Oceanic Impunity

Ocean protection is essential to avoid climate disaster. Phytoplankton, seaweeds, and sea grasses produce more than half of Earth’s oxygen—exceeding all terrestrial forests and plants combined—and absorb about ninety percent of the heat generated by rising emissions. Yet oceans continue to be sites for brazen environmental law violations, from illegal fishing to toxic dumping. International criminal law has largely ignored these crimes, even when they amount to offshore environmental atrocities. Meanwhile, legal structures for ocean governance tend to focus on regulatory compliance, self-policing, and dispute resolution, all of which have proved inadequate to protect oceans and coastal communities. Without more global enforcement, environmental criminals will continue to operate with impunity at sea, even as their crimes exacerbate existential climate threats.

Mare liberum or freedom of the seas has been a foundational principle of ocean law for centuries, dating back to the writings of Hugo Grotius. But unconditional free seas are no longer defensible in the Anthropocene. The idea of free seas falsely presumes an inexhaustible ocean too vast to govern. Consequently, governance models based solely on the principle of free seas continue to legitimate careless national policies, destructive relations with marine ecosystems, and exploitation of vulnerable ocean environments. Moving forward the international community must defend oceans as the heritage of all humankind and work together to protect seas against serious environmental harms.

This Article develops a blueprint for targeted forms of international criminalization that would deter offshore ecological destruction. It defends international prosecutions for a range of oceanic environmental crimes, including marine pollution, illegal fishing, and seabed destruction caused by illegal trawling or deep-sea mining. Beyond theories of retribution or deterrence, global criminal prosecutions for environmental harms have expressive value during this time of climate crisis. International criminal convictions showcase humanity’s shared concern for ocean life and marine environments. Criminalization of grave ocean harms would signal an ecocentric shift in international criminal law and aid multilateral efforts to protect marine environments and to promote new legal duties to nature.

INTRODUCTION

Violence and insecurity are common at sea.1See generally William Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea (2004); Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean (2019). For centuries, seafarers have committed serious crimes and human rights abuses, often with the explicit backing of sovereign governments.2See Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty 158–61 (2010); Brian Wilson, Human Rights and Maritime Law Enforcement, 52 Stan. J. Int’l L. 243, 246 (2016); Emily Haslam, The Slave Trade, Abolition and the Long History of International Criminal Law 1–11 (2020). Oceans are also notorious sites for environmental crimes, including toxic dumping, illegal fishing, and unlawful seabed destruction. Notwithstanding this grim history of oceanic impunity, international criminal law has long neglected oceanic offenses.3This Article uses “ocean” and “sea” interchangeably to refer to all global seas and oceans. Geographically, there are five oceans: the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Arctic, and the Southern (Antarctic). There are approximately fifty seas throughout the world, from the Sargasso Sea in the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea in the Pacific Ocean. Offshore environmental atrocities, when acknowledged at all, have been prosecuted by domestic law enforcement agencies or adjudicated by federal and state administrative bodies.4See, e.g., Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 211, 219 (2016); Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Of Dead Pelicans, Turtles, and Marshes: Natural Resources Damages in the Wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill, 38 B.C. Env’t Affs. L. Rev. 317, 333 (2011). Accountability gaps persist for grave ocean crimes, especially those that occur beyond national jurisdictional waters.5See Cymie R. Payne, New Law for the High Seas, 46 Ecology L.Q. 191, 192–93 (2019).

Oceans have never been entirely lawless places.6See generally Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean Governance (1996). For centuries, state leaders have engaged in various kinds of ocean governance with varying degrees of success.7See David Bosco, The Poseidon Project 4–6 (2021). However, offshore environmental crimes present substantial enforcement challenges for national agencies and international courts, and state efforts to hold criminals accountable for environmental offenses at sea have regularly failed for several reasons.8Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 131, 133 (2005).

For example, vast open seas and limited ocean patrols often hamper criminal investigations and enforcement.9See Ascensión García Ruiz, Nigel South & Avi Brisman, Eco-Crimes and Ecocide at Sea: Toward a New Blue Criminology, 66 Int’l. J. Offender Therapy & Compar. Criminology 407, 410–11 (2022). Sovereignty claims and principles of noninterference create obstacles for criminal prosecutors that target defendants on foreign vessels.10See Josh Martin, A Transnational Law of the Sea, 21 Chi. J. Int’l L. 419, 424 (2021). Conflicts over maritime boundaries and territorial seas also exacerbate interstate tensions over criminal jurisdictions, particularly within contested territorial waters.11See Stephen Cody, Dark Law on the South China Sea, 23 Chi. J. Int’l L. 62, 68–69 (2022). Additionally, international organizations tasked with ocean protection frequently lack effective enforcement mechanisms or adequate resources to address criminality.12Desirée LeClercq, Outsourcing Enforcement, 62 Va. J. Int’l L. 271, 273–74 (2022). Meanwhile, captains flying flags of convenience and corrupt officials at local ports often hide environmental crimes, thereby shielding criminal networks from the monitoring bodies designed to prevent marine pollution and illegal resource exploitation.13Anastasia Telesetsky, Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Transnational Organized Crime, 41 Ecology L.Q. 939, 953–61 (2014).

Nevertheless, the need for criminal accountability to deter environmental harms and express collective commitments to ocean protection has never been greater. Phytoplankton, seaweeds, and sea grasses produce more than half of the world’s oxygen—more than all forests and plants on land combined—and absorb approximately ninety percent of the heat generated by rising emissions.14Deborah Rowan Wright, Future Sea: How to Rescue and Protect the World’s Oceans 26 (2020); see also Christopher L. Sabine, Richard A. Feely, Nicolas Gruber, Robert M. Key, Kitack Lee, John L. Bullister, Rik Wanninkhof, C. S. Wong, Douglas W. R. Wallace, Bronte Tillbrook, Frank J. Millero, Tsung-Hung Peng, Alexander Kozyr, Tsueno Ono & Aida F. Rios, The Oceanic Sink for Anthropogenic CO2, 305 Sci. 367, 370 (2004); Nathaniel L. Bindoff, William W. L. Cheung, James G. Kairo, Javier Arístegui, Valeria A. Guinder, Robert Hallberg, Nathalie Hilmi, Nianzhi Jiao, Md saiful Karim, Lisa Levin, Sean O’Donoghue, Sara R. Purca Cuicapusa, Baruch Rinkevich, Toshio Suga, Alessandro Tagliabue & Phillip Williamson, Changing Ocean, Marine Ecosystems, and Dependent Communities, in Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate 447, 450 (Working Grp. II Tech. Support Unit ed., 2019). Without healthy seas, the global community is unlikely to achieve its climate goals or to mitigate ongoing environmental impacts of industrialization. Intense waves and storm surges now regularly devastate coastal communities. Lethal chemicals, sewage, and plastics threaten vital fisheries and marine environments worldwide. The climate crisis and marine deterioration are rapidly transforming ocean governance priorities and underscoring the need for enhanced monitoring and enforcement of environmental protections beyond national jurisdictions.

This Article lays the groundwork for international criminalization of ecological harms at sea. It describes the relational dynamics of oceanic impunity and discusses several options for improving accountability in coastal waters and on the high seas. Most important, international criminal prosecutions should express shared principles and concerns about the climate crisis, underscore global commitments to protect marine environments, and raise awareness about destructive consequences of serious ocean crimes.15Stephen C. McCaffrey, Criminalization of Environmental Protection, in 1 Int’l Crim. L. 1013, 1015–26 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008).

International criminalization of activities that destroy ocean ecosystems would signal a common awareness of critical threats to marine environments and national leaders’ willingness to situate humanity within the natural world, not above it.16Avi Brisman & Nigel South, Green Criminology and Environmental Crimes and Harms, Socio. Compass, Jan. 2019, at 1, 5. In contrast to the dominant anthropocentrism of international criminal law, international criminalization of ocean crimes could establish duties to nature independent of direct human victimization and recast international criminal accountability as including crimes against marine flora and fauna.17See Rob White, Ecocentrism and Criminal Justice, 22 Theoretical Criminology 342, 358 (2018). Such an ecocentric shift holds promise for “greening” various aspects of international criminal law.18See, e.g., Rachel Killean, From Ecocide to Eco-Sensitivity: “Greening” Reparations at the International Criminal Court, 25 Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 323, 324–25 (2021). Recognizing international crimes against nature, for example, could influence financial investment in the investigation of ocean crimes, tailor prosecutorial priorities, or improve case selection decisions to better reflect environmental concerns in communities worldwide.19See David R. Boyd, The Rights of Nature 109–30 (2017); see generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972); Vito De Lucia, Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in International Environmental Law, 27 J. Env’t L. 91 (2015).

Part I of this Article conceptualizes oceanic impunity as the embodiment of relationships and interactions between criminal perpetrators and enforcement authorities. Drawing on relational sociology, Part I defines oceanic impunity as a series of unfolding processes and interactions rather than as a permanent state of criminality.20For background on relational sociology, see generally The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology (François Dépelteau ed., 2018); Mustafa Emirbayer, Manifesto for a Relational Sociology, 103 Am. J. Socio. 281 (1997); Ann Mische, Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency, in The Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis 80–97 (John Scott & Peter J. Carrington eds., 2011); Mustafa Emirbayer, Relational Sociology as Fighting Words, in Conceptualizing Relational Sociology: Ontological and Theoretical Issues 209 (Christopher Powell & François Dépelteau eds., 2013); Owen Abbott, The Self, Relational Sociology, and Morality in Practice (2020); John Dewey and the Notion of Trans-action (Christian Morgner ed., 2020). Attempting to circumvent both methodological individualism and methodological nationalism, this Article identifies seven transnational dynamics that perpetuate criminality on the world’s oceans and advances a relational approach to study these dynamics.21See generally Andreas Wimmer & Nina Glick Schiller, Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology, 37 Int’l Migration Rev. 576 (2003). By documenting weak transnational and global enforcement practices, relational approaches to oceanic impunity reveal contemporary barriers to criminal accountability, particularly in seas beyond national jurisdictions.

Part II discusses three ocean crimes—ocean pollution, illegal fishing, and seabed destruction—with consequential effects on marine environments. Part II advances the argument that targeted international criminalization can improve criminal enforcement and accountability for each crime category. International law has long sought to address offshore environmental crimes through treaties and regulatory agreements but monitoring and enforcement challenges have regularly undermined these efforts.

Part III makes the case for targeted international criminalization to supplement existing ocean governance frameworks. By individualizing culpability for offshore crimes against nature, international criminalization creates new modalities for deterrence and novel enforcement mechanisms to address environmental crimes perpetrated beyond national jurisdictions. Selective criminalization through multilateral agreements and international courts can outfit global prosecutors with new tools to address oceanic impunity and ensure protection of marine environments.

Part IV discusses the expanded use of suppression conventions and criminal prosecutions at the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to combat offshore environmental criminality. Amendments and new protocols to incorporate crimes against nature, including the proposed crime of ecocide, can empower international criminal prosecutors to investigate suspected perpetrators of environmental atrocities at sea.

I.  OCEANIC IMPUNITY

Relational approaches to “objects” of legal research require a different method of legal analysis. Relational scholars recognize the mutual constitution of law and social relations. Ocean crimes and oceanic impunity, therefore, cannot be studied as distinctive social facts independent of concrete relationships and social problems. Understanding oceanic impunity requires accounting for evolving personal and institutional interactions that shape both community perceptions and participants’ own identities and practices. In other words, perpetrators of ocean crimes do not operate independent of governance regimes and enforcement agencies that prohibit and police their offshore activities. They exist only in relation to each other. The study of ocean criminality requires empirical investigation of relations among lawmakers, ocean offenders, and law enforcement authorities whose entanglements construct criminality in complex social fields transcending maritime boundaries. A relational approach seeks to overcome an ontological model of law as something outside of social relations and to capture the full situation of meaning-making between the observer and the observed.22John Dewey & Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known 203 (1976); François Dépelteau, Relational Thinking: A Critique of Co‐deterministic Theories of Structure and Agency, 26 Sociological Theory 51, 70 (2008); François Dépelteau, Relational Sociology, Pragmatism, Transactions and Social Fields, 25 International Review of Sociology 45, 51 (2015). Oceanic impunity emerges through historically and geographically contingent transactions between legal regimes, law enforcement officials, and ocean outlaws. Offshore criminality, in this sense, is spontaneous, socially complex, and dynamic. It is rarely, if ever, the outcome of free will, rationality, or deeply considered social actions. Shifting oceanic relations are simultaneously constitutive of both lawlessness and order at sea. Study of oceanic impunity therefore requires reflexive empirical investigations and theoretical revision based on changing social practices within national jurisdictions and on the high seas.23See Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 35 (1992).

Relational sociology also provides an alternative view of criminalization. Ocean crimes are not objective empirical facts to study. They are portals into a diverse set of interpersonal processes created and reproduced by social interactions. As an alternative explanatory framework, relational approaches to criminalization seek to move beyond conceptual antinomies—perpetrators and victims, state and non-state, legal and illegal—to focus analysis on evolving transnational practices, exchanges, and dialogues. Viewing oceanic impunity in this way means that targeted international criminalization does more than establish new crimes or empower prosecutors. It has symbolic effects that can transform social relations. Such expressive power in many cases exceeds the benefits of individualized retributive justice. International environmental criminalization under the right social conditions can encourage greater environmental protection by cultivating new social logics and institutional dynamics better aligned with ecocentrism.

A.  Geography

Geography matters for ocean accountability. Oceans are massive, open spaces. They are difficult to navigate and made dangerous by high winds, changing currents, and inclement weather. Consequently, oceans are hard places for law enforcement to monitor vessels and activities aboard them.24See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton, Gunslingers on the High Seas: A Call for Regulation, 24 Duke J. Compar. & Int’l L. 107, 108 (2013). Limited resources for patrols hamper maritime enforcement in territorial waters and on the high seas. Another enforcement challenge created by open water and nautical travel is the limited availability of logistical or medical support for routine maritime operations. Patrol boats may operate as solitary vessels unless they are monitoring shipping lanes, busy harbors, or navigating close to shore. However, while geography certainly matters for oceanic impunity, vast ocean distances cannot completely explain the pervasiveness of offshore criminality.

Advanced satellite imaging and other surveillance technologies, including long-range reconnaissance drones and unmanned submersibles, have increased the visibility of ocean crimes in recent decades. Nonprofit organizations like Global Fishing Watch, Trygg Mat Tracking, and Oceana employ satellite technologies that increasingly make it possible to identify and track particular maritime vessels.25See Gwilym Rowlands, Judith Brown, Bradley Soule, Pablo Trueba Boluda & Alex D. Rogers, Satellite Surveillance of Fishing Vessel Activity in the Ascension Island Exclusive Economic Zone and Marine Protected Area, 101 Marine Pol’y 39, 40 (2019). Vessel tracking technology, big data, algorithms, and artificial intelligence (“AI”) can now be used to estimate apparent fishing efforts and to identify illegal catches in many places.26See Glob. Fishing Watch, https://globalfishingwatch.org [https://perma.cc/8WLX-BYZ7]. While satellite technologies have not yet created an ocean panopticon, they do allow state enforcement agencies to detect a range of ocean crimes, tighten port surveillance, and exercise better control over transitory waterways and commercial shipping channels. New kinds of collaborations between states and nonprofit organizations hold promise for detection of serious ocean crimes. The United States Southern Command (“SOUTHCOM”), for example, has partnered with Global Fishing Watch in recent years to enhance detection of illegal fishing in the Caribbean and the Pacific.27Press Release, Sarah Bladen, Commc’ns & Int’l Affs. Dir., Glob. Fishing Watch, U.S. Southern Command Signs Partnership Agreement with Global Fishing Watch (June 5, 2021), https://globalfishingwatch.org/press-release/southcom_gfw_partnership [https://perma.cc/LS4L-335U].

Several monitoring firms now triangulate public and private data to provide unprecedented real-time surveillance of offshore activities, even across vast geographic areas. Windward, an Israeli based company, uses AI and predictive modeling to create operational profiles of individual vessels, which enables the company to monitor a wider range of private ships. The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) has registered about 70 thousand maritime vessels worldwide, but Windward tracks more than five times that number using its digitized data.28Omer Benjakob, This Startup Is Using AI to Investigate Crime on the High Seas, Wired (Oct. 3, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ship-tracking-winward-ai [https://perma.cc/2ZY3-N6VV]. The expansion of AI technologies such as these will likely aid maritime law enforcement in identifying suspect vessels and environmentally damaging activities across vast oceans in the coming years.

However, visual detection of criminality alone may not improve enforcement or impact overall levels of oceanic impunity. Ocean perpetrators increasingly avoid aerial surveillance by shifting operations to different kinds of marine vessels or simply turning off automated tracking systems. Private fishing vessels, for example, are frequently used to hide illicit trafficking activities, evade detection by enforcement agencies, and distribute the costs of interdiction.

B.  Technology

Transforming technologies are another powerful dynamic that shapes oceanic impunity. While new technologies have enhanced states’ capacity to monitor oceans and sometimes improved interdiction operations in coastal waters, they have also facilitated criminal enterprises.

Criminal syndicates increasingly use technology to conceal their offshore activities.29Nilufer Oral, Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of IUU Fishing Under International Law, 22 Int’l Cmty. L. Rev. 368, 371 (2020). For example, vessel cloaking technologies formerly restricted to advanced naval powers have appeared on global black markets.30Anatoly Kurmanaev, How Fake GPS Coordinates Are Leading to Lawlessness on the High Seas, N.Y. Times (Sept. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html [https://perma.cc/T75A-UPF3]. These new technologies enable ship captains to jam or modify data showing their navigational positions. The U.N. requires all large maritime ships to operate satellite transponders and transmit their geographic positions in real time.31Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], A.1106(29) (Dec. 2, 2015), Revised Guidelines for the Onboard Operational Use of Shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), https://
wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.1106(29).pdf [https://perma.cc/KX48-MCQ2].
But ships using cloaking technologies can transmit false location data to avoid detection in contested waters or to violate international sanctions regimes.32Kurmanaev, supra note 30.

Global fuel tankers, for example, disguise resupply locations to visit sanctioned oil ports in Venezuela, Iran, or Russia, and large container ships use new navigational cloaking technologies to hide shipments of commodities traveling to or from embargoed countries. In 2022, ocean monitoring groups discovered hundreds of ships manipulating onboard transmissions to camouflage their navigational location. Surveillance technologies can increase detection of environmental crimes and mitigate oceanic impunity in some cases. But emerging technologies can also fortify criminal networks and shadow economies that contribute to it.

C.  Sovereignty

The Westphalian system also contributes to oceanic impunity. National maritime jurisdictions established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) prevent the investigation of many offshore environmental crimes.33See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 433 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. States have criminal jurisdiction over their territorial sea and archipelagic waters, ordinarily the first twelve nautical miles from shore.34UNCLOS, Part II, art. 4. States can further prevent infringements to customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations for the next twelve nautical miles where a contiguous zone exists.35UNCLOS, Part II, art. 33. But beyond these waters, state authorities generally lack jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute criminality except on their own flagged vessels or with regard to foreign resource exploitation within their exclusive economic zone.36UNCLOS, Part VII & Part IV. Consequently, most of the open ocean lies beyond any national criminal jurisdiction.37UNCLOS, Part VII.

Moreover, even when environmental crimes amount to flagrant violations of domestic criminal law, state authorities routinely fail to enforce criminal laws in their own territorial seas.38See Urbina, supra note 1, at 47.

National laws can also facilitate illicit ocean activities. Chinese fishing boats, for example, participate in civilian militia patrols in the South and East China seas. To prevent foreign states and international organizations from tracking these fishing vessels, Chinese national security laws forbid sharing data, including vessel tracking data, with international bodies.39See Cody, supra note 11, at 72. Under the cover of domestic Chinese law, the fishing vessels go dark in contested waters.

D.  Flags of Convenience

Flags of convenience are yet another pervasive dynamic contributing to oceanic impunity. In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (“ICJ”) held all ships subject to the laws of their flag state. Vessels registered to a national territory were required to operate under the domestic laws of that state. UNCLOS later required a vessel owner to have a “genuine link” to its flagged state, though generous interpretations of what constitutes such a link have been commonplace.40See UNCLOS, arts. 90, 91. Flag state jurisdiction covers criminal enforcement and typically includes oversight of labor and safety standards and international rules as well as maritime law standards.

However, despite its legacy as a foundational principle of maritime law, there is no immediate consequence for a flag state that fails to monitor registered vessel conditions or to prosecute criminal activities aboard. Consequently, flag state enforcement varies considerably.41Camille Goodman, The Regime for Flag State Responsibility in International Fisheries Law – Effective Fact, Creative Fiction, or Further Work Required?, 23 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J. 157, 159–60 (2009). Some states willfully ignore national and international law. Fictitious shell companies linked to the flag country only by a mailing address commonly appear in national vessel registries. Secondary shell companies often are used to further mask vessel ownership. This layered system of corporate ownership means that flag states seeking to enforce criminal codes or regulations may struggle to identify the relevant person or parties, making criminal accountability difficult. Shell companies not only protect secrecy and insulate owners from culpability but also often provide added financial advantages by allowing owners to transfer vessel profits to jurisdictions with lower tax rates. A 2018 study, for example, found that seventy percent of vessels engaged in illegal fishing were flagged in tax haven countries.42Victor Galaz, Beatrice Crona, Alice Dauriach, Jean-Baptiste Jouffray, Henrik Österblom & Jan Fichtner, Tax Havens and Global Environmental Degradation, 2 Nature Ecology & Evolution 1352, 1352 (2018); see Gohar A. Petrossian, Monique Sosnowski, Dana Miller & Diba Rouzbahani, Flags for Sale: An Empirical Assessment of Flag of Convenience Desirability to Foreign Vessels, Marine Pol’y, March 2020, at 1, 2.

E.  Regulation

Reliance on regulatory compliance is another dynamic that contributes to oceanic impunity. Legal scholars have documented the regulatory turn in international law.43Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 Harv. Int’l L.J. 321, 325 (2011). But less attention has been given to how this regulatory turn has undercut criminal accountability for environmental crimes.

Many state officials and environmental groups view ocean protection as a task for administrative agencies, not criminal prosecutors.44Id. at 200. Consequently, environmental treaties typically define adjudication procedures for conflicts between parties but seldom include language that explicitly criminalizes treaty violations.45See Frédéric Mégret, The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment, 36 Colum. J. Env’t L. 195, 219–20 (2011). With this regulatory focus, law enforcement tends to respond to ocean crimes retroactively, which makes the collection of evidence challenging and criminal prosecutions less likely.46See id. at 247.

Further, regulatory approaches tend to place emphasis on guidelines, voluntary codes of conduct, and self-reporting. This often means that international authorities responsible for monitoring compliance shy away from questions of individual criminal culpability for environmental damage. Some fear that insisting on punishments for criminal wrongdoing will threaten regulatory alliances or jeopardize existing conformity to compliance regimes.

Even when domestic laws impose fines for environmental damage or censure offshore activities, authorities often do not seek legal judgments against vessel owners or crew. Individual accountability for environmental harms is rare. Diplomacy and economic policy remain the primary tools state officials use to encourage treaty compliance.

Ocean regulation, while expansive, is also fragmented among countries and within them. National laws governing ocean protection usually involve multiple agencies and complex jurisdictional questions. In the United States, for example, state agencies tend to regulate marine resources in territorial waters, and federal agencies regulate marine resources in the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) and continental shelf.47Robin Kundis Craig, Re-Valuing the Ocean in Law: Exploiting the Panarchy Paradox of a Complex System Approach, 41 Stan. Env’t L.J. 3, 23 (2022). The United States is not a party to UNCLOS, but recognizes the maritime boundaries established by the treaty. But even these jurisdictional lines are contested. At least twenty-four coastal states, five island territories, and four Native American tribes make claims to jurisdiction over marine resources in the United States’ ocean territories.48Id. Moreover, even when only a single national law applies, management responsibilities for its regulations may involve various subnational and regional regulatory bodies that complicate lines of authority and enforcement efforts.49See id. at 26. Regulatory compliance regimes also tend to adopt governance models that focus on specific resources, marine species, or geographic territories. This creates a patchwork of narrow, overlapping, and potentially competing interests and complicates enforcement more than a more wholistic, ecological approach that focuses generally on biodiversity protection and ecological sustainability.

F.  Jurisdiction

Conflicts over maritime boundaries are another dynamic of oceanic impunity. Domestic criminal legal systems generally require a nexus between alleged perpetrators’ criminal acts and state claims to maritime jurisdiction. Jurisdictional disputes in contested waters can lead judges to question this nexus and halt criminal investigations and prosecutions. Perpetrators of environmental crimes also purposefully exploit jurisdictional gaps and interstate disputes to avoid obligations under international law.

Although maritime jurisdictions are well defined under UNCLOS, major powers still ignore established maritime limitations. In 2016, for example, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) unanimously rejected China’s claims to historic rights over most of the South China Sea and found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering with fishing and resource exploration.50South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19, 471–77 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). The PCA award, however, did not change Beijing’s territorial claims or dissuade the activities of its military and its civilian maritime militia in the contested waters.51See Jill I. Goldenziel, Law as a Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Global Escalation of Lawfare, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 1085, 1102–04 (2021). In brazen disregard of the PCA, China has continued to claim the disputed seas as its jurisdiction.52See Lucy Reed & Kenneth Wong, Marine Entitlements in the South China Sea: The Arbitration Between the Philippines and China, 110 Am. J. Int’l L. 746, 747–48 (2016).

Universal jurisdiction might provide an alternative mechanism to combat serious ocean crimes in the future. Historically, states have relied on universal jurisdiction to prosecute pirates and slave traders as enemies of all humankind.53See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 81 (2001). However, the international community has yet to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction to environmental crimes.54UNEP, Observations on The Scope and Application of The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/universal_jurisdiction/unep_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/747J-F52J].

G.  Corruption

Corruption is yet another crucial dynamic that contributes to oceanic impunity. National and coastal economies regularly benefit from oceanic impunity, particularly from fisheries that are unlawfully exploitative.55See Don Liddick, The Dimensions of a Transnational Crime Problem: The Case of IUU Fishing, 17 Trends Org. Crime 290, 293–95 (2014). Intentionally permissive state compliance regimes and local officials who act outside legal boundaries can generate windfall profits for local authorities. State leaders may neglect enforcement in exchange for direct payments. In some cases, they build cottage industries to aid in the illegal collection of certain marine species, such as sharks and whales.56See, e.g., David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT’L 154, 159 (1995); See generally, Keiko Hirata, Japan’s Whaling Politics, in Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy (Yoichiro Sato & Keiko Hirata eds., 2008). Rewards of such illegal resource exploitation pool with violating states, even as compliant states bear additional costs of attempted criminal enforcement.

Local officials in some countries also partner with organized crime syndicates, which generally diminishes prospects for criminal accountability.57See generally Emma Witbooi, Kamal-Deen Ali, Mas Achmad Santosa, Gail Hurley, Yunus Husein, Sarika Maharaj, Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Inés Arroyo Quiroz & Omar Salas, Organized Crime in the Fisheries Sector Threatens a Sustainable Ocean Economy, 588 Nature 48 (2020). Threats of violence from members of criminal organizations tend to suppress local complaints and severely restrict community cooperation with outside criminal investigations. Environmental crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups may also be associated with other criminal activities, such as money laundering, trafficking, and forced labor.

II.  OCEAN CRIMES

Environmental ocean crimes are not expressly defined under international law.58Vasco Becker-Weinberg, Recognition of Maritime Environmental Crimes Within International Law, in The Environmental Rule of Law for Oceans (Froukje Maria Platjouw and Alla Pozdnakova Eds.) 207-209 (2023). Despite overwhelming empirical evidence that offshore environmental harms are global problems with impacts far beyond any single national jurisdiction, no global framework defines normative principles or articulates national obligations to combat environmental sea crimes. Instead, criminalizing ocean destruction depends exclusively on national lawmaking and ratification of treaties or environmental agreements.

Several well-established multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) incorporate provisions that criminalize environmental harms at sea.59International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships art. 4, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 185–86 [hereinafter MARPOL Protocol]. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (“BASEL”), for example, states that “illegal traffic in hazardous wastes or other wastes is criminal.”60Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal art. 3, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 132 [hereinafter Basel Convention]. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”) also authorizes the use of criminal penalties “to discourage violations” of Convention provisions.61MARPOL Protocol, supra note 59, at 186. Countries often impose criminal penalties for trafficked illicit wildlife, including protected marine species, under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”).

These and other MEA criminal provisions are useful in combating oceanic impunity. However, most international environmental agreements still focus on regulatory solutions to specific environmental problems and lack adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. In other words, multilateral agreements may aspire to limit marine pollution, avoid fishery exploitation, or revise shipping regulations, but compliance with these agreements still primarily depends on self-policing and domestic administrative oversight. Even where international agreements contain criminal penalties, states often have wide latitude to interpret their legal obligations and broad discretion in enforcing—or not enforcing—criminal sanctions. Ocean governance continues to rely, ineffectively, on a mosaic of layered customs, treaties, and international environmental agreements that prioritize regulatory solutions and voluntary compliance.62See generally International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S.; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S.; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S.; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”), Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S.; UNCLOS, supra note 33; MARPOL Protocol, supra note 59; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”), Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S.; International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (“OPRC”), Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S.; Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, 2275 U.N.T.S.

A.  Ocean Pollution

In the Anthropocene, ocean pollution presents unprecedented threats to ocean health. According to the United Nations, ocean pollution constitutes at least eighty-five percent of all marine waste.63A New Declaration to Help Save Our Oceans, United Nations Env’t Programme (July 7, 2022), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/new-declaration-help-save-our-oceans [https://perma.cc/D2K8-SY89]. Waste disposal at sea dates to early maritime navigation, but the scale and toxicity of ocean pollution has changed over time. In 2021, for example, maritime enforcement agencies in 67 countries identified 1,600 marine pollution offences worldwide in single month.64INTERPOL, Operation 30 Days at Sea 3.0 reveals 1,600 marine pollution offences worldwide, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2021/Operation-30-Days-at-Sea-3.0-reveals-1-600-marine-pollution-offences-worldwide [https://perma.cc/CDN9-6CC6]. Human activities are now responsible for fifty-three percent of petroleum discharges to marine environments.65Semion Polinov, Revital Bookman & Noam Levin, Spatial and temporal assessment of oil spills in the Mediterranean Sea, 167 Marine Pollution Bulletin 1, 1 (2021). Illegal oil discharges from commercial vessels are a major source of this ocean pollution.66Ben Vollaard, Temporal Displacement of Environmental Crime: Evidence from Marine Oil Pollution, 82 J. Env’t Econ. and Mgmt., 168, 169–172 (2017). While several multilateral agreements prohibit ocean dumping, few countries invest significant resources to investigate or prosecute offenders, particularly when dumping occurs beyond national jurisdictions.

States agencies and national militaries also dump harmful waste into oceans. The United States, for example, began to dump radioactive waste into the Pacific Ocean after World War II. Between 1946 and 1970, U.S. vessels discarded more than 55,000 containers of radioactive waste.67Learn About Ocean Dumping, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ocean-dumping/learn-about-ocean-dumping [https://perma.cc/2YQD-Z29C]. The Russian navy adopted similar dumping practices and continued to dispose of nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan until 1993. Even today, countries are actively considering ocean dumping of nuclear waste. Japan, for example, plans to discard about 1.3 million tons of contaminated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant into the Pacific when storage runs out at the current facility.68Fukushima: Japan Approves Releasing Wastewater into Ocean, BBC (Apr. 13, 2021, 12:42 AM), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56728068 [https://perma.cc/6J23-ADWN]. Discarded poisons, such as DDT, and toxins leaking from spent military munitions pose similar global ecological and health risks.

Plastics pollution needs greater attention, too.69See Donald McRae, Introduction to the Symposium on Global Plastic Pollution, 114 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound 192, 193 (2020); Gerry Nagtzaam, A Fraying Patchwork Quilt: International Law and Plastic Pollution, 34 Vill. Env’t L.J. 133, 179 (2023). The rough equivalent of one garbage truck of plastic is dumped into the world’s oceans every minute.70Fighting for Trash Free Seas, Ocean Conservancy, https://oceanconservancy.org/trash-free-seas/plastics-in-the-ocean [https://perma.cc/Y2ZY-7LVQ]. Slow plastic breakdown generates microplastics that ocean currents circulate throughout the world. Scientists now find microplastics in marine life from every kind of ocean habitat, from shallow coral reefs to deep-sea trenches.71Anthony L. Andrady, Microplastics in the Marine Environment, 62 Marine Pollution Bull. 1596, 1596–1601 (2011). In May 2019, the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention amended Annexes II, VIII, and IX to define plastics as a hazardous waste and outlaw their disposal at sea.72See Adopted Decision BC-14/12 (2019), Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989); 1673 U.N.T.S. 125. But international governance and oversight remains haphazard and unreliable.73McKayla McMahon, Tides of Plastic: Using International Environmental Law to Reduce Marine Plastic Pollution, 28 Hastings Env’t L.J. 49, 70 (2022).

Ocean dumping is a quintessential global problem. It inevitably impacts waters beyond sovereign territorial boundaries.74See generally Sandrine Maljean-Dubois & Benoît Mayer, Liability and Compensation for Marine Plastic Pollution: Conceptual Issues and Possible Ways Forward, 114 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound 206 (2020). Yet few perpetrators are prosecuted for illegal ocean dumping. Without eyewitnesses, investigators often struggle to identify conclusively the precise source of marine pollution. It can also be tricky at trial to prove causality and other elements of criminal offenses, including the perpetrators’ intent or their subjective awareness of the potential for environmental harm. Scientists can detect and measure different types of ocean pollution, but building a case for criminal prosecution generally requires larger-scale investigations by environmental protection and law enforcement agencies.

International law has long struggled to combat toxic pollution. Several international agreements presently prohibit ocean dumping, including the MARPOL and the London Convention.75Gerard Peet, The MARPOL Convention: Implementation and Effectiveness, 7 Int’l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 277, 278 (1992). UNCLOS also requires states to control marine pollution.76UNCLOS, supra note 40, art. 194, at 478. Further, several regional agreements ban ocean dumping.77See Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Not Your Dumping Ground: Criminalization of Trafficking in Hazardous Waste in Africa, 35 Wis. Int’l L.J. 326, 365–66 (2018). However, enforcement of anti-dumping laws is highly uneven. In some countries, waste disposal is tightly regulated with high penalties for violations of domestic environmental protections. In others, enforcement is non-existent. Reporting and compliance problems also persist at the domestic level, with few options to internationalize enforcement.

Selective international criminalization offers a path forward to hold ocean polluters accountable for harmful dumping on the high seas. Current agreements generally lack powers to punish individual violators, especially when dumping happens beyond a state’s territorial waters. Enforcement depends almost entirely on the actions of domestic officials, who may lack resources or an interest in investigating ocean pollution.

Global courts and international prosecutors often have more autonomy than local officials or state agencies to investigate offshore crimes and bring criminal charges. They can also investigate ocean dumping as a crime of omission and prosecute state inaction to stop ocean dumping. If international investigations document ongoing ocean pollution, prosecutors can either charge polluters or threaten prosecution to encourage compliance with existing international prohibitions. The criminal investigations and option to prosecute, even when international prosecutors elect not to bring criminal charges, also expresses a shared global commitment to ocean protection.

As with other international criminal investigations, state leaders may try to obstruct investigations, a practice that is sometimes effective at impeding the criminal process.78See Tatiana E. Sainati, Divided We Fall: How the International Criminal Court Can Promote Compliance with International Law by Working with Regional Courts, 49 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 191, 200 (2016). But this should not distract from the expressive power that targeted criminalization gives international prosecutors to bring global attention to serious environmental crimes at sea. The mere public threat of prosecution can deter some kinds of ocean destruction, even when criminal investigations or prosecutions never occur.

B.  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”) fishing operations are highly-profitable and annually generate between an estimated $10 and $23 billion worldwide.79Telesetsky, supra note 13, at 951. However, the consequences of IUU fishing can be devastating. IUU fishing depletes fish stocks and inhibits long-term sustainability. It undermines domestic and regional fisheries management and, more universally, ocean conservation. A lack of accountability for IUU fishing can also undercut state governance regimes and disadvantage responsible fishers who abide by existing environmental regulations.80See generally How to End Illegal Fishing, Pew (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2013/12/10/how-to-end-illegal-fishing [https://perma.cc/N6EJ-CE7T].

Whales, sharks, turtles, and other protected species have been hunted to near extinction in many regions. IUU fishing tends to target vulnerable marine stocks that are often subject to controls specifically created to prevent fishery collapse. Unreported catches often interfere with essential management plans designed to aid species recovery and to restore the ecological balance, biodiversity, and sustainability of marine environments. IUU fishing also generates food insecurity for coastal communities dependent on local hauls for protein.81See Cornelia E. Nauen & Simona T. Boschetti, Fisheries Crimes, Poverty and Food Insecurity, in Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security 239, 239–41 (Ruxandra-Laura Boşilcă, Susana Ferreira & Barry J. Ryan eds., 1st ed. 2022). Absent effective fisheries enforcement, climate change will likely compound these issues.

Prosecuting IUU fishing offenses can be challenging for a variety of reasons. Fishery managers usually have few resources for patrols or boat inspections and depend on fishers’ self-reporting of their catches and fishing methods. At the same time, the absence of high seas patrols makes detection unlikely beyond coastal waters. Illicit operators can hide illegal catches in several ways. Captains can offload catches to bribed port authorities or others complicit with their criminal enterprise. Fish can be processed offshore or relabeled to avoid detection. Crews from vessels employing illicit fishing methods, such as bottom trawling, can mix their catches with fish caught legally before returning to port.

Decentralized IUU fishing operations regularly cross jurisdictional lines, making it difficult to identify or track illegal boats or to target those most responsible for organizing criminal networks.82See Telesetsky, supra note 13, at 961. Migrants and captive fishers may be forced to work on unregistered ghost ships where they engage in various forms of unregulated or illegal fishing. Those who attempt to leave can be shackled, sealed below deck, or even cast overboard.83Ian Urbina, “Sea Slaves”: The Human Misery That Feeds Pets and Livestock, N.Y. Times, (July 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-ocean-thailand-fishing-sea-slaves-pets.html [https://perma.cc/38SX-GQNF]. State enforcement agencies also regularly ignore IUU fishing practices, which offer short-term benefits to coastal communities or provide supplemental income through patronage networks. Corruption and willful blindness to illegality continues to be a major obstacle to oceanic accountability for IUU fishing.

To be clear, there is no shortage of international agreements on fisheries.84See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/225, at 147–48 (Dec. 22, 1989); Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Nov. 24, 1993, 2221 U.N.T.S. 91; Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88; Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, arts. 1.2, 1.3 (Oct. 31, 1995); Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for Managing the World’s Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 45, 47 (2002). But while UNCLOS and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) are responsible for investigating IUU fishing, these bodies often hamper criminal accountability for perpetrators. Article 73(3) of UNCLOS, for example, authorizes coastal state penalties for fishing violations in EEZs but explicitly forbids imprisonment of offenders absent a bilateral agreement to the contrary.85UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 73, at 427.

State leaders must balance protection of fish stocks under current international and regional fisheries’ agreements against other state interests, including economic growth and national security. Consequently, many state governments take no notice of IUU fishing when other salient national interests are at stake. This partly explains why government IUU prosecutions are exceedingly rare. National law enforcement authorities often tolerate wrongdoing in their own civilian fishing fleets.

Efforts to combat IUU fishing generally focus on regulatory enforcement and treat illegal catches as management problems to be addressed by administrative state agencies rather than free-standing criminal offenses. State prosecutions and official public accounts of IUU fishing frequently attribute criminality to personal greed and rouge captains, even when sophisticated global criminal syndicates are known to run IUU fishing operations.86See generally Rob White, Transnational Environmental Crime: Toward an Eco-Global Criminology (2011). Targeted international criminalization of IUU fishing can empower international prosecutors to investigate global IUU criminal networks, which often extend beyond any single national jurisdiction.

Some IUU-related crimes, including human trafficking and seafood slavery, are already investigated and prosecuted in national jurisdictions. But international criminalization potentially broadens the scope of criminal culpability to include criminal offenses against the environment. International prosecutors can bypass corrupt port officials and domestic agencies complicit in IUU activities and lead investigations of powerful individuals, including high-ranking corporate financiers, who are involved in global IUU fishing. International criminalization individualizes culpability for serious ecological damages that transgress national jurisdictions. It also facilitates accountability for perpetrators engaged in transnational criminal enterprises that destroy marine environments. Further, following criminal convictions, international courts can order criminal reparations to aid the defense and restoration of depleted fish stocks. Criminalization of grave ocean crimes empowers international courts to serve as sentinels of marine environments.

C.  Seabed Destruction

Seabed ecosystems increasingly face threats from illegal trawling and deep-sea mining.87See, e.g., Charles R. Taylor, Fishing with a Bulldozer: Options for Unilateral Action by the United States under Domestic and International Law to Halt Destructive Bottom Trawling Practices on the High Seas, 34 Environs: Env’t L. & Pol’y J. 121 (2010); Pål Buhl-Mortensen & Lene Buhl-Mortensen, Impacts of Bottom Trawling and Litter on the Seabed in Norwegian Water, 5 Frontiers in Marine Sci 42 (2018). Despite grave and well-documented environmental costs, bottom trawling remains the most common seabed fishing method employed on the high seas.88Kerry Tetzlaff, Bottom Trawling on the High Seas – Protection under International Law from Negative Effects, 9 N.Z. J. Env’t L. 239, 241 (2005); Lissette Victorero et al., Out of Sight, But Within Reach: A Global History of Bottom-Trawled Deep-Sea Fisheries From >400 m Depth, Frontiers In Marine Sci. (2018); Keelin Bogart Ciccariello, Bottom Trawling: A Goldilocks Approach to Evaluating the Right Level for Effective Regulation, 46 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 35 (2023). Deep sea mining exploration and exploitation activities also increasingly threaten seabed environments.89Stephen Cody & Jeffrey Feldmann, Exploiting Seabed Law, 45 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 181 (2024).

The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (“CCZ”) in the Pacific Ocean is an area roughly the size of Europe, spanning more than 3,000 miles at depths of 12,000 to 18,000 feet.90National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Ocean Explorer, Deep-sea Mining Interests in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (last visited Feb. 15, 2024, 2:00PM), https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/18ccz/background/mining/mining.html [https://perma.cc/CSP5-QUNV]. The CCZ seabed is rich in polymetallic nodules, a potential source of metals needed for lithium-ion batteries and other green energy technologies.91Davide Castelvecchi, Electric Cars and Batteries: How Will the World Produce Enough?, Nature (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02222-1 [https://perma.cc/H6KY-KNHZ]. Deep-sea mining could begin there in the next few years.92Eric Lipton, Secret Data, Tiny Islands and a Quest for Treasure on the Ocean Floor, N.Y. Times (Aug. 29, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/29/world/deep-sea-mining.html [https://perma.cc/FHR4-KDY8]. Because the area lies in international waters, the International Seabed Authority (“ISA”) governs mining in the CCZ.93Exploration Contracts, Int’l Seabed Auth., https://www.isa.org.jm/exploration-contracts [https://perma.cc/J45E-YHMK]. Companies seeking to mine the area must partner with a UNCLOS member country and apply for authorization from the ISA—a UN agency with fifty employees, a modest annual budget, and a jurisdiction that covers half the world.94Lipton, supra note 92. As it stands, more than a dozen international companies have exploration contracts for the CCZ.95Elizabeth Claire Alberts, Deep-Sea Mining: An Environmental Solution or Impending Catastrophe?, Mongabay (June 16, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/06/deep-sea-mining-an-environmental-solution-or-impending-catastrophe [https://perma.cc/78WJ-BCJU]. A 2022 ocean trial conducted by The Metals Company, a Canadian-based mining company that has partnered with Nauru to start mining the CCZ, generated fierce debate and opposition from some UNCLOS member states, including several states that are now seeking a moratorium on deep-sea mining operations.96Todd Woody, France Puts Future of Deep Sea Mining in Doubt, Bloomberg (Nov. 10, 2022, 3:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-10/france-puts-future-of-deep-sea-mining-in-doubt [https://perma.cc/KZ92-UJW9].

Understanding the environmental consequences of mining the CCZ is complicated by the depths of mining operations and the current lack of information about deep-sea ecology.97See generally Diva J. Amon, Amanda F. Ziegler, Thomas G. Dahlgren, Adrian G. Glover, Aurélie Goineau, Andrew J. Gooday, Helena Wiklund & Craig R. Smith, Insights into the Abundance and Diversity of Abyssal Megafauna in a Polymetallic-Nodule Region in the Eastern Clarion-Clipperton Zone, Sci. Reps., July 2016, at 1; Rob Williams, Christine Erbe, Alec Duncan, Kimberly Nielsen, Travis Washburn & Craig Smith, Noise from Deep-Sea Mining May Span Vast Ocean Areas, 377 Sci. 157 (2022); Bernd Christiansen, Anneke Denda & Sabine Christiansen, Potential Effects of Deep Seabed Mining on Pelagic and Benthopelagic Biota, Marine Pol’y, Apr. 2020, at 1. Marine scientists estimate that ninety percent of species living in the region earmarked for mining remain undescribed.98Muriel Rabone, Joris H. Wiethase, Erik Simon-Lledó, Aidan M. Emery, Daniel O. B Jones, Thomas G. Dahlgren, Guadalupe Bribiesca-Contreras, Helena Wilklund, Tammy Horton & Adrian G. Glover, How many metazoan species live in the world’s largest mineral exploration region? Current Biology 33(12), 2383-2396 (2023). Mining advocates argue that environmental damage from seabed mining is minimal when compared to land-based operations, and underscore the need for manganese, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt, lead, zinc, lithium, and rare earth elements to transition to green energy.99Prizma, Scoping Document for a Social Impact Assessment for the NORI-D Polymetallic Nodule Collection Project 21–28 (2022), https://metals.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/NORI-D-SIA-Scoping-Dec_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TZ-XHPU]. Conservationists strongly disagree with mining advocates about the environmental harms of deep-sea mining. They argue that mining operations will gouge the seabed and cause plumes of sediment to enter the water column and resettle over delicate ecosystems.100Holly J. Niner, Jeff A. Ardron, Elva G. Escobar, Matthew Gianni, Aline Jaeckel, Daniel O. B. Jones, Lisa A. Levin, Craig R. Smith, Torsten Thiele, Phillip J. Turner, Cindy L. Van Dover, Les Watling & Kristina M. Gjerde, Deep-Sea Mining with No Net Loss of Biodiversity–An Impossible Aim, 5 Frontiers Marine Sci., Mar. 2018, at 1, 5. They seek a moratorium on mining until more environmental assessments can be completed on the impact of mining operations.

Presently, the science on the impact of deep-sea mining is nascent.101See generally Malcolm R. Clark, Jennifer M. Durden & Sabine Christiansen, Environmental Impact Assessments for Deep-Sea Mining: Can We Improve their Future Effectiveness?, Marine Pol’y, 2020, at 1. Scientists have limited access to such remote depths and insufficient data on deep-sea species, habitats, and ecosystems. Consequently, deep-sea research has neither produced clear baseline data nor determined how sediment plumes will impact marine life on the sea floor.102See Jeffrey C. Drazen, Craig R. Smith, Kristina M. Gjerde, Steven H. D. Haddock, Glenn S. Carter, C. Anela Choy, Malcolm R. Clark, Pierre Dutrieux, Erica Goetze, Chris Hauton, Mariko Hatta, J. Anthony Koslow, Astrid B. Leitner, Aude Pacini, Jessica N. Perelman, Thomas Peacock, Tracey T. Sutton, Les Watling & Hiroyuki Yamamoto, Midwater Ecosystems Must Be Considered when Evaluating Environmental Risks of Deep-Sea Mining, 117 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sciences 17455, 17455–56 (2020); see also Jeremy Spearman, Jonathan Taylor, Neil Crossouard, Alan Cooper, Michael Turnbull, Andrew Manning, Mark Lee & Bramley Murton, Measurement and Modelling of Deep Sea Sediment Plumes and Implications for Deep Sea Mining, 10 Sci. Reps. 1, 9 (2020). Scientists continue to identify new marine species during expeditions to the ocean floor but still know little about how mining will impact these species. Many deep-sea species are uniquely adapted living thousands of feet below the surface, where they thrive in near-total blackness and under immense water pressure. At such depths, metabolism and evolution slow, and even minor alterations of the environment can have long-term impacts.

Despite the lack of knowledge about deep-sea species, dozens of countries have started to plan mining operations for the near future. In 2017, Japan was the first country to mine its seabed and chose a location off the coast of Okinawa.103Japan Successfully Undertakes Large-Scale Deep-Sea Mineral Extraction, Japan Times (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/26/national/japan-successfully-undertakes-large-scale-deep-sea-mineral-extraction [https://perma.cc/CY6G-KBTT]. Norway also recently discovered rich seabed deposits and authorized further seabed exploration.104Nerijus Adomaitis, Norway Finds “Substantial” Mineral Resources on Its Seabed, Reuters (Jan. 27, 2023, 5:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/norway-finds-substantial-mineral-resources-its-seabed-2023-01-27 [https://perma.cc/45KS-VW88]. Mining companies already have begun prospecting for nodules to assess their size, composition, and economic value.105See Norway’s Approval of Sea-Bed Mining Undermines Efforts to Protect the Ocean, 625 Nature 424, 424 (2024). Absent political support for a temporary moratorium on seabed exploitation, large-scale commercial operations will likely begin in the next few years.

In the 1960s, Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo declared the seabed “the common heritage of all (hu)mankind.”106Address by Arvid Pardo to the 22nd session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (1967), U.N. GAOR, 22nd sess., U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967). He advocated for an international governance regime to ensure deep sea resources benefited all of humanity, emphasizing the needs of less developed countries to share in any benefits of seabed exploitation. His advocacy eventually resulted in the Law of Sea Convention and the establishment of the International Seabed Authority. His concern that seabed resources serve our common heritage, in particular, seem prescient today. Technological advances and increased demand for mineral resources have renewed interest in mining the sea floor, especially as land-based mineral deposits decline. But the environmental consequences of such offshore operations are still unknown, and perhaps unknowable in the coming decade.

As demand grows, mining pressures will continue to increase, and more countries will partner with large corporations to exploit the deep sea.107See Christiana Ochoa, Contracts on the Seabed, 46 Yale J. Int’l L. 103, 114–15 (2021). Lackluster supervision of deep-sea mining operations and no real threat of criminal prosecution from partner countries creates well-founded fears that mining companies will be able to operate with impunity.108See Jochen Halfar & Rodney M. Fujita, Danger of Deep-Sea Mining, 316 Sci. 987, 987 (2007). Under ISA contractual arrangements, companies are required to undertake baseline studies and conduct annual environmental assessments.109Michael Lodge, David Johnson, Gwenaëlle Le Gurun, Markus Wengler, Phil Weaver & Vikki Gunn, Seabed Mining: International Seabed Authority Environmental Management Plan for the Clarion–Clipperton Zone. A Partnership Approach, 49 Marine Pol’y 66, 67 (2014). The ISA is tasked with judging these environmental assessment plans and determining the likelihood of compliance before they grant mining permits. However, once companies have permits in hand, the system relies on self-policing. Many conservationists believe this lack of mining operations oversight – combined with companies’ profit motive—will inevitably result in a tragedy of the deep-sea commons.110Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 Stan. Env’t L.J. 109, 111 (2009).

International prosecutions, however, could help to ensure compliance with ISA regulations and deter companies from intentionally generating severe environmental harms. The possibility of individual criminal punishments for wanton acts of environmental destruction puts company officials on notice.

Further, the reparations processes that follow international criminal prosecutions could provide added resources to coastal communities and oversight agencies if company executives act illegally and conceal their criminal activities. Reparations decisions could also generate funds for the restoration and protection of marine life in the deep sea. Nature is resilient when provided the chance to recover. Criminal prosecutions and post-conviction reparations could help to ensure that environmental damage from mining violations stops with the first bad actor and that damaged sectors have time to recover before other operations can begin.

III.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALIZATION

No global organization monitors environmental ocean crime or coordinates national enforcement efforts to protect marine environments. As a result, accountability for offshore environmental crimes depends on an incomplete jigsaw puzzle of enforcement regimes. State agencies and international organizations tasked with combatting transnational organized crime or protecting the marine environment from illegal fishing and toxic dumping often lack the capacity to address even the most egregious and visible ocean violations. Few offshore environmental crimes are ever investigated or prosecuted, even when marine scientists and conservation groups document permanent and extensive environmental harms.

Human rights scholars have rightfully criticized the punitive focus of international law, especially when the focus on criminal accountability and retributive punishment eclipses more reparative approaches to human rights and transitional justice. Some scholars argue that the turn to criminal law in international justice distracts from less visible forms of state violence and global efforts to grapple with persistent structures of social inequality.111Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1120–26 (2015). Under this view, criminalization diverts attention and resources from endeavors to combat poverty, racial discrimination, and enduring forms of colonial domination.

Uncritical criminalization is a disturbing problem, and that is not what I suggest here. However, any serious global effort to address the climate crisis will need enforcement mechanisms to provide greater accountability for environmental harms beyond national jurisdictions. Rapid climate changes and environmental degradation demand innovations to improve ocean governance and ensure ocean protection. Targeted international criminalization of serious ocean crimes can provide critical tools to investigate environmental destruction at sea and to deter future harms.112See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 1015–18. Criminalizing environmental atrocities can also reinforce the legal status of oceans as the common heritage of humankind and encourage a shift toward greater ecocentrism in international justice.

International criminalization could also facilitate the investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal networks and other groups acting in concert to circumvent environmental protections even when national officials oppose accountability efforts. Organized criminal syndicates engage in various types of illegal fishing and toxic dumping that pose significant threats to marine environments. International criminalization could enable criminal cases against syndicate members independent of domestic interest or capacity to bring criminal charges.

International criminalization could further authorize criminal charges in cases where state officials fail to undertake obligatory actions to protect marine environments. Willful inaction, at least under certain conditions, amounts to a crime of omission. National environmental laws routinely fail to protect marine environments because state authorities are unwilling to enforce the rule of law. International criminalization could help to outlaw official inaction that results in serious ocean destruction and advance efforts to establish an international environmental duty of care.113See, e.g., Rob White, Ecocide and the Carbon Crimes of the Powerful, 37 U. Tas. L. Rev. 95, 114 (2018). Even when the international criminal investigation of a state official’s failure to protect the marine environment does not result in criminal charges, it could still encourage greater compliance with existing environmental regulations and improve regional cooperation on ocean governance. International criminalization communicates a global concern for ocean protection that promotes dialogue and cooperation even in the absence of criminal prosecutions. Criminalization of environmental offenses on the high seas could also direct international attention toward invisible ocean harms often neglected by international criminal courts.114See generally Randle C. DeFalco, Invisible Atrocities: The Aesthetic Biases of International Criminal Justice 22–23 (2022).

The present incapacity of the international community to hold perpetrators accountable for ocean crimes abandons nearly all maritime enforcement to state and local officials, who often have vested interests in ongoing practices of oceanic impunity. International criminalization, in contrast, offers a potential solution to the problem of state corruption and complicity. Inadequate domestic enforcement of environmental law frequently results in environmental harms that cross borders and warrant international concern. Mare liberum or freedom of the seas has been a foundational principle of ocean law for centuries, dating back to the writings of Hugo Grotius.115John T. Parry, What Is the Grotian Tradition in International Law?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 299, 361 (2013); Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden Right: The Expansion of Closed Seas and Its Consequences, 47 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 46–50 (2011). This idea of free seas has remained the backbone of ocean governance. But unconditional free seas are no longer defensible in the Anthropocene. Governance models based solely on the principle of free seas often legitimate careless national policies and encourage exploitation and destruction of vulnerable ocean environments.

Accountability is a primary aim of international justice.116See Mirjan Damaška, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 329, 330–31 (2008). Yet, no single state institution or solitary judicial body can respond to the complex challenges posed by oceanic impunity. Various organizations, law enforcement agencies, and courts play complementary roles in collective responses to transnational criminality and environmental degradation at sea. International criminalization offers a useful, if limited, means to improve accountability for ocean criminality and better coordinate global responses to offshore environmental destruction.

The following section discusses two options for targeted forms of international criminalization. First, the Article discusses the expanded use of suppression conventions to encourage multilateral criminalization of ocean crimes. Criminalization, under the right conditions, enhances environmental compliance and supports international cooperation. Second, the Article discusses Rome Statute amendments that would allow the ICC to investigate certain oceanic crimes of ecocide. Amending the Rome Statute to include the crime of ecocide could transform the ICC into an environmental court of last resort. However, despite the potential benefits of internationally prosecuting ocean crimes, international criminalization should still be viewed as a limited tool for seeking justice and improving environmental ocean protection.

A.  Suppression Conventions and Voluntary Instruments

Suppression conventions are an alternative mechanism for targeted international criminalization. Suppression conventions are multilateral agreements that require signatories to criminalize certain kinds of activities.117Neil Boister, Human Rights Protections in the Suppression Conventions, 2 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 199, 199 (2002); Roger S. Clark, Some Aspects of the Concept of International Criminal Law: Suppression Conventions, Jurisdiction, Submarine Cables and the Lotus, 22 Crim. L. F. 519, 523 (2011). The threshold for criminalization depends upon the objectives of the sovereign states signing the agreement, but the promise of criminalization signals a mutual commitment to transnational enforcement. Suppression conventions, therefore, help coordinate law enforcement responses by defining substantive legal prohibitions, establishing jurisdictional boundaries, and authorizing procedures for cooperation and investigative methods. Historically, suppression conventions have addressed a range of criminal activities from slavery and human trafficking to serious violations of international and customary law.

Suppression conventions that criminalize environmental harms are particularly salient in the context of oceanic impunity because of shortfalls in environmental monitoring and enforcement in EEZs and on the high seas. The freedom of the seas principle generally sanctions unencumbered maritime navigation and unrestricted resource exploitation beyond national jurisdictions, which disincentivizes the monitoring of oceanic harms and often precludes enforcement actions.

Suppression conventions provide two distinct paths for international criminalization. First, state officials can negotiate new stand-alone suppression conventions. These novel agreements could address a broad range of ocean crimes or be tailored to address a specific category of offshore criminality. For example, like-minded states could establish a suppression convention to address biodiversity loss in designated marine protected areas and as part of the convention members states could collectively criminalize specific activities that result in species or habitat destruction. Alternatively, states concerned about protecting migratory routes for pelagic species could negotiate a suppression convention to criminalize fisheries exploitation near migratory seamounts or agree to collectively police important migratory territories.

Because suppression conventions generally require the incorporation of crimes into national criminal codes, the enactment of suppression conventions could also improve monitoring and enforcement within national jurisdictions, thus improving accountability for oceanic impunity in domestic waters. The domestication of environmental crimes in suppression conventions in some instances could also permit investigations and prosecutions of corporate actors, thereby extending corporate liability for offshore environmental crimes. The utility of these stand-alone suppression conventions would be illustrated if and when a smaller group of interested states developed independent suppression conventions and thereby encouraged a larger community of states to recognize specific ocean crimes.

The second path that suppression conventions offer for international criminalization is that lawmakers already bound by an existing convention could seek to amend it or to enact new protocols that expand its scope. For example, States’ parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”) could file a resolution at the UNTOC Conference of the Parties to categorize certain ocean crimes as serious crimes under the existing framework agreement and, thereby, establish mutual obligations to investigate and prosecute those ocean crimes. States’ parties could also otherwise develop a new protocol outside of the existing framework to supplement the UNTOC. Supplemental protocols have the advantage of cultivating new forms of cooperation among treaty members while also preserving general procedural rules and provisions.

Amendments or additional protocols that incorporate new ocean crimes or binding enforcement provisions could strengthen a range of existing international conventions without scrapping or undermining established agreements. For example, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling requires member states to take appropriate measures to punish violators of the convention.118See art. 9, International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. Present provisions, however, do not include any criminal penalties. Likewise, the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources requires member states to ensure compliance and to punish conduct that contravenes the agreement. But again, the present provisions do not explicitly authorize any criminal punishments. Amendments or additional protocols to established conventions could strengthen enforcement regimes by authorizing some criminal punishments.

Voluntary instruments are an alternative to suppression conventions for criminalization of environmentally destructive activities at sea. They generally operate independent of binding commitments negotiated by participating states. These voluntary instruments, for example, might be simple declarations that define a new ocean crime or articulate a shared commitment to investigate and prosecute a specific environmental harm. While such non-binding instruments often depend on implementation agreements and generally function more as regulatory compliance regimes, they can still accelerate multilateral enforcement coordination and legal harmonization in ocean governance. The adoption of voluntary instruments can further express states’ shared commitment to environmental conservation and communicate a more ecocentric approach to international law.

Suppression conventions and voluntary instruments are no panacea for oceanic impunity. However, they are adaptable instruments of multilateralism and, as such, provide alternative pathways for states concerned with ongoing environmental crimes to strengthen environmental monitoring and enforcement at sea.

B.  International Criminal Courts

International criminal courts are possible mechanisms to investigate and prosecute oceanic impunity. International criminal law has long acknowledged environmental destruction—from aerial bombing campaigns during the Second World War to Agent Orange defoliation programs in the Vietnam War. However, international prosecutors have not traditionally focused on environmental harms in case selection or charging decisions.119See Peter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International Criminal Court, 18 Va. Env’t J. 217, 218 (1999); Payal Patel, Expanding Past Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes: Can an ICC Policy Paper Expand the Court’s Mandate to Prosecuting Environmental Crimes?, 14 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 175, 188 (2016). Most acts that cause serious environmental damage are not defined as international crimes whether perpetrated on land or at sea.

1.  Rome Statute

As ratified, only one article in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s legal foundation, addresses environmental crimes. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) defines “war crimes” to include the following:

Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.120Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Rome Statute].

Article 8(2)(b)(iv) creates possibilities for environmental war crime prosecutions and expands individualized criminal accountability for environmental offenses committed during armed conflicts.121Ryan Gilman, Expanding Environmental Justice After War: The Need for Universal Jurisdiction over Environmental War Crimes, 22 Colo. J. Int’l Env’t L. & Pol’y 447, 453–57 (2011). The Article also recognizes environmental damage as a stand-alone offense that need not relate directly to human injuries. In this way, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) moves away from traditional anthropocentrism in international criminal law and closer to an ecocentric vision of international justice.122See Jessica C. Lawrence & Kevin Jon Heller, The First Ecocentric Environmental War Crime: The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 20 Geo. Int’l Env’t L. Rev. 61, 70–71 (2007).

However, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) has significant limitations. The definition of environmental destruction requires that harms be “widespread, long-term and severe” but these terms are undefined. As a result, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) has wide discretion to interpret the language and to decide what kinds of environmental damage fall under the Article’s purview. The exercise of such discretion can irregularly prioritize environmental crimes and raise questions about both fair notice and equitable enforcement.

Article 8(2)(b)(iv) also includes a proportionality requirement that restricts its applicability during armed conflict.123Rome Statute, supra note 120, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). Article 8(2)(b)(iv) inherits the requirement from Protocol I, which requires that attacks be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 26 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Acts causing environmental damage must be “clearly excessive” in relation to any anticipated military advantage.124Rome Statute, supra note 120, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). This threshold for disproportionate violations gives military officials significant leeway to defend strategic strikes, even when military actions result in severe environmental harms.125See Aurelie Lopez, Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage Occurring in Times of Non-International Armed Conflict: Rights and Remedies, 18 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 231, 261, 268 (2007). Further, to satisfy the mens rea requirement for the offense international prosecutors must establish the defendant’s subjective knowledge of the attack’s disproportionality, which creates a high threshold that must be crossed to secure convictions for environmental destruction.

Finally, and most concerning, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) only covers environmental damage inflicted during armed conflict.126Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes or Humanitarian Atrocities?, 17 Geo. Int’l Env’t L. Rev. 697, 699 (2005). Environmental crimes that happen in times of peace, therefore, fall outside the scope of the Article.

2.  Ecocide

The crime of ecocide could provide a pathway to prosecute serious ocean crimes perpetrated outside of armed conflicts. Campaigns to criminalize ecocide as an international crime began in the 1970s but for decades failed to gain widespread public support.127For discussions on the crime of ecocide, see Richard A. Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide – Facts, Appraisal and Proposal, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 4, no. 1 (1973): 80–96; Mark Allan Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, Cal. W. Int’l L.J 26, no. 2 (1996): 215-271; Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide 61–71 (2015); Polly Higgins, Damien Short & Nigel South, Protecting the Planet: A Proposal for a Law of Ecocide, 59 Crime, L. & Soc. Change 251 (2013); Anastacia Greene, The Campaign to Make Ecocide an International Crime: Quixotic Quest or Moral Imperative?, 30 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 1, 1–7 (2019); Peter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International Criminal Court, 18 Va. Env’t L.J. 217, 240–42 (1999); Mégret, supra note 45, at 202–03; Darryl Robinson, Ecocide – Puzzles and Possibilities, 20 J. of Int’l Crim. Just. 313 (2022). But growing awareness about environmental degradation and the climate crisis have resurrected past ecocide debates. In February, the European Union Parliament became the first international body to criminalize serious environmental damage as “cases comparable to ecocide.”128Mette Mølgaard Henriksen, ‘Revolutionary’: EU Parliament votes to criminalise most serious cases of ecosystem destruction, euronews., Feb. 27, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/green/2024/02/27/revolutionary-eu-criminalises-the-most-serious-cases-of-ecosystem-destruction [https://perma.cc/FBW2-XDCP]. Advocates for criminalization now include a range of world leaders from environmentalist Greta Thunberg to Pope Francis.129See Sophie Yeo, Ecocide: Should Killing Nature be a Crime?, BBC (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201105-what-is-ecocide [https://perma.cc/38XE-XRLM] (“Pope Francis has also called for ecocide to be recognised as a crime by the international community, and Greta Thunberg has backed the cause too, donating €100,000 (£90,000) in personal prize winnings to the Stop Ecocide Foundation.”). Viewed amid their concerns about accelerating environmental degradation, supporters emphasize ecocide’s moral force and expressive power.130See generally Carsten Stahn, Justice as Message: Expressivist Foundations of International Criminal Justice (2020). They argue that ecocide prosecutions would raise the global profile of environmental crimes, which are too often treated as second order crimes.

In 2021, an independent panel of international criminal law experts published a definition of “ecocide” for consideration as an amendment to the Rome Statute.131Stop Ecocide Found., Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide 5 (2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ca2608ab914493c64ef1f6d/t/60d7479cf8e7e5461534dd07/1624721314430/SE+Foundation+Commentary+and+core+text+revised+%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE4E-T3WM]. Subsequent debate on the definition evidences burgeoning interest in the criminalization of ecocide.132See also UCLA Promise Institute for Human Rights Group of Experts, Proposed Definition of Ecocide (2021), https://ecocidelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Proposed-Definition-of-Ecocide-Promise-Group-April-9-2021-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF7R-QRCA]. The panel definition reads: “‘[E]cocide’ means unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.”133Id.

The proposed definition would significantly broaden the scope of criminal culpability for environmental destruction and clarifies some critical statutory terms. As described above, although ICC prosecutors must establish that international crimes are “severe,” “widespread,” and “long-term,” the Rome Statute does not explicitly define these essential terms.134Rome Statute, supra note 120, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). This lack of statutory clarity would make it difficult for OTP to determine whether specific environmental harms would satisfy the legal threshold for ecocide. The new draft definition solves this problem by clarifying the terms as follows:

“Severe” means damage which involves very serious adverse changes, disruption or harm to any element of the environment, including grave impacts on human life or natural, cultural or economic resources;

“Widespread” means damage which extends beyond a limited geographic area, crosses state boundaries, or is suffered by an entire ecosystem or species or a large number of human beings;

“Long-term” means damage which is irreversible or which cannot be redressed through natural recovery within a reasonable period of time.135Stop Ecocide Found., supra note 131.

In addition to clarification of the legal elements, the independent panel definition enables crimes to be prosecuted during peacetime, discarding the previous requirement to show a nexus between the environmental harm and an armed international conflict. This change recognizes that environmental atrocities frequently happen outside of war. The new definition also criminalizes acts irrespective of their connection to a civilian population or the boundaries of state territories. Individuals can be prosecuted for ecocide even when environmental damage does no harm to people. This change potentially brings corporate officials under the scope of criminal culpability if they engage in unlawful or wanton acts when they are aware of the substantial likelihood of severe and long-term environmental damage.

The proposed definition of ecocide further criminalizes acts of omission under some circumstances. With environmental harms, the failure to act—whether to prevent damage or to stop its continuance—can be as devastating as affirmative acts of destruction. Under the draft definition, global prosecutors would have the ability to investigate perpetrators responsible for serious and ongoing environmental dumping, illegal fishing, or unlawful mining operations. In some cases, even gross failures to prevent greenhouse gas emissions could result in potential criminal liability. Expanded international criminal culpability could help to safeguard domestic environmental protections and encourage criminal investigations of state officials complicit in serious oceanic crimes or other significant crimes against nature. Enlarging the scope of criminal culpability could also improve state compliance with environmental treaties, conventions, and voluntary instruments if the threat of international criminal investigation deters violations by state officials and corporate leaders.136See Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64 Int’l Org. 225, 232–34 (2010).

Support for a more ecocentric approach to international criminal justice has not been limited to forces outside the ICC. In recent years, the OTP has gestured toward greater engagement with environmental concerns. In 2016, the OTP issued new guidance requiring international prosecutors to consider environmental consequences in evaluating the gravity of crimes and giving particular weight to crimes that result in environmental destruction, illegal exploitation of natural resources, or illegal dispossession of land.137Int’l Crim. Ct. [ICC], Off. of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation 13–14 (2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/
20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH2Q-Z3G7].
New guidelines also explicitly recognize environmental destruction as a factor in decisions to launch preliminary investigations and select cases for prosecution.138Id. The OTP customarily selects investigations and prosecutions based on the gravity of alleged crimes and on the degree of responsibility of the alleged perpetrators. In the gravity analysis, prosecutors normally consider the scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact of the alleged crimes on human victims.139These elements are generally defined by provisions in the Rome Statute language and ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Harms to the environment are now also weighed as significant factors in the gravity analysis.

ICC member states have also started to lobby for the crime of ecocide and requested investigations into serious environmental crimes. In 2019, for example, several island nations, including Vanuatu and the Maldives, called for ICC member states to consider the addition of ecocide as a core crime at the annual Assembly of States’ Parties Conference. The ICC has also received at least five formal complaints alleging serious environmental crimes in the Brazilian Amazon, opening a preliminary evaluation of its jurisdiction in one of the cases in 2020.140Isabella Kaminski, Calls for international criminal court to end ‘impunity’ for environmental crimes, Mar. 6, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/mar/26/international-criminal-court-end-impunity-environmental-crimes [https://perma.cc/J72A-UH8Y]. In June 2023, Ukraine officials accused Russia of committing environmental war crimes and ecocide by destroying the Kakhovka dam, which caused severe flooding and environmental damage.141Radina Gigova, Russia Is Accused of Ecocide in Ukraine. But What Does That Mean?, CNN (July 3, 2023) https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/02/world/ukraine-ecocide-dam-collapse-crime-climate-intl-cmd/index.html [https://perma.cc/QZ2N-8APC]. In February 2024, the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Karim A.A. Khan KC, announced a new policy initiative to advance accountability for environmental crimes. He stated:

“Damage to the environment poses an existential threat to all life on the planet. For that reason, I am firmly committed to ensuring that my Office systematically addresses environmental crimes in all stages of its work, from preliminary examinations to prosecutions. This latest policy initiative is another commitment to this necessary objective.”142Int’l Crim. C.t, The Office of the Prosecutor launches public consultation on a new policy initiative to advance accountability for environmental crimes under the Rome Statute (Feb. 16, 2024), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/office-prosecutor-launches-public-consultation-new-policy-initiative-advance-accountability-0 [https://perma.cc/474F-M3LH].

3.  Ecocide and Oceanic Impunity

Amending the Rome Statute to include ecocide as a core international crime would likely advance efforts to combat oceanic impunity for several reasons.143See generally Ruiz et al., supra note 9, at 407. Ecocide prosecutions would facilitate ICC investigations of environmental violations committed in the territorial seas of ICC member states and also violations committed by member state nationals. The ICC could claim jurisdiction over ocean crimes committed on ships sailing under member state flags, even when law enforcement authorities in those member states are unwilling or unable to investigate the crimes. While ICC jurisdiction in the EEZs of member states and on the high seas remains in question, ICC investigations would likely avoid some jurisdictional challenges associated with flags of convenience as the most notorious flag states, including Panama and Liberia, are current parties to the Rome Statute.144Many vessels accused of environmental crimes are flagged in countries that are signatories of the Rome Statute.

Making ecocide an international crime could also empower international prosecutors to take on a larger role in environmental protection at sea.145See Patrick J. Keenan, Doctrinal Innovation in International Criminal Law: Harms, Victims, and the Evolution of the Law, 42 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 407, 437–42 (2020). The ICC operates as an independent judicial institution authorized by the Rome Statute to investigate international crimes and seek accountability even when state officials are complicit in the criminal acts or oppose ICC investigations. As a permanent court of last resort, the ICC has the legal authority to prosecute international crimes when state agencies are unable or unwilling to do so.146Art. 17, Rome Statute. Arguably, a global court insulated from domestic political pressures and interest groups could more effectively monitor criminality at sea and perhaps intervene before severe and long-term ocean violations arise, thereby preventing future environmental harms.147See Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 334, 334 (2013).

Amending the Rome Statute to include the crime of ecocide could lead to major institutional changes for the ICC.148See, e.g., Ammar Bustami & Marie-Christine Hecken, Perspectives for a New International Crime against the Environment: International Criminal Responsibility for Environmental Degradation under the Rome Statute, 11 Goettingen J. of Int’l L. 145, 170–84 (2021). The new crime would broaden the scope of criminal liability to include a range of environmental harms and promote a more ecocentric approach to international justice. For the first time in the history of international criminal law, serious crimes against nature could be prosecuted during peacetime independent of injuries to human beings. Ecocide investigations could also explore forms of “slow violence” that impact the environment.149See generally Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (2011). Tasked with a duty to protect nature, the ICC could consider scientific indicators of environmental decline and climate impacts in the gravity analysis of alleged crimes. Ecocide prosecutions might also contribute to public dialogues about justice and accountability for coastal communities impacted by extreme environmental changes.150See Martha Minow, Do Alternative Justice Mechanisms Deserve Recognition in International Criminal Law?: Truth Commissions, Amnesties, and Complementarity at the International Criminal Court, 60 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 44 (2019). The ICC Chief Prosecutor could take a leading role in shaping the field of international environmental law and global sustainability through preliminary investigations and case selection. Meanwhile, ICC judges could contribute to the development of jurisprudence on international environmental crimes.

Ecocide also potentially expands the significance of the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s proprio motu power and encourages individual informants and nongovernmental sources to report serious environmental crimes directly to the OTP. Under the Rome Statute, ICC inquiries start in one of three ways: member states can refer a situation to the ICC; the UN Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, can refer a situation to the ICC; or the ICC Chief Prosecutor can exercise proprio motu power and independently start an investigation.151Rome Statute, supra note 120, arts. 13(b), 14, 15. Because the ICC Chief Prosecutor has the power to initiate criminal investigations independent of states, informants with information or evidence about serious environmental crimes would have a direct channel to provide information to the court without involving state officials or domestic law enforcement. Informants might likewise report information about global criminal syndicates to the ICC even when they fear retaliation from syndicate members or domestic authorities. The ICC Chief Prosecutor might also properly exercise proprio motu power to express shared normative commitments to environmental protection.152Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 Mich. J. Int’l L. 265, 268–71 (2012).

Ecocide prosecutions over time might also establish ocean crimes as jus cogens offenses and thereby prevent state derogations from obligations to protect the marine environment in future international agreements. International state practice continues to evolve rapidly in response to divergent forms of ocean criminality. Customary law will also need to adapt to new priorities in ocean governance and environmental protection.153See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 Cornell Int’l L.J. 439, 467–68 (2010).

International ecocide prosecutions would signal an ecocentric shift in international criminal justice. Ecocide would be the first international crime to address non-human violations outside of armed conflict. In contrast to previous international crimes, a criminal conviction for ecocide would be possible without any evidence of human injury or suffering. By holding out crimes against nature as the moral equivalents of other atrocity crimes, ecocide prosecutions could advance a vision of international justice that recognizes both our ecological interdependence and the intrinsic value of nature.154Rosemary Mwanza, Enhancing Accountability for Environmental Damage Under International Law: Ecocide as a Legal Fulfilment of Ecological Integrity, 19 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 586, 593–95 (2018). The activities of humanity at sea will likely accelerate in the coming decades and continue to impact climate change.155Jean-Baptiste Jouffray Robert Blasiak, Albert V. Norström, Henrik Österblom & Magnus Nyström, The Blue Acceleration: The Trajectory of Human Expansion Into The Ocean, 2 One Earth 43, 46 (2020). If empowered by the global community to prosecute environmental crimes, the ICC could help to moderate offshore environmental harms by prosecuting those people most responsible for illegal destruction of marine environments and expressing a global commitment to ocean protection.156Tom Caroccia, Rescuing the International Criminal Court: Crimes Against Humanity and Environmental Destruction, 70 Rutgers Univ. L. Rev. 1167, 1183–88 (2018).

The idea of an environmentalist ICC presently seems utopian. But the climate crisis will transform priorities for criminal accountability and international criminal justice in the next decade. In the meantime, the international community can no longer afford to abdicate responsibility for ocean governance to national authorities. The next generation of international prosecutors must merge international environmental law and international criminal law to respond to the urgent and existential environmental threats to oceans and the planet.157Darryl Robinson, Your Guide to Ecocide: Part 1, OpinioJuris (July 16, 2021), http://opiniojuris.org/2021/07/16/your-guide-to-ecocide-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/92Z6-LPWZ].

CONCLUSION

This Article advances a relational approach to the study of oceanic impunity. Building on scholarship in international criminal law, marine ecology, and relational sociology, the Article proposes targeted international criminalization to increase offshore accountability for severe environmental harms.

National law enforcement has mostly failed to protect marine environments or to combat widespread oceanic impunity. State agencies tasked with investigating offshore criminality routinely have insufficient resources to patrol waters under their jurisdiction. Beyond national jurisdictions, no single organization monitors environmental ocean crimes or coordinates law enforcement efforts.

This Article describes three critical ocean crimes—ocean pollution, illegal fishing, and seabed destruction—and suggests two international options for improving accountability at sea. First, suppression conventions could establish compulsory obligations to criminalize certain ocean crimes and encourage the development of multilateral enforcement regimes. Second, international criminal courts could investigate and prosecute serious environmental crimes. Amending the Rome Statute to include ecocide, for example, could empower ICC prosecutors to investigate serious ocean crimes and allow the ICC to operate as an environmental court of last resort. Targeted forms of international criminalization could also help to harmonize definitions of environmental ocean crimes and improve intelligence sharing and evidence gathering in criminal investigations and prosecutions.

In the Anthropocene, international cooperation to end oceanic impunity is essential to confront the climate crisis. Beyond theories of criminal retribution or deterrence, international criminalization and the investigation of serious environmental harms has expressive value. Environmental prosecutions signal an ecocentric shift in international criminal justice and promote a shared global commitment to ocean protection. Recognizing our inextricable relations with nature, ecocentrism presents an ontological challenge to the traditional anthropocentrism of international criminal law.158See generally Boyd, supra note 19; Stone, supra note 19; De Lucia, supra note 19.

Healthy oceans and seas will ultimately depend on more than criminalization, however. International criminal prosecutions are insufficient instruments to achieve comprehensive ocean governance, and criminal punishments alone cannot address the most pressing problems facing oceans or coastal communities. Combatting oceanic impunity and ecological disaster requires deeper commitments to international cooperation. In addition to targeted criminalization, state lawmakers must make oceans a priority and collaborate to protect marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions, fund international organizations tasked with ocean governance, and establish more marine protected areas.

97 S. Cal. L. Rev. 637

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* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Thanks to Amanda Beck, Sarah Burstein, Kevin Davis, William Dodge, Andrew Van Duyn, Laurel Fletcher, Maryam Jamshidi, Chimène Keitner, Steve Koh, Cody Corliss, Katerina Linos, Xander Meise, Saira Mohammed, Sharmila Murthy, Julie O’Sullivan, Dan Richman, Wadie Said, Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, Shayak Sarkar, Daimeon Shanks, David Sloss, Melissa Stewart, Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Joshua Weishart, and participants in the Faculty Workshop on Global Criminal Justice at Boston College, the Northern California International Law Scholarship Workshop at Berkeley Law, and the Junior International Law Faculty Workshop at Boston University. All errors are mine.

“Shelby County” to Clean Air Act: Evaluating the Constitutionality of California’s Clean Air Act Waiver Under the Equal Sovereignty Principle

In August 2022, California promulgated the Advanced Clean Cars II regulation, banning all sales of new gasoline-powered cars in the state by 2035. Transportation is the largest source of air pollution in California, responsible for nearly 40% of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions; thus, the regulation is a crucial step towards meeting the state’s carbon neutrality and climate goals. California has the unique authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions due to a waiver exemption in the Clean Air Act. Congress recognized California’s expertise and unique air pollution challenges early on by authorizing just two standards: the national and California standards. Over the last five decades, California has received over one hundred waivers for its motor vehicle emission standards. However, in May 2022, seventeen states challenged the constitutionality of the waiver provision in Ohio v. EPA (pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals as of the publication of this Note), alleging, inter alia, that it violates the equal sovereignty principle—the idea that states must have equal political authority—by allowing only California to set new vehicle emission standards. These states further argue that California cannot regulate GHGs because climate change is a global problem not unique to California. To date, no court has addressed the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act under the equal sovereignty principle. Thus, this Note takes the principle seriously and analyzes how courts historically have applied it. In 2013, the Supreme Court developed the equal sovereignty principle as a meaningful concept for the first (and last) time in Shelby County v. Holder to invalidate section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. This Note applies the test established in Shelby County to the Clean Air Act waiver at issue, arguing that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to the Clean Air Act, and even if it were to apply, the Clean Air Act waiver provision remains constitutional because Congress’s reasons for granting California an exemption remain relevant. California’s pioneering role in early air pollution control, its large economy, and its characteristic geographic and climate conditions put the state in a unique position to protect public health by regulating automobile emissions, while the state faces increasingly formidable threats from climate change that have exacerbated the local air pollution problems that initially compelled its motor vehicle regulations. Thus, even as California’s motor vehicle regulations have shifted from reducing local smog to reducing GHG emissions, California’s current needs continue to justify its differential treatment—maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening, the Clean Air Act waiver’s relevance in the twenty-first century.

INTRODUCTION

In August 2022, the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), California’s chief air pollution regulator, promulgated the Advanced Clean Cars II regulation, which bans the sale of new gasoline-powered cars in California by 2035.1Advanced Clean Cars II Regulations: All New Passenger Vehicles Sold in California to be Zero Emissions by 2035, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii [https://perma.cc/A9WT-T2BP]; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.4 (2022). Transportation is the largest source of air pollution in the state, responsible for nearly 40% of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, 80% of nitrogen oxide pollution, and 90% of diesel particulate matter pollution.2Current California GHG Emission Inventory Data, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ghg-inventory-data [https://perma.cc/L9KM-VCG3]; Transforming Transportation, Cal. Energy Comm’n, https://www.energy.ca.gov/about/core-responsibility-fact-sheets/transforming-transportation [http://perma.cc/LAS2-MAYL]. CARB estimates that the new rule will result in significant climate, economic, and public health benefits. By 2040, the regulation is projected to result in a 50% reduction in GHG emissions from cars, pickup trucks, and SUVs.3California Moves to Accelerate to 100% New Zero-Emission Vehicle Sales by 2035, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Aug. 25, 2022), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035 [https://perma.cc/5GRX-9NXR]. Taking gas cars off the road would eliminate the equivalent of 395 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions, which is analogous to avoiding the combustion of 915 million barrels of petroleum or shutting down more than one hundred coal plants for a year.4Id. From 2026 to 2040, the decrease in pollution should lead to 1,290 fewer cardiopulmonary deaths, 460 fewer hospital admissions for cardiovascular or respiratory illness, and 650 fewer emergency room visits for asthma.5Id. Thus, the regulation is a crucial step towards meeting the state’s carbon neutrality and climate goals.6Id. (“The ACC II regulation is a major tool in the effort to reach the SB 32 target of reducing greenhouse gases an additional 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 . . . . Ending sales of vehicles powered by fossil fuels is a critical element in the state’s efforts to achieve carbon neutrality by 2045 or sooner.”).

The regulations that California enacts are hugely influential; thus, the implications of California’s ability to implement motor vehicle regulations are extensive. If California were a country, it would be the tenth largest auto market in the world.7Naveena Sadasivam, It’s Official: California is Phasing Out Gas-Powered Cars by 2035, Grist (Aug. 25, 2022), https://grist.org/transportation/california-gas-car-ban-electric-vehicles [https://perma.cc/2XPY-J5HH]. As of May 13, 2022, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have adopted California’s Low-Emission Vehicle (“LEV”) and Zero-Emission Vehicle (“ZEV”) regulations under section 177 of the Clean Air Act, which allows other states to adopt California’s approved standards instead of the federal standards.8States That Have Adopted California’s Vehicle Standards Under Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (May 13, 2022), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM9D-QLM9]. California alone makes up 11% of U.S. new light-duty vehicle sales, or 40.1% when combined with the states that have already adopted its rules.9Id. New York was the second state to ban sales of gas-powered cars by 2035 as part of its plan to increase EV adoption.10Kira Bindrim, NY Implements 2035 All-EV Plan After California Clears the Way, Bloomberg (Sept. 29, 2022, 1:57 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-29/new-york-follows-california-in-banning-sale-of-gas-cars-by-2035 [https://perma.cc/N7N6-LUSS]. In February 2021, New York passed a law requiring all new passenger cars and trucks sold in the state to produce zero emissions by 2035,11Assemb. B. 4302, 2021–2022 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021). and in September 2022, after California finalized its own ban, New York followed California in requiring all new vehicles sold by 2035 to be zero-emissions, setting in motion the regulatory process to implement the law.12Press Release, Kathy Hochul, Governor of the State of New York, Governor Hochul Drives Forward New York’s Transition to Clean Transportation (Sept. 29, 2022), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-drives-forward-new-yorks-transition-clean-transportation [https://perma.cc/8EJ3-NPTG]. In August 2022, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker also signed climate change legislation to end new sales of gas-powered cars in the state by 2035.13Keith Goldberg, Calif. Sews Up Regs to End Gas Car Sales by 2035, Law360 (Aug. 25, 2022, 6:52 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1524638/calif-sews-up-regs-to-end-gas-car-sales-by-2035 [https://perma.cc/RQK3-HTU3].

California has the unique ability to implement motor vehicle emissions regulations because of an exception in the Clean Air Act.1442 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). While the Clean Air Act generally prohibits states from setting vehicle emission standards,1542 U.S.C. § 7543(a). it provides a waiver exemption under section 209(b)(1) that allows California to set more stringent vehicle emission standards than the federal government.1642 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). While the waiver does not reference California by name, it was clearly intended for California because California was the only state that met the requirement of adopting motor vehicle emission standards prior to March 30, 1966. H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 49 (1967). Given California’s pioneering role in motor vehicle regulations and unique air pollution problems, Congress recognized California’s expertise early on in the history of federal air pollution regulation.17See Air Quality Act of 1967, S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (“California’s unique problems and pioneering efforts justified a waiver . . . . [I]n the 15 years that auto emission standards have been debated and discussed, only the State of California has demonstrated compelling and extraordinary circumstances sufficiently different from the Nation as a whole . . . .”). However, in May 2022, seventeen Republican-led states filed a lawsuit, Ohio v. EPA, challenging California’s ability to set its own pollution rules and demanding that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) revoke the waiver.18Petition for Review, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2022). The petitioner states claimed that the waiver provision is unconstitutional because it violates the so-called equal sovereignty principle—the idea that states must have equal political authority—by only empowering California to set new vehicle emission standards.19See Brief for Petitioners at 28, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 11, 2022). The petitioners additionally argued that Congress cannot allow California alone to regulate climate change, which is a global problem not unique to California.20Id. at 13. Because California has shifted from regulations to reduce smog and local air pollution to GHG regulations to address global climate change, the petitioners essentially argued that circumstances have changed enough since Congress enacted the waiver provision in 1967 that California’s special treatment is no longer justified.21See id. at 13, 30–33.

This Note takes the equal sovereignty claim seriously and argues that the Clean Air Act waiver provision remains constitutional under the equal sovereignty principle. Part I provides relevant background on the waiver provision and history of California’s waiver requests. It then summarizes the equal sovereignty principle arguments made in the pending Ohio v. EPA lawsuit and provides relevant history on how courts have applied the principle leading up to Shelby County v. Holder,22Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540 (2013). the first time the Supreme Court held a statute unconstitutional based on the equal sovereignty principle. Part II argues that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to the Clean Air Act, but even if it were to apply, the test from Shelby County does not invalidate the Clean Air Act waiver provision. This Note concludes by offering final thoughts on the equal sovereignty claim and underscoring the implications of Ohio v. EPA in California’s ability to continue to lead the nation in addressing GHG emissions.

I.  BACKGROUND

A.  The Clean Air Act and EPA Waiver Provision

California’s ability to implement its own motor vehicle standards stems from the Clean Air Act. Congress passed the Clean Air Act in response to air pollution crises in the mid-20th century resulting from industrialization.23Clean Air Act Requirements and History, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history [https://perma.cc/HL9S-DUXJ]. “Killer fog” events, where a deadly mix of pollution and fog covered cities in the United States and around the world, spurred federal regulation of air pollution.24The 1948 Donora, Pennsylvania killer fog killed at least 20 people and left 5,900 ill. Lorraine Boissoneault, The Deadly Donora Smog of 1948 Spurred Environmental Protection—But Have We Forgotten the Lesson?, Smithsonian (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/deadly-donora-smog-1948-spurred-environmental-protection-have-we-forgotten-lesson-180970533 [https://perma.cc/QXH6-BJ4N]; Elizabeth T. Jacobs, Jefferey L. Burgess & Mark B. Abbott, The Donora Smog Revisited: 70 Years After the Event That Inspired the Clean Air Act, 108 Am. J. Pub. Health S2, S85–S88 (2018). The 1952 London Killer Fog killed between 8,000 and 12,000 people. Christopher Klein, When the Great Smog Smothered London, History (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.history.com/news/the-killer-fog-that-blanketed-london-60-years-ago [https://perma.cc/BS36-3M7Z]. In 1955, Congress enacted the Air Pollution Control Act, the first national air pollution legislation.25Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, 322. Continuing “killer fog” incidents in the United States then prompted Congress to pass the 1963 Clean Air Act, which established grant and research programs to support states in their air pollution control efforts but left air pollution regulation primarily to the states.26Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 393.

California was the first state to regulate emissions from cars.27History, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/BA4F-FJXN]. The first recognized episodes of smog occurred in Los Angeles in 1943, and in the 1950s, a California researcher determined that the automobile was the main cause of the smog.28Id.; Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate Change, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-transportation-air [https://perma.cc/ZS88-ZEXJ]. In 1966, California established the first tailpipe emissions standards in the nation.29Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 27.

Congress continued to enact new statutes in response to California’s regulations.30The 1967 Air Quality Act regulations for controlling motor vehicle emissions “were patterned after those . . . in effect in California.” 113 Cong. Rec. S32478 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1967) (remarks by Sen. George Murphy of California). The 1967 Air Quality Act amended the 1963 Clean Air Act, moving towards a uniform federal policy by requiring national air quality criteria, which states would then implement.31Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 485–86. It was also the first statute to give preemptive power to the federal government to adopt and enforce standards relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.32Id. at 501. However, Congress added a waiver provision exempting California from the preemption provision when California could demonstrate a need for more stringent standards than those the EPA established.33“The Secretary shall . . . waive application of [federal preemption] . . . to any State which has adopted standards . . . for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless he finds that such State does not require standards more stringent than applicable Federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions . . . .” Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208(b), 81 Stat. 485, 501. While the waiver does not reference California by name, it was clearly intended for California because California was the only state that met the requirement of adopting motor vehicle emission standards prior to March 30, 1966.34H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 49 (1967). Thus, Congress acknowledged California’s expertise early on in the history of federal air pollution regulation.

In fact, the Clean Air Act is a paradigmatic example of cooperative federalism, under which “States and the Federal Government [are] partners in the struggle against air pollution.”35Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990). The federal preemption provision reflects Congress’s interest in allowing automobile manufacturers to produce uniform automobiles for a national market and benefit from the economies of large-scale production without having to accommodate multiple state standards.36H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 21 (1967); see also id. at 50. Congress acknowledged the complex nature of automobile manufacturing and noted the importance of ensuring that automobile manufacturers obtain “clear and consistent answers” concerning emission standards.37Id. at 21. Courts have also interpreted that Congress preempted the field of vehicle emission regulation “to ensure uniformity throughout the nation, and to avoid the undue burden on motor vehicle manufacturers which would result from different state standards.”38Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. New York State Dep’t. of Env’t. Conservation, 810 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994). However, given California’s lead in early motor vehicle regulations and Congress’s additional interest in having California as a “laboratory for innovation,”39Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA (MEMA I), 627 F.2d 1095, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Congress intentionally struck a balance between having one national standard and fifty different state standards by authorizing just two standards, the national and California standards.40See S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (1967) (“California’s unique problems and pioneering efforts justified a waiver . . . .[I]n the 15 years that auto emission standards have been debated and discussed, only the State of California has demonstrated compelling and extraordinary circumstances sufficiently different from the Nation as a whole . . . .”); 113 Cong. Rec. H30975 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1967) (remarks by Rep. John Moss) (“[The California waiver] permits California to continue a role of leadership which it has occupied among the States of this Union for at least the last two decades . . . . [I]t offers a unique laboratory, with all of the resources necessary, to develop effective control devices which can become a part of the resources of this Nation and contribute significantly to the lessening of the growing problems of air pollution throughout the Nation.”); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Rather than being faced with 51 different standards, as they had feared, or with only one, as they had sought, manufacturers must cope with two regulatory standards . . . .”); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols (MEMA II), 142 F.3d 449, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This balance allowed California to continue to innovate and improve its air quality without creating a practical nightmare for automakers and interstate commerce.41Members of Congress favored states’ rights, but also were concerned that having 50 different sets of requirements related to emissions controls would “unduly burden interstate commerce.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 309 (1977).

The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, which form the basis of the contemporary federal Clean Air Act, authorized the development of federal and state regulations to limit emissions from stationary (industrial) and mobile sources (including automobiles).42Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678; Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/7XMF-6QVB]. Section 109 requires the EPA Administrator to establish basic requirements for ambient air quality, known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), for particular criteria pollutants, which the states would be required to meet.43Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109(a)(1), § 110(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 1679–80. The current list of criteria pollutants includes sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead, but does not include carbon dioxide.44Criteria Air Pollutants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants [https://perma.cc/Y9JR-T8K6].

In 1977, Congress revised the provision to read as it does today. Section 202(a)(1) requires the EPA Administrator to establish motor vehicle emissions standards for pollutants “which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”45Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 401(d)(1), 91 Stat. 685, 791. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments strengthened the deference given to California under the waiver provision in two significant ways. First, the 1977 Amendments revised section 209(b)(1) by requiring the EPA Administrator to grant a preemption waiver for California “if the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.”46Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 207, 91 Stat. 685, 755 (emphasis added). This amendment allows California, rather than the EPA, to make its own determination as to whether the regulations are sufficiently protective of public health and welfare. It also allows California to make this determination by looking at the entire program as a whole, rather than evaluating each regulation individually. Thus, as long as the entire set of regulations is more protective than the federal system, the EPA must allow California to implement these measures. The EPA Administrator can deny the waiver only if the state’s determination is “arbitrary and capricious” or the state does not need its standards to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions.”47Id. Second, the 1977 Amendments added section 177, which enhanced the strength of California’s motor vehicle emissions regulations by allowing other states to adopt California’s approved standards in lieu of the federal standards.48Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 177, 91 Stat. 685, 750. According to the House Report, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce makes clear that it sought to “ratify and strengthen the California waiver provision . . . to afford California the broadest possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect the health of its citizens and the public welfare.”49H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977). The legislative and statutory history thus suggests that Congress intended to give California broad discretion to regulate air pollutants in the way it deems most appropriate to protect public health and welfare.

B.  History of California’s Motor Vehicle Regulations and Waiver Requests

The Clean Air Act section 209(b)(1) waiver reflects a five-decade history of allowing California to implement motor vehicle emissions standards that are more stringent than federal government standards.50Pollution Standards Authorized by the California Waiver: A Crucial Tool for Fighting Air Pollution Now and in the Future, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/pollution-standards-authorized-california-waiver-crucial-tool-fighting-air [https://perma.cc/P6EX-HUGH]; Emily Wimberger & Hannah Pitt, Come and Take It: Revoking the California Waiver, Rhodium Grp. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/come-and-take-it-revoking-the-california-waiver [https://perma.cc/3Q28-6RBA] (“Since 1970, the federal government has granted California over 100 waivers . . . .”); see Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations [https://perma.cc/VA5H-RSVG] (documenting all the waivers the EPA has granted). California was granted its first waiver in 1968 and has since received over one hundred waivers for a range of new or amended motor vehicle and motor vehicle engine standards.51Pollution Standards Authorized by the California Waiver: A Crucial Tool for Fighting Air Pollution Now and in the Future, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/pollution-standards-authorized-california-waiver-crucial-tool-fighting-air [https://perma.cc/P6EX-HUGH]; Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations [https://perma.cc/VA5H-RSVG] (documenting all the waivers the EPA has granted). Smog in Los Angeles initially spurred California to adopt statewide standards to regulate criteria pollutants,52See infra Section I.A. and CARB has consistently developed the first emission standards in the nation.53The California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) developed the nation’s first tailpipe emissions standards for hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide in 1966, oxides of nitrogen in 1971, and particulate matter from diesel-fueled vehicles in 1982, as well as catalytic converters in the 1970s. More recently, CARB has delved into regulations seeking to mitigate climate change by encouraging Low-Emission Vehicles (“LEVs”). It promulgated LEV regulations that established criteria pollutant regulations for light and medium-duty vehicles in 1990 for the 1994–2003 model years (LEV I), and in 1999 for the 2004 model year and after (LEV II). Low-Emission Vehicle Program, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/low-emission-vehicle-program/about [https://perma.cc/R7KV-ME7L]; Low-Emission Vehicle (LEV II) Program, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/lev-program/low-emission-vehicle-lev-ii-program [https://perma.cc/MG4U-3U6M].

As California transitioned from regulating criteria pollutants to promulgating regulations that address GHG emissions, certain EPA administrations began to challenge its waiver requests, leading to the ping-ponging back and forth between administrations. In 2002, recognizing that global warming would impose “compelling and extraordinary impacts” on California, the state enacted Assembly Bill (AB) 1493, Chapter 200.54Assemb. B. 1493, Ch. 200, 2001–2002 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). The bill acknowledged that motor vehicle emissions are a major source of the state’s GHG emissions and that reducing GHG emissions is critical to slowing down the effects of global warming and protecting public health and the environment.55Id. The bill directed CARB to adopt regulations that achieve the “maximum feasible . . . reduction of greenhouse gas emissions” from passenger vehicles, beginning with the 2009 model year.56Id. Thus, in 2004, CARB approved the first regulations in the nation that control GHG emissions from motor vehicles (Pavley regulations), which applied to new vehicles for the 2009–2016 model years.57Low-Emission Vehicle Program, Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 53.

In December 2005, CARB requested a waiver to allow California to enforce its new GHG emission standards.58California’s Greenhouse Gas Vehicle Emission Standards Under Assembly Bill 1493 of 2002 (Pavley), Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/californias-greenhouse-gas-vehicle-emission-standards-under-assembly-bill-1493-2002-pavley [https://perma.cc/6T52-5YNF]. The EPA delayed action pending the outcome of litigation regarding whether the EPA had authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act, as the Clean Air Act did not explicitly regulate GHG emissions at the time.59Letter from John B. Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, to Congressional Requesters (Jan. 16, 2009) (on file with the United States Government Accountability Office). The Supreme Court addressed GHG emissions for the first time in Massachusetts v. EPA, holding in a 5-4 decision that carbon dioxide is considered an “air pollutant” that the EPA may regulate under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.60Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). Thus, the Court held that the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles and that Congress provided the EPA with the flexibility to address new air pollutant threats that the EPA determines endanger the public welfare.61Id.

Despite the Supreme Court ruling, in March 2008, the Bush administration’s EPA denied the waiver for the Pavley regulations, which was the first time the EPA denied a waiver for California.62California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156, 12157 (Mar. 6, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Waiver Denial]. In its decision, the EPA deviated from the traditional interpretation of the “compelling and extraordinary” waiver criteria6342 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1); see Rachel L. Chanin, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 699, 723 (2001); California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 18887, 18889–92 (May 3, 1984). to narrowly interpret that Congress authorized the EPA to grant a waiver only when “California standards were necessary to address peculiar local air quality problems,” as opposed to global climate change problems.642008 Waiver Denial, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12161. Unlike California’s previous motor vehicle programs, which addressed local smog problems, the GHG emission standards aimed to address climate change. Thus, the EPA determined that California did not need its new motor vehicle standards to meet “compelling and extraordinary” conditions related to GHG emissions because emissions from California cars “become one part of the global pool of GHG emissions”65Id. at 12160. and do not directly cause elevated concentrations of GHGs in the region.66Id. at 12162 (“The local climate and topography in California have no significant impact on the long-term atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in California.”). Alternatively, the EPA determined that because climate change is a global issue, the impacts of climate change in California were not sufficiently unique and different.67Id. at 12168.

In July 2009, the Obama administration’s EPA reversed the 2008 denial and granted California’s waiver request to enforce its GHG emission standards for model year 2009 and later new motor vehicles.68Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744, 32746 (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Waiver Grant]. As the EPA stated, CARB has repeatedly demonstrated the need for its motor vehicle program to address “compelling and extraordinary” conditions in California, and Congress did not intend to allow California to address only local or regional air pollution problems.69Id. at 32761. Rather, Congress intended California to have broad discretion and autonomy, acting as a pioneer and a “laboratory for innovation.”70Id. (citing Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA (MEMA I), 627 F.2d 1095, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (1967) (“The Nation will have the benefit of California’s experience with lower standards which will require new control systems and design. In fact California will continue to be the testing area for such lower standards and should those efforts to achieve lower emission levels be successful it is expected that the Secretary will . . . give serious consideration to strengthening the Federal standards.”). Thus, narrowing the waiver’s scope would hinder California from implementing motor vehicle programs “as it deems appropriate to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.”712009 Waiver Grant, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32761. In contrast to the 2008 EPA’s reasoning, the 2009 EPA determined that the impacts of global climate change can exacerbate the local air pollution problem.72Id. at 32763. It found compelling California’s assessment that its GHG standards are linked to improving California’s smog problems and that higher temperatures from global warming will exacerbate California’s high ozone levels and the “climate, topography, and population factors conducive to smog formation in California, which were the driving forces behind Congress’s inclusion of the waiver provision in the Clean Air Act.”73Id. The EPA noted that California’s GHG regulations will reduce greenhouse gas concentrations, even if only slightly, and “every small reduction is helpful . . . .”74Id. at 32766. Given California’s unique geographical and climatic conditions that foster extreme air quality issues, its ongoing need for dramatic emissions reductions, and growth in its vehicle population and use, the EPA determined that California’s need met “compelling and extraordinary” conditions.75Id. at 32760. Still, the EPA acknowledged that “conditions in California may one day improve such that it no longer has the need for a separate motor vehicle program.”76Id. at 32762.

In 2012, CARB adopted the Advanced Clean Cars I (“ACC I”) regulations to increase the stringency of criteria pollutant and GHG emission standards for new passenger vehicles for the 2015–2025 model years.77The regulations consisted of two programs: (1) the Low Emission Vehicle program, designed for cars to emit 75% less smog-forming pollution (criteria pollutants) than the average car sold in 2012 and to reduce GHG emissions by about 40% from 2012 model year vehicles by 2025; and (2) the Zero Emission Vehicle program, which requires manufacturers to ensure that about 22% of their California sales consist of zero-emission vehicles and plug-in hybrids by 2025. Advanced Clean Cars Program, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/about [https://perma.cc/W2R9-KFF7]. In 2013, the Obama administration’s EPA granted California a waiver for its ACC I regulations.78Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112, 2145 (Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Waiver Grant]. The EPA largely followed the 2009 waiver decision in determining that the new standards continued to meet “compelling and extraordinary” conditions.79Id. at 2131. The EPA found a rational connection between CARB’s emission standards and long-term air quality goals,80Id. (“Whether or not the ZEV standards achieve additional reductions by themselves above and beyond the LEV III GHG and criteria pollutant standards, the LEV III program overall does achieve such reductions, and EPA defers to California’s policy choice of the appropriate technology path to pursue to achieve these emissions reductions.”). The long-term goals were to have ZEVs be nearly 100% of new vehicle sales between 2040 and 2050, and reduce GHG emissions by 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Id. at 2131–32. as well as compelling and extraordinary conditions within the state pertaining to the effects of pollution.81CARB noted: “Record-setting fires, deadly heat waves, destructive storm surges, loss of winter snowpack—California has experienced all of these in the past decade and will experience more in the coming decades . . . . In California, extreme events such as floods, heat waves, droughts and severe storms will increase in frequency and intensity. Many of these extreme events have the potential to dramatically affect human health and well-being, critical infrastructure and natural systems.” Id. at 2129.

In September 2019, in an unprecedented move, the Trump administration’s EPA revoked the 2013 waiver, marking the first time the EPA retroactively withdrew a previously granted waiver.82The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Waiver Withdrawal]. The EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a joint rulemaking that withdrew the waiver of California’s GHG and ZEV standards that were part of the ACC I program. The EPA went a step further than its 2008 waiver decision, narrowly interpreting that “Congress did not intend the waiver provision . . . to be applied to California measures that address pollution problems of a national or global nature,” but only conditions “extraordinary” with respect to California; that is, “with a particularized nexus to emissions in California and to topographical or other features peculiar to California.”83Id. at 51347. The EPA argued that climate change caused by carbon dioxide emissions is not a local air pollution problem and that California’s new motor vehicle standards deviated too far from what Congress intended in granting California a waiver.84Id. at 51350 n.285 (“Attempting to solve climate change, even in part, through the Section 209 waiver provision is fundamentally different from that section’s original purpose of addressing smog-related air quality problems.”) (quoting the SAFE proposal). The EPA concluded that California’s GHG standards were missing a specific connection to local features, and thus excluded GHG regulation from the scope of the waiver.85Id. at 51347, 51350.

In March 2022, the Biden administration’s EPA rescinded the 2019 waiver withdrawal, restoring the 2013 waiver and California’s authority to enforce its GHG emission standards and ZEV sales mandate.86Advanced Clean Car Program; Reconsideration of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption; Notice of Decision, 87 Fed. Reg. 14332, 14332 (Mar. 14, 2022) [hereinafter 2022 Waiver Reconsideration]. In determining that California has a compelling need for its GHG standards and ZEV sales mandate, the EPA essentially reverted back to its 2013 analysis, maintaining that pollution continues to pose a distinct problem in California.87Id. at 14352–53, 14367. The EPA saw no reason to distinguish between local and global air pollutants, reasoning that all pollutants play a role in California’s local air quality problems and that the EPA should provide deference to California in its comprehensive policy choices for addressing them.88Id. at 14363. The 2022 EPA refuted the 2019 EPA’s premise that GHG emissions from motor vehicles in California do not pose a local air quality issue,89Id. at 14365–66. noting that criteria pollution and GHGs have interrelated and interconnected impacts on local air quality.90“[T]he Agency [in SAFE 1] failed to take proper account of the nature and magnitude of California’s serious air quality problems, including the interrelationship between criteria and GHG pollution.” Id. at 14334. “The air quality issues and pollutants addressed in the ACC program are interconnected in terms of the impacts of climate change on such local air quality concerns such as ozone exacerbation and climate effects on wildfires that affect local air quality.” Id. at 14334 n.10. CARB also attributed GHG emissions reductions to vehicles in California, projecting that the standards will reduce car CO2 emissions by about 4.9% a year. Id. at 14366.

Congress recently expanded the Clean Air Act to include GHGs, clarifying that GHGs are pollutants under the Clean Air Act. On August 16, 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, the single largest climate package in U.S. history, which will invest almost $370 billion in clean energy and other climate-related measures over the next ten years, and is expected to reduce U.S. carbon emissions by 40% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels.91The White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action 5–6 (2023); Summary: The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Senate Democrats, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/inflation_reduction_act_one_page_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4ED-W32A]. The Act reinforces the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act, amending sections of the Clean Air Act to define “greenhouse gas” to include “the air pollutants carbon dioxide, hydrofluorocarbons, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.”92Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, § 132(d)(4), 136 Stat. 1818, 2067. It also grants money under the Clean Air Act for any project that “reduces or avoids greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of air pollution.”93Id. § 134(c)(3)(A), 136 Stat. 1818, 2064. This language supports that Congress fully intends to include GHGs in the Clean Air Act and that California is acting within the scope of the Clean Air Act in implementing its forward-looking motor vehicle emissions regulations.

C.  Pending Lawsuit—Ohio v. EPA

Similar to its prior motor vehicle regulations, California will need to request a preemption waiver from the EPA under section 209(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act to regulate post-2025 vehicles. In the meantime, the Biden administration’s EPA’s latest March 2022 waiver decision prompted Republican-led states and private petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act waiver provision, making the case highly relevant for California’s ability to regulate motor vehicle emissions in the future.94Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 28. In May 2022, seventeen states filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Ohio v. EPA), claiming, inter alia, that the section 209(b)(1) waiver provision violates the equal sovereignty principle because it limits state political authority unequally by allowing only California to set new car emission standards and “exercise sovereign authority that section 209(a) takes from every other State.”95Id. Under this principle, the petitioners alleged, Congress cannot give only some states favorable treatment of sovereignty authority, as it has done with California.96Id. at 26. Even if section 209(b)(1) allowed California to regulate unique state-specific issues, the petitioners argued that the waiver would still be unconstitutional because it allows California to regulate GHGs to address climate change, which is not a problem unique to California.97Id. at 13. The petitioners disagreed with the Biden administration’s EPA’s statement that “California is particularly impacted by climate change,”982022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14363. arguing that other states will be impacted just as much, if not more, from climate change.99Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 32.

The petitioner states also took issue with the idea of giving one state power to regulate a major national industry.100“A federal law giving one State special power to regulate a major national industry contradicts the notion of a Union of sovereign States.” Id. at 29–30. The states argued that California’s “special treatment” under the Clean Air Act—giving California special power to regulate a major national industry and exercise sovereign authority that the Act withdraws from every other state, when California has no unique interest101Id. at 26.—violates the Constitution’s intent to hold all states equal.102Id. at 30. “Instead of allowing all States with a unique environmental concern to seek a waiver, it accords special treatment to a category of States defined to forever include only California and to forever exclude all other States, without regard to whether other States face their own localized environmental concerns.” Id. at 30. In a separate brief, a group of private petitioners, including the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers and Clean Fuels Development Coalition, argued that the equal sovereignty principle does not allow the federal government to give only one state the authority to regulate national and international issues.103Initial Brief for Private Petitioners at 15, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 2022). They claimed that any mandate to shift the nation’s automobile fleet to electric vehicles must come from Congress, because such a shift would “substantially restructure the American automobile market, petroleum industry, agricultural sectors, and the electric grid, at enormous cost and risk.”104Id. at 23. The private petitioners cited the recent West Virginia v. EPA decision, which essentially restricted the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions from power plants.105See id. at 23; West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2612, 2615–16 (2022). Applying the major questions doctrine,106The major questions doctrine states that if an agency seeks to decide an issue of major national significance—that is, in cases where the “history and breadth of the authority” an agency asserts or the “economic and political significance” of that assertion is extraordinary—its action must be supported by clear congressional authorization. Id. at 2607–08. See Kate R. Bowers, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12077, The Major Questions Doctrine 1 (2022) (providing an overview of the major questions doctrine). the Court held that the EPA must point to “clear congressional authorization”107 West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). to justify its regulatory authority in “extraordinary cases” when the EPA asserts broad authority in an area of “economic and political significance.”108West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608–09 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)). The case centers around the Clean Power Plan, a regulation the EPA issued in 2015 that would have curbed carbon emissions from existing coal and gas plants via “‘generation shifting from higher-emitting to lower-emitting’ producers of electricity.” Id. at 2603 (quoting Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64728 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)). The decision was the first time the Supreme Court has used the term “major questions doctrine” in a majority opinion. Bowers, supra note 106, at 2. The Court concluded that the EPA does not have the authority to “substantially restructure the American energy market . . . .”109West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610. If the EPA cannot upend energy generation in the country, as West Virginia v. EPA held, then, the petitioners argued, California similarly cannot “upend the transportation and energy sectors.”110Initial Brief for Private Petitioners, supra note 104, at 19–20. The petitioners further argued that section 177 also allows California to shape national industries, which may burden the states that decline to adopt California’s standards.111Id. at 54.

On the other hand, several electric utility providers, clean energy industry groups, and auto manufacturers have backed California.112Goldberg, supra note 13. A few automakers have indicated that they support the more stringent California standards. In July 2019, CARB reached a voluntary agreement with four major automakers—BMW of North America, Ford, Honda, and Volkswagen Group of America—to adopt a modified version of the GHG standards.113California and Major Automakers Reach Groundbreaking Framework Agreement on Clean Emission Standards, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (July 5, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-and-major-automakers-reach-groundbreaking-framework-agreement-clean-emission [https://perma.cc/52VH-PCLS]. Building on this voluntary framework, in 2020, Volvo joined the four automakers in agreeing to a 17% emissions cut through the 2026 model year.114Framework Agreements on Clean Cars, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Aug. 17, 2020), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/framework-agreements-clean-cars [https://perma.cc/EN78-JR87]. The automakers filed a motion to intervene to defend the EPA’s March 2022 decision.115Ford Motor Co., Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., BMW of N. Am., LLC, Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., and Volvo Car USA LLC, Motion to Intervene in Support of Respondents, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2022).

To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act under the equal sovereignty principle. In its 2019 decision revoking the 2013 California waiver, the Trump administration’s EPA interpreted the statutory criteria in the context of the equal sovereignty principle, explaining that section 209(b)(1) provides “extraordinary treatment” to California and therefore should be interpreted to require a “state-specific particularized” pollution problem.1162019 Waiver Withdrawal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51340. In contrast, in its 2022 waiver grant, the Biden administration’s EPA noted that it has historically declined to consider constitutional issues, reviewing the waiver solely based on the section 209(b)(1) criteria because the statute and legislative history reflect a broad policy of deference to California to address its air quality problems.1172022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14376. This interpretation has been upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA (MEMA I), 627 F.2d 1095, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (declining to consider whether California standards are constitutional); Am. Trucking Ass’ns. v. EPA, 600 F.3d 624, 628 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (declining to express a view on a constitutional challenge to the California standards). In both cases, the Court upheld prior EPA decisions to not consider constitutional objections. Although equal sovereignty presented a new constitutional argument, the EPA limited its role in evaluating waiver requests to “the criteria that Congress directed EPA to review.”1182022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14376. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s EPA briefly addressed the equal sovereignty principle, arguing that the waiver does not impose a burden on any state and that Section 177, in enabling other states to adopt California’s standards, undermines the notion that the section 209(b)(1) waiver treats California in an extraordinary manner.119Id. at 14356. Rather, in deliberately compromising between having one national standard and fifty different state standards by authorizing just two—the federal standard and California’s standards—Congress allowed California to be a “laboratory for innovation” and address the state’s extraordinary pollution problems, while ensuring that automakers were not overburdened with varying state standards.120Id. at 14360, 14377.

D.  California’s Advanced Clean Cars II Regulations

California recently promulgated the Advanced Clean Cars II (“ACC II”) regulations in the shadow of the pending Ohio v. EPA lawsuit. ACC II stems from an executive order Governor Gavin Newsom signed in September 2020 directing CARB to develop regulations contributing to the goal that 100% of in-state sales of new passenger cars and trucks will be zero-emission by 2035.121Cal. Exec. Order No. N-79-20 (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/9.23.20-EO-N-79-20-Climate.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4SE-B5AB]. As a point of comparison, in 2022, nearly 19% of all new light-duty vehicles sold in the state were electric vehicles. New ZEV Sales in California, Cal. Energy Comm’n, https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales [https://perma.cc/TDY9-TXST]. As a result of the executive order, on August 25, 2022, CARB promulgated a new regulation, the ACC II program, phasing out all sales of new fossil fuel cars by 2035.122Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 1. The regulation requires that automakers increase the percentage of electric vehicles progressively, nearly tripling it to 35% by 2026 and reaching 100% by 2035 (see Figure 1).123Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 3.

Figure 1.  Percentage of new vehicle sales that must be zero-emission vehicles

The ACC II regulations amend the ZEV and LEV standards for model years 2026–2035,124Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 77. The ACC II regulations: (1) amend the ZEV regulation to require an increasing number of zero-emission vehicles, and rely on advanced vehicle technologies, including battery-electric, hydrogen fuel cell electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, to meet air quality and climate change emissions standards; and (2) amend the LEV regulations to include increasingly stringent standards for gasoline cars and heavier passenger trucks to continue to reduce smog-forming emissions while the sector transitions toward 100% electrification by 2035. Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 1. following the ACC I regulations, which address model year 2015–2025 vehicles.125Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 1. CARB estimates that the new regulations will reduce vehicle GHG emissions by more than 50% by 2040.126Goldberg, supra note 13. Thus, the decision from Ohio v. EPA will have implications for California’s ability to implement standards including the ACC II program going forward.

E.  The Equal Sovereignty Principle

The Supreme Court didn’t develop the equal sovereignty principle as a meaningful concept until Shelby County v. Holder in 2013,127Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540 (2013); see Equal Sovereignty Five Years After Shelby County, Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.: Amicus Blog (Oct. 31, 2018), https://harvardcrcl.org/equal-sovereignty-five-years-after-shelby-county [https://perma.cc/S5G8-QSAQ]. in which the Supreme Court held a statute (the Voting Rights Act) unconstitutional based on the equal sovereignty principle for the first time. The Court did not clarify what constitutional provision this principle is based on.128See Amdt 10.4.3 Equal Sovereignty Doctrine, Const. Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt10-4-3/ALDE_00013628 [https://perma.cc/US7J-4YU9]. Although the Constitution requires equal treatment among the states in particular contexts,129See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (requiring “Duties, Imposts and Excises” to be “uniform throughout the United States”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (requiring “a uniform Rule of Naturalization” and “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (“No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause – “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (Privileges and Immunities Clause – “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); U.S. Const. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”); U.S. Const. amend. XI. no provision explicitly requires Congress to treat all states equally as a general matter.130See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1230–32 (2016); Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 Duke L.J. 1087, 1099–1100 (2016). This absence of an explicit statement could mean that the founders did not intend to establish a generally applicable equal sovereignty principle.131See Final Brief for Respondents at 33, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2023). Critics of Shelby County have claimed that the Supreme Court invented the equal sovereignty principle to achieve political ends.132See Abigail B. Molitor, Understanding Equal Sovereignty, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1839, 1840 (2014); Litman, supra note 130. Judge Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote regarding the equal sovereignty principle: “This is a principle of constitutional law of which I had never heard—for the excellent reason that . . . there is no such principle . . . . The opinion [Shelby County] rests on air.” Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court and the Voting Rights Act: Striking Down the Law Is All About Conservatives’ Imagination, Slate (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/06/the-supreme-court-and-the-voting-rights-act-striking-down-the-law-is-all-about-conservatives-imagination.html [https://perma.cc/P7WJ-62A7]. Other scholars argue that questions about the sovereign power of the states have existed since the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.133See Molitor, supra note 132, at 1877; Colby, supra note 130, at 1102; Valerie J.M. Brader, Congress’ Pet: Why the Clean Air Act’s Favoritism of California Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Env’t L. & Pol’y 119, 151 (2007); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 209, 238 (2016). Many scholars agree there is some support for the principle in the historical record and constitutional doctrine, but they doubt that is sufficient for it to be considered a “fundamental” principle, as Shelby County claims.134See Molitor, supra note 132, at 1841; Litman, supra note 130, at 1212; David Kow, An “Equal Sovereignty” Principle Born in Northwest Austin, Texas, Raised in Shelby County, Alabama, 16 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y 346, 375 (2015). This Section traces the history of how courts have applied the equal sovereignty principle, from the context of admitting new states into the Union to voting rights.

1.  Origins: The Equal Footing Doctrine—New Admission of States

The equal sovereignty principle dates back to the equal footing doctrine referenced in Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution: “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”135U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided a path toward statehood for the territories northwest of the Ohio River,136These territories would later become Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, U.S. H.R.: Hist., Art & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1700s/Northwest-Ordinance-1787/ [https://perma.cc/CLG2-V2ZA]. further required that these states be admitted “on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever,” on the condition that the new state constitutions and governments were “republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles . . . .”137Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio art. V (1787), https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/northwest-ordinance [https://perma.cc/2ZUF-U5DT]. The act also banned slavery in the new territories but allowed for the return of fugitive slaves. Id., art. VI. Professor Litman argues, however, that the Northwest Ordinance’s meaning is unclear because “equal footing” did not necessarily promise new states the same legislative sovereignty as the original states, but rather just that new states would receive fair representation in Congress. Litman, supra note 130, at 1235–36. Additionally, Litman notes that the Northwest Ordinance actually broadened Congress’s powers over the would-be states, resulting in different treatment of those states, since it prohibited religious discrimination and slavery in the new states. Id. James Madison inferred that Congress would determine whether newly admitted states have the same “legislative sovereignty” as the original states. Id.

Several court cases also interpret the Constitution to support the equal sovereignty principle. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan held that Congress must admit every state into the Union on the same terms and with the same powers as the original states.138“The new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction [over the shores of navigable waters] as the original states.” Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845). Every state must be “admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states,139Id. at 216. with “equal sovereign rights.”140Id. at 231. Further, the court held that “no compact” can “diminish or enlarge” the rights a state has when it enters the Union.141Id. at 229. Northwest Austin v. Holder referenced this case as support for the historic tradition that all states enjoy equal sovereignty.142Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (citing United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845))). Coyle v. Smith held that states, not Congress, have sovereignty to choose where to locate their state capital: the United States “was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.”143Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). No state is “less or greater . . . in dignity or power” than another.144Id. at 566. Thus, Congress may not unequally limit or expand the states’ political and sovereign power.145See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900) (“It has often been said that a State admitted into the Union enters therein in full equality with all the others, and such equality may forbid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations . . . .”). Indeed, “the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”146Coyle, 221 U.S. at 580. Thus, these cases establish the origins of the equal sovereignty principle in the admission of new states into the Union.

2.  Equal Sovereignty Applied to Voting Rights

When the equal sovereignty principle was brought up in the context of the Voting Rights Act, courts had to determine whether the principle applied outside the state admission context.

Congress designed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address continuing voting discrimination after the Civil War.147South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1870, prohibited voting discrimination based on race,148See id. at 310; U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1. and Congress subsequently enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870, which prohibited obstruction of the exercise of the right to vote.149See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310; Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 41st Congress, Sess. II. However, enforcement of the law was ineffective, and throughout Reconstruction, many southern states continued to enact tests designed to prevent Black people from voting.150See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310–11. Literacy tests disproportionately affected African Americans due to the high illiteracy rates in comparison with Whites. At the same time, grandfather clauses, property qualifications, character tests, and interpretation requirements were employed to “assure that white illiterates would not be deprived of the franchise.” Id. at 311. To address this continuing discrimination, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act established a preclearance requirement, mandating that the federal government approve all new voting regulations to ensure that they did not perpetuate racial discrimination.151Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439. However, the preclearance requirement only applied to states with a history of voting discrimination, as determined by the coverage formula in section 4 of the Voting Rights Act.152The coverage formula established that if the state used a law like a literacy or character test to keep people from registering to vote as of November 1, 1964, and less than 50% of the eligible voting population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964 or voted in the presidential election of November 1964, then the state was subject to preclearance. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437, 438. The coverage formula implicated states located primarily in the South; thus, a select group of states were subject to more stringent requirements than other states when seeking to change their voting laws.

In its 1966 decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the equal sovereignty principle prohibited differential treatment in the voting rights context. The Court held that the equal sovereignty principle only applied to situations involving the admission of new states, not the Voting Rights Act: “The doctrine of the equality of States . . . applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”153Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29. The Court observed that Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in response to the “insidious and pervasive evil” of racial discrimination in voting,154Id. at 309. and thus held that the Voting Rights Act was a constitutional and appropriate means for carrying out the Fifteenth Amendment.155Id. at 328–29.

Fourteen years later in City of Rome v. United States, the Supreme Court again upheld the Voting Rights Act as constitutional, finding that the Reconstruction Amendments were “specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty,” and thus, Congress had the authority to regulate state and local voting.156City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980). The Court cited Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, which held that the principle of state sovereignty embodied by the Eleventh Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”157Id. at 156–58 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). However, the Court would later apply the equal sovereignty principle to invalidate part of the Voting Rights Act.

3.  Shelby County v. Holder—Equal Sovereignty as a General Principle

Only two Supreme Court cases discuss equal sovereignty as a general principle.158Molitor, supra note 132, at 1879. Northwest Austin v. Holder,159Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). though still a voting rights case, applied the equal sovereignty principle more broadly in 2009, laying the foundation for Shelby County v. Holder160Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). to overrule Voting Rights Act section 4 in 2013.161See Molitor, supra note 132, at 1878 (“Since Shelby County, only one court has issued an opinion dealing with equal sovereignty [NCAA v. New Jersey, a Third Circuit case].”).

In Northwest Austin, the Supreme Court observed that the section 4 coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act went against the “historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty’ ” by differentiating between the states.162Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (citing United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845))). The Court acknowledged that differentiating between states is sometimes justified, citing Katzenbach as an example.163Id.  (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)). However, it held that departing from “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”164Id. Thus, the equal sovereignty principle limits Congress’s ability to subject different states to unequal burdens, at least without sufficient justification.165Amdt 10.4.3 Equal Sovereignty Doctrine, Const. Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt10-4-3/ALDE_00013628 [https://perma.cc/US7J-4YU9]. The Court also noted that the Act “imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”166Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. While the Court ultimately resolved the case on statutory grounds,167Id. at 206–11. it expressed concern that sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act raised “serious constitutional questions.”168Id. at 204. The Court observed that improved conditions in the South since 1965 may distinguish the case from Katzenbach because current conditions in 2009 may no longer reflect the discriminatory state actions that Congress meant for section 5 to address, and cited a lower racial gap in voter registration as an example to show that the coverage formula may rely on outdated statistics.169Id. at 202–04 (2009). The Court notes that “[v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity[,]” “[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare,” and “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” Id. at 202. The Court also observed that the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements “authorize[d] federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking” and imposed “substantial ‘federalism costs.’ ”170Id. at 202.

These concerns formed the basis for Shelby County to hold that section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional because it departed from the “fundamental principle” of equal sovereignty.171Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). The Supreme Court found the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” to be “highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”172Id. The Court adopted the guidelines Northwest Austin set—namely, that the Voting Rights Act “imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs,” and that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”173Id. at 542; see Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. The Court also distinguished the case from Katzenbach. Whereas in Katzenbach, the coverage formula was “relevant to the problem” of voting discrimination at the time,174Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 551–52; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 301 (1966). here, the coverage formula was not updated to reflect contemporary improvements in voting participation, including higher voter registration and turnout numbers.175Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 547–49, 551. The Court concluded that Congress did not sufficiently justify its reauthorization of the “extraordinary and unprecedented features” of the Voting Rights Act;176Id. at 549. thus, the Court held that the coverage formula no longer met the test introduced in Northwest Austin.177Id. at 551.

Shelby County, the only Supreme Court case to apply the test established in Northwest Austin, gave little guidance on how to apply the equal sovereignty principle in future cases, other than indicating that the law should rely on “current data reflecting current needs” when the degree of voting discrimination that prompted the original passage of the Voting Rights Act had changed.178Id. at 552–53. The Supreme Court has not decided an equal sovereignty challenge since Shelby County, leaving lower courts to interpret how to apply the equal sovereignty principle outside the voting rights context.

II.  APPLYING THE SHELBY COUNTY TEST TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT

Under the Northwest Austin test that Shelby County applied (the “Shelby County test”), the statute “must be justified by current needs,” and if federal legislation departs from the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty,” it “requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”179Id. at 542; see Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). This Part argues that the equal sovereignty principle likely does not apply to the Clean Air Act, thus the Shelby County test should not even apply. But even if it were to apply and the Shelby County test is triggered, this Part concludes that the principle does not invalidate section 209(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act because California’s current needs continue to justify its differential treatment. California’s unique exemption is sufficiently related to the public health problem that the Clean Air Act waiver provision targets; allowing California broad discretion to regulate motor vehicle emissions directly contributes to Congress’s goal of addressing public health threats from motor vehicle pollution in the state.

A.  The Equal Sovereignty Principle Likely Does Not Apply to the Clean Air Act

This Section argues that the scope of the Shelby County test is limited and likely does not apply to the Clean Air Act. Shelby County emphasizes that the equal sovereignty principle applies to federal laws that “authorize[] federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.”180Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 545 (citing Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)). The Supreme Court thus applied the equal sovereignty principle to the Voting Rights Act because it determined that election regulation was a sensitive area of state policymaking. Highlighting the “extraordinary” nature of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance provisions,181Id. the Court noted that the law suspends “all changes to state election law—however innocuous—until they have been precleared by federal authorities . . . .”182Id. at 544 (citing Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202). The federal government must explicitly grant states permission to implement voting laws that they “would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own . . . .”183Id. Because the Voting Rights Act intruded into a sensitive area of state policymaking that had traditionally been the exclusive province of the states, the Court limited Congress’s authority under the Fifteenth Amendment to restrict states’ election procedures disparately.

Professor Leah Litman goes even farther to posit that only federal action that lessens the dignity of a state or group of states triggers the Shelby County conception of equal sovereignty.184Litman, supra note 130, at 1214. Under this narrower interpretation, Litman argues that laws will violate equal sovereignty only if they single out particular states that have behaved in morally-blameworthy ways, limiting the scope of the principle to legislation enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments.185Id. at 1214–15. Under this interpretation, the equal sovereignty principle primarily serves as a check on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and should only apply in cases similar to those involving voting rights, in which the dignity of human beings is at stake.186Id.

Since Shelby County, a few weak equal sovereignty claims have been made in the lower courts in areas outside of voting rights, and the courts have distinguished these cases from Shelby County. For example, in Mayhew v. Burwell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to Medicaid laws.187In Mayhew v. Burwell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) did not violate equal sovereignty even though it prevented Maine from “design[ing] its [own] Medicaid laws in ways that many of its sister States remain[ed] free to do.” Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 93 (1st Cir. 2014). The court reasoned that the ACA did not intrude into an area of authority traditionally occupied by the states because it governed Maine’s administration of a federal program that is primarily funded by the federal government. Id. at 95. Thus, the statute at issue “does not similarly effect a federal intrusion into a sensitive area of state or local policymaking.” Id. at 93. Perhaps most relevant to the Clean Air Act waiver is National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Governor of New Jersey, which addressed the constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”).188Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013). PASPA prohibits states from licensing sports gambling, except for states that had gambling operations prior to the Act’s passage, which only includes Nevada.189Id. at 214–15; see 28 U.S.C. § 3702, 3704. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to PASPA, distinguishing the Voting Rights Act from PASPA by finding that regulating gambling via the Commerce Clause is “not of the same nature” as regulating elections via the Reconstruction Amendments.190Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 238. The court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to enact laws “aimed at matters of national concern and finding national solutions will necessarily affect states differently,”191Id. such that federal Commerce Clause regulation “does not require geographic uniformity.”192Id. (citing Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388 (1946)). The court found that applying Shelby County to all situations is “overly broad” and that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply outside “the context of ‘sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.’ ”193Id. at 238–39 (citing Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 545 (2013)).

Similar to PASPA, Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority in passing the Clean Air Act to regulate motor vehicle emissions; thus, Congress is exercising the federal power of regulating interstate commerce and can treat states differently in the process.194See Vikram David Amar, Why the Clean Air Act’s Special Treatment of California is Permissible Even in Light of the Equal-Sovereignty Notion Invoked in Shelby County, Justia: Verdict (Aug. 2, 2022), https://verdict.justia.com/2022/08/02/why-the-clean-air-acts-special-treatment-of-california-is-permissible-even-in-light-of-the-equal-sovereignty-notion-invoked-in-shelby-county [https://perma.cc/EYD8-H26N] (“[T]he Clean Air Act was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, a provision that decidedly does not require geographic uniformity”); Final Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 32–35. The Clean Air Act likely does not intrude into “sensitive areas of state and local policymaking” as the Voting Rights Act does. Regulating motor vehicles has not traditionally been the exclusive province of the states. Three agencies set federal and state vehicle emissions standards: the EPA, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and CARB.195Federal Vehicle Standards, Ctr. for Climate & Energy Sols., https://www.c2es.org/content/regulating-transportation-sector-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/BK55-6TCA]. Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act explicitly provides for federal preemption, prohibiting states from adopting their own motor vehicle regulations.19642 U.S.C. § 7543(a). Regulating motor vehicle emissions affects interstate commerce because air pollution crosses state borders.197S. Allan Adelman, Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions: State or Federal Responsibility? 20 Cath. U. L. Rev. 157, 158, 163–64 (1970). Thus, like PASPA, the Clean Air Act does not intrude into a sensitive area of policymaking traditionally occupied by the states.

At its core, the outcome the petitioners demand in Ohio v. EPA is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty. Without the waiver, the Clean Air Act defaults to only federal standards and federal preemption, leaving states with no choice but to adopt the federal standard. Thus, invalidating the California waiver—as petitioners seek to do—gives states fewer choices. It fails to promote the principle of equal sovereignty, which arguably protects the power of the states to enact policies that differ from those of the federal government.198Schmitt, supra note 133, at 262; see infra Section I.E.1; 2022 Waiver Reconsideration, supra note 86, at 14360 (“Indeed, if section 209(b) is interpreted to limit the types of air pollution that California may regulate, it would diminish the sovereignty of California and the states that adopt California’s standards pursuant to section 177 without enhancing any other state’s sovereignty.”). In her amicus brief, Professor Litman noted that the petitioners’ invocation of the equal sovereignty principle is inconsistent with its history because the petitioners’ arguments would result in less authority and flexibility for the states, and more coercive authority for the federal government.199Brief for Professor Leah M. Litman as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Ohio v. EPA, No. 22-1081 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 2023). By allowing California to promulgate more stringent standards and allowing other states to choose between the federal and California standards, Congress has offered those states more options, not fewer. This is likely not an abuse of state sovereignty.200Id. at 28. By arguing for an expansion of federal preemption, thereby preempting more state legislative and policy goals, the petitioners seek a result that does not promote state sovereignty and instead runs contrary to the equal sovereignty principle’s historical use as a limit on congressional power.201Id. at 5, 30; see infra Section I.E.1.

Congressional debates regarding California’s special status indicate that Congress clearly considered the equal sovereignty problem and rejected it. In 1970, members of the House of Representatives expressed concern that all states should have the “same right that the State of California has in setting standards that they deem necessary for the health and safety of their people.”202See 91 Cong. Rec. H19232 (daily ed. Jun. 10, 1970) (statement of Rep. Leonard Farbstein, New York). Representatives of other states, including Pennsylvania and New York, argued that their air quality problems were worse than California’s, so they too should have the power to create state regulations exceeding federal standards.203Pennsylvania “has had more deaths due to air pollution than any other State in the Nation” and “is interested in increasing its standards.” Id. at 19231. “New York has a problem with fog and smog that is just as bad as that condition which exists in California.” Id. at 19232. Thus, proper application of the equal sovereignty principle would allow all states to promulgate their own motor vehicles emissions regulations. Congress was more concerned about other states not being able to promulgate their own motor vehicles emissions standards than about California having special privileges. In contrast, in Ohio v. EPA, the petitioner states attempt to prevent California from enacting more stringent policies that could benefit other states, thus flipping the use of the equal sovereignty principle to make it more difficult for states to enact their own policies.

The Supreme Court has suggested in Shelby County that the equal sovereignty principle does not extend to all areas of the law, and this Section concludes that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to the Clean Air Act. However, even if it were to apply, the Clean Air Act waiver provision passes the Shelby County test and remains constitutional, as analyzed in the next Section.

B.  Even if the Equal Sovereignty Principle Applies to the Clean Air Act, It Does Not Invalidate Section 209(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act

Even if the equal sovereignty principle were to apply to the Clean Air Act, the Clean Air Act waiver provision remains constitutional. Applying the Shelby County test, the Clean Air Act waiver likely departs from the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” in creating a differential in its treatment of states’ political authority. As a result, the “statute’s disparate geographic coverage” must be “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” This Section concludes that this criterion is met; thus, the waiver provision remains constitutional. Congress had strong justifications for granting California an exemption that continue to remain relevant. First, the Clean Air Act targets not only smog in one region of California, but also the broader problem of public health from automobile emissions. Second, allowing California to implement more stringent motor vehicle regulations would directly help address this broader problem. California faces new and increasingly formidable threats from climate change, which have exacerbated the existing problems that initially compelled California’s motor vehicle regulations. Allowing California broad discretion to regulate GHG emissions is directly related to Congress’s goal of addressing the public health threats from motor vehicle pollution in California because the effects of GHG emissions and smog are interrelated and affect one another. This Section thus concludes that California’s current needs continue to justify Congress’s differential treatment of California—maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening, section 209(b)’s relevance in the twenty-first century.

1.  By Treating States’ Political Authority Differently, the Clean Air Act Waiver Likely Violates the Equal Sovereignty Principle

The equal sovereignty principle does not require the federal government to treat states equally in every scenario, but requires that all states have equal political authority.204Schmitt, supra note 133, at 220. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sovereignty” as “[s]upreme dominion, authority, or rule”205Sovereignty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). and “state sovereignty” as “[t]he right of a state to self-government; the supreme authority exercised by each state.”206State sovereignty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The Court in Shelby County explained that “[s]tates retain broad autonomy . . . in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives,”207Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013). referencing the Tenth Amendment and federalism principles as crucial in preserving the “integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States.”208Id. at 530 (citing Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011)). In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court noted that the equal footing doctrine applies to political rights and sovereignty, but not economic issues.209United States v. Texas, 339 US 707, 716 (1950). The Court observed that the equal footing doctrine was not designed to eliminate diversity in economic aspects such as area, location, and geology, but rather to “create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.”210Id. Thus, Congress violates the equal sovereignty principle when it limits the political power of a particular subset of states.211Schmitt, supra note 133, at 220.

Legislation that prohibits some states but not others from enacting laws about the same topic likely would violate the equal sovereignty principle. For example, the Voting Rights Act limits only southern states’ ability to regulate elections and PASPA permits only Nevada to legalize sports betting;212Colby, supra note 130, at 1155. PASPA “does not merely regulate private conduct; it curtails the regulatory and revenue-raising authority of the states. It precludes non-exempted states from legalizing sports gambling . . . . Nevada may derive enormous financial benefits from casino sports book betting, but other states may not.” Id. thus, these laws would in theory violate the principle. Similarly, the Clean Air Act treats California’s sovereign authority differently from the other states. By permitting only California to regulate motor vehicles and promulgate new motor vehicles emissions standards, while limiting other states to either adopt the California or federal standards, the Clean Air Act waiver arguably limits other states’ rights to govern themselves in the area of motor vehicles, as well as transportation and energy more broadly. Rather than allow all states with certain air quality conditions to set regulations, the Clean Air Act allowed the state that first adopted its own motor vehicle regulations to continue setting the standard for new regulations.213See Brader, supra note 133, at 155–56. “The one state that had chosen to regulate in particular ways was given a power denied to all the states that had chosen not to exercise their equal right to do so . . . . These provisions are not about an inequality of economics or geography—they are about sovereignty.” Id. Thus, if we were to apply the equal sovereignty principle to the Clean Air Act, the Clean Air Act likely departs from the equal sovereignty principle by exhibiting disparate treatment of the states’ political authority pertaining to motor vehicle regulations.

2.  Nevertheless, the Clean Air Act Waiver Provision Remains Constitutional Because Its Disparate Geographic Coverage Favoring California Is “Sufficiently Related to the Problem that It Targets”

Violating the equal sovereignty principle does not automatically invalidate a law as unconstitutional. However, it triggers heighted scrutiny, meaning that Congress must justify the disparate treatment of the states as unequal sovereigns214See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“Distinctions can be justified in some cases.”). by showing that the differential treatment is sufficiently related to the problem the law is addressing.215Colby, supra note 130, at 1155–56. If the statute departs from the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty,” it “requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542 (2013) (citing Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (2009)). This higher standard “ensures that when Congress limits the sovereign power of some of the states in ways that do not apply to others, it has a good reason to do so.”216Schmitt, supra note 133, at 213.

In Shelby County, the Supreme Court concluded that the coverage formula, while perhaps justified in 1965, was no longer justified in 2006 when Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act.217Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 551. Because the coverage formula continued to distinguish states “based on ‘decades-old data and eradicated practices,’ ” including the past use of literacy tests that “have been banned nationwide for over 40 years” and on racial disparity in “voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s” that no longer persisted, the Court held that the 2006 reauthorization statute’s disparate geographic coverage was not sufficiently related to the problem of twenty-first century racial discrimination in voting that it targeted, so “current needs” no longer justified it.218Id. at 551–53. Thus, the Court found circumstances in 2013 to be sufficiently changed to render the coverage formula unconstitutional.219Id. at 550–53, 556–57; Molitor, supra note 132, at 1849–50.

Applying this line of reasoning to the Clean Air Act, the petitioners in Ohio v. EPA claim that because California has transitioned to regulating GHG emissions, the waiver provision is no longer sufficiently related to the problem that it targets because California’s standards are targeting climate change, which is global, not state-specific, in nature: “[C]limate change is not an acute California problem.”220Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 30–31. This Section counteracts this argument and asserts that the waiver provision continues to be sufficiently related to the problem that it targets, distinguishing California’s motor vehicle regulations from the voting regulations at issue in Shelby County. First, the Clean Air Act targets not only smog in one region of California, but also the broader problem of public health from automobile emissions. Second, allowing California to implement more stringent motor vehicle regulations would directly help address this broader problem. California faces new and increasingly formidable threats from climate change that have exacerbated the existing problems that initially compelled California’s motor vehicle regulations. The effects of GHG and smog pollution are directly interrelated and affect one another; thus, addressing GHG emissions is directly related to Congress’s goal of addressing the public health threats from motor vehicle pollution in California. This Section therefore concludes that California’s current needs continue to justify the state’s differential treatment.

i.  The Clean Air Act Targets the Broad Problem of Public Health Threats from Automobile Emissions

How courts frame the problem that Congress is targeting can shape their determination of whether a statute is constitutional. In NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that even if the equal sovereignty principle were to apply to Commerce Clause legislation, PASPA passed the Shelby County test because its “true purpose” was to “stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling,” rather than eliminate it altogether.221Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 239 (3d Cir. 2013). Because PASPA was drafted in neutral terms, any state that already supported gambling could continue to do so, and Congress likely knew that Nevada was the only state that had existing gambling operations.222“It shall be unlawful . . . to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 3702. However, § 3702 shall not apply to a state that conducted a gambling scheme “at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990 . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 3704. “Nevada alone began permitting widespread betting on sporting events in 1949 . . . .” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 215. PASPA’s disparate geographic coverage was therefore justified: “Targeting only states where the practice did not exist is . . . precisely tailored to address the problem.”223Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 239. If the court had defined the problem PASPA was targeting as eliminating all sports gambling, Nevada’s exemption would be harder to justify, and the statute would likely be unconstitutional for not being sufficiently related to the problem. However, because the court defined the problem as halting the spread of sports gambling, the Third Circuit’s analysis was a stronger one.

In Ohio v. EPA, the petitioners argue that the problem Congress designed the Clean Air Act to target was a narrow, California-specific problem.224Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 30–31. However, while smog may have been the impetus for the legislation,225See H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 50 (1967) (recognizing the “critical concern of California for air pollution control, which is prompted especially by the acute susceptibility of the Los Angeles basin to concentrations of smog”). Congress also intended a broader goal of enabling California to use its developing expertise in vehicle pollution to develop innovative regulatory programs and serve as a leader in automobile emissions regulations.226See Chanin, supra note 63, at 716–17. In 1967, Congress acknowledged California’s serious air quality problems as well as its role as a laboratory for emissions control technology for the country.227See H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 96 (1967). The Senate Report concluded that with California’s experience in control systems and design, the waiver provision will allow California to “continue to be the testing area” for more stringent standards, potentially strengthening federal standards and benefiting all states.228S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (1967).

Multiple instances from the Congressional Record suggest that the broader problem Congress intended to target was the public health threats caused by motor vehicle pollution.229See H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 3–8, 96 (1967); S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 32–33 (1967). Congress could have amended the Clean Air Act in 1977 to restrict the waiver provision. Instead, it ratified and strengthened the waiver by giving California the flexibility to adopt a complete program of motor vehicle emission controls.230Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA (MEMA I), 627 F.2d 1095, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977); see infra Section I.A. The original 1967 waiver provision required the EPA Administrator to grant a waiver “unless he finds that such State does not require standards more stringent than applicable Federal standards . . . .”231Clean Air Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208(b), 81 Stat. 485, 501. In contrast, the amended version requires that the EPA grant the waiver “if the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.”232Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 207, 91 Stat. 685, 755 (emphasis added); see infra Section I.A. Congress intentionally granted California deference in creating motor vehicle standards in order to “afford California the broadest possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect the health of its citizens and the public welfare.”233H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977); see MEMA I, 627 F. 2d at 1110–11. The amendment “confers broad discretion” on California to “weigh the degree of health hazards from various pollutants and the degree of emission reduction achievable for various pollutants with various emission control technologies and standards.”234H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 23 (1977). Congress made clear that the EPA should defer to California’s policy decisions, unless they are overwhelmingly arbitrary and capricious: the EPA Administrator “is not to overturn California’s judgment lightly. Nor is he to substitute his judgment for that of the State. There must be clear and compelling evidence that the State acted unreasonably in evaluating the relative risks of various pollutants . . . .”235Id. at 302. The EPA recognized in its 2013 waiver decision that Congress allowed it only limited review based on the section 209(b)(1) criteria to “ensure that the federal government did not second-guess state policy choices.”2362013 Waiver Grant, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2115. As the EPA affirmed, “Congress recognized that California could serve as a pioneer and a laboratory for the nation in setting new motor vehicle emission standards.”237Id. at 2113. Thus, as long as the regulations protect the health of California residents, the EPA should defer to California on the scope of those regulations.

ii.  Allowing California Broad Discretion to Regulate GHG Emissions Is Sufficiently Related to Addressing the Public Health Threats from Motor Vehicle Pollution in California

In Shelby County, the Voting Rights Act coverage formula factored in states’ voting discrimination history, which consisted of specific, unchangeable factors.238The coverage formula established that if the state used a law like a literacy or character test to keep people from registering to vote as of November 1, 1964, and less than 50% of the eligible voting population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964 or voted in the presidential election of November 1964, then the state was subject to preclearance. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437. In contrast, Congress noted that California’s circumstances can change: if California no longer faces “compelling and extraordinary” conditions, it can no longer establish its own standards.239S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (1967). This possibility creates a built-in mechanism to continually evaluate whether California needs its separate regulations240See Final Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 42. and whether the waiver provision is “justified by current needs.”241See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). Recognizing “the unique problems facing California as a result of its climate and topography,” Congress noted in 1967 that only California has demonstrated “compelling and extraordinary circumstances sufficiently different from the Nation as a whole to justify standards on automobile emissions which may, from time to time, need [to] be more stringent than national standards.”242H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 21–22 (1967); S. Rep. No. 90-403 at 33 (1967). The petitioners in Ohio v. EPA treat GHG emissions as if they are a separate and mutually exclusive concept from smog and criteria pollutants, claiming that because California has shifted from regulations to reduce local smog problems to regulations to reduce GHGs and address global climate change, the waiver provision no longer justifies California’s exemption.243See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 32 (“[T]here is no evidence California will suffer effects that are worse—in magnitude or in kind—than those experienced by the other forty-nine States.”). On the contrary, this Section argues that the effects of GHG emissions and smog pollution are interrelated and affect one another. Thus, addressing GHG emissions is directly related to Congress’s goal of addressing the public health threats from motor vehicle pollution in California.

Given the history of California’s early motor vehicle regulations and Congress’s interest in having California as a “laboratory for innovation” while not overburdening automobile manufacturers by forcing them to comply with multiple state standards, Congress intentionally struck a balance by authorizing just two standards: the national standard and the California standard.2442022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14360, 14377; H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 21 (1967); see S. Rep. No. 90-403 at 33–34 (1967). This compromise would allow California to continue to innovate and improve its air quality without creating a practical nightmare for automakers and interstate commerce.245Members of Congress favored states’ rights but were also concerned that having 50 different sets of requirements related to emissions controls would “unduly burden interstate commerce.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 309 (1977). Congress deliberately exempted California from federal preemption of motor vehicle regulations because of its “pioneering role in regulating automobile-related emissions, which pre-dated the Federal effort.”246Id. at 301. Because California had already adopted a robust air quality program and established its own motor vehicle emission standards prior to the passage of the federal Clean Air Act, it had expertise in emissions regulations that other states did not have.247See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 281, 314 (2003) (“The prospect of fifty separate standards for automobiles is untenable. But California has unique air pollution problems and an economy large enough to support separate standards.”); id. at 311 (noting that California “is probably unique in the country in the amount of expertise and sophistication it has developed in the regulation of auto emissions”).

California’s large automobile market and economy continue to justify its disparate treatment. At the time Congress passed the Clean Air Act waiver, it recognized the “presence and growth of California’s vehicle population, whose emissions were thought to be responsible for ninety percent of the air pollution in certain parts of California.”2482013 Waiver Grant, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2126. Congress noted the large effect of vehicles on local air pollution: “Motor vehicles are responsible for about 90 percent of the smog in the Los Angeles County, some 56 percent in the San Francisco Bay area, and about 50 percent in San Diego.”249H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 97 (1967). Congress also noted that because of its large size, California has “an economy large enough to support separate standards.”250Carlson, supra note 247, at 314. Thus, California’s market was large enough that automobile companies could still make a sizable profit while producing cars to meet California’s more stringent environmental requirements.251“The auto industry has shown itself willing and able to make the modifications required for its lucrative California market.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 97 (1967). There were twice as many vehicles in California as in any other state, including New York.252113 Cong. Rec. H30942 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1967) (statement of Rep. Chet Holifield, California). Today, California continues to be the largest automobile market in the United States; if the state were a country, it would be the tenth largest auto market in the world.253Based on new passenger car/light vehicle registrations. Felix Richter, California Is Among the World’s Largest Car Markets, Statista (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/23023/top-10-markets-for-new-passenger-car-registrations [https://perma.cc/6886-64FN]. California makes up 11% of U.S. new light-duty vehicle sales, and combined with the states that have already adopted its LEV rules, makes up 40.1% of U.S. new light-duty vehicle sales.254Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 8. Forty-three percent of ZEVs sold in the U.S. are sold in California.255California ZEV Sales Near 18% of All New Car Sales in 2022, Off. Cal. Governor Gavin Newsom (Oct. 19, 2022), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2022/10/19/california-zev-sales-near-18-of-all-new-car-sales-in-2022 [https://perma.cc/XM2W-6F3U].

California’s unique topography and climate conditions have also contributed to the air pollution problems exacerbated by climate change. The legislative history indicates that Congress granted California an exemption to regulate motor vehicle emissions primarily because California was facing unique, severe air pollution problems across the state, particularly in the Los Angeles area.256See H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 50 (1967) (recognizing the “critical concern of California for air pollution control, which is prompted especially by the acute susceptibility of the Los Angeles basin to concentrations of smog”). California’s air pollution problem was among “the most pervasive and acute in the Nation” at the time.257H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 301 (1977); see 113 Cong. Rec. H30943 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1967) (statement of Rep. Tunney, California: “We are facing a serious and spreading smog problem, primarily caused by motor vehicle emissions.”). Geographical and climatic factors were consistently cited as “compelling and extraordinary” factors during the House debate, including the “unique problems facing California as the result of numerous thermal inversions that occur within that State because of its geography and prevailing winds pattern.”258113 Cong. Rec. H30948 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1967) (statement of Rep. Harley Staggers, Chairman, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee); see also id. at H30955 (statement of Rep. Roybal, California, referring to “atmospheric inversion”); id. at H30975 (statement of Rep. John Moss, California, referring to California’s “unique” meteorological problems). Rep. Holifield noted that California has a unique problem due to an atmospheric inversion which “the peculiar topography of the metropolitan area of Los Angeles County” has caused to some extent by keeping smog in the area and surrounding counties.259Id. at H30942 (statement of Rep. Chet Holifield, California). Even though members of Congress recognized that air pollution also affects other states in concerning ways,260William Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, noted that air pollution has become an increasingly pressing problem in most metropolitan areas, including New York City, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington D.C. H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 50 (1967). they agreed that California’s distinct conditions and topography continue to contribute to the unique effects of pollution in the state, creating a critical need for air pollution control.261See S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (1967) (“California’s unique problems and pioneering efforts justified a waiver . . . in the 15 years that auto emission standards have been debated and discussed, only the State of California has demonstrated compelling and extraordinary circumstances sufficiently different from the Nation as a whole . . . .”). As CARB established, California’s ozone levels will be exacerbated by higher temperatures from global warming, and “there is general consensus that temperature increases from climate change will exacerbate the historic climate, topography, and population factors conducive to smog formation in California, which were the driving forces behind Congress’s inclusion of the waiver provision.”2622022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14364 n.297.

Most significantly, climate change has only exacerbated the air pollution and smog problems that initially compelled California’s motor vehicle regulations and the Clean Air Act waiver. Automobiles emit both GHGs and smog-forming emissions including nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter.263Greenhouse Gas Versus Smog Forming Emissions, EPA, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-versus-smog-forming-emissions_.html [https://perma.cc/ULA6-84AC]. The 2021 report of the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) reflects the latest scientific consensus that climate change is both a local and global problem.264Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 25 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2021) [hereinafter IPCC 2021 Report] (“Cities intensify human-induced warming locally, and further urbanization together with more frequent hot extremes will increase the severity of heatwaves.”). The report establishes a connection between climate change and intensifying weather extremes including heat waves and droughts.265Id. at 8. Additionally, GHGs contribute to respiratory disease from smog and air pollution.266Christina Nunez, Carbon Dioxide Levels are at a Record High. Here’s What You Need to Know, National Geographic (May 13, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/T2EQ-QABH]. GHG emissions lead to hotter global temperatures,267IPCC 2021 Report, supra note 264, at 5. which is expected to enhance the formation of ground-level ozone (a main component of smog).268John H. Tibbetts, Air Quality and Climate Change: A Delicate Balance, 123 Env’t Health Persps. A148, A149 (2015); Junfeng (Jim) Zhang, Yongjie Wei & Zhangfu Fang, Ozone Pollution: A Major Health Hazard Worldwide, 10 Frontiers Immunology 1, 2–3 (2019); Criteria Pollutants, N.H. Dep’t Env’t Servs., https://www.des.nh.gov/air/state-implementation-plans/criteria-pollutants [https://perma.cc/F8HD-GUFC] (noting ozone is a key ingredient in smog). Exposure to ozone can cause respiratory problems269Tibbetts, supra note 268, at A151. and aggravate lung diseases including asthma, particularly within more vulnerable groups.270Greenhouse Gas Versus Smog Forming Emissions, EPA, supra note 263; Health Effects of Ozone Pollution, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ground-level-ozone-pollution/health-effects-ozone-pollution [https://perma.cc/LVH2-6KX8]; see also Ozone Effects, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Nov. 3, 2016), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/ozone-effects [https://perma.cc/P7TL-JJ4V]; Ozone and Your Health, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Feb. 16, 2023), https://www.cdc.gov/air/ozone.html [https://perma.cc/YEB4-Z7XM]. Thus, GHGs can worsen exposure to ground-level ozone and smog, which is associated with increased mortality from respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.271Zhang et al., supra note 268, at 5. As a result, it has been well established that GHGs and smog are interrelated and affect air quality separately and together.272See 2022 Waiver Reconsideration, supra note 86, at 14363 (“[A]ir pollution problems, including local or regional air pollution problems, do not occur in isolation.”); see also Final Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 89–90.

Contrary to what the petitioners claim, climate change continues to uniquely affect California as an “acute California problem.”273See Final Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 52. While GHG emissions from California cars can “become one part of the global pool of GHG emissions,”2742008 Waiver Denial, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12160. this global pool eventually affects local conditions. The EPA recognized CARB’s strong evidence that California is “particularly impacted by climate change, including increasing risks from record-setting fires, heat waves, storm surges, sea-level rise, water supply shortages and extreme heat,” and that “GHG emissions contribute to local air pollution.”2752022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14363, 14365. Climate change impacts ozone exacerbation and wildfires, which affect local air quality.276Id. at 14334 n.10. California continues to have a serious smog problem, exacerbated by climate change.277California & the Waiver: The Facts, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/california-waiver-facts [https://perma.cc/N9DL-6B2P]. Seven of the ten cities with the worst air pollution nationwide are in California.278Id.; see Most Polluted Cities, Am. Lung Ass’n, https://www.lung.org/research/sota/city-rankings/most-polluted-cities [https://perma.cc/Z535-6KNT]. Ten million Californians in the San Joaquin Valley and Los Angeles air basins currently live under “severe non-attainment” conditions for ozone, where people suffer unusually high rates of asthma and cardiopulmonary disease.279Cal. Air Res. Bd. supra note 277. Climate change has increased the number of hot days that can result in smog events and exacerbate wildfires.280Id. Thus, smog exacerbates climate change, which in turn exacerbates smog, and GHGs—which lead to climate change—continue to pose a direct and local threat.281Cause and Effects of Climate Change, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/causes-effects-climate-change [https://perma.cc/6G32-UAYX] (“As greenhouse gas emissions blanket the Earth, they trap the sun’s heat. This leads to global warming and climate change.”). As the 2022 EPA decision concluded, the 2019 EPA decision to withdraw the 2013 EPA waiver grant failed to properly consider “the nature and magnitude of California’s serious air quality problems, including the interrelationship between criteria and GHG pollution.”2822022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14334. The EPA noted that the 2019 record contained evidence that GHG emissions can lead to locally elevated carbon dioxide concentrations with local impacts such as ocean acidification, in addition to the longer-term global impacts from global emissions.283Id. at 14366. Thus, just like smog, climate change poses serious threats to the public health and safety of residents in California. As a result, ZEV regulations are crucial in protecting the public health and safety of Californians.

Even adopting the 2019 EPA’s narrow “local nexus” test, which required that the California waiver only applies to measures that address conditions “extraordinary” with respect to California, or those with a specific connection to local features and emissions peculiar to California,2842019 Waiver Withdrawal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51347. California’s ZEV standard meets this test in directly addressing local air pollutant conditions by reducing criteria pollutant emissions. California’s 2020 Executive Order and resulting ACC II regulations made clear that California intended to regulate both GHG emissions and smog pollutants. The 2020 Executive Order states that zero emissions technologies “reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and toxic air pollutants,”285Cal. Exec. Order No. N-79-20 (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/9.23.20-EO-N-79-20-Climate.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4SE-B5AB]. and the ACC II regulations require new vehicles to “produce zero exhaust emissions of any criteria pollutant (or precursor pollutant) or greenhouse gas . . . .”286Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.4. California’s more stringent standards will thus continue to achieve critical reductions in conventional criteria pollution and help the state address public health problems caused by smog and soot.287See 2022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14353 (“CARB’s motor vehicle emission standards operate in tandem and are designed to reduce both criteria and GHG pollution and the ways in which GHG pollution exacerbates California’s serious air quality problems, including the heat exacerbation of ozone . . . .”); id. at 14364 (“CARB had demonstrated the need for GHG standards to address criteria pollutant concentrations in California.”). Congress has not provided any indication that California cannot take measures to reduce criteria pollutants and GHGs. Transportation is the largest source of air pollution in the state, responsible for nearly 40% of GHG emissions, 80% of nitrogen oxide pollution, and 90% of diesel particulate matter pollution.288Transforming Transportation, Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 2; Current California GHG Emission Inventory Data, Cal. Air Res. Bd., supra note 2. The EPA concluded that GHG measures are relevant to addressing local criteria pollutant issues2892009 Waiver Grant, supra note 68, at 32763 (“[A]lthough the factors that cause ozone are primarily local in nature and [] ozone is a local or regional air pollution problem, the impacts of global climate change can nevertheless exacerbate this local air pollution problem . . . California has made a case that its greenhouse gas standards are linked to amelioration of California’s smog problems. Reducing ozone levels in California cities and agricultural areas is expected to become harder with advancing climate change . . . ‘California’s high ozone levels—clearly a condition Congress considered—will be exacerbated by higher temperatures from global warming.’ ”); id. at 32750 (“CARB also found that its greenhouse gas standards will increase the health and welfare benefits from its broader motor vehicle emissions program by directly reducing upstream emissions of criteria pollutants from decreased fuel consumption.”). and that regulations to reduce GHGs often simultaneously address smog-forming pollutants like nitrogen oxide.2902022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14364 (citing Heavy-Duty Tractor-Trailer Greenhouse Gas Regulations); Notice of Decision, 79 Fed. Reg. 46256, 46261 (Aug. 7, 2014) (projecting that GHG standards will reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by one to three tons per day through 2020). The legislative history provides no basis for the claim that California cannot mitigate climate change threats or address environmental problems within their boundaries as soon as the problems extend beyond them.291See Final Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 52. In fact, Congress expressed an interest in allowing California to “continue its already excellent program” and continue to be the testing area of motor vehicle standards, which is expected to benefit its people and the nation by strengthening federal standards.292S. Rep. No. 90-403, at 33 (1967). The Senate report reflected opposition to displacing California’s right to set more stringent standards, as justified by California’s “unique problems and pioneering efforts.”293Id. Members of Congress concurred with the principle that California’s advances in air pollution regulation should not be nullified and that the state’s progress should not be impeded. Congressman John Dingell stated: “To penalize California for being ahead of the rest of the country in combating the menace of air pollution is totally incomprehensible.”294113 Cong. Rec. at H30946 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1967) (remarks of Congressman John Dingell). The Ninth Circuit has also stated that California should be “encouraged to continue and to expand its efforts . . . to lower carbon emissions.”295Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, Congress’s reasons for granting California a waiver continue to be compelling and extraordinary, and California’s current needs continue to remain relevant as ever in justifying the Clean Air Act waiver provision.

Congress did not justify the Clean Air Act waiver provision based on whether pollution problems were of a more local or global nature, but rather on the unique effects of smog in the Los Angeles area.296See H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 50 (1967) (recognizing the “critical concern of California for air pollution control, which is prompted especially by the acute susceptibility of the Los Angeles basin to concentrations of smog”). This emphasis suggests that Congress intended to give California the flexibility to adopt motor vehicle standards that the state determines are needed to address air pollution in the state, regardless of whether those problems might also be global in nature.297See 2022 Waiver Reconsideration, 87 Fed. Reg. at 14363 (“EPA sees no reason to distinguish between ‘local or regional’ air pollutants versus other pollutants that may be more globally mixed. Rather, it is appropriate to acknowledge that all pollutants and their effects may play a role in creating air pollution problems in California and that EPA should provide deference to California in its comprehensive policy choices for addressing them.”). Thus, California’s problems are serious enough and its efforts are such a model for the nation that a waiver provision is necessary in order for California to adequately protect public health. More recently, Congress’s clarification in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act that GHGs are pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act suggests that Congress intends the Clean Air Act to include GHGs.298Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818. This further strengthens the argument that California is acting within the scope of the Clean Air Act in regulating GHGs through its innovative motor vehicle program.

CONCLUSION

The equal sovereignty argument is a new attempt to invalidate the Clean Air Act waiver provision and California’s ability to regulate motor vehicle emissions. As of this Note, no court has specifically addressed the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act under the equal sovereignty principle, and the decision is pending for Ohio v. EPA, which is expected to address this constitutional question.

This Note concludes that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to the Clean Air Act, but even if it were to apply, it does not invalidate section 209(b)(1). Distinguishing from the outcome in Shelby County, the Clean Air Act waiver provision remains constitutional because granting California an exemption is “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” First, the Clean Air Act targets the broader problem of public health from automobile emissions. Second, allowing California to implement more stringent motor vehicle regulations will directly help address this problem. Congress had strong justifications for granting California an exemption which continue to remain compelling and relevant today. California’s history with air pollution control, its large economy, and its characteristic geographic and climate conditions put the state in a unique position to influence the automobile market and address GHG emissions. California faces new and increasingly formidable threats from climate change, which have exacerbated the existing problems that initially compelled California’s motor vehicle regulations. Allowing California broad discretion to regulate GHG emissions is directly related to Congress’s goal of addressing the public health threats from motor vehicle pollution in California because the effects of GHGs and smog are directly related and affect one another. Even as California’s motor vehicle regulations have shifted from reducing local smog by regulating criteria pollutants to reducing GHG emissions by eliminating gasoline-powered cars, California’s current needs continue to justify its differential treatment—maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening, section 209(b)(1)’s relevance in the twenty-first century.

The court’s decision on whether section 209(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act remains constitutionally valid will determine the extent to which California can continue to realize the localized benefits of the Clean Air Act while helping accelerate the nation’s transition towards a clean energy economy. It will also have implications for California’s ability to continue to regulate GHG emissions as a leader in addressing the most pressing environmental issues of the day.

Is the court going to handcuff California’s ability to protect the health and safety of its residents in the name of equal sovereignty? That was not the intention of Congress when it discussed equal sovereignty concerns pertaining to the Clean Air Act waiver. On the contrary, Congress debated whether other states should also be able to enact more stringent standards than the federal government, which would be the more reasonable remedy if the Clean Air Act waiver provision were deemed unconstitutional per equal sovereignty, as the petitioners demand.

To strengthen the ability of motor vehicle regulations to withstand future court challenges, California could emphasize criteria pollutants in its regulations. Since criteria pollutants have been more directly linked to local air pollution issues and Congress originally implemented the waiver provision in response to regional smog problems, this change could make it more difficult to challenge a regulation on the basis of it only regulating climate change. It will likely be simpler to show that the disparate treatment of California is sufficiently related to the problem that the Clean Air Act targets if legislators explicitly provide how they expect the regulations to affect local air quality as well as the local co-benefits of implementing them. For example, replacing internal combustion passenger vehicles with EVs will reduce not only GHG emissions, but also criteria pollutants including nitrogen oxides that are emitted.

California’s motor vehicle standards alone may not reverse or solve climate change, but the EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.299States need not “resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). Allowing California to continue to promulgate innovative, forward-looking motor vehicle standards is crucial to its ability to lead the country as a “laboratory of innovation,” as Congress intended, and address the urgent environment and public health consequences of motor vehicle pollution.

97 S. Cal. L. Rev. 165

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* Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 97; J.D. Candidate 2024, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Economics 2019, Wellesley College. A special thank you to Professor Robin Craig for her thoughtful guidance, my friends and family for their consistent support and encouragement, and the Southern California Law Review editors for their thorough feedback.

Red, White, and Blue—And Also Green: How Energy Policy Can Protect Both National Security and the Environment

Too often, energy policy protects the environment while neglecting national security, or vice versa. Since each goal is critical, this Article shows how to advance both at the same time.

For national security, the key is to avoid depending on the wrong suppliers. If they are vulnerable to attack (like some Middle Eastern producers), they need to be defended. Or, if they are themselves geopolitical threats (like Russia and Iran), their energy exports fund harmful conduct. This Article breaks new ground in showing why suppliers tend to be insecure or menacing: authoritarian regimes—which are more likely to pose these risks—have a comparative advantage in producing oil and gas, since they are less responsive to opposition from environmentalists, local residents, and other groups.

To avoid depending on the wrong suppliers, the U.S. and its allies should pursue two strategies. First, they should cut demand for fossil fuel. Along with making it easier to stop buying from the wrong suppliers, slashing demand also reduces greenhouse gas emissions and pollution. Yet although these are significant national security and environmental advantages, there is an offsetting national security risk: like fossil fuel, the main alternative—clean energy—also can foster dependence on insecure or potentially hostile suppliers (like Congo and China). In response, the U.S. and its allies should ramp up domestic production of clean energy technology, while also encouraging households and businesses to use it.

Second, since the transition to clean energy will take time, the U.S. and its allies also need to tap new sources of fossil fuel in countries that are secure and friendly. Yet since new fossil fuel development raises familiar environmental concerns, this Article proposes three ways to do it while still reducing emissions and pollution. First, these new sources should be as “clean” as possible (for example, natural gas instead of coal). Second, in adding new capacity, the goal should be to replace other fossil fuel sources, not to add to them (for example,  so more production in the U.S. means less production in Russia). Third, new sources should be flexible, so they can ramp up and scale back as needed. Fortunately, these shifts are relatively easy for U.S. shale producers—indeed, more so than for others—and can be encouraged with the right regulatory approach.

While government intervention is needed to pursue these goals, policymakers should strive to harness the private sector’s capacity to innovate, cut costs, and enhance quality. A moratorium on new fossil fuel development is counterproductive, entrenching a status quo that depends too much on coal, as well as on insecure and hostile energy suppliers. Instead, the best approach is to “price” the relevant national security and environmental costs with Pigouvian taxes, motivating businesses and consumers to mitigate these costs and letting them choose how to do it. Yet if Pigouvian taxes are not politically feasible, this Article recommends a heuristic called “the marginal efficiency cost of energy”: policymakers should account for all the social costs of each source—private costs, national security costs, and environmental costs—and strive to replace high-cost sources with low-cost sources. This framework should guide all aspects of energy policy—from permits and regulations to rate-setting, mandates, moratoriums, subsidies, and government leases—so policymakers stay focused on both environmental and national security goals.

 

In December 2021, the Biden Administration blocked the construction of a natural gas pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. “Why would we build a fossil fuel pipeline,” the Administration’s senior energy advisor asked, “when our entire policy is to support new technology . . . and new investments in going green and in going clean?”1Lahav Harkov, US Informs Israel It No Longer Supports EastMed Pipeline to Europe, Jerusalem Post (Jan. 18, 2022, 16:12 PM), https://www.jpost.com/international/article-693866 [https://perma.cc/P64H-P9UC] (quoting Amos Hochstein, the State Department Senior Advisor for Energy Security). Hochstein offered these thoughts before returning to the government, when he was interviewed for a documentary aired on Turkish state media. Turkey opposes the EastMed pipeline and has been lobbying for Israeli gas to be routed through Turkey instead of Greece. Id.

The answer to this rhetorical question should have been clear. In a word, it was “Russia.” Just three months later, Russia would invade Ukraine, and troops were already amassing on the border. To fund this military build-up, the Russian government depended heavily on energy exports, which accounted for a whopping 45% of its revenue.2Energy Fact Sheet: Why Does Russian Oil and Gas Matter?, Int’l Energy Ass’n (Mar. 21, 2022) [hereinafter Energy Fact Sheet], https://www.iea.org/articles/energy-fact-sheet-why-does-russian-oil-and-gas-matter [https://perma.cc/H9EX-PGV4] (“Russia relies heavily on revenues from oil and natural gas, which in 2021 made up 45% of Russia’s federal budget.”). Since Russia’s main market was Europe, one way to weaken Russia was to wean Europe off its energy. A new pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean would help (although it would take years to complete). Even so, the Biden Administration nixed this pipeline,3See Harkov, supra note 1. Months later, Egypt and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union to supply natural gas to Europe. Since no pipeline is in place, the assumption is that they will rely on Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) terminals in Egypt. See Stuart Elliott, EC Inks Trilateral MOU for Supply of Israeli Gas to Europe via Egypt, S&P Global (June 15, 2022, 9:22 PM), https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/
061522-ec-inks-trilateral-mou-for-supply-of-israeli-gas-to-europe-via-egypt [https://perma.cc/F48N-EMJH]. In October of 2022, Israel and Lebanon resolved a long-standing dispute about the ownership of offshore natural gas fields; brokered by the U.S., this deal was intended in part to facilitate the export of more gas to Europe. Dov Lieber, Israel, Lebanon Reach Rare Deal for Gas Extraction and Export to Europe, Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 2022, 2:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-lebanon-agree-to-u-s-brokered-maritime-border-deal-for-gas-extraction-11665489608 [https://perma.cc/4C2Z-WEYN].
prioritizing the environment over national security.

As this example illustrates, energy policy has a profound impact on both national security and the environment, but too often the focus is on one or the other. Indeed, several prominent scholars have chosen to omit national security from their analysis altogether.4See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Economics of Energy Security 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19729, 2013), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_
papers/w19729/w19729.pdf [https://perma.cc/72SN-NVHM] (“Reducing oil consumption (as opposed to oil imports) might lessen the influence of oil rich countries. But it might not materially affect military and strategic thinking.”); Ian W. H. Parry & Joel Darmstadter, The Costs of US Oil Dependency 15 (2004) (“US military expenditures in the Middle East are in part the result of US interests in securing its flow of imported oil from that region, and therefore count as a total cost of oil import dependency. However, many analysts do not include them when assessing the external costs of marginal changes in US oil imports.”); Nat’l Rsch. Council of the Nat’l Acads., Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use 333 (2010) (“[T]he marginal cost is essentially zero. This view is held by a number of other researchers in the area, including Bohi and Toman (1995). The committee adopts this position.”). For a discussion of the views of these scholars, see infra Sections I.D & II.C.
For example, an influential 1996 book on energy security pointedly ignores the cost of defending Middle Eastern oil, arguing that energy is not the only reason for the U.S. to intervene in the region.5Douglas R. Bohi & Michael A. Toman, The Economics of Energy Security 53–54 (Kluwer Acad. 1996). But oil surely is one of the reasons. Ignoring it renders their analysis incomplete. Instead, energy policy needs to account for—and, indeed, to protect—both national security and the environment. This Article shows how to do it.

To enhance national security, the key is to avoid depending on the wrong suppliers. If they are vulnerable to attack (like some Middle Eastern suppliers), they need to be defended. Or, if they are themselves geopolitical threats (like Russia and Iran), their exports fund harmful conduct.

Unfortunately, it is no accident that fossil fuel suppliers often are insecure or hostile. This Article breaks new ground in explaining why. In democracies, fossil fuel production regularly faces staunch opposition from local residents, economic competitors, and environmental groups. But interest groups have less influence in authoritarian regimes, so production gravitates to these countries. This “authoritarian comparative advantage,” as the dynamic is called here, renders the U.S. and other democracies more dependent on authoritarian suppliers, which are more likely to be insecure or hostile.

To mitigate these national security risks, the U.S. and its allies should rely less on these suppliers. In general, there are two ways to do this. The first is to reduce demand for their product, while the second is to find other suppliers. This Article analyzes both alternatives, evaluating their implications for national security and the environment.

The first strategy—cutting demand for fossil fuel—lessens the stakes. There is less economic disruption when the U.S. and its allies stop buying from insecure or hostile suppliers. Finding other suppliers also is easier, since there is more slack in the system. Along with these national security advantages, reducing demand also yields familiar environmental benefits, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.

Yet although it is important to reduce demand for fossil fuel—for instance, by depending more on clean energy—this strategy poses national security risks of its own. Unfortunately, as with oil and gas, many clean energy suppliers are insecure or potentially hostile. For example, China is a leading supplier of EV batteries, solar panels, and minerals needed for clean energy. Arguably, replacing Russian hydrocarbons with Chinese clean energy is like jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.

In response, the U.S. and its allies should ramp up domestic production of clean energy technology, while also encouraging households and businesses to use it. To incentivize this effort, Congress offered a range of subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, although it remains to be seen how effective these subsidies will be; as I have emphasized elsewhere, targeted subsidies require Congress to pick which technologies to fund, but Congress often lacks the expertise and incentives to make the right choices.6David M. Schizer, Energy Subsidies: Worthy Goals, Competing Priorities, and Flawed Institutional Design, 70 Tax L. Rev. 243, 277–87 (2017) [hereinafter Schizer, Energy Subsidies]. Even with these subsidies, moreover, clean energy still faces daunting regulatory barriers. For example, the permitting process for wind projects, mines, and solar farms is expensive, slow, and risky, but Congress failed to pass a 2022 bill on permitting reform.7David Blackmon, The Death of Manchin’s Permitting Reform Effort Is a Loss for Everyone, Forbes (Sept. 28, 2022, 7:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2022/09/28/the-death-of-manchins-permitting-reform-effort-is-a-loss-for-everyone [https://perma.cc/4XEQ-UJ44]. For this reason (and others as well), the “friend-shoring” of supply chains—and, more generally, the transition to clean energy—is likely to take many years.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allies should also pursue a second strategy. To ease their dependence on insecure and hostile fossil fuel suppliers, they should find other suppliers. Yet this effort, which involves adding new wells, pipelines, and infrastructure, raises familiar environmental concerns.

To square this circle, this Article proposes three ways to develop new sources of fossil fuel while still reducing emissions and pollution. First, these new sources should be as “clean” as possible; for example, natural gas generally is preferable to coal. Second, in adding new capacity, the goal should be to replace other fossil fuel sources, not to add to them. For instance, the point of increasing U.S. exports should be to reduce Russian exports. Third, new sources should be flexible, so they can ramp up and scale back, as needed. Fortunately, these shifts are relatively easy for U.S. shale producers—indeed, more so than for others—and can be encouraged with the right regulatory approach. For example, in awarding permits for a new pipeline or Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) facility, the government should reserve (and pay for) the right to shut it down after a specified period. This would be much better than the Biden Administration’s decision in January 2024 to “pause” decisions on new export permits.8FACT SHEET: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Announces Temporary Pause on Pending Approvals of Liquefied Natural Gas Exports (Jan. 26, 2024) (imposing “a temporary pause on pending decisions on exports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to non-FTA countries until the Department of Energy can update the underlying analyses for authorizations”), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/26/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-temporary-pause-on-pending-approvals-of-liquefied-natural-gas-exports/ [https://perma.cc/
8LDE-HCV9].

To protect both the environment and national security, then, the U.S. and its allies need to reduce demand for fossil fuel, while also tapping new supply. But who is supposed to pursue these twin goals? After all, producing energy is not a government responsibility—at least not in the U.S. Rather, this is the job of private firms, and rightly so. They have the expertise and incentives to innovate, cut costs, and enhance quality. So even though authoritarian systems are better at overcoming interest group opposition, free societies have their own edge—economic dynamism—which they should harness.

Yet the private sector can do only what it is allowed to do. New wells and pipelines require permits, as do wind farms and mines for clean energy minerals, while extensive regulations also apply. The wrong government policies would thwart the approach recommended here. For example, a moratorium on new fossil fuel development—a step with influential supporters, including the International Energy Agency (“IEA”)9Int’l Energy Agency, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector 21 (2021) [hereinafter Net Zero by 2050], https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2AJ5-BNJZ] (“There is no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply in our net zero pathway.”).
—would be counterproductive, entrenching a status quo that depends too much on coal, as well as on insecure and hostile suppliers of oil and gas.

Yet the point is not for the government to leave these issues to the market, but to intervene the right way. The most efficient response is a Pigouvian tax. By adding environmental and national security harms to market prices, it creates financial incentives to mitigate them. At the same time, a Pigouvian tax lets consumers and businesses pick the solutions that are best for them, from electric vehicles and energy efficient appliances to shorter commutes, mass transit, better home insulation, and much more. The government does not have to pick specific responses to support—a key advantage because the government is not good at “picking winners.”10See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 298 (“[M]any green energy subsidies under current law seemingly embrace the opportunity to ‘pick winners.’ But it is not clear that government officials have the information, expertise, and incentives to choose which technologies to favor, and they are subject to interest group pressure in attempting to do so.”).

Unfortunately, Pigouvian taxes have encountered stiff political resistance in the U.S.11Id. at 270–72. If they are not available, policymakers should use other policy instruments to reduce the demand for fossil fuels and change the ones we use. To guide this effort, this Article proposes a heuristic called “the marginal efficiency cost of energy”: policymakers should account for all the social costs of each source—private costs, national security costs, and environmental costs—and then seek to replace high-cost sources with low-cost sources. This framework should guide all aspects of energy policy—from permits and regulations to rate-setting, mandates, moratoriums, subsidies, and government leases.

Admittedly, this agenda faces political challenges. Generating the requisite political support will require compromise, as well as an alliance between advocates for the environment and for national security.

Part I analyzes the national security costs of defending insecure fossil fuel suppliers, showing that these costs can be reduced by cutting demand for fossil fuel and adding secure new sources. Part II shows that this two-part strategy also addresses another national security cost of fossil fuel: strengthening hostile exporters. Since energy policy should also protect the environment, Part III briefly surveys two familiar environmental goals: limiting climate change and pollution. To identify synergies and tensions among the various national security and environmental goals, Part IV focuses on strategies to reduce demand for fossil fuel, while Part V considers strategies to tap secure new sources. Part VI generalizes these insights into a regulatory strategy, and Part VII is the conclusion.

I.  DEFENSE EXTERNALITIES: A COST OF DEPENDING ON THE WRONG SUPPLIERS

When energy exporters are vulnerable to attack, they may need to be defended; indeed, the U.S. and its allies have protected Middle Eastern oil producers for decades. But this Part argues that instead of defending insecure suppliers, the U.S. and its allies should find ways to depend less on them. By tapping new sources of supply and reducing demand, the U.S. and its allies could cut their defense budgets.

Even so, some commentators and government agencies dismiss this potential benefit, deeming it too speculative to consider in energy policy. The last Section in this Part responds to their claims.

A.  The National Security Implications of Energy

1.  Defining National Security

Before considering this link between energy policy and national security, it is important first to clarify what the phrase “national security” means here. This Article uses the classical “realist” definition, which focuses on physical security and material well-being, rather than on the advancement of ideals.12See generally Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1948) (advocating for a classical realist approach to international politics).

The goal here is to enhance the security of the U.S. and its allies, not to maximize global welfare. For example, conduct that is dangerous to U.S. citizens is considered harmful, even if it is beneficial to adversaries of the U.S.

To identify threats, this Article relies on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s annual threat assessments.13Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2022) [hereinafter 2022 U.S. Annual Threat Assessment], https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/64FE-FYVR].
The 2022 analysis highlighted four threats—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea14Id. at 6–17. Admittedly, the U.S. relationship with China is not solely rivalrous, since robust trade can benefit both parties in various ways. In any event, a comprehensive effort to classify and assess nuances in these various relationships is beyond this Article’s scope.—while earlier assessments also focused on terrorism.15See, e.g., Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 10–13 (2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4M8-4FJ4].

In mentioning “allies” of the U.S., this Article refers to countries that feature prominently as “allies and partners” in the Biden-Harris 2022 National Security strategy, including the U.K., Germany, France, and other NATO allies in Europe; Canada and Mexico in North America; and Japan, Australia, and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific.16See generally The White House, National Security Strategy (2022) [hereinafter Biden-Harris National Security Strategy], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/T42C-HKCQ].

2.  Links Between Energy and National Security

As the U.S. and its allies strive to counter security threats, energy is relevant in a number of ways. This Part focuses on the cost of defending suppliers, while the next considers the cost of empowering them.

But admittedly, these are not the only links between national security and energy. The military needs fuel to fight wars, just as it also needs weapons, rations, and other materials.17For example, access to oil played a key role in World War II, both in starting the war and in influencing how it was fought. See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power 300–09 (Simon & Schuster 1991) (discussing how the U.S. decision to stop selling oil to Japan helped to motivate the attack on Pearl Harbor); id. at 312–26 (describing Germany’s reliance on synthetic fuel, its efforts to conquer Russia’s oil fields, and the impact of fuel shortages on German campaigns). The familiar response is to stockpile these supplies.

Energy policy also can cause environmental harms, which some classify as security threats.18For example, the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy treated climate change as a national security threat. See Biden-Harris National Security Strategy, supra note 16, at 27 (“The climate crisis is the existential challenge of our time. A warming planet endangers Americans and people around the world—risking food and water supplies, public health, and infrastructure and our national security.”). Yet as a matter of terminology, this Article classifies them instead as environmental harms, discussing them in Part III’s analysis of climate change and pollution.19See infra Section III.A.2.

Energy also affects national security through the economy. Without cheap and reliable energy, it is harder to produce and deliver food, medicine, and other essentials; heat homes; enforce the law; maintain effective communications and transportation networks; and engage in a range of other indispensable activities. In short, energy is a fundamental ingredient of modern life.

To avoid severe economic and social disruptions, countries need to protect their electrical grids, pipelines, and power plants.20See, e.g., Alistair MacDonald, Ukraine Hunts the World for Parts to Fix Crippled Energy Grid, Wall St. J. (Dec. 2, 2022, 10:57 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-hunts-the-world-for-parts-to-fix-crippled-energy-grid-11669975331 [https://perma.cc/XZU4-FSDS] (describing Russian strategy of targeting Ukraine’s electrical grid and power plants). This is no different from the need to defend other vital infrastructure.

For similar reasons, countries also need reliable sources of fuel. Recognizing the importance of this precious resource, the literature used to focus on another security challenge: the economic drain from energy imports.

In the U.S., this was mainly an issue for oil, not for natural gas or coal. The U.S. became a net importer of petroleum in the 1950s, and these imports generally increased every year after 1954 until they peaked in 2005.21Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Oil Imports and Exports, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. [hereinafter Oil and Petroleum], https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php [https://perma.cc/TXV9-N2ER]. Since the U.S. was the world’s largest oil importer for decades, the cost of these imports loomed large in the literature on energy and national security.22An extensive literature focused on “the oil premium,” arguing that the U.S. imported so much oil that it should have been able to influence global prices, but there was a negative externality: consumers did not consider the impact of their purchases on global prices. See, e.g., Paul N. Leiby, Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports 5 (2007) (“The approach estimates the incremental benefits to society, in dollars per barrel, of reducing U.S. imports.”); Parry & Darmstadter, supra note 4, at 9–10 (“This transfer [to other nations] is an additional cost borne by the United States as a whole that is not taken into account by individual US consumers . . . .”). In contrast, the U.S. did not depend on imports for natural gas during this period, although experts worried that this would change as U.S. reserves dwindled.23Daniel Yergin, The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations 31 (Penguin Publ’g Grp. 2020) (noting the consensus of the early 2000s that dwindling domestic supply would cause the U.S. to begin importing significant volumes of natural gas). There was no such concern about coal, though. With the largest reserves in the world,24Countries with the Biggest Coal Reserves, Mining Tech. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.mining-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-biggest-coal-reserves-by-country [https://perma.cc/C5KB-2TV2] (“The US tops the list holding more than one-fifth of the total proven coal reserves . . . .”). the U.S. has been a net exporter for decades.25Coal Explained: Coal Imports and Exports, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. https://
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/imports-and-exports.php [https://perma.cc/TM6Q-CPFU].

Yet the economic drain from energy imports is no longer a concern in the U.S. In the past fifteen years, U.S. firms have unlocked vast oil and gas reserves in shale formations, using hydraulic fracturing.26See Yergin, supra note 23, at 11–12, 24 (describing the impact of the shale revolution on U.S. oil and gas production). This innovation has turned the U.S. into the world’s largest producer of oil and gas.27Id. at xiv–xv. U.S. oil production surged 145% from 2008 to 2019, from 5,000 to 12,289 barrels per day.28Petroleum & Other Liquids, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., https://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a [https://perma.cc/UU75-KNPM].
Likewise, U.S. natural gas production increased 88% between 2005 and 2019.29Natural Gas, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9070us1A.htm [https://perma.cc/ZEB8-622J] (increasing from 18,051 billion cubic feet (“bcf”) to 33,899 bcf). After a dip during the coronavirus pandemic, U.S. gas production set a record in the summer of 2022,30Sheetal Nasta, Long Story Short—Natural Gas Production Hits 100 Bcf/D, but Is No Match for Record Demand, RBN Energy (Sept. 18, 2022), https://rbnenergy.com/long-story-
short-natural-gas-production-hits-100-bcf-but-is-no-match-for-record-demand [https://perma.cc/4UQ6-RH3W] (producing more than 100 bcf per day).
reaching a level that once was unimaginable.31Id. (“Lower 48 natural gas production this month hit a once-unthinkable milestone, topping the all-important psychological threshold of 100 Bcf/d for the first time.”). This “shale boom” has turned the U.S. into a net exporter of oil and gas,32Oil and Petroleum, supra note 21 (“In 2021, the United States exported about 8.54 million barrels per day (b/d) and imported about 8.47 million b/d of petroleum, making the United States an annual total petroleum net exporter for the second year in a row since at least 1949.” (footnote omitted)); see also Parry & Darmstadter, supra note 4, at 10 (“If the United States were self-sufficient in oil there would be no monopsony power externality.”). so energy no longer contributes to the U.S. trade deficit. The economic drain of energy imports still burdens many U.S. allies, but not the U.S.

B.  National Security Risks from Insecure Suppliers

Even so, the U.S. still faces another important energy security challenge, which is the focus of this Section: the risk of sudden contractions in the global supply of energy. This can happen if a supplier suddenly stops producing because of a revolution, war, or other geopolitical crisis. Notably, these supply shocks can still harm the U.S.—even though it is a net exporter—by triggering economically damaging spikes in energy prices.

1.  Supply Shocks

These supply shocks can trigger both inflation and recessions in the U.S. and across the globe. For example, when Arab nations slashed oil production in 1973 and embargoed the U.S. to protest U.S. support of Israel, the spike in energy prices triggered nearly a decade of “stagflation.”

Soaring energy prices are especially painful for low-income households. Energy represents a larger percentage of their budgets, so price spikes are even more noticeable, causing difficult tradeoffs between oil, gas, and electricity, on the one hand, and necessities like food, medicine, rent, and education, on the other. Unlike wealthier households, families with low incomes do not have the liquidity to invest in more energy efficient cars, homes, and appliances or, in many cases, the flexibility to move closer to work or telecommute.

To head off these dire economic consequences, policymakers need “to ensure that the United States . . . is more resilient to inevitable global energy shocks,” Jason Bordoff and Meghan O’Sullivan have observed.33Jason Bordoff & Meghan L. O’Sullivan, By Not Acting on Climate, Congress Endangers U.S. National Security, Foreign Pol’y (July 21, 2022, 1:58 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/
07/21/climate-change-action-us-congress-biden-bill-national-security [https://perma.cc/F972-ZR9E].

2.  Cost of Defending Access to Energy

The traditional way to avoid energy shocks is to police access to fossil fuel, especially oil. For decades, the U.S. armed forces have “maintain[ed] the security of international oil flows for the global market,” a RAND Corporation analysis explained in 2009.34Keith Crane, Andreas Goldthau, Michael Toman, Thomas Light, Stuart E. Johnson, Alireza Nader, Angel Rabasa & Harun Dogo, Imported Oil and U.S. National Security 59 (RAND Corp. 2009).

Like climate effects and pollution, this cost is not included in the price at the pump, so consumers do not consider these “defense externalities” in deciding how much fuel to use. Instead, “[t]he cost of those forces . . . generates a burden on the U.S. taxpayer.”35Id.

For many years, the U.S. has defended oil suppliers in the Middle East. For example, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Jimmy Carter warned that “[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America.”36Toby Craig Jones, America, Oil, and War in the Middle East, 99 J. Am Hist. 208, 208 (2012) (quoting President Carter’s State of the Union Address). Two years later, President Ronald Reagan pledged to defend oil producers from their neighbors as well.37Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Says U.S. Would Bar a Takeover in Saudi Arabia That Imperiled Flow of Oil, N.Y. Times (Oct. 2, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/02/world/reagan-says-us-would-bar-a-takeover-in-saudi-arabia-that-imperiled-flow-of-oil.html [https://perma.cc/TNC6-HTEC] (“There’s no way that we could stand by,” Ronald Reagan said, “and see [Saudi Arabia] taken over by anyone that would shut off that oil.”).

Honoring this commitment, President George H.W. Bush protected Kuwait from an invasion by Iraq in 1990, invoking U.S. reliance on fossil fuels, among other things, to justify a military response. “[M]y administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf,” he told the American people.38Former U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Address on Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (Aug. 8, 1990), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-8-1990-address-iraqs-invasion-kuwait [https://perma.cc/49QV-LAYJ]. “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence.”39Id.

To secure the Middle East (and its oil) after the First Gulf War, the U.S. permanently stationed troops there for the first time. This U.S. military presence, especially in Saudi Arabia, was one of the reasons invoked by Osama Bin Laden to rally support for terrorist strikes against the U.S.40The Military Cost of Defending the Global Oil Supply, Securing America’s Future Energy 1, 10 (2018) [hereinafter SAFE], http://secureenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Military-Cost-of-Defending-the-Global-Oil-Supply.-Sep.-18.-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5BM-6YZR].

Bin Laden’s attacks on September 11, 2001 prompted the U.S. to invade Afghanistan. So, although this invasion was a response to terrorism, the terrorism itself was motivated (at least in part) by U.S. efforts to defend fossil fuels. “You can draw a thread through the whole thing with oil,” argued Admiral Dennis C. Blair, former director of National Intelligence.41Id.

Similarly, although the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 for a number of reasons, energy was a key motivation for Vice President Dick Cheney. “Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and seated atop ten percent of the world’s oil reserves,” he observed six months before the invasion, Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein could then be expected to “seek domination of the entire Middle East” and “take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies.”42David E. Sanger, The World: First Among Evils?; The Debate Over Attacking Iraq Heats Up, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/01/weekinreview/the-world-first-among-evils-the-debate-over-attacking-iraq-heats-up.html [https://perma.cc/999S-A4BD] (quoting Dick Cheney); see also Full Text of Dick Cheney’s Speech at the Institute of Petroleum Autumn Lunch, 1999, London Inst. of Petrol. (June 8, 2004), https://www.resilience.org/stories/2004-06-08/full-text-dick-cheneys-speech-institute-petroleum-autumn-lunch-1999 [https://perma.cc/P4H9-VWH4] (“Oil is unique in that it is so strategic in nature. We are not talking about soapflakes or leisurewear here. Energy is truly fundamental to the world’s economy. The Gulf War was a reflection of that reality.”).

Admittedly, the U.S. has intervened in the Middle East not only to protect its oil, but also to counter terrorism, support allies, contain rivals, and defend the principle of sovereignty. But although energy is not the only factor shaping U.S. defense policy, it is an important one, as a group of retired senior military planners affirmed in interviews for a 2018 study.43SAFE, supra note 40, at 7–11. “We are not in the Persian Gulf because we are benevolent. We want oil to flow out of there,” one observed.44Id. at 11 (quoting General Charles Wald, former Deputy Commander, Headquarters United States European Command). “Since the end of [the] Cold War, the only real threats we have are threats to the oil supply,” another said.45Id. at 9 (quoting John Lehman, former secretary of the Navy). “[M]ore than half the Defense budget is for the security of Persian Gulf oil.”46Id. at 3 (quoting John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy).

These military efforts have long been reinforced by diplomacy. The U.S. has maintained close ties with oil-producing regimes, including ones that do not share U.S. values.47John Deutch, James R. Schlesigner & David G. Victor, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report # 58: National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency 26 (2006), https://www.cfr.org/report/national-security-consequences-us-oil-dependency [https://perma.cc/8RD3-VY9A] (noting that oil dependence can cause “political realignments that constrain the ability of the United States to form partnerships to achieve common objectives”). Propping up these authoritarian “petrostates” is all the more costly because they often are unstable.48Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 Eur. Econ. Rev. 827, 828, 837 (2001).

3.  As a Net Exporter, Can the U.S. Stop Worrying About Supply Shocks?

Can the U.S. stop supporting these regimes now that it has become a net exporter of petroleum?49The U.S. is both an importer and an exporter. A key reason why is that many U.S. refineries are better suited to process “heavy” oil (from the Middle East) instead of “light” oil (from the shale boom). See Martin Tillier, America Produces Enough Oil to Meet Its Needs, so Why Do We Import Crude?, Nasdaq (Mar. 8, 2022, 10:18 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/116merica-produces-enough-oil-to-meet-its-needs-so-why-do-we-import-crude [https://perma.cc/C6CQ-LTHN]. Are Americans protected from oil shocks, as long as U.S. wells keep pumping? Unfortunately, the answer is “no.”

For one thing, key allies and trading partners still import oil, and their economic health affects the U.S. Energy shocks drain away money they otherwise would spend on U.S. goods and services, as well as on shared strategic interests.

Supply shocks also still affect the U.S. more directly: when consumers in Europe or Asia cannot buy from their usual supplier, they try to buy from U.S. producers, bidding up the price.50See Yergin, supra note 23, at 61 (“Even if the U.S. is not importing much Middle Eastern oil, a supply disruption would drive up global prices, including in the United States.”). This is why U.S. gasoline prices spiked after Russia invaded Ukraine, even though the U.S. was importing very little oil from Russia.51Gabriel T. Rubin, U.S. Inflation Hits New Four-Decade High of 9.1%, Wall St. J. (July 13, 2022, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-inflation-june-2022-consumer-price-index-11657664129 [https://perma.cc/U4QB-7VQB] (“The consumer-price index’s advance for the 12 months ended in June was the fastest pace since November 1981 . . . . A big jump in gasoline prices—up 11.2% from the previous month and nearly 60% from a year earlier—drove much of the increase . . . .”). In a global market, a war or revolution thousands of miles away—involving suppliers who do not sell to U.S. consumers—can still cause U.S. prices to spike.

Does the U.S. have the same sort of exposure with natural gas? The answer is “yes, but not nearly as much.” The difference is that oil is easier to ship. Since a tanker can take Texas oil to either Athens or Alabama, buyers in both places can bid for it, yielding a (relatively) uniform global price.

In contrast, the price of natural gas is set locally because it is harder to transport. The cheapest way is a pipeline, but then the destination is fixed. If the pipeline goes to Alabama, Athenians cannot easily buy this gas. They would have to turn it into liquid, ship it on a tanker, and then turn it back into gas. This costly process requires a sophisticated infrastructure. At the moment, the U.S does not have enough liquefaction facilities to satisfy European demand. This constraint on exports leaves more gas for domestic consumption. As a result, prices in the U.S. are much lower than in Europe and Asia.

Even so, U.S. natural gas prices are still affected by global supply shocks, at least to an extent. When prices spike in other markets, U.S. suppliers can export at least some gas, a choice that reduces domestic supply. This helps explain why U.S. natural gas prices spiked for several months after Russia invaded Ukraine (while European prices went much higher).52David Uberti & Ryan Dezember, Why Gas Bills Are Going Crazy—With No End in Sight, Wall St. J.  (Mar. 15, 2023, 7:56 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/natural-gas-prices-energy-bills-ea3ea9da [https://perma.cc/3VJR-M89U] (“Homeowners and businesses across the country have seen their gas bills go wild . . . . Policy decisions from the White House . . . have exacerbated the situation . . . . [F]ederal officials have said they would boost gas exports to support U.S. allies, particularly in Europe.”); Robert Rapier, Why Natural Gas Prices Quadrupled in Two Years, Forbes (Sept. 27, 2022, 6:00 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2022/09/27/why-natural-gas-prices-quadrupled-in-two-years [https://perma.cc/ADQ8-B3BH] (noting that European demand for LNG drove natural gas prices higher in the U.S.). Looking ahead, global demand will have even more impact on U.S. prices as the U.S. builds more LNG facilities.53Even with the Biden Administration’s “pause” on new export permits, projects already in development can still be completed. Yet exports obviously will increase even more if the pause is lifted, so new projects can be added as well. David Braziel, Take Five – Gauging The Impact Of The DOE’s Pause In LNG Export Licenses, RBN Energy (Jan. 31, 2024), https://rbnenergy.com/take-five-gauging-the-impact-of-the-does-pause-in-lng-export-licenses. Like natural gas prices, coal prices are also influenced by global trends, but still vary by location. As with natural gas, the cost of transporting coal is high compared with the cost of extracting it. As a result, redirecting it from one market to another is not always practical. See, e.g., Coal Explained: Coal Prices and Outlook, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/prices-and-outlook.php [https://perma.cc/WYD7-ZTX8] (“In some cases . . . , transportation costs are more than the price of coal at the mine.”); Peter Nagle & Kaltrina Temaj, Energy Market Developments: Coal and Natural Gas Prices Reach Record Highs, World Bank Blogs (July 19, 2022), https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/energy-market-developments-coal-and-natural-gas-prices-reach-record-highs [https://perma.cc/BU3Y-68PG] (noting that when Europe decided to boycott Russian coal in 2022, selling it “to other countries . . . will be costly as coal is bulky and expensive to transport”).

To sum up, energy supply shocks are still a challenge, even though the U.S. has become a net exporter of petroleum and gas. The traditional U.S. response has been to protect oil and gas suppliers, especially in the Middle East. The costs of defending these suppliers are a hidden price of fossil fuels.

C.  Depending Less on Insecure Suppliers

Is the U.S. stuck bearing these defense externalities? Or can these costs be reduced over time? In principle, there is another way to deal with supply shocks: instead of defending insecure suppliers, we can depend less on them. Admittedly, reducing reliance on these suppliers can be difficult, especially on short notice. Yet easing this dependence has become much more plausible than it used to be, and the right policies can accelerate this progress.

1.  An Illustrative Example

To illustrate different responses to defense externalities, assume that two neighboring countries, Emirate and Warmonger, are both oil exporters. Unfortunately, Warmonger has been threatening to invade Emirate. If war breaks out, the two countries’ combined exports of 4.3 million barrels per day will suddenly become unavailable.

The traditional way to avert this oil shock is for the U.S. and its allies to protect Emirate by issuing security guarantees and, if necessary, dispatching troops. If we replace “Emirate” with Kuwait and “Warmonger” with Iraq, this is precisely what happened in 1990.

Yet there are two other ways to avoid this oil shock. First, if another supplier can increase production by 4.3 million barrels per day, it can replace the exports from Emirate and Warmonger. To avoid extra defense costs, this supplier should be easy to defend. The U.S. obviously fits the bill, as do Canada, Brazil, Norway, Mexico, the U.K.,54Currently, they are the fourth, ninth, eleventh, thirteenth, and twentieth largest producers of crude oil in the world, respectively. See Top 20 Oil Producing Countries in 2022, Or Noir Africa, https://ornoirafrica.com/en/top-20-des-pays-producteurs-de-petrole-en-2022 [https://perma.cc/3T6W-Z69Q]. and other secure jurisdictions. If enough additional supply can be coaxed from secure countries, there is less need to defend insecure ones. In this way, energy development can be a substitute for military spending. National security is protected with wells and pipelines, instead of troops and fighter planes.

Second, the same is true of reductions in demand. There would be no oil shock if the global economy could cut consumption by 4.3 million barrels per day through fuel efficiency, renewable energy, mass transit, and the like. “Meeting more of the energy needs of the United States through alternative sources of energy,” Bordoff and O’Sullivan have observed, “can lessen exposure to global markets by reducing U.S. consumption of oil and gas overall . . . .”55Bordoff & O’Sullivan, By Not Acting on Climate, Congress Endangers U.S. National Security, supra note 33. So, like new supply, efforts to reduce demand can be an alternative to military spending.

2.  Reducing Dependence on Insecure Suppliers: Promising Trends

Admittedly, severing ties with a problematic supplier is sometimes quite challenging, especially in the short run. Indeed, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s efforts to stop buying oil, gas, and coal from Russia were painful. Even so, replacing—instead of defending—a supplier has become more realistic in recent years, and the right policies can make this alternative even more plausible.

For example, if some oil from the Middle East becomes unavailable, do other suppliers have the potential to replace it? A promising candidate is the U.S., where production has surged in recent years, as noted above. This increase (about seven million barrels per day) is much more than the 4.3 million barrels per day that Iraq and Kuwait were exporting in 1990 when Iraq invaded. In other words, the recent U.S. increase is almost twice the size of the disruption the U.S. intervened to prevent in the First Gulf War.

The U.S. also has ample reserves of natural gas and coal. As long as the U.S. has the necessary LNG terminals and other infrastructure to transport these fossil fuels, it may be able to replace other gas and coal producers in a crisis, even if they serve markets far from the U.S.

Obviously, any effort to replace other suppliers is more effective, and thus more likely to reduce defense externalities, when the products are fungible. For example, LNG can replace natural gas from a pipeline (though LNG is more expensive). Likewise, coal and natural gas are plausible substitutes for each other since both generate electricity. Yet neither can

substitute for oil, as long as oil (not electricity) is the main fuel for transportation.

Looking ahead, could the U.S. develop the potential to increase fossil fuel production even more in a crisis? Do U.S. firms have the capacity and incentives to ramp up? Could policymakers encourage them to do so? If the answer is “yes,” this backup capacity would reduce the pressure to defend other suppliers.

This pressure would ease not only if the U.S. and its allies could produce more fossil fuel, but also if they used less. In a supply shock, prices do not spike as much if demand also contracts. Even if prices do rise, there is less harm if the economy is less reliant on fossil fuel.

This brings us to a second promising trend: even as demand for fossil fuel has increased worldwide (and especially in the developing world), the U.S. and its allies have become less dependent on fossil fuel in recent years. For example, the “energy intensity” of the U.S. economy—a measure of how much energy is needed to produce a given level of economic output—is less than half of what it was forty years ago.56Specifically, energy intensity is energy consumption divided by GDP. U.S. Energy Intensity Has Dropped by Half Since 1983, Varying Greatly by State, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48976 [https://perma.cc/2CH4-PDE7]. Even as the population and economy have grown significantly, U.S. oil consumption has held steady at about 18.5 million barrels per day.57The U.S. consumed 18.51 million bpd in 1970, and 18.684 million bpd in 2021. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Review (2012), https://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0501a [https://perma.cc/5XNK-3ZGK]; Oil Consumption in the United States From 1998–2021, Statista (Mar. 2, 2023), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/282716/oil-consumption-in-the-us-per-day [https://perma.cc/HMR5-PP2F].
Vehicles and appliances have become more energy efficient,58For instance, over the next five years, greater fuel efficiency and increased use of electric cars are projected to save 1.85 million barrels of oil per day worldwide. Int’l Energy Agency, Oil 2021: Analysis and Forecast to 2026 28 (2021). and the U.S. economy depends less on energy intensive industries, such as manufacturing. In addition, renewable energy has become less expensive, and thus more common. It generated 12.61% of all energy used in the U.S. in 2021—a new high59Ken Bossong, US Renewable Energy Production in 2021 Hit an All-time High, Renewables Now (Mar. 31, 2022, 11:40 AM) https://renewablesnow.com/news/us-renewable-energy-production-in-2021-hit-an-all-time-high-779202 [https://perma.cc/62P8-XG5V].—as well as 67% of new electric power generation in the first half of 2022.60Michelle Lewis, Wind, Solar Provide 67% of New US Electrical Generating Capacity in First Half of 2022, Electrek (Aug. 15, 2022, 12:05 PM), https://electrek.co/2022/08/15/wind-solar-provide-67-of-new-us-electrical-generating-capacity-in-first-half-of-2022 [https://perma.cc/T7NM-MK4N]. Likewise, the global share of electricity from renewables reached 29% in 2020 (up from 27% in 2019). Global Energy Review 2021: Renewables, Int’l Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2021/renewables [https://perma.cc/J7R5-BGC6].

Can U.S. firms and households build on this progress? Can policymakers encourage this trend? Again, if the answer is “yes,” there would be less pressure to defend insecure fossil fuel suppliers.

3.  Encouraging Extra Supply

How can the U.S. and its allies keep reducing defense externalities? What else can they do to tap more supply from secure sources, while also cutting demand? How can policymakers reinforce these trends?

i.  Stockpiles

A key challenge is timing. Supply shocks come on suddenly, but it takes time to tap new supply and reduce demand. Until these efforts bear fruit, the U.S. and its allies are exposed to higher prices. If these responses take years to implement, instead of weeks or months, there could be significant economic disruptions in the interim.

As a (partial) response, the U.S. and its allies can rely on stockpiles of fossil fuel, such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) for oil.61See generally Jason Bordoff, Antoine Halff & Akos Losz, Columbia Ctr. on Glob. Energy Pol’y, New Realities, New Risks: Rethinking the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (2018), https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/CGEP_Rethinking_
the_Strategic_Petroleum_Reserve_June2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMB3-XEZW] (analyzing the continuing need for strategic petroleum reserve in the U.S.). These stockpiles are either physically stored (as in the U.S.) or required of refiners. Similarly, Germany and other European countries have storage facilities for natural gas. Europe’s Underground Gas Storage Sites, Prospero Events Grp. (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.prosperoevents.com/europes-underground-gas-storage-sites-2 [https://perma.
cc/F5RJ-ZCUL]; Arne Delfs, Germany Takes Control of Gazprom Unit to Ensure Energy Supply, Bloomberg (Apr. 4, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/4/4/germany-takes-control-of-gazprom-unit-to-ensure-gas-supply [https://perma.cc/Y6JP-7L39].
“[E]mergency stocks could smooth economically harmful price spikes until markets are able to adjust,” observed Jason Bordoff, Antoine Halff, and Akos Losz.62Bordoff et al., supra note 61, at 6.

Even so, a stockpile is more effective when the supply shock is temporary. Since a stockpile’s supply is finite, the market knows it eventually will run out. The key question, then, is whether the stockpile can outlast the supply shock. If the answer is “yes”—for instance, while a pipeline is being repaired—prices should remain stable. But a stockpile is less effective when the shock is expected to persist, which is likely for a revolution, an invasion, or another geopolitical crisis.63Richard G. Newell & Brian C. Prest, Informing SPR Policy Through Oil Futures and Inventory Dynamics 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23974, 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/23974.html [https://perma.cc/YJ3D-J96R] (“SPR releases are more effective and appropriate in response to temporary supply shocks, and less so in the face of persistent shocks.”). Since market prices are forward-looking, they will still rise, even when supply from the stockpile is released, because everyone knows the extra supply is only temporary.64Hopefully, SPR releases can keep prices from surging even higher. For example, oil prices still spiked after Russia invaded Ukraine, even though President Biden responded with the largest SPR release in history. See Adam Aton, Biden’s Use of Oil Reserves Overshadows Past Presidents, E&E News (Oct. 20, 2022, 6:53 AM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/bidens-use-of-oil-reserves-overshadows-past-presidents [https://perma.cc/VXK7-KUYA] (reporting that Biden released 50 million barrels in response to price increases in the months before the invasion, another 180 million shortly after the invasion, and another 15 million in October of 2022); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, The Price Impact of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release (July 26, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0887 [https://perma.cc/9NW2-24KV] (concluding that SPR release lowered gas prices by 17 to 42 cents per gallon).

As a result, a stockpile alone cannot address supply shocks. Other measures are also needed, which either increase supply or reduce demand. A shock is averted only if the market expects these measures to kick in before the stockpile runs out.

ii.  Spare Capacity

When the solution is new supply, it needs to get to market quickly. Yet, although firms have economic incentives to ramp up production when prices rise, a rapid pace often is not feasible.

“Generally speaking, the oil industry is highly capital intensive and relatively slow moving,” observed Bordoff, Halff, and Losz.65Bordoff et al., supra note 61, at 19. “Most oil development projects cost billions of dollars and take years to bring into production.”66Id. Natural gas projects have an added challenge, emphasized above: transporting gas requires either pipelines or liquefaction facilities, which take years to build.

Fortunately, some suppliers can respond more quickly. In the oil market, the fastest response is what the International Energy Agency calls “spare capacity”: additional production that comes online within thirty days and lasts for more than ninety days. This pace usually is feasible only for Saudi Arabia. It “maintains the largest spare capacity and has historically played the role of ‘swing’ supplier,” explained Bordoff, Halff, and Losz, “adjusting production in line with market conditions.”67Id. at 20.

Even so, Saudi Arabia is not always able (or willing) to ramp up oil production. For example, after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Saudis agreed to only a minor increase.68Ryan Hogg, Saudi Arabia Can’t Increase Oil Production Further in the Medium Term, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Reportedly Said, Bus. Insider (July 16, 2022, 5:54 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-agrees-to-boost-oil-production-after-biden-visits-2022-7 [https://perma.cc/K4HC-JUUH]. A few months later, they cut production, disregarding a U.S. request to pump at capacity.69Dmitry Zhdannikov, Steve Holland & Jarrett Renshaw, OPEC+ Oil Output Cut Shows Widening Rift Between Biden and Saudi Royals, Reuters (Oct. 8, 2022, 12:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/opec-oil-output-cut-shows-widening-rift-between-biden-saudi-royals-2022-10-07 [https://perma.cc/7CY7-F25E].

As this disagreement highlighted, Saudi and U.S. interests sometimes diverge. For one thing, the Saudis benefit from high oil prices. The U.S. and the Saudis also have clashed over Saudi ties to Russia, U.S. diplomatic approaches to Iran (the Saudis’ main regional rival), and the murder of a dissident Saudi journalist. The relationship was further strained by Joe Biden’s comments on the kingdom while running for President: asserting that there was “very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia,” he pledged to make them “the pariah that they are.”70Alex Emmons, Aída Chávez & Akela Lacy, Joe Biden, In Departure from Obama Policy, Says He Would Make Saudi Arabia a “Pariah,” Intercept (Nov. 20, 2019, 9:52 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/11/21/democratic-debate-joe-biden-saudi-arabia [https://perma.cc/W6GQ-5AK7]. Indeed, ties between the Biden Administration and the Saudi leadership were so frayed that when the Saudis restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023, they worked through China instead of the U.S., a step that was “a real slap in the face to Biden.”71Stephen Kalin, Benoit Faucon, Vivian Salama & David S. Cloud, Saudi Arabia, Iran Restore Relations in Deal Brokered by China, Wall St. J. (Mar. 10, 2023, 2:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-restore-relations-in-deal-brokered-by-china-406393a1 [https://perma.cc/K5CQ-K33C] (quoting Aaron David Miller, a veteran U.S. negotiator in the Middle East).

iii.  Increasing Supply in Other Ways and Reducing Demand

Instead of relying on Saudi Arabia to stabilize global oil markets, the U.S. would be better off developing its own backup capacity, which could be tapped in a crisis. But is this feasible? Can U.S. oil producers ramp up quickly enough to play this role? What about the U.S. natural gas industry? How can policymakers encourage faster responses?

In general, the answer depends on the type of well and the availability of key infrastructure. Offshore wells take years for permitting, construction, and drilling, costing billions of dollars. But fortunately, drilling in shale is different.72Nick Lioudis, Oil and Gas Production Timelines, Investopedia (Sept. 30, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/061115/how-long-does-it-take-oil-and-gas-producer-go-drilling-production.asp [https://perma.cc/PRX8-3MFT] (“Shale wells can be drilled in two to four weeks and brought on line within months, while offshore wells are costlier and can take much longer.”). The “ability of US shale producers to ramp output up or down relatively quickly in response to price signals or changing market conditions,” Bordoff, Halff and Losz have explained, “could be seen as a form of insurance against disruption risks . . . .”73Bordoff, et al., supra note 61, at 19. The same is true of new natural gas wells in shale.

Yet even if wells can be drilled quickly, pipelines and other infrastructure are needed to bring oil and gas to market. Even so, with the right infrastructure in place—and, more generally, with the right policies—the U.S. could take advantage of the elasticity of shale production to respond to supply shocks. Part V of this Article explores this possibility, and the synergies and tradeoffs it presents for national security and the environment.

To become less dependent on insecure suppliers, the U.S. and its allies also should reduce demand. Like new supply, this response takes time but, again, the right policies can accelerate it. Part IV explores the national security and environmental implications of promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Admittedly, neither of these strategies—increased supply or reduced demand—is easy to execute on short notice.74Deutch et al., supra note 47, at 23 (“In general, policies intended to affect consumption or supply are slow to take effect.”). But the same is true of an effective military response. All of these efforts require long-term investment and preparation.

The fundamental question, then, is which response maximizes welfare. To head off supply shocks—and, more generally, to access energy at the lowest social cost—is it better to build aircraft carriers, drill new wells, or install electric vehicle charging stations? The answer is a combination of measures—not just military responses, but also new sources of fossil fuel, as well as efforts to use less of it.

D.  Division of Labor Between the Private and Public Sectors

Which institutions are supposed to pursue these various goals? Unlike in some countries, the U.S. does not have government-owned energy companies, which could be tasked with implementing government policy along with earning profits.

By relying instead on the private sector, the U.S. reaps familiar benefits. In a competitive market, private firms have strong incentives to cut costs and experiment with new approaches. In this way, the private sector sometimes delivers transformative innovations, such as the U.S. shale boom.75Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 145, 148 (2013).

Yet a familiar downside of private firms is that they do not minimize negative externalities, such as the national security and environmental costs in this Article. Rather, addressing these externalities requires a government response. Policymakers can choose from a range of policy instruments, including Pigouvian taxes, permitting policies, subsidies, moratoriums, and mandates. Part VI surveys various options, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages.

E.  Objections to Considering Defense Externalities in Energy Policy

So far, this Part has argued that depending on fossil fuel adds to the defense budget, and that policymakers need to account for this cost in evaluating the merits of different energy sources. However, other commentators have taken the opposite view, urging policymakers to omit defense externalities from this analysis. Douglas Bohi and Michael Toman made this case in an influential 1996 book.76Bohi & Toman, supra note 5, at 53–54. Several other commentators have followed their lead,77Metcalf, supra note 4; Parry & Darmstadter, supra note 4, at 15 (“US military expenditures in the Middle East are in part the result of US interests in securing its flow of imported oil from that region, and therefore count as a total cost of oil import dependency. However, many analysts do not include them when assessing the external costs of marginal changes in US oil imports.”). Although a 2006 Council of Foreign Relations study does not cite Bohi and Toman, it echoes their argument.  Deutch et al., supra note 47, at 29 (noting that the U.S. “will depend on the Persian Gulf” for oil for the next twenty years and that, even if it did not, “there would be reasons to maintain a substantial military capability in the region”). as have a number of U.S. government agencies. For example, a 2018 analysis of tougher fuel economy standards omitted the national security advantages of using less petroleum,78See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 43211 n.426 (Aug. 24, 2018) (“While the U.S. maintains a military presence in certain parts of the world to help secure global access to petroleum supplies, that is neither the primary nor the sole mission of U.S. forces overseas. Additionally, the scale of oil consumption reductions associated with CAFE standards would be insufficient to alter any existing military missions focused on ensuring the safe and expedient production and transportation of oil around the globe.”); see also EPA, Proposed Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022–2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation: Technical Support Document Section 3.5.2.4, at 3-35 to 3-36 (2016) (“Military Security Cost Components of Energy Security”) (“[I]t is unclear that incremental reductions in either U.S. imports, or consumption of domestic petroleum, would produce incremental changes to the military expenditures related to the oil protection mission.” (citation omitted)). as did a 2009 National Research Council study79Nat’l Rsch. Council of the Nat’l Acads., supra note 4, at 333 (“[T]he marginal cost is essentially zero. This view is held by a number of other researchers in the area, including Bohi and Toman (1995). The committee adopts this position.”). and a 1992 Congressional Research Service report.80Carl E. Behrens, John E. Blodgett, Martin R. Lee, John L. Moore & Larry Parker, Cong. Rsch. Serv., 92–574–ENR, The External Costs of Oil Used in Transportation 31 (1992) (“The security cost of oil . . . is either insignificant or ponderous, depending on the assumptions made.”). The literature has offered two reasons to ignore defense externalities, and this Section shows why neither is persuasive.81I have made these arguments in earlier work as well. See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 256–58.

1.  Many Factors Influence Defense Policy

The first argument is that energy is just one of many factors affecting the defense budget, so its impact is too hard to isolate.82See Crane et al., supra note 34, at 59 (“[M]ilitary forces are . . . multipurpose and fungible . . . . It is . . . difficult to distill the genesis of a military operation to a unitary aim.”). “Until an effort that yields a credible measure of the externality involved is completed,” Bohi and Toman wrote, “this externality is too uncertain to be used in determining energy policy.”83Bohi & Toman, supra note 5, at 54.

But even when a cost is difficult to quantify, we should not simply ignore it. After all, we do not do this with climate externalities, even though they are hard to measure.84Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 256–57. Instead, the right approach is to use the best available estimate, however imperfect it is.

For example, a 2018 study concluded that the Pentagon spends 16% of its general operating budget to protect Middle Eastern oil.85SAFE, supra note 40 (offering an estimate based on the average of seven other studies). To cover this cost, U.S. gasoline taxes would have to increase by 28 cents per gallon86Id. These calculations are in 2017 dollars. (and by an additional 70 cents to fund the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq).87Id.; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz & Linda J. Bilmes, Estimating the Costs of War: Methodological Issues, with Applications to Iraq and Afghanistan, in  Oxford Handbook of the Econ. of Peace and Conflict 3 (Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas eds., 2012) (“Some argued that the invasion of Iraq was motivated largely by a desire to control the supply of oil.”). Again, SAFE’s calculations are in 2017 dollars. Admittedly, this estimate may be off the mark. Other studies propose estimates of their own—some higher, some lower—by using different methodologies and assumptions.88See SAFE, supra note 40 (surveying other studies). The goal here is not to defend a particular estimate, but to show that these costs are too substantial to ignore.

2.  Can Shifts in Energy Markets Change the Defense Budget?

Second, these commentators argue that energy policy should ignore the cost of defending fossil fuel, not only because this cost is hard to measure, but also because it is fixed. In their view, the U.S. is stuck protecting insecure suppliers, and energy policy cannot do anything about it. For example, even if U.S. energy policy delivers modest increases in energy efficiency and in domestic oil and gas production, the U.S. would still have to defend the Middle East.89Bohi & Toman, supra note 5, at 53 (“[M]ilitary security expenditures are a fixed cost, and their internalization in the price of oil will not solve the problem that they are intended to address.”); Metcalf, supra note 4, at 168 (“[A] marginal (or even inframarginal) reduction in oil consumption may not affect our national security planning or spending significantly.”).

While this argument is persuasive for limited changes, there have been major shifts since Bohi and Toman made this claim in 1996. As emphasized above, domestic production of oil and gas has surged, while energy efficiency and renewable energy have enabled the U.S. and its allies to depend less on fossil fuel. If government policy can accelerate these trends, there will be less pressure to defend insecure suppliers.

To sum up, American dependence on fossil fuels has added to U.S. military and foreign policy burdens. These “defense externalities” are a hidden price of oil and gas. To reduce the cost of defending insecure suppliers, the U.S. and its allies need to depend less on them. The answer is a two-pronged strategy, which reduces demand for fossil fuel, while also tapping new supply in the U.S. and other secure locations.

II.  FUNDING EXTERNALITIES: ANOTHER COST OF DEPENDING ON THE WRONG SUPPLIERS

While the last Part analyzed the cost of protecting fossil fuel suppliers, this Part considers the cost of strengthening them. Unfortunately, some energy exporters use fossil fuel revenue to pay for harmful conduct. For example, Russia’s energy exports have financed its war in Ukraine. Buying from bad actors can facilitate their threatening behavior. Like defense externalities, these “funding externalities”—the national security costs of providing revenue to dangerous suppliers—do not appear in the price of energy.

So how should policymakers respond? As with defense externalities, the key is to depend less on the wrong suppliers. Again, the U.S. and its allies should use less fossil fuel, while also finding other (friendly) suppliers. Even so, some commentators urge policymakers to ignore funding externalities, so the last Section of this Part responds to their claims.

A.  National Security Risks from Dangerous Suppliers

There are national security risks from depending not only on insecure suppliers, but also on threatening ones. “Governments of some countries openly hostile to the United States . . . ,” the RAND Corporation observed, “rely on oil exports for most of their budget revenues.”90Crane et al., supra note 34, at 43; see also Deutch, et al., supra note 47, at 26 (“[T]he control over enormous oil revenues gives exporting countries the flexibility to adopt policies that oppose U.S. interests and values.”). They use this revenue to pursue harmful agendas both abroad and at home.91See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 258–60. Unfortunately, buying from these suppliers undermines national security by facilitating this threatening behavior.

1.  Funding War, Terrorism, and Other Threats

Let us begin with the harm these suppliers cause outside their borders. Russia is the quintessential example. In 2022, its energy exports paid for its invasion of Ukraine. Before the war, Russia was the world’s largest exporter of oil and natural gas92Yergin, supra note 23, at 71. Russia was the third largest producer of oil (after the U.S. and Saudi Arabia), the second largest producer of natural gas (after the U.S.), and the largest exporter of both commodities. and Europe’s main supplier.93Energy Fact Sheet, supra note 2. Russia supplied 40% of Europe’s natural gas, id., as well as more than 25% of its imported crude oil. Charlotte Edmond, How Much Energy Does the EU Import from Russia?, World Econ. F. (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/eu-energy-russia-oil-gas-import [https://perma.cc/H5EJ-KW2Z]. Russia was also the world’s third largest exporter of coal in 2021 (behind Australia and Indonesia and ahead of the U.S.).94Daniel Workman, Coal Exports by Country, World’s Top Exports, https://www.worldstopexports.com/coal-exports-country [https://perma.cc/K56V-8JCC]. Since Russia’s largest energy companies were state owned and private producers were heavily taxed,95See Jennifer Josefson & Alexandra Rotar, Oil and Gas Regulation in the Russian Federation: Overview, Thompson Reuters Practical Law (Apr. 1, 2021), https://uk.practical
law.thomsonreuters.com/0-527-3028 [https://perma.cc/XF3F-L494] (describing complex system of subsoil license fees, taxes on revenue and extraction, export duties, and other taxes).
nearly half of the Russian government’s revenue in 2021 came from energy exports.96Energy Fact Sheet, supra note 2 (“Russia relies heavily on revenues from oil and natural gas, which in 2021 made up 45% of Russia’s federal budget.”). “Increased production and long periods of high prices gave President Vladimir Putin the resources to beef up Russia’s army and throw his weight around,” Ricardo Hausmann has observed.97Ricardo Hausmann, How to Eat Russia’s Oil Lunch, Project Syndicate (Mar. 31, 2022), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-to-reduce-russias-share-of-global-oil-market-by-ricardo-hausmann-2022-03 [https://perma.cc/3ZDW-TVKT].

Since the costs of “throwing his weight around” did not appear in the market price, consumers did not account for them in deciding how much fossil fuel oil to buy. Europe kept paying Russia for energy, even as troops amassed on the Ukrainian border. Once the war began, the human toll from these purchases became clear: hundreds of thousands of casualties, millions of displaced civilians, and massive economic dislocation.98Helene Cooper, Russia and Ukraine Each Have Suffered Over 100,000 Casualties, the Top U.S. General Says, N.Y. Times (Nov. 10, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com
/2022/11/10/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-casualties-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/2UKJ-TT2C] (explaining that the U.S. estimates 200,000 military and 40,000 civilian casualties and 15 to 30 million displaced civilians); Valerie Hopkins, Neil MacFarquhar, Steven Erlanger & Michael Levenson, 100 Days of War: Death, Destruction, and Loss, N.Y. Times (June 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-100-days.html [https://perma.
cc/YA9X-J77V] (explaining the U.N. estimates that Ukraine’s GDP fell by 50% in 2022. Half of Ukraine’s businesses closed, 4.8 million jobs were lost, and 90% of the population were at risk of poverty).
As the foreign minister of Lithuania put it, “buying Russian oil and gas is financing war crimes.”99Jake Epstein, Lithuania’s Top Diplomat Says Buying Russian Oil and Gas is ‘Financing War Crimes’ and Urges EU Not to Be ‘an Accomplice,’ Bus. Insider (Apr. 4, 2022, 8:39 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/lithuania-diplomat-says-buying-russian-oil-financing-war-crimes-ukraine-2022-4 [https://perma.cc/5WRP-UVTD] (quoting Gabrielius Landsbergis). Yet even as the war raged, Russia still earned nearly $1 billion per day exporting energy. Although the U.S. and its allies tried to stop buying from Russia, soaring oil prices—stoked in part by the war itself—kept Russia’s coffers full in the months following the invasion.100Hiroko Tabuchi, Russia’s Oil Revenue Soars Despite Sanctions, Study Finds, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/13/climate/russia-oil-gas-record-revenue.html [https://perma.cc/GG9N-C7QL] (citing new study by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, a research organization based in Helsinki, Finland).

Russia is not the only fossil fuel exporter that threatens the U.S. and its allies. Iran uses export revenue to finance its nuclear program,101Crane et al., supra note 34, at 45–48. as well as terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.102Id. at 56–57. Venezuela poses a threat to its neighbors,103Maduro Government a Threat to U.S. National Security: Pompeo, Reuters (Apr. 10, 2019, 9:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-pompeo/maduro-government-a-threat-to-u-s-national-security-pompeo-idUSKCN1RM25K [https://perma.cc/Y5CU-8YCA] (statement of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo) (“I don’t think there is any doubt that . . . the Maduro regime presents a threat to the United States of America.”). In November 2022, the U.S. shifted gears, allowing Venezuela to resume energy exports. Although the stated reason was to recognize the Maduro government’s willingness to engage in talks with the opposition, commentators believe the U.S. also was trying to bring down global oil prices, which spiked after Russia invaded Ukraine. See Matt Daily, Biden Gives Chevron Permit to Restart Venezuelan Oil Sales, Politico (Nov. 26, 2022, 3:08 PM), https://
http://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/26/biden-chevron-permit-venezuelan-oil-sales-00070836 [https://
perma.cc/W8PH-M5V4].
and Saudi Arabia funds institutions that promote Islamic extremism.104Crane et al., supra note 34 (noting Saudi financing of Wahhabi religious institutions).

2.  Extortion

Hostile fossil fuel exporters can threaten others by harnessing not just the revenue they earn, but also the leverage they exert.105Deutch et al., supra note 47 (“[C]ountries dependent on imports subtly modify their policies to be more congenial to suppliers.”). To influence their buyers’ policies, exporters can use fossil fuel as a carrot (by dangling favorable terms) or a stick (by threatening to stop selling).

Again, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a paradigmatic example. When Europe supported Ukraine, Russia retaliated by reducing the flow of natural gas, causing prices in Europe to skyrocket.106The Nord Stream 1 pipeline, connecting Russia and Germany, first slowed gas deliveries, then stopped them entirely, and then was damaged in explosions that many attribute to sabotage. Melissa Eddy, Pipeline Breaks Look Deliberate, Europeans Say, Exposing Vulnerability, N.Y. Times (Sept. 27, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/27/world/europe/pipeline-leak-russia-nord-stream.html [https://
perma.cc/GVU4-X4LB]; Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, Intelligence Suggests Pro-Ukrainian Group Sabotaged Pipelines, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/us/politics/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-ukraine.html [https://
perma.cc/EK74-58ZP] (“New intelligence reviewed by U.S. officials suggests that a pro-Ukrainian group carried out the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines.”).
The goal was to pressure Europeans to “vote their pained pocketbooks,” Daniel Yergin and Michael Stoppart explained.107Daniel Yergin & Michael Stoppard, Winter in Europe May Be Springtime for Putin, Wall St. J. (Aug. 3, 2022, 6:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/winter-in-europe-may-be-springtime-for-putin-ukraine-energy-gas-supplier-war-european-union-shipments-pipeline-11659556722 [https://perma
.cc/6DNM-FJLC].
“The ultimate aim is to bring governments to power in Europe that aren’t committed to supporting Ukraine . . . .”108Id.

Unfortunately, Europe could not easily replace Russian gas on short notice. The price of LNG skyrocketed—even as U.S. firms redirected their LNG exports from Asia to Europe—because there were not enough liquefaction facilities to meet Europe’s needs.109Marianna Parraga, More U.S. LNG Heads to Europe Despite Output Constraints, Reuters (Oct 3, 2022, 12:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/more-us-lng-heads-europe-despite-output-constraints-2022-10-03 [https://perma.cc/FYC7-T58G]. These shortages exacted a severe economic toll as inflation spiked and the economy slowed.110Andreas Walstad, Energy Prices Trigger EU Inflation, Poor Worst Hit, Politico (Nov. 28, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://www.politico.eu/sponsored-content/energy-prices-trigger-eu-inflation-poor-worst-hit [https://perma.cc/4X4N-LNMP] (noting added burden on European households because of higher energy prices). This energy crisis exposed the geopolitical cost of depending on Russia, empowering it not only with export revenue, but also with the ability to turn off the spigot.

3.  Entrenching Repressive Regimes

Buying from hostile petrostates empowers them to harm not just the U.S. and its allies, but also their own people. Authoritarian leaders often use this revenue to line their own pockets and stay in power.111See Deutch, et al, supra note 47, at 9 (“Too often, these revenues accrue to a small minority that is unaccountable to any representative political authority.”). Again, this cost does not appear in the price at the pump.

Venezuela is a tragic example. Despite its vast oil reserves,112Amelia Cheatham, Diana Roy & Rocio Cara Labrador, Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate, Council on Foreign Rels. (Dec. 29, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis [https://perma.cc/R486-M4AC]. Venezuela has faced hyperinflation and a steep decline in GDP in recent years.113GDP fell by roughly two-thirds from 2014 to 2020. Id. Inflation reached an all-time high of 344,509.50% in February of 2019. Venezuela Inflation Rate, Trading Econ., https://tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/inflation-cpi [https://perma.cc/22T9-7P22]. The rate fell to a (still extreme) 686.4% in 2021. Nicolle Yapur, Venezuela Breaks One of World’s Longest Hyperinflation Bouts, Bloomberg (Jan. 14, 2022, 1:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-14/venezuela-breaks-one-of-world-s-longest-hyperinflation-bouts [https://perma.cc/D3ZF-NM2R]. The poverty rate is 90%, and food shortages caused the average citizen to lose 24 pounds in 2017.114Robert Valencia, Venezuelans Are Losing a Lot of Weight Amid Money Crisis, Newsweek (Feb. 22, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/venezuelans-are-losing-lot-weight-amid-money-crisis-816886 [https://perma.cc/LS56-4UUM]. Meanwhile, President Nicolás Maduro’s “policies are marked by authoritarianism, intolerance for dissent, and violent and systematic repression of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”115U.S. Relations with Venezuela: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State), https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela [https://perma.cc/APR8-FSAN].

Even so, Maduro clings to power by exporting oil. These sales represent 99% of the nation’s export earnings and about 25% of its GDP.116Cheatham et al., supra note 112. Maduro controls this revenue, using it to maintain the military’s support and reward political allies.117Scott Morgenstern & John Polga-Hecimovich, Why Venezuela’s Oil Money Could Keep Undermining its Economy and Democracy, Conversation (Feb. 8, 2019, 6:35 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-venezuelas-oil-money-could-keep-undermining-its-economy-and-democracy-111013 [https://perma.cc/S49F-CZGU] (“He installed military cronies as managers . . . . [C]orruption has run rampant.”).

To sum up, there are national security risks from buying oil and gas from Russia, Iran, and other threatening suppliers. These “funding externalities” arise when suppliers use export revenue to finance wars and terrorism abroad and repressive policies at home.

B.  Depending Less on Hostile Suppliers

So what should the U.S. and its allies do? How can they reduce these funding externalities? As with defense externalities, the key is to depend less on the wrong suppliers. Indeed, since the responses are so similar, the discussion here can be brief.

To avoid empowering hostile suppliers, the U.S. and its allies should stop buying from them, while encouraging others to do the same. But if these commercial ties need to be severed quickly, there is a risk of a supply shock. Indeed, this is what happened after Russia invaded Ukraine, prompting Europe to wean itself off of Russian oil, gas, and coal.118See supra Sections II.A.1 & 2.

How can the U.S. and its allies mitigate these supply shocks? As with defense externalities, the answer is a two-part effort. Along with reducing demand, they should tap more supply in friendly countries, such as the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Norway, Israel, Cyprus, and the U.K.

In responding to funding externalities, the U.S. and its allies face an additional challenge, which does not arise with defense externalities: persuading other countries to stop buying from the relevant supplier.

Why the difference? Either way, the U.S. and its allies do not buy from the supplier, but the reason is different. With defense externalities, the supplier cannot sell (for example, because it has been invaded). In contrast, with funding externalities, the supplier might still want to sell, but the U.S. and its allies do not want to buy from it (for example, because it has launched an invasion).

In refusing to buy, their goal is to deprive the supplier of revenue, and thus to reduce its military and economic power. Yet this goal will not be achieved if the supplier can simply sell to other buyers. To discourage these other buyers, the U.S. and its allies can try a range of policies, including embargoes, tariffs, price caps, restrictions on financing and insuring cargoes, sanctions on buyers, and the like.

Admittedly, these policies can be hard to enforce. Some countries will not adopt them. Hostile suppliers also might evade them with deception (for example, by selling through intermediaries, falsifying records, and so forth).

Fortunately, however, even porous sanctions can still reduce funding externalities, as long as they force the hostile supplier to sell at a discount, eroding the funding for its harmful agenda. For example, even though China and India did not join the U.S.-led embargo of Russian oil in 2022, they bought this oil at a steep discount.119Russian Oil Selling at 30% Discount to Global Benchmark, Data Show, Bloomberg (May 31, 2022, 3:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-31/the-deepening-discounts-on-russian-oil-in-the-country-s-own-data [https://perma.cc/7GE5-MYX3]. The discount has narrowed as Russia has figured out more ways to evade Western sanctions. Lisa Shidler, Not Giving In – Is The G-7’S Price Cap On Russian Crude Oil Exports Having Its Intended Effect?, RBN Energy (Jan. 30,
2024), https://rbnenergy.com/not-giving-in-is-the-g7s-price-cap-on-russian-crude-oil-exports-having-its-intended-effect (noting that discount on Russian crude has gone from $40 in early 2023 to $17 in the second half of 2023).

C.  Objections to Considering Funding Externalities in Energy Policy

While this Article warns about risks from buying fossil fuel from hostile suppliers and offers a strategy to deal with these funding externalities, some commentators are not troubled by these risks. In their view, the real problem is with the hostile regime itself, not with the commodities it exports, and that sometimes the best way to moderate the regime is to buy its energy. This Section responds to these claims.

1.  The Problem is the Regime, Not its Fossil Fuel Exports

Even though a number of fossil fuel exporters pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies, some commentators urge us to distinguish between these regimes, on the one hand, and their exports, on the other.120See, e.g., Crane et al., supra note 34, at 57 (“[O]il revenues provide a means, not a motivation.”). This argument is a bit like the mantra of some gun rights advocates: “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people.”121Michael Shammas, It’s Time to Retire the ‘Guns Don’t Kill People—People Kill People’ Argument. Guns DO kill People, Medium (Apr. 5, 2018), https://medium.com/@mshammas/its-time-to-retire-the-guns-don-t-kill-people-people-kill-people-argument-60d91889f806 [https://perma.cc/X5HS-BAZF] (critiquing view of gun control opponents that “guns don’t kill people, people kill people”). In this spirit, “fossil fuel exports don’t harm people, exporting regimes do.”

They are right that not all fossil fuel exporters are threatening. After all, Canada and Norway are major exporters.122Daniel Workman, Crude Oil Exports by Country, World’s Top Exports, https://www.worldstopexports.com/worlds-top-oil-exports-country [https://perma.cc/CKL3-GM3X]. At the same time, some potentially threatening regimes are not fossil fuel exporters, including China and North Korea.123As the 2009 RAND study put it, “Oil exports are not a necessary condition for financing rogue states.” Crane et al., supra note 34, at 43.

But unfortunately, some fossil fuel exporters clearly do pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies, including Russia and Iran. Their fossil fuel exports give them more power to pursue their threatening ambitions. Indeed, if the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has taught us anything, it has revealed the folly of ignoring defense costs in energy policy. The willingness of Europe—and of Germany in particular—to become so dependent on Russian energy has turned out to be a grave mistake.

In Russia, Iran, and other energy producers, energy exports do not just facilitate harmful behavior; in some cases, they actually cause it. As Michael Ross has argued, a government funded by energy exports is less accountable,124Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations 74 (2012) (explaining that oil rich countries are 50% more likely to be ruled by autocrats and none have successfully become democracies between 1960 and 2010). and thus is more likely to pursue reckless policies. To extract oil and gas, the government can rely on a small fraction of the population (or on foreign partners).125See, e.g., id. (noting that oil and gas accounts for 90% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP but employs only 1.6% of population). So, instead of depending on the labor, tax dollars, and the good will of its people, the regime can use export revenue to fund a police state, buy off dissent, and control the press.126Id. at 63. This revenue also can cause a “resource curse,” undermining entrepreneurship, diversified growth, and the social rights they facilitate.127Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 Eur. Econ. Rev. 827, 828, 837 (2001). For a regime presiding over this sort of stagnant economy, an aggressive foreign policy can rally domestic support, tapping into nationalist sentiment, justifying military expenditures that keep the military on its side, and distracting citizens from the regime’s failings. As a result, it is no accident that petrostates tend to be unstable or aggressive (or both).

In short, it is not always persuasive to distinguish between a threatening regime and its fossil fuel exports. These exports facilitate (and sometimes may even motivate) its aggressive and repressive policies.

2.  Target the Harmful Conduct, Not the Revenue That Funds It

Even if fossil fuel exports contribute to harmful conduct, some commentators argue that the right response is to target the conduct, not the revenue that pays for it.

It would be better “to address the foreign policy problem directly,” the National Research Council argued in its 2006 report, instead of “reduc[ing] oil consumption to lower world prices,” since “such an effort would be an imperfect proxy for better targeted instruments and would hurt oil producing friends and foe alike.”128Nat’l Rsch. Council of the Nat’l Acads., supra note 4, at 333. In making this argument, the National Research Council incorrectly asserts that there is no negative externality when someone buys fossil fuel from hostile or repressive regimes:

A simple analogy illustrates the problem with viewing that situation as an externality. Let us assume that my neighbor burns trash in his backyard that causes pollution that adversely affects my household. This is a clear externality. Further assume that I purchase commodities in a store owned by my neighbor. My consumption thus provides income for my neighbor that leads him to purchase more commodities and produce more trash to be burned. My purchase of goods from my neighbor’s store is not an externality. Rather, the neighbor’s burning of trash is the externality.

Id. at 331.Yet even though externalities affect third parties, there is no third party in this example; rather, the same person spends money in the store and lives next door. To illustrate the externality, let us change the example so someone else—not the wronged neighbor—spends this money: R likes to burn trash, which harms U, who lives next door. Meanwhile, G, who lives far away, spends money in R’s store, giving R the funds needed to set large and toxic bonfires. If we substitute “Russia” for R, “Ukraine” for U, and “Germany” for G, we see that G’s transaction with R hurts U, who is not part of their transaction. This clearly is an externality.

Admittedly, targeting the behavior is sometimes more efficient, but this is not always true. In some situations, going after the revenue stream could be cheaper, less risky, more technologically feasible, or otherwise more effective. Nor are these approaches necessarily alternatives.129Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 259 n.78. For example, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the U.S. and its European allies reduced their purchases of oil and gas from Russia, while also supplying military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Ultimately, the right answer is to pick the response—or, indeed, the combination of responses—that is most efficient under the circumstances.

3.  Exports Might Moderate the Regime

In this spirit, there may be times when the most efficient course is not to stop buying from a hostile regime, but to buy more from them. If trade would moderate a hostile regime, persuading it not to pursue aggressive or repressive policies, the externalities for these purchases actually would be positive, instead of negative.130Id. at 260.

How can trade have this beneficial impact? For one thing, it gives a regime’s leaders something to lose. They may shy away from an aggressive policy if they think it will jeopardize export revenue (but not if they expect this revenue to continue anyway). In addition, trade can moderate a regime by empowering constituencies that press for change, such as a pro-Western middle class. Unfortunately, fossil fuel exports often have the opposite effect of strengthening regime loyalists.131See supra Section II.A.3.

For decades, Germany hoped to moderate Russia through trade (and, a cynic would add, to reap the commercial advantages of cheap Russian energy). Angela Merkel doggedly pursued this policy as chancellor.132Katrin Bennhold, The Former Chancellor Who Became Putin’s Man in Germany, N.Y. Times (Apr. 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/23/world/europe/schroder-germany-russia-gas-ukraine-war-energy.html [https://perma.cc/U3F2-ESPG]. Her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, struck the deal to build the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and then earned sizable sums after leaving office as chair of the pipeline’s shareholder committee and a board member of Russia’s state-controlled oil company.133Id. Schröder has not been willing to concede error even after Russia invaded Ukraine. “I don’t do mea culpa,” he said.134Id. “It’s not my thing.”135Id. Nevertheless, his approach to Russia has been thoroughly discredited. “Obviously, this policy has totally failed,” said Marcel Dirsus, a German security expert, articulating a widely shared view.136Hans von der Burchard, Ukraine Crisis Prompts Germany to Rethink Russian Gas Addiction, Politico (Feb. 22, 2022, 11:42 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-russia-gas-ukraine-crisis-nord-stream [https://perma.cc/VEX7-JRCQ] (quoting Marcel Dirsus).

Yet, although commercial ties have not moderated Russia (but, on the contrary, have made the country a more dangerous foe), this will not be true of every regime. To predict the effect of export revenue, policymakers need to make context-specific judgments about a country’s leadership, the potential influence of other constituencies, and the like. But the general assumption in this Article is that policymakers will want to weaken and deter hostile regimes, not to rely on trade to moderate them.

To sum up, the key to weakening hostile suppliers is to depend on them less. In this spirit, the U.S. and its allies should reduce demand for oil and gas, while also looking for new (friendly) suppliers. Through this two-part strategy, energy policy can enhance national security by reducing both defense and funding externalities.

III.  ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS: CLIMATE, POLLUTION, AND THE AUTHORITARIAN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN ENERGY PRODUCTION

So far, this Article has focused exclusively on national security. Yet environmental goals are also important in energy policy, so we need to understand how these goals affect the analysis. What are the environmental implications of the proposal in Parts I and II to reduce demand for fossil fuels and tap new supply? What changes, if any, are needed to ensure that this strategy protects the environment, as well as national security? The rest of this Article focuses on these issues.

To lay the groundwork for this analysis, this Part briefly surveys two familiar environmental goals in energy policy: limiting climate change and pollution. How can we advance these goals, while also reducing demand for fossil fuel and tapping new supply? Parts IV, V, and VI identify synergies and tensions among these various goals, showing how to make progress on all fronts.

But before the rest of this Article digs into these policy details, this Part identifies a blunter tension between the environment and national security, which is rooted more in political economy than in policy. To enhance national security, the U.S. and its allies should produce more energy domestically, so they depend less on insecure and hostile suppliers. But unfortunately, democracies are not easy places to produce energy. Opposition to energy production—whether from local residents, environmental organizations, or other groups—gains more traction in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. As a result, the production of fossil fuel gravitates to authoritarian countries, as do some aspects of the production of clean energy. This unfortunate reality, which this Article calls the “authoritarian comparative advantage,” can harm both national security and the environment.

A.  Climate Harm from Fossil Fuels

The connection between energy policy and climate change is familiar: fossil fuel is the key driver of rising temperatures.

1.  Fossil Fuel, Emissions, and the Social Cost of Rising Temperatures

The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has increased by 50% in the 250 years since the industrial revolution began.137 News Release, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Carbon Dioxide Now More Than 50% Higher Than Pre-Industrial Levels (June 3, 2022), https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/carbon-dioxide-now-more-than-50-higher-than-pre-industrial-levels [https://perma.cc/C384-KLAJ] (noting that current concentration of CO2 in atmosphere of 421 parts per million (ppm) is up from 280 ppm before the industrial revolution). A scientific consensus has emerged that these emissions are raising global temperatures.138 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis 5 (2021) [hereinafter IPCC, Climate Change 2021], https://
report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg1/IPCC_AR6_WGI_FullReport.pdf   [permalink] (“The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–2019 is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C.” (footnote omitted)).

“The largest source of CO2, and of overall greenhouse gas emissions,” the EPA recently reported, “was fossil fuel combustion primarily from transportation and power generation.”139EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990–2020  ES-7 (2022) [hereinafter Sinks 1990–2020], https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-04/us-ghg-inventory-2022-main-text.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJM9-Q6R9]. For example, petroleum represents 90% of transportation fuel in the U.S., accounting for 27% of total U.S. emissions.

According to the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“UN IPCC”), rising emissions are already causing a range of harms, including extreme weather, wildfires, water shortages, rising sea levels, more heat-related deaths, and species extinctions.140Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability 9-13 (2022) [hereinafter IPCC, Climate Change 2022], https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg2/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf [permalink]; see also Risky Bus. Project, The Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States (2014), https://riskybusiness.org/report/national [https://perma.cc/5KXN-GSU3]. Looking ahead, the UN IPCC warns of significant economic losses from submerged coastal property, damaged infrastructure, effects of heat on health and productivity, storm damage, and reduced crop yields.141IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note 140, at 14–20.

These costs do not appear in the market price of energy. So, like the funding and defense externalities discussed above, consumers do not account for them in deciding how much energy to use.

2.  Climate Change as a National Security Threat

In addition to the costs described above, the Biden Administration has emphasized that some climate harms affect national security. When the administration requested an analysis of this question, the intelligence community highlighted three issues. First, there will be geopolitical tension about how to respond to climate change, including the speed of the response, who will pay for it, and whether China and India will join the effort.142Nat’l Intel. Estimate, Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040, at 1 (2021) [hereinafter Climate Change International], https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and
_National_Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWX4-RJYP]. The Administration tasked the intelligence community with analyzing this issue. See id. at i–ii.

Second, nations may clash over resources and refugees. For instance, there will be competition for fresh water, as well as for resources in the Arctic, a region that will become more accessible as temperatures rise.143Id. at 8, 10. In addition, when areas become uninhabitable, the flight of refugees will stoke tensions along borders.144Id. at 10.

Third, climate change will be especially costly in warmer regions. This could “increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict” in central Africa, Latin America, South and East Asia, and island nations in the Pacific.145Id. at 11.

In principle, this Article could label these climate-related national security risks either “climate” costs or “national security” costs. For clarity of exposition, this Article calls them “climate” costs, as noted above,146See supra Section I.A.2. but this choice should not affect the analysis. After all, a cost is a cost, regardless of what we call it. Either way, energy policy is more efficient if it accounts for these externalities, as well as the others flagged in this Article.

3.  Reducing Climate Externalities from Fossil Fuel

To mitigate climate harms, the UN IPCC has called for “[n]ear term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C.”147IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note 140, at 13.  This step, the UN IPCC has said, “would substantially reduce projected losses and damages related to climate change.”148Id.

Given the role of fossil fuel in climate change, energy policy needs to feature prominently in this effort. The right policies can reduce climate change in three ways. The first is to dial back the use of fossil fuel. Greater energy efficiency reduces the need for it, as does the wider use of clean energy, such as solar, wind, and nuclear power.

Second, since fossil fuels vary in their climate impacts, it is better to use ones with lower carbon footprints. Coal is the worst offender, since burning it produces nearly twice as much CO2 as burning natural gas.149Carbon Dioxide Emissions Coefficients, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Oct. 5, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php [https://perma.cc/D96D-LLTA] (noting that coal emits 211.87 pounds of CO2 per million Btu, while natural gas emits only 116.65 points per million Btu). Admittedly, natural gas has a limitation of its own: its main component, methane, is a potent greenhouse gas that can leak into the atmosphere.150Benjamin Storrow, Methane Leaks Erase Some of the Climate Benefits of Natural Gas, Sci. Am. (May 5, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/methane-leaks-erase-some-of-the-climate-benefits-of-natural-gas [https://perma.cc/3UW6-LZBF]. But as long as these leaks are prevented—and they are, indeed, preventable—emissions can be slashed by replacing coal with natural gas.151Id. (noting that technology to curb leaks is widely available and quoting the Environmental Defense Fund’s Chief Scientist Steve Hamburg in saying that “[t]here is no need for this pollution. It is just completely unnecessary.”).

This is precisely what has happened in the U.S., causing U.S. emissions to fall even as they have increased in China, India, and the developing world (and thus overall).152IPCC, Climate Change 2021, supra note 138, at 8 (“In 2019, atmospheric CO₂ concentrations were higher than at any time in at least 2 million years . . . .”). In the U.S., the percentage of electricity generated by coal fell from about 50% to 24% between 2007 and 2019, with natural gas picking up most of the slack. “That was the main reason,” Dan Yergin observed, “why U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions dropped down to the levels of the early 1990s, despite a doubling in the U.S. economy.”153Yergin, supra note 23, at 12–13; see also Electric Power Sector CO2 Emissions Drop as Generation Mix Shifts from Coal to Natural Gas, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (June 9, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48296 [https://perma.cc/RHA8-HH7W] (“Although both the increased use of renewables and the shift from coal-fired to natural gas-fired generation contributed to reductions in electric power sector CO2 emissions, the shift from coal to natural gas had a larger effect.”). According to EPA, U.S. emissions decreased by 13% from 2005 to 2019 (including a 1.7% decline from 2018 to 2019). EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990–2019  ES-4 (2021), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2021-main-text.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6CM-UQGQ] (attributing decline in emissions to greater energy efficiency, as well as “a continued shift from coal to less carbon intensive natural gas and renewables in the electric power sector.”). Notably, there was a steep decline in 2020, driven largely by the pandemic, but this was temporary. See Sinks 1990–2020, supra note 139, at ES-4 (“The sharp decline in emissions from 2019 to 2020 is largely due to the impacts of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on travel and economic activity.”).

Third, along with using less fossil fuel and changing the ones we use, another strategy is to offset or capture emissions. Planting trees and reclaiming land reduces the concentration of CO2, as does trapping emissions underground or converting them into chemicals or plastics.154Vincent Gonzalez, Alan Krupnick & Lauren Dunlap, Carbon Capture and Storage 101, Res. for the Future (May 6, 2020), https://www.rff.org/publications/explainers/carbon-capture-and-storage-101 [https://perma.cc/7AR3-9WUU].

B.  Pollution from Fossil Fuel

Along with climate change, energy policy also needs to account for pollution. It is well understood that fossil fuel is dirty to extract, transport, and burn, and that these costs are not always reflected in the market price.

1.  Polluting Air, Water, and Soil

Extracting fossil fuel can damage the air, water, and land, harming human health, disrupting local economies, and disturbing animal habitats. Perhaps the most extreme example was the accident at Deepwater Horizon, an offshore oil rig, that released 130 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Tragically, it took eighty-seven days to stop the oil from flowing. During those long weeks, the spill caused $17.2 billion of environmental damage to animals, beaches, coral, fish, and marshes.155Mike Gaworecki, BP’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Caused $17.2 Billion in Environmental Damage to the Gulf of Mexico, Mongabay (Apr. 20, 2017), https://news.mongabay.com/2017/04/bps-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-caused-17-2-billion-in-environmental-damage-to-the-gulf-of-mexico [https
://perma.cc/7ZCW-CMPD].
The spill killed millions of marine mammals, sea turtles, birds, and fish,156Joan Meiners, Ten Years Later, BP Oil Spill Continues to Harm Wildlife—Especially Dolphins, Nat’l Geographic (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/how-is-wildlife-doing-now–ten-years-after-the-deepwater-horizon [https://perma.cc/7U3Z-5VLY]. while also causing lasting health problems among workers who cleaned up the spill.157Mark A. D’Andrea & G. Kesava Reddy, The Development of Long-Term Adverse Health Effects in Oil Spill Cleanup Workers of the Deepwater Horizon Offshore Drilling Rig Disaster, 6 Frontiers in Public Health 1, 1 (2018) (“[Workers involved in cleanup developed] persistent alterations or worsening of their hematological, hepatic, pulmonary, and cardiac functions,” as well as “prolonged or worsening illness symptoms even 7 years after their exposure to the oil spill.”).

Extracting fossil fuel can cause pollution in more mundane ways as well. Coal mining causes miners to contract black lung disease and other health problems,158Mining Topic: Respiratory Diseases, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/
topics/respiratorydiseases.html [https://perma.cc/HMU5-N9XQ].
while also polluting streams and disfiguring landscapes. For example, “[m]ountaintop removal, a particularly destructive form of surface mining, involves stripping all trees and other vegetation from peaks and hilltops,” the Union of Concerned Scientists has explained, “and then blasting away hundreds of feet of the earth below with explosives.”159The Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels, Union of Concerned Scientists (July 15, 2008), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/hidden-costs-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/L2KQ-F8VG]. Likewise, extracting oil and gas also can cause pollution. For example, wastewater from hydraulic fracturing can contaminate water or induce seismic activity if not disposed of properly.160See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 75, at 179–96 (discussing seismic risks and water contamination).

Transporting fossil fuels can also cause pollution, for instance, when pipelines leak or there are accidents involving tankers, barges, trains, and trucks. In March of 1989, for example, the Exxon Valdez, an oil supertanker, ran aground in Prince William Sound, releasing 11 million gallons of oil.161Shamseer Mambra, The Complete Story of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Marine Insight (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-history/the-complete-story-of-the-exxon-valdez-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/L7CY-77RX]. While the ship’s hungover captain slept, his third mate missed a turn. This careless mistake dealt a devastating blow to local wildlife, with some effects lasting for years.162Doug Struck, Twenty Years Later, Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Linger, Yale Env’t 360 (Mar. 24, 2009), https://e360.yale.edu/features/twenty_years_later_impacts__of_the_exxon_valdez_linger [https://perma.cc/9TBY-6PZL].

Likewise, a train carrying oil exploded in the small Canadian town of Lac-Mégantic in July of 2013, killing forty-seven people, destroying over forty buildings, and releasing millions of gallons of oil into the soil and the nearby Chaudière River. Sadly, another seven trains carrying oil derailed in Canada between 2013 and 2020.163Guy Quenneville, Dave Seglins & Joseph Loiero, Why Crude Oil Trains Keep Derailing and Exploding in Canada—Even After the Lac-Mégantic Disaster, CBC (June 15, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/lac-megantic-crude-oil-train-canada-guernsey-saskatche
wan-rail-1.5608769 [https://perma.cc/53LD-23VP].

Even if there are no mishaps in extracting or transporting fossil fuel, burning it is a familiar source of pollution. For example, coal-fired power plants and factories cause smog and acid rain, which can affect air quality thousands of miles away.164Stephanie A. Ewing, John N. Christensen, Shaun T. Brown, Richard A. Vancuren, Steven S. Cliff & Donald J. Depaolo, Pb Isotopes as an Indicator of the Asian Contribution to Particulate Air Pollution in Urban California, 44 Env’t Sci. Tech. 8911, 8911 (2010) (finding that 29% of airborne Pbs in the San Francisco area originated in Asia). Auto exhaust also degrades air quality.165Vehicles, Air Pollution, and Human Health, Union of Concerned Scientists (July 18, 2014), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/vehicles-air-pollution-human-health [https://perma.cc/9ZL6-3UNE] (noting that passenger vehicles and trucks are major sources of pollution). Indeed, air pollution from fossil fuel harms human health in a range of ways.166Karn Vohra, Alina Vodonos, Joel Schwartz, Eloise A. Marais, Melissa P. Sulprizio & Loretta J. Mickley, Global Mortality from Outdoor Fine Particle Pollution Generated by Fossil Fuel Combustion: Results from GEOS-Chem, 195 Env’t Rsch. 110754, 110759 (2021) (estimating deaths from fossil fuel pollution).

2.  Reducing Pollution from Fossil Fuel

How can energy policy reduce pollution from fossil fuel? Although the literature on this topic is vast, and the details are beyond this Article’s scope, it is worth emphasizing that the three responses to climate change, noted above, also reduce pollution.

First, using less fossil fuel generally reduces the pollution it causes. Again, energy efficiency and clean energy can help, although some types of clean energy have pollution risks of their own (such as the radioactive waste from nuclear power).167See Michael Hendryx, Keith J. Zullig & Juhua Luo, Impacts of Coal Use on Health, 41 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 397, 406 (2020) (“In sum, it is clear that no fuel source for power generation is entirely benign, although renewables pose a substantially smaller risk potential for human health than do fossil fuels.” (citations omitted)).

Second, some types of fossil fuel are dirtier than others. Again, coal is the worst of them. It produces the most pollution, and its pollutants are most harmful to human health168Id. at 403 (“Per kilowatt hour, coal combustion generates more particulate matter, heavy metals, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides than does natural gas or other fuels. In turn, coal combustion pollutants contribute to widespread organ system pathology and to substantially greater mortality and morbidity compared with other fuel sources.” (citations omitted)). At the same time, some types of coal—and, indeed, some types of mining—are worse than others.169For example, different types of coal produce different levels of sulphur dioxide, while surface or “strip” mining harms landscapes more than subsurface mining. See, e.g., HEAL Briefing, Lignite Coal—Health Effects and Recommendations from the Health Sector 4 (Genon K. Jenson et al. eds., 2018), https://www.env-health.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/HEAL-Lignite-Briefing-en_web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8MXX-6PHJ] (“Lignite, also called brown coal, is the most health harming type of coal.”); Coal Explained: Coal and the Environment, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. [hereinafter Coal Explained], https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/coal/coal-and-the-environment.php [https://perma.cc/F7ZV-JJ47] (“Underground mines generally affect the landscape less than surface mines.”).
As a result, replacing coal with natural gas reduces pollution, as well as emissions.

Third, when fossil fuels are used, there are ways to keep pollutants from being released. For instance, thick well casings prevent fracking fluid from seeping into drinking water when oil is extracted, while tankers with two hulls prevent oil spills when oil is transported.170Merrill & Schizer, supra note 75, at 166–70 (discussing ways to avert release of wastewater); Doug Helton, The Spills That Never Happened Thanks to Double Hulls, NOAA Off. Response Restoration Blog (Mar. 26, 2021, 1:44 PM), https://blog.response.restoration.noaa.gov/spills-never-happened-thanks-double-hulls [https://perma.cc/K95Y-F2HA]. Likewise, catalytic converters in cars and scrubbers in power plants contain some pollutants when fossil fuel is burned.171Theo Schmit, The Catalytic Converter: Its Pros and Cons in the Modern World, Sequoyah Stem Inst. Blog (Feb. 6, 2019), https://sequoyahsteminstitute.org/blog/2019/2/1/the-catalytic-converter-its-pros-and-cons-in-the-modern-world [https://perma.cc/5E2K-4AV3] (noting that the catalytic converter “has been highly effective in reducing air pollution, especially in major cities”); Coal Explained, supra note 169 (“Power plants use flue gas desulfurization equipment, also known as scrubbers, to clean sulfur from the smoke before it leaves their smokestacks.”).

C.  National Security and the Environment: Synergies and Tensions

So far, this Article has showed that the U.S. and its allies need to pursue a range of goals in energy policy. Along with encouraging firms to generate and transport energy efficiently and reliably—goals that a competitive market usually is well suited to advance—policymakers also need to address four externalities, which require government intervention: first, the cost of protecting insecure suppliers; second, the cost of funding hostile suppliers; third, the cost of climate change; and fourth, the cost of pollution.

As Parts I and II showed, the key to addressing the first two externalities—and, thus, to protecting national security—is to reduce demand for fossil fuel, while also tapping new supply in secure and friendly countries. Yet what effect does this two-part strategy have on the environment?

In principle, the first strategy—reducing demand—has the potential to advance environmental goals. After all, using less fossil fuel can reduce emissions and pollution. But in fact, reducing demand is not always a “win-win” for national security and the environment. For example, even as clean energy eases dependence on problematic fossil fuel suppliers (such as Russia), it increases dependence on problematic clean energy suppliers (such as China). Part IV analyzes various options to reduce demand for fossil fuel, highlighting synergies and tensions between national security and environmental goals.

What about the second part of the two-part strategy? Is it feasible to tap new sources of fossil fuel while also protecting the environment? At first blush, these goals seem to conflict. Instead of drilling new wells (to protect national security), aren’t we supposed to phase out fossil fuel (to protect the environment)? But in fact, this tension can be resolved with the right policies, which tap new sources of fossil fuel while still reducing emissions and pollution. The key is for the new sources to be lower-carbon fossil fuels (for example, natural gas instead of coal) and for them to replace, instead of adding to, existing sources. Part V considers a range of strategies to tap new supplies of fossil fuel, identifying synergies and tensions between national security and environmental goals.

D.  Authoritarian Comparative Advantage

The rest of this Article shows how nuanced policy judgments, with careful attention to the relevant tradeoffs, can deliver gains for both national security and the environment. But before turning to this challenge of policy, it is important to highlight a challenge of political economy that complicates efforts to adopt better policies: compared with authoritarian regimes, democracies are at a disadvantage in producing and transporting energy.

In a nutshell, the problem is interest group opposition. When democratic governments are asked to approve new wells, pipelines, or other fossil fuel infrastructure, there is almost always opposition from environmental groups, local residents and businesses (motivated by “not in my backyard” or “NIMBY” concerns), regulators who protect culturally significant sites, and economic competitors (such as coal companies, which regularly oppose natural gas pipelines).172See, e.g., Sam Levin, Dakota Access: Company Under Scrutiny over Sacred Artifacts in Oil Pipeline’s Path, Guardian (Nov. 5, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/05/dakota-access-oil-pipeline-native-american-artifacts-discovered [https://perma.cc/
6RNE-HM8J]; Matt Reynolds, Coal Companies Lose Battle over Gas Pipeline, Courthouse News Serv. (Oct. 6, 2010), https://www.courthousenews.com/coal-companies-losebattle-over-gas-pipeline [https://perma.cc/LYF8-BXFF].
In the U.S. and Europe, these coalitions have banned fracking in several jurisdictions, halted drilling in some places, and blocked pipelines and LNG terminals.

Ironically, similar dynamics also have thwarted clean energy projects, including nuclear power plants and wind and solar facilities.173Matthew Dalton, Tourism and Manufacturing Fight for the Future of Power in Europe, Wall St. J. (Jan. 2, 2023, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tourism-manufacturing-fight-wind-power-natural-gas-europe-11672682789 [https://perma.cc/DVS7-GU63] (“Europe’s plans to install wind and solar power . . . [are] running into opposition from residents and officials who say a wave of new projects will harm the region’s landscapes, cultural sites, and valuable tourism industry.”); Katharine Q. Seelye, After 16 Years, Hopes for Cape Cod Wind Farm Float Away, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/offshore-cape-wind-farm.html [https://perma.cc/9UJT-EBKV]. For example, after a failed effort to secure approval, which took sixteen years and cost $100 million, a clean energy company gave up on installing wind turbines off the coast of Cape Cod.174Seelye, supra note 173. “The project unfortunately demonstrated,” observed a Massachusetts regulator who supported the project, “that well-funded opposition groups can effectively use the American court system to stop even a project with no material adverse environmental impacts . . . .”175Id. (quoting Ian Bowles, former state secretary of energy and environmental affairs).

In contrast, this sort of interest group pressure gains much less traction in authoritarian regimes. For instance, environmental campaigns in Russia often “butt up against political realities,” observed a 2021 report by a U.S. think tank, “leading to the prosecution of activists and even physical threats and abuse toward . . . them by state institutions, often on behalf of a private company.”176Angelina Davydova, Environmental Activism in Russia: Strategies and Prospects (Mar. 3, 2021), Ctr. Strategic & Int’l Studs., https://www.csis.org/analysis/environmental-activism-russia-strategies-and-prospects [https://perma.cc/2X7H-M98Z]. Likewise, “it can be said that there is no green movement in Iran,” concluded a 2019 study by Iranian academics.177Faezeh Hashemi, Hasan Sadighi, Mohammad Chizari & Enayat Abbasi, The Relationship Between ENGOs and Government in Iran, Heliyon 1, 3 (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6926184 [https://perma.cc/97SB-ZFSC].
“Policy makers in Iran still don’t cooperate with ENGOs [environmental NGOs] and even newspapers consider them as marginal issues.”178Id.

As a result, fossil fuel production (and, indeed, some clean energy initiatives) gravitate to authoritarian countries. In a sense, their insulation from political pressure gives them an edge, which this Article calls “authoritarian comparative advantage.”

This is the mirror image of a more familiar idea, noted above, that extractive industries encourage authoritarianism (for example, by freeing governments from depending on citizens for tax revenue and labor).179See supra Section II.C.1. The point here is that the causal link can run in the other direction as well: not only do extractive industries facilitate authoritarianism, but authoritarianism also can facilitate extractive industries.

To weaken the competition, some authoritarian leaders cynically encourage environmental opposition in democracies. For example, Vladimir Putin regularly warns western audiences of the risks of fracking. “Today’s technology of shale oil production and shale gas,” he said at a 2019 business conference, “are without any doubt . . . barbaric.”180Sam Meredith, Russia’s Putin Says Shale Oil Technologies Are ‘Barbaric’, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/20/russias-putin-says-shale-oil-technologies-are-barbaric.html [https://perma.cc/XEA3-YTEG] (quoting Vladimir Putin). He made the same point quite heatedly at an earlier conference. “I was going to ask him a normal question about diversifying your economy,” recalled energy expert Daniel Yergin, whose question prompted this outburst.181Michael P. Regan & Vildana Hajric, How an Energy Expert Triggered Vladimir Putin with One Word, Bloomberg (May 21, 2022, 9:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-21/how-an-energy-expert-triggered-vladimir-putin-with-one-word [https://perma.cc/5CBR-U5BD]. “And I said ‘shale,’ and to be shouted at by him in front of 3,000 people [was] a really unpleasant experience.”182Id. Putin’s vehemence presumably stems not from concern for the planet, but from economics and geopolitics. “[S]hale was a challenge for Russia,” Yergin explained.183Yergin, supra note 23, at 59.

To protect Russia’s market share, Putin has allegedly funded groups opposing shale development in Europe, as Hillary Clinton and the Secretary General of NATO each have claimed.184Fiona Harvey, Russia ‘Secretly Working with Environmentalists to Oppose Fracking’, Guardian (June 19, 2014, 11:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/19/russia-secretly-working-with-environmentalists-to-oppose-fracking [https://perma.cc/9KR3-TMDQ] (“I have met allies who can report that Russia, as part of their sophisticated information and disinformation operations, engaged actively with so-called non-governmental organisations—environmental organisations working against shale gas—to maintain European dependence on imported Russian gas.” (quoting Anders Fogh Rasmussen, secretary-general of NATO and previously the premier of Denmark)). “We were . . . up against phony environmental groups, and I’m a big environmentalist,” Clinton asserted, “but these were funded by the Russians to stand against any effort, ‘Oh that pipeline, that fracking, that whatever will be a problem for you,’ and a lot of the money supporting that message was coming from Russia.”185Valerie Richardson, Leaked Emails Show Hillary Clinton Blaming Russians for Funding ‘Phony’ Anti-fracking Groups, Wash. Times (Oct. 10, 2016), https://
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/10/clinton-blames-russians-anti-fracking-groups [https://
perma.cc/JP32-F2MM] (noting remarks to tinePublic, a Canadian promotional group in June of  2014). Similar allegations have been made about funding for U.S. environmental groups, but they are hotly contested. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, The Bogus ‘Allegation’ That Putin Is Funding a California Environmental Charity, Wash. Post (Mar. 17, 2022, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/17/bogus-allegation-that-putin-is-funding-california-environmental-charity [https://perma.cc/89PE-FPH5].

As Putin understands, when democracies abstain from energy production, authoritarian regimes fill the gap. Unfortunately, this makes the U.S. and its allies more dependent on authoritarian suppliers, which often are insecure or hostile.186Jason Bordoff & Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Jason Bordoff and Meghan O’Sullivan on Maintaining Energy Supply While Still Hitting Climate-Change Goals, Economist (Mar. 26, 2022), https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/jason-bordoff-and-meghan-o-sullivan-on-maintaining-energy
-supply/21808312 [https://perma.cc/543C-VLEX] (“[T]he world cannot ignore more immediate energy security needs in the process of making this transition [to decarbonized energy]. To do so emboldens petro-states like Russia . . . .”).
It would be far better to rely on production in democracies, which usually are more secure and friendly.187There is a robust debate about whether (and why) democracies are less likely to go to war, whether with each other (an idea known as “dyadic” democratic peace) or with any other state (which is known as “monadic” democratic peace). See generally, e.g., Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Peace: Selected Essays (Florence: Routledge 2012) (arguing that liberal states generally have maintained peace among themselves, but have tended to fight wars with non-liberal states, exploring the strategic value of cooperation among liberal states); Dan Reiter, Democratic Peace Theory, Oxford Bibliographies, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml [https://perma.cc/VL7S-M4FW] (surveying extensive literature on democratic peace theory). The details of this debate are beyond this Article’s scope.  But as this Section has showed, this is an uphill climb politically.

Even so, this climb must be attempted. After all, relying on authoritarian suppliers is problematic not just for national security, but also for the environment. Who is more vigilant in regulating emissions and pollution? Do we trust Russia and Iran more than the U.S. and the EU? Admittedly, when environmental harms are localized, democracies can deflect these costs to the citizens of authoritarian countries—in effect, a form of global nimbyism. But two of the most important risks—climate change and air pollution—are global, not local. So instead of simply farming out fossil fuel development (and other energy initiatives) to authoritarian regimes, democracies should rely more on domestic production.

More specifically, the U.S. and its allies should pursue a two-part strategy that protects both national security and the environment: first, they should reduce the demand for fossil fuel; second, they should tap new supplies of fossil fuel in environmentally responsible ways. The next two Parts consider these strategies in turn.

IV.  REDUCING DEMAND FOR FOSSIL FUELS: SYNERGIES AND TENSIONS

Let us begin with reducing demand. This Part shows how efforts to use less fossil fuel have the potential to be a “win-win,” protecting both national security and the environment. Yet the devil is in the details. Does an initiative actually reduce demand, once all the relevant fuel consumption is considered? If it does, are there offsetting costs, such as new risks to national security or the environment? Some strategies to reduce fossil fuel demand are better than others. Finding and implementing the right ones is critical.

At the same time, reducing demand should not be our exclusive focus. Since the transition away from fossil fuel will take years, the U.S. and its allies also need to find new sources that are secure, friendly, and can be tapped in environmentally responsible ways.

A.  Potential to be a “Win-Win”

In general, the demand for fossil fuel can be cut in two ways: energy efficiency, and wider use of clean energy. Both are promising and should be pursued vigorously.

1.  Energy Efficiency

A key step is to change the habits of consumers. For example, instead of driving to work, they should walk, carpool, take mass transit, or work from home. The right policies can encourage these shifts, including congestion pricing, bike lanes, cheaper mass transit fares, lower speed limits, and the like.

Technological innovations—and policies that encourage them—also can enhance energy efficiency. For example, switching from incandescent to more efficient LED bulbs—as the Biden Administration mandated in 2022—should reduce U.S. emissions by 222 million metric tons over thirty years and save nearly $3 billion annually in electricity costs.188Press Release, Am. Council Energy-Efficient Econ., U.S. Light Bulb Standards Will Cut Utility Bills and Climate Emissions (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.aceee.org/press-release/2022/04/us-light-bulb-standards-will-cut-utility-bills-and-climate-emissions [https://perma.cc/W7FT-WZER]. Likewise, changing the idle power settings on computers also can “save $3 billion a year . . . and reduce CO2 emissions by 20 million metric tons,” Kit Kennedy has explained, “without any impact on computer performance. . . .”189Kit Kennedy, The Role of Energy Efficiency in Deep Decarbonization, 48 Env’t L. Rep. 10030, 10056 (2018). The same is true of better heating and cooling systems. For example, “heat pumps” use 50% less energy because they do not actually generate heat; instead, they extract it from the air.190Energy Saver: Heat Pump Systems, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, https://www.
energy.gov/energysaver/heat-pump-systems [https://perma.cc/4NG3-3RP5].

Energy efficiency has obvious national security advantages, as German Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck emphasized a few weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine. “If you can take the train or bike . . . , that’s good,” he said.191Ukraine Conflict: Save Energy and Annoy Putin, Germans Told, BBC (Apr. 15, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61117828 [https://perma.cc/JC36-TRDS] (quoting Robert Habeck). “[I]t’s easy on the wallet and annoys Putin.”192Id. Obviously, there are parallel environmental advantages as well.

2.  Clean Energy

Along with energy efficiency, another way to use less fossil fuel is to rely more on clean energy, including wind, solar, geothermal, nuclear, hydroelectric, and hydrogen. Fortunately, the cost of wind and solar has declined significantly in recent years, making them increasingly competitive even without subsidies.193Lazard, Levelized Cost of Energy+ (Version 15.0 2021), https://www.
lazard.com/research-insights/levelized-cost-of-energyplus [https://perma.cc/LF29-Z8NB].

So far, clean energy has been used mainly to generate electricity. This has been an effective way to burn less fossil fuel, since electric power plants are responsible for about 38% of all energy generated in the U.S.194In 2021, the U.S. generated 36.7 quadrillion BTU of electricity, while all energy sources in the U.S. totaled 97.3 quadrillion BTU, so electricity’s share was just under 38%. Notably, only about one third of electricity generated is actually sold to customers because about two thirds of the energy is lost during the generation process. The amount sold (12.9 quadrillion BTU) is only about 18% of the total energy used in the U.S. (73.5 quadrillion BTU). U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. [hereinafter U.S. Energy Facts], https://www.lazard.com/research-insights/levelized-cost-of-energyplus/ [https://perma.cc/9AY5-3QCP] (noting 36.7 of 97.3 quadrillion BTUs). The progress so far has been significant: in 2021, only 60% of electricity in the U.S. came from fossil fuels, compared with 21% from nuclear and 19% from renewable energy.195Id.

Another 37% of energy in the U.S. is used for transportation.196Id. For decades, virtually all of this energy has come from fossil fuel—and, specifically, from petroleum.197See id. (stating that 90% came from petroleum and 4% came from natural gas in 2021). Yet EVs can break petroleum’s monopoly, since the electricity powering them can come from clean energy (or, for that matter, from coal or natural gas). Fortunately, the performance and range of EVs has improved significantly. There also is a growing network of charging stations,198Rachel Wolfe, I Rented an Electric Car for a Four-Day Road Trip. I Spent More Time Charging It Than I Did Sleeping, Wall St. J. (June 3, 2022, 3:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-rented-an-electric-car-for-a-four-day-road-trip-i-spent-more-time-charging-it-than-i-did-sleeping-11654
268401?mod=e2tw [https://perma.cc/89B8-WXCY] (“The government is spending $5 billion to build a nationwide network of fast chargers, which means thousands more should soon dot major highways.”).
although this effort has a long way to go.199As an anecdotal illustration of this challenge, the Wall Street Journal asked a reporter to drive an electric car from New Orleans to Chicago and back. Her experience was not encouraging. See id. (“It turns out not all ‘fast chargers’ live up to the name.”).

Like energy efficiency, clean energy has the potential to offer national security and environmental advantages. Again, using less fossil fuel not only reduces emissions and pollution, but also eases dependence on the wrong fossil fuel suppliers.

B.  Are We Really Using Less Fossil Fuel?

Even so, before policymakers conclude that a policy or technology  really is a “win-win,” they need to dig deeper. A key question is how much, if at all, it actually reduces the demand for fossil fuel.

1.  Rebound

For example, a fuel-efficient car is supposed to use less fuel. But what if drivers respond by putting more miles on the car, since each additional mile is cheaper? Similarly, what if homeowners with heat pumps turn up the thermostat? If energy efficient products are used more, they do not save as much energy. This “rebound effect,” as it is called, reduces the national security and environmental advantages of energy efficient technology, since fossil fuel consumption declines less than expected.200Paul E. Brockway, Steve Sorrell, Gregor Semieniuk, Matthew Kuperus Heun & Victor Court, Energy Efficiency and Economy-Wide Rebound Effects: A Review of the Evidence and its Implications,

141 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Rev. 110781, 110782 (2021) (noting that “the evidence suggests economy-wide rebound effects may erode more than half of the potential energy savings from improved energy efficiency”).

2.  Life Cycle Calculations

Similarly, to determine how much fuel a new technology actually saves, we need to know how much is used not just in operating it, but also in manufacturing and powering it. For example, compared with a gasoline-powered car, less energy is needed to run an EV, but more is required to manufacture it because extra energy is needed to build the battery.201Electric Vehicle Myths, EPA (Dec. 22, 2022), https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/electric-vehicle-myths#Myth5 [https://perma.cc/NDK7-E95M] (“Some studies have shown that making a typical EV can create more carbon pollution than making a gasoline car. This is because of the additional energy required to manufacture an EV’s battery.”). EVs make up for this disadvantage by using less energy when driving.202Id. But how much less depends on how the electricity was generated. If it comes from solar or wind, the EV cuts fossil fuel demand more than if it comes from coal.203Karin Kirk, Electrifying Transportation Reduces Emissions AND Saves Massive Amounts of Energy, Yale Climate Connections (Aug. 7, 2022), https://yaleclimate
connections.org/2022/08/electrifying-transportation-reduces-emissions-and-saves-massive-amounts-of-energy [https://perma.cc/2W2F-24TV] (noting that electricity generated with coal uses 31% less energy than gasoline to power an EV, while electricity from natural gas uses nearly 50% less, and electricity from renewables uses up to 75% less energy).
This sort of “life cycle” analysis is needed to determine how effective a new technology is in cutting demand for fossil fuel, and thus in reducing emissions, pollution, and the national security risks from depending on the wrong fossil fuel suppliers.

C.  New National Security Risks: “Just When I Thought I Was Out . . .”

Using less fossil fuel elicits another challenge as well: the transition to clean energy poses national security risks of its own. So as much as the U.S. and it allies would like to stop protecting insecure suppliers and funding adversaries, they will not necessarily get their wish. This Section shows that clean energy imposes parallel burdens. One is reminded of a famous line from The Godfather: “Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in.”204The Godfather: Part III (Paramount Pictures 1990).

1.  Defense Externalities: The Electrical Grid

For one thing, the U.S. and its allies become even more vulnerable to attacks on power plants, power lines, and other infrastructure. Since electricity is the most effective way to harness clean energy, using more of it means depending more on this grid.

There already are familiar risks from relying on the grid. Blackouts disrupt communications, finance, business, law enforcement, health care, and the delivery of water, food, and other essential goods and services.205See, e.g., Critical Nat’l Infrastructures, Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack vii (2008) (“Should significant parts of the electrical power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may ultimately die for the lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban communities.”). To avoid these hardships, the grid must be protected from extreme weather and natural disasters, as well as from cyber and physical attacks206See e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Electricity Grid Cybersecurity: DOE Needs to Ensure Its Plans Fully Address Risks to Distribution Systems 11 (2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-81.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SNX-CM3Z] (“[The U.S. grid is] increasingly at risk from cyberattacks.”); Travis Fischer, Inst. Energy Rsch., Assessing Emerging Policy Threats to the U.S. Power Grid: How Regulations, Mandates, and Subsidies Undermine Electric Reliability 1 (2015), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Threats-to-U.S.-Power-Grid.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KDG-MECU] (“[T]hreats to the consistent delivery of electricity put modern life itself at risk.”).—a lesson emphasized, sadly, by Russia’s repeated attacks on Ukraine’s grid in 2022.207MacDonald, supra note 20.

Yet these risks are bounded today because electricity is not the only game in town. It provides only 38% of the energy consumed in the U.S.208See U.S. Energy Facts, supra note 194 (offering data for 2021). Petroleum and other fossil fuels are the main sources for transportation,209Id. (noting that transportation used 26.9 of 73.5 quadrillion BTU, of which 90% came from petroleum in 2021). heating, and industrial processes.210Id. (stating that 78% of power for industry and 50% for residences came from fossil fuel in 2021). Admittedly, the infrastructure for these fuels is also vulnerable. Pipelines can be hacked211See, e.g., Cammy Pedroja, Colonial Pipeline Hackers Used Unprotected VPN to Access Network: Report, Newsweek (June 4, 2021, 6:19 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/colonial-pipeline-hackers-used-unprotected-vpn-access-network-report-1597842 [https://perma.cc/B2N8-KZW5]. or sabotaged,212Probe into Nord Stream Pipeline Leaks Has Strengthened Suspicions of ‘Sabotage,’ Sweden Says, NBC News (Oct. 6, 2022, 9:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nord-stream-pipeline-leaks-sabotage-suspicion-sweden-russia-ukraine-rcna50999 [https://perma.cc/PT84-RJRD]. refineries can be damaged in fires213Barbara J. Powell, BP’s Ohio Refinery May Stay Shut into 2023 After Deadly Fire, Bloomberg (Sept. 27, 2022, 12:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-27/bp-toledo-refinery-fire-repairs-may-extend-into-early-2023 [https://perma.cc/L6WT-MFNV]. or natural disasters,214Damaged Oil Refinery Closing; Parish Weighs Economic Impacts, Associated Press (Nov. 10, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-ida-floods-business-mississippi-river-storms-cc7d00516965e67c8c1b64baf8af8f32 [https://perma.cc/7JNV-CFRC] (stating that a Louisiana refinery closed after sustaining damage during Hurricane Ida). oil depots can be attacked,215Matt Clinch, Yemen’s Houthis Claim Attack on Aramco Facility After reports of a Huge Fire in Saudi city of Jeddah, CNBC (Mar. 25, 2022, 12:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/25/reports-of-huge-fire-at-aramco-oil-facility-in-saudi-arabia.html [https://perma.cc/PU5S-JKCC]. and the like. Yet the fact that this infrastructure is separate from the grid—and, for that matter, scattered across the country—offers useful diversification. If some pipelines, refineries, and gas stations go offline, others still function. Likewise, if the grid fails today, most homes will still be heated and most cars will still work.216Admittedly, fossil fuel infrastructure runs in part on electricity. For example, gas station pumps are powered with electricity, as are some components of pipelines, but backup generators can keep them functioning. See Kenza Moller, How Do Gas Stations Pump Without Electricity?, ABC News (Sept. 8, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.abcactionnews.com/simplemost/how-do-gas-stations-pump-without-electricity [https://perma.cc/ZA77-2BWX]. In principle, backup generators also could replace the grid, but far more of them would be needed. For example, the number of generators needed to power all the gas stations in the U.S. is a tiny fraction of the number needed to power all the cars. But if all homes are heated with electricity and all cars are EVs, this will no longer be true.

In short, tapping clean energy means depending more on the grid. As a result, its security—and, more generally, its effectiveness—become even more essential.

2.  Defense Externalities from Nuclear Power

The grid’s vulnerability is an example of a broader point: although fossil fuels have national security costs, so do other energy sources, and the risks from these new sources need to be addressed.

This is certainly true of nuclear power. On the one hand, it has national security advantages in easing dependence on problematic fossil fuel suppliers. For example, France has relied less on Russian natural gas because 70% of its electricity comes from nuclear plants.217Usually, 70% of France’s electricity comes from nuclear power. Unfortunately, a number of France’s nuclear plants required maintenance in the summer of 2022, forcing France to import electricity at record prices. Sam Meredith, France’s Nuclear Energy Strategy—Once Its Pride and Joy—Faces Big Problems This Winter, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2022, 1:05 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/05/frances-nuclear-heavy-energy-strategy-faces-big-problems-this-winter.html [https://perma.cc/TN58-6YYC]. In contrast, Germany has been in a weaker position because it started phasing out nuclear power in 2011.218See David Frum, The West’s Nuclear Mistake, Atlantic (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/12/germany-california-nuclear-power-climate/620888 [https://perma.cc/8JYT-GSLS].

On the other hand, nuclear power requires uranium. While some uranium suppliers are secure and friendly (such as Canada, Australia, and India),219                    World Uranium Mining Production, World Nuclear Ass’n, https://world-nuclear.
org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx [https://perma.cc/9VKN-99NU] (noting that Canada, Australia, and India were, respectively, the third, fourth, and ninth largest producers in 2021).
others are not. For example, Kazakhstan (the world’s largest producer) shares a border with Russia, as do Uzbekistan and Ukraine.220Id. (noting that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine were, respectively, the first, fifth, and tenth largest producers in 2021). Meanwhile, Russia itself is a “top ten” producer, as is China.221Id. (explaining that Russia and China were, respectively, the sixth and eighth largest producers in 2021). Rounding out the “top ten” list, Namibia and Niger were, respectively, the second and seventh largest producers. Id.

Along with dependence on uranium, another risk is the security of the reactor itself. During a war, its core could be breached by missiles or artillery, or staff responsible for safety protocols could be incapacitated or driven away. Unfortunately, these risks became all too real in 2022 when Russian troops captured the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine.222Yulia Kesaieva, Olga Voitovych & Sana Noor Haq, New Rocket Strike on Ukraine Nuclear Plant, as UN Watchdog Warns of ‘Disaster’, CNN (Aug. 7, 2022, 12:48 PM), https://
http://www.cnn.com/2022/08/07/europe/zaporizhzhia-power-plant-nuclear-disaster-intl/index.html [https://
perma.cc/K3F2-7F99].
Reactors also need protection from terrorist attacks, including truck bombs, plane crashes, and attempts to trigger a meltdown. The waste from reactors also must be secured, so terrorists cannot build dirty bombs. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, security at U.S. nuclear facilities was upgraded to address these threats.223Gwyneth Cravens, Terrorism and Nuclear Energy: Understanding the Risks, Brookings (Mar. 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/terrorism-and-nuclear-energy-understanding-the-risks [https://perma.cc/QR86-5UUU].

3.  Defense Externalities: Clean Energy Raw Materials

Like nuclear power, other types of clean energy also ease some national security burdens, while creating others. A key challenge is the need for specialty minerals, such as cobalt and lithium.224For example, EV batteries need lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese,  and graphite, while the magnets in wind turbines and EV motors require rare earth elements, and electricity networks need copper and aluminum. See Int’l Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report 5 (2022). More are needed for solar panels, wind turbines, electricity networks, and EVs than for fossil fuel systems. “A typical electric car requires six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car,” the IEA has observed, “and an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired power plant.”225Id. To scale up clean energy, the global economy will need far more of these minerals—four times more in 2040 to meet the goals of the Paris Accords and six times more to hit net-zero globally by 2050.226Id. at 8.

Yet to source these minerals, the U.S. and its allies rely heavily on imports.227From 2016 to 2019, “100% of graphite and manganese was imported,” the U.S. Department of Energy reported. “76% of cobalt was imported, and about 50% of lithium and nickel was imported in 2020.” From 2016-2019, Over 90% of U.S. Lithium Imports Came from Argentina and Chile, Off. Efficiency & Renewable Energy (Feb. 14, 2022), https://www.energy.gov/eere/
vehicles/articles/fotw-1225-february-14-2022-2016-2019-over-90-us-lithium-imports-came [https://
perma.cc/7XFU-69LB].
Most come from only a handful of suppliers, since production “is more concentrated than that of oil or natural gas.”228Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 224, at 11. Unfortunately, “[m]uch of it comes from countries that are not our friends,” as Mark Mills has observed.229Mark P. Mills, Green Energy’s Overseas Dependence, Nat’l Rev. Online (July 5, 2020), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/green-energy-depends-overseas-materials-components [https://
perma.cc/4K8M-KZV2].

For example, more than two-thirds of the world’s cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo,230Dionne Searcey, Michael Forsythe & Eric Lipton, A Power Struggle Over Cobalt Rattles the Clean Energy Revolution, N.Y. Times (Nov. 20, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/11/20/world/china-congo-cobalt.html [https://perma.cc/Y8W2-L2ES].
which has been wracked by factional violence and protests in recent years.231Nicholas Bariyo, Surging Violence in Congo Turns Peacekeepers Into Targets, Wall St. J. (July 27, 2022, 12:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/surging-violence-in-eastern-congo-turns-peacekeepers-into-targets-11658940728?reflink=integratedwebview_share [https://perma.cc/6BVM-DML7] (“[D]ozens of armed groups have been waging war with the nation’s army for nearly three decades.”); see generally Siddharth Kara, Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives (2022) (chronicling human rights abuses and damage to environment in Congo’s cobalt mining industry). Likewise, the U.S. and its allies depend heavily on Gabon for manganese, as well as on Chile and Argentina for lithium.232Bariyo, supra note 231. China is the main supplier of rare earths,233U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind Energy: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment 21 (2022) (“Global production is concentrated in China, with all processing of heavy rare earth elements—including dysprosium and terbium—taking place there.” (citation omitted)). the global leader in processing other clean energy minerals,234Int’l Energy Agency, Global Supply Chains of EV Batteries 2 (2022) [hereinafter Global Supply EV]; Bordoff & O’Sullivan, supra note 33 (“China is decades ahead in the development of critical minerals . . . .”). and a determined buyer of mines all over the world.235See, e.g., Searcey et al., supra note 230 (stating that China controls fifteen of Congo’s nineteen cobalt mines); see also Climate Change International, supra note 142, at 6 (2022), (“Competition will grow to acquire and process minerals and resources used in key renewable energy technologies. China is in a strong position to compete . . . .”).

Depending on other countries for these minerals poses familiar national security risks. Like with oil, the U.S. and its allies will feel pressure to defend insecure suppliers in a crisis, while also funding hostile suppliers’ harmful policies. “New geopolitics around the minerals for net zero may well emerge,” S&P Global has warned, “which will echo the geopolitics that have long surrounded oil and natural gas.”236S&P Glob., The Future of Copper: Will the Looming Supply Gap Short-Circuit the Energy Transition? 67 (2022), https://ihsmarkit.com/info/0722/futureofcopper.html [https://perma.cc/4AM4-7WVV].

Fortunately, there are ways to reduce these national security costs. For one thing, the U.S. and its allies should ramp up efforts to recycle minerals, so newly-mined sources are less critical. In addition, they should try to replace minerals from an insecure supplier with alternatives that are easier to access (for example, by building batteries with lithium iron phosphates instead of cobalt).237Searcey et al., supra note 230.

Likewise, the U.S. and its allies should encourage domestic mining. The good news is that they actually have deposits of most of the relevant minerals. But the bad news is that opening new mines is quite challenging, especially in democracies. Many projects whither on the vine, while successes usually require a decade or more of planning, negotiation, and construction to complete.238S&P Glob., supra note 236, at 69 (“In nearly every jurisdiction, a new mine seeking permission today would not be productive until the late 2030s.”). “[D]isruptions from labor strikes, protests, environmental activism, domestic political rivalries, governmental shifts, and contractual disputes and renegotiations . . . delay projects and investment,” S&P Global has warned.239Id. at 66. “Brownfield and greenfield development of new projects turn on the complex interaction of permitting and policy, contracts and politics, and businesses and civil society . . . .”240Id. Unfortunately, some environmental groups are adamantly opposed to mining, even for minerals needed to reduce emissions.241See, e.g., Meadhbh Bolger, Diego Marin, Adrien Tofighi-Niaki & Louelle Seelmann, European Env’t Bureau & Friends of the Earth Europe, ‘Green Mining’ Is a Myth: The Case for Cutting EU Resource Consumption (Rachel Tansey ed., 2021), https://friendsoftheearth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Green-mining-myth-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A744-8H6Z]. Like when they oppose fossil fuel projects, these activists will find allies among local residents and economic competitors. Again, we see the authoritarian comparative advantage in extractive industries.242See supra Section III.D.

Seeking to change this dynamic, the Inflation Reduction Act offered substantial subsidies for domestic mining and recycling. For example, half of the EV tax credit is available only if enough of the minerals in the battery were extracted and processed in the U.S. (or in a country with a free trade agreement with the U.S.) or were recycled in North America.243In December of 2022, the Treasury offered preliminary guidance about EV mineral requirements. See U.S. Treasury, Anticipated Direction of Forthcoming Proposed Guidance on Critical Mineral and Battery Component Value Calculations for the New Clean Vehicle Credit 2 (2022) [hereinafter U.S. Treasury]. According to the Treasury, “North America” means the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Id. at 2 n.2. Likewise, the term “free trade agreement” includes “at minimum, the comprehensive trade agreements of the United States with the following countries: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.” Id. at 3. Notably, this list does not include Japan or U.S. allies in Europe.

Yet even with these subsidies, domestic mining and recycling cannot proceed without permits. Although Congress considered a permitting reform bill in 2022, it was not enacted.244See Colin Mortimer, Manchin’s Permitting Reform Effort Is Dead. Biden’s Climate Agenda Could Be a Casualty, Vox (Dec. 16, 2022, 12:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/12/12/23500140/permitting-reform-inflation-reduction-act-congress-manchin [https://
perma.cc/XB8K-25W6].
“[T]he United States is still in some early days of scrutinizing the existing web of federal and local mining permits and addressing NIMBY-ism,” Jane Nakano observed, “[so] a domestic supply chain is years away at best.”245Jane Nakano, IRA and the EV Tax Credits—Can We Kill Multiple Birds with One Stone?, Ctr. Strategic & Int’l Studs. (Sept. 15, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/ira-and-ev-tax-credits%E2%80%94can-we-kill-multiple-birds-one-stone-0 [https://perma.cc/GB65-K3ZF].

4.  Funding Externalities: Clean Energy Manufacturing

The U.S. and its allies depend on other countries not just for raw materials, but also for the finished product. The main concern is China, a formidable geopolitical rival, 246See Biden-Harris National Security Strategy, supra note 16, at 23 (“The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”); 2022 U.S. Annual Threat Assessment, supra note 13, at 4 (“China increasingly is a near-peer competitor, challenging the United States in multiple arenas—especially economically, militarily, and technologically—and is pushing to change global norms and potentially threatening its neighbors.”); see also Julian E. Barnes, China Poses Biggest Threat to U.S., Intelligence Report Says, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/04/13/us/politics/china-national-security-intelligence-report.html [https://perma.cc/GP8H-Z5FP].
which has become the world’s leading manufacturer of clean energy technology.247Searcey et al., supra note 230 (“[China has] followed a disciplined playbook . . . to dominate the world’s emerging clean energy economy.”).

China has seven of the world’s top ten solar manufacturers,248David M. Kuchta, Where Are Solar Panels Made? Why Your Manufacturer Matters, Treehugger, https://www.treehugger.com/where-are-solar-panels-made-5194436 [https://perma.cc/
GKF7-SQY9]. The other three are in the U.S., South Korea, and Canada. When the U.S. imports completed solar panels (or “modules”), they come from Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and South Korea, but the components mainly are from China. Id.
and produces over 75 percent of the world’s EV batteries.249Global Supply EV, supra note 234, at 2 (“Today’s battery and minerals supply chains revolve around China.”). While the U.S. and its allies are less dependent on China for wind turbines, this could change. For land-based turbines, the U.S. is a leading manufacturer (though it faces stiff competition).250U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind Energy Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment 25 (2022), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/Wind%20Energy%20Supply%20Chain%20Report
%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CUC-BMSF]. The main competitors, who produce low-cost components, are Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam, and India. Id. at 26. China focuses more on building offshore wind turbines. See id. (naming China, Europe, and Taiwan as major manufacturers of offshore wind facilities).
For offshore turbines, however, the U.S. relies on European suppliers,251Id. at 26. but China is ramping up, “buil[ding] more offshore wind turbines in 2021 than every other country did in the past five years.”252Ariel Cohen, China’s Wind Power Push Threatens US Strategic Interests, Forbes (May 23, 2022, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/05/23/windy-times-in-american-energy-policy [https://perma.cc/3WZK-P2QU].

Unfortunately, depending on China for clean energy could pose the same three risks, discussed above, as depending on rivals for fossil fuel. First, these purchases could fund policies that undermine U.S. interests, such as China’s efforts to control the South China Sea and Taiwan. Second, clean energy exports could give China leverage (for example, to stop exporting to countries that oppose its geopolitical agenda). Thus, just as Russia has weaponized natural gas while invading Ukraine, China might do the same with EV batteries and solar panels while attacking Taiwan. Third, China’s exports could also fund repressive policies at home, such as the use of forced labor to produce solar panels.253See Laura T. Murphy & Nyrola Elimä, Sheffield Hallam Univ. Helena Kennedy Ctr. for Int’l Just., In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains 7-8 (2021) (alleging that China uses forced labor to produce polysilicon).

Admittedly, even without clean energy, the U.S. and its allies already depend on China for other important products, ranging from semiconductors and cell phones to surgical masks. Even so, adding clean energy to this list is still significant—not just because the list grows longer—but also because energy is so fundamental in (literally) powering a modern economy.

While this sort of economic interdependence is not always bad—indeed, it can moderate potentially hostile regimes, as noted above—these benefits do not always materialize, as Germany learned in buying fossil fuel from Russia. Is China a safer bet? Although President Xi’s assertive foreign policy is not reassuring in this regard,254Jo Inge Bekkevold, What Xi’s First Decade Tells Us About the Next, Foreign Pol’y (Oct. 13, 2022, 6:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/13/xi-jinping-china-ccp-communist-party-congress-geopolitics [https://perma.cc/GR6T-GX9B] (“[Under Xi], Beijing has adopted a more assertive foreign policy with increased use of coercive diplomacy.”). the relationship between China and the West is complex. Over time, it could become either more confrontational or more cooperative. The goal here is not to offer a definitive prediction, but to highlight a meaningful risk.

Again, like with fossil fuel, the best way to mitigate funding externalities is to depend more on production in the U.S., Europe, and other friendly countries. In fact, Congress tried to encourage this sort of “friend-shoring” in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Along with providing billions of dollars in subsidies directly for clean energy manufacturing in the U.S., Congress set conditions on other subsidies, so they would be available only for products with supply chains in the U.S. or other treaty partners.255For example, the statute creates a new advanced manufacturing production credit “for domestic manufacturing of components along the supply chain for solar modules, wind turbines, battery cells and modules, and critical minerals processing.” White House, Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action 26 (2023) [hereinafter Building a Clean Energy Economy], https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5MGV-32EW]. The statute also includes Defense Production Act funding for “[n]ew domestic production facilities projects for heat pumps (air- or ground-source), heat pump water heaters, or heat pump system components where domestic production would address a clear supply-chain vulnerability.” Id. at 32. In addition, the statute “includes billions of dollars to support vehicle manufacturers looking to expand their domestic production of clean vehicles.” Id. at 47. An expanded credit for purchasers of electric vehicles is available only if vehicles are assembled domestically and an increasing percentage of components and minerals in their batteries are “sourc[ed] or process[ed] in the United States or from trusted trade partners.” Id. at 46. Similarly, the production and investment tax credits for renewable energy are increased by 10% for projects that meet domestic content requirements. Id. at 13–14. The same is true of the clean electricity production tax credit and the clean electricity investment tax credit. Id. at 18–20.

This is not to say that the Inflation Reduction Act has executed this policy flawlessly. For one thing, the definitions of which countries count as “friend-shoring” vary by provision,256In the EV credit, for example, the sourcing requirement varies, depending on whether the minerals were extracted or recycled. If extracted, they need to come from the United States or “any country with which the United States has a free trade agreement in effect.” I.R.C. § 30D(e)(1)(A)(i). In contrast, if the minerals are recycled, this recycling must take place in “North America.” Id. and have prompted complaints from U.S. allies.257For example, when Treasury offered initial guidance in December of 2022 on which countries qualify as treaty partners under the statute’s EV mineral requirements, Japan and U.S. allies in Europe were not included. See U.S. Treasury, supra note 243. These (and other) supply chain requirements in the statute have inflamed tensions with U.S. allies. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ravi Mattu, Bernhard Warner, Sarah Kessler, Stephen Gandel, Michael J. de la Merced, Lauren Hirsch & Ephrat Livni, Could Biden’s Climate Agenda Trigger a New Trade War?, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/06/business/dealbook/biden-climate-trade-europe.html [https://
perma.cc/W4E7-GBP3] (“Europe is growing hot over the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act, . . . At issue is a portion of the law that offers $369 billion in subsidies and tax breaks to companies that develop green technologies . . . in North America.”). One way to broaden the list of eligible suppliers is to include countries with collective defense arrangements with the U.S., including Japan and NATO. See John Bozzella, What If No EVs Qualify for the EV Tax Credit? It Could Happen, All. for Auto. Innovation (Aug. 5, 2022), https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/blog/what-if-no-evs-qualify-for-the-ev-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/2ZJ7-AVF7].

In addition, the Inflation Reduction Act also tries to “pick winners,” choosing which technologies get larger subsidies, which get smaller ones, and which get none at all. As I have emphasized elsewhere, government institutions often lack the expertise and incentives to make this sort of judgment effectively.258Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 277–89. As Part VI emphasizes below, a better strategy is to rely on policies that do not depend on the government to make these judgments, such as Pigouvian taxes.259See infra Section VI.A.1.

To sum up, clean energy can mitigate one national security risk (depending on the wrong fossil fuel suppliers) while creating another (relying on the wrong clean energy suppliers). To address this new risk, the key is to “friend-shore” the relevant minerals and manufacturing (and, of course, to do this the right way).

D.  New Environmental Harms

Just as clean energy has national security costs, as well as benefits, the same is true of its environmental effects. While the benefits (such as reducing emissions and pollution) are very significant, they are not free.

1.  Avian Impacts of Wind and Solar

For one thing, wind turbines and solar panels can harm birds and bats. These risks are regularly invoked to block clean energy projects.260See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Save Birds Now or Birds Later, Env’t F. 39, 39 (May/June 2015) (describing the failure of the Cape Winds project). Although regrettable, these species impacts should not keep the U.S. and its allies from using renewable energy. As Professor Michael Gerrard has explained, we face a choice between saving “birds now or birds later.”261Id. Halting these projects may save some birds now, but “won’t some of the animals we are trying to protect be gone anyway [because of climate change], together with untold numbers of others?”262Id. Faced with this tradeoff, policymakers should target the greater threat, which is climate change.263Id. (“The current system of U.S. environmental law, with its multiple delays and veto points, may be incompatible with the scale and pace of the transformation of the energy system that is needed to meet the climate problem.”). Unfortunately, some environmentalists resist this logic. “Rather than climate denial, the environmental community has tradeoff denial,” Professor Gerrard has observed.”264Michael B. Gerrard, A Time for Triage, Env’t F. 38, 40 (Nov./Dec. 2022).

2.  Mining for Clean Energy Minerals

Clean energy has another set of environmental costs as well: mining for the necessary minerals can cause pollution, water shortages, accidents, and disruption of local communities and habitats.265Iris Crawford, Ask MIT Climate: Will Mining the Resources Needed for Clean Energy Cause Problems for the Environment?, Mass. Inst. Tech. Climate Portal (July 21, 2022), https://
climate.mit.edu/ask-mit/will-mining-resources-needed-clean-energy-cause-problems-environment [https
://perma.cc/33ZG-Q7N2].
Invoking these risks, some environmental groups oppose mining for these minerals in the U.S. and E.U.266See, e.g., Aaron Mintzes, Harmful Mining Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, Earthworks (Aug. 4, 2022), https://earthworks.org/blog/harmful-mining-provisions-in-the-inflation-reduction-act [https://perma.cc/HC27-VP3H] (opposing mining incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act for minerals needed for clean energy).

Again, this is a mistake. As with the impact on birds, pollution from these mines is an unavoidable cost of combatting climate change. “[W]e need to be in an era of triage,” Michael Gerrard has urged, “where we save what we can but recognize that there are things we’ll have to give up.”267Gerrard, supra note 264. Moreover, if these minerals are going to be extracted somewhere, isn’t it better to do it in jurisdictions with meaningful environmental regulation? The U.S. and E.U. are likely to be more responsible than many current suppliers.

3.  Pollution and Accidents From Nuclear Energy

Like wind and solar power, nuclear power also poses environmental tradeoffs. On the one hand, the advantages are quite significant. No greenhouse gas is emitted268Three Reasons Why Nuclear is Clean and Sustainable, Off. of Nuclear Energy (Mar. 31, 2022), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/3-reasons-why-nuclear-clean-and-sustainable [https://
perma.cc/44SM-49YN].
and, unlike with wind and solar, output does not vary with the weather.269Alex Brown, Climate Change is Shifting State Views on Nuclear Power, Stateline (June 15, 2022), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2022/06/15/climate-change-is-shifting-state-views-on-nuclear-power [https://perma.cc/XHX2-W5HE] (“If you build your whole grid around intermittent renewables, you have times and days of the year where you don’t have any wind or sun . . . . Baseload power is critical, and nuclear is the cleanest form of baseload power.” (quoting Connecticut state Senator Norm Needleman)).

On the other hand, nuclear power poses two familiar risks, which prompt staunch opposition from some environmentalists. First, there is radioactive waste, which must be disposed of safely. Second, there also is a risk of accidents. Fortunately, these have been rare. In the U.S., the most significant one, a partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island plant in 1979, had only negligible effects on public health and the environment.270Five Facts to Know About Three Mile Island, Off. of Nuclear Energy (May 4, 2022), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/5-facts-know-about-three-mile-island [https://perma.cc/W4WT-YRVH]. In contrast, the meltdowns at Fukushima in Japan in 2011 and at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986 were quite serious, causing disease and death from radiation exposure and also rendering some areas uninhabitable for decades.271Richard Gray, The True Toll of the Chernobyl Disaster, BBC (July 25, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190725-will-we-ever-know-chernobyls-true-death-toll [https://
perma.cc/L3L3-4Z3U].
Yet these tragedies were the product of unique circumstances: a tsunami in Japan, and a blend of human error and dysfunctional efforts to conceal the incident in the Soviet Union.272Michael Fitzpatrick, Nuclear Power is Set to Get a Lot Safer (and Cheaper)—Here’s Why, Conversation (Apr. 11, 2017, 6:46 AM), https://theconversation.com/nuclear-power-is-set-to-get-a-lot-safer-and-cheaper-heres-why-62207 [https://perma.cc/2V42-3RLL] (“The reactors that are being constructed today benefit from 60 years of experience gained in the design and operation of nuclear power plants around the world.”).

With the right safety features and regulation, the risks from nuclear power should be quite limited. For example, new reactors have passive cooling systems that work even if power has been knocked out—the problem at Fukushima—as well as “core catchers” that contain radiation more effectively.273Id.

Arguably, then, the risks of not using nuclear power are greater than the risks of using it. For example, after Germany began phasing out nuclear power as a response to Fukushima, its economy became even more dependent on Russian natural gas. This choice turned out badly not just for national security, but also for the environment: when the gas stopped flowing, Germany ramped up its use of coal, spewing more emissions and pollution into the air.

E.  Timing: A Gradual Transition

Although replacing fossil fuel with clean energy has the potential to be a “win-win”—protecting both national security and the environment—a number of new national security and environmental risks must be addressed. In addition, there is another daunting challenge: for now, the world’s supply of clean energy is not even close to adequate. In 2021, renewables generated only 7% of the world’s energy. Paired with nuclear and hydroelectric power, the non-carbon total rose to just 18%. As Table 1 shows, fossil fuel still provided 82% of the world’s energy:

 

Table 1.  Share of Global Energy By Source in 2021
FuelAmount (Exajoules)Percentage
Oil184.2131%
Natural Gas145.3524%
Coal160.1027%
Nuclear25.314%
Hydroelectric40.267%
Renewables39.917%
Total595.15100%
Notes: This data comes from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 9 (71st ed. 2022).

The market share of clean energy can increase, to be sure, but this progress inevitably will be gradual. Consumers do not replace cars and heating systems all that frequently. Even if they did, there are not enough EVs, heat pumps, solar panels, and wind turbines to accommodate everyone at once. As of now, we do not have enough factories to build them—or, for that matter, enough raw materials.

For example, replacing all petroleum-powered cars on the road today would require 1.39 billion EVs, whose batteries would need massive quantities of lithium, cobalt, and other minerals.274Simon P. Michaux, Geological Survey of Finland Rep.: Assessment of the Extra Capacity Required of Alternative Energy Electrical Power Systems to Completely Replace Fossil Fuels iv (2021), https://tupa.gtk.fi/raportti/arkisto/42_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4FM-65HC] (“The mass of lithium ion batteries required to power the 1.39 billion EV’s [sic] . . . would be 282.6 million tonnes.”). But according to the Geological Survey of Finland, “[p]reliminary calculations show that global reserves, let alone global production, may not be enough to resource the quantity of batteries required.”275Id. “In theory, there are enough global reserves of nickel and lithium if they were exclusively used just to produce li-Ion batteries for vehicles,” Michaux estimates.  “To make just one battery for each vehicle in the global transport fleet (excluding Class 8 HCV trucks), it would require 48.2% of 2018 global nickel reserves, and 43.8% of global lithium reserves. There is also not enough cobalt in current reserves to meet this demand and more will need to be discovered.” Id.

There is a similar challenge with copper. Since it is essential for power infrastructure, renewable generation, and EVs, global demand is expected to double by 2035.276S&P Glob., supra note 236, at 3. According to S&P Global, the global supply cannot grow fast enough to meet the goal of net-zero global emissions by 2050.277Id. at 9 (predicting that supply will fall twenty percent below what is needed). “Unless massive new supply comes online in a timely way,” they warn, “the goal of Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 will be short-circuited and remain out of reach.”278Id. There are parallel challenges in building enough renewable powerplants. Michaux, supra note 274, at ii–iii (estimating that an additional 221,594 renewable power plants will have to be built, compared with an existing global stock of only 46,423 stations, and explaining that this large differential “reflects the lower Energy Returned on Energy Invested (ERoEI) ratio of renewable power compared to current fossil fuels”).

The bottom line, then, is that the world has no realistic choice but to keep depending on fossil fuel for years to come. So although it is important to reduce demand for fossil fuel over time—the first part in this Article’s two-part proposal—it also is necessary to implement the second part: tapping new sources of supply.

V.  TAPPING NEW SOURCES OF FOSSIL FUEL IN ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE WAYS

As Parts I and II showed, new sources of fossil fuel enhance national security when they come from the U.S. and other secure and friendly countries, and thus ease dependence on insecure or hostile suppliers. Yet notwithstanding these advantages of new sources, the IEA and other influential voices have called for an end to fossil fuel development.279See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6. For a discussion, see infra Section VI.B. At times, the Biden Administration has also gestured in this direction, although at other times it has supported more drilling in response to rising energy prices, legal constraints, geopolitical imperatives, and political concerns.280See infra Section V.C.4.

It is naïve—and, ultimately, misguided—to end fossil fuel development in the near term. On the contrary, to protect national security, the U.S. and its allies need to keep adding new wells and infrastructure in the right countries. Even so, this needs to be done in an environmentally responsible way. How can the U.S. and its allies tap new fossil fuel sources while still reducing emissions and pollution? This Part proposes three strategies to do both at once: first, new sources should be as “clean” as possible; second, they should replace, instead of adding to, sources that pose national security risks; and third, new sources should be temporary instead of permanent.

A.  Increase Carbon Efficiency of Secure and Friendly Sources

As emphasized above, a key national security goal is to use less oil and gas from Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, and more from countries like the U.S., Brazil, Mexico, and Canada. If these friendly and secure sources also offer environmental advantages, developing them advances both national security and environmental goals. To pursue this “win-win” scenario, policymakers should look for ways to reduce the carbon and pollution footprints of these sources. How can we get more energy from them, while generating the same levels of emissions and pollution—or, ideally, reducing these levels?

1.  Flaring

For one thing, we should get more energy from fuel we already burn. Unfortunately, massive amounts of natural gas are burned (or “flared”) at the wellhead. No one uses this energy, but it still produces significant emissions and pollution.281Zubin Bamji, We Can End Routine Gas Flaring by 2030. Here’s How, World Bank Blogs (Mar. 1, 2021), https://blogs.worldbank.org/energy/we-can-end-routine-gas-flaring-2030-heres-how [https://perma.cc/93YJ-D87Y] (explaining that flared gas emits 400 MM metric tons of CO2-equivalent emissions and pollution each year).

This means a great deal of energy is wasted: about eight percent of global natural gas production (accounting for six percent of global emissions).282U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Flaring and Venting Reduction Research & Development Activities 3 (2021) [hereinafter Flaring and Venting Reduction], https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/Flaring%20and%20Venting%20Report%20to%20
Congress%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZKX-GC7R].
“If half of the amount of gas flared annually [across the globe] was used for power generation,” Zubin Bamji observed, “it could provide about 400 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity – that’s roughly the annual electricity consumption of Sub-Saharan Africa.”283Bamji, supra note 281. In the U.S. alone, gas worth $10.6 billion was flared between 2012 and 2020.284Nicole Sadek, Zoha Tunio & Sarah Hunt, Flaring Profits: The Economics of Burning Gas, Cronkite News (Feb. 24, 2022) https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/howardcenter/gaslit/economics.html [https://perma.cc/2K6W-2ASM] (estimating 3.5 trillion cubic feet using gas prices in effect at the time).

Why is so much natural gas wasted? Unfortunately, there is no infrastructure to bring it to market. This gas comes from oil wells, which have infrastructure to transport oil, but not gas.285Patrick Springer, North Dakota’s Gas Flaring Rate Seven Times Higher Than Next-Highest State, Study Finds, Inforum (Dec. 4, 2022, 12:10 PM), https://www.inforum.com/news/north-dakota/north-dakotas-gas-flaring-rate-7-times-higher-than-next-highest-state-study-finds [https://perma.
cc/MHG4-T7F6] (noting that flaring occurs at oil wells, not natural gas wells).
When gas cannot be delivered to consumers, the easiest alternatives are either to burn it or—even worse—to release it into the atmosphere.286Releasing (or “venting”) it is even more harmful because the main component of natural gas, methane, is a potent greenhouse gas. Flaring and Venting Reduction, supra note 282, at v.

But instead of wasting this gas, we should find ways to use it—and, thus, to increase the supply of energy without increasing emissions (since this gas will be burned anyway). One option is to build pipelines to take it to market.287Rystad Energy, Cost of Flaring Abatement 45 (2022), https://blogs.edf.
org/energyexchange/files/2022/02/Attachment-W-Rystad-Energy-Report-Cost-of-Flaring-Abatement.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6NSC-WUWA] (“Gathering is typically the most cost-effective method of preventing flaring . . . .”).
Indeed, flaring is less common in Texas than in North Dakota because there are more pipelines.288Springer, supra note 285 (“[F]laring in North Dakota is largely driven by a lack of infrastructure. Infrastructure capacity constraints account for 84% of flaring in North Dakota and 64% in Texas . . . .”). Where pipelines are not economical, facilities to use this gas can be added near the well, including small-scale generators, “micro” compression and liquefaction facilities, and petrochemical plants.289Rystad Energy, supra note 287, at 54, 59, 72; see also Flaring and Venting Reduction, supra note 282, at 11–13. If these solutions are not viable, the gas can be stored underground.290Rystad Energy, supra note 287, at 64.

2.  Methane Leaks

Natural gas also is wasted when it leaks from wells and pipelines. Like flaring, these leaks increase emissions without generating useful energy,291See supra Section III.A.3 (noting that methane is a dense greenhouse gas). so plugging them should be a priority. EPA proposed new rules on leaks in November of 2021, as well as supplemental rules a year later.292See EPA, Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review, 86 Fed. Reg. 63110 (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/11/15/2021-24202/standards-of-performance-for-new-reconstructed-and-modified-sources-and-emissions-guidelines-for [https://
perma.cc/A6E9-VVEZ]; EPA, Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review, 87 Fed. Reg. 74702 (Dec. 6, 2022), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/12/
06/2022-24675/standards-of-performance-for-new-reconstructed-and-modified-sources-and-emissions-guidelines-for [https://perma.cc/6RHX-NREY].
The Inflation Reduction Act also introduced a charge on methane leaks in some circumstances.293Jason Lindquist, Cover Me, Part 2—Inflation Reduction Act’s New Methane Charge Takes Aim at Emissions, RBN Energy (Sept. 28, 2022), https://rbnenergy.com/cover-me-part-2-inflation-reduction-act-new-methane-charge-takes-aim-at-emissions [https://perma.cc/489S-32YV]. Analyzing the details of these measures is beyond this Article’s scope. The goal here is not to determine whether they are the best ways to target leaks, but to emphasize the importance of addressing this issue.

3.  Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (“CCUS”)

Still another way to reduce environmental harms from fossil fuel is to capture and store CO2, so it is not released into the atmosphere. For example, emissions from power plants can be piped to old oil and gas wells.294About CCUS, Int’l Energy Agency (Apr. 2021), https://www.iea.org/reports/about-ccus [https://perma.cc/HJK7-ELTE]. “Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) so far has not lived up to its promise,” the IEA has observed, but “[s]tronger climate targets and investment incentives are injecting new momentum into CCUS.”295A New Era for CCUS, Int’l Energy Agency (2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/ccus-in-clean-energy-transitions/a-new-era-for-ccus [https://perma.cc/V8A9-5DW4]. The U.S. tax code offers a tax credit for carbon capture, which the Inflation Reduction Act made more generous.296See I.R.C. § 45Q; see also Building a Clean Energy Economy, supra note 255, at 67–70 (describing IRA provisions on industrial decarbonization and carbon management). Again, the details of this credit are beyond this Article’s scope.

4.  Replace Coal With Natural Gas

Along with reducing emissions and pollution from specific types of fuel, policymakers also should change the mix of fuel. Specifically, a determined effort is needed to replace coal with natural gas.

Since the U.S. has ample reserves of both, they offer similar national security advantages.297See supra Section I.C.2. Yet burning coal produces nearly twice as many emissions as burning natural gas, as well as more pollution.298Carbon Dioxide Emissions Coefficients, supra note 149. Admittedly, natural gas poses the additional risk of methane leaks, as noted above.299See supra Section III.A.3. But as long as this problem is addressed, replacing coal with natural gas reduces emissions and pollution.300Id.

Indeed, this switch has helped U.S. emissions decline substantially in recent years, as noted above.301Id. Yet there is a lot of room for improvement, since coal still accounts for about 27% of the world’s energy,302Of the 92.97 Exajoules of energy the U.S. consumed in 2021, 10.57 Exajoules (or 11%) came from coal. Similarly, of the 595.15 Exajoules of energy the world consumed in 2021, 160.10 Exajoules (or 26.9%) came from coal. See bp, bp Statistical Review of World Energy 9 (71st ed.
2022), https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/
statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20230407
184949/https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/
statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf].
as well as 11% of all energy used in the U.S.303U.S. Energy Facts, supra note 194.

As a result, U.S. exports of natural gas do double duty. Not only do they enhance national security (by replacing Russian gas), but they also protect the environment (by replacing coal). For the same reasons, bringing natural gas to Europe from the Eastern Mediterranean is also good for both national security and the environment, so it is unfortunate that the Biden Administration has impeded this effort, at least initially, as noted above.304See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. Just as natural gas should replace coal, there are analogous gains from replacing “heavy” oil with “light” oil. For example, using less Russian oil arguably is good not only for national security, but also for the environment; it is heavier and more sour than most U.S. crude. Hausmann, supra note 97 (“Russian oil is heavier than most OPEC or US oil, meaning that it generates more carbon dioxide per unit of energy. It is also sour, meaning that it contains a lot of sulfur, a nasty contaminant.”). For a comparison of the environmental effects of different types of crude oil, see D. Nathan Meehan, Hassan M. El-Houjeiri & Jeffrey S. Rutherford, Carbon Intensity: Comparing Carbon Impacts of Middle East and US Shale Oils, Society of Petroleum Engineers 3–6 (2018), https://onepetro.org/SPESATS/proceedings-abstract/18SATS/All-18SATS/SPE-192166-MS/215513 [https://perma.cc/85Y4-EYVM].

B.  Extra Supply Should Replace, Instead of Adding to, Existing Sources

As the previous Section showed, when the U.S. and its allies tap new sources of fossil fuel, they should favor cleaner ones. This Section adds a second environmental safeguard: in tapping new sources, the goal should be to stabilize—not increase—global supply.

Fortunately, increasing supply should not be necessary. Rather, to protect national security, the key is to fill a gap. If one supplier suddenly stops selling (because of an invasion or revolution) or should not be allowed to sell (because its revenue funds harmful conduct), another supplier needs to step in—not to add to global supply, but to replace the insecure or hostile source.

This reality reduces the tension with environmental goals. As long as new sources just fill a gap in the market, emissions and pollution should not increase. Overall, the same quantity of fossil fuel is burned; it just comes from different countries. Indeed, if friendly and secure sources are cleaner than the oil and gas they replace, as the previous Section recommended, global emissions and pollution would decline.

To be clear, this happens only if the insecure or hostile supplier’s oil and gas actually come off the market. This is quite likely for insecure sources, whose production is disrupted by an invasion or revolution. But with a hostile exporter, exiting the market is not automatic. If they want to keep selling, boycotts or other sanctions are needed to stop them. The key question, noted above, is whether these sanctions are effective.305See supra Section II.B. If not, adding new wells would increase global supply, instead of just stabilizing it, and thus could generate additional emissions and pollution.

To avoid this problem, new sources ideally should be elastic. They should increase production as insecure or hostile producers cut back, while reducing production as these other producers ramp up.

Is this feasible? The good news is that, at least to an extent, it happens automatically in response to market prices. On the one hand, if insecure or hostile producers cut production, prices rise, motivating secure and friendly suppliers to increase production. On the other hand, if insecure or hostile producers maintain their production, prices do not rise (or, at least, they revert after an initial panic). As a result, there is no market-based incentive to produce more (and, obviously, policymakers do not need to intervene with other incentives).

Yet, although prices provide some protection from oversupply (and the extra emissions and pollution it triggers), they are not a sure-fire solution. Suppliers sometimes respond slowly to changes in price, expecting prices to be volatile and waiting to see whether a trend endures.306Nick Lioudis, Oil and Gas Production Timelines, Investopedia, https://
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/061115/how-long-does-it-take-oil-and-gas-producer-go-drilling-production.asp [https://perma.cc/Z6JL-YD5E] (“[C]hronic volatility . . . gives producers another reason not to rush longer-term supply decisions.”).
In addition, some suppliers are able to adjust more quickly than others, as emphasized above.307See supra Section I.C.3.ii. When prices rise, how fast can they bring more product to market? When prices fall, how rapidly can they cut production? Producers vary widely in this regard; for example, Saudi Arabia is fast, U.S. offshore wells are slow, and so forth.308Id.

The bottom line, then, is that tapping new sources of fossil fuel does not increase emissions or pollution if this new supply stabilizes (but does not increase) global supply. The same amount of fossil fuel is used, but it comes from different countries. This outcome is more likely when the new suppliers are flexible, so they can respond more quickly to market prices (and, therefore, to underlying shifts in global supply).

C.  In Adding New Capacity, Retain Flexibility to Make It Temporary

This brings us to a third way to minimize environmental harm from tapping new sources of oil and gas: ideally, this extra supply should be reversible, producing only as long as it is needed. This Section shows how U.S. shale can offer this flexibility and explains how policymakers can leverage it.

1.  U.S. Shale Has the Potential to Ramp Up Quickly

For one thing, shale producers can increase production fairly quickly, enabling them to replace suppliers that have become unavailable. Shale producers are not as fast as Saudi Arabia—which, as noted above, often can bring additional barrels to market within thirty days—but they are quicker than most other producers.309Id.; Bordoff et al., supra note 61, at 20 (“[S]hale oil supply cannot be ramped up quite as quickly as OPEC spare capacity can be activated.”). In general, shale producers take between six and twelve months to react to price changes.310See Bordoff et al., supra note 61, at 26. So when prices spike, these suppliers have the ability (and usually also the incentive) to increase production.

“Shale oil developments require relatively low amounts of initial capital and can be developed in relatively short order, making shale oil highly sensitive to price increases,” Bordoff, Halff and Losz have explained.311Id. at 20. “In contrast with the rest of the industry, which is highly concentrated, the shale oil industry is fragmented and made up of myriad small companies that are nimble, dynamic, innovative, and responsive to market changes.”312Id. 

Admittedly, before a well is drilled—in a shale formation or anywhere else—years may be required to find the right location and secure permits. But this does not slow down well-run energy companies. They constantly explore and lease new sites and secure permits, sometimes years before they ever intend to drill there. As a result, these firms have an inventory of sites already approved. “The idea is that if there are delays with permitting or other land issues,” one analyst explained, “that the management team will have flexibility in deciding where they want to drill and not run short on options.”313Gary Gentile & Starr Spencer, Fuel for Thought: US Oil, Gas Industry Not Keen on Playing ‘Swing Producer’ Role, Despite Government Pleas, S&P Glob. (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/blogs/oil/031522-fft-us-oil-gas-swing
-producer-energy-prices-inflation-granholm [https://perma.cc/DPX8-GRSC] (quoting oil analyst Nathan Hasbrook).

Obviously, they still have to drill the well, but drilling in shale is a lot faster than drilling offshore.314“Drilling an offshore well can take three to four months and cost $120 million to $160 million per well,” Nick Lioudis explains, “with the most complex drilling projects taking as long as a year.” Lioudis, supra note 306. In contrast, a shale well takes about ten weeks to drill. See id. (Explaining that it takes two to four weeks to drill the well, a week to prepare for hydraulic fracturing, ten days for fracturing, a week to add production tubing, and another two to three weeks in which oil or gas is still mixed with sand). To shorten the time even further, companies can drill the well, cap it, and then complete the process later when they actually need the oil or gas.315Time Between Drilling and First Production Has Little Effect on Oil Well Production, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41253 [https://perma.cc/L8QT-XEBD] (“Some oil wells are completed shortly after drilling is completed, but other wells remain drilled but uncompleted (DUC) for several months or years.”).

2.  U.S. Shale Also Can Slow Production Quickly

Not only can U.S. shale producers ramp up quickly to fill a gap in the market, but they also can ramp down when extra production is no longer needed. As a result, shale wells are well positioned to replace, instead of supplementing, other production.

A more traditional well, whether drilled onshore or offshore, usually lasts twenty years or more.316From Inception Through Completion: The Life Cycle of a Well, Energy HQ (2017), https://energyhq.com/2017/08/from-inception-through-completion-the-life-cycle-of-a-well [https://
perma.cc/G2S3-VFNL] (“Oil and natural gas production of one well can last up to 20–30 years.”).
As a result, it has more potential to become a stranded asset, which keeps pumping even after it is no longer needed.

In contrast, shale wells have much shorter useful lives. Hydraulic fracturing usually enables them to pump only for a year or two.317Hausmann, supra note 97 (“From an environmental standpoint, US oil and gas projects have the advantage of being quick to execute and wind up. A tight oil or gas well produces over 85% of its output in the first two years, whereas traditional oil fields can take up to a decade to develop and then run for decades . . . .”). To keep producing, the firm needs another round of hydraulic fracturing or a new well. If demand has declined—so prices have fallen—the firm will not have the incentive to make this additional investment. “Unlike other types of oil projects, shale oil production declines steeply after initial production,” Bordoff, Halff and Losz have explained.318Bordoff et al., supra note 61, at 20. “Another distinctive quality of shale projects is their relatively high ongoing costs, which makes shale production sensitive to price declines as well.”319Id.

These differences give shale a significant edge over conventional wells, such as the Willow Project in Alaska, which the Biden Administration green-lighted in March 2023.320Ella Nilsen, The Willow Project has Been Approved. Here’s What to Know About the Controversial Oil-Drilling Venture, CNN (Mar. 14, 2023, 3:46 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/14/politics/willow-project-oil-alaska-explained-climate/index.html [https
://perma.cc/R74T-EW3C]. The project was first approved by the Trump Administration in 2020, and Biden Administration officials have indicated that legally they had no choice but to allow it to proceed, but many environmental advocates are not persuaded by this claim. Id.
Unlike shale wells, Willow is expected to have a thirty-year useful life.321Victoria Petersen, Alaska’s Willow Project Promises Huge Amounts of Oil—and Huge Environmental Impacts, High Country News (Aug. 3, 2022), https://www.hcn.org/articles/
north-energy-industry-alaskas-willow-project-promises-huge-amounts-of-oil-and-huge-environmental-impacts [https://perma.cc/JX72-R9M3] (noting that Willow is expected to produce 180,000 barrels per day for 30 years).
Will the world still need Willow’s oil in thirty years? With a fast enough transition to clean energy proceeds, the answer could well be “no.” Arguably, then, approving Willow and other long-lived conventional projects is a mistake. Instead, the better approach is to rely more on shale to increase U.S. production.

In short, the geology of shale wells makes them much less likely to become stranded assets. They can ramp up to fill gaps in the market, and then slow production when there is excess supply.

3.  Reversible Infrastructure

While shale producers can get oil and gas out of the ground quickly, it still needs to be refined and brought to market. This requires an elaborate infrastructure, including pipelines, refineries, and LNG terminals. Unlike shale wells, infrastructure take years to build.

i.  Infrastructure Approvals: A Key Lever for the Government

A key question is whether this infrastructure is already in place. The answer varies with the location of the drilling, as well as the type of fossil fuel. In places where the infrastructure is adequate, shale producers already have the potential to serve as swing producers. But in other places, costly infrastructure investments are still needed, especially for natural gas, to take full advantage of their rapid reaction time. For example, the U.S. needs more LNG terminals to do more to replace Russian natural gas in Europe. Yet although a number of new export terminals have been built and more are under construction, the Biden Administration decided in January 2024 to “pause” the issuance of permits for new projects.322See U.S. LNG Export Capacity to Grow as Three Additional Projects Begin Construction, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Sept. 6, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=53719 [https://perma.cc/PR6E-8SRT]; see also Shidler, supra note 119 (discussing impact of pause on export permits to countries that do not have free trade treaties with the U.S.).

In these efforts to ramp up production, the division of labor between the private sector and the government should be emphasized. In the U.S., private firms have significant discretion about how many wells to drill. In contrast, the government plays a critical role in major infrastructure projects. Under current law, the permitting process is as protracted as it is significant; a project cannot proceed unless the relevant agencies sign off. Deciding whether to do so is one of the main ways the government can either encourage or slow U.S. production.

In making these judgments, policymakers should balance the various considerations highlighted in this Article. How important is it to replace Russia? Or to have greater potential to replace Middle Eastern suppliers? Is the new source of oil and gas cleaner or dirtier than other sources? Would it really replace these other sources, or just supplement them?

ii.  Investing in Infrastructure to Leverage the Flexibility of Shale

While these are context-specific judgments, the recommendation here is to err on the side of building more infrastructure. We should build it, even if we will not always use it.

This approach enables the U.S. and its allies to leverage the flexibility of shale production. On the one hand, when more fossil fuel is needed to replace insecure or hostile suppliers, the infrastructure is there to bring it to market. On the other hand, when there is too much supply—so shale producers are ramping down—the infrastructure does not need to be fully utilized.

Admittedly, this approach raises two potential concerns. First, once this infrastructure is built, we might keep using it longer than we should. For instance, what if we hope to stop using fossil fuel in fifteen years, but a pipeline has a thirty-year useful life? If the pipeline is built, there will be a temptation to use it for thirty years, instead of just fifteen.323Jason Bordoff & Megan L. O’Sullivan, The New Energy Order, Foreign Affs. (July/Aug. 2022), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/energy/2022-06-07/markets-new-energy-order [https://
perma.cc/2Z5F-B9MQ] (“[S]uch investments should not create obstacles to climate action by strengthening economic forces that oppose faster progress because they have vested financial interests in today’s energy system.”).

The solution to this problem is for infrastructure approvals to be contingent. In licenses and permits, the government should reserve the right to shut the infrastructure down before the end of its useful life. In the above example, the permit could allow the government to close the pipeline after fifteen years. This provides flexibility to respond to changed circumstances. In fifteen years, if the primary concern is climate and pollution, policymakers can shutter the pipeline. But if national security looms especially large, it can remain in use. Put another way, it is better to make permits contingent than to refuse to issue them at all—as the Biden Administration has done in “pausing” new LNG export permits—so the infrastructure is there when it is needed.

Admittedly, even if a contingent permit is granted, this does not mean that the project will proceed. This brings us to the second issue: limits on the use of infrastructure reduce its value to the private sector. The risk of an early shut down may keep projects from being built, even if they are urgently needed now. For example, the U.S. should build LNG terminals to be able to support its European allies and weaken Russia. But what if the risk of an early shut down discourages the private sector from building them?

The answer is for the government to help fund some projects. This is not meant as a handout to the fossil fuel industry, but as a response to the national security and environmental externalities highlighted in this Article. In some cases, investing in an LNG facility is more cost-effective than supplying military aid to Russia’s neighbors. Likewise, shutting down this facility when it is no longer needed may well be cheaper than building seawalls or repairing damage from storms. In short, the market failures discussed in this Article justify a government role, along with government expenditures.

“[G]overnments,” Bordoff and O’Sullivan have observed, “could develop innovative tools to plan for obsolescence.”324Id. For example, one approach would be for the government to pay compensation (for example, the infrastructure’s appraised value) in shutting down infrastructure after a period of time (for example, fifteen years). Another would be for the government to cover a share of the cost up front in exchange for acquiring ownership (or the right to shut the infrastructure down) after a preset term of years.325See id. (“[Governments] might favor the permitting of hydrocarbon infrastructure investments with shorter payback periods, condition that permitting on having a right to pay to wind down the asset after a specified time, or shorten the payback period by lowering the cost of capital for private firms in exchange for the right to retire the asset after the investment yields a certain return.”).

In deciding which infrastructure projects to approve, policymakers should also consider whether they can be retooled for another purpose. An advantage of natural gas pipelines, for instance, is that they might someday transport hydrogen, a potential source of clean energy.326Vera Eckert, Stephen Jewkes & Isla Binnie, Europe’s Gas Firms Prime Pipelines for Hydrogen Highway, Reuters (Nov. 18, 2021, 6:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/europes-gas-firms-prime-pipelines-hydrogen-highway-2021-11-18 [https://perma.cc/2JDX-A88N].

Is investing in pipelines and other infrastructure the best use of public money? Obviously, rigorous judgments are needed about how this investment stacks up against other ways to address national security and environmental risks. But in some cases, reversible infrastructure is likely to be the most cost-effective way to pursue these goals.

4.  So Why Did U.S. Shale Production Not Increase More Rapidly After Russia Invaded Ukraine?

With the right infrastructure, U.S. shale producers have the potential to avert (or at least dampen) supply shocks. Yet admittedly, they did not play this role after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Even as prices spiked, they were slow to increase production.327Dan Eberhart, Why U.S. Shale Producers Aren’t Riding to the Rescue Despite Tight Oil Supplies, Forbes (Sept. 19, 2022, 11:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
daneberhart/2022/09/19/why-us-shale-producers-arent-riding-to-the-rescue-despite-tight-oil-supplies [https://perma.cc/V3NE-RWXW] (“Despite intense market signals that more supply is needed, shale producers say a bailout is not in the cards.”).

Even so, there were context-specific reasons for their hesitation, which will not necessarily recur. For one thing, the industry had just weathered the coronavirus pandemic, which slashed global demand, requiring steep production cuts, and plunged a number of producers into bankruptcy. This bruising experience made firms cautious about ramping up quickly.328Paul H. Tice, Why U.S. Oil and Gas Producers Aren’t Solving the Energy Crisis, Wall St. J. (Mar. 15, 2022, 12:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-american-producers-arent-solving-energy-crisis-price-hike-rise-oil-gas-wells-fracking-shale-lng-climate-change-green-russia-1164735474
4 [https://perma.cc/KB28-CA9X].

For firms that were willing to increase production, there was another barrier: the pandemic caused a host of supply chain bottlenecks. Like in other industries, shale producers struggled to get enough equipment and employees to increase production.329Eberhart, supra note 327 (“Part of this is down to supply chain issues, inflation, and infrastructure constraints . . . .”).

Economic losses during the pandemic also burned investors. For years, they had provided capital even though shale producers were not (yet) profitable, prioritizing production increases and accepting that profits would come eventually. But the pandemic changed Wall Street’s attitude. After a wave of losses and bankruptcies, earnings—not increased production—became the priority.330Gentile & Spencer, supra note 313 (“E&Ps have restricted their capital budgets in recent years and given generous percentages of their cash flows to shareholders.”). Executive compensation was adjusted to reflect this shift,331See Eberhart, supra note 327 (“Compensation incentives for executives in the shale industry are now dominated by cash return targets rather than production growth targets.”). and the inventory of wells declined.332Jinjoo Lee, Oil’s Other Strategic Reserve Is Running Low, Too, Wall St. J. (Nov. 9, 2022, 7:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/oils-other-strategic-reserve-is-running-low-too-11667963507 [https://perma.cc/7X66-HVDN] (noting decline in number of drilled but uncompleted wells among shale producers). Yet the good news is that shale producers delivered record profits in 2022, which were turbocharged by a surge in oil and gas prices. Hopefully, these profits will ease investor concerns about expansion going forward.

Even so, there is still another barrier to overcome—one rooted in policy and perception, rather than in market dynamics. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, the Biden Administration’s rhetoric and policies sent a clear signal that fossil fuel production should decline.

“I want you to just take a look . . . I want you to look in my eyes,” Joe Biden said as a presidential candidate.333Thomas Phippen, Biden Keeping His Promise to ‘End Fossil Fuel’ Increased Gas Prices, RSC Memo Shows, Fox Bus. (Mar. 28, 2022, 8:14 AM), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/biden-fossil-fuel-gas-prices-promise-republican-study-comittee-memo [https://perma.cc/G9SH-XNPT]. “I guarantee you, I guarantee you we are going to end fossil fuel and I am not going to cooperate with them, OK?”334Id. In this spirit, he pledged to stop auctioning oil and gas leases on federal land. “And by the way,” he said, “no more drilling on federal lands, period. Period, period, period.”335Libby Cathey, Infuriating Climate Activists, Biden Expands Oil Drilling on Public Land, ABC News (Apr. 18, 2022, 2:17 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/infuriating-climate-activists-biden-expands-oil-drilling-public/story?id=84148098 [https://perma.cc/YMC6-FFXD] (quoting Joe Biden’s pledge at a 2020 townhall in New Hampshire). On his first day in office, President Biden canceled the Keystone Pipeline.336Ben Lefebvre & Lauren Gardner, Biden Kills Keystone XL Permit, Again, Politico (Jan. 20, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/20/joe-biden-kills-keystone-xl-pipeline-permit-460555 [https://perma.cc/XR6W-2QXN]. Less than a week later, he imposed a “pause [on] new oil and natural             gas leases on public lands or in offshore waters . . . .”337Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, Exec. Order No. 14,008, Sec. 208, 86 Fed. Reg. 7169 (Jan. 27, 2021).

Yet as energy prices started to rise—and then spiked after Russia invaded Ukraine—the Biden Administration began walking back this message. They resumed leasing federal land after a district court enjoined the “pause,”338See generally State of La. v. Biden, 543 F. Supp. 3d 388 (W.D. La. 2021) (enjoining Biden Administration from implementing a “pause” on new oil and gas leases on public lands and in offshore waters, and holding that president does not have authority to override statutes requiring auctions for these leases). and agreed to allow more leases as a compromise to pass the Inflation Reduction Act.339 See Jake Bittle, The Inflation Reduction Act Promises Thousands of New Oil Leases. Drillers Might Not Want Them, Gov’t Exec. (Aug. 11, 2022), https://www.govexec.
com/oversight/2022/08/inflation-reduction-act-promises-thousands-new-oil-leases-drillers-might-not-want-them/375698 [https://perma.cc/Q6NB-Z7S8] (“[B]ecause the so-called Inflation Reduction Act bears the imprint of swing-vote Senator Joe Manchin, it . . . reinstates old auctions that the Biden administration has tried to cancel and . . . . requires that the government auction millions of acres of oil and gas leases before it can auction acreage for wind and solar farms.”).
President Biden also began urging U.S. companies to increase production (while also criticizing them for profiting from higher prices).340Josh Boak, Biden Calls for More Production and Lower Profits in Letter to U.S. Oil Refiners, PBS (June 15, 2022, 11:46 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/biden-calls-for-more-production-and-lower-profits-in-letter-to-u-s-oil-refiners [https://perma.cc/J9RT-3L4P] (“Your companies need to work with my Administration to bring forward concrete, near-term solutions that address the crisis.” (quoting letter from President Biden to U.S. oil refiners)); Rachel Frazin, Biden Sends Mixed Signals to Oil Industry, The Hill (Mar. 24, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/599473-biden-sends-mixed-signals-to-oil-industry [https://perma.cc/QW9P-M5V8] (“The administration has asked U.S. oil and gas producers to drill more as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed gasoline prices higher. But it has also taken a somewhat hostile tone, blaming the industry for not bringing prices down quickly enough.”).

Even so, U.S. oil and gas producers were skeptical about the Administration’s shift in policy and rhetoric. “The Biden administration’s anti-fossil fuel policies and messaging have not helped the investment environment,” observed the CEO of an oil services firm.341Eberhart, supra note 327. “The White House may ask producers for more supply today, but their policy priorities seek to eliminate the need for that additional supply within five years.”342Id. This pessimistic assessment was reinforced when the Biden Administration stopped issuing new LNG export permits early in 2024.

This chilling effect was unfortunate. Since the U.S. and its allies will rely on fossil fuel for years to come, discouraging new development comes at a cost.

To sum up, developing extra supply in the market for oil and gas has advantages for national security, but potential costs for the environment. Yet there are three ways to square this circle. First, policymakers should aim to make these new fossil fuel investments as “clean” as possible. Second, in adding new capacity, the goal should be to replace other fossil fuel sources, not to add to them. Third, the new sources should be flexible, so they can be ramped up and dialed back, as needed. In these ways, the U.S. and its allies can bring new oil and gas online while still reducing emissions and pollution.

VI.  REGULATORY STRATEGY

As the last two Parts have shown, the U.S. and its allies need to reduce demand for fossil fuels, while also tapping new sources in environmentally responsible ways. This Part outlines a regulatory strategy to advance these goals. The best approach is a mix of Pigouvian taxes, targeting the various national security and environmental costs discussed in this Article. Unfortunately, this strategy has not gained any political traction in the U.S., at least so far.

As a fallback, some commentators (and, indeed, a number of celebrities) have called for a moratorium on new fossil fuel development. Yet this would be a mistake, as a moratorium would actually harm both national security and the environment.

Instead, the better approach is an incremental effort to alter the mix of energy sources over time. To guide this effort, this Part proposes a heuristic called “the marginal efficiency cost of energy”: policymakers should account for all the social costs of each source (for example, U.S. oil, Russian natural gas, U.S. coal, nuclear, and so forth)—not just private costs, but also national security and environmental costs—and then proceed step-by-step, looking for opportunities over time to replace high social cost sources with low social cost sources. To advance this agenda, policymakers can rely on whatever policy instruments are available, including permits, licenses, regulations, mandates, and subsidies.

A key challenge in implementing this agenda is regulatory fragmentation. A policymaker responsible solely for environmental risks will not have the incentives (and possibly also the expertise) to consider national security risks, and vice versa.

Lining up political support is also a challenge, but this Article’s approach—emphasizing both the environment and national security—could prove helpful. At the risk of dramatically oversimplifying U.S. politics, the environment tends to be more of a priority for the left, while national security tends to be more of a priority for the right. The key to bipartisan support could well be policies that advance both sets of goals. In other words, the right coalition could be both green and red, white, and blue.

A.  Pigouvian Taxes

As I (and many others) have written elsewhere, arguably the best way to deal with negative externalities in energy is with Pigouvian taxes, which add these third-party costs to the price.343See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 267–70. This Section outlines the advantages of this regulatory approach, and briefly discusses how it can be used to target threats not only to the environment (which are well understood), but also to national security (which have received less attention). Yet since carbon taxes have attracted very little political support in the U.S., the discussion of Pigouvian taxes here is brief.

For the same reason, this Article does not offer a separate discussion of cap and trade. It is well understood that this regulatory strategy—which sets limits on an activity and issues tradable permits that authorize a designated level of it—offers similar benefits as Pigouvian taxes, so there is no need for a separate analysis here.

1.  Efficiency of Pigouvian Taxes

Pricing externalities is a very efficient way to mitigate them. With a carbon tax, for example, if emissions from a gallon of gasoline cause fifty cents of harm to the climate, a tax of fifty cents per gallon is added to the price at the pump.344See Mitch Ratcliffe, Helping Future Generations Cover the Cost of a Gallon of Gasoline Today, Earth911 (Feb. 23, 2023), https://earth911.com/inspire/pay-social-cost-of-carbon-today [https://perma.cc/3K93-U67K] (noting that the Biden Administration estimated the social cost of carbon at $51 per ton for 2021, which implies a carbon tax of 50 cents per gallon, and that the Biden Administration might increase the estimate to $190 per ton, which implies a carbon tax of $1.84 per gallon). A tax also is imposed on other sources of climate harms, including natural gas, coal, jet fuel, propane, livestock, chemicals, and so on. Since the harms from these various activities are not the same, a well-crafted carbon tax is calibrated to reflect these variations.

In implementing a Pigouvian tax, the regulator’s most important job is to estimate the externalities as accurately as possible—a responsibility that is difficult, to be sure, but also limited.345In a cap-and-trade system, the key step is to set the quantity, not the price. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1 (2002). The good news is that adding these costs to the price of goods and services fixes the market failure. Once regulators accomplish this, they can rely on the market to address the externality as efficiently as possible.

Instead of a “one-size-fits-all” approach, consumers have broad discretion to mitigate the relevant harm in whatever way is easiest for them. In response to a carbon tax, for instance, consumers can adjust their behavior in a host of ways: they can take mass transit, carpool, telecommute, move closer to work, get a car with a more fuel-efficient internal combustion engine, drive a hybrid, buy an EV, install solar panels on their roof, lower the thermostat in the winter, buy heat pumps and energy-efficient appliances, turn off the lights when they leave the room, use energy efficient bulbs, install better insulation, eat less meat, and much more. In dozens of choices every day, they can reduce their carbon footprint.346See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 277 (describing range of potential responses to national security tax).

Pigouvian taxes also offer similar flexibility to businesses. For example, by increasing gasoline prices, a carbon tax motivates auto manufacturers to prioritize fuel efficiency. Again, there are a host of ways to do this, including lighter materials, more efficient internal combustion engines, hybrids, EVs, and so on.347Id. at 278 (noting that tech neutral taxes allow the government to rely on private sector competition).

With a subsidy, the government would have to pick which approaches to support—something the government usually lacks the incentives and expertise to do well.348Id. at 278–81. With a carbon tax, by contrast, the government does not have to make this sort of a judgment. Instead, the tax motivates businesses to respond to the problem. They compete for customers by experimenting with different approaches.349Id.

2.  The Perils of Picking Winners: EVs versus Hybrids

Sadly, the problems with “picking winners” were on full display in the Inflation Reduction Act. For example, it offers a generous subsidy for EVs, but no subsidy for hybrids, which have both a battery and a gas tank. At one level, this makes sense. EVs have a smaller carbon footprint, so the switch from a gasoline-powered car to an EV reduces emissions approximately twice as much as the switch to a hybrid.

But this analysis does not take account of an important downside of EVs: their batteries are a lot larger because, unlike hybrids, they can’t run on gasoline as a backup power source. So compared with a Toyota Camry hybrid, a Chevy Bolt’s battery is sixty times larger, and thus requires sixty times more lithium and other minerals. Hopefully, this differential won’t matter over time, as the global supply of the relevant minerals expands.

But for now, this supply is quite constrained. This means that the same quantity of scarce minerals can produce either one Chevy Bolt or sixty Toyota Camry hybrids. Although a Bolt is about twice as effective at reducing emissions as a hybrid on a one-for-one basis, the analysis is very different when one Bolt is compared—not to a single hybrid—but to sixty of them. Are emissions reduced more by replacing one gasoline-powered car with a Bolt, or sixty gasoline-powered cars with sixty Toyota Camry hybrids? The sixty hybrids reduce emissions twenty-nine times more than a single Bolt!350See Steve Hanley, Reducing Carbon Emissions — Hybrid Vs. Plug-In Hybrid Vs. Battery Electric, Clean Technica (June 14, 2019), https://cleantechnica.com/2019/06/14/reducing-carbon-emissions-hybrid-vs-plug-in-hybrid-vs-battery-electric [https://perma.cc/P48Y-EJC8] (relying on analysis of Kevin F. Brown).

In other words, once the analysis incorporates the scarcity of minerals—and thus the number of cars that actually can be produced—Congress’s decision to subsidize only hybrids, and not EVs, is questionable. The broader point, of course, is that Congress is not well positioned to pick one technology over another. Again, this is the great advantage of a carbon tax. It spares Congress from making these choices. After setting a price for emissions, Congress can rely on the market to develop the most cost effective ways to reduce them, such as hybrids in the short term and EVs in the long term.

3.  A Menu of Pigouvian Taxes on Energy

Like carbon taxes, Pigouvian taxes on pollution and national security harms have the same advantages. For example, since coal causes more pollution than other fossil fuels, adding this cost to the price of coal motivates consumers and businesses to use less of it and favor cleaner alternatives.

To internalize the externalities discussed in this Article, four types of Pigouvian taxes are needed: first, a carbon tax; second, a tax on pollution; third, a tax to cover the cost of defending access to energy from insecure or unstable sources (including petroleum, specialized minerals used in clean energy, and uranium); and, finally, the cost of funding exporters that engage in aggressive or repressive conduct (including oil and gas from Russia and Iran, clean energy from China, and so forth).

4.  Defense Externalities: A Tax on Oil

As an example of a tax on defense externalities, consider the case of oil. Should this tax apply to all oil, or only to barrels imported from insecure suppliers? In other words, should it be a version of a gasoline tax, or a tariff?

The argument for a broader tax, which would apply even to domestic production, is that oil is fungible. Using it exposes the U.S. to supply shocks, and the prospect of these shocks motivates the U.S. to defend insecure suppliers (even ones that do not sell oil in the U.S.). By taxing all oil, policymakers would reduce demand for oil overall, thereby mitigating these risks.

In contrast, the case for the narrower tax, which would apply only to imports from insecure suppliers (such as those in the Middle East), is that the U.S. incurs extra defense costs only to protect these suppliers, not suppliers in the U.S., Canada, and other secure countries. Favoring the latter (with either an exemption or a lower rate) would encourage more production in North America and other secure locations.

Notably, the U.S. could probably differentiate among these suppliers without violating its trade commitments. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), countries have significant latitude to protect national security.351See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (Security Exceptions).

Even so, distinguishing among suppliers poses a number of administrability challenges. For example, how feasible would it be to trace the origin of crude oil?352See Georg Zachmann, Ben McWilliams & David Kleimann, How a European Union Tariff on Russian Oil Can Be Designed, Bruegel (Apr. 29, 2022), https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/how-european-union-tariff-russian-oil-can-be-designed [https://perma.cc/6B7Z-7S6B] (“Anti-circumvention measures must play a prominent role,” including the policing of ship-to-ship transfers, which “have been used by countries including Iran and Venezuela to evade sanctions.”). What if crude from different sources is blended together?353See id. (“Shell mixed 49% Russian diesel with 51% diesel of other origin, conferring non-Russian originating status onto Russian produce in order to disguise purchases of Russian oil.”).

If these administrability issues can be addressed, the right approach may be to impose two taxes: one on all oil used in the U.S., regardless of where it is produced, and another on imports from insecure suppliers (so these imports are subject to both taxes). Yet a definitive analysis of this issue is beyond this Article’s scope.354A number of other implementation issues would arise as well. For instance, at what point in the production process would the tax be imposed? What penalties and enforcement mechanisms would be appropriate? Would the tax still apply to crude that is imported, refined in the U.S., and then exported?

5.  Funding Externalities: A Tariff on Russian Oil

A tax can be used to internalize the cost not only of defending insecure exporters (such as Kuwait), but also of funding threatening exporters (such as Russia). This sort of tax is supposed to reduce the revenue of rogue exporters, but this does not always happen. In some cases, the tax ends up hurting consumers, instead of the hostile exporter.355See Ricardo Hausmann, The Case for a Punitive Tax on Russian Oil, Project Syndicate (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/case-for-punitive-tax-on-russian-oil-by-ricardo-hausmann-2022-02 [https://perma.cc/6GWY-DJZ5] (“The more elastic the demand, the more the producer bears the cost of the tax because consumers have more options. The more inelastic the supply, the more the producer—again—bears the tax, because it has fewer options.”); Zachmann et al., supra note 352 (“This success of [a tariff on Russian oil] would rely on the assumption that the EU can more easily find alternative oil suppliers than Russia can find alternative buyers.”); John Sturm, Kai Menzel & Jan Schmitz, The Simple Economics of Optimal Sanctions: The Case of EU-Russia Energy Trade 11 (2022) (“EU-optimal tariff is . . . larger when Russia has a smaller supply elasticity.”).

The key question is, “who has more bargaining power?” To illustrate the difference, let us use a stylized example in which the global price of oil is $75 per barrel and the U.S. and E.U. impose a $25 per barrel tariff on Russian oil.

Let us start with the optimistic scenario. Assume that consumers have a lot of bargaining power (because, for example, they can either use less oil or buy it from other producers), while Russia cannot afford to cut production. In this case, Russia absorbs the tariff: the global price stays at $75, forcing Russia to cut its price to $50 to remain competitive. In this situation, the tariff does its job. It reduces Russia’s revenue—shifting Russia’s producer surplus to the taxing jurisdictions—so Russia has less money for the war in Ukraine.356Sturm et al., supra note 355, at 7 (“This reduction in price makes Russian producers worse off, as shown by their smaller ‘producer surplus’ region . . . . Meanwhile, the EU collects the full change in Russian producer surplus as tariff revenue.”).

Unfortunately, this successful outcome is not inevitable. Instead, another possibility is that the tariff ends up hurting U.S. and E.U. consumers, without reducing Russia’s export revenue very much. This happens if Russia is the one with the bargaining power (for example, because it can afford to stop selling or can sell to other buyers, but consumers cannot cut their consumption or rely on other suppliers). In this case, consumers bear the economic burden of the tax.357Id. at 9 (“We conclude that—in the extreme case of inelastic EU demand—a tariff on imports from Russia is totally ineffective at damaging the Russian economy . . . .”). Russia raises its price to $100 (so it still gets $75 pre-tax per barrel), and the global price rises to $100. In this situation, the tariff does not reduce Russia’s revenue, at least by much. The modest advantage of this policy is that higher prices should reduce demand a bit in the short term—and, presumably, more over time as consumers find ways to adjust—so Russia sells fewer barrels.358Id. at 9–10 (observing that a tariff that increases prices reduces consumer demand, causing Russia to sell fewer barrels).

What does the evidence suggest about Russia? Instead of a tariff, the U.S. immediately stopped buying Russian oil, while the E.U. phased down its purchases more gradually. In response, Russia redirected its exports to China, India, and other countries that have not joined these boycotts. But as noted above, Russia has had to sell at a discount of approximately 25%. This lack of bargaining power suggests that if the U.S. and E.U. decided to impose a 25% tariff, instead of a boycott, Russia would be willing to keep selling at a 25% discount (as they already do in selling to China and India).359Indeed, they might be willing to sell at an even steeper discount, if only because their production costs are so low. “[T]he numbers are staggering,” Hausmann has observed. “[E]ven if the oil price fell to $6 per barrel (it’s above $100 now), it would still be in [the Russian state oil company’s] interest to keep pumping: Supply is truly inelastic in the short run.” Hausmann, supra note 355 (noting that Rosneft’s marginal cost is estimated to be $5.67 per barrel); see also Hannes Lenk, The Costs of War: How Tariffs Could Help Europe Give Up Russian Oil and Gas, Swedish Inst. for Eur. Pol’y Studs. 1 (2022), https://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2022/the-costs-of-war-how-tariffs-could-help-europe-give-up-russian-oil-and-gas [https://perma.cc/9AKS-BXEA] (“Russian suppliers would struggle to offload the huge volume destined for the EU elsewhere, and would be forced to sell at a discount.”).

So, what is the difference? Either way, Russia loses this 25%. The question is who gets it. With the tariff, it would go to the taxing countries (for example, the U.S. and members of the E.U.). With the embargo, it goes to buyers in China, India, and other countries that keep buying discounted Russian crude.

In December of 2022, the U.S. and its allies imposed another sanction: a cap on the price of Russian oil. Instead of a total ban on insuring and transporting Russian oil—a policy that was about to go into effect, and might have triggered a supply shock—the U.S. and its allies made an exception for Russian oil, as long as it was selling below $60 per barrel.360Chris Cook & David Sheppard, Russian Crude Being Shipped to India Under G7 Price Cap, Fin. Times (Dec. 27, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/41237fe7-210d-406c-a22a-2e17a79f7381 [https://perma.cc/8H8Z-CXH8] (“The G7 price cap was designed to keep Russian oil flowing to avert supply shortages, but at a price of $60 a barrel or lower in order to squeeze the Kremlin’s revenues.”). Notably, Russian crude was already trading below this level because of the discount, as discussed above.361Id. (“Putin has acknowledged that most Russian oil was already trading at or below $60 a barrel, saying ‘the ceiling they have suggested is in line with the prices we are selling at today.’ ”). This price cap presumably gave India and China even more leverage to demand discounts, while also avoiding a supply shock by allowing Russia to keep selling crude. But eventually, Russia found ways to avoid this cap, for instance, by cobbling together its own fleet to ship oil (and overcharging on shipping as a way to make up for the discount).362Id. (noting that India has continued buying Russian crude under the price cap); see also Shidler, supra note 119 (discussing how Russia has evaded the cap).

Although Russia was forced to accept discounts in selling oil, it has more bargaining power in selling natural gas. Because it is much harder to reroute, as noted above, Europe cannot easily replace Russian natural gas, at least in the short term. This means a tariff on Russian natural gas is likely to hurt E.U. consumers, not Russia, at least in the near term.363Lenk, supra note 359, at 1 (“The price elasticity of oil is not the same as that of gas . . . . The market for gas . . . is localized and Russia holds a quasi-monopoly . . . . [So] in the short term only a fraction of Russian natural gas could be replaced with supplies from other countries or with LNG.”). Indeed, even without a tariff, Russia has dramatically cut its gas shipments to Europe, as noted above, causing prices to spike and pressuring Europe to ration natural gas.364See supra Section II.A.2.

6.  Political Constraints

While Pigouvian taxes have obvious advantages, which have prompted most of our allies to adopt carbon taxes,365See Olivia Lai, What Countries Have a Carbon Tax?, Earth.org (Sept. 10, 2021), https://earth.org/what-countries-have-a-carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/KN7K-XDDA] (noting that twenty-seven countries have a carbon tax, including Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the U.K., and the European Union). the political track record in the U.S. is discouraging. Indeed, few U.S. politicians have been willing even to propose carbon taxes.366A modest exception is a tax on methane emissions in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. This narrow measure taxes emissions of some large natural gas and petroleum wells, LNG facilities, and pipelines. Jonathan L. Ramseur, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47206, Inflation Reduction Act Methane Emissions Charge: In Brief 3–9 (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47206 [https://perma.cc/6YZ7-R686]. Instead, the Obama and Biden Administrations usually favored subsidies for green technology—a choice I have criticized elsewhere.367See Schizer, Energy Subsidies, supra note 6, at 278–81.

Since a carbon tax still seems to be a political dead letter, a national security tax presumably also is a hard sell, at least in ordinary circumstances. Yet perhaps the idea could gain traction in a time of crisis.

For example, what if President George W. Bush had proposed a tax on petroleum (or on petroleum imports) in response to the terror attacks on September 11? Like Nixon going to China, a former oil executive like President Bush had added credibility in making this case. To rally support, he could have argued that the tax would weaken regimes that fund terrorism. Given the groundswell of support for a vigorous response to 9/11, one wonders whether a promising opportunity was missed.

A more recent crisis—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—could also have justified a different national security tax: a tariff on Russian oil, like the one discussed above. The President already had statutory authority to impose this tariff.368According to a Congressional Research Service Report, the authority President Biden used to ban imports, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), could also have been used to impose tariffs. Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Nina M. Hart, Brandon J. Murrill & Liana Wong, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12071, Russia’s Trade Status, Tariffs, and WTO Issues (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12071%5Bhttps://perma.cc/2AYD-F49Q%5D (“President Biden cited IEEPA when banning the import of certain products of Russian origin . . . . Thus, even if Congress does not impose a blanket revocation of Russia’s MFN treatment, the President could rely upon IEEPA . . . to impose tariffs on Russian imports.”). But instead, the Biden Administration initially opted to ban imports. A few weeks later, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen floated the idea of a tariff with U.S. allies,369See Andrew Duehren & Laurence Norman, U.S. Floats Tariff on Russian Oil as EU Oil-Sanction Talks Drag On, Wall St. J. (May 17, 2022, 1:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-floats-tariff-on-russian-oil-as-eu-oil-sanction-talks-drag-on-11652803552 [https://perma.cc/V3DU-SJPS]. but the focus quickly shifted to the price cap, discussed above.370See supra Section VI.A.4; see also David Wessel, The Story Behind the Proposed Price Cap on Russian Oil, Brookings (July 5, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/07/05/the-story-behind-the-proposed-price-cap-on-russian-oil [https://perma.cc/9EZ4-8642] (“One textbook solution to keeping oil flowing from Russia but reducing its revenues would be for major importers to impose a tariff on Russian oil . . . . Secretary Yellen floated that idea, but it didn’t go anywhere.”). Maybe the concern was that a tariff might raise prices—and thus hurt U.S. and E.U. consumers, instead of Russia—but as noted above, this seems unlikely for oil.371See supra Section VI.A.4.

In any event, the glaring absence of these proposals—even in times of crisis—is not an encouraging sign. Since the political prospects for Pigouvian taxes in the U.S. seem to be dim, at least for now, let us turn to potential alternatives.

B.  Moratorium on New Exploration and Infrastructure: A Flawed Strategy

In principle, one option is a moratorium on new fossil fuel development and infrastructure. We may be stuck using existing wells and pipelines for many years, the logic goes, but let’s at least stop adding more.

This idea has gained significant traction. The International Energy Agency supports it.372See Net Zero by 2050, supra note 9, at 21. The Biden Administration showed some sympathy for this approach early on, and returned to it in pausing LNG export permits, as noted above.373See supra Section V.C.3. Seattle and Vancouver have banned new fossil fuel infrastructure and development,374Washington County Passes Moratorium on New Fossil Fuel Infrastructure, Yale Env’t 360 (Jan. 29, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/washington-county-passes-moratorium-on-new-fossil-fuel-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/2AB6-M8XT]; In Our View: Fossil-Fuel Moratorium a Key Step for Climate, Columbian (Dec. 9, 2021, 6:03 AM), https://www.columbian.com/news/2021/dec/09/in-our-view-fossil-fuel-moratorium-a-key-step-for-climate [https://perma.cc/45NR-4MRT]. while other state and local governments have taken more limited steps.375See The Latest Local Wins in Phasing Out Fossil Fuels, Stand.earth (July 18, 2021), https://www.stand.earth/blog/people-vs-big-oil/stop-oil-trains-now/latest-local-wins-phasing-out-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/6NND-Q3G5]. A number of advocacy groups have also urged a moratorium. Calling for a “nonproliferation treaty” for fossil fuels, Fossil Fuel Treaty.org claims endorsements from 101 Nobel Laureates, 2900 scientists, hospitals representing over 100,000 doctors, 230 legislators from 60 countries, Hawaii’s state legislature, London’s City Council, the Foreign Minister of Tuvalu, and the Vatican.376Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, https://fossilfueltreaty.org [https://
perma.cc/6CTP-UQAV] (last visited Feb. 9, 2023).
“Keep it in the ground” has drawn support from a number of prominent celebrities.377#keepitintheground, http://keepitintheground.org [https://perma.cc/7MTG-497M] (last visited Feb. 9, 2023) (“400 Organizations Call on World Leaders: End New Fossil Fuel Development.”). The same drumbeat has been sounded also by Oil Watch,378Oilwatch, https://www.oilwatch.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/CN3W-WUJN] (last visited Feb. 9, 2023). Clean Water Action,379Take Action: Fossil Fuel Moratorium, Clean Water Action, https://www.
cleanwateraction.org/empowernj-petition [https://perma.cc/WRT7-PDDC] (last visited Feb. 9, 2023).
and “LINGO,” which is short for “Leave it in the ground.” “What is clear today is that looking for more fossil fuels needs to stop,” LINGO urged.380Global Fossil Fuel Exploration Moratorium, LINGO, https://www.leave-it-in-the-ground.org/resources/exploration-moratorium [https://perma.cc/WW9U-ZH9N] (last visited Feb. 9, 2023). “Allowing it to continue is like allowing a child to buy more sweets, when we already know its teeth are rotten and it has diabetes.”381Id.

Nevertheless, a moratorium on new development and infrastructure is a bad idea. The risks to national security are obvious. The world would have to depend solely on existing production and, as emphasized above, too many wells are in countries that either have to be defended or are themselves threats.382See supra Section III.D (discussing authoritarian comparative advantage in extractive industries). The decades-long useful life of these wells, moreover, is much longer than the typical two-year life of a well in U.S. shale. If new U.S. wells could not be drilled, shale production would fall dramatically, and the global economy would become even more dependent on the wrong producers.

Instead, the better course for national security, as emphasized above, is to rely increasingly on new production in the U.S. and other secure and friendly countries, while cutting back purchases from rogue exporters (for example, Russia and Iran) and insecure sources (for example, in the Middle East). This would not be possible with a moratorium.

Ironically, a moratorium also would harm the environment, locking us into a status quo that wastes energy and uses the wrong fossil fuels. As emphasized above, we need new pipelines to help end flaring.383See supra Section V.A.1. Likewise, we should keep replacing coal with natural gas, an effort that requires more natural gas wells and infrastructure, including more LNG export terminals.384See supra Section V.A.4. In short, changing the mix of the fossil fuels we use would help the environment, but a moratorium would stand in the way.

C.  A Better Approach: Incremental Substitutions Based on the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Energy

Instead of a moratorium, a better strategy is to rely on incremental change. To vet these reforms, this part offers a heuristic called “the marginal efficiency cost of energy.” In essence, the idea is to consider all the social costs of energy—environmental and national security costs, along with private costs—and to hunt for ways to replace costlier sources with more efficient ones.

To be clear, the goal here is not to grant new power to regulators, but to help them make wiser use of the power they already have. They should use this framework in all the choices they are called upon to make, including decisions about permits, regulations, rates, leases, moratoriums, and subsidies. Whenever regulators make these judgments, they should compare alternative sources of energy, account for all their social costs, and favor the most (socially) efficient ones.

1.  Parallel Problems: Tax and Energy

In offering this approach, this Article applies an idea from public finance, developed by Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, called “the marginal efficiency cost of funds.”385Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF Staff Papers 172 (1996). Notably, the problem they addressed—how to determine which marginal changes in the tax system improve efficiency386Id. at 183 (“[W]e offer a tractable methodology that can evaluate marginal changes in tax systems and take account of all five components of the cost of tax systems. The methodology is based on the concept of the marginal cost of public funds.”).—resembles the challenge here in four important ways.

First, in each case, the goal is to figure out how to provide an additional unit of output at the lowest possible cost. In one case, the output is tax revenue, while in the other it is energy.

Second, in each case, there are several options for producing this additional output. Another dollar of tax can be collected with an income tax, wealth tax, value added tax, estate tax, carbon tax, or some other tax. For each type of tax, a range of adjustments can be considered, including in rates, audits, penalties, and particular rules. Like tax revenue, additional energy also can be generated in many ways. The next kilowatt hour can come from Russian natural gas, German coal, U.S. oil, solar panels from China, wind turbines from the U.S, or a host of other sources.

How do we know which option is most efficient? This brings us to the third parallel between tax and energy: each option has its own unique mix of costs, which often involve tradeoffs. In tax, there are administrative costs (such as when staffers write rules and auditors check returns), compliance costs (when accountants prepare returns), substitution effects (when taxpayers respond by working fewer hours or saving less), evasion costs (when taxpayers cheat), and avoidance costs (when taxpayers pursue legal tax minimization strategies). Likewise, in energy, there are different types of environmental and national security externalities, as well as private costs.

Fourth, making a change can increase some costs, while reducing others. For example, if Congress starts requiring foreign banks to share information about U.S. depositors, this change in the tax system increases compliance costs (as banks prepare these reports) and administrative costs (as the IRS reviews them), but (hopefully) reduces evasion costs (as taxpayers stop hiding money in offshore banks). Likewise, switching from German coal to Russian natural gas reduces environmental harms, while increasing national security risks.

2.  The Answer in Tax Policy: Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds

When there are a host of options, and each offers a unique mix of different costs, what should policymakers do? For one thing, they need to account for all the relevant costs. “[I]f an essential part of the problem is overlooked,” Slemrod and Yitzhaki observed, “partial models may give incorrect answers.”387Id. at 175.

Policymakers then should strive to reduce the sum of these various costs, so they can collect a specified amount of revenue as efficiently as possible. The key is to figure out which features of the tax system are more costly, and to replace them with more efficient alternatives. “In reality, the MECF [marginal efficiency cost of funds] of different instruments can differ,” Slemrod and Yitzhaki showed, “and it is feasible to raise revenue utilizing only those policy instruments with a relatively low MECF.”388Id. at 188–89.

For example, what if the same amount of revenue can be raised either by eliminating a deduction or by raising the tax rate? Policymakers should pick the one with the lowest total social costs, including administrative costs, compliance costs, and tax-motivated changes in taxpayer behavior. “One can calculate the MECF for alternative ways of raising revenue,” Slemrod and Yitzhaki explained, “and other things being equal, the one with the lowest MECF is the one that should be recommended.”389Id. at 194.

3.  The Answer in Energy Policy: Marginal Efficiency Cost of Energy

The same approach should be used in energy policy. Like another dollar of revenue, another kilowatt hour can be generated in various ways. What is the social cost of each alternative?

Like in tax policy, it is essential to account for all the costs. Again, the established practice among some commentators and government agencies to omit national security costs is simply wrong.390See supra Sections I.D. & II.C. Hopefully, the invasion of Ukraine in 2022—and the ensuing scramble to replace Russian oil and gas on short notice—has discredited this misguided approach.

Instead, policymakers should consider the five different types of costs emphasized in this Article: first, private costs (X); second, climate externalities (C); third, pollution externalities (P); fourth, defense externalities (D); and, fifth, funding externalities (F). (In accounting for all these costs, this heuristic seeks to replicate the effect of a menu of Pigouvian taxes, which was recommended above.)391See supra Section VI.A.2.

The cost of producing another kilowatt hour from a specific source—that is, this source’s “marginal efficiency cost of energy” (“MECE”)—must include all of these costs. For example, assume that two sources of energy are available, A and B. To decide which to favor, policymakers should calculate the MECF of each one:

MECEA = [XA + CA + PA + DA + FA] / kWh

MECEB = [XB + CB + PB + DB + FB] / kWh

After comparing these two options, policymakers should favor the one with the lowest total social cost. So, if MECEA > MECEB, policymakers should favor B.

For example, if A is U.S. coal and B is U.S. natural gas, policymakers should replace coal with gas. More generally, within the set of sources with comparable national security impacts (such as energy produced in the U.S.), policymakers should favor ones with environmental advantages (for example, natural gas instead of coal). This is analogous to a Pareto improvement: one goal is advanced, without setting the other back.392Strictly speaking, the step is not Pareto optimal, at least from a global welfare perspective, since helping U.S. national security can hurt the leaders and citizens of geopolitical rivals. For example, reducing Putin’s export revenue is good for the U.S. and its allies—and certainly for Ukraine—but not necessarily for Russians, and certainly not for Putin himself. But as noted above, the goal of this Article is not to maximize global welfare, but to enhance security of the U.S. and its allies, while also protecting the environment. See supra Section I.A.1.

The same analysis holds if A is Russian natural gas and B is U.S. natural gas. Within a set of energy sources with comparable environmental impacts (for example, natural gas), policymakers should favor ones with national security advantages (gas produced in the U.S., instead of in Russia). Again, policymakers can advance one goal, without losing ground on the other.

Policymakers also can trade off environmental and national security benefits. Since the goal is to minimize the sum of the relevant costs, it usually makes sense to accept a modest increase in some costs in exchange for major reductions in others.393This sort of step can satisfy Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, but not Pareto efficiency (even by analogy).

D.  Regulatory Expertise and Stability

To make these judgments effectively, policymakers need the right information, expertise, and incentives—but this is a tall order. Just understanding the relevant technology and markets is hard enough. Yet energy policy is even harder because of its implications for the environment and national security. Therefore, a truly interdisciplinary effort is needed. Wise decisions require a keen understanding not only of the relevant science, markets, and law, but also of defense strategy and foreign policy.

While the U.S. government as a whole has expertise on this diverse range of issues, these experts are not all in the same agency. On the one hand, EPA (and their counterparts at the state level) understand environmental challenges and the laws governing them. On the other hand, the Pentagon, State Department, and various intelligence agencies know the nuances of defense and foreign policy. Meanwhile, other institutions master the details of trade and industrial policy (for example, Treasury, Commerce, and Department of Energy (“DOE”)), oil and gas drilling (state and local agencies), approval of oil and gas exports (DOE and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)), fuel economy standards and vehicle emissions (the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, EPA, state regulators), the regulation of nuclear power (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), disposal of nuclear materials (DOE), the regulation of electricity (FERC and state public utility commissions), and the regulation of pipelines (FERC, Department of Transportation, and state agencies).

There is room to wonder whether this fragmented structure serves us well enough. Are these various regulators accounting for all the relevant costs? Are they valuing them the same way? For example, when regulators develop U.S. fuel economy standards, they should account not just for pollution and emissions, but also for the national security costs of defending access to petroleum. Yet unfortunately—and, indeed, somewhat unfathomably—they have omitted this important national security cost, as noted above.394See supra note 78 and accompanying text. National security costs are not easy to value, to be sure. But like with the social cost of carbon, the best available estimate should be developed and periodically updated. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (or some other body of experts) should ensure that the same estimate is used throughout the government.

The problem with our fragmented system of energy regulation is not only one of information and expertise, but also of decision-making authority. There are different ways to pursue our various policy goals, but no single agency has broad enough jurisdiction to compare them all and pick the best one. For example, as this Article has emphasized, one way to counter Russian influence is with diplomacy, covert capabilities, and military force. Another is to “starve the beast” by weaning Europe off Russian energy, whether with the right fossil fuel infrastructure (for example, to deliver U.S. natural gas) or with the wider use of alternative energy and energy efficient technology. Yet these various alternatives each fall under the jurisdiction of a different cluster of government institutions. If some are more promising than others, does anyone actually have the authority—and, for that matter, the incentives—to compare all the relevant options and pick the best ones?

As if this were not hard enough, still another challenge is worth emphasizing. Energy policy goals cannot be achieved overnight. They require sustained effort and investment over the course of years, or even decades. This means that a measure of stability is needed in U.S. policy.

But unfortunately, there have been wild gyrations from one administration to the next. For example, nurturing renewable energy was a high priority under President Obama, a lower priority under President Trump, and a high priority again under President Biden. Likewise, tapping domestic oil and gas was a high priority under President Trump, but not under President Biden, at least initially, as noted above.395See supra Section V.C.4. Unfortunately, mixed signals and constant changes in priorities come at a cost; without certainty, the private sector is less likely to invest, experiment, and innovate.

To sum up, two things should be clear. First, whoever is responsible for energy policy needs to have a broad enough mandate to consider all the relevant issues. Second, there should be a measure of policy stability from one administration to the next, so long-term goals can be pursued effectively.

The good news is that there is an institution that checks both of these boxes and, of course, is charged with these responsibilities under the constitution: the U.S. Congress. Although individual committees have specialized mandates, Congress as a whole has more general jurisdiction, so members are supposed to see “the big picture.” Their decisions also have unique legitimacy, since they answer directly to the people.

Admittedly, there is a familiar challenge in relying on Congress: political deadlock often prevents it from acting. But in a way, this weakness is also a strength: once legislation is enacted, it is quite hard to repeal, so a measure of stability is assured even as the White House changes hands. As a result, congressional action on these issues is especially valuable.

To administer the relevant statutes, Congress should consider consolidating more responsibilities under a single energy regulator with broad jurisdiction. On the one hand, if the priority is political accountability, the model could be a cabinet-level department like Homeland Security. On the other hand, if the priority is independence and policy stability, the model could be an independent agency like the Federal Reserve. For instance, just as the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate to target both inflation and unemployment, this energy regulator could have a triple mandate to (1) assure that the supply of energy is cheap and reliable; (2) strengthen national security; and (3) protect the environment.

In any event, an analysis of the right institutional division of labor is beyond this Article’s scope. The goal here is to flag these issues, not to resolve them. After all, designing the right structure for crafting energy policy—one that accesses all the relevant information, creates the right incentives, and accords with constitutional norms—is a complex task. It warrants hundreds of pages of analysis, not just a few paragraphs.

E.  Political Economy: A “Red, White, and Blue—and Green” Coalition

The same is true of the political dynamics driving energy policy—another issue that is beyond this Article’s scope, but still is critically important. After all, in reflecting on the recommendations here, one might easily say, “This is all fine in theory, but could any of this ever actually happen in our polarized political environment?”

While Congress did pass climate legislation in 2022, it used reconciliation instead of its regular process so the Vice President could cast the deciding vote in the Senate. Doesn’t this suggest that the prospects for more robust legislation are dim?

Not necessarily. For one thing, the legislation made it past the finish line because Joe Manchin, the deciding vote in the Senate at the time, insisted that the bill should include support for both clean energy and fossil fuels. This is not to say that the relevant provisions were the right ones. Rather, the point is that there could be a coalition—even a bipartisan one—for efforts to promote clean energy, while also encouraging environmentally responsible fossil fuel development, as this Article has urged.

How does this sort of effort, which pursues multiple goals at once, help to attract political support? A cynic would observe that it appeals to more interest groups, and thus may draw a measure of support from both environmental groups and fossil fuel producers.

But there is another political advantage as well: national security has broad political appeal, especially in times of crisis. Invoking this goal allows legislation to resonate not only with voters who are passionate about the environment, but also with voters who want to thwart terrorism, block the global ambitions of America’s adversaries, and support our troops. As emphasized above, these are not necessarily the same voters. As a result, energy policy that is grounded in both the environment and national security is likely to attract a broader coalition.

CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that energy policy must consider risks not only to the environment, but also to national security. It is important to account for the costs of securing access to energy (defense externalities) and of funding exporters that engage in harmful conduct (funding externalities), even though a number of commentators have argued over the years that these costs should not be considered.

This Article has offered guidance about how energy policy can protect both national security and the environment. The key goal for national security is to depend less on insecure or hostile suppliers. To do so, while also reducing emissions and pollution, policymakers need to pursue a two-part agenda: they should reduce the demand for fossil fuels, while also tapping new sources of supply in environmentally responsible ways. Pigouvian taxes would be an effective way to implement this agenda. Alternatively, policymakers could use the heuristic proposed in this Article, the marginal efficiency cost of energy, to replace high (social) cost energy sources with more efficient alternatives.

Generating the requisite political support will require compromise, as well as an alliance between supporters of the environment, on one hand, and national security, on the other. Ultimately, the policy goals, as well as the political coalition supporting them, need to be red, white, and blue—and also green.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1157

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Dean Emeritus & Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Columbia Law School. Helpful comments were received from Jason Bordoff, Mike Gerrard, Miryl Hilibrand, Erica Hur, Tom Merrill, Kira Patterson, Alex Raskolnikov, Joel Slemrod, Matt Waxman, Dan Yergin, and participants at the annual conference of the American Law and Economics Association, the N.Y. State Bar Association Tax Section’s Annual Meeting, as well as at workshops at Columbia Law School, Hebrew University, IAC-Edge, the Institute for Law and Strategy, the University of British Columbia, the World Law Congress, the Center on Capitalism and Society at Columbia University, and the Louis D. Brandeis Law Society.

Climate, Controversy, and Courts

The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in West Virginia v. EPA, along with other recent cases in which federal courts have grappled with the ongoing climate crisis, offers an opportunity to assess the role of the judiciary in helping the United States adopt effective responses to monumental threats such as the climate crisis. Courts reviewing legislative and executive actions must find ways to enforce constitutional limits without preventing the political branches from implementing effective policy responses to potentially catastrophic problems. Three relatively recent climate cases—West Virginia v. EPA, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, and Juliana v. United States—illustrate the need for courts to balance their competing obligations. In West Virginia and in Juliana, courts lost their balance, disregarding practical consequences in West Virginia and neglecting institutional limits in Juliana. Utility Air Regulatory Group, despite other shortcomings, emerges as the best example of a court striking the proper balance between its dual responsibilities. The fact that Justice Scalia, an ideologically conservative Justice, could write an opinion that constrained EPA’s regulatory authority without impairing the effectiveness of the agency’s policy supplies some basis for optimism that courts can play a constructive role in supporting the development of practical solutions to pressing problems. West Virginia, by contrast, provides a discouraging cautionary example of a court thoroughly out of balance.

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Justice Breyer’s Friendly Legacy for Environmental Law

Environmentalists did not cheer President Bill Clinton’s decision in May 1994 to nominate then-First Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer to fill Justice Harry Blackmun’s seat on the Supreme Court. Just the opposite. Many instead expressed serious concerns about Breyer’s impact on environmental law were he to be confirmed, and openly questioned whether a Justice Breyer might be “hazardous to our health.” This Article considers whether, in light of Justice Breyer’s actual record over the past twenty-seven years on the Court, environmentalist concerns about him at the time of his nomination were realized. The Article concludes they were not. Justice Breyer was instead friendly to environmental protection concerns even if he fell shy of being an unqualified friend on the bench. In almost all of the most important environmental cases of the past twenty-seven years, he was a reliable vote joining the majority in the big cases environmentalists won—often providing the critical fifth vote. And although Justice Breyer on a handful of occasions was less a reliable vote in dissent with liberal justices sounding the alarm in the big cases environmentalists lost, in none of those cases was his vote dispositive of the outcome. For this reason, although environmentalist concerns at the time of Justice Breyer’s nomination were reasonable, and had the potential to cause the very problems environmentalists identified, they proved largely insignificant in actual application. Finally, Justice Breyer’s actual record on the Court suggests the wisdom of rethinking what it means to be a “dream” justice for environmental law. Most simply put, the best Justice for environmental law may not be a Justice who always votes in favor of the outcome favored by environmentalists in individual cases.

INTRODUCTION

Environmentalists did not cheer President Bill Clinton’s decision in May 1994 to nominate then-First Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer to fill Justice Harry Blackmun’s seat on the Supreme Court. Just the opposite. While Justice Breyer had his defenders, environmentalists mostly expressed serious concerns about Justice Breyer’s impact on environmental law were he to be confirmed. And some denounced him on that ground, worrying that he might be “hazardous to our health”1Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 491 (1994) (statement of Ralph Nader) (citing the attachment Thomas O. McGarity, Could Justice Breyer Be Hazardous to Our Health?) [hereinafter Breyer Confirmation Hearings].—a concern strikingly similar to that which had been expressed a year earlier by attorneys advising President Clinton when the President had first considered Justice Breyer for a vacancy on the Court.2See infra notes 14–25 and accompanying text. Yet, ironically, although those concerns had abruptly derailed Justice Breyer’s nomination only hours before its expected announcement in 1993, they became a major reason why the President chose Justice Breyer over the President’s first choice for the nomination in 1994. Senate Republican leaders threatened to wage an all-out campaign against the President’s first choice, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, because of his reputation as an unabashed environmentalist.3See infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. And that same Republican leadership promised smooth sailing if Justice Breyer were instead the nominee because Justice Breyer had expressed concern about unduly costly environmental protection requirements and therefore was perceived, unlike Babbitt, as pro-business.4See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.

Justice Breyer’s recent retirement from the Court after twenty-eight years5Letter from Justice Stephen Breyer to the President (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.supremecourt.
gov/publicinfo/press/Letter_to_President_January-27-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7CF-Q7EL].
provides an opportune moment to reflect on his legacy for environmental law based on his actual record—as reflected in the votes he has cast and the opinions he has written. More specifically, this Article considers whether Justice Breyer’s record on the Court confirms or contradicts the expectations of his supporters and detractors more than a quarter century ago.

To that end, the Article is divided into three Parts. Part I reviews the events surrounding Justice Breyer’s nomination and the role that environmental law then played in securing both his nomination and confirmation. Part I includes discussion of previously undisclosed information long buried in the official archival papers of President Clinton related to the decision not to nominate Justice Breyer in 1993. Part II reviews Justice Breyer’s record in environmental cases before the Court, with special emphasis on opinions he wrote in those cases, whether majority, concurring, or dissenting.

Part III considers whether, in light of Justice Breyer’s actual record on the Court, environmentalist concerns—shared by some advising the White House—about Justice Breyer were realized. Although those concerns were understandable and pertained to the very problems that White House advisors and environmentalists identified in 1993 and 1994, they have proven largely insignificant in actual application. In the vast majority of environmental law cases heard by the Court during Justice Breyer’s tenure to date, Justice Breyer has both displayed heightened sensitivity to environmental protection concerns and voted in a manner sympathetic to environmentalists, without expressing any concern about environmental protection requirements being too demanding. And, in those relatively few cases in which his concern with unduly stringent environmental law was relevant to a legal issue’s resolution, Justice Breyer’s views made no difference to the outcome of the case, nor has he written an opinion of the Court in any of those cases, instead at most writing a separate concurring opinion of no legal effect. In only one relatively unimportant case that defied application of liberal or conservative ideology did he ever supply the decisive fifth vote against environmentalists,6See infra note 108. likely because the Court has been consistently dominated by at least five more conservative Justices ever since he joined the bench.

I.  WHITE HOUSE ADVISOR CONCERNS AND ENVIRONMENTALIST OPPOSITION TO JUSTICE BREYER’S NOMINATION

President Clinton’s decision to nominate then–First Circuit Judge Breyer to fill Justice Harry Blackmun’s seat in May 1994 was remarkable because only one year earlier, the President had decided at the last minute not to nominate Judge Breyer to fill Justice Byron White’s seat on the Court. In June 1993, Judge Breyer had been the expected nominee, bolstered by the strong support of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy.7Richard L. Berke, Judge in Boston Is Called Likely for High Court, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1993, at A1. But in what was dubbed by the New York Times as “A Surprise Choice,” Clinton instead tapped D.C. Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to fill the opening.8Richard L. Berke, A Surprise Choice—President Hails Judge as Force for Consensus and Rights Pioneer, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1993, at A1.

According to press accounts at that time, Judge Breyer’s nomination stumbled in the final day and hours because of reports that he had failed to pay Social Security taxes on the wages of a part-time housekeeper.9Richard L. Berke, Favorite for High Court Failed to Pay Maid’s Taxes, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1993, at 1. Judge Breyer’s problem was an especially sensitive one for the White House because the President had recently suffered repeated embarrassment when his two successive choices to serve as the first female Attorney General were abandoned because of problems with their domestic household employees: the first had reportedly failed to pay taxes for a childcare provider and the other had failed to inform the White House that she had once hired an illegal alien as a household employee (although, in her defense, that hiring was not itself unlawful when it occurred).10Id.; Richard L. Berke, Judge’s Friends Try to Save Candidacy for High Court, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1993, at A11. And, as much as the Clinton White House sought to distinguish Judge Breyer’s circumstances, the specter of excusing conduct from a man that resembled conduct that had only recently derailed two female cabinet picks apparently cratered Judge Breyer’s nomination.11Berke, supra note 9. Judge Breyer also reportedly interviewed poorly with the President not long before Ginsburg was announced—which Judge Breyer’s supporters blamed on painkillers he was taking while recovering from a serious bicycle accident for which he had recently been hospitalized.12Berke, supra note 10; Richard L. Berke, President Has First Meeting with High Court Candidate, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1993, at 10; Berke, supra note 8.

But what was not reported at the time is that White House concerns about Judge Breyer were also substantive in nature.13In 2014, the Clinton Presidential Library released several hundred pages of previously undisclosed documents regarding the nominations of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer
to the Supreme Court. See Robert Barnes, Clinton Library Release of Papers on Ginsburg, Breyer Nominations Offer Insight, Some Fun, Wash. Post (June 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/clinton-library-release-of-papers-on-ginsburg-breyer-nominations-offer-insight-some-fun/2014/
06/08/3aac9276-ed8d-11e3-9b2d-114aded544be_story.html [https://perma.cc/NXH6-G952].
In early June 1993, White House Counsel Bernie Nussbaum asked Joel Klein, a highly skilled and trusted D.C. private sector attorney, to conduct a confidential review of both Judges Ginsburg and Breyer to assist the President’s decision. Over the course of just a few days, Klein orchestrated detailed reviews of the record of both judges by forty lawyers at six law firms. And Klein provided Nussbaum a comparative analysis of the two judges in memos dated June 10 and June 1114Draft Memorandum from Joel Klein to Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President on Judge Breyer’s Opinions and Legal Scholarship (June 10, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/
items/show/14693 [https://perma.cc/95AQ-66Y7] [hereinafter Klein-Nussbaum Draft Breyer Memo]; Memorandum from Joel Klein to Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President on Judge Ginsburg’s Opinions and Legal Scholarship (June 11, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/
14693 [https://perma.cc/5LDG-VGHD] [hereinafter Klein-Nussbaum Ginsburg Memo].
—precisely the time period when President Clinton pivoted away from Judge Breyer in favor of Judge Ginsburg, whose Senate confirmation Klein then championed in his new role as Deputy White House Counsel.15Ronald J. Ostrow, Joel Klein, L.A. Times (Apr. 12, 1998), https://www.latimes.com/
archives/la-xpm-1998-apr-12-op-38666-story.html [https://perma.cc/9S4L-4AWP].

The reviews were devastating to Judge Breyer’s prospects. As summarized by Klein to Nussbaum, “Judge Ginsburg more closely meets the President’s articulated standards for the Supreme Court than does Judge Breyer.”16Klein-Nussbaum Ginsburg Memo, supra note 14, at 4. Her “work has more of the humanity that the President highly values and fewer of the negative aspects that will cause concern among some constituencies.”17Id. at 5. “She has written more, and consistently, about the human condition and the plight of the disadvantaged, and she has done so with obvious conviction and commitment.”18Id. at 1. In a draft memo to Nussbaum on Judge Breyer, while describing Judge Breyer as “a brilliant jurist” with “the potential to rank with the most distinguished judges in our past,”19Klein-Nussbaum Draft Breyer Memo, supra note 14, at 1. Klein also described the “dispassionate” nature of his writing and how “he does not wear his heart on his sleeve.”20Id. Klein added that Judge Breyer’s views on government regulation such as environmental risk regulation were “conservative” and in a recent book he authored on risk regulation, he had proposed “a government-wide cost/benefit approach” akin to what Republicans then favored and to those regulatory reforms supported by the prior presidential administration.21Id. at 6.

Those attorneys who reviewed Judge Breyer’s writings for Klein stressed Breyer’s apparent lack of sensitivity to the human stakes of economic regulation and environmental protection requirements. In one memo dated June 8, and sent to Klein on June 9, two reviewers described the “bloodlessness” evidenced by Judge Breyer’s penchant for “analyz[ing] every problem he is considering within a framework [so] bounded by economic theory or rules of logic that the result seems devoid of emotion and even . . . humanity.”22Memorandum from Jim Hamilton to Joel Klein 1, 3 (June 8, 1993), https://clinton.
presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14693 [https://perma.cc/QC5W-J84V] [hereinafter Hamilton-Klein Breyer Memo].
The reviewers harshly contrasted Breyer’s writings with those of Bruce Babbitt—the candidate favored by environmentalists who was then serving as Secretary of the Interior—which were described as “lucid, exuberant and wide-ranging.”23Id. at 3. A second memo, prepared on June 7, similarly described Judge Breyer as a “cold fish,” “bring[ing] no passion or insight” and as so “lack[ing] of vigor in his jurisprudence that one suspects he does not have (or refuses to utilize) any innate sense of justice.”24Memorandum from Tom Perrelli and Ian Gershengorn to Joel Klein, Judge
Breyer’s Civil Rights, Privacy and National Security Opinions, 1–2, 8 (June 7, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14693 [https://perma.cc/QC5W-J84V] [hereinafter Perrelli-Gershengorn-Klein Breyer Memo].
The memo concluded that Judge Breyer was “certainly a judicial conservative” and “[c]onservatives will be thrilled if Judge Breyer is appointed. . . . Nothing in Judge Breyer’s opinions suggests that he would be a great Supreme Court Justice.”25Id. at 9. “In no way is he a ‘man of the people,’ as some other candidates have been.”26Id. at 2. When this memo was released for the first time in June 2014, its two co-authors, Tom Perrelli and Ian Gershengorn, quickly and easily acknowledged they had been completely mistaken. They were second- and first-year law firm associates at the time, and Perrelli commented, “That shows why you shouldn’t have second-year associates evaluating Supreme Court nominees.” Gershengorn noted that Breyer has been “a terrific justice” and, quoting the baseball manager Earl Weaver, “It is what you learn after you know it all that counts.” Both Perrelli and Gershengorn served in high-ranking positions in the Justice Department during the Obama administration—Gershengorn as Solicitor General. Barnes, supra note 13.

These concerns had a clear impact. Then-Associate White House Counsel Ron Klain made an explicit reference to the concern in his June 11, 1993, memorandum to White House Counsel that listed the questions that the President could ask Judge Breyer in their interview.27Memorandum from Ron Klain to Berrnie Nussbaum on Areas of Discussion for the President (June 11, 1993), https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14734 [https://perma.cc/WHG9-UXDY]. One question asked Judge Breyer to respond to the claim that his “writings suggest an over-emphasis on economics: putting a cost on lives, for example.”28Id. at 1. Another question more pointedly asked him to “respond to the criticism that his opinions are ‘bloodless.’ ”29Id. President Clinton’s interview with Judge Breyer that same day did not go well,30Neil Lewis, As Political Terrain Shifts, Breyer Lands on His Feet, N.Y Times, May 15, 1994, at 1. and a few hours later, Klein called Judge Ginsburg to let her know she should be available for a meeting with President Clinton. She met with the President two days later, Sunday, June 13, and the President called her later that same night to offer her the job.31Ruth Bader Ginsburg, My Own Words 177–82 (2016).

What resurrected Judge Breyer’s prospects a year later and secured President Clinton’s nomination was the President’s desire to avoid a Senate confirmation battle. Clinton’s apparent first choice in 1994, as it had first been in 1993, was Bruce Babbitt.32Thomas L. Friedman, Latest Version of Supreme Court List: Babbitt in Lead, 2 Judges Close Behind, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1993, at A20. Liberals in the Democratic Party strongly endorsed Babbitt, as did environmentalists, in 1994 because of his progressive views and his championing of environmental protection causes both as Governor of Arizona and Interior Secretary.33Ron Fournier, Babbitt One of Three Court Favorites, Ariz. Daily Sun, May 11, 1994, at 2. Indeed, environmentalists had a year earlier been so enthusiastic about Babbitt that some had actually opposed his nomination to the Court to replace Justice White because they did not want to lose his leadership at Interior—in retrospect a decision they may well regret.34See Berke, supra note 8; Friedman, supra note 32; Thomas L. Friedman, The 11th-Hour Scramble—After Hoping for a “Home Run” in Choosing a Justice, Clinton May Be Just Home Free, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1993, at A1.

But it was that same environmentalist enthusiasm for Babbitt that ended up sinking his possible nomination to replace Justice Blackmun in 1994. When the White House let leak to the news media that the President had settled on Babbitt and would announce his nomination shortly,35Gwen Ifill, President Is Said to Pick Babbitt for Court Despite Senate Concern, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1994, at A1. Republican Senate leadership preemptively announced that they would vigorously oppose Babbitt—because of his reputation as an ardent environmentalist.36Id. Simultaneously, the Republican Senate minority leader, Senator Bob Dole, predicted “smooth sailing” were President Clinton to nominate Judge Breyer instead.37Gwen Ifill, Pragmatic Jurist—Bipartisan Support Seen as Clinton Sidesteps Risky Senate Fight, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1994, at 1. The President blinked, and Judge Breyer became the nominee. Judge Breyer also overcame Clinton’s earlier doubts, upon meeting him a summer before, that he lacked energy, by literally taking a run with the President along the Capital Mall to establish his physical stamina for the job.38Lewis, supra note 30. Judge Richard Arnold of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had also been an early favorite to receive the nomination in 1994, but his nomination faltered after President Clinton learned from the judge that he had recently been treated for a cancer diagnosis. The President’s interest in Judge Arnold had been so keen that he even contacted the judge’s own doctors to learn more about the judge’s prognosis, preferring to appoint a Justice who could serve on the Court for many years. Id.; Neil A. Lewis, Richard S. Arnold, 68, Judge Once Eyed for Supreme Court, Dies, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2004, at B9. Some environmental law professors at the time wrote a letter in support of Judge Arnold, rooted in the judge’s writings and National Environmental Policy Act litigation he performed in the early 1970s for the then-new public interest organization the Environmental Defense Fund. See William Funk, Justice Breyer and Environmental Law, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 735, 735 & n.2 (1995) (citing to a letter in support of Judge Arnold from thirty-three law professors to President Bill Clinton); Summary & Comments Article in This Issue: “Substantive Rights Under NEPA,” by Richard S. Arnold, 3 Env’t L. Rep. 10069, 10079 (1973) (describing Richard Arnold “[a]s an attorney who has brought several NEPA suits for the Environmental Defense Fund”). Arnold also published an article in the Environmental Law Reporter on the substantive right to environmental quality under the National Environmental Policy Act. See Richard S. Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 Env’t L. Rep. 50028 (1973). The White House’s concerns of a year earlier, regarding his lack of humanity and affinity for regulatory reform, apparently disappeared—these qualities had been transformed from a political liability into a political virtue.

Most liberal Democrats in Congress muted their displeasure with the Judge Breyer choice, presumably to avoid breaking publicly with their own President, following twelve years of Republican administrations. But some of the more progressive Democrats and hardcore environmentalists did not shy away from sharply criticizing the nominee, revealing their obvious frustration that the President had let pass a potentially historic opportunity to have an acclaimed environmentalist join the High Court.39Neil A. Lewis, In a Sea of Praise, Discouraging Words, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1994, at A10.

The focus of their criticism was a common theme evident in Judge Breyer’s scholarship, work experience, and judicial opinions in favor of reform of excessively burdensome regulations. These were the same concerns that advisors to the White House had stressed in 1993. As counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, on leave from Harvard Law School in the late 1970s, Breyer had worked effectively in a bipartisan fashion with both Democrats and Republicans in support of legislation that deregulated the airline industry. He favored such deregulation on the ground that regulation imposed unnecessary costs on industry and impeded the operation of free market forces that could on their own lead to better products and services for lower prices than burdensome government regulation might achieve.40Joan Biskupic, Breyer: Pragmatic Lawyer and Judge, Wash. Post (June 27, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/06/27/breyer-pragmatic-lawyer-and-judge/90ac
d981-f9b6-452b-8c57-ef013b2b5549 [https://perma.cc/8LQS-ADFD].

Indeed, Breyer had so impressed Senate Republicans with his support of regulatory reform that they endorsed President Carter’s nomination of Breyer to serve on the First Circuit even though that nomination occurred on November 13, 1980—a time when a nomination for a life-tenured position should have been dead on arrival in Congress. After all, the date of the nomination was only nine days after Carter had lost the Presidency to Ronald Reagan and the Democrats had lost the Senate to the Republicans. Confirming Breyer to the First Circuit during a congressional lame duck session would accordingly mean the elimination of an important federal appellate court vacancy that would otherwise have been available for a Republican President and Republican Senate to fill a couple months later. Yet, because of Senator Kennedy’s clout and significant Republican leadership support for Breyer, rooted in his work on regulatory reform as a Senate staffer, Breyer was confirmed as a federal appellate judge less than a month later in December 1980.41David Rogers, New England in Washington: The Politics Behind N.E. Judgeship, Bos. Globe, Nov. 30, 1980; Richard H. Stewart, Profile in the News: They Call Him a Natural for Federal Bench, Bos. Globe, Dec. 10, 1980; Martin Tolchin, Bill to Strengthen Fair Housing Act Killed as Senate Cloture Vote Fails, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at B8 (reporting on Judge Breyer’s confirmation to First Circuit following vote of eighty to ten to defeat an attempted filibuster).

As an appellate judge, moreover, Judge Breyer continued to be a proponent of regulatory reform, including for environmental protection rules. In both his judicial rulings and his extra-judicial writings, Judge Breyer expressed concern about the possible harm caused by irrational environmental regulations with compliance costs that far exceeded their benefits.

One of Judge Breyer’s most prominent opinions for the First Circuit was United States v. Ottati & Goss, in which the court upheld a trial court ruling that had rejected the proposed remedy by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to clean up a hazardous waste site on the ground that the public health benefits did not warrant the high cleanup costs.42United States v. Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d 429, 444–45 (1st Cir. 1990). The ruling was remarkable at the time because it was so unusual for a court not to defer to EPA’s judgment about the extent of cleanup needed to reduce risks from hazardous wastes. Although the force of Judge Breyer’s opinion for the First Circuit was a bit muted because the appellate court was simply affirming the trial court’s ruling against EPA—concluding that “[w]e cannot say that the district court was ‘clearly erroneous’ or unreasonable”43Id. at 442.—his opinion seemed to join the lower court in ridiculing EPA’s decision to base its cleanup remedy on the proposition that a child would eat contaminated soil over a sustained period of time.44Id. And, while declining to impose sanctions on EPA, Judge Breyer’s opinion gratuitously took the occasion to “wonder about the government’s priorities in the face of other, apparently more serious, environmental demands for ‘cleanup’ time and effort.”45Id. at 445.

Judge Breyer, moreover, did far more than just author the opinion. Outside of his judicial role, he trumpeted its policy themes regarding how environmental risks should be regulated. He used the Ottati & Goss case as the basis for his 1992 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School, which he then published as a book entitled Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation the following year.46Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993). In that book, Judge Breyer identified why and how government regulation of risks, including environmental risks, had a tendency to require excessive expenditures to reduce the “last ten percent” of risks,47Id. at 11. here too referring to the facts of the Ottati & Goss case as an illustrative example.48Id. at 11, 40. Judge Breyer more broadly proffered the question whether determining the acceptable level of environmental risk was best answered by a political process vulnerable to accommodating the public’s tendency to overreact to environmental risks. And, answering his own question, Judge Breyer concluded that such public policy questions were better answered by expert, technical agencies removed from the pressure of politics and popular opinion.49Id. at 59–81.

What simultaneously made Judge Breyer’s book so popular with the Republican Party and regulated business and so unpopular with Democratic Party progressives and environmentalists was its embrace of the rhetoric of regulatory reform. Regulatory reform had in fact been an express and significant part of the agenda of the administration of President Jimmy Carter and EPA when Judge Breyer first endorsed it in his work at the Senate in 1980.50U.S. EPA, OPA-114/8, 1978 Report: Better Health & Regulatory Reform (1979) [hereinafter EPA 1978 Report]. Regulatory reform then was a more benign political issue, and it enjoyed support on both sides of the political aisle. In March 1978, President Carter issued an executive order, developed in part by EPA leadership, that sought to “reform” the process for developing “significant regulations” in order to eliminate regulations that “impose unnecessary burdens on the economy.”51Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, §§ 1–2, (Mar. 24, 1978); see also EPA 1978 Report, supra note 50, at 10. Political appointees at EPA during the Carter administration favored opportunities to employ economic analysis to ensure that the Agency was directing its limited resources to the most serious environmental issues and taking advantage of market incentives to reduce pollution in general.52Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 103–04 (2004). The Reagan administration announced from the outset that it would similarly champion a regulatory reform agenda that took more account of the costs of environmental protection.53Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 Md. L. Rev. 253, 261 (1986); Lazarus, supra note 52, at 99–101.

But by 1993, the term “regulatory reform” had become a highly partisan term, tainted by efforts during three Republican administrations to cut back on environmental protections under the guise of cost-benefit analysis and economic efficiency. Reagan administration officials at the Office of Management and Budget and EPA used the rhetoric of regulatory reform and cost-benefit analysis but in a wholly skewed fashion to justify deregulation based on exaggerated estimates of regulatory costs coupled with underassessments of the benefits of environmental protection.54McGarity, supra note 53, at 260–68; Lazarus, supra note 52, at 101–06. Environmentalists vehemently opposed those efforts.55McGarity, supra note 53, at 268–73; Lazarus, supra note 52, at 101–06.

Even prominent supporters of President Reagan openly commented at the time that his environmental appointees had so bungled the regulatory reform effort that they had undermined it. The President’s own chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, a stalwart champion of regulatory reform, publicly declared: “We will be lucky if by January 1985, we are back where we were 1981 in terms of the public’s attitude toward” regulatory reform.56Lazarus, supra note 52, at 100–05.

That is why Judge Breyer’s promotion of regulatory reform rhetoric in his 1993 book set off alarm bells throughout the environmental community, and to those reviewing his writings for the White House Counsel in 1993, to a degree that would not have happened in the late 1970s during the Carter administration. But, in light of how much the political debate had shifted since 1980 when Breyer was working on deregulation on the Senate Judiciary Committee, his 1993 publication was either politically tone-deaf or deliberately designed to position Judge Breyer for promotion as a justice with bipartisan support. With Judge Breyer, the former is a distinct possibility. However, whatever the actual motivation, the publication of Judge Breyer’s book coincided with the openings of two seats on the Supreme Court in successive years and played a central role in whether he would be nominated and confirmed.

Republicans and the business community became his cheerleaders while environmentalists expressed serious concerns. The latter’s criticism could be scathing. “[I]t is clear that [Judge Breyer] is no fan of health and environmental regulation.”57Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 495 (statement of Ralph Nader) (citing the attachment Thomas O. McGarity, Could Justice Breyer Be Hazardous to Our Health?). If he “had been a member of Congress, he would not have supported many of the current health and environmental statutes.”58Id. at 502. They accused him of blithely accepting the economic
analysis of right-wing think tanks to belittle the risks addressed by government regulation,59Id. at 496. minimizing “the risks posed by toxic chemicals
in the environment,”60Id. “reject[ing] a policy of erring on the side of safety . . . because it leads society to spend too many dollars chasing after what he believes to be trivial risks,”61Id. at 499. failing to recognize the limits of cost-benefit analysis,62See id. at 500–01. and of “even accept[ing] the highly dubious ‘richer is safer’ argument against stringent regulation of activities that pose health and safety regulations.”63Id. at 501.

Consumer advocate Ralph Nader pulled no punches in testifying against Judge Breyer’s confirmation. Nader described Judge Breyer as an “extremist.”64Id. at 470 (statement of Ralph Nader). According to Nader, Judge Breyer was “ridden with fantasy” and “insensitive on the ground to the health and safety needs of the American people.”65Id. Judge Breyer, Nader concluded, “appears to seriously question many health and safety laws that he will be expected to interpret impartially as a Justice of the Supreme Court.”66Id. at 477 (statement of Ralph Nader).

There were, of course, supporters too. The renowned scholar Professor Cass Sunstein, a close professional colleague of Judge Breyer, casebook co-author, and the leading legal scholar in support of the central role of cost-benefit analysis for rational regulation, testified in favor of Judge Breyer’s nomination.67Id. at 577–78 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein). More moderate legal academics contended that Judge Breyer would be a “friend” to environmental law and that, even though “in sheer numbers, his rulings against environmental groups probably exceed his rulings in their favor”—only because they lose most of their cases—the judge “ha[d] shown a sensitivity and appreciation for environmental issues.”68Funk, supra note 38, at 736, 745.

Only one environmental public interest organization affirmatively supported Judge Breyer’s nomination—the Conservation Law Foundation, headquartered in Massachusetts—perhaps because of his favorable ruling in a case they had brought to clean up Boston Harbor, because of geographic allegiance to Judge Breyer, or perhaps even more likely, because of institutional loyalty to his principal political sponsor, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy.69Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 130 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (citing the attachment Letter from Douglas I. Foy, Executive Director, Conservation Law Foundation, Boston, Mass. (June 30, 1994)) (supporting Judge Breyer’s nomination to the Supreme Court); United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding a district court order that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to remedy violations of the Clean Water Act that had polluted Boston Harbor, was barred from hooking up new sewer lines emptying into the harbor until the state provided its Water Resource Authority the power to acquire a suitable landfill site to avoid such continuing pollution). But even that organization’s letter was noticeably understated. It was only two paragraphs long and addressed merely “To Whom It May Concern.”70Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 130 (Letter from Douglas I. Foy). The most the organization’s director could muster in his opening sentence was that “Stephen Breyer has fashioned a remarkable record on environmental matters that have come before the First Circuit Court of Appeals.”71Id. The word “remarkable,” is, of course, itself remarkable for what it does not say in a letter that purports to be an endorsement.

During his own Senate testimony, Judge Breyer plainly sought to assuage concerns by walking back from the deregulatory import of some of his writings. While conservative Republican Senator Strom Thurmond stressed how he “was pleased to learn of [Judge Breyer’s] concerns with excessive regulation,”72Id. at 140. Judge Breyer asserted that the “role of economics” was necessarily “much more limited” in application to “health, safety, and the environment . . . because, there, no one would think that economics is going to tell you how [much] you ought to spend helping the life of another person.”73Id. at 128. He also characterized the book as “a plea . . . not to cut back by 1 penny this Nation’s commitment to health, safety, and the environment” but only to “reorganize[e] that commitment” to ensure that money was spent on saving real lives rather than “on the statistical life that might not exist.”74Id. at 308.

The Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of Judge Breyer’s confirmation to join the Court.75Helen Dewar, Breyer Wins Senate Confirmation to Top Court, 87 to 9, Wash. Post (July 30, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/30/breyer-wins-senate-confirmation-to-top-court-87-to-9/762b763f-f95f-46de-8f8a-fd6dc567b54a [https://perma.cc/W9AE-W8P6]. Eighty-seven senators voted in favor, only nine were opposed, and four did not vote.76Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress—2nd Session, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1032/vote_103_2_00242.htm [https://perma.cc/TS5W-Y8EH].
And the only votes opposed were a smattering of conservative Senate Republicans.77See id. No liberal Democrat opposition challenged their own President’s nominee notwithstanding any misgivings they might have harbored.78Id.

II.  JUSTICE BREYER’S RECORD IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES BEFORE THE COURT

Justice Breyer’s environmental law record consists of his votes in individual cases and his written opinions in a subset of those cases. During the past twenty-eight years on the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer has written more than five hundred opinions: (1) about two hundred opinions for the Court; (2) approximately one hundred concurring opinions; (3) just shy of two hundred dissenting opinions; and (4) approximately thirty opinions dissenting and concurring in part.79See Writings by Justice Breyer, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/
justices/breyer.dec.html [https://perma.cc/D98H-6V3T].

The Justice has written relatively few opinions in environmental cases, mostly for the straightforward reason that the Court does not decide that many environmental cases. Environmental law is, at least numerically, a relatively small part of the Court’s docket so long as one defines “environmental law” more narrowly as I am doing for the purposes of this inquiry.

My narrower approach considers only those cases that arise in a fact pattern in which environmental protection concerns are at stake and those stakes are not wholly incidental to the legal issue raised. That definition sweeps in both cases involving the construction and application of classic environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy Act8042 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347. as well as those cases involving general cross-cutting legal issues such as the scope of congressional commerce authority in a case where environmental protection is at stake. A broader, and perfectly fair contrary approach would be to consider all cases that raise legal issues that, although not arising in an environmental protection setting in the case then before the Court, are likely to have significant implications in future cases that do.81A clear example is a case like United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a Court ruling involving the scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority. The Lopez case itself raised the question whether a federal firearms law exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, id. at 552, but the Court’s decision has clear implications for the reach of other federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. The same is true for the Court’s decisions on a host of other wide-ranging legal issues that cut across many fact patterns, including those implicating environmental protection. A Supreme Court decision on standards of judicial review in interpreting statutes or regulations, the rules of civil procedure, limits on corporate liability, Article III standing, among myriad others, are naturally not confined to the fact patterns in which they arise. Nor, in the vast majority of circumstances, could they be or should they be for those Court rulings to be coherent. Consistent, however, with the author’s belief that there is a discernible “environmental” dimension to environmental law that is important for judges (and Justices) to consider,82Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703, 744–63 (2000); Lazarus, supra note 52, at 16–42. But see Jay Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 260 (2006). this Article relies on the narrower definition instead.

Based on that narrower definition, I have identified sixty-three “environmental law cases” decided by the Court during Justice Breyer’s tenure to date, in which he participated in sixty-one due to his recusal in two cases in which his brother, also a federal judge, participated in the case in the lower courts. This subset of cases fulfilled two conditions: (1) each case raised legal issues in the environmental protection context; and (2) that context was not wholly incidental to the legal issue being considered by the Court.83See infra Appendix A. My database does not include original action equitable apportionment cases involving the allocation of water rights between states. A very strong argument could be made for inclusion of those cases. The only reason I did not do so was, correctly or incorrectly, I did not include them in my original 2000 database, and I decided it was best to be consistent for comparative purposes over time. In all events, those cases amount to a very small percentage of the cases and are unlikely to have any significant impact on the resulting statistics or the accompanying analysis. For instance, I excluded from my sample a case like Alaska v. United States,84Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75 (2005). a 2005 original action case in which the State of Alaska and the United States were disputing ownership over certain submerged lands in Glacier Bay. I also excluded the Court’s recent decision in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore,85BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore,141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021). concerning the scope of judicial review of a district court ruling not to allow removal of a state court case to federal court. In neither of those cases, or those like them, do the environmental stakes play any non-incidental role in the Court’s resolution of the legal issue to be decided.86Unsurprisingly, whether the legal issue is “incidental” to the environmental protection concerns is a judgment call, and there are close cases. As a general matter, if it was close, my tendency was to include the case. But I included cases like Article III standing and regulatory takings cases because, as I have elaborated in previous scholarship,87Lazarus, supra note 82, at 749–52. the environmental dimension of those cases should bear on the application of the relevant legal standards even if, as described below, individual Justices and sometimes a majority of the Justices too often fail to grasp its relevance.

A.  Justice Breyer’s Votes

In 2000, I published an article that tried to develop a rough quantitative basis for comparing how individual Justices voted in environmental law cases and for assessing whether certain Justices and the Court as a whole were more or less responsive to the need for environmental protection. The article argued more broadly in support of the thesis that there was a uniquely “environmental” dimension to environmental law relevant to judicial decision making—for instance, how such concerns might provide a proper basis for rethinking what constitutes a “concrete injury” for Article III standing purposes, a “property right” in natural resources for regulatory takings purposes, an “intelligible principle” for nondelegation doctrine purposes, an “economic activity” in Commerce Clause analysis, or the degree of judicial deference owed a federal agency in both technical assessments and statutory interpretations.88Id. at 744–63. While concluding that the Court overall had displayed “apparent apathy or even antipathy towards environmental law,”89Id. at 703. I concluded that some individual Justices had shown more sensitivity than others to how environmental protection concerns could be relevant to how the legal issues before the Court should best be decided.90Id. at 721–34.

My 2000 analysis relied on a scoring system somewhat analogous to that employed by the League of Conservation Voters in scoring members of Congress on environmental matters,91See generally, e.g., League of Conservation Voters, National Environmental Scorecard (1998), https://scorecard.lcv.org/sites/scorecard.lcv.org/files/2021_LCV_Scorecard.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BJ9-KSSK]. but now applied to each Justice. A Justice was awarded one point for each outcome that I classified as “pro-environmental protection,” resulting in each Justice receiving an “EP score,” based on the percentage of pro-environmental votes the Justice cast out of those in the sample of environmental cases in which that Justice participated. Although nominally quantitative in its ultimate yield, I freely admitted at the time the “inevitabl[e] arbitrariness and sometimes downright foolishness in attempting any such ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ policy assignments to Supreme Court rulings, especially assignments that purport to be binary in nature.” 92Id. at 722.

The problems are obvious. First, I defined as “pro-environmental” the legal position favored by environmentalists in each case. An environmental advocate, however, trying to win a particular case may in fact be making an argument that leads to a win in that case but to losses in other future environmental cases. For instance, the advocate may be arguing against deferring to an expert agency’s judgment because, in the case before the Justices, an argument against such deference may be needed to secure a win. But if the advocate prevails in that case, the precedent established may cause environmentalists in the future to lose far more than they win if it turns out that judicial deference to agency expertise is more advantageous to environmental protection concerns over the longer term.

Second, the legal position favored by environmentalists in a particular case may be very weak on the merits and warrant rejection. There is no necessary correlation between a legal argument favoring environmental protection and its being a meritorious argument. Not every argument in favor of environmental protection is necessarily a strong legal argument that a judge or Justice should accept.

Indeed, there is good reason to worry that the Justices tend to hear cases in which the legal arguments favoring environmental protection are disproportionately weaker. As I have detailed elsewhere,93Richard Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1524–26 (2008); Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 Yale L.J. Online 89, 95 (2009); Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 Geo. L.J. 1507, 1532–34 (2012). the Court’s decision-making at the jurisdictional stage for most of the past fifty years that define the modern environmental law era has been skewed against environmentalists. The vast majority of the cases in which the Court has granted review are cases in which the position favored by environmentalists prevailed in the courts below. The Court has taken relatively few cases in which the environmentalists lost and then sought the Court’s review, especially those in which the federal government was the prevailing party.94For instance, when the Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in Massachusetts v. EPA, 548 U.S. 903 (2006), in June 2006, it was the first time since 1970 that the Justices had granted a petition supported by environmentalist parties over the federal government’s opposition and ruled on the merits. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971). The Court has, in effect, cherry-picked the cases in which environmentalists may have won based on potentially weak arguments while not being similarly ready to review cases in which business interests have won on weak grounds.95The most troubling explanation for this persistent decades-long trend is that the Justices have been far more ready to conclude at the class certification stage that a lower court ruling in favor of environmentalists is wrong and important enough to warrant granting review than if the environmentalists had instead lost. To be sure, once the Court grants review, the Court gains a fuller appreciation of the competing legal arguments, and it quite often ends up affirming the lower court’s judgment, sometimes unanimously. But the resulting skewed docket nonetheless still means that the Court is far less ready to correct mistakes in cases environmentalists won in the lower courts than in cases they lost. And there is no obvious reason to presume that the lower courts only make mistakes in the former category and not in the latter too. A contributing factor to such skewing, however, may also be that environmentalists who have lost in the lower courts have been understandably wary of taking their cases to the Court over the past fifty years because of its conservative leanings. Just when modern environmental law was taking off in the United States in the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon was transforming the Supreme Court, which had not long before been fairly liberal, into a far more conservative Court. Nixon appointed four new Justices to the Court in fewer than three years, including a Chief Justice—Warren Burger—who replaced Earl Warren. About the Court: Justices 1789 to Present, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/9T5R-46C9]. Since 1972, only two years after the EPA was created and Congress passed the Clean Air Act, the Court has been reliably conservative, and it has been increasingly conservative over time as conservative Republican Presidents have dominated the nominations for the past fifty years. See id. Nor is a general reluctance to have the Court hear cases in which environmentalists have lost limited to certiorari petition–shy environmental advocates. In a not-for-attribution conversation with a Justice a few years ago, the Justice confided that they followed the same practice. They would not vote in favor of review in a case important to them that they thought was decided incorrectly by the lower court unless they were confident that, once granted, they could later secure five votes to win. While it takes only four Justices to agree to hear a case, it of course requires five votes to win. Lazarus, supra note 52, at 230 & n.32.

I accordingly warned in 2000 against drawing any conclusions based on EP scores apart from those at the two extremes—either very high or very low. Because of the obvious limits to such scoring, only such extreme discrepancies in scores might offer a fair basis for positing that the Justice in question was more or less “likely to rule in favor of or against an environmentally protective outcome because of that outcome’s environmental dimension.”96Lazarus, supra note 82, at 722–23. Those same limits are also a reason not to be surprised when even the highest EP score is not that high—the potential result of a skewed merits docket.

In 2000, Justice Breyer had served on the Court for only six years, and his EP score back then of 66.6 after six years of service was in fact one of the highest of those then on the Court. It far exceeded Justice Scalia’s strikingly low score of 13.8 and the scores of Justices Thomas (20.0) and Kennedy (25.9). But, of course, his score came nowhere close to Justice Douglas’s, who retired from the Court in 1975. An environmentalist hero and former member of the Board of the Sierra Club,97See M. Margaret McKeown, Citizen Justice: The Environmental Legacy of William O. Douglas—Public Advocate and Conservation Champion 107–22, 146–47, 188–89 (2022). Douglas boasted of a score of 100—apparently no matter the legal issue presented, and perhaps even the relative strength of the competing arguments, Douglas always voted in favor of the outcome supported by environmentalists. Justice Breyer’s EP score of 66.6 was also higher than Justices Brennan (58.3), Marshall 61.3), Blackmun (58.3), Stevens (50.6), Souter (57.1), and Ginsburg (63.6) but not to any significant extent, especially because both Justice Breyer and Ginsburg had both served for far fewer years than Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens and therefore reflected very different cases too. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens were accordingly being measured based on cases in which it might have been harder on the merits to vote for the side favored by environmentalists.98Id. at 725–28.

Two decades later, the number of environmental cases in which Justice Breyer has participated has naturally risen, and interestingly his new EP score (62.3) is essentially the same as before and as the two other Justices with high scores—Sotomayor (64) and Kagan (68). Yet Justice Breyer’s score is sufficiently higher than former Justices Scalia (23.4) and Kennedy (36.0) and current members such as Chief Justice Roberts (20), Justice Thomas (20.6), and Justice Alito (10.5) for their overlapping cases since 1994 to suggest significant differences in the application of law to environmental protection. Justice Alito’s score of 10.5 is astoundingly low. The only cases in which Alito voted on the side supported by environmentalists were in four cases that the Court decided unanimously in their favor.99S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006); Env’t Def. Fund v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007); Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1608 (2021).

On the other end of the spectrum, although former Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg’s scores in 2000 were a tad lower than Justice Breyer’s at that time, all of their scores became higher—Stevens (78.4), Souter (80.6), and Ginsburg (71.9)—than Justice Breyer’s for the cases on which they overlapped while serving on the Court. The gap between Justice Breyer and both Justice Stevens and Souter is not especially significant but arguably enough to suggest a potential difference in their respective willingness to consider how the environmental protection dimension of the case might be relevant to their resolution of the legal issue before the Court and, for Justices Stevens and Souter, in favor of a more protective outcome.100See infra Appendix B.

Finally, not all environmental cases are, of course, equally important, and the individual votes are more significant in some cases than in others. Some cases are far more significant in terms of their import for environmental protection. Whether EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act101Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–34 (2007). is clearly more important than whether a certain river in Alaska is “public land” for the purposes of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.102Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1085 (2019). And, because in some of those more important cases the vote was also closely divided, the vote of any one Justice in the majority is outcome-determinative. In that distinct respect, the individual vote of any single Justice in a five-Justice majority is more significant.

Based on this criteria, Justice Breyer’s votes in several cases were especially significant, including Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA,103Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 (2004). upholding the EPA’s authority to override Alaska’s issuance of a permit under the Clean Air Act; Kelo v. City of New London,104Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–89 (2005). sustaining a local government’s exercise of its eminent domain power to condemn residential property to promote commercial development; Massachusetts v. EPA,105Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520, 534–35. both upholding environmental-plaintiff standing and rejecting the EPA’s claim that it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; and Murr v. Wisconsin,106Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949–50 (2017). rejecting a regulatory takings claim against a local environmental restriction on residential development. Those are all, moreover, cases environmentalists won.

By contrast, in only one of the sixty-one environmental law cases in which Justice Breyer participated and environmentalists lost did he provide the critical vote against their position.107See infra Appendix A. Justice Breyer voted against the legal outcome favored by environmentalists on twenty-three occasions. In eleven of those cases, the Court ruled unanimously and in three others the vote was eight to one against the environmentalist position. Justice Breyer supplied the sixth and seventh vote for the majority in six cases and dissented in the last two. The only case in which Justice Breyer’s vote was outcome-determinative in a case that environmentalists lost during the past twenty-eight years was the Court’s ruling in June 2021 that the condemnation authority provided by the federal Natural Gas Act to recipients of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate of public convenience and necessity extended to the right to acquire state-owned property. Interestingly, the five-Justice majority was an unusual one, consisting of Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the Court’s opinion, and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh.108PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2021).

B.  Justice Breyer’s Opinions in Environmental Cases

Justice Breyer has written opinions in nineteen environmental cases, which is a disproportionately large number of the sixty-one environmental cases in which he has participated. He has written three majority opinions for the Court,109Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998); Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000); Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). six concurring opinions,110Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010). and ten opinions either dissenting in full or in part.111Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Def. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 777 (2021); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct 2063 (2021). Although Justice Breyer’s majority opinions are clearly the most significant because they alone announce binding legal precedent, the concurring and dissenting opinions may well be the most personally revealing because they largely resulted from the Justice’s own decision to write an opinion expressing his views rather than, as with majority opinions, an assignment from the senior Justice in the majority to write the official opinion of the Court.112One caveat is that when several Justices are all dissenting on a common ground, the most senior Justice dissenting may informally decide which of the Justices should author the dissent. However, that assignment lacks the weight and obvious significance of an assignment to author an opinion of the Court. The majority opinion, however, nonetheless can very much reflect the priorities and values of its author, especially whether the Justice chooses to write the opinion narrowly and tries to attract as many votes as possible or instead drafts the opinion in as sweeping a way as possible consistent with maintaining the bare minimum of five votes required for a majority.113Richard J. Lazarus, Back to “Business” at the Supreme Court: The “Administrative Side” of Chief Justice Roberts, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 38–39 (2015).

1.  Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinions

Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinions in Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club,114Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998). Public Lands Council v. Babbitt,115Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000). and County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.116Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). None is a headliner. Nor is that at all surprising, given that Justice Breyer remained the most junior Justice for his first twelve years on the Court,117See Justices 1798 to Present, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/F4SL-7RSH].
which does not lend itself to especially high-profile opinion assignments from his more senior colleagues. That status is also likely why it was not until 2019 that Chief Justice Roberts assigned Justice Breyer a moderately more important environmental case, County of Maui, though still far short of a blockbuster.

All three Court opinions by Justice Breyer evidence his essential pragmatism, a catchword that the White House promoted when he was nominated and that was accordingly captured in the first New York Times headline announcing his nomination.118Gwen Ifill, Pragmatic Jurist: Bipartisan Support Seen as Clinton Sidesteps Risky Senate Fight, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1994, at 1. His pragmatism was similarly the theme of favorable testimony provided before Congress by one of his leading academic supporters.119See Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1, at 424–26 (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan) (describing Breyer “as a pragmatist in the tradition of Holmes”).

Ohio Forestry is a classic opinion assigned to a junior Justice. Indeed, it might well be classified as one of the “dogs” of the docket that Term, a term of art the Justices use informally in referring to the kind of case no Justice has any particular interest in writing.120Lazarus, supra note 113, at 63–64. At issue was whether the Sierra Club’s challenge to the Forest Service’s plan for managing the Wayne National Forest in Ohio was justiciable.121Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998). The Court ruled unanimously that the lawsuit was not ripe for review on the ground that the plan did not itself create any adverse effects of a “strictly legal kind” because it did not purport to authorize any particular action within the forest.122Id. at 733. It would be far more sensible, Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court reasoned, to wait until “the Plan is implemented” which would allow the reviewing court to benefit from “further factual development” of the issues.123Id. at 733, 737.

Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court evidences significant sensitivity to the administrative preferences of the federal agency and to the resources of the federal judiciary. The ruling that the case was not ripe emphasizes how allowing the Sierra Club’s lawsuit to proceed would have “require[d] time-consuming judicial consideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan . . . without benefit of the focus that a particular logging proposal could provide.”124Id. at 736. There is obvious force to the Court’s concern. But the opinion evidences no comparable consideration of the litigation resource challenges that a public interest organization like Sierra Club faces in trying to oversee a series of site-specific logging proposals over time. What the Court posits as the better approach may well be better in theory, but the challenges of such constant site-specific oversight may in fact be preclusive as a practical matter of any meaningful review of future logging decisions in a national forest.

To that same end, the Court declined to consider a series of other ways that the Forest Plan could immediately harm the Sierra Club and its members. The Court reasoned that Sierra Club’s argument “suffer[ed] from the legally fatal problem that it ma[de] its first appearance [before the] Court in the briefs on the merits.”125Id. at 738. That is a fair point, and the Court is not at all out of bounds in strictly applying administrative law exhaustion principles in denying consideration of Sierra Club’s argument. Yet, here too, the ruling ignores the practical limits of a resource-strapped public interest organization maintaining lawsuits in an effort to ensure other unrepresented interests are given voice. An organization like the Sierra Club is hard-pressed to monitor all the site-specific decisions that Forest Service personnel are making on a daily basis throughout a national forest. For this reason, the Club’s only practical recourse may be to persuade a court, as they tried unsuccessfully to accomplish in the Ohio Forestry case, to establish some guidelines for the exercise of Forest Service personnel discretion in the future. And the Court’s lack of sensitivity to that practical limitation contrasts unfavorably with the many ways that the Justices, in my experience both litigating for and against the United States, routinely allow the federal government to raise new arguments and bring to the Court’s attention new facts not considered below, because of the Justices’ awareness of the practical limits in the government’s ability to oversee all of its lower court litigation.

The Court’s providing such practical flexibility to the United States makes great sense. Otherwise, the Court would be making significant pronouncements of law affecting the country based on incomplete arguments and flawed factual assumptions. And, given the thousands of cases the federal government handles in the lower courts, it is exceedingly limited in its ability to ensure that all the best arguments are made in the timeliest manner. The Court, however, could demonstrate some sensitivity to the practical needs of environmental citizen suit litigants too. Justice Breyer’s opinion for the unanimous Court in Ohio Forestry evidences no such awareness of the problem.

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt126Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000). was a logical sequel to Ohio Forestry. Again, Chief Justice William Rehnquist assigned the junior Justice Breyer the task of writing an opinion for a unanimous Court in another public lands administrative law case that was likely of little, if any, interest to the Justices. The major difference was that, rather than environmental plaintiffs challenging the Forest Service’s management of a national forest, it was commercial livestock interests challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s administration of grazing permits on public lands.

The basic result was the same. The Court concluded that the federal agency’s regulations governing the issuance of permits were valid under the relevant statutory language and that the commercial plaintiffs’ concerns that they might be harmed in how those regulations were applied in the future were largely premature.127See id. at 750. The plaintiffs should instead wait, not unlike the environmental plaintiffs in Ohio Forestry, until the federal agency actually applied the regulations in a specific factual context that harmed them.128Id. at 743–44. While the reasoning is similar is tone, there is still a significant practical difference between the two cases because the commercial party subject to a grazing regulation will naturally always know as soon as such harm happens in the future, which is not true for an environmental organization striving to learn of any possible site-specific decision to allow logging or other potentially harmful activity within a very large area of land such as a national forest.129Id. at 739–44.

It took twenty more years for Justice Breyer to write a third opinion for the Court in an environmental case, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.130Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund,140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). And, reflecting his more senior status by that time, the case is far more significant than either Ohio Forestry or Public Lands Council. It is not a mere unanimous toss-off. County of Maui instead presents a rather thorny and important question of statutory interpretation under the Clean Water Act—the type of question that nicely lends itself to Justice Breyer’s proclivity to pragmatic solutions.

The precise legal issue raised in County of Maui concerns how direct or indirect an addition of pollutants into navigable waters must be to constitute a “discharge” of a pollutant into navigable waters requiring a pollution permit under the Clean Water Act.131Id. at 1468; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1321. In County of Maui itself, the municipal sewage treatment facility seeking to avoid the permit requirement injected contaminated water into a well located about a half mile from the Pacific Ocean—but the discharge naturally reached the Pacific within a few months through the ground water.132See Cnty. of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469. The facility contended that no permit was required unless the pollutants were directly introduced into a navigable water body like the Pacific, meaning that the pollution was exempted from the Clean Water Act permit requirement if it travelled even just a few inches through groundwater or over the surface land before reaching the ocean.133See id. at 1473. The EPA agreed that any travel through groundwater placed the addition of pollutants outside the Clean Water Act but contrasted that any travel over surface land would depend on a more contextual analysis of directness.134Id. at 1469–71.

In rejecting both those limits, Justice Breyer’s opinion for a six-Justice majority held that a Clean Water Act permit was required “when there is a discharge from a point source directly into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”135Id. at 1476. The Court’s ruling displays Justice Breyer’s willingness to embrace a nuanced and accordingly ultimately vague legal test—such as “functional equivalence”—when he believes clearer legal rules fail to account for all the factors that should be relevant in solving a problem. The Court’s “functional equivalence” test rejects any hard-and-fast lines for when an addition of a pollutant is too indirect in favor of a multi-factor inquiry. The opinion candidly acknowledges that there are “too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court to use more specific language,”136Id. while both highlighting seven relevant factors and underscoring that “time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.”137Id. at 1477. Interestingly, the Chief Justice expressed confusion at oral argument about what Justice Breyer’s “functional equivalence” test meant, when Justice Breyer then raised the possibility of such a test,138Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260). but nonetheless subsequently chose Justice Breyer to write the Court’s opinion.

The County of Maui ruling is significant for environmental law. Although the Court nominally vacated the lower court’s judgment favorable to the environmental plaintiffs and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration in light of its ruling, the functional equivalent test amounted to a clear win for the plaintiffs. They will do well under that test, as will environmental plaintiffs in a host of cases across the country who have brought Clean Water Act citizen suits against sources that discharge to navigable waters in a proximate but still indirect water through groundwater and over land. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the County of Maui ruling, environmentalists targeted leakage of coal ash into navigable water bodies from power plants.139Ellen M. Gilmer, Environmentalists Eye Power Plants After Supreme Court Ruling, Bloomberg L., (April 24, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/
environmentalists-eye-power-plants-after-supreme-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/8WDC-27GM].
Although County of Maui does not rise to the front page headline status of a case like Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,140Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). expanding Article III standing for environmental citizen suit plaintiffs, or Massachusetts v EPA,141Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). establishing the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, the case will make a big difference in application to lots of factual circumstances and represents an increasingly rare environmentalist victory as the Court’s own bench becomes more conservative.

2.  Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinions

As described above, Justice Breyer’s separate opinions are even more revealing because, unlike majority opinions that are assigned by the most senior Justice in the majority, one can be more confident that the Justice writing separately is expressing their own views. Justice Breyer wrote six concurring opinions, four of which both address significant legal issues and relate directly to the concerns raised by environmentalists when Justice Breyer was nominated. In each, Justice Breyer expressed views that promoted the very regulatory reform themes antithetical to many environmentalists. His doing so each time in a concurring opinion makes clear that these themes remained very important to him, just as environmentalists had feared at the time of his nomination.

First, in General Electric v. Joiner,142Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). decided in 1997, Justice Breyer wrote separately while also joining the majority ruling that upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude from jury consideration expert testimony proffered to demonstrate a link between the plaintiffs’ exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) and small-cell lung cancer.143Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring). In his separate opinion, Justice Breyer stressed that “modern life, including good health and economic well-being, depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances,”144Id. at 148. presumably alluding to a chemical like PCBs, and the need for judges to use their gatekeeping authority to ensure that tort liability did not effectively “destroy” the “wrong” chemicals.145Id. at 149. Such a concern with the potential for excessive tort liability to harm businesses was in the late 1990s a major talking point for business leaders seeking to curb large tort liability awards.146See, e.g., Barry Meier, Companies Likely to Seek Federal Court Reviews, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1996, at A19; William Glaberson, The Nation: Looking for Attention with a Billion-Dollar Message, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1999, at WK3.

In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,147Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). decided in 2001, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion was the one blight on an otherwise glorious day for environmentalists. In Whitman, Justice Scalia authored a unanimous opinion for the Court that repudiated what had been a major attack on the constitutionality of a central part of the Clean Air Act. The Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s remarkable ruling that the Act violated the nondelegation doctrine by requiring the EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards requisite to protect public health without basing its determination of those standards on an intelligible principle such as cost-benefit analysis.148Id. at 472–76.

Scalia’s opinion not only rejected the notion that cost-benefit analysis was required to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine’s requirement of an intelligible principle, but it further ruled that the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act barred the EPA from considering economic costs at all in promulgating the national standards.149Id. at 486. It was a sweeping win for both environmentalists and the EPA. But what made their victory even sweeter still was that it was unanimous and written by Justice Scalia, the Court’s leading conservative.

Justice Breyer’s separate concurring opinion fell far short of dampening the victor’s spirits that day, but his words were nonetheless chillingly expressive of some of the worst fears of environmentalists upon his confirmation. He disputed Scalia’s powerful statement that the EPA could consider compliance costs only if Congress’s textual commitment to such consideration was “clear.”150Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring). According to Justice Breyer, “other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting [rather than] forbidding” regulatory agencies from adopting “rational regulation” that considered a proposed regulation’s adverse economic effects.151Id.

Even more telling, Justice Breyer conflated economic costs with public health, just as industry had long been arguing should be done. According to Justice Breyer, because an overly protective environmental protection requirement that returned society to the “Stone Age” would clearly not be “requisite to protect the public health,” “the EPA, in setting standards that ‘protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety’” should be deemed to be able to weigh compliance costs against environmental benefits at least to guard against disproportionately high costs for only trivial benefits.152Id. at 495–96.

For environmentalists, Justice Breyer’s language sounded unsettlingly similar to the business community’s claims that a healthy society was a wealthy society and environmental protection laws that reduced business profitability were accordingly undermining rather than promoting public health.153See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Mercatus Center in Support of Cross-Petitioner at 12–22, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-1426); Brief of Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation and California Chamber of Commerce in Support of Cross-Petitioners American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. at 15–18, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-1426).  Had Justice Breyer authored his concurring opinion in any context other than a concurring opinion with no legal import and when environmentalists were otherwise enjoying an enormous victory, it might have garnered far more attention and concern. But, on a day of widespread relief and celebration, few paid attention to Justice Breyer’s concurrence.

Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Bates v. Dow Agriculture Sciences LLC,154Bates v. Dow Agric. Scis. LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). decided in 2004, strikes a similar concern about the adverse impacts of excessive government regulation. In Bates, however, the issue arose in the context of a federal preemption case, in which a pesticide manufacturer was arguing that federal pesticide regulation preempted state common law tort liability.155See id. at 435, 448–49. The majority opinion, which Justice Breyer joined, rejected the manufacturer’s more sweeping preemption theories, concluded that some state tort law liability might not be preempted, and remanded the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings.156See id. at 452–54. Justice Breyer wrote separately to emphasize that the EPA, the federal agency charged with administering the federal pesticide statute at issue, enjoyed authority to promulgate regulations that effectively preempted state tort liability to avoid “a counter-productive ‘crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements.’ ”157Id. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 448 (majority opinion)).

Finally, similarly sensitive to his perception of excessive environmental regulations was Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Conservation Council158Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). in 2009, in which the Justice provided the more conservative wing of the Court with its sixth vote in a major loss to environmentalists. At issue in Coeur Alaska was in effect whether a gold mine that was discharging toxic slurry into a lake three miles away could avoid having to comply with section 402 of the Clean Water Act, which would likely have barred the activity, by characterizing their toxic slurry as “fill,” thereby triggering section 404 of the Act, which separately and less restrictively regulates the addition of fill into navigable waters.159See id. at 265–67. The gold mine had placed enormous volumes of toxic slurry into the lake, which was 51 feet deep, 800 feet wide, and 2,000 feet long.160Id. at 294 (Breyer, J., concurring). And the EPA freely acknowledged that the slurry would kill all of the lake’s fish and nearly all of its aquatic life.161Id. at 297 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, JJ., dissenting).

To the environmental plaintiffs and the Ninth Circuit in its lower court ruling, the gold mine’s claim that it was “fill” rather than pollutant seemed like a blatant end run around the Water Act’s section 402 limitations on the addition of pollutants into navigable waters. But, relying on the EPA’s agreement that section 404 rather than section 402 applied, the Court ruled in industry’s favor.162Id. at 291 (majority opinion). Justice Breyer agreed, declining to join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which both Justices Stevens and Souter joined. Exhibiting the same preference for deferring to expert technical agencies promoted by his 1993 book, Justice Breyer explained the reasons why he joined the majority: “I cannot say whether the EPA’s compromise represents the best overall environmental result; but I do believe it amounts to the kind of detailed decision that the statutes delegate authority to the EPA, not the courts, to make (subject to the bounds of reasonableness).”163Id. at 294 (Breyer, J., concurring).

The contrast between Justice Breyer’s willingness to defer to the EPA, notwithstanding the extreme results, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent for herself and Justices Stevens and Souter was stark:

The Court’s reading . . . strains credulity. A discharge of a pollutant, otherwise prohibited by firm statutory command, becomes lawful if it contains sufficient solid material to raise the bottom of a water body, transformed into a waste disposal facility. Whole categories of regulated industries can thereby gain immunity from a variety of pollution-control standards.164Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, JJ., dissenting).

Justice Ginsburg, unlike Justice Breyer, was not willing to assume that the EPA would ensure this loophole was not abused in future applications, especially given the dissent’s view that it had been abused in the facts of the case then before the Court.165See id. at 303 n.5.

3.  Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinions in Part or in Full

Justice Breyer wrote separate opinions that dissented either in part or in full on ten occasions. In some, he concurred in part or in full with conservative majorities, and in others he dissented in part from liberal majorities. And on a few occasions, he dissented in full. The latter category tended to be those instances when Justice Breyer expressed views wholly favorable to the legal arguments of environmentalists. 

Two of the cases involved tort liability. In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers,166Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003). decided in 2003, Justice Breyer dissented from that part of the Court’s ruling that allowed tort plaintiffs who had been exposed to asbestos fibers and were suffering from asbestosis to recover for damages from their related reasonable fear of cancer.167See id. at 182 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer acknowledged that the legal issue was “a close and difficult one.”168Id. But he dissented in part from Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion because he was worried both about the “impossibility of knowing an appropriate compensation” for such fear169Id. at 185. and that compensating victims for their fear might leave too little money remaining later on for victims who ultimately suffered from cancer.170Id. at 185–87. On the other hand, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,171Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). decided in 2008, Justice Breyer dissented from a majority ruling limiting punitive damages from the Exxon Valdez Alaska oil spill based on his view that the punitive damages awarded the oil spill victims in that case need not be reduced.172Id. at 525–26 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Unlike in Norfolk and Exxon Shipping, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,173Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Entergy v. Riverkeeper,174Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,175Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). it was Justice Breyer’s partial concurrences with a conservative majority rather than his dissent from a liberal majority that were telling. In each, Justice Breyer’s separate opinion reflected his pragmatism and general desire to provide federal expert agencies with flexibility absent excessive judicial second-guessing.

In Winter, Justice Breyer declined to join Ginsburg’s dissent from the majority ruling overturning a lower court injunction of U.S. Navy exercises that the environmental plaintiffs alleged were harming marine mammals.176See Winter, 555 U.S. at 33; id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred in part with the conservative Justices who made up a majority and concluded that the plaintiffs’ evidentiary support was too “weak or uncertain” to justify the “seriousness of the harm” that the Navy maintained the injunction would do “to the Navy’s ability to maintain an adequate national defense.”177Id. at 36–37 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In Entergy, Justice Breyer returned most explicitly to his argument, reflected in his 1993 book and earlier concurring opinion in American Trucking, that cost-benefit analysis is essential in setting rational environmental protection standards. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented from the majority ruling that the Clean Water Act permitted the EPA to engage in cost-benefit analysis in deciding the extent to which a power plant’s cooling water intake structure must minimize its adverse environmental impact.178Entergy, 556 U.S. at 236 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) Justice Breyer, however, agreed that such analysis was permissible, arguing that “an absolute prohibition would bring about irrational results.”179Id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While suggesting some limits on how demanding such a cost-benefit analysis could be, he also cautioned that “in an age of limited resources available to deal with grave environmental problems, . . . too much wasteful expenditures devoted to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious) problems.”180Id. at 233. 

In Utility Air Regulatory Group, Justice Breyer again concurred in part with a conservative majority but this time to a very different policy end. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, ruled that the term “any pollutant” under the Clean Air Act did not extend to greenhouse gas pollutants as applied to one significant part of the Act.181Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 320–24 (2014). Justice Breyer proffered a different approach that, like the majority, avoided the EPA’s being compelled to regulate sources that the EPA agreed would be administratively impractical, but by interpreting instead the term “any source” in a manner that would ultimately provide the EPA more discretionary authority to choose how best to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. As described by Justice Breyer, “[t]he Court’s decision to read greenhouse gases out of the [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] program drain[ed] the Act of its flexibility.”182Id. at 341 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And Justice Breyer’s preferred approach “le[ft] the EPA with the sort of discretion as to interstitial matters that Congress likely intended it to retain.”183Id. at 342.

On the other hand, the Justice’s practical approach prompted him to dissent in full from the Court’s ruling in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club,184U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club,141 S. Ct. 777 (2021). decided in March 2021, in favor of a federal agency’s decision not to release a document to environmental plaintiffs under the Freedom of Information Act.185See id. at 783; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). That Act requires agencies to release to the public final agency decision-making documents unless they are deliberative in nature, reflecting Congress tempering its desire for public disclosure with a competing desire not to unduly chill those candid internal exchanges of ideas that might not occur if the participants knew all their thinking would later be made part of the public record.1865 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 141 S. Ct. at 785–86.

Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, the Interior Department’s Fish & Wildlife Service and the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service provide formal “biological opinions” to any federal agency whose proposed action may “adversely affect” an endangered or threatened species or its critical habitat.187U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 141 S. Ct. at 783–84; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, the two Services were preparing biological opinions on a proposed rule by the EPA under the Clean Water Act to regulate power plant cooling water intake structures because of the potentially adverse impact of those structures on aquatic wildlife.188U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 141 S. Ct. at 783–84.

Had the Services provided the EPA with a final biological opinion, the parties would not have disputed that such a final opinion would have been subject to public disclosure.189See id. at 786–87. In the case, however, the two Services never submitted a final biological opinion because the EPA ultimately rescinded its initially proposed rule after receiving an early draft of the Services’ biological opinion that had not yet been formally approved by either Service for submission.190See id. at 784. In challenging the EPA’s final cooling water intake structure, Sierra Club sought a copy of the informal draft biological opinions on the original proposed rule, which it hoped to use to attack the final rule.191See id. at 784–85.

The majority easily concluded, based on FOIA’s text, that such draft biological opinions—especially ones never approved by the relevant officials of the two services—need not be disclosed because they lacked any formal legal status within the ESA: “The deliberative process privilege protects the draft biological opinions at issue here because they reflect a preliminary view—not a final decision—about the likely effect of the EPA’s proposed rule on endangered species.”192Id. at 786. Such preliminary assessments were, the Court concluded, “both predecisional and deliberative.”193Id. at 788.

In dissent, Justice Breyer naturally took a more practical approach, looking not at the formal name of the relevant document, but its function in the agency decision-making process. Because, Justice Breyer reasoned, “[t]he function of a Draft Biological Opinion finding jeopardy [of an endangered species] . . . is much the same as that of a Final Biological Opinion” and triggers the same process within EPA, the same reasons that justify public release of the final biological opinion apply with equal force to the draft.194Id. at 790 (Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). However, because it was not clear whether the biological opinions at issue in the record were “drafts” or merely “Drafts of Draft Biological Opinion,” because they had never been approved by all relevant officials in the two Services, Justice Breyer contended the case should be remanded back to the court of appeals to decide their status.195Id. at 791–92.

In short, in some instances Justice Breyer’s lack of commitment to formalism supports policy ends favored by environmentalists, as in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. But in other instances, as in Coeur Alaska, he frustrates environmentalists by allowing the government to avoid what seems, on the face of the relevant statutory language, to be a clear transgression of congressional purpose.

However, Justice Breyer’s support for the constitutionality of environmental restrictions has been unqualified in Fifth Amendment takings cases. He has participated in ten Fifth Amendment takings cases while on the Court. And he voted against the regulatory takings claim in nine of those cases196Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1995); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (judicial taking); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). and against a per se physical takings claim in the tenth case.197Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct 2063 (2021). In one of those regulatory cases, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,198Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606. he filed a separate dissent to underscore his agreement both with Justice Ginsburg that the case was not ripe and with Justice O’Connor that it was relevant to regulatory takings analysis whether the landowner was challenging a land use restriction that existed at the time of their purchase of the property.199Id. at 654–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). And in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,200Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. 2063. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion on the ground that the majority erred by analyzing the state regulation of land use as a per se physical taking rather than as a possible regulatory taking.201Id. at 2089–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Finally, Justice Breyer also earned high marks from environmentalists for his support of environmental plaintiff Article III standing. Like regulatory takings, Article III standing has been a persistent issue in environmental law since the 1970s.202See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Admin. Procs., 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Justice Breyer voted in favor of environmental plaintiffs in the two most important standing cases during his tenure on the Court, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw203Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). and Massachusetts v. EPA,204Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). and he authored the opinion for himself and three other Justices dissenting from the Court’s ruling against the plaintiffs’ standing in Summers v. Earth Island Institute205Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). in 2009.206Id. at 501 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Breyer took direct issue with the majority’s ruling that the environmental plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a concrete injury in their lawsuit challenging the U.S. Forest Service’s salvage sale of timber from a national forest.207Id. at 501–10.

 III.  ASSESSING JUSTICE BREYER’S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW LEGACY: FRIEND OR FOE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION?

Justice Breyer is likely the only Justice ever chosen because of his perceived views on environmental law. But, ironically not because he was viewed as an ardent environmentalist. Just the opposite. He was thought to be a Justice who would instead be more sensitive to business than to environmental protection concerns.

That is both why Breyer failed to secure the nomination to the Court in 1993 and environmentalists opposed his selection in 1994—strongly favoring Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. And it is also why Republican Senate Leadership, including the Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole and the Judiciary Committee’s Ranking Minority Member Orrin Hatch, informed the White House that they would fight Babbitt’s nomination and promised a smooth confirmation process for Judge Breyer. As described at this Article’s outset, President Clinton chose not to fight, notwithstanding environmentalists’ warnings that Judge Breyer would be bad for environmental law and even “hazardous to our health.”208Breyer Confirmation Hearings, supra note 1.

So, which has Justice Breyer turned out to be—friend or foe? The answer seems relatively clear: friendly, if still shy of an unqualified friend. As reflected in a rough sense in his EP score, especially compared to those of his colleagues on the bench, Justice Breyer has voted in favor of results supported by environmentalists far more than most of the other Justices on the Court. And, in almost all of the most important environmental cases of the past twenty-eight years, he was a reliable vote joining the majority in the big cases environmentalists won—often providing the critical fifth vote—and no less a reliable vote in dissent with liberal justices sounding the alarm in the big cases environmentalists lost—as he did in West Virginia v. EPA, the very last environmental case decided by the Court when Justice Breyer was on the bench.209West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). These cases include major cases decided under framework environmental laws like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, as well as those involving major issues of constitutional law, such as Article III standing, congressional Commerce Clause authority, and regulatory takings. Justice Breyer has been a reliable, forceful vote for environmental protection in the biggest cases that mattered the most.

Environmentalist concerns about Justice Breyer’s support for regulatory reform proved overblown in application, but not because they were wrong about his views on the central role that cost-benefit analysis should play in setting environmental standards and his willingness to believe that such standards are unduly protective. They weren’t incorrect. Especially in his concurring opinions and in a scattering of his votes, Justice Breyer made clear, just as they feared, his belief in the essential role of cost-benefit analysis as well as his receptivity to concerns that environmental protection requirements may be so exceedingly expensive as to undermine, rather than promote, public health.210Jonathan Z. Cannon, Environment in the Balance: The Green Movement and the Supreme Court 126–27, 133–34 (2015).

However, in no case did Justice Breyer’s distinct views make a difference. He never once provided the critical “fifth vote” in any case in which he expressed those policy preferences for cost-benefit analysis.211The only case in which Breyer provided the decisive vote for the majority in which the position favored by environmentalists did not prevail was the recent PennEast case described above, which did not implicate cost-benefit analysis. The only legal issue raised in PennEast was whether the eminent domain authority possessed by a natural gas company pursuant to its receipt of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission extended to the condemnation of state-owned property. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. And his concurring voice was of no legal effect at all. Of course, had the makeup of the Court when those cases were decided been tilted slightly more to the left, Justice Breyer’s vote might well have made a critical difference, just as environmentalists had worried it would. But that concern was never realized in almost three decades.

Justice Breyer has also proved far less dogmatic in his views than assumed by his detractors at the time of his nomination. While supporting EPA’s authority to use cost-benefit analysis in his separate concurring opinion in Entergy, Justice Breyer agreed with the environmental respondents that Congress had intentionally curbed EPA’s ability to rely on cost-benefit analysis in the Clean Water Act.212Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 232 (2009) (“As this language suggests, the Act’s sponsors had reasons for minimizing the EPA’s investigation of, and reliance, upon cost-benefit comparisons.”). Where Justice Breyer departed from the environmental respondents was his view that EPA nonetheless was permitted to take such analysis into account so long as the agency did so in a very limited way: to guard against costs wholly disproportionate to environmental benefits—a far more modest invocation of cost-benefit analysis than that sought by industry.213Id. at 134. Justice Breyer also later fully joined Justice Kagan’s forceful dissent in Michigan v. EPA,214Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 764 (2015) (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). which criticized the majority for concluding that EPA was required to consider potential compliance costs in determining whether regulation of toxic mercury emissions from power plants was “appropriate.” Justice Breyer agreed with the other Michigan dissenters that Congress had instead instructed EPA to base its threshold determination of the appropriateness of emissions controls only on the extent of environmental harm posed by such emissions. None of the Justices, including the four dissenters, disputed that the Clean Air Act required EPA to consider control costs in subsequently determining the extent of emissions reduction subsequently required of power plants.215Id. at 769–78.

Finally, critics of Justice Breyer’s nomination to the Court failed to appreciate how Justice Breyer’s pragmatism and openness to consideration of regulatory costs and cost-benefit analysis might prompt the Justice to favor upholding EPA regulations those critics favored. In two very significant Clean Air Act cases, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation in 2014 and the recently-decided West Virginia v. EPA, EPA’s legal arguments in favor of the regulations at issue—the Clean Air Interstate Rule in EME Homer216EPA v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2013). and the Clean Power Plan in West Virginia217West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).—were weakened by the absence of clear support in the relevant statutory text. But what strengthened each of those EPA regulations was that both sets of ambitious regulations justified their broad reading of that language by the extent to which it permitted the EPA to take costs and benefits into account. In short, the kinds of economic analysis Justice Breyer favored allowed EPA to adopt more, not less, demanding environmental protection requirements.

To be sure, Justice Breyer has been no Justice Douglas. He has not voted in favor of the position favored by environmentalists in all cases. But nor is it clear that the nation, including environmentalists, should necessarily want such a Justice on the Court. Such a Justice might be a very good environmentalist, but not an especially good judge.

As described above, in eleven of the twenty-three environmental cases in which Justice Breyer voted against the position favored by environmentalists, all the Justices voted the same way.218See infra Appendix B. None dissented, neither Justice Souter, Stevens, Kagan, nor Sotomayor. All the other most progressive Justices on the Court agreed that there was no, or at least too little, merit to the legal position favored by environmentalists. In three more of those twenty-three cases, environmentalists lost by a vote of eight to one. Perhaps a Justice who dissented in those cases could be credited with perceiving actual strength in legal arguments that the others were missing. But it is also quite possible that they would be engaging in the very kind of ideologically driven judicial decision-making that environmentalists correctly condemn in those Justices with very low EP scores like Justices Alito and Scalia. Even those of us who care deeply about environmental protection, and worry no less deeply about the failings of our elected branches of government, should not see a judiciary that decides cases strictly on personal ideology rather than fair consideration of the actual strengths of the competing legal arguments as the proper solution to those failings.

Finally, contrary to the predictions of those advising President Clinton in June 1993, Justice Breyer has not remotely proven to be a dispassionate, “bloodless,” “cold fish” Justice lacking any “innate sense of justice.”219See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. To be sure, Justice Breyer is no Justice Sonia Sotomayor—a Justice whose writings evince a compassion for victims of injustice without ready modern parallel. He is a committed pragmatist. But his striking pragmatism should not be mistaken for a lack of passion. He has proven himself deeply committed to social justice and the fundamental role of the judiciary in its pursuit. He has made that philosophy clear in both his judicial opinions and in his writings outside of the Court, especially his 2005 book, Active Liberty, in which the Justice contends that judges should not merely attend to the need to ensure that individuals are free from governmental coercion but also ensure they enjoy freedom to participate fully in government itself, including the right to vote.220Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 32 (2005). 

CONCLUSION

Justice Breyer was certainly not environmentalists’ dream pick in 1994. And they had good reason to be concerned. But he has proved in actual practice to be an outstanding jurist for the nation and an excellent Justice for environmental protection law.

More fundamentally, Justice Breyer’s record on the Court suggests the wisdom of rethinking what it means to be a “dream” justice. Should it mean having a Justice who shares one’s ideological preferences on certain issues like environmental protection and will vote accordingly? Or should it mean having a Justice whose votes are rooted in a broader understanding of the proper role of the courts in interpreting law and deciding cases, including the central role our Constitution assigns to the judiciary to safeguard certain individual and collective rights? While the former Justice may reliably receive an EP score of 100, the latter is the better Justice, even if that means they sometimes will, as they should, rule in ways that disappoint.221Professor William Funk may have nailed it at the time of Justice Breyer’s confirmation. See Funk, supra note 38, at 736 (“Environmental law does have a friend on the Court, albeit a friend who places his duty to the law higher than his love for the environment.”).


APPENDIX A

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES OCTOBER TERM 1994–OCTOBER TERM 2021


Case Name

Citation

EP Designation

Dolan v. City of Tigard

512 U.S. 374 (1994)

Dissent

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Communities for A Great Oregon

515 U.S. 687 (1995)

Majority

Meghrig v. KFC Western

516 U.S. 479 (1996)

Dissent

General Electric v. Joiner

522 U.S. 136 (1997)

Dissent

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment

523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Dissent/Concur

Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club

523 U.S. 726 (1998)

Dissent

United States v. Bestfoods

524 U.S. 51 (1998)

Majority

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.

526 U.S. 687 (1999)

Concur

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.

528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Majority

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

529 U.S. 728 (2000)

Majority

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States

531 U.S. 159 (2001)

Dissent

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

531 U.S. 457 (2001)

Majority

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Dissent

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

535 U.S. 302 (2002)

Majority

Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers

538 U.S. 135 (2003)

Majority

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA

540 U.S. 461 (2004)

Majority

South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe

541 U.S. 95 (2004)

Majority

Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality Management District

541 U.S. 246 (2004)

Dissent

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

541 U.S. 752 (2004)

Dissent

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Association

542 U.S. 55 (2004)

Dissent

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences

544 U.S. 431 (2005)

Majority

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

544 U.S. 528 (2005)

Majority

Kelo v. City of New London

545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Majority

S.D. Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

547 U.S. 370 (2006)

Majority

Rapanos v. United States

547 U.S. 715 (2006)

Dissent

Massachusetts v. EPA

549 U.S. 497 (2007)

Majority

Environmental Defense Fund v. Duke Energy Corporation

549 U.S. 561 (2007)

Majority

United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority

550 U.S. 330 (2007)

Plurality

United States v. Atlantic Research Corporation

551 U.S. 128 (2007)

Majority

National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife

551 U.S. 644 (2007)

Dissent

Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker

554 U.S. 471 (2008)

Dissent in part

Winter v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.

555 U.S. 7 (2008)

Dissent 

Summers v. Earth Island Institute

555 U.S. 488 (2009)

Dissent

Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

556 U.S. 208 (2009)

Dissent

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States

556 U.S. 599 (2009)

Dissent

Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council

557 U.S. 261 (2009)

Dissent

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

560 U.S. 702 (2010)

Concurrence in part

Monsanto Company v. Geertson Seed Farm

561 U.S. 139 (2010)

Dissent

American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut

564 U.S. 410 (2011)

Dissent

Sackett v. EPA

566 U.S. 120 (2012)

Dissent

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States

568 U.S. 23 (2012)

Dissent

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

568 U.S. 597 (2013)

Dissent

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District

570 U.S. 595 (2013)

Dissent

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation L.P.

572 U.S. 489 (2014)

Majority

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA

573 U.S. 302 (2014)

Concur/Dissent

Michigan v. EPA

576 U.S. 743 (2015)

Dissent

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association

577 U.S. 260 (2016)

Majority

Sturgeon v. Frost

577 U.S. 424 (2016)

Dissent

United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Company

578 U.S. 590 (2016)

Dissent

Murr v. Wisconsin

137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017)

Majority

Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service

139 S. Ct. 361 (2018)

Dissent

Sturgeon v. Frost II

139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019)

Dissent

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v Warren

139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019)

 Majority

Knick v. Township of Scott

139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)

Dissent

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian

140 S.  Ct. 1335 (2020)

All But Alito

County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund

140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020)

Majority

United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association

140 S. Ct 1837 (2020)

Dissent

United States Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club

141 S. Ct. 777 (2021)

Dissent

Guam v. United States

141 S. Ct 1608 (2021)

Majority

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021)

Dissent

Hollyfrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association

141 S. Ct 2172 (2021)

Dissent

PennEast Pipeline Company v. New Jersey

141 S. Ct 2244 (2021)

Dissent

West Virginia v. EPA

142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022)

Dissent

 

APPENDIX B

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (“EP”) SCORES OF SELECTED INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

OCTOBER TERM 1994–OCTOBER TERM 2021

 

Justice

Number of Cases

EP Points

EP Score

Breyer

61

38

62.3

Scalia

47

11

23.4

Stevens

37

29

78.4

Kennedy

50

18

36

Thomas

63

13

20.6

Souter

36

29

80.6

Ginsburg

57

41

71.9

CJ Roberts

40

8

20

Alito

38

4

10.5

Sotomayor

25

16

64

Kagan

25

17

68

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1395

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Howard J. & Katherine W. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Professors Hope Babcock, Jonathan Cannon, Bill Funk, Steph Tai, and Susannah Weaver for their terrific comments on a preliminary draft of this Article. Kathryn C. Reed, Harvard Law School Class of 2022, provided outstanding research and editorial assistance. Although it has no bearing on my analysis, for the sake of disclosure I served as counsel for either one of the parties or an amicus in the following Supreme Court cases that fall within this Article’s scope of review: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farm, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); and Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).

Should Humanity Have Standing? Securing Environmental Rights in the United States

While courts around the world are increasingly recognizing rights of nature or the rights of individuals or communities to a safe and healthy environment, American courts have been much more skeptical of environmental rights claims. This Article examines this growing divergence and identifies trends in American law that might account for it, including explanations deeply rooted in U.S. constitutional history as well as recent doctrinal developments such as the major questions doctrine. More importantly, this Article offers a way forward for American law in the face of critical environmental challenges, most notably climate change. Specifically, it presents constitutional interpretive methods that might advance the interests of nature and individuals facing pollution impacts. It also explores the potential role for states and state constitutions in protecting the environment. But given the obstacles—both jurisprudential and political—to a more robust environmental rights framework in American courts, this Article concludes that the best path forward might be a theory of negative environmental rights—namely, the right to be free from harmful pollution. Such a narrowly constructed commitment to an end to uninternalized environmental externalities might offer a practical and politically feasibly way to move past the pervasive concerns of American courts about positive rights, separation of powers, the political question doctrine, and appropriate modes of judicial relief.

INTRODUCTION

In his landmark Should Trees Have Standing? article, Professor Christopher Stone posed the question of whether Nature could, and indeed should, have legally enforceable rights.1See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). Today, a handful of countries have granted rights—sometimes in the form of “legal personhood”—to Nature generally or to discrete geographic features, such as mountains or rivers.2See, e.g., Mihnea Tănăsescu, Rights of Nature, Legal Personality, and Indigenous Philosophies, 9 J. Transnat’l Env’t L. 429, 429–31 (2020); Laura Schimmöller, Paving the Way for Rights of Nature in Germany: Lessons Learnt from Legal Reform in New Zealand and Ecuador, 9 J. Transnat’l Env’t L. 569, 574–81 (2020); Kristen Stilt, Rights of Nature, Rights of Animals, 134 Harv. L. Rev. F. 276, 280–81 (2021); James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism 255–56 (2015) (discussing rights of rivers and other rights of nature). Many more countries recognize their citizens’ right to a healthy environment in one form or another.3David R. Boyd, Catalyst for Change: Evaluating Forty Years of Experience in Implementing the Right to a Healthy Environment, in The Human Right to a Healthy Environment 17 (John H. Knox & Ramin Pejan eds., 2018); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 Stan. J. Int’l L. 103, 125–28 (1991); Alexandre C. Kiss, Environment et Développement ou Environnement et Survie?, 118 Journal du Droit International [J. Dr. Int’l] 263, 266–67 (1991) (Fr.). And a growing number of litigants across the globe—spurred on perhaps by the youth movement for climate change action—have used these rights to force governments or businesses to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.4Nathaniel Levy, Juliana and the Political Generativity of Climate Litigation, 43 Harv.  Env’t L. Rev. 479, 480–81 (2019); Charles Beauregard, D’Arcy Carlson, Stacy-ann Robinson, Charles Cobb & Mykela Patton, Climate Justice and Rights-Based Litigation in a Post-Paris World, 21 Climate Pol’y 652, 654 (2021); see infra Sections II.A–B; Larissa Parker, Juliette Mestre, Sébsdtien Jodoin & Margarentha Wewerinke-Singh, When the Kids Put Climate Change on Trial: Youth-Focused Rights-Based Climate Litigation Around the World, 13 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t 64, 71–78 (2022). Courts in many nations around the world have been increasingly sympathetic to these claims, establishing the judiciary in many nations as an important point of leverage for moving society toward a more sustainable future in general and a more robust response to climate change in particular.5Communiqué de Presse [Press Release], Conseil d’Etat (CE), Émissions de Gas À Effet de Serre: le Gouvernement Doit Justifier Sous 3 Mois Que la Trajectoire de Réduction À Horizon 2030 Pourra Être Respectée (Nov. 19, 2020) (Fr.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court] Sala Civ. febrero 12, 2018, Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona Sentencia C-4360-2018 (Colom.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Sexta de Revisión noviembre 10, 2016, Jorge Iván Palacio Palacio, Expediente T-5.016.242 (Colom.); Leghari v. Fed’n of Pak., (2015) W.P. No.25501 (HC Lahore) (Pak.); Complaint, Mbabazi v. AG, Civil Suit No. 283 of 2012 (2012) (Uganda); see also Daniel C. Esty, Toward a Sustainable Future: Environmental Jurisprudence from France’s Constitutional Council Breaks New Ground, in French Constitutional Council: Annual Report 2020, at 106, 106–07 (2020); Justine Bell-James & Briana Collins, Human Rights and Climate Change Litigation: Should Temporal Imminence Form Part of Positive Rights Obligations?, 13 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t 212, 212–15 (2022).

In the United States, however, such efforts have met with little success. Recognition of environmental rights remains limited and largely in the background of the American legal system. Such rights are rarely constitutionally defined (and only at the state level) and have gone almost entirely unrecognized by courts.6T. Quinn Yeargain, Decarbonizing Constitutions, 41 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. (forthcoming 2023). Although Stone’s argument altered the environmental rights conversation in the United States (particularly after being cited in Justice Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton7Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).), it has not translated into strengthened environmental rights in American courts. Indeed, both federal and state courts across the country have expressly declined to entertain climate change litigation, rejecting a range of legal theories and assertions of environmental rights advanced by a diverse set of plaintiffs. The judges in these cases consistently suggest that the remedies sought by the plaintiffs go beyond what the judiciary can order.8E.g., Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169–75 (9th Cir. 2020); Chernaik v. Brown, 475 P.3d 68, 82–83 (Or. 2020); Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438, 449–51 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021), aff’d, 497 P.3d 350 (Wash. 2021).

This reality leads to the central puzzle of this Article: Why has the conception of environmental rights remained so crimped in the United States in contrast with other nations?

In seeking to answer this query, I also address another critical question: Are there legal avenues available to better secure environmental rights in the United States?

In Part I, I set the stage for these inquiries with a brief survey of environmental rights scholarship over the past fifty years, chronicling how such rights emerged from the human rights discourse and have now become constitutionalized in the vast majority of nations across the globe. I go on to document how environmental rights have become increasingly widely recognized in international law through treaties, resolutions, and declarations—including a 2022 United Nations (“U.N.”) General Assembly Resolution declaring access to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment to be a human right. Given this universality of commitment to environmental protection, I argue that environmental rights should be recognized as natural rights that need not be granted by a constitution or a statute but rather understood to be inherent in what it means to be human. In this regard, the failure of U.S. courts to recognize environmental rights seems out of step with modern mores and legal thinking across the globe—setting up the puzzles noted above.

In Part II, I undertake a comparative review of national case law around the world, noting how courts in many nations have strengthened environmental rights in recent years—particularly in the context of the need to shift our economic activities onto more sustainable underpinnings and to address the rising risks of climate change. In analyzing the global march of environmental rights, I note that while the trend is toward broader protection of peoples across the world from pollution, each nation’s framing of environmental rights reflects the particular values, circumstances, and legal traditions of that society—with the United States in a relatively unique and lagging position.

I extend this analysis in Part III with a more detailed look at the reasons why environmental rights remain limited in the United States. I focus particular attention on the decisions in a number of recent climate change cases where courts have concluded that the judicial branch of government is not positioned to provide the relief that the plaintiffs sought. I go on to suggest that the narrow American view of environmental rights derives not only from the lack of a clear constitutional provision, but also from the U.S. judiciary’s tradition of restraint in the face of cases that present political or “major” questions that might be seen as within the purview of the legislative and executive branches of government. I also note that, unlike civil rights, which have relatively clear lines, environmental protection inescapably entails tradeoffs and multidimensional policy choices. This reality makes climate change and other environmental policy issues polycentric problems, which present competing claims and no clear framework for balancing the contesting interests. In the face of such difficulties, many judges and scholars have concluded (following the conceptual framing of Professor Lon Fuller) that such issues are inappropriate for courts to adjudicate and must be left to political processes. Finally, I note that the approach to evaluating competing interests embedded in the U.S. framework of pollution control law and regulation—centered on benefit-cost analysis with particular reliance on the Kaldor-Hicks model of net social benefits—effectively privileges economic activity and often treats individual environmental rights as inconsequential.9E. Donald Elliott & Daniel C. Esty, The End Environmental Externalities Manifesto: A Rights-Based Foundation for Environmental Law, 29 N.Y.U. Env’t. L.J. 505, 507–10 (2021); Karl S. Coplan, The Missing Element of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis: Compensation for the Loss of Regulatory Benefits, 30 Geo. Env’t L. Rev. 281, 290–91 (2018).

In Part IV, I argue that the sustainability imperative10The need to move the American and global economies onto a more sustainable trajectory—where market failures are addressed, externalities internalized, and (what former Bank of England Governor Mark Carney calls) the “tragedy of the horizon” overcome with a shift to a clean-energy economy—has been widely recognized. Mark Carney, Value(s): Climate, Credit, Covid, and How We Focus on What Matters 264–65 (2021). See generally David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainability Imperative, Harv. Bus. Rev., May 2010, at 44; Rebecca Henderson, Reimagining Capitalism in a World on Fire (2020); Mariana Mazzucato, Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism (2021); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 4. and the risks posed by climate change demand that U.S. courts revisit their hesitancy to vindicate environmental rights and respond to the need to address climate change and establish a more sustainable foundation for the American economy. I advance several legal theories and accompanying political strategies for expanding environmental rights in America—consistent with emerging norms across the country and around the world and the increasingly clear epidemiological and ecological evidence that deteriorating environmental conditions threaten the capacity of humanity to flourish in the years ahead. Ultimately, I argue that the key to progress might well not be found in the expansion of individual environmental rights per se, but rather in the emerging norm against uninternalized environmental externalities—the acceptance of which makes pollution spillovers unacceptable. Thus, the most promising pathway to expanded environmental rights in America might be through the assertion of the environmental rights of the people in a negative construct—that is, the right of individuals not to be harmed by pollution.

I conclude the Article with a reflection on the ongoing relevance of Christopher Stone’s 1972 vision of humanity’s moral development over time leading to the gradual extension of rights to those who (and that which) had previously been left out of legal personhood and thus the law’s protection.11Stone, supra note 1, at 450. But rather than emphasize the value of extending legal rights to natural objects,12Id. at 456. I urge that human rights be understood to encompass a natural law right to a habitable environment—accomplishing through a different route Stone’s call for a “new conception of man’s relationship to the rest of nature . . . [as] a step towards solving the material planetary problems.”13Id. at 495. Rather than give trees standing, I propose a narrower path forward based on declaring an end to uninternalized externalities and asserting the right of each person to physical integrity and freedom from pollution. In doing so, we can give American citizens standing to challenge harmful emissions and stop the damage to the Earth systems that threatens to make the planet uninhabitable for humanity.

I.  ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

Environmental rights have increasingly been recognized as foundational to human rights. In recent decades, many nations have enshrined rights to a healthy environment in one form or another in their constitutions. The near-universal acceptance of environmental rights provides a starting point for the argument that the right to a healthy environment should be recognized as an element of natural law.

A.  Environmental Rights as Human Rights

Over the past fifty years, much of the world has come to recognize environmental rights as fundamental to human existence—and therefore to be understood as natural rights that need not be expressly or specifically established by statute or governmental edict.14See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 Stan. Env’t L.J. 71, 129 (2005); Lavanya Rajamani, The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based Perspectives in the International Negotiations on Climate Change, 22 J. Env’t L. 391, 391–430 (2010); Lavanya Rajamani, Human Rights in the Climate Change Regime: From Rio to Paris and Beyond, in The Human Right to a Healthy Environment 236–37 (John H. Knox & Ramin Pejan eds., 2018); Lavanya Rajamani, Integrating Human Rights in the Paris Climate Architecture: Contest, Context, and Consequence, 9 Climate L. 180, 183–86 (2019); U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Rep. of the Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 2009); Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation, 7 Transnat’l Env’t L. 37, 42–45 (2017); Parker et al., supra note 4, at 67. While the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not mention the environment specifically, it does recognize rights to life and to security.15G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). Moreover, just two decades later as environmental consciousness was rising around the world, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution highlighting the relationship between environmental quality and human rights.16G.A. Res. 2398 (XXIII), Problems of the Human Environment (Dec. 3, 1968). In reflecting on this resolution and the momentum building for greater focus on environmental protection at the time of the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Janusz Symonides, a prominent Polish jurist and academic, observed that the right to a clean environment must be understood as a universal human right because the ability to enjoy other fundamental rights, including the right to life, depends on it.17Janusz Symonides, Human Right to a Clean, Balanced and Protected Environment, 20 Int’l J. Legal Info. 24, 24–25 (1992).

The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which emerged from the U.N. Conference, strengthened this conclusion with a further observation: “Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights—even the right to life itself.”18Rep. of the U.N. Conf. on the Hum. Env’t, at 3–5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972). But the governments in Stockholm declined to specify what might be encompassed by this right, encouraging scholars and rights activists to develop their own definitions and conceptions.19Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have Been Recognized?, 35 Denv. J. Int’l L & Pol’y 129, 132 (2006) (“The lack of state support at the Stockholm Conference for pronouncing a substantive right to environment (proposed by the United States) led scholars and activists during the following decade to consider human rights in a more instrumental fashion, to give content to environmental rights by identifying those rights whose enjoyment could be considered a prerequisite to effective environmental protection.”). Most notably, Alexandre Kiss, a French diplomat and scholar, offered a series of publications that explored different dimensions of environmental rights centered on the theory that environmental protection is essential to what it is to be human.20Alexandre Kiss, Définition et Nature Juridique d’un Droit de l’Homme à l’Environment, in Environnement et Droits de l’Homme 13, 16–17 (Pascale Kromarek ed., 1987) (Fr.). Kiss argued that Principle I of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration—asserting a “fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being”—had become so well established as to be added to the category of fundamental rights, the enjoyment of which is guaranteed to all individuals.21Id. at 28. He further explained that these environmental rights create obligations (not only for states but also for individuals), duties to future generations, and “remedies in the event of environmental harm.”22Id. at 18, 23, 27; Alexandre Kiss, Le Droit à la Conservation de l’Environnement, 2 Revue Universelle des Droits de l’homme 445 (1990) (Fr.); see also Shelton, supra note 19, at 132.

As the world community prepared to gather in 1992 for the second Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Professor Dinah Shelton further developed the argument for recognizing environmental rights as fundamental to human rights. She critiqued many of the theories of environmental rights that were common at the time, noting that none of them was “fully articulated.”23Shelton, supra note 3, at 106. Shelton ultimately concluded that an approach that viewed “human rights and environmental protection as each representing different, but overlapping, societal values” showed the most promise—and that a “clearly and narrowly defined international human right to a safe and healthy environment” could achieve objectives in human rights law and environmental law.24Id. at 103, 105.

The breadth of support for the recognition of environmental rights has strengthened in recent years. In 2008, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted Council Resolution 7/23, which affirmed the council’s view that “climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.”25See Peel & Osofsky, supra note 14, at 42. The 2022 U.N. General Assembly Resolution—adopted with 161 votes in favor (including the United States) and just eight abstentions—declaring access to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment to be a universal human right represents the latest manifestation of this growing consensus.26G.A. Res. 76/300 (July 28, 2022); see also UN General Assembly Declares Access to Clean and Healthy Environment a Universal Human Right, UN News (July 28, 2022), https://news.un.org/
en/story/2022/07/1123482 [https://perma.cc/QG6J-AGA6].
Momentum continues to build, as the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted in 2022 a biodiversity conservation framework designed to accommodate the “rights of nature and rights of Mother Earth.27Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, at 5, U.N. Doc. CBD/COP/15/L.25 (Dec. 18, 2022).

B.  Constitutional Recognition of Environmental Rights

The importance of environmental conditions to human flourishing is now so widely recognized and highly valued that 150 nations highlight the importance of the environment in their constitutions.28U.N. Envtl. Programme, Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.unep.org/resources/assessment/environmental-rule-law-first-global-report [https://perma.
cc/QQ9M-LQKJ].
More than 100 nations now have constitutions that expressly recognize a right to a healthy environment in some form.29See infra Appendix. As David Boyd explains in his seminal study, The Environmental Rights Revolution, three concurrent waves of rights conceptualization in the second half of the 20th century contributed to the firm footing of environmental rights in constitutions today: (1) growth in democratic governance; (2) a global “rights revolution”; and (3) public awareness of severe environmental degradation.30David R. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment 3–19 (2011). Against the backdrop of expanding rights discourse and ecological consciousness, over half of the world’s constitutions were written or re-written, with many of those doing the drafting seizing this opportunity to establish a legal right to a healthy environment.31See Vivien Hart, U.S. Instit. Peace, Special Report 107: Democratic Constitution Making 2 (2003) (stating that more than half of the world’s national constitutions have been rewritten in the past half-century); see also infra Section II.B (outlining many of the instances in which nations have taken advantage of constitution-making to establish legal rights to a healthy environment). Indeed, over this period environmental rights have been the fastest-growing provision in constitutional revisions.32David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762, 775 (2012). While it may be difficult to establish a precise causal link, Boyd demonstrates a consistent correlation between a formal right to a healthy environment and strengthened environmental governance and results.33Boyd, supra note 30, at 253–77.

The extent to which nations have constitutionalized environmental rights depends on country-specific context. For example, some resource-rich countries explicitly connect environmental rights to public access to the benefits of the country’s natural resources.34E.g., Konstitutsiia Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 8 (Russ.) (“Land and other natural resources shall be utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis of the life and activity of the peoples living on the territories concerned.”); Türkmenistanyn Konstitusiyasy [Constitution] art. 53 (Turkm.) (“The state shall control the rational use of natural resources in order to protect and improve healthy living conditions, as well as conservation of the stable natural environment.”); Konstytutsiya Ukrayiny [Constitution] art. 13 (Ukr.) (“The land, its subsoil, atmosphere, water and other natural resources within the territory of Ukraine, the natural resources of its continental shelf, and the exclusive (maritime) economic zone, are objects of the right of property of the Ukrainian people.”); Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 32 (“The state shall preserve and effectively exploit [the State’s natural resources] may not deplete them, and shall observe the rights of future generations to them.”). Many island nations, perhaps recognizing their vulnerability to ecosystem damage, instead highlight the government’s duty to preserve an “ecologically balanced environment.”35E.g., Constituição da República de Cabo Verde [Constitution] 1980, art. 70(1) (Cape Verde); Constitution of the Republic of the Maldives, 2008, art. 22; Constitution de la République des Seychelles [Constitution], June 18, 1993, art 38 (Sey.). And a number of countries formerly constituting the Soviet Union include specific protections for the public’s access to “information about the environment,”36Konstytutsiya Ukrayiny [Constitution] art. 50 (Ukr.); Konst. RF [Constitution] art. 42 (Russ.); Latvijas Republikas Satversme [Constitution],  Nov. 18, 1918, reinstated May 4, 1990, art. 115 (Lat.); see also Kanstytucyja Respubliki Bielaruś [Constitution], Mar. 15, 1994, art. 34 (Belr.) (“State bodies, public associations and officials shall afford citizens of the Republic of Belarus with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with material that affects their rights and legitimate interests.”). likely inspired by the Soviet Union’s tradition of state-sponsored disinformation and the specific failure to share critical facts about the Chernobyl nuclear crisis.

C.  Environmental Rights as Natural Law

The increasingly universal recognition of environmental rights suggests that every person should have access to basic environmental amenities—including clean air to breathe, safe water to drink, freedom from exposure to toxic chemicals, and functioning Earth systems (including a stable climate) that provide a “safe operating space for humanity.”37Johan Rockström, Will Steffen, Kevin Noone, Åsa Persson, F. Stuart Chapin III, Eric Lambin, Timothy M. Lenton, Marten Scheffer, Carl Folke, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Björn Nykvist, Cynthia A. de Wit, Terry Hughes, Sander van der Leeuw, Henning Rodhe, Sverker Sörlin, Peter K. Snyder, Robert Costanza, Uno Svedin, Malin Falkenmark, Louise Karlberg, Robert W. Corell, Victoria J. Fabry, James Hansen, Brian Walker, Diana Liverman, Katherine Richardson, Paul Crutzen & Jonathan Foley, Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 14 Ecology & Soc’y 32, 33 (2009). So fundamental is this right to human existence that it must be understood to have independent and intrinsic value—and not simply instrumental importance as a pathway to the fulfillment of other fundamental rights such as the right to life or health. Many legal commentators have thus concluded that the right to a healthy environment should be seen as an element of the universal moral principles that must be regarded as sacrosanct in all societies at all times.38See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 741, 745–49 (2012) (arguing for a global analog to the public trust doctrine, including accompanying environmental rights, on the basis of natural law); Brendan F. Brown, International Environmental Law and the Natural Law, 18 Loy. L. Rev. 679, 687–92 (1971) (exploring natural law implications of environmental rights internationally); Scott A. Davison, A Natural Law Based Environmental Ethic, 14 Ethics & Env’t 1, 1–5 (2009) (arguing that philosopher Mark Murphy’s book Natural Law and Practical Rationality should be applicable in the environmental rights context).

Along with my colleague Don Elliott, I have argued that the U.S. Congress highlighted the existence of environmental rights at the time of the 1970 adoption of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when it declared: “The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.”39Elliott & Esty, supra note 9, at 511 (emphasis added). Note that the Congress did not establish this right, but rather recognized it. In doing so, the Congress suggested that NEPA was intended to provide mechanisms to vindicate a pre-existing natural law right to a “healthful environment” and to clarify the obligation of every American to protect the environment. But the central thrust of this Article is not to make the case for environmental rights as an element of natural law but rather to map the environmental rights terrain in search of an explanation as to why U.S. courts have been hesitant to accept such rights. Part II takes up this quest.

II.  DEVELOPMENT OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE

In the face of the existential threat posed by climate change and a growing recognition that a commitment to sustainability must be a foundational feature of twenty-first-century life, courts around the world have advanced environmental rights in recent years and issued decisions that required both governments and corporations to address a diverse set of ecological and public health harms—including the risk of climate change from a build-up of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) in the atmosphere. In their totality, these decisions by trial courts, appeals courts, and constitutional courts across the world make clear that environmental protection is now seen as a fundamental right in many societies. I begin in Section II.A with a discussion of the international and transnational legal framework that has underpinned many of these decisions—and explore the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in this respect. In Section II.B, I extract some common themes from the environmental decisions of national courts around the world.

A.  Transnational Courts and Environmental Rights

In recent years, the belief that access to a healthy environment is essential to the fulfillment of other human rights has increasingly been upheld in international legal proceedings.40Bridget Lewis, Environmental Rights or a Right to the Environment?: Exploring the Nexus Between Human Rights and Environmental Protection, 8 Macquarie J. Int’l & Comp. Env’t. L. 36, 37–39 (2012). See generally Annalisa Savaresi & Joana Setzer, Rights-Based Litigation in the Climate Emergency: Mapping the Landscape and New Knowledge Frontiers, 13 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t 7 (2022); Peel & Osofsky, supra note 14; Juan Auz, Human Rights-Based Climate Litigation: A Latin American Cartography, 13 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t 114 (2022). For example, Justice Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice observed in his Gabcikovo-Nagymaros opinion that protection of the environment is “a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself.”41Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 4, 91 (Sep. 25) (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.).

This jurisprudence is underpinned in large part by language in a suite of treaties, which provide further international undergirding for environmental rights. Most notably, four regional agreements establish a right to a healthy environment: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Aarhus Convention, the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, and the 2004 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights.42African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) art. 24, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/ rev. 5; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) art. 1, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.S.T. 447; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (San Salvador Protocol) art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988; Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 38, May 22, 2004, 12 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893. Together, these treaties have 126 independent signatories, comprising a healthy majority of all sovereign states.43David Boyd, John Knox & Marc Limon, #TheTimeIsNow: The Case for Universal Recognition of the Right to a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, Universal Rts.
Grp., 8 (2021), https://www.universal-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2021_URG_R2HE_
TIME_REPORT_MM.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F83-PAP5].
While these treaties do not cover every nation—with the United States being one of the notable non-signatories—they bolster a global sentiment that humans have a fundamental right to a healthy environment.

Nowhere is the trend toward recognition of environmental rights more visible than at the ECtHR.44See Peel & Osofsky, supra note 14, at 64; see also Jacques Hartmann & Marc Willers QC, Protecting Rights Through Climate Change Litigation Before European Courts, 13 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t 90 (2022). Indeed, while the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) has no explicit reference to the environment, the ECtHR has developed “an elaborate and extensive body of case law which all but in name provides for a right to a healthy environment.”45Ole W. Pedersen, The European Court of Human Rights and International Environmental Law, in The Human Right to a Healthy Environment 86, 86 (John H. Knox & Ramin Pejan eds., 2018). In fact, the ECtHR Registry (which acts as the administrative support structure for the Court) has produced an extensive “Guide to the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights” that explains ECtHR case law on environmental issues.46See generally Eur. Ct. H.R. Registry, Guide to the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights (Aug. 31, 2022), https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Environment_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6ZV-D48U]. Likewise, the court’s Press Unit has compiled a fact sheet with cases related to the environment. ECtHR Press Unit, Environment and the European Convention on Human Rights (June 2022), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/fs_environment_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K6ZV-D48U].

The ECtHR has an environmental history going back to noise pollution cases in the 1980s.47Arrondelle v. United Kingdom, App No. 7889/77, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 118 (1982); Baggs v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13 (1985); Powell v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 41, ¶¶ 40–46 (1990). Arrondelle and Baggs were accepted by the ECtHR but were settled before they made it to the court. The ECtHR made a decision in Powell and considered that noise pollution by airplanes can adversely affect the quality of someone’s private life but ultimately did not determine that Article 8 was violated. In 1994, the court explicitly recognized that environmental harms may “affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely” as protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.48Ostra v. Spain, App No. 16798/90, ¶ 51 (1994). Also see an earlier case, in which the ECtHR considered that noise pollution by airplanes can adversely affect the quality of someone’s private life but ultimately did not determine that Article 8 was violated, Powell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81, ¶¶ 40–46 (1990). The ECtHR has found ECHR Article 8 violations related to air pollution49Çiçek v. Turkey, App. No. 44837/07, ¶¶ 22–26 (2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
app/conversion/docx/?library=ECHR&id=001-201673&filename=%C3%87%C4%B0%C3%87EK%20
AND%20OTHERS%20v.%20TURKEY.docx&logEvent=False [https://perma.cc/2ATH-EYWF]. See ¶¶ 22–26 for an overview of the case-law of the court where Article 8 was violated in cases about air pollution. Id.
and other environmental risks, such as the proximity of a dangerous chemical plant,50Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89 (1998). mines,51Taskin v. Turkey, App. No. 46117/99 (2004); Tătar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01 (2009). or a waste treatment facility,52Giacomelli v. Italy, App. No. 59909/00 (2006). as well as potential water contamination by a cemetery close to a home.53Dzemyuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 42488/02 (2014). The ECtHR has also invoked the right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR in a few cases when environmental harms posed a direct risk to someone’s life.54Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99 (2004); Kolyadenko v. Russia, App. Nos. 17423/05, 20534/05, 20678/05, 23263/05, 24283/05, 35673/05 (2012). But these cases remain rare and not central to the court’s environmental rights jurisprudence.

The court’s decisions suggest that governments retain a degree of flexibility in addressing environmental harms and weighing them against other interests, such as the country’s economic well-being.55Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, ¶ 97 (2003); Giacomelli v. Italy, App. No. 59909/00, ¶ 78 (2006). But the ECtHR has been clear that states have a positive obligation to take preventive measures to address environmental harms.56See Hudorovič v. Slovenia, App. Nos. 24816/14 & 25140/14, ¶ 140 (2020) (finding no violation of Article 8), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-201646 [https://perma.cc/RE9Q-QQK3].

B.  Environmental Rights Jurisprudence Around the World

An ever-growing list of countries around the world are seeing their courts act decisively in the face of environmental disputes. These courts have demonstrated a much greater willingness to make findings and order governmental action with regard to climate change and other sustainability threats than have American courts, as will be explored in Part III in greater detail. Many foreign courts have explicitly recognized substantive environmental rights and a governmental duty of care towards citizens with regards to environmental quality or climate stability, even if they have left the specific path forward to be defined by other branches of government.

       A number of courts have questioned the adequacy of their government’s efforts to mitigate or adapt to climate change57Savaresi & Setzer, supra note 40, at 21.—especially in light of the nationally determined contributions to which they committed as part of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Courts around the world have held that their country’s respective governments had run afoul of their constitutional,58Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No.25501 (HC Lahore) (Pak.); Gerechtshof Den Haag 9 Oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) [hereinafter Urgenda]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG]
[Federal Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 2656/18, Mar. 24, 2021 [hereinafter Neubauer], https://
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2021/03/rs20210324_1bvr265618
en.html [https://perma.cc/RM93-SLZ9]; Conseil d’Etat (CE) [highest administrative court] Nov. 19, 2020,
No. 427301 (Fr.), https://www.conseil-etat.fr/actualites/actualites/emissions-de-gaz-a-effet-de-serre-
le-gouvernement-doit-justifier-sous-3-mois-que-la-trajectoire-de-reduction-a-horizon-2030-pourra-etre-respectee [https://perma.cc/G2C7-9LY4]; see also Commune de Grande-Synthe v. France, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L.: Global Climate Change Litigation Database [hereinafter Grande-Synthe], http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/commune-de-grande-synthe-v-france/ [https://perma.
cc/4EDB-MWC3]; Plan B Earth & Others v. Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA (Civ) 214 (Eng.) (ordering British government to consider climate goals committed to in the Paris Agreement in conducting environmental impact assessment of a runway at Heathrow International Airport), rev’d, [2020] UKSC 52 (appeal taken from Eng.).
statutory,59Notre Affaire à Tous v. France, Administrative Court of Paris, No. 1904967, 1904968, 1904972, 1904976/4-1 (2021) (ordering the State and government ministers to take immediate and concrete actions to comply with its emissions-reduction objectives); Incident under Review R.A.(I) 81/2021, Eleventh Collegiate Court of the First Circuit in Administrative Matters, Mexico, [2021] FCA 560, 774 (2021); VZW Klimaatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium, Brussels Court of First Instance, 2015/4548/A (2021) (Bel.) (finding that the State and several federated entities violated a statutory duty of care by failing to adequately reduce carbon emissions but declining, on separation of powers grounds, to issue an injunction against the executive bodies of the State); Bushfire Survivors for Climate Action, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Authority, Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, [2021] NSWLEC 92 (Aus.). or common-law60See Sharma v. Minister for the Environment, Federal Court of Australia, [2022] FCAFC 65 (Aus.) (finding a common-law duty of care on the Government relating to the effects of climate change on the nation’s youth). But cf. Minister for the Environment v. Sharma, Federal Court of Australia, [2022] FCAFC 35 (Aus.) (overturning the lower court’s decision on the grounds that the creation of such a duty of care implicates policy questions outside of the judiciary’s competence). obligations (in some cases, violating the plaintiffs’ individual rights to a healthy environment) because of the insufficiency of their plan to reduce GHG emissions. Many courts—including those of France, Germany, Pakistan, and the Netherlands—responded61See cases cited supra notes 58–60. to these violations by ordering the governments to develop new frameworks for reducing greenhouse gas emissions—with Germany’s Constitutional Court ordering the federal parliament to adopt a new climate change mitigation plan.62Louis J. Kotzé, Neubauer et al. Versus Germany: Planetary Climate Litigation for the Anthropocene?, 22 Ger. L.J. 1423, 1424 (2021); see also Sher Singh v. Himachal Pradesh, No. 237 (THC)/2013 (CWPIL No.15 of 2010) (India) (in which India’s Green Tribunal ordered the State of Himachal Pradesh to reduce carbon emissions); Savaresi & Setzer, supra note 40, at 20–24 (breaking down obligations imposed on state actors by the courts in response to human rights-based climate litigation).

Some courts have been willing to entertain claims raised against private companies—or against the government vis-à-vis its failure to adequately regulate a private actor.63See Savaresi & Setzer, supra note 40, at 24. One of the first of such cases was the 2005 Nigerian case, Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum.64Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria, [2005] FHC/B/CS/53/05 AHRLR 151 (Nigeria). In that case, several plaintiffs filed suit against the Nigerian government for failing to stop Shell Petroleum from gas flaring, which they argued had devastating environmental effects in their local community. The Federal High Court—akin to a federal district court in the United States—ultimately found an environmental right in the Nigerian constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and it declared that Shell’s gas flaring violated these rights as well as other human rights to life and dignity, and that provisions of Nigerian law that allowed the gas flaring to take place violated the country’s constitution.65Id. In the Netherlands, the same district court that ordered the government to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions concluded in a separate case that Royal Dutch Shell had violated the environmental plaintiffs’ rights under the Dutch Civil Code and ordered Shell to reduce its GHG emissions by 45% by 2030 from the oil company’s 2019 baseline.66Rb. Den Haag 26 mei 2021, JBPR 2021/43, m.nt. Barbiers, D.L. e.a. (Milieudefensie/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.). As one law firm’s “alert” to clients observed, “this decision marks the first time any court in the world has imposed a duty on a company to do its share to prevent dangerous climate change . . . . Similarly situated companies should expect to be bound by the same rules.” Maurits Dolmans, Géraldine Bourguignon, Quinten De Keersmaecker, Michael J. Preston & Emma O’Brien, Dutch Court Orders Shell to Reduce Emissions in First Climate Change Ruling Against Company, Cleary Gottlieb (June 30, 2021), clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2021/dutch-court-orders-shell-to-reduce-emissions-in-first-climate-change-ruling-against-company.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GC3G-36MP].

And while explicit rights for Nature remain rare in national constitutions or in global jurisprudence,67See generally Stilt, supra note 2 (discussing global development of rights of nature and animals). developments in Colombia and Ecuador have bucked this broader trend. In Ecuador, the Pachamama (or “Mother Earth” to indigenous Ecuadorians) has been protected in its constitution since the late 2000s. In 2021, the Constitutional Court gave this protection real force in holding that mining undertaken by Enami, the state mining company, in an ecologically sensitive part of the rainforest was unconstitutional. It grounded its decision not only in the rights of nature—but also tied those rights to human rights to the environment. Judge Agustín Grijalva Jiménez wrote:

The concept of nature that the Constitution develops in Article 71 includes human beings as an inextricable part of nature, and of the life it reproduces and realizes in its breast . . . . In order to highlight this relationship, the Constitution in its preamble states that Mother Nature is vital for our existence. Here the Constitution perceives (or pays close attention to) the fact that humanity’s own existence is inevitably tied to that of nature, for he conceives it as part of himself. The rights of nature necessarily span to the rights of humanity as a species of nature.68Constitutional Court of Ecuador, Case No. 1149-19-JP/21, Nov. 10, 2021. The author expresses appreciation to Sara Gomez for assistance in translating the Ecuadorian decision, which was published in Spanish.

In a similar case, Colombia’s Supreme Court accepted the claims of a group of youth plaintiffs who argued that their rights to a healthy environment were being debased by the government’s failure to end deforestation in the Colombian Amazon region. In its 2018 Future Generations decision, the Court declared that “fundamental rights of life, health, the minimum substance, freedom, and human dignity are substantially linked and determined by the environment” and ordered development of a plan to address the deforestation concerns brought forward by the plaintiffs.69Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala Civ. abril 5, 2018, M.P: L. Villabona, Expediente 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01 (Colom.). The Court also granted the Amazon Basin something akin to legal personhood, finding that it was a “subject of rights” and was therefore “entitled to protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration.”70Rachel Shuen, Comment, Addressing a Constitutional Right to Safe Climate: Using the Court System to Secure Climate Justice, 24 J. Gender Race & Just. 377, 394 (2021).

These decisions reflect the effect of international legal regimes in many countries around the world. Many of the decisions favorable to environmental rights have linked together generic rights in national constitutions—such as a general right to life—with more specific protections in transnational treaties or agreements to craft a right to a healthy environment.71Urgenda, supra note 58; Neubauer, supra note 58; Grande-Synthe, supra note 58; Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria, [2005] FHC/B/CS/53/05 AHRLR 151 (Nigeria). The remedies that have been developed in these countries have not always been terribly specific. The orders in several European courts that governments reduce greenhouse gas emissions left the governments space to design their own plans—though in some cases, the government remained under the supervision of the court as it developed a plan.72Grande-Synthe, supra note 58; Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2018) W.P. No. 25501 (HC Lahore) (Pak.). Indeed, in Pakistan, the court-created Climate Change Commission was designed to facilitate cooperation among government officials—not to function as a judicially imposed policymaking force.73R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 295, 343–44 (2017); Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Foreword to Climate Change Litigation in the Asia Pacific xi, xiii (Jolene Lin & Douglas A. Kysar eds., 2020).

C.  Conclusions from Survey of Global Environmental Rights Cases

Three broad conclusions can be drawn from this survey of the judicial response to environmental claims. First, environmental rights are being recognized ever more broadly across the world. Second, the frame and scope of these rights and the underlying legal theories advanced vary across the world—reflecting the individual circumstances, judicial traditions, values, and political dynamics of each society. Finally, the United States stands apart from the rest of the world with regard to the broad trend toward court recognition of environmental rights, clearly suggesting a distinct legal framework and tradition, which is the subject of Part III.

III.  UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The pattern that emerges from Part II of expanding judicial recognition of environmental rights—except in the United States—requires us to delve into the issue of American judicial exceptionalism in the environmental context. Specifically, why are U.S. courts an outlier with regard to recognizing environmental rights? A number of explanatory factors are explored below in pursuit of a better understanding of the unique elements of America’s legal structure and traditions that translate into a more constricted view of environmental rights than exists in other countries, particularly other economically advanced democracies.

A.  The State of Climate Litigation in the United States

Litigants in the United States seeking to enforce their environmental rights or advance the U.S. response to climate change have faced a skeptical judiciary. Of particular note in this regard, in the 2022 case of West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court found that the EPA lacked authority under the Clean Air Act’s statutory framework to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing coal and gas-fired power plants via “generation-shifting”—a regulatory mechanism akin to a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases.74West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614 (2022). In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on a separation of powers argument and a refinement of its political question jurisprudence—advanced as a major questions doctrine.75Id. I also note that, unlike foreign and international courts, the Supreme Court made no mention of the Paris Agreement in its decision. See id.; cf. cases cited supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.

In Juliana v. United States, arguably the most high-profile climate case in the federal courts to date, twenty-one youth plaintiffs, organized by an Oregon-based environmental group called Our Children’s Trust, asserted that their substantive due process rights to a life-sustaining climate system had been violated and, further, that the federal government had failed to uphold its public trust doctrine obligation to protect shared natural resources. The Oregon District Court initially ruled that the case could go forward based on the theory that “a climate system capable of sustaining human life” was a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.76Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). But the Ninth Circuit, while conceding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated the risks of climate change and the federal government’s contribution to the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere,77Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2020). declared that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The panel majority based this conclusion on a legal finding that the injury plaintiffs sought to have addressed was not “redressable” by the courts.78Id. at 1175. More specifically, the majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit panel leans on separation of powers arguments79Id. at 1171–73 (citing Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019)). and the limits of authority of Article III judges80Id. at 1174–75 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011)). to suggest that, in providing equitable relief, courts are always constrained and can only act where they can identify “limited and precise” legal standards to follow.81Id. at 1173. See generally Juliana v. United States: Ninth Circuit Holds that Developing and Supervising Plan to Mitigate Anthropogenic Climate Change Would Exceed Remedial Powers of Article III Court, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 1929 (2021). For a helpful discussion of proposed legal standards, see Lucy Maxwell, Sarah Mead & Dennis van Berkel, Standards for Adjudicating the Next Generation of Urgenda-Style Climate Cases, 13 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t 35 (2022).

Climate change litigants in state courts have faced similar hurdles. In 2020, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected public trust doctrine claims from a group of similar youth climate plaintiffs—including the lead plaintiff in Juliana—in Chernaik v. Brown. The court majority concluded that the doctrine applied only to the management of navigable waters and underlying lands—and should not be extended to include the atmosphere, nor does it require state action to address climate change as a potential source of damage to these resources.82Chernaik v. Brown, 475 P.3d 68, 80–82 (Or. 2020).

In 2021, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected a similar claim in Aji P. ex rel. Piper v. State,83Aji P. ex rel. Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438, 447–51 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). in which youth climate plaintiffs asserted fundamental rights to a stable climate system. The court ultimately held that the claims presented non-justiciable political questions. The Supreme Court of Washington denied review of the appellate court’s decision,84Aji P. v. State, 497 P.3d 350 (Wash. 2021). with two justices dissenting.85Id. at 351–53 (González, C.J., dissenting). While declaring that the “right to a stable environment should be fundamental,”86Aji P., 480 P.3d at 444. the Court of Appeals leaned heavily on the logic of separation of powers and the political question doctrine as spelled out in the Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr decision87Id. at 447 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). in dismissing the plaintiffs’ case.

The Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar decision in the 2022 Sagoonick v. State case.88Sagoonick v. State, 503 P.3d 777 (Alaska 2022). There, the plaintiffs advanced arguments similar to those of the plaintiffs in Juliana, Chernaik, and Aji P.89Id. at 791 (laying out plaintiffs’ claims, including an alleged “fundamental and inalienable right[] to . . . a stable climate system that sustains human life and liberty,” a violation of the public trust doctrine, and age-based discrimination against the youth plaintiffs). But see id. at 789–90, 803–05 (noting that plaintiffs challenged the denial of a petition they made to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation “to adopt an agency rule ensuring carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions . . . have a ‘reduction trajectory that is based on best climate science’ ”). But the court rejected their claims based on the conclusion that the plaintiffs raised non-justiciable political questions.90Id. at 793. Though the court acknowledged that, under the Alaska Constitution, it did have a role to play in supervising the state’s management of natural resources,91Id. at 788 (“[O]ur role . . . is ensuring that constitutional principles are followed, particularly the mandate that ‘natural resources are to be made available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.’ ”) (citing Sullivan v. Resisting Env’t Destruction on Indigenous Lands, 311 P.3d 625, 634–35 (Alaska 2013)); see also Sullivan, 311 P.3d at 634 (holding that the “consideration of cumulative impacts” during environmental impact assessments “is constitutionally required throughout all the phases of a project”). those same constitutional provisions also “expressly delegated to the legislature the duty to balance competing priorities for the collective benefit of all Alaskans.”92Sagoonick, 503 P.3d at 796. The court declined to intervene in the face of these political questions, but it noted that the plaintiffs had several alternative avenues for recourse, including the challenging of “discrete actions implementing State resource development and environmental policies,” pursuing a ballot initiative to codify their preferred policies, and lobbying state policymakers.93Id. at 798–99.

In finding that the relief requested by plaintiffs (a court order for more aggressive government policies to address climate change) has no judicially manageable standards and risks usurping the authority of the legislative and executive branches,94Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 2020); Sagoonick, 503 P.3d at 797–99; Aji P. ex rel. Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438, 448–49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). the courts here followed a venerable tradition of judicial restraint within U.S. courts, but one to which the judiciary does not always adhere—as I explore further below.

B.  No Environmental Provision in the U.S. Constitution

Perhaps the most obvious place to start the search for an explanation for the resistance of U.S. courts to assertions of environmental rights lies in the absence of any explicit environmental or public health provision in the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, in almost all of the international environmental rights cases reviewed in Part II above, courts make reference to provisions in the country’s constitution or other foundational legal documents (including reliance on the ECHR). But only in a minority of cases was the constitutional provision one that specifically mentions the environment. Much more often, courts read environmental rights into provisions for life or health. Of course, the U.S. Constitution does not make mention of these terms either.

       But this explanation is not fully satisfactory. Other countries with constitutions that make no mention of the environment or related terms have seen the judiciary expand environmental rights and even extend legal protection to elements of Nature. In fact, my research suggests that thirty-seven other nations find themselves in a similar posture (see Appendix). But courts in many of these countries have advanced a broader view of environmental rights than is found in the United States. In fact, some of these nations have been trailblazers in judicial recognition of fundamental rights in support of environmental protection claims. In New Zealand, for example, where there is no constitutional provision for environmental rights, the Whanganui River has been given legal personhood with the Maori people who claim ancestral rights to the waterway acting in a trusteeship role to ensure the resource is protected.95David Takacs, We Are the River, 2021 U. Ill. L. Rev. 545, 547 (2021); Katie Surma, Does Nature Have Rights? A Burgeoning Legal Movement Says Rivers, Forests and Wildlife Have Standing, Too, Inside Climate News (Sept. 19, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/19092021/rights-of-nature-legal-movement/ [https://perma.cc/5N6M-6MQC]. Likewise, although Canada lacks explicit environmental language in its constitution, its courts have repeatedly affirmed the authority of federal policies that regulate for the purpose of environmental protection. And multiple Canadian courts have assigned environmental rights to Aboriginal titleholders as well as Aboriginal title lands.96Lynda M. Collins, Safeguarding the Longue Durée: Environmental Rights in the Canadian Constitution, 71 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 519, 527–28 (2015); Randy Kapashesit & Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protection, 36 McGill L.J. 925 (1990).

In other countries, the executive branches have asserted environmental rights in advancing pollution control and sustainability initiatives. In Kiribati, for example, despite an absence of constitutionally enshrined environmental rights, the government has developed an extensive right-based national policy focused on a healthy environment, and the nation’s political leaders have spoken at lengths on the global stage about the need to advance this right worldwide.97Ministry of Env’t, Lands, & Agric. Dev., Kiribati Integrated Environment Policy (2013); Silja Klepp & Johannes Herbeck, The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region, 7 J. Hum. Rts. & Env’t. 54, 54–56 (2016). Similarly, Japan’s legislature introduced a mandamus action within its Administrative Case Litigation Act in 2004, which the Japanese Supreme Court has interpreted as a rights-based obligation on the government to minimize damage to health from environmental pollution.98Noriko Okubo, Judicial Control over Acts of Administrative Omission: Environmental Rule of Law and Recent Case Law in Japan, in Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development: Horizontal and Sectorial Policy Issues 189–202 (Volker Mauerhofer ed., 2016); Yuichiro Tsuji, The Legal Issues on Environmental Administrative Lawsuits Under the Amendment of ACLA in Japan, 1 Yonsei L.J. 339, 339–62 (2010).

While the lack of explicit or implicit environmental provisions in the U.S. Constitution starts to explain the narrow view of environmental rights emerging from American courts, it cannot be seen as a full explanation given the divergent outcomes across the world in climate change cases and other legal challenges based on environmental rights.

C.  Non-Justiciability and Judicial Deference to the Political Branches

In the recent U.S. court decisions dismissing environmental rights claims, the standing of plaintiffs to bring a case has almost always been rejected based on the legal theory that courts cannot provide the remedy being sought—notably, a court order mandating more vigorous climate change policies. This conclusion builds on the separation of powers, political question, and the recently articulated major questions doctrines, as well as the longstanding Baker v. Carr framework, which suggests that courts should only take up cases where there are “appropriate modes of effective judicial relief.”99Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259 (1962). But as noted in Part II above, other courts around the world have not hesitated to declare government policies inadequate and order the remedies requested in similar circumstances. So why does the United States stand apart?

Perhaps the real explanation lies in the seriousness with which courts in the United States struggle with the issue of whether the injuries for which plaintiffs seek redress are within the power of the judiciary to address. In the Juliana case, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs had alleged particularized claims of injury from GHG emissions that could be linked to federal government actions (including leases and subsidies) in support of fossil fuel producers.100Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2020). But the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the redressability requirement for standing. The majority opinion rejects the notion that courts could “order, design, supervise, or implement” the sort of climate change action plan that plaintiffs sought.101Id. at 1171–72. The two-judge majority goes on to declare that the plaintiffs must take their concerns to the “political branches” of the government.102Id. at 1175.

This line of reasoning fits into a long American tradition of courts steering clear of political questions that are deemed to be better resolved by the political branches of the government—including in a series of prior cases involving environmental claims.103See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). See generally Philip Weinberg, Political Questions: An Invasive Species Infecting the Courts, 19 Duke Env’t L. & Pol’y 155, 155–56 (2008). While invoking the political question doctrine to avoid adjudicating environmental cases is common in American courts, it is not uniquely American. See, e.g., Greenpeace v. United Kingdom [2021] CSIH 53 (Scot.) (“The issue [of assessing “the environmental effects of a project for the extraction of fossil fuels”] is essentially a political and not a legal one . . . .”). The Juliana majority notes that the transition to renewable energy requires “a host of complex policy decisions entrusted, for better or worse, to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches.”104Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171.

But is this outcome really mandated? Couldn’t the court have declared the government’s current climate change posture inadequate and ordered a ramped-up response to the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere—while leaving the details of how to do so to the other branches? As Aharon Barak, former Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, observes in The Judge in a Democracy, which analyzes the role of the judiciary, “[T]he separation of powers is not pure and . . . each branch performs some functions that belong to the other branches[] so long as they are intimately related to the branch’s primary function.”105Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy 37 (2006). Barak goes on to argue that the principle of checks and balances stands alongside the separation of powers as a foundational element of a functioning democracy—thus requiring the judiciary to act if the other branches fail to uphold the law or otherwise perform their duties.106Id. at 42–44. He concludes:

The more non-justiciability is expounded, the less opportunity judges have for bridging the gap between law and society and for protecting the constitution and democracy. . . . [T]he court should not abdicate its role in a democracy merely because it is uncomfortable or fears tension with the other branches of the state.107Id. at 177–78.

As Part II demonstrates, courts around the world seem to follow this principle in their willingness to step into environmental controversies, including cases that require them to declare the policies of the government inadequate—and to order more robust responses, including but not limited to climate change policies, to the claims of a diverse set of plaintiffs.

But the U.S. judiciary has traditionally taken a much narrower view of its proper role—and concomitantly has been much more likely than courts elsewhere to declare a matter non-justiciable when confronted with cases that seem to present political questions—following the Supreme Court’s guidance and multi-factor test established in Baker v. Carr.108Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (laying out six-factor test). In Juliana, for example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ request for relief would have entailed handling an issue committed to other branches of government (Baker v. Carr factor 1), forcing them into establishing a remedy where there were no judicially manageable standards (factor 2), and requiring the court to make policy determinations (factor 3). In finding the matter non-justiciable, the majority declared that they were “bound ‘to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, and disciplined by system’ ”109Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921)). and that “the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches,”110Id. at 1175. noting further and somewhat curiously “[t]hat the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well-intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.”111Id.

But this restraint is not mandated, as the dissent in Juliana makes clear. The dissenting Ninth Circuit judge signals that she would not have found the requested relief non-justiciable and believes that a court order that the federal government take more vigorous action to address climate change would be efficacious, even if such a command were not likely to fully solve the problem.112Id. at 1181–82 (Staton, J., dissenting). She rejects the majority’s “deference-to-a-fault” approach and highlights a “countervailing constitutional mandate to intervene where the other branches run afoul of our foundational principles.”113Id. at 1184.

Similar separation of powers and political question arguments dominate Aji P., in which the Washington Court of Appeals found plaintiffs’ claims nonjusticiable based on four of the Baker v. Carr factors. Notably, the majority concluded that: (1) the issues on which the plaintiffs sought judicial relief were “constitutionally committed” to the legislative and executive branches of government; (2) there exists no “judicially manageable standard” for providing relief; (3) the legislature and executive agencies have established climate change policies (albeit ones that plaintiffs believe are inadequate); and (4) judicial intervention in this case would “disrespect[] the coordinate branches” of government.114Aji P. ex rel. Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438, 447–48 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). While the Court of Appeals decision was upheld by the Washington Supreme Court, the Chief Justice dissented and indicated that he would have allowed the plaintiffs’ case to go forward, observing that “the Court of Appeals decision unnecessarily expanded the political question doctrine” and that “considerable statutory authority” supports the plaintiffs’ claim of fundamental environmental rights.115Aji P. v. State, 497 P.3d 350, 351–53 (Wash. 2021) (González, C.J., dissenting).

Similarly, the decision in Sagoonick was decided by just one vote and was issued over a vigorous dissent by Justice Peter Maassen, who noted that the state’s public trust doctrine incorporated a “constitutional right to a livable climate.”116Sagoonick v. State, 503 P.3d 777, 811 (Alaska 2022) (Maassen, J., dissenting in part). Justice Maassen criticized the majority for failing to issue a declaratory judgment “recogniz[ing] a constitutional right to a livable climate—arguably the bare minimum when it comes to the inherent human rights to which the Alaska Constitution is dedicated.”117Id. at 805. Justice Maassen further noted that the court had been repeatedly presented with the same question and that declining to answer it on justiciability grounds “will not eliminate it but will only postpone our answer, in the meantime putting the burden of redundantly litigating it on plaintiffs, the State, and the trial courts.”118Id. at 807. He added that recognition of the right does not require the court to develop a remedy itself, to immediately and fully “answer every subsequent question” about how the right might be invoked, or to convert any policy that harms the climate in the slightest into a rights violation—but that the court had a duty to answer the question.119Id. at 808–11.

Although the outcome in the Chernaik case in Oregon turned on the court’s unwillingness to expand the reach of the public trust doctrine, dissenting Chief Justice Martha Walters expressly rejected the suggestion that a judicial declaration regarding climate change would be inappropriate and such matters should be left to the legislative and executive branches. In fact, she concluded that “the judicial branch also has a role to play.”120Chernaik v. Brown, 475 P.3d 68, 84 (Or. 2020) (Walters, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion turns aside the separation of powers argument for judicial restraint, citing Marbury v. Madison and declaring that one of the core functions of the judicial branch “is to determine the legal authority and obligations of the other two branches of government.”121Id. at 88. In addition, the dissent takes apart the suggestion that the relief plaintiffs seek lacks judicially manageable standards (citing Baker v. Carr) and would require the court to make “particular policy decisions.”122Id. at 89. In rejecting the need for the court to show deference to the other branches in the face of a “political question,” Chief Justice Walters makes it clear that a court invalidating a policy decision of another branch is not the same thing as the court itself making a policy decision123Id. at 89–92.—and explains that she would have stepped up to the “obligation to determine what the law requires” and ordered a more robust state response to the threat climate change poses for public trust resources.124Id. at 93.

Signs that the tide may be turning in U.S. climate litigation have begun to emerge. Most notably, a trial court in Montana recently allowed the legal challenge brought by a group of youth plaintiffs to proceed to trial. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that several state statutory provisions violated the Montana Constitution’s environmental rights provision, the public trust doctrine, and their right to a stable climate system.125Alec Skuntz, Case Note, Held v. State, No. CDV-2020-307 (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2021), 1 Pub. Land & Res. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2021). The state argued that the claims presented by the plaintiffs presented non-justiciable political questions.126Id. at 8. In 2021, the trial court partially granted the state’s motion to dismiss on all requests for relief—except for the plaintiffs’ request for  declaratory judgment that the state had violated the plaintiffs’ rights.127Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 19, Held v. State, No. CDV-2020-307 (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2021). Accordingly, a trial will take place in 2023 on this question.128Lucas Thompson, Date Set for First Youth-Led Climate Trial in U.S. History, NBC
News (Feb. 7, 2022), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/date-set-first-youth-led-climate-trial-us-history-rcna11793 [https://perma.cc/8LQ4-AYR2].

Judges and justices in other countries have not felt constrained by separation of powers or political question concerns—nor about the risk that ordering action on climate change involves decisions that have no judicially manageable standards. Scholars have similarly raised questions about the logic and advisability of declaring cases to be non-justiciable. Justice Barak, for instance, condemns the concept of normative non-justiciability (of the sort Justice Brennan develops in Baker v. Carr in concluding that there will be no judicially manageable standards for addressing some issues). He argues that every dispute has “criteria for its resolution . . . . There is no sphere containing no law and no legal criteria . . . . The mere fact that an issue is ‘political’—that is, holding political ramifications and predominant political elements—does not mean that it cannot be resolved by a court.”129Barak, supra note 105, at 179. Justice Barak likewise rejects the notion of institutional non-justiciability. He declares Justice Brennan’s Baker v. Carr argument—that for a court to take up an issue that has been committed to another branch risks disrespecting a coordinate branch of the government or creating chaos with “multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”130Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).—to be “unconvincing.”131Barak, supra note 105, at 183. As Justice Barak observes, “all of the issues that are considered in constitutional or administrative law” have been entrusted to political authorities.132Id. at 184.

The jurisprudence of non-justiciability—and the tradition of judicial restraint in the face of cases that raise separation of powers issues or political questions—clearly represents a distinct element of the American legal tradition. U.S. judicial norms in this regard stand apart from the legal frameworks in place in other nations—as the next section explores in more detail.

D.  Negative Rights

While the opinions in U.S. environmental rights cases and the related academic literature focus on various elements of the separations of powers and political question doctrine, what more notably underlies the U.S. legal framework and sets the nation apart from the practice of judges elsewhere in the world (and particularly in Europe) is the American constitutional emphasis on securing negative rights and wariness about assertions of positive rights133San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (declining to hold that education is a “fundamental right” within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1970) (rejecting the idea that access to welfare is a fundamental right); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (requiring that, “to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,” rejecting the argument that higher standard of care is required (emphasis added)); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989) (rejecting the argument that a government agency’s failure to prevent child abuse does not violate the child’s right to liberty). The context of prisoner medical care is especially helpful for illustrating this point. Some circuits have adopted a standard that prisons are only required “to provide minimally adequate medical care.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying a “minimal standards of adequacy” standard).—at least at the federal level. So while the commentary centers on non-justiciability and the various Baker v. Carr factors, what undergirds the American exceptionalism is a distinct approach to rights—building, of course, on a federal Constitution that emerged at a moment in time when the critical issue was protecting the citizen from an abusive state, therefore translating into a document that emphasizes negative rights.

1.  Positive Rights in State Constitutions

In fact, the U.S. structure of rights is somewhat more complicated than just suggested. Notably, some U.S. state constitutions explicitly secure positive rights.134See Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions 135–92 (2009) (discussing the development of positive rights in state constitutions). See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 (1999); Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights (2013). Indeed, the Massachusetts Constitution (of 1780) establishes a right to education.135Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; see also Lawrence Friedman & Lynnea Thody, The Massachusetts Constitution 144 (2011) (discussing the development of Massachusetts’s right to education). Other states have also written positive rights into their constitutions with a number of states having constitutionalized rights to education,136Zackin, supra note 134, at 67–105; Allen W. Hubsch, Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1325, 1343–48 (1992). labor protections,137E.g., Zackin, supra note 134, at 106–45. and protections for arrestees and prisoners.138E.g., Caroline Davidson, State Constitutions and the Humane Treatment of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees, 19 Berkley J. Crim. L. 1, 23–47 (2014). Many other states have adopted expansive legal interpretations of their state-level equivalents to the Bill of Rights in the context of abortion,139E.g., Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 469 (2009). death penalty,140James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State Constitutions, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1299 (1989). and criminal justice litigation.141Davidson, supra note 138, at 23–47. And seven states have expressly defined environmental rights in one form or another142Haw. Const. art. XI, § 9; Ill. Const. art. XI, § 2; Mass. Const. amend. XLIX; Mont. Const. art. II, § 3; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 19; Pa. Const. art. I, § 27; R.I. Const. art. I, § 17; see also Yeargain, supra note 6 (discussing adoption and impact of these provisions).—with New York amending its constitution in 2021 to add an environmental rights amendment.143N.Y. Const. art. I, § 19 (amended 2021).

2.  Federal Positive Constitutional Rights

I note further that, while the federal Constitution largely takes the form of establishing rights against government intrusion on the liberties of the people, there are some exceptions where positive rights have been established.144Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution 327–28 (2005); Jamal Greene, How Rights Went Wrong: Why Our Obsession with Rights is Tearing America Apart 68–86 (2021). For example, American courts have come to recognize the right of an accused person to testify in court in their own defense. As my Yale colleague Akhil Amar notes, this reversal of the prior legal tradition came to be accepted because the old rules raised problems of “legal coherence.”145Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 Yale L.J. 1734, 1748–52 (2011). Likewise, the advance of civil rights in the 1960s146See generally Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 407 (1966); Arthur Selwyn Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199 (1968). and gay rights in the 2000s147See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893 (2004) (discussing the implicit expansion of fundamental rights in Lawrence v. Texas); Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 Yale J.L. & Feminism 331 (2016) (discussing the state of fundamental rights following Obergefell v. Hodges). might also be seen as the recognition of positive rights under the federal Constitution.148Indeed, litigants in Urgenda, the landmark climate case decided in the Netherlands, explicitly linked their court battle to that of Brown v. Board of Education, with attorney Roger Cox noting that there was “a parallel” between Urgenda and “the situation in the 1950s in the United States” with school desegregation. Ketan Jha, Networked Public Interest Litigation: A Novel Framework for Climate Claims?, in Climate Change Litigation in the Asia Pacific 38, 39 (Jolene Lin & Douglas A. Kysar eds., 2020). The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence paints an inconsistent picture, however, of the legal logic the Court perceives itself to be advancing. A number of the Court’s civil rights opinions raise doubts about whether these rulings should be understood as advancing positive rights.149E.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 857, 859–60 (2001). Indeed, constitutional law scholars have criticized the landmark decisions in Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell v. Hodges as rather imprecise in specifying the rights being extended.150E.g., Tribe, supra note 147; Nicolas, supra note 147.

3.  European Tradition of Positive Rights with Horizontal Effect

European courts (and a number of other judicial systems around the world) have taken another tack. Not only have they been more willing to specify positive rights, they have increasingly moved toward giving human rights horizontal effect—meaning that the courts have been willing to define rights (including environmental rights) that create obligations not only for governments but also for other citizens and corporate entities.151See cases cited supra notes 58–60. This tradition has resulted in a framework of environmental rights that are not just broader than in the United States, but also deeper in that they have direct effect on private parties—creating affirmative duties to which companies (and others) must adhere.

Most notably, the ECtHR requires the parties to the ECHR to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . [the] Convention.”152European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Sept. 3, 1953. The ECtHR has declared that states have a positive obligation to protect the rights under the ECHR,153They were for the first time stated in Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, ¶ 31 (June 13, 1979), see Article 8 ECHR, summarized in Dickson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44362/04, ¶ 70 (Dec. 4, 2007), and recently stated in Lozovyye v. Russia, App. No. 4587/09, ¶ 36 (Apr. 24, 2018). In an environmental context, see Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, ¶ 98 (July 8, 2003). including the adoption of an adequate regulatory framework154For Article 8, the court expressed this requirement in Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, ¶ 31 (June 13, 1979). For the right to life (Article 2), see Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, ¶ 89 (Nov. 30, 2004). and a duty to prevent indirect or horizontal effects caused by other citizens or entities.155For the theory, see Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights 365 (2010). For the terms, see Eleni Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality, 21 Eur. L.J. 657, 663 (2015). Note that while individuals cannot make a claim of human rights violations against other private individuals, they can call upon the state to enforce their human rights vis-à-vis private parties. In Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, a case involving the interpretation of a will, the ECtHR famously stated:

Admittedly, the Court is not in theory required to settle disputes of a purely private nature. That being said, in exercising the European supervision incumbent on it, it cannot remain passive where a national court’s interpretation of a legal act, be it a testamentary disposition, a private contract, a public document, a statutory provision or an administrative practice appears unreasonable, arbitrary or, as in the present case, blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination established by Article 14 and more broadly with the principles underlying the Convention.156Pla & Puncernau v. Andorra, App. No. 69498/01, ¶ 59 (July 13, 2004). For a case concerning two contracting parties, see Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, App. No. 23883/06, ¶¶ 30–34 (Dec. 16, 2008).

E.  Polycentric Problems and Judicial Overreach

The American judiciary’s hesitance to take up climate change cases reflects a further distinct legal tradition: a concern that polycentric problems—ones that involve balancing of interests and apportioning of costs—are particularly unsuitable for adjudication by the courts. This theory is often associated with Professor Lon Fuller, who analogized polycentric problems to a spider web, where a pull on one strand puts stress across the many other strands and leads to instability.157Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 395 (1978). Fuller thus argued that complex policy problems must be left to political processes and not resolved by the judiciary. His theorizing has had a broad impact within the Anglo-American legal tradition.158See generally Jeff A. King, The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity, Pub. L. 101 (2008); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 617 (2003); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635 (1982).

1.  Environmental Issues as Polycentric Problems

          Environmental problems generally, and climate change in particular, present just the sort of polycentric policy challenge that Fuller warned was inappropriate for courts to adjudicate.159See, e.g., Brian J. Preston, The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change, 28 J. Env’t L. 11, 16 (2016). Not only does climate change policy involve many elements and choices—involving production processes, pollution control possibilities, transportation systems, power generation and energy strategies, clean technology development, and many other aspects of life in modern society—but it also involves multiple trade-offs in which environmental gains for some almost always imply environmental costs for others.

Thus, unlike assertions of civil rights, which will often present bright line choices with clear underlying moral imperatives, environmental rights seem much less clear—and indeed, potentially quite intricate and hard to specify with precision. In asserting a moral right and constitutional claim that Black citizens should have a right to vote, there is no balancing to be done nor really any legitimate other side to the argument. No one can claim a right to prevent Black citizens from voting. Likewise, when gay rights are asserted, those that might wish to prevent gay citizens from living their lives as they wish have no firm foundation on which to build. These rights are relatively absolute.

In contrast, assertions of environmental rights might seem to be relatively unbounded. Do my environmental rights extend to a pristine environment? To a habitable environment? How much money should society (or polluters) be forced to spend to vindicate my right? Do I have a right to experience Nature as it is? Does the fact that Nature is not static but rather in a constant state of flux change the scope of the rights?160See Oswald J. Schmitz, Sustaining Humans and Nature as One: Ecological Science and Environmental Stewardship, in A Better Planet: 40 Big Ideas for a Sustainable Future 11, 11 (Daniel C. Esty ed., 2019) (explaining the dynamic nature of ecosystems). Simply put, if I have a right to a healthy environment, who owes me what duties and to what extent—and at what cost?

Moreover, the resolution of these questions is likely to have externalities on other citizens and private actors in society. A judicial order that a government adopt an emissions-reduction plan, while ostensibly requiring government action, will inevitably require private action to comply with the government regulations that follow. Courts may be more reluctant to order remedies that have these sort of economic impacts—as the Alaska Supreme Court in Sagoonick suggested. There, in rejecting the plaintiffs’ assertion of a right to a healthy environment and denying their requested relief, the court noted that the Alaska Constitution “directs the legislature (and not the judiciary) to manage and develop the State’s natural resources for the maximum common use and benefit of all Alaskans.”161Sagoonick v. State, 503 P.3d 777, 795 (Alaska 2022) (emphasis added). As the court made clear, the legislature is responsible for striking “the proper balance between development and environmental concerns,” and that the court “cannot, and should not, substitute [its] judgment for that of the political branches.”162Id. (citing Sullivan v. Resisting Env’t Destruction on Indigenous Lands, 311 P.3d 625, 635 (Alaska 2013)).

While legal cases that require analysis of policy choices present challenges for the judiciary, a number of scholars, including Professor Owen Fiss, have pushed back on Lon Fuller’s arguments. Fiss suggests that the judiciary must not shy away from upholding fundamental rights even in the face of polycentric problems.163Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 40–41, 44 (1979). He argues that “courts should not be viewed in isolation but as a coordinate source of governmental power, as an integral part of the larger political system.”164Owen M. Fiss, Two Models of Adjudication, in How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? 43 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985). In the American legal system, “the legitimacy of the courts and the power judges exercise in structural reform . . . are founded on the unique competence of the judiciary to . . . give concrete meaning and application to the public values embodied in an authoritative text such as the Constitution.”165Id. Cass Sunstein raises a parallel argument, that the task of judges in adjudicating disputes—even those seemingly governed by “some preexisting rule”—is intricate and necessarily requires value judgments.166Cass R. Sunstein, Politics and Adjudication, 94 Ethics 126, 134 (1983). Moreover, it is a fiction that courts are not already making the sort of decisions that Fuller argues that they should not or do not.167Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question Doctrine, 24 J. Land Use & Env’t L. 79, 93–94 (2008). And as Abram Chayes argued, the scope and breath of injunctive relief—including that which is widely accepted in the American legal system—involves the precise sort of value judgments that courts theoretically ought to shy away from.168Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1292–96 (1976).

In the context of environmental rights, it is inapposite to suggest that the questions involve too many imprecise calculations or debatable values. If the judiciary is able to weigh the competing concerns of other rights, both those presently enshrined in the Constitution and those recognized in common law, which implicate nearly identical concerns, it is capable of doing so here. As the dissent in Juliana noted, if courts are skeptical of granting the kind of relief sought by plaintiffs—that is, a broad order to do something that requires a coordinated effort at all levels of government, likely needing to be overseen by individual judges or special masters—there is a readily available example in Brown v. Board of Education.169Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1188 (9th Cir. 2020) (Staton, J., dissenting). There, “the Supreme Court was explicitly unconcerned with the fact that crafting relief would require individualized review of thousands of state and local policies that facilitated segregation.”170Id.

2.  Politicization of the Judiciary

A related argument suggests that courts are obliged to steer clear of cases that require making policy choices for fear of politicizing the judiciary. Under this line of thinking, courts in the United States are more concerned about politicization or the political nature of climate policy questions than are courts of other nations, perhaps reflecting the deep partisan divides in American politics over environmental issues and climate change—rifts that do not exist to the same extent in most other nations. Concerns over judicial policymaking are arguably reflected in the Supreme Court’s recent invocation of major questions doctrine to invalidate proposed climate regulations which, in leaving significant policy choices to Congress, could be read as the Court declining to resolve questions with partisan overtones.171See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

But the Court’s reliance on the major questions doctrine to steer clear of hot political questions—and the argument that the Court is hyper-protective of its legitimacy as an apolitical arbiter—hardly seem convincing in a post-Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization world.172See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). Justice Alito opens the majority opinion of Dobbs, in fact, with an acknowledgement that the issue of abortion is “a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views.”173Id. at 2240. The majority opinion recognizes the criticisms that a “decision overruling Roe would be perceived as having been made ‘under fire’ and as a ‘surrender to political pressure,’ ”174Id. at 2278. but it concedes that political or politicized responses to the decision are immaterial in the Court’s eyes: “We do not pretend to know how our political system or society will respond to today’s decision. And even if we could foresee what will happen, we would have no authority to let that knowledge influence our decision.”175Id. at 2279. In other words, fear of politicization was expressly  waved away by the Supreme Court in Dobbs. That climate change also represents a profound moral or political issue (or that there would no doubt be partisan backlash to a judicial decision demanding governmental action in the face of climate change) does not seem immediately distinguishable from the Court’s eagerness to take up arms in Dobbs.

Besides, concerns over politicized climate-related decision-making beg the question of whether adjudicating political matters relating to climate change would threaten the legitimacy of the judiciary to the extent that critics claim. The presumption of grave risk seems overstated. In “invalidating actions by other branches of the state . . . the court does not criticize the internal logic or practical efficiency of such political considerations,” instead solely focusing on the legality of the action taken.176Barak, supra note 105, at 186; see also Amar, supra note 145, at 1786. In this respect, it is entirely possible for a court to assert a right, and hold that a legislature’s action violates that right, without actually infringing on the legislature’s policymaking discretion.177Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 928–29 (Pa. 2013); see also Sagoonick v. State, 503 P.3d 777, 810–11 (Alaska 2022) (Maassen, J., dissenting in part). In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated portions of an oil and gas regulation passed by the legislature on the basis that it violated the plaintiffs’ state constitutional right to a healthy environment.178Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 985. In response to arguments that the plaintiffs’ claims presented non-justiciable political questions, the court had a forceful response. It noted that a court’s review of policy choices made by the legislature “does not challenge [its] power” to set policy; “it challenges whether, in the exercise of the power, the legislation produced by the policy runs afoul of constitutional command.”179Id. at 928. “[T]he political question doctrine,” it added, “is a shield and not a sword to deflect judicial review.”180Id. (citing Council 13 v. Commonwealth, 986 A.2d 63, 75–76 (Pa. 2009)). Thus, the idea that judicial restraint is to be applauded when courts face a case with political overtones should be questioned if not rejected outright, especially in the face of fundamental threats to society, such as those posed by climate change.

While it is understandable that the deep political divides that now riven America have pushed U.S. judges to be extra cautious about taking up political questions, there are good arguments to suggest that this posture is not just inappropriate but constitutionally incorrect. To the contrary, it may be that with regard to the most political issues—where the legislative branch is too divided to act—courts have a special obligation to step into the breach. In fact, in explaining when the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a foundation for unenumerated rights that should be acknowledged by courts, Akhil Amar notes that such rights are most easily recognized when there exists clear national support and particularly when Congress has recognized such rights. But he goes on to say courts may need to secure fundamental rights even without these signals of broader support because the judiciary has a “role as a critical backstop in the event that Congress ever fails to act with proper vigor.”181Amar, supra note 145, at 1782 n.116. See generally Amar, supra note 144.

F.  America’s Benefit-Cost Approach to Environmental Regulation

One further explanation for the U.S. judiciary’s exceptionalism on environmental rights might be found in the relatively unique structure of American environmental law and regulations. In particular, American regulatory practice has developed around a law and economics approach to environmental protection that permits powerplants, mines, factories, and other entities to pollute (literally issuing these facilities permits) so long as the benefits to society of the economic activity exceed the emissions harms created by the enterprise. As Don Elliott and I explain, this net social benefits approach to pollution control—which builds on a Kaldor-Hicks economic efficiency logic (rather than a Pareto optimization that would require compensation to those suffering the pollution impacts)—results in significant unabated emissions in many instances.182Elliott & Esty, supra note 9. In privileging economic activities over environmental rights, this environmental policy framework could be read as a signal that America’s political branches have established a mechanism for balancing the competing interests discussed above and concluded that environmental rights should give way to economic growth and jobs as the priority. Such an observation might well lead U.S. judges to conclude that they should not take up cases that tread on this policy domain—particularly to the extent that the environmental arena is one of contested rights and divergent values.

IV.  THE SUSTAINABILITY IMPERATIVE AND PATHWAYS TO SECURING U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

Perhaps the most curious aspect of the recent environmental-rights-based climate change decisions across several federal and state courts is the broad recognition that the problem plaintiffs seek to address is both real and significant. The Juliana majority says, in particular: “There is much to recommend the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change.”183Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2020). They further suggest that a more vigorous climate change policy response is “a matter of national survival.”184Id. Yet the court declines to act.

This paradox raises several important questions: Does the political dispute and ongoing contestation over environmental policy really justify the U.S. judiciary’s dodging of questions involving fundamental rights to a habitable environment? Is the judiciary’s restraint still justified if responding to climate change is seen as a matter of national survival? Or, to turn these questions around, what is the path forward that might allow environmental rights to be secured in the current U.S. political context? How might courts be positioned to respond to the threat posed by climate change and the need to put American society onto more sustainable footings?

In addressing these questions, the starting point must be the fact that climate science has established beyond any credible doubt the threat posed to humanity by the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere.185See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis (2021) (discussing the science behind climate change). More generally, society has begun to recognize a sustainability imperative186See supra note 10 (explaining the concept and the array of voices calling for a more sustainable future). that derives from the ever-more-clear findings of ecosystems science, which suggest the need to restructure our economic activities to ensure that they do not create environmental impacts that transgress critical planetary boundaries in a manner that might destabilize the Earth systems on which all life depends.187Rockström et al., supra note 37, at 32–37; see also Johan Rockström & Mattias Klum, Big World, Small Planet: Abundance Within Planetary Boundaries 14–31 (2015).

Policy emphasis on sustainability is not new. A commitment to sustainable development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (the Brundtland Commission’s definition in the 1987 report, Our Common Future) has been a core commitment of the world community for decades188World Comm’n on Env. & Dev., Our Common Future ¶ 27 (1987). and understood to require limits on pollution and natural resource depletion.189U.N. Conf. on Env’t & Dev., at annex I, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992). See generally Mark L. Brusseau, Sustainable Development and Other Solutions to Pollution and Global Change, in Environmental and Pollution Science 585 (Mark L. Brusseau, Ian L. Pepper & Charles P. Gerba eds., 2019); Kieran Mayers, Tom Davis & Luk N. Van Wassenhove, The Limits of the “Sustainable” Economy, Harv. Bus. Rev. (June 16, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/06/the-limits-of-the-sustainable-economy [https://perma.cc/W8LB-XL5A]. The foundational importance of sustainability as a core principle for life in the twenty-first century has recently been reiterated with the adoption of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals and the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, as well as the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact, under which 197 nations (including the United States) committed to net-zero GHG emissions by mid-century.190Paris Agreement, Dec. 12. 2015, 55 I.L.M. 740 (2016); see The Glasgow Climate Pact—Key Outcomes from COP26, U.N. Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-glasgow-climate-pact-key-outcomes-from-cop26 [https://perma.cc/JLX8-6JR3].

I have argued elsewhere that sustainability (by its very definition) requires a changed foundation for business and our economic life centered on bringing an end to uninternalized environmental externalities.191Daniel C. Esty, Mastering the Labyrinth of Sustainability: Toward a New Foundation for the Market Economy, Revue Européenne du Droit, Summer 2022, at 119, 120; see also Elliott & Esty, supra note 9. In this light, Part IV explores how environmental rights to a sustainable future might be established in the American political context.

A.  Reading Positive Environmental Rights into U.S. Constitution

While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly recognize environmental rights nor even rights to life or health, the Supreme Court has built upon the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments a set of protections for fundamental interests of American citizens including the right to marry,192See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (establishing fundamental right to marry). maintain a family,193See generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that inability to pay court fees cannot be used to deny parental rights). and choose one’s own occupation.194See generally Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (establishing that occupational pursuits cannot be denied in a manner that violates the Due Process Clause). These fundamental rights have been judicially defined and as such “may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”195Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (quoting W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). In citing these cases and the pathway by which these rights were recognized, the dissenting judge in the Juliana case observed that the judiciary need not stand by in the face of climate change and allow a “calamity.”196Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175, 1177–81 (9th Cir. 2020) (Staton, J., dissenting). Rather, courts could secure a fundamental right to a habitable environment in a similar fashion.

Finding constitutional space for new rights has been done in a variety of ways in other circumstances. For example, unenumerated rights can be found in the “penumbras” and “emanations” of the Bill of Rights as Justice Douglas observed in his Griswold v. Connecticut opinion that established a constitutional right to privacy.197Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Amar, supra note 145, at 1761. Although the Supreme Court is increasingly strict in gatekeeping the Due Process Clause through the “deeply rooted” test on which it has relied in recent cases,198See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997). there may be significant foundations upon which to build upon in securing environmental rights. Notably, the Preamble to the Constitution declares the purpose of the document to be promotion of “the general welfare.” For a court ready to take up the challenge of combating climate change, this phrase offers a foundation for an assertion of rights to a habitable environment, especially in the face of the threat to humanity posed by climate change. The Constitution should also be read in light of the natural rights beliefs that undergirded the American Revolution199See Randy E. Barnett, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People (2016); Randy Barnett, Opinion, What the Declaration of Independence Said and Meant, Wash. Post (July 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/04/what-the-declaration-of-independence-said-and-meant/ [https://
perma.cc/TV2B-5CG5].
and the intentions of the Founders as expressed in the Declaration of Independence with regard to inalienable rights to “Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness” and the insistence that the “new Government” should be designed to “effect” the “Safety and Happiness” of the people200The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).—all of which could be read as requiring courts to secure the environmental rights needed to avoid catastrophic climate change or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”201Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; cf. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (2016) (“I have no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”).

As Akhil Amar suggests, unenumerated rights can alternatively be discovered in the “lived practices and beliefs of the American people.”202Amar, supra note 145, at 1748–52. As an example, he cites Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Griswold as offering a better basis for inferring a right to privacy203Id. at 1762. than the majority opinion provides. Amar adds that such unenumerated rights are most easily advanced when they align with other “canonical sources” such as the Declaration of Independence or state constitutions204Id. at 1752.—factors that might well now argue for recognition of environmental rights. Moreover, the facts that (1) polling suggests that a very substantial majority of Americans now support a more comprehensive response to climate change;205James Bell, Jacob Poushter, Moira Fagan & Christine Huang, In Response to Climate
Change, Citizens in Advanced Economies Are Willing to Alter How They Live and Work, Pew Rsch.
Ctr. (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/09/14/in-response-to-climate-change-citizens-in-advanced-economies-are-willing-to-alter-how-they-live-and-work/ [https://perma.cc/JN37-CWHP]; Danielle Deiseroth, Voters Want America to Lead on Climate at Home and Abroad, Data for Progress (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2021/4/22/voters-want-america-to-lead-on-climate-at-home-and-abroad [https://perma.cc/SY8J-J48K]; Lisa Martine Jenkins, Half of U.S. Voters Now Characterize Climate Change as a ‘Critical Threat,’ Morning Consult (Apr. 27, 2021), https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/paris-agreement-climate-change-threat-poll/ [https://perma.cc/
X3QG-K3GZ].
and (2) businesses of all sizes and across virtually all industries across America have adopted net-zero GHG emissions targets206For a sense of which companies have made these targets, see Companies Taking Action, Science Based Targets, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/companies-taking-action [https://perma.cc/
Q6ZF-8KEK]; Companies, Net Zero Tracker, https://zerotracker.net/#companies-table [https://perma.
cc/J4A9-A2LS].
perhaps opens the way for U.S. courts to define the right to a habitable environmental as constitutionally protected—as made clear by the expectations and values of the people as expressed in both their daily and professional lives.

While there are solid constitutional foundations for securing environmental rights in America—especially for a judiciary that understands its obligation to act in the face of an overarching threat and inaction on the part of the political branches—political reality means a high hurdle must be overcome to get U.S. courts to recognize positive environmental rights.

B.  Rights for Nature

Another path forward would be to heed Chris Stone’s call to give Nature legal personhood. But in the United States, the argument for extending legal rights to natural objects is seen by many as “radical”207Tănăsescu, supra note 2, at 452. and has thus not gotten much traction—with one exception. In 2019, the citizens of Toledo, Ohio, voted to grant Lake Erie a “Bill of Rights,”208Sigal Samuel, Lake Erie Now Has Legal Rights, Just Like You, Vox (Feb. 26, 2019), https://
http://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/26/18241904/lake-erie-legal-rights-personhood-nature-environment-toledo-ohio [https://perma.cc/SUE7-S67V].
which included “the right to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve.”209Drewes Farm P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551, 554 (N.D. Ohio 2020). But this initiative was quickly struck down in federal court, with the judge ruling that the proposed legal rights for the lake were unconstitutionally vague. The court asked, “What conduct infringes the right of Lake Erie and its watershed to ‘exist, flourish, and naturally evolve’?”210Id. at 556. It went on to say, “The line between clean and unclean, and between healthy and unhealthy, depends on who you ask.”211Id.

While the Toledo court was perhaps too quick to dismiss the idea of rights for Lake Erie, the revered environmental law professor Joseph Sax decades ago offered a logic for not trying to advance “rights for objects” as Stone proposed. In a review of the standing issues addressed in the Supreme Court’s Sierra Club v. Morton decision,212Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Sax noted: “If Stone is saying only that we should take account of diffuse citizen interests not routinely represented,” then ascribing the rights to Nature is “verbal overkill.”213Joseph L. Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 24 Nat. Res. J. 76, 84 n.37 (1973). What is really required, observed Sax, is “a more spacious view of the right of citizens”214Id. to ensure that courts take seriously the “risks of long-term, large scale practically irreversible disruptions to ecosystems”215Id at 88.—thus specifying five decades ago the path forward that this Article seeks to advance.

C.  State Constitutions

As discussed in Part III, seven U.S. states have provisions that establish environmental rights in one form or another. Although these rights have not yet yielded promising outcomes for litigation to implement broad-based climate change policies,216Yeargain, supra note 6. But see John C. Dernbach, Thinking Anew About the Environmental Rights Amendment: An Analysis of Recent Commonwealth Court Decisions, 30 Widener Commonwealth L. Rev. 147 (2021). it may well be that vindication of these rights in state courts will provide a basis for mandating greater government action in the years ahead. State courts might also require a more vigorous climate change response by corporate entities, which could have implications more broadly across the national marketplace. If more states were to adopt New York’s recent example217See N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 19. and adopt environmental rights constitutional amendments (a process that is much easier at the state level than the national one), this trend might be a further signal of changing values of the American people—therefore justifying the recognition of positive environmental rights by federal judges.

State experiences with rights to public education provide a theoretical, if incomplete, model of how an expansion of environmental rights might unfold driven by state leadership. In 1973, the Supreme Court held that education was not a fundamental right—and rejected claims brought regarding unequal funding of schools in Texas.218San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37, 54–55 (1973). But because many state constitutions provide a right to public education, state-court litigants have been successful in vindicating these rights—either by themselves or by linking the right to education with state-level equal protection analogs.219Robert J. Klee, What’s Good for School Finance Should Be Good for Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and Constitutions, 30 Colum. J. Env’t L. 135, 142–43 (2005). As Professor Rob Klee has noted, it’s possible that this strategy could prove viable with environmental rights, as well.220See id. at 160–86.

Success at the state level could be critical to nudging federal courts to take similar action. Robinson Woodward-Burns observes that state constitutional change is “a steady, constant, quiet background process in American politics, the heretofore unnoticed channel for most American constitutional development.”221Robinson Woodward-Burns, Hidden Laws: How State Constitutions Stabilize American Politics 6 (2021). He argues that “[n]ational outcomes attributed to the federal courts may instead be caused by state constitutional reform,” pointing out that prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, all but four states had already abolished poll taxes through constitutional amendments.222Id. at 8–9. Indeed, in the long tradition of ideas getting tested out in the laboratory of the states, it might well be that the state-level experience will demonstrate that environmental rights can be judicially managed—thus stripping away one of the core concerns federal judges have advanced for declining to take up cases where positive environmental rights are being asserted.

D.  Establishing Negative Environmental Rights: End Uncompensated Pollution Spillovers

Rather than seeking to establish a broad-based right to a healthy or habitable environment, it might be easier within the U.S. constitutional framework to secure negative environmental rights—specifically a right not to be harmed by pollution. Requiring an end to pollution spillovers or full compensation for all harms from residual emissions (mandating, as economists would say, an end to uninternalized environmental externalities) would simply align America’s environmental law and policy framework with long-standing principles of the common law. Indeed, the right not to be harmed by pollution goes back at least four centuries in the Anglo-American legal tradition to the 1610 decision in Aldred’s Case, which established an English plaintiff’s cause of action against the stench from his neighbor’s pigs.223Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.). And the government’s obligation to protect shared natural resources has an even longer history insofar as the origins of the public trust doctrine224See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 475–77 (1970); see also Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 Pace Env’t L. Rev. 515, 518–30 (2001). can be traced not only to old English law but also ultimately to Roman law before that.225See Helen Althaus, Public Trust Rights 1–23 (1978) (explaining the origins going back to the sixth century Corpus Juris Civilis and even earlier views of natural law rights).

1.  Securing a Right to Be Free from Harmful Pollution

Establishing a right to be free from harmful pollution—to each of us as individuals and to the resources on which we depend for life—might be seen by American judges as more consistent with the negative rights tradition of the U.S. Constitution. This kind of negative right would be consistent with the widely accepted principle that people have affirmative duties not to harm others—a concept key to modern tort and property law. A duty not to harm others has been justified and explained by many scholars, including John Stuart Mill in On Liberty—in which he outlined the argument for a “harm principle”—and more recently by William David Ross.226Elliott & Esty, supra note 9, at 527 (citations omitted).

Not only is such a conceptualization consistent with legal developments in the Anglo-American legal traditions, but the narrow frame of a right to be protected from damaging pollution impacts might also be seen as more judicially manageable and thus less of a worry with regard to the separation of powers and political question doctrines. As I have explained in some detail elsewhere,227Id. at 511–12. establishing such a right would not necessarily translate into no pollution. But an environmental rights framework that forbids uninternalized environmental externalities might require emissions reductions to the extent feasible—and full compensation to be paid for any residual harms.

A degree of scientific knowledge and expert analysis would still be required to determine which pollutants cause damage and at what scale—and thus what the harm charge for unabated pollution should be. While such calculations might require a redeployment of resources within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the enormous base of epidemiological and ecological information that has been developed in recent decades along with advances in valuation methodologies makes the task manageable—especially if one excludes from the calculus de minimis levels of pollution that produce no real harm.228One might also exclude cases where individuals have given their informed consent. See id. at 508 (discussing exceptions to the end externalities principle and the compensation that should be provided).

2.  Horizontal Effect but Narrow Framing Consistent with Emerging American Norms

While a right to be free from harmful pollution would have a horizontal effect—establishing duties for private parties as well as the government—it would do so in the most constitutionally protected domain: the right of individuals to the sanctity of their person, their home, and the necessities of life.229Amar, supra note 145, at 1772–73. Framed as a right against harmful pollution intrusions, these negative environmental rights would be seen as offering a bright line that keeps courts clear of the polycentric problem of trying to engage in setting policy goals, allocating costs, or making tradeoffs.

       Even more usefully, the idea that pollution spillovers should not be countenanced has already gained widespread support—and would be seen as consistent with emerging public expectations and business ethics. Evidence of this new reality can be seen, for instance, in the widespread adoption of net-zero GHG emissions targets. Not only have governments around the world—including the U.S. government—committed to net-zero emissions by 2050, but this target and timetable has cascaded to the business community where thousands of companies have made net-zero GHG pledges.230See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, Making Net Zero Matter, 79 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 679, 681 (2022); see also Daniel C. Esty & Nathan de Arriba-Sellier, Zeroing in on Net-Zero: Matching Hard Law to Soft Law Commitments, 94 U. Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023).

Growing public expectations of corporate transparency and reporting on sustainability performance more broadly has helped to reinforce the sustainability imperative framework. These new expectations around emissions disclosure reinforce corporate commitments to reduce pollution and end environmental externalities. Emissions disclosure, in turn, also provides the data needed to identify pollution spillovers that might be subject to legal action by a right to be free from harmful pollution.231See Daniel C. Esty & Todd Cort, Values at Work: Sustainable Investing and ESG Reporting 13–34 (2020); see also Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 37 Yale J.  Reg. 625, 631–36 (2019). The finance world has added momentum to this trend with a growing number of investment advisors demanding expanded ESG (environmental, social, and governance) disclosures from the companies in their portfolios. Likewise, a sweeping array of Wall Street leaders and finance experts from around the world have declared their support for net-zero GHG emissions as a corporate target across all industries and for commitments to internalize externalities more generally.232Mark Carney, Value(s): Building a Better World for All 280–83 (2021); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, It’s Not ‘Woke’ for Businesses to Think Beyond Profit, BlackRock Chief Says, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/17/business/dealbook/larry-fink-blackrock-letter.html [https://perma.cc/J79Z-F7BY] (highlighting the leadership of former Bank of England Governor Mark Carney and BlackRock CEO Larry Fink).

In a similar vein, the Business Roundtable, a collection of 200 CEOs of America’s largest companies, has announced its support for full GHG pricing, which, if implemented, would effectively bring an end to uninternalized externalities in the climate change context.233A Call to Action from the Global Business Community: Global Businesses Support
Climate Action that Enhances Competitiveness, Bus. Roundtable (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.
businessroundtable.org/a-call-to-action-from-the-global-business-community-global-businesses-support
-climate-action-that-enhances-competitiveness [https://perma.cc/4548-QR2H].
The Roundtable has also declared an end to the era of shareholder primacy (sometimes framed as the Friedman doctrine, which suggested that corporate leaders should seek to maximize the profits of their enterprises in any manner they could within the bounds of the law). Instead, these CEOs of the Business Roundtable have committed their companies to a mission of stakeholder responsibility in which companies have obligations beyond their owners to their customers, suppliers, employees, the communities in which they operate, and society as a whole (which would almost certainly include a duty not to inflict environmental harms on people or the planet).234Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.
org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-
americans [https://perma.cc/YJ45-KLJY].
Simply put, private gain at public expense is increasingly seen as an inappropriate and unacceptable business model. Again, the emergence of what might be seen as a transformed base of business ethics makes a right to be free of uninternalized environmental externalities more of an incremental step than it might otherwise appear to be.

The momentum for net-zero GHG emissions and the broader movement away from a world where corporate pollution was seen as unavoidable has given way to a new reality where any company whose profitability depends on externalizing environmental costs faces ever greater scrutiny. Viewed cumulatively, these trends make clear the breadth of support for the new norm against uninternalized environmental externalities—making it ever easier for courts to adopt as a legal obligation what is already a pervasive business practice.

       To draw the obvious conclusion: a right not to be polluted is not the same as having a right to a healthy environment. But the implication of a prohibition on harmful pollution spillovers is that individuals have environmental rights—albeit more narrowly defined. This backdoor into securing environmental rights in the United States might not be the full victory that some environmental advocates would have hoped for, but it is the most expedient path forward given America’s legal traditions and political realities.

CONCLUSION

Fifty years ago, Christopher Stone launched a debate about environmental rights—and opened a conversation that has not yet come to an end, at least in the United States. This Article does not purport to bring the discussion to a close, but it offers a direction that might be taken up to ensure that U.S. courts are positioned to play an appropriate judicial role in addressing the threat of climate change and putting America on a trajectory toward a sustainable future.

I believe that there is ample basis for concluding that environmental rights should be understood as an element of natural law—meaning, as Dinah Shelton proposes,235Shelton, supra note 3, at 103–06. that a narrowly crafted right to a safe and healthy environment should be recognized as an element of human rights and respected in all nations at all times. But to advance this agenda in the United States, the most promising path forward appears to me to be a focus in the federal context on securing negative environmental rights—defined concretely as a right not to be harmed by pollution. In advancing a right centered on enforcing an end to uninternalized environmental externalities, U.S. judges would be able to respond to climate change litigation and other sustainability-related cases in a thoughtful, serious, and tightly focused manner that steers clear of concerns about the separation of powers, the political question doctrine, and appropriate modes of effective judicial relief. Simply put, a narrowly constructed right to be free from harmful emissions would give pollution victims in America standing, which might just be enough to save the planet.

APPENDIX: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS BY COUNTRY

 

National Constitution

International Treaty

 

 

National Constitution

International Treaty

Afghanistan

N

N

 

Liechtenstein

N

N

Albania

N

Y

 

Lithuania

Yi

Y

Algeria

Y

Y

 

Luxembourg

N

Y

Andorra

N

N

 

Madagascar

N

Y

Angola

Y

Y

 

Malawi

Y

Y

Antigua and Barbuda

N

N

 

Malaysia

Yi

N

Argentina

Y

Y

 

Maldives

Y

N

Armenia

N

Y

 

Mali

Y

Y

Australia

N

N

 

Malta

N

Y

Austria

N

Y

 

Marshall Islands

N

N

Azerbaijan

Y

Y

 

Mauritania

Y

Y

Bahamas

N

N

 

Mauritius

N

Y

Bahrain

N

Y

 

Mexico

Y

Y

Bangladesh

Yi

N

 

Micronesia (Federated States of)

N

N

Barbados

N

N

 

Monaco

N

N

Belarus

Y

Y

 

Mongolia

Y

N

Belgium

Y

Y

 

Montenegro

Y

Y

Belize

N

N

 

Morocco

Y

N

Benin

Y

Y

 

Mozambique

Y

Y

Bhutan

N

N

 

Myanmar

N

N

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

Y

Y

 

Namibia

Yi

Y

Bosnia and Herzegovina

N

Y

 

Nauru

N

N

Botswana

N

Y

 

Nepal

Y

N

Brazil

Y

Y

 

Netherlands

N

Y

Brunei Darussalam

N

N

 

New Zealand

N

N

Bulgaria

Y

Y

 

Nicaragua

Y

Y

Burkina Faso

Y

Y

 

Niger

Y

Y

Burundi

Y

Y

 

Nigeria

Yi

Y

Cambodia

N

N

 

North Macedonia

Y

Y

Cabo Verde

Y

Y

 

Norway

Y

Y

Cameroon

Y

Y

 

Oman

N

N

Canada

N

N

 

Pakistan

Yi

N

Central African Republic

Y

Y

 

Palau

N

N

Chad

Y

Y

 

Panama

Yi

Y

Chile

Y

N

 

Papua New Guinea

N

N

China

N

N

 

Paraguay

Y

Y

Colombia

Y

Y

 

Peru

Y

Y

Comoros

Y

Y

 

Philippines

Y

N

Congo

Y

Y

 

Poland

N

Y

Costa Rica

Y

Y

 

Portugal

Y

Y

Cote d’Ivoire

Y

Y

 

Qatar

N

Y

Croatia

Y

Y

 

Republic of Korea

Y

N

Cuba

Y

N

 

Republic of Moldova

Y

Y

Cyprus

Yi

Y

 

Romania

Y

Y

Czechia

Y

Y

 

Russian Federation

Y

N

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

N

N

 

Rwanda

Y

Y

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Y

Y

 

Saint Kitts and Nevis

N

Y

Denmark

N

Y

 

Saint Lucia

N

N

Djibouti

N

Y

 

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

N

Y

Dominica

N

N

 

Samoa

N

N

Dominican Republic

Y

N

 

San Marino

N

N

Ecuador

Y

Y

 

Sao Tome and Principe

Y

Y

Egypt

Y

Y

 

Saudi Arabia

N

Y

El Salvador

Yi

Y

 

Senegal

Y

Y

Equatorial Guinea

N

Y

 

Serbia

Y

Y

Eritrea

N

Y

 

Seychelles

Y

Y

Estonia

Yi

Y

 

Sierra Leone

N

Y

Eswatini

N

Y

 

Singapore

N

N

Ethiopia

Y

Y

 

Slovakia

Y

Y

Fiji

Y

N

 

Slovenia

Y

Y

Finland

Y

Y

 

Solomon Islands

N

N

France

Y

Y

 

Somalia

Y

Y

Gabon

Y

Y

 

South Africa

Y

Y

Gambia

N

Y

 

South Sudan

Y

N

Georgia

Y

Y

 

Spain

Y

Y

Germany

Yi

Y

 

Sri Lanka

Yi

N

Ghana

Yi

Y

 

Sudan

Y

Y

Greece

Y

Y

 

Suriname

N

Y

Grenada

N

N

 

Sweden

N

Y

Guatemala

Yi

Y

 

Switzerland

N

Y

Guinea

Y

Y

 

Syrian Arab Republic

N

Y

Guinea-Bissau

N

Y

 

Tajikistan

N

Y

Guyana

Y

Y

 

Thailand

Y

N

Haiti

N

N

 

Timor-Leste

Y

N

Honduras

Y

Y

 

Togo

Y

Y

Hungary

Y

Y

 

Tonga

N

N

Iceland

N

Y

 

Trinidad and Tobago

N

N

India

Yi

N

 

Tunisia

Y

Y

Indonesia

Y

N

 

Turkey

Y

N

Iran

Y

N

 

Turkmenistan

Y

Y

Iraq

Y

Y

 

Tuvalu

N

N

Ireland

Yi

Y

 

Uganda

Y

Y

Israel

N

N

 

Ukraine

Y

Y

Italy

Yi

Y

 

United Arab Emirates

N

Y

Jamaica

Y

N

 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

N

N

Japan

N

N

 

United Republic of Tanzania

Yi

Y

Jordan

N

Y

 

United States of America

N

N

Kazakhstan

N

Y

 

Uruguay

N

Y

Kenya

Y

Y

 

Uzbekistan

N

N

Kiribati

N

N

 

Vanuatu

N

N

Kuwait

N

Y

 

Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of)

Y

N

Kyrgyzstan

Y

Y

 

Vietnam

Y

N

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

N

N

 

Yemen

N

Y

Latvia

Y

Y

 

Zambia

N

Y

Lebanon

N

Y

 

Zimbabwe

Y

Y

Lesotho

N

Y

 

TOTAL

110

126

Liberia

Yi

Y

 

 

 

 

Libya

N

Y

 

 

 

 

 

* Yi indicates implicit constitutional language. Adapted from Boyd et al., supra note 43, at 50–55.

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1345

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Hillhouse Professor of Environmental Law and Policy, Yale Law School and Yale School of the Environment. The author thanks Andrew Follett, Isabella Soparkar, Kirsten Williams, Zack Steigerwald Schnall, Jan-Baptist Lemaire, and Sara Gomez for their research assistance—and Professors Don Elliott and Quinn Yeargain for conversations that helped to shape the argument presented.

Standing for Rivers, Mountains—and Trees—in the Anthropocene

In his well-known article, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Professor Christopher Stone proposed that courts grant nonhuman entities standing as plaintiffs so their interests may directly represented in court. In this Article, I review Stone’s ideas about standing and our relationship with the natural environment and describe the current, burgeoning, widespread trend toward granting not just standing, but legal rights and legal personhood to rivers, mountains, and other natural entities. I analyze the ways in which courts and legislatures in New Zealand, Australia, Colombia, and elsewhere are addressing concerns similar to Stone’s with expansive, even radical results. I draw from multiple sources, including interviews I conducted with actors advocating for or implementing these legal initiatives. Stone eloquently describes how to rationalize and implement standing and other kinds of moral consideration for nonhuman entities, but he did not envision the diverse, expansive, paradigm-shifting, justice-altering ways such rights are being granted in diverse locales around the world. Various human communities have adapted lifeways that ensure their behaviors continue to sustain their environments so that their environments continue to sustain them; often they have been dispossessed from the legal right to manage their natural environment. When jurisdictions grant rights for rivers, they simultaneously honor the cosmologies and practices of those who are staking moral, historical, ecological, and now legal, claims to speak for nonhuman entities. The very notion—espoused by Stone and now inscribed in law around the world—that law should be rooted in ecological interrelationship is itself a paradigm shift that shapes our mindsets and thus our behaviors toward the natural world that is us.

INTRODUCTION

For one, the fact that we can bring a suit on behalf of loggerheads and leatherbacks is an affirmation of who we are, or may become, as a people. . . . But these happenings, together with the collapsing glaciers and vanishing frogs, are offered to us the way a sly God scatters omens—black cats and thunderclaps—to test whether a people is really worth saving, offering them a final chance, if they will only make the right interpretation, to mend their ways. It should not take an oracle to read the signs.1Christopher D. Stone, Does the Climate Have Standing?, in Should Trees Have Standing?: Law, Morality, and the Environment 33, 76–77 (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2010) (1974).

In his famous2In this rare case, not an oxymoron. law review article, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Professor Christopher Stone proposed that courts grant nonhuman entities standing as plaintiffs to have their interests directly represented in court.3Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). In this Article, I revisit Trees and other writings from Stone through the lens of the current global movement to grant legal rights to rivers, mountains, and other nonhuman ecosystems.

For Stone, “standing” stood for more than whose interests count in the law. Writing (presumably) as a dutiful law professor who wanted to get published, Stone framed his original article around constitutional standing requirements, that is what would and should get an entity a hearing in court. But more profoundly, Stone was reaching for a new understanding of humans’ place on the planet. Standing was a vehicle for a disquisition on matters that were, as he wrote, “a bit unthinkable”4Id. at 453.—a holistic, radical (as in, from the roots) paradigm shift on humans’ place in the natural world, and our hubris in not seeing where our proper place should be. Stone later wrote that his “concern is not with moral and legal philosophy for their own sake. Rather, the animating concern is worldly: What sort of planet will this be?”5Christopher D. Stone, Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism 15 (1987).

In this Article, I describe the current, burgeoning, widespread6Described by the United Nations (“U.N.”) Secretary General as “the fastest growing legal movement of the twenty-first century.” U.N. Secretary-General, Harmony with Nature, ¶ 129, U.N. Doc. A/74/236 (July 26, 2019). trend toward granting not just standing, but legal rights and legal personhood to rivers, mountains, and other natural entities.7I describe this movement and its various iterations in painstaking detail in David Takacs, We Are the River, 2021 U. Ill. L. Rev. 545 (2021). These legal moves leap beyond standing in ways Stone could not have anticipated fifty years ago and reimagine our relationship to the nonhuman world, as inscribed in the law.

In Victoria, Australia, the Yarra River Protection Act (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) names the Yarra as “one living . . . natural entity.”8Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) Act 2017 (Cth) pt 1 s 1(a) (Austl.). The law creates the eleven-person Birrarung Council, including at least two Aboriginal traditional custodians, as well as representatives from environmental groups, and scientific, planning, and agricultural interests. They are the Voice of the River and now speak for the interests of the Yarra as the government charts a fifty-year plan to manage the river. Colombia’s highest court has drawn upon ecocentric philosophy to give rights to the polluted Río Atrato, while ordering the government to assemble a committee of local residents and government officials to determine what legal personhood means for the river.9Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T-622/16, Relatoría de la Corte Constitucional [R.C.C.] (§ 10.2) (Colom.), translated in Erin Daly, Hugo Echeverria & Thomas Swan, Dignity Rts. Project, Center for Social Justice Studies v. Presidency of the Republic Judgment T-622/16 Constitutional Court of Colombia (November 10, 2016) The Atrato River Case 110 (2019), https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/
resources/riveratratodecisionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RCL-TCLC] [hereinafter The Atrato River Case].
Following this lead, Colombian courts have declared that the Amazon,10Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], abril 5, 2018, Andrea Lozano Barragán, Victoria Alexandra Arenas Sánchez, Jose Daniel y Felix Jeffry Rodríguez peña y otros v. Presidente de la República y otros, Radicacion n. 11011-22-03-000-2018-00319-01 (Colom.). several other rivers,11Rio La Plata, Juzgado Único Civil Municipal la Plata—Huila [Juz. Mun.] [Municipal Civil Court], marzo 19, 2019, J: Juan Carlos Clavijo González, 41-396-40-03-001-2019-00114-00 (Colom.); Rios Coello, Combeima, and Cocora, Tribunal Administrativo del Tolima [T. Admtivos] [Administrative Superior Court], Sala. Civil. mayo 30, 2019, M.P: José Andrés Rojas Villa, Sentencia 73001-23-00-000-2011-00611-00 (p. 149) (Colom.). a high-altitude ecosystem,12Pisha Highlands, Tribunal Administrativo del Boyocá [T. Admtivos] [Administrative Superior Court], Sala. de Decisión agosto 9, 2018, M.P: Clara Elisa Cifuentes Ortiz, Expediente 15238-3333-002-2018-00016-01 (p. 67–68) (Colom.). and the spectacled bear13Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. de Casación Civil julio 26, 2017, M.P: Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona, AHC4806-2017 (No. 17001-22-13-000-2017-00468-02, p. 34–35) (Colom.). are legal persons. In New Zealand, the legislature has passed laws granting personhood—with “all the rights powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person”—to the Whanganui River and to the Te Urewera mountain ecosystem on the North Island.14Te Urewera Act 2014, pt 1, s 7 (N.Z.); Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, pt 2, s 12 (N.Z.) [hereinafter “Te Awa Tupua Act 2017”]. In both cases, the legislation grants local Māori communities the rights to speak for the natural features; they have started by laying out the traditional community values that define their interrelationship with the natural entities for whom they will speak.15See, e.g., Te Urewera Board, Te Kawa O Te Urewera 7 (2017), https://www.
ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-urewera [https://perma.cc/KF5S-YT62] (describing the values that will drive management of the Te Urewera mountain ecosystem).

When, as the Māori express it, “Ko au te awa, ko te awa, ko au” (“I am the River and the River is me”),16Ngati Rangi Trust v. Manawatu-Wanganui Reg’l Council A067/2004, 18 May 2004 at [318] (N.Z.). the river’s interests must be taken into account, based on a worldview that the river’s interests are our interests. In numerous locales, citizens, governments, legislatures, and courts are moving toward Stone’s idea of a “radically different law-driven consciousness,”17Christopher D. Stone, Introduction: Trees at Thirty-Five, in Should Trees Have Standing?: Law, Morality, and the Environment xi, xi (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2010) (1974). and in so doing, this posture both reflects and evolves communities’ views of themselves. When the law turns from “we own the river” to “we are the river,” we redefine how the law understands “property.” At the same time, we create new legal paradigms that conceive of the human-nature relationship in novel ways and that empower different voices who speak for what that relationship should comprise, and why. In these nations, legislatures and courts are redefining who “we” actually are. These shifts in worldview also hack traditional power hierarchies, as those who have been disenfranchised from managing environmental resources gain legal control to say what the river or mountain (and therefore their own human communities) really need. These changes build upon and reflect Stone’s ideas, but they also transcend them in ways he might never have envisioned.

Ideas can act as forces of nature. Our evolving views of who we are and what nature needs shape our ethical precepts about these relationships; these ethical evolutions (re)shape the law. The law, in turn, shapes the natural world through what it permits and proscribes, and that remade nature, in turn, shapes our views and ethics. When a particular worldview prevails and ecosystems gain formal rights, the evolution has not been in the original views of those who have proposed such conceptions, now inscribed in law: the Māori, for example, have long believed in an indivisible relationship with the natural world around them. Instead, the ethics of the hegemonic cultures in some nations are evolving. When governments or courts grant rivers legal rights, they reflect and propel changing views both of human relationships with the natural world, and of dominant groups’ relationships with indigenous peoples or other disenfranchised subpopulations from whom the right to manage the natural world had been taken.

In this Article, I review Stone’s ideas about standing and our relationship with the natural environment and analyze the ways in which courts and legislatures in Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, and elsewhere have addressed similar questions with expansive, even radical results. I draw from multiple sources, including interviews I conducted with actors advocating for or implementing these legal initiatives. Stone eloquently describes how to rationalize and implement standing and other kinds of moral consideration for nonhuman entities. But he did not envision the diverse, expansive, paradigm-shifting, justice-altering ways such rights are being granted in diverse locales around the world. When jurisdictions grant rights for rivers, they honor the cosmologies and practices of those who are staking moral, historical, ecological, and now legal, claims to speak for nonhuman entities. Various human communities have adapted certain lifeways that ensure their behaviors continue to sustain their environments so that their environments continue to sustain them; often they have been dispossessed from the legal right to manage their natural environment. The very notion—espoused by Stone and now inscribed in law around the world—that law should be rooted in ecological interrelationship is itself a paradigm shift that shapes our mindsets and thus our behaviors toward the natural world that is us.

I.  THE THEMES THAT ANIMATE CHRISTOPHER STONE’S WORK

By advocating for legal standing for rivers, mountains, and, famously, trees, Stone was really standing for an evolved view of humans’ relationships with the natural world to be inscribed in the law.

A.  Standing

Constitutional standing was the legitimated, law-professor-proper way to write about more radical ideas. Criticizing U.S. standing doctrine is a favorite pastime of some law professors.18For one recent view of the somewhat incoherent state of U.S. Constitutional Standing, see Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 Colum. J. Env’t L. 57, 154 (2020); Robin Kundis Craig, Standing and Environmental Law: An Overview (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of L. Pub. L., Research Paper No. 425, 2009). But Stone goes beyond the normal complaints. Standing, as he notes, “does nothing but get you through the courthouse door; it does not mean the case on behalf of the environment is won, or can even be argued intelligibly.”19Stone, supra note 5, at 10. He decries that in environmental cases, nature—whales, trees, rivers, whatever—are the real objects of concern, even though the law does not treat them as such. Stone advocated that nonhumans should have direct legal rights, where an appropriate custodian could institute legal actions on the entity’s behalf.

When the law recognizes this, injury to the entity itself must be the focus of legal attention, and relief from injuries must flow to the entity’s benefit.20Stone, supra note 3, at 458. For example, in the 1970s debate over Disney Corporation’s planned development in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierras, Stone advocated:

[W]hy not designate Mineral King, the wilderness area, as the plaintiff ‘adversely affected,’ let the Sierra Club be characterized as the attorney or guardian for the area, and get on with the merits? Indeed, that seemed a more straightforward way to get at the real issue, which was not what all the gouging of roadbeds would do to the club or its members, but what it would do to the valley. Why not come right out and say—and try to deal with—that?21Stone, supra note 17, at xiii.

In the resulting case, Sierra v. Morton, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas cites Stone’s work (albeit in dissent): “Permitting a court to appoint a representative of an inanimate object would not be significantly different from customary judicial appointments of guardians ad litem, executors, conservators, receivers, or council for indigents.”22Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 750 n.8 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Douglas suggests that the suit should “be more properly labeled as Mineral King v. Morton.”23Id. at 742. But with the current state of the law, to get through the courtroom gates, an appellant had to argue that it is their human interests that matter. Stone pithily sums up his opinion on this state of affairs: “How grotesque.”24Stone, supra note 1, at 65.

It is not that standing did not matter to Stone—it is just that the current state of standing is a symbolic surrogate for the misdirected ways we apply our environmental laws. For Stone, then, standing was a professorially suitable stand-in for much more. As he wrote, “My concern is not with moral and legal philosophy for their own sake. Rather, the animating concern is worldly: What sort of planet will this be?”25Stone, supra note 19, at 15. But despite the expansive views Stone promoted, even in his later writings, I cannot see that he could have envisioned the bends and oxbows the flow of developments has taken in the current movement to give rights to nonhuman entities.

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

Stone proposes, soundly, that apt “guardians” or “conservators” exist who have earned a place to speak for the needs of the nonhuman world.26Stone, supra note 3, at 464, 466, 471; Christopher D. Stone, Should We Establish a Guardian for Future Generations, in Should Trees Have Standing?: Law, Morality, and the Environment 104, 125 (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2010) (1974). Writing as late as 2010, he does not envision the place-specific, justice-promoting answers of who will speak for nature that different rights-granting governments now envision, which I will detail below. Even if fitting guardians could be identified, Stone visualizes problems in what they would say about what the nonhuman world would actually want. He wrote extensively about how difficult it is to assess the needs and wants of nonpersons.27Stone, supra note 5, at 57. He asks, “On what basis, and in what manner, might a nonhuman, a thing, be accorded legal or moral standing or considerateness?”28Id. at 12. While he dislikes that “[o]rthodox legal and moral theories provide nonhumans only a limited accounting, one that generally makes the claim on behalf of the thing directly dependent upon human interests,” he nonetheless continues that this “is particularly so when we turn to things like rivers that (unlike whales) have no interests or preferences of their own.”29Id. And thus, because the “lake itself being utterly indifferent to whether it is clear and full of fish or muddy and lifeless, when the guardian for the river gets up to speak, what is he or she supposed to say?30Id. at 47–48.

Because “[n]onpersons . . . have no preferences[,] . . . [w]hat, then, could comprise a working solution” to those who would be granted standing to speak for those alleged preferences?31Id. at 58. As he goes on about how difficult it is to assess the needs and wants of nonpersons, Stone’s imagination fails him.32Id. at 57. When jurisdictions grant legal rights to nonhuman entities, they impute that the river is not indifferent, and neither are the communities that depend upon and speak for the river. The communities know and depend upon the river, and the law could thus allow the communities to speak for the lake and community symbiosis. Ecosystem entities may, indeed, tell us what they want. In his book, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Jurisprudence, Cormac Cullinan writes:

Fortunately rivers communicate rather a lot about their essential natures. We know that they need to flow, tend to rush over rocks in a highly oxygenated, high-energy flurry in their upper reaches, and have a distinct inclination to meander languidly in their lower reaches. They create microclimate and Riverine ecosystems along their banks and they flood from time to time, compensating for what they destroy with rich silt and demarcating a flood plain as their territory. In other words, a flooding River is almost certainly acting in accordance with its nature.33Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice 107 (2d ed. 2017).

       We will see that in granting rights to rivers and mountains, modern legal actors are coming to recognize that these entities might tell us what they need, and apt spokespersons exist for conveying these messages. At the same time, nature is becoming a fulcrum to leverage power for disparate actors who have been previously disenfranchised from speaking for nature or for managing the resources upon which they depend. In his writings, Stone does suggest scientists could be the guardians because of their “authoritative” opinions and could thus speak with “practical wisdom and humility.”34Stone, supra note 26, at 107. Stone does not contemplate indigenous people who have been guardians (even if they would choose a different translated term) for natural objects.

C.  Property

Stone was also using standing as a disquisition on the nature of “property.”35For more on the future of private property in the Anthropocene, see David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. Env’t L. Rev. 712 (2008). It is interesting that the star-making idea of his career—in his retelling, at least—came from an off-the-cuff series of thoughts at the end of a property class: “I sensed that the students had already started to pack away their enthusiasm for the next venue. (I like to believe that every lecturer knows this feeling.)”36Stone, supra note 17, at xi. In class, he used “property” to illustrate that

[t]hroughout history, there have been shifts in a cluster of related property variables, such as: what things, at various times were recognized as ownable . . . who was deemed capable of ownership . . . the powers and privileges ownership conveyed . . . and so on. It was easy to see how each change shifted the locus and quality of power. . . . “So,” I wondered aloud, reading their glazing skepticisms, “what would a radically different law-driven consciousness look like? . . . One in which Nature had rights[.]” I supplied my own answer: “Yes, rivers, lakes, . . .” (warming to the idea) “trees . . . animals . . .” (I may have ventured “rocks”; I am not certain.) “How would such a posture in law affect a community’s view of itself?”37Id.

Around the world, governments, legislatures, and courts are moving toward this “radically different law-driven consciousness” and in so doing, this posture is both affecting and reflecting communities’ views of themselves and of what constitutes “property.” When we move from “we own the river” to “we are the river,” we enter into a new paradigm of what “property” is and who “we” actually are. But Stone does not quite go where some of the cultures and governments I portray here will travel.

Stone was reaching for a paradigm shift, a break with a worldview, reflected nearly universally in property (but also other forms of) law, that humans are apart from and not a part of the natural world. Even by the time he was writing, the Public Trust Doctrine had made its peripatetic way around the world for more than a millennium (connoting that certain natural features are so essential to human survival that the sovereign could not arrogate them to private interests).38Takacs, supra note 35, at 713. States and nations were beginning to pass environmental human rights resolutions, declaring that the right to a healthy environment (or some elements thereof) is essential to human well-being and dignity.39Id. at 725. For a recent review of global environmental rights provisions, see James R. May, Making Sense of Environmental Human Rights and Global Environmental Constitutionalism, in The Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law 6 (Erika Techera, Jade Lindley, Karen N. Scott & Anastasia Telesetsky eds., 2020). That did not mean, however, that those who would vindicate those rights could find their way into court, or if they did, that the natural world upon which the appellant depended would benefit from a favorable ruling; nor did it change the nature of human ownership over the natural world.

Stone was reaching for not only a new worldview on what “private property” is and could be, although in a more limited way than the legal maneuvers I describe below will lead:

Wherever it carves out “property” rights, the legal system is engaged in the process of creating monetary worth. . . . I am proposing we do the same with eagles and wilderness areas as we do with copyrighted works, patented inventions, and privacy: make the violation of rights in them to be a cost by declaring the ‘pirating’ of them to be the invasion of a property interest.40Stone, supra note 3, at 476,

The interest is held by the nonhuman entity itself and defendable by suitable guardians who will insure against unjust infringements on the property right.41Id. at 482. And so, for example, when the Endangered Species Act protects “critical habitat,” it is giving the listed species a kind of defendable property right.42Christopher D. Stone, Epilogue, in Should Trees Have Standing?: Law, Morality, and the Environment 169 (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2010) (1974).

Stone’s vision was both expansive (nature belongs to all of us and none of us for our stewarded, essential, interconnected uses) and circumscribed (expanding who might own a property right, but still the nature of property remained rooted in Western notions of ownership).

D.  Nature as Relationship

Even as he finds it difficult to discern how a “guardian”43Stone, supra note 3, at 466–67. would speak for the desires of nonhuman entities, Stone still roots his views in our need to reconfigure our laws, so we recognize the fundamental interconnection between human and nonhuman. Ecological science should shape how we view our relationships with the nonhuman world, and thus how we shape our laws:

This learning to look at the world from the other thing’s distinctive standpoint is a major step toward respecting its moral worth . . . the growing recognition that we are all, even amidst so much conflict and competition, part of one fragile global community encourages rearranging the legal-moral framework so as to make more room not only for the infirm, insane, and infants, but for animals, plants—indeed, for the entire planet as an organic whole.44Stone, supra note 5, at 35.

Specifically, he wished that we took these relationships more seriously, to treat those relationships as if our lives depended on it—because, of course, they do.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the movement to grant legal rights to nature is the recognition in the law of the essential, interwoven relationship between humans and nonhumans, and that modern, Western law is simply catching up to what indigenous peoples and other communities dependent upon the natural world (but aren’t we all?) have long known. Stone notes:

Mankind is part of this organic planetary whole; and there can be no truly new global society, and perhaps in the present state of affairs no society at all, as long as man will not recognize, accept and enjoy the fact that mankind has a definite function to perform within this planetary organism of which it is an active part.45Stone, supra note 3, at 499.

His underlying concern is that

[t]he problems we have to confront are increasingly the world-wide crises of a global organism: not pollution of a stream, but pollution of the atmosphere and of the ocean. Increasingly, the death that occupies each human’s imagination is not his own, but that of the entire life cycle of the planet earth, to which each of us is as but a cell to a body.46Id. at 500.

Similarly, “[b]ecause the health and well-being of mankind depend upon the health of the environment, these goals will often be so mutually supportive that one can avoid deciding whether our rationale is to advance ‘us’ or a new ‘us’ that includes the environment.”47Id. at 489. Below, we will see how courts and legislatures are redefining who “we” might be.

Clearly, Stone had a lot more on his mind than constitutional standing. He is trying to figure out how to fit the round peg of ecological science and ecological consciousness into the square hole of myopic legal doctrine. In standing, and in figuring out who would be appropriate guardians and what they should say when asked about nature’s needs, Stone states that “while the habitat may include higher animals, we may find ourselves wishing to speak for some value not reducible to the sum of the values of the habitat’s parts, the various things that the habitat sustains in relation.”48Stone, supra note 5, at 47. Writing about Ecuador’s constitutional change that granted legal rights to nature, he notes this “may reflect a shift, in Ecuador at least, from an exclusively homocentric view of the environment to one in which some consideration of Nature itself constrains permissible levels of ‘resource’ exploitation.”49Stone, supra note 26, at 164.

The legal rights that I describe below have disparate answers to how to name and prize and legalize these synergistic values.

E.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

As, I believe, Stone was aware, ideas act as forces of nature. He notes that “[h]ow we arrange our affairs so that the future we choose is the future that becomes the reality: that is the question of social institutions, of law.”50Stone, supra note 5, at 15–16. Our ethical systems should be informed by our scientific understanding of how we are interconnected with the natural world. And our laws need to reform to reflect this evolved understanding. In so doing, the law would mold the natural world through permitted and proscribed human behaviors. Remade nature then molds our worldviews and our ethics and, eventually, our laws.

In the United States, our current limited standing doctrine represents a pronounced anthropomorphic (or even egocentric) view of our place in the natural world: it is my needs that count. And this limits the possibility for sustaining the natural world: when the benefits of a successful environmental legal battle fail to flow to protect and restore the harmed natural entity, nature continues to degrade. If we achieved what Stone was seeking—recognition that healthy human communities require healthy ecological communities—we would continue to restore and protect the natural world, whose contours would continue to shape our experiences of it. Below I describe what has happened when nations evolve their laws to reflect an evolved conception of the value of the human and nonhuman relationship.

II.  AUSTRALIA

A.  Introduction

The Yarra River flows 150 miles through the heart of the Australian State of Victoria, weaving through farms, vineyards, ranches, Aboriginal lands, national, state, and local parks, and, eventually, meandering through the heart of Melbourne and its sprawling suburbs. The Yarra is the state’s most vital resource, and everyone wants a part of it. The 2017 Yarra River Protection Act (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron, which translates to “Keep the Birrarung Alive” in Wujundjeri51Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) Act 2017 (Cth) Preamble (Austl.).) describes the Yarra as “one living and integrated natural entity.”52Id. at ss 1, 3, 14. The Yarra River Protection Act is the first Australian law containing both English and an Aboriginal language. “Birrarung” translates to “river of mists and shadows.”53Victoria State Government, Burndap Birrarung Burndap Umarkoo, Yarra Strategic Plan: A 10-Year Plan for the Yarra River Corridor––2022 to 2032, at 1
(2022), https://www.water.vic.gov.au/waterways-and-catchments/protecting-the-yarra/yarra-strategic-plan [https://perma.cc/VHQ7-SSRX].
Part of the Act’s Wujundjeri text reads (in translation):

The Birrarung is alive, has a heart, a spirit and is part of our Dreaming. We have lived with and known the Birrarung since the beginning. We will always know the Birrarung. . . . Since our beginning it has been known that we have an obligation to keep the Birrarung alive and healthy—for all generations to come.54Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) Act 2017 (Cth) Preamble (Austl.).

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

The Act provides one solution to Stone’s challenge to find appropriate spokespersons for what a nonhuman ecosystem wants or needs.55E.g., Stone, supra note 26, at 104. The Birrarung Council, which the Act names as “the Voice of the River,” is an eleven-person body who will speak for what the river might require. Appointed by the Environment Minister, the council acts as an independent (meaning without government representatives) advisory body.56Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) Act 2017 (Cth) s 47 (Austl.). Currently, the group comprises three Aboriginal elders (the Act requires at least two), an infrastructure expert, two members from a Yarra Riverkeeper NGO, a landscape architect, a farmer or rancher, and an environmental lawyer and legal scholar.57Birrarung Council, Birrarung Council: The Voice of the Yarra: 2020 Second
Year Report 4–5 (2020), https://www.birrarungcouncil.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/
541642/Birrarung-Council-Second-Annual-Report-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/J98V-HCPQ].
This disparate group seeks to be independent, transparent, accountable, consultative, expert, and considered.58Id. at 5.

The council is not the Yarra’s official legal “guardian”; it serves as “the independent voice of the river” and reports to the Minister for Water, Planning, and Environment.59Victoria State Government, supra note 53, at 159. The council is currently tasked with speaking for the river during a ten-year strategic plan and fifty-year community vision processes hosted by the state’s municipal water agency.60Id. at 9; Birrarung Council, supra note 57, at 9.

COVID-19 has delayed much of the council’s preparatory work during the past two years, but its first two annual reports have been about relationship building with key stakeholders and, especially, with local governments along the Yarra River. It has played a major role in getting the Yarra Strategic Vision completed, and it looks forward to playing a major role in holding responsible public entities accountable as they implement the plan.61E-mail from Erin O’Donnell, Early Career Acad. Fellow, Senior Fellow, Melbourne L. Masters, to author (Feb. 18, 2022, 04:22 PM PST) (on file with author).

As in several other grants of rights for nonhuman entities (see below), the answer to Stone’s investigation of who should be empowered to speak for the nonhuman world includes indigenous or local, ecosystem-dependent populations. Here, in addition to the Act requiring that Aboriginal elders serve, the Birrarung Council has framed its mission “[a]s a bi-cultural, independent and authentic voice of the Yarra, the Birrarung Council champions the interests of the river as one living and integrated natural entity, guided by the voice and knowledge of Traditional Owners as the custodians of the river and its lands.62Our Mission, Birrarung Council, https://www.water.vic.gov.au/birrarung-council/about-us/about-the-council [https://perma.cc/786E-DZVY]. The council describes that some of the initial work they are doing has included building “a collective Council understanding of Wurundjeri Woi-wurrung appreciation of the River and its corridor,” and notes that such “learning cannot occur just by sitting at the conference table but requires the council to physically engage with the River.”63Birrarung Council, supra note 57, at 8.

The Wurundjeri Forward to the 2022 Yarra Strategic Plan acknowledges that the Act gives the people “a legislative mechanism and a formal process through which to engage with responsible public entities to work collaboratively and oversee the governance of the Birrarung and its lands as one living entity” and that “[o]ur inclusion in the Act was highly significant for the first time a legislative mechanism included a placed-based approach to the management of a waterway—pairing right Country with the right people—our people.”64Victoria State Government, supra note 53, at 5. The Forward from the Bunurong people stresses the 35,000 year history (over 2,000 generations) of their ancestors as lending credibility to their right and wisdom to help speak for what the river might need; for them, “[a]ll of [their] Country is highly significant, every square inch, every rock, every leaf, every dune and every artefact.”65Id. at 6.

The ideas that Stone championed, decades ago and far away, now provide a fulcrum to leverage power for those who have been disempowered from stewarding their own resource base. And those people are using these ideas to advance their own rights to manage their own resource base according to their own traditional and modern concepts of what is right for the human and nonhuman community bond. For example, in the Kimberly of northwest Australia, Anne Poelina, a Nykina Aboriginal elder, is spearheading a movement to have the Fitzroy River (Martuwarra in local language) recognized as a living being with legal rights, with the local Aboriginal groups acting as the voice of the river. She wishes to translate Nykina lore into Australian law.66Interview with Anne Poelina, Prof., U. of Notre Dame Austl., in Sydney, Austl. (July 11, 2019). Their Fitzroy River Declaration declares that “[t]he Fitzroy River is a living ancestral being and has a right to life.”67Traditional Owners from the Fitzroy River, Fitzroy River Declaration (Nov. 3, 2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59fecece017db2ab70aa1874/t/5b286f2bf950b776fe5ead56/1529376561505/Fitzroy+River+Declaration._2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/55E5-ZG7Z]. Dr. Poelina and other scholars have published in Transnational Environmental Law, Recognizing the Martuwarra’s First Law Right to Life as a Living Being. The “Martuwarra RiverOfLife” itself is listed as the first author.68Martuwarra RiverOfLife, Anne Poelina, Donna Bagnall & Michelle Lim, Recognizing the Martuwarra’s First Law Right to Life as a Living Ancestral Being, 9 Transnat’l Env’t L. 541 (2020). The article draws upon other grants of legal rights to rivers as a basis for its own assertion that this River in the Kimberly deserves similar recognition, with the local Martuwarra Nations accorded the rights to speak for what the river and culture nexus requires.

The article decries the farming, ranching, mining, and fracking that is destroying the river (and the ancient cultures that depend upon it and have long depended upon it). They assert the right to speak for the river as “Traditional Owners” who “view Country as alive, vibrant, all encompassing, and fully connected in a vast web of dynamic, interdependent relationships; relationships that are strong and resilient when they are kept intact and healthy by a philosophy of ethics, empathy and equity.”69Id. at 543–44. Dr. Poelina and others (see below) are using our desire to find appropriate spokespersons for the human and nonhuman relationship, to sustain our natural environment, and to atone for past wrongs committed against indigenous people. Initiatives that include or devolve cultural and thus management authority to indigenous or local communities make compelling cases that these communities’ histories, worldviews, and ecological knowledge grant them the authority to speak for and thus regulate the ecosystems that sustain them. They assert that they will manage nature as if their lives depended on it, because their lives depend on it.

C.  Standing

It is not clear that the Birrarung Council would ever have formal legal standing to represent the Yarra River’s interests in a court proceeding. The Act grants the river its spokes-council, but it does not look like the Yarra has legal rights of its own that the council would be empowered to defend.70Erin O’Donnell, Rights as Living Beings: Rights in Law, But No Rights to Water?, 29 Griffith L. Rev. 643, 654 (2020). That is to say, the Act recognizes that many, many entities have interests in the Yarra, and simply names a suitable entity to advocate for the river’s own needs when its waters are being allocated.

D.  Property

As a result of this Act, the river does not own itself, or own any rights to its own water. As Birraung Council member Erin O’Donnell has noted disapprovingly of all newly established legal rights for rivers, “None of the river persons has a legally recognised right to flow.”71Id. So while the Birrarung Act recognizes the vital force of the river in the life of Victorians, and provides voices to protect that force, it does not radically change the idea of who can own what ecosystem resource or what counts as “property” under the law.

E.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

The Birrarung Council has stated its vision grounded in relationship and respect: “For the Yarra River [Birrarung] and its lands to be forever protected as a living entity and kept alive and healthy for the benefit of future generations.72About the Council, Birrarung Council, https://www.water.vic.gov.au/birrarung-council/about-us/about-the-council [https://perma.cc/786E-DZVY]. One of the council’s early ideas promotes the concept of the Great Birrarung Parkland.” It aims to “champion the extension and greater recognition of this unique asset” to preserve more of the river and its riparian corridor for future generations.73Birrarung Council, supra not 57, at i. Furthermore, the council sees its role “to challenge conventional thinking about the nature of a ‘park’ as a parcel of land which exists for a public purpose.74Id. at 9. Specifically, it advocates that Victoria take the “one living and integrated natural entity” language seriously, which should include the way we conceive of parklands not as disconnected parcels, but a continuous entity:

The narrative about the Parkland should convey that its significance is about more than just gazetted land, and relates to a combined landscape of all land parcels that form the river corridor landscape. Such an understanding would allow the public to more fully and respectfully experience the River, understand its cultural significance for all Australians and improve connection to the River.75Id.

The brand new Yarra Strategic Plan’s Aboriginal name—Burndap Birrarung burndap umarkoo—means “[w]hat is good for the Yarra is good for all.”76Victoria State Government, supra note 53, at 10. The Yarra Strategic Plan proposes that “[c]ollaborative management of the river will rightly see Traditional Owners and authorities working together to manage Yarra River land.77Id. at 23. Informed by the Birrarung Council, the vision is of a multicultural panel that represents various interests in sustaining the river. The Victoria government has empowered the council to speak for what the river needs because of both traditional and modern forms of wisdom. It sees the river as a vital entity that links ecology and culture, past and present in a seamless, flowing whole.

According to the Birrarung Council, recognition of the Yarra and other rivers as living beings “has been explicitly grounded in the relationship between the river and the people(s) who live along and near it.”78Birrarung Council, Birrarung Council: The Voice of the Yarra River: 2019 First Year Report 4 (2019), https://yarrariver.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/47-BC-First-Year-Report-Final-8April2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P2P-59QG]. The legally appointed “Voice of the River,” composed of diverse individuals with different access to different expertise, will speak for that relationship going forward. If the goals of the statute are realized, the river and its interrelated communities will be healthier in the future. We should continue to watch how the legally appointed “Voice of the River” uses its voice to speak for how the relationship should be sustained.

III.  COLOMBIA

A.  Introduction

While in Australia, answers to some of Stone’s challenges came through statute, in Colombia, those answers come from court decisions. In a 2016 case brought by Afro-Caribbean communities in the Chocó, “one of the most bio-diverse regions of the planet”79The Atrato River Case, supra note 9, at 6. and part of “mega-biodiverse” country of Colombia,80Id. at 32. the Constitutional Court declared that the Rio Atrato’s “basin and tributaries are recognized as an entity subject to rights [(which translates to ‘entidad sujeto de derechos’)] of protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration by the State and ethnic communities.”81Id. at 5. Following this decision, Colombian courts have declared that the Amazon,82Corte Suprema de Justicia, supra note 10. several other rivers,83Rio La Plata, supra note 11; Rios Coello, Combeima & Cocora, supra note 11. a high-altitude ecosystem,84Pisha Highlands, supra note 12. and the spectacled bear85Corte Suprema de Justicia, supra note 13. are legal persons. What is going on here, and what might Stone have made of all this?

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

Unlike in Australia or New Zealand, where communities stake their claims to manage their environment in part due to cultural identities as indigenous peoples whose arrival and environmental stewardship long predated the colonizers, here the affected communities are marginalized—Afro-Caribbean residents whose ancestors migrated to this region a couple of centuries ago and who are dependent on and connected to the affected river.

To represent the river, the court orders the national government to “exercise legal guardianship and representation of the rights of the river,” designating one government minister to join a community-appointed guardian.86The Atrato River Case, supra note 9, at 110. These “legal representatives,” in turn, are tasked with designating a “commission of guardians of the Atrato River” guided by two NGOs who “have the necessary experience to guide the actions to take. This advisory team can be formed and receive support from all public and private entities, universities[,] . . . research centers on natural resources and environmental organizations (national and international), community and civil society wishing to join the protection project.”87Id.  Each of seven river communities appointed one male and one female guardian to develop a plan to implement the court’s ruling.88Elizabeth Macpherson & Felipe Clavijo Ospina, The Pluralism of River Rights in Aotearoa, New Zealand and Colombia, 25 J. Water L. 283, 292 (2018). The members of the Collegiate Corps of Community Guardians are responsible comanagers for seeing that the order of the court is fulfilled as part of the Commission of Guardians of the Rio Atrato, consisting, as the court ordered, of representatives of government and affected communities.89“[E]l Cuerpo Colegiado de Guardianes Comunitarios” son “cogestores responsables.” Comité de Seguimiento, VIII Informe de Seguimiento Sentencia T-622 de 2016, Sobre la Gestion Cumplida en el Primer Semester de 2021, Bogotá Noviembre 2021, at Introducción, §§ 1.1, 1.1.1 (2021).

Chief Justice Palacio informed me that it is not working as quickly as we all would like, but enormous efforts have been made to comply with it, especially by the Colombian Attorney General’s Office.90“[N]o marcha con la prontitud que todos quisiéramos, pero sí se han hecho ingentes trabajos para su cumplimiento, especialmente por la Procuraduría General de la Nación de Colombia.” E-mail from Jorge Ivan Palacio, C.J., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], to author (Feb. 21, 2022, 5:57 PST) (on file with author). The work has not been easy, with COVID-19 making a new model of environmental management even more difficult than it would otherwise be, as the most recent report of the committee acknowledges.91Comité de Seguimiento, supra note 89, at Introducción, § 1.1.1. The scope of work that the committee has taken on is impressive—that is, the judicial decision does seem to have prompted the remedial actions the government is now taking. Throughout the report, the rights of the river are addressed as the co-managers develop their expertise to say what the river might need.

The court proclaims that “the protection of a healthy environment of the black communities acquires special relevance from the constitutional point of view, since it is a necessary condition to guarantee the validity of their lifestyle and their ancestral traditions.”92The Atrato River Case, supra note 9, at 19. According to the court, “[t]he communities have made the Atrato River Basin not only their territory, but the space to reproduce life and recreate culture.”93Id. at 7. Chief Justice Palacio reiterated to me that these isolated, ethnic minority communities had been abandoned by the government as their environment was being destroyed and thus required special judicial intervention.94In our interview, Chief Justice Palacio explained to me that “es una gente demasiado abandonada por las instituciones gubernamentales” (which translates to “this population is extremely abandoned by government institutions”). Interview with Jorge Iván Palacio, C.J., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], in Bogotá, Colom. (Sept. 26, 2019). The local Afro-Caribbean inhabitants require a healthy river, and they wish to help the river return to health through managing “according to their own laws and customs—and the natural resources that make up their habitat, where their culture, their traditions and their way of life are developed based on the special relationship they have with the environment and biodiversity.”95The Atrato River Case, supra note 9, at 35.

As in Australia and New Zealand, the law is highlighting a certain kind of relationship that gives those who would speak for nature legal authority to sustain that relationship. Although the communities are not indigenous per se, “since ancestral times,”96Id. at 45.

there is a close and intimate relationship between the individual and the river, which is observed in expressions such as “he does not like to leave his river” or “when I return to my river.” In this configuration the river represents a notion of home, a strong feeling of belonging full of symbolic, territorial and cultural values.97Id. at 54.

To answer Stone’s challenge for who ought to be empowered to speak for what an ecosystem might want, the decision contains a lengthy, learned analysis of “biocultural rights” founded on the interdependence of biological and cultural diversity.98Id. at 99. It is this connection that gives these communities the right to speak for what the river needs, because it is what the communities’ livelihoods and cultures need:99Id. at 18–19.

[T]he rights that ethnic communities have to administer and exercise autonomous guardianship over their territories—according to their own laws and customs—and the natural resources that make up their habitat, where their culture, their traditions and their way of life are developed based on the special relationship they have with the environment and biodiversity.100Id. at 35.

Inherent in the ecocentric philosophy articulated by the court is the idea that the ecosystem and its constituent parts have moral worth and legally recognized needs, and thus legal rights to meet those needs. The court does not say exactly what the river requires, but it names the associated, culturally and environmentally connected communities as the logical mouthpieces for what the river might need.101Id. at 99. The now-ongoing resulting work is aimed at cleaning up the Atrato and halting the illegal, damaging mining and logging that despoils the river.102Comité de Seguimiento, supra note 89.

C.  Standing

The Constitutional Court addresses the standing requirement:

In this case, the representative of the ethnic communities is claiming that the acción de tutela [(a writ for protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights in Colombia)] is necessary to restrain the intensive and large-scale use of various methods of mining and illegal logging. These methods include heavy machinery, such as dredgers and backhoes, and highly toxic substances, such as mercury, in the Atrato River (Chocó), its basins, swamps, wetlands and tributaries. The methods have been intensifying for several years and are having harmful and irreversible consequences on the environment, thereby affecting the fundamental rights of ethnic communities and the natural balance of the territories they inhabit.103The Atrato River Case, supra note 9, at 8.

The NGO (Tierra Digna) has standing to represent the special rights of the Afro-Caribbean communities who have special solicitude as indigenous and pluri-ethnic communities to have their rights protected.104Id. at 18.

As in the other cases I describe herein, it is not yet clear how the river or any of the other ecosystem elements now given legal rights will have their own rights represented in court. That is to say, Stone’s starting point—formal legal standing in court—remains to be explicated should the river’s ongoing injuries find their way to court.

D.  Property

The court notes that these communities have a notion of the river-as-community that diverges from the Western model of river-as-property: “[F]or the ethnic communities, the territory does not fall on a single individual—as it is understood in the classical conception of private law—but above all the human group that inhabits it, so that it acquires an eminently collective character.”105Id. at. 54. However, in the resulting decision, while the river becomes the object of legal obligations, the community does not come to own the river, and the river does not own itself or the waters it contains.

But more so than in the other developments I portray, the court is influenced by, and seeks to promote, ecocentric philosophy. The river may not own itself, but its own needs matter in the law, even apart from the connected needs of the communities that depend on it. Chief Justice Palacio confirmed that his decision was influenced by his deep readings in ecocentric philosophy.106“Que dice, la especia humana, es una especie mas en el planeta tierra como los hermanos arboles, como el hermano león, como las hermanas flores . . . .” Interview with Jorge Iván Palacio, supra note 94. The decision respects

other living organisms with whom the planet is shared, which are understood to be worthy of protection in themselves. It is about being aware of the interdependence that connects us to all living beings on earth; that is, recognizing ourselves as integral parts of the global ecosystem—the biosphere—, rather than from normative categories of domination, simple exploitation, or utility.107 The Atrato River Case, supra note 9, at 34–35.

[The] ecocentric approach starts from a basic premise according to which the land does not belong to man . . . . According to this interpretation, the human species is just one more event in a long evolutionary chain that has lasted for billions of years and therefore is not in any way the owner of other species, biodiversity, or resources, or the fate of the planet.108Id. at 33–34.

E.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

Nonetheless, the court had no viable way to change the very nature of property in the Colombian legal system. Instead, the court notes that “the relationship between the Constitution and the environment [is] dynamic and in constant evolution.”109Id. at 33. Like Stone, the court here is looking for a new appreciation of the human interrelationship with the natural world, wishes that law would reflect this interrelationship, and takes steps toward this desired evolution. Beyond what Stone envisioned, the court finds that a new legal form is necessary to effect that evolution, one that grants direct rights to nature, with a reasonable answer for who should speak for those rights, meaning those communities most dependent on and knowledgeable about the river, in association with the government bodies best poised to stop the pollution destroying that river. Chief Justice Palacio told me that the decision was mean to “send the message: to preserve life. Not just the life of human beings, rather all of life on Planet Earth.”110Interview with Jorge Iván Palacio, supra note 94 (“[E]se es mi interés y el interés es enviar el mensaje: que se preserve la vida. No solamente la vida de los seres humanos si no de todo el planeta tierra.”). Ecocentric philosophy becomes instantiated in legal rights for an ecosystem; ecologically dependent, culturally rooted populations gain legal rights to speak for the river’s rights. Chief Justice Palacio hopes that if the court’s decision is implemented correctly, it would create a feedback loop remaking and revitalizing the river and the human communities that depend on it.

IV.  NEW ZEALAND

A.  Introduction

New Zealand is providing the most far-reaching, innovative answers to some of the challenges Stone posed. The government has passed statutes that grant the North Island’s Whanganui River and Te Urewera mountain ecosystem (formerly a national park) legal personhood, with Māori communities granted the right to speak for what the river or mountain will require going forward.111Te Urewera Act 2014, supra note 14, at s 11; Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, supra note 14, at s 14. A third ecosystem, Mount Taranaki, has also been granted legal personhood, with prepared arrangements for conservatorship shared between eight local Māori in the works.112Te Anga Pūtakerongo mō Ngā Maunga o Taranaki, Pouākai me Kaitake,
Record of Understanding for Mount Taranaki, Pouākai and the Kaitake Ranges
§ 5.2 (2017) [hereinafter Record of Understanding], https://www.govt.nz/assets/Documents/OTS/
Taranaki-Maunga/Taranaki-Maunga-Te-Anga-Putakerongo-Record-of-Understanding-20-December-2017
.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9W7-44EL]; Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand Gives Mount Taranaki Same Legal Rights as a Person, Guardian (Dec. 22, 2017, 12:18 A.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/dec/22/new-zealand-gives-mount-taranaki-same-legal-rights-as-a-person [https://perma.cc/
Z75F-YYQE].
I believe the dimensions of these legal revolutions go beyond what Stone could have envisioned.

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

Stone wrote extensively about who nature’s “guardian” could and should be, and what they might do once appointed.113Stone, supra note 3, at 466. In Australia and Colombia, legislatures and courts have named appropriate guardians based upon ecological connection and expertise, and historical or cultural claims to have authority in resource management. In New Zealand, the Crown’s desire to remedy past colonial wrongs, and spiritual, cultural, and ecological connections to the ecosystem legitimated the Māori claims to say what the river or mountain wants.114See, e.g., Waitangi Tribunal, The Whanganui River Report xiii, 31 (1999), https://
forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68450539/Whanganui%20River%20Report%201999.pdf [https://perma.cc/B296-ZZS8] (“For nearly a millennium, the Atihaunui hapu [clan] have held the Whanganui River. They were known as the river people . . . . The river was central to Atihaunui lives, their source of food, their single highway, their spiritual mentor. It was the aortic artery of Atihaunui heart. Shrouded in history and tradition, the River remains symbolic of Atihaunui identity. It is the focal point for the Atihaunui people, whether there or away.”).

Statutes grant that various Mãori communities now serve as guardians of the environment. Except, the communities themselves would not use the term “guardians.” Gerrard Albert, chief negotiator for the Whanganui Māori, reminded me that the term “guardian” (or anything similar) does not appear in the statute; more importantly, if anything, the Whanganui guards over the community.115Interview with Gerrard Albert in Whanganui, N.Z. (July 9, 2019). I think Stone himself would recognize that in some ways it turns reality on its head to say we are guardians for natural objects, as opposed (as Albert believes) that nature, in fact, guards us. We might need to assert a certain fiction in court, but the worldview underlying so much of environmental law is that functioning ecosystems make life possible.

The 2017 Whanganui River Claims Act, or “Te Awa Tupua” (“River With Ancestral Power”) grants legal personhood to the Whanganui River and deeds legal stewardship over the river to the local Māori, based on their longstanding relationship with the river.116Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, supra note 14, at pt 2, s 12. Under the Act, the river “is an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements.”117Id. at pt 2, s 12. The Act acknowledges “Tupua te Kawa,” as the “intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua,” including that the river is a “spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the life and natural resources within the Whanganui River and the health and well-being of the iwi, hapū,118“Iwi” can be translated as tribe; “hapu” are extended family clans within a tribe. and other communities of the River.”119Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, supra note 14, at pt 2, s 13. Te Pou Tupua” is a newly enshrined governance entity;120Id. at pt 2, s 18 subss 1–2. as newly named conservators of the river, “[t]he iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an inalienable connection with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and well-being.”121Id. at pt 2, s 13(c).

The Te Urewera Act turns a former national park (which had been the largest on the North Island)—a magnificent land of mountains, lakes, and rivers—into “a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person” with the local Māori given the duties to govern.122Te Urewera Act 2014, supra note 14, pt 1, s 11, subs 1. The Act notes that “Te Urewera is ancient and enduring, a fortress of nature, alive with history . . . a place of spiritual value, with its own mana [status, prestige] and mauri [life force] . . . has an identity in and of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care.”123Id. at pt 1, s 3, subss 1–3.

Stone had qualms that anyone could know what a nonhuman biophysical entity wants: “Even if moral obligations to a mountain are conceded to exist in principle, the question of how they can be discharged remains: How does one ‘do right by’ a mountain?”124Christopher D. Stone, The Gnat Is Older than Man: Global Environment and the Human Agenda 276 (1993). Operating “as the voice of the living personality of Te Urewera,” the Tühoe Māori have presented its guiding values “that inspirit wise and beneficial decision making” in a preliminary document, “Te Kawa.”125Te Urewera Board, supra note 15, at 9, 21. They will know what the mountain wants because “[w]atching Te Urewera over many seasons and centuries reveals her moral conduct acted out in her interrelationships with all life that she has created.”126Id. at 21. So for example, “Papatūānuku” or “landscape,” means that “[w]e revere nature, we respect her ability in connecting us to all living things.”127Id. at 38.Mauri,” or “her life” means “the living relationship between the forest the land and everything living within that relationship.”128Id. This means that “prioritized action” will include that “[w]e treasure our indigenous ecological systems and biodiversity through significantly reducing key existing pressures, enabling Te Urewera to a natural state of balance,” which means “we customise smart respectable ways to reduce known and potential pressures.”129Id. So, for example, Te Kawa notes that “[g]uards are effective against new or external pressures looking for a home within [Te Urewera].”130Id. A few initial controversies suggest how these values will enlighten knowledge about the mountain’s desires, as described below.

C.  Standing

It is not yet clear how or whether the empowered Māori communities will have formal legal standing to represent their associated ecosystems in court. For example, for the Whanganui, Te Awa Tupua “may participate in any statutory process affecting Te Awa Tupua in which Te Pou Tupua would be entitled to participate under any legislation”;131Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, supra note 14, at pt 2, s 19, subs 2(e). it is not clear if that means formal legal standing. Albert told me that the Whanganui Māori prefer to stay out of court for the present time, choosing instead to build capacity within their communities around what the new laws mean and to build relationships with other neighbors of the Whanganui. He described an occasion shortly after Te Awa Tupua’s passage where the government began construction of a bike bridge over the river without discussing this with the Māori; rather than appeal to a court, Te Awa Tupua sought dialogue with the government agency to explain the new legal authority.132Albert, supra note 115; Whanganui River Work Triggers Te Awa Tupua Legislation, NZ Herald (Mar. 14, 2019, 8:08 AM), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/whanganui-chronicle/news/whanganui-river-work-triggers-te-awa-tupua-legislation/VOU5EVLN457XJ77VQD7R7EEHTU [https://perma.cc/
G6JD-7JXF].

In Te Urewera, the Tūhoe rejected an oil-based asphalt sealant for a neighboring road, even though the delay could result in loss of funding. While the local government accused the Tūhoe of “hillbilly thinking,” the Tūhoe reject the “rape and pillage mentality . . . of unchecked tourism,” and plan, instead, to proceed with road construction that reflects Te Kawa’s environment-friendly values.133Andre Chumko, Fears Tūhoe Trial Will Expire Funding for Road to Lake Waikaremoana, Stuff (July 4, 2019, 4:39 PM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/113940377/fears-thoe-trial-will-expire-funding-for-road-to-lake-waikaremoana [https://perma.cc/N82V-7BBB]; John Boynton, Te Urewera Roading Trial Taking Natural Route, RNZ (Feb. 4, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.rnz.co.
nz/news/te-manu-korihi/349631/te-urewera-roading-trial-taking-naturalroute [https://perma.cc/RBW9-34YL]; The Road to Nature, Tūhoe (June 16, 2019), https://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/The-Road-to-Nature [https://perma.cc/M76Q-XT9F].
Also in Te Urewera, the Tūhoe governing body delayed fixing a flood-damaged footbridge around Lake Waikeremoana that forms part of one of New Zealand’s tourist-friendly “Great Walks.” According to Tūhoe Chairman Tāmati Kruger, “[the Tūhoe] are wanting engineers to come in because the issue could very well be that the bridge is in the wrong place,” and perhaps Te Urewera did not want the footbridge there to start with.134Marty Sharpe, Large Section of One of New Zealand’s Great Walks ‘Temporarily Closed’ by Footbridge, Stuff (Feb. 12, 2019, 3:15 PM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/110431160/
large-section-of-one-of-new-zealands-great-walks-temporarily-closed-by-swingbridge [https://perma.
cc/7YAH-AECB].
So we do not know how standing would play out should these skirmishes arrive in court; but we do see that newly empowered Māori communities wish to use their new legal powers to govern their ecosystems according to traditional precepts, merging traditional values with Western law.

D.  Relationship

When explaining that “Suits on Behalf of Nature Are Better Suited to Moral Development,” Christopher Stone wrote, “As I argue in the original Trees, the law has not merely an educative, but a spiritualizing role in our society.”135Stone, supra note 1, at 66. I do not know what, exactly, he means by “spiritualizing,” but I do think I know what he means by moral development. And this is one place where the New Zealand experiment pushes us forward: it asks that the morality of how we treat the Earth embrace a relationship that has always existed and must exist, but which Western ethical systems, and the law that flows from those systems, tend to ignore. These grants of rights for nature and rights to protect that nature are sanctifying a certain kind of relationship, a web of mutually protective being. Te Awa Tupua and the Te Urewera Act grant the Māori the right to have their conception of relationship with rivers and mountains sanctified in the law, which simultaneously allows them to speak for the ecosystems on which they have always depended. These steps toward self-determination honor the saying “I am the River and the River is me,” reflecting a more capacious vision of “self” than the dominant cultures normally understand.136Valmaine Toki, Māori Seeking Self-Determination or Tino Rangatiratanga?, 5 J. Maori & Indigenous Issues 134, 142–43 (2017) https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/
10289/11519/Toki%20Maori%20Seeking%20self-determination.pdf?sequence=15&isAllowed=y [https://
perma.cc/K6Q3-T72T].
As a New Zealand court has explained,

One needs to understand the culture of the Whanganui River iwi [tribe] to realise how deeply ingrained the saying ko au te awa, ko te awa, ko au [I am the River, the River is me] is to those who have connections to the river. . . . Their spirituality is their ‘connectedness’ to the river. To take away part of the river . . . is to take away part of the iwi. To desecrate the water is to desecrate the iwi. To pollute the water is to pollute the people.137Ngati Rangi Trust, supra note 16.

I believe Stone was advocating for moral systems rooted in deep connection to the environment, even if he did not envision the particular arrangement advancing in New Zealand.

E.  Property

According to both Christopher Finlayson, then-Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, and Albert, chief negotiator for the local Māori, the two sides negotiated cordially, and the government agreed to grant what the Māori wanted on their own terms that reflected their cosmology.138Albert, supra note 115; Interview with Chris Finlayson in Wellington, N.Z. (July 8, 2019). Scholar Anne Salmond has called previous New Zealand arrangements that granted formal property rights to the Māori “ontological submission”: although they gained the right to control their relationship with the ecosystem around them, by accepting a Western version of legal property ownership, they had to violate their own cosmology that defined their relationship with the world around them.139Anne Salmond, Tears of Rangi, 4 Hau J. Ethnographic Theory 285, 302 (2014).

As in the other nations discussed here, neither the river nor mountain own itself in New Zealand. The Māori themselves did not wish to own the ecosystem elements in any traditional, Western legal sense.140Interview with Albert, supra note 115. The Māori traditional notions of “property” differ from the Crown’s conceptions, as you could not “own” that to which you belong,141Erin O’Donnell & Elizabeth Macpherson, Voice, Power and Legitimacy: The Role of the Legal Person in River Management in New Zealand, Chile and Australia 23 Australasian J. Water Res. 35, 35 (2019). and the new statutes respect this notion of environment-as-relationship. The government did not wish to cede formal ownership of the Whanganui,142Salmond, supra note 139, at 297; Interview with Finlayson, supra note 138. and, as Albert explained to me, “ownership does not provide for the totality of the relationship.”143Interview with Albert, supra note 115. In the negotiations, Albert said, his community “[d]idn’t want to change the dance—we wanted to change the music so people would dance a different way: what instrument can we play to change the music?”144Id. In Te Kawa, the initial governing guide for Te Urewera, the Tūhoe Māori explain that the

use of property rights by the western legal system has hidden from view the concept of nature; rendered her parts as natural resources now capable of rival priorities competing with other household choices. These human granted rights have displaced our devotion for Papatūānuku [landscape] with ownership now serving individual advantage . . . property rights do not give life nor do they encourage the connectedness of all living things for life . . . our fracturing of nature has sponsored our own fragmentation.145Te Urewera Board, supra note 15, at 23.

At the end of the day, the Crown still “owns” the entities. Still, for the Māori, the exact nature of “property” matters less than having their cosmology recognized in the law, their historical injustices mitigated, and their relationship with their environments back under their control.

It remains to be seen whether any new conception of “property”—in the formal ownership way Western law understands it—emerges. Absent formal ownership of the ecosystems, how far the Māori are able to take their new powers remains to be seen. The ultimate prize will be the 2040 relicensing of the Tongariro Power Scheme, which diverts eighty percent of the Whanganui’s water; Albert told me that the years leading up to 2040 will be about building his community’s and the government’s capacity to truly understand and respect the new vision of human and nonhuman relations, and the Tongariro Power Scheme will be the test.146Erin O’Donnell, Legal Rights for Rivers: Competition, Collaboration, and Water Governance 178 (2019); Interview with Albert, supra note 115; Finlayson, supra note 138.

F.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

In Should Trees Have Standing?, Stone mused on why we would use “rights” language to refer to nonhuman entities in the first place, given the ambiguities of what such rights might comprise:

In the case of such vague rules . . . . [t]hese terms work a subtle shift into the rhetoric of explanation available to judges; with them, new ways of thinking and new insights come to be explored and developed. In such fashion, judges who could unabashedly refer to the “legal rights of the environment” would be encouraged to develop a viable body of law—in part simply through the availability and force of the expression.147Stone, supra note 3, at 488–89.

Rights exert moral suasion on all actors. In the New Zealand examples, the nation is moving way beyond the “right to a healthy environment” or similar grants that the majority of nations bequeath their citizens.148New Zealand is in the minority of nations that provide no statutory or constitutional right to a healthy environment to citizens. Catherine Iorns Magallanes, Human Rights, Responsibility and Legal Personality for the Environment in Aotearoa, New Zealand, in Human Rights and the Environment: Legality, Indivisibility, Dignity and Geography 550 (James R. May & Erin Daly eds., 2019). These laws and constitutional provisions are still anthropocentric: I have the right to breathe healthy air or drink clean water. Through granting rights directly to rivers or mountains, New Zealand is designing a new idea of our relationship with the natural world, with new stewards of that relationship, inscribed in law.

Like Stone, Cormac Cullinan had some qualms about rights for nonhuman entities; he noted:

[E]ven if the law were to acknowledge that, say, a river had the capacity to hold rights, extending the language of rights and duties to relations with nonhuman subjects is potentially confusing. Terms such as ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ are infused with our experience of existing legal systems and burdened with the connotations of conflicts.149Cullinan, supra note 33, at 95.

New Zealand imposes an entirely new conception of what it means to have rights, one the nation now must make more justiciable. If we are the river and the river is us, then the new ideas supporting these legal reforms are an eco-anthropocentric hybrid. The ecosystems still support human communities, but the humans who depend on the ecosystems also serve the ecosystems’ needs. Which is why, for example, in Te Urewera, the Māori community has started by naming what the values are that the mountain ecosystem holds. Anticipating judicial decisions, they have made contractual obligations contingent on attestations that those profiting from Te Urewera will first and foremost respect those values that flow from the right.

These agreements lend themselves to a broader understanding of how all New Zealanders (and those of us far from that enclave) relate to, and thus manage the ecological world around us. The New Zealand Office of Māori-Crown relationships has adopted a new name, “Te Arawhiti,” which means “The Bridge.”150Interview with Ian Hicks, Negot. & Settlement Manager, Off. of Māori-Crown Rels., in Wellington, N.Z. (July 9, 2019). These reforms present a new vision for how law can reflect ecological reality and can change that reality. If the Māori succeed in cleaning up the Whanganui, changing the management regime of Te Urewera, and, eventually, shutting down the Tongariro Power Scheme, then a new hierarchy of whose ideas about nature count will have been remade into law, which will have remade nature.

CONCLUSION

When, as the Māori express it, “I am the River and the River is me,” we must take into account the river’s interests, based on a worldview that the river’s interests are our interests. Around the world, governments, legislatures, and courts are moving toward Stone’s idea of a “radically different law-driven consciousness”151Stone, supra note 17, at xi. and in so doing, this posture both reflects and evolves communities’ views of themselves. When we move from “we own the river” to “we are the river,” we enter into a new paradigm of what “property” is, and who we actually are.

Stone opined:

The time may be on hand when these sentiments, and the early stirrings of the law, can be coalesced into a radical new theory or myth—felt as well as intellectualized—of man’s relationships to the rest of nature. I do not mean “myth” in a demeaning sense of the term, but in the sense in which, at different times in history, our social “facts” and relationships have been comprehended and integrated by reference to the “myths” that we are co-signers of a social contract, that the Pope is God’s agent, and that all men are created equal. . . . What is needed is a myth that can fit our growing body of knowledge of geophysics, biology and the cosmos.152Stone, supra note 3, at 498.

In the scenarios I have portrayed here, that growing knowledge dovetails with, informs, and is informed by the lifeways of people who have long created and lived by “myths” that guide how they treat the world around them. Myth is not pejorative: where cultures have survived pre- and post- colonial invasion, they have survived because their myths kept them from undercutting the ecosystems that sustained them. When Western cultures grant nonhuman entities formal rights, the evolution in worldview has not been in the original views of those who have proposed such conceptions, now inscribed in law: Australia’s Aborigines153A recent best-seller in Australia has revolutionized how non-Aboriginal Australians understand Aborigines’ relationship with the land. Bruce Pascoe, Dark Emu: Aboriginal Australia and the Birth of Agriculture (2018). or New Zealand’s Māori, for example, have long believed in an indivisible relationship with the natural world around them. Instead, the ethics of the hegemonic cultures in some Western nations are evolving toward the direction that nature-connected communities have long understood and implemented in their own lore, that is their own law. Stone muses that “[o]ne is certain to wonder how, in selecting the critical boundary variables or supplying content to the key ‘ideal’ (riverhood, habitathood), we can avoid being, on the one hand, totally arbitrary or, on the other, guilty of smuggling in whatever standard advances our own most ‘raw’ homocentric interests.”154Stone, supra note 5, at 60. Thus who “we” are is going to matter a lot. In the models I have described here, governments have designated appropriate spokespersons for nature, who, it is hoped, will not simply smuggle in their own “raw” homocentric interests. When governments or courts in these nations grant ecosystems legal rights, they reflect and propel changing views both of human relationships with the natural world. In the examples I describe here, they also reflect and propel evolving views of dominant groups’ relationships with indigenous peoples or other disenfranchised subpopulations from whom the right to manage the natural world had been taken.

The legal evolutions I have described here go beyond what Stone imagined. Despite his foresight, in his writings, he is here, and the river is there: he is not the river. This makes sense. Stone’s worldview was rooted in the U.S. tradition; he was writing for U.S. audiences and was concerned with the intricacies of U.S. constitutional and statutory law. Stone dedicated much of one of his books to the idea of moral and legal pluralism;155E.g., id. at ch. 12. meaning, he espoused that no one size fits all as we seek to remake our cultural and thus legal relationships with the natural world. He advocated “a whole network of mutually supportive principles, theories and attitudes toward consequences.”156Id. at 242. The ideas he espoused find pluralistic fruition in the disparate ecological, historical, and cultural milieux I have described here, where previously subordinated groups have hacked the legal hierarchy to allow their views of human and nonhuman relationships to take legal precedence.

I am not a moral philosopher, and this is not a journal of moral philosophy. Laws, however, reflect our moral inclinations. And our moral inclinations—in Western philosophy and law—derive from how we see ourselves in relationship to the “other,” including the relative worth of the others in relation to other entities and in relation to ourselves. When a society gives rights to rivers or mountains, law is acknowledging that one way of knowing one’s place on the Earth is to see oneself as the Earth. It is the value of the indivisible relationship that gives rise to legal pathways that honor that relationship, with one entity in that relationship given priority to speak for and protect that relationship.

Ideas are forces of nature, acting with greater force when they are translated into law. Law—especially environmental laws—should be adaptive in the evolutionary sense; that is, they should evolve to fit the changing ecological matrix, and should evolve to protect and sustain that matrix, if communities and our species is to survive and thrive. As described here, law in some locales is acknowledging that one way of knowing one’s place on the Earth is to see oneself in a relationship with the Earth, or to see oneself simply as the Earth. We do not know whether or how any of these instantiations of Christopher Stone’s ideas will work to protect the ecological matrix that sustains the relationship between ecosystems and the communities who are being given new rights to speak for those ecosystems. We do not know whether or how nature will be remade, but newly empowered stewards for these experiments in “standing” and more may well improve on the way we have been managing the ecosphere up until now.

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1469

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Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco. J.D., University of California Hastings College of the Law; LL.M., University of London, School of Oriental & African Studies; B.S. (Biology), M.A. (History & Philosophy of Science), & Ph.D. (Science & Technology Studies), Cornell University. I may be reached at takacsd@uchastings.edu. I thank the people who took the time to speak with me about this project: Gerrard Albert, Christopher Finlayson, Ian Hicks, Michelle Maloney, Erin O’Donnell, Claudia Orange, Jorge Iván Palacio, and Anne Poelina. For intellectual contributions, I also thank Hadar Aviram, Larry Carbone, Ming Chin, James May, Michelle Maloney, Dave Owen, Michael Pappas, Zach Price, Reuel Schiller, Linda Sheehan, Jodi Short, Michael Pappas’ Online Workshop for Environmental Scholarship, and the Green Bag group at the University of Tasmania Law School. Final thanks to the excellent editors at the Southern California Law Review.

Fish, Whales, and a Blue Ethics for the Anthropocene: How Do We Think About the Last Wild Food in the Twenty-First Century

One of the lesser celebrated threads of Christopher Stone’s scholarship was his interest in the ocean—especially international fisheries and whaling. Fish and whales are among the “last wild food”—that is, species that humans take directly from the wild for food purposes. While whales are primarily cultural food, fisheries remain important contributors to the human diet globally. Indeed, the food security issues surrounding marine foods are increasingly being recognized as an important international and domestic component of human well-being and equity. These concerns helped to spur the fall 2021 launch of the Blue Foods movement and the conscious incorporation of aquatic foods into the pursuit of the United Nations’ sustainable development goals.

At the same time, changes in the ocean resulting from climate change and other anthropogenic forces are making the commercial harvest of marine wild foods increasingly unsustainable, simultaneously undermining ocean ecosystem function, marine biodiversity, and human food security. Humanity’s continued engagement in industrial-scale commercial marine fisheries is thus both factually uncertain and ethically suspect.

This Article explores the multilayered ethical issues surrounding Blue Foods in the Anthropocene, drawing from Stone’s work in environmental ethics and “Moral Pluralism.” Finding a balance between protecting the world’s marine ecosystems and appropriately promoting the ocean’s contribution to global food security remains an important policy challenge for the twenty-first century, but it is one that nations can meet by privileging indigenous and local fisheries while simultaneously carefully expanding the more environmentally benign forms of marine aquaculture, particularly shellfish and kelp aquaculture.

Introduction

Food security is a global issue garnering increasing attention from academics and policymakers alike. For example, Martin Barry Cole, Mary Ann Augustin, Michael John Robertson, and John Michael Manners noted that “[f]eeding the world sustainably is one of our society’s grand challenges” and that “[i]n 2050, it is estimated there will be 9.7 billion people, and we will require about 70% more food available for human consumption than is consumed today.”1Martin Barry Cole, Mary Ann Augustin, Michael John Robertson & John Michael Manners, The Science of Food Security, Nature Partner J. Sci. Food, Aug. 6, 2018, at 1, https://
http://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-018-0021-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/V98V-WKSN].
After a period of improvement, global food insecurity is increasing, exacerbated over the last two years by the coronavirus pandemic and attending economic stress.2Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Int’l Fund for Agric. Dev., UNICEF, World Food Programme & World Health Org., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Transforming Food Systems for Food Security, Improved Nutrition, and Affordable Healthy Diets for All, at vi (2021) [hereinafter 2021 FAO Food Security Report], https://www.fao.org/3/cb4474en/cb4474en.pdf [https://perma.cc/33ZA-X5DZ]; see also id. at 10 fig.1 (graphing the changing trajectory). According to the United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization’s (“FAO”) 2021 food security report, “Nearly 2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food in 2020—an increase of 320 million people in just one year”;3Id. at vi. 720 to 811 million people faced actual hunger in 2020.4Id. at xv. Among other impacts, the pandemic exposed “the fragility of our food systems,”5Id. at vi. with the result that 30 million more people will likely be dealing with hunger in 2030 than if the pandemic had not occurred.6Id. at xii. Impacts have been worst in Asia and Africa and among children.7Id. at xii–xiii; see also id. at 13 fig.2 (showing that most of the world’s undernourished people are in Asia and Africa). “[B]old actions” are needed to achieve the goal of eradicating world hunger by 2030,8Id. at xii. prompting the FAO to offer both a pragmatic and an ethical vision of future food systems. In its summary, food systems “need to provide decent livelihoods for the people who work within them,” “need to be inclusive and encourage the full participation of Indigenous Peoples, women and youth,” and need to “ensure that children are no longer deprived of their right to nutrition.”9Id. at vii.

The recognition that achieving food security has an ethical dimension, while not new, has gained force over the last decade, in part because of increasing acknowledgement that food insecurity derives from multiple drivers, many of which require redress of larger social inequities. Over the last five years, for example, the FAO has documented that “[c]onflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns and downturns (now exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic) are behind recent rises in hunger and slowing progress in reducing all forms of malnutrition,”10Id. at xviii; see also id. at 2. while “high and persistent levels of inequality” and inability to pay for healthy food exacerbate these drivers.11Id. at 2. For example, “More than half of the people who are undernourished and almost 80 percent of stunted children live in countries struggling with some form of conflict, violence or fragility.”12Id. at 3. As for climate, “Hunger is significantly worse in countries with agri-food systems highly sensitive to rainfall and temperature variability and extremes, and where a high proportion of the population depends on agriculture for livelihoods.”13Id. Economic insecurity leads to multiple negative impacts on food security and nutrition, including increased hunger, consumption of cheaper but less nutritious foods, reduced nutrition, and food insecurity.14Id. Finally, healthy diets are often not the cheapest diets, and “[t]he unaffordability of healthy diets . . . is associated with increasing food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition, including stunting, wasting, overweight and obesity.”15Id. Given these multiple drivers and influences, the FAO identified six combinable pathways toward ethical, sustainable, and resilient food systems.16Id. at xx.

Pathway 6—strengthening food environments and changing consumer behavior to promote the environment as well as human health17Id.—is the most relevant to both Christopher Stone’s vision of an “Earth Ethics”18See generally Christopher D. Stone, Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism (1987) (laying out the principles and values of Moral Pluralism). and this Article’s pursuit of a “Blue Ethics.” By “Blue Ethics,” this Article refers to how we think about and modify human use of the ocean in the twenty-first century in order to keep ocean ecosystems resilient to the Anthropocene while still meeting critical human needs. Among the most pivotal of humans’ uses of the ocean in terms of promoting a new Blue Ethics is food supply.

What the FAO’s food security report largely left to one side is foods from the ocean and other aquatic systems, now dubbed Blue Foods.19Blue Food Assessment, Building Blue Food Futures for People and the Planet: The Report of the Blue Food Assessment 6 (2021) [hereinafter 2021 Blue Food Report], https://
bluefood.earth/wp-content/uploads/The-Report-of-the-Blue-Food-Assessment-Digital.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4FV3-DSP2] (defining “Blue Food” as “foods derived from aquatic animals, plants and algae cultivated and captured in freshwater and marine environments”).
That elision is not unusual; the oceanic component of human food supply is often left out of food security discussions, including the ethical dimensions of food security. This Article seeks to begin filling that near void by sketching an ethical path forward for humanity’s continued dependence on Blue Foods.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I details humanity’s continued reliance on the ocean for food. Part II explores the issue of whether humanity should continue to engage in wild-caught fisheries, sketching out a Blue Ethics at the same time. Part III establishes that attitudes toward the ocean and its importance are already changing in ways that support a Blue Ethics, while Part IV concludes by arguing that humans can pursue Blues Ethics and Blue Food security simultaneously through a measured and careful investment in marine aquaculture.

I.  Human Food Security and Blue Foods

As the FAO is well aware, marine foods are a significant part of the global food security equation. Worldwide, total consumption of food fish has increased at a rate almost double the rate of human population growth and about 50% faster than the increasing rate of consumption of other animal protein.20Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Sustainability in Action 3 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report], https://www.fao.org/3/ca9229en/ca9229en.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEJ6-3V57]. Indeed, “In 2017, fish consumption accounted for 17 percent of the global population’s intake of animal proteins, and 7 percent of all proteins consumed.”21Id. at 5. Around the world, 3.3 billion people consume 20% of their animal protein in the form of fish, and that number can reach “50 percent or more in countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and several small island developing States (SIDS).”22Id.

Importantly, despite the increase in aquaculture globally,23Id. at 6, 21–22. wild capture fisheries still outstrip Blue Food production in aquaculture, particularly with respect to marine fish. In 2018, the latest year for which global data are available, freshwater and marine wild capture fisheries together produced 96.4 million tonnes of fish, seafood, and algae, while freshwater and marine aquaculture produced 82.1 million tonnes.24Id. at 3 tbl.1. The shares from the ocean, in contrast, were 84.4 million tonnes and 30.8 million tonnes, respectively.25Id. In other words, almost three-quarters of the human food taken from the ocean still comes from wild-caught fisheries. These marine fisheries mostly target fish. Indeed, “Finfish represent[] 85 percent of total production” in wild capture fisheries, with anchoveta, Alaska pollock, and skipjack tuna leading the lists of species caught.26Id. at 6. Seven countries account for almost 50% of this wild harvest: China (15%), Indonesia (7%), Peru (7%), India (6%), the Russian Federation (5%), the United States (5%), and Viet Nam (3%).27Id.

Of potential relevance to the ethics of fishing, much of this wild Blue Food is not of particularly high value. Indeed, three of the four most valuable wild-caught groups of species—cephalopods (octopus and squid), shrimps, and lobsters—are not finfish.28Id. at 12. The most valuable group of finfish species, perhaps not surprisingly, is tuna.29Id.

Given humanity’s dependence on Blue Foods, when the FAO noted in 2020 that “as we approach a world of 10 billion people, we face the fact that since 2015 the numbers of undernourished and malnourished people have been growing,”30Id. at vi. it also emphasized that capture fisheries and especially aquaculture will play a “crucial role in global food security.”31Id. However, most other food security researchers and food policymakers ignore the ocean, instead focusing on land-based crops and livestock. For example, Alexander Y. Prosekov and Svetlana A. Ivanova discuss food security in terms of “[g]rain and cereals, vegetable and animal fats, and meat and dairy products.”32Alexander Y. Prosekov & Svetlana A. Ivanova, Food Security: The Challenge of the Present, 91 Geoforum 73, 74 (2018). Other researchers focus solely on agriculture and crops.33Paul C. West, James S. Gerber, Peder M. Engstrom, Nathaniel D. Mueller, Kate A. Brauman, Kimberly M. Carlson, Emily S. Cassidy, Matt Johnston, Graham K. MacDonald, Deepak K. Ray & Stefan Siebert, Leverage Points for Improving Global Food Security and the Environment, 345 Sci. 325, 325–28 (2014). As such, the role of Blue Foods in global food security remains an underacknowledged issue for law, policy, and ethics.

Nevertheless, the world’s dependence on marine foods raises real, if underappreciated, food security concerns. Simultaneously, however, the continued dependence on wild-caught fisheries also raises several ethical concerns, particularly in terms of preserving and enhancing marine biodiversity and the resilience of ocean ecosystems to climate change and other anthropogenic stressors. Part II will explore these concerns in more detail.

II.  Blue Ethics and Wild Capture Fisheries: Should We Keep Fishing the Ocean?

Commercial exploitation of wild fisheries stocks in the ocean has plateaued,342020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report, supra note 20, at 4 fig.1; see also Christopher D. Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?, 24 Ecology L.Q. 505, 506 (1997) [hereinafter Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats] (“The world’s capture fisheries are being over-exploited.”). despite increased fishing effort,35Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, supra note 34, at 507–08. raising important ethical questions about the continued pursuit of these wild foods. The desire for a more ethical path forward regarding humanity’s dependence on ocean food gave birth to the Blue Food Assessment, an emerging movement seeking to ensure that all food policies, including the environmental and climate policies surrounding food, take account of the importance and potential benefits of aquatic foods—fish and shellfish, both marine and freshwater, together with more culturally specific aquatic delicacies such as kelp and sea cucumber.36The Blue Food Assessment, Blue Food Assessment, https://bluefood.earth [perma.cc/Q527-XZHV].

The Blue Food Assessment37Id. launched September 16, 2021. It focuses on using aquatic foods to help bring about the transformation of the global food system to end hunger while increasing sustainability. As its report announces:

There is growing recognition that food systems must be transformed—that achieving the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) requires shifting toward a system that is more diverse, resilient and just, as well as healthier. “Blue foods”—foods derived from aquatic animals, plants and algae cultivated and captured in freshwater and marine environments—have much to offer in that transformation.382021 Blue Food Report, supra note 19, at 6.

Like the FAO, therefore, the Blue Food Assessment seeks to promote a
new ethical approach to food security as well as more comprehensive food management policies and assessments. For example, one of its key
platforms is the need to “[c]ommit to human rights in policy and practice— . . . empowering in every part of the food value chain women, Indigenous groups, marginalized communities and youth.”39Id. at 9.

Another goal of the Blue Food movement is to consider the impact of Blue Food harvest on the environment itself40Id. at 8, 16.—a critical component of Blue Ethics. As such, an ethical approach to Blue Foods must start by considering what industrial-scale commercial fishing of wild marine species does both to those species and to their attendant ecosystems.

A.  The Current Harvest of Wild Marine Species Is Unsustainable

The FAO maintains the most reliable and comprehensive sets of data about how the world supplies itself with aquatic food, and roughly every two years it publishes a State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture report.41The FAO maintains a full set of these reports online, dating back to 1995. Fisheries and Aquaculture, Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, http://www.fao.org/fishery/publications/
sofia/en [https://perma.cc/M777-BAT6].
According to the 2020 report, in 2018 the world produced (from all sources, including fishing and freshwater aquaculture) about 179 million tonnes of fish, crustaceans like crab and lobster, mollusks like clams and oysters, and other aquatic animals, worth $401 billion.422020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report, supra note 20, at 2. Of that total harvest, 156 million tonnes, or over 87%, were used for human food.43Id.

The world’s taste for fish and seafood, however, comes at a cost. Wild capture fisheries in the ocean leveled off in the late 1980s and 1990s.44Id. at 4 fig.1. Moreover, wild marine fisheries are becoming increasingly unsustainable:

The state of marine fishery resources, based on FAO’s long-term monitoring of assessed marine fish stocks, has continued to decline. The proportion of fish stocks that are within biologically sustainable levels decreased from 90 percent in 1974 to 65.8 percent in 2017 (a 1.1 percent decrease since 2015), with 59.6 percent classified as being maximally sustainably fished stocks and 6.2 percent underfished stocks. The maximally sustainably fished stocks decreased from 1974 to 1989, and then increased to 59.6 percent in 2017, partly reflecting improved implementation of management measures. In contrast, the percentage of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10 percent in 1974 to 34.2 percent in 2017. In terms of landings, it is estimated that 78.7 percent of current marine fish landings come from biologically sustainable stocks.45Id. at 7.

Not coincidentally, marine aquaculture industries have been growing rapidly since 1986 to close the gap in global seafood demand.46Id. at 4 fig.1.

Christopher Stone provided as succinct a summary as anyone of the perils facing the ocean:

The oceans—over 70% of the planet’s surface—are in trouble. The omens are everywhere. Marine catches have stagnated in almost every region, even in the face of intensified harvest efforts. The wetlands and coastal nurseries vital to maintain the stocks are vanishing under the pressures of commercial development and a siege of sewage and waste. We are dousing the seas with chemicals, and seasoning them with millions of tons of stubbornly persistent litter. Periodic red tides, kelp and coral afflictions, and major die-offs of marine mammals such as harbour seals and dolphins, may be early warning signs of worse to come.47Christopher D. Stone, Can the Oceans Be Harboured? A Four Step Plan for the 21st
Century, 8 Rev. Eur. Compar. & Int’l Env’t L. 37, 37 (1999) [hereinafter Stone, Can the Oceans Be Harboured].

The succeeding two decades since his summary have made clear that the “worse to come” is climate change and its “evil twin,” ocean acidification, which are wreaking havoc on marine ecosystems.48Robin Kundis Craig, Re-Valuing the Ocean in Law: Exploiting the Panarchy Paradox of a Complex System Approach, 41 Stan. Env’t L.J. 3, 10–19 (2022). In particular, ocean warming is driving marine species poleward, but not at uniform rates, disrupting marine food webs and shifting the concentrations of increasing numbers of important fisheries across management boundaries.49Id. at 16–19.

These current and future changes to the ocean resulting from climate change and ocean acidification will only exacerbate the global insecurity of wild-caught marine fisheries. From a global perspective, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) concluded in 2019 that, already, “[c]hanges in the ocean have impacted marine ecosystems and ecosystem services with regionally diverse outcomes, challenging their governance (high confidence).”50Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on the Ocean
and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate 16 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 IPCC Ocean &
Cryosphere Report], https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2022/03/01_SROCC_SPM_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQV5-X4CT].
While, at the moment, these changes are both enhancing and undermining food security, depending on the exact community involved, the impacts on ecosystem services already “have negative consequences for health and well-being (medium confidence), and for Indigenous peoples and local communities dependent on fisheries (high confidence).”51Id.

For example, coral reef ecosystems produce critical fisheries for island peoples, but they are increasingly vulnerable to both increasing temperatures and ocean acidification.52Id. at 13. In addition, increasing ocean temperatures are already causing many marine species to shift their ranges53Id. at 12.—and those range shifts are already complicating fisheries management. For example, a 2018 study of 686 marine species indicated that species along the Pacific Coast of North America could shift ranges as much as 1,500 kilometers (more than 930 miles), while those on the Atlantic Coast could shift more than 600 kilometers (more than 370 miles).54James W. Morley, Rebecca L. Selden, Robert J. Latour, Thomas L. Frölicher, Richard J. Seagraves & Malin L. Pinsky, Projecting Shifts in Thermal Habitat for 686 Species on the North American Continental Shelf, PLOS One, May 16, 2018, at 1, 12, https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0196127&type=printable [https://perma.cc/HL88-KNMN].
As the researchers noted, “In the United States, fisheries are managed regionally, including species that are managed by individual states and federally managed fisheries that are governed by regional councils with representatives from neighboring states,”55Id. at 23. and their projected range shifts are more than sufficient to move commercially important fish stocks across regulatory jurisdictions within the United States, from the United States to Canada, from Mexico to the United States, and, on the Pacific Coast, from Canada to the United States and Alaska.56Id. at 17 fig.7, 18 fig.8. Other management challenges include “shifts in fishing locations, conflict over regional allocation of fisheries quota, displaced fisherman, and changes in stock boundaries.”57Id. at 23.

Future changes to the ocean, including species migration and food web simplification, pose even greater threats to global food security, fisheries governance, and even national security—including for the United States.582019 IPCC Ocean & Cryosphere Report, supra note 50, at 26. Moreover, the decreasing supplies of seafood are also likely to be less safe because of elevated concentrations of mercury and other toxics in marine plants and animals and increasing contamination, especially of shellfish, by both Vibrio pathogens (the family of bacteria that include cholera and the flesh-eating Vibrio vulnificus) and harmful algal blooms like red tides.59Id. “These risks are projected to be particularly large for human communities with high consumption of seafood, including coastal Indigenous communities (medium confidence), and for economic sectors such as fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism (high confidence).”60Id. In addition, while climate-adaptive management can in some circumstances delay the collapse of fisheries, tipping points are still likely at about 2.0°C of warming.61K. K. Holsman, A. C. Haynie, A. B. Hollowed, J. C. P. Reum, K. Aydin, A. J. Hermann, W. Cheng, A. Faig, J. N. Ianelli, K. A. Kearney & A. E. Punt, Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Forestalls Climate-Driven Collapse, Nature Commc’ns, Sept. 11, 2020, at 1–3 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-18300-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY9Z-W8TL].

Thus, in light of overexploited fisheries and worsening impacts from climate change and ocean acidification, enlightened self-interest alone counsels humanity to reconsider its current reliance on wild-caught Blue Foods and commercial marine fisheries. Blue Ethics adds the additional consideration of preserving marine biodiversity and increasing the resilience of marine ecosystems.

B.  Blue Ethics: From Food to Ecosystems and Biodiversity

Enlightened self-interest only goes so far toward increasing the planet’s chances of retaining high levels of marine biodiversity and functional ocean ecosystems. As Christopher Stone noted repeatedly, getting courts and legislatures to protect these values can be difficult, leading him to propose that natural objects and places—like the Mineral King Valley in California—should have standing to represent their own interests in court.62Stone, supra note 18, at 3. While the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed,63Id. at 3–5. the problem of protecting larger natural values remained, a problem Stone found particularly vexing for whales:

[A]s long as the judges . . . remain within the bounds of conventional international and U.S. legal principles, with no accounting for invasion of the whales’ interests, the “harvesting” will continue. An argument truly on behalf of the whales has as its starting point not the sanctity of treaties and regard for “political questions,” but respect for whales.64Id. at 10.

To account for the value of whales (and trees and mountains and functional ecosystems), he eschewed “Moral Monism”—the positing of one theory of ethics, such as utilitarianism, to resolve all ethical dilemmas—in favor of Moral Pluralism.65Id. at 13. Moral Pluralism

invites us to conceive moral activities as partitioned into several distinct frameworks, each governed by distinct principles and logical texture. We do not try to force the analysis of good character into the same framework as for good acts; nor are our obligations to the spatially and temporally remote subject to exactly the same rules that relate us to our kin, on the one hand, or to species, on the other.66Id.

From this pluralistic framework, whales and other natural entities are entitled to moral considerateness even if they are not legal persons, such that “killing a whale is prima facie wrong: one is obligated in a fairly strong sense not to do so.”67Id. at 220.

However, as Stone immediately noted, the strength of that obligation can vary by the exact moral context from which we evaluate the issue, and the Inupiat occupy a different moral framework with respect to whales than a twenty-first-century Angelina who teaches at the University of Southern California (and who has absolutely no interest in eating whale meat, it should be emphasized).68Id. Expanding on Stone’s point, the Inupiat’s moral duty to the whale may be not to waste whales, or, as was true of the Makah Tribe in the U.S. Pacific Northwest, to forebear whale hunts for cultural purposes when other food is sufficient and the whale species in question is endangered.69The Makah have endured a long-running legal battle to exercise their right to hunt grey whales. However, when grey whales were considered endangered species, the Makah cooperated in their recovery:

[T]he Makah, who now number about 1,500, have hunted whales for more than 2,700 years. The tribe’s 1855 treaty with the US reserved the ‘right of taking fish and of whaling or sealing at usual and accustomed grounds[.]’ The Makah continued whaling until the 1920s, when they gave it up because commercial whaling devastated populations.

Judge Recommends Tribe Be Allowed to Hunt Gray Whales off Washington State, Guardian (Sept.
25, 2021, 10:30 AM) [hereinafter Judge Recommends], https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2021/sep/25/makah-tribe-hunt-gray-whales-washington-state-judge [https://perma.cc/X5Y5-YWFV]. Conversely, increasing numbers of studies confirm that one key to both food security and better health for indigenous communities is access to traditional foods70See generally, e.g., Jennifer Sowerwine, Megan Mucioki, Daniel Sarna-Wojcicki & Lisa Hillman, Reframing Food Security by and for Native American Communities: A Case Study Among Tribes in the Klamath River Basin of Oregon and California, 11 Food Sec. 579 (2019); Fidji Gendron, Anna Hancherow & Ashley Norton, Exploring and Revitalizing Indigenous Food Networks in Saskatchewan, Canada, as a Way to Improve Food Security, 32 Health Promotion Int’l 808 (2017). —including Blue Foods and, when culturally and ecologically appropriate, even whales.71For example, in September 2021, after over two decades of legal battles, an administrative law judge recommended to the U.S. Department of Commerce (which houses the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)) that the Makah be allowed “to land up to 20 Eastern North Pacific gray whales over 10 years, with hunts timed to minimize already low chances of accidentally harpooning an endangered Western North Pacific gray whale,” explicitly “finding that the tribal hunts would have no effect on the healthy overall population of the whales.” Judge Recommends, supra note 69.

Moral Pluralism thus allows for a Blue Ethics that takes multiple values into account simultaneously while still demanding a moral conversation about humans’ uses of the ocean that goes beyond mere human utility.72See Stone, supra note 18, at 221 (discussing how there is still moral saliency in the choice, in an emergency, of whether to dump drilling chemicals on common perennial wildflowers that will reappear next year or, conversely, on rare Arctic lichen, destroying the colony forever). Applying this Blue Ethics to Blue Foods, if one method of getting the Blue Foods essential to human food security imperils marine biodiversity and ocean ecosystems, while another available method not only avoids those impacts but also contributes to the ocean’s resilience to climate change and other stressors, the choice between these two Blue Food security pathways is not an amoral one. As with Stone’s example of killing whales, a Blue Ethics for the twenty-first century must posit that the first path—specifically, the continued reliance on industrial-scale commercial wild-caught fisheries—is simply “prima facie wrong,” and “one is obligated in a fairly strong sense” to switch to the second pathway to achieve Blue Food security.

C.  Marine Biodiversity Is at Risk—and the Primary Legal Tool to Protect Marine Biodiversity Conflicts with Fishing

1.  Overfishing Is a Threat to Marine Biodiversity

Fishing clearly has an impact on the species caught, and multiple case studies—perhaps most famously, the collapse of the cod fishery in Canada—have documented how overfishing can semi-permanently render the target species commercially extinct.73Marten Scheffer. Steve Carpenter & Brad de Young, Cascading Effects of Overfishing Marine Systems, 20 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 579, 579–80, 580 fig.1 (2005). However, ecosystem and biodiversity impacts extend beyond the fished species, in part because fishers initially target the largest members of the largest species, effectively removing apex predators from marine ecosystems.74Id. at 579. As a result, wild-caught marine fisheries at commercial scale have also pervasively altered marine ecosystem function and ocean biodiversity. Indeed, in 2001 a large group of marine biologist luminaries concluded that “[e]cological extinction caused by overfishing precedes all other pervasive human disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including pollution, degradation of water quality, and anthropogenic climate change.”75Jeremy B.C. Jackson, Michael X. Kirby, Wolfgang H. Berger, Karen A. Bjorndal, Louis W. Botsford, Bruce J. Bourque, Roger H. Bradbury, Richard Cooke, Jon Erlandson, James A. Estes, Terence P. Hughes, Susan Kidwell, Carina B. Lange, Hunter S. Lenihan, John M. Pandolfi, Charles H. Peterson, Robert S. Steneck, Mia J. Tegner & Robert R. Warner, Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems, 293 Science 629, 629 (2001). Moreover, “Any fishing tends to alter biodiversity at some or all of its levels, from genes to ecosystems,” and the “fishing . . . of the largest animals results in alteration of age structure, population size, relative abundance of predators and prey, food webs, and ecosystems.”76Mark J. Costello & Bill Ballantine, Biodiversity Conservation Should Focus on No-Take Marine Reserves, 30 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 507, 507 (2015).

Thus, overfishing has long been considered a primary threat to marine biodiversity and ecosystem function,77Melinda Harm Benson & Robin Kundis Craig, The End of Sustainability: Resilience and the Future of Environmental Governance in the Anthropocene 115–17 (2017). and “since the advent of industrial fishing . . . the sequential depletion of coastal, then offshore populations of marine fish has become the standard operating procedure.”78Daniel Pauly & Maria-Lourdes Palomares, Fishing Down Marine Food Web: It Is Far More Pervasive Than We Thought, 76 Bull. Marine Sci. 197, 197 (2005). Indeed, a whole vocabulary has developed to describe these impacts. “Ecological extinction” is the elimination of a species’ ability to function as it should in an ecosystem, even if it is not entirely biologically extinct.79Jackson et al., supra note 75. “Fishing down marine food webs” describes how fishers move from the most desirable fish to lower trophic levels—for example, from apex predators like tuna and swordfish to herring—as they exhaust the initial target species.80Pauly & Palomares, supra note 78, at 198. “Bycatch,” in turn, encapsulates the incidental catch of nontarget species, such as marine mammals, turtles, and seabirds, and “[f]isheries bycatch has been implicated as an important factor in many population declines, including Pacific loggerhead . . . and leatherback . . . sea turtles, North Atlantic harbor porpoises . . . , vaquita . . . in the Sea of Cortez, Mediterranean striped dolphins . . . , the wandering albatross . . . and white-chinned petrel . . . of the Southern Ocean.”81Rebecca L. Lewison, Larry B. Crowder, Andrew J. Read & Sloan A. Freeman, Understanding Impacts of Fisheries Bycatch on Marine Megafauna, 19 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 598, 598–99 (2004). Finally, Daniel Pauly coined “shifting baseline syndrome” to describe how each generation of fishers accepts an increasingly impoverished ocean as normal.82Daniel Pauly, Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline Syndrome of Fisheries, 10 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 430, 430 (1995).

2.  Climate Changes and Ocean Acidification Are Also Significant Threats to Marine Biodiversity

Fishing is no longer the only primary threat to marine biodiversity; climate change has become its equal. A 2015 meta-analysis of 632 peer-reviewed studies related to ocean biodiversity concluded that warming ocean waters will likely increase primary production in the ocean (phytoplankton growth) while simultaneously disrupting marine ecosystems overall and starving both herbivores and carnivores farther up marine food chains.83Ivan Nagelkerken & Sean D. Connell, Global Alteration of Ocean Ecosystem Functioning Due to Increasing Human CO2 Emissions, 112 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. 13272, 13273–75 (2015). Although specific results will likely vary by location, in general,

We find that ocean warming and acidification increase the potential for an overall simplification of ecosystem structure and function, with reduced energy flow among trophic levels with little scope for acclimation. Ocean acidification per se appears to have the potential to bring penetrating modifications to ecological systems through changes in ecosystem processes and shifts in species community structures.84Id. at 13275.

Similarly, the United Nations’ May 2019 biodiversity report concluded that “almost 33% of reef-forming corals and more than a third of all marine mammals are threatened” with extinction, and the planet has already lost about 30% of seagrass meadows and 50% of coral reefs—two highly productive marine habitats—since 1970 and 1870, respectively.85UN Report: Nature’s Dangerous Decline “Unprecedented”; Species Extinction Rates “Accelerating,” United Nations (May 6, 2019), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/
2019/05/nature-decline-unprecedented-report [https://perma.cc/QL6X-95ZX].
By the end of the century on the current trajectory, primary production in the ocean could decrease by 10% and total fish biomass by 25%.86Id.; see also 2019 IPCC Ocean & Cryosphere Report, supra note 50, at 22 (projecting nearly identical losses).

The IPCC concurs that, by 2100, we likely will not recognize the world’s ocean.872019 IPCC Ocean & Cryosphere Report, supra note 50, at 18. Even under a low emissions scenario, ocean heat waves will likely occur twenty times more often than they do now; under a business-as-usual scenario, they will likely occur fifty times more often.88Id. Most coastal ecosystems, including kelp forests, sea grass meadows, and salt marshes, face an increasing risk of destruction as a result of this heat, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise.89Id. at 24. By mid-century, on our current trajectory, oxygen loss will occur to depths of 600 meters (almost 1970 feet) in 59% to 80% of the ocean.90Id. at 19. Extreme sea-level events that used to occur once per century will be occurring once a year by 2050 in many locations, especially the tropics, and the rate of global average sea level rise will continue to accelerate to centimeters per year.91Id. at 20. By the end of the twenty-first century, again assuming business as usual, 60% of the ocean will be experiencing all five of the IPCC’s drivers of ecosystem change—surface warming, acidification, oxygen loss, nitrate pollution, and change in net primary production (growth of marine plants and zooplankton).92Id. at 18.

3.  Protecting Marine Biodiversity Leads to Fisheries Conflicts

Between climate change and fishing, fishing is by far the easier anthropogenic stressor to ocean ecosystems to control immediately through regulation. The primary legal tool for protecting marine biodiversity and promoting the marine resilience are marine protected areas (“MPAs”).93Antonios D. Mazaris, Athanasios Kallimanis, Elena Gissi, Carlo Pipitone, Roberto Danovaro, Joachim Claudet, Gil Rilov, Fabio Badalamenti, Vanessa Stelzenmüller, Lauric Thiault, Lisandro Benedetti-Cecchi, Paul Goriup, Stelios Katsanevakis & Simonetta Fraschetti, Threats to Marine Biodiversity in European Protected Areas, 677 Sci. Total Env’t 418, 419 (2019). MPAs legally set aside a specific area of the ocean and restrict at least some uses of that area. The most protective MPAs, generally referred to as marine reserves,94Costello & Ballantine, supra note 76. significantly restrict or prohibit all resource extraction from the area—especially fishing.95Id.

As such, MPAs and especially marine reserves often impose tradeoffs on coastal communities: the health of local biodiversity, and often of the local fisheries themselves, may depend on leaving large swaths of the ocean unfished. In this classic environmental law conflict between short-term economic gain and longer-term ecological (and often economic and personal) health, time after time, existing fishers protest the creation of these areas. For example, virtually no marine reserve created for biodiversity purposes96The U.S. Department of Defense, most notably, has created a number of de facto biodiversity reserves by prohibiting entry to the waters next to coastal facilities for security purposes. For example, the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, is now considered the United States’ oldest fully protected marine reserve, protecting sportfish at significantly greater abundance and to much larger size than outside its boundary. Eric A. Reyier, Douglas M. Scheidt, Eric D. Stolen, Russell H. Lowers, Karen G. Holloway-Adkins & Bonnie J. Ahr, Residency and Dispersal of Three Sportfish Species from a Coastal Marine Reserve: Insights from a Regional-Scale Acoustic Telemetry Network, Glob. Ecology & Conservation, Sept. 2020, at 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2020.e01057 [https://perma.cc/
H9B6-72EX].
has come into existence in the United States without significant opposition, often from fishers97A Fishing Perspective: Understanding Marine Reserve Effects, Or. Marine Rsrvs. (Nov.
2, 2016), https://oregonmarinereserves.com/2016/11/02/garibaldi [https://perma.cc/54B7-SSBG]; Bret Yager West, Fishermen Protest Marine Reserve at Kaupulehu, W. Haw. Today (June 5, 2016, 3:33
PM), https://www.westhawaiitoday.com/2016/06/05/hawaii-news/fishermen-protest-marine-reserve-at-kaupulehu [https://perma.cc/B5KW-ULK8]; Tim Langlois, Opposition Keen to Stop Marine Parks, but Will Fishers Benefit?, Conversation (June 4, 2013, 11:08 PM), https://theconversation.com/
opposition-keen-to-stop-marine-parks-but-will-fishers-benefit-14955 [https://perma.cc/5A9U-DHZM].
or indigenous groups.98Heidi Walters, Scenes from Tribes’ MLPA Protest, N. Coast J. (June 30, 2010,
3:58 PM), https://www.northcoastjournal.com/NewsBlog/archives/2010/06/30/scenes-from-tribes-mlpa-protest [https://perma.cc/E4YR-5Z6K].
These conflicts manifest as political machinations,99See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155 (2003) (discussing the creations of the Dry Tortugas marine reserve within the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and the lengthy process that preceded President George W. Bush’s establishment of the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument). litigation,100Most recently, for example, the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association, Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen’s Association, Long Island Commercial Fishing Association, Garden State Seafood Association, and Rhode Island Fishermen’s Alliance unsuccessfully challenged President Obama’s 2016 creation of the Northeast Canyons & Seamounts National Marine Monument in the Atlantic Ocean roughly 130 miles off the coast of Massachusetts. Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross, 349 F. Supp. 3d 48, 68 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 945 F.3d 535 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Raimondo, 141 S. Ct. 979 (2021). Nevertheless, President Trump purported to reopen the Monument to fishing by Executive Order in 2020. Proclamation No. 10049, 85 Fed. Reg. 35793, 35793 (June 11, 2020). The Conservation Law Foundation, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Center for Biological Diversity challenged the legality of this Executive Order in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Conservation L. Found. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-01589 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020). They voluntarily withdrew the lawsuit when President
Biden restored the Monument’s restrictions on fishing. Conservation Law Foundation v. Biden
(Northeast Canyons and Seamounts), Nat. Res. Def. Council (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.nrdc.org/
court-battles/conservation-law-foundation-v-trump-northeast-canyons-and-seamounts [https://perma.cc/
P3QU-572E].
or lengthy negotiations and collaborations.101See generally Steven L. Yaffee, Beyond Polarization: Public Process and the Unlikely Story of California’s Marine Protected Areas (2020) (detailing the long and convoluted public collaboration process). Nevertheless, however they arise legally, they evidence some of the practical difficulties of balancing Blue Food security with ocean health.

D.  Nevertheless, Blue Ethics Requires Recognition that Not All Fisheries Are Equal

As already hinted at with respect to indigenous whaling, the Blue Ethics assessment, based on Moral Pluralism, shifts frameworks when the focus moves from reducing or eliminating large-scale commercial fishing to regulating indigenous, local community (subsistence), or artisanal fishing. While the terminology is fluid,102Hillary Smith & Xavier Basurto, Defining Small-Scale Fisheries and Examining the Role
of Science in Shaping Perceptions of Who and What Counts: A Systematic Review, 6 Frontiers
Marine Sci., May 7, 2019, at 2–3, https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/18600/
Smith%20and%20Basurto%202019.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/2QR2-BQX7].
these types of fisheries are usually much smaller in scale than even small-scale commercial fisheries, generally have fewer impacts on marine ecosystem function, provide food and economic security to communities that often have few other resources, and often are deeply ingrained into local and traditional culture.103Id. at 3–4. They also employ a much higher proportion of women than industrial fisheries.104Id. at 4.

To be sure, these smaller-scale fisheries are not all the same in terms of their cultural and food security importance,1052021 Blue Food Report, supra note 19, at 12–14. nor does a twenty-first-century Blue Ethics require that all existing small-scale fisheries continue unaltered. The point, rather, is that not all fisheries important to food security operate at an industrial scale, and the Blue Ethics frameworks for evaluating their continuing morality may be different.

As one example, a context of redressing the harms of colonialism may require a different framework for assessing the morality of a marine reserve. The Māori of New Zealand, for example, have strong traditions in both fishing and coastal management, and much of the early reconciliation focus and implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand focused on the redistribution of fishing rights.106Christopher Finlayson, Plastic in the Pacific: How to Address an Environmental Catastrophe, in Re-Envisioning the Anthropocene Ocean 246–51 (Robin Kundis Craig & Jeffrey M. McCarthy eds.) (forthcoming Feb. 2023). Nevertheless, New Zealand’s impulses toward reconciliation clashed with its desires to protect the Kermadec Islands, “one of the most pristine and unique places on the planet,” located halfway between New Zealand and Tonga.107Id. at 246. Christopher Finlayson, a former member of the New Zealand Parliament who was instrumental in according the Whanganui River personhood rights and Māori co-management, notes that “[t]he legislation to give effect to the Sanctuary is still stalled in the New Zealand Parliament because of objections of the indigenous people of New Zealand (The Māori) who say that the proposal will breach a historic settlement reached with them in 1992.”108Id. at 247 (citation omitted). Specifically, “The complaint of Māori about the Kermadecs is that if the Crown can unilaterally alter the system it entered into as a condition of the Fisheries Settlements of 1989 and 1992, it has the capacity to alter any Treaty Settlements on its own political whim. That could undermine the entire historical settlement framework.”109Id. at 250. As a result, he concludes, national efforts to protect marine ecosystems from overfishing “depend[] on the circumstances and in particular the history, the expectations of the indigenous people, and the relevant legal framework.”110Id. at 251.

Similar conflicts are occurring in the United States in Hawai’i, where marine reserve establishment threatens subsistence fishing and privileges (or at least appears to privilege) the non-indigenous tourist sector. As a result, Native Hawaiian fishers on the Big Island of Hawai’i protested on these grounds “the establishment of the Ka’ūpūlehu Marine Reserve, the island’s first initiative to put a reef off-limits to fishing,” which sought to impose a ten-year moratorium on all taking of fish while a subsistence plan was being drafted for Ka’ūpūlehu Bay coastline.111West, supra note 97.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the Moral Pluralism underlying Blue Ethics is not moral relativism. As Stone elaborated, “Pluralism conceives the realm of morals to be partitioned into several planes. The planes are intellectual frameworks that support the analysis and solution of particular moral problems, roughly in the way that algebra and geometry provide frameworks for the problems to which they are respectively suited.”112Stone, supra note 18, at 133. Concrete examples will help to illustrate the difference.

       Moral relativism evaluates the morality of a given action or decision according to the ethical framework of the actor. Under this approach, the morality of hunting whales varies according to the ethics of each group proposing to hunt them.113Id. at 132. Notably, even under moral relativism it is fairly simple to conclude that the Makah Tribe acts ethically when its members hunt non-endangered eastern gray whales, but the nations that are signatories to the International Whaling Convention114International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. and who voted for its commercial whaling moratorium115Commercial Whaling, Int’l Whaling Comm’n, https://iwc.int/management-and-conservation/whaling/commercial [https://perma.cc/H5C6-5EPJ]. However, the moratorium applies only to commercial whaling; aboriginal subsistence whaling supports “the needs of indigenous communities . . . [and] is regulated by the [International Whaling Commission] which sets catch limits every six years.” Whaling, Int’l Whaling Comm’n, https://iwc.int/management-and-conservation/whaling [https://perma.cc/N5LK-LZCY]. act unethically when they authorize their non-indigenous citizens to kill whales to sell. The different ethical rules that the Makah and signatory nations impose upon themselves still mandate different answers to the question: Is it ethical to kill a whale?

A Blue Ethics based on Moral Pluralism, however, identifies different ethical frameworks independently of what individuals or specific groups believe. With respect to Blue Foods, for example, three of the relevant frameworks might be Mass Production of Seafood for Global Trade, Blue Foods as Cultural Preservation, and Indigenous Subsistence Fishing. Within the first framework, the moral considerateness of both whales and marine ecosystems is particularly strong, such that killing whales is prima facie wrong and large-scale capture fisheries become ethically suspect because of their impacts on marine biodiversity. Within the second framework, which encompasses the Makah Nation’s whale hunt, the moral considerateness of the whales is still strong, but it must be balanced against the cultural and legal rights of the Makah. As a result, the species’ ecological status becomes ethically relevant, and application of Blue Ethics can allow limited indigenous hunting of non-endangered eastern gray whales at levels unlikely to harm the species but prohibit any hunting of still-endangered western gray whales. Within the third framework, the survival and food security of individual community members is potentially at stake, reducing still further the moral considerateness of whales and other marine species needed for food security—but only if more ethical substitutes are not readily available.

Thus, Moral Pluralism requires Blue Ethics to distinguish among types of wild-capture marine fishing rather than embrace an outright ban on all versions of wild-capture fisheries in all locations, while still creating a presumption that there are more ethical pathways to Blue Food security than large-scale commercial marine fishing. The next question is whether the larger cultural context surrounding the ocean and the laws that govern human use of it will allow for this nuanced shift away from wild-capture fisheries, a question to which Part III now turns.

III.  A Blue Ethics for the Twenty-First Century Can Emerge: Evolving Attitudes Toward and Understanding of the Anthropocene Ocean

Blue Ethics requires seeing the ocean with a new morality that makes species, marine biodiversity, and ocean ecosystems ethically and legally considerate—essentially valuing the ocean as a complex adaptive planetary life support system, not just as a grocery store.116See Craig, supra note 48, at 3–80 (exploring a more expansive discussion of this argument). Importantly for the future success of any Blue Ethics project, nations increasingly value these larger systemic functions over fisheries.

Marine tourism provides an important example. Coral reefs are some of the most valuable ecosystems on the planet, contributing over $375 billion each year to the global economy.117J.M. Pandolfi, J.B. C. Jackson, N. Baron, R.H. Bradbury, H.M. Guzman, T.P. Hughes, C.V. Kappel, F. Micheli, J.C. Ogden, H.P Possingham & E. Sala, Are U.S. Coral Reefs on the Slippery Slope to Slime?, 307 Science 1725, 1725 (2005); see U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, The National Action Plan to Conserve Coral Reefs 1 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Coral National Action Plan]. Many of these benefits derive from tourism. For example, the economic benefits from recreation on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef alone have been valued from $700 million to $1.6 billion.118Liam Carr & Robert Mendelsohn, Valuing Coral Reefs: A Travel Cost Analysis of the Great Barrier Reef, 32 Ambio 353, 353, 356 (2003). A study in the Maldives calculated that each shark that tourists can see when diving or snorkeling is worth $33,500, while a similar study in Palau calculated that each shark was worth $1.9 million over the course of its lifetime in reef tourism revenue—far exceeding its paltry value in a fishery.119David Jolly, Priced Off the Menu? Palau’s Sharks Are Worth $1.9 Million Each, A Study Says, N.Y. Times (May 2, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/science/earth/02shark.html [https://
perma.cc/J5AS-X83A].
In Indonesia, shark and ray (such as manta rays) tourist diving was worth at least $22 million in 2017, dwarfing the export value of the entire Indonesian shark fishery ($10 million) and expected to increase dramatically over the next decide if Indonesia invests in these species’ conservation.120Putu Liza Kusuma Mustika, Muhammad Ichsan & Hollie Booth, The Economic Value of
Shark and Ray Tourism in Indonesia and Its Role in Delivering Conservation Outcomes, Frontiers Marine Sci., Apr. 28, 2020, at 1–2, 8–9, https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/62984/1/Mustika%20et%
20al%202020%20Shark%20tourism%20in%20Indonesia.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NDG-ZBLH].
More comprehensively, a study in support of marine spatial planning in Wales found that “the economic importance of non-extractive recreational uses of marine biodiversity,” such as “diving, kayaking, wildlife watching from boats and seabird watching,” “is comparable to that of commercial fisheries for the same region,” arguing that these interests should be given equal weight to fishing in marine planning.121A. Ruiz-Frau, H. Hinz, G. Edwards-Jones & M.J. Kaiser, Spatially Explicit Economic Assessment of Cultural Ecosystem Services: Non-Extractive Recreational Uses of the Coastal Environment Related to Marine Biodiversity, 38 Marine Pol’y 90, 90 (2013).

Marine recreation is a form of ecosystem service, and identifying and valuing these ecosystem services more generally is another means of articulating the morality of protecting the ocean’s systemic functions. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystem services broadly as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems.”122Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: A Framework for Assessment 49, 53 (2003) [hereinafter MEA Framework]. More specifically, according to Gretchen Daily, “Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life.”123Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems 1, 3 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). In 1997, Robert Costanza and several colleagues estimated that the world’s ecosystem services were worth $16 to $54 trillion each year,124Robert Costanza, Ralph d’Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farber, Monica Grasso, Bruce Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. O’Neill, Jose Paruelo, Robert G. Raskin, Paul Sutton & Marjan van den Belt, The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 Nature 253, 253 (1997). underscoring the economic importance of ecosystem services to human well-being.

The ocean provides a significant portion of the Earth’s ecosystem services. As the IPCC summarized in 2019, In addition to their role within the climate system, such as the uptake and redistribution of natural and anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) and heat, as well as ecosystem support, services provided to people by the ocean and/or cryosphere include food and water supply, renewable energy, and benefits for health and well-being, cultural values, tourism, trade, and transport.1252019 IPCC Ocean & Cryosphere Report, supra note 50, at 5.

In their 1997 Nature article, Costanza and his colleagues estimated that about 63% of the total world value of ecosystem services—about $20.9 trillion—comes from marine environments,126Costanza et al., supra note 124, at 259. and about 60% of the value of marine ecosystem services derives from coastal ecosystems.127Id. at 256 tbl.2. These researchers emphasized that the ocean is particularly important for the gas regulation, disturbance regulation, nutrient cycling, biological control, habitat, food production, raw materials, recreation, and cultural services it provides.128Id. As one often-undervalued example, the ocean provides oxygen production. Tiny plants that float near the ocean’s surface around the world, known as phytoplankton, produce this oxygen.129John Roach, Source of Half Earth’s Oxygen Gets Little Credit, Nat’l Geographic (June
7, 2004), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/source-of-half-earth-s-oxygen-gets-little-credit [https://perma.cc/KXJ3-95EC].
Some of the oxygen remains dissolved within the ocean itself, where fish and other marine animals (but not marine mammals or sea turtles, which breathe atmospheric oxygen) use it. Most of the oxygen, however, is released into the atmosphere. In fact, marine phytoplankton produce half of the world’s atmospheric oxygen130Id.—the oxygen upon which terrestrial animals, including humans, depend.

Reflecting the greater moral consideration that the ocean thus deserves, many nations have shifted to ecosystem-based or resilience-based management of their marine resources. Indeed, ecosystem-based management (“EBM”) has become the dominant approach for governing marine ecosystems as ecosystems. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), for example, has adopted EBM for many of its programs in the United States, describing that approach as follows:

Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is an integrated management approach that recognizes the full array of interactions within an ecosystem, including humans, rather than considering single issues, species, or ecosystem services in isolation. EBM is a broad resource management approach that considers dynamic, cumulative effects on marine environments using data and indicators . . . . EBM supports working across sectors to consider tradeoffs between marine resources, ultimately sustaining both diverse ecosystems as well as the services they provide to humans.131Ecosystem-Based Management, Nat’l Marine Ecosystem Status, https://ecosystems.
noaa.gov/EBM101/WhatisEcosystem-BasedManagement.aspx [https://perma.cc/BQ6Z-RLZU].

Moreover, The overarching goal of EBM is to sustain the long-term capacity of marine ecosystems to deliver a range of ecosystem services, such as seafood, clean water, renewable energy (e.g., wave, tidal, and biofuels), protection from coastal storms, and recreational opportunities, with a focus on both ecosystem health and human well-being.132Benjamin S. Halpern, Sarah E. Lester & Karen L. McLeod, Placing Marine Protected Areas onto the Ecosystem-Based Management Seascape, 107 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. 18312, 18312 (2010).

Most recently, an ever-broadening systems view of the ocean has led to the increased adoption of resilience-based marine management. There is little debate that the ocean is a complex adaptive system containing multiple linked complex adaptive ecosystems.133Emanuele Bigagli, Marine Complex Adaptive Systems: Theory, Legislation and Management Practices (Mar. 22, 2017) (Ph.D. thesis, Wageningen University); Mary Ruckelshaus, Terrie Klinger, Nancy Knowlton & Douglas P. DeMaster, Marine Ecosystem-Based Management in Practice: Scientific and Governance Challenges, 58 BioScience 53, 53 (2008); Larry Crowder & Elliott Norse, Essential Ecological Insights for Marine Ecosystem-Based Management and Marine Spatial Planning, 32 Marine Pol’y 772, 775–76 (2008). Specifically, it is a complex of marine ecosystems, and “marine ecosystems are complex adaptive systems linked across multiple scales by flow of water and species movements.”134Ruckelshaus et al., supra note 133; Steven A. Levin & Jane Lubchenco, Resilience, Robustness, and Marine Ecosystem-Based Management, 58 BioScience 27, 27 (2008). The many calls for increased use of EBM arose in part because, “[d]espite their adaptive character and often redundant linkages, marine ecosystems are vulnerable to rapid changes in diversity and function.”135Ruckelshaus et al., supra note 133. “In short, marine ecosystems are in trouble, indicating that many previous attempts to manage individual threats in the absence of a system-wide approach have not worked.”136Id.

The concept of ecological resilience is important for the systems approach to ocean law. Ecological resilience and resilience thinking acknowledge that ecosystems and social-ecological systems are dynamic—not, as prior theories had assumed, inherently stable systems tending toward an equilibrium.137Lance H. Gunderson & Craig R. Allen, Why Resilience? Why Now?, in Foundations of Ecological Resilience xiii, xiv–xv (Lance H. Gunderson, Craig R. Allen & C.S. Holling eds., 2010). “Resilience,” as a concept, recognizes that, in fact, there are at least three ways in which ecosystems experience and respond to changes.138Id. at xv (citation omitted). The first and most common understanding of resilience refers to an ecosystem’s ability to resist change or bounce back from system disturbances.139Id. Sometimes referred to as “engineering resilience,” this sense of resilience refers to “the rate or speed of recovery of a system following a shock.”140Id. The second aspect of resilience acknowledges that ecosystems can exist in multiple states rather than stabilizing around a single equilibrium state; as a result, changes and disturbance can “push” ecosystems over thresholds from one ecosystem state to another.141Id. This second sense of resilience, ecological resilience, “assumes multiple states (or ‘regimes’) and is defined as the magnitude of a disturbance that triggers a shift between alternative states.”142Id. at xv–xvi. Finally, resilience thinking also acknowledges “the surprising and discontinuous nature of change, such as the collapse of fish stocks or the sudden outbreak of budworms in forests.”143Id. at xv. The long-time persistence of an ecosystem (or collection of multiple ecosystems) like the Gulf of Mexico in an apparently stable, productive ecosystem state is absolutely no guarantee that humans can continue to disturb (abuse) the system and expect only a gradual or linear response. Indeed, sudden regime shifts have been documented for a number of marine ecosystems, including Jamaican coral reefs (caused by the combined impacts of overfishing, hurricanes, and disease)144Terence P. Hughes, Catastrophes, Phase Shifts, and Large-Scale Degradation of a Caribbean Coral Reef, in Foundations of Ecological Resilience 205, 205 (Lance H. Gunderson, Craig R. Allen & C.S. Holling eds., 2010). and Alaskan kelp forests (caused by sea otter hunting and predation).145James A. Estes & David O. Duggins, Sea Otters and Kelp Forests in Alaska, in Foundations of Ecological Resilience 249, 251 (Lance H. Gunderson, Craig R. Allen & C.S. Holling eds., 2010).

A complex systems and resilience-based approach to ocean management provides a governance framework that can operationalize Blue Ethics in the twenty-first century because this perspective changes the very goals of marine management. Increasing numbers of marine scientists are concluding, for example, that because it is no longer possible to completely control or prevent change in ocean systems, “the goal of management should be to maintain ecosystems in a healthy, productive, and resilient condition so that they can sustain human uses and provide the goods and services humans want and need.”146Bigagli, supra note 133, at 15 (citing K. L. McLeod, J. Lubchenco, S.R. Palumbi & A.A. Rosenberg, Scientific Consensus Statement on Marine Ecosystem-Based Management 1 (2005)). Among these scientists, the adoption of a complex systems view of the ocean, including ecological resilience and the potential for regime shifts, has led to calls for a new approach to management: resilience-based management (“RBM”).147Elizabeth McLeod, Kenneth R.N. Anthony, Peter J. Mumby, Jeffrey Maynard, Roger Beeden, Nicholas A.J. Graham, Scott F. Heron, Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Stacy Juniper, Petra MacGowan, Sangeeta Mangubhai, Nadine Marshall, Paul A. Marshall, Tim R. McClanahan, Karen Mcleod, Magnus Nyström, David Obura, Britt Parker, Hugh P. Possingham, Rodney V. Salm & Jerker Tamelander, The Future of Resilience-Based Management in Coral Reef Ecosystems, 233 J. Env’t Mgmt. 291, 292 (2019). RBM has been discussed in the context of a variety of ecosystems since about 2012, although coral reefs remain a prominent focus in this research. See generally, e.g., Vivian Y. Y. Lam, Christopher Doropoulos & Peter J. Mumby, The Influence of Resilience-Based Management on Coral Reef Monitoring: A Systemic Review, PLOS One, Feb. 10, 2017, at 1, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0172064&type=printable [https://perma.cc/B6K4-WSUK]; Andrew K. Carlson, William W. Taylor, Kelsey M. Schlee, Troy G. Zorn & Dana M. Infante, Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Stream Salmonids with Implications for Resilience-Based Management, 26 Ecology Freshwater Fish 190 (2017); David J. Yu, Hoon C. Shin, Irene Pérez, John M. Anderies & Marco A. Janssen, Learning for Resilience-Based Management: Generating Hypotheses from a Behavioral Study, 37 Global Env’t Change 69 (2016); Kenneth R.N. Anthony, Jeffrey M. Dambacher, Terry Walshe & Roger Beeden, A Framework for Understanding Cumulative Impacts, Supporting Environmental Decisions and Informing Resilience-Based Management of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (2013); Brandon T. Bestelmeyer & David D. Briske, Grand Challenges for Resilience-Based Management of Rangelands, 65 Rangeland Ecology & Mgmt. 654 (2012).
“Resilience-based management is defined as using knowledge of current and future drivers influencing ecosystem function (e.g., coral disease outbreaks; changes in land-use, trade, or fishing practices) to prioritize, implement, and adapt management actions that sustain ecosystems and human well-being.”148McLeod et al., supra note 147; see also Lam et al., supra note 147, at 2 (noting that “RBM steers management actions towards the preservation of fundamental ecosystem functions, structure, identity and feedbacks. RBM departs from the classic view of steady-state resource management and instead attempts to focus on the processes that govern system dynamics. Contrary to the emphasis on the maintenance of a static perceived optimal state in traditional management approaches, RBM is closely tied to the prevention of regime shifts, whereby a conspicuous change to the structure and function of a system occurs once a threshold is surpassed. Regime shifts involve complex feedback mechanisms that affect system dynamics, hence, a critical aspect of managing for resilience is a thorough understanding of ecological processes of the relevant ecosystems.”). These prioritized actions include threat mitigation (“controlling pollution, sedimentation, overfishing”), actions that support ecosystem processes (for example, improving water quality), and strengthening the abilities of communities dependent on particular marine ecosystems to adapt to the changes occurring in those ecosystems, including by changing how people earn their livelihoods.149McLeod et al., supra note 147. RBM seeks not to maximize the goods that humans can extract from the ocean but rather to cope with the changes that overfishing, marine pollution, climate change, and ocean acidification are bringing to the ocean, simultaneously “acknowledg[ing] that humans are capable of driving change, adaptation, and transformation.”150Id.

Resilience-based management effectively promotes Blue Ethics by prioritizing the reduction of anthropogenic stressors to ocean systems.151Id. at 296. These stressors, as noted, include commercial fishing. The question then becomes whether we can shift humanity’s dependence on Blue Foods from commercial fishing to something else. As the next Part explores, that “something else” is likely to be certain kinds of marine aquaculture.

IV.  Toward a Blue Ethics for Blue Foods: Replacing Fisheries with Marine Aquaculture

Blue Ethics requires that the pursuit of human food security not impoverish the rest of the planet, particularly in terms of worsening biodiversity loss and the impacts of climate change. Certain forms of marine aquaculture hold the promise of not only increasing food global security but also global planetary health and—if done with attention to access and the special needs of indigenous and small coastal communities, women, and children—equity.

However, this transition in Blue Food production and consumption patterns has two components. First, laws and policies need to de-incentivize, if not outright prohibit, large-scale marine commercial fishing. Christopher Stone had much to say on this subject. Simultaneously, however, nations need to recognize both that a replacement source of Blue Foods—marine aquaculture—exists and that not all forms of marine aquaculture are equally ethical. This Part explores both sides to implementing a more ethical approach to Blue Foods.

A.  Tools to Decrease Wild-Caught Fisheries: Christopher Stone’s Five-Step Program for the Twenty-First-Century Ocean

Christopher Stone recognized that global wild-caught fisheries were plateauing.152Stone, Can the Oceans be Harboured, supra note 47, at 37–38. He noted the longstanding clash between biologists and economists on how to calculate optimum yield from a fishery, but he also underscored the need to consider bycatch and habitat destruction, as well.153Id. at 38. In so doing, he made seabirds, sea turtles, and benthic habitat morally considerate in fisheries management—and he championed a multipronged approach to give that moral consideration real-world impact.

1.  End Commercial Fishing Subsidies

According to Stone, the fishing “industry has been the historical beneficiary of public subsidy. Subsidization lowers private costs at public expense, thereby increasing the investment in fishing beyond the level that market signals would warrant.”154Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, supra note 34, at 514. Government subsidies to fishers, he concluded, have “been a crucial culprit in over-fishing,” promoting an increase in commercial fishing instead of its reduction.155Stone, Can the Oceans be Harboured, supra note 47, at 39. “Hence, the first step in restoring the health of the oceans is to wean the industry from subsidies,” a task that Stone thought international trade law was well-suited to address.156Id.; see also Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, supra note 34, at 519–35.

2.  Improve and Extend Resource Management

According to Stone, reducing fishing subsidies, “by reducing interest-group pressures in the political and regulatory environment, would enable the managers to do their jobs.”157Stone, Can the Oceans be Harboured, supra note 47, at 39. However—and again emphasizing international trade law as an enforcement mechanism—Stone also argued that global fisheries management also needs to be enhanced through stronger regional fisheries organizations and better management of the high seas.158Id. Notably, with regard to the high seas, the United Nations is currently drafting a new treaty to protect marine biodiversity in the high seas, rendering large portion of the open ocean marine reserves protected from fishing.159Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally Binding Instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (General Assembly Resolution 72/249), United Nations, https://www.un.org/bbnj [https://perma.cc/FQM7-TMR7].

3.  Charge for Use

Stone also advocated that, rather than rely (solely) on command-and-control catch limits and gear restrictions, governments or fishery managers charge for fishing, in the form of either a landings tax or a royalty.160Stone, Can the Oceans be Harboured, supra note 47, at 40. “A charge raises the cost of fishing to the fisher,” and the goal would be

to create cost conditions that result in the fleet extracting fish at the revenue maximizing level of effort that would be employed by a sole owner. Such a sole owner would stop fishing when the landed value of a marginal stock reduction equalled the marginal cost of catch (including congestion costs and any impairment in future yield).161Id.

Specifically, and consistently with making impacts to marine ecosystems and biodiversity morally and legally considerate, this charge would go beyond the recovery of management costs and seek “to confront the fisher with (ideally) the marginal costs of harvest rivalry, stock depletion and environmental damage.”162Id. at 41.

4.  Establish an Ocean Trust Fund

Revenues from the fishing tax, in turn, would fund the Ocean Trust Fund that Stone proposed.163Id. This fund “could support”

the monitoring of fishing regulations; this could include expansion of satellite programmes, on-board inspectors, etc; defending, restoring, even purchasing wetland and nursery areas; carry-over payments for investors and workers to compensate for tie-up losses required by stock rehabilitation; gathering and analysis of stock data; fisheries health services, including monitoring health effects of mariculture on coastal quality and safeguarding against incursions of exotic species.164Id.

Thus, in addition to making fishing itself more expensive, the fishing tax would make fisheries enforcement more effective, protect marine habitat, transition fishers to other jobs, improve fisheries science, and protect marine ecosystems more generally. Again, Stone was already effectively practicing a Blue Ethics, incorporating the greater health of the ocean into the economics and regulation of fishing.

5.  Establish Ocean Guardians

At the heart of Stone’s Earth Ethics was a quest to give the environment a legal voice165Stone, supra note 18, at 3-4. that could press at least a legal advantage (as opposed to a legal right) of intactness.166Id. at 48–55. That voice would often come in the form of a legal guardian,167Id. at 48. because “Nonpersons such as whales, . . . while possessing interests and even preferences, are at best restricted in their capacities to express them.”168Id. at 51. Similarly, for the ocean, “while we cannot orient the law to a Thing’s welfare, we can orient it to some ideal state of the Thing,”169Id. at 60. and the guardian can urge action consistent with that legal orientation.170Id. at 48. Viewed in this light, guardians for the ocean could also operationalize a Blue Ethics in marine fisheries by articulating the ideal of healthy, resilient marine ecosystems free from the stresses of large-scale commercial marine fishing.

B.  The Ethical Promise of the More Environmentally Benign Forms of Marine Aquaculture

The last step for a Blue Ethics agenda is to substitute a more ethically sound Blue Foods production system for commercial wild-capture fisheries—and that substitute is already emerging. Given the plateauing of wild fisheries, marine aquaculture industries have been growing rapidly since 1986 to close the gap in global seafood demand.1712020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report, supra note 20, at 4 fig.1. Indeed, for most categories of fisheries, aquaculture production has already exceeded that of wild commercial fisheries:

Based on time-series data of major species groups, world aquaculture production has progressively surpassed that of capture fisheries. The “farming more than catch” milestones were reached in 1970 for aquatic algae, in 1986 for freshwater fishes, in 1994 for molluscs, in 1997 for diadromous fishes, and in 2014 for crustaceans. However, despite the increasing output from global aquaculture, farming of marine fishes is unlikely to overtake marine capture production in the future.172Id. at 23.

Aquaculture production of marine animals has grown from an average of 6.3 million tonnes per year between 1986 and 1995 to almost 31 million tonnes in 2018, a growth rate of 489% over about 35 years.173Id. at 3 tbl.1. While, overall, finfish aquaculture dominates aquaculture production, most of that production occurs inland, in freshwater.174Id. at 21. In contrast, “[i]n 2018, shelled molluscs (17.3 million tonnes) represented 56.3 percent of the production of marine and coastal aquaculture. Finfish (7.3 million tonnes) and crustaceans (5.7 million tonnes) taken together were responsible for 42.5 percent, while the rest consisted of other aquatic animals,”175Id. at 6, 26 tbl.6. including sea turtles and marine invertebrates such as sea cucumbers.176Id. at 21.

However, food animals are not the only aquacultured marine species of global importance. In 2018 the world produced 32.4 million tonnes of aquacultured algae (kelp, seaweed) worth $13.3 billion and 26,000 tonnes of ornamental seashells and pearls worth $179,000.177Id. Seaweeds dominate the aquacultured algae, and while tropical seaweed aquaculture in Southeast Asia has decreased in recent years, seaweed aquaculture in temperate and cold waters—like those that surround most of the United States—continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace than marine animal aquaculture.178Id. at 21, 23; see also id. at 22 fig.8 (displaying graphically the growth of seaweed aquaculture compared to other types).

As such, aquaculture, both freshwater and marine, already plays an increasing role in preserving Blue Food security.179Id. at 4 fig.3, 21–36. The issue is whether this global expansion of marine aquaculture is also an example of Blue Ethics. The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is “sometimes.”

As both the FAO and the Blue Food Assessment have recognized, sometimes an ethical approach to food security requires shifting consumer demand. For Blue Foods, the more ethical approach must include a careful expansion of marine aquaculture—but not in the form of the most common finfish aquaculture, Atlantic salmon. Instead, that expansion should focus on marine algae (seaweed) and bivalves such as clams, mussels, and oysters. “[A]cross all blue foods, farmed bivalves and seaweeds generate the lowest stressors” to the environment,180Jessica A. Gephart, Patrik J.G. Henriksson, Robert W.R. Parker, Alon Shepon, Kelvin D. Gorospe, Kristina Bergman, Gidon Eshel, Christopher D. Golden, Benjamin S. Halpern, Sara Hornborg, Malin Jonell, Marc Metian, Kathleen Mifflin, Richard Newton, Peter Tyedmers, Wenbo Zhang, Friederike Ziegler & Max Troell, Environmental Performance of Blue Foods, 597 Nature 360, 360 (2021). making them the most ethical choice of Blue Foods.

1.  Marine Aquaculture and Climate Change

On the whole, Blue Foods are better for the environment than terrestrial foods, and most forms of marine aquaculture are better for the environment than wild-caught fisheries. The multi-author article entitled Environmental Performance of Blue Foods appeared in the journal Nature to accompany the launch of the Blue Food Assessment.181Id. It provides a standardized evaluation of the environmental impacts of twenty-three species groups of blue foods across several parameters, including greenhouse gas emissions, water and land use, and nutrient pollution, all conveniently compared to chicken production.182Id. at 360. Importantly, both environmental impacts and human nutritional values vary considerably across marine foods, whether wild-caught or farmed (aquaculture). To take greenhouse gas emissions as just one example, the authors found that “[a]cross assessed blue foods, farmed seaweeds and bivalves generate the lowest emissions, followed by small pelagic capture fisheries, while flatfish and crustacean fisheries produce the highest.”183Id. at 361.

As the authors note, “fuel use drives capture fisheries emissions.”184Id. Even so, the greenhouse gas emissions from several wild capture fisheries remain lower than emissions from terrestrial chicken production when assessed by weight of edible food produced.185Id. at 361 fig.1(d). These fisheries include herring, sardines, anchovies, cods, hakes, haddocks, salmon, trout, and smelts; in addition, fisheries for tunas, bonitos, billfishes, squid, cuttlefishes, and octopuses are about equivalent in greenhouse gas emissions, on average (albeit with a wider range of variation) to domestic chicken production.186Id. Nevertheless, tradeoffs abound—including with respect to impacts on marine biodiversity. For example, finfish fishing practices that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as use of gill nets and entangling nets, simultaneously increase risks to marine mammals.187Id. at 363.

Seaweed and bivalve marine aquaculture avoid greenhouse gas emissions because neither seaweed nor bivalves need to be fed. “For fed aquaculture, feed production is responsible for more than 70% of emissions for most groups.”188Id. at 361. While seaweeds are technically not plants, like plants they rely on chlorophyll and sunlight to grow—but, unlike land crops, they do not require fertilizer. Bivalves, in turn, are filter feeders and rely on small plants and animals in the water column, known as plankton, for their food.1892020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report, supra note 20, at 26.

More impressively, seaweed aquaculture has the potential to actually sequester carbon dioxide, the most ubiquitous greenhouse gas.190Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C, at
4–6 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2022/06/SR15_Full_Report_HR.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P7C4-WR5G].
As noted, kelps and marine algae photosynthesize, meaning that they take in carbon dioxide. However, while the potential for terrestrial plants, especially forests, to mitigate climate change as carbon sinks is well recognized and promoted,191E.g., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Nations (REDD+) Web Platform, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, https://redd.unfccc.int [https://perma.cc/C98D-CT7C]; Alan Buis, Examining the Viability of Planting Trees to Help Mitigate Climate Change, NASA Global Climate Change (Nov. 7, 2019), https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2927/examining-the-viability-of-planting-trees-to-help-mitigate-climate-change [https://perma.cc/V4RP-VYR5]; Bruno Locatelli, Carla P. Catterall, Pablo Imbach, Chetan Kumar, Rodel Lasco, Erika Marín-Spiotta, Bernard Mercer, Jennifer S. Powers, Naomi Schwartz & Maria Uriarte, Tropical Reforestation and Climate Change: Beyond Carbon, 23 Restoration Ecology 337, 337–38 (2015). the same has not been true for seaweed aquaculture. Indeed, although “[t]he world production of marine macroalgae, or seaweed, has more than tripled, up from 10.6 million tonnes in 2000 to 32.4 million tonnes in 2018,”1922020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report, supra note 20, at 29. only recently has seaweed aquaculture been “gaining increasing attention to be promoted and monitored for climate and environmentally friendly bioeconomy development.”193Id. at 31. Nevertheless, seaweed aquaculture’s potential contribution to climate change mitigation is significant.194Calvyn F.A. Sondak, Put O. Ang Jr., John Beardall, Alecia Bellgrove, Sung Min Boo, Grevo S. Gerung, Christopher D. Hepburn, Dang Diem Hong, Zhengyu Hu, Hiroshi Kawai, Danilo Largo, Jin Ae Lee, Phaik-Eem Lim, Jaruwan Mayakun, Wendy A. Nelson, Jung Hyun Oak, Siew-Moi Phang, Dinabandhu Sahoo, Yuwadee Peerapornpis, Yufeng Yang & Ik Kyo Chung, Carbon Dioxide Mitigation Potential of Seaweed Aquaculture Beds (SABs), 29 J. Applied Phycology 2363, 2363, 2370–71 (2017). Marine kelps generally have been left out of world “blue carbon” (ocean-based climate mitigation) strategies until recently because, unlike seagrasses and salt marshes, they grow on rocks, not in submerged soil, raising questions about their ability to sequester carbon dioxide for long periods.195Dorte Krause-Jensen & Carlos M. Duarte, Substantial Role of Macroalgae in Marine Carbon Sequestration, 9 Nature Geoscience 737, 737 (2016). Thus, “it is difficult for seaweeds to be recognized as carbon sink agents under the current concept of CO2 sequestration as conceived by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).” Ik Kyo Chung, Calvyn F. A. Sondak & John Beardall, The Future of Seaweed Aquaculture in a Rapidly Changing World, 52 Eur. J. Phycology 495, 500 (2017). There has been considerable debate about considering seaweeds as a CO2 sink, particularly with respect to the time period of sequestration of the carbon in their organic matter. Id. “It is obvious that seaweeds draw down CO2 from seawater through photosynthesis in the water column, but a good proportion of this carbon is easily decomposed back to CO2.” Id. However, more recent investigations indicate that natural seaweeds do indeed sequester carbon in the deep ocean (eventually becoming, somewhat ironically, petroleum).196Krause-Jensen & Duarte, supra note 195, at 739 fig.2.

Given the sequestration capacity of natural seaweeds, researchers have proposed that seaweed aquaculture could also significantly contribute to climate change mitigation.197Chung et al., supra note 195, at 500–01. In particular, seaweed aquaculture “should prove to be expandable to the offshore environment and the open sea, . . . unlocking a capacity to greatly increase carbon capture in biomass. This approach has been termed Seaweed Carbon Capture and Sink (‘Seaweed CCS’; analogous to terrestrial Carbon Capture and Storage).”198Id. at 501.

2.  Marine Aquaculture and Nutrient Pollution

Bivalve and seaweed aquaculture can also help to address marine nutrient pollution. Water flowing over and from farms, in the forms of both irrigation return flows and runoff from rain or snowmelt, carries excess fertilizer (mostly nitrogen compounds) to the ocean.199Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and Consequences for Marine Ecosystems, 321 Science 926, 927 (2008). Nutrients also reach the waters through atmospheric deposition, such as from the burning of fossil fuels.200Id. Once there, nutrients induce large blooms of marine plants—phytoplankton and algae. Algae are marine plants, many of which are beneficial to marine food webs.201What Is a Harmful Algal Bloom?, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. (April 27, 2016), https://www.noaa.gov/what-is-harmful-algal-bloom [https://perma.cc/4TUP-WGHP]. Marine algae include both the large marine seaweeds and kelp and the nearly microscopic algal forms of marine phytoplankton.202Id. However, the small phytoplankton forms of algae can create an “algal bloom,” which “is a rapid increase in the population of algae in an aquatic system,” which often “may be recognized by discoloration of the water resulting from the high density of pigmented cells.”203Reference Terms: Algal Bloom, ScienceDaily, https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/
algal_bloom.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC5S-9ACQ]; Algal Bloom, bionity, https://www.bionity.com/en/
encyclopedia/Algal_bloom.html [https://perma.cc/8LMH-PAPH].
This discoloration can give algal blooms common names, such as “red tides.”204Danielle Hall, What Exactly Is a Red Tide?, Smithsonian Ocean (Aug. 2018), https://
ocean.si.edu/ocean-life/plants-algae/what-exactly-red-tide [https://perma.cc/Q9LF-2JZA].
Increasing nutrient concentrations are the usual cause of algal blooms,205Id. because, like terrestrial plants, marine phytoplankton respond to nitrogen and phosphorus compounds as fertilizers.

Algal blooms impact both marine ecosystems and human health. At the ecosystem level, as the blooms die off, their decomposition consumes all the oxygen in the water column, leading to hypoxic (low-oxygen) conditions that make large areas of the ocean uninhabitable by marine animals.206Id. In the United States, the largest of these so-called “dead zones” occurs seasonally in the northern Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the Mississippi River and can reach the size of Massachusetts or New Jersey—over 7,000 square miles.207See Jennifer Viegas, Gulf Wildlife ‘Dead Zone’ Keeps Growing, Discovery News (May 7, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://news.discovery.com/animals/gulf-dead-zone-oil-spill.html [https://perma.cc/
H9YA-V7VV].
However, dead zones are now common throughout the world’s coastal regions.208See Diaz & Rosenberg, supra note 199, at 926 (“[D]ead zones have developed in continental seas, such as the Baltic, Kattegat, Black Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and East China Sea, all of which are major fishery areas.”). The number of dead zones in the world’s seas has doubled every decade since 1960 as a result of increasing marine pollution, and a 2008 study identified more than 400 dead zones throughout the world.209Id. at 926, 928. Perhaps most disturbingly, dead zones are missing biomass compared to what would be expected, suggesting that the oxygen deprivation that algal blooms cause can have long-term effects on the region’s biodiversity and productivity.210Id. at 927.

In part because of these aquatic impacts, researchers have concluded that nutrient pollution (along with biodiversity loss)—not climate change—actually poses the greatest current risk of pushing planetary systems across potentially irreversible thresholds.211Johan Rockström, Will Steffen, Kevin Noone, Asa Persson, F. Stuart III Chapin, Eric Lambin, Timothy M. Lenton, Marten Scheffer, Carl Folke, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Björn Nykvist, Cynthia A. de Wit, Terry Hughes, Sander van der Leeuw, Henning Rodhe, Sverker Sörlin, Peter K. Snyder, Robert Costanza, Uno Svedin, Malin Falkenmark, Louise Karlberg, Robert W. Correll, Victoria J. Fabry, James Hansen, Brian Walker, Diana Liverman, Katherine Richardson, Paul Crutzen & Jonathan Foley, Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, Ecology & Soc’y, Dec. 2009, at 3, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/ES-2009-3180.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7EY9-KWUM].
Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, and their colleagues at the Stockholm Resilience Center first identified their nine planetary boundaries in 2009.212See generally id. Planetary boundaries “are human-determined values of the control variable” to keep the planet from crossing thresholds and entering into transformations that represent existential threats to current social-ecological systems.213Id. at 3. The nine boundaries identified represent systems operating at a global scale, either directly or cumulatively, and include climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, atmospheric aerosol loading, biogeochemical flows (phosphorus and nitrogen nutrient pollution), global freshwater use, land system change, biodiversity loss, and chemical pollution.214Id. at 8–9 tbl.1. The researchers’ 2015 update article moderated those conclusions by working with risk zones instead of hard boundaries215Will Steffen, Katherine Richardson, Johan Rockström, Sarah E. Cornell, Ingo Fetzer, Elena M. Bennett, Reinette Biggs, Stephen R. Carpenter, Wim de Vries, Cynthia A. de Wit, Carl Folke, Dieter Gerten, Jens Heinke, Georgina M. Mace, Linn M. Persson, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Belinda Reyers & Sverker Sörlin, Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet, 347 Science 736, 736 (2015). but nevertheless concluded that genetic biodiversity loss and both nitrogen and phosphorus pollution had crossed into red zones, while climate change remained in the yellow (lesser) risk zone.216Id.

As the FAO has emphasized, mollusks like clams and oysters are filter feeders, meaning that aquacultured mollusks do not need to be fed.2172020 FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture Report, supra note 20, at 26. Similarly, seaweeds grow through photosynthesis.218Id. at 27. As a result, “[m]arine bivalves, filter-feeding organisms that extract organic matter from water for growth, and seaweeds, which grow by photosynthesis by absorbing dissolved nutrients, are sometimes described as extractive species.”219Id. These species can reduce nutrient pollution in marine environments, regardless of whether the pollution comes from fed finfish aquaculture220Id. at 27, 29. or other sources, such as fertilizer runoff from upstream agriculture.221Matt Parker & Suzanne Bricker, Sustainable Oyster Aquaculture, Water Quality Improvement, and Ecosystem Service Value Potential in Maryland Chesapeake Bay, 39 J. Shellfish Rsch. 269, 277–78 (2020).

Thus, shellfish and kelp aquaculture can improve marine water quality as well as feed human beings. For example, “In the U.S., oysters are the largest grossing marine species group for U.S. aquaculture, valued at $192 million in 2016.”222Jessica S. Turner, M. Lisa Kellogg, Grace M. Massey & Carl T. Friedrichs, Minimal Effects of Oyster Aquaculture on Local Water Quality: Examples from Southern Chesapeake Bay, PLOS One,
Nov. 7, 2019, at 1, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0224768&
type=printable [https://perma.cc/BKJ2-FXPA] (citation omitted).
Oysters are also particularly good at filtering water.223Id. at 2 (citations omitted). Statistically significant water quality improvements have been measured in and around oyster farms in Virginia’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay,224Id. at 9. and the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) and NOAA have determined that “[a]ll of the nitrogen currently polluting the Potomac River estuary could be removed if 40 percent of its river bed were used for shellfish cultivation.”225Oyster Aquaculture Could Significantly Improve Potomac River Estuary Water Quality, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. (April 9, 2014), https://www.noaa.gov/oyster-aquaculture-could-significantly-improve-potomac-river-estuary-water-quality [https://perma.cc/Z6YK-G8EJ]. In the Maryland portion of Chesapeake Bay, oyster aquaculture removes nitrogen pollution associated with farm runoff, allowing oyster aquaculture (and clam aquaculture) to potentially participate in nutrient trading programs under the federal Clean Water Act.22633 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.

Kelp aquaculture can also improve water quality. For example, some species of kelp can remove up to 94% of ammonia pollution and up to 61% of phosphorus.227See Zhibing Jiang, Jingjing Liu, Shanglu Li, Yue Chen, Ping Du, Yuanli Zhu, Yibo Liao, Quanzhen Chen, Lu Shou, Xiaojun Yan, Jiangning Zeng & Jianfang Chen, Kelp Cultivation Effectively Improves Water Quality and Regulates Phytoplankton Community in a Turbid, Highly Eutrophic
Bay, Sci. Total Env’t., Mar. 10, 2020, at 6–7, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0048969719355561?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/5HA9-RZP4], and studies cited therein.
Similar studies along the northeastern (Atlantic) coast of the United States have “demonstrat[ed] that nutrient bioextraction through seaweed aquaculture can be an effective coastal nutrient management tool in urbanized estuaries.”228Jang K. Kim, George P. Kraemer & Charles Yarish, Use of Sugar Kelp Aquaculture in Long Island Sound and the Bronx River Estuary for Nutrient Extraction, 531 Marine Ecology Progress Series 155, 160 (2015). Moreover, the nutrient extraction benefits potentially multiply when marine aquaculture facilities grow kelp and shellfish together.229Id. at 161.

C.  Ethical Transitions to Shellfish and Seaweed Aquaculture

Careful attention to Blue Foods could improve both the environmental impacts of human food security and human nutrition. For example, “blue foods provide the highest nutrient richness across multiple micronutrients (for example, iron and zinc), vitamins (for example, B12), and long-chain polyunsaturated fatty acids (for example, EPA and DHA) relative to terrestrial animal-source foods.”230Gephart et al., supra note 180, at 363.

More specifically as discussed above, marine aquaculture, particularly kelp and shellfish aquaculture, is a key component of a more ethical Blue Food future. On the whole, both aquacultured kelp and “bivalves have a low environmental impact per gram of protein produced, compared with finfish aquaculture, most capture fisheries, and terrestrial livestock.”231Turner et al., supra note 222, at 1 (citation omitted); see also Parker & Bricker, supra note 221, at 276 (noting that oyster aquaculture in Maryland did not affect dissolved oxygen or ammonia levels in the water, indicating that the aquaculture was not negatively affecting the environment). Moreover, FAO data indicate “that 70 percent of people involved in aquaculture production are women,”232Rob Fletcher, Women in Aquaculture: Julie Kuchepatov, Fish Site (Mar. 22, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://thefishsite.com/articles/women-in-aquaculture-julie-kuchepatov#:~:text=Statistics%20from%20
FAO%20show%20that,where%20women%20are%20most%20active [https://perma.cc/K7YQ-GV6A].
suggesting that marine aquaculture is already promoting gender equity in Blue Food production.

       There are, of course, other ethical considerations, such as how to transition fishers to new jobs and finding ways to support communities that transition from fishing to aquaculture. Access to the new industry needs to remain equitable, and sometimes contentious issues regarding how to locate new businesses and infrastructure in crowded coastal zones will require resolution—although marine aquaculture is increasingly moving into deeper ocean waters, and co-location with offshore renewable energy facilities can save space.233See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Harvest the Wind, Harvest Your Dinner: Using Law to Encourage an Offshore Energy-Food Multiple-Use Nexus, 59 Jurimetrics J. 61 (2018) (providing a more expansive discussion of these issues). In other words, the transition to more ethical Blue Food security will require work, careful planning, new laws and policies, and probably some money, either from governments or investors.

Conclusion

The Anthropocene requires humanity to continually adjust law and policy to meet basic human needs—like food and water—without sacrificing the rest of the biosphere in the process. Although Christopher Stone is now most strongly associated with the Rights of Nature movement (as other articles in this volume make clear), he also recognized that progress was also possible through a new Earth Ethics that gives Things and Nonhumans in nature—like whales and coral reef ecosystems—both legal advantage234Stone, supra note 18, at 43–62. in court and moral considerateness235Id. at 71–83. in policymaking while still stopping short of giving nature actual legal rights.

This more limited ethical framework, and the Moral Pluralism that Stone developed to support it, provides a workable framework for reconsidering the ethics of humans’ dependence on Blue Foods for our overall food security. Under this new Blue Ethics, the choice of how to procure Blue Foods is not amoral; instead, giving full moral considerateness to ocean species and marine ecosystems requires consciously shifting Blue Food production away from industrial-scale commercial fishing to the most environmentally benign forms of marine aquaculture, generally involving aquaculture of bivalves and kelp. At the same time, adopting Moral Pluralism provides a principled basis for using multiple frameworks and analyses to evaluate the continued morality of other kinds of wild-caught fisheries, particularly subsistence fishing among the world’s indigenous communities.

The transition from large-scale marine fishing to increased aquaculture will not be easy in all, or even most, locations. Moreover, the details of how to first define and then shift among relevant ethical frameworks without devolving into moral relativism236See id. at 132 (distinguishing moral relativism). and its political manifestations will require careful thought and intimate situational wisdom, as well as a strong commitment to improving the ocean’s resilience. However, the result could be both increased food security and improved health for many coastal communities and an ocean with more capacity to adapt to climate change and ocean acidification, extending the many non-fish ecosystem services it provides to future generations.

 

 

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1307

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* Robert C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law, Los Angeles, CA. My thanks to the editors of the Southern California Law Review for including me in the Christopher Stone Symposium on Environmental Law. I may be reached at rcraig@law.usc.edu.