report includes a list of the guidelines violated. Data & Mktg. Ass’n, DMA Annual Ethics Compliance Report, January–December 2016, at 21 (2016), https://thedma.org/wp-content/uploads/Jan-Dec-2016-Ethics-Compliance-Report.pdf.

 [113]. Josh Constine, Facebook Will Hire 1000 and Make Ads Visible to Fight Election Interference, TechCrunch (Oct. 2, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/02/facebook-will-hire-1000-and-make-ads-visible-to-fight-election-interference.

 [114]. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theory and Limits (2015) (proposing that, under certain circumstances, an expressive mechanism causes compliance with a law more so than deterrence or legitimacy); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585, 585–608 (1998) (discussing an economic theory of expressive law); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339 (2000) (discussing a “causal theory for the expressive effect of law”) [hereinafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory]; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 66 (1995) (discussing the expressive dimensions of legal and political decision-making).

 [115]. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 114, at 342–43. Similarly, removing legal requirements also affects behavior. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 135, 148–51 (2007).

 [116]. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 114, at 66.

 [117]. Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. Times (May 2, 2015) (internal quotation omitted), https://nyti.ms/1E4sjOu. See generally Russ Choma, Get Ready for a Flood of Online Campaign Ads that Will Target and Track You, Mother Jones (Sept./Oct. 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/08/digital-political-election-ads-dark-money (describing how online advertising can be used by political groups to gain valuable information about voters with minimal disclosure).

 [118]. 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a)(1) (2018).

 [119]. Id. § 110.11(b)(2)–(3). Examples taken from Fed. Election Comm’n, Special Notices on Political Ads and Solicitations 4 (2006), https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/spec_notice
_brochure.pdf.

 [120]. 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a)(1)–(3) (2018).

 [121]. Id. § 110.11(a)(4); id. § 100.29(a)(1)–(3). The FEC has recently upheld the disclaimer requirement for paid Facebook ads featuring express advocacy. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Dec. 15, 2017).

 [122]. 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2018) (“Public communication means a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising. The term general public political advertising shall not include communications over the Internet, except for communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.”) (emphasis added); id. § 110.11(a) (defining the scope of disclaimer requirements as limited to public communications, as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 110.26 (2018), and electioneering communications, which, as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(1) (2018), exclude communications over the Internet).

 [123]. Id. §§ 100.29(a), (c)(1) (2018).

 [124]. See id. § 100.29(c)(1).

 [125]. Id. §§ 110.11(f)(1)(i)(ii).

 [126]. See id. § 110.11(f)(1)(i).

 [127]. See id. § 110.11(f)(1)(ii).

 [128]. Facebook, FEC Advisory Op. Request 2011-09 (Apr. 26, 2011), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs
/1174825.pdf; FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (June 15, 2011) (Facebook) (certification of vote), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1176290.pdf; FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (June 15, 2011) (Facebook) (agenda), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1176195.pdf.

 [129]. Google’s AO request did propose a disclaimer on a landing page. Google, FEC Advisory Op. Request 2010-19 (Aug. 5, 2010), http://saos.fec.gov/saos/searchao?AONUMBER=2010-19.

 [130]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2017-12, at 2 n.1 (Dec. 15, 2017).

 [131]. Nonconnected committees are a class of committees that includes Leadership PACs and SuperPACs. Types of Nonconnected PACs, Fed. Election Comm’n, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/registering-pac/types-nonconnected-pacs (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).

 [132]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2017-05 (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/83543
.pdf (Great America PAC & The Committee to Defend the President).

 [133]. See Liz Kennedy & Alex Tausanovitch, Secret and Foreign Spending in U.S. Elections: Why America Needs the DISCLOSE Act, Ctr. for Amer. Progress (July 17, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/07/17/435886/secret-foreign-spending-u-s-elections-america-needs-disclose-act. See generally WMP/CRP Special Report Outside Group Activity, 2000–2016, Wesleyan Media Project (Aug. 24, 2016), http://mediaproject
.wesleyan.edu/blog/disclosure-report (examining outside group advertising in elections).

 [134]. The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law: Disclosure, Fed. Election Comm’n, http://classic.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Disclosure (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).

 [135]. Although the primary purpose of 501(c)s must be non-political, they may participate in limited election activities so long as they do not solicit funds with the specification that they will be used for an election-related purpose. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(a) (2012). See also Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising in the United States 33 (2016). Instead, 501(c)s solicit money generally and may direct some of their resources toward political activities such as purchasing issues ads.

 [136]. See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), Open Secrets, https://www.opensecrets.org
/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (last updated Sept. 6, 2018).

 [137]. Wyden Demands Documents on Possible Links Between Russian Money and NRA, CBS News (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wyden-demands-documents-on-possible-links-between-russian-money-and-nra.

 [138]. Andy Kroll, How Secret Foreign Money Could Infiltrate US Elections, Mother Jones (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/foreign-dark-money-2012-election-nonprofit.

 [139]. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017). A similar prohibition exists for IRS.

 [140]. 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.20(e)–(f) (2018).  

 [141]. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011). See also 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2018); Matea Gold, Did Facebook Ads Traced to a Russian Company Violate U.S. Election Law?, Wash. Post (Sept. 7, 2017), http://wapo.st/2wL7Mpc?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term
=.d298c9e82dd8.

 [142]. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (2018).

 [143]. See Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 284; Entous, supra note 20.

 [144]. Sydney Ember, Digital Ad Spending Expected to Soon Surpass TV, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1Qq9rTV.

 [145]. For a discussion of the media exemption, see supra Part I. But we reiterate here that Facebook Pages and fake newspapers like the nonexistent “Denver Guardian” do not qualify for the media exemption. We discuss below why we think the current proposal in the Senate, with its $500 threshold, is too high.

 [146]. The Political File is organized by station and is therefore cumbersome to navigate manually to get a picture of advertising for a statewide or national race over space and time. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) offers an API for researchers to download the information contained in it, but much of the information is stored in PDF documents and handwritten, making it difficult to glean systematic data quickly.

 [147]. The FCC’s website describes the political file content of the Public File as follows:

Political file (as required by [47 C.F.R. §§] 73.3526(e)(6), 73.3527(e)(5) [(2018)]) (retain for two years). This file must contain all requests for specific schedules of advertising time by candidates and certain issue advertisers, as well as the final dispositions or “deals” agreed to by the broadcaster and the advertiser in response to any requests. It is not necessary to retain any of the materials relating to the negotiation between the parties to reach the disposition. Finally, the file must include the reconciliation of the deal such as a description of when advertising actually aired, advertising preempted, and the timing of any make-goods of preempted time, as well as credits or rebates provided the advertiser. The request and disposition must be placed in the file as soon as possible, which the Commission has determined is immediately absent extraordinary circumstances. The reconciliation information need not be placed in the file immediately but the broadcaster must identify a person or persons at the station capable of informing an advertiser of the details of any reconciliation information.

About Public Inspection Files, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/about-station-profiles (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). The Political File requirements for cable (47 C.F.R. § 76.1701(d) (2018)) and satellite (47 C.F.R. § 25.701(d) (2018)) track the language for broadcast with some differences that are not material here, with one interesting exception. The Political File for cable must retain a list of the “the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or board of directors,” as applicable, of any entity that has paid for or furnished television broadcast programming that is ‘political matter or matter involving the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.’” About Public Inspection Files, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/about-station-profiles (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 76.1701(d) (2018)) (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).

 [148]. Hillary Clinton’s campaign paid $3,000 for a thirty-second spot on March 9, 2016, during “Blackish” on KDNL-TV, in the St. Louis area. Hillary For America Political File, KDNL-TV, Fed. Commcn’s Comm’n, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/tv-profile/kdnl-tv/political-files/2016/federal/president
/a1315a49-66c8-b09e-306f-20b3b4e49d9a (follow “Hillary for America” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).

 [149]. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726–27 (2012) (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”). Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett contains dicta implying that facilitating more speech is not a valid regulatory objective under the First Amendment. Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011) (“‘Leveling the playing field’ can sound like a good thing. But in a democracy, campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form of speech.”). In that case, a public financing scheme provided additional funds to candidates facing attacks by outside spenders. Id. at 727–28. Here, the regulation we propose (along with the existing FCC Political File) does not fund speech, it merely reveals the audience to whom an opponent or opposing group spoke. We therefore believe that the more precise Alvarez case about false speech would be more persuasive to the Court than Arizona Free Enterprise.

 [150]. Honest Ads Act, H.R. 4077, 115th Cong. (2017).

 [151]. Antonio García Martínez, who “helped create Facebook’s ad machine,” is skeptical that a repository of every ad run would be informative to viewers. Antonio García Martínez, I Helped Create Facebook’s Ad Machine. Here’s How I’d Fix It, Wired (Sept. 22, 2017, 3:55 PM) [hereinafter García Martínez, Wired], https://www.wired.com/story/i-helped-create-facebooks-ad-machine-heres-how-id-fix-it.

Per [Zuckerberg’s] video [announcing new transparency policies], Facebook pages will now show each and every post, including dark ones (!), that they’ve published in whatever form, either organic or paid. It’s not entirely clear if Zuckerberg intends this for any type of ad or just those from political campaigns, but it’s mindboggling either way. Given how Facebook currently works, it would mean that a visitor to a candidate’s page—the Trump campaign, for instance, once ran 175,000 variations on its ads in a single day—would see an almost endless series of similar content.

Id. We disagree. In the age of big data, smart data journalists and campaigns can distil key information from the repository, even if it does seem initially to contain “an almost endless series of similar content.” Id. The regulatory cat-and-mouse game that emerges is fairly obvious. Advertisers will be incentivized to bury truly objectionable or hateful content as a needle in a haystack of otherwise fairly neutral content, but we are confident that it is not beyond the technological reach of sophisticated campaigns and analysts to find and expose the problematic content.

 [152]. See Elmendorf & Wood, supra note 64, at 33; Ryan D. Enos & Eitan D. Hersh, Campaign Perceptions of Electoral Closeness: Uncertainty, Fear and Over-Confidence, 47 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 501, 502 (2015).

 [153]. Carol D. Leonning et al., Russian Firm Tied to Pro-Kremlin Propaganda Advertised on Facebook During Election, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 2017), http://wapo.st/2gN5NLf.

 [154]. Most voters will not explore the repository themselves, of course. Just like with FEC filings and political polling, they will receive the information as it is filtered through the media, as data journalists make browser plugins, and as clever activists attempt to “gamify” learning about campaign advertising.

 [155]. Including ads “swept up” by political targeting categories or by type of advertiser in the repository means that more than mere “electioneering communications” will be included in the repository. We do not see a “constitutional overbreadth” challenge to this as viable, in part because the political file for broadcast and radio advertising implemented by the FCC already includes so-called “issue ads,” which do not reference a candidate in the way that electioneering communications do. Issue ads do not require disclaimers, yet important details about them are made public in the Political File. If regulators or legislators were concerned with a possible overbreadth challenge succeeding, they could make only ads identified under (1), reference to candidates or ballot issues, public. Ads identified by targeting criteria (2) or advertiser (3) could be provided to the regulator to check for potential violations of campaign finance laws. Counter speech would be impossible under this scenario.

 [156]. We are not alone. See, e.g., Kennedy & Tausanovitch, supra note 133. Facebook has gone beyond this in its current iteration of the Archive, with all political ads, issue or advocacy, subject to retention in the archive whenever they are placed. Shining a Light on Ads with Political Content, Facebook Newsroom (May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-political-content. Their choice is less “gameable” and less administratively intense than our proposal, which is a more modest extension of current regulations.

 [157]. Facebook’s ad review process says that Facebook will “check your ad’s images, text, targeting, and positioning, in addition to the content on your ad’s landing page. Your ad may not be approved if the landing page content isn’t fully functional, doesn’t match the product/service promoted in your ad or doesn’t fully comply with our Advertising Policies.” Facebook Advertising Policies, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).

 [158]. One aspect of our trigger proposal would be more difficult to administer than the all-ads system that Facebook chose: the platforms would need a complete list of all candidates running for office anywhere in the country to only archive ads placed after candidates announce and issues appear on the ballot. They can work with federal, state, and local regulators to get this information. Our hope is that after the first round of elections in which it occurs, the process will be much easier, though the diversity and instability of thousands of candidate-registry lists on websites nationwide will never mean that this is a simple task. On the other hand, if platforms adopt Facebook’s approach of archiving all political ads without regard to the timing of the election, this is an example of private regulation going further than public regulation might be able to.

 [159]. Eitan Hersh, Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters 168–69 (2015).

 [160]. Antonio García Martínez, I’m An Ex-Facebook Exec: Don’t Believe What They Tell You About Ads, Guardian (May 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/02/facebook
-executive-advertising-data-comment.

 [161]. García Martínez, Wired, supra note 151.

 [162]. Facebook’s current proposal is to require a U.S. driver’s license and a social security number to promote content. Sarah Perez, Facebook’s New Authorization Process for Political Ads Goes Live in the US, TechCrunch (Apr. 23, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/23/facebooks-new-authorization-process-for-political-ads-goes-live-in-the-u-s.

 [163]. We are grateful to Antonio García Martínez, a former Facebook employee, for this insight.

 [164]. L.A., Cal., Code § 49.7.2.F, § 49.7.31–.32 (2018), https://ethics.lacity.org/PDF/laws/law
_CFO.pdf.

 [165]. As we finalize this Article, Twitter has purged 70 million fake accounts and bots— around 20% of its user base. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Is Sweeping Out Fake Accounts Like Never Before, Putting User Growth at Risk, Wash. Post (July 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/06/twitter-is-sweeping-out-fake-accounts-like-never-before-putting-user-growth-risk.

 [166]. See Indictment ¶¶ 6–7, U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, L.L.C., 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477.

 [167]. This is an improvement over what was promised, which was disclosure of “which page paid for an ad, [and the ability to] visit an advertiser’s page and see the ads they’re currently running to any audience on Facebook.” Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.facebook.com
/zuck/posts/10104052907253171.

 [168]. Christopher S. Elmendorf et al., Opinion, Open Up the Black Box of Political Advertising, S.F. Chron. (Sept. 23, 2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Open-up-the-black-box-of-political-advertising-12221372.php.

 [169]. See, e.g., Kent Walker, Supporting Election Integrity Through Greater Advertising Transparency, Google: Keyword (May 4, 2018), https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public
-policy/supporting-election-integrity-through-greater-advertising-transparency.

 [170]. Honest Ads Act, H.R. 4077, 115th Cong. (2017).

 [171]. See generally Hersh, supra note 159 (discussing the consequences of the use of microtargeting by campaigns during elections); Sasha Issenberg, The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns (2012) (discussing how social science and analytics are changing political campaigns); Daniel Kreiss, Prototype Politics: Technology­Intensive Campaigning and the Data of Democracy (2016) (providing an analytical framework for understanding why and how campaigns are newly “technology-intensive”).

 [172]. Impressions are simply “eyeballs on ads.” The cost every time someone clicks on an ad through to a landing page (the “click through” rate) is higher, ranging from around 22 to 30 cents per click over the time we’ve written this Article. However, many disinformation ads clicked through to non-functioning landing pages, meaning that they are probably placed for impressions, rather than clicks. Constant repetition in one’s newsfeed from outlandish headlines with provocative pictures may be enough to suppress one’s enthusiasm for a candidate or conversely to mobilize her opponents.

 [173]. García Martínez thinks that the size of the Russian ad buy of $100,000 is “peanuts” and “didn’t influence the election’s outcome.” The peanuts may be in comparison to Facebook’s ad revenues, in which case we agree. No study has yet shown the effect of Russian ads or disinformation ads on social media for getting out the vote or suppressing the vote, so his conclusion that it did not affect the election is untested. García Martínez, supra note 151.

 [174]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Oct. 8, 2010) (Google, Inc.,); FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (June 15, 2011) (Facebook) (certification of vote); FEC, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (June 15, 2011) (Facebook) (agenda); FEC, Advisory Opinion No. 2017-05 (Sep. 20, 2017) (Great America PAC & Comm. to Defend the President).

 [175]. FEC, Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Dec. 15, 2017) (Take Back Action Fund).

 [176]. FEC Holds Hearing on Internet Communication Disclaimers, Fed. Election Comm’n (June 28, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-holds-hearing-internet-communication-disclaimers.

 [177]. Basic Rules for Disclaimers on Radio and TV Ads, Fed. Election Comm’n (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.fec.gov/updates/basic-rules-for-disclaimers-on-radio-and-tv-ads.

 [178]. Research in political science suggests that this kind of enhanced disclosure can moderate the effectiveness of negative advertising. Dowling & Wichowsky (2013), supra note 87; Dowling & Wichowsky (2015), supra note 87. Given that disinformation advertising is almost all negative against one candidate, enhanced disclaimers should reduce their effectiveness and, as a result, disincentivize their production and circulation in the first place. We also know that negative ads cite more sources than positive ads, so losing them entirely, while unlikely, may actually reduce voter competence. See Matthew P. Motta & Erika Franklin Fowler, The Content and Effect of Political Advertising in U.S. Campaigns, Oxford Res. Encyclopedia Pol. fig. 4 (Dec. 2016), http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10
.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-217.

 [179]. See WMP/CRP Special Report Outside Group Activity, 2000–2016, supra note 133; Kennedy & Tausanovitch, supra note 133.

 [180]. John Cook et al., Neutralizing Misinformation Through Inoculation: Exposing Misleading Argumentation Techniques Reduces Their Influence, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 10 (2017).

 [181]. Sander van der Linden et al., Inoculating Against Misinformation, 358 Science 1141, 1141 (2017).

 [182]. See Bad News, GetBadNews, getbadnews.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (hosting a game designed by Cambridge Social Decision-Making Lab members).

 [183]. Another technological fix could be a browser or app plug-in that automatically filters out disinformation advertising that fact checkers have flagged as false, which would have to be a private-sector fix, rather than a government project. Facebook has moved away from using flags for now. Flags actually encouraged more clicks. If it went back to identifying disinformation, Facebook could probably encode the fact that a fact checker disputes the information in the underlying code, for the app or plug-in to filter out.

 [184]. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651 passim (2005).

 [185]. Kate Kaye, Study: Consumers Don’t Know What AdChoices Privacy Icon Is, Ad Age (Jan. 29, 2014), http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/study-consumers-adchoices-privacy-icon
/291374.

 [186]. See Elmendorf & Wood, supra note 64, at 39–40.

 [187]. See generally Jennifer Jerit & Jason Barabas, Partisan Perceptual Bias and the Information Environment, 74 J. Politics 672 (2012) (finding that people’s perceptions of the world are shaped by their political views).

 [188]. Id. at 673 (internal citation omitted).

 [189]. D.J. Flynn et al., The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics, 38 Advances Pol. Psychol. 127, 132 (2017) (citing C.S. Taber & M. Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 755, 757 (2006)).

 [190]. They can change, but correcting misinformation is difficult. See generally Jennifer L. Hochschild & Katherine Levine Einstein, Do Facts Matter? Information and Misinformation in American Politics, 130 Pol. Sci. Q. 585 (2015) (discussing how people exposed to misinformation resist corrections). One way of correcting information, is to “hit them between the eyes” with factual information. James H. Kuklinski et al., Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship, 62 J. Pol. 791, 805 (2000). However, corrections can backfire. See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 Pol. Beh. 303, 311–22 (2010).

 [191]. Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 190, at 323 (noting that there is also a great deal of evidence that liberals and Democrats also engage in motivated reasoning, though the backfire effect, in particular, was not observed in this particular project).

 [192]. Brendan Nyhan, Why the “Death Panel” Myth Wouldn’t Die: Misinformation in the Health Care Reform Debate, 8 Forum 1, 15 (2010). See also Nyhan, supra note 190, at 311–22.

 [193]. Kerry Flynn, Facebook Is Going After One of the Big Ways Fake News Spreads, Mashable (Aug. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Flynn, Mashable], http://mashable.com/2017/08/28/facebook-fake-news-advertising-crackdown/#BrL7D4yVkaqM.

 [194]. Adam Mosseri, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, Facebook Newsroom (Apr. 6, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-news.

 [195]. Jeff Smith et al., Designing Against Misinformation, Medium (Dec. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/facebook-design/designing-against-misinformation-e5846b3aa1e2.

 [196]. Emma Hinchliffe, Facebook Just Quietly Rolled out Its Long-Awaited Solution to Fake News, Mashable (Mar. 4, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/03/04/facebook-fake-news-rollout/#
.lUNWbQIkOqM. Though note that hoaxes have long existed on Facebook. See, e.g., Karissa Bell, Facebook Is Cracking Down on Hoaxes in Your News Feed, Mashable (Jan. 20, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/01/20/facebooks-news-feed-hoaxes/#g1usvpOnwmqJ; How is Facebook Addressing False News Through Third-Party Fact-Checkers?, Facebook Help Center, https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536 (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) (placing false stories lower in users’ feeds, and reducing distribution of stories from repeat offenders).

 [197]. Sapna Maheshwari & Sydney Ember, The End of the Social News Era? Journalists Brace for Facebook’s Big Change, N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/business
/media/facebook-news-feed-media.html.

 [198]. See supra note 29 for definition.

 [199]. See Lehrman, supra note 9.

 [200]. Flynn, Mashable, supra note 193.

 [201]. Mosseri, supra note 194.

 [202]. Patrick Kulp, Facebook Cracks Down on Bogus ‘Likes’ and Zombie Accounts in Battle Against Fake News, Mashable (Apr. 15, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/04/15/facebook-shuts-down-fake-likes/#0DujDggJ5Pqw. See also Timberg & Dwoskin, supra note 165.

 [203]. Scott Roxborough, How Europe Is Fighting Back Against Fake News, Hollywood Rep. (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/how-europe-is-fighting-back-fake-news-1030837.

 [204]. Id.

 [205]. Id.

 [206]. Id.

 [207]. Voting Day(s), ACE: Electoral Knowledge Network, https://aceproject.org/ace-en
/topics/me/mef/mef04/mef040d (last updated 2012).

 [208]. Catherine Nicholson, French Media Rules Prohibit Election Coverage over Weekend, France 24 (May 7, 2017), https://www.france24.com/en/20170506-france-media-rules-prohibit-election-coverage-over-weekend-presidential-poll; Media Rules During an Election, Elections Ontario, http://www.elections.on.ca/en/media-centre/media-rules-during-an-election.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).

 [209]. See Steven J. Balla & William T. Gormley, Jr., Bureaucracy and Democracy, 129–72 (4th ed. forthcoming 2018); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 551, 553–66 (2016) (reviewing literature on agency mission).

 [210]. Mission and History, Fed. Elections Comm’n, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-history (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).

 [211]. Ann Ravel, Opinion, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election Commission, N.Y. Times (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunction-and-deadlock-at-the-federal-election-commission.html.

 [212]. See Fed. Election Comm’n, Guidebook for Complainants and Respondents on the FEC Enforcement Process, Fed. Elections Comm’n 12 (2012), https://transition.fec.gov/em
/respondent_guide.pdf.

 [213]. Id.

 [214]. Editorial, Deadlocked in Regulation, Wash. Post (June 15, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061402400.html (“The three Republican appointees are turning the commission into The Little Agency That Wouldn’t: wouldn’t launch investigations, wouldn’t bring cases, wouldn’t even accept settlements that the staff had already negotiated. This is not a matter of partisan politics. These commissioners simply appear not to believe in the law they have been entrusted with enforcing.”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The Justice Department Is Now on the Campaign Finance Beat, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/justice-department-now-campaign-finance-beat (“With the Federal Election Commission hopelessly deadlocked, campaign finance enforcement is now coming as federal criminal cases.”).

 [215]. Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is as Good as Dead, Slate (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.slate.com
/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/the_fec_is_as_good_as_dead.html.

 [216]. Ann Ravel, How the FEC Turned a Blind Eye to Foreign Meddling, Politico (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/18/fec-foreign-meddling-russia-facebook-215619.

 [217]. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2012); id. § 30121(a). The Department of Justice prosecutes “serious and willful” violations of our campaign finance laws, as well as criminal issues like fraud.

 [218]. Mission, Fin. Crimes & Enforcement Network, https://www.fincen.gov/about/mission (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).

 [219]. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 84504.3 (West 2018); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-621 (2018); Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 8021 (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1014 (2017); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 211B.04 (West 2017).

 [220]. Elmendorf et al., supra note 168.

 [221]. 2018 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 59 (S. 7509-C) (McKinney) (to be codified at N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 14-100, 14-106, 14-107, 14-126).

 [222]. Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act, Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law §§ 1-101(a), (dd-1), (ll-1), (k); 13-306(a)–(e); 13-307(a)–(e), 13-401; 13-403; 13-405; 13-405.1; 13-403; 13-405.2) (West 2018).

 [223]. 2018 Cal. A.B. 2188, Political Reform Act of 1974: Campaign Disclosures: Advertisements.

 [224]. Seattle, Wash., Charter ch. 2.04.280 (2018), https://library.municode.com/WA/seattle
/codes/municipal_code?nodeId=TIT2EL_CH2.04ELCACO_SUBCHAPTER_IIICADI_2.04.280COADDURE.

 [225]. Eli Sanders, Seattle Says Facebook Has Failed to Follow Law on Election Ad Transparency, Stranger (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2018/02/05/25781471/seattle-says-facebook-has-failed-to-follow-law-on-election-ad-transparency.

 [226]. L.A., Cal., Code § 49.7.31–.32 (2017), https://ethics.lacity.org/PDF/laws/law_CFO.pdf.

 [227]. See Elmendorf et al., supra note 168.