Patently Unjust: Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the U.S. Patent Office – Note by Christopher B. Phillips

From Volume 92, Number 3 (March 2019)
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Patently unjust:
Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the U.S. Patent Office

Christopher B. Phillips[*]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

I. Sovereign Immunity

A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity

1. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc.

2. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

3. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren

B. State Sovereign Immunity

1. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank

2. The Eleventh Amendment in Administrative Proceedings:
State-Owned Patents and PTAB IPR Rulings

C. Sovereign Immunity’s Purposes

1. Tribal Sovereign Immunity’s Justifications

2. State Sovereign Immunity’s Justifications

II. Reasons for the Allergan-Saint Regis Deal

A. Are These Good Deals for Participants?

B. Are Such Deals a Good Thing?

III. Decisions in the Allergan-Saint Regis IPR

A. Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2018 Decision

1. PTAB Does Not Apply Tribal Sovereign Immunity in IPRs

2. Issues with the PTAB Decision

B. The Federal Circuit Decision to Not Apply Tribal
Sovereign Immunity in an IPR Proceeding

IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY’S UNEQUAL STATUS
WITH STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. The Inconsistency

1. This Inconsistency Matters and Should Be Fixed

2. Addressing the Inconsistency

CONCLUSION

Introduction

The Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress plenary power to regulate Native American tribes.[1] In the absence of congressional action, a “dual sovereign” structure exists whereby the tribes are allowed—subject to constraints imposed by Congress—to exist and regulate their own affairs independently of the states and the Federal Government.[2] As a benefit of sovereignty, tribes possess sovereign immunity—an immunity similar to the immunity granted to states under the Eleventh Amendment.[3] Sovereign immunity as a doctrine is based in the common law and allows the sovereign to avoid being sued without its consent.[4] Tribal sovereign immunity, unlike state sovereign immunity,[5] is subject to congressional abrogation, meaning Congress can decide the circumstances whereby tribes are subject to suit without their consent.[6]

In September 2017, Allergan Pharmaceuticals (“Allergan”) made news when, in the middle of a challenge to its Restasis[7] patent’s validity in Inter Partes Review (“IPR”), it assigned its patent rights in the drug to upstate New York’s Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (“Saint Regis”).[8] After receiving the patent rights, Saint Regis quickly licensed the Restasis patent back to Allergan for an immediate payment of $13.75 million, coupled with an additional $15 million per year in royalties.[9] Because the transaction gave Saint Regis ownership of the patent, the tribe became the patent’s defender in the IPR proceeding. The tribe moved to have the IPR terminated, asserting their immunity from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.

An IPR is an adversarial post-grant proceeding located in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”); it is overseen by a panel of Administrative Patent Judges.[10] Third parties utilize this forum to challenge the validity of patents that they believe were improperly granted.[11]

The deal between Allergan and Saint Regis ignited a public relations firestorm. Critics allege that Allergan acted in bad faith. They claim Allergan “rented” Saint Regis’s sovereign immunity to gain an improper protection from IPRs.[12] Former Senator Claire McCaskill of Missouri sponsored legislation to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity by eliminating it as an IPR defense.[13] In response to criticism, Allergan and other defenders of the deal, tried to shift public focus from the deal to an IPR system that they allege inadequately protects patent owners.[14]

The deal’s critics countered by arguing that IPRs are essential to the intellectual property system because IPRs provide a forum in which disputes over patents are resolved in a quick, cost-effective manner by experts in the field.[15] The alternative to IPRs is litigation in federal district court, which can be costly. In addition, IPRs are overseen by patent law experts, while district court litigation is in front of a judge who may have no familiarity with the complexities of patent law. Moreover, IPRs provide a final check on the USPTO’s grant of a patent by reviewing the granting decision; thus, it can be viewed as a last-chance mechanism by which the USPTO can ensure it has properly granted a patent. Thus, the proceeding’s purpose is to prevent unpatentable material from gaining patent protection which can harm the patent owner’s competitors and hinder further innovation.[16]

On the other hand, the deal has upsides.[17] The tribe received much-needed funds, leading attorneys for the tribe to advocate similar deals as a solution for Saint Regis, other tribes, and state universities in need of revenue.[18] Additionally, some proponents of stronger patent rights condemn IPR proceedings as patent “death squad[s],”[19] so engaging in workarounds of this kind is necessary for patent owners to protect their hard-earned and valuable patent rights.[20]

Nearly one year after the Allergan-Saint Regis deal was announced, on July 20, 2018, the Federal Circuit decided that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPRs, rejecting Saint Regis’s assertion of the doctrine.[21] Therefore, unless the Supreme Court steps in to reverse this decision, the Allergan-Saint Regis deal, and any others like it, is dead.

Part I of this Note covers the history of tribal sovereign immunity, its close relationship to state sovereign immunity, the applicability of state sovereign immunity in intellectual property disputes and administrative proceedings, and the purposes of sovereign immunity. Part II proceeds by evaluating why the Allergan-Saint Regis deal was attractive enough to its participants that they were willing to endure the negative press in order to reap its benefits—patent owners get greater protection of their patents, while tribes receive much-needed funds for little to no cost.[22] The Allergan-Saint Regis deal existed because of concerns that IPRs do not adequately protect patent owners. Congress could take the chance to address these issues, so counterproductive end-runs—even unsuccessful ones—are no longer sought out by patent owners.[23]

 Part III analyzes the various legal decisions rendered in the Allergan-Saint Regis matter. First, it reviews and evaluates the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)[24] decision from February 2018, finding the it filled with legal error. Next, it evaluates the July 2018 Federal Circuit decision, again finding legal error in refusing to apply tribal sovereign immunity in IPRs. Contra these decisions, tribal sovereign immunity should apply in IPR proceedings, even if this may cause issues from a policy standpoint. These policy issues can be addressed by Congress[25] and, even so, do not outweigh the importance of maintaining tribal sovereign immunity. Therefore, the Supreme Court should take up the issue and reverse the Federal Circuit by finding that tribal sovereign immunity applies in IPRs.

In fact, the Supreme Court would likely reverse the Federal Circuit if it takes the case because its recent decisions have generally protected tribal sovereign immunity.[26] These recent decisions have been rooted in the reasons for the doctrine, such as promoting the dignity of sovereigns, protecting sovereign resources, and protecting a sovereign’s unique culture. Given these purposes, the Court has been extremely hesitant to curtail tribal sovereign immunity without clear Congressional direction to do so. Rather, the Court generally defers to Congress on the issue. Recent cases showcase the Supreme Court giving explicit direction to Congress that it must take ownership over any fixes to problems arising from the assertion of tribal sovereign immunity. Reversal is made even more likely because the Supreme Court has found that state sovereign immunity applies in administrative proceedings and patent litigation. Further, PTAB precedent allows state sovereign immunity to be invoked in IPRs, giving even more reason for the Supreme Court to find that tribal sovereign immunity applies in IPRs, thus preventing unequal treatment of the two sovereigns.

Part IV builds on this contention by evaluating how making tribal immunity inapplicable in IPRs erodes tribal sovereign immunity’s status relative to state sovereign immunity given that state sovereign immunity has typically been allowed to apply in IPRsand administrative proceedings more generally. In fact, Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past several decades has become more protective of state sovereign immunity through the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the Federal Circuit decision in this case leaves tribal sovereign immunity out of line with state sovereign immunity in the context of administrative proceedings. Such incongruence should be remedied. This Note argues the best remedy to this issue is for tribal immunity to be brought in line with state immunity in IPRs, thus allowing tribal sovereign immunity to apply in IPR proceedings.

I.  Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is [a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without its consent. Founded on the ancient principle that the King can do no wrong, it bars holding the government or its political subdivisions liable . . . unless such immunity is expressly waived . . . .[27]

A.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity

The Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that Congress has the authority to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”[28] By placing Indian tribes alongside states and foreign nations, the United States “recognized tribes among the family of sovereigns.”[29] Chief Justice Marshall classified tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”[30] The Court also has declared that tribes “are in many respects . . . foreign and independent nation[s],” so courts have no “power . . . to arrest the public representatives or agents of Indian nations . . . [or] compel them to pay the debts of their nation.”[31]

Today, the Supreme Court recognizes that “Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”[32] In this respect, the Court firmly grounds tribal sovereign immunity in the “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”[33] In other words, tribal sovereign immunity predates the Constitution and continues to have effect. However, the enactment of the Constitution did place limitations on the immunityconsistent with tribes’ new status as domestic dependent nationsas Congress has the authority to abrogate the immunity through the Indian Commerce Clause.[34] But to do so, Congress must speak clearly, as “courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian self-government.”[35]

Congress’s power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity has played a key role in the outcome of several cases. It is worth discussing two of these cases to provide a better understanding of how the Supreme Court approaches tribal sovereign immunity. This Section will conclude with a brief discussion of the Court’s most recent tribal sovereign immunity case, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren. The Court in Lundgren avoided establishing any new rules for tribal sovereign immunity—the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had not yet had an opportunity to opine on legal issues of immense significance to the case, and since the Supreme Court is not generally a court of first impression, the justices remanded the case to the lower courts.[36] However, the dispute in that case concerned proceedings that could be viewed as similar to IPRs, so its various opinions and dicta are instructive.

1.  Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.

In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Supreme Court held that tribal sovereign immunity can be invoked by tribes when engaged in off-reservation, commercial activity.[37] The underlying dispute in Kiowa involved stock purchased by a tribal entity from the plaintiff.[38] As part of the transaction, a promissory note was signed in the name of a tribe by which the tribe agreed to pay the plaintiff $285,000 plus interest in exchange for stock.[39] When the tribe defaulted on its payments, an action was commenced in Oklahoma state court. Once in court, the tribe moved to dismiss the case because its sovereign immunity insulated it from suit; however, both the state trial court and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled in favor of the creditor because they reasoned that tribal sovereign immunity should not apply to breaches of contract that involve “off-reservation commercial conduct.”[40] After the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion by reviewing the general principles of tribal sovereign immunity: “[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”[41]

A key factual dispute in the case was whether the promissory note was signed on Indian territory or “beyond the Tribe’s lands;”[42] however, Justice Kennedy dismissed this issue because tribal sovereign immunity does not depend “on where the tribal activities occurred.”[43] Without Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity for off-reservation, economic conduct, the Supreme Court held for the tribe, allowing them to invoke their sovereign immunity from suit.

Justice Kennedy proceeded to lay out what the Court viewed as the shaky foundation of tribal sovereign immunity, given that it “developed almost by accident.”[44] The majority believed that “[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because the it can economically “harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe” or have no awareness of tribal sovereign immunity.[45] However, the Court was not moved enough by these arguments to reverse, or even limit, the doctrine. Rather, the Supreme Court put the impetus on Congress to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in situations where they find it necessary because “Congress is in a position to weigh and accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests.”[46] Therefore, tribes enjoy sovereign immunity protections even when engaging in economic activity outside of reservations. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to reconsider this issue again in 2014. The result remained the same.

2.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

When the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community in 2014, it reaffirmed the basic holding from Kiowa that tribal sovereign immunity applies to commercial activity outside of Indian lands unless otherwise abrogated by Congress.[47] Michigan had asked the Supreme Court to find the federal statute at issue authorized their suit and abrogated tribal sovereign immunity, or alternatively, reverse Kiowa’s holding that tribal sovereign immunity applies to commercial activity on non-Indian lands.[48]

The Supreme Court first engaged in statutory construction and found that the statute did not clearly express a Congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the context at issue.[49] The Court then noted that Michigan could have negotiated a waiver of the tribe’s immunity at the outset of their dealings and, in fact, had significant leverage to do so.[50] Therefore, this was not a situation where parties dealing with tribes were left with no recourse. It is important to remember that parties remain free to negotiate waivers of sovereign immunity, thus protecting themselves in the event future litigation is required in the matter.[51]

Next, the Bay Mills Court turned its attention to reviewing the Kiowa decision and the arguments made in favor of overruling its basic holding. The Court made four arguments under stare decisis that counted against overturning its precedent. First, the decision in Kiowa was only one decision of many in a long line of precedent upholding tribal sovereign immunity.[52] Second, the Supreme Court had relied on the Kiowa precedent as a basis for subsequent rulings. Third, the Court noted that tribes, as well as individuals and entities doing business with them, have relied on the Kiowa precedent when structuring their business dealings. Finally, the Court reiterated that the law places the power in Congress to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity—not in the Court. Therefore, in order “[t]o overcome all these reasons for [the] Court to stand pat, Michigan . . . need[ed] an ace up its sleeve.”[53]

Michigan produced no ace, leaving the Court to explain that Michigan was simply rehashing the same functional arguments promoted by Kiowa’s plaintiff—because tribal business activities have become more detached from tribal governmental interests, sovereign immunity should no longer apply to a tribe’s commercial activity.[54] In Kiowa, the Court was sympathetic to these functional arguments, but still rejected them in favor of tribal sovereign immunity; the Bay Mills Court did the same.[55]

Importantly, after the Kiowa decision, Congress expressly considered abrogating tribal sovereign immunity in the context of commercial activity on non-Indian lands, but rejected a law that overturned Kiowa’s holding.[56] Therefore, Congress had spoken directly on the issue, leading the Court to defer to Congress’s decision and uphold tribal sovereign immunity for commercial activities taking place outside of tribal land.[57] Deferring to Congress kept Bay Mills in line with Justice Kennedy’s Kiowa opinion, which rested its holding on the fact that Congress had the authority to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and was better positioned to do so, since it could weigh the competing policy concerns. Bay Mills demonstrates the uneasiness the Supreme Court feels towards abrogating tribal sovereign immunity without clear congressional abrogation.

3.  Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren

In May 2018, the Supreme Court decided Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.[58] The dispute concerned tribal land that the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe’s neighbors (the Lundgrens) claimed to have adverse possessed.[59] The Lundgrens “launched a quiet title lawsuit against the Upper Skagit tribe . . . after the tribe attempted to assert ownership over a strip of land . . . the Lundgrens claim[ed] belong[ed] to them.”[60] The Tribe responded to this action by invoking their sovereign immunity. Washington State courts resolved the issue in favor of the Lundgrens, holding that “the case could go forward under in rem jurisdiction,” even though the court did not have jurisdiction over the Tribe due to sovereign immunity.[61]

This state court holding created a new exception to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. On review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court for further review, ultimately ignoring the tribal sovereign immunity issues—though it did touch on those issues in dicta and dissenting and concurring opinions.[62] The Court remanded the case on a procedural grounds because the lower court decisions improperly interpreted a Supreme Court precedent;[63] thus, the parties in the case were asking the Supreme Court to answer a legal question that had not yet been addressed by the lower courts. Namely, the parties wanted the Court to find an “immovable property” exception to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.[64] In remanding the case, the Court noted that it was the importance of the question that lead them to refrain from answering the “immovable property” exception question—“[d]etermining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before us.”[65] Therefore, whether an immovable property exception exists is an open question. Due to the similarity of the issues, the eventual resolution of this case will be instructive for the application of tribal sovereign immunity in IPRs and must be watched closely.

Justice Thomas filed a strongly worded dissent arguing that the “immovable property” exception was strongly established, thus no need to remand existed.[66] He found the idea that an entity (in this case, a tribe) could assert immunity in a suit over land situated inside another sovereign’s jurisdiction ridiculous. Further, “[a]llowing the judge-made doctrine of tribal immunity to intrude on such a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty contradicts the Constitution’s design.”[67] In making such an argument, Justice Thomas articulates a view of tribal sovereign immunity that would naturally be extended to prevent the doctrine’s assertion in IPR proceedings—since patents are historically the jurisdiction of the federal government, allowing tribal sovereign immunity there may “intrude” on the federal government’s sovereignty.[68]

B.  State Sovereign Immunity

Another set of sovereigns recognized by the Constitution is the states.[69] However, the basis for state sovereign immunity is explicitly recognized in a constitutional amendment.[70] The Eleventh Amendment says “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”[71]

A few years after the Eleventh Amendment’s enactment, the Supreme Court, in Hans v. Louisiana, held that the amendment imposed a broad understanding of state sovereign immunity.[72] This broad understanding of state sovereign immunity has largely been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.[73] Thus, unlike tribal sovereign immunity, which can be abrogated by Congress, states enjoy sovereign immunity as a Constitutional right.[74]

In patent cases, the Supreme Court has held that states cannot be subject to suit for patent infringement due to their sovereign immunity.[75] The Supreme Court has not addressed whether a state is immune from a direct challenge to the validity of its patents as would occur if a state-owned patent was challenged in an IPR proceeding.[76] However, the USPTO has opined on the issue. Several 2017 PTAB decisions hold that state-owned patents are not subject to IPR challenges due to state sovereign immunity. But these holdings are subject to the condition that sovereign immunity would be deemed waived if the state had asserted the patent in litigation against the IPR petitioner. Both the Supreme Court case and these PTAB decisions are discussed in more detail below.

1.  Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank

In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity by allowing private suits against state entities that were infringing patents under the Patent Act.[77] At issue was the Patent Act’s clear abrogation of state sovereign immunity: “[a]ny State . . . shall not be immune, under the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court . . . for infringement of a patent.”[78]

To address this issue, the Supreme Court first discussed its holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida from only a few years prior. Seminole Tribe reaffirmed that Congress is not able to use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity.[79] Rather, the only way state sovereign immunity could be abrogated is if Congress properly acted through its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers (“Section 5 enforcement powers”).[80] Because a patent is property for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Congress could have theoretically used its Section 5 enforcement powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity.[81] However, since Section 5 enforcement powers are remedial, Congress can only use them when the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions are being violated and Congress needs to step in to prevent further violation of the substantive provisions.[82] Therefore, the question became whether this was a proper use of Congress’s enforcement power. After engaging in a thorough analysis under the City of Boerne v. Flores[83] Section 5 enforcement test, the Supreme Court found the Patent Act’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity was not a proper exercise of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power.[84]

While Florida Prepaid addressed a state entity’s alleged infringement of a private party’s patent, it is instructive for its discussion of state sovereign immunity’s interplay with patent rights—allowing states to assert their sovereign immunity if made a defendant in a patent suit. A natural extension from this holding would be that state-owned patents cannot have their validity directly challenged.[85] Such a challenge to a state-owned patent’s validity would have to be in an IPR proceeding because if a state asserts their patent in an infringement suit, the suit will suffice as a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity such that the alleged infringer would be able to challenge the patent’s validity as a defense to patent infringement.[86] Although no federal appellate court has decided if direct challenges to state-owned patents are barred by sovereign immunity, PTAB decisions in 2017 have found that state sovereign immunity protects state-owned entities from having their patents attacked in IPR proceedings.[87] A general overview of these decisions is provided in this next Section.

2.  The Eleventh Amendment in Administrative Proceedings: StateOwned Patents and PTAB IPR Rulings

Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC) extends a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity beyond just Article III proceedings, covering administrative proceedings as well.[88] Additionally, in Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of University of Missouri, the Federal Circuit[89] held that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to interference proceedings[90] at the USPTO.[91] Building on this Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, PTAB issued several decisions in 2017 regarding the applicability of state sovereign immunity in IPRs.[92]

In Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc.,[93] PTAB relied on FMC and Vas-Cath to hold that state sovereign immunity is a defense in IPR proceedings.[94] But to directly apply these two precedents, PTAB needed to address a few things. First, they dealt with the argument that since patents are “public rights” they can be subject to any statutory conditions—such as being subject to review in an IPR proceeding to ensure that the patent was properly granted.[95] PTAB rejected this argument outright as “unpersuasive” because there had been no “case law, or persuasive authority” holding that “a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity may be limited or abrogated by a public rights exception.”[96] Second, PTAB also rejected the argument that sovereign immunity is irrelevant in IPRs because the “proceedings are directed to the patent itself,” and therefore, are not a private claim against the state.[97] In so deciding, PTAB asserted that the primary function of protecting a sovereign from suit is not monetary, though that is one purpose, but is according them “the respect owed . . . as joint sovereigns.”[98] This tracks recent Supreme Court decisions, the details of which are covered in Section I.C. Additionally, PTAB conceived of the IPR proceeding as a suit between parties rather than as a challenge directed solely to the patent.[99] Therefore, PTAB concluded that it is proper to apply the FMC framework in IPRs.[100]

Applying the FMC framework to IPRs, PTAB began by reaffirming the fact that “immunity applies regardless of whether a private plaintiff’s suit is for monetary damages or some other type of relief.”[101] Therefore, the “absence of monetary and injunctive relief” was irrelevant to the determination of whether state sovereign immunity could be invoked.[102] Next, PTAB considered the nature of IPRs. While noting that there were some differences in procedure and substance between IPRs and civil litigation, PTAB focused on the fact that IPRs are “adversarial” and intended to “resemble civil litigation in federal courts.”[103] Therefore, PTAB held that Eleventh Amendment immunity could be invoked in IPRs.[104]

However, PTAB went further in order to address the patent challenger’s policy argument that allowing a state to assert sovereign immunity in IPR would lead to regrettable outcomes.[105] PTAB conceded that the practical effect of the ruling would mean that states and state-owned entities no longer need to worry about having their patents challenged in the proceeding; however, the PTAB panel pointed out that exempting states from suit is exactly the point of the Eleventh Amendment.[106] The amendment, in fact, explicitly places state dignity as a sovereign above other practical considerations that may merit subjecting the state to suit.[107] Moreover, PTAB pointed out that “there is no evidence that . . . harm to the patent system . . . will come to pass.”[108]

In December 2017, PTAB convened an expanded panel of Administrative Patent Judges to hear another IPR case involving state sovereign immunity.[109] In this case, Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,[110] PTAB’s “Chief Judge Ruschke expanded the panel from the normal three administrative patent judges to seven judges, including himself and the Deputy and Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judges” and wrote the opinion himself.[111] As such, the resulting decision can be understood as PTAB’s authoritative position on the applicability of state sovereign immunity in IPRs. The expanded panel reaffirmed the prior PTAB holdings by concluding that state sovereign immunity can be invoked in IPR proceedings.[112] In coming to this conclusion, they followed Covidien’s reasoning.[113]

However, this expanded PTAB panel placed some limits on a state’s ability to invoke its sovereign immunity. The issue before the expanded panel was whether the state-entity waived its sovereign immunity by filing a patent infringement action in federal district court against the party that had instituted the IPR proceeding.[114] The state-entity argued that waiver of sovereign immunity ought to be limited to the forum in which any waiver occurred.[115] PTAB disagreed, holding that the state waived its sovereign immunity for the purposes of subsequent IPR proceedings when it brought the patent infringement suit.[116]

This holding could prove to be a slight limitation on the usefulness of deals similar to the one between Allergan and Saint Regishowever, as will be discussed in Part III, in light of Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc.,[117] the deal would be between a patent owner and a state entity rather than a tribe. This is because a party who has been sued for patent infringement in district court could simply initiate IPR review of the asserted patent. The state entity would then be barred from asserting its sovereign immunity as it would be deemed waived by the commencement of the infringement suit against the party who is challenging the patent in the IPR. However, observers of the patent system believe that Ericsson’s holding on waiver could prove to be “controversial on appeal.”[118] This is because “[w]aivers of sovereign immunity . . . are typically forum specific, and [PTAB] did not cite any direct precedent for its ruling” that extended the waiver doctrine to encompass litigation in a separate forum.[119] How this issue is resolved should be watched carefully as it could have far-reaching consequences for patent owners wishing to assert sovereign immunity in IPRs.[120]

While these PTAB decisions have not authoritatively settled the question of state sovereign immunity as a defense in IPR, they provide examples of legal reasoning that may indicate how state sovereign immunity will be dealt with in IPRs if the Federal Circuit opines on the issue.[121] This is because the Federal Circuit is likely to affirm PTAB’s legal analysis.

Through January 15, 2018, the Federal Circuit has affirmed PTAB on every issue raised in cases related to the IPR process just under seventy-four percent of the time.[122] Moreover, the PTAB decisions in Covidien and Ericsson follow what the Federal Circuit held in Vas-Cath. In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent state sovereign immunity cases have viewed sovereign immunity’s primary purpose as protecting the respect due to sovereigns. Because PTAB’s decision rests on similar reasoning, it is likely PTAB will be upheld in the event the decision somehow made it to the Supreme Court.

C.  Sovereign Immunity’s Purposes

Sovereign immunity as a historical doctrine developed out of the idea that “the King c[ould] do no wrong.”[123] This was justified on the grounds that the “King” created the law within a nation or state, and therefore could not act illegally.[124] However, this justification fell out of vogue in America in the late eighteenth century and was replaced with “a rationale emphasizing the doctrine’s benefit to society.”[125] This newer strain of thought stressed that the doctrine was necessary to protect the “sovereigns funds.”[126] Sovereigns use their money to provide services to their people, and if forced to compensate every person with a claim, sovereigns would have less money to spend on providing social services, among other necessary governmental services. While the protection of sovereign funds has been mostly abandoned as a reason to protect states and the federal government via sovereign immunity,[127] it still provides a normative basis for tribal sovereign immunity.[128]

1.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity’s Justifications

Tribal sovereign immunity can be justified with a variety of functional considerations. First, it allows tribes to protect their economic interests, so they can be self-sufficient—in other words, tribal resources will be better protected. Justice Sotomayor espoused this view in her Bay Mills concurring opinion. She wrote in concurrence to provide normative reasons supporting the outcome that reasserted the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because she viewed the doctrine as under attack, with even the majority opinion questioning the doctrine’s normative foundations.[129]

Justice Sotomayor bolstered the argument in favor of tribal sovereign immunity with an in-depth discussion of the unique issues facing tribes and the ways sovereign immunity helps. First, she pointed out that while some tribes have become “substantial and successful commercial actors,” most tribes do not participate in “lucrative commercial activity.”[130] Furthermore, “[a] key goal of the Federal Government is to render Tribes more self-sufficient, and better positioned to fund their own sovereign functions, rather than relying on federal funding.”[131] The idea is to promote tribal self-sufficiency by allowing them space to operate in the commercial arena so they can make money to perform basic functions expected of sovereigns. These functions include providing schools, roads, police, among other services.

Promoting tribal self-sufficiency is an important goal because tribes are uniquely situated compared to the other sovereigns in the United States when it comes to raising revenue to fund their government. This is because tribes face significant hurdles in imposing taxes. “[T]ribes have no power to impose taxes on non-Indian owners of land inside the reservation even if the tribe provides significant services to the owner.”[132] Additionally, tribes are deprived “of the usual means of raising government funds” as they are significantly limited in their ability to impose property taxes.[133] Tribal governments are not allowed to impose “real property tax on trust lands, which are owned by the federal government.”[134] In some reservations, trust land is equal to all of the tribe’s land.[135] Finally, raising revenue through means such as income taxes is unrealistic because “proportionally more Indians qualify for negative income taxes,” which means they actually pay less in taxes than they receive in benefits.[136] Rather, tribes’ main source of income comes from “federal transfers, which are widely acknowledged to be inadequate . . . and . . . tribe-owned enterprises.[137] These enterprises suffer from less competitive pricing, lower productivity, and worse profitability when compared to privately owned enterprises.[138]

Given these limitations on a tribe’s ability to raise money through taxation, its funds could be significantly depleted if it is expected to pay out on every claim against it. This is especially true for tribes because they are smaller sovereigns acting within much larger sovereigns—the U.S. federal government as well as state governments. As smaller sovereigns, tribes have less money to work with and therefore can be economically crippled if they end up in a situation where they are forced to pay many judgements. To illustrate, imagine a tribe consisting of several thousand people. The tribe could be engaged in economic activity with thousands of people, and if those individuals with whom they are engaged in business have claims against them, the tribe could be wiped out. For this reason, sovereign immunity is essential to maintaining the financial well-being—and independence—of tribes which directly impacts their ability to govern themselves.

In addition to promoting self-sufficiency through stronger economic development, tribal sovereign immunity promotes “Tribal Self-Government.”[139] This idea comes from the place tribes hold in the United States. Tribes are placed alongside foreign nations and states in the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause and are treated, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, as “domestic dependent nations.” As this status indicates, tribes govern their own territories. Therefore, they ought to be granted the same dignity afforded to other sovereigns—namely, immunity from suit in the absence of a waiver or congressional abrogation.[140] It is a matter of respect for them to be treated like other sovereigns in the United States.[141]

Finally, tribal sovereign immunity preserves tribal cultural identity.[142] While maintaining a distinct culture in this interconnected world may be difficult, sovereign immunity assists tribes accomplish this by preventing outside forces from imposing foreign rules and values.[143] Because sovereign immunity prevents tribes from being subject to suit in non-Indian tribunals, the tribe does not need to alter its behavior to conform with outside legal and social norms, thus allowing the tribe to chart its own path regarding the law. To the extent law is influenced by culture rather than the reverse,[144] tribal sovereign immunity provides a way for tribes to control their own culture by being free from the influence of another sovereign’s laws.[145]

2.  State Sovereign Immunity’s Justifications

Like tribal sovereign immunity, state sovereign immunity rests on justifications such as protecting state resources and promoting sovereign dignity. The Eleventh Amendment was passed due to concern with protecting state resources after the Revolutionary War because most states had accumulated large debts.[146] Recently, the Supreme Court has focused on the “preeminent purpose” of promoting sovereign dignity.[147] However, because state sovereign immunity exists as a constitutional right, it is unlike tribal sovereign immunity, in which the purposes of the doctrine loom larger because Congress can abrogate it at any time.

II.  Reasons for the Allergan-Saint Regis Deal

The basic idea behind Allergan’s action is simple. The deal made Saint Regis the owner of the Restasis patent, which should leave the Tribe to defend the patent’s validity in any IPR proceeding. In defending the Restasis patent in the IPR, Saint Regis’s Motion to Terminate the proceeding argued: “[t]he tribe is a sovereign government that cannot be sued unless Congress unequivocally abrogates its immunity or the tribe expressly waives it. Neither of these exceptions apply here.”[148] Saint Regis is correct that the tribe’s sovereign immunity has not been abrogated by Congress for IPRs and that Saint Regis has not waived its immunity. In fact, in IPR decisions from 2017, PTAB validated this approach in the context of state sovereign immunity by claiming lack of jurisdiction over a proceeding involving a state-owned patent. As a result, it appeared that by slightly extending PTAB’s logic from its 2017 state sovereign immunity decisions, the Restasis patent would be safe from being challenged in the IPR. However, as will be discussed in Part III, both PTAB and the Federal Circuit disagreed and held that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPR proceedings.

Even so, the motives for the Allergan-Saint Regis deal are still important to understand. As discussed in Section I.B.2, states and state-owned entities are still able to assert sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings, which could lead to patent owners seeking deals with those entities as possible protection for their patents. Therefore, it is possible—though perhaps unlikely—that these sorts of deals could proliferate.

A.  Are These Good Deals for Participants?

Yes. The deals are extremely attractive for tribes, states, and patent owners. They would allow patent owners to evade challenges to their patents in IPR proceedings, which is extremely valuable due to high invalidation rates of patents in IPRs. Independent analysis of invalidation in IPRs finds that anywhere between 62% to 92% of the patents challenged are invalidated, depending upon the technology at issue.[149] Moreover, a recent review found that fifty-eight patents had been invalidated by PTAB on the exact same grounds with which a district court had previously upheld their validity, thus demonstrating PTAB’s “slanted playing field.”[150] In addition, challenged patents represent a substantial asset for the patent owner. In Allergan’s case, the Restasis patent is valued at $1.5 billion.[151] The price of having such a valuable patent invalidated is steep. Allergan prepared for such a possibility by announcing it would layoff over 1,000 employees, costing the company an expected $125 million just in severance expenses.[152] Companies, therefore, have strong incentives to adopt measures to protect their intellectual property.[153] Paying several million dollars to “rent” a tribe’s or state’s sovereign immunity is a small price to pay to protect the patent’s validity.[154]

For tribes, deals like these provide a good way to earn much-needed money.[155] The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe has 15,600 members and is geographically centered in upstate New York.[156] Saint Regis planned to put this money to use by enhancing government services such as “health, welfare, education, housing and other services.”[157] As discussed in Section I.C, tribes have a hard time raising revenue because they have a limited tax-base. Therefore, tribes must get creative to raise money. While casinos are a lucrative option for some tribes, a large majority of tribes have not been able to tap into casinos for any meaningful amount of revenue.[158] Providing this service to pharmaceutical and technology companies who have patents being challenged in IPRs would provide substantial revenue raising opportunities for tribes that desperately need it.[159]

B.  Are Such Deals a Good Thing?

No. In the case of Allergan and Saint Regis, the two parties use Saint Regis’s sovereign immunity to escape a procedure by which Allergan’s Restasis patent may be invalidated through a mechanism designed by Congress. This violates common notions of fairness by engaging in a “sham” transaction through which Allergan keeps a potentially improperly granted patent because they had the money to “rent” Saint Regis’s sovereign immunity. The deal acts as a loophole through which a big pharmaceutical companythat has access to expensive lawyershas exploited a process in a way that is completely unavailable to patent owners who possess fewer resources.

Arguments made on behalf of Saint Regis and Allergan, while satisfying on the surface, ultimately stumble under scrutiny. An argument supporting this deal notes that IPRs have been deemed a patent “death squad” as most patents are invalidated by the process.[160] Critics of IPRs have noted that by engaging in deals like the one between Allergan and Saint Regis, economically valuable patents may be better protected, thus stimulating more investment in research and development on products that improve people’s lives.

Yet this argument is satisfactory only to the extent that it highlights needed reforms to IPRs. While the IPR process may be flawed, those flaws should not be cured by creating an end run around the Patent Office. Doing it this way diminishes the credibility of the entire system, misallocates money by paying millions of dollars to lawyers and tribes to make the deal, and only benefits companies with resources to pay for the expensive licensing agreement and the lawyers who structure it. Therefore, any fixes to the IPR process should be done by Congress—not by private actors.[161]

Others find the deal appealing because it provides a much-needed revenue source to economically struggling tribes.[162] However, while it does enhance tribal economic independence, it accomplishes that goal by disrupting the congressionallydesigned patent system. Where tribes need to find more funding sources, steps should be taken independently of the patent system. Addressing one problem while undermining an unrelated government program is not a sustainable way to fix anything.

Furthermore, while this could boost funding for a small class of tribes, the actual benefit to most tribes will likely be marginal. Money received in these ventures could be difficult to rely on as the amount may vary dramatically over time. In fact, the appeal of such a deal could hurt early participants the most. As more sovereigns[163] recognize the upside, benefits could become more widely spread, thus leading to fewer benefits for all recipients as the funding sources are spread across a larger number of entities.[164] In addition, if the practice does not become widespread, that means tribes who need the revenue are not reaping the benefits, thus further limiting the benefit of these deals as a solution to tribal revenue issues.

As a panacea for tribal funding, then, this is a poorly targeted program. Either only a select few tribes will benefit, leaving many unable to obtain its benefits, or many will take advantage of these deals, meaning the benefit to each tribe will be small and the amount received will shrink over time as more sovereign actors take advantage of the practice. The problems faced by tribes in the financial sphere is something that should be addressed. However, promoting more deals like the one between Allergan and Saint Regis is not an efficacious solution because these deals will provide only a marginal benefit, at best.[165]

III.  Decisions in the Allergan-Saint Regis IPR

Since the deal was made in September 2017, litigation has proceeded over the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity of IPRs, resulting in opinions from both PTAB and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Both opinions found tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPRs. As will be discussed below, a proper reading of PTAB, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that these decisions were incorrect.

A. Patent Trial and Appeal Board 2018 Decision

1.  PTAB Does Not Apply Tribal Sovereign Immunity in IPRs

On February 23, 2018, PTAB denied Saint Regis’s Motion to Terminate IPR proceedings due to tribal sovereign immunity.[166] After going through the history of the deal between Allergan and Saint Regis, PTAB rejected that the Supreme Court’s decision in FMC[167]which allowed state sovereign immunity to be invoked in administrative proceedings—had any bearing on the application of tribal sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings.[168] Moreover, it distinguished its own decisions allowing state sovereign immunity to be invoked in IPRs because “the immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not co-extensive with that of the states”[169] and “there are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the . . . doctrine.”[170]

PTAB further based its decision on Congress’s plenary control over tribal sovereign immunity and noted that the Patent Act is a generally applicable statute that places conditions on the grant of a patent, which includes the possibility of being subject to IPR proceedings.[171] PTAB relied on a variety of circuit court decisions, noting that only in limited circumstances do generally applicable laws not apply to tribes, then found that IPR proceedings do not meet these limited circumstances.[172] PTAB also relied on prior cases in which government administrative enforcement actions against tribes were deemed not to have implicated tribal sovereign immunity because “tribes cannot impose sovereign immunity to bar the federal government from exercising its trust obligations.”[173] Moreover, IPRs are not the type of suit to which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy immunity under the common law.”[174]

PTAB concluded this section of the opinion by noting that it does “not exercise personal jurisdiction over the patent owner,” rather, it is over “the challenged patent in an inter partes review proceeding.”[175] In a footnote, the opinion rejects characterizing the proceedings as in rem because they could find no “controlling precedent” for that proposition.[176]

Finally, PTAB concluded that even if tribal sovereign immunity applied in IPRs, the proceeding may continue because Allergan still effectively owns the patent.[177] Allergan is found to be a “patent owner” because the license from Saint Regis to Allergan “transferred ‘all substantial rights’ in the challenged patents”—including the “right to sue for infringement,” the “right to make, use, and sell products or services under the patents,” the “right to sublicense,” the “reversionary rights in patents,” the “right to litigation or licensing proceeds,” among others.[178] In addition, the “tribe is not an indispensable party” to the proceeding, thus, PTAB allowed the IPR to continue without the Tribe.[179] This decision was appealed by Saint Regis and Mohawk to the Federal Circuit.[180]

2.  Issues with the PTAB Decision

PTAB’s decision suffered from numerous flaws that should have made it a prime candidate for reversal on appeal. First, its rejection of state sovereign immunity precedent dealing with the doctrine’s applicability in administrative proceedings because tribal immunity is “not co-extensive with that of the States”[181] dramatically misunderstands the Supreme Court’s tribal sovereign immunity case law. This quote from Kiowa, when read in context, actually stands for the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity is broader than state sovereign immunity in some respects.[182] Yet PTAB relied on it for just the opposite proposition; the panel’s fundamental misunderstanding of Kiowa is evident throughout the rest of its opinion.

Other than this out-of-context quote from Kiowa, PTAB provided no reasons for holding that tribal sovereign immunity is situated differently from state sovereign immunity in IPRs or other administrative proceedings. PTAB did not attempt to distinguish other administrative adjudications that found tribal sovereign immunity applicable; rather, it dismissed them all as non-binding and simply asserted that tribal sovereign immunity is so different from state sovereign immunity that it must not apply.

The remaining arguments from PTAB hold up just as poorly under scrutiny. PTAB asserted that only in limited circumstances do generally applicable laws not apply to tribes. However, this misunderstands the issue, which is whether the tribe can assert its sovereign immunity from suit—not whether the tribe must follow a particular law. As PTAB decided in Covidien, which followed FMC and held that state sovereign immunity applies in IPR proceedings, IPRs are adversarial in nature and modeled on civil litigation.[183] Covidien explicitly found that IPRs are properly conceived of as a civil suit between two parties, rather than as an administrative enforcement proceeding.[184] PTAB’s holding in the Saint Regis case is directly at odds with its own holding in Covidien and Ericssonthe latter being PTAB’s authoritative view on state sovereign immunity in IPRs given the make-up of the expanded panel that decided it. Framing the IPR component of the Patent Act as an enforcement proceeding (rather than an adjudicative proceeding) is incorrect according to PTAB’s own decisions. Rather, as Covidien held, IPRs are modeled as a civil suit, which is the type of proceeding in which tribes historically have sovereign immunity protection.[185]

PTAB also argued its jurisdiction in IPRs is over “the challenged patent,” rather than over the tribe itself.[186] However, Covidien, again, is instructive as it reached the exact opposite conclusion when state sovereign immunity was at issue. PTAB’s Covidien decision applied state sovereign immunity because sovereign immunity’s “central purpose is to accord the States the respect owed them as joint sovereigns.”[187] Moreover, PTAB in Covidien pointed to the adversarial nature of the proceeding, the parties’ involvement in it, and the procedure imposed on PTAB’s authority to review the challenged patents as reasons the proceeding should be understood as having jurisdiction over the patent owner, rather than the patent itself.[188] PTAB in the Saint Regis case does not attempt to explain why it reaches precisely the opposite result in the tribal sovereign immunity context.[189]

PTAB reaffirmed Covidien’s basic holding in Ericsson.[190] There, PTAB convened an expanded panel in which PTAB’s Chief Judge Ruschke wrote the opinion.[191] After Ericsson, it can be reasonably concluded that the authoritative PTAB view applies state sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings for the reasons provided in Covidien. By adopting Covidien’s reasoning on the applicability of state sovereign immunity to IPRs, the Ericsson holding rests upon conclusions of law that the Saint Regis panel directly contradicts without providing any explanation.

In the Saint Regis proceeding, PTAB simply asserted that tribal immunity is different and moved on. However, tribal sovereign immunity is not different from state sovereign immunity in this context. Both doctrines promote the dignity of the sovereign, while helping protect the sovereign’s economic well-being—the latter reason being even more compelling for tribal sovereign immunity given the economic difficulties tribes experience compared to states. The better result would have been to extend Ericsson and Covidien to find that tribal sovereign immunity applies in IPRs. Unfortunately, the decision appeared to be motivated by a desire to stop deals like one between Allergan and Saint Regis from becoming an option for patent owners.[192] The main difference between the state proceedings and the tribal proceeding is that the tribal proceeding garnered significant negative press. Unfortunately, simply shutting down the Allergan-Saint Regis deal ignores the negative impacts on tribal sovereign immunity going forward.

    1.  The Federal Circuit Decision to Not Apply Tribal Sovereign Immunity in an IPR Proceeding

The Federal Circuit approached the question of whether tribal sovereign immunity applies in IPRs in much the same way as PTAB did, also finding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPRs.[193] After briefly discussing the case’s procedural history, the Federal Circuit began by laying out the rules of tribal sovereign immunity. It noted that “[g]enerally, immunity does not apply where the federal government . . . engages in an investigative action or pursues an adjudicatory agency action,” while acknowledging the FMC rule that immunity can “apply in federal agency proceedings.[194] The court described the FMC rule as allowing immunity in “adjudicative proceedings brought . . . by a private party,” but not allowing immunity in “agency-initiated enforcement proceedings.”[195] Therefore, the key question in front of the Federal Circuit was which of these two types proceedings is most analogous to IPRs.[196]

 However, answering this question was not straightforward for the Federal Circuit, as it noted IPRs are complicated, “hybrid proceeding[s]” that combine both traditional adjudicatory aspects with characteristics similar to “specialized agency proceeding[s].”[197] The Federal Circuit reviewed “several factors” that led it to determine that “IPR[s] [are] more like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit.”[198]

 First, IPRs are only instituted if the USPTO Director decides to grant review, much like a traditional enforcement action. While it is a private party that requests the review, the Director has “broad discretion in deciding whether to institute review.”[199] Therefore, IPRs are unlike the agency in FMC, which could not refuse to adjudicate private complaints. This means that a federal official is the one deciding to haul a sovereign into “court,” rather than a private party. Second, even though most IPRs are conducted in an adversarial nature between two private parties, the USPTO retains the ability to “continue review even if [a party] chooses not to participate.”[200]

 Next, the Federal Circuit pointed to the “substantial” differences between IPR procedures and the Federal Rules of Civil procedure.[201] It noted the far greater extent of discovery in district court litigation, the opportunity for live testimony at trial, and various differences in pleadings, with the Federal Rules being more liberal in allowing changes. Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that despite the USPTO having options for reexamination that are more inquisitorial than IPR proceedings—in which even the tribe acknowledged sovereign immunity would not apply under FMCthe existence of these options does not make IPRs adjudicatory proceedings. Rather “[w]hile IPR[s] present a closer case for the application of tribal immunity than reexamination, [the Federal Circuit] nonetheless conclude[d] that tribal immunity does not extend to these . . . reconsideration decisions.”[202] In deciding this, the court noted that IPRs are intended to “reexamine . . . agency decision[s].”[203]

 This decision suffers from many of the same issues that the PTAB decision suffered from, which will not be rehashed here. Further issues with the decision will be discussed in Part IV—with a particular focus on how the Federal Circuit incorrectly conceived of IPRs as agency enforcement actions rather than administrative adjudications. In addition to the faulty legal analysis, the bigger issue is the effect of this decision: tribal sovereign immunity cannot be invoked during IPRs, while state sovereign immunity can be. This creates a sort of second-class immunity for the very sovereigns that need the immunity most.

IV.  TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY’S UNEQUAL STATUS WITH STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

 With its decision in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal Circuit established that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPRs.[204] However, as discussed in Section I.B.2, PTAB decisions have previously found that states can invoke their sovereign immunity from suit when having their patents challenged in an IPR proceeding. The reason for this comes from inconsistent legal positions on how to conceive IPRs—that is, treating them as either adjudicatory agency actions or as agency enforcement actions. This inconsistency will be discussed below in Section IV.A.2, which contemplates how to address this inconsistency, while Section IV.A.1 argues that in addition to this inconsistency being based on legal error, this inequality in immunity is normatively undesirable for the way that it negatively impacts tribes, ultimately depriving them of a benefit bestowed on other sovereigns for no just reason.

A. The Inconsistency

 In Saint Regis, the Federal Circuit explicitly did not decide whether state sovereign immunity applies in IPRs; instead, it only explained that tribal sovereign immunity.[205] By leaving this question unanswered, prior PTAB decisions allowing states to invoke their sovereign immunity IPR proceedings were left on shaky footing.[206] This inconsistency in whether states and tribes are allowed to invoke their sovereign immunities in IPRs stems from the conception of the IPR proceeding itself as either adjudicative or enforcement-based. Currently, states can assert their sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings because IPRs are allegedly similar to adjudicative actions, while tribes may not assert their sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings because IPRs are supposedly more similar to enforcement actions.[207]

1.  This Inconsistency Matters and Should Be Fixed

  At a basic level, this inconsistency matters because it stems from an inconsistent legal position taken on the conception of IPRs—adjudicative versus enforcement—rather than a real, substantive differences between tribal and state sovereign immunity.[208]

 This inconsistent treatment of the nature of IPRs should be addressed, and the proper resolution should be that IPRs are similar to district court litigation such that, under FMC, sovereign immunity should apply.[209] First, In the USPTO’s own words, IPRs are trial proceeding[s] adjudicated before PTAB.[210] They are very similar to civil litigation in that they are an adversarial process with discovery, deadlines, and binding decisions. As discussed by PTAB in both Covidien and Ericsson, IPRs share a number of similarities with district court patent litigation.[211] IPRs are initiated by a third party, typically a competitor of the patent owner.[212] Moreover, the proceeding contains many of the safeguards for its participants that district court litigation does, including the prevention of harassment, clear pleading rules, and impartial, politically-insulated decisionmakers.[213]

 Further, the Code of Federal Regulations even provides IPR practitioners with a “trial practice” guide for when they appear “before the patent trial and appeal board,[214] further indicating the specific design of IPR practice to be modeled on civil litigation. A review of the legislative history surrounding the creation of IPRs is consistent with this. The framers of the process envisioned IPRs as adjudicative proceedings, not an enforcement proceeding.[215] Congressional intent appears to have been that “IPRs [are] to serve as a substitute for district court litigation with respect to the key issue of validity.”[216] Based on the similarities of IPR and district court litigation, the FMC framework should apply, meaning that sovereign immunity can be invoked in an IPR from a legal standpoint.[217]

 Beyond just the improper conception of IPRs adopted by PTAB and the Federal Circuit in this case, state and tribal sovereign immunity do not differ enough for this result. In fact, while there are legal differences between tribal and state sovereign immunity, any legal difference between the doctrines should actually break in favor of tribal immunity for both legal and normative reasons.

 First, tribes were not present at the original Constitutional Convention. While they were considered during the drafting of the Constitution and by the early U.S. governments in treaty discussions,[218] tribes did not have any actual input into either the drafting or the ratification of the Constitution. This is quite unlike states, which played an essential role in both drafting and ratification.[219] Given states roles in the drafting of the Constitution, a state sovereign immunity doctrine has developed which says that states can be found to have given up their immunity in some contexts in the “plan of the convention.”[220] While this is a limited doctrine in the state sovereign immunity context—state sovereign immunity case law is largely grounded in the Eleventh Amendment—it does not apply to tribes. Tribes were not present at the convention and, thus, cannot be said to have waived any immunity in the “plan of the convention.” Therefore, in many respects, tribal sovereign immunity is broader than state.[221]

 Second, the Supreme Court, in both Kiowa and Bay Mills, has made it clear that absent actual waiver by a tribe, tribal sovereign immunity does not apply only when Congress has clearly decided to abrogate it. Here, no abrogation occurred, despite former Senator Claire McCaskill introducing legislation to do so. When introducing her legislation, she expressed outrage that it was “one of the most brazen and absurd loopholes I’ve ever seen, and it should be illegal.”[222] However, since the bill was introduced in October 2017, it has not made any progress in Congress. This possibly reflects its status a low priority item for a Congress that has issues passing legislation higher on its priority list. In addition, Congress has been hesitant in the past to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. As mentioned in Bay Mills, Congress considered abrogating tribal sovereign immunity in the context of commercial, off-reservation activity, but declined to act despite the potentially bad consequences of allowing tribes to engage in such commercial activity without the possibility of being held accountable in court. Given congressional silence in the face of knowing about the problem, courts should be wary of taking actions that fly in the face of Congress’s decision, especially given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on deferring to Congress on issues of tribal sovereign immunity.

Yet beyond these legal issues, there are normative reasons to be concerned about as well. First, courts should be wary of abrogating tribal sovereignty because they should wish to show tribes their due respect as sovereigns. Courts should not want to damage the financial health of the tribes; statistics show poor economic health in tribal territory. For example, “[f]ive of the poorest [ten] counties in the United States are in Indian country.”[223] Therefore, courts should tread lightly when considering any action that that could economically cripple a tribe, including taking away their tribal sovereign immunity in IPRs, which puts them at a disadvantage compared to states. States are still able to take advantage of their sovereign immunity in IPRs and, thus, as discussed in Section II.A, would have strong incentives to engage in these deals with patent owners.

Further, a key reason to promote the doctrine of sovereign immunity is to show the sovereign the respect that it is owed as a sovereign. Treating tribes and states differently here sends the message that tribes are lesser sovereigns than states. Given a long history of tribal oppression in the United States, effort should be made to foster respect owed to these sovereign entities. Legal rules that do the opposite should be renounced or, at least, reconsidered.

2.  Addressing the Inconsistency

 The Supreme Court should review and reverse the Federal Circuit ruling, allowing tribal sovereign immunity to apply in IPRs. In late 2018, Saint Regis appealed the Federal Circuit ruling to the Supreme Court.[224] There is a possibility that “[t]his case is headed for the Supreme Court,[225] where it will likely be reversed. This is the most desirable option available because it accomplishes several things. First, it puts tribes and states back on an even playing field when it comes to IPR sovereign immunity. This is beneficial because being able to assert sovereign immunity in an IPR proceeding is an economic benefit, as evidenced by how the Saint Regis tribe and others began to eagerly promote this service.[226] In addition, it reinstates tribes as equal sovereigns to states, thus allowing them to regain respect that is owed to them as sovereigns.

 In the absence of Supreme Court intervention, PTAB and the Federal Circuit could reverse their view on state sovereign immunity.[227] This alternative response would require PTAB to reverse course and disallow state sovereign immunity from applying in IPRs. While this is not normatively desirable, this would be the response most consistent with the Federal Circuit’s approach in Saint Regis, given how it framed IPRs as an enforcement proceeding.[228] However, the Federal Circuit’s Saint Regis opinion suffers from serious flaws in how it conceives of IPRs—it is also flawed because it largely ignores tribal sovereign immunity case law—and, therefore, its legal error should be reversed rather than extended, making this an undesirable option even though it has the benefit of putting tribes and states on an even playing field in IPRs.

CONCLUSION

In order to ensure that tribes are respected as co-sovereigns, tribal sovereign immunity should be found to apply in IPRs. There has been no congressional abrogation and state sovereign immunity has typically applied in such proceedings. As such, the Allergan-Saint Regis deal should be upheld. The Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit decision preventing Saint Regis from asserting its immunity for several reasonsthe Federal Circuit misunderstood the essential adversarial nature of IPR proceedings, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on state and tribal sovereign immunity, and the reasons underlying the sovereign immunity doctrine. This incorrect result is fundamentally unjust, treating sovereign tribes as lesser than states for no good reason. This improper ruling calls for immediate Supreme Court intervention and reversal.

In addition, the Allergan-Saint Regis deal highlighted many issues of pressing importance. Going forward, these issues are in need of more public debateon topics such as the financial situation of tribes and issues patent owners have with IPR proceedings. Each problem requires further study, thought, and innovation to be properly solved. However, as a first step, the Supreme Court should step in and fix the errors of PTAB and the Federal Circuit, restoring the proper respect owed to tribe sovereigns.

 


[*] *. Editor-in-Chief, Southern California Law Review, Volume 92; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; M.S. Mechanical Engineering 2013, University of Minnesota; B.A. Physics 2012, Saint John’s University. I am eternally grateful to my incredible wife, Margaret, for her endless love, support, and patience over the last three years. Thank you to my parents, Jim and Teri, for all their encouragement and support. In addition, thank you to Professor Sam Erman for his guidance, time, and input as I worked through many versions of this Note. Finally, thank you to Katie Schmidt, Karen Blevins, Kevin Ganley, and the rest of the talented Southern California Law Review editors for their great work.

 [1]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, Hum. Rts., Spring 2015, at 3, 3, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2616802.

 [2]. See Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law, SLS Blogs: Legal Aggregate (Sept. 13, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/13/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent
-law (“Congress can readily use its plenary power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in patent law.”).

 [3]. Fletcher, supra note 1; see also U.S. Const. amend. XI. There is an academic debate over the precise contours of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and whether or not it actually enshrines state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1035 (1982). This Note does not opine on this issue.

 [4]. Sovereign Immunity, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

 [5]. See infra Section I.B for further discussion of state sovereign immunity’s meaning and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject.

 [6]. Id. The differences between tribal sovereign immunity and state sovereign immunity are discussed infra Part III. However, at the outset, it is important to remember that state sovereign immunity is based on the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, while tribal sovereign immunity is not enshrined in a specific constitutional amendment; rather, it is federal common law. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 764–65 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

 [7]. Restasis is most commonly used to treat dry eye but can also be used to treat more serious medical conditions. See Allergan, About RESTASIS® and RESTASIS MultiDose®, Restasis, https://www.restasis.com/about-restasis-and-restasis-multidose (last visited Mar. 29, 2019); Restasis Patient Information Including Side Effects, RxList, https://www.rxlist.com/restasis-drug/patient-images-side-effects.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2019).

 [8]. Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native American Tribe, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/health/allergan-patent-tribe.html.

 [9]. Press Release, Allergan, Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements Regarding RESTASIS® Patents (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters
/allergan-and-saint-regis-mohawk-tribe-announce-agr. The Restasis patent expires in 2024, and its value has been estimated at $1.5 billion. Id.; Jan Wolfe, Allergan Ruling Casts Doubt on Tribal Patent Strategy, Reuters (Oct. 17, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents-analysis
/allergan-ruling-casts-doubt-on-tribal-patent-strategy-idUSKBN1CM369.

 [10]. Inter Partes Review, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last visited Mar. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Inter Partes Review, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.]; Inter Partes Review Replaces Inter Partes Reexamination, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.taftlaw.com
/news-events/law-bulletins/inter-partes-review-replaces-inter-partes-reexamination.

 [11]. Inter Partes Review, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 10.

 [12]. Wolfe, supra note 9 (discussing a quote from Judge William Bryson of the Federal Circuit that casts the legality of “rent[ing]” a tribe’s sovereign immunity into doubt).

 [13]. S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017).

 [14]. See infra Section II.A.

 [15]. Lawrence Hoffman, Inter Partes Review: Good or Bad for Patent Owners, Ehrlich & Fenster (Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.ipatent.co.il/inter-partes-review-good-or-bad-for-patent-owners.

 [16]. The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the IPR process in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). The case challenged IPR constitutionality because IPRs extinguish private property rights (patents) through a non-Article III venue. Id. at 137273. The precise details of this case are beyond the scope of this Note; however, the key takeaway is that IPRs are constitutional.

 [17]. For a more detailed discussion of the deal’s upsides, see infra Part II.

 [18]. See Susan Decker, Tribal Lawyer Shops Patent-Shielding Idea to State Universities, Bloomberg L. (Oct. 19, 2017, 1:11 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-law/triballawyer-shops-patent-shielding-idea-to-state-universities.

 [19]. Id.

 [20]. It is important to keep in mind that while deals like this prevent patents from being invalidated by IPR, such patents may still be challenged when asserted in district court litigation. In nearly all patent litigation, the alleged infringer argues that the patent being asserted against them is invalid. In such cases, the patent owner will not be able to assert tribal sovereign immunity as they will have been deemed to have waived their immunity by entering the forum through litigation.

 [21]. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Rules Tribal Sovereign Immunity Cannot Be Asserted in IPRs, IPWatchdog (July 20, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/20/federal-circuit-tribal-sovereign
-immunity-cannot-asserted-iprs/id=99504.

 [22]. States could engage in these deals in addition to tribes. Therefore, even if the Federal Circuit decision finding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPRs is upheld, Congress may still face pressure to address this issue because it could become widespread if a few cash-needy states engage in these deals.

 [23]. However, actual proposals for improving the IPR system go beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the application of tribal sovereign immunity to IPR proceedings.

 [24]. The Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”) hears IPR challenges and is located inside the USPTO. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a)(b) (2012). The USPTO is part of the federal government’s executive branch.

 [25]. Many of these issues stem from issues with the IPR proceeding itself. While an evaluation of the IPR proceeding is beyond the scope of this Note, if IPRs are part of the problem, a good congressional response would be to reform the IPR proceeding, thus reducing incentives for patent owners to engage in these deals. This approach would leave tribal sovereign immunity in place as a defense in IPRs (which as this Note argues infra Parts III and IV is normatively desirable), while focusing on reforming the IPR system such that it may no longer be considered a “death trap” for patent owners.

 [26]. See infra Section I.A.

 [27]. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4.

 [28]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

 [29]. William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1625 (2013).

 [30]. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).

 [31]. Wood, supra note 29, at 1641 (quoting Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850) (second alteration in original)).

 [32]. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (holding a tribe was immune from an action taken to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act in federal court through declaratory and injunctive relief). Additionally, in Santa Clara Pueblo, the Supreme Court elaborated on reasons for this immunity such as the financial burdens that being subject to suit could impose on the “financially disadvantaged” tribes. Id. at 64.

 [33]. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (emphasis omitted).

 [34]. Id. at 323 (discussing Congress’s plenary power to regulate the conduct of tribes).

 [35]. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014).

 [36]. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1654–55 (2018).

 [37]. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).

 [38]. Id. at 753–54.

 [39]. Id.

 [40]. Id. at 754.

 [41]. Id.

 [42]. Id. at 753–54.

 [43]. Id. at 754.

 [44]. Id. at 756. Justice Kennedy explains this phenomenon in his opinion by arguing that Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 355 (1919), the case cited for the proposition that tribes enjoy immunity from suit, did not originally stand for this particular proposition. Rather, Justice Kennedy believes that tribal sovereign doctrine only came to exist through the Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). But see Wood, supra note 29, at 1587 (criticizing Kennedy’s historical analysis of the doctrine’s development).

 [45]. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.

 [46]. Id. at 758–59.

 [47]. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788–90 (2014).

 [48]. Id. at 791.

 [49]. Id. at 791–804 (evaluating Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provisions).

 [50]. Id. at 796–97. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

If a State really wants to sue a tribe for gaming outside Indian lands, the State need only bargain for a waiver of immunity. . . . States have more than enough leverage to obtain such terms because a tribe cannot conduct class III gaming on its lands without a compact . . . and cannot sue to enforce a State’s duty to negotiate a compact in good faith . . . . So as Michigan forthrightly acknowledges, ‘a party dealing with a tribe in contract negotiations has the power to protect itself by refusing to deal absent the tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.’ . . . And many States have taken that path.

Id. (citations omitted).

 [51]. This reasoning would not apply in the Allergan-Saint Regis case. There, waiver of sovereign immunity would not be negotiable by third parties as the third parties by definition were not present when the licensing deal was made. It is interesting though that when Allergan made this deal with Saint Regis, it secured a limited waiver of the Tribe’s immunity as it related to any potential litigation arising from the deal. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *10 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (denying Saint Regis’s motion to terminate the proceeding).

 [52]. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 798 (explaining that the Kiowa Court positioned itself as simply following well-established precedent that tribal immunity does not have “any exceptions for commercial or off-reservation conduct”).

 [53]. Id. at 799.

 [54]. Id at 798–801.

 [55]. Id.

 [56]. Id. at 802–03.

 [57]. Id.

 [58]. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018).

 [59]. Andrew Westney, Justices May Cinch Immunity Loophole in Upper Skagit Case, Law360 (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1008098/justices-may-cinch-immunity-loophole-in-upper-skagit-case.

 [60]. Id.

 [61]. Id.

 [62]. Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1654–55.

 [63]. See id. at 1651–53.

 [64]. See id. at 1654.

 [65]. Id.

 [66]. Id. at 1661–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

 [67]. Id. at 1663.

 [68]. However, as will be discussed infra Part III, neither PTAB or the Federal Circuit relied on reasoning similar to Justice Thomas’s to decide that tribal immunity does not apply in IPR.

 [69]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[R]egulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”).

 [70]. See U.S. Const. amend. XI.

 [71]. Id.

 [72]. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1890) (holding that despite clear textual language to the contrary, citizens of a state are not allowed to sue the state of which they are a citizen).

 [73]. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56–­57 (1996).

 [74]. As mentioned supra note 3, the specific nuances of state sovereign immunity are beyond the scope of this Note.

 [75]. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.

 [76]. A holding on this issue would be instructive for the Allergan-Saint Regis case because Allergan’s patent was having its validity challenged in IPR when the deal took place.

 [77]. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).

 [78]. Id. at 632 (citation omitted) (providing the statute at issue’s language, which clearly abrogated state sovereign immunity).

 [79]. Id. at 636–37 (discussing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59).

 [80]. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (discussing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452–56 (1976)).

 [81]. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636–37 (discussing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59–60).

 [82]. Id.

 [83]. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).

 [84]. Fla. Prepaid, at 646–47. The Court evaluated the various requirements introduced in City of Boerne. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. A deeper discussion of these requirements is beyond the scope of this Note.

 [85]. There are two ways a state’s patent could be challenged. First, the patent could be challenged in a post-grant proceeding at the Patent Office such as an IPR proceeding. Second, in a case where the state is the plaintiff, the defendant (that is, the alleged infringer) could challenge the patent’s validity during district court litigation. See David Carnes, How to Challenge a Patent, Legalzoom, https://info.legalzoom.com/challenge-patent-21969.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). IPRs are the only venue in which sovereign immunity could be helpful because by filing suit against an alleged infringer, the sovereign would be deemed to have waived its immunity for the purposes of that litigation.

 [86]. See Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. California, 505 F.3d 1328, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

 [87]. Catherine Garza & Paula Heyman, Sovereign Immunity Protects State-Funded Patent Owners from Post-Grant Proceedings, Lexology: PTAB Trials Blog (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d1a3c68b-efdc-4c16-bae8-d5fdd2b6feba (noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has addressed this question).

 [88]. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth. (FMC), 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (holding that a state entity was immune from an adjudication at the Federal Maritime Commission because of the similarities that such proceedings have with civil litigation).

 [89]. Appeals of PTAB decisions are reviewed by the Federal Circuit. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases that occur in federal district court. Federal Circuit decisions, along with Supreme Court decisions, are binding in the realm of patent law on PTAB and federal district courts. See id.

 [90]. In interference proceedings, the Patent Office seeks to settle a dispute over which party invented the patented product or method first. See Introduction to USPTO Patent Interference Practice, McNeely, Hare & War LLP, http://www.patentek.com/patent-interference-overview (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). This proceeding was necessary because the United States patent system granted a patent to the first inventor. However, in 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act, which eliminated interferences as a part of patent law in the United States. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 290 (2011). This is because the law altered the patent system to a first-to-file system, where the first entity to file for a patent is granted the patent, regardless of who invented it first. See Introduction to USPTO Patent Interference Practice, supra.

 [91]. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the reasoning in FMC applied to interference proceedings because they “bear ‘strong similarities’ to civil litigation, . . . can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit”).

 [92]. Garza & Heyman, supra note 87.

 [93]. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-1274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).

 [94]. Garza & Heyman, supra note 87.

 [95]. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *5.

 [96]. Id.

 [97]. Id. at *6 (presenting the argument from the party challenging the patent).

 [98]. Id. at *6 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002)).

 [99]. Id. Note that this conception of IPR means that the ultimate disposition of Upper Skagit, discussed supra Section I.A.3., would not be applicable. That case concerns whether the “immovable property” exception applies to tribal sovereign immunity. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 (2018). The point of that exception, as noted by Justice Thomas in dissent, is that sovereign immunity should not extend to actions over property within another sovereign’s jurisdiction. Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1661–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Here, given the Patent Clause of the Constitution, exclusive jurisdiction is given to the federal government over patents. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This means that patents are a property exclusively of federal jurisdiction, much like a physical property is exclusively within a state’s jurisdiction. Therefore, extending Justice Thomas’s view to the IPR case, would mean that sovereign immunity should not apply in IPRs due to the fact that patents are exclusively within federal jurisdiction. However, since PTAB views IPRs as adversarial in Covidien, this type of analysis is inapplicable.

 [100]. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *8. The FMC approach is used to determine whether sovereign immunity applies in administrative proceedings. IPRs are an administrative proceeding.

 [101]. Id. at *9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FMC, 535 U.S. at 765).

 [102]. Id.

 [103]. Id. The PTAB decision extensively details all the ways that IPRs resemble civil litigation in federal courts. See id. at *9–11.

 [104]. Id. at *12.

 [105]. Id. at *11 (“Petitioner additionally argues that immunizing patents owned by alleged state entities from IPR proceedings would have harmful and far-reaching consequences.” (internal citation omitted)).

 [106]. Id. at *11.

 [107]. Id.

 [108]. Id. at *12. There is still no evidence available which shows that allowing state sovereign immunity to be asserted in IPRs causes any harm to the patent system. It seems possible, however, that this harm could surface if states begin setting up their own deals with patent owners who wish to take advantage of state sovereign immunity, much like the Allergan-Saint Regis deal. In fact, in light of the Federal Circuit’s refusal to allow tribal sovereign immunity in IPRs, it is possible patent owners may begin seeking deals with states or state-owned entities, thus, “renting” their sovereign immunity.

 [109]. Anthony Blum, PTAB Offers Clarification on Inter Partes Review and State Sovereign Immunity, Thompson Coburn LLP (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/              publications/item/2017-12-22/ptab-offers-clarification-on-inter-partes-review-and-sovereign-immunity (noting that seven administrative patent judges heard this case in contrast to the usual three judges).

 [110]. Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at

*1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (expanded panel).

 [111]. Blum, supra note 109.

 [112]. Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2.

 [113]. Id. PTAB also utilized the FMC holding that state sovereign immunity can be invoked in administrative proceedings.

 [114]. Id.

 [115]. Id. at *2–3.

 [116]. Id. at *4.

 [117]. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

 [118]. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 109.

 [119]. Id.

 [120]. At the time of writing, no appeals were pending on this issue.

 [121]. In Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceutical, Inc., the Federal Circuit noted that it had not opined on state sovereign immunity’s application in IPRs, saying in its decision that made tribal sovereign immunity inapplicable that “we are only deciding whether tribal immunity applies in IPR. While we recognize there are many parallels, we leave for another day the question of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity differently.” Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

 [122]. David C. Seastrunk et al., Federal Circuit PTAB Appeal Statistics – January 15, 2018, Finnegan LLP (Feb. 6, 2018) https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/america-invents-act/federal-circuit-ptab-appeal-statistics-January-15-2018.html.

 [123]. Thomas P. McLish, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Limits, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1988) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

 [124]. Id.

 [125]. Id.

 [126]. Id.

 [127]. Id. at 174–75 (noting a large majority of the states have either completely or partially waived their sovereign immunity from suit).

 [128]. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 804–07 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

 [129]. Id.; see also supra Sections I.A.1. and I.A.2. (discussing Bay Mills and its doctrinal underpinnings in detail). Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority opinion’s application of sovereign immunity on stare decisis grounds but concurred to provide normative justifications for the doctrine to address critics of who no longer saw it serving any purpose.

 [130]. Id. at 809 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that nearly half of all tribes in the United States do not operate casinos and that among the tribes that do operate casinos only a small percentage of them reap most of the profits).

 [131]. Id. at 810.

 [132]. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 17 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Paper No. RWP04-016, 2004) (discussing the holding of Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001)).

 [133]. Kelly S. Croman & Jonathan B. Taylor, Why Beggar Thy Indian Neighbor? The Case for Tribal Primacy in Taxation in Indian Country 5 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, JOPNA 2016-1, 2016), http://nni.arizona.edu/application/files/8914/6254/9090/2016_Croman_why_beggar_thy
_Indian_neighbor.pdf.

 [134]. Id.

 [135]. Id. Croman and Taylor also note that reservations are subject to state property taxes within the boundaries of the reservation unless they have been given an exemption under state law. Id.

 [136]. Id.

 [137]. Id.

 [138]. Id.

 [139]. Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1058, 1069 (1982). In addition, this idea can be related back to the idea that the “King” does “no wrong.” See supra Section I.C.

 [140]. Remember that tribes are “domestic dependent nations” and, as such, the scope of tribal sovereignty is limited by the sovereign on which they depend: the federal government. The limitations placed on tribal sovereign immunity give meaning to the tribe’s “dependent” status by recognizing that they are, in a sense, inferior to the federal government.

 [141]. Obviously, the dependent status of tribes still exists in the United States, but to the extent possible, tribes should be treated as a sovereign.

 [142]. See In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 139, at 1069–70.

 [143]. See id.

 [144]. While there is debate about this point, law can be conceptualized as—at least partly—reflecting the culture from which it springs. See, e.g., Iris I. Varner & Katrin Varner, The Relationship Between Culture and Legal Systems and the Impact on Intercultural Business Communication, 3 Global Advances Bus. & Comm. Conf. & J., no. 1, 2014, at 1, 2–3.

 [145]. There will be some crossover as tribes are “domestic dependent nations” that are subject to the constraints of the United States Constitution and laws passed by Congress. However, sovereign immunity still provides some level of protection in this area. Evaluating how much protection is beyond the scope of this Note.

 [146]. See Wood, supra note 29, at 1619.

 [147]. Id. at 1619–20 (noting additionally that protecting a state’s treasury was still a meaningful purpose of the Eleventh Amendment).

 [148]. Carlos Quijada, Patents and Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Univ. of Utah S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law: LABS Blog (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.law.utah.edu/patents-and-tribal-sovereign-immunity.

 [149]. Dan Schneider & James Edwards, Open Letter from Conservatives: What’s at Stake in Oil States v. Greene’s Energy Group, IPWatchdog (Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com
/2017/11/28/conservatives-open-letter-oil-states-v-greenes-energy-group/id=90579.

 [150]. Steve Brachmann & Gene Quinn, 58 Patents Upheld in District Court Invalidated by PTAB on Same Grounds, IPWatchdog (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/08/58-patents-upheld-district-court-invalidated-ptab/id=91902.

 [151]. Wolfe, supra note 9.

 [152]. Michael Erman, Allergan to Cut Over 1,000 Jobs as It Works to Cut Costs, Reuters (Jan. 3, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-layoffs/allergan-to-cut-over-1000-jobs-as-it-works-to-cut-costs-idUSKBN1ES1HN.

 [153]. Patents such as Restasis also represent the reward after substantial investment by the company.

 [154]. Again, while the Federal Circuit has said that tribal immunity does not apply, these numbers are emblematic of the massive economic incentive that patent owners have to engage in these types of workarounds.

 [155]. These deals help protect and grow tribal resources, which is one of the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity.

 [156]. Quijada, supra note 148.

 [157]. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Frequently Asked Questions About New Research and Technology (Patent) Business 3 (2017), https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/Office-of-Technology-Research-and-Patents-FAQ.pdf.

 [158]. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 809–10 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

 [159]. Similar reasons exist for states to engage in such deals, even if, as noted in Section I.C.2, states possess stronger mechanisms for raising money. That being said, it is easy to envision poorer states engaging in such deals as another source of revenue. The biggest obstacle to states doing such a thing, it seems, would be potential political pressure. In addition, given how the Federal Circuit ruled in Saint Regis, see infra Section III.B., it is possible state sovereign immunity may no longer be found to apply in IPRs.

 [160]. See supra Section II.A.; see also Decker, supra note 18 (explaining that IPRs act as patent “death squad[s]”).

 [161]. However, as will be discussed infra Part III, these shortcomings do not justify the outcomes reached by the Federal Circuit and PTAB in the Allergan-Saint Regis case. Rather, reforms should focus on improving the patent system, while respecting tribal sovereign immunity.

 [162]. See, e.g., Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, supra note 157, at 3; cf. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 809–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that “not all Tribes are engaged in highly lucrative commercial activity” and that even if they were, this fact alone “would not justify the commercial-activity exception urged by the principal dissent”).

 [163]. States could do this as well. See supra Section I.B.2.

 [164]. While such benefit spreading could be a good thing, it most likely will harm sovereigns, such as Saint Regis, who pioneered these deals only to have companies go to other sovereigns who offer better deals. This could cause harm to some tribes as revenue sources dry up and previously relied upon services must go away due to lack of funding.

 [165]. This Note takes no position on how to best handle the financial situation of tribes. It just recognizes that relying on a system like the one used by Allergan and Saint Regis could be very counterproductive.

 [166]. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (denying Saint Regis’s motion to terminate the proceeding).

 [167]. See supra Section I.B.2. for a discussion of FMC and its holdings on state sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings.

 [168]. Mylan Pharm., 2018 WL 1100950, at *34 (discussing Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (FMC), 535 U.S. 743 (2002), in which the Supreme Court held that state sovereign immunity could be invoked in administrative proceedings). PTAB also rejected in this portion of the opinion decisions by other administrative agencies which had found that tribal sovereign immunity could be invoked in administrative proceedings. Id. at *3 (discussing Kanj v. Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, No. 06-074, 2007 WL 1266963 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor Adm. Rev. Bd. Apr. 27, 2007)), which noted that no prior cases prevented tribes from asserting sovereign immunity in administrative adjudications). It should be noted that PTAB provided no reasons for treating states and tribes differently in this context.

 [169]. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).

 [170]. Id. (citation omitted).

 [171]. Id. at *4–5.

 [172]. See, e.g., id. at *5 (discussing San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir. 2007), which said “when a tribal government goes beyond matters of internal self-governance and enters into off-reservation business transaction[s] with non-Indians, its claim of sovereignty is at its weakest.”). This underlying idea is directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s approach in Bay Mills, which found tribal sovereign immunity is only abrogated where Congress clearly intends, even if there may be negative consequences from the immunity’s applicability. PTAB did not discuss Bay Mills in its analysis. For further discussion of Bay Mills, see Section I.A.

 [173]. Mylan Pharm., 2018 WL 1100950, at *5 (quoting Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994)). The tribes attempted to distinguish these cases on the basis that IPRs include a third party initiating and remaining involved in the entire proceeding; however, PTAB rejected this argument. Id. at *6.

 [174]. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It is unclear then why PTAB thinks state sovereign immunity can be invoked in IPRs.

 [175]. Id. (discussing how patent owners are not required to participate in IPR proceedings).

 [176]. Id. at *6 n.6.

 [177]. Id. at *7–8.

 [178]. Id. at *8, *10–12.

 [179]. Id. at *13–15 (noting that the Federal Rules of Procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings).

 [180]. Kevin E. Noonan, St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and Allergan Appeal Denial of Motion to Dismiss on Sovereign Immunity Grounds, Patent Docs: Patent Law Weblog (Mar. 1, 2018, 10:04 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2018/03/st-regis-mohawk-tribe-and-allergan-appeal-denial-of-motion-to-dismiss-on-sovereign-immunity-grounds.html. The decision can be appealed under the collateral order doctrine which allows for immediate appeal of denials of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2007).

 [181]. See Mylan Pharm., 2018 WL 1100950, at *4 (discussing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)).

 [182]. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 75556 (1998). The Court “noted, however, that the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of the States,” distinguishing “state sovereign immunity from tribal sovereign immunity,” because “tribes were not at the Constitutional Convention.” Id. Accordingly, the tribes were “not parties to the ‘mutuality of . . . concession’ that ‘makes the States’ surrender of immunity from suit by sister States plausible.’”

Id. (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (alteration in original)).

 [183]. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-1274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *13 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).

 [184]. Id.

 [185]. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754–55.

 [186]. Mylan Pharm., 2018 WL 1100950, at *6.

 [187]. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *6.

 [188]. Id. at *9–11.

 [189]. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, discussed supra Section I.A.3, almost answered whether tribal sovereign immunity applies to in rem jurisdiction, where lower courts have claimed the jurisdiction is over the property instead of the tribe, thus allowing the lower courts to find tribal immunity not applicable in the proceeding. In rem jurisdiction is like IPRs because the proceeding can be construed to be about the patent itself—not the patent owner. However, the Supreme Court avoided answering whether tribal immunity applies to in rem cases, leaving the question for another day. See generally Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018).

 [190]. Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at

*2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (expanded panel).

 [191]. Blum, supra note 109.

 [192]. Which, as discussed supra Section II.B., is a valid concern. However, abrogating tribal sovereign immunity where it should not be is not the proper response. Rather, the onus should be on Congress to address the issue as they are better situated to do so.

 [193]. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

 [194]. Id. at 1325–26.

 [195]. Id. at 1326.

 [196]. Remember, as discussed supra Section I.B.2., the PTAB had previously decided that for the purposes of state sovereign immunity, IPR should be treated as an adjudicative action rather than a traditional enforcement action.

 [197]. Saint Regis, 896 F.3d at 1326 (citation omitted).

 [198]. Id. at 1327.

 [199]. Id.

 [200]. Id. at 1328. While this is true as a rule, most often IPRs proceed as would litigation, with the patent owner arguing for patent validity and a variety of private challengers arguing the patent is invalid.

 [201]. Id.

 [202]. Id. at 1329.

 [203]. Id. (citation omitted).

 [204]. See supra Section III.B. for a discussion of the ruling.

 [205]. Saint Regis, 896 F.3d at 1329 (“In this case [the Federal Circuit] only decid[ed] whether tribal immunity applies in IPR. While [it] recognize[d] there are many parallels, [it] le[ft] for another day the question of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity differently.”).

 [206]. See Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (expanded panel); Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-1274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *12 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).

 [207]. For a discussion of PTAB rulings on state sovereign immunity’s applicability in IPRs, including Covidien and Ericsson, see supra Section I.B.2. In those cases, PTAB focused on the similarity between IPRs and district court litigation on its way to finding that state sovereign immunity applies. See supra Part III for further discussion of PTAB’s and the Federal Circuit’s decisions finding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in an IPR proceeding because of its dissimilarity to district court litigation.

 [208]. While PTAB’s original holding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply in IPRs focused on the difference between tribal and state sovereign immunity, the Federal Circuit’s decision did not.

 [209]. For PTAB’s proper analysis of why IPR is similar to district court litigation, see supra Section I.B.2.

 [210]. Inter Partes Review, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 10.

 [211]. See supra Section I.B.2.

 [212]. Inter Partes Review, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., supra note 10 (presenting, on the government’s own website, the procedure for how this “trial proceeding” is conducted); see also Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, How IPR Gang Tackling Distorts PTAB Statistics, IPWatchdog (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/05/ipr-gang-tackling-distorts-ptab-statistics/id=81816 (explaining the process by which third parties can initiate IPR proceedings).

 [213]. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–314 (2012) (revealing the adversarial nature of the proceeding); 37 C.F.R. § 42.51–.52 (2018) (laying out IPR discovery procedures); Alex Chan, Are Administrative Patent Judges Properly Appointed Under the Appointments Clause?, Am. B. Ass’n (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-trial-lawyer/articles/2019/are-administrative-patent-judges-properly-appointed-under-the-appointments-clause (“PTAB judges exercise significant independent discretion, are not removable from the competitive service except for cause.”); see also Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-1274, 2017 WL 4015009, at *8–11 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (“[C]onsidering the nature of inter partes review and civil litigation, [PTAB] conclude[d] that the considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

 [214]. See 37 C.F.R. § 42 (2018) (laying out the procedure for a PTAB trial).

 [215]. See 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“One important structural change made by the present bill is that inter partes reexamination is converted into an adjudicative proceeding in which the petitioner, rather than the [USTPO], bears the burden of showing unpatentability.”).

 [216]. Joel Sayres & Julie Wahlstrand, To Stay or Not to Stay Pending IPR? That Should Be a Simpler Question, 17 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop., no. 3, 2018, at 52, 59.

 [217]. It is true that there are some dissimilarities between IPRs and civil litigation as well, but these dissimilarities are limited to procedures, rather than the main substance between them, and largely reflect the somewhat more limited nature of the IPR proceeding. It is then important to note that per PTAB, “there is no requirement that the two types of proceedings be identical for sovereign immunity to apply to an administrative proceeding.” Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11.

 [218]. See, e.g., Relations with Native Americans, Library of Cong., https://www.loc.gov
/collections/continental-congress-and-constitutional-convention-from-1774-to-1789/articles-and-essays
/to-form-a-more-perfect-union (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).

 [219]. See, e.g., The Constitutional Convention of 1787, Univ. of Mo.-Kansas City Sch. L., http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/convention1787.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).

 [220]. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[A] State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’” (citation omitted)).

 [221]. Of course, this is only true in those areas where tribal sovereign immunity has not been abrogated.

 [222]. Meg Tirrell, More Scrutiny for Allergan over Native American Tribe Deal, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2017, 6:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/02/more-scrutiny-for-allergan-over-native-american-tribe-deal.html.

 [223]. Juana Summers, Looming Trump Budget Cuts Deepen Distress on Pine Ridge, CNN (May 28, 2017, 10:49 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/27/politics/indian-reservation-trump-budget/index
.html.

 [224]. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc. (No. 18-899) (U.S. Jan. 11, 2019); St. Regis Mohawk Tribe Appeals Loss in Patent Case to Supreme Court, Indianz.com (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.indianz.com/News/2019/01/16/st-regis-mohawk-tribe-appeals-loss-in-pa.asp.

 [225]. Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Rules Tribal Sovereign Immunity Cannot Be Asserted in IPRs, IPWatchdog (July 20, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/20/federal-circuit-tribal-sovereign
-immunity-cannot-asserted-iprs/id=99504.

 [226]. See, e.g., supra note 155 and accompanying text.

 [227]. This assumes that neither plan on reversing course on tribal sovereign immunity. The Federal Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc. Matthew W. Johnson, PTAB Denies Stay Pending Sovereign Immunity Cert Petition, Lexology: PTAB Litig. Blog (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a28cb7cc-76b1-47ea-8364-0cf8d618ba1d.

 [228]. See supra Section III.B. (discussing the Federal Circuit’s decision in the Saint Regis case).

 

Crushing Creativity: The Blurred Lines Case and Its Aftermath

From Volume 92, Postscript (February 2018)
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CRUSHING CREATIVITY: THE BLURRED LINES CASE AND ITS AFTERMATH[*]

EDWIN F. MCPHERSON[†]

On March 10, 2015, the music world was stunned when a jury in Federal District Court in Los Angeles rendered a verdict in favor of the heirs of Marvin Gaye against Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, who, along with rapper Clifford Harris, Jr., professionally known as “T.I.,” wrote the 2013 mega-hit song entitled “Blurred Lines.” The eight-member jury unanimously found that Williams and Thicke had infringed the copyright to Marvin Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.”[1] On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict and recently rejected Williams and Thicke’s Petition for Rehearing en banc.

The case is significant for a number of reasons. In typical music copyright casesat least successful onesthe two works share the same (or at least a similar) sequence of pitches, with the same (or at least similar) rhythms, set to the same chords. The Blurred Lines Case [DB1]was unique, in that the two works at issue did not have similar melodies; the two songs did not even share a single melodic phrase. In fact, the two works did not have a sequence of even two chords played in the same order, for the same duration. They had entirely different song structures (meaning how and where the verse, chorus, etc. are placed in the song) and did not share any lyrics whatsoever.

The verdict in this caseassuming (perhaps naively) that it was based upon the music at all,[2] and not, for example, the jury’s dislike for Robin Thicke and his admitted drug usewas no doubt based upon a perception that the overall “feel” or “groove” of the two works is similar, as songs of a particular genre often are. In essence, Williams and Thicke have been found liable for the infringement of an idea, or a series of ideas, and not for the tangible expression of those ideas, which is antithetical to Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.[3] Such a result is very dangerous to the music community and is certain to stifle future creativity.

All music shares inspiration from prior musical works, especially within a particular musical genre. The import of the Blurred Lines Case is, therefore, that songwriters can now be punished for creating new music that is merely inspired by prior works. By eliminating any meaningful standard for drawing the line between permissible inspiration and unlawful copying, the verdict is certain not only to impede the creative process and stifle future creativity, it ultimately does a disservice to past songwriters as well and adversely affects the entire music industry. The law, and specifically the intent behind the Copyright Act, would be much better served if the courts could provide clearer rules so that songwriters could know when the line is crossed, or at least where the line is.

I.  District Court’s Denial of Summary Judgment

Just prior to trial, the district court denied Williams and Thicke’s motion for summary judgment based upon the declarations of two musicologists submitted by the Gayes, which were filled with abstract theories, identifying certain remote, seemingly unrelated, factors of alleged similarity.[4] The court dismissedsimply as “issues of fact”the multitude of dissimilarities in the two works that were identified by Williams and Thicke’s musicologistincluding distinct, material differences in the actual melodies of the two songs.

Because “Got to Give it Up” was a pre-1978 composition and was recorded prior to 1972, the Court properly limited the Gayes’ proof to include only the deposit copy of the sheet music that was presented to the U.S. Copyright Office upon registration by Marvin Gaye’s publisher and did not allow the jury to hear the entire sound recording. However, immediately following this ruling, the court systematically and completely emasculated the ruling in the following significant ways:

  1. After the court had ruled on summary judgment that “Theme X” (a four-note melody) was not on the deposit copy, the court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to testify that her “Theme X” was different from the court’s “Theme X,” and that her “Theme X” was implied[5] in the deposit copy (as was much of the music that was contained in the sound recording).
  2. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to further testify that although the keyboard part in “Got to Give it Up” similarly was not in the deposit copy, “professional musicians would understand[6]” to play the keyboard part as she transcribed it—and that keyboard part was the “heartbeat” of “Got to Give it Up.”
  3. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to use a transcription of the bass part from the sound recording that was different than the bass part on the deposit copy.
  4. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to use sound bites from both works to show a “total concept and feel,” while in actuality compounding the issue with an instruction to the jury to disregard the actual clips and only to consider the musicologist’s “opinions.”
  5. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to present a “mashup” of the two works, which was prepared after the close of expert discovery, and which included the bass and keyboard elements (that were not in the deposit copy)—while excluding mashups that were prepared by Williams and Thicke’s musicologist between “Got to Give it Up” and numerous old soul songs and many pop songs that could be played over the same four chords.
  6. The court allowed a lay witness who was in charge of the Marvin Gaye catalogue at Marvin Gaye’s record label (which also happened to be Robin Thicke’s record label), who does not even know how to read music, to testify that he listened to “Blurred Lines,” and thought that it was similar to the “Got to Give it Up” sound recording.

At the same time, the district court excluded evidence that Marvin Gaye’s own publisher strongly believed that there was no infringement. One of the functions of a music publisher is to police the copyrights of the songs in its catalogue, to assess whether or not its songwriters’ music has been infringed, and to commence litigation against the infringers.

In this case, according to Marvin Gaye’s publisher, EMI/Jobete, as stated in the Joint Rule 16(b) Report, EMI/Jobete

first internally analyzed whether ‘Blurred Lines’ was an infringement of ‘Got To Give It Up’ and determined that there was no infringement. Thereafter, Jobete secured the opinion of an expert musicologist who similarly concluded that there was no basis for a claim of infringement. Jobete duly reported its determinations to Frankie and Nona Gaye’s representatives . . . . Further Jobete advised that it could not, in good faith, bring infringement claims (either for ‘Got To Give It Up’ or for ‘After The Dance’ [another song that the Gayes claimed was infringed by Williams and Thicke] because its analysis, including expert analysis confirmed that neither work had ben infringed by Blurred Lines . . . . Jobete advised that, consistent with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it therefore could not and would not either defend Frankie and Nona Gaye [in Williams and Thicke’s declaratory relief action] or pursue the infringement claim they demanded.[7]

Ultimately, the Gayes actually sued EMI/Jobete for not pursuing the infringement claim against Williams and Thicke.[8]

II.  Infringement of An Idea, Which Is Not Copyrightable

It appears that the jury in this case was persuaded by a number of factors, including the foregoing similarities that were extraneous to the sheet music, interviews given by Robin Thicke, the number of musicologists that each side had (Gayes: two; Williams and Thicke: one), and the biased lay witness opinion. Not one of these factors had anything to do with any perceived similarity in pitch, rhythm, or chords, and not one of these factors constituted a proper basis for a finding of copyright infringement.

A result such as this, in which the melodies are not even close to being similar, is very dangerous, in that it does not distinguish between an idea and the expression of that idea, nor does it distinguish between the influence of a predecessor’s music and the unlawful copying of that music. The inherent danger of such a result is that, without drawing a proper line between what is an idea and what is an expression or between what is an influence and what is an infringement, future songwriters do not know whether their “influence” is going to land them with the next hit record or land them in courtor both, as demonstrated in this case.

Much has been said about Williams’s and Thicke’s apparent ability to afford to fund a case like this. Whether or not Williams and Thicke are able to afford to defend this case and pay a judgment, most of the musicians in the world are not in a position to do so. Clearly then, when a budding songwriter is contemplating the composition of a song, it is axiomatic that he or she is going to think twice before he or she writes a song that “feels” like a Marvin Gaye song or any other artist’s song, always with one foot in the recording studio and one foot in the courtroom. This is an untenable situation that most certainly will not foster uninhibited creativity.

III.  The Ninth Circuit Decision

Devastated by the effect that the verdict would have on future songwriters and the music industry in general, Williams and Thicke appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuitin a 2-1, very lengthy decision,[9] written by Judge Milan D. Smith Jr.affirmed the bulk of the district court’s decision and ignored the cries of the 212 Amicus songwriters (and dissenting judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen). The majority asserted that its entire decision was about narrow procedural matters and concluded its decision by stating that: “[f]ar from heralding the end of musical creativity as we know it, our decision, even construed broadly, reads more accurately as a cautionary tale for future trial counsel wishing to maximize their odds of success.”[10]

At the heart of the appeal was the issue of whether the copyright protection enjoyed by the Gayes was limited to the sheet music of “Got to Give it Up” that was deposited with the U.S. Copyright Office, or whether the jury could hear the sound recording as well. Williams and Thicke had successfully argued to the district court that because the Gaye song was created under the Copyright Act of 1909, the jury should not get to hear the sound recording. The Gayes’ attorney argued at the district court and at the Ninth Circuit that their proof should not be so limited. On appeal, Williams and Thicke’s attorney argued that Judge Kronstadt erred by initially restricting the Gayes’ proof to the deposit copy but then allowing in bits and pieces of the sound recording through the testimony of the handsomely paid musicologist, Judith Finell.

The majority noted that Williams and Thicke’s position that the scope of the Gayes’ copyright was limited to the deposit copy did not appear to be specifically supported by any case law until the district court’s ruling. However, the court decided to avoid the issue altogether: “Nevertheless, because we do not remand the case for a new trial, we need not, and decline to, resolve this issue in this opinion.”[11]

The Court did affirm that the district court had discretion to allow testimony from both of the Gayes’ music experts, which Williams and Thicke’s lawyers claimed to have improperly incorporated opinions about the similarity of the sound recordings, notwithstanding its earlier limitation of proof to sheet music.

In response to Williams and Thicke’s assertion that Judge Kronstadt erroneously denied their motion for summary judgment, the appellate court determined that the denial of summary judgment, after a complete trial on the merits, is not reviewable unless the issue is one of pure law. The court determined that this was not such a case: “The district court’s application of the extrinsic test of similarity was a factbound inquiry far afield from decisions resolving ‘disputes about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law.’ The district court’s ruling bears little resemblance to legal issues we have reviewed pursuant to our exception.”[12]

With respect to Williams and Thicke’s claim that the district court should not have allowed certain portions of the testimony of the Gayes’ musicologists, the court pointed out that Finell “was impeached with her deposition testimony, in which she admitted that the rhythm of the keyboard parts in the sound recording of Got To Give It Up is not notated in the deposit copy.”[13] The court further noted that Williams and Thicke’s expert disputed her testimony and that the whole thing “boiled down to a question of whose testimony to believe,” which was the purview of the jury.[14] Ultimately, the court ruled that the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence.

The Blurred Lines decision was indeed a procedural one and is on very narrow grounds. The court held that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of evidence and refused to disturb or “second guess” the jury’s fact-finding at trial. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams and Thicke’s motion for a new trial.[15]

Even Williams and Thicke’s contention that the damages were excessive was met with a purely procedural response. The jury had awarded the Gayes 50% of the publishing revenue from “Blurred Lines” as actual damages, which amounted to approximately $3.2 million. The court ruled that the Gayes’ expert testimony in that regard was not speculative and, therefore, affirmed the amount. Similarly, the court determined that the jury’s verdict awarding profits to the Gayes of $1.8 Million against Robin Thicke and $375,000 against Williams was “not clearly erroneous,” nor was the continuing 50% royalty rate.[16]

The court did take exception to the district court’s treatment of T.I. and the Interscope parties, but that was on procedural grounds as well. The jury had rendered a general verdict in favor of T.I. and the Interscope parties, finding (albeit inconsistently) that neither had violated the Gayes’ copyright. The district court disregarded the jury’s verdict in that regard and brought them back into the case.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Gayes waived their challenge to the consistency of the jury’s verdict in this regard by not asserting their position at trial before the jury was discharged. The court went on, however, to rule that, even if the Gayes had properly preserved their challenge, “neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) nor our decisions in Westinghouse and El-Hakem v. BJY Inc. conferred authority on the district court to upset the jury’s verdicts in this case.”[17] The court further noted that “no evidence showed Harris was vicariously liable.”[18]

The majority, by focusing on the procedural aspects of the case, minimized the precedential value of the appeal itself, ignoring the potentially catastrophic ramifications of the case as a whole. This cavalier dismissal by the majority precipitated a blistering dissent by Judge Jacqueline Nguyen and an actual rebuttal to the dissent by the majority.

Judge Nguyen writes: “The majority allows the Gayes to accomplish what no one has before: copyright a musical style.”[19] She states further that: “‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got to Give It Up’ are not objectively similar. They differ in melody, harmony, and rhythm. Yet by refusing to compare the two works, the majority establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future musicians and composers everywhere.”[20]

With respect to the expert musicologists, the dissent goes on:

While juries are entitled to rely on properly supported expert opinion in determining substantial similarity, experts must be able to articulate facts upon which their conclusions—and thus the jury’s findings—logically rely. Here, the Gayes’ expert, musicologist Judith Finell, cherry-picked brief snippets to opine that a constellation of individually unprotectable elements in both pieces of music made them substantially similar. That might be reasonable if the two constellations bore any resemblance. But Big and Little Dipper they are not. The only similarity between these constellations is that they’re both compositions of stars.[21]

Judge Nguyen then picks up on a theme that was forefront in the 212 Songwriters, etc. Amicus Brief, and that was that it is axiomatic that copyright laws do not protect ideas, but only the expression of ideas. In the Blurred Lines Case, the only similarities that exist between the two compositions is the “idea” of, for example, clapping hands, yells, different instruments, etc.

Judge Nguyen goes on to challenge the majority to explain which elements of “Got to Give It Up” were protectable. She also does not believe in the “sliding scale” of access vs. similarity, in other words, the more access can be proved, the less substantial the similarity that is required. The majority adopted the inverse ratio rule, which was designed for cases with limited accessessentially, the less likely the access, the more similarity that is necessary to prove “copying.”[22] Judge Nguyen does not believe that, with undisputed access, the extent of similarity necessary to fulfill a plaintiff’s burden of proof essentially dwindles down to nothing.[23]

In response, the majority strikes back, stating:

[T]he dissent prophesies that our decision will shake the foundations of copyright law, imperil the music industry, and stifle creativity. It even suggests that the Gayes’ victory will come back to haunt them, as the Gayes’ musical compositions may now be found to infringe any number of famous songs preceding them. Respectfully, these conjectures are unfounded hyperbole. Our decision does not grant license to copyright a musical style or groove. Nor does it upset the balance Congress struck between the freedom of artistic expression, on the one hand, and copyright protection of the fruits of that expression, on the other hand. Rather, our decision hinges on settled procedural principles and the limited nature of our appellate review, dictated by the particular posture of this case and controlling copyright law. Far from heralding the end of musical creativity as we know it, our decision, even construed broadly, reads more accurately as a cautionary tale for future trial counsel wishing to maximize their odds of success.[24]

A.  The Denial of Rehearing En Banc

After their appeal to the Ninth Circuit failed, Williams and Thicke filed a petition for an en banc rehearing of the case. Judge Nguyen was the sole judicial proponent of en banc review, which was therefore denied.

IV.  All Music Is InSpired By Other Music

From time immemorial, every songwriter, composer, and musician has been inspired by music that came before him or her. Even one of the musicologists for the Gayes admitted that, with respect to music: All composers share devices and building.” This is especially so within a particular musical genre. Virtually no music can be said to be 100% new and original.

David Bowie was influenced by John Coltrane, Velvet Underground, and Shirley Bassey, among others.[25] Lady Gaga was influenced by David Bowie, Elton John, and Queen, among others.[26] Elton John was influenced by The Beatles, Bob Dylan, The Kinks, and Elvis Presley, among others.[27] The Beatles were influenced by Chuck Berry, Cliff Richard, The Beach Boys, and Elvis Presley.[28] Elvis Presley’s musical influences were “the pop and country music of the time, the gospel music he heard in church and at the all-night gospel sings he frequently attended, and the black R&B he absorbed on historic Beale Street as a Memphis teenager.”[29]

Marvin Gaye, himself, was reportedly influenced by Frank Sinatra, Smokey Robinson, Nat “King” Cole, Sam Cooke, Ray Charles, Bo Didley, and James Brown.[30] In fact, “Got To Give It Up” was apparently inspired by Johnnie Taylor’s song “Disco Lady.”[31]

One can only imagine what our music would have sounded like if David Bowie would have been afraid to draw from Shirley Bassie, or if the Beatles would have been afraid to draw from Chuck Berry, or if Elton John would have been afraid to draw from the Beatles, or if Elvis Presley would have been afraid to draw from his many influences. Presumably, it would also be difficult for the Gayes to imagine if their father had been afraid to draw from Ray Charles or Bo Didley. Quite simply, if an artist is not allowed to display his or her musical influences, for fear of legal reprisal, there is very little new music that is going to be created, particularly with the limitations that already naturally exist in songwriting.

V.  Music Copyright Cases Need A Bright Line Test

In the world of film, television, and books, the universe of choices is unlimited. One can write about the past, the present, or the future; one can write about things that actually happened, things that one wished had happened, or things that could never happenthere is absolutely no limit beyond the author’s imagination.

Yet, notwithstanding those unlimited options, there is somewhat of a bright line test for infringement (and for obtaining summary judgment) in the film/television/book world that does not exist in the music world. With a film, an expert conducts the extrinsic test by comparing the plots, sequence of events, characters, theme, mood, and pace of the two works. The expert also filters out all of the scènes à faire, such as a car chase in an action movie or a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat.

A motion for summary judgment in such cases will weed out the protectable elements from the unprotectable elements. It will then demonstrate how the works are different with respect to protectable elements, and how any perceived similarities are based upon commonplace, unprotectable elements. The “language” spoken by the experts is typically one that the judge understands and can articulate freely.

In music, unlike film, etc., however, there is a “limited number of notes and chords available to composers,” and composers are therefore much more restricted in their options.[32] There are literally twelve notes per octave, and not all of those notes can be used in the same song. As Judge Learned Hand once wrote: “It must be remembered that, while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism.”[33]

Yet, notwithstanding the severe actual and practical limitation of choices in music cases, the line drawing that exists in film copyright cases does not appear to exist in music cases. Musicologists speak a language that is often foreign to judges (and juries), and therefore confuse judges into denying summary judgment motions whenever two musicologists disagree.[34] There appears to be no easy way, no bright line, to determine in music casesand it was certainly not done in this casethe difference between creating the same “feel” or “style,”[35] and infringing a copyright.[36]

This is particularly so when a plaintiff can hire three, four, or five musicologists, conflict out three of them that find no similarities between any protectable elements, and know that, even if he only has one musicologist that can argue a case for infringement, he will avoid summary judgment. This is exactly what happened in the Blurred Lines Case. There were two or three musicologists that were initially consulted, rendered strong opinions of non-infringement, and ultimately were conflicted out of the case.[37]

VI.  Copyright Law Should Stimulate, Not Stifle, Creativity

The “ultimate aim” of the Copyright Act is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good,” and most musicians applaud and appreciate that endeavor.[38] However, they also understand that, like the music that was created before them, their own music will serve as building blocks for future songwriters, who will create their own music. As discussed in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., “copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”[39]

As written by Peter Alhadeff and Shereen Cheong in the Berklee College of Music Music Business Journal, “The Lesson of Blurred Lines,” quoting an interview with Berklee College of Music professor, Dr. E. Michael Harrington:If you’re not influenced by Marvin Gaye, there must be something wrong with you.”[40] The authors go on to write: “[h]e could just as well be talking about James Brown, Chuck Berry, the Beatles, or Michael Jacksonall of them a product of their own influences. Copyright law should make musical creativity flourish, not stifle.”[41]

Parker Higgins, director of copyright activism at the Electronic Frontier Foundation writes that

[w]hen we say a song sounds like a certain era, it’s because artists in that era were doing a lot of the same thingsor, yes, copying each other. If copyright were to extend out past things like the melody to really cover the other parts that make up the feel of a song, there’s no way an era, or a city, or a movement could have a certain sound. Without that, we lose the next disco, the next Motown, the next batch of protest songs.[42]

Finally, as written by composer Ron Mendelsohn, owner of production music company Megatrax:

All musical works, indeed all creative works, are born from a spark of inspiration. It is essential for musicians and composers to be able to find this spark anywhere and everywhere without having to constantly look over their shoulders and worry about being sued. To extinguish this spark, to replace it with fear, is to stifle creativity and deprive society of the next generation of great artists and new music. And yes, artists should be able to talk freely about their sources of inspiration without having to worry about their exuberant proclamations being played back as damning evidence in a court of law.[43]

VII.  The Celebration Of Influences Should Be Encouraged

Mendelsohn’s last point is an especially important one. In addition to the potential adverse impact that this case is certain to have on future songwriters, this case will have a lasting effect on past songwriters and musicians as well. Many interviews were played during the trial in which Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke both expressed that they loved Marvin Gaye, and wanted, as an homage to him, to create a song that had the feel of “Got To Give It Up.” One might ask if there could possibly be a better legacy for a songwriter than to inspire other songwriters to write music and expressly pay homage to him or her for inspiring that musicpublicly, on national television and elsewhere, keeping his name and his music alive for generations to come.

Yet there can be no doubt in this case that the jury was swayed, at least in part (arguably in large part), by hearing such interviews. Ultimately, the jury held Williams and Thicke liable for copyright infringement and rendered an award of several million dollars against them. It is difficult to imagine a songwriter that comes along after this case publicly affording any credit to any influence that he or she receives from any songwriter.

Conclusion

It is apparent that the denial of summary judgment and the ultimate verdict in this case were based upon an undeniable musical inspiration, the overall look and feel of the two works, and a series of random, coincidental, and unimportant alleged similarities between unprotectable elements in the sound recording of “Got To Give It Up” (random elements that were not in the “Got To Give It Up” deposit copy) and “Blurred Lines.”

Many important popular songs in the modern era would not exist today if they were subjected to the same scrutiny as “Blurred Lines” was in this case. This case, which was based upon such factorswith no similarities in melody, with virtually no similarities with the music notation on the actual deposit copy, and simply based on a “groove”will clearly stifle future creativity, will undoubtedly diminish the legacies of past songwriters, and, without a doubt, is antithetical to the principals of the Copyright Act.

 

 

 


[*] *. This article was adapted from an amicus curiae brief that was filed by the author on behalf of 212 songwriters, composers, musicians, and producers, in connection with the appeal of the Blurred Lines Case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See generally Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter the Blurred Lines Case].

[†] †. Edwin F. McPherson is a partner at McPherson Rane LLP in Century City, California, specializing in entertainment litigation, intellectual property litigation, and crisis management. He attended much of the trial in the Blurred Lines Case, has given numerous lectures on the case, and submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Ninth Circuit on behalf of 212 songwriters, composers, musicians, and composers.

 [1]. Though Williams and Thicke were both found liable for copyright infringement, T.I. was exonerated by the jury. Although the district court purported to overrule the jury and brought back in T.I. and the Interscope-related entities as defendants, the Ninth Circuit reversed that portion of the District Court’s judgment. The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1182–83.

 [2]. In the two days in which the jury deliberated, they did not once listen to any of the music.

 [3]. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018).

 [4]. Those theories were difficult enough (if not impossible) for trained musicians to understand; it is difficult to imagine how the Court could possibly fully grasp their import.

 [5]. Even to a person with no musical training, the concept of certain music being implied by certain other music sounds a bit suspect; however, to anyone with a modicum of musical training, this concept is absurd.

 [6]. Similarly, this concept makes no musical sense whatsoever.

 [7]. Joint Rule 16(b) Report at 5–6, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193633.

 [8]. This illustrates an important (perhaps rhetorical) question for the courts and the music world in general. If the executives at EMI/Jobete, whose job it is to assess copyright claims involving their songwriters, did not believe that “Blurred Lines” infringed “Got To Give It Up,” and if the expert musicologist that EMI/Jobete hired to assist it in that determination did not believe that “Blurred Lines” infringed “Got To Give It Up,” and if the lawyer that was hired by EMI/Jobete believed so strongly that there was no infringement that he advised EMI/Jobete that suing Williams and Thicke might very well be a violation of Rule 11, how in the world could a songwriter, with no experience policing copyrights, no experience as an expert musicologist, and no legal training, determine that his or her own song might be an infringement?

 [9]. The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1183.

 [10]. Id. at 1182.

 [11]. Id. at 1165–66.

 [12]. Id. at 1166–67 (citations omitted).

 [13]. Id. at 1170.

 [14]. Id.

 [15]. Id. at 1172.

 [16]. Id. at 1174.

 [17]. Id. at 1175 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Circuit Breaker & Elec. Supply, Inc., 106 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1997) and El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005)).

 [18]. Id.

 [19]. Id. at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).

 [20]. Id.

 [21]. Id.

 [22]. Although this rule makes sense in the context of proving “copying” (access plus substantial similarity), when there is limited or a low likelihood of access, it is absurd to suggest that, if access is 100% proved, no similarity whatsoever is necessary. Moreover, this “test” also ignores the requirement, independent of proof of copying, that protectable elements of the two works must be substantially similar in order to prove actual infringement through the extrinsic test. In other words, copying alone does not constitute infringement if the elements copied are not protectable. There must be substantial similarity in copyrightable expression. The inverse ratio rule is so controversial that, in an amended decision, the Ninth Circuit deleted the paragraph from its original opinion discussing the rule and its application. Compare The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1163, with Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018).

 [23]. The inverse ratio analysis has been criticized and rejected in other jurisdictions. For instance, in Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 1961), the Second Circuit ruled that access will not make up for a lack of similarity, “and an undue stress upon that one feature can only confuse and even conceal this basic requirement.”

 [24]. The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1182 (majority opinion).

 [25]. Commencement 1999, Berklee, https://www.berklee.edu/commencement/past (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).

 [26]. Sam Stryker, Lady Gaga and the Glam Rock Men Who Inspire Her, Mic (Nov. 14, 2013), https://mic.com/articles/73263/lady-gaga-and-the-glam-rock-men-who-inspire-her#.YIo314rrY.

 [27]. Neil McCormick, Leon Russell Interview for the Union with Elton John, Telegraph (Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/rockandpopfeatures/8062253/Leon-Russell-interview-for-The-Union-with-Elton-John.html.

 [28]. Ten Artists and Bands that Inspired the Beatles, Reader’s Digest U.K.,

https://www.readersdigest.co.uk/culture/music/ten-artists-and-bands-that-inspired-the-beatles
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019).

 [29]. Elvis Presley Biography, Graceland, https://www.graceland.com/elvis/biography.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2018)              .

 [30].  Marvin Gaye Influences, Shmoop, https://www.shmoop.com/whats-going-on/influences
.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).

 [31]. See generally Graham Betts, Motown Encyclopedia (2014).

 [32]. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2nd Cir. 1988).

 [33]. Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2nd Cir. 1940) (per curiam).

 [34]. What the Gayes’ musicologists did in this case to avoid summary judgment (and ultimately at trial) is the equivalent of an expert in a film case testifying that the word “destruction” was used four times in the first scene of one film and two times in the second scene of the second film. They might go on to say that the word “destruction” was followed by the words “of a house” in the first film, and “of a truck” in the second film, along with an explanation that “house” and “truck” both have five letters, and many trucks are parked at houses. Such testimony would be readily dismissed, if not laughed at, in a film case, and the motion for summary judgment granted. Unfortunately, the musical equivalent—which is essentially what occurred in this case—is not as easy to understand and dismiss.

 [35]. Music law is further hampered by the Ninth Circuit’s intrinsic test, in which a lay jury is asked to determine the “total concept and feel” of the works in question. Such a test simply does not work in a music context. One might argue that virtually every disco song has the same “total concept and feel.” One could argue that every blues song or every rap song has the same “total concept and feel.” This notion is antithetical to the reality of musicians’ inspirations and borrowing and is entirely preventative of creativity.

 [36]. Duke Law School music copyright law professor Jennifer Jenkins, after noting that “Got to Give It Up” was inspired by Johnnie Taylor’s song “Disco Lady,” writes that “Gaye cannot claim copyright over material that he himself borrowed.” As professor Jenkins further discusses: “Copyright only covers ‘original, creative expression.’ Anything Marvin Gaye copied directly from his Motown, funk, or disco predecessors is not ‘original’ and should be off the table.” She writes further: “In addition, copyright’s “scènes à faire” doctrine allows anyone to use the defining elements of a genre or style without infringing copyright, because these building blocks are ‘indispensible’ to creating within that genre . . . . Many of the musical elements common to ‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got To Give It Up’ fall into these unprotectable categories.” Jennifer Jenkins, The “Blurred Lines” of the Law, Ctr. for the Study of the Pub. Domain, https://law.duke.edu/cspd/blurredlines (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).

 [37]. This is another practice that should be discontinued. Expert witnesses, if they are to maintain any credibility of non-bias whatsoever, should be allowed to testify for whatever side they agree with, and not be immediately conflicted out from testifying in favor of the second party/attorney that calls them just because they were second. The Court could also retain its own expert(s) pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

 [38]. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

 [39]. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (emphasis added).

 [40]. Dr. Harrington has analyzed more than 230 of Marvin Gaye’s songs and uses his music in classes that he has taught. He agrees that the “groove” and “bounce” of the two works are similar, but is adamant that “[o]bjectively, there is NO protectable expression (melody, harmony, etc.) that has been copied by Thicke” and that “[t]here is no copying of copyrightable expression involving harmonies of the two songs. What is extremely close between the songs is the tempo . . . but tempo is not copyrightable.” Peter Alhadeff & Shereen Cheong, The Lesson of Blurred Lines, Music Bus. J. (Feb. 2016), http://www.thembj.org/2016/01/the-lesson-of-blurred-lines; see also Dr. E Michael Harrington, Good News for Robin, Katy & One Direction: Music Copyright Expert Says Nobody’s Ripping Off Anybody, E Michael Music (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.emichaelmusic.com/good-news-for-robin-katy-one-direction-music-copyright-expert-says-nobodys-ripping-off-anybody.

 [41]. Alhadeff & Cheong, supra note 40.

 [42]. Adam Pasick, A Copyright Victory for Marvin Gaye’s Family Is Terrible for the Future of Music, Quartz (Mar. 10, 2015), https://qz.com/360126/a-copyright-victory-for-marvin-gayes-family-is-terrible-for-the-future-of-music.

 [43]. Ron Mendelsohn, Will the “Blurred Lines” Decision “Stifle Creativity”?, Megatrax (Apr. 1, 2015), http://blogtrans.megatrax.com/will-the-blurred-lines-decision-stifle-creativity.

 

 

Patenting Elasticities – Article by Clark D. Asay

 

From Volume 91, Number 1 (November 2017)
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Patenting Elasticities

Clark D. Asay[*]

Over the last decade, a growing consensus has emerged: there are too many patents, and they are causing a host of problems. These problems include patent “trolling,” patent “wars,” and other wasteful societal costs. In explaining this patent overabundance, some scholars have pinpointed the United States Patent Office, the governmental body responsible for issuing patents, as the main culprit. Others have blamed patent holders themselves, identifying a number of incentives these parties have to pursue patents even in cases where doing so makes little economic sense. Overall, these analyses thus typically assume a high and relatively uniform demand for patents among inventive partiesone that the United States Patent Office is only too willing to satisfy.

Yet this focus on excessive patenting obscures the reality that parties likely differ significantly in their demand for patents and other forms of intellectual property. In economic parlance, different inventive parties are likely to exhibit different “elasticities,” or sensitivities, in their demand for patents and other types of intellectual property. This Article uses economic principles to disaggregate intellectual property demand by highlighting a number of factors that may affect a party’s demand for patents and other forms of intellectual property. It argues that resource-constrained parties are more likely to exhibit more elastic demand for patents, meaning they are more sensitive to the costs of patenting, both in general and relative to the costs of other intellectual property forms. As a result, rising costs of patenting are more likely to lead resource-constrained parties to forego patenting and rely on alternative, cheaper forms of intellectual property protection when available. Well-capitalized parties, on the other hand, are more likely to exhibit relatively inelastic, high demand for patents, regardless of the costs of other intellectual property types that may otherwise function as substitutes. Thus, well-capitalized parties tend to patent en masse and complement patenting with additional intellectual property protections when available.

With this theoretical framework in place, the Article then assesses several recent judicial and legislative changes in patent and trade secrecy laws, including the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, and several important Supreme Court patent law cases. Overall, these changes have largely weakened patent rights while potentially strengthening other forms of intellectual property law such as trade secrecy. Many argue the patent law changes in particular are a step in the right direction. This Article’s analysis suggests these changes may suppress resource-constrained parties’ demand for patents while having little to no effect on well-capitalized parties’ demand for patents or other forms of intellectual property. Hence, these intellectual property changes may mean that resource-constrained parties patent even less relative to their well-capitalized counterparts, instead relying on other forms of intellectual property when available. The Article concludes by assessing this possibility and other potential implications for intellectual property law, innovation, and the economy more generally.

Introduction

According to many, there are far too many patents, and they are causing a host of problems.[1] From fueling the business models of so-called patent trolls,[2] to diverting valuable resources into patent “wars,”[3] to otherwise failing to live up to their purported theoretical justifications,[4] the increasing number of patents flooding the U.S. marketplace is of growing concern to scholars and policymakers alike.[5] In response to these concerns, Congress,[6] the Supreme Court,[7] the executive branch,[8] and a vast majority of states[9] have all recently undertaken significant efforts to help fix what many perceive as a “broken” patent system.[10]

Scholars attempting to explain why there are so many patents have typically blamed the parties and institutions involved in the patenting process. Some scholars, for instance, have identified several incentives the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has to grant patent applications, even in cases when it should not.[11] More recently, other scholars have focused on reasons why some inventors patent in excess. For instance, companies often engage in “patent harvesting,” whereby they implement processes to ensure that all patentable inventions find their way into a patent application.[12] In fact, other scholarship has shown that large companies in particular derive the most value from patenting when they are able to amass patents in large “patent portfolios.”[13] Furthermore, some scholars have pointed to a number of non-traditional reasons for why parties pursue patents even when it seems to make little economic sense.[14] Relatedly, overpatenting may be something firms do, not because pursuing large numbers of patents is always economically rational, but simply because patenting satisfies an industry’s norms, conventions, and “myths.”[15]

Yet focusing on these reasons for the high numbers of aggregate patents obscures the reality that different parties often exhibit vastly different patenting behaviors.[16] Overpatenting, after all, mostly seems to be a phenomenon of large, resource-heavy companies.[17] But even some large companies do not pursue patents as often as they could.[18] Furthermore, a host of other types of parties appear to forego seeking as many patents as we might expect. Many opensource software developers, for instance, decline to pursue patents on software inventions that are almost certainly patentable.[19] Startup companies may also often fail to pursue patents as frequently as they could.[20] The industry to which a party belongs may further affect the patenting decisions of that party.[21]

 Hence, while the aggregate number of patents may be concerning for a number of reasons, failing to properly disaggregate how different parties make patenting and other intellectual property decisions may also create issues. Such issues may arise, for instance, if reform efforts aimed at reducing excessive numbers of patents fail to properly consider how those reforms affect the economic incentives of different parties in the intellectual property ecosystem.

This Article uses economic principles to more systematically analyze why parties may choose to forego pursuing patents in some cases, and what those reasons for underpatenting tell us about the patent and intellectual property system as a whole. In economic parlance, it attempts to better understand the patent “demand curves” of different types of parties and what those demand curves suggest about recent and proposed intellectual property law reforms.[22]

Overall, this Article argues that demand for patents and other forms of intellectual property is likely to differ significantly depending on the resources available to a given party. Well-capitalized parties, on one end of the spectrum, will typically exhibit high demand for patents per innovation, and that high demand will remain relatively constant regardless of increases in the costs of patenting and changes in other economic factors, such as the relative costs of possible “substitute” forms of intellectual property protection like trade secrecy, copyright, and trademark.[23]

This high, relatively constant demand for patents has several causes. First, the costs of patenting typically consume a relatively small percentage of a well-capitalized party’s overall resources, meaning that such parties will not be as sensitive to those costs as they would be if they had fewer resources.[24] Second, well-capitalized parties often derive the most value from patenting when they are able to amass patents in large numbers, as mentioned above.[25] These and several other factors, to be discussed more fully below, mean that well-capitalized parties will typically stockpile high numbers of patents, even when the relative costs of potential substitute forms of intellectual property fall. Indeed, well-capitalized parties, rather than substituting alternative forms of intellectual property for patents, are likely to complement patents with these other types of intellectual property protection when available, thereby building intellectual property “fortresses.”[26]

On the other end of the spectrum, resource-constrained parties, such as startups, are likely to exhibit lower, more elastic demand for patents compared to their resource-rich counterparts. The reasons for this mirror the reasons why well-capitalized parties are likely to exhibit high, relatively constant demand for patents per innovation. First, because the costs of patenting consume a relatively high percentage of their overall resources, resource-constrained companies are likely to be more sensitive to those costs as they rise and fall.[27] Second, because such parties do not have the resources to patent en masse, resource-constrained parties often restrict patenting to acquiring a limited number of strategic patents.[28] As a result of these and related factors, to be discussed more fully below, resource-constrained parties are more likely to be selective in their patenting, and their relatively elastic demand for patents will be more responsive to changes in the relative costs of other forms of intellectual property. For instance, resource-constrained parties seem more likely to be willing to sacrifice patenting when the relative costs of substitute forms of intellectual property—such as trade secrecy, copyright, or trademarks—decrease. Hence, resource-constrained parties are more likely to use these forms of intellectual property as patent substitutes than are their well-capitalized counterparts, who will typically use them as patent complements.

Between these two ends of the spectrum, of course, there will be a variety of parties with varying levels of resources. But the point remains: those varied resource levels are likely to play a significant role in how a party makes intellectual property decisions.

This model for assessing how different parties make intellectual property decisions has implications for recent changes in intellectual property law. For instance, a slew of recent Supreme Court patent law decisions, as well as the biggest legislative patent law changes in some sixty years, have weakened patents in important respects.[29] This weakening may yield some positive effects by ridding the marketplace of patents of dubious quality; in fact, there is evidence to indicate that this is already happening.[30] But this weakening may also suppress resource-constrained parties’ demands for patents by making, for instance, substitute forms of intellectual property more attractive. This result may be even more likely given that other recent legislative changes, such as the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, may have bolstered the relative value of other forms of intellectual property.[31] Well-capitalized parties’ demand for patents, on the other hand, is likely to remain high in spite of these changes, in part because these types of parties’ demand for patents is less responsive to the relative costs of different forms of intellectual property. Whether these and other possible implications are beneficial or harmful will be explored in greater detail below.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews five general reasons why parties may choose to forego patenting. Its basic insight is that demand for and ability to secure patents often differ depending on the resources available to a party. Highly-capitalized parties tend to patent in bulk and make fewer tradeoffs as between different forms of intellectual property—they can afford them all. Resource-constrained parties, on the other hand, must often choose between different types of intellectual property protection, so the relative costs of each are important in how much they patent per innovation. Part II then reviews several recent changes in intellectual property law that appear to increase the costs and risks of patenting relative to the costs of other forms of intellectual property. It thus builds on Part I’s analysis by arguing that these changes are likely to suppress resource-constrained parties’ demand for patents, while having only negligible effects on well-capitalized parties’ demand for patents vis-à-vis other forms of intellectual property. Part III then assesses some potential implications of this Article’s analysis, including whether less patenting by resource-constrained parties is normatively desirable.

I.  Why Parties Do NOt patent

Because many scholars have been focused on why parties overpatent, they have devoted less recent attention to why parties forego patent protection altogether. This Part seeks to more systematically analyze the reasons why parties may forego seeking patents, even when they could, thereby better elucidating different types of parties’ demand for patents and other forms of intellectual property.

The reasons against patenting typically fit into one of five general categories: (1) the likely costs of obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing patents are too high relative to the patents’ likely value; (2) parties rely on alternative types of intellectual property protection, such as trade secrecy, copyright, or trademark, instead of patent protection; (3) parties are sometimes ignorant of patent law’s requirements and thereby forfeit patenting opportunities; (4) parties sometimes act irrationally against their own self-interest in choosing to forego patenting; and (5) the norms in a particular community may deter some parties in that community from patenting as much as they could. While I have separated these reasons into distinct categories, these reasons can and sometimes do work in concert to prevent patenting, as the following sections will explore.

Overall, this Part claims that these reasons against patenting are often likely to affect parties differently depending on the resources available to them. The high costs of patenting, for instance, are less likely to affect the patenting decisions of well-capitalized parties, and changes in the relative costs of other forms of intellectual property are also unlikely to affect well-capitalized parties’ demand for patents. Furthermore, well-capitalized parties are unlikely to miss out on many chances to patent due to ignorance or irrationality, and norms for well-capitalized parties typically push in favor of patenting, rather than against it. Resource-constrained parties, on the other hand, are likely to exhibit greater sensitivity to both the high costs of patenting and the relative costs of substitute forms of intellectual property protection. They are also more likely to miss out on patenting opportunities due to ignorance or irrationality, while in some cases the norms of their particular communities push against patenting. The following sections discuss these claims in turn.

A.  The High Costs of Obtaining, maintaining, and Enforcing Patents

 One important disincentive to patenting is that obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing patents is extremely costly.[32] For purposes of simplicity, I will call these costs, collectively, “the costs of patenting.” To see how the costs of patenting may dissuade some parties from pursuing patents, it is useful to briefly explain the patenting process and what comes thereafter. To obtain a patent, a party must file an application with the USPTO.[33] That application must satisfy several substantive patent law requirements, including demonstrating that the patent covers a useful invention that qualifies as patentable subject matter and is new and non-obvious in light of what others have already invented.[34] Furthermore, the application must disclose enough technical information regarding the invention that a person with ordinary skill in the area would be able to (1) replicate the invention without “undue experimentation,” and (2) recognize the applicant is in possession of what they claim to have invented.[35] An applicant must also distinctly lay out the “metes and bounds” of their patented invention at the end of the application, in what are called patent “claims.”[36]

These requirements mean that successfully crafting patent applications is typically a highly technical exercise. As a result, inventors wishing to obtain patents normally seek the assistance of patent lawyers to help them “prosecute” patent applications before the USPTO.[37] That prosecution process generally involves a significant amount of time for both drafting the initial application and finalizing it as the patent lawyers and USPTO examiners haggle over whether the patent application satisfies patent law’s substantive requirements.[38] All of this means that obtaining a patent is often quite expensive. While costs vary depending on a variety of factors, a typical range for many patents is in the tens of thousands of dollars.[39]

Furthermore, patent applicants must often pursue patents in multiple countries and layers to ensure their inventions receive effective protection, which increases the costs of patenting even further.[40] For instance, because patent law is territorial, a U.S. patent provides little to no protection against someone practicing the same invention in another country.[41] Consequently, in order to combat infringement in other important territories, a patent applicant may often seek patents in those jurisdictions.[42]

Moreover, to ensure effective patent protection, parties often prosecute multiple related applications concerning the same invention. For example, a party might pursue an initial application for its core technology, but then also file separate applications relating to the technology’s design, improvements to the technology, and methods of using it.[43] These additional patents are necessary in some cases to ensure that other parties cannot find simple workarounds to the initial patent.[44] Hence, obtaining patents becomes an even more expensive proposition when considering that effective protection often requires filing and prosecuting numerous related patent applications in multiple jurisdictions.

Obtaining a patent is also not the end of a patent’s costs. For instance, the U.S. patent system requires periodic payment of maintenance fees in order to keep an issued patent from expiring before the end of its twenty-year term.[45] In addition, for many parties a patent is only valuable if successfully enforced against infringers.[46] But enforcing patents is notoriously expensive, with the average cost of patent litigation ranging in the millions of dollars.[47] Indeed, analyzing one’s own patents and determining who may be infringing them is often a costly exercise in its own right, let alone the additional costs of actually negotiating with and litigating against the potential infringers.[48] The high costs of maintaining and enforcing patents thus also likely influence many parties’ decisions to forego patent protection.[49]

Of course, the high costs of maintaining and enforcing patents may not always affect a party’s decision whether to patent, simply because they are future, less immediate costs. Yet knowing that maintaining and enforcing a patent will entail significant costs down the road frequently can dissuade a party from pursuing a patent in the first place.[50]

Last, the high costs of patenting are particularly likely to deter patenting when the potential commercial value of an invention is low.[51] In other words, the prospect of the high costs discussed above is likely to have an even greater deterrent effect on patenting when the invention in question is of limited value because, for instance, others can easily invent around it.[52] Although large companies may still regularly obtain such low-value patents as part of a “patent harvesting” program, the high costs of maintaining and enforcing them relative to their value still appear to have their effect, as significant percentages of patents are allowed to lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees.[53] And failing to obtain patents or allowing them to lapse (because of the high costs of patenting relative to the patent’s value), may be particularly palatable in cases where alternative, cheaper forms of intellectual property are available, as discussed in Part I.B.

So far this discussion has examined the high costs of patenting in general. Yet it is clear that the high costs of patenting do not affect all parties equally.[54] For instance, these high costs may dissuade resource-constrained parties in particular from patenting as frequently as they could, as some survey evidence confirms.[55] These high costs may have such an effect because they consume too high of a percentage of a party’s limited resources, thus preventing it from effectively pursuing other important goals.[56] In economic parlance, the marginal costs of patenting often outweigh the marginal benefits, in part because the high costs of patenting entail sacrifices, or “opportunity costs” (for example, diversion of resources from hiring), that outweigh the benefits of patenting.[57] And while it is true that recent legislation has reduced patent application and maintenance fees for parties with fewer resources,[58] those fees are typically only a small part of what makes patenting so expensive, as discussed above. Hence, the overall patenting burden remains high for resource-constrained companies, and that burden is likely to deter many of them from pursuing as many patents as they could.

An example better drives home these points. Imagine a startup company with under ten employees. These employees are passionate about the technology they are developing. But, like with many startups, they can hardly find the time to do everything they are asked to do, and the capital the company has at its disposal is severely limited.[59] In fact, the employees are being paid primarily in company stock, which at this point in the startup’s life cycle is basically worthless, but, the employees hope, will become quite valuable if the company succeeds.[60]

Now imagine that some of these employees develop a patentable innovation. Even if the company’s management is familiar with patents and recognizes the potential benefits of patenting the innovation, the high costs of patenting may simply be too daunting given the company’s significant resource constraints. For instance, diverting employees’ time into helping patent lawyers draft and finalize a patent application means those employees have less time to devote to their engineering responsibilities (for which they already had insufficient time). Furthermore, the costs of applying for patents may eat up too much of the company’s already limited capital; in some cases, in fact, that capital may be needed to get the company through the next financial quarter. Finally, even if the company were in a position to use some of its limited resources to obtain a patent, the prospect of ongoing maintenance and enforcement costs down the road may deter them from even applying. In sum, while patenting may seem like a good idea in the abstract, the practical realities for many resource-constrained companies mean that patenting’s opportunity costs are simply too great.[61]

There are other reasons why the high costs of patenting may prevent resource-constrained parties from patenting. For example, a poorly capitalized party may actually desire a patent, but the high costs of patenting mean that the party is unable to file the patent application before another, betterresourced party files an application for the same invention. For patents filed before March 16, 2013, resource-constrained parties have some comfort on this score: even if filing after another party, the poorly capitalized party can still win the patent race by demonstrating that it conceived of the invention first and was diligent in reducing it to practice from a time before the other party conceived of the same invention.[62] Yet this all may be cold comfort for many parties, because providing sufficient evidence in support of such arguments can be difficult.[63] Furthermore, for patents filed on or after March 16, 2013, the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) means that whichever party files the first patent application for an invention automatically wins the patent race.[64] Hence, going forward, this reality may mean that resource-constrained parties have a more difficult time patenting vis-à-vis their well-capitalized counterparts.[65]

None of the above means, of course, that resource-constrained parties will not pursue patents at all—in fact, some evidence suggests that some patent acquisition helps early-stage companies attract financing.[66] Yet the high costs of patenting may mean that many resource-constrained parties forego adding patents beyond the absolute minimum number deemed necessary because the marginal costs of more patenting exceed the marginal benefits. Per innovation, therefore, resource-constrained parties are likely to patent less than those with greater resources. The result is fewer patents than what otherwise might be. And as will be discussed in Part II, as legal changes increase the costs of patenting, parties with more malleable demand for patents—such as startup companies and other resource-constrained parties—may patent even less than they traditionally have.

The high costs of patenting are likely to affect well-capitalized parties much differently. For instance, on average patenting consumes a lower percentage of such parties’ overall resources, especially since the large-scale patenting systems common at larger companies result in economies of scale.[67] The result is that for well-capitalized companies, the high costs of patenting seem less likely to deter them from patenting, particularly since many large companies derive much of their value from patents in large aggregations.[68] This is not to say that the high costs of patenting will not deter well-capitalized parties from pursuing patents in some cases. But it is to say that those high costs are less likely to discourage well-capitalized parties than their resource-constrained counterparts from pursuing patents.

Again, an example helps illustrate these points. Assume the startup company described earlier has made it through its early struggles and is now a public company with access to significant amounts of capital. Rather than ten or fewer employees, the company now boasts thousands of engineers and other personnel. The company routinely churns out patentable innovations, and it patents as many of these innovations as possible.[69] Why the difference compared to its early startup days?

While many possible explanations exist,[70] the greater resources available to the company would certainly seem to play a role. For instance, while patenting still entails opportunity costs—for example, the costs of patenting could be devoted to some other purpose, and employees must sacrifice time helping in the patenting processseveral factors reduce the importance of those costs. First, as mentioned above, patenting en masse creates significant value for well-capitalized parties, which often rely on large patent portfolios to protect their positions in the marketplace.[71] In other words, for well-capitalized parties, the opportunity costs of patenting typically pale in comparison to the benefits of high-volume patenting. Second, the opportunity costs of patenting are simply lower in many cases because the company’s significant resources allow it to continue to pursue its other goals in spite of the resources—including employees and capital—being devoted to patenting. Unlike in its startup days, then, the high costs of patenting are simply not that high for the now well-provisioned company because diversion of resources to patents does not affect the company’s ability to operate.

Below I have depicted, in several figures, these relationships between the resources available to a given party and their likely demand for patents. The vertical axes in the figures represent the “price” of patents, while the horizontal axes represent the “quantity” demanded. Figure 1 below depicts a theoretical demand curve for aggregate patent demand. Specific prices and quantities are omitted because they are not important for purposes of this discussion. Instead, the point of Figure 1 is simply to show that, per classic economic theory, as the costs of patenting rise, the demand for patents is expected to fall.[72] Conversely, as patents become less costly, or alternatively, more valuable, the demand for patents increases.[73]

Yet this simple graphical depiction of aggregate patent demand fails to account for the different sensitivities—or elasticities—among parties to the costs of patenting. As discussed above, resource-constrained parties are more likely to patent less per innovation in general, and they are also more likely to be sensitive to changing costs of patenting in making patenting decisions. Their demand is more elastic because an increase or decrease in the costs of patenting is more likely to affect how many patents they pursue. Well-capitalized parties, on the other hand, are more likely to exhibit higher demand for patents in general and be less sensitive to the changing costs of patenting.

Figure 2 below again depicts the aggregate patent demand (the middle demand curve, still “DPA”), which in reality is the aggregate of resource-constrained parties’ more elastic demand curve (to the left of DPA, labeled “DPP”) and well-capitalized parties’ relatively inelastic demand curve (to the right of DPA, labeled “DPW”). Notice that well-capitalized parties’ demand curve (DPW) is relatively vertical, meaning that the high number of patents they pursue is not expected to change much in response to changes in the costs of patenting. The demand curve for resource-constrained parties (DPP), in contrast, is relatively flat, meaning the lower number of patents they pursue changes significantly as the costs of patenting change. Furthermore, if the costs of patenting reach a high enough threshold, resource-constrained companies may opt out of patenting altogether. The next section builds on this analysis in showing how “economic substitutes,” or alternatives to patenting, may further affect how many patents these differently resourced parties pursue.

One possible counter to the preceding analysis is that, in general, we would expect capital to flow to productive uses—including for purposes of obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing patents—in well-functioning capital markets.[74] Hence, even parties with relatively limited resources should be able to patent their inventions as much as necessary because capital markets, including venture capitalists, will recognize the value of that patenting and channel additional capital to those parties accordingly.

There are several reasons, however, to doubt that capital markets will always, or even typically, function this way. First, innovation and any associated patenting are often speculative processes—it can be difficult even for experts to know which innovations will ultimately prove valuable.[75] For this reason, venture capitalists typically diversify their investments among a variety of early-stage companies to mitigate risk.[76] Hence, capital markets may often fail to identify instances where funneling more capital into an innovative startup makes economic sense. As a result, poorly capitalized parties may often lack access to additional capital for patenting purposes, forcing them to ration their limited resources among a variety of purposes, of which patenting may not be the most immediately importanteven if it would otherwise be economically rational.

Second and relatedly, failures to recognize the economic sense of some or more patenting may often be attributable to innovators themselves. Indeed, resource-constrained parties may often fail to recognize the need for more, or any, patenting, particularly as they struggle to establish themselves commercially.[77] Of course, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that resource-constrained parties recognize that some patenting is often important, including as a means of attracting more funding.[78] But that evidence does not demonstrate that such parties recognize all economically prudent instances of patenting and that they deploy their resources accordingly. Hence, though in theory capital markets and innovators should always funnel their available capital into productive patenting practices, in many cases the factors discussed above suggest reasons to be skeptical of such a result in practice.

In fact, some evidence suggests a belief among policymakers that capital markets do not always channel sufficient capital to poorly capitalized parties for patenting purposes. For instance, individuals and small businesses pay only half the fees that other types of parties must in order to obtain and maintain their patents.[79] Other scholars, moreover, have noted that the small inventor lobby has often proved quite effective at preventing legislation that it perceives as advantaging large companies over smaller ones.[80]

A few final notes: these graphs, as well as the preceding analysis and the analysis to follow, are obviously oversimplified in a number of respects. For instance, as briefly mentioned in the Introduction, not all parties can easily be classified as either “well-capitalized” or “poorly capitalized; this bi-modal analysis thus simplifies what is in reality a spectrum in terms of how many resources a party has at its disposal. Nor do all poorly and well-capitalized parties exhibit the same sensitivities to the costs of patenting. Other factors, such as a company’s culture, the industry in which the company operates, the company’s products and services, and the actual personnel involved, will undoubtedly affect how any given party makes intellectual property decisions. Indeed, a party’s industry may frequently dictate patenting decisions, as scholars have noted for some time that patents play significantly different roles from one industry to the next.[81]

But despite these and other generalizations, the analysis in this Part I helps articulate a theoretical model for explaining some evidence regarding how parties make patenting and other intellectual property decisions. Indeed, theory is not meant to capture all relevant nuances that may arise in a particular scenario.[82] Furthermore, as Parts II and III will examine, this theoretical model provides a useful lens through which to assess recent and proposed changes to intellectual property law and how those changes may ultimately impact the intellectual property ecosystem and economy as a whole.

B.  Alternative Forms of Intellectual Property

Another reason parties may choose to forego patenting is because, in some cases, other forms of intellectual property prove more enticing. Importantly, the high costs of patenting discussed above may often play a role in determining how enticing these other forms of intellectual property are, particularly for resource-constrained parties. The following sections describe three alternatives to patenting and how the resources available to a party may affect the intellectual property protections it chooses.

1.  Trade Secrecy

Trade secrecy, often viewed as the primary alternative to a patent,[83] offers innovators several potential advantages over patent protection. First, trade secret protection can last indefinitely, whereas patents only last twenty years from the date the patent application was filed.[84] Second, as discussed above, the life cycle of a patent is expensive: obtaining a patent entails a costly application process, maintaining a patent even after issuance requires payment of periodic maintenance fees,[85] and enforcing patents is incredibly expensive. While enforcing trade secrets is also typically expensive,[86] obtaining trade secret status requires primarily that a party actually keep its inventions secret.[87] Of course, keeping things secret often entails non-trivial costs, including implementing physical security measures and routinely training employees.[88] But those costs are less than they might seem with respect to any specific invention, because companies often undertake these types of security measures as a matter of course and thus need not expend significant additional funds for each new invention they want to keep secret.[89] For instance, a company may incur significant costs in initially training employees and getting processes in place to protect trade secrets. But once those systems are in place, the company’s additional costs in keeping new inventions secret are minimal.

Third, parties can enjoy trade secret protection without having to disclose details about their inventions to the public—in fact, if they did, they would lose trade secret status for the disclosed inventions.[90] Patents, on the other hand, force applicants to disclose important technical information about their inventive ideas as part of the patenting process.[91] And that information typically becomes available to the public, either as a published patent application eighteen months after filing the application[92] or once the patent issues. In fact, some survey evidence indicates that patent law’s disclosure requirements deter a good number of parties from seeking patents, who instead rely on trade secrecy.[93]

Of course, trade secret protection is weaker vis-à-vis patent protection in other respects. For instance, trade secret law typically offers no recourse when a competitor reverseengineers the trade secret owner’s product in order to obtain the trade secrets.[94] Furthermore, if Party B independently develops information similar to or the same as Party A’s trade secrets, Party A has no recourse against that party (or any other party to which Party B discloses the information, for that matter).[95] Indeed, once a party’s trade secrets become generally known, that party’s remedial options are often at an end.[96]

Nonetheless, despite these and other potential risks, many parties may prefer trade secret protection over patent protection because of its relative merits, including affordability, as described above. As such, a preference for trade secret protection provides one important disincentive to patenting.

2.  Copyright

Copyright protection is another form of intellectual property that can function as an alternative to patenting. Technically, a party can enjoy both copyright and patent protection simultaneously; a party need not choose between the two forms as long as the invention is otherwise eligible for both types of intellectual property protection.[97] Software is a good case-in-point: a party can obtain patent protection for the inventive concepts relating to the software, but can also obtain copyright protection for the software code (the software’s “text”) and other nonliteral, expressive elements of the software.[98]

Yet copyright is cheaper to obtain than patent protection. Copyright arises, for instance, as soon as the work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression for more than a transitory period of time.[99] In other words, as soon as a party writes (or types) the work down, it is subject to copyright. Furthermore, copyright subsists in things that exhibit only trivial amounts of creativity—they must merely be “original” to the author, meaning the author independently created the work and it includes some “modicum” of creativity.[100] A person’s doodling, for instance, may be subject to copyright once created, regardless of how poorly done. Patents, on the other hand, are only supposed to issue for useful inventions that are new and non-obvious in light of what others have already done.[101] Hence, as discussed above, a relatively stringent application process is required for those seeking patents, whereas those seeking the advantages of copyright remedies need merely register their work with the United States Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”) and undertake a few other relatively simple formalities.[102]

All of this suggests that for some technologies such as software, the availability of copyright may make obtaining patent protection less crucial. Consequently, many parties with both options may choose to simply rely on copyright, particularly since copyright is much cheaper to obtain, resulting in less patenting.[103] Of course, obtaining both forms of protection is often the ideal approach, particularly since copyright protection is in some key respects weaker than patent protection.[104] And many parties do, in fact, pursue dual protections when available.[105] Yet the high costs of patenting may frequently push parties to sacrifice that ideal for an economically prudent alternative.

3.  Trademark

Trademark protection may also sometimes function as an alternative to patent protection. Trademark protection may seem like a less likely candidate for this role than trade secrecy or copyright, in part because the historical purposes behind trademark law differ significantly from those of patents, trade secrecy, and copyright. For instance, traditionally the primary justification for trademark protection lies in marketplace integrity.[106] Trademark protection is supposed to achieve marketplace integrity by prohibiting third parties from using the trademarks of others in ways that confuse consumers.[107] Hence, by credibly signaling to consumers the actual source of goods and services, trademarks reduce the debilitating information costs that consumers would otherwise face in making consumption decisions.[108]

The traditional purposes behind patents, copyrights, and trade secrecy differ significantly from the consumer protection rationale for trademarks. For instance, the predominant justification for patents is that they incentivize technological and scientific innovation.[109] Trade secrecy is similar in its purpose of promoting such innovation.[110] And while copyright’s purpose centers on incentivizing parties to undertake creative activities, those activities often overlap with and result in technological innovation, meaning that copyright protection may also end up incentivizing such innovation.[111] Hence, given trademark’s different purpose, labeling it a possible alternative to patent protection may seem odd at first glance.

Yet over time, trademarks have taken on roles that in some cases make them a plausible alternative to patent protection. For instance, some scholars have argued that trademarks serve an important incentive function.[112] That is, because innovative parties know that trademark protection prohibits third parties from using an innovator’s mark to sow confusion about its products, trademark protection may embolden parties to devote more resources to increasing the quality of their goods and services.[113] Hence, although trademark protection is less direct than patents, trade secrecy, or copyright in encouraging parties to innovate, trademarks nonetheless may sometimes play a nontrivial role in inspiring parties to invest in innovation.[114]

Of course, similar to copyright and trade secrecy, trademark protection is an imperfect substitute for patent protection. Trademarks, after all, provide no protection against a third party copying the trademark owner’s invention, so long as the third party uses its own trademark on its product.[115] Indeed, trademark law’s functionality doctrines prohibit trademarks owners from using trademarks to protect functional aspects of their goods and services.[116]

But despite these limitations, trademarks indirectly protect a party’s innovative products by protecting its branding of those products. In fact, a party’s branding may often be the primary driver of its commercial success.[117] Hence, while trademarks do not match patents in what they protect against, trademarks nonetheless provide innovative parties with key protections for their inventive products.

Consequently, some parties may elect to rely on trademark protection, perhaps in combination with trade secrecy and copyright, rather than incurring the costs of patenting. Again, like copyright, parties can and often do seek both patents and trademarks with respect to a good or service.[118] But compared to patenting, obtaining trademark protection is relatively cheap. To qualify, for instance, a party need merely use an otherwise eligible mark in commerce; no application process is necessary.[119] Parties may federally register their trademarks under the Lanham Act, which brings a host of advantages.[120] But that process is also relatively cheap, especially in comparison to patent prosecution and maintenance.[121] Hence, in cases where the costs of patenting are too high, parties may elect to simply rely on trademark protection or on some combination of trademark, trade secrecy, and copyright.

4.  Substitutionary Versus Complementary Intellectual Property

In sum, these other forms of intellectual property protection may sometimes function as imperfect “substitutes” to patenting.[122] Importantly, the high costs of patenting discussed in Part I.A may often affect whether parties substitute these alternative forms of intellectual property for patents. Thus, while parties frequently prefer multiple forms of protection when available, the relative advantages of trade secrecy, copyright, and trademarks, combined with the high costs and risks of patenting, may lead many parties to substitute one or more of these intellectual property alternatives for patents.

But again, how often parties substitute these other forms of intellectual property for patents is likely to differ depending on the resources available to a party. Highly capitalized parties are less likely to exhibit sensitivity to the relatively high costs of patenting in making decisions about whether to pursue patents, trade secrecy, copyrights, or some combination thereof. This lack of sensitivity derives from the same factors discussed above in Part I.A. First, the main value of patents for many large companies lies in their aggregation; any individual patent, on its own, is typically unimportant. Instead, patents become valuable to highly capitalized parties mostly when patents are assembled in large “patent portfolios.”[123] This means that well-capitalized parties’ demand for patents is likely to be relatively high, even as the costs of patenting relative to other forms of intellectual property are high and rising. In economic parlance, their high demand for patenting is relatively inelastic in response to changes in other economic factors, including changes in the costs of patents, trade secrecy, copyrights, and trademarks.[124]

Second, well-capitalized companies are able to reduce the relative costs of patenting through economies of scale. For instance, large companies often implement systematic processes for harvesting patentable inventions, which create a variety of efficiencies that help keep the costs of patenting in check.[125] For many well-capitalized parties, these efficiencies likely help prevent the costs of patenting from becoming so high that they affect such parties’ demand for patents by increasing the appeal of cheaper forms of intellectual property protection.

Finally, because the costs of intellectual property protection typically consume a small percentage of well-capitalized companies’ overall assets, in many cases such entities need not choose between the different types of intellectual property protection—where multiple forms are available, they can afford them all.[126] Hence, rather than substituting one form for another, well-capitalized parties are more likely than their resource-constrained counterparts to use the different forms of intellectual property as economic “complements” to each other.[127]

Poorly capitalized parties, on the other hand, are more likely to exhibit greater sensitivity to the relative costs of each form of intellectual property. Their demand for patents, therefore, is likely to exhibit greater cross-price elasticity, meaning as the costs of substitute forms of intellectual property fall relative to the costs of patenting, their demand for patents decreases.[128]

As discussed in Part I.A, the reasons for this mirror the reasons behind well-capitalized parties’ relatively inelastic demand for patents. Unlike well-capitalized parties, poorly capitalized parties face greater resource constraints that often force them to choose one form of intellectual property over another. Hence, such parties’ demand for patents is likely to be more sensitive—or elastic—to the costs of patenting relative to the costs of other forms of intellectual property, meaning that resource-constrained parties are more likely to substitute these other forms of intellectual property for patents. And as Part II will discuss, this substitution effect is likely to become even more pronounced as recent legal changes increase the advantages of trade secrecy, copyright, and trademarks relative to patents.

That said, it is important to stress that in some cases, parties’ preferences for a particular type of intellectual property protection are likely to remain fairly stable, regardless of the relative costs of each form of intellectual property. For instance, a startup company may seek to patent its core software technology no matter how much it costs to patent it relative to the costs of trade secrecy, copyright, or trademarks. A pharmaceutical company is likely to pursue patents on new drugs it develops, regardless of the relative costs of trade secrecy, copyright, or trademark, simply because it is the most viable form of intellectual property protection for its products.[129] Indeed, trade secrecy may not be a viable alternative in many cases where the patented invention, once commercialized, becomes readily apparent.[130]

On the other hand, parties may choose trade secrecy over patenting in cases where it is clearly the best option, such as Coca-Cola protecting its drink formula through trade secrecy to avoid having to disclose the formula as part of the patenting process.[131] Substitution is still occurring in these types of scenarios, but the substitution patterns are typically driven by the relative merits of the distinct forms of intellectual property, rather than by the parties’ resource constraints.

Hence, one of this section’s primary points is to highlight that there is a grey area of intellectual property protection—where “peripheral” technologies are concernedin which resource constraints are more likely to affect what type of intellectual property protection a party chooses. By peripheral technologies, I do not necessarily mean technologies of trivial or minimal value. Sometimes that might be the case, but not always; indeed, some peripheral technologies may be significant innovations with meaningful potential value. But for a variety of reasons, they may not fit within a party’s current business plans, thus leaving them on the periphery.

To illustrate: large technology companies frequently tinker with a variety of innovations, but may decline to pursue them commercially for any number of reasons. Microsoft, for instance, is notorious for experimenting internally with a variety of possible innovations, only to forego commercializing them, even if they do patent them.[132] The oft-cited reason for this behavior is that the innovations in question do not connect meaningfully enough to Microsoft’s core business, the Windows operating system.[133] They are, in a word, peripheral to the company’s core commercial vision. Even when a company launches a product—such as Amazon’s failed bid to revolutionize the smartphone industry—the failed attempt may solidify the technologys position on the periphery.[134] In other words, while companies such as Amazon may have high hopes for their peripheral technologies ultimately becoming something more, their failure to become so is typically not a make-or-break event for the company. Hence, as I use the term, the category of “peripheral technology” covers technologies that are unnecessary for realizing a party’s core commercial vision.

Core technologies, conversely, are those that parties deem as crucial to their immediate commercial prospects. For instance, a core technology for a software startup might be its software database technology, because that is the startup’s primary commercial product. Hence, core technologies are those that relate in some meaningful way to a party’s vision of how it intends to stay commercially afloat. That vision, of course, will often change as parties experiment with a variety of different possibilities. Indeed, as discussed with respect to Amazon’s smartphone foray, parties often attempt to move peripheral technologies into the core technology category. But ultimately parties settle or focus their commercial efforts (at least for a time), and when they do, a party’s core technologies emerge.

These definitions are admittedly leaky. Nonetheless, they are useful in thinking through how different types of parties make intellectual property decisions. For instance, for core technologies, both poorly capitalized parties and highly capitalized parties are more likely to use all forms of intellectual property protection available. Parties will either patent or rely on trade secrecy, depending on the nature of the invention, and where copyright and trademarks protections are available, they will rely on them, too. In such cases, then, the resources available to a party and the relative costs of each form of intellectual property protection are likely to play less of a role in driving parties’ decisions as to which form of intellectual property protection to choose. And again, while substitution may occur in these cases, that substitution often has less to do with the relative costs of different forms of intellectual property and more to do with the relative advantages and disadvantages of each form.

Where peripheral technologies are concerned, however, the resources available to a party and the relative costs of each form of intellectual property are more likely to affect how parties make intellectual property decisions. For instance, resource-constrained parties are more likely to opt out of patenting in this grey area and instead rely on cheaper forms of intellectual property such as copyright, trade secrecy, and trademarksor, in some cases, no protection at all. Indeed, even if other forms of intellectual property are unavailable for these peripheral technologies, a poorly capitalized party may still often decide that the high costs of patenting are simply not worthwhile.[135]

Well-capitalized parties, conversely, will typically pursue patenting in addition to other forms of intellectual property, when available, because their high demand for patents is relatively inelastic in response to the relative costs of the different intellectual property forms. In other words, their lack of similar resource constraints means they often also end up patenting peripheral technologies. Furthermore, because of their resource advantages, they are more likely to create peripheral technologies in the first place.[136] As Part III will further explore, this reality has implications for the patent and intellectual property system as a whole.

Table 1 below provides a brief summary of these possible relationships. Note that every box includes patents as an option, except for when poorly capitalized companies develop peripheral technologies. In such scenarios, as discussed above, patents are likely to disappear as an option because the high costs of patenting relative to other forms of intellectual property protection (or no protection at all) mean that patents are not worth pursuing in light of these parties’ resource constraints.

In every other box, however, patents remain in the mix. This does not mean the relative costs of different forms of intellectual property will not affect parties’ decisions as to which form to select—even for core technologies, for instance, some evidence suggests that poorly capitalized companies forego patenting because of its high costs, instead relying on other forms of intellectual property or no protection at all.[137] The point here is simply that resource constraints likely lose some of their predictive power, particularly with respect to well-capitalized companies because of their relatively inelastic demand for patents generally and inelastic cross-price demand for patents vis-à-vis the costs of other forms of intellectual property.

C.  Ignorance

Another reason parties may forego patenting and instead rely on trade secrecy, copyright, and trademarks (or nothing at all) is ignorance of patent law. To be clear: parties may also be, and often are, ignorant of copyright, trade secret, and trademark law. Yet that ignorance will often not be as damning to a party’s copyright, trade secrecy, and trademark prospects as ignorance of patent law is to a party’s patent prospects.

To see why, consider each body of law in turn. As briefly discussed above, copyright applies immediately once a party creates the work—a party need not undertake any sort of formality before copyright applies.[138] This was not always so. In earlier eras, a party ignorant of copyright’s requirements could easily forfeit copyright protection by “publishing” (a technical term of art) its work without attaching an appropriate copyright notice.[139] Furthermore, a party also had to register their copyrighted work with the Copyright Office for copyright to apply.[140] But Congress softened those requirements with the Copyright Act of 1976 and then did away with them entirely when it implemented the Berne Convention, an international treaty, in 1989.[141] As a result, in today’s world a party does not forfeit copyright in a work when it fails to attach a copyright notice or register a work with the Copyright Office. Such failures may limit a party’s remedies, but copyright still applies, and a party may still avail itself of copyright remedies once it gets its house in order.[142] Hence, while a party may inadvertently limit its remedial options because of its ignorance of copyright law, that ignorance does not result in the forfeiture of copyright protection.

Trade secrecy exhibits important similarities to copyright law in these regards. As with copyright, parties desiring trade secret protection need not undertake any sort of formality in order to qualify for trade secret protection.[143] Essentially, parties qualify merely by keeping their inventions secret.[144] The benefits of trade secrecy, therefore, largely align with how trade secret law works, the result being that ignorance of trade secret law is unlikely to doom many parties’ trade secret prospects.

There are exceptions, of course. For instance, generally a party must have employed “reasonable efforts” to maintain the information’s secrecy,[145] and it is not always straightforward what such reasonable efforts entail. A court’s determination that a party failed in this regard can thus mean a party has no protectable trade secret. But again, while ignorance of these intricacies can result in trade secret forfeiture, the reality is that parties ignorant of the law often end up qualifying for protection anyway, simply by pursuing their interest in keeping the inventions secret.

Trademark law is also more forgiving of those ignorant of its details. As mentioned, trademark rights arise once a party begins using a mark in commerce.[146] A party thus need not undertake any sort of application process to qualify for rights, though doing so at the federal level provides the trademark owner with a number of advantages.[147] But while parties may lose out on an ability to expand their rights by failing to register their marks, they nonetheless retain rights of use so long as they were first to use their marks in a particular geographic area and have not otherwise relinquished their rights in the mark.[148]

Ignorance of patent law, however, is more likely to result in forfeiture of rights than ignorance of copyright, trade secret, or trademark law. Unlike these other bodies of law, a party desiring patent rights must apply for them and pass a relatively rigorous application process, as discussed above.[149] Furthermore, patent law is often highly technical, particularly with respect to timing issues.[150] And these technicalities can easily trip up those ignorant of them.

For instance, in a famous patent case, a repairman of boats invented a means of preventing corrosion of a boat’s stern drive, which aids in boats’ propulsion.[151] He then made this invention available to several friends and acquaintances, all without retaining control of the invention prototypes or seeking feedback from his friends about their use of his invention.[152] Over a year later, he filed a patent application for his invention, which was ultimately granted.[153] But in a later dispute about the validity of his patent, a court deemed it invalid because he had not filed the patent application early enough in light of his having made the invention available to his friends.[154] In fact, his failure to retain control over his prototypes and seek feedback helped defeat his defense that he was still tinkering with the invention, which otherwise might have saved his patent.[155] Hence, patent law’s technicalities with respect to timing and evidentiary issues may often mean that parties fail to obtain valid patents simply because they are ignorant of the law’s intricacies.

The resources available to a party may often play a role in determining whether ignorance of patent law has such effects. Ignorance, for instance, seems more likely to affect poorly capitalized parties than highly capitalized ones.[156] This certainly will not always be true—some poorly capitalized parties are undoubtedly sophisticated with respect to patent law. For instance, a poorly capitalized startup company may have at its helm a former patent attorney. Yet as with the case described above, a party’s limited resources may often function as an accurate proxy for a lack of sophistication in patent law. Indeed, a lack of resources may often prevent parties from obtaining that sophistication since the assistance of patent attorneys comes at such a high price, as discussed in Part I.A.

Ignorance of patent law may also sometimes doom the patent prospects of even well-capitalized parties. For instance, though larger companies often implement internal systems to help ensure that all patentable inventions make their way into patent applications, these systems undoubtedly still fail to capture all patentable inventions.[157] And part of that failure is due to inventors and other personnel failing to carry out their inventive activities in ways that satisfy patent law’s often arcane requirements.[158] Despite such possibilities, however, ignorance seems on average more likely to negatively affect the patent prospects of poorly capitalized parties, for the reasons described above.

In sum, while a party’s ignorance of each type of intellectual property law may ultimately affect its ability to use each type, ignorance of patent law can be particularly devastating to its chances of obtaining patents. Moreover, resource constraints may make such ignorance more likely because, for instance, a party lacks specialized patent counsel or appropriate patenting protocols. Hence, while ignorance may affect well-capitalized parties in some instances, it likely hampers the patent prospects of poorly capitalized parties more frequently. The result of that ignorance is fewer patents generally, but fewer for resource-constrained parties in particular.

D.  Irrationality

Parties may also fail to pursue patents, even when they could, due to irrational decision making. For example, even if parties understand patent law’s requirements, appreciate a patent’s potential advantages, and have resources with which to procure, maintain, and enforce patents, those parties may still choose to forego patenting because they fail to understand their own self-interests.

Some scholars have suggested this to be a potential issue in the opensource software world.[159] That world stresses freely sharing software resources in order to enhance collaborative software innovation.[160] Yet that world is also characterized by a lack of patents, despite the fact that many open-source software developers and companies create inventions that could be patented and—at least in some caseshave means by which to procure patents.[161] Hence, scholars have argued that those involved in open-source software development should better recognize their own self-interests by adopting a more aggressive strategy of patenting to better protect their open model of software innovation.[162]

Despite such pleas, the open-source software community has largely neglected to aggressively pursue patents.[163] This Article does not take a position on this particular issue in the open-source software community—it simply points to the community as an example where irrational decision making may help explain why parties choose to forego seeking patents.

The resources available to a company may sometimes play a role in whether a party makes such irrational intellectual property decisions. For instance, irrational decision making with respect to patenting may be more likely when a party lacks significant resources, because that lack of resources may prevent the party from hiring patent counsel and business strategy personnel to help steer the party into a more economically rational patent acquisition strategy.[164] And while irrational decision making may affect choices regarding other forms of intellectual property, those other forms, unlike patents, may often escape irrationality’s consequences simply because, as discussed above, they often do not require deliberate choices in order to apply.[165]

Well-capitalized parties, on the other hand, seem less likely to forego patenting due to irrational decision making. Their access to resources, for instance, enables such parties to hire patent counsel and other business strategy personnel, who may help them make economically rational decisions regarding patents and other forms of intellectual property. Of course, other forms of irrationality may creep into such parties’ decisionmaking processes, such as “groupthink”[166] and a form of “path dependence.”[167] But that irrationality may often actually push in favor of overpatenting. Indeed, some evidence indicates that well-capitalized parties typically tend to overpatent rather than underpatent.[168]

In sum, irrationality may result in parties failing to pursue patents when doing so would be economically prudent. And because patenting, unlike other forms of intellectual property, requires parties to affirmatively seek out patents, the window for overcoming that irrationality is often short. Resource-constrained parties seem on average more likely than their well-capitalized counterparts to exhibit such irrationality, simply because they more frequently lack access to patent counsel and other business strategy personnel. The result is fewer patents generally and even fewer for those with greater resource constraints.

E.  Sociology

Sometimes parties may appear to be acting irrationally, but in reality their behavior is in some sense rational because it conforms to the norms and values of their particular community. Sociology may thus provide an alternative explanation for why parties fail to seek patents as often as they might.

For instance, sociology may help explain underpatenting in the open-source software world, as briefly discussed above. That community, as mentioned, is built on norms of freely sharing and reusing software resources.[169] In fact, in some cases the licenses under which the software resources are made available mandate that those wishing to use the resources must abide by the same norms.[170] Hence, a patent’s exclusionary nature has long been anathema to many in the community.[171] And that anathema (and the values underlying it) may help explain why parties in the open-source software community elect to forego many patenting opportunities.

Thus, though some scholars have recently argued that some strains of sociology predict parties will typically overpatent,[172] sociology may also predict underpatenting in communities where anti-patent norms are dominant. And in such communities, resource constraints may play less of a role in deterring patenting, simply because the real driver of underpatenting appears to be those norms and values, rather than resource considerations.

Yet resource constraints may still play a role by reinforcing the anti-patent norm. For example, it may be easier for parties with limited means to stick with the norm against patenting. Well-capitalized parties, on the other hand, may be more tempted to deviate from the non-patenting norm, and in fact we see some of that happening in the open-source software world, where billion-dollar open-source software companies have begun to build modest-sized patent portfolios.[173] Hence, the resources available to a party may still play a role in directing a party’s intellectual property decisions, even when sociological factors heavily influence them as well.

II.  Why (Some) Parties May Now Patent Even Less

Part I reviewed five categories of reasons why parties may forego pursuing patents, even in cases where they clearly could. Importantly, in each of these five categories, the resources available to a party appear to play an important role in determining whether and to what extent a party pursues patents vis-à-vis other types of intellectual property protection.

Part II now turns to assessing several recent changes in intellectual property law. In building on Part I’s analysis, it argues that these changes, by increasing the costs of patenting relative to other forms of intellectual property, are likely to suppress resource-constrained parties’ demand for patents. On the other hand, these same changes are unlikely to affect well-capitalized parties’ intellectual property decisions because of those parties’ relatively inelastic demand for patents. Later, Part III will explore the possible implications of this analysis.

A.  The Defend Trade Secrets Act

The recently enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA)[174] is the first legal change that may affect some parties’ demand for patents. It is poised to do so because it enhances the value of trade secrecy in at least three ways. First, and most importantly, it provides trade secret owners with the option of bringing trade secret misappropriation claims in federal courts.[175] Traditionally, state courts have been the primary venue for trade secret misappropriation claims, because trade secret law has principally been state law.[176] But with the DTSA, parties now have civil recourse for trade secret misappropriation in federal courts as well.[177] Hence, this recourse is poised to enhance trade secret protection by providing trade secret owners with more remedial options.

Second, the DTSA may bolster trade secret protection by defining trade secrets more broadly than existing state laws do.[178] For instance, the DTSA’s definition may allow for misappropriation claims even in cases where the trade secrets are only stored in a person’s memory.[179] In fact, even outside this possibility, the DTSA’s definition is arguably broader than under existing state laws, encompassing any type of secret information that derives independent economic value from that secrecy and which has been subject to reasonable measures to maintain its secrecy.[180] This broader definition may thus bolster trade secret protection by allowing parties to bring more misappropriation claims than existing state laws would countenance.

Third, the DTSA may bolster trade secret protection by providing for enhanced remedies. For instance, the DTSA allows for ex parte seizures of misappropriated trade secrets, all without advance notice to the defendant.[181] As some have noted, there is no comparable provision in any existing state trade secret law.[182] Hence, by providing enhanced remedies in federal courts for a potentially broader range of activities, the DTSA has the potential to strengthen trade secret protections in at least these three key ways.

Of course, since the DTSA has only recently come into effect, it is impossible to say whether the DTSA will ultimately make much of a difference in practice. So far, the law does not seem to have resulted in any ground-breaking changes in trade secrecy.[183] Yet despite being in its infancy, there are good reasons to believe that the Act will enhance trade secret protection over time.[184]

And if it does so, the DTSA will increase the value of trade secrecy, meaning an effective decrease in trade secrecy’s costs. In other words, by providing the enhancements described above, the DTSA gives a trade secret owner more trade secret protection today than the party had before the DTSA’s passage, all without the owner incurring any additional costs. To put it more colloquially, in a post-DTSA world, a party obtains more trade secrecy bang for its buck.

These trade secrecy enhancements may thus push inventors to choose trade secrecy over patents in a broader range of cases. As discussed in Part I, this may be so because patents and trade secrecy often function as economic substitutes for one another, meaning parties frequently make choices between the two. Of course, not all inventors will have this choice, because the nature of their products may preclude effective trade secret protection. For example, some inventions are evident as soon as the product encompassing it is made available to the public.

Furthermore, also discussed in Part I, in some cases the benefits of one form of intellectual property over the other may trump any relative cost considerations; a party may want to patent its core technology no matter what it costs, for instance, and other parties may keep their inventions secret simply because that is the best business strategy in a variety of scenarios. But in cases where the relative costs of patents versus trade secrecy matter, the DTSA, by effectively decreasing the costs of trade secrecy relative to patents, may lead some parties that would otherwise choose patenting to pick trade secrecy.

Moreover, in line with Part I’s analysis, the DTSA is more likely to have such effects on resource-constrained parties because such parties’ demand for patents exhibits a higher cross-price elasticity with respect to changes in the prices of other intellectual property forms such as trade secrecy. On the other hand, the DTSA seems less likely to affect the patenting decisions of highly capitalized companies. Such parties’ demand for patents is relatively inelastic and thus insensitive to changes in the costs of other forms of intellectual property such as trade secrecy. Hence, well-capitalized parties are likely to continue to harvest large numbers of patents, regardless of the newfound attractions of trade secrecy that the DTSA ushers in.[185]

That is not to say that the DTSA will not benefit companies with significant resources. To the contrary, for those inventions for which such parties choose trade secrecy, the DTSA may provide several benefits, as discussed above. But the DTSA and its bolstered protections seem less likely to push highly capitalized parties away from patenting into trade secrecy in cases where they would otherwise choose patenting. Instead, that effect is more likely for parties with fewer resources. Moreover, that effect may become even more pronounced as the costs of patents also (and independently of the DTSA) rise, as discussed below.

The DTSA’s enhancements to trade secrecy seem less likely to affect parties’ patenting decisions based on sociology, irrationality, or ignorance. From a sociological standpoint, over time one can certainly imagine different communities adopting new norms in response to changes in intellectual property laws such as the DTSA. But while the DTSA bolsters trade secrecy in the ways discussed above, it does not so dramatically change existing intellectual property laws that dramatic shifts in behavior are likely. Instead, the changes seem poised to push some parties, particularly resource-constrained ones, to choose trade secrecy over patents in a broader range of cases, for the reasons discussed above.

The DTSA’s trade secrecy enhancements also seem unlikely to affect intellectual property decisions grounded in irrationality or ignorance. While resource constraints may make it more likely that parties miss patenting opportunities based on irrationality and ignorance, the DTSA would not appear to exacerbate that irrationality or ignorance in any relevant way. Instead, because of the DTSA’s enhancements to trade secrecy, rational, informed parties seem poised to increasingly choose trade secrecy over patents in cases where resource constraints matter.

B.  The Weakening of Patents

A general weakening of patent rights is another reason more parties may forego patenting. Over the last decade in particular, patent law has experienced some of the most far-reaching changes in some sixty years.[186] And while these changes may ultimately have a number of effects, one early result appears to be a general weakening of patents by making it easier for third parties to invalidate them.[187] This weakening of patents is likely to deter some parties—particularly resource-constrained ones—from pursuing patents in a broader range of cases because that weakening effectively increases the costs of obtaining and enforcing patents.

Of course, some evidence suggests that changes in patent law, whether they strengthen or weaken patent rights, actually have very little effect on parties’ patenting behavior.[188] This may be because few parties that obtain patents ever actually intend to enforce them.[189] Indeed, given the pervasiveness of patent non-assertion, one might plausibly argue that a weakening of patent rights is hardly a cost consideration for those deciding whether to pursue a patent. Hence, the relative strength of patent rights may be of little importance to many parties deciding whether to patent their inventions.

Yet such analysis suffers from the same problem identified at the outset of this Article: it assesses patenting behavior in the aggregate, rather than disaggregating the parties involved in patenting and determining how patent law changes may affect them differentially.

Indeed, as discussed above, this Article’s analysis does not suggest that the relative costs of different forms of intellectual property, including patents, fully dictate how parties make patent and other intellectual property decisions. Its claims are much more modest: that the relative costs of different forms of intellectual property matter more to resource-constrained parties than well-capitalized ones. Thus, resource-constrained parties are more likely to move away from patenting, particularly with respect to peripheral technologies, when patenting costs increase relative to the costs of other intellectual property forms. In fact, this claim may be perfectly consistent with the aggregate data mentioned above, since that aggregate data may mask varied responses to the legal changes from parties situated differently along the resource spectrum.

One might still argue that weakening patents is not a cost that parties take into account when deciding whether to patent. Yet significant survey evidence suggests that parties, both big and small, patent their inventions primarily to prevent thirdparty copying.[190] Hence, greater difficulties in achieving that purpose because of weakened patent protection would certainly seem to be a significant cost consideration for many parties when deciding whether to patent in the first place.

The following sections describe some of the recent legal changes that have weakened patents and how those changes may deter some parties, particularly resource-constrained ones, from pursuing patents. Note that the following sections limit themselves to two sets of changes—the Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter decisions and the AIA’s new post-grant proceedings. But as Mark Lemley has noted, the list of recent legal changes that have weakened patent rights goes beyond just these.[191] Nonetheless, I have chosen to focus on these two sets of changes because they have arguably weakened patents more than any other recent legal reforms.[192] Furthermore, to the extent that other recent legal changes weaken patents, that additional weakening only reinforces this Article’s claims.

1.  Patentable Subject Matter

Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been especially active in reviewing patent law cases.[193] In fact, over that time period, the Court has decided more patent law cases than it did in the previous three decades combined.[194]

Some of the most important of these patent cases relate to patent law’s patentable subject matter requirement.[195] This requirement defines the types of things that can be patented. Based solely on the patent statute, very few things fall outside the scope of patentable subject matter: the statute merely stipulates that, subject to patent law’s other substantive requirements, any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” is eligible for patenting.[196] Given the breadth of these categories, the patent statute itself thus imposes very few limitations on the scope of patentable subject matter.[197]

Over time, however, courts have defined several common law exceptions to patentable subject matter.[198] According to this case law, abstract ideas, laws of nature, and products of nature may not be patented because, the argument goes, these categories are the “handiwork of nature”[199] and do not owe their origin to human ingenuity.[200] Instead, they are the building blocks of human ingenuity, and patenting these building blocks would hinder progress by preventing others from discovering inventive applications for them.[201]

Hence, the most important controversies over patentable subject matter revolve around determining what these common law exceptions mean.[202] And many of the most important recent Supreme Court patent law cases have dealt with articulating and applying these exceptions.[203] This section does not provide a comprehensive overview of these cases; others have already trodden that ground.[204] Instead, it focuses on showing how these cases have generally weakened many patents by making it easier to invalidate them.

For instance, in the important 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International case, the Supreme Court, building on its other recent patentable subject matter cases,[205] articulated a two-step test for assessing whether a patent covers patentable subject matter.[206] According to the Court, the first step requires a court to determine whether the patent at issue claims “laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”[207] But in establishing this step, the Alice Court provided little guidance on how courts should go about making this determination.[208] For instance, it is unclear what criteria courts should use in determining whether something is merely an abstract idea.[209] In the Alice case itself, the Supreme Court seemed to simply frame the patent claims as covering the abstract idea of “intermediated settlement,” without clearly specifying how or why the Court chose that level of abstraction.[210]

The Alice Court did emphasize that the idea of intermediated settlement was a basic economic practice that had long been prevalent, which seemed to drive its analysis under the first step of its two-part test.[211] Yet even if true, that fact still provides little to no guidance on how courts should choose the level of abstraction at which to view patent claims.[212] Indeed, the idea behind any patent claim, if abstracted at high enough a level, becomes just that: an abstract idea.[213]

Furthermore, it is also unclear what criteria courts should use to determine whether a concept such as “intermediated settlement” constitutes a basic economic practice long in practice, such that it constitutes an ineligible abstract idea. The Alice Court did point to some evidence suggesting that the idea of intermediated settlement had long been in use throughout economic history.[214] But the decision nonetheless falls short of providing future courts with specific guidelines for determining whether something constitutes a long-standing, basic economic practice ineligible for patent protection.[215]

The Alice test also purports to formulate a framework for assessing all of the exceptions to patentable subject matter, not just the abstractidea category. But because the Alice case dealt specifically with the “abstract ideas” exception to patentable subject matter, the case provides little to no guidance regarding how to determine whether something constitutes a “law of nature” or “natural phenomen[on].[216]

Once a court determines that a patent claims an abstract idea, law of nature, or physical phenomenon, Alice specifies a second step: besides that patentineligible abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon, “[w]hat else is there in the claims?[217] As the Court put it, “[t]o answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”[218] In other words, does the patent include an “inventive concept” such that the patent is significantly more than simply a patent on an ineligible concept?[219]

With regards to this second step, the Court again failed to provide much guidance about what criteria future courts should use in resolving the question. It is unclear, for instance, what “significantly more” than a patent on an ineligible concept looks like in practice, or what types of “additional features” must be included for the patent to survive invalidation.[220]

The Alice Court did indicate that simply adding conventional or well-understood steps for implementing an ineligible abstract idea, law of nature, or physical phenomenon fails to implicate an inventive concept.[221] For instance, implementing the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using generic computer equipment involves merely conventional or well-understood means for doing so, and thus fails to transform the abstract idea of intermediated settlement into patenteligible subject matter.[222] But this reasoning suggests that most if not all software patents are invalid, since most software can be conceived of as an abstract idea that is merely implemented using generic computer equipment.[223] Yet it does not seem to have been the Supreme Court’s intent to prohibit software patents in general, since the Alice decision fails to even mention software.[224] Furthermore, because the Alice case dealt specifically with the abstract idea exception, the case provides no specific commentary on what an “inventive concept” may look like with respect to a law of nature or physical phenomenon.[225] Hence, with regards to the second step of the Alice test as well, the Court fell short of providing clear criteria for determining when something is so conventional or well-understood that an inventive concept is lacking.

Largely because of these issues, courts, the USPTO, and the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) have struggled to apply Alice. So far, the primary trend has been high rates of invalidation for issued patents, and high rejection rates for those patent applications still before the USPTO.[226] Subsequent to Alice, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to which all patent appeals go, has invalidated the vast majority of patent claims it has reviewed where patentable subject matter was the appealed issue.[227] District courts have also invalidated a high percentage of patents where patentable subject matter was the key concern.[228] The PTAB, which conducts a recently introduced “post-grant” review procedure (discussed in greater detail below), has also invalidated patent claims on the basis of Alice in each of the three decisions it has rendered so far, though the limited number of such reviews makes identifying trends premature.[229] Nonetheless, other review mechanisms at the PTAB have also resulted in high rates of invalidation under Alice.[230]

Still-pending patent applications also face an uphill battle following Alice. For instance, immediately after the Alice decision, some data indicate that the USPTO rejected more than 90% of applications in the area of e-commerce on the basis of Alice.[231] Appeals of USPTO rejections to the PTAB have similarly fared poorly under Alice.[232]

In sum, though the Federal Circuit has begun to uphold some patents subsequent to the Supreme Court’s Alice decision,[233] Alice and its antecedents continue to have their impact.[234] And their primary impact has been to make obtaining and enforcing patents—particularly software, business method, and biotechnology patents—more difficult.

That difficulty, in turn, has significantly weakened many patents. Importantly for purposes of this Article, such weakening effectively means that the costs and risks of patenting have risen, particularly for those patents in areas strongly impacted by these decisions. For instance, the cost of an average software, business method, or biotechnology patent has likely risen in part because parties must spend more time and resources assessing how to craft patent applications in ways that pass Alice muster.[235] The high rates of Alice rejections, even for applications that ultimately issue as patents, also provide evidence that parties are incurring greater costs navigating the post-Alice world of patentable subject matter.

The prospective costs of enforcing patents post-Alice also loom large. For instance, the high success rates of defendants challenging patents post-Alice suggest that patent enforcement will be even more costly than before, in part because the high success rates invite additional challenges and present a greater risk of patent invalidation. Parties crafting new patents in the post-Alice world may face fewer obstacles in this regard because their applications and USPTO approvals will have taken Alice into account. Yet uncertainty lingers even with respect to these patents, since the USPTO and courts may view and apply Alice differently .[236]

Hence, by weakening many types of patents, Alice and its antecedents have increased the costs of obtaining and enforcing patents. The next section describes some additional patent law reforms that have effectively weakened patent rights, thereby increasing the costs and risks of patenting.

2.  The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act

In 2011 the U.S. Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the AIA.[237] The AIA has been called the most important patent law reform since the 1952 Patent Act.[238] The AIA brought about a number of important changes to U.S. patent law, including better aligning it with the rest of the world’s patent laws.[239]

For purposes of this Article, one of the AIA’s most significant reforms was to implement several new mechanisms for reviewing the validity of issued patents. For some time prior to the AIA’s enactment, commentators had complained that the USPTO did a poor job of screening patent applications.[240] The result was high numbers of issued patents that the USPTO probably never should have granted.[241] Once issued, these patents impose a variety of costs on society.[242] For instance, the abundance of bad patents on the market arguably helps fuel the business models of so-called patent trolls, which sometimes use such patents to wring economic rents from purported infringers.[243] But even beyond the patent troll phenomenon, high numbers of improperly issued patents impose costs on society by forcing third parties to take them into account when making business decisions, responding to litigation, and innovating more generally.[244]

In part to help deal with these problems, the AIA introduced several new administrative means by which to challenge issued patents.[245]Post-grant review” allows a party to challenge the validity of an issued patent on nearly any ground of substantive patent law.[246] These grounds include arguments that the patent fails to claim patentable subject matter, lacks novelty, is obvious in light of what others have already done, lacks utility, or fails to disclose enough technical details about the invention.[247] The party wishing to so challenge a patent must file its petition with the USPTO within nine months of the patent issuing,[248] and, with the exception of covered business method patents, these post-grant procedures only apply to patents filed for on or after March 16, 2013.[249] Going forward, they thus provide a powerful means by which to invalidate patents. This is particularly so since any interested party can make such a petition, not just parties that the patent owner has sued or is poised to sue.[250]

“Inter partes review” provides an additional mechanism by which to challenge issued patents before the PTAB.[251] For patents filed on or after March 16, 2013, this review procedure is available once the post-grant review period ends—nine months after the patent has issued or once a post-grant review has ended, whichever comes later.[252] For patents filed before March 16, 2013, parties can file a petition for inter partes review immediately, since post-grant review is unavailable for such patents.[253]

Inter partes review allows petitioners to challenge the validity of an issued patent on two grounds. First, petitioners may seek to demonstrate that the patent lacks noveltythat is, that the invention already exists.[254] Second, petitioners may seek to show that the patent is obvious in light of what others have already invented.[255] Petitioners may prove lack of novelty or obviousness by pointing to other issued patents or printed publications as prior art.[256]

Hence, these and related review procedures have dramatically increased opportunities for parties to invalidate issued patents. In fact, since their implementation, these mechanisms have proved to be fertile grounds for doing so. For instance, invalidation rates have been so high at the PTAB that some have referred to it as the “death squad.”[257] Indeed, invalidation rates utilizing some of these review mechanisms have been estimated to be nearly 80% when the procedure results in a final decision.[258] The number of petitions in absolute terms has also been rising, demonstrating that these review mechanisms have become a preferred means of invalidating issued patents.[259]

The AIA’s new review procedures have thus weakened patents by facilitating their invalidation in increasingly more instances. Of course, one might also argue that these mechanisms will ultimately strengthen the patent system by helping to weed out bad patents. That may certainly be the aggregate effect. But for individual patent seekers, the procedures have made patenting costlier by putting more patents at risk of invalidation. As such, they have increased the costs and risks of patenting in several key respects, making effective patent acquisition and enforcement more difficult in a post-AIA world.

3.  A Post-Alice, Post-AIA World

The previous two sections discussed several Supreme Court decisions and legislative changes that have effectively weakened patents. By doing so, they have increased the costs of obtaining and enforcing patents. In line with Part I’s analysis, therefore, these increased costs seem poised to deter patenting in a broader range of cases. And this deterrence seems particularly likely for parties with more limited resources.

For instance, because resource-constrained parties are more likely to be sensitive to the high costs of obtaining and enforcing patents, increasing those costs is more likely to affect how many patents they pursue. Of course, in some cases—particularly with respect to their core technologies—resource-constrained parties may still find it important to pursue patents in spite of the increased costs described above. Plenty of evidence, for instance, suggests that patents can serve important functions for resource-constrained parties, such as enhancing their ability to attract financing.[260] But past survey evidence has also already shown that the high costs of patenting deter some resource-constrained parties from patenting even their most important technologies.[261] Increasing those costs through the legal changes discussed above thus seems likely to deter patenting in even more cases.

Furthermore, for resource-constrained parties, the greater costs of patenting described above are likely to increase the appeal of other forms of intellectual property because of those forms’ relative affordability. Trade secrecy, for instance, may increase in appeal not solely because of the DTSA, but also because patenting’s growing costs make the cheaper trade secrecy alternative that much more attractive. Indeed, even where the costs and risks associated with other forms of intellectual property protection have remained relatively stable, the increasing costs of patent protection may nonetheless increase those other forms’ appeal by decreasing their relative costs.

The heightened costs of patenting may also deter resource-constrained parties from patenting in a greater range of cases due to ignorance, irrationality, and sociology. For instance, growing costs may make it that much more difficult to afford patent counsel. Without patent counsel, resource-constrained parties may forfeit additional patenting opportunities due to ignorance and economic irrationality.[262] Furthermore, the increased costs of patenting described above may make it even easier for parties that subscribe to anti-patent norms—such as many in the open-source software world—to justify foregoing patenting.[263]

On the other hand, the increased costs of obtaining and enforcing patents described above seem less likely to affect well-capitalized parties’ intellectual property decisions. As discussed in Part I, these types of parties are less sensitive to changes in the costs of patenting, in large part because they derive value from patents en masse, and the costs of intellectual property protection consume a relatively small percentage of their overall resources. Furthermore, because well-capitalized parties tend to be able to afford the full complement of intellectual property protections, the relative price differentials between the different forms of intellectual property are less likely to affect their intellectual property decisions. They canand dochoose them all when available.

Last, the increased costs of patenting described above seem unlikely to deprive well-capitalized parties of many patenting opportunities due to ignorance, irrationality, or sociology. Well-capitalized parties will still have access to patent counsel in a post-Alice, post-AIA world, and their economic incentives to pursue large numbers of patents likely remain unchanged in most cases. In fact, the legal changes described above may have reinforced those incentives by encouraging such parties to pursue even more patents in order to offset the growing share of potentially invalid patents in their portfolios. The next part turns to addressing this and other possible implications.

III.  Implications

Part I of this Article laid out five reasons why parties may forego patenting. Importantly, it sought to demonstrate how the resources available to a party may often play a critical role in determining whether a party patents its inventions or instead relies on alternative forms of intellectual property protection, or, in some cases, no protection at all. In short, resource-constrained parties seem more likely to forego patenting due to its relatively high costs, instead relying on cheaper forms of intellectual property such as copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrecy. Furthermore, the relatively high costs associated with patents may also disproportionately hamper resource-constrained parties’ patenting opportunities due to ignorance, irrationality, or sociology.

Well-capitalized parties, on the other hand, are likely to exhibit a relatively high, steady demand for patents. And the costs of patenting are less likely to affect their intellectual property decisions in general. Indeed, typically such parties can afford the whole gamut of protections, and they act accordingly. While ignorance, irrationality, and sociology may also affect well-capitalized parties in their intellectual property decisions, those factors typically push well-capitalized parties towards overprotection, not underprotection.

Part II, relying on Part I’s analysis, then assessed several recent intellectual property law changes. The purpose of doing so was to demonstrate how these changes have increased the costs of patenting even further, while decreasing the relative costs of other types of protections such as trade secrecy. This Part now turns to assessing some potential implications of the analyses in Parts I and II.

A.  If Resource-Constrained Parties Patent Less, Is That Normatively Desirable?

In the run-up to the AIA’s enactment, many commentators worried that some of its provisions would put resource-constrained parties at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis larger corporations.[264] In particular, commentators viewed the AIA’s provisions relating to priority as potentially detrimental to resource-constrained parties’ patenting prospects.[265] These provisions align U.S. patent law with most of the rest of the world, stipulating that whoever first files a patent application receives the patent.[266] This new regime contrasts with earlier U.S. patent law, which assigned patents to whoever invented something first.[267] The worry with the AIA’s new priority rules is that large companies will often receive patentseven when resource-constrained parties were the first to inventsimply because the larger companies’ superior resources enable them to file patent applications more quickly.[268]

This Article highlights additional ways that the AIA, as well as the other intellectual property law changes reviewed in Part II, may affect the patenting prospects of different parties along the resource spectrum. In short, while many of these changes have been viewed as necessary correctives to an overabundance of bad patents,[269] they also seem poised to suppress at least some patenting by parties with more limited resources.

What would this mean in practice? It may mean that resource-constrained parties face greater difficulty on a number of important economic fronts. For instance, some studies show that patents help resource-constrained parties attract financing; fend off incumbent rivals; prevent larger companies from stealing their innovations; ensure their freedom to operate; increase their market share; and facilitate collaborations, acquisitions, and initial public offerings.[270] Less patenting by resource-constrained parties may thus sometimes harm their economic prospects. And if resource-constrained parties’ economic prospects grow bleaker, the economy as a whole may suffer, since resource-constrained parties such as startup companies are vital engines of job growth and innovation.[271]

To some extent, resource-constrained companies have always been at an intellectual property disadvantage vis-à-vis their well-capitalized counterparts.[272] Indeed, the resource differentials between these groups mean that well-capitalized parties have always been able to afford more intellectual property protections, including patents, than parties with more limited means, and to use those protections to further their own economic interests.[273] Hence, less patenting by resource-constrained parties may not drastically change the status quo. Nonetheless, widening the patent gap between well-capitalized parties and poorly capitalized ones through the changes discussed in Part II could more frequently deprive resource-constrained parties of the benefits they reap from patents, as enumerated above.[274] And without such benefits, the economy may suffer.

That possibility becomes even more acute if the same legal changes fail to affect the intellectual property decisions of well-capitalized parties. And as argued throughout, while resource-constrained parties seem poised to decrease patenting in more cases, well-capitalized parties seem likely to maintain their heavy patenting in response to the legal changes discussed in Part II.

In fact, those legal changes may actually push well-capitalized parties to increase their patenting. As discussed, well-capitalized parties rely on patents in bulk.[275] Yet the legal changes discussed above mean it has become easier to invalidate patents. Knowing this, well-capitalized parties may increase the number of patents they pursue in order to maintain the necessary patent volume. Hence, while resource-constrained parties seem likely to forego patenting in more circumstances, well-capitalized parties may respond by increasing, rather than decreasing, their patenting activities.

Of course, less patenting by resource-constrained parties may also prove beneficial in some respects. For instance, if resource-constrained parties more frequently elect to forego patenting but still elect to pursue the innovation, society receives the innovation without the significant costs that patents often impose.[276] Indeed, those avoided costs may include patent trolling, since the patents of small entities frequently end up in patentassertion campaigns.[277] Despite these possible benefits, it may be the case that if resource-constrained parties forego patenting more of their innovations, society will miss out on the disclosures that patenting an invention requires.[278] This may be particularly true if resource-constrained parties respond to the growing relative costs of patents by switching to trade secrecy, where secrecy, rather than disclosure, is required for protection.[279] Yet there is widespread doubt that patenting actually discloses much useful information.[280] Furthermore, as some scholars have argued, trade secrecy may actually encourage, rather than inhibit, disclosure of information regarding the innovations.[281]

One of the key questions, then, becomes whether resource-constrained parties that elect to forego patents will still have incentives to pursue the associated innovations. For several reasons, I believe the answer in many cases is likely in the affirmative. First, resource-constrained parties are most likely to forego patenting when it comes to peripheral technologies, rather than core technologies.[282] Hence, since these technologies reside outside of the party’s core commercial vision, the party may not have considered patent protection for the innovation crucial in the first place. Second, parties can still rely on other types of protection, including trade secrecy, for many of their innovations. And third, even for core technologies that a party would otherwise wish to patent, there are other important incentives that motivate many parties to pursue innovations, even absent patent rights.[283]

Finally, if resource-constrained parties opt to patent less, while well-capitalized parties patent the same or more, the latter may be worse off than the former in key respects. For instance, amassing ever more patents may be increasingly foolhardy if patent rights are growing ever weaker. This may be particularly true if the attractiveness of alternative types of protection, such as trade secrecy, has increased. Hence, though a widening patent gap between well-capitalized and resource-constrained parties may result in some disadvantages for smaller parties, that gap may present some disadvantages to larger parties as well.

Thus, as Congress and courts consider additional patent and intellectual property law changes,[284] this Article highlights important economic considerations relevant to such efforts. In short, failing to fully consider the impact of resource differentials on intellectual property decision making could mean that well-intended reforms produce unintended results. The discussion above is not meant to definitively resolve any of the highlighted issues, but instead is meant to stress the significant possible implications of patent law changes that fail to take such resource differentials into account.

B.  Feeding or Starving the Trolls?

A primary motive behind many of the recent patent law reforms has been to address the growing concern of so-called “patent trolls”—patent owners that do not make goods or services, but sue others that do.[285] Such entities, according to many, abuse the patent system in various ways, including in some cases relying on patents of dubious quality and scope to extract rents from otherwise productive companies.[286]

The legal changes discussed herein could encourage patent trolling in a number of ways. First, to the extent that large corporations increase their patenting in order to maintain high patent volume, those bloated patent portfolios may become a fresh source of patents for patent trolls. Indeed, patent trolls often source their patents from companies with overstocked portfolios.[287] And if larger corporations patent even more in order to maintain volume, those companies may ultimately have that many more patents to shed, particularly if the increase in patenting leads to patenting in areas unrelated to the companies’ core products and services (that is, peripheral technologies). Hence, to the extent the legal changes discussed in Part IIor future reformslead well-capitalized parties to maintain or even increase their patenting, those changes may help provide a steady, even growing, source of patents for those engaged in trolling.

Second, some of the legal changes discussed in Part II may increase patent trolling by pushing patent owners to outsource more of their patent enforcement activities to third-party assertion entities. As I have written elsewhere, the high costs and risks of patent assertion may often lead parties to shift those costs and risks to thirdparty patent assertion entities, all in an effort to realize some return on their patent investments while minimizing the otherwise prohibitive costs associated with patent assertion.[288] Hence, to the extent the legal changes discussed in Part II and future reforms increase the costs of patent protection, those changes may push even more patent owners to shift those costs to patent assertion specialists. And when such shifting occurs, patent trolling rates are likely to rise, since patent troll business models demand ever-increasing rates of assertion to survive.[289]

On the other hand, the changes discussed above may also help starve patent trolls. First, as mentioned above, the patents of resource-constrained parties frequently find their way into patent assertion campaigns.[290] Thus, to the extent that resource-constrained parties patent less in response to the rising relative costs of patenting, they may ultimately have fewer patents to contribute to trolling campaigns. In other words, the legal changes discussed herein may deprive trolls of an important source of patents.

Second, even if large corporations increase their patenting in response to the legal changes described herein, those legal changes may still reduce trolling. For instance, since patents are more difficult to enforce, patent asserters can expect higher costs of assertion and thus reduced profitability. And that reduced profitability may drive some or even many parties away from a business model focused on patent assertion.

In sum, the legal changes described in Part II may help combat patent trolling by, among other things, reducing the supply of patents from resource-constrained parties and making trolling less profitable. On the other hand, the legal changes may contribute to more trolling by helping replenish the patent well from which trolls often draw and pushing more patent owners to outsource patent enforcement activities to patent trolls. Again, the point here is not to resolve these issues once and for all. Instead, it is to highlight that legal changes that fail to account for how resource differentials among parties impact intellectual property decisions neglect an important component of any effective reform.

C.  Intellectual Property Law Distortions

One long-term consequence of the legal changes described in Part II may be incremental distortions in other areas of intellectual property law. For instance, in technological areas where both patents and other forms of intellectual property apply, courts may be tempted to distort the other forms of intellectual property to make up for the perceived patent shortfall.[291]

In fact, such a dynamic may have been at play in a recent high-profile copyright dispute between Oracle and Google.[292] In that case, Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement because Google copied thirty-seven of Oracle’s Java application programming interfaces (APIs) into Android, its mobile operating system.[293] Software APIs are functional in nature; in essence, they enable distinct software programs using the same APIs to communicate with one another.[294] Copyright law typically excludes functional features of otherwise copyrightable works from copyright protection.[295] Hence, because of APIs’ functional nature, the software industry had for decades prior to the dispute between Oracle and Google assumed that APIs fall outside the scope of copyright protection.[296] Indeed, a good number of previous judicial decisions provided a solid basis for that assumption.[297]

Yet in Oracle v. Google, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit deemed the APIs subject to copyright, largely because creation of the APIs entailed some creativity.[298] In doing so, the court interpreted copyright expansively, in a way with which many commentators disagreed.[299] Some have suggested that the court may have been motivated to take this expansive view in order to counteract the weakening of patent rights it had witnessed over the last several years.[300] Indeed, as the exclusive court of appeals for patent cases, the Federal Circuit has had a front-row seat to the last decade’s general weakening of patent rights by the Supreme Court and Congress.[301]

The inclination to bolster copyright in the face of declining patent rights may be particularly likely given how previous copyright decisions have addressed the intersection between copyright and patent law. For instance, in an influential Second Circuit decision addressing copyright as applied to software, the court suggested that patents may be better suited than copyright for protecting computer science inventions.[302] Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s seminal Baker v. Selden decision, the Court pointed to patents as the appropriate form of protection for utilitarian solutions to technical and scientific problems.[303] Hence, to the extent courts perceive that patents no longer serve these roles effectively, courts may be inclined to expand copyright’s role to provide more effective intellectual protection in these areas.

Beyond copyright, courts may be tempted to distort other areas of intellectual property law to compensate for a perceived weakening of patent rights. For instance, the Supreme Court has long held that parties asserting trademark rights with respect to some feature of their product face a heavy presumption against those rights if the feature is detailed in a patent application.[304] With the general weakening of patent rights, however, courts may be tempted to relax that presumption.

In fact, courts may be tempted to relax a host of other intellectual property doctrines meant to screen out functional elements.[305] Courts have long considered functional elements outside the scope of other bodies of intellectual property law, in large part because the courts view those elements as the province of patent law.[306] But if courts perceive a growing ineffectiveness of patents in protecting such functional features, courts may increasingly relax how these other intellectual property doctrines are applied in order to provide innovators with effective intellectual property protection from these other sources.

If such intellectual property law distortions were to occur, would that be a positive development? After all, if parties subject to significant resource constraints are increasingly unable or unwilling to rely on patent protection, then providing them with more expansive protection from other intellectual property sources may be precisely what is needed. But while such a solution may seem appealing in some respects, the long-term health of the intellectual property system as a whole would likely suffer. As others have written, the various doctrines of each intellectual property law type have been crafted with specific, and in some cases constitutional, ends in mind.[307] Hence, when the law in any given area is applied in a way that ignores those ends, the result is often a morphing of the law that imposes more costs on society than intended, in many cases without any offsetting societal benefits.[308]

Conclusion

Over the last decade in particular, many commentators have focused on the ever-increasing number of patents and the societal problems this patent glut causes. In response, Congress, the USPTO, courts, and other governmental institutions have sought ways to correct for the perceived overabundance of patents.

Yet this focus on the aggregate number of patents obscures the reality that different types of parties have quite different relationships to the patent system. Resource-constrained parties are more likely to be sensitive to the patent system’s high costs in selectively patenting and substituting other forms of intellectual property when available. Well-capitalized parties, conversely, are typically impervious to those costs in utilizing other types of intellectual property as complements, rather than substitutes, to high-volume patenting. Hence, when these relative costs change, whether through court decisions, acts of Congress, or otherwise, those changes matter, particularly to those with more limited resources.

Failing to take these relationships into account when implementing patent and other intellectual property law reforms is therefore likely to result in a number of unintended consequences. This Article has briefly touched upon a few possible consequences of some of the most important recent patent and trade secret reforms. Future reform proposals would do well to more fully account for parties all along the resource spectrum.

 

 


[*] Associate Professor of Law, BYU Law School. MPhil, University of Cambridge. JD, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Jonas Anderson, Charles Asay, Stephanie Bair, John Duffy, Roger Ford, Janet Freilich, Mark Lemley, Andrew Michaels, David Moore, Randall Rader, Arielle Sloan, Rachel Sachs, Jake Sherkow, Paul Stancil, John Whealan, participants at the George Washington Law School’s IP Speaker Series, and participants at the 2017 IP Scholars Conference for helpful comments on the ideas presented in this Article.

 [1]. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 10–18, 26 (2008); Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 103, 108–09 (2011) (suggesting that the fact that half of all litigated patents that make it through trial are invalidated means that the United States Patent Office issues too many invalid patents); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 71, 87–91 (2013); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 589–91 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, Atlantic (July 12, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725 (arguing that patents are not needed in most industries and the United States Patent Office often issues patents that they should not, resulting in a complex set of wasteful costs on society); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2135, 2139–45 (2009); Too Many Patents, Pat. Progress, http://www.patentprogress.org/systemic-problems/too-many-patents (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (discussing the astronomical rise in the overall number of patents and the problems, such as patent thickets, that result).

 [2]. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2149–50 (2013) (discussing the problem of excessive numbers of patents and how patent trolls take advantage of this reality when carrying out their business models).

 [3]. Vivek Wadhwa, Ending Patent Wars Will Be a Huge Boon to the Tech Industry, TechCrunch (Mar. 10, 2016), http://tcrn.ch/1pbUVVU (discussing patent wars in the smartphone industry and the negative effects such wars have had).

 [4]. Posner, supra note 1 (arguing that patents are largely unimportant, and even potentially harmful, in most technological fields for promoting innovation); Time to Fix Patents, Economist (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-way-rewarding-them-time-fix (arguing that the patent system is failing to promote innovation, which is its core purpose).

 [5]. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy 3–7 (2003).

 [6]. See Manus Cooney, The America Invents Act—How It All Went Down, IPWatchdog (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/20/the-america-invents-act-how-it-all-went-down (describing enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the largest patent system overhaul since the 1952 Patent Act).

 [7]. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette et al., Supreme Court Patent Cases, Written Description, http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing all patent cases that have come before the Supreme Court since 1952, and showing that a third of all such cases have been decided since 2010).

 [8]. See Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root out ‘Patent Trolls, N.Y. Times (June 4, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2ze4U2n.

 [9]. See Jonathan Griffin, 2015 Patent Trolling Legislation, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (June 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/2015-patent-trolling-legislation.aspx.

 [10]. Nilay Patel, The ‘Broken Patent System’: How We Got Here and How to Fix It, Verge (July 10, 2012, 2:59 P.M.), http://www.theverge.com/2011/08/11/broken-patent-system; Jay Walker, Our System Is So Broken, Almost No Patented Discoveries Ever Get Used, Wired (Jan. 5, 2015, 6:25 A.M.), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/fixing-broken-patent-system.

 [11]. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 613, 625–29 (2015) (discussing incentives the United States Patent Office has to overgrant patents).

 [12]. Jeremy W. Bock, Patent Quantity, 38 U. Haw. L. Rev. 287, 304–15 (2016).

 [13]. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 29–42 (2005) (arguing that the value of patents for many parties is in the aggregate, rather than in individual patents).

 [14]. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 1573, 1593–98 (2016) (discussing how parties may often patent for purposes of advertising and personal recognition); Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 259, 286–308 (2015) (discussing how many parties use patents to signal information to capital, labor, and product markets); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 636–43 (2002) (discussing how many parties derive value from their patents because of the information about their holders that patents may signal to investors).

 [15]. Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 421, 441–44 (2016).

 [16]. See Joseph J. Cordes et al., Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., A Survey of High Technology Firms 55–58 (1999), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? doi=10.1.1.202.514&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1296–1303, 1309–14 (2009) (providing survey results regarding the various reasons why different parties in different industries patent, and also highlighting some reasons why they may not); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 14–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=214952 (listing the ability of others to invent around patents as a significant reason why many parties forego patenting).

 [17]. See Bock, supra note 12, at 293, 301, 304–15; Burk, supra note 15, at 440–41.

 [18]. Cf. Bock, supra note 12, at 305–13, (discussing patent harvesting programs at large companies as mechanisms for increasing patenting at those companies, with one implication that imperfect patent harvesting systems may yield fewer patents than is optimal).

 [19]. See, e.g., Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 2–5, 37–49 (2012) (claiming that many open-source software companies do not patent their innovations because doing so is expensive and stigmatized in the open-source community, and arguing that they should more aggressively pursue patents to help combat risks to their innovation model).

 [20]. Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1276–78 (indicating that a substantial proportion of early-stage companies hold no patents, and that many startup companies forego patenting even their most important technologies).

 [21]. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 181–83 (arguing that patents play different roles depending on the industry).

 [22]. Conceptually, it may also make sense to flip this analysis to focus on the “supply” curves of different parties in providing patents to the marketplace. For reasons that I hope will become clear, however, I have instead chosen to analyze the intellectual property decisions of various parties in the intellectual property ecosystem using economic demand principles.

 [23]. “Well-capitalized” is admittedly a vague term. In general, I simply mean that a party has sufficient resources to run its operations for the foreseeable future without significant financial restraints. And while vague, the distinction nonetheless proves useful in conceptualizing how different parties make intellectual property decisions, as the rest of this Article will attempt to demonstrate.

 [24]. See, e.g., Michael Parkin, Microeconomics 89–90 (10th ed. 2011).

 [25]. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 13, at 29–42 and accompanying text.

 [26]. See John Dodds, Patenting Strategies: Building an IP Fortress, in 1 Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices 911, 919–20 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007), http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ resources/Publications/links/ipHandbook%20Volume%201.pdf.

 [27]. See Parkin, supra note 24, at 89–90.

 [28]. See Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1310–12 (finding the costs of obtaining and enforcing patents to be a major reason why early-stage companies sometimes do not patent at all, or patent only inventions at the core of their business models).

 [29]. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 10–49 (2016) (discussing many of these changes and noting that, despite them, the patent system manifests a surprising resiliency based on several metrics).

 [30]. See, e.g., Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part One), Fenwick & West: Bilski Blog (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/ 2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html (showing that since a series of important Supreme Court decisions, certain types of patents have been easier to invalidate).

 [31]. Patrick J. Coyne, What You Should Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Law360, (June 27, 2016, 11:10 P.M.), http://www.law360.com/articles/806201/what-you-should-know-about-the-defend-trade-secrets-act (discussing how the Defend Trade Secrets Act has bolstered trade secret protection).

 [32]. Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1310 (finding the costs of obtaining and enforcing patents to be a major reason why early-stage companies forego patenting even their major innovations).

 [33]. See 35 U.S.C. §                                           111(a) (2012) (“An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the Director [of the USPTO].”).

 [34]. See id. §§ 101–103 (laying out the patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, and non-obviousness requirements).

 [35]. See id. § 112(a) (providing for the enablement and written description requirements); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 546–47 (2009).

 [36]. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); Fromer, supra note 35, at 546–47, 550.

 [37]. See Cathie Kirik, Working with a Patent Practitioner, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.: Inventors Eye (Jan. 2011), https://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/eye/201101/ advicepracticioner.jsp (recommending that inventors use patent lawyers to help them prosecute patent applications before the USPTO).

 [38]. Kathleen Kuznicki, How Long Does It Take to Get a Patent?, Lynch L. Group (Apr. 20, 2014), http://lynchlaw-group.com/how-long-does-it-take-to-get-a-patent (describing the usual back-and-forth between the USPTO and applicants).

 [39]. Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWatchdog (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us.

 [40]. See Dodds, supra note 26, at 918–19.

 [41]. Jay A. Erstling & Frederik W. Struve, A Framework for Patent Exhaustion from Foreign Sales, 25 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 499, 508–18 (2015) (providing an overview of the territoriality of U.S. patent law).

 [42]. Id.

 [43]. Dodds, supra note 26, at 919–20.

 [44]. See Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1310 (listing the ease with which patented inventions can be invented around as one major reason parties forego patenting).

 [45]. Maintain Your Patent, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent (last visited Nov. 23, 2017).

 [46]. But see Asay, supra note 14, at 286–308; Long, supra note 14, at 636–43.

 [47]. Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IPWatchdog (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of-patent-litigation.

 [48]. Clark D. Asay, Patent Pacifism, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 645, 663 (2017).

 [49]. Of course, one way to mitigate these costs is to outsource them to a patent assertion entity, otherwise known as a patent troll, or to seek some form of patent litigation financing. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 373–74 (2012). This Article will return to these topics in Part III.

 [50]. See Todd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just About Worthless, Forbes (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2013/10/04/for-most-small-companies-patents-are-just-about-worthless (discussing how the difficulty of enforcing patents makes patenting for small companies “worthless”). Of course, one way to deal with many of these costs is to outsource them to a third party, such as a patent assertion entity, or to obtain litigation funding. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 48, at 652. These options may cause some parties that would otherwise forego patenting to pursue a patent, though the uncertainty of obtaining funding or finding a third-party enforcer may still deter patent acquisition in many cases.

 [51]. Cf. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 435–37 (2004) (arguing that most patents are never enforced because most patents lack significant commercial value).

 [52]. Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 15.

 [53]. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1503, 1504 tbl.3 (2001) (showing that by the seventeenth year of protection fees are paid on only 36% of patents).

 [54]. As a general matter, it has long been clear that the resources available to a party affect that party’s ability to successfully navigate the legal system. See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 969, 969–73 (2005) (discussing the disadvantages that resource-constrained parties face in traversing the legal system).

 [55]. See Cordes et al., supra note 16, at 55–59; Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1310–12; Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 15–16, 15 n.35.

 [56]. See Parkin, supra note 24, at 89–90.

 [57]. For a fuller explanation of this type of marginal analysis, see Irvin B. Tucker, Macroeconomics for Today 37–38 (7th ed. 2011).

 [58]. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Fee Schedule (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO%20fee%20schedule_current.pdf (archive version on file with author) (listing filing and prosecution fees for “small entity” and “micro entity” applicants, which are 50 percent and 25 percent of the regular fees, respectively).

 [59]. See Sarah White, Pros and Cons of Working for a Startup Company, Monster, https://www.monster.com/career-advice/article/pros-and-cons-of-working-for-a-startup-company (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing longer hours and lower base salaries—which are often justified by providing employees with equity—as likely cons to working for a startup).

 [60]. Id.

 [61]. For an explanation of opportunity costs, see David R. Henderson, Opportunity Cost, Library Econ. & Liberty: Concise Encyclopedia Econ., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ OpportunityCost.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017).

 [62]. See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-Invent, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 755, 761–70 (1998) (providing background on how this system works).

 [63]. Id.

 [64]. Gene Quinn, A Brave New Patent World—First to File Becomes Law, IPWatchdog (Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/03/16/a-brave-new-patent-world-first-to-file-becomes-law (explaining the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and its new “first-to-file” priority system). See also 35 U.S.C. § 100 note (2012) (Effective Date of 2011 Amendment).

 [65]. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 517, 546–550 (2013) (providing evidence from Canada suggesting first-to-file patent laws may reduce the number of patents individual inventors acquire).

 [66]. Long, supra note 14, at 637, 655–56; Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1063, 1071–82 (2008) (discussing the many roles that a patent can play for startup companies, including attracting financing).

 [67]. See Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 15–16. See also Bock, supra note 12, at 309–15 (describing the resource-intensive process of patent harvesting that enables some companies to stuff their patent portfolios).

 [68]. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 13, at 29–42.

 [69]. Doing so is, in fact, a regular practice of large companies in particular. See e.g., Bock, supra note 12, at 304–09, 304 n.94.

 [70]. See supra notes 1215 and accompanying text.

 [71]. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 13, at 29–42.

 [72]. David R. Henderson, Demand, Library Econ. & Liberty: Concise Encyclopedia Econ., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Demand.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (“The law of demand states that when the price of a good rises, the amount demanded falls, and when the price falls, the amount demanded rises.”).

 [73]. Id.

 [74]. See e.g., Schwartz, supra note 49, at 373–74 (discussing various forms of litigation financing used by small businesses).

 [75]. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 3, 16–21 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (analogizing innovation and patenting to a lottery system, in which parties often overinvest in hopes of earning supracompetitive returns). John R. Allison and others do provide some evidence as to the characteristics of valuable patents at filing and prosecution. See Allison et al., supra note 51, at 437–39, 448–65. Nonetheless, these predictors still occur after a party has decided whether to seek a patent at all.

 [76]. Ryan Caldbeck, Successful Venture Investing: The Importance of Understanding Risks, and Diversification, Forbes (Feb. 19, 2014, 5:55 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/ 2014/02/19/successful-venture-investing-the-importance-of-understanding-risks-and-diversification.

 [77]. Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1310–12.

 [78]. See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 66, at 1067.

 [79]. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012).

 [80]. See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 Hastings L.J. 1299, 1304 (2003).

 [81]. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 49 (2009) (“Companies in different industries vary widely in the importance they attribute to patents and in the cost and effort they expend to obtain them.”).

 [82]. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 7 (1979) (“A full description would be of [the] least explanatory power . . . .”).

 [83]. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1974) (discussing the choice between patents and trade secrecy).

 [84]. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 917, 924 (2011).

 [85]. Id. at 925.

 [86]. See James Morando, Defending Trade-Secret Claims, Farella Braun & Martel LLP (May 5, 2008), http://www.fbm.com/files/Publication/0c2adca1-3549-4cd7-896e-957205dea39c/ Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b83233e6-fd45-4cdf-9a1a-9638c3b99163/6154c86f-0cf6-42d3-8037-5c2f2cb0822f_document.pdf (explaining that trade secret litigation is often just as costly as patent litigation).

 [87]. See id.

 [88]. Id.

 [89]. For a discussion on the physical measures a company may take to protect its trade secrets, see Pamela Passman, Eight Steps to Secure Trade Secrets, WIPO Mag., Feb. 2016, at 22, 23–24, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2016/wipo_pub_121_2016_01.pdf.

 [90]. Anderson, supra note 84, at 926.

 [91]. Id.

 [92]. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012).

 [93]. See Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 13–16, 15 n.33.

 [94]. Anderson, supra note 84, at 924–25.

 [95]. See id.

 [96]. Id. at 926.

 [97]. See, e.g., In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395–96 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that the constitutional provision that authorizes both copyrights and patents does not require parties to choose one over the other).

 [98]. See Jonas P. Herrell, The Copyright Misuse Doctrine’s Role in Open and Closed Technology Platforms, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 441, 458 (2011).

 [99]. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).

 [100]. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).

 [101]. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (providing for the novelty and non-obviousness requirements of patent law).

 [102]. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 Colum. J.L. & Arts 311, 333–42 (2010) (describing the effects of undertaking formalities with respect to a copyrighted work, including the ability to sue infringers). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 138–42 (discussing the limited copyright protections that attach even without registration).

 [103]. Cf. Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1473, 1512–15, 1523–24 (2004) (describing how copyrights can function as “backdoor patents” by providing similar rights of exclusion after a patent has expired).

 [104]. Cf. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 475, 479 (2006) (arguing in favor of making patent law more like copyright law by including an independent invention defense to patent infringement).

 [105]. See Dodds, supra note 26, at 916–20 (“Patents are not the only way to protect IP. Trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets are used as well, and very often they form an important part of an overall IP strategy.”).

 [106]. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1844 (2007) (“It would be difficult to overstate the level of consensus among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs.”).

 [107]. Id.

 [108]. Id.

 [109]. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 439 (2004) (“Traditionally, the economic rationale for granting intellectual property rights in innovations has been that the rights provide an incentive or reward for the sizeable investments needed to create the intellectual property disclosed in the patent document.”).

 [110]. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 319–20 (2008) (suggesting that the two traditional theories behind trade secret protection both focus on incentivizing innovation, whether directly or indirectly).

 [111]. Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. Colo. L. Rev. 65, 90–96 (2016).

 [112]. Bryan L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 735, 738 (2015); Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 769, 769–70, 772–74 (1991); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1460–61, 1460 n.17 (2002).

 [113]. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 112, at 1460 n.17.

 [114]. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 269–70 (1987) (arguing that trademarks encourage investments in improving the quality of products sold under the marks).

 [115]. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995) (describing trademark law’s functionality doctrine, which prohibits parties from using trademarks to protect functional aspects of their products and services).

 [116]. Id.

 [117]. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 651 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[F]irms that innovate often capture long-term benefits from doing so, thanks to various first mover advantages, including lockins, branding, and networking effects.”); Scott Goodson, Why Brand Building Is Important, Forbes (May 27, 2012, 4:47 A.M.) https://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/ 05/27/why-brand-building-is-important (“[I]t’s easy to see why brands are more important now than at any time in the past 100 years.”).

 [118]. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 112, at 1460–61 (arguing that patent and trademark protection often complement each other in spurring innovation).

 [119]. William Fisher, Overview of Trademark Law, Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y Harv. U., https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).

 [120]. Id.

 [121]. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Fee Schedule (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO%20fee%20schedule_current.pdf (archive version on file with author).

 [122]. Arleen J. Hoag & John H. Hoag, Introductory Economics 65 (4th ed. 2006).

 [123]. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 13, at 27.

 [124]. Cf. Parkin, supra note 24, at 89–90.

 [125]. Bock, supra note 12, at 305–09.

 [126]. This is not to say that large companies have no sensitivity to the costs of intellectual property protection, but simply that their superior resources mean they are, on average, less sensitive to those relative costs than a party with greater resource limitations.

 [127]. Hoag & Hoag, supra note 122, at 65.

 [128]. See David A. Besanko & Ronald R. Braeutigam, Microeconomics 52 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining cross-price elasticity of demand).

 [129]. Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1290–91, 1296–98.

 [130]. See Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 7 n.12. Survey results have shown that first-mover advantage is often the most important way that startups secure a competitive advantage. Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1288–90. Note, however, that first-mover advantage need not be distinct from patents; in fact, startups may bolster their first-mover advantage by securing a patent.

 [131]. Cf. Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 14–15 (noting that having to disclose technical information as one significant reason why parties forego patenting).

 [132]. Kurt Eichenwald, Microsoft’s Lost Decade, Vanity Fair: Hive (Aug. 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer (discussing how Microsoft often innovates internally without launching those innovations as commercial products).

 [133]. Gary P. Pisano, You Need an Innovation Strategy, Harv. Bus. Rev. (June 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/06/you-need-an-innovation-strategy (“Microsoft is often criticized for milking its existing technologies rather than introducing true disruptions.”).

 [134]. Eugene Kim, How Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos Has Inspired People to Change the Way They Think About Failure, Bus. Insider (May 28, 2016, 9:49 A.M.), http://read.bi/1P6kTWP (describing the failure of Amazon’s Fire Phone).

 [135]. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 16, at 15 (discussing how some parties forego patenting because of patenting’s high costs). This may occur even in cases where technical details about the invention are disclosed as part of the commercialization process.

 [136]. See, e.g., Ryan Tate, Google Couldn’t Kill 20 Percent Time Even if It Wanted To, Wired (Aug. 21, 2013, 6:30 A.M.), https://www.wired.com/2013/08/20-percent-time-will-never-die (describing a trend among large technology companies of allowing employees time to tinker with their own ideas).

 [137]. See Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1309–15.

 [138]. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 487–88 (2004).

 [139]. Id. at 491–94.

 [140]. See id.

 [141]. Id. at 538–45.

 [142]. Id. at 494–95.

 [143]. See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 Va. L. Rev. 317, 326–29 (2015) (discussing promulgation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has been adopted in most states, and which defines what constitutes a trade secret). Notably, trade secrecy arises so long as something is secret and not readily ascertainable, and a party has taken reasonable precautions to protect the information’s secrecy. Id.

 [144]. See id.

 [145]. Id.

 [146]. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.

 [147]. Id.

 [148]. Keith A. Barritt, Prior User vs. Federal Registrant: Whose Mark Is It, Anyway?, Fish & Richardson (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.fr.com/news/prior-user-vs-federal-registrant-whose-mark-is-it-anyway1 (discussing the rights of “prior users” vis-à-vis those that register their marks under the Lanham Act).

 [149]. See supra Part I.A.

 [150]. See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1415–16 (2016) (describing patentable subject matter as “highly technical”). See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 11 (2014) (critiquing the assumptions underlying the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent law appeals inasmuch as they assert that patent law is overly technical for general jurisdiction courts).

 [151]. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1114–16 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

 [152]. Id. at 1116.

 [153]. Id.

 [154]. Id. at 1122.

 [155]. See id.

 [156]. Cf. Gene Quinn, The Top 5 Mistakes Inventors Make with Their Invention, IPWatchdog (July 18, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/18/top-5-mistakes-inventors-make-invention (describing a variety of timing issues “newbies” should be aware of if they want to patent their inventions).

 [157]. See, e.g., Matt Rosoff, If Patents Are Weapons, These Companies Are Armed to the Teeth, Bus. Insider (Mar. 14, 2012, 7:52 P.M.), http://read.bi/x6iWdh (providing a list of twenty-three large companies with patent numbers ranging from 448 (Amazon) to over 70,000 (IBM)). While IBM may simply be that much more innovative than others on the list, the greater likelihood is that it has focused on patent acquisition more than many of the other companies on the list.

 [158]. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 68–69 (1998) (holding that a party’s acceptance of an order from Texas Instruments constituted an “on-sale” event, triggering a one-year clock within which the inventor must file a patent application covering the invention or lose the right altogether).

 [159]. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 19, at 2–5.

 [160]. See Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 753, 754–56, 759–65 (2013) (providing background and analysis on “open license movements”).

 [161]. See Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 Md. L. Rev. 431, 459–60 (2015).

 [162]. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 19, at 5–6.

 [163]. Asay, supra note 161, at 460.

 [164]. Of course, patent counsel may also push parties to irrationally acquire too many patents, because their specialization in the field can skew their perspective.

 [165]. See supra Part I.C.

 [166]. See generally Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (1972) (coining the term “groupthink” to describe the degradation of moral judgment that results from group pressure).

 [167]. See Christopher Marquis & András Tilcsik, Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory, 7 Acad. Mgmt. Annals 193, 203 (2013).

 [168]. See Bock, supra note 12, at 293, 301, 304–15; Burk, supra note 15, at 424–25, 440–41.

 [169]. See Asay, supra note 160, at 755.

 [170]. Id.

 [171]. Asay, supra note 161, at 460.

 [172]. See Burk, supra note 15, at 424–27, 440–50.

 [173]. See Sean Michael Kerner, What Is the Value of Red Hat’s Patents?, Internet News (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3929261/What+is+the+Value+of+Red+ Hats+Patents.htm (discussing Red Hat’s relatively robust patent acquisition strategy).

 [174]. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-154, 130 Stat. 376 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.); Robert B. Milligan et al., President Obama Signs the Defend Trade Secrets Act: Tips for Navigating the New Law, Seyfarth Shaw: Trading Secrets (May 11, 2016), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2016/05/articles/trade-secrets/president-obama-signs-the-defend-trade-secrets-act-tips-for-navigating-the-new-law/#page=1.

 [175]. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c) (2016); Eric Goldman, The New ‘Defend Trade Secrets Act’ Is the Biggest IP Development in Years, Forbes (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:04 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ ericgoldman/2016/04/28/the-new-defend-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years; Milligan et al., supra note 174.

 [176]. See Goldman, supra note 175.

 [177]. Id.

 [178]. Peter J. Toren, Five Things to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, IPWatchdog (May 11, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/11/five-things-know-defend-trade-secrets-act. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1839.

 [179]. Toren, supra note 178.

 [180]. Id.

 [181]. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2).

 [182]. Toren, supra note 178.

 [183]. See Benjamin H. Mccoy, The First Year of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Legal Intelligencer (July 11, 2017), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202792752504/The-First-Year-of-the-Defend-Trade-Secrets-Act (discussing the limited amount of jurisprudence surrounding the Act since its implementation).

 [184]. See Goldman, supra note 175.

 [185]. Cf. generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 13.

 [186]. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Patent Reform 101—A Primer on Pending Patent Legislation, IPWatchdog (May 7, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/07/patent-reform-101-a-primer-on-pending-patent-legislation (pointing to the recent Leahy-Smith America Invents Act as “the most substantive change to U.S. patent laws since 1952” and indicating that patent law reform “is the new normal.”).

 [187]. See Lemley, supra note 29, at 10–11 (detailing several legal changes between 2000 and 2016 that have weakened patent rights).

 [188]. Id. at 14–18 (highlighting that patent applications and grants do not seem to respond in any sort of predictable way to weakening or strengthening of patent rights).

 [189]. Lemley, supra note 53, at 1501 (estimating that a very low percentage of patents are ever enforced, let alone asserted).

 [190]. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 111, 153–57 (2010).

 [191]. Lemley, supra note 29, at 10–11.

 [192]. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 93, 99–105 (2014) (reviewing early statistics relating to inter partes review, one of the AIA’s new post-grant proceedings, and finding high petition grant rates and high invalidation rates); Sachs, supra note 30 (pointing to data demonstrating the far-reaching impact of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International and its predecessor decisions on the patent eligibility of a variety of patent types). See also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).

 [193]. See Ouellette et al., supra note 7 (listing the eighty-six Supreme Court patent cases heard since 1952, thirty-five of which were post-2006).

 [194]. Id.

 [195]. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1115 (2015) (analyzing government-provided incentives beyond patents).

 [196]. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). According to the Supreme Court, Congress intended wide breadth when drafting the statute, determining that patentable subject matter should “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).

 [197]. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1041, 1058–64 (2011) (describing the inquiry as to whether the claimed invention fits within one or more of the statute’s “broadly drawn categories” as “merely a coarse filter” that involves “only a threshold question for patentability”).

 [198]. See id. at 1048, 1058–64, 1060 n.101.

 [199]. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 127–32 (1948) (rejecting patent claims for combining bacteria to produce an inoculant because the combination yielded nothing beyond what nature produced on its own).

 [200]. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–71 (2012).

 [201]. Id.; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”).

 [202]. See generally Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1289 (2011) (reviewing decades of Supreme Court case law addressing patentable subject matter, all of which focuses on determining whether an invention runs afoul of one of the exceptions to patentable subject matter).

 [203]. See Ouellette, supra note 195, at 1116–24 (noting that the Court has decided four patentable subject matter cases in its last five terms).

 [204]. See e.g., Amy L. Landers, Patentable Subject Matter as a Policy Driver, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 505, 517–30 (2015) (reviewing several recent cases); Ouellette, supra note 195, at 1116–25 (same).

 [205]. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 70–73.

 [206]. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).

 [207]. Id.

 [208]. See Ryan Davis, 3 Lessons from Fed. Circ.’s Latest Post-Alice Patent Ruling, Law360 (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:48 P.M.), http://www.law360.com/technology/articles/858667 (summarizing recent case law from the Federal Circuit and arguing that the court has struggled, and ultimately failed, to provide concrete guidance as to how to assess this question).

 [209]. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 29, 32–46 (2005) (discussing the inherent difficulties of construing claims, including the difficulty of choosing the right level of abstraction at which patent claim elements should be assessed).

 [210]. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57.

 [211]. Id.

 [212]. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 209, at 32–40; Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1118–34 (2011) (discussing problems courts face in choosing the correct level of abstraction in defining patented inventions).

 [213]. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. See also Zachary Silbersher, McRo Decision Expected to Clarify Abstract Idea Doctrine Under Alice, IPWatchdog (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 2016/01/05/mcro-to-clarify-abstract-idea-under-alice (discussing how a district court judge found patent claims to be merely abstract ideas by “stripping the claim of its conventional elements before looking at it again and concluding that, adequately stripped, it is indeed directed to an abstract idea without ‘significantly more.’”).

 [214]. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.

 [215]. See id. at 2356–57.

 [216]. Id. at 2355–57.

 [217]. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78 (2012)).

 [218]. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 78–79).

 [219]. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72).

 [220]. See id. at 2355, 2357.

 [221]. Id. at 2357–58.

 [222]. Id. at 2357–60.

 [223]. See Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice: A Conversation with Mark Lemley, IPWatchdog (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-ramifications-of-alice-a-conversation-with-mark-lemley (discussing the reality that the reasoning in Alice may mean that the majority of software patents are invalid for failing to claim patentable subject matter).

 [224]. Robert Sachs, Alice, the Illusory Death of Software Patents, IPWatchdog (June 27, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/06/27/alice-the-illusory-death-of-software-patents (“The Court did not even mention ‘software’ or ‘computer programs’ or discuss the eligibility of software as a general matter.”).

 [225]. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57.

 [226]. Sachs, supra note 30.

 [227]. Id.

 [228]. Brandon S. Bludau, Elliot C. Cook & Darren M. Jiron, Section 101 Metrics: Post-Alice District Court Rulings on Section 101 Motions, IP Litigator, Sept.–Oct. 2015, at 6, 6–7, (revealing that in the year following Alice, those challenging patents on the basis of patentable subject matter won their motions 68% of the time); Sachs, supra note 30.

 [229]. Kat Greene, PTAB Nixes Tracking Patent in Post-Grant Review, Law360 (Aug. 3, 2016, 3:01 P.M.), http://www.law360.com/articles/824677/ptab-nixes-tracking-patent-in-post-grant-review. See Brad M. Scheller & Lily Zhang, The Specter of Alice Looms Large Even in PGRs, Mintz Levin: Global IP Matters (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.globalipmatters.com/2016/08/15/the-specter-of-alice-looms-large-even-in-pgrs.

 [230]. Sachs, supra note 30.

 [231]. Ryan Davis, Wave of USPTO Alice Rejections Has Cos. Tweaking Strategies, Law360 (Nov. 2, 2015, 1:36 P.M.), http://www.law360.com/articles/720762/wave-of-uspto-alice-rejections-has-cos-tweaking-strategies.

 [232]. See Eli Mazour & James Bennin, PTAB Wonderland: Statistics Show Alice PTAB Interpretation Not Favorable to Patent Applicants, IPWatchdog (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/27/ptab-wonderland-statistics-alice-ptab-interpretation (providing a variety of statistics regarding 140 post-Alice appeals to the PTAB, most of which show the PTAB treating patent applications unfavorably under the Alice test).

 [233]. Sachs, supra note 30.

 [234]. See, e.g., Lincoln S. Essig & Damien Howard, Impact of the USPTO Examination Guidelines on Software Patents Post-Alice, Knobbe Martens: IP Practice (Sept. 2, 2016), https://knobbe.com/ news/2016/09/impact-uspto-examination-guidelines-software-patents-post-alice (showing that, despite some recent improvements, most patent applications relating to software and e-commerce receive § 101 rejections during the application process at some point).

 [235]. In fact, commentators have written a number of articles providing drafting guidance for patents in these areas in particular, because the Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter case law impacts them disproportionately. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, How to Patent Software in a Post Alice Era, IPWatchdog (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/17/patent-software-post-alice (providing guidance with respect to software patents). See also Scrutinizing Biotechnology & Software Patent Eligibility in M&A Deal Valuations, Morse Barnes-Brown Pendleton: M&A Today (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.mbbp.com/news/patent-eligibility (analyzing the difficulties of assessing patentable subject matter in the software and biotechnology spaces in light of Alice and other recent Supreme Court decisions).

 [236]. See Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 551, 584–87, 600–13 (2017) (providing some examples of decoupled patent law while arguing the law should be further decoupled depending on the context).

 [237]. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Jennifer Martinez, Obama Signs, Touts Patent Reform Law, Politico (Sept. 16, 2011, 4:35 P.M.), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/09/obama-signs-touts-patent-reform-law-063697.

 [238]. See John N. Anastasi et al., U.S. Patent Reform: America Invents Act Makes Major Changes to Patent Law, Lando & Anastasi, http://www.lalaw.com/news_resources/u-s-patent-reform-america-invents-act-makes-major-changes-to-patent-law (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).

 [239]. See id.

 [240]. See e.g., Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 11, at 622–25.

 [241]. Id. at 644–63.

 [242]. Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. Legal Analysis, 687, 696–98 (2010) (analyzing the various costs that “bad” patents impose on society).

 [243]. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2146–66 (pointing out that many patent trolls rely on “bad” patents in pursuing their business models).

 [244]. Masur, supra note 242, at 696–98.

 [245]. Some of these were briefly mentioned supra in Part II.B.1.

 [246]. Robert F. Shaffer & Justin A. Hendrix, Post Grant Proceedings of the AIA Provide New Opportunities and Require Reconsideration of Old Patent Litigation Strategies, Finnegan (June 15, 2012), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=598696f7-7eba-4fcb-83b8-2369caa91dd3. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2012).

 [247]. Shaffer & Hendrix, supra note 246.

 [248]. Id.

 [249]. See Post-Grant Proceedings: Post-Grant Review, Fish & Richardson: Post-Grant, http://fishpostgrant.com/post-grant-review (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).

 [250]. See Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between IPRs and District Court Patent Litigation, Corp. Couns. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/almID/ 1202745014401.

 [251]. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319; Post-Grant Proceedings: Inter Partes Review, Fish & Richardson: Post-Grant, http://fishpostgrant.com/inter-partes-review (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).

 [252]. Id.

 [253]. Id.

 [254]. Shaffer & Hendrix, supra note 246.

 [255]. Id.

 [256]. Id.

 [257]. Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, Law360 (Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 P.M.), http://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-not-totally-off-base-chief-says.

 [258]. See Love & Ambwani, supra note 192, at 94, 101–02, 102 tbl.6 (reporting findings of an empirical study tracking the outcome of inter partes reviews).

 [259]. See id. at 96–97, 97 tbl.1.

 [260]. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

 [261]. Graham et al., supra note 16, at 1309–14.

 [262]. See supra Parts I.C–D.

 [263]. See supra Part I.E.

 [264]. See John Villasenor, How Entrepreneurs Can Thrive Under the “First-Inventor-to-File” Patent System, Forbes (Dec. 7, 2012, 4:02 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/ 2012/12/07/how-entrepreneurs-can-thrive-under-the-first-inventor-to-file-patent-system (“Critics of first-inventor-to-file often argue that it will favor larger companies over entrepreneurs who may be unfamiliar with the patent system.”).

 [265]. See id.

 [266]. Anastasi et al., supra note 238.

 [267]. See Gene Quinn, A Simple Guide to the AIA Oddities: First to File, IPWatchdog (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/11/a-simple-guide-to-the-aia-oddities-first-to-file.

 [268]. See Villasenor, supra note 264. See generally Abrams & Wagner, supra note 65 (examining analogous changes in Canadian law to predict that the AIA will suppress patenting by individual inventors, thereby reducing their share of patents).

 [269]. See Daniel Nazer, Happy Birthday Alice: Two Years Busting Bad Software Patents, Electronic Frontier Found. (June 20, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/happy-birthday-alice-two-years-busting-bad-software-patents.

 [270]. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 66, at 1064–70; David Pridham & Brad Sheafe, The Top 10 Reasons Why Your Startup Needs Patents, Forbes (Aug. 18, 2015, 4:46 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2015/08/18/the-top-10-reasons-why-your-startup-needs-patents.

 [271]. Jeffrey Sparshott, Sputtering Startups Weigh on U.S. Economic Growth, Wall St. J. (Oct. 23, 2016, 11:20 A.M.), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sputtering-startups-weigh-on-u-s-economic-growth-1477235874 (“The American economy has long relied on fast-growing young companies to fuel job growth and spread the latest innovations.”). See J.D. Harrison, Who Actually Creates Jobs: Start-Ups, Small Businesses or Big Corporations?, Wash. Post (Apr. 25, 2013), http://wapo.st/17TVoN3 (pointing to a variety of data showing the importance of startups and small businesses to economic growth).

 [272]. See Gene Quinn, The Story of the Bullied Patent Owner, More Widespread than Bad Acting Patent Trolls, IPWatchdog (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/11/30/bullied-patent-owner-more-widespread-patent-troll (arguing that large corporations often use their intellectual property advantages to bully smaller parties).

 [273]. See Jeff John Roberts, Which Big Tech Firm Won the Most Patents in 2015?, Fortune (Jan. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/13/patents-2015 (listing the top ten patenting tech companies from 2015, all of which are large multinational corporations). This does not mean, of course, that small parties do not patent. In fact, in some cases, they may patent more per worker than larger companies, simply because they are more innovative. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 271. Be that as it may, large companies typically still have more patents in absolute terms, which often give them significant advantages in the marketplace.

 [274]. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 66, at 1064–70; Pridham & Sheafe, supra note 270.

 [275]. See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 13.

 [276]. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1058–59 (2005) (discussing five categories of costs imposed by IP rights).

 [277]. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 20–26 (2009) (discussing how a high percentage of the most litigated patents originated with small entities).

 [278]. See Fromer, supra note 35, at 541, 544–62 (discussing the role of patent law’s disclosure requirements).

 [279]. See Anderson, supra note 84, at 922–27 (discussing the differences between patents and trade secrecy); supra Part I.B.1.

 [280]. Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 545, 561–65, 580–85 (2012) (discussing this skepticism while pointing to some evidence in the nanotechnology industry supporting the proposition that patents disclose useful information).

 [281]. See Lemley, supra note 110, at 332–37 (arguing that in some situations, trade secrecy actually encourages diffusion of information about innovations).

 [282]. See supra Part I.B.4.

 [283]. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 637, 645–48 (2011) (discussing how competition, first-mover advantages, and lead-time advantages may incentivize parties to innovate even absent monopoly rights); Ouellette, supra note 195, at 1125–41 (discussing some non-patent mechanisms, including tax incentives, direct grants and contracts, prizes, and regulatory exclusivity, that provide support to innovative parties); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 Colum. J.L. & Arts 317, 322–23, 340–57 (2011) (describing reasons why parties may pursue innovative activity even absent formal intellectual property protections).

 [284]. See, e.g., Ryan Davis, IP, Pharma Groups Call for Patent Eligibility Law Overhaul, Law360 (Jan. 30, 2017, 8:51 P.M.), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/884771/ip-pharma-groups-call-for-patent-eligibility-law-overhaul (discussing calls for new patent law reforms).

 [285]. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881, 910 & n.194 (2015) (indicating that one of the primary motives behind the AIA’s enactment was to help eliminate “dubious” patents, upon which patent trolls purportedly often rely).

 [286]. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2118–19, 2126–28.

 [287]. See Patent Trolls, Electronic Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (“[Patent trolls] often buy up patents cheaply from companies down on their luck who are looking to monetize what resources they have left, such as patents.”).

 [288]. See generally Asay, supra note 48 (providing an industry-specific, informal model as to why patent owners forego asserting patent rights).

 [289]. Id. at 652, 707.

 [290]. Allison et al., supra note 277.

 [291]. See Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1215, 1297–98 (2017).

 [292]. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Samuelson, supra note 291, at 1251–66.

 [293]. Oracle Am., 750 F.3d at 1347. For background on the case, see Clark D. Asay, Copyright’s Technological Interdependencies, 18 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 189, 228–31 (2015).

 [294]. Brian Proffitt, What APIs Are and Why They’re Important, ReadWrite (Sept. 19, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/09/19/api-defined.

 [295]. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 111, at 75–81 (pointing to a number of copyright law doctrines meant to exclude functional aspects of works).

 [296]. See Pamela Samuelson, Three Fundamental Flaws in CAFC’s Oracle v Google Decision, 37 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 702, 702 (2015) (reviewing the Oracle v. Google decision and noting it to be at odds with several decades of copyright precedent and practice).

 [297]. Id. at 702–06.

 [298]. Oracle Am., 750 F.3d at 1353–54, 1363.

 [299]. See e.g., Clark D. Asay, Software’s Copyright Anticommons, 66 Emory L.J. 265, 267–73 (2017); Samuelson, supra note 296, at 702.

 [300]. Samuelson, supra note 291, at 1289.

 [301]. See supra Part II.B.

 [302]. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992).

 [303]. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1879).

 [304]. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001).

 [305]. See Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1293, 1306–14 (2017) (discussing how other areas of intellectual property law screen out functionality).

 [306]. See id. at 1298–1306.

 [307]. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 549, 587–89 (2015).

 [308]. Id.

 

The Law of Look and Feel – Article by Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder

From Volume 90, Number 3 (March 2017)
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Design—which encompasses everything from shape, color, and packaging to user interface, consumer experience, and brand aura—is the currency of modern consumer culture and increasingly the subject of intellectual property claims. But the law of design is confused and confusing, splintered among various doctrines in copyright, trademark, and patent law. Indeed, while nearly every area of IP law protects design, the law has taken a siloed approach, with separate disciplines developing ad hoc rules and exceptions. To address this lack of coherence, this Article provides the first comprehensive assessment of the regulation of consumers’ aesthetic experiences in copyright, trademark, and patent law—what we call “the law of look and feel.” We canvas the diverse ways that parties have utilized (and stretched) intellectual property law to protect design in a broad range of products and services, from Pac-Man to Louboutin shoes to the iPhone. In so doing, we identify existing doctrines and principles that inform a normatively desirable law of look and feel that courts and Congress should extend throughout IP law’s protection of design. We argue that design law should protect elements of look and feel but remain sensitive to eliminating or mitigating exclusive rights in response to evolving standardization, consumer expectations, and context. Notably, our normative conception of design protection sometimes departs quite starkly from how courts have expansively conceptualized look and feel as protectable subject matter. Going further, we argue that the new enclosure movement of design, if not comprehensively reformed and grounded in theory, can erode innovation, competition, and culture itself.


 

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Opening the Patent System Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law – Article by Colleen V. Chien

From Volume 89, Number 4 (May 2016)
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The patent system uses exclusion to stimulate innovation. But a mounting body of evidence calls into question the assumption that innovation based on excluding others is the only, or even primary, way that the patent system supports innovation today. Nearly 50 percent of manufacturers got the idea for their most important new product from an outside source that shared it with them, 45–59 percent of patentees acquire patents in order to access the technology of others, and over 2,100 companies, including five of the top ten holders of patents, have committed to sharing their patents with others. But because the essence of a patent is the right to exclude, policymakers have paid relatively less attention to ways in which patents can be used to include and to diffuse technology. This paper focuses on the ways that innovators are modifying the patent system’s exclusionary defaults, employing open source approaches, licenses, pledges, contracts, defensive publication and patenting, and related mechanisms to share innovation—including with their rivals. This Article advocates supporting and encouraging, rather than just tolerating these uses of the patent system, for several reasons. First, as innovation takes place in open and closed modes, the patent system can increase its relevance to all types of innovation. Second, weaknesses in voluntary diffusionary arrangements—for example, the lack of enforceability of patent pledges or open source commitments, the use of patents subject to licensing commitments to seek injunctions, and the use of once-defensive patents for patent assertion —suggest that the policy environment for innovation could be improved. Finally, providing ways for patent holders to take voluntary steps to curtail or limit their rights can offer a more flexible and predictable framework for rebalancing the patent system than measures like imposing limits on patentable subject matter or compulsory licensing.


 

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Clear Skies Ahead: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision in Aereo Should Have Limited Copyright Implications on Cloud Technology – Note by Mark Cikowski

From Volume 89, Number 4 (May 2016)
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Despite Justice Scalia’s dissent and the claims of Aereo and its amici, this Note will argue that, when viewed on the whole, any potential fears that the Aereo decision could implicate the legality of cloud-based technology or affect copyright infringement analysis with respect to this industry are likely unwarranted. First, there are substantial structural differences between how Aereo operated and how cloud-based services (particularly remote storage systems) continue to run. Second, the Aereo decision is a narrow response particularly attenuated to that company’s practice of functioning like a traditional cable system while failing to pay the fees required by such systems when they rechannel broadcast networks’ signals. Thus, because the case addresses such a specific factual scenario, its holding is unlikely to be extended to other cloud-based services. To illustrate this point, Part I will discuss Aereo’s technology to clarify how the system physically functioned to stream practically live television through the Internet. Part II will analyze the key reasons why the Supreme Court found this particular technology to violate the networks’ rights, while also analyzing Justice Scalia’s concerns about potential fallout from the majority opinion, particularly with respect to the cloud industry. And finally, Part III will contrast Aereo’s technological infrastructure with that of several common cloud-computing service providers and will examine the shortcomings of the argument that Aereo leaves in flux: the legality of cloud-computing services and the copyright infringement analysis with respect to those services.
 

 

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Mouse v. Mau5: Implications of the Morehouse Defense in International Trademark Disputes – Note by Zachary Lainer

From Volume 89, Number 3 (March 2016)
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What happens when an iconic cartoon mouse and an internationally renowned, electronic dance music disc jockey face off? While this may sound like the making of a fictitious scenario, this was actually the underlying context of the 2015 trademark dispute between Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) and Joel Zimmerman —stage name “deadmau5” (pronounced “dead mouse”)—in which Disney challenged the trademark registration of deadmau5’s logo. Though short-lived, and likely best remembered for its attention grabbing headlines, the dispute is instructive as to how U.S. trademark law should adapt to international trademark disputes. While the deadmau5-Disney dispute ended by a settlement between the parties, it is extremely probable that there will be more trademark disputes with common factual underpinnings in the future; thus, the dispute raises more questions than answers.


 

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Seeing Red, Spending Green: The Costly Process of Registering and Defending Color Trademarks – Note by Lauren Traina

From Volume 87, Number 5 (July 2014)
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As demonstrated by the recent Second Circuit decision in Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., a shoe can certainly offer a great deal of legal controversy. In September 2012, the Second Circuit upheld the validity of designer Christian Louboutin’s trademark for the color red on the soles of his shoes. Although Christian Louboutin and the fashion media have called the case a victory for color trademarks, Louboutin’s affirmation of the “aesthetic functionality” doctrine will likely make defending color trademarks harder in the future. Further, a survey of color trademark registration activity and case law reveals that the Louboutin decision is an outlier, and the overwhelming tendency of courts is to weaken color marks in infringement lawsuits. Therefore, color mark applicants and current color trademark holders face steep obstacles in registering and protecting their color marks, and this battle will likely become more challenging in the near future.


 

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