Children Archives – Southern California Law Review

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: Labor & Privacy in the Age of Kidfluencers and the Internet’s Stage Mothers

March 2026March 2026Elinor J. Haddad*

INTRODUCTION

In 2022, a group of minors sued Tiffany Smith, mother and producer of prolific child influencer Piper Rockelle, and her corporation Piper Rockelle Inc. (“PRI”), alleging nineteen claims in total, nearly all for violations of either state tort law or the California Labor Code.¹ The minors had previously appeared in monetized content on Rockelle’s YouTube channel, which then boasted over 8.5 million followers,² as part of a group of children self-nicknamed “the Squad.”³ According to their complaint, they devoted long hours—in some cases more than twelve hours a day for seven days a week⁴—over three years to producing “hundreds” of “highly lucrative” videos but were never compensated, were denied meal and rest breaks while filming, and did not receive regular on-set education.⁵ Following the suit’s initial filing, YouTube demonetized Rockelle’s channel, and venues where Rockelle had upcoming tour dates canceled her appearances.⁶ In 2023, Smith countersued for $30 million, accusing plaintiffs and their parents of defamation, fraud, and extortion; before plaintiffs responded, Smith dropped her lawsuit.⁷ In March 2024, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge denied Smith’s motion for summary judgment, thus scheduling the case for trial.⁸ By October 2024, the parties had settled for $1.85 million.⁹

The suit illustrates the potential for severe damage inherent in the world of child influencers—a world that is, as of now, largely unregulated. The plaintiffs in the suit, and Rockelle herself, represent a common demographic among child influencers (“kidfluencers”): children between ten and sixteen years of age with public, monetized accounts on large social-media platforms like YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, and talent and training in skills like dancing and singing as well as video editing and other skills required for content creation. Between 2017 and 2020, the plaintiffs appeared in content on Rockelle’s YouTube channel and on her accounts on other platforms; while Rockelle’s early postings were relatively innocuous (videos with titles like “My trip to the Los Angeles Zoo”¹⁰ and “Getting a pet turtle!!!”¹¹), the channel’s tone quickly took a questionable turn, with videos featuring children performing skits, challenges, and pranks in various stages of undress and in suggestive situations accompanied by clickbait thumbnails and titles¹² such as “24 HOURS HANDCUFFED to my ‘BOYFRIEND’ ” (featuring a then-ten-year-old Rockelle),¹³ “11 YEAR OLD BELLY PIERCED **PRANK** (Can’t Say No 24 Hour Challenge) 🚫👌,”¹⁴ and “Asking STRANGERS To Be My BOYFRIEND Challenge **1 DATE = $100** ❤️💵” (featuring a then-twelve-year-old Rockelle).¹⁵

Using the Piper Rockelle lawsuit (“the PRI lawsuit”) as a case study,¹⁶ this Note will focus on the growing number of kidfluencers and the need for standardized, federal laws ensuring their fair labor conditions and preservation of personal privacy. In particular, this Note will discuss the inadequacy of federal and state regulation of two forms of exploitation that present concerns in the kidfluencer context: (1) labor (exploiting a child’s work without compensation, meaningful consent, or regulation) and (2) privacy (exploiting a child’s image or likeness without compensation and meaningful consent).¹⁷ Part I of this Note presents an overview of the kidfluencer phenomenon and the evolution of stage parents from vaudeville and the early motion picture industry to the Internet and social media. Part II describes kidfluencers’ vulnerability to labor exploitation, discussing how measures protecting child performers remain largely unavailable to kidfluencers and require expansion to cover this new demographic of child workers. Part III details the rampant exploitation of kidfluencers’ privacy and analyzes how the increasing legal spotlight on protecting children as social-media users has yet to acknowledge kidfluencers’ privacy and publicity interests and must do so to adequately protect them. Part IV proposes that, in addition to enacting laws to protect the labor and privacy rights of kidfluencers, Congress should empower social-media platforms as enforcers of kidfluencer laws and impose liability on platforms that host content produced in violation of these recognized kidfluencer rights. Ultimately, this Note presents a holistic set of common-sense regulations, grounded in analogous, existing law, that are designed to close the critical gaps in kidfluencer protections as quickly and effectively as possible. This all-encompassing approach—covering both privacy and labor—to regulating children in monetized content is essential given the pervasiveness of their online presence and the reality of ever-advancing online technology that is here to stay.

I. THE ARRIVAL OF KIDFLUENCERS

The influencer economy is worth over $250 billion worldwide¹⁸ and is expected to swell to $480 billion before the year 2030.¹⁹ U.S. brands spend more than $5 billion on influencers each year.²⁰ Massive content-sharing platforms like YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok host millions of influencers who then share content to millions more subscribers.²¹ On YouTube, influencers creating and sharing videos on their “channels” earn revenue based on the number of views their videos generate. When a YouTube channel is monetized, YouTube collects forty-five percent of advertising revenue from the creator’s videos, and the creator receives the remainder.²² With this formula, top creators earn tens of millions of dollars each year—and kidfluencers with at least one million followers can earn $10,000 or more for each sponsored post they share.²³ Before the onset of the PRI lawsuit, PRI made between $4.2 million and $7.5 million annually from social-media advertising alone, and the PRI plaintiffs averaged up to $28,000 per month in YouTube revenue.²⁴

And kidfluencers are a fast-growing demographic in monetized social-media content.²⁵ Social-media accounts listed in children’s names but managed by parents (typically with a moniker like “Managed by Mom” in the account biography) feature young children almost exclusively, with little to no regulations governing the children’s compensation, working conditions, or content output. Thus, children can work extensive hours, receive little to no formal schooling, and have their intimate details shared on the Internet at-large with essentially no recourse and no safeguarding of their earnings from parents or other adults controlling their accounts. Many kidfluencer accounts boast massive followings, with subscribers in the hundreds of thousands or even millions, and the financial payout is huge. Roughly a century ago, states began regulating labor conditions for child performers, many of whom were pushed into the entertainment industry by their parents and subsequently experienced extensive exploitation.²⁶ Now, social media has given stage parents a new arena—one with novel and potentially catastrophic dangers if left unchecked.

A. A Brief History of Stage Mothers

The concept of “stage parents” and “stage mothers” enjoys a long and controversial history in American culture.²⁷ Early discussion of overbearing and even abusive parents pushing their children into careers on stage and in film arose from personal anecdotes of early film stars. Legendary movie star Judy Garland often recounted growing up on a vaudeville stage in the 1920s and 1930s, and the intensity with which her mother, Ethel Gumm, pushed her to perform; in a 1967 interview, Garland, recalling her early days of performing onstage, stated, “[My mother] would sort of stand in the wings . . . and if I didn’t feel good, if I was sick to my tummy, she’d say, ‘You get out and sing, or I’ll wrap you around the bedpost and break you off short!’ So, I’d go out and sing.”²⁸ Garland, cemented in American culture by her performance as Dorothy in 1939’s The Wizard of Oz, later characterized her mother as “the real Wicked Witch of the West” and described how Ethel began giving her pills to increase energy or to promote sleep before Garland’s tenth birthday.²⁹

Nearly a century and the passage of much legislation for child performers later, stage parents like Ethel Gumm remain, motivated by many of the same interests—money, fame, power, attention—as their twentieth-century counterparts. These interests can easily collide with children’s needs, and the development of laws protecting child actors demonstrates a commitment by the traditional entertainment industry to limiting the effects of such conflict. Today, child actors in multiple states, including California and New York, and members of entertainer unions like SAG-AFTRA have protections that Judy Garland’s generation did not, such as guaranteed access to wages, adequate education, and limitations over working hours.³⁰ These regulations acknowledge both the potential conflict of interest between stage parents and child performers as well as the reality of children as a key and enduring presence within the entertainment industry. But while child actors today are more protected from parents who squander their earnings or force them to work oppressively long hours, children are still at the mercy of their parents as to whether they ultimately pursue an entertainment career in the first place and, if they do, the relentlessness of that pursuit.

In 2022, former child star Jennette McCurdy released her memoir I’m Glad My Mom Died. Chronicling her ascent from poverty to fame on the highly successful Nickelodeon show iCarly, McCurdy detailed her late mother’s longstanding obsession with McCurdy’s success as a child actor, regardless of McCurdy’s own disinterest in such a career. Recalling the initial signing meeting with her first agent, McCurdy wrote,

“It’s important that Jennette wants to act, in order for her to do well,” [the agent] says.

“Oh, she wants this more than anything,” Mom says as she signs on the next page’s dotted line.

Mom wants this more than anything, not me. [Auditioning] was stressful and not fun, and if given the choice, I would choose to never do anything like it again. On the other hand, I do want what Mom wants, so she’s kind of right.³¹

McCurdy emphasized her lack of agency and meaningful choice in embarking on her career as an actor, framing her mother’s eventual death from cancer as the catalyst that allowed McCurdy to leave behind the career she never wanted—though she could not as easily escape her fame.³²

When I was six years old, she pushed me into a career I didn’t want. I’m grateful for the financial stability that career has provided me, but not much else. I was not equipped to handle the entertainment industry and all of its competitiveness, rejection, stakes, harsh realities, fame. I needed that time, those years, to develop as a child. To form my identity. To grow. I can never get those years back.³³

B. Reality Television Bridges the Gap from Film and Television to the Internet

In 2011, the Lifetime reality series Dance Moms premiered, unwittingly marking the beginning of a new era and a new medium for twenty-first-century stage parents. Following a group of young competitive dancers and their intense and argumentative mothers, Dance Moms became an overnight sensation and launched the show’s young dancers into stardom. In the show’s early seasons, the dancers’ mothers spoke of their hopes for their children to achieve careers on a Broadway stage and in film.³⁴ In 2011, Instagram was in its infancy and the advent of TikTok was years away; a handful of hit reality shows featuring children, like Jon and Kate Plus 8 and the ill-fated 19 Kids and Counting,³⁵ existed but the children on those shows were not positioned adjacent to entertainment careers and also had not built independent followings or fanbases—the concept of kidfluencers was entirely new. Dance Moms changed the game.³⁶

Today, the original Dance Moms dancers are in their early to mid-twenties and their primary careers are as social-media influencers.³⁷ Instead of becoming “stars” in a traditional sense on stage and in film, the Dance Moms girls achieved stardom as themselves, beloved by young fans of their show who flocked to follow them on social media as Instagram and other platforms simultaneously took off.³⁸ While the first Dance Moms dancers did not begin their time on the show imagining kidfluencer fame, cast members during the show’s later seasons arguably did. In 2016, a group of younger dancers joined the now-wildly successful Dance Moms cast; entering the show in the post-Instagram and Musical.ly (TikTok’s forerunner application) world, these new dancers had social-media pages ready when the show’s global audience began following them in droves. Now teenagers, many members of Dance Moms’ second generation work as kidfluencers today³⁹—and the world of kidfluencers and reality child stars is a small one. Dance Moms’ second generation includes seventeen-year-old Lilliana Ketchman and eighteen-year-old Elliana Walmsley. Ketchman was named by the PRI plaintiffs as a perceived competitor to Rockelle, “anger[ing]” Smith; the plaintiffs believed Smith subsequently used “dirty tactics” to cause a significant decline in Ketchman’s followers, viewership, and revenue in January 2021.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Walmsley is a former member of Rockelle’s Squad, though she was not a party to the PRI lawsuit.⁴¹

Image 1. Former Dance Moms Cast Member and Current Influencer Kendall Vertes’s Instagram⁴²

Image 2. Former Dance Moms Cast Member and Current Influencer Chloé Lukasiak’s Instagram⁴³

Barely a decade after Dance Moms’ premiere and Instagram’s launch, kidfluencing is now eclipsing the once-well-trodden paths to child stardom found on television and in film. Piper Rockelle exemplifies this phenomenon:

Paparazzi don’t wait outside Piper’s fuchsia-painted mansion in the San Fernando Valley, but among a young, YouTube-fixated demographic, the ebullient brunette is idolized. As a rising star on the most-watched video-content platform of her generation, Piper bypassed the traditional paths of Nickelodeon and Disney to become a millionaire through the monetization of her social media content.

Propelled by the force of millions of likes and heart emojis, Piper was making between $4.2 million and $7.5 million a year before the Squad’s lawsuit. Her YouTube videos had amassed over 1.87 billion views, and companies such as NBCUniversal, Disney and Amazon were paying her to promote their products on Instagram and TikTok. Super-VIP tickets on her tour—a live variety show that trades on the Squad’s online personas—went for $599.99. She was also selling merchandise on her website, offering personalized greetings via Cameo and making music. She has released seven singles.⁴⁴

The PRI “empire[],” much like many YouTube money machines, “was built at home.”⁴⁵ Smith’s live-in boyfriend, Hunter Hill, also a defendant in the PRI lawsuit, filmed and edited the Squad’s videos in the Smith home, and Smith planned video content and coordinated filming schedules for Squad members.⁴⁶ Initially, Rockelle and other members of the Squad sought success as actors on stage and in film; after her social-media channels took off, however, Rockelle narrowed her focus solely to kidfluencing, while Smith “strongly discouraged” other Squad members from continuing to pursue work beyond their growing YouTube empire.⁴⁷

And though stage parents like Smith are pursuing fame for their children in a new medium, the same conflicts of interest between parents and children that persist in film and television recur in the Internet-child-stardom era. In the early 2000s, the challenges of living in poverty colored Jennette McCurdy’s high-stress journey into the television industry; just a few years later, PRI would allegedly take advantage of children also coming from limited means in order to profit from their involvement in the Squad. Said one PRI plaintiff, “[s]ingle mothers using YouTube to support the family—there’s a lot of those in the [Squad’s families].”⁴⁸

While the PRI lawsuit is seemingly unique (as of now) in terms of its size and the breadth of the allegations at-issue, Rockelle and the Squad are in good company as part of a vast, bankable movement of kidfluencer content creators. Kidfluencer accounts are undeniably popular: a 2019 study revealed that videos featuring a child younger than thirteen-years-old receive three times the views garnered by videos without children.⁴⁹ And critics of the kidfluencer phenomenon say that platforms like YouTube, as well as brands that partner with kidfluencers for paid product placements, are deliberately skirting child labor laws because of kidfluencer accounts’ popularity and payoff; in their view, the legal gray area surrounding kidfluencers enables platforms and brands to make “billions” from kidfluencer content while avoiding the costs and coordination that film and television productions are legally required to undertake to work with child performers.⁵⁰ YouTube currently makes it fairly easy, with strategic use of algorithmic tools like hash-tagging, to achieve monetized status, requiring that channels reach just 1,000 subscribers and 4,000 viewing hours within twelve months to become monetized; as of last year, YouTube hosted roughly two million monetized accounts.⁵¹

Between YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, opportunities for children to build a massive online presence—and for adults to make serious money off their backs—are exploding. As the last century of developing adequate legal protections for child actors demonstrates, this level of financial promise coupled with children as the key moneymakers is a recipe for exploitative disaster. Now that the recipe has found a new home on the Internet, the potential for lifelong damage to the children behind the money machines has reached devastating levels. The baby steps that some lawmakers are beginning to take toward protecting, primarily, kidfluencers’ compensation are, to be sure, essential regulatory efforts. But the reality of the kidfluencer world demands a much more all-encompassing approach—one that treats kidfluencers as the professionals they are and treats the Internet as the uniquely permanent and wide-ranging medium it is. Making parents the unchecked shot-callers over their children’s labor conditions and privacy is an untenable arrangement because of the potential conflict of interest inherent in parents choosing between substantial monetary gain and their children’s best interests. Kidfluencers and the Internet (much like child film stars and the motion picture industry as seen a century ago) are not going anywhere. So, lawmakers must get serious about how to regulate them.

II. REGULATING THE LABOR OF KIDFLUENCERS

While federal law does provide some protections for child labor, it expressly exempts child performers from those protections. Thus, to the extent that child entertainers receive protection from labor exploitation, those protections come either from state law or from unions for media professionals such as SAG-AFTRA. However, summarizing what relevant federal law is present in this area helps contextualize the gaps in child entertainer regulations that state laws and unions have had to attempt to fill. And while neither state laws (for the most part) nor unions protect kidfluencers’ labor rights, they do protect child entertainers and thus provide helpful and relevant models for what effective legal protections for kidfluencers’ labor should entail.

Only a handful of states have laws governing child entertainers, and the most stringent laws exist in California and New York; both states limit child entertainers’ working hours, regulate their education, mandate their on-set supervision and advocacy, and protect their wages. All of these regulations should be expanded to cover kidfluencers; further, because kidfluencers primarily work at home and thus are not restricted by a need to live within range of entertainment hubs like Los Angeles and New York City, these regulations should apply to kidfluencers in every state through federal legislation. Recent legislation in California, Illinois, Utah, and Minnesota protecting primarily kidfluencers’ wages, while helpful, is but one small piece of the comprehensive regulatory scheme needed to adequately protect kidfluencers’ labor.

A. Existing Labor Regulations for Child Entertainers

1. Federal Measures for Child Workers: The Fair Labor Standards Act

In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) marked a new era for regulation of child workers. Setting the minimum age of employment for most non-agricultural work at sixteen,⁵² the act came on the heels of the United States Supreme Court striking down laws aimed at regulating commercial goods produced by child workers in Hammer v. Dagenhart⁵³ and the Child Labor Tax Case.⁵⁴ These decisions were but one component of a long struggle by labor reformers to protect child workers—by the twentieth century, reformers heavily emphasized how child labor led to extensive health problems and the deprivation of adequate education.⁵⁵ In developing their platform regarding child labor, advocates also had to reckon with the difficult but inescapable reality that many child workers came from immense poverty. Some reformers lobbed heavy criticism at parents who they claimed were “too lazy to work” and had “become accustomed to subsist[ing] by their children’s labor.”⁵⁶

The FLSA still has multiple exemptions, some critical to child entertainers and kidfluencers alike: the FLSA exempts from regulation “a parent employing his own child”⁵⁷ and does not apply to “any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions.”⁵⁸ The latter exemption is known as the “Shirley Temple Act” because without it, the then-wildly popular child star would have disappeared from movie screens.⁵⁹ Further, the lawmakers behind the FLSA did not consider entertainment work especially hazardous or oppressive, unlike the dangerous factory and agricultural labor the FLSA was intended to address, and thus excluded minors in entertainment from coverage.⁶⁰ Due to this exclusion of child performers from federal regulation, labor rights for child performers fall under state law, and states have adopted a variety of protections (including, in seventeen states, no protections at all) for this demographic.⁶¹

2. SAG-AFTRA, States’ Approaches & the Coogan Law

Some of the most comprehensive protections for child entertainers come from SAG-AFTRA, the primary union for media professionals in the United States. SAG-AFTRA’s collective bargaining agreements with production companies require that companies adhere to the standards delineated in SAG-AFTRA’s contracts as well as applicable state law regarding employment of minors.⁶² Thus, SAG-AFTRA functions as the enforcer of its own standards for employing child performers; its collective bargaining agreements act as a bottleneck against potentially negligent or exploitative employment practices because production companies that are SAG-AFTRA signatories must comply with these standards in order to employ children with SAG-AFTRA membership.⁶³ SAG-AFTRA restricts the working hours of child entertainers working anywhere in the United States, stipulating that minors may not work before 5:00 a.m. or after 10:00 p.m. on days preceding a school day (and may not work after 12:30 a.m. on mornings of non-school days); SAG-AFTRA further limits total working hours per school day to four hours for children ages six to eight, five hours for children ages nine to fifteen, and six hours for children ages sixteen and seventeen.⁶⁴ School days for SAG-AFTRA contract purposes conform to the public school calendar for the district where the minor resides, and SAG-AFTRA requires that school-age minors receive an average of at least three hours of educational instruction on school days.⁶⁵ Minors between six months and two years old may work up to two hours while minors between two and five years old may work up to three hours; only preschool-age minors do not attend on-set school.⁶⁶

SAG-AFTRA’s protections for child actors’ compensation also conform to applicable state law, where present.⁶⁷ Originally passed in California in 1939, the Coogan Law now requires that fifteen percent of all minors’ earnings for entertainment work be placed in a blocked trust account (known as a “Coogan Account”) accessible only by the minor once they reach adulthood.⁶⁸ The law’s namesake, child actor Jackie Coogan, enjoyed a tremendously successful career in the 1920s after being discovered by Charlie Chaplin.⁶⁹ But despite Coogan’s millions of dollars in earnings as a child star, he only ever received a weekly allowance of $6.25 from his mother until, when Coogan turned twenty-one, she ultimately refused to ever turn over more of his earnings to him.⁷⁰ Though intended to prevent exploitation like that Coogan suffered from befalling future young actors, the first iteration of the Coogan Law had critical gaps, including merely permitting, rather than mandating, trust accounts for child performers.⁷¹ It was precisely these gaps that enabled the parents of Shirley Temple herself to devote her earnings entirely to supporting their family of twelve even after the initial passage of the Coogan Law; after her acting career slowed down in her teenage years, the generation-defining star’s “only assets were a few thousand dollars and the deed to her dollhouse in the back yard [sic] of her parents’ Beverly Hills home.”⁷² California closed the gaps in its Coogan Law in January 2000 following advocacy by SAG-AFTRA for unequivocal legal recognition that minors’ earnings from entertainment work are their own.⁷³ Currently, New York, Illinois, Louisiana, and New Mexico all have trust-account mandates for child actors comparable to California’s Coogan Law.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, some states also have laws concerning child performers’ labor conditions in addition to compensation requirements and union protections. California mandates a maximum eight-hour workday for child entertainers in addition to three hours of on-set education for each weekday that children work; California also requires that a state-licensed teacher or welfare worker be present at all times on sets where child performers are working,⁷⁵ and that adults obtain permits before employing children and ensure that a minor’s parent or guardian is within their sight and hearing range at all times that the minor is on set.⁷⁶ In New York, employers of child entertainers working three or more consecutive days must provide a credentialed on-set teacher to ensure that state educational requirements for child entertainers are met.⁷⁷

3. When Does the Home Become a Set?

State laws protecting child entertainers, however well-established, largely do not extend to kidfluencers—even in states like California, which has very strict regulations for child performers⁷⁸ (PRI is located in Los Angeles and the Squad’s videos were filmed there⁷⁹). If we apply California and SAG-AFTRA’s labor regulations for child actors to PRI and the Squad, PRI—sometimes allegedly, other times admittedly—fell far short.⁸⁰ Smith did not obtain permits to work with the minors in the Squad.⁸¹ Some PRI plaintiffs claimed they worked up to twelve hours per day, seven days a week, without rest and meal breaks and without compensation.⁸² The mother of two plaintiffs, sisters, worried that one of her daughters “was falling behind in school because she wasn’t getting enough sleep” due to Smith’s demanding filming schedule.⁸³ Some of the plaintiffs’ parents alleged that Smith “regularly forbade other adults from being on set”;⁸⁴ Smith reportedly only ever “briefly” hired an on-set teacher for Squad members and “was uninterested in the children’s education,” even though none of the minors attended traditional in-person school during their years filming.⁸⁵ After some of the plaintiffs’ parents hired a private tutor to work with the minors in Smith’s guesthouse, Smith “barged” into the guesthouse mid-lesson, “screaming” that the child currently studying needed to “report to set immediately” and that “she didn’t care whether the tutor’s hour wasn’t up.”⁸⁶ The tutor left her position teaching the Squad after the incident.⁸⁷ Plaintiffs also reported that Rockelle herself had significant educational gaps, claiming Rockelle, who has only ever been homeschooled,⁸⁸ had trouble reading and “never” did schoolwork.⁸⁹

Commenting on the allegations in the PRI lawsuit regarding failure to provide compensation as well as the maintenance of an oppressive work environment, plaintiffs’ attorney Matthew Sarelson remarked, “Imagine if these kids had been on a movie set for Lionsgate . . . . People would go to jail if this had happened at a studio.”⁹⁰ But kidfluencers occupy a legal gray area existing somewhere between professional child performers and the kids-next-door getting together to make a funny video.⁹¹ And the PRI plaintiffs assert that that legal gray area has given rise to a “Wild West atmosphere of content creation” where adults can push children into extensive, high-profile content creation with little to no oversight.⁹²

Throughout the PRI lawsuit, Smith emphasized that she “did not view her home as a workplace” nor herself as the plaintiffs’ employer; she described the Squad’s activities as “ ‘kids get[ting] together voluntarily to collaborate on making videos,’ ” a far cry, in her view, from a professional studio environment that would necessitate her compliance with state child labor laws.⁹³ Smith’s lawyer commented, “There is tremendous uncertainty about what labor laws apply in the context of filming a YouTube video at home, with an iPhone . . . . At what point is that a professional production?”⁹⁴ Meanwhile, Sarelson argued that “PRI should be treated no differently than a traditional production company” and expressed “hopes [that] the lawsuit sparks change in the social media space.”⁹⁵ Some of PRI’s activities—including using a professional camera to film content and posting audition notices for young actors to film with Rockelle—could indicate that the corporation was effectively operating as a professional production company.⁹⁶ But currently, no federal legislation exists delineating the line between making home videos and shooting professional social-media content.

B. New Efforts: Expanding Child Labor Regulations to Cover Kidfluencers

A handful of states are beginning to enact labor protections for kidfluencers, underscoring the desire and need for a comprehensive, federal approach to kidfluencer regulation.⁹⁷ In July 2025, Minnesota enacted some of the most significant kidfluencer regulations so far: not only does the state now mandate protected trust accounts to safeguard kidfluencers’ earnings, but it also prohibits children less than fourteen years old from appearing in monetized content at all.⁹⁸ Instead of designing its law solely as a means of “legitimizing” kidfluencers as akin to child entertainers, University of Minnesota Law School Dean William McGeveran said Minnesota “ ‘set [its law] up as almost a child labor law. . . . It’s about kids needing to be able to be paid for work that they do . . . . And if they’re 13 and under, kids can’t work in the ice cream shop and they can’t work in their parents’ content creation either.’ ”⁹⁹ Minnesota’s statute does not enshrine any further labor regulations for kidfluencers over fourteen beyond protecting their earnings.

For the other six states that now protect kidfluencers’ labor, their measures are limited to regulating kidfluencers’ compensation. In July 2024, Illinois became the first U.S. state to enact laws expressly protecting kidfluencers’ earnings.¹⁰⁰ Content creators in Illinois must now set aside a portion of earnings in a protected trust account for all minors age sixteen and under who appear in at least thirty percent of their monetized content.¹⁰¹ Illinois Senator Dave Koehler, who introduced the law, took action after Shreya Nallamothu, a fifteen-year-old high school student in his district, alerted him to the issue of young children being featured extensively online with no labor protections for them in place.¹⁰² “This new digital age has given us tremendous opportunities to connect with one another, but it’s also presented legal issues that have never existed before,” said Koehler.¹⁰³ “We need to work with our children to see the problems they face and tackle them head-on before any further harm is done.”¹⁰⁴

The Illinois law protects earnings for minors under the age of sixteen while stipulating that minors under sixteen who produce their own videos are not considered “vlogger[s]” subject to the compensation and record-keeping requirements established by the law.¹⁰⁵ The law explicitly includes “famil[ies]” in its definition of “vlogger[s],” thus requiring parents who produce content featuring their own children (as well as any other children) to set aside the minors’ earnings if their inclusion reaches the specified threshold. The law also amends Illinois’ Child Labor Law by allowing teenagers who are at least eighteen years old to take legal action against their parents for failing to compensate them in accordance with the new requirements.¹⁰⁶ In response to the law, University of Alabama professor of digital media Jessica Maddox called the legislation “long overdue” and pushed for other states to take similar steps as well as expand protections to allow eighteen-year-olds to petition for the removal of social-media content that features them.¹⁰⁷ Emphasizing the need for regulations that adequately measure up to the reality of the kidfluencer phenomenon, Maddox commented:

[Kidfluencing and vlogging] are actual jobs, possible ways of earning income, that need protection . . . . Since there aren’t unions, there isn’t systemic protection in terms of laws, that is why Illinois law is super important for setting the precedent that this type of labor needs to be protected, especially for minors.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, on September 26, 2024, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed legislation expressly expanding the state’s Coogan Law to cover kidfluencers sharing content on YouTube and similar platforms.¹⁰⁹ The bill in question, AB 1880, defines “content creator” as “an individual who creates, posts, shares, or otherwise interacts with digital content on an online platform,” including “vloggers, podcasters, social media influencers, and streamers”; “online platform” is defined as “any public-facing website, web application, or digital application.”¹¹⁰ Regarding Governor Newsom’s support for the bill, bill author Assemblymember Juan Alanis remarked:

I thank Governor Newsom for signing AB 1880 and for his commitment to addressing the unique challenges minors face as online content creators in the rapidly growing digital entertainment industry. Child content creators deserve the same protections under the Coogan Law as their counterparts in traditional entertainment. With this bill, California takes a significant step in protecting the financial rights and well-being of child online influencers by extending critical protections against exploitation and ensuring they receive a fair share of earnings from their content.¹¹¹

Former child actor and successful musician Demi Lovato championed the bill as a critical step toward “grant[ing] agency” toward kidfluencers upon reaching adulthood.¹¹²

Signed alongside AB 1880 was SB 764,¹¹³ the Child Content Creator Rights Act (“CCCRA”), authored by Senator Steve Padilla.¹¹⁴ The CCCRA stipulates that video bloggers (“vloggers”) engage a minor “in the work of vlogging” when at least thirty percent of the vlogger’s monetized visual content includes “the likeness, name, or photograph of the minor.”¹¹⁵ Vloggers engaging minors in vlogging work under the definition of the CCCRA are required to keep detailed records of the minor’s age during the vlogging period and the extent of their appearance in and compensation for monetized content.¹¹⁶ Contracts for vlogging work between a minor and their parent must be approved by a court to avoid application of the bill’s terms; “[i]n determining whether to approve such a contract, the court shall consider whether the terms of the contract are at least as beneficial to the minor as the compensation the minor would otherwise receive under [the CCCRA].”¹¹⁷

And as of May 2025, Utah now also mandates protected trust accounts for kidfluencers.¹¹⁸ With similar provisions to those in California and Illinois, Utah’s law also lays out procedures for managing kidfluencers trusts and also requires that content creators “inform a minor’s parents that the minor is featured” in their content if, as in the PRI lawsuit, the creator is not themselves the minor’s parent.¹¹⁹ In the same vein, Virginia, Arkansas, and Montana all enacted kidfluencer laws in 2025, and each state focused its labor protections for kidfluencers on compensation safeguards, mandating Coogan Account-esque trusts for kidfluencers appearing in a certain percentage of creators’ content.¹²⁰

As lawmakers in California, Minnesota, Illinois, Utah, Arkansas, Montana, and Virginia have recognized, kidfluencing is a job, plain and simple. It demands the same safeguards against labor exploitation that are accepted throughout the United States for children in traditional entertainment jobs, along with additional protections that are necessary to address issues unique to kidfluencing. Thus, while the recent legislation in these states represents important progress, much more robust protections for kidfluencers—regulations modeled after California’s existing laws for child actors—are needed. Because of the geographic flexibility inherent in kidfluencer work, such protection is needed at the federal level to be fully comprehensive; further, kidfluencer regulations must not only mandate safeguards to compensation, but also ensure limits on working hours, guaranteed access to education, on-set supervision and advocacy, and the obtainment of permits to employ minors. As it stands today, even for kidfluencers now protected from financial exploitation in a handful of states, the rest of their working conditions remain largely unregulated—as does their privacy.

III. REGULATING THE PRIVACY OF KIDFLUENCERS

Growing up in the pop culture spotlight compromises a child’s privacy and reputation in ways that can be painful and enduring. As child actor Jennette McCurdy put it, “Growing is wobbly and full of mistakes, especially as a teenager—mistakes that you certainly don’t want to make in the public eye, let alone be known for for the rest of your life. But that’s what happens when you’re a child star.”¹²¹ And for kidfluencers, the extent to which their privacy and reputations are at stake is much greater. For Shirley Temple and Judy Garland, while the laws protecting them were still woefully inadequate, the personal information they shared with the public was limited to their performances as fictional characters, filmed on a soundstage by a camera that never followed them home. But for kidfluencers, the camera lives at home. Nothing is off-limits and every experience, every mistake, every embarrassment is potential content with dollar signs attached to it.

If labor regulations for kidfluencers are largely undeveloped, laws protecting kidfluencers’ privacy seem like less than an afterthought—perhaps even conceptually oxymoronic given that the point of kidfluencer content, in general, is to share children’s personal lives online. Even as lawmakers take steps to protect children as Internet users, kidfluencers are nowhere to be found in their policies. Though states have common law rights to privacy and publicity and a 1998 federal act regulates online platforms’ collection of children’s personal data, these rights can all generally be waived with consent—and for children, the consenting parties are their parents. Meanwhile, online platforms typically limit accounts to users aged thirteen and older, but given the numerous active kidfluencer accounts heavily featuring children under thirteen, platforms do not appear to restrict accounts that overwhelmingly feature children if the accounts are set up and managed by adults. These gaping loopholes in existing rights and policies allow kidfluencer accounts to thrive unchecked,¹²² leading to severe, long-term harm to and exploitation of kidfluencers that society is likely only beginning to reckon with.¹²³

A. Privacy Regulations for Children as Users Online

Existing and Proposed Federal Regulations for Children Online

i. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998

The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”) is the primary set of federal regulations concerning children’s online privacy, covering consent and notice requirements for online platforms and entities that collect personal data from children.¹²⁴ COPPA’s “primary goal . . . is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online,”¹²⁵ and it focuses on protecting children as users of online platforms as opposed to children appearing in online content. COPPA requires the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to regulate online collection of children’s data and was last amended in 2013 in an effort to keep up with advancing technology.¹²⁶ Kidfluencers are not explicitly covered by COPPA or any other federal law.

As a protective measure for children who are merely consumers of online content, COPPA is reasonably comprehensive (though it needs continuous updates to remain effective). Its critical failure as a protective measure for kidfluencers, however, lies in its parental-consent-based structure—and in the fact that it makes no actual mention of kidfluencers at all. COPPA only applies to children under thirteen and requires that online entities obtain parental consent before collecting children’s personal data from children. COPPA prohibits “unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with the collection and use of personal information from and about children on the Internet.”¹²⁷ The act applies to websites or online services “directed to children”; in determining whether a given platform qualifies under this standard, the FTC considers the platform’s “subject matter,” “use of . . . child-oriented activities and incentives,” and “presence of child celebrities” as among relevant factors.¹²⁸ COPPA defines “collection” as “the gathering of any personal information from a child by any means, including . . . [r]equesting, prompting, or encouraging a child to submit personal information online,” “[e]nabling a child to make personal information publicly available,” and “[p]assive tracking of a child online.”¹²⁹ “[P]ersonal information” under COPPA includes identifiers like first and last name, physical address, and a “photograph, video, or audio file where such file contains a child’s image or voice.”¹³⁰ “Child” under COPPA includes only “individual[s] under the age of 13.”¹³¹

Before online entities collect personal data from a child, COPPA requires that the child’s parent receive adequate notice about the information collected and its intended use and that the parent consent to such collection.¹³² Online platforms also must provide parents with a “reasonable means . . . to review the personal information collected . . . and to refuse to permit its further use or maintenance.”¹³³ COPPA specifies that any means employed for parents to review collected information cannot be “unduly burdensome” to the parent and asserts that parents have the right to “at any time . . . refuse to permit . . . further use or future online collection of personal information . . . and to direct the [online platform] to delete the child’s personal information.”¹³⁴ Platforms have the right to terminate a child’s use of its services if the child’s parent revokes consent and requests deletion of collected information.¹³⁵ Platforms also must only retain children’s information for “as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected.”¹³⁶

Lastly, COPPA includes safe harbor provisions, allowing online entities that follow approved sets of self-regulatory guidelines to be deemed compliant with COPPA and eligible for safe harbor treatment shielding them from potential liability.¹³⁷

ii. COPPA 2.0

In May 2023, U.S. Senator Edward Markey, the author of COPPA, alongside Senator Bill Cassidy, introduced a new version of COPPA, “COPPA 2.0.”¹³⁸ After the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee unanimously advanced COPPA 2.0 in July 2023, the Senate passed the bill in August 2024.¹³⁹ Senators Markey and Cassidy then reintroduced the bill in March 2025.¹⁴⁰ In early 2024, COPPA 2.0 cosponsor Senator Ted Cruz described the bill’s purpose as ensuring that no child leaves behind a digital footprint:

When Congress first passed the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, Americans were using dial-up to search “Ask Jeeves” instead of Google. Now, kids can access the Internet in the palm of their hands, and tech companies routinely surveil and target America’s youth. I’m proud to have worked with Sens. Markey, Cantwell, and Cassidy on bipartisan legislation to empower parents to safeguard their children’s online privacy and hold tech companies responsible for keeping minors safe from data collection. Every child deserves to grow up free of a digital footprint, and this bipartisan legislation is one step closer to achieving that goal.¹⁴¹

Championed as a means of bringing “children and teen’s online privacy standards into the 21st century,”¹⁴² COPPA 2.0 enumerates additional categories of online platforms, including mobile applications,¹⁴³ and forms of personal data, including biological and physiological information.¹⁴⁴ Most significantly, however, COPPA 2.0 creates an entirely new class of protected minors: teenagers between thirteen and sixteen years old.¹⁴⁵ Under COPPA 2.0, teenagers—not their parents—consent to collection of their own personal data and are empowered to request review of collected data as well as revoke consent for data collection.¹⁴⁶ However, COPPA 2.0 does not permit teenagers to withdraw consent for their own data that was collected with their parents’ consent before they turned thirteen.¹⁴⁷ The omission of this right, under either iteration of COPPA, is particularly sobering in the kidfluencer context because it prevents kidfluencers from compelling platforms to remove their data, collected before age thirteen, in the event that their parents cannot or will not do so.

2. Online Platforms’ User Age Restrictions

The largest social-media platforms typically require users to be at least thirteen years old,¹⁴⁸ though caveats to this rule exist. YouTube’s terms of service specify that users “must be at least 13 years old to use [YouTube]; however children of all ages may use [YouTube and YouTube Kids] . . . if enabled by a parent or legal guardian.”¹⁴⁹ TikTok requires users to be at least thirteen years old,¹⁵⁰ and TikTok’s settings default accounts associated with minor users to private mode; TikTok users ages sixteen and seventeen can choose to make their accounts public.¹⁵¹

Instagram also requires that users be at least thirteen;¹⁵² on September 17, 2024, Instagram began defaulting all accounts created by users who indicated they are under eighteen to private mode.¹⁵³ These changes, which Instagram says are being “rolled out on an individual basis,”¹⁵⁴ are part of Instagram’s new “Teen Accounts” initiative promoted as a means of increasing safety for minors using the platform.¹⁵⁵ Under the “Teen Accounts” setup, users ages sixteen and seventeen can change the default privacy setting themselves to make their accounts public; minors under sixteen need their parents’ permission to do so.¹⁵⁶

It is not clear whether Instagram’s recent changes will affect accounts that feature minors but are at least ostensibly managed by an adult (as most kidfluencer accounts typically are); however, Instagram makes no mention of such accounts in its communications about this new measure, while stipulating that the “Teen Accounts” setup applies to “users.” Thus, even as platforms begin rolling out age restrictions, kidfluencer accounts continue to

occupy a gray area outside of the growing spotlight on child social-media users.

B. Relevance and Current Limitations of the Common Law Rights of Privacy and Publicity

In the United States, the common law rights of privacy and publicity are “distinct” from one another and “intended to vindicate different interests,” though the latter initially evolved out of the former.¹⁵⁷ While the right of publicity enshrines the “right to control the commercial value of one’s identity,”¹⁵⁸ the right of privacy “protects one’s right ‘to be let alone.’ ”¹⁵⁹ The common law right of privacy comprises four tort causes of action: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation.¹⁶⁰

The common law right of publicity developed out of both the right of privacy and intellectual property law, and has existed formally in the United States since the 1970s.¹⁶¹ While the United States Supreme Court recognized the existence of the right of publicity in 1977 in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,¹⁶² there is no federal right of publicity; rather, the right of publicity exists at the state level and is currently recognized in thirty-five states, including California.¹⁶³ The right of publicity stipulates that individuals have a common law right against appropriation of “the commercial value of [their] identity . . . without consent”;¹⁶⁴ inherent in the right is the recognition that “an individual’s likeness” is that individual’s “own property.”¹⁶⁵ The right of publicity is based on three core justifications: (1) the right to “reap the fruit of [one’s] labors,” connected to concerns about unjust enrichment;¹⁶⁶ (2) the “copyright-incentive theory” that the law must protect the individual’s persona so as to promote creative artistry; and (3) the need to protect “consumer[s] from advertising deception.”¹⁶⁷ Section 3344 of the California Civil Code (“section 3344”) codifies California’s common law right of publicity and prohibits use of another’s image or “likeness” for profit without consent.¹⁶⁸ For minors, however, it is precisely the element of “consent” that is likely to prove most challenging if and when section 3344 is invoked to protect their rights, for the law expressly recognizes consent by a minor’s parent or guardian as equivalent to the minor’s own consent.¹⁶⁹

While the PRI lawsuit is currently unique, it illustrates how disputes over consent are likely to be central to any efforts to protect kidfluencers’ privacy and publicity rights under the common law and corresponding statutes. Three plaintiffs in the PRI lawsuit alleged violations of both section 3344 and California’s common law right of publicity;¹⁷⁰ Smith argued that she could not be liable under section 3344 and the common law precisely because the parents of the three plaintiffs had consented to the use of their children’s likenesses for commercial purposes on Rockelle’s channel.¹⁷¹ The plaintiffs disputed the fact of such consent¹⁷² and, in denying summary judgment in March 2024, the Superior Court of California ruled that these claims created issues of triable fact. Presumably, parents of the other eight plaintiffs had consented to use of their children’s likenesses for profit by Smith and PRI. And given that no plaintiff ever alleged that their parent had no knowledge whatsoever of their appearance in videos on Rockelle’s channel, it follows that the parents of the three children alleging publicity violations simply may not have given meaningful consent.

At least for situations like the ones in which these three PRI plaintiffs found themselves, requiring that online platforms verify meaningful consent and notice by kidfluencers or their parents to use of the child’s likeness in monetized content would counteract harm. But still further, the lack of application of recognized privacy and publicity rights to the kidfluencer context as well as the parental-consent waiver’s potential for conflicts of interest in that context is representative of the current limitations of existing laws. Looking at the plain language and spirit of the recognized rights of privacy and publicity alongside the raw reality of the kidfluencer phenomenon, as typified by the PRI lawsuit, it follows not only that our society and legal system should care about protecting kidfluencers’ privacy and publicity rights, but that we in fact do care about it. However, our society has not yet recognized how our concern for privacy and publicity rights implicates kidfluencers due to their novelty; and it would likely take years of litigation—and kidfluencer exploitation—before the common law could produce a legal framework appropriate for the competing claims of parents and kidfluencers to control over the child’s rights to privacy and publicity.

C. Falling Through the Gaps: Protecting Kidfluencers’ Privacy

1. Kidfluencing’s Unique Threat to Privacy

The Senate’s passage of COPPA 2.0 indicates a strong desire on the part of lawmakers to protect children online. But thus far, kidfluencers are missing entirely from that conversation—and to disastrous results. The types of information COPPA and COPPA 2.0 mention specifically as constituting “personal” data worth protecting—full names, online contact information, photographs, video and audio files containing a child’s image or voice, geolocation information, and more—are available in droves on kidfluencer accounts. And even as social-media platforms place age restrictions on users, kidfluencer accounts need only include a few words claiming to be managed by a parent in their description to post massive amounts of kidfluencer content to vast online audiences without constraint.

And kidfluencers’ audiences grow more dangerous as their accounts gain traction: in early 2024, the New York Times published an in-depth investigation into kidfluencers’ follower demographics, and the results are sobering. The proportion of kidfluencer account followers who are adult males grows “dramatically” as accounts grow in popularity.¹⁷³ While men made up approximately 35 percent of kidfluencer audiences overall, “[m]any [accounts] with more than 100,000 followers had a male audience of over 75 percent,” while some had over 90 percent.¹⁷⁴ The Times discovered men previously charged with or convicted of sex crimes among kidfluencer followers and found that some of these men participated in chat rooms with thousands of members, “treat[ing] children’s Instagram pages . . . as menus to satisfy their fantasies.”¹⁷⁵

While some parents are ignorant of the dangers posed by their children’s audiences,¹⁷⁶ others have grown “numb” trying to beat back the unending tide of suspicious followers.¹⁷⁷

“You are so sexy,” read one comment on an image of a 5-year-old girl in a ruffled bikini. “Those two little things look great thru ur top,” said another on a video of a girl dancing in a white cropped shirt, who months later posted pictures of her 11th birthday party.

For many mom-run accounts, comments from men—admiring, suggestive or explicit—are a recurring scourge to be eradicated, or an inescapable fact of life to be ignored. For others, they are a source to be tapped.

“The first thing I do when I wake up and the last thing I do when I go to bed is block accounts,” said Lynn, the mother of a 6-year-old girl in Florida who has about 3,000 followers from the dance world.

Another mother, Gail from Texas, described being desensitized to the men’s messages. “I don’t have as much of an emotional response anymore,” she said. “It’s weird to be so numb to that, but the quantity is just astounding.”¹⁷⁸

Still other parents are taking knowing advantage of this population: men in the chat rooms that the Times uncovered “frequently praise[d] the advent of Instagram as a golden age for child exploitation” and “trade[d] information about parents considered receptive to producing and selling ‘private sets’ of images.”¹⁷⁹ And among the allegations in the PRI lawsuit was a claim by one plaintiff that she accompanied Smith in mailing “several of Piper’s soiled training bras and panties to an unknown individual,” whereupon Smith told the plaintiff that “old men like to smell this stuff.”¹⁸⁰ Plaintiffs also alleged that Smith often “boast[ed] . . . about being the ‘Madam of YouTube’ ” and a “Pimp of YouTube,” and about making “kiddie porn.”¹⁸¹

Rockelle’s content and the PRI plaintiffs’ allegations paint a stark picture of the rampant sharing of invasive kidfluencer content carrying on unchecked throughout social media. For the members of the Squad, their experience working with PRI shares themes with Jennette McCurdy’s recollection of losing her childhood, autonomy, and privacy to child stardom. The Squad made countless videos centered around the group’s internal “crushes” and these videos performed much more strongly than the more innocent videos from Rockelle’s early days.¹⁸² Smith and Hill documented Rockelle’s first kiss on camera at age eleven¹⁸³ and filmed challenges among the Squad in which the minors competed to see who could kiss without stopping for the longest period of time.¹⁸⁴ The mother of two PRI plaintiffs, who is also Rockelle’s aunt, claimed that Smith sent Rockelle “a daily iPhone checklist cataloging the attention she needed to pay to her boyfriend, including sending him heart emojis [and] giving regular kisses, hugs and loving touches.”¹⁸⁵

In addition to the suggestive video content on Rockelle’s channel, the thumbnail images for the videos themselves are clearly set up to provide shock value and drive an increase in viewership. The mother of one PRI plaintiff alleged that Smith “often urged [plaintiffs] to pose more provocatively for thumbnail photo shoots,” ¹⁸⁶ and the lawsuit claimed that Smith, declaring that “sex sells,” “would frequently tell [the Squad members] to make ‘sexy kissing faces’ for thumbnails, to ‘push their butts out,’ to ‘suck their stomachs in,’ ‘wear something sluttier’ and would otherwise position [the p]laintiffs’ bodies in explicitly and sexually suggestive positions.”¹⁸⁷ As a result, minors are frequently depicted in provocative, revealing, or otherwise exploitative positions and situations in Rockelle’s thumbnails.

Image 3. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds¹⁸⁸

Image 4. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds¹⁸⁹

Image 5. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds¹⁹⁰

Image 6. Video on Piper Rockelle’s YouTube Channel, Featuring Eleven-Year-Olds¹⁹¹

The following YouTube video thumbnail images are merely described herein to protect the privacy of the minors featured in them:

Six teenagers (four female, two male), aged thirteen to seventeen, photoshopped to appear crowded together inside a bubble bath. The two male teenagers are shirtless, while the female teenagers appear to be wearing tank tops. The female teenager in the center has her hair arranged covering the straps of her tank top. The video is entitled “LAST TO LEAVE THE BUBBLE BATH!!” and has 2.3 million views.¹⁹²

Six teenagers (three female, three male), aged twelve to fifteen, arranged in co-educational pairs, each in one of three horizontal panels. Each female is touching her male counterpart. The male in the center panel is shirtless and his female counterpart is touching his bare torso. The video is entitled “LAST TO STOP MASSAGING THEIR BOYFRIEND WINS **Couples Challenge** 💆‍♀️💕” and has 1.9 million views.¹⁹³

One female aged eleven pictured in a cropped shirt pointing at her navel. A fake piercing is attached to her navel and a yellow circle is superimposed around her stomach while a zoomed-in image of her navel with the piercing appears in the right-hand side of the thumbnail. In the center of the thumbnail, the words “11 YEARS OLD!!” appear in large block lettering. The video is entitled “11 YEAR OLD BELLY PIERCED **PRANK** (Can’t Say No 24 Hour Challenge) 🚫👌” and has 4.6 million views.¹⁹⁴

Two females, aged eleven and twelve, wearing fake “baby bumps” designed to look like a pregnant woman’s belly with their shirts raised to expose the bumps. The video’s description includes the note, “We are only 11 and 12 so [this is] a pretty crazy challenge for us.” The video is entitled “24 Hours Being PREGNANT Challenge in PUBLIC with TWINS **FUNNY REACTIONS** 🍼🎀” and has 14 million views.¹⁹⁵

According to the Los Angeles Times’ investigation of the PRI lawsuit, PRI’s videos chronicling the Squad’s “crushes” performed the best with Rockelle’s online audience.¹⁹⁶ This data combined with the New York Times’ findings regarding dangerous followers of kidfluencers reflect the significant market that exists for kidfluencer content that is sensitive at best and criminal at worst. If, in the words of COPPA 2.0 cosponsor Senator Ted Cruz, “[e]very child deserves to grow up free of a digital footprint,”¹⁹⁷ the law is currently failing kidfluencers to a staggering degree.

Further, even content that perhaps falls short of the hallmark suggestiveness of Rockelle’s brand victimizes kidfluencers—according to some kidfluencers themselves. In July 2023, Ruby Franke, former figurehead of the now-defunct YouTube channel “8 Passengers,” made headlines when her two youngest children, then ages nine and twelve, were found emaciated and wounded.¹⁹⁸ The children had been imprisoned and suffered months of abuse by both Franke and her business partner Jodi Hildebrandt.¹⁹⁹ Franke had stopped posting videos of her children over a year before, changing the name of her channel to “Moms of Truth” and posting solemn videos alongside Hildebrandt discussing parenting strategies and religion. But in the 8 Passengers heyday, Franke posted videos of her family of eight almost daily, chronicling her six children’s lives as they grew up in front of an audience of up to two million subscribers.²⁰⁰

By 2022, 8 Passengers viewers had started to grow concerned about Franke’s behavior—while the harrowing nature of Franke’s eventual abuse would have been impossible for viewers to predict, many subscribers began to notice that Franke showed an indifference, at best, to her children’s privacy.²⁰¹ Franke spoke at length in her YouTube videos about sensitive matters in her children’s lives; over the course of several videos, she described in-depth her and her husband Kevin’s decision to send their oldest son, then fourteen, to a behavioral modification camp in the Arizona wilderness. At one point, Franke played a voicemail for viewers that her son had left her while at the camp; her son cried throughout the voicemail as he described his experience.²⁰² Another video featured the parents taking their preteen daughter to buy her first bra. After Kevin asked his preteen, “How come you’re all embarrassed?” his oldest daughter Shari spoke up off camera: “Because you’re filming her and you’re her dad?”²⁰³

2. Adapting COPPA 2.0 and the Necessity of a Right to Removal

In October 2024, Shari, now twenty-one, addressed Utah’s Business and Labor Interim Committee; Utah Representative Doug Owens, who sponsored Utah’s subsequent bill regulating kidfluencers, introduced her testimony.²⁰⁴ Shari told lawmakers that she appeared before them “as a victim of family vlogging” in hopes of “shed[ding] light on the ethical and monetary issues that come from being a child influencer.”²⁰⁵ Her words highlighted how adequate compensation is but one small component of a comprehensive regulatory scheme to protect kidfluencers; her experiences as a kidfluencer also evoke many of the same themes as Jennette McCurdy’s retelling of her time as a child actor—in particular, the sense that the compensation she received, while helpful, was simply not worth the loss of her childhood.

[Being a kidfluencer] is more than just filming your family life and putting it online. It is a full-time job with employees, business credit cards, managers, and marketing strategies. The difference between family vlogging and a normal business, however, is that the employees are all children. Children, from before they are born to the day they turn eighteen, have become the stars of family businesses on YouTube, Instagram, and most other social media platforms.

. . . .

At first, family vlogging is an alluring business that can bring high revenue. For my family, it became the primary source of income . . . . Many child influencers are paid for their work as I was, and this money has helped me in my adult life. However, this payment was usually a bribe. For example, we’d be rewarded $100 or a shopping trip if we filmed a particularly embarrassing moment or an exciting event in our lives. . . . Any payment that happens is under the table, with no paper trail. And how do we determine how much a child should make from appearing in family content? What price is worth giving up your childhood?

. . . Some of our most popular videos were when my eyebrow was accidentally waxed off, and the whole world saw a crying teenager when I just wanted to mourn in private. Or the time I was violently ill and got the leading role in the video for that day. My friends became scarce because dates were filmed and none of my friends wanted to be on camera. The camera never stops and there is no such thing as a [vacation] from filming.

. . . .

[A]s children, we do not understand the consequences of filming our lives and [having it] post[ed] for the world to see. We cannot give consent to our parents to post our lives. . . . I did not realize the impact that filming as a child would have on me now. . . .

. . . .

If I could go back and do it all again, I’d rather have an empty bank account now and not have my childhood plastered all over the Internet. No amount of money I received has made what I’ve experienced worth it. . . . I promise you that my experiences are not unique and are happening to child influencers all over Utah and the country. Let’s tackle this issue before it becomes a bigger crisis than it already is.²⁰⁶

As Shari’s words illustrate, kidfluencing is currently too unchecked and too profitable—for parents—to be safe; thus, common-sense regulations aimed at deterring parents from overworking and oversharing their children for a financial payout are critically necessary. Just as labor protections for kidfluencers would be most effective if enacted at the federal level, protective measures for kidfluencers’ privacy need federal support. COPPA presents a key opportunity to begin developing that support by empowering kidfluencers to wield greater control over their digital footprints long term. While COPPA 2.0 takes an important step forward by expanding online privacy protections for teenagers, a truly comprehensive and effective COPPA amendment would also cover kidfluencers.

Protections for kidfluencers under a new version of COPPA would make explicit the right of teenaged kidfluencers to consent (or not) to sharing their personal information in monetized content and their right to revoke that consent at any time; this system would empower teenaged kidfluencers by allying them with the social-media platforms hosting their content—regardless of a parent’s role in producing kidfluencer content, platforms would require the kidfluencer’s consent before new content could be shared. For kidfluencers under thirteen, the consent that their parents give to sharing their children’s information and to commercial use of their likeness would become provisional only and revocable by the child upon reaching age thirteen. This change would allow kidfluencers to retroactively revoke consent to personal data their parents had agreed to share and compel platforms to remove it.²⁰⁷ And in situations where groups of kidfluencers create content together, as in the case of Piper Rockelle’s Squad, a kidfluencer-focused COPPA section would provide legal scaffolding to discourage casual content-sharing to large online audiences without informed consent by every parent or teenager involved. These amendments would be a first step in giving kidfluencers the privacy protections that they currently lack.

Four of the states that now regulate kidfluencers’ compensation have also taken steps in this direction: recent laws in Montana, Arkansas, Utah, and Minnesota include provisions aimed at empowering kidfluencers to request removal of content featuring them. In particular, Minnesota’s flat ban on children thirteen and under working as kidfluencers is well worth lawmakers’ consideration both in other states and at the federal level; such a ban would have automatically made much of the Squad’s early content unlawful due to the children’s ages, while also avoiding the challenges of enforcing more nuanced regulations. Yet gaps persist—Minnesota’s law provides that “[c]ontent containing the likeness of a child must be deleted and removed from any online platform by the individual who posted the content, the account owner, or another person who has control over the account when the request is made,” either by a kidfluencer at least thirteen years old or by a former kidfluencer who is now an adult.²⁰⁸ However, the law does not provide an explicit enforcement mechanism or a means for relief for kidfluencers whose requests for removal go unheeded; it also seemingly exempts social-media platforms from responsibility entirely as it has no “effect on a party that is neither the content creator nor the minor who engaged in . . . content creation.”²⁰⁹

Meanwhile, Utah’s law does involve social-media platforms that host kidfluencer content explicitly in its removal provisions, requiring that platforms “provide a readily apparent process” for former kidfluencers who are now at least eighteen to request removal of content featuring themselves as minors.²¹⁰ But under Utah’s system, creators can still refuse to comply with removal requests. The law provides only an ex post, litigation-dependent right of action for former kidfluencers to challenge a creator’s refusal; at that point, a court would then consider the “emotional harm or substantial embarrassment” the challenged content poses to the former kidfluencer and both “the interests of the content creator” as well as “the public interest served by” that content.²¹¹ Thus, while Utah and Minnesota’s protections are certainly better than nothing, they are also critically limited; because kidfluencer exploitation is so rampant and systemic, an expensive, slow, after-the-fact system of relief available only on a state-by-state basis is simply not enough to protect them.

From that perspective, Arkansas and Montana have gone the furthest toward effecting an adequate legal solution: both states’ kidfluencer laws put responsibility on platforms, though with some caveats, to enforce kidfluencer protections, including removing kidfluencer content upon request. In Montana, creators are removed from the takedown process entirely; instead, Montana’s law triggers platforms’ responsibility to “take all reasonable steps to permanently delete” kidfluencer content as soon as former kidfluencers (who are at least eighteen) request removal.²¹²

Arkansas’ kidfluencer law is arguably even more sweeping; under that law, platforms must allow for removal requests by kidfluencers and then notify content creators of their obligation to remove the applicable content within thirty days; if creators do not do so, platforms “shall review and take all reasonable steps to remove the content.”²¹³ Unlike Montana, Arkansas does include caveats to platforms’ mandated removal, including for content that the platform finds “sufficiently newsworthy or of other public interest to outweigh the privacy interests” of the kidfluencer in question.²¹⁴ However, Arkansas also elevates platforms’ responsibilities in an additional, consequential area: its law makes it “unlawful to financially benefit from knowingly producing or distributing publicly . . . any visual depiction of a minor with the intent to sexually gratify or elicit a sexual response in the viewer or any other person.”²¹⁵ This section mandates platforms to “develop and implement a risk-based strategy to help mitigate risks related to monetization of the intentional sexualization of known minors” in a content-creation context; the structure of such strategies is at platforms’ discretion and can include monetization policies, “automated system[s] to identify and enforce against potentially problematic content and accounts,” and “[q]uality assurance processes” to monitor the effectiveness of platform’s policies in this area.²¹⁶ While the precise standard for determining whether content has “the intent to sexually gratify or elicit a sexual response” under Arkansas’ law are unspecified, much of the PRI Squad’s content could likely qualify. Thus, in addition to placing responsibility on social-media platforms to effectuate kidfluencer content removal, Arkansas also made the critical first step, at the state level, toward mandating that platforms develop ongoing procedures to monitor for at least some kinds of problematic kidfluencer content, and, ideally, prevent exploitation before it occurs.

Overall, both Arkansas and Montana’s regulatory approaches—situating platforms as the enforcers of newly-recognized kidfluencer privacy and publicity rights—represent the most effective way forward for a comprehensive federal scheme to protect kidfluencers.

IV. THE SOLUTION—FEDERAL LABOR AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND REQUIRING SOCIAL-MEDIA PLATFORMS TO ENFORCE KIDFLUENCER RIGHTS

Kidfluencers need comprehensive labor and privacy protections, and because the Internet transcends the geographical limits that made state-specific labor regulations for child actors practical, adequate kidfluencer labor and privacy regulations must be set at the federal level. But once enacted, these comprehensive federal protections will require an effective enforcement mechanism—and the social-media platforms that host kidfluencer content are likely the entities best situated to moderate and enforce kidfluencer regulations. Thus, a robust set of federal kidfluencer labor and privacy protections would include an imposition of liability on platforms that feature kidfluencer content on monetized accounts (thereby creating revenue for the platform itself as well as for those managing the kidfluencer accounts) when that content is produced under conditions that violate kidfluencer laws. So far, only two states, Montana and Arkansas, have placed legal responsibility squarely on platforms to remove kidfluencer content upon request; lawmakers seeking to adequately protect kidfluencers must follow these states’ lead by pushing for federal measures that regulate kidfluencers’ labor and privacy and enable platforms to enforce those laws.

A. Section 230 and Techlash

Any conversation surrounding potential liability for online platforms based on a platform’s third-party content implicates section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“section 230”). Recognizing how “[t]he rapidly developing array of Internet . . . services available to individual Americans represent[s] an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources,”²¹⁷ and how the Internet “ha[s] flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation,”²¹⁸ section 230 provides limited immunity to any online platform for content posted by third-party users.²¹⁹ In the nearly thirty years since section 230’s passage, its supporters have credited it with enabling some major online platforms to grow from start-ups into global giants,²²⁰ particularly with regard to the largest companies commonly referred to as a whole as “Big Tech.”²²¹ And many of those supporters have defended section 230 in the last ten years as an increasing number of detractors began voicing concerns over Big Tech’s ever-growing and seemingly unchecked power, a phenomenon dubbed “techlash.”²²²

Kidfluencers are glaringly missing from this increasingly heightened debate over the virtues and dangers of section 230 and, more broadly, about the responsibilities or lack thereof that Big Tech owes to users. Any federal proposal to impose liability upon platforms who violate laws designed to prevent kidfluencer exploitation will prompt questions about whether imposing such liability would infringe platforms’ rights under section 230 and their constitutional rights to freedom of expression. Crucially, however, section 230 itself already includes limiting language: in addition to protecting the right of platforms to “voluntarily” and “in good faith” “restrict access to or availability of material that [the platform] considers to be obscene, lewd, . . . or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,”²²³ section 230 dictates explicitly that it has “[n]o effect on intellectual property law.”²²⁴ Thus, new kidfluencer regulations, if modeled after this exception for intellectual property law, could be fully consistent with section 230.

B. Contributory Liability as a Basis for Platform Enforcement

In keeping with section 230’s unrestricted exception for intellectual property concerns, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), passed two years later, empowers copyright owners to compel online entities to remove infringing material hosted on their platforms or otherwise face liability.²²⁵ Under the DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown system,” online platforms can qualify for limitations on liability, known as safe harbor provisions, provided that they comply with an owner’s takedown request.²²⁶ Thus, the system enables copyright owners to safeguard their work from infringement while avoiding litigation and also ensures, via its safe harbor provisions, that online platforms are not impeded in their industrial development by these intellectual property protections. The DMCA has roots in common law contributory liability doctrine in recognizing partial responsibility on the part of online entities for infringement happening on their platform.²²⁷ In this way, the DMCA serves as an analog for a potential liability model for platforms hosting kidfluencer content produced in violation of expanded regulations.

In the kidfluencer context, online platforms also go a step further than inadvertent sharing of objectionable material—they profit directly from kidfluencer content by collecting a percentage of advertising revenue from the accounts they monetize.²²⁸ Thus, under expanded labor and privacy protections for kidfluencers, adapted from existing laws for child actors and child social-media users, platforms hosting monetized kidfluencer accounts would more than meet the criteria for contributory liability for profiting off of content produced in violation of these new regulations. Yet at the same time, platforms are also likely the most well-situated party to enact protocols that can effectively monitor and enforce updated kidfluencer laws.

Platforms can develop a more robust application process for kidfluencer account monetization requiring that adults running kidfluencer accounts to comply with the same laws regulating studios employing traditional child entertainers: obtaining permits to employ minors, tracking and reporting kidfluencers’ working hours and staying within working hour limits, providing proof of regular education and on-set supervision, and setting up protected trust accounts to safeguard kidfluencers’ compensation. Under this regulatory system, would-be kidfluencer accounts would have to meet these requirements as part of applying for account monetization, and existing kidfluencer accounts would have to provide documentation showing that they are maintaining these mandates to retain their monetized status on a continuing basis. Further, if federal protections for kidfluencers’ privacy were enshrined in an expansion of COPPA, online platforms could also be required to actively monitor kidfluencer accounts’ adherence to COPPA’s expanded mandates; specifically, platforms must obtain consent by teenagers and provisional consent by parents of children under thirteen to appear in monetized content and provide a means to revoke consent and compel removal upon request. Just as proof of continuing adherence to expanded kidfluencer labor regulations should be required for kidfluencer accounts to achieve monetization, so too should kidfluencer accounts be required to demonstrate compliance with privacy protections in order to keep gaining revenue. Online platforms already have established procedures to conform with COPPA’s existing mandates for children’s data collection that are similar to DMCA’s safe harbor criteria—in particular, COPPA includes its own self-regulatory guidelines for platforms to keep themselves eligible for COPPA’s longstanding safe harbor provisions. Thus, platforms are poised with a foundation to further develop protocols that monitor compliance with kidfluencer regulations. And despite the ongoing debate over the fate of section 230, imposing liability for online platforms in the kidfluencer context arguably need not threaten section 230, or platforms’ free expression more broadly, at all; such liability would not be without precedent given section 230’s blanket exception for intellectual property infringement, the DMCA’s subsequent imposition of the notice-and-takedown system, and COPPA’s longstanding restrictions on how online platforms interact with child users.

CONCLUSION

While some former kidfluencers like Shari Franke have explicitly called for a ban on kidfluencing entirely, such a drastic measure would be remarkably difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. At the same time, though the PRI lawsuit is unique, as of this writing, in its involvement of kidfluencers personally suing adult content producers, the PRI plaintiffs are part of an ever-growing cohort, the oldest of whom are only beginning to reach adulthood. As the first generation of kidfluencers comes of age while regulations to protect kidfluencers remain, at best, in their infancy, courts could see a rise in litigation by former kidfluencers only now independent enough to seek legal recourse. Rather than Shari’s proposed all-out ban on kidfluencing or a slew of merely reactive, post-exploitation lawsuits in the spirit of the PRI lawsuit, the more promising approach to addressing kidfluencer exploitation lies in enacting strict labor and privacy regulations at the federal level; once these regulations are created or expanded, lawmakers can then explore mechanisms for imposing liability on social-media platforms that host kidfluencer content produced in violation of these expanded regulations. If kidfluencers are to remain a fixture of the content-creator world (and they likely will, given the pervasiveness of their online presence as well as their financial value to the platforms that feature them), their career field needs to be regulated like the bona fide occupation that it is. Thus, federal law must ensure the right of kidfluencers in every state to limits on their working hours, guaranteed access to education, on-set supervision and advocacy, and compensation safeguards—the same protections that the most stringent states afford to professional child actors.

But merely applying labor regulations for child actors to kidfluencers as an overall protective measure still falls short because the nature of kidfluencing itself presents an unprecedented privacy intrusion. Child actors have built-in privacy protections by virtue of conducting their work on a set, away from home, playing characters. Their work, by and large, is only seen by people who pay to see it and is only broadcast subject to intellectual property and other licensing agreements between production companies and distributors. In contrast, when kidfluencers’ parents say, “Action!” the entire world immediately has an unrestricted window directly into their personal, private life. Thus, just as federal law must be expanded to regulate kidfluencers’ labor, COPPA should be amended to explicitly cover kidfluencers and also to make parental consent to collection of kidfluencers’ personal data provisional only—once children turn thirteen, they must be able to retroactively withdraw consent for data their parents turned over on their behalf. Under this new regulatory system, social-media platforms would be charged with monitoring kidfluencer accounts’ adherence to these requirements and suspending accounts in violation, drawing upon their existing safe harbor guidelines that currently ensure their compliance with COPPA and the DMCA as a model. This all-encompassing approach will serve to close the gaps in kidfluencer protections as quickly and effectively as possible, preventing future generations of kidfluencers from needing to wait to reach adulthood before they can pursue legal recourse after years of exploitation. It defies common sense that, as far as kidfluencers’ labor and privacy are concerned, the younger—and more vulnerable—they are, the fewer rights they have.

APPENDIX

My name is Shari Franke. My mother, Ruby Franke, is the prominent family vlogger arrested last year for child abuse. I don’t come today as the daughter of a felon, nor a victim of an abnormally abusive mother. I come today as a victim of family vlogging. My goal today is not to present any idea of a solution to this problem, but to shed light on the ethical and monetary issues that come from being a child influencer.

When children become stars in their family’s online content, they become child influencers. It is more than just filming your family life and putting it online. It is a full-time job with employees, business credit cards, managers, and marketing strategies. The difference between family vlogging and a normal business, however, is that the employees are all children. Children, from before they are born to the day they turn eighteen, have become the stars of family businesses on YouTube, Instagram, and most other social media platforms.

Utah is specifically a hotspot for family content due to the LDS culture around family and the goal to share the church with the world. We also have large families which makes family content more lucrative. Specifically, many parents film their regular family life as an online video blog, called a vlog. But I want to be clear that there is never, ever a good reason for posting your children online for money or fame. There is no such thing as a moral or ethical family vlogger.

At first, family vlogging is an alluring business that can bring high revenue. For my family, it became the primary source of income as is often the case for full time family vloggers. Many child influencers are paid for their work as I was, and this money has helped me in my adult life. However, this payment was usually a bribe. For example, we’d be rewarded $100 or a shopping trip if we filmed a particularly embarrassing moment or an exciting event in our lives. Or other times, simply going on vacation was expected to be payment enough—because most kids don’t get to go on regular and expensive trips. Never mind the fact that the child’s labor is actually what paid for the vacation or trip. There is no law in place to guarantee that child influencers get any money from their work. If a family account does not become an LLC, parents are taxed heavily for paying their children. But parents receive tax write offs for the regular clothes they wear, the gas money used to drive places, and even the houses they live in—anything that is filmed can be written off. And even after registering their business as an LLC, there is no guarantee that children will get paid. Any payment that happens is under the table, with no paper trail. And how do we determine how much a child should make from appearing in family content? What price is worth giving up your childhood?

But despite any monetary payment children may receive, don’t let this excuse the 24/7 labor that these children are subjected to. As a child, I was fully aware that I was an employee. The business was successful when I was happy or when I shared my hardships with the world. Some of our most popular videos were when my eyebrow was accidentally waxed off, and the whole world saw a crying teenager when I just wanted to mourn in private. Or the time I was violently ill and got the leading role in the video [for] that day. My friends became scarce because dates were filmed and none of my friends wanted to be on camera. The camera never stops and there is no such thing as a [vacation] from filming.

At the time, I’d tell you that I had a choice in what was filmed. But I’ve come to learn that every child influencer, in a way, suffers from Stockholm syndrome. Most child influencers would probably tell you they have full control over what is posted; but the reality is that their parents bribe and shame them into posting their most vulnerable moments. In fact, many child influencers may tell you they enjoy their work because of the monetary perks they receive, or the fun experiences that they can have. After all, what child would say no to a fun vacation or shopping spree if all they needed to do was film [a mental breakdown or] an embarrassing moment?

But as children, we do not understand the consequences of filming our lives and [having it] post[ed] for the world to see. We cannot give consent to our parents to post our lives. In any other context, it is understood that children cannot give consent—but for some reason, people think family vlogging is different. I did not realize the impact that filming as a child would have on me now. My social media became flooded with rumors of having sexual relations with my own brother, to being called a baby birthing machine at the age of thirteen. All these things have stuck with me, and I will forever live between the ages of thirteen to seventeen in many of my viewer’s minds. In addition, pedophiles stalk the internet, specifically seeking out child influencers. I promise you that the parents are aware of these predators and choose to post their children anyway.

I understand that this a big issue to tackle. I am not asking you to ban family vlogging, though that is my end goal. I also understand that as Utahns, we don’t appreciate big government overreach. But when it comes to protecting children, it should be a bipartisan issue. The only people harmed by child influencer laws are the parents exploiting their children. While this may not seem like an issue now, as child influencers in Utah continue to grow up, I foresee there will be legal crises with these children realizing that vlogging has brought severe emotional distress. Or these kids may realize they don’t have an appropriate amount of money to show for their [forced] labor. After all, how does that child know how much they should have made versus what their parents may or may not have paid them? Let’s deal with this now, before we reach that point. But even despite a good paycheck, I want to be absolutely clear that there is no amount of money can justify selling your soul, as a child, to the world. In no other industry would we justify unregulated child labor with a huge paycheck, and we should not do that here.

If I could go back and do it all again, I’d rather have an empty bank account now and not have my childhood plastered all over the Internet. No amount of money I received has made what I’ve experienced worth it. While I don’t have all the answers, nor many feasible solutions for this problem, I am proud to be one of the first child influencers in the state of Utah to speak against this issue. I don’t want people to look at me and blame my unique circumstances, with a mother in prison, to the Franke criminal case. Family vlogging ruined my innocence long before Ruby committed a crime. I promise you that my experiences are not unique and are happening to child influencers all over Utah and the country. Let’s tackle this issue before it becomes a bigger crisis than it already is. Thank you.²²⁹

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 449

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Elinor J. Haddad*

*Executive Postscript Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 99; J.D. Candidate, 2026, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Law, History, and Culture, 2016, University of Southern California. This Note is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother Nan Johnson. Thank you to my advisors Professors Jonathan Barnett and Jef Pearlman for their support and guidance; to Cristopher Swain for his unconditional encouragement; to Mark E. Haddad for his faith and wisdom; to Miranda Johnson-Haddad for her unwavering support; to Madeline Goossen and Robyn Kazemaini for their loyal mentorship; and to Kelcey Sholl, Isabella Flaherty, Nicholas Considine, and the staff of the Southern California Law Review for their thoughtful and dedicated editing.

A Whole-of-Government Approach to Protect Unaccompanied Children from Labor Exploitation

July 2025July 2025Charlie Murphy*

A sharp rise in illegal child labor and an influx of unaccompanied migrant children into the United States combined to dominate headlines in 2023. Despite federal authorities placing migrant children in sponsor care, reports detailed such children being exploited in hazardous occupations across the country, with some losing their lives. An aging patchwork of federal immigration and labor laws and underfunded enforcement agencies have left an incredibly vulnerable subset of children at risk of exploitation or worse, and congressional action is needed to ensure that sponsored children are properly cared for and kept out of hazardous workplaces. While the federal government’s processing of unaccompanied children and illegal child labor have been separately examined by scholars, there is a glaring lack of scholarship on how the gaps in the immigration system and federal labor law combine to put unaccompanied minors at a greater risk of labor exploitation. This Note argues that the federal government must comprehensively update existing immigration and labor laws and increase interagency coordination to lower the risk of labor exploitation for unaccompanied children. If the United States wants to fulfill a humanitarian mission of caring for unaccompanied children, it must take responsibility for every child’s wellbeing throughout their immigration journey by taking a whole-of-government approach to the problem.

Introduction

News reports broke midway through the Biden presidency detailing shocking and troubling findings of migrant children working in punishing and dangerous jobs across the United States in violation of federal law. One report detailed the experience of a migrant child named Antonio, a fourteen-year-old who had left his home in Guatemala and made the perilous trek north to the United States.¹ After arriving at the U.S. border alone, the U.S. government placed Antonio into its custody in a shelter for several weeks until a former neighbor residing in Florida agreed to sponsor him while Antonio made his way through the immigration system. Upon his release to the sponsor, Antonio enrolled in the eighth grade and went to work for anyone who would hire a child without a work permit. Work took priority, and Antonio soon stopped attending school in order to survive. While sponsors of undocumented children are supposed to provide for the children in their care, Antonio’s sponsor instead kept track of the costs required to transport, house, and feed Antonio and required him to pay that money back, which took a year of work. Antonio cleaned houses, landscaped, and packed vegetables overnight. He worked for companies that claimed not to hire minors. He did not stay in his sponsor’s care long, instead living in apartments with several other people. Rather than attend school like other children, Antonio was forced to support himself. He now lives in a neighborhood in which children as young as twelve years old work in hazardous occupations such as construction in order to survive.²

Antonio’s story is a common one. Children who arrive at the U.S. border alone often find themselves forced to work rather than attend school in order to survive or pay off debts that sponsors or other parties impose on them, creating a real risk of child labor exploitation or even labor trafficking. “Labor exploitation” is an oft-used term without an exact definition, but as used in this Note, it generally describes employers committing workplace violations for profit, usually by scheduling employees for excessively long hours, underpaying them in violation of law, or disregarding safety rules and regulations meant to protect workers.³ “Labor trafficking” is a crime in which traffickers force people to work while taking the fruits of workers’ labor for themselves.⁴ Labor trafficking turns on an element of force, fraud, or coercion, by which labor exploitation is elevated from harmful, but possibly blameless, conduct to criminal and morally reprehensible behavior.⁵ Unaccompanied children are meant to be protected from such abuses in the United States by federal immigration and labor law.⁶

When children arrive at the U.S. border without permission to enter the country, they are apprehended and detained, usually by United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).⁷ Children with no parent or legal guardian present are separated from whoever they are with and held in temporary facilities made for adults. They are then questioned by federal agents and, if found to be unaccompanied, are transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”). In ORR custody, children are put into some form of group facility with other children, generally for about thirty days. ORR houses and feeds these children, and case managers eventually speak with each child to determine a suitable sponsor for the child to be placed with. While finding sponsors, the U.S. government enters each child into formal removal proceedings, unless a child asks to be repatriated.

ORR screens each potential sponsor, but screening requirements often change with presidential administrations or with a rise in the backlog of children in federal custody. Changes in sponsor screening can affect the length of time that children are in ORR custody, which is particularly problematic given that longer stays in government custody can cause lasting trauma to children. With a backlog of children in federal custody upon taking office in 2021, the Biden administration pushed to release children as quickly as possible to sponsor homes and lowered the hurdles that sponsors must clear when applying to ORR’s Unaccompanied Alien Children Bureau (“UAC Bureau”), the federal program that places unaccompanied children in sponsor homes.⁸ In its haste, the administration may have unintentionally increased the risk of unaccompanied children landing in unsuitable environments in which labor exploitation or trafficking can occur.

In the best-case scenario, ORR places a child with a sponsor that the child knows, such as a parent or family member, who will properly care for them and enroll them in school while the child’s immigration proceedings play out. The worst-case scenario is that the child is placed with a sponsor whom they have never met, who will take advantage of the child financially or otherwise. In this worst-case scenario, sponsors might charge children for basic expenses like rent, food, clothing, and school supplies, essentially forcing the child to work after school (or in lieu of attending) to repay their debt.⁹ Worse, the sponsor may force the child to work and take the child’s entire earnings for themselves. Migrant children who must work often find themselves in workplaces considered dangerous by the federal government, even for adults.¹⁰ These children may not make enough money to pay their debts working normal shifts after school hours, so they may work overnight shifts or stop attending school altogether to work full-time. In such workplaces, child workers have been injured, maimed, and killed while working in violation of federal labor law.¹¹ Despite the risk, the harsh reality is that many unaccompanied children feel they have to work due to their vulnerable circumstances. What choice do they have otherwise?

The scenario described may seem horrific, or even unrealistic, but it has happened repeatedly in the United States. While such stories surface in the news annually, Congress finally put a renewed focus on the issue of child labor in 2023 after Hannah Dreier’s reporting in The New York Times detailed just how widespread the issue of migrant children working in dangerous American workplaces is.¹² Some migrant children have allegedly been trafficked into forced labor, and multiple federal agencies have been criticized for failing to adequately prevent or respond to the risk these children face, particularly ORR and the Department of Labor (“DOL”). Exposés like Dreier’s have cropped up amidst an unprecedented spike in unaccompanied children arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, a spike that strained the government’s ability to adequately care for unaccompanied children. Particularly concerning to some members of Congress and the public was an allegation that ORR was unable to get in touch with over 80,000 unaccompanied children that the agency had released from its custody into sponsor homes.¹³ ORR’s inability to get in touch with tens of thousands of children coincided with a dramatic surge in documented cases of illegal child labor nationwide. Although congressional Republicans and Democrats held hearings with ORR and DOL officials to understand why children could not be contacted and why child labor violations were increasing,¹⁴ there was little in the way of a coordinated government response to deal with these crises as related issues that may increase the risk of unaccompanied children being exploited for their labor.

Encouragingly, in 2023, ORR and DOL agreed to share information in an effort to jointly combat child labor trafficking and exploitation.¹⁵ But between ORR’s limitations in providing post-release services to children paroled into sponsor care and DOL’s lack of resources and relatively toothless enforcement options, migrant children still have inadequate protections and can fall prey to labor trafficking or exploitation. While some scholarship exists on the inadequacies of the UAC Bureau,¹⁶ few if any scholars have focused on how gaps in immigration law and federal labor law combine to increase the risk of exploitation to unaccompanied children. This Note aims to fill the gap in current scholarship relating to unaccompanied children by undertaking a novel and holistic review of both federal immigration law and labor law. The aim is to identify gaps in both areas of law that contribute to the risk of unaccompanied children being exploited for their labor by either their sponsors or irresponsible employers and discuss how these areas can be addressed in a comprehensive manner to lower that risk of harm.

This Note attempts to make sense of the various statutes, regulations, and government agencies that are meant to protect migrant children in different ways and argues for a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to minimize the risk that unaccompanied children fall into labor exploitation. While this Note touches on labor trafficking, its main focus is labor exploitation, as there is no comprehensive source of reliable data on labor trafficking among unaccompanied minors. Part I of this Note begins by quantifying the historic levels of unaccompanied minors arriving at the U.S. border since 2019 and explores the shifting immigration policies and rationales that have contributed to the crisis. Part II explains the legal foundation governing the apprehension of unaccompanied minors and discusses ORR’s role in placing minors into custody. Part III examines child labor violations nationwide and delves into the legal framework that is supposed to protect children from being exploited in the workplace. Part IV analyzes the current failings of both federal immigration law and labor law to protect unaccompanied children and offers possible solutions that can minimize the risk of exploitation for these children. The Note concludes by laying the groundwork for future discussion.

By addressing the labor exploitation of unaccompanied children through a multipronged review of separate but overlapping areas of law, this Note endeavors to change the discourse surrounding the federal government’s approach from a conversation of unilateral federal agency failures to one that discusses how our patchwork system of laws can be updated to best serve the needs of unaccompanied children. The Biden administration correctly approached influxes of unaccompanied minors with a humanitarian focus, but federal law needs to be updated to ensure that the federal government takes full responsibility for ensuring the safety of each child it welcomes into the country.¹⁷

I.A Historic Influx of Unaccompanied Children

Before exploring what happens when unaccompanied children enter the United States, it is important to highlight who these children are, where they come from, why they flee their homes, and what happens when they encounter border authorities in the United States. To begin, a migrant child who arrives at the U.S. border unaccompanied by a parent or guardian is referred to by CBP as an “unaccompanied alien child,” or “UC,” for short.¹⁸ A UC is statutorily defined as a child under eighteen years old who has no lawful immigration status in the United States and who either has no parent or legal guardian accompanying them into the United States or has no parent or guardian who can provide immediate care and physical custody.¹⁹ From 2010 until 2019, CBP apprehended an average of 43,425 unaccompanied children per year at the U.S. border, with nearly all of those apprehensions occurring at the Southwest border.²⁰ The number of apprehensions trended upward over that ten-year span, hitting a then-record high of 76,136 during the first Trump presidency in 2019.²¹ Decreased migration and public health border enforcement during the COVID-19 pandemic led to a sharp downturn in apprehensions in 2020, but since 2021, there has been a massive spike in the number of unaccompanied children arriving at the U.S. border, with an average of 130,122 CBP apprehensions per year.²² This average nearly doubles the pre-pandemic record high for apprehensions of unaccompanied children in a single year.

The majority of unaccompanied children are consistently aged between fifteen and seventeen years old.²³ For years, most unaccompanied children arrived from Mexico, but that majority has shifted dramatically over the last ten years to the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.²⁴ Regardless of country of origin, similar explanations underlie why migrant children are traveling to the U.S. border en masse. Many migrant children seek economic opportunity, which has always been a factor driving immigration, but many others flee extreme violence, poverty, and ecological disaster.²⁵ Others are driven by a desire to reunite with family already in the United States, with an estimated 80% of unaccompanied children having at least one family member in the country as of 2021.²⁶ While some politicians and pundits may try to ascribe nefarious motives to the spike in migration, there are usually reasonable economic and socio-political explanations for why children arrive at the U.S. border.

Where an unaccompanied child is from makes a large difference in what happens when they encounter border officials. Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”),²⁷ children arriving from noncontiguous countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are usually detained by CBP and transferred into the custody of ORR.²⁸ Once transferred, these children are put into formal removal proceedings and given an opportunity to seek different forms of immigration relief, such as asylum.²⁹ In contrast, children arriving from Mexico or Canada are usually repatriated immediately, so long as they are not trafficking victims and raise no fear of persecution upon return to their home countries.³⁰

Waves of unaccompanied minors arriving at the U.S. border have challenged the last four presidential administrations. Fearing that children were being trafficked into the United States, the George W. Bush administration passed the TVPRA in 2008, which barred the quick deportation of unaccompanied minors from countries other than Mexico.³¹ The Obama administration used the TVPRA to greatly expand the government’s ability to respond to unaccompanied arrivals, housing children in temporary camps on military bases and spending billions of dollars expanding a network of shelters that ORR could place unaccompanied children into while they awaited placement in the United States.³² The Trump administration responded to surges in arrivals in 2019 and 2020 by trying to limit both legal and illegal immigration, focusing on deterrence through family separation policies and the solicitation of Congress for funds to erect a border wall, all while allowing ORR’s shelters to fill near capacity.³³ When the COVID-19 pandemic struck in 2020, the Trump administration seized on a Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) public health order called Title 42 to promptly deport most unaccompanied children detained by CBP to Mexico, in violation of the TVPRA.³⁴ The use of Title 42 cut encounters with unaccompanied children at the southern border by more than half,³⁵ but left kids to fend for themselves along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2021, the Biden administration reversed course, formally exempting unaccompanied minors from Title 42 expulsions and requiring that they be processed under the TVPRA’s Title 8 procedures.³⁶ Unaccompanied minor apprehensions rebounded in 2021 to what was then a new record high of 140,191, before jumping again in 2022 to 149,086.³⁷

Whether any executive policy has been particularly effective in properly addressing surges in unaccompanied-minor arrivals is up for debate. The Trump administration’s hardline policies against immigration lessened the number of encounters with unaccompanied minors, but a survey of Central American children in transit revealed that 66% would try to flee their country again if detained and deported by the U.S. government,³⁸ showing that hardline tactics are not likely to stop unaccompanied children from arriving at the U.S. border. The Obama and Biden administrations took a two-pronged humanitarian approach by housing minors in shelters as a short-term solution with a goal of family reunification or sponsor placement, while attempting to address the root causes of immigration by working with foreign governments to dissuade foreign citizens from immigrating and providing legal pathways for children to apply for entry into the United States without arriving at the border unannounced.³⁹ While the Obama and Biden approaches were humanitarian in nature, such approaches were also unlikely to disincentivize children from traveling to the border.

This Note is not meant to tackle the root causes of child migration or question whether the U.S. border should be accessible or closed to migrant children. Whether increased child migration is driven by violence, poverty, ecological disaster, economic opportunity, or governmental policy, it almost certainly will persist. Rather, this Note recognizes that unaccompanied minors are uniquely vulnerable to labor exploitation and trafficking and that current U.S. law is ill equipped to protect children from such realities. The question is, how can current legal structures be changed or improved to handle arrivals of unaccompanied minors in a way that best meets the needs of such children?

II.The Legal Foundation Underpinning ORR’s Apprehension, Custody, and placement of Unaccompanied Children

The apprehension and administrative processing of unaccompanied children is governed by a court settlement known as the Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997 (“Flores Agreement”), the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”), the TVPRA, and various regulations. Understanding the legal foundation underpinning the UAC Bureau is critical to evaluating the gaps in the system that expose unaccompanied minors to a greater risk of labor exploitation.

A.The Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997

The modern-day treatment of unaccompanied children detained by the government was largely shaped by the Flores Agreement. The Flores Agreement resulted from a class action lawsuit between the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) and two organizations representing the legal interests of immigrant children held in INS detention. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of detained children who were held in “suboptimal conditions” and “subjected to daily strip searches by immigration officers.”⁴⁰ In 1984, the INS “adopted a policy prohibiting the release of detained minors to anyone other than ‘a parent or lawful guardian, except in unusual or extraordinary cases.’ ”⁴¹ These children were held in government detention despite many having other adult family members who were willing to care for them while their immigration proceedings played out.⁴²

In 1997, the plaintiff class and the government reached a settlement which set out a nationwide policy governing the detention, release, and treatment of minors in INS custody.⁴³ The settlement required the humane treatment of migrant children held in federal custody⁴⁴ and created a presumption in favor of release and family reunification for minors who were not at risk of missing appearances in immigration court or whose safety did not need to be ensured.⁴⁵ Under the agreement, minors were to be released from INS custody, in order of preference, to (1) a parent, (2) a legal guardian, (3) an adult relative, (4) an adult individual or entity designated by the parent or legal guardian, (5) a licensed program willing to accept legal custody, or (6) an adult individual or entity seeking custody.⁴⁶ Unreleased children were to be placed in a state-licensed and non-secure program that provided residential, group, or foster-care services for children.⁴⁷

While the district court that approved the Flores Agreement continues to monitor the federal government’s compliance with its terms,⁴⁸ developments in statutory law (particularly the passage of the HSA and TVPRA) and federal regulations have changed the structure of U.S. immigration and modified the Flores Agreement’s nationwide policy regarding the detention and release of minors held in government custody.

B.The Homeland Security Act of 2002

The HSA abolished the INS and created the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to fulfill most of INS’s functions,⁴⁹ including immigrant detention and removal responsibilities.⁵⁰ Importantly, section 462 of the HSA transferred INS’s jurisdiction over unaccompanied children to ORR.⁵¹ Section 462(b)(1) made ORR responsible for “the care and placement of unaccompanied alien children,” requiring the agency to consider the interests of each child when making care and custody decisions and make placement determinations for every unaccompanied child in federal custody by reason of immigration status.⁵² The HSA defined “unaccompanied alien children” as children under eighteen years of age who have no lawful immigration status and no accompanying parent or guardian present in the United States⁵³ and defined the term “placement” as the “placement of an unaccompanied child in either a detention facility or an alternative to such a facility.”⁵⁴ ORR inherited both INS’s custodial responsibilities and its responsibilities arising under the Flores Agreement, specifically the mandate to place unaccompanied minors into the care of a suitable sponsor, per the list of placement preferences.

C.The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008

Congress enacted the TVPRA, in part, to address concerns that unaccompanied minors in government custody were being inadequately screened for evidence of human trafficking.⁵⁵ The TVPRA builds on the HSA and requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop policies and procedures to ensure that unaccompanied children are safely repatriated to their country of nationality or to the last country they lived in.⁵⁶ Section 235 of the TVPRA lays out “special rules” allowing children from contiguous countries (Mexico and Canada) to be safely repatriated to their country of origin or last habitual residence.⁵⁷ Under section 235(a), an immigration officer may remove an unaccompanied child appearing at a land border or U.S. port of entry from the country so long as the child is from a contiguous country, has not been nor is at risk of being a victim of a severe form of human trafficking, and does not have a credible fear of persecution in their home country, and so long as the child is allowed to make an independent decision to withdraw their application for admission to the United States.⁵⁸ Children must be screened for evidence of trafficking or persecution within forty-eight hours of apprehension.⁵⁹

Unaccompanied children from noncontiguous countries, like those comprising the Northern Triangle, must be transferred to ORR’s custody within seventy-two hours, consistent with the HSA.⁶⁰ The Secretary of HHS, in collaboration with the Secretary of Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Secretary of State, is tasked with promulgating policies and programs for ORR to follow to ensure that unaccompanied children are “protected from traffickers and other persons seeking to victimize or otherwise engage such children in criminal, harmful, or exploitative activity.”⁶¹ Importantly, children in ORR’s care and custody are to be promptly placed in the “least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”⁶² The least restrictive setting requirement works hand in hand with the HSA requirement of sponsor placement and prevents children from being held in government detention indefinitely while awaiting their immigration hearings.

The TVPRA directs ORR to find each child a suitable sponsor who is capable of providing for the child’s physical and mental well-being.⁶³ ORR is tasked with verifying a sponsor’s identity and relationship to the child and is responsible for ensuring that a sponsor has not engaged in any activity that would signal potential risk to the child.⁶⁴ ORR must also determine whether a study of the sponsor’s home is necessary before placement, which is required for children who were victims of severe forms of trafficking or of physical or sexual abuse, who have disabilities, or whose proposed sponsors clearly present a risk of “abuse, maltreatment, exploitation, or trafficking.”⁶⁵ After placement, the TVPRA requires ORR to conduct “follow-up services” only for children for whom a home study was conducted, but ORR is authorized to conduct such services for children who could “benefit from ongoing assistance from a social welfare agency.”⁶⁶ What follow-up services entail is not defined in the law, nor is there guidance as to which children would benefit from ongoing assistance, leaving ORR with discretion unless directed otherwise. Put another way, if no home study is performed, ORR has no responsibility under the TVPRA to follow up with a child whom it placed into a sponsor’s care.

D.ORR’s Role in Child Custody and Placement

As laid out in the HSA and TVPRA, ORR is the branch of HHS tasked with caring for and placing unaccompanied minors into sponsor homes. Those two statutes, and by extension, the Flores Agreement, provide the legal basis for ORR’s UAC Bureau, which puts the statutory schemes of child detention and placement into practice. Exploring the reality of the UAC Bureau, including how and where children are actually placed and what occurs after placement, is essential to understanding how immigration law and ORR practices place migrant children at an increased risk of labor exploitation.

The majority of unaccompanied children are referred to ORR’s UAC Bureau after being apprehended by DHS border patrol officers, with some children referred by other federal agencies in rare circumstances.⁶⁷ When a child is referred to ORR, ORR obtains background information on the child from the referring agency and attempts to determine the most appropriate and least restrictive setting in which to hold the child until a sponsor determination is made.⁶⁸ Settings may include a shelter facility, foster care or group home, staff secure or secure care facility, residential treatment center, or other special needs care facility.⁶⁹ In moments of high influx, settings have included temporary influx care facilities (“ICFs”), in which hundreds or thousands of children can be kept, usually on army bases or in remote locations.⁷⁰

The initial setting that children are held in is part of the problem with ORR’s UAC Bureau. While some shelters are appropriate for children, the use of ICFs is controversial due to the “facilities’ large sizes, remote locations, durations of stay, and processes for transferring children to the facilities.”⁷¹ ORR internal reports have revealed thousands of allegations of sexual abuse and harassment in ICFs and identified shortcomings for reporting such incidents within ORR’s shelter network.⁷² Even in smaller settings, children are often traumatized by their stays in government custody. Minors are often surrounded by strangers and limited to two short phone calls per week with family members or potential sponsors, facing a lack of caregiver support that can cause toxic stress in children.⁷³ Studies have shown that children detained in federal custody can suffer from “high rates of PTSD, anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation.”⁷⁴ Thus, the longer children are detained, the more likely they will suffer harm of some sort. As of March 2025, the average stay for children in ORR custody was eighty-two days, which ORR is continually working to reduce.⁷⁵

The placement of children in sponsor homes and ORR’s follow-up services are of particular interest in this Note. As discussed, ORR’s placement of a child with a sponsor begins as soon as ORR takes custody, with the Flores Agreement preferences used as a guideline in placement. Parents, relatives, and close family members in the United States may apply to have a child in custody released to their care.⁷⁶ If no family member comes forward, ORR works with the child to identify a potential sponsor, or with the child’s consulate or a reputable family tracing organization if the child is too young to provide potential sponsor information.⁷⁷

ORR requires each potential sponsor to be screened using safe screening methods. A non-exhaustive list of safe screening methods includes identifying the sponsor, verifying a familial relationship, coordinating with a child’s parents, legal guardians, or closest relative to contact nonrelative adult sponsors, screening for exploitation or trafficking concerns, or communicating with the child directly about his or her own sense of safety.⁷⁸

Sponsor requirements are not extensive. For the most part, a sponsor simply needs to fill out an application, undergo a background check, address any criminal history, and provide proof of their identity and address, the identity of the child whom they wish to sponsor, and any sponsor-child relationship.⁷⁹ Sponsors are assessed based on a number of factors. A non-exhaustive list includes the sponsor’s relationship with the child, their resources and motivation to care for the child, the child’s view on the release, the sponsor’s understanding of the child’s needs, and risk factors that may impact the child, such as the sponsor’s criminal background, history of substance abuse, mental health issues, or domestic violence or child welfare concerns.⁸⁰ ORR does not disqualify sponsors “based solely on their immigration status or for law enforcement purposes.”⁸¹ Importantly, while sponsors enter into agreements with the federal government to provide for the physical and mental well-being of children,⁸² there appears to be no enforcement mechanism at ORR’s disposal to ensure that sponsors live up to their agreements.

Once a child is transferred to a sponsor’s custody, “ORR’s custodial relationship with the child terminates,” and care providers are required only to keep a child’s case file open for thirty days to conduct a “Safety and Well-Being Follow Up Call.”⁸³ The purpose of the safety call is to determine whether the child is safe, still in the sponsor’s care, enrolled in or attending school, and aware of upcoming immigration court dates.⁸⁴ If the care provider cannot get in touch with the child or sponsor, the provider is required only to document that fact in the child’s file,⁸⁵ a somewhat inadequate requirement given that the government has tasked itself with ensuring the well-being of unaccompanied children.⁸⁶ While ORR provides post-release services to some children with certain needs, most children and sponsors are given access only to a national hotline to be called when needed. With hotline reports of labor trafficking and exploitation of unaccompanied children jumping up in 2023,⁸⁷ it is alarming that ORR was able to contact only 81% of sponsor households between 2021 and 2022.⁸⁸ But even more alarming is that ORR has no legal responsibility to track children once they leave its custody⁸⁹ or to remove children from unfit sponsors in the event a child is exploited.⁹⁰

III. Labor Law’s Role in protecting Unaccompanied Children

While the federal government grappled with an influx of unaccompanied minors during the Biden presidency, the United States saw a 69% increase nationwide in the number of documented cases involving children employed illegally from 2018 through 2022, notably in dangerous workplaces such as meatpacking plants, construction sites, and food-processing factories.⁹¹ This increase corresponded with several news reports in 2023 detailing migrant children working in dangerous workplaces in violation of child labor laws,⁹² along with reports documenting the possible trafficking of migrant children into forced labor.⁹³ While this Note has explored the leaky system of sponsor placement for unaccompanied minors, an exploration of the laws governing child labor protections also needs to be conducted before the holes in the system can be addressed.

A. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Related Child Labor Policies

The federal law governing the employment of child labor is the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).⁹⁴ The FLSA imposes occupational and hourly restrictions for children of different ages and provides penalties for employers who violate these restrictions. According to § 212(c) of the FLSA, employers⁹⁵ cannot employ any “oppressive child labor” in commerce, the “production of goods for commerce,” or any “enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce.”⁹⁶ Oppressive child labor means that an employer employs a child under the age of sixteen in any industry except for those exempted by the Secretary of Labor⁹⁷ or that a child between sixteen and eighteen is employed in any occupation declared as particularly hazardous for the child or detrimental to the child’s health.⁹⁸

There are several subparts in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) that either permit or prohibit specific jobs that children are allowed to work, with jobs not explicitly allowed by the CFR considered prohibited.⁹⁹ The CFR allows minors to work in jobs like babysitting, newspaper delivery, and retail work,¹⁰⁰ but minors are generally not allowed to work in hazardous occupations such as manufacturing, mining, processing, construction, roofing, warehousing, or transportation of persons.¹⁰¹ Working hours for children between the ages of fourteen and fifteen are restricted by the FLSA, with such children generally not allowed to work during school hours, more than three hours a day or eighteen hours a week while school is in session, or beyond 7 p.m. during the school year or 9 p.m. during the summer.¹⁰² Children sixteen and older can generally work without hourly restriction in any jobs that have not been declared hazardous or detrimental to their health. While occupational restrictions remain in place as children age, federal law removes hourly restrictions when children turn sixteen, a somewhat arbitrary line, but one that corresponds with the maximum age of compulsory school attendance in many states. The main thrust of the FLSA’s restrictions is that children should not be working in hazardous workplaces or doing jobs that are detrimental to their health, nor should work interfere with their education.

An employer who violates the FLSA is subject to civil money penalties and possibly up to six months in prison if they willfully violate a child labor provision subsequent to an earlier conviction.¹⁰³ Employers are subject to a maximum fine of $15,138 for each employee who was the subject of a child labor violation and can face fines up to $68,801 for each violation that causes the death or serious injury of employees under eighteen.¹⁰⁴ For repeated or willful violations that lead to the death or serious injury of a child employee, the fine may double.¹⁰⁵ There is no private cause of action under the FLSA for children who suffer child labor violations, a problematic omission that will be discussed in Section IV.B.2.

DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”) is responsible for investigating and determining whether employers are in compliance with the FLSA’s child labor provisions.¹⁰⁶ In 2023, WHD concluded 955 cases involving child labor violations, finding 5,792 minors were employed in violation of the FLSA, of which 502 were employed in hazardous occupations.¹⁰⁷ During the Biden presidency, WHD stepped up enforcement significantly, levying multi-million dollars in fines that nearly doubled in amount year-over-year between 2022 and 2024.¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, the number of cases involving migrant children is not tracked by WHD, but the number of children employed in violation of federal law increased 88% between 2019 and 2023,¹⁰⁹ corresponding with the influx of unaccompanied child arrivals.

In February 2023, DOL and ORR recognized the link between increased child migration and increased child labor exploitation and entered into an interagency agreement to combat child labor exploitation amongst unaccompanied children.¹¹⁰ Pursuant to this agreement, DOL and ORR collaborate and share information regarding child labor investigations and child placements.¹¹¹ The agencies gave an example of what this information sharing looks like: DOL shares information regarding an active child labor investigation with ORR, and ORR scrutinizes its sponsor vetting process in the related geographic location for signs of exploitation affecting unaccompanied children placed nearby.¹¹² In the agreement, WHD pledged to affirmatively initiate investigations in which child labor violations are most likely to occur, while ORR pledged to follow up with any child who calls the ORR National Call Center with a safety concern, a practice that was not previously utilized.¹¹³ Most importantly, the agreement called on Congress to increase funding for WHD and the Office of the Solicitor to investigate child labor cases and to increase civil penalties for child labor violations to be more of a deterrent for employers.¹¹⁴ WHD and the Office of the Solicitor have been chronically underfunded for decades, costing WHD 12% of its staff between 2010 and 2019 and resulting in more than a hundred attorneys leaving the Office of the Solicitor.¹¹⁵ Those losses have limited the number of child labor cases that WHD and the Office of the Solicitor can investigate and conclude. Given that the actual number of child labor violations in the United States is currently unknown and WHD’s budget shortfalls leave it unable to properly investigate, there is no telling how many children are actually being exploited in U.S. workplaces.

B. Varying State Child Labor Laws

As mentioned earlier, state law plays a role in the child labor protection scheme, with each state having its own system for policing illegal child labor. Some states simply implement FLSA’s provisions into their labor codes, but many create stronger protections for minors. For instance, California follows the FLSA structure of occupational and hourly restrictions but imposes hourly restrictions on children over sixteen.¹¹⁶ California’s labor code also expands the reach of its child labor protections to any person who owns or controls real property where a minor is employed if that person benefits from the minor’s employment and knowingly permits a child labor violation.¹¹⁷ Extending liability to those who own or control property covers situations in which no employment relationship exists between the property holder and a minor. For example, if a business entity hires an independent contractor to work on the entity’s property and the contractor uses illegal child labor, the entity could be liable despite having no control over the contractor’s employee. State laws also often require children and employers to obtain work permits that can provide proof of age and detail any restrictions in working hours or tasks a minor is qualified to do.¹¹⁸

Troublingly, at least twenty-eight states have reworked their labor codes to loosen restrictions on child labor since 2021, with some states loosening hourly and occupational restrictions to the point of conflict with the FLSA.¹¹⁹ Iowa, for example, loosened occupational restrictions to allow children to work in dangerous occupations like brick manufacturing, roofing, and excavation, which are prohibited under the FLSA.¹²⁰ Iowa’s approach of allowing children to work in direct violation of FLSA restrictions is reflective of a recent push by some states to create a point of tension between state and federal law, which puts DOL on alert moving forward.¹²¹

Due to the varying approaches states take to child labor protections, state law generally is not the best tool with which to protect unaccompanied minors. While states like California may offer stronger protections than states like Iowa, unaccompanied minors will only be protected by the laws of the states in which they reside with their sponsors. Relying on state law to cure the gaps in federal law creates a system in which unaccompanied minors will be exposed to various levels of risk depending on how much emphasis states put on protecting children in the workplace.

C. Anti-Trafficking Laws Protecting Unaccompanied Children

Labor trafficking of unaccompanied minors is the ultimate concern when it comes to labor exploitation. Although the TVPRA is written to help protect minors from being trafficked by requiring DHS to determine whether an unaccompanied minor has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking or whether a child is at risk of being a victim in the future,¹²² there are not many preventative measures once a child leaves ORR custody. The precursor to the TVPRA, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”), added criminal offenses relating to human trafficking to the United States Code, which are supposed to act as a deterrent to would-be traffickers.¹²³ Under 18 U.S.C. § 1589, defendants found to be trafficking in persons can face fines and be imprisoned for up to twenty years.¹²⁴ If a trafficking violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the trafficker can be imprisoned for life.¹²⁵ Traffickers are people who knowingly provide or obtain the labor or services of a person by means or threats of force, physical restraint, serious harm, the actual or threatened abuse of law or legal process, or by any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that if they do not perform labor or services, they or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.¹²⁶ The meaning of the term “serious harm” is broad, including physical, psychological, financial, or reputational harm that is serious enough to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform labor or services to avoid the harm.¹²⁷ Traffickers are also subject to civil penalties, including full restitution to a victim for the full amount of the victim’s losses.¹²⁸

On its face, the penalty scheme for trafficking has robust enough punishments to deter sponsors or third parties from trafficking unaccompanied minors and abusing their labor. But the actual effectiveness of those deterrents is unknown given that there are no readily available and reliable statistics about how often traffickers are prosecuted for the labor trafficking of unaccompanied minors. Unaccompanied children have a remedy under the TVPA in the event that trafficking is proven, but trafficking tends to be very hard to prosecute, and the TVPA’s deterrents are unlikely to keep migrant children from being pressured or forced into hazardous labor in the first place. As discussed, migrant children often want to work to help their families, and it is unlikely that many know what a textbook case of labor trafficking consists of or when to report it. While these protections for unaccompanied children and punishments for traffickers are important to keep in mind, a lack of information from the government prevents this Note from being able to adequately explore and critique the TVPA’s efficacy.

IV. ISSUES WITH and possible solutions for ORR’s PLACEMENT OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AND Federal enforcement of Child LABOR LAWs

Migrant children working in hazardous occupations is not a new issue, but the rate at which child labor violations are increasing and the holes in the placement and supervision of unaccompanied children portend serious failings in U.S. law and the procedures that federal agencies employ. At best, the current gaps in immigration and labor law increase the risk of migrant children being exploited or harmed by working in jobs they should not be in. At worst, the gaps are large enough to allow labor trafficking to occur. Determining how to solve the issue is not a straightforward exercise. Federal agencies, shelter networks, and individuals all have a part to play, but the complex web of federal laws, regulations, and interagency agreements has been built by dealing with one symptom of the unaccompanied arrivals issue at a time. The government should take a more comprehensive approach, updating existing laws as a complete system to protect children from point A (arrival at the border) to point B (the resolution of immigration proceedings). The Biden administration rightfully responded to unaccompanied arrivals with a humanitarian approach focused on quickly getting children out of federal custody, but current law does not ensure that unaccompanied children will be adequately taken care of after their release. The TVPRA alone does not mandate ORR to do enough to protect children, nor does the FLSA provide robust enough enforcement mechanisms to properly deter irresponsible employers or third parties from exploiting children who are motivated to work for a variety of reasons. State law also cannot be relied on to adequately protect unaccompanied children due to the various different enforcement schemes at hand across the nation.

This Part will identify issues with ORR’s custody, placement, and post-release supervision of unaccompanied minors and DOL’s inability to properly deter illegal child labor. It will also discuss possible solutions that can be implemented in a way that balances humanitarian principles with employer realities and government capabilities, presenting a series of adjustments in U.S immigration and labor law that could combine to minimize the risk that unaccompanied children face labor exploitation. This Part assumes that the majority of employers are responsible and seek to fully comply with the law. It uses the term “irresponsible employers” to mean those that would willingly resort to illegal child labor in violation of state or federal law.

A.Issues with ORR’s Custody, Placement, and Post-Release Supervision of Unaccompanied Minors

1.Proper Vetting of Sponsors Versus Speed of Release

As discussed in Part III, there are many drawbacks to holding children in ORR custody. Children may suffer sexual harassment and abuse in government facilities,¹²⁹ and a child’s lack of contact with their family can lead to toxic stress that permanently alters brain chemistry.¹³⁰ Children being traumatized in federal custody is real. Studies show that detention is “deleterious to the mental health of immigrants” and that detained children experience significant psychological distress, especially when separated from their caretakers.¹³¹ While the risk of harm to migrant children in ORR’s custody has been clearly documented, releasing a child to a sponsor too quickly can put the child at risk of not being properly cared for, possibly leading to the child’s exploitation or trafficking, examples of which reporters have repeatedly identified.¹³² Thus, the government must strike a risk-minimizing balance between quickly placing unaccompanied children with sponsors to avoid prolonged detention and properly vetting sponsor households to ensure a safe environment for paroled children.

During the first Trump presidency, the average length of time that unaccompanied children remained in ORR custody ballooned to 102 days, partially as a result of an information-sharing agreement between ORR, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and CBP that was geared toward increasing the due diligence required for sponsors.¹³³ The agreement called for ORR to share the citizenship and immigration status, criminal and immigration history, and biographic and biometric information about potential sponsors and their household members with ICE.¹³⁴ In turn, ICE would provide summaries of a sponsor’s immigration and criminal histories for ORR to make a more thorough decision on a sponsor’s suitability.¹³⁵ While the Trump administration sold the agreement as a more stringent vetting of sponsors to ensure the well-being and protection of unaccompanied minors, the policy was ultimately used by ICE to arrest and deport undocumented migrants who applied to sponsor children, causing a chilling effect on the number of sponsors willing to apply to take children in.¹³⁶ With fewer sponsors, increases in minors’ detention time naturally resulted. A massive backlog of unaccompanied minors in prolonged detention led the Biden administration to terminate the Trump-era information sharing agreement between ORR and ICE and temporarily waive background check requirements for sponsor applicant household members,¹³⁷ adopting a controversial policy of moving children more rapidly through the shelter system.¹³⁸ These policy changes created a major issue for the UAC Bureau: the risk of harm to children in custody was traded for the risk that children would end up in an inappropriate sponsor home. Moving back into a Trump presidency begs the question of whether President Biden’s approach should persist.

The second Trump administration should not return to a policy of sharing sponsor information between ORR and ICE, as it greatly prolonged child stays in detention while being used as a tool to deport family members who sought to reunite with children in federal custody. The Biden administration’s decision to terminate the information sharing agreement to speed up sponsor placements was the correct call, as it is not in the best interests of unaccompanied children or the government to discourage sponsorship by involving ICE in the vetting process. A child’s best interest is to be released quickly and safely, ideally into a family member’s care. But many family members of unaccompanied children may themselves be undocumented or live with others who are. Allowing ICE to scrutinize members of a sponsor’s household will undoubtedly disincentivize family members from applying as sponsors and lead to longer detention for children, as seen during the first Trump presidency. It is also unlikely that the immigration status of a member of a sponsor’s household, on its own, increases any risk to a child placed in the sponsor’s care. Likewise, the government’s best interest is also to quickly and safely place a child in a sponsor’s care, as it is not feasible for ORR to house, educate, and care for tens of thousands of children for any prolonged period of time. In its current state, the U.S. immigration system is not equipped to care for unaccompanied minors for more than a few weeks, if at all. Placing children with sponsors quickly, even if a member of a sponsor’s household may not have legal status in the United States, is better than leaving children languishing in federal detention and meets the needs of both unaccompanied minors and the federal government.

While the second Trump administration should not return to its former policies, the Biden administration’s policy of speeding up sponsor placements by waiving background checks for members of a sponsor applicant’s household should also not be used in the future. When ORR’s ability to properly care for children in custody is maxed out, sponsor placement is the only option, absent an uptick in resources meted out by Congress. That is the situation the Biden administration found itself in after taking office. But while speeding up placements is the only adequate option during times of agency overwhelm, the executive branch should not be able to resort to outright waivers of background checks for members of sponsor-applicants’ homes, as such measures impose unnecessary risk on the children that ORR is tasked to protect. The TVPRA already spells out minimum considerations ORR must make regarding sponsors,¹³⁹ and agency officials should remain beholden to minimal legal standards for the safety of unaccompanied minors.

Congress can likely address the shortcomings of both the Trump and Biden administrations by amending the TVPRA to ensure that anti-immigration administrations cannot impose unnecessary burdens on the UAC Bureau that slow child placement and that immigration-neutral or pro-immigration administrations cannot waive necessary background checks. Rather than setting a minimum standard, the TVPRA could be amended to define what a proper background check consists of, while making that background check non-waivable. While the TVPRA has minimum background check standards, Congress should take some discretion out of the hands of the Secretary of HHS by laying down a comprehensive and non-waivable background check via statute. Congress is in the best position to listen to stakeholders and balance the needs of children and HHS in outlining a background check. It can define the full scope of what a proper background check should consist of, prohibiting unnecessary steps like the extra ICE check, while ensuring that background checks cannot be legally waived by the HHS Secretary. Moreover, Congress should also statutorily guarantee that it will adjust ORR’s funding in times of system overwhelm. Such measures would add a layer of accountability and oversight over HHS in order to protect children from the harm of being released to unsuitable sponsors and guarantee that ORR has the resources it needs to properly ramp up operations during times of influx.

2.Keeping Track of Migrant Children Paroled into Sponsor Homes

The true impact of the Biden administration’s changes to sponsor vetting and child placement is currently unknown due to a lack of information about children placed into a sponsor’s care after a waived background check, which is a large part of the issue. According to former HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra, ORR has no legal requirement to keep track of children once it releases them from its custody, nor do paroled children or their sponsors have an obligation to follow up with ORR.¹⁴⁰ This is a major gap in the TVPRA and related regulations that raises the risk of labor exploitation. ORR increasingly lost touch with the children it paroled into sponsor care during the Biden presidency, as evidenced by the fact that it could not reach roughly 85,000 children for follow-up calls.¹⁴¹ Without a legal mandate to keep track of unaccompanied children upon release, ORR cannot be expected to prioritize critical measures that could help ensure the well-being of paroled children. ORR is the first line of defense in ensuring that children are in proper homes in which education is the priority, and the agency should be required to procure and maintain post-release data about whether children are attending school full-time or working, the nature of any such employment, and whether sponsors are adequately caring for them. Such data is critical in evaluating whether children are at a greater risk of harm by remaining in government custody or by being released as quickly as possible. At a minimum, Congress should amend the TVPRA to require ORR to keep track of children formerly in its custody and record statistics regarding school attendance and work performed, along with qualitative data about the child’s experience with their sponsor.

ORR does voluntarily contact children thirty days after their release and offers post-release services to a decent number of children,¹⁴² which shows that some infrastructure exists that could be scaled up. But ORR is not currently equipped to keep track of the tens of thousands of sponsored children currently in the United States and would certainly need further funding from Congress to do so. It is important to note that children would not need to be monitored indefinitely. The length of time that monitoring would be required is limited temporally by two factors: first, all unaccompanied minors are placed into removal proceedings immediately upon being transferred into ORR’s custody,¹⁴³ meaning each child’s monitoring has a guaranteed end date based on a determination of their immigration status; and second, children age out of the unaccompanied child program when they turn eighteen.¹⁴⁴ While ORR would need to significantly scale up its post-release capabilities to comprehensively track where every unaccompanied child goes and what happens to them post-release, this is likely a matter of political will that could have the backing of both conservative politicians concerned about undocumented immigrants in the country and liberal politicians concerned about the wellbeing of migrant children.

Monitoring whether unaccompanied children are attending school regularly would greatly improve the ability of ORR and DOL to identify children who may be at risk of exploitation. Much of the victimization discussed in this Note centers on unaccompanied minors who are working in hazardous conditions in violation of federal child labor laws. Children released to sponsors are usually required to attend school under state law,¹⁴⁵ but news reports make clear that many are not attending school regularly, if at all, and instead working long shifts in dangerous workplaces.¹⁴⁶ These children should be attending school full-time and focusing on their immigration matters. If a child’s attendance record in school is sparse, it may be evidence that the child is being overworked outside of school, which could point to exploitation from a third party. While ORR alone does not have the capacity or infrastructure to monitor every child it places into a sponsor home, it could enter into an information-sharing agreement with the Department of Education (“DOE”) to monitor school attendance for paroled children attending public schools. Local and state education boards regularly track student attendance in schools, and public schools that receive federal funding have the ability to share attendance statistics with DOE under the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).¹⁴⁷ Although FERPA protects the privacy of students’ education records (including history of attendance) and prevents them from being shared with any individual, agency, or organization without the written consent of parents,¹⁴⁸ the law only specifically affords privacy protections to parents and eligible students.¹⁴⁹ FERPA arguably does not apply to unaccompanied minors who are not in the care of their parents and, as such, would not be an impediment to DOE sharing student records with ORR. This kind of interagency agreement would provide ORR with vital information that could help tip the government off to potential exploitation of children who are not regularly attending class.

Through congressional mandate or interagency cooperation, keeping track of paroled children is the surest way to monitor their wellbeing and prevent them from working in dangerous situations. If the TVPRA were amended to mandate that ORR keep track of paroled children, an information-sharing agreement with DOE would likely be an efficient and cost-effective way to fulfill part of that mandate. Along with ORR’s information-sharing agreement with DOL, an agreement with DOE would enable federal agencies to pool their resources and work together to protect unaccompanied minors, without requiring a massive increase in funding from Congress. In today’s polarized political climate, a targeted amendment to the TVPRA and an interagency agreement are probably the most realistic and practical solutions.

3.Implementing Reporting Requirements for Sponsors

Even if ORR was mandated to monitor every unaccompanied child post-release, its efforts would not be effective without a change in current law to require sponsors and paroled children to report in to the agency. As previously noted, ORR was able to contact only about 81% of sponsor households with thirty-day wellness checks between 2022 and 2023.¹⁵⁰ Mandating ORR to contact children will not ensure contact will be made. Sponsors and children may simply be unreachable. While each sponsor signs an agreement with the federal government promising to provide for a child’s well-being, there is seemingly no requirement that a sponsor prove that they are doing so. For instance, if a sponsor coerces a child to work in order to pay for rent or meals that the sponsor is supposed to provide, ORR will not know unless the child reports the abuse to ORR’s National Call Center. The current system puts the onus squarely on children to voluntarily report their own abuse, which leads to guaranteed underreporting issues.¹⁵¹ A more humane system would require sponsors to check in with ORR at regular intervals to certify that children are being cared for, with an emphasis placed on hearing from the child directly. While such reporting requirements would still be vulnerable to sponsor misrepresentation or noncompliance, an affirmative obligation would exist for sponsors that could deter unsuitable sponsors from applying in the first place.

There may be some question as to whether tracking children post-release is actually necessary, as most children who arrive unaccompanied at the border are fifteen or older.¹⁵² Indeed, the idea of fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds entering the workforce is common in the United States,¹⁵³ but it is important to remember we are talking about a specific subset of particularly vulnerable children. It should not be controversial to say that a child’s focus should be on completing a primary education rather than working in a factory or slaughterhouse. As it stands, children who fail to attend school regularly, regardless of the reason, tend to suffer worse outcomes than those who do.¹⁵⁴ If the federal government is intent on meeting arrivals of unaccompanied children with a humanitarian focus, as it was under President Biden, it must create an immigration system that focuses on providing unaccompanied children with a proper education while keeping them from working in illegal occupations. Knowing where children are and what their condition is post-release is an important step toward meeting those goals and lowering the risk of harm.

4.Enforcement Mechanism Needed

The last major problem with ORR that this Note will address is ORR’s inability to act when sponsors fail to properly care for children. ORR’s role is limited to placing children safely into sponsor homes. It is not a federal law enforcement agency, and it is not statutorily tasked with scrutinizing whether sponsorships are successful. But ORR does require sponsors to agree to provide care for paroled children,¹⁵⁵ and it has an interest in knowing that sponsors comply with those agreements. If a sponsor’s care is lacking, ORR does not have many options to enforce its agreement and ensure that children are getting the help they need. According to former ORR Director Robin Dunn Marcos, ORR’s only recourse in such cases is to refer the matter “to local law enforcement, child protective service[s], and other federal entities as appropriate.”¹⁵⁶ ORR itself has no power to remove a child from a sponsor’s care. While referring allegations of sponsor abuse to state and local agencies seems like a reasonable process, the reliance on third-party entities to make a determination adds complexity to the UAC Bureau system and shifts the burden of protection away from the federal government. Unaccompanied children have distinct needs due to their immigration status, such that being placed into a foster home by a state or local agency may complicate their ability to seek familial help or legal representation during their immigration processes. Rather than relying on state agencies using differing processes to address sponsor abuse or abandonment, the federal government should be responsible for managing each unaccompanied minor to ensure continuity of care throughout the immigration process.

If an ORR sponsor credibly fails to honor their agreement with the federal government, there should be tangible actions that ORR can take, such as reclaiming custody of any child in the sponsor’s care and revoking that sponsor’s right to sponsor other children in the future. Rather than letting paroled children bounce between local, state, and federal agencies in the event of a failed sponsorship, Congress should amend the TVPRA to allow ORR to reassign children to suitable sponsors. Failed sponsorships include not only cases of abuse and exploitation, but also cases of neglect and abandonment in which sponsors help children get out of federal custody but then leave them to fend for themselves after release, which are not always foreseeable situations when vetting sponsors. By allowing or requiring ORR to retake custody of unaccompanied minors, Congress would incentivize ORR to follow sponsor-vetting procedures and find the right match at the outset, while allowing for continuity of contact between paroled children and the agency in the event a child is exploited by their sponsor. Increased continuity would lessen the confusion that unaccompanied children experience throughout the UAC Bureau and task ORR with the responsibility to make the program a success.

B. Inadequacies in FLSA Penalties and DOL Enforcement Capabilities

In 2023, then former ORR Director Dunn Marcos told the House Oversight and Accountability Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs that combatting labor exploitation among unaccompanied children requires “a whole-of-government approach,”¹⁵⁷ intimating that ORR alone cannot solve the issue. Despite facing heavy bipartisan criticism for ORR’s performance, Director Dunn Marcos was correct. The federal government must act in tandem across agencies and government branches to properly safeguard unaccompanied minors. Collaborating with DOE would be a start in terms of monitoring children’s well-being post-release, but ORR cannot also monitor children in the workplace. That task belongs to DOL. While an existing agreement between the agencies exists to tackle possible labor exploitation of unaccompanied minors, congressional action and statutory changes are needed to further reduce the risk of exploitation for unaccompanied minors. This Section will address DOL’s chronic underfunding and FLSA’s insufficient statutory penalties as two issues that can be remedied to reduce the risk of unaccompanied minor exploitation. Further, it will discuss the need for a private cause of action for victims of willful child labor violations to provide children with a remedy for the harm they suffer.

1.DOL’s Chronic Underfunding Increases the Risk that Unaccompanied Minors Go Unnoticed by Federal Investigators

2023 and 2024 marked DOL’s most aggressive enforcement years in the agency’s history in terms of punishing employers who illegally employed child labor.¹⁵⁸ In response to a reported 88% jump in illegal child labor between 2019 and 2023,¹⁵⁹ DOL made clear that the rising rate “is a direct result of [the agency’s] increased emphasis on identifying child labor cases and bringing enforcement actions when [it] find[s] companies violating the law.”¹⁶⁰ The agency’s focus on expanding enforcement actions is welcome news for those concerned about unaccompanied children facing labor exploitation or trafficking, but Congress has left DOL chronically underfunded for years, undercutting WHD’s ability to properly investigate and enforce child labor laws.

In reviewing DOL’s 2024 budget, the number of investigators that WHD employed is near the lowest it has been in the last fifty years, down significantly from the peak level achieved in the 2013 fiscal year.¹⁶¹ According to the agency, reduced staffing levels limit WHD’s ability to “develop impactful cases,” and “[c]ontinuing to operate at these levels poses significant risks to the [agency’s] mission.”¹⁶² As of April 2023, WHD employed a mere 794 investigators¹⁶³ to police 11 million workplaces and enforce laws protecting roughly 165 million workers.¹⁶⁴ The number of investigators that WHD can afford to hire has eroded year-after-year since the agency employed over a thousand investigators per year from 2010 to 2013.¹⁶⁵ WHD’s 2023 operating budget authority of roughly $310 million was a slight increase over 2022’s $299 million,¹⁶⁶ but in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars, those funding figures are roughly even with the amount of money appropriated by Congress back in 2006,¹⁶⁷ demonstrating that Congress has been unwilling to increase its investment in the enforcement of child labor protections for decades. Without adequate funding, WHD cannot ensure it has an adequate number of investigators to look into allegations of illegal child labor.¹⁶⁸

The sheer number of workplaces that WHD is responsible for illustrates the problem of underfunding. If each of WHD’s 794 investigators began individually reviewing one workplace per day for signs of child labor violations, it would take roughly thirty-eight years to complete a single round of investigations of all eleven million workplaces in the United States.¹⁶⁹ Obviously, not every employer needs to be investigated for child labor violations, as many (if not most) do everything in their power to follow the law, but the illustration serves to show how thinly stretched WHD is. Under all of the statutes that WHD enforces, it concluded 20,215 compliance actions in 2023, its lowest total in ten years.¹⁷⁰ Even though its number of closed cases involving child labor violations reached a ten-year high in 2023,¹⁷¹ WHD failed to conclude the same number of compliance actions as the previous year for the sixth straight year.¹⁷² These figures should not be read to assume that federal labor law violations are on the decline. As evidenced by the sharp increase in child labor law violations nationwide, the rate of violations tends to increase in areas in which WHD focuses its attention in the first place.

The only solution to the issue of inadequate enforcement caused by understaffing is proper funding. Both chambers of Congress have made a point to try to address child labor violations by presenting bills with expanded penalties for violators,¹⁷³ but increasing penalties alone will not lessen WHD’s burden as it attempts to enforce child labor laws. Harsher penalties may deter some irresponsible employers and lead them back to a place of compliance, but the agency will likely still be stymied by the same erosion of resources and investigators as has been the case the past ten years. If Congress is serious about addressing the harms that unaccompanied children (and U.S. children) face in abusive workplaces, it needs to fully fund DOL, as the Biden administration requested in its 2024 budget. With full agency funding, WHD would have the capacity to increase child labor investigations, thereby reducing the risk that unaccompanied minors working in some of the United States’ most dangerous workplaces go unnoticed. Without adequate funding, WHD will be continually forced to ration its enforcement capabilities with an ever-shrinking roster of investigators, thus ensuring that labor exploitation of unaccompanied minors goes unnoticed.

2. Current FLSA Penalties Are Inadequate to Deter Bad Actors from Committing Child Labor Law Violations

Even if Congress adequately funded DOL, there would still be an issue of inadequate penalties for child labor law violators. As mentioned in Section III.A, FLSA violators are currently subject to a maximum fine of $15,138 for each child labor violation and can be fined up to $68,801 for each violation that causes the death or serious injury of any employee under eighteen.¹⁷⁴ By assessing fines per violation,¹⁷⁵ WHD is also able to stack penalties against violators depending on the severity of the conduct. But while these fines may be costly, the FLSA penalization scheme often feels woefully insufficient based on the harm suffered.

For instance, a contractor that hired a fifteen-year-old boy to do roofing work on a corporate building was fined $117,175 in civil penalties for FLSA child labor violations, but the harm the boy suffered included falling fifty feet to his death on his first day of work.¹⁷⁶ Proportionally, the civil penalty feels inadequate given that the boy lost his life in a job he should have never been hired for. To make matters worse, the fines collected in such a tragedy only go toward “reimbursement of [WHD’s] costs of determining the violations and assessing and collecting such penalties.”¹⁷⁷ No compensation exists under the FLSA for the victim or their family. Depending on the size of the irresponsible employer cited, a six-figure fine may not be enough of a deterrent for risky behavior.

In lieu of fines, WHD may hold an irresponsible employer accountable by activating the “hot goods” provision of the FLSA, allowing WHD to prevent the sale of any goods made using oppressive child labor.¹⁷⁸ This provision was used in 2023 against a Wisconsin sawmill operator following the death of a sixteen-year-old who was caught in a wood-stacking machine, resulting in the company’s goods being withheld from shipment.¹⁷⁹ Ultimately, in exchange for WHD releasing its hold on the goods, the sawmill operator agreed to $190,696 in civil penalties for numerous child labor violations and to place labels and signage to prevent children under eighteen from using dangerous equipment at the sawmill.¹⁸⁰ The company then fired all employees under the age of eighteen.¹⁸¹ While costly and inconvenient for the sawmill operator, the threat of such fines did not prevent the tragic outcome in the first place.

Given that child labor violations, even those involving the death of children, generally result only in civil monetary penalties that are limited by statute, Congress should revisit the effectiveness of the FLSA’s penalization scheme. The current scheme does not make up for the serious harm children sometimes suffer, nor are the penalties adequate to deter irresponsible actors from using and abusing the labor of unaccompanied children. While many responsible employers will be sure to hire competent counsel to guide their compliance efforts, irresponsible employers may not and might expose children to risk based on a cost-benefit analysis.

To illustrate an extreme case, a slaughterhouse sanitation company was fined more than $1.5 million after WHD investigators found over one hundred children employed by the company cleaning slaughterhouses across the country.¹⁸² Some of these children were as young as thirteen and suffered chemical burns, and DHS investigated possible human trafficking after finding that some of the children were unaccompanied minors.¹⁸³ In addition to chemical burns and working overnight shifts after attending school all day,¹⁸⁴ the children also lost their jobs in response to government fines and saw no compensation from the penalties levied on their employer, aside from the end of their exploitation. While the sanitation company lost some contracts with major corporations¹⁸⁵ and paid a hefty WHD fine, it otherwise showed few, if any, signs of a long-term setback in operations and still employs about 16,500 workers nationwide.¹⁸⁶ The children who were the subject of the violations arguably fared much worse, specifically the unaccompanied minors, as such children are often motivated to work to send money home to their families¹⁸⁷ and probably needed their jobs, however exploitative. Moreover, if the sanitation company properly terminated the unaccompanied minors in its employ, the unaccompanied minors were likely left with no recourse whatsoever, as the FLSA provides no private cause of action for victims of child labor violations.

While this Note assumes that most employers want to do the right thing and do not wish to exploit children, irresponsible or negligent actors do exist. So, what statutory fixes can be made to increase deterrence? As noted earlier, several bipartisan bills have been proposed in Congress in recent years to strengthen the penalties for child labor violations.¹⁸⁸ An interesting bill advanced by Senators Brian Schatz and Todd Young, the Stop Child Labor Act,¹⁸⁹ proposed to increase the maximum FLSA fines to $132,270 for common child labor violations and $601,150 for violations that result in serious injury or death to a minor.¹⁹⁰ It also proposed a private cause of action for exploited children to seek up to $250,000 in punitive and compensatory damages in federal court.¹⁹¹ By proposing increased fines and a private cause of action, the senators’ bill addressed two issues that make current labor law so ineffective as a deterrent for irresponsible employers, thus serving as an intriguing model for how labor law could evolve to safeguard unaccompanied minors.

First, FLSA fines are currently far too low to deter many employers. Even the sizeable $1.5 million fine mentioned above can be a drop in the bucket for many companies. The sanitation company that absorbed the $1.5 million fine was bought for close to $1 billion in 2014¹⁹² and sold for an undisclosed amount in 2018 to a private equity firm with a January 2025 market cap of $210 billion.¹⁹³ While most employers are responsible and seek to avoid child labor violations, irresponsible actors may simply conduct a cost-benefit analysis and turn a blind eye to potential child labor violations in their workplaces if the payoff is high enough. There is also an issue of companies failing to recognize an appreciable risk of harm to children when utilizing staffing agencies or contractors who place children in company workplaces.¹⁹⁴ To have any kind of a deterrent effect, FLSA fines need to be high enough to convince irresponsible employers to seek full compliance with the law. Otherwise, if the cost is negligible, irresponsible actors will simply build potential penalties into their business models and accept the risk of getting caught. The Stop Child Labor Act proposed increasing the minimum and maximum fines nearly tenfold, with penalties increasing annually in lockstep with the consumer price index for all urban consumers.¹⁹⁵ It is hard to say whether these increases would be enough to properly incentivize every irresponsible actor to comply with the law or too punitive for responsible employers who mistakenly violate the law, but increases of any kind are a start and are recommended by this Note.¹⁹⁶

Second, granting a private cause of action to children who suffer exploitation may be more effective than assessing WHD penalties in remedying the harm caused, provided that responsible employers are protected from unnecessary and unfair litigation. The Stop Child Labor Act’s inclusion of liability in the form of punitive and compensatory damages for child victims is a model that could help increase deterrence and provide an avenue for unaccompanied minors to seek justice, an avenue which does not currently exist. As seen earlier, employers who are fined by WHD for child labor violations sometimes terminate all minors in their employ, even children who are not the subjects of the violations. Due to the particular needs of unaccompanied minors, they may be incentivized to work, even if the work is exploitative. Thus, losing a job, even an exploitative one, can harm these children more than it helps at times. In such a situation, government action essentially victimizes unaccompanied minors further, exposing them to a vicious cycle in which they are exploited in a job that they need, fired when DOL cracks down, and then forced to find another available job, even if it too is dangerous. Providing such children with a cause of action would give them a remedy to their individualized harm. Moreover, litigation can enable facts to come to light that demonstrate the true harm that unaccompanied minors at times suffer.

The federal government will soon be able to look to Colorado to see whether a private cause of action is viable. Colorado added a private cause of action to its labor code for aggrieved children who suffer child labor violations, which became effective on January 1, 2025.¹⁹⁷ Depending on the violation suffered, a child can recover anywhere from $500 to $65,000.¹⁹⁸ This scheme provides an outlet for exploited children to seek redress where they otherwise may not have been able to. It is worth noting, however, that such a system could be abused by children who lie about their ages, thus burdening responsible employers. Unaccompanied minors seeking work are not immune to misrepresenting their ages to employers. Importantly, Colorado’s additions to its labor code protect responsible employers by allowing actions against an employer to be waived if a minor intentionally misleads the employer about their age.¹⁹⁹ Further employer protections may be needed to avoid incentivizing frivolous litigation, such as limiting an employer’s liability in situations in which the employer was merely negligent. A delicate balance must be struck so that unaccompanied minors can seek justice and compensation without employers bearing an undue burden by having to litigate unnecessarily.

Increased fines and the availability of a private cause of action for exploited minors, with some guardrails to protect responsible employers, would add an appropriate level of deterrence to existing law and provide an avenue for unaccompanied children who are wronged to actually be compensated for their harm. Without strong deterrents, the rate of child labor violations nationwide may continue to increase, leaving unaccompanied minors at an increased risk of exploitation. At a minimum, Congress must properly fund DOL so that WHD can continue its important mission of uncovering exploitation of unaccompanied minors in the workplace.

C. Summary of Solutions

To reduce the risk of unaccompanied minors being exploited in U.S. workplaces, a number of measures need to be taken. As discussed in Section IV.A, Congress should first ensure that ORR never waives background checks for sponsors. Next, Congress should amend the TVPRA to require ORR to monitor children formerly in its custody and record school attendance and employment statistics for unaccompanied children, as well as qualitative data about each child’s experience with their sponsor. This monitoring can be accomplished by ORR increasing post-release services for all children and creating an information-sharing agreement with DOE to track school attendance among unaccompanied minors. Moreover, regulations should be implemented to require sponsors and unaccompanied children placed into their care to report to ORR periodically. To meet the mission of monitoring hundreds of thousands of paroled children, Congress will have to direct proper funding and resources to ORR, as well grant ORR the statutory authority to reclaim custody and find new sponsor homes for children whose sponsors fail to care for them.

Addressing ORR’s issues alone is not sufficient. A whole-of-government approach is required, whereby Congress must properly fund DOL so it can increase enforcement actions against irresponsible parties engaging in illegal child labor. Increased enforcement can be accomplished only by properly staffing WHD, which requires DOL to be fully funded. Additionally, Congress should act to increase the penalties that DOL can assess for child labor violations and create a cause of action for victims of illegal child labor, provided that any cause of action has proper protections built in for responsible employers. If implemented as a comprehensive set of reforms, these solutions will minimize the risk of unaccompanied children being victimized and exploited for their labor.

CONCLUSION

This Note sought to identify the gaps in federal immigration law and labor law that increase the risk of labor exploitation for unaccompanied minors who are placed in sponsor homes in the United States. While immigration law and labor law are usually looked at separately, this Note set out to recommend a comprehensive set of measures that could be taken in both areas of law to meet the common goal of mitigating the risk of harm that unaccompanied minors face due to their unique circumstances.

In making these recommendations, this Note examined a series of overlapping statutes and policies that are either structurally unsound or undermined by congressional inaction and underfunding. The TVPRA’s text and ORR’s approach to child placement are too relaxed and put unaccompanied children at an increased risk of exploitation. The TVPRA mandates government action only while unaccompanied minors are in ORR custody and relieves the government of any responsibility once children are placed into sponsor homes. Moreover, ORR does not have the resources or infrastructure available to effectively monitor every child that it releases from its custody. Similarly, while the basic structure of the FLSA is sound, the statute is undermined by relatively weak penalties and provides no avenue for child victims to seek compensation for the harm they suffer. Moreover, although Congress has signaled that it wants child labor protections to be enforced, it has underfunded the agency responsible for upholding child labor laws for years, leaving DOL understaffed and unable to meet its critical mission of holding irresponsible employers accountable and ensuring a safe workplace for children and adults alike.

Protecting unaccompanied children from labor exploitation cannot be accomplished by addressing only one set of laws or a single federal agency. A whole-of-government approach is needed whereby the legislative branch addresses gaps in current law and the executive branch uses all of the levers at its disposal to combat the issue. Legal adjustments in both immigration law and labor law and congressional funding are needed to empower ORR and DOL to fulfill their missions, and interagency agreements should be entered into and maintained in order to safeguard unaccompanied minors through their entire journey with the UAC Bureau. In the immigration arena, Congress should amend the TVPRA to require ORR to monitor children who are released from government custody until their immigration matters are settled or they age out of the UAC Bureau, and ORR must be given the authority to reclaim custody and find new sponsor homes for children who are being abused or exploited by their sponsors. ORR should also find creative ways to monitor children in lieu of increased federal funding, such as entering into an information-sharing agreement with DOE. Finally, sponsors and unaccompanied children should be required to check in with ORR as a means to demonstrate that the child is being properly cared for.

Once children have been released from ORR custody, DOL is uniquely positioned to safeguard them from employer exploitation. But DOL needs to be properly funded by Congress to be able to adequately monitor and respond to reports of illegal child labor. Understaffing has hindered DOL’s ability to investigate illegal child labor, which puts unaccompanied minors at a greater risk of harm in dangerous workplaces. While an information-sharing agreement with ORR to identify potential exploitation or trafficking amongst unaccompanied minors is a good start, DOL needs help from Congress regarding enforcement. Congress should first update the FLSA to ensure that financial penalties are high enough to act as a proper deterrent against illegal child labor. Congress should also consider providing victims of illegal child labor with a private cause of action to seek individual justice, so long as proper protections exist to prevent frivolous litigation against responsible employers.

Unaccompanied children are a particularly vulnerable group, made even more so by the shifting political winds in the United States. With the current gaps in federal law and new leadership in the executive branch every four years, unaccompanied minors are falling through the cracks and ending up in prohibited workplaces. No single agency or statutory scheme is capable of protecting each child through every step of their immigration journey. But through a collaborative and whole-of-government approach, the United States can address the shortcomings in federal immigration and labor law to properly mitigate the risk that unaccompanied children face exploitation. If Congress truly cares about children being exploited in the workplace, it should not hesitate to act by amending the TVPRA and FLSA and properly funding ORR and DOL. Congressional critiques of these agencies will not fix the structural problems hampering their performances; only congressional action can do that. The federal government has properly committed itself to protecting unaccompanied children, but it is long past time that it lives up to that commitment.

98 S. Cal. L. Rev. 761

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Charlie Murphy*

* Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 98; J.D. Candidate 2025, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. 2011, Emerson College. Thank you to Jeremy Gartland, Isabelle Yuan, Michelle Solarczyk, and the staff of the Southern California Law Review for their expert edits and wonderful feedback, and to Professor Rebecca Brown for her guidance and tutelage.

I especially want to thank Professor Henna Pithia and my International Human Rights Clinic classmates. Advocating for the rights of vulnerable and politically unpopular groups requires bravery and sacrifice, and the passion that Professor Pithia and my IHRC family brought to their work inspired me in writing this Note and left me in awe.

INTRODUCTION

I. THE ARRIVAL OF KIDFLUENCERS

A. A Brief History of Stage Mothers

B. Reality Television Bridges the Gap from Film and Television to the Internet

II. REGULATING THE LABOR OF KIDFLUENCERS

A. Existing Labor Regulations for Child Entertainers

1. Federal Measures for Child Workers: The Fair Labor Standards Act

2. SAG-AFTRA, States’ Approaches & the Coogan Law

3. When Does the Home Become a Set?

B. New Efforts: Expanding Child Labor Regulations to Cover Kidfluencers

A. Privacy Regulations for Children as Users Online

Existing and Proposed Federal Regulations for Children Online

i. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998

ii. COPPA 2.0

2. Online Platforms’ User Age Restrictions

B. Relevance and Current Limitations of the Common Law Rights of Privacy and Publicity

C. Falling Through the Gaps: Protecting Kidfluencers’ Privacy

1. Kidfluencing’s Unique Threat to Privacy

2. Adapting COPPA 2.0 and the Necessity of a Right to Removal

IV. THE SOLUTION—FEDERAL LABOR AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND REQUIRING SOCIAL-MEDIA PLATFORMS TO ENFORCE KIDFLUENCER RIGHTS

A. Section 230 and Techlash

B. Contributory Liability as a Basis for Platform Enforcement

CONCLUSION

99 S. Cal. L. Rev. 449

Introduction

I.A Historic Influx of Unaccompanied Children

II.The Legal Foundation Underpinning ORR’s Apprehension, Custody, and placement of Unaccompanied Children

A.The Flores Settlement Agreement of 1997

B.The Homeland Security Act of 2002

C.The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008

D.ORR’s Role in Child Custody and Placement

III. Labor Law’s Role in protecting Unaccompanied Children

A. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Related Child Labor Policies

B. Varying State Child Labor Laws

C. Anti-Trafficking Laws Protecting Unaccompanied Children

IV. ISSUES WITH and possible solutions for ORR’s PLACEMENT OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AND Federal enforcement of Child LABOR LAWs

A.Issues with ORR’s Custody, Placement, and Post-Release Supervision of Unaccompanied Minors

1.Proper Vetting of Sponsors Versus Speed of Release

2.Keeping Track of Migrant Children Paroled into Sponsor Homes

3.Implementing Reporting Requirements for Sponsors

4.Enforcement Mechanism Needed

B. Inadequacies in FLSA Penalties and DOL Enforcement Capabilities

1.DOL’s Chronic Underfunding Increases the Risk that Unaccompanied Minors Go Unnoticed by Federal Investigators

2. Current FLSA Penalties Are Inadequate to Deter Bad Actors from Committing Child Labor Law Violations

C. Summary of Solutions

CONCLUSION

98 S. Cal. L. Rev. 761

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