The Care Act: A System of Coercion Masquerading as One of Compassion

Against the bleak backdrop of a cold November afternoon in San Francisco, Erica Stone faces a heart-wrenching dilemma. Her twenty-eight-year-old daughter, Monica, has been battling schizophrenia-induced psychosis since she was sixteen. Homeless and living just north of Market Street, Monica adamantly rejects her mother’s offers of psychiatric hospitalization, as she has done on many past occasions. Gripped with anxiety over her daughter’s safety, Monica’s refusal to seek treatment weighs heavily on her mind.

In years past, Erica would have been forced to return home after leaving Monica food and a sleeping bag, heart heavy with her daughter’s continued refusal to accept treatment, yet without any available recourse. However, a recent development in California’s mental health legislation has reshaped this narrative. As of December 1, 2023, the Community Assistance, Recovery, and Empowerment (“CARE”) Act grants Erica the ability to petition Monica into court-ordered treatment.1Community Assistance, Recovery, and Empowerment (CARE) Act, ch. 319, 2022 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1 (West 2024) (codified as amended at Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5970–5987 (West 2024)). Now fully implemented across all fifty-eight California counties, the Act establishes a network of civil CARE Courts that can order those suffering from schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders into treatment programs at the community level.2Mary Kekatos, California’s CARE Court Program to Tackle Mental Illness Starts Next Month. What You Need to Know, ABC News (Sept. 25, 2023, 11:10 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/californias-care-court-program-tackle-mental-illness-starts/story?id=103461370 [https://perma.cc/5DTX-8VTP].

Once Erica submits a petition on Monica’s behalf, affirming her eligibility for the CARE program as an individual with untreated schizophrenia, the petition undergoes evaluation by a CARE Court.3Id. For Monica to qualify for assistance through the CARE Act, the court must find that Monica is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision or that she is a threat to herself or others without support.4Manuela Tobias & Jocelyn Wiener, California Lawmakers Approved CARE Court. What Comes Next?, CalMatters (Sept. 14, 2022), https://calmatters.org/housing/2022/09/california-lawmakers-approved-care-court-what-comes-next [https://perma.cc/Q2RN-P5Y9]. If the court finds either of these to be true, the Act empowers the court to create a “Care Plan” for Monica that lasts up to twelve months, with the possibility to extend the plan for an additional year.5Id. This Plan may include provisions necessitating Monica’s relocation to emergency housing, mandatory participation in behavioral health treatment, and court-ordered stabilization medications.6Jocelyn Wiener & Manuela Tobias, CARE Court: Can California Counties Make It Work?, CalMatters (July 14, 2022), https://calmatters.org/health/2022/07/care-court-california [https://perma.cc/9ZPG-FSBY].

Created with the goal of connecting Californians suffering with schizophrenia and other related psychotic mental illnesses with treatment “before they end up cycling through prison, emergency rooms, or homeless encampments,” the CARE Act promises to advance upstream diversion from more restrictive conservatorships or incarceration.7Governor Newsom Statement on Introduction of CARE Court Legislation, Governor Gavin Newsom (Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2022/04/07/governor-newsom-statement-on-introduction-of-care-court-legislation [https://perma.cc/YQ3H-REB6]. However, if Monica fails to comply with her CARE program, she may be referred to conservatorship proceedings with a new factual presumption that no suitable alternatives to conservatorship are available.8Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5979(a)(3) (West 2024) (“[T]he fact that the respondent failed to successfully complete their CARE plan . . . shall create a presumption at that hearing that the respondent needs additional intervention beyond the supports and services provided by the CARE plan.”).

This Note explores the implications of the CARE Act on California’s existing mental health landscape, while also pointing out certain deficiencies in the Act as it exists today. Part I of this Note explores the inner workings of the CARE Court framework, as well as the grounds for challenging a law as “vague” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II argues that the CARE Act’s current eligibility criteria are unconstitutionally vague and are thus likely to result in arbitrary and discriminatory court enforcement. Part III goes on to propose possible amendments to the CARE Court framework that aim to protect against these potentially speculative and arbitrary judicial determinations. Part IV acknowledges the inherent limitations of these proposed amendments within the broader context of systemic change while underscoring the short-term necessity of these amendments in defending individuals’ due process rights.

 

(Un)Safe and (In)Effective: Preemption, Deference, the FDA, and the Opioid Crisis

The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is tasked with keeping prescription drugs safe and effective for the American people. The FDA has long enjoyed deference in its decision-making because of the ambiguity in its organic statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). Gaining FDA approval for prescription drugs, however, is not a rubber stamp that frees a drug manufacturer from liability. Prescription drug manufacturers, such as opioid manufacturers, have been unsuccessful in convincing courts to use the concept of federal preemption and deference—specifically FDA approval and therefore judicial deference to that approval—to shield them from liability from state law claims against the distribution of these drugs. With the fall of Chevron deference in June 2024, it is unclear if the FDA will still enjoy the deference it has received, potentially leading to the promulgation of litigation against the FDA for (un)safe and (in)effective drugs. This Note examines the evolution of litigation against prescription drug manufacturers, specifically opioid manufacturers, by analyzing the difficult-to-meet standard of federal preemption under the FDCA. It then examines the history of deference to the FDA under Chevron by using the FDA approval and regulation of opioids as a case study. Lastly, it predicts how the overruling of Chevron by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo will impact the prescription drug landscape—ranging from circuit splits, to changes in the FDA structure, to even a floodgate of ligation against the FDA itself.

When Doctors Become Cops

The lines between law enforcement and health care are blurring. Police increasingly lean on doctors to provide them with genetic samples, prescription histories, and toxicology results that they could not obtain on their own. This often occurs without a warrant or the patient’s consent. At the same time, legislatures are using physicians as regulatory levers to police pregnant and transgender bodies. And due to chronic underfunding of social services, many Americans now receive pseudo-mental health treatment through the courts rather than clinics. Together, these things paint a sinister picture of law enforcement being thrust into medicine in ways that are deeply troubling and vastly underexplored.

In this Article, I reveal how the blurring of law enforcement and health care undermines core principles of medical ethics—such as privacy, accountability, efficacy, honesty, and autonomy—in the service of diametrically opposed prosecutorial goals. I walk through various examples of law enforcement’s co-option of medicine. These examples expose fundamental conflicts between the two professions that support keeping them far apart.

Scholars have done excellent work documenting the overpolicing of emergency rooms. This Article expands the analysis to a wider set of clinical domains and ratchets up the urgency by establishing police involvement in health care as a social determinant of health. When doctors become cops, this does violence to the physician-patient relationship and the (disappearing) trust on which it relies. This in turn causes demonstrable negative health outcomes. Not coincidentally, medical mistrust is highest in communities that are poor, racially diverse, and overpoliced. Thus, to improve the physician-patient relationship and promote health, I provide a few suggestions for how the line between law enforcement and health care may be better enforced.

INTRODUCTION

A.  Abortion Restrictions Intensify Police Presence into Health Care

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), legislatures in conservative states have significantly restricted access to abortion.1Larissa Jimenez, 60 Days After Dobbs: State Legal Developments on Abortion, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Aug. 24, 2022), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/60-days-after-dobbs-state-legal-developments-abortion [https://perma.cc/V2N3-N6YX] (“Aside from trigger bans already on the books, over 100 bills restricting access to abortion have been introduced in 2022 alone.”); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022). One such law is Utah’s SB 174, which was written to go into effect as soon as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was overturned.2Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This law criminalizes the provision of abortion from implantation in all but three narrow circumstances.3Abortion Prohibition Amendments, Senate Bill 174, 2020 Leg., Gen Sess. (Utah 2020) (codified at Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 76-7a-101). One of the three circumstances is if the woman was sexually assaulted.

However, it is not enough that the patient confide in her doctor that she was raped. Before terminating a pregnancy, physicians are required to verify that the rape has been reported to law enforcement.4SB 174 is currently enjoined from being enforced. However, this same requirement is present in the current law, which bans abortion after eighteen weeks and also makes an exception in the instance of rape. Because the vast majority of abortions occur before eighteen weeks, this provision has not been tested much. This same provision exists in other states.5See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-45 (2024); Idaho Code § 18-622(2)(b) (2024); W. Va. Code § 16-2R-3 (2024). There is no legislative guidance on the procedure to be followed to protect the confidentiality of the patient’s medical records or the patient-provider privilege. This sort of conspicuous and ill-conceived police intrusion into medical decision-making is both exceptionally troubling and on the rise.

Such laws interfere with patient care by thrusting police into decisions that should be exclusively between patients and their doctors. Rape survivors frequently choose not to report their assault out of concerns that it will revictimize them without leading to a conviction.6“[Survivors] often encounter individuals who are skeptical about their claims, diminish their credibility, minimize their experience, are dismissive of them entirely, or are generally insensitive to their experience. This phenomenon has been termed ‘secondary victimization,’ or ‘the second rape.’ ” Alexa Sardina & Alissa R. Ackerman, Restorative Justice in Cases of Sexual Harm, 25 CUNY L. Rev. 1, 6 (2022) (footnote omitted). Under the law of several states, this rational, personal decision will now block these patients from accessing safe medical interventions. Complying with these laws puts physicians in a bind—do they fulfill their ethical obligations, or their legal ones? More importantly, such laws force patients to have their medical needs subordinated to larger prosecutorial goals. Prioritizing the state’s interest in prosecution in this way violates long-standing norms of patient autonomy and medical ethics.

The criminalization of abortion brings law enforcement’s conscription of physicians into agonizingly sharp relief.7See Carleen M. Zubrzycki, The Abortion Interoperability Trap, 132 Yale L.J.F. 197, 209 (2022). As of writing, the following states are enforcing their near-complete bans on abortion: Alabama (Ala. Code § 26-23H-4 (2024)); Idaho (Idaho Code § 18-622(1) (2024)); Louisiana, (La. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:87.7, 14.87.8, 40:1061 (2024)); Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.017(2) (2022)); Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.772 (West, Westlaw through 2023 Reg. Sess.)); Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-45 (2024)); Oklahoma (Senate Bill 1555, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2022)); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 22-17-5.1. (2024)); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-213 (2024)); Texas (Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 170A.001-.007 (West, Westlaw through 2023 legislation)); West Virginia (W. Va. Code § 16-2R-3 (2024)). But this conscription goes well beyond reproductive care and operates on two axes. The first axis involves legislators, acting through the police, leaning on nurses and physicians to enforce moral codes that are only tangentially related to medicine. Examples include not just bans on abortion or gender-affirming care, but the implementation of prescription drug monitoring programs and the provision of addiction or mental health treatments through the carceral system. The second axis of police encroachment into health care is more historic and familiar. It involves cops asking hospital staff to provide them with biological samples that they then use to investigate drug prosecutions, car accidents, murders, and sexual assaults. Everywhere you look, it seems, cops are operating on these two axes to blur together the provision of health care with the prosecution of crime.

While these police encroachments target diverse kinds of data and endanger different aspects of health care, they each do violence to the physician-patient relationship and the trust on which it relies. They take what makes health care so unique and special—the confidentiality and ethical obligations the physicians have toward their patients—and exploit this for prosecutorial ends. The physician-patient relationship is not just some precious ideal that we need to protect out of respect for old-fashioned values. Substantial research now demonstrates that when we undermine the trust patients have in physicians, we do significant damage to population8See Carol Bova, Paulette Seymour Route, Kristopher Fennie, Walter Ettinger, Gertrude W. Manchester & Bruce Weinstein, Measuring Patient-Provider Trust in a Primary Care Population: Refinement of the Health Care Relationship Trust Scale, 35 Rsch. Nursing & Health 397, 397–98 (2012). and individual health.9See Sachiko Ozawa & Pooja Sripad, How Do You Measure Trust in the Health System? A Systematic Review of the Literature, 91 Soc. Sci. & Med. 10, 13 (2013).

In this Article, I explore how the blurring of health care and law enforcement violates fundamental principles of medical ethics. But I will also reveal how shaky and aspirational these core ethical principles are, and how far we are from realizing them. I establish medical mistrust, which is exacerbated by police intrusion, as a social determinant of health (“SDOH”) that has been massively underexplored.10See Ivy Mannoh, Merna Hussien, Yvonne Commodore-Mensah & Erin D. Michos, Impact of Social Determinants of Health on Cardiovascular Disease Prevention, 36 Current Op. Cardiology 572, 572 (2021). Not coincidentally, medical mistrust leads to poorer health outcomes and is much higher in communities that are poor, racially diverse, and overpoliced. This exacerbates health inequities, as Latinx and Black people have a long history of receiving inferior care, despite having comparable insurance and access.11Derek M. Griffith, Erin M. Bergner, Alecia S. Fair & Consuelo H. Wilkins, Using Mistrust, Distrust, and Low Trust Precisely in Medical Care and Medical Research Advances Health Equity, 60 Am. J. Preventive Med. 442, 442 (2021). To repair mistrust to improve patient outcomes and respect for autonomy, physicians cannot be perceived to be aligned with policing—an institution that is oppressive and surveillance-oriented.12See Marleen Stelter, Iniobong Essien, Carsten Sander & Juliane Degner, Racial Bias in Police Traffic Stops: White Residents’ County-Level Prejudice and Stereotypes Are Related to Disproportionate Stopping of Black Drivers, 33 Psych. Sci. 483, 483 (2022); see generally Mikah K. Thompson, A Culture of Silence: Exploring the Impact of the Historically Contentious Relationship Between African-Americans and the Police, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 697, 715 (2017) (describing the history of slave patrols and connecting it to modern policing).

To justify my thesis—that law enforcement and health care need to be more completely divorced from one another—the Article will proceed in the following way. In the first Part, I will reveal how abortion restrictions are just the tip of the iceberg. In the second Part, I will describe how law enforcement easily gains access to confidential medical data. In the third Part, I establish medical mistrust as a SDOH. Unfortunately, when the police lean on physicians to do their investigative work, this has the potential to annihilate the struggling physician-patient relationship and to lead to poorer health outcomes. In the fourth Part, I provide several illustrations of how law enforcement is meddling inappropriately in health care. These examples reveal not just how pervasive the meddling has become, but also how fundamental the differences are between the two cultures’ ethics. While medicine aspires toward self-regulation, privacy, accountability, efficacy, honesty, and respect for autonomy, law enforcement resists these values. This matters because the co-option of health care by the police undermines principles of medical ethics in the service of diametrically opposed prosecutorial norms. To respect patient autonomy, repair medical mistrust, and promote individual and public health, I will conclude by suggesting a few concrete legal reforms that may better wall health care off from law enforcement.

B.  Ubiquitous Police Involvement in Health Care

The post-Dobbs abortion restrictions give us a unique sense of urgency regarding the co-option of health care by law enforcement. However, abortion is just the tip of the iceberg. In many other domains, police are reaching into medical databases and spaces to gain access to information that they cannot obtain on their own.

The reason for the high quantity of police meddling in health care is two-fold. First, physicians are risk-averse and already highly regulated. Attaching threats of criminal penalties to their noncompliance with state laws will deter many of them, and it is easy to add new conditions to the renewal of their medical licenses.13See, e.g., State ex rel. Sorensen v. Lake, 236 N.W. 762, 764 (Neb. 1931) (upholding the revocation of a physician’s license for procuring a criminal abortion on the ground that it constituted immoral, unprofessional, and dishonorable conduct). See generally Annotation, Grounds for Revocation of Valid License of Physician, Surgeon, or Dentist, 82 A.L.R. 1184 (1933). This is the “easy deterrence” rationale. Second, cops are constantly looking for ways to improve their crime clearance rates, or the percentage of crimes that are solved. The value of medical and biological evidence to this pursuit is enormous, and this is something hospitals have in spades. This is the “easy access” rationale. Hospitals and physicians are thus both a convenient regulatory lever and a reservoir of evidence.14See David B. Wilson, David Weisburd & David McClure, Use of DNA Testing in Police Investigative Work for Increasing Offender Identification, Arrest, Conviction and Case Clearance, 7 Campbell Systematic Revs. 1, 6 (2011).

Astute observers have written about how the police have forced their way into emergency rooms in poor, urban neighborhoods.15See, e.g., Ji Seon Song, Cops in Scrubs, 48 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 861, 900 (2021). In one study, close to 80% of patients who had cops transport them to or visit them in the emergency department were Black.16Rucha Alur, Erin Hall, Utsha Khatri, Sara Jacoby, Eugenia South & Elinore J. Kaufman, Law Enforcement in the Emergency Department, 157 JAMA Surgery 852, 853 (2022). Police omnipresence has been shown to compromise clinical care by, for example, prioritizing the interrogation of trauma patients when they need life-saving interventions.17Kate Gallen, Jake Sonnenberg, Carly Loughran, Michael J. Smith, Mildred Sheppard, Kirsten Schuster, Elinore Kaufman, Ji Seon Song & Erin C. Hall, Health Effects of Policing in Hospitals: A Narrative Review, J. Racial & Ethnic Health Disparities 870, 874 (2022); see Christin Bexelius, Klaus Hoeyer & Niels Lynöe, Will Forensic Use of Medical Biobanks Decrease Public Trust in Healthcare Services? Some Empirical Observations, 35 Scandinavian J. Pub. Health 442, 442 (2007). Additionally, their swiping of confidential patient data in emergency departments—sometimes without a warrant or consent—appears to be rampant, and increasing, with very little oversight.18See Ji Seon Song, Policing the Emergency Room, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2646, 2682 (2021). Overpolicing in urban emergency rooms is a harrowing example of cops injecting themselves into health care in ways that frustrate patient autonomy and clinical care.

But it goes beyond this phenomenon too. To the surprise of many, police have been quietly conducting warrantless searches of various genetic databases.19See Natalie Ram, America’s Hidden National DNA Database, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 1253, 1268–69 (2022). Physicians have also been asked to take on the mantle of law enforcement to limit patient access to not just abortion, but also opioid medications and gender-affirming treatments. Police administer fatal doses of ketamine to patients they diagnose as having “excited delirium” despite this diagnosis being highly contested in the medical community. Counties are expanding their “treatment courts” to provide substandard mental health and addiction treatment, with threats of incarceration for noncompliance.

In many domains, law enforcement is co-opting the practice of medicine. I will go into greater detail for each example below, as they each illustrate different violations of medical ethics norms. However, in the following Section, I will introduce the problems with community distrust of police. I will then compare this to medical mistrust and explore how the deep roots of medical mistrust are an important SDOH.

1.  Police Mistrust Is at Record Highs

The public’s trust in the police is at an all-time low.20Julie Ray, Global Progress on Safety, Confidence in Police Stalls, Gallup (Oct. 26, 2022), https://news.gallup.com/poll/403937/global-progress-safety-confidence-police-stalls.aspx [https://perma.cc/YJF4-5QGA]; Charlie Sorrel, People Living In High-Crime Areas Respect the Law, But Distrust the Police, Fast Co. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3068921/people-living-in-high-crime-areas-respect-the-law-but-distrust-the-police [https://perma.cc/RLH6-6ZVT] (citing the results of a study in which just 23.8% of participants “thought the police are honest”). This is related, no doubt, to the fact that in the last year alone, The Washington Post reported that over 1,100 people have been shot and killed by the police.21Fatal Force Portal, Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database [https://web.archive.org/web/20240109124949/https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database]. Shockingly, one in twenty homicides in the U.S. are committed by law enforcement.22Lois Beckett, One in 20 US Homicides Are Committed by Police – and the Numbers Aren’t Falling, Guardian (Feb. 15, 2023, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/feb/15/us-homicides-committed-by-police-gun-violence [https://perma.cc/HN3P-M7DQ]. In 2022, 11% of police killings involved no alleged offense by the deceased, 9% involved mental health or welfare checks, and 8% involved traffic violations.23Sam Levin, ‘It Never Stops’: Killings by US Police Reach Record High in 2022, Guardian (Jan. 6, 2023, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/06/us-police-killings-record-number-2022 [https://perma.cc/B47K-76WX]. One need not linger on these data to understand why the police in the United States spark fear of violence.24See Cheryl Boudreau, Scott A. MacKenzie & Daniel J. Simmons, Police Violence and Public Perceptions: An Experimental Study of How Information and Endorsements Affect Support for Law Enforcement, 81 J. Politics 1101, 1101 (2019). People should obviously not be killed for being mentally ill or for running a red light.

Now that there is more widespread video recording of officers “as they engage in violence against Black citizens . . . the world has begun to see the human rights violations” committed against Black people by police.25Corinthia A. Carter, Police Brutality, the Law & Today’s Social Justice Movement: How the Lack of Police Accountability Has Fueled #Hashtag Activism, 20 CUNY L. Rev. 521, 522–23 (2017). In the wake of the police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, almost ninety percent (88%) of Black Americans say major changes are needed to make policing more accountable.26Steve Crabtree, Most Americans Say Policing Needs ‘Major Changes,’ Gallup (July 22, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/315962/americans-say-policing-needs-major-changes.aspx [https://perma.cc/93BQ-EP5Z]. This is compared with 63% of Hispanic Americans and 51% of White Americans who likewise desire greater police accountability.27Id. And since the widespread coverage of these incidents, even more examples of police brutality have impaired community trust and reduced incentives to cooperate with the police.28See Scott M. Mourtgos, Roger C. Mayer, Richard A. Wise & Holly O’Rourke, The Overlooked Perspective of Police Trust in the Public: Measurement and Effects on Police Job Behaviors, 31 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 639, 662 (2020). Awareness of police brutality has been shown to result in fewer calls to 911 and less information-sharing with the police.29Joanelle A. Bailey, Sara F. Jacoby, Erin C. Hall, Utsha Khatri, Gregory Whitehorn & Elinore J. Kaufman, Compounding Trauma: The Intersections of Racism, Law Enforcement, and Injury, 8 Current Trauma Reps. 105, 107 (2022).

2.  Structural Racism in Policing

A large body of scientific research reveals structural racism in “virtually all aspects of the criminal legal system,” with Black Americans “experiencing harsher outcomes in relation to police encounters, bail setting, sentence length, and capital punishment than White people.”30Zinzi D. Bailey, Justin M. Feldman & Mary T. Bassett, How Structural Racism Works — Racist Policies as a Root Cause of U.S. Racial Health Inequities, 384 New Eng. J. Medicine 768, 769 (2021) (“A large body of scientific research documents both racially unequal outcomes and racial bias in virtually all aspects of the criminal legal system, with Black people experiencing harsher outcomes in relation to police encounters, bail setting, sentence length, and capital punishment than White people.”). While people’s trust in the police varies greatly based on their race, in general, the trust people have in police has taken a huge hit in the last few years.31See Daniel K. Pryce & Joselyne L. Chenane, Trust and Confidence in Police Officers and the Institution of Policing: The Views of African Americans in the American South, 67 Crime & Delinq. 808, 809 (2021).

Researchers have begun to make the connection between police brutality and unmet medical needs.32Sirry Alang, Donna McAlpine, Malcolm McClain & Rachel Hardeman, Police Brutality, Medical Mistrust and Unmet Need for Medical Care, 22 Preventive Med. Reps. 1, 1 (2021). A proposed mechanism for this is impaired medical trust. This Article proposes a direct link between policing and inequitable health outcomes, because patients perceive medicine as aligned with law enforcement. When doctors work too closely with cops, health care is not just seen as affected by the police—it is the police. This takes medicine in the opposite direction from where it needs to go: to correct health inequities. Because trust is so vital and diminishing in health care, we must do more to ensure that the violent and patronizing cop culture does not infect the clinic.

I.  MEDICAL MISTRUST IS A SOCIAL DETERMINANT OF HEALTH

A.  The Physician-Patient Relationship Is Suffering

Trust is a “vital aspect of clinical care”33Jennifer Richmond, Marcella H. Boynton, Sachiko Ozawa, Kathryn E. Muessig, Samuel Cykert & Kurt M. Ribisl, Development and Validation of the Trust in My Doctor, Trust in Doctors in General, and Trust in the Health Care Team Scales, Soc. Sci. & Med., Apr. 2022, at 1, 2. with mistrust being “a major barrier to a strong patient-clinician relationship.”34Mohsen Bazargan, Sharon Cobb & Shervin Assari, Discrimination and Medical Mistrust in a Racially and Ethnically Diverse Sample of California Adults, 19 Annals Fam. Med. 4, 4 (2021). Unfortunately, the physician-patient relationship is not what it once was. Today, the ideal of the trustworthy, compassionate, attentive physician seems almost quaint. Most of us do not have a long-term, trusting relationship with our primary care doctor. There are many reasons for this.

First, patients and physicians have precious little time to build trust.35Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, Cara James, Byron J. Good & Anne E. Becker, The Culture of Medicine and Racial, Ethnic, and Class Disparities in Healthcare, in The Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities 396, 402 (Mary Romero & Eric Margolis eds., 2005). Since the 1990s, managed care insurance organizations have put considerable pressure on physicians to move quickly from patient to patient.36Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 328 (1995). Seeing a high volume of patients is financially rewarded in the allocation of relative value units (“RVUs”), which is a performance metric that impacts physicians’ promotions and salaries. Additionally, doctors “face mounting demands on their time” to fill insurance authorization requests, perform utility review, train mentees, and update their recordkeeping.37David C. Dugdale, Ronald Epstein & Steven Z. Pantilat, Time and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 14 J. Gen. Internal Med. S34, S34 (1999). Patients and physicians simply do not have the time to get to know one another in the way they did decades ago.

Research shows the best way to forge a strong therapeutic alliance is for physicians to “engage more with patients by listening to what they have to say, asking questions and showing sensitivity to their emotional concerns.”38Rafael Zambelli Pinto, Manuela L Ferreira, Vinicius C Oliveira, Marcia R Franco, Roger Adams, Christopher G Maher & Paulo H Ferreira, Patient-Centred Communication Is Associated with Positive Therapeutic Alliance: A Systematic Review, 58 J. Physiotherapy 77, 77 (2012). But unfortunately, this is not occurring. The fee-for-service model reimburses hospitals and physicians for doing things, but not for talking about whether and how to do things.39Physicians are incentivized to “medicate and operate on patients, rather than to talk about whether or why to do these things.” See Teneille R. Brown, Denying Death, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 977, 977 (2015). Relatedly, as medicine has become more technical and specialized, there has also been “a growing substitution” of patient self-reports for those made by machines.40Iain Hay, Money, Medicine, and Malpractice in American Society 41 (1992). Why focus on what a patient is telling you, when you can run a test, bill for it, and see “objective” data for yourself? The overreliance on tests and technology may lead patients to feel like their personal accounts of their health histories do not matter.41See id.

Telemedicine may also be damaging the physician-patient relationship. Something critical is lost when our regular physicians cannot see us biting our nails, rapidly losing weight, or struggling to walk. In one study of telemedicine, physicians reported they “were very concerned about the loss of personal connections and touch, which they believed diminished expected rituals that typically strengthen physician-patient relationships.”42Teresita Gomez, Yohualli B. Anaya, Kevin J. Shih & Derjung M. Tarn, A Qualitative Study of Primary Care Physicians’ Experiences with Telemedicine During COVID-19, 34 J. Am. Bd. Fam. Med. S61, S61 (2021). Of course, telemedicine improves access for many rural Americans. It is not a universally bad thing. But when it comes to initiating strong, trusting bonds between physicians and patients, it is a poor substitute for in-person visits.

Given these systemic pressures, it is impressive that some physicians still take the time to get to know their patients. Though of course, not all physicians do. And data suggests that patients of color43See Adolfo G. Cuevas, Kerth O’Brien & Somnath Saha, African American Experiences in Healthcare: “I Always Feel Like I’m Getting Skipped Over,” 35 Health Psych. 987, 990–91 (2016). who are overweight,44See David B. Sarwer, Hamlet Gasoyan, Sarah Bauerle Bass, Jacqueline C. Spitzer, Rohit Soans & Daniel J. Rubin, Role of Weight Bias and Patient–Physician Communication in the Underutilization of Bariatric Surgery, 17 Surgery for Obesity & Related Diseases 1926, 1928–29 (2021). who have intellectual disabilities,45See J. Wilkinson, D. Dreyfus, D. Bowen & B. Bokhour, Patient and Provider Views on the Use of Medical Services by Women with Intellectual Disabilities, 57 J. Intell. Disability Rsch. 1058, 1064–65 (2013). or who use illicit drugs46See P. Todd Korthuis, Somnath Saha, Geetanjali Chander, Dennis McCarty, Richard D. Moore, Jonathan A. Cohn, Victoria L. Sharp & Mary Catherine Beach, Substance Use and the Quality of Patient-Provider Communication in HIV Clinics, 15 AIDS & Behav. 832, 838–39 (2011). are more likely to feel rushed by their doctors and to experience poor physician communication.

Most patients are familiar with the feeling of being rushed by their doctor. One famous study found that on average, physicians interrupt their patients after less than twenty seconds of the patient speaking.47See Larry B. Mauksch, Questioning a Taboo: Physicians’ Interruptions During Interactions with Patients, 317 JAMA 1021, 1021 (2017). While interruptions sometimes facilitate deeper sharing, physicians often interrupt patients in ways that discourage patients from offering additional relevant concerns. It is difficult to trust people who do not appear to listen to us.

Together, these factors contribute to a perfect storm that is weakening the physician-patient relationship. Repairing this relationship is not just a good insofar as it promotes health; it is a good on its own because it fosters informed, compassionate, and individualized care. Against this backdrop where doctors are not trusted and police are trusted even less, we need to do more to repair patient trust in health care. Allowing cops to take advantage of the trust that remains in health care to access patient data and prosecute crime does exactly the opposite. In this next Section, I will describe how medical mistrust impairs individual and public health.

B.  Medical Mistrust Hurts Health

The trust between clinicians and patients does not exist in the context of an equal relationship. There is a sharp power imbalance, where the “doctor typically has knowledge that the patient lacks, and the power to order investigations and treatments.”48Zoë Fritz & Richard Holton, Too Much Medicine: Not Enough Trust?, 45 J. Med. Ethics 31, 33 (2019). But the asymmetry flows in the other direction as well—the patient may hold private knowledge about their symptoms, their values, and their medical history that really ought to be shared.

In theory, patients can adopt the treatment plan or not, they can terminate the relationship, and they can seek treatment elsewhere. But this power is severely limited by practical considerations. For example, many patients live in rural areas, have complicated diagnoses that require specialized care, or do not have access to affordable insurance and a range of providers. Any of these can mean that they have no real choice and are “stuck” seeing particular physicians. Because patients lack the ability to see another doctor, earning the patient’s trust is essential to making sure patients receive quality care and do not feel forced to continue a disrespectful relationship.49See id. at 31.

Researchers have documented unacceptable levels of medical mistrust, which captures the “overall suspicion of the health care system and beliefs that health care providers and organizations may act contrary to patients’ best interests.”50Alang et al., supra note 32, at 1. Medical mistrust has been shown to lead to poorer health outcomes,51Bova et al., supra note 8, at 398; Ozawa & Sripad, supra note 9, at 10. and to “trigger nothing short of a public health crisis.”52Robert I. Field, Anthony W. Orlando & Arnold J. Rosoff, Am I My Cousin’s Keeper?: A Proposal to Protect Relatives of Genetic Database Subjects, 18 Ind. Health L. Rev. 1, 21 (2021). However, while understood to be “ubiquitous,” precise measurement of medical mistrust has been difficult because it encompasses many different things.53Ramona Benkert, Adolfo Cuevas, Hayley S. Thompson, Emily Dove-Meadows & Donulae Knuckles, Ubiquitous Yet Unclear: A Systematic Review of Medical Mistrust, 45 Behav. Med. 86, 86 (2019).

Even so, mistrust has been shown to cause patients to feel stressed about seeing their physician54See Lisa Rosenthal & Marci Lobel, Gendered Racism and the Sexual and Reproductive Health of Black and Latina Women, 25 Ethnicity & Health 367, 388–89 (2020). and report less satisfaction with their care.55Bazargan et al., supra note 34, at 5. Medical mistrust also leads patients to refuse prescribed medications, to miss cancer screenings,56Natalie Escobio Bustillo, Heather L. McGinty, Jason R. Dahn, Betina Yanez, Michael H. Antoni, Bruce R. Kava & Frank J. Penedo, Fatalism, Medical Mistrust, and Pretreatment Health-Related Quality of Life in Ethnically Diverse Prostate Cancer Patients, 26 Psycho-Oncology 323, 327 (2017). to not see their doctor for regular visits,57See Alaina Brenick, Kelly Romano, Christopher Kegler & Lisa A. Eaton, Understanding the Influence of Stigma and Medical Mistrust on Engagement in Routine Healthcare Among Black Women Who Have Sex with Women, 4 LGBT Health 4, 9 (2017); Richmond et al., supra note 33, at 7. to discourage others from seeking treatment, to not share sensitive medical information with their providers, and to be less likely to comply with the prescribed treatment or health care plan.58See Mohsen Bazargan, Cheryl Wisseh, Edward Adinkrah, Hoorolnesa Ameli, Delia Santana, Sharon Cobb & Shervin Assari, Influenza Vaccination Among Underserved African-American Older Adults, 2020 BioMed Rsch. Int’l 1, 2 (2020); Richmond et al., supra note 33, at 7. There is even some evidence that trusting your health care provider is associated with better self-reported health status.59Ozawa & Sripad, supra note 9, at 10. Put simply, when trust suffers, patients suffer.60See Benkert et al., supra note 53, at 94.

Medical mistrust is exaggerated in already marginalized communities. It has been shown to discourage Native Americans,61Mary K. Canales, Diane Weiner, Markos Samos & Nina S. Wampler, Multi-Generational Perspectives on Health, Cancer, and Biomedicine: Northeastern Native American Perspectives Shaped by Mistrust, 22 J. Health Care for Poor & Underserved 894, 896 (2011); Lauren Vogel, Broken Trust Drives Native Health Disparities, 187 Canadian Med. Ass’n J. E9, E9 (2015). Black people,62Ballington L. Kinlock, Lauren J. Parker, Janice V. Bowie, Daniel L. Howard, Thomas A. LaVeist & Roland J. Thorpe Jr., High Levels of Medical Mistrust Are Associated with Low Quality of Life Among Black and White Men with Prostate Cancer, 24 Cancer Control 72, 76 (2017); K. Allen Greiner, Wendi Born, Nicole Nollen & Jasjit S. Ahluwalia, Knowledge and Perceptions of Colorectal Cancer Screening Among Urban African Americans, 20 J. Gen. Internal Med. 977, 982 (2005); Brenick et al., supra note 57, at 4–5. and Latinx   people63Jessica Jaiswal, Whose Responsibility Is It to Dismantle Medical Mistrust? Future Directions for Researchers and Health Care Providers, 45 Behav. Med. 188, 189 (2019). from   receiving   all   kinds   of   care.   In   groups   with intersectionalities,64Ivy K. Ho, Taylor A. Sheldon & Elliott Botelho, Medical Mistrust Among Women with Intersecting Marginalized Identities: A Scoping Review, 27 Ethnicity & Health 1733, 1733–35 (2022). the effects of mistrust might be even more exaggerated.65See Rosenthal & Lobel, supra note 54, at 388–89.

For example, researchers have linked vaccine hesitancy to medical mistrust.66See Xiaoning Zhang, Yuqing Guo, Qiong Zhou, Zaixiang Tan & Junli Cao, The Mediating Roles of Medical Mistrust, Knowledge, Confidence and Complacency in the Pathway from Conspiracy Beliefs to Vaccine Hesitancy, 9 Vaccines 1342, 1342 (2021). And poor adherence to medication plans has also been linked to medical mistrust. See Gregory L. Hall & Michele Heath, Poor Medication Adherence in African Americans Is a Matter of Trust, 8 J. Racial & Ethnic Health Disparities 927, 927 (2021). During the COVID-19 (“COVID”) pandemic, public health researchers observed that Black and Latinx people had more “vaccine hesitancy” despite being disproportionately impacted by COVID deaths.67Monica Webb Hooper, Anna María Nápoles & Eliseo J. Pérez-Stable, No Populations Left Behind: Vaccine Hesitancy and Equitable Diffusion of Effective COVID-19 Vaccines, 36 J. Gen. Internal Med. 2130, 2130–31 (2021). But rather than focusing on “why people of color distrust medicine,” scholars have recently encouraged asking “how has power been abused in medicine?” and “what can institutions do to stop it?”68See Keisha Ray, What Is Medicine to Do?: Righting Past and Present Abuses Against People of Color, Bioethics Today (Mar. 21, 2021), https://bioethicstoday.org/blog/what-is-medicine-to-do-righting-past-and-present-abuses-against-people-of-color [https://perma.cc/GJ6M-PDAV] (describing how the medical field can address distrust of medicine among people of color). That is, why might people of color rationally fear the COVID vaccine, based on how they have been exploited and abused in the past? The burden of rectifying mistrust cannot be borne exclusively by the disadvantaged communities themselves. This is the great insight of the SDOH framework. It allays the propensity to engage in victim blaming or assuming that the alarming state of health inequity is just.

Unfortunately, the nature of medical mistrust makes it difficult to combat. In a poll by the Association of American Medical Colleges, “six in 10 adults have concerns about sharing their social and online activity data in a healthcare setting” in part due to mistrust.69Franzi Rokoske, Medical Mistrust: One Obstacle on the Path to Health Equity, RTI Health Advance (June 14, 2022), https://healthcare.rti.org/insights/medical-mistrust-and-health-equity [https://perma.cc/YH8B-TVMP] (referencing Anurupa Dev, Kendal Orgera, Sarah Piepenbrink & Phoebe Ramsey, For the Common Good: Data, Trust, and Community Health, AAMC Ctr. for Health Just. (Mar. 4, 2022), https://www.aamchealthjustice.org/news/polling/common-good [https://perma.cc/KE4T-24GC]). While researchers often need access to race, income, and other sensitive data to measure health inequities, “when patients distrust the system, they are less likely to share self-identifying data.”70Id. This creates an unfortunate feedback loop; the very causes of medical mistrust make patients reluctant to provide the data needed to correct it. Of course, if patients know that their health data can be shared with law enforcement, they are even less likely to share their demographic data with their doctors. This will make it even harder to run racially sensitive epidemiological studies to correct health inequities.

As a key factor in racial health disparities, distrust in health care institutions is a massively underexplored SDOH.71See Alicia L. Best, Faith E. Fletcher, Mika Kadono & Rueben C. Warren, Institutional Distrust Among African Americans and Building Trustworthiness in the COVID-19 Response: Implications for Ethical Public Health Practice, 32 J. Health Care for Poor & Underserved 90, 91–92 (2021); see also Jaiswal, supra note 63, at 188. It needs to be explored in the same way as other well-known factors, such as stress,72See Richard C. Palmer, Deborah Ismond, Erik J. Rodriguez & Jay S. Kaufman, Social Determinants of Health: Future Directions for Health Disparities Research, 109 Am. J. Pub. Health S70, S70 (2019). exposure to high levels of industrial chemicals, air pollution,73See Harriet A. Washington, How Environmental Racism Fuels Pandemics, 581 Nature 241, 241 (2020). or living in food deserts.74See Donald Warne & Siobhan Wescott, Social Determinants of American Indian Nutritional Health, Current Devs. Nutrition, Supplement 2, Aug. 2019, at 12. Only by viewing the co-option of health care by law enforcement as a SDOH can we appropriately evaluate the health impacts on communities of color who already experience disproportionate health disparities.

1.  Medicine’s History of Injustice

Medicine has a troubled history of policing bodies and reinforcing power structures.75See DelVecchio Good et al., supra note 35, at 401–03. For too long, physicians from upper-class, white households have dismissed the stories of patients who were considered “disobedient” or “difficult” simply because they had different backgrounds or experiences.76See Edward J. Bergman & Nicholas J. Diamond, Sickle Cell Disease and the “Difficult Patient” Conundrum, Am. J. Bioethics, Mar. 2013, at 3, 4–5. This dynamic continues today. The disparity in class, education, physical ability, and race creates a form of epistemic injustice77See Melissa Creary & Arri Eisen, Acknowledging Levels of Racism in the Definition of “Difficult,” Am. J. Bioethics, Mar. 2013, at 16, 17. that prioritizes the voices of patients who tell the physicians familiar stories and what they expect to hear.78See DelVecchio Good et al., supra note 35, at 401–03. Add to this the fact that physicians generally have poor listening skills,79See Peter M. Ruberton, Ho P. Huynh, Tricia A. Miller, Elliott Kruse, Joseph Chancellor & Sonja Lyubomirsky, The Relationship Between Physician Humility, Physician–Patient Communication, and Patient Health, 99 Patient Educ. & Counseling 1138, 1139 (2016); Allan S. Berger, Arrogance Among Physicians, 77 Acad. Med. 145, 145–47 (2002). and we can see why we need to “dethrone” physicians from their presumed superiority to respond to the SDOH.80See Ellen J. Amster, The Past, Present and Future of Race and Colonialism in Medicine, 194 Canadian Med. Ass’n J. E708, E708 (2022).

Hubris and histories of racism in health care have led to justified mistrust of medical providers, especially among people with disabilities,81See Nancy Sharby, Katharine Martire & Maura D. Iversen, Decreasing Health Disparities for People with Disabilities Through Improved Communication Strategies and Awareness, 12 Int’l J. Env’t Rsch. & Pub. Health 3301, 3312 (2015). women, Indigenous, Black, and Latinx populations.82See Richmond et al., supra note 33, at 1–2. When reflecting on this, people often call to mind the unethical Tuskegee experiments, in which poor Black sharecroppers were deliberately infected with syphilis and denied available treatments. But by focusing on Tuskegee, we risk minimizing the geographic and temporal breadth of medical racism.

Before the Civil War, physicians “attributed poor health among slaves to their biologic inferiority.”83Rachel R. Hardeman, Eduardo M. Medina & Katy B. Kozhimannil, Structural Racism and Supporting Black Lives — The Role of Health Professionals, 375 New Eng. J. Medicine 2113, 2114 (2016). They ignored the fact that servitude was toxic to health while simultaneously exploiting individuals for medical research. Historically, hospitals were intentionally racially segregated, and they continue to be underfunded in racially diverse communities.84Ayah Nuriddin, Graham Mooney & Alexandre I.R. White, Reckoning with Histories of Medical Racism and Violence in the USA, 396 Lancet 949, 949–50 (2020). Up until the 1970s, Black and Indigenous women were formally and involuntarily sterilized by physicians.85Id. Women in detention facilities continue to be sterilized through deception and violations of informed consent.86See Toni Fitzgerald, New Documentary ‘Belly of the Beast’ Explores a Sadly Timely Issue, Forbes (Oct. 26, 2020 7:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonifitzgerald/2020/10/26/new-documentary-belly-of-the-beast-explores-a-sadly-timely-issue/?sh=5d73ed3a5424 [https://perma.cc/G737-WHHM]; see also Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Investigation Finds Women Detained by ICE Underwent “Unnecessary Gynecological Procedures” at Georgia Facility, CBS News (Nov. 15, 2022, 4:18 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/women-detained-ice-unnecessary-gynecological-procedures-georgia-facility-investigation [https://perma.cc/ZM2P-CQ6W]. To this day, Black women are much more likely to die from childbirth because their health concerns are dismissed.87Jasmine D. Johnson & Judette M. Louis, Does Race or Ethnicity Play a Role in the Origin, Pathophysiology, and Outcomes of Preeclampsia? An Expert Review of the Literature, 226 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology S876, S876 (2022); Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, Nothing Protects Black Women from Dying in Pregnancy and Childbirth, ProPublica (Dec. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/nothing-protects-black-women-from-dying-in-pregnancy-and-childbirth [https://perma.cc/B6N4-JYYU]. In one study, half of the white physicians surveyed were found to hold false beliefs about Black people’s biological differences—such as thinking they have thicker skin or their blood coagulates more quickly.88Hardeman et al., supra note 83, at 2114. Infant mortality for Black babies is higher now than it was during the antebellum period.89Nuriddin et al., supra note 84, at 950. To this day, physicians are more than twice as likely to call the cops when treating a Black patient compared with when they are treating white patients.90Gallen et al., supra note 17, at 871. Reports of these disparities naturally make their way to the affected communities.

2.  To Repair Medical Mistrust, Law Enforcement Must Be Walled Off from Medical Spaces and Data

At the population level, physicians are generally trusted as an institution. However, trust in the medical establishment varies significantly by class and race. People of color report lower trust in doctors and the larger health care system than do white people, likely due to the medical racism described above.91Richmond et al., supra note 33, at 2. Members of the LGBTQ community have also experienced discrimination and inferior health care treatment.92See Brenick et al., supra note 57, at 9.

Compared with white participants, a multivariate analysis revealed that Black and Hispanic participants had 73% and 49% higher odds, respectively, of reporting mistrust in health care professionals.93Bazargan et al., supra note 34, at 8. Additionally, low-income families in the U.S. report being significantly less trusting of physicians and less satisfied with their care than adults who are not from low-income families.94Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson & Joachim O. Hero, Public Trust in Physicians — U.S. Medicine in International Perspective, 371 New Eng. J. Medicine 1570, 1571. Given the volume of data that demonstrates how mistrust impacts health outcomes, it also contributes to significant health care inequalities.95See Richmond et al., supra note 33, at 2. By including ratings of trust from marginalized groups, we can see that for many, the health care system is already failing to behave in ways that are worthy of trust.96See Blendon et al., supra note 94, at 1571.

These datapoints tell us that structural racism and discrimination persist in health care. However, the quantitative data risks masking the lived experiences of people of color, many of whom have a personal story of being mistreated by a medical professional.97Ray, supra note 68.

As one physician put it, “to improve relationships between doctors and disenfranchised patients[,]” physicians must “recognize that racial preconceptions continue to affect clinical practice, even if it’s not intentional.”98Sushrut Jangi, Medicine Has a Long History of Failing Black People. Let’s Change That, Bos. Globe (Nov. 2, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2016/11/02/medicine-has-long-history-failing-black-people-let-change-that/JQTDySyqeOOjcgHlEG2FMM/story.html [https://perma.cc/QK87-MUPT]. Unfortunately, little has changed since the recognition over twenty years ago that “black Americans are less likely than whites to receive a wide range of medical services, including potentially lifesaving surgical procedures.”99Arnold M. Epstein & John Z. Ayanian, Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 344 New Eng. J. Medicine 1471, 1471 (2001). Black people are “dying not of exotic, incurable, poorly understood illnesses nor of genetic diseases that target only them, but rather from common ailments that are more often prevented and treated among whites than among blacks.”100Harriet A. Washington, Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present 3 (1st ed. 2006).

Medical schools in the U.S. are working to correct this. For example, during the initial COVID lockdowns, doctors protested in solidarity with Black Lives Matter activists in grassroots events called “White Coats for Black Lives.”101Abby Haglage, ‘White Coats for Black Lives’: How Nurses and Doctors Are Sounding the Alarm About Medical Racism, Yahoo (June 14, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/now/white-coats-for-black-lives-how-nurses-and-doctors-are-sounding-the-alarm-about-medical-racism-151450054.html [https://perma.cc/WR5P-4JG6]. The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has also worked to incorporate anti-racism102See Betial Asmerom, Rupinder K. Legha, Russyan Mark Mabeza & Vanessa Nuñez, An Abolitionist Approach to Antiracist Medical Education, 24 AMA J. Ethics 194, 195 (2022). and anti-ableist education103See Trisha Kaundinya & Samantha Schroth, Dismantle Ableism, Accept Disability: Making the Case for Anti-Ableism in Medical Education, J. Med. Educ. & Curricular Dev’t, Feb. 2022, at 1, 1. throughout the medical curriculum. However, they must still do more. Medicine must continue to shift its gaze to the SDOH, rather than “record[ing] politics as biological misfortune.”104Eric Reinhart, Medicine for the People, Bos. Rev. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/eric-reinhart-accompaniment-and-medicine [https://perma.cc/2ZD8-KVF3]. To trust health care systems, patients must feel heard by their doctor, trust that their doctor is being honest and doing what is in their best interest, and feel the doctor will respect their confidentiality.105See Ozawa & Sripad, supra note 9, at 12; Carol L. Connell, Sherry C. Wang, LaShaundrea Crook & Kathy Yadrick, Barriers to Healthcare Seeking and Provision Among African American Adults in the Rural Mississippi Delta Region: Community and Provider Perspectives, 44 J. Cmty. Health 636, 637 (2019).

Most of the metrics on trust in medicine focus on the physician-patient relationship, because it is the most important aspect of patient trust.106See Ozawa & Sripad, supra note 9, at 11–12. As Ji Seon Song recognized, “[w]hen medical and police actors act in concert, there is the potential for their actions to amplify bias and discrimination.”107Song, supra note 15, at 873. In light of the rampant violence and pervasive lack of trust in the police, repairing medical mistrust cannot be done if law enforcement intrudes on this struggling relationship by invading medical spaces and data.

In the next Section, I will pivot to explaining how it is that police gain access to confidential health information. Given that health data is considered especially sensitive, federal statutes, state statutes, and evidence rules recognize it as privileged and confidential. However, ironically, the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which was enacted to shield medical data from unauthorized disclosure, incorporates a number of exceptions for the police.108Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1. These exceptions oddly give the state access to this highly private information.

II.  HOW POLICE HAVE EASY ACCESS TO MEDICAL DATA AND SPACES

Many of the articles and cases that have analyzed whether police can co-opt health data have viewed this query exclusively through the lens of a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Fourth Amendment cases nearly always find a way to permit the unconsented-to blood draw, search of a private database, or forced involvement of physicians in policing.109See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 Geo. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2013) (explaining how courts side with governments over individual rights in close to 80% of Fourth Amendment cases, and that the need for effective law enforcement is the most cited reason).

The Fourth Amendment framing makes sense as an initial matter, because it provides the constitutional floor for privacy protection. However, it does not provide the ceiling. Governments can do much more to protect medical privacy than what is required by the Fourth Amendment. And by myopically focusing on constitutionality when assessing medical privacy, courts and legislatures do not take seriously the social good that comes from walling health care off from law enforcement.110See id.

This is not to say that Fourth Amendment doctrine is irrelevant; it provides a critical piece of the tapestry. I will therefore explain how it has operated to generally grant police access to private medical data. For starters, if a valid warrant is issued on a showing of probable cause, the medical search would not violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.111Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 316 (2018) (“[T]he Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records. Although the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is reasonableness, our cases establish that warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But even without a warrant, police access to medical records is often permitted as either not being a search,112See United States v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 439 (D. Md. 2009). being a reasonable search, or being part of a “special need” that is incidental to law enforcement.113Song, supra note 18, at 2679.

Even so, depending on the circumstances, police can be found to have violated a patient’s Fourth Amendment rights if they obtained private medical data without a warrant and the search was deemed unreasonable. To determine reasonableness, courts balance the government interest in obtaining the data, which is often compelling, against the “manner in which the information was gathered and maintained, and whether confidentiality is protected.”114Devon T. Unger, Minding Your Meds: Balancing the Needs for Patient Privacy and Law Enforcement in Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. 345, 358 (2014). In practice, this does not limit police access too much. This is especially true when police obtain toxicology results from the emergency department to prosecute drunk driving. As Song points out, this is because emergency departments are often treated as though they are public spaces, where patients forfeit their expectations of privacy.115“Courts generally view the ER as a place with no expectation of privacy, shielding certain searches and seizures from further scrutiny.” Song, supra note 18, at 2666. Thus, even if the access to medical data is deemed a “search,” it will often be considered a reasonable one in light of the patients’ reduced expectations of privacy.

Given the unpredictability of the Fourth Amendment balancing test, many are concerned about the protection medical data will be afforded in the context of reproductive or gender-affirming care. At present, the case law is inconsistent in terms of whether the involuntary disclosure of private, non-emergency medical data runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, especially when the evidence might be permitted under federal law, but not under state law.116See Unger, supra note 114, at 353. And if the courts come out differently on the reasonableness of searches in less politicized contexts of drunk driving and gunshot wounds, they will certainly be variable when dealing with prosecutions of physicians who provide highly-politicized abortion and trans care.117See, e.g., Courtney Tanner, Private Medical Records for Transgender Minors Will Be Shared with the State, Utah Judge Rules in Sports Ban Case, Salt Lake Trib. (Sept. 12, 2023, 11:28 AM), https://www.sltrib.com/news/education/2023/09/12/private-medical-records/#:~:text=Judge%20Keith%20Kelly%20said%20the,their%20legal%20claimS%2C%20he%20said [https://perma.cc/66QU-UUYR]. And no matter how or why the private medical data are disclosed, once the state has access to this sensitive health data, the damage will be done. This will almost certainly chill patient access to many types of treatment.

However, to be clear, the police rarely need warrants to search in health care settings. Instead of obtaining a warrant by demonstrating probable cause, they can simply rely on subpoenas, state statutes, and HIPAA exceptions to gain warrantless access to patient medical data. Health care data has become the warrantless, backdoor, investigatory jackpot. So, how does this happen?

First, hospitals can play a quite active role in sharing patient data. The coercive prenatal drug testing program deemed unconstitutional in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), was a hybrid program run by both the hospital and the local police. It threatened women with criminal punishment if they did not “agree” to drug treatment.118The Supreme Court held that testing women for this law enforcement purpose, without their informed consent, violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001). In this case, the hospital “colluded” with law enforcement to test pregnant women for drug use if one of nine criteria were met. The hospital then sent the results to law enforcement, who used evidence of cocaine use during pregnancy to “coerce women into treatment programs” by threatening them with prosecution. See Laura Beth Cohen, Informing Consent: Medical Malpractice and the Criminalization of Pregnancy, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1297, 1304–05 (2018). Hospitals and law enforcement conspired together to violate patient trust in what was something like a medical “sting operation.”119“[E]stablishing a legally imposed complicity between health care providers and the police violates the ethical code that animates the medical profession.” Schuyler Frautschi, Understanding the Public Health Policies Behind Ferguson, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 587, 597 (2001).

This program exploited vulnerable patients while generating negative public health impacts.120See Stephen W. Patrick & Davida M. Schiff, A Public Health Response to Opioid Use in Pregnancy, Pediatrics, Mar. 2017, at 1, 1. That is, when pregnant women worry that they can be prosecuted for drug use, they are discouraged from seeking prenatal and addiction care, which then harms them and their newborns.121See Theresa Kurtz & Marcela C. Smid, Challenges in Perinatal Drug Testing, 140 Obstetrics & Gynecology 163, 163–64 (2022). To be clear, routine drug testing of pregnant individuals does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as it is done initially for medical purposes and with patient consent. However, the legal consequences of the consent to the blood draw or urinalysis might not be explicit, and the pervasiveness of drug testing has led one physician to ask whether it is a “policing practice masquerading as clinical care.”122Mishka Terplan, Test or Talk: Empiric Bias and Epistemic Injustice, 140 Obstetrics & Gynecology 150, 150 (2022).

Cases like Ferguson are extreme, and hopefully rare. But the police do not need to formally run sting operations within prenatal clinics to obtain confidential medical data. Instead, they can do something much more banal. So long as the data are either incidental to law enforcement or relevant to an ongoing investigation, they can just ask nurses and physicians to provide them with it. And often, health care workers comply.

A.  Cooperation by Health Care

One of the most common ways police access patient data without a warrant is to rely on nurse or physician complicity. Because the Fourth Amendment case law is messy, nurses and physicians report not being sure what the police are constitutionally allowed to do.123See Alur et al., supra note 16, at 856; see also Song, supra note 15, at 917–18. And even when they know disclosure is neither required nor permitted, health care workers have admitted to turning over confidential patient data simply because law enforcement asked.124See Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 891 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2018). One nurse reported how a police officer started asking investigative questions of a patient while he was being resuscitated.125Megan Y. Harada, Armando Lara-Millán & Lauren E. Chalwell, Policed Patients: How the Presence of Law Enforcement in the Emergency Department Impacts Medical Care, 78 Annals Emergency Med. 738, 742 (2021). She knew this was not allowed. But she noted that it can be awkward to tell a loitering cop, who is armed, to leave the radiology suites, or to stop observing lifesaving treatments.126Id.

Qualitative research has documented how physicians and nurses may divulge test results, patient treatments, and patient locations127Id. (“I’ve seen nurses divulge test results [to police] . . . physicians too . . . test results, scan results, patient treatment, where they’re going, other sorts of things which are protected health information.”). to cops because they feel pressured128Id. at 743 (“It does add an additional layer of stress to the interaction because I have to ask an armed officer to do something.”). or “cornered” by armed officers.129Id. (“I had two homicide detectives come in and they cornered me . . . They kept asking me questions, and I realized I was sharing more information than I felt comfortable with.”). This is especially apparent in bustling emergency departments where providers may feel safer having police around. A symbiotic relationship sometimes develops—in which the police protect staff from seemingly unruly patients and in turn the providers give the police access to confidential medical data.130See id. at 742, 744.

The pressure that nurses report feeling to comply with police requests is warranted. In 2017, nurse Alex Wubbels was arrested after explaining to a University of Utah cop that she could not draw blood from an unconscious patient. She told the officer that because the patient was not under arrest, there was no warrant, and the patient could not consent, she could not provide a blood sample according to the institution’s policy and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.131Note that if the police had made a written request, the nurse would have been permitted under HIPAA, but not required, to share the patient’s data. After confirming she would not comply with his request, the cop lunged at Wubbels, forcing her into handcuffs and taking her outside while she screamed in protest.132Laurel Wamsley, Utah Nurse Arrested for Doing Her Job Reaches $500,000 Settlement, NPR: Two-Way (Nov. 1, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/01/561337106/utah-nurse-arrested-for-doing-her-job-reaches-500-000-settlement [https://perma.cc/HN2X-DB3Y]. She ultimately settled a suit against the university for $500,000 for battery and false imprisonment. However, the media coverage of this event will likely deter other nurses from similarly pushing back against illegal police overreach. Police have come to feel entitled to emergency room patients, as if the hospital is just an extension of what happens out on the public street.

There is great inconsistency in how cases are treated when patients allege Fourth Amendment violations against the police having access to their medical data. However, the trend seems to be to allow law enforcement to use medical data and even obtain blood samples without a warrant. And there is sadly little accountability for the health care workers who are complicit. When providers cross the line and violate patient privacy, as Ji Seon Song points out, “[o]nly in the rare case has a doctor been taken to task by the courts for assisting police officers by performing procedures,” such as when a doctor “participated in a number of forced rectal examinations.”133Song, supra note 18, at 2686 n.256 (describing United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 2013)).

We do not have good data on how often nurses and physicians turn over private medical data without a warrant. However, qualitative studies suggest that health care staff often comply with warrantless police requests to obtain biological samples or test results of patients without probable cause. In cases where patients are later prosecuted, they may challenge the constitutionality of the search of their medical records or the acquisition of specimens for law enforcement. But sometimes the medical data is just used to identify individuals and is never introduced at trial. In these cases, the legal remedies are quite unsatisfying.134If the data are never introduced at trial, they cannot be subject to a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing. The patient and criminal defendant would likely have to bring a private, civil tort suit for intrusion upon seclusion or against the hospital or clinic for public disclosure of private facts. These civil suits are expensive and time-consuming and a poor way to deter privacy breaches.

B.  Permissive State Laws

Another way cops gain access to patient medical data is by broadly interpreting permissive state laws. State statutes explicitly allow law enforcement to access patient data—such as toxicology or urine results in the event of a vehicle crash,135See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.20B (2023); see also Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 676.260 (West, Westlaw through 2024 Regular Session of the 82nd Leg. Assemb.). prescription history to regulate controlled substances,136See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-265 (2023); see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4729.80 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through File 15 of 135th Gen. Assemb.). paramedic data on opioid overdoses for public health reporting,137See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 13-3602 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2023 legislation). or positive test results for sexually transmitted disease.138See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 70.02.050 (2023). But often, police use these statutes to obtain medical data for very different reasons than those contemplated by the statute.

Permissive state laws can provide a tremendous amount of wiggle room. In State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 2002), the defendant challenged a warrantless search of his prescription history as violating the Fourth Amendment. The state responded that the search was reasonable because a Connecticut statute granted law enforcement access to prescription records in order to enforce controlled substance laws. It did not matter that the police inspected the patient records for a very different purpose—to prosecute fraud.139See State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132, 1142 (Conn. 2002). The court still upheld the search under a broad and deferential interpretation of the statute.

For another example, a state attorney general was investigating whether abortion clinics were performing abortions after fetal viability in violation of Kansas law.140Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6703 (2022). The Kansas statute permitted disclosure of patient information “to comply with the obligation to disclose the medical basis and specific medical diagnosis relied upon [for the abortion.]”141Id. When the attorney general was later being investigated himself for misconduct and harassing the clinics, the court permitted thirty complete patient medical records to be produced—from an abortion clinic, no less—despite neither the provider nor the patients being under investigation.142In re Kline, 311 P.3d 321, 332 (Kan. 2013). Broad interpretation of disclosure statutes with narrow statutory purposes provides another avenue for police access to confidential medical data.

Even when permissive statutes are deemed unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, police reliance on them will not always trigger exclusion at trial. That is, even when statutes specifically exclude use of the medical data, or the statute itself has been found to violate the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution might still be allowed to rely on the data in a criminal trial if the police can show they were confused, and relied on the statute in “good faith.”143See Matthew Tokson & Michael Gentithes, The Reality of the Good Faith Exception, 113 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4414248 [https://perma.cc/5NSR-6JBH]; State v. Eads, 154 N.E.3d 538, 541, 549 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020). The latitude shown to law enforcement in these contexts is astounding.

C.  HIPAA Exceptions

In addition to state confidentiality provisions, most readers will be familiar with the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).144Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1. This federal law requires that covered entities like health care providers and insurance companies obtain the patient’s authorization before sharing their protected health information (“PHI”).145Id. Protected health information is anything identifying an individual, created or received by a health care provider that relates “to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.”146Id. § 1320d.

HIPAA is often invoked as the universal health privacy protector. But it poses almost no obstacles to the police use of medical data.147See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Office for C.R., COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders and Public Health Authorities 1–2 (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QDB-5G65]. For starters, the police themselves are not a “covered entity,” so once medical data resides with them, they are not subjected to HIPAA privacy or security rules.148United States v. Prentice, 683 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1001 (D. Minn. 2010). And even when the police request PHI from a hospital or other covered entity, the Privacy Rule permits disclosure to them for a broad variety of reasons, and without judicial involvement. For example, disclosure is permitted (1) if a state law permits it (such as the statutes above mandating disclosure of opioid overdoses), or (2) to respond to a court order, warrant, subpoena,149See Booth v. City of Dallas, 312 F.R.D. 427, 431 (N.D. Tex. 2015). or summons issued by a judge or grand jury.150Layna C. Rush, The HIPAA Privacy Rule and Disclosures of Health or Medical Information to Law Enforcement, Champion, July 2022, at 42, 45 (2022). Perhaps most broadly, HIPAA allows covered entities to share PHI (3) to respond to an administrative subpoena or written statement by police that specifies how the request is “relevant and material” to an investigation.151Id. at 44.

The only limit on these administrative requests is that they must be limited in scope “to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought” and “[d]e-identified information could not reasonably be used.”15245 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) (2023). This squishy language from the Privacy Rule seemingly does not employ any balancing test. If law enforcement has made a request that asks for information that is relevant and material (a low bar) and the request fits within one of the stated uses, then HIPAA will allow it.153“HIPPA regulations themselves make clear that any privacy interest patients have in their medical records is trumped by a grand jury subpoena that is ‘relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.’ ” In re Grand Jury Subpoena John Doe No. A01-209, 197 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (E.D. Va. 2002).

Because hospitals need not publicly report when they disclose PHI to law enforcement, we have no idea how often the police use this backdoor route.154James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, “A World of Difference”? Law Enforcement, Genetic Data, and the Fourth Amendment, 70 Duke L.J. 705, 733–34 (2021). The exception is a gigantic loophole. If nurses and physicians incorrectly interpret this exception as requiring rather than permitting disclosure of PHI, it could result in much less privacy protection against government disclosure than the drafters envisioned. And even if they interpret it correctly, the exception permits law enforcement to have access to confidential medical information any time it might be useful to their criminal investigations. They do not need a warrant. They do not even need a subpoena.

Unfortunately, in addition to allowing quite a lot of unconsented-to disclosures, trial courts interpreting these HIPAA exceptions sometimes read them to suggest that they preempt common law or constitutional privacy requirements.155See, e.g., Consuelo v. State, 613 S.W.3d 330, 333 (Tex. App. 2020) (finding there was no Fourth Amendment problem in later using a patient’s medical data in a grand jury proceeding because “the release of those results did not violate HIPAA”). Thus, if something is permitted under HIPAA, some trial courts treat it as permissible under various tort theories156Because HIPAA has exceptions, a patient’s right to privacy is not “absolute” and thus must be balanced against the law enforcement need. United States v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 439 (D. Md. 2009). and the Fourth Amendment. This is an error, as the Privacy Rule applies to a very narrow context of covered entities and was never meant to be coterminous with preexisting privacy rights.157See Jennifer Clark, HIPAA As an Evidentiary Rule? An Analysis of Miguel M. and Its Impact, 26 J.L. & Health 1, 4 (2013); Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, 102 A.3d 32, 36 (Conn. 2014) (concluding that HIPAA does not preempt common law privacy claims, but can be evidence of the standard of care); R.K. v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 715, 722–23 (W. Va. 2012). However, confusion about HIPAA’s application is rampant. This may lead cops, health care workers, and patients to think that it replaces common law privacy protections and gives the final say on what may legally be disclosed.158See Stacey A. Tovino, Complying with the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Problems and Perspectives, 1 Loy. U. Chi. J. Regul. Compliance 23, 39 (2016). It is counterintuitive and troubling that a statute meant to expand confidentiality over medical data is likely having the opposite effect.

Additionally, if the disclosure of a suspect’s medical data was unauthorized under HIPAA, that does not automatically lead to suppression in a related criminal trial.159State v. Straehler, 745 N.W.2d 431, 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). Conversely, if the disclosure was permitted under HIPAA, it might still violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. If the medical data does need to be introduced at trial, it could be suppressed if the police are found to have conducted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. This risk might be why the police are increasingly relying on nondefendants’ medical data. Nondefendant’s medical data poses no risks of suppression or Fourth Amendment violations.

When seeking genetic data to identify suspects, police can rely on “close enough” genetic matches by requesting the medical data of a suspect’s children, siblings, or even cousins. They can then use the biological sample from the suspect’s relative to connect the suspect to the crime scene through familial matching. When done this way, the investigative use of a relative’s genetic material might never see the light of day at trial and may never need to be introduced. Because the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression at trial, if the relative whose specimen was tested by police is never criminally charged, the relative would need to seek redress by filing a civil rights violation under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code.16042 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to being time-consuming and expensive, the evidentiary hurdles are quite high.161To overcome the claim of qualified immunity, petitioners must show that defendant’s actions violated a “clearly established” Fourth Amendment right. See, e.g., Suttles v. Butler, 564 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2021). And these civil proceedings would have no impact on the related conviction. This renders the legal guardrails against police overreach in this context insufficient.

In the previous Section, I explained how there are few legal hurdles to law enforcement accessing private patient data. Specifically, the way the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted, provider compliance, and broad HIPAA exceptions permit a great deal of police access to confidential medical data. Additionally, even when police overreach, the remedies that are available are insufficient to fully protect patient privacy. In the next Section, I describe why police access to medical data has the potential to do so much violence to the physician-patient relationship and core principles of medical ethics.

III.  THE GUN AND THE STETHOSCOPE: TWO VERY DIFFERENT CULTURES

Conscripting clinicians to do the bidding of law enforcement is lamentable for a number of reasons. This is because the goals of law enforcement are diametrically opposed to the goals of health care. Consider the most common symbols of each profession. For physicians, it is the stethoscope, which amplifies the patient’s body and allows its rhythms to be heard. Now, consider the symbol of policing in the U.S.—the gun, which is violent and silencing. While these two professions embody more than can be encapsulated by these two symbols, the stethoscope and the gun reflect deep concrete and metaphorical differences between the two institutions. These differences are reflected in their values, ethics, and in the community’s expectations of them.

But let us start with how they are similar, and then we can highlight their significant differences. First, doctors and cops are both considered part of the helping professions. Each owes fiduciary obligations to the people they serve, which in theory, are built on trust. They both wield tremendous power over vulnerable populations, given their status as gatekeepers to important social goods. However, mounting awareness of the disparities experienced at their hands has led to reduced trust in both professions.

In practically every other way, there could not be two more different institutions. Health care is about healing and promoting evidence-based measures, while protecting patient autonomy, privacy, and health care accountability. Law enforcement is not about healing, does not promulgate evidence-based measures, and frequently disrespects individual autonomy and privacy, while dodging most forms of legal accountability. Some have argued for police to adopt a “culture of health” to improve their policing, and perhaps they should.162Evan Anderson & Scott Burris, Policing and Public Health: Not Quite the Right Analogy, 27 Policing & Soc’y, 300, 308–09 (2017). But it cannot operate the other way. That is, the culture of medicine cannot be infected with the culture of policing. I will now explore various case studies of police intruding into health care. Each example reveals the diametrically opposed norms and ethics of each profession, and why this creates a strong argument for their being kept separate.

A.  Different Self-Regulation Norms

In the last century, fueled in part by complicity in the Nazi concentration camps, physicians have developed and internalized sweeping reforms to their codes of ethics.163See Janet L. Dolgin & Lois L. Shepherd, Bioethics and the Law 45, 435 (2d ed. 2009). Emerging from this grisly past, physicians have documented many instances of their abuses of power. Principles of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, privacy, accountability, and justice have since been incorporated not only into the medical school curriculum, but also into the fabric of how hospitals and clinics should be run.164Tom L. Beauchamp, Principlism in Bioethics, in Bioethical Decision Making and Argumentation 1, 4–5 (Pedro Serna & José-Antonio Seoane eds., 2016).

These ideals are not consistently realized, and sometimes they are pit against one another. However, because the principles of autonomy, privacy, accountability, and nonmaleficence are near-absolute, when physicians fail to realize them, these norms are likely to be regulated by the physicians and hospitals themselves—even in the absence of any legal liability. As compared with law enforcement, physicians extensively self-regulate through governing bodies and professional associations.165Howard Bauchner, Phil B. Fontanarosa & Amy E. Thompson, Professionalism, Governance, and Self-Regulation of Medicine, 313 JAMA 1831, 1831 (2015). And of course, on top of their self-regulation, if physicians breach confidentiality, fail to obtain patient consent, or cause harm through their negligence, they are frequently civilly sued and held accountable for malpractice.

When it comes to honesty, almost seventy percent (69%) of Americans now rate the honesty and ethical standards of physicians as “very high” or “high.”166Blendon et al., supra note 94, at 1570. Most, but certainly not all, Americans feel safe entrusting our physicians with sensitive health information about ourselves or our family members that we would never willingly give to the cops. This did not happen by accident. This is the result of decades of developing cultures of honesty and disclosure.167See generally, Bryan Sisk, Richard Frankel, Eric Kodish, J. Harry Isaacson, The Truth about Truth-Telling in American Medicine: A Brief History, Permanente J., 2016 Summer, at 74. Overall, trust in clinicians in the U.S. remains relatively high, though it could and should be much higher, particularly among the most socially disadvantaged groups.168Field et al., supra note 52, at 21–22.

By contrast, police rarely hold themselves accountable for the violence that they perpetrate, which is often not just careless, but intentional.169“Even when a citizen files a complaint, many police departments fail to actually investigate these complaints, especially when the complaint alleges excessive force.” See Robert M. Bloom & Nina Labovich, The Challenge of Deterring Bad Police Behavior: Implementing Reforms That Hold Police Accountable, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 923, 938–39 (2021). If anything, police culture “tolerate[s] and encourages” misconduct by framing things in terms of “us versus them”—where a certain amount of brutality is considered necessary to protect law enforcement from the communities they serve.170Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 373, 381–82 (2010).

And when it comes to honesty, rather than regularly exposing mistakes, as is done during medical peer review meetings, cops are discouraged from disclosing misconduct or perjury by fellow officers. This practice of solidarity has been referred to as the “blue wall of silence.”171See Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 213, 213, 218 (2016). This code of silence and resulting lack of transparency makes it difficult to identify problem officers and widespread corruption. Experts who have examined root causes of police misconduct have concluded that “the roots of police misconduct rest primarily within the organizational culture of policing.”172Simmons, supra note 170, at 381.

To the extent police officers support ethical codes of conduct, they appear to do so instrumentally to prosecute crime. And perhaps this makes sense because they are accountable to the public, and not to individuals. That is, respect for autonomy does not appear to be an end in itself, but a means of having a better rapport with the community and increasing crime clearance rates. Conversely, in medicine, there are precious few actions a clinician can take that violate a competent individual’s autonomy, because autonomy is a deontological obligation that clinicians are bound to uphold. These different institutional values and goals lead to very different patient expectations of clinicians and cops. If cops intrude on clinical spaces in ways that violate autonomy, patients may worry that physicians will do the same—and indeed they might at police behest.

B.  Different Privacy Norms

Cops and clinicians also have very different norms around privacy and confidentiality. Patient privacy is considered by the American Medical Association (“AMA”) to be “fundamental, as an expression of respect for patient autonomy and a prerequisite for trust.”173AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.1.1: Privacy in Health Care, Am. Med. Ass’n, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/privacy-health-care [https://perma.cc/MM9P-VNHX]. The AMA Code of Ethics even spells out the different zones of privacy that physicians must respect: physical space, personal data, decisional privacy, and associational privacy.174Id. Ethically, physicians should inform patients when their privacy has been breached, separate from any legal obligations.

Physicians also have common law fiduciary obligations for “confidences communicated by a patient [to] be held as a trust.”175Sorensen v. Barbuto, 143 P.3d 295, 299 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio 1965)). Texas law stresses that due to the “highly personal nature of [medical] information[,] [it] places a heavy responsibility on the trial court to prevent any disclosure that is broader than necessary.”176In re Barnes, 655 S.W.3d 658, 672 (Tex. App. 2022) (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 844 (Tex. 1994)). And every state has now created a statutory physician-patient privilege of some form that prohibits disclosure of statements17745 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d Protected Communication Between Physician and Patient § 2 (1986) [hereinafter Protected Communication] (“[T]he privilege that now exists by that name in all jurisdictions is entirely a creature of statute.”). and medical records178See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Physician-Patient Privilege as Extending to Patient’s Medical or Hospital Records, 10 A.L.R.4th 552 (1981). in court without the patient’s consent.179Jayne v. Smith, 124 N.Y.S.3d 714, 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). The privilege promotes “free and full communication between a patient and his doctor so that the doctor will have the information necessary to competently diagnose and treat the patient.”180Slaughter v. Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2019) (citing Fagen v. Grand View Univ., 861 N.W.2d 825, 831–32 (Iowa 2015)). Indeed, courts have warned against jeopardizing the “sanctity” of the physician-patient relationship by divulging patient information to third-parties.181See, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Lab’ys, Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Others have stated that “the patient [has] the power to reveal the private information to the persons the patient chooses, reinforcing the [physician-patient] privilege’s policy of patient autonomy and privacy.”182Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836, 850 (N.M. 2016) (quoting State v. Roper, 921 P.2d 322, 326 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)). It is difficult to square these unequivocal statements with granting cops broad access to sensitive medical information, just because they ask.

If patients do not trust that their communications will be private, they will keep secrets from their doctors that will frustrate their care.183Protected Communication, supra note 177, at § 2. Even worse, they may refuse to seek important prenatal or emergency care altogether. Additionally, confidentiality fosters a feeling of safety and sanctuary between patients and physicians, which signals that, as it relates to the physician’s goals, the needs of the patient are paramount even to those of society.

People (sometimes reluctantly) must also share sensitive and humiliating information with cops. Even so, there are no norms of confidentiality in law enforcement. There are also no common law, statutory, or evidentiary requirements that information shared with police be kept confidential. If anything, in law enforcement, the norms generally run in the opposite direction.

Witnesses largely lose control over their testimony when it becomes part of an investigative record. For example, Chanel Miller recounts in her beautiful memoir, Know My Name, how painful it was to realize that intimate photos of her naked, assaulted body would be shared in a crowded courtroom during the prosecution of Brock Turner.184Chanel Miller, Know My Name: A Memoir 169–70 (2019). Once the police are involved, the victim’s images are no longer private.185 See, e.g., People v. Hines, 833 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); see also Casey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Tex. App. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 215 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (close-up photographs of victim’s enlarged clitoris and vagina were deemed appropriately admitted as prosecutorial exhibits). This is true regardless of how sensitive or embarrassing those images or statements might be. This is not to say that the police are unethical—this is just to say that their code of ethics do not include honoring confidentiality.

1.  Police Search Clinical Laboratories and Biobanks

Genetic information is one of the most sensitive types of information connected to us: it reveals predictive information about our future health and our relatives, it does not change over time, and we are only scratching the surface of what it all means.186Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and Public People, 11 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 295, 313 (2008). Recognizing that genetic material is highly sensitive, but might be used nefariously, Congress passed a federal statute in 2008 to restrict its use in the provision or pricing of health insurance.187Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Despite its extensive protection in health care, genetic information receives meager confidentiality safeguards when used by cops. The Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has shockingly analogized discarded genetic samples to trash, permitting its warrantless seizure.188See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41–43 (1988).

Given the value of genetic samples to solving crime, it is no wonder police use of genetic material from health care databases is so common. In 2005, police in Kansas subpoenaed a DNA sample from a woman’s pap smear to connect her father to a string of murders. Through the use of her medical sample (which had been held in a Kansas health clinic), without her notice or consent,189Colin McFerrin, Note, DNA, Genetic Material, and a Look at Property Rights: Why You May Be Your Brother’s Keeper, 19 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 967, 974 (2013). the police confirmed that her father, Dennis Rader, was likely the BTK serial killer.190Ari Shapiro, Police Use DNA to Track Suspects Through Family, NPR (Dec. 12, 2007, 12:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17130501 [https://perma.cc/3RCN-H783]. This connection gave them probable cause to arrest the suspect. Rader was later convicted of ten counts of first-degree murder.191Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK, 92 ABA J. 45, 45 (2006).

2.  Police Search Public Health Newborn Screening Genetic Databases

Recently in New Jersey, a child’s genetic sample—also obtained in a health care setting—was used to implicate her father in a sexual assault.192Nathan H. Lents, Use of Familial DNA in an Investigation Can Be Intrusive. But a Middle Ground Is Possible. NBC News (Aug. 21, 2022, 1:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/new-jersey-polices-use-babys-dna-undermines-publics-trust-rcna43996 [https://perma.cc/4WYG-V9AC]. The child, who is now nine years old, had her heel stuck by hospital staff when she would have been just a couple of days old.193See Ram, supra note 19, at 1259. The heel stick was part of New Jersey’s mandatory newborn screening program, which blends together individualized patient care with public health goals.194See What is the Purpose of Newborn Screening?, Nat’l Inst. of Health, https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/newborn/conditioninfo/purpose [https://perma.cc/6CTN-8N6M]; see also How Many Newborns Are Screened in the United States, Nat’l Inst. of Health, https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/newborn/conditioninfo/infants-screened [https://perma.cc/55C2-S5ER] (reporting “[m]ost states report participation of 99.9% or higher”). Because the database is maintained for public health reasons, the consent process is not as robust as it is in regular clinical decisions.195 Ram, supra note 19, at 1261–62. In the absence of a formal refusal, hospital staff collect the blood samples on filter paper that they use to test the baby for dozens of serious, hidden diseases. The residual samples are often maintained in public health facilities.196See, e.g., id. at 1255; Nakita Biryukov, Newborn Screening Program Used to Aid Criminal Investigation, Public Defender Says, N.J. Monitor (July 13, 2022, 7:44 AM), https://newjerseymonitor.com/2022/07/13/newborn-screening-program-used-to-aid-criminal-investigation-public-defender-says [https://perma.cc/75V8-LCZE]; Julie Watts, CA Still Storing Newborn DNA Without Consent. Golden State Killer Case Raising New Concerns, CBS News: Sacramento (Dec. 7, 2020, 1:09 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/newborn-dna-california-consent-gsk-killer [https://perma.cc/Z2TT-VXDV].

In the New Jersey case, law enforcement suspected that the child’s father had committed a sexual assault.197Biryukov, supra note 196. When they realized he had a child in New Jersey, they accessed the child’s state newborn screening database without a warrant. A comparison of the crime scene DNA and the blood on the screening card revealed the newborn to be a first-degree relative of the perpetrator. This gave them the probable cause they needed to arrest the father for the assault.198Id.

News of this prompted a lawsuit by the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender against the Department of Health (which maintains the screening cards).199Verified Complaint at 1, N.J. Office of the Pub. Def. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health, No. MER-L-001210-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 11, 2022), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22084922-nj-office-of-the-public-defender-et-al-vs-department-of-health-et-al [https://perma.cc/GA5D-KB68]. The complaint asserted that parents are not told that their child’s DNA will be placed in this database and potentially used by law enforcement. The litigation resulted in the state admitting to using the newborn bloodspots, without parental consent, in at least five other cases that resulted in prosecutions. Legislators in New Jersey proposed a bill in 2022 to prohibit the use of newborn blood spots for criminal investigations without parents’ affirmative consent, but the bill has stalled in committee.200Dana Difilippo, New Bill Would Limit Police Use of DNA Collected from Newborn Blood Screening, N.J. Monitor (Sept. 28, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://newjerseymonitor.com/2022/09/28/new-bill-would-limit-police-use-of-dna-collected-from-newborn-blood-screening [https://perma.cc/EZ4C-K55D]; Dana Difilippo, Judge Orders State to Release Information About Police Use of Baby Blood Spots, N.J. Monitor (Jan. 4, 2023, 11:41 AM), https://newjerseymonitor.com/2023/01/04/judge-orders-state-to-release-information-about-police-use-of-baby-blood-spots [https://perma.cc/R8DV-LYDN].

For Fourth Amendment purposes, the lack of any consent for secondary law enforcement use makes this case very different from the use of a public genetic database, called GEDMatch, to apprehend the Golden State Killer in 2018.201See Teneille R. Brown, Why We Fear Genetic Informants: Using Genetic Genealogy to Catch Serial Killers, 21 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 15–16, 44 (2019). So-called forensic genetic genealogy relies on public genetic databases, in which users voluntarily upload their genetic information from Ancestry.com or 23andMe to facilitate their personal genealogical research. This was also how police identified the man who murdered four college students at the University of Idaho.202Heather Tal Murphy, How Police Actually Cracked the Idaho Killings Case, Slate (Jan. 10, 2023, 6:19 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2023/01/bryan-kohberger-university-idaho-murders-forensic-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/NUG4-YWRS].

In this case, however, parents were not uploading their child’s genetic profiles to a public website for recreational purposes. Rather, the genetic newborn screening bloodspots were obtained in a hospital, exclusively for medical purposes. This draws hospital staff into the prosecutorial process in a very different way.

Because the newborn screening program is not completely voluntary, and parents usually must affirmatively opt out rather than opt in,203See Kanuszewski v. Shah, 627 F. Supp. 3d 832, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2022), vacated in part, 636 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (“[E]very state should—but does not—require ‘an opt-in approach’ to obtain parents’ informed consent for posttesting use, disposal, and access of their children’s blood.”). there should be no unconsented-to secondary uses of this data. It only takes one highly publicized instance of misuse, such as in the New Jersey case, to deter parents from participating in the screening program. If parents opt out, newborns will lose the huge benefit of detecting rare diseases that can be fatal if untreated.204See Newborn Screening Process, Health Res. & Servs. Admin., https://newbornscreening.hrsa.gov/newborn-screening-process [https://perma.cc/6LF4-9ZAW]. Given that overpolicing and distrust is already more rampant in communities of color, there is reason to worry that blurring the public health goals of newborn screening with the prosecutorial goals of criminal investigations will cause greater health disparities.

Some may argue that the use of newborn screening bloodspots is justified, on an instrumentalist account. On this view, the data is just sitting there in a warehouse, waiting to serve the public and identify rapists, murderers, and other “bad” people. In response to this, I offer two thoughts. First, we ought not to concede that the inquiry is a consequentialist one, as opposed to holding firm in the obligations to keep medical data private. And second, even on the instrumentalist account, it is not clear that providing cops access to genetic newborn screening databases will yield net benefits to society. Are dozens of children dying from preventable diseases obviously worth less than a murder prosecution? The life of a child who dies because his parents opted out of the screening program is just as valuable as the life of a murder victim for whom the police seek justice. The public should be able to debate the competing values of these institutions, rather than the prosecutorial goals always trumping those of public health.

Additionally, the police may not be able to handle these sensitive specimens in a way that adequately maintains confidentiality.205See Ram, supra note 19, at 1310–1311. The storage, labeling, and transfer of genomic materials is highly regulated in health care settings and laboratories.206See The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)). Because data stored by law enforcement is not subject to health privacy or clinical laboratory regulations, medical data could find its way into an investigative police file, and be treated far too cavalierly.207See Nathaniel P. Mark, A Qualified Right to Remain Silent: Health Care Providers’ Obligations Under HIPAA in Response to Criminal Investigations, S.C. Law., Jan. 2013, at 14, 17.

This fear is not exaggerated. In San Francisco in 2016, a woman provided her DNA to police as part of a sexual assault rape kit. Without her knowledge or consent, in 2021, police used her genetic sample to charge her with retail theft.208Eduardo Medina, Woman Sues San Francisco Over Arrest Based on DNA From Her Rape Kit, N.Y. Times (Sept. 13, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/13/us/rape-kit-dna-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/67TP-6EXX]. This horrific use of her genetic information reveals the lack of respect for privacy in law enforcement. Once they have your data for one purpose, they may feel entitled to use it however they please. And just as we worry that parents will opt out of newborn screenings if they think their samples are accessible to law enforcement, sexual assault victims are now given yet another reason not to report their assault to police.

All of this blurring of genetic data with law enforcement occurs amidst considerable police secrecy. We do not know how often police access medical or public health databases; law enforcement does not report this.209Vilius Dranseika, Jan Piasecki & Marcin Waligora, Forensic Uses of Research Biobanks: Should Donors Be Informed?, 19 Med. Health Care & Phil. 141, 142 (2016). This is an additional difference between cops and clinicians. Clinicians are much more likely to report on their own internal practices, either due to accreditation requirements or because of their civil commitment to transparency. Cops, on the other hand, tend to be very secretive about their own internal processes—using privacy as a shield and sword when it comes to their own institutional data.

C.  Different Accountability Norms

One reason for the different privacy norms has to do with who each profession sees as their “client.” Medical institutions must address social injustice at the policy level. However, individual physicians do not owe duties to society generally when making treatment decisions.210See Charles L. Sprung, Leonid A. Eidelman & Avraham Steinberg, Is the Physician’s Duty to the Individual Patient or to Society? 23 Critical Care Med. 618, 618–620 (1995). Instead, their duty is to the individual patient.211See Basil Varkey, Principles of Clinical Ethics and Their Application to Practice, 30 Med. Principles & Prac. 17, 18 (2021). This has been enshrined in some states’ common law. For example, physicians in Arizona owe a fiduciary duty to their patients “to exercise the utmost good faith” and to “act in the best interests of his patient so as to protect the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.”212Duquette v. Superior Ct., 778 P.2d 634, 640 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).

This focus on the individual can create conflict between medical and public health ethics. For example, during pandemics, governments might ask physicians to allocate scarce resources like ventilators or antivirals to serve population health. Because physicians see themselves as agents for individual patient care and not as instruments of public health, having to do this caused some physicians moral distress.213Teneille R. Brown, When the Wrong People Are Immune, J.L. & Biosciences, Jan.–June 2020, at 1, 8–9.

1.  Police Are Increasingly Unaccountable to Private Individuals and the Public They Serve

To law enforcement, conversely, the client is the public, not any one individual. The first sentence of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Code of Ethics states that the police officer’s “fundamental duty is to serve mankind.”21437 Tex. Admin. Code § 1.112 (“[M]y fundamental duty is to serve mankind . . . .”). There is also some toxic masculinity in the Code, such as: “I will . . . maintain courageous calm in the face of danger . . . .” Id. Police success is measured in terms of public safety statistics measured at the population level. The utilitarian framework contributes to an ideology of police being unaccountable to individuals for the harms they cause.

The unaccountability of law enforcement plays out directly in negligence law, where police are often immunized from liability under the “public duty doctrine.”215See Bassett v. Lamantia, 858 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Buck v. City of Highland Park, 733 F. App’x 248, 255 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining the need for a preexisting special relationship for cops to owe a duty to individual citizens). This common law doctrine varies a bit from state to state. However, it essentially holds that cops cannot be held liable for an injury if they fail to perform a duty, and the duty is “owed to the general public rather than to an individual plaintiff.”216Bassett, 858 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Gatlin-Johnson v. City of Miles City, 291 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Mont. 2012)); see also Buck, 733 F. App’x at 255. For police to owe a duty to affirmatively act to protect an individual, some special, pre-injury relationship must exist between the cop and the injured party, the injured party must be in custody, or the cop must have created detrimental reliance.217See Faucheaux v. Provo City, 343 P.3d 288, 294 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). Even grossly negligent failures by a cop may not be considered a basis for tort liability, as cops are protected by the discretionary nature of their decision, the public duty doctrine, and other government immunity provisions.218See Michael Locklear, Parents of Lauren McCluskey Sue State of Utah with Hopes to Overturn Police Immunity, KUTV News (June 8, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://kutv.com/news/local/parents-of-lauren-mccluskey-sue-state-hope-to-overturn-police-immunity [https://perma.cc/9F6N-WN4Q] (explaining how Utah’s government immunity statute and tort law doctrine protects police from negligence and gross negligence liability).

The common law doctrine of qualified immunity further shields the police from individual liability for constitutional rights claims unless the officials violated “clearly established law.”219Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 Yale L.J. 2, 66 (2017). The specter of immunity impacts the likelihood that individuals will even file suit.220Id. at 10. Qualified immunity for civil rights violations has received well-deserved criticism in recent years due to media coverage of appallingly high levels of police killings.221L. Darnell Weeden, Exploring Protest Rights, Unreasonable Police Conduct, and Qualified Immunity, 45 T. Marshall L. Rev. 167, 169 (2021); Harper Neidig & Marty Johnson, Police Reform Fight Hinges on Qualified Immunity, Hill (May 25, 2021, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/555172-police-reform-fight-hinges-on-qualified-immunity [http://perma.cc/2NUT-TR89]. Shielding police from civil lawsuits in all but a tiny fraction of cases, the doctrine “serves as a barrier to incentivizing police officers to do better when dealing with the public.”222Bryan Castro, Note, Can You Please Send Someone Who Can Help? How Qualified Immunity Stops the Improvement of Police Response to Domestic Violence and Mental Health Calls, 16 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 581, 584 (2022).

This patchwork of immunities reveals a picture of police that are increasingly unaccountable to the public they serve. This led one judge to write that “liability for municipal employees is effectively dead.”223Borelli v. Renaldi, 243 A.3d 1064, 1105 (Conn. 2020) (Ecker, J., dissenting). Meanwhile, the duties of medical professionals are expanding to protect nonpatients and unnamed third-parties the physicians have never met.224See Maas v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 234 A.3d 427, 439 (Pa. 2020).

These opposite trajectories bear emphasizing. In the last fifty years, physicians, nurses, and therapists have seen sharp increases in their liability through expanding notions of negligence obligations.225Teneille R. Brown, Needles, Haystacks and Next-Generation Genetic Sequencing, 28 Health Matrix 217, 231 (2018) (recognizing duties to nonpatients); see also B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 275 P.3d 228, 229 (Utah 2012); Safer v. Est. of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). Physicians in Pennsylvania have duties to protect or warn a patient’s neighbors, even when they have never met them or know their names. Somewhat paradoxically, physicians have been asked to pay for accidents that may even be principally caused by law enforcement. I will explain how this came to be, below.

2.  Physician Accountability to the Public Is Expanding

The landmark case of Tarasoff v. University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), is an important illustration of the asymmetrical obligations owed to the public by health care professionals and law enforcement.226Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339–40 (Cal. 1976). Because it was a key factor in the erosion between health care and law enforcement, I will go into a bit of detailing describing the case here. In Tarasoff, a young man named Prosenjit Poddar brutally killed fellow Berkeley student Tatiana Tarasoff. In Poddar’s criminal trial, the family discovered that Poddar’s therapist had breached confidentiality—risking tort liability—to report Poddar to local law enforcement. The therapist was concerned for the unnamed woman (Tatiana) whom his client had admitted he wanted to harm. Discovering this, Tatiana’s parents then sued the police, the university, and the individual therapist who had treated Poddar in negligence—for failing to warn their daughter of Poddar’s threats.

The facts of this case are quite remarkable. When the therapist called the campus police, the police detained Poddar and then let him go because he “appeared rational.”227Id. The police were sued but were given statutory immunity because their decision to release Poddar was part of their public duties and was discretionary. The court reasoned this was appropriate because courts should not be second-guessing the executive branch.228Id. at 349–50.

The therapist, on the other hand, was found to have a duty to protect Tatiana. The California Supreme Court suggested that the therapist was careless for not figuring out that Poddar’s target was Tatiana, and then personally reaching out to warn her. How the therapist was reasonably supposed to do this in the 1970s, without Google or Tatiana’s contact information, much less any training in risk assessment or violence prevention, remains a mystery.

An oft-cited section from the opinion states that patient-psychotherapist confidentiality “must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”229Id. at 347. Many follies in the co-opting of medical privacy to serve law enforcement goals may be traced to this opinion, and this singular sentence. Even the HIPAA exception that permits unauthorized disclosure if someone threatens themselves or others is referred to as the “Tarasoff exception.”230John H. Dunkle, Zachary B. Silverstein & Scott L. Warner, Managing Violent and Other Troubling Students: The Role of Threat Assessment Teams on Campus, 34 J.C. & U.L. 585, 632 (2008).

After Tarasoff, judges extended affirmative duties to warn nonpatients to social workers and physicians. Clinicians may be liable for negligence if they do not violate patient confidentiality to prevent imminent, serious bodily harm to an identifiable person.231Brown supra note 225, at 233. While physicians already had duties to report infectious diseases, Tarasoff can be viewed as creating a sea change in creating broad obligations for therapists, and then other clinicians, to protect the public health and safety. Unsurprisingly, therapists really dislike being asked to violate patient confidentiality to disclose imminent risks to third parties, as they worry it chills therapeutic speech and can stymie treatment. It also runs counter to principles of beneficence—the ethical duty to prioritize the interests of their individual patients.

The Tarasoff majority created new duties for therapists by exploiting the special relationship between the therapist and patient and using it to generate duties to people outside of that relationship.232Id. Put differently, the court took the very things that made therapeutic relationships special and sacrosanct—confidentiality and trust—and exploited them for law enforcement goals. Many take this “special relationship” argument at face value and assume that because the therapist had a trusting relationship with the murderer, this naturally led to his owing a duty to the murderer’s victim.233“Decisions of other jurisdictions hold that the single relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to support the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating from the patient’s illness.” Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344. But this move was and is extremely counterintuitive.

Imagine extolling the cherished relationship between mother and son, and then requiring the mother to divulge her son’s secrets to prioritize some other kid’s needs. The obligations to third parties is a weak link in the reasoning of Tarasoff that is assumed rather than defended. As a landmark example of the co-option of health care by law enforcement, the Tarasoff decision has likely done a great deal of violence to the therapeutic relationship.

3.  The Tarasoff Ruling Frustrates Psychiatric Care

Indeed, shortly after the case was decided, a whopping eighty percent of therapists “observe[d] greater patient reluctance to discuss violent thoughts,” and sixty percent felt “that patients were at least somewhat more reluctant to discuss sensitive information.”234Griffin Edwards, Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal Activity, 57 J.L. & Econ. 321, 329 (2014). In addition to chilling patient willingness to discuss sensitive matters, therapists also erred on the side of restricting patients’ freedoms. A third of therapists reported being “more likely after Tarasoff to commit patients involuntarily to the hospital.”235Id. This might not be terrible policy if it helped patients or prevented violent crime. But that appears not to be the case. One study using a fixed-effects model found that mandatory duty-to-warn laws actually resulted in an increase in homicides of five percent.236Id. at 344.

Of course, recognizing the vulnerability of patients and the potential for abuse, physicians and nurses are accountable to the public in many other ways. If they abuse patient trust or fail to execute their duties, they can lose their professional licenses,237Recent Cases – Constitutional Law – Police Power – Physician’s License, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 186, 188 (1888). be denied hospital admitting privileges,238See, e.g., Or. Admin. R. 333-505-0005 (2020); Wood v. Archbold Med. Ctr., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1310 (M.D. Ga. 2010); Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 204 (R.I. 2003). and may also be liable for fines for violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.239Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2005 (1996). They also may be prosecuted for many health-care-specific types of self-dealing, fraud, and misrepresentation.240See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. For example, “[t]he Stark Law prohibits physicians from referring federal healthcare program patients to entities with which they have a financial relationship, with limited exceptions.” See Jeffrey B. Hammond, What Exactly Is Healthcare Fraud After the Affordable Care Act?, 42 Stetson L. Rev. 35, 40 n.26 (2012). And of course, unless they work for a public, state-run hospital, they can be, and frequently are, sued for ordinary common law malpractice claims.241See Holly Piehler Rockwell, Annotation, What Patient Claims Against Doctor, Hospital, or Similar Health Care Provider Are Not Subject to Statutes Specifically Governing Actions and Damages for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R.4th 887, 897 (1991).

D.  Different Efficacy Norms

Therapists worried (correctly) that the Tarasoff ruling would pierce a huge hole in patient confidentiality, demand clairvoyance,242Deborah Doyle Belknap, Maas v. UPMC: Muddying the Waters of Therapist Liability in Pennsylvania, 92 Pa. Bar Ass’n Q. 163, 164 (2021). and not deter much crime. They were right. Without gathering any data whatsoever, Tarasoff-type expansions of duties have knocked down the preexisting wall between health care and law enforcement. This is concerning, but unsurprising. Judges do not conduct research on the efficacy of the policies they propose, and neither do the police.

Even law enforcement interventions that are passed by statute and capable of being carefully studied first by experts are almost never evidence based. Of the scant few police interventions that have undergone validity or reliability testing after the fact, the large majority have not been shown to work at all.243David Weisburd, David P. Farrington, Charlotte Gill, What Works in Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation: An Assessment of Systematic Reviews, 16 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 415, 416 (2017) (citing Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 Pub. Int. 22, 25 (1974)). This means, in effect, that law enforcement is allowed to experiment on the public. This makes it all the more appalling that they are then immunized from negligence when they get it wrong.

This is diametrically opposed to ethical principles in clinical medicine.244See Laura I. Appleman, The Captive Lab Rat: Human Medical Experimentation in the Carceral State, 61 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 67 (2020). Virtually no treatments should be offered to patients without testing their safety and efficacy first. An untested intervention might actually cause harm as opposed to just not work, which would lead to violations of the ethical principle of nonmaleficence (colloquially, “do no harm”).245See Varkey, supra note 211, at 17; Beauchamp, supra note 164, at 6. While all health care involves some uncertainty, to experiment on patients, physicians must first demonstrate that no safer options have worked.246See World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 310 JAMA 2191, 2193 (2013); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 Am. J.L. & Med. 361, 362 (2002). To deviate from an accepted standard of care, physicians must have data that the new path is equally safe and potentially more effective. This is not an ethical norm held by law enforcement. In the following Section, I explore two examples of law enforcement dabbling in health care in ways that resemble raw experimentation rather than evidence-based care.

1.  Examples of Law Enforcement Providing Experimental “Treatment”
i.  Excessive Ketamine Administration

In August 2019, a twenty-three-year-old Black man named Elijah McClain was stopped by police on his way home. Someone reported he was “acting suspicious” though he was not suspected of any crimes.247Allison Sherry, Elijah McClain’s Cause of Death Has Changed to Ketamine Administered by Responders, NPR (Sept. 26, 2022, 5:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2022/09/26/1125172989/elijah-mcclains-cause-of-death-has-changed-to-ketamine-administered-by-responder [https://perma.cc/7PP9-YDRX]. Three cops restrained Elijah in a chokehold and then handcuffed him while he stated he was an introvert who never even hurt flies. The police claimed after the fact that McClain went for a gun, but there is no evidence of this. When the paramedics arrived, at law enforcement’s request, they administered five milliliters of ketamine without knowledge of Elijah’s vital signs, asthma, or mental health history.248Lucy Tompkins, Here’s What You Need to Know About Elijah McClain’s Death, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-was-elijah-mcclain.html [https://perma.cc/A7QK-8J64]. Elijah went into a coma and later died. The final autopsy report indicated a high dose of ketamine contributed to his death. The police officer who put McClain in a neck hold after he was administered ketamine was acquitted of negligent homicide and manslaughter.249Shelly Bradbury, Officer Acquitted in Elijah McClain’s Death Resigns from Aurora Police Department, Denver Post (Jan. 16, 2024, 2:23 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2024/01/16/nathan-woodyard-aurora-police-resign-elijah-mcclain [https://perma.cc/L6JS-EMWH].

While law enforcement may need to restrain individuals who are physically threatening them, they seem to have no internal criteria for how the restraint will be done ethically and according to best medical practices. In Elijah’s case, there was no evidence that he needed the ketamine to be restrained. Indeed, he was already in handcuffs.

Unfortunately, police often rely on the controversial diagnosis of “excited delirium” to administer ketamine to stressed individuals.250See, e.g., Axtell v. City of Lakewood, No. 21-CV-00291, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45767, at *21 (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 2023). As Osagie Obasogie has written, “there is little scientific evidence to support claims that excited delirium exists as a legitimate psychiatric condition.”251Osagie K. Obasogie, Excited Delirium and Police Use of Force, 107 Va. L. Rev. 1545, 1587 (2021). Even so, it is increasingly being used to explain “suspicious deaths that occur in police custody.”252Id. Reviews of police custody deaths validate that excessive use of ketamine is often the primary cause of death, as law enforcement are administering doses of sensitive medication without adequate medical training or supervision. This is yet another troubling example of the medicalization of criminal investigations, using nonevidence-based “treatments.” Police have inadequate training on how to assess the health status of individuals. And yet, they, along with paramedics, routinely experiment on a case-by-case basis, injecting powerful medications into people experiencing mental health crises.

ii.  Drug Courts Provide Nonevidence-Based Treatment

Drug courts have proliferated in the last two decades as a result of the failed War on Drugs and mass incarceration.253See Lesli Blair, Carrie Coen Sullivan, Jennifer Lux, Angela J. Thielo & Lia Gormsen, Measuring Drug Court Adherence to the What Works Literature: The Creation of the Evidence-Based Correctional Program Checklist-Drug Court, 60 Int’l J. Offender Therapy & Compar. Criminology 165, 166 (2016). Qualifications for drug court vary, but state and county programs typically allow people charged with nonviolent crimes to take a plea in abeyance, which will disappear so long as they graduate from a diversion program such as drug court. Drug courts often involve a county judge overseeing someone’s treatment program with regular check-ins with parole officers, treatment providers, and counselors. Participants must appear before their judge and explain any relapses they have had. Judges will often place requirements on graduation from drug court, such as obtaining and keeping a job.

Drug courts provide an on-ramp to treatment. Compared with probation-as-usual, some studies suggest they reduce recidivism rates.254Id. However, because addiction is a disease, the primary comparison should not be criminal metrics, but clinical ones.255See Miriam Krinsky & Leo Beletsky, Why It’s Time to Abandon Drug Courts, Crime Rep: Ctr. on Media Crime & Just. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://thecrimereport.org/2021/03/05/why-its-time-to-abandon-drug-courts [https://perma.cc/DG9B-8GBV]. We do not know how drug courts compare to routine, affordable evidence-based medical care for addiction because access to this treatment does not exist in the United States.256See Teneille R. Brown, Treating Addiction in the Clinic, Not the Courtroom: Using Neuroscience and Genetics to Abandon the Failed War on Drugs, 54 Ind. L. Rev. 29, 29 (2021). Instead, we funnel addiction “treatment” through the prison system or through highly unregulated addiction clinics that often do not have even one licensed medical provider.257Bertha K. Madras, The Surge of Opioid Use, Addiction, and Overdoses: Responsibility and Response of the US Health Care System, 74 JAMA Psychiatry 441, 442 (2017); see Barbara Andraka-Christou, America Needs the TREAT Act: Expanding Access to Effective Medication for Treating Addiction, 26 Health Matrix 309, 315 (2016).

The blending of punishment and treatment goals problematically blurs the lines between health care and law enforcement. People in recovery are expected to check in with their parole officer and attend drug court regularly with the threat of incarceration looming in the background. These check-ins make it difficult for poorer people living on the margins and without transportation to sustain employment. The result is that the carceral state is engaged in a great deal of surveillance and treatment that should be provided not in the courtroom, but in the clinic.258Brown, supra note 256, at 30.

While some of the treatment programs mandated through drug court are evidence-based, many are not.259“Medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid addiction is ideologically contested in problem-solving courts, despite strong evidence of its effectiveness.” Barbara Andraka-Christou, What Is “Treatment” for Opioid Addiction in Problem-Solving Courts? A Study of 20 Indiana Drug and Veterans Courts, 13 Stan. J.C.R & C.L. 189, 189 (2017). As a result, participants in drug courts often get mixed messages about the value of medication to their recovery. For example, despite being highly effective and the “gold standard” for opioid use disorder, some drug court programs prohibit the use of buprenorphine to curb opioid cravings.260Joanne Csete, United States Drug Courts and Opioid Agonist Therapy: Missing the Target of Overdose Reduction, 1 Forensic Sci. Intl’l: Mind & L. 1, 2 (2020). For decades, many drug courts have considered medication for opioid use disorder (such as methadone) to be taboo because it is “just another addiction.”261Id. at 3. This perspective ignores the reliable empirical data that when properly dosed, opioid agonists like buprenorphine can keep people employed and able to break the cycle from craving to binging.262See generally Nat’l Acads. Scis., Eng’g, & Med., Medications for Opioid Use Disorder Save Lives (Alan I. Leshner & Michelle Mancher eds., 2019).

There are unfortunately great disparities between courts in the level and quality of addiction care that participants receive. Even some of the evidence-based drug courts that contract with licensed addiction providers require participants to attend group therapy through Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.263See Sara Gordon, The Use and Abuse of Mutual-Support Programs in Drug Courts, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1503, 1503, 1522 (2017). Group therapy can be a very useful form of social support to individuals in recovery. However, in some counties it is the primary method of “treatment” for individuals in drug court. This is a problem because its faith-based message is “not a substitute for scientifically valid addiction treatment and should not constitute the primary form of medical assistance received by drug court participants.”264Id. at 1543.

2.  Police Are the Default Providers for Patients in Crisis

Because the U.S. has failed to fund many types of social services and behavioral health care, the police are often called on when people are in crisis.265Michele P. Bratina, Kelly M. Carrero, Bitna Kim & Alida V. Merlo, Crisis Intervention Team Training: When Police Encounter Persons with Mental Illness, 21 Police Prac. & Rsch. 279, 280 (2020); see also Frank M. Webb, Criminal Justice and the Mentally Ill: Strange Bedfellows, 49 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 817, 820 (2017). When police are the hammer and the only tool we have, every social service—from “traffic stops and noise complaints to evictions, overdoses, and psychiatric emergencies”—becomes their nail.266Bailey et al., supra note 29, at 106. We have culturally come to depend on the police as the key point-of-access for the delivery of addiction treatment, mental health care, and even the reporting of child abuse, despite their inability to meet vulnerable patients where they are.267See Webb supra note 265, at 824; Taleed El-Sabawi & Jennifer J. Carroll, A Model for Defunding: An Evidence-Based Statute for Behavioral Health Crisis Response, 94 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2021). To be clear, police departments may not desire being frontline medics. However, due to the chronic underfunding of behavioral health services, police are much more likely to be the first and last resort for people in crisis.268Judy Ann Clausen & Joanmarie Davoli, No-One Receives Psychiatric Treatment in a Squad Car, 54 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 645, 649–50 (2022); see United States v. Mississippi, 400 F. Supp. 3d 546, 578 (S.D. Miss. 2019) (explaining that in Mississippi, mental health services are largely underfunded and inaccessible).

While crisis-trained police can reduce escalation and help divert people to treatment,269See Gabriella K. Olgin, Annick Bórquez, Pieter Baker, Erika Clairgue, Mario Morales, Arnulfo Bañuelos, Jaime Arredondo, Alicia Harvey-Vera, Steffanie Strathdee, Leo Beletsky & Javier A. Cepeda, Preferences and Acceptability of Law Enforcement Initiated Referrals for People Who Inject Drugs: A Mixed Methods Analysis, 15 Substance Abuse Treatment, Prevention, & Pol’y 75 , 82 (2020). these programs are only successful relative to the status quo of carceral, law enforcement methods.270Bratina et al., supra note 265, at 289–90; see also Clausen & Davoli, supra note 268, at 648 (“[A]ny reform that focuses only on first responders will not fix our system.”). And while they may be “associated with reducing recidivism and lowering costs, . . . there is little association between program participation and improved behavioral health.”271Caroline Harmon-Darrow, Jenny Afkinich, Nancy D. Franke & Gail Betz, Police Diversion at Arrest: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 50 Crim. Just. & Behav. 307, 307 (2022); see also El-Sabawi & Carroll, supra note 267, at 13 (“Despite the enormous number of programs in operation in the thirty years following CIT’s [crisis intervention team’s] conception, little evidence exists to show that the CIT approach is effective at reducing incidents of police use of force (or even simply reducing incidents of excessive police use of force) during behavioral-health-related calls.”). That is, they might reduce crime, but they do not appear to promote health. And yet, state governors and mayors are expanding nonevidence-based programs to funnel “treatments” for mental illnesses through law enforcement and the criminal justice system.272For a critique of various ineffective state reforms, see generally Clausen & Davoli, supra note 267, at 675.

In California, the “CARE Court” will “connect[] people in crisis with a court-ordered treatment plan for up to two years, while diverting them from possible incarceration, homelessness or restrictive court-ordered conservatorship.”273Karen Garcia, CARE Court Will Change How California Addresses Serious, Untreated Mental Illness. Here’s How, L.A. Times (Sept. 15, 2022, 1:20 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-09-15/how-care-court-program-will-work-for-mentally-ill [https://perma.cc/K6AS-RNZD]. Programs like this reveal how we have completely given up on providing actual, evidence-based mental health treatment and instead criminalize poverty and mental illness.274See Holly Ober & John Warren, UCR Experts: Newsom’s CARE Courts an ‘Oxymoron,’ UC Riverside News (Mar. 23, 2022), https://news.ucr.edu/articles/2022/03/23/ucr-experts-newsoms-care-courts-oxymoron [https://perma.cc/S62C-GWHB]. The vast majority of unhoused people with addiction or other mental illnesses receive no treatment.275Id. And when this is the reality—where we have given up on providing universal mental health treatment—the illnesses do not simply disappear. They show up in ways that are funneled by default through law enforcement and the criminal justice system.276See Bailey et al., supra note 29, at 107; Sara Jacoby, Elinore Kaufman, Utsha Khatri, Erin Hall, Millie Shepherd & Michael Smith, When Health Care and Law Enforcement Overlap: Ideas from a Symposium of Stakeholders, Univ. Pa. Leonard Davis Inst. Health Econ. (May 2, 2022), https://ldi.upenn.edu/our-work/research-updates/when-health-care-and-law-enforcement-overlap [https://perma.cc/Y4JX-ZRKB].

CARE Court and similar programs only seem progressive if they are compared to incarceration. When compared with the receipt of top-notch, evidence-based treatment, they fall woefully short.277El-Sabawi & Carroll, supra note 267, at 14 (discussing the weak evidence that behavioral-health-response training fundamentally changes officer behavior in the field). And yet, we lack the collective imagination or will to treat people in the clinic rather than the courtroom.278Brown, supra note 256, at 30. It would be far better to provide mental health treatment wholly divorced from the threat of punishment. The looming stick of incarceration distracts from the provision of quality, evidence-based treatment.

Providing “treatment” through criminal courts confuses the roles of law enforcement and clinicians. Participants may come to view clinicians as being inherently aligned with the police state. If you are used to your treatment provider talking about your mental health struggles with your parole officer, counselor, or judge, you might come to think these disclosures are normal outside of this context. You might also not tell your court-appointed provider everything that they need to know to adequately treat you; if you say the wrong thing, it might delay graduation from drug court or any other diversion program. But most importantly for our purposes, the treatment that is provided by these diversion programs is often out-of-date and not evidence-based. This will impair patient trust in health care. In the next Section, I will explain how another ethical principle, honesty, is also critical for trust. I will discuss how it is a cornerstone of medicine, but not of law enforcement, and why this matters.

E.  Different Honesty Norms

There used to be norms of “benevolent deception” in medicine,279Joanna L. Hart, Deception, Honesty, and Professionalism: A Persistent Challenge in Modern Medicine, Current Op. Psychology, Oct. 2022, at 1. where physicians did not disclose terrible prognoses to patients to give them hope. This is no longer ethically or legally permitted.280See AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.3: Withholding Information from Patients, Am. Med. Ass’n, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/withholding-information-patients [https://perma.cc/ARC4-TXLZ]. The AMA Code of Ethics requires physicians to maintain “open communication between physician and patient” as “essential for trust in the relationship.”281Id.

If a clinician is dishonest in any way, this will negatively impact the care the patient receives, the willingness of the patient to seek care, and the likelihood that the patient will see the clinician as protecting their best interests.282See Bazargan et al., supra note 34, at 5, 11. Deception is universally condemned in medicine.283“It is a truth universally acknowledged that ethical doctors will not intentionally deceive their patients.” See Daniel K. Sokol, Can Deceiving Patients be Morally Acceptable?, 334 Brit. Med. J. 984, 984 (2007) (provocatively arguing that in some cases deceiving patients may be moral, contra the consensus view). It impairs shared decision-making and “fundamentally undermines patients’ autonomy in nearly all situations.”284Hart, supra note 279, at 3. Clinicians who lie to patients can be sued and investigated for professional ethics violations.285See, e.g., Abraham v. Kosinski, 759 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Walters v. Rinker, 520 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Baker v. UC Health, No. 16-CV-00853, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17899 at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2017); Adams v. Durrani, 183 N.E.3d 560, 569 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022). They could also potentially lose their license.286See Mary Anne Bobinski, Law and Power in Health Care: Challenges to Physician Control, 67 Buff. L. Rev. 595, 611 (2019) (explaining the rise of informed consent liability and professional licensing, but noting how professional licensing boards need to do a better job being accountable to the public); see also Dinah Stein, Florida’s “Three Strikes” Legislation: A Defense Perspective, Trial Advoc. Q., Spring 2010, at 22.

Police, on the other hand, routinely lie to witnesses to get them to cooperate.287See Margareth Etienne & Richard McAdams, Police Deception in Interrogation as a Problem of Procedural Legitimacy, 54 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 21, 27 (2021). For example, they may tell someone their statement is not being recorded when it is, or say they have video footage of the defendant committing the crime, even if this is not the case. Courts do not find this violates defendants’ due process rights.288See, e.g., People v. Green, 139 N.Y.S.3d 446, 450–52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021). It is well-recognized that “[t]he police are permitted to lie or use some deceptive methods in their questioning as long as the deception was not . . . so extensive as to induce a false confession . . . .”289People v. Henry, 103 N.Y.S.3d 656, 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). In this regard, health care and law enforcement are quite distinct. Physicians should not assume that patients are lying, because the physician and the patient should theoretically be on the same page. However, for the police, the need to investigate a crime means everyone is presumed to be hiding something. They have therefore “come to believe that lying is a necessary and justifiable component of their jobs.”290Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 389, 394 (1999).

Police are allowed to use deceptive methods to obtain evidence.291Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 665, 666 (2011). For example, DNA that a suspect unwittingly leaves on an armchair may later be analyzed without a warrant and without violating the Fourth Amendment.292See Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 756, 768 (Md. 2014). If one technically agrees to provide a DNA sample, but did not feel they were free to refuse, this is presumed to be voluntary consent in the police context.293See, e.g., People v. Muhammad, 117 N.Y.S.3d 917, 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020); People v. Osborne, 930 N.Y.S.3d 367, 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“[T]he fact that the police officers did not advise the defendant . . . of [his] right to refuse consent does not, by itself, negate the consent otherwise freely given.”).

Some have argued that police surreptitiously obtaining genetic samples for investigative purposes is unethical because they “bypass[] the codes of informed consent.”294Denise Syndercombe Court, Forensic Genealogy: Some Serious Concerns, 36 Forensic Sci. Int’l: Genetics 203, 203 (2018). In the medical context, the phrase “informed consent” is a term of art. It “requires that a patient understands what is being done to her before she agrees to be touched by a physician or researcher.”295Brown, supra note 201, at 34–35.

A physician’s failure to provide informed consent can result in battery or medical malpractice liability. It is a well-developed concept and obligatory.296Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d 1008 (1978) (“[T]he existence of a duty on the part of physicians to inform patients of the risks of a proposed treatment has seldom been denied . . . .”). But this is not true for law enforcement, which is not an institution built on honesty, transparency, or trust.297See Christina Koningisor, Coopting Privacy, 104 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4745551 [https://perma.cc/97Y6-ACAY] (“The privacy law regime today permits law enforcement agencies to collect massive amounts of data about citizens. In exchange, these agencies have ample secrecy tools at their disposal to guard that information against further public disclosure.” (footnote omitted)). The different disclosure and transparency norms between health care and law enforcement stem from the different weight each puts on the value of autonomy. In the next Section, I will explore the principle of autonomy, and how it steers medical ethics but not police practice.

F.  Different Autonomy Norms

Despite physicians and nurses having a great deal more clinical education than most of their patients, they should not tell the patient what to do with their bodies.298See Linda L. Olson & Felicia Stokes, The ANA Code of Ethics for Nurses with Interpretive Statements: Resource for Nursing Regulation, 7 J. Nursing Regul. 9, 10 (2016). In medicine, respecting autonomy means that patients have the freedom to make decisions for themselves and determine the course of their care.299See Raanan Gillon, Autonomy and the Principle of Respect for Autonomy, 290 Brit. Med. J. 1806, 1806–07 (1985). Autonomy does not mean patients get to demand specific things. Rather, it means they should be presented with the options—their risks and benefits—and be given the chance to ask questions.

Patients cannot make autonomous decisions if physicians do not share information that would be material to their decision.300See AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 11.2.4: Transparency in Health Care, Am. Med. Ass’n, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/transparency-health-care [https://perma.cc/2KHA-CKM8]. Respect for autonomy means that patients might make choices that appear irrational to physicians (like refusing chemotherapy), but stem from personal goals of care. Thus, respecting autonomy means respecting the patient’s idiosyncratic values and right of self-determination.

There is no corollary respect for autonomy in law enforcement. There is not a police code of ethics that ensures that autonomy is respected. Indeed, manipulative or sneaky tactics might be instrumentally encouraged to detain or interrogate individuals.301“[T]he government’s use of manipulative, sneaky, and deceitful investigative methods does not, without more, rise to the level of a constitutional outrage.” United States v. Colon, 71 F. Supp. 3d 269, 275 (D. Conn. 2014). This provides yet another critical difference between the two institutions and another basis for keeping them separate. To trust physicians, patients must not come to expect their doctors to treat them like cops do.

The next two examples I will explore demonstrate how the legislature disrespects autonomy by refusing to allow patients to make medical decisions for themselves. If the legislature has decided that a type of health care—such as abortion or gender-affirming care—is morally suspect, they regulate it heavily, using health care licenses and professionals as the enforcement mechanism. And yet, states only have the ostensible moral authority to regulate these practices in the way they do because at base, they do not consider them to be legitimate health care. If they did honor them as valid treatments, they would have no authority to stick their noses in a conversation that should be between patients and their doctors.

1.  Limiting Access to Lifesaving Abortion Care

Governments are presently using their police power to block access to critical health care—showing perhaps the greatest disrespect possible for the autonomy of people who can become pregnant. Statutes that have restricted access to abortions since Roe v. Wade was overturned demonstrate a remarkable lack of recognition of how they require physicians to violate medical ethics.302See Teneille R. Brown, Abortion and the Extremism of Bright Line Rules, 119 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4459558 [https://perma.cc/L2GY-MBAQ]; NARAL Pro-Choice America, Bans on Abortion by Week, https://reproductivefreedomforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/WHODecides2022-BANS-BY-WEEK-Report-011722-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3S5-ZT3C]; David S. Cohen, Greer Donley & Rachel Rebouché, The New Abortion Battleground, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 72–73 (2023).

Because these power grabs by law enforcement are not evidence-based, the way the exceptions are crafted reveals complete naivete about how medicine is practiced. For example, the meaning of terms like “medical emergency” have already been tested in hospitals across the country. In Missouri, a woman named Mylissa Farmer went into labor at 18 weeks with a desired pregnancy. Her water broke and she had vaginal bleeding and cramping.303Susan Szuch, She Had ‘A Baby Dying Inside’ Her. Under Missouri’s Abortion Ban, Doctors Could Do Nothing, USA Today (Oct. 15, 2022, 8:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/10/15/missouri-abortion-ban-pregnancy-complications/10496559002 [https://perma.cc/C6QR-9X2X]. When emergency physicians assessed her, they said the baby girl she was carrying would not survive. However, because it was technically still alive, Missouri’s post-Dobbs abortion ban would not permit them to perform an abortion, even to prevent serious complications to Mylissa. Unfortunately, her physicians did not think she was close enough to death to justify the termination under Missouri’s law. Mylissa’s doctors told her she would just need to wait until her “vitals plummeted or infection set in, or the fetus’ cardiac activity stopped” before they could intervene.304Id. This put her at great risk, as she attempted to travel to a neighboring state while in a precarious and unstable situation.

The Missouri statute, and others like it, tie physicians’ hands and do not let them do what they know is best for the birth mother and her baby, which is to terminate the pregnancy compassionately and safely.305Id. There is already mounting evidence that in other states, like Texas, patients are suffering from preventable complications that are caused not by medicine, but by criminal laws.306Stephanie Emma Pfeffer, Texas Woman Nearly Loses Her Life After Doctors Can’t Legally Perform an Abortion: ‘Their Hands Were Tied,’ People (Oct. 18, 2022), https://people.com/health/texas-woman-nearly-loses-her-life-after-doctors-cannot-legally-perform-abortion [https://perma.cc/DP2H-6HL2]. These abortion bans are obviously not meant to respect the autonomy of women and people who can become pregnant. In fact, they are written in such medically naive ways, they might even be designed to do the opposite.

In an effort to advance a pro-life, anti-choice agenda, abortion bans forget that they are conscripting physicians to violate their code of ethics in the service of prosecutorial goals. They also forget that medical decisions are not black-and-white. Several of the statutes are written as if a siren goes off when someone’s life is at risk.307Brown, supra note 302, at 7 (“Aside from the key fact that physicians are ethically required to do more than prevent death, these statutes make it seem as if medical emergencies operate like a light switch, and are either present or absent.”). But that is not how critical situations arise. A pregnant person’s vital signs can change rapidly, often without advance notice. Someone can seem stable, and then two minutes later they are crashing.

Finally, “medical emergencies” are not declared without patient input. Respect for autonomy means that physicians do not unilaterally tell patients when heroic life-saving interventions will be used. Whether a patient wants chest compressions or a ventilator depends on their values and personal goals of care. The exceptions that only permit abortions when the pregnant person is near death ignore the very purpose of medicine. Medical ethics requires that physicians do what they can to promote healing and to help people thrive—by promoting autonomy and beneficence—and not just to prevent death.

Other abortion laws exhibit additional “black-and-white” thinking about medicine.308Brown, supra note 302, at 1. Utah’s current eighteen-week ban permits abortions if the fetus has a lethal defect or severe brain abnormality that is “uniformly diagnosable.”309Abortion Prohibition Amendments, Senate Bill 174, 2020 Leg., Gen Sess. (Utah 2020) (codified at Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 76-7a-101). However, this fundamentally misunderstands the way bodies present themselves and the uncertainty inherent in many clinical situations. While some fetal defects are expressed with near certainty, whether a particular defect will be fatal and within a particular timeframe is rarely something that can be uniformly diagnosed.310See Greer Donley, Parental Autonomy Over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 175, 184 (2020). Medically speaking, the phrase “uniformly diagnosable” is nonsense. These are just some of the terrifying real-world problems that arise when legislators try to commandeer the practice of medicine, with the threat of criminal consequences to physicians for noncompliance.

Physicians in Utah and elsewhere have expressed concern over how to thread the needle in these situations—that is, to do what is best for their patients while also not exposing themselves to criminal fines or jail time.311Katie McKellar, Uncertainty Swirls Around How Utah Will Enforce Its Trigger Abortion Ban, Deseret News (July 13, 2022, 7:55 PM), https://www.deseret.com/utah/2022/7/13/23195392/questions-swirl-how-utah-will-actually-enforce-its-trigger-abortion-ban-collateral-damage-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/BX2W-649S]. Every physician’s risk preference will vary, but these laws will certainly have a chilling effect and put patients’ lives at risk.312For example, Kate Cox was unable to terminate her unviable pregnancy under the Texas state’s medical emergency exception, putting her life and ability to have future children at risk. See Brendan Pierson, Texas Top Court Rules Against Woman Who Sought Abortion for Medical Emergency, Reuters (Dec. 11, 2023, 11:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/texas-woman-who-sought-emergency-abortion-court-will-leave-state-care-2023-12-11 [https://perma.cc/E5BT-J8EV]. Kate Cox “said her fetus had a fatal diagnosis and that her health was at risk if she continued the pregnancy to term, including her ability to have more children in the future.” Id. They are also part of a long-term, disturbing trend of requiring physicians to violate autonomy by shoehorning politics into health care.313See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 Colum. J. Gender & L. 111, 113–14 (2008); Callie Beusman, A State-by-State List of the Lies Abortion Doctors Are Forced to Tell Women, VICE (Aug. 18, 2016, 8:15 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/nz88gx/a-state-by-state-list-of-the-lies-abortion-doctors-are-forced-to-tell-women [https://perma.cc/3K5W-AUAC]. Below is yet another example of this phenomenon, which is tragically on the rise.

2.  Punishing the Provision of Gender-Affirming Treatment

State laws banning gender-affirming care also require physicians to disrespect patient autonomy. In 2023, the Governor of Utah signed a ban on gender-affirming surgeries for minors into law.314Ava Sasani, Utah Bans Transition Care for Transgender Youth, N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/29/us/utah-transgender-bill.html [https://perma.cc/97D7-XXAD]. The Utah law prohibits a health care provider from “providing a hormonal transgender treatment” or “providing sex characteristic surgical procedures” to new patients who were not diagnosed with gender dysphoria before a certain date.” The penalty for violating this law is either losing one’s license or being sued for malpractice.315Transgender Medical Treatments and Procedures Amendments, Senate Bill 16, 2023 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2023).

On April 6, 2021, the Arkansas State Legislature overrode the governor’s veto to prohibit the provision of gender-affirming treatment to minor patients—or to even refer them to other physicians for this treatment.316The law is currently being challenged by patients who say it violates the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and the physician’s free speech rights. The Arkansas law states that “[t]he risks of gender transition procedures far outweigh any benefit at this stage of clinical study on these procedures.”317Save Adolescents From Experimentation Act (SAFE Act), Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-1502 (2021). In Arkansas, unlawful provision of gender-affirming care is likewise considered unprofessional conduct and can provide a basis for a malpractice lawsuit. Because physicians who provide gender-affirming care could lose their license in Arkansas, this will effectively remove this care for many youths in the state and will almost certainly result in increased mental distress and suicide.318See Myeshia N. Price & Amy E. Green, Association of Gender Identity Acceptance with Fewer Suicide Attempts Among Transgender and Nonbinary Youth, 8 Transgender Health 56, 56 (2023) (finding that transgender and nonbinary youth are four times more likely to attempt suicide compared with cisgender youth).

Similar legislation is pending in approximately fifteen other states. Most of these bills propose banning all health care professionals from prescribing or administering puberty blockers, hormone therapy, or gender-affirming surgeries to anyone under the age of eighteen unless the patient can verify that they are genetically intersex.319Outlawing Trans Youth: State Legislatures and the Battle over Gender-Affirming Healthcare for Minors, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2163, 2173–74 (2021). Penalties can be extreme; in Idaho, a proposed bill would punish physicians with a felony punishable by a life sentence.320See H.B. 465, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020). The law would have defined gender-affirming care as “genital mutilation of a child,” which carries a maximum life sentence under the state criminal code. See id.; Idaho Code § 18-1506B(6) (2024). Fortunately, the Idaho bill has not yet passed their senate.

In the aforementioned laws, the legislature is deciding what counts as the medical standard of care—disrespecting patient autonomy by going against the great weight of medical evidence and expertise and imposing fines and professional penalties.321See Simona Martin, Elizabeth S. Sandberg & Daniel E. Shumer, Criminalization of Gender-Affirming Care — Interfering with Essential Treatment for Transgender Children and Adolescents, 385 New Eng. J. Medicine 579, 580–81 (2021). The American Academy of Pediatrics issued a statement saying “[p]olitics has no place here. These are individual conversations between clinicians, patients and families about what’s best.”322Trisha Korioth, Pediatricians Say State Bills Would Harm Transgender Youths, Am. Acad. Pediatrics (Mar. 9, 2021), https://publications.aap.org/aapnews/news/12780 [https://perma.cc/E4C4-HHQY]. In testimony regarding the harms the legislation will cause, pediatricians said it is based on “myths and misinformation” and a “misunderstanding about medical and surgical aspects of gender-affirmative care.”323Id.

While legislators claim these bills protect children, physicians argue they do the opposite. Long-term data shows that “access to gender-affirming care in childhood and adolescence can have profoundly important mental health benefits,” including reducing the risk of suicide, decreasing depression, and decreasing anxiety.324Martin et al., supra note 321, at 580. At some point, these statutes will need to be enforced, and when they are, law enforcement will trump important goals of clinical treatment simply because the government holds itself to a lower standard of care, permits experimentation on the public, and violates patient autonomy.

Once again, we see the state invading private medical domains through the apparatus of law enforcement. This is concerning, because as I have laid out above, law enforcement fails to promote the key tenets of privacy, honesty, evidence-bases, respect for autonomy, and accountability, which are key ingredients to stimulate trust. Once in the hands of law enforcement, vulnerable patients’ data may be used for nefarious, punitive purposes, which might discourage patients from receiving necessary treatments. The disrespect for individuals in the law enforcement context cannot infect patients’ perspectives in the medical space; otherwise, patient trust in medicine will suffer. In the next Section, I will explain why patient trust is critical to the delivery of quality care.

G.  Different Trust Norms

Compared with other countries, public trust in physicians in the U.S. is low—unacceptably low.325Id. It is therefore imperative that health care policies do more to earn the trust of the patient populations they serve, and not less. Promoting patient trust cannot be accomplished if people perceive physicians to be prosecutors, or as working in tandem with law enforcement.

This is not about trying to keep groups separate for the sake of purity or to fetishize medicine. Rather, to prevent negative impacts on patient health, it is critical that we erect sharp boundaries between law enforcement and treatment. The lack of respect for patient privacy, honesty, and autonomy, and the lack of accountability in law enforcement for causing brutal, individual harms, makes the police in the U.S. less worthy of public trust. In the next Section, I will explore instances when the lines between health care and law enforcement have been blurred, and how these blurred lines have likely caused significant harm to the physician-patient relationship, the trust on which it relies, and the quality of care.

1.  Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Rely on and Exacerbate Mistrust

Prescription drug monitoring programs (“PDMPs”) are databases that track prescriptions and patient requests for controlled substances.326Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring to Address the Overdose Crisis: Ideology Meets Reality, 15 Ind. Health L. Rev. 139, 144–45 (2018). They proliferated over the last decade in response to the opioid crisis and now exist in nearly every state.327Rebecca L. Haffajee, Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs — Friend or Folly in Addressing the Opioid-Overdose Crisis?, 381 New Eng. J. Medicine 699, 699 (2019). From the outset, they were “an instrument of law enforcement.”328Mina Hong, Sarah Seymour, Thomas J. Stopka, Lane Bandanza, Erin Crocker, Allison Morgan & Leo Beletsky, “Nobody Knows How You’re Supposed to Interpret It:” End-User Perspectives on Prescription Drug Monitoring Program in Massachusetts, 16 J. Addiction Med. e171, e171 (2022). PDMPs operate differently in every state, but generally require physicians and pharmacists to enter prescribing data for controlled substances or to check such data before initiating a new controlled substance prescription.

Proponents argue that PDMPs are a helpful investigative tool to assess potential criminal diversion of drugs by patients, physicians, and providers.329Id. Critics argue that they are inefficient and poorly designed. PDMPs are often not developed with a “clear orientation towards health promotion” and instead complicate “communication and relationships between prescribers, pharmacists, and patients.”330Id. Put simply, they place law enforcement between a patient and their physician and can violate the trust between them.

PDMPs also may trigger unintended consequences that harm patients. Fearing law enforcement oversight, physicians may under-prescribe necessary pain medications.331Haffajee, supra note 327, at 700. This may lead patients to seek treatment for their pain illegally on the streets, with a drug supply that could be impure and deadly.332Id. In addition to the significant public health concerns, there are enormous potential privacy risks of PDMPs when this sensitive data lands in the hands of law enforcement.333Jennifer D. Oliva, Prescription-Drug Policing: The Right to Health Information Privacy Pre- and Post-Carpenter, 69 Duke L.J. 775, 821 (2020); Brief for Plantiffs-Intervenors-Appellees at 4–5, Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.14-35402).

For the purposes of this Article, the chief problem with PDMPs is that they destroy patient trust by injecting law enforcement norms and goals into medicine. If patients know that their physician is stepping away for a few minutes to check a police database to see if the patient is telling the truth, this brings a prosecutorial element into the decision-making process that will destroy rapport. When programs like PDMPs start chipping away at the principle of confidentiality in medicine, there are no obvious principled limits on cops’ use of doctors as their prosecutorial instruments. This loss of confidentiality will further hurt the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship, and the disappearing trust on which it relies.334See Beletsky, supra note 326, at 145.

CONCLUSION

For the many reasons laid out above, it is important that the norms of law enforcement not creep into the world of medicine. As the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons so fittingly recognized, “[p]hysicians are not agents of the police power of government, and should not be forced to choose between protecting their patients against prosecution or protecting them against disease.”335Oliva, supra note 333, at 777 (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons in Support of Respondent-Appellant Abbas T. Zadeh, in Support of Reversal at 8, United States v. Zadeh, 820 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-10202 & 15-10195), 2015 WL 4380678, at *8). Unlike cops, physicians must embody ethical norms that respect self-regulation, privacy, accountability, efficacy, honesty, and autonomy. Respecting these ethical norms is critical not only to promote public health, but also to repair the broken trust between physicians and patients. In this Article, I described the rampant mistrust of medical providers and institutions, which is exacerbated by police intrusion into health care. Medical mistrust is a SDOH that disproportionately impacts patients of color. To build health care systems that are more trustworthy and equitable, physicians must be walled off from law enforcement.

A number of efforts can mitigate against the police intrusion into health care. However, there is no simple solution to this complex problem, and more detailed research needs to be completed on each solution. Nevertheless, below are some concrete steps courts and legislatures could consider to better separate health care from law enforcement.

A.  HIPAA Should Be Revised to Make It Harder for Cops to Obtain Medical Data

The HIPAA exceptions described above make it too easy for law enforcement to pierce medical privacy and obtain access to confidential health data.336See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2016). In addition to permitting disclosures of patient data in response to subpoenas, HIPAA also permits disclosures on a simple written administrative request; this is what health privacy scholar Leslie Francis has called an “open-ended provision.”337Leslie Francis, Privacy and Health Information: The United States and the European Union, 103 Ky. L.J. 419, 430 (2014).

HIPAA has thus had the counterintuitive effect of making it easier, rather than harder, for the government to access health data. HIPAA was not intended to provide cops with greater access to confidential data. However, because its permissive exceptions are sometimes read by law enforcement and health care staff to create entitlements to patient data, the statute has become not a shield, but a sieve.338See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 681, 684 (2007). This is unfortunate because the “HIPAA drafters worried as much about personal data being abused by the government as they did about misuse by researchers or the insurance industry.”339Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 496 (2013).

Indeed, while I was writing this Article, Vanderbilt Medical Center became embroiled in controversy over its disclosure of transgender patients’ medical records to the Tennessee attorney general “as part of an investigation into medical billing.”340Anisha Kholi, Vanderbilt’s Decision to Turn Over Trans Patient Records to the State Sparks Backlash, TIME (June 23, 2023, 10:17 AM), https://time.com/6289609/vanderbilt-transgender-records-patients-backlash [https://perma.cc/6DSJ-K9V5]. The disclosure appears to have been pursuant to a civil investigative request, and it is unclear whether this runs afoul of existing Fourth Amendment precedent.341While the Supreme Court “has generally required individualized suspicion for warrantless searches . . . [t]here is a line of pre-Carpenter decisions . . . that hold that certain investigatory or administrative subpoenas are not subject to the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement.” Oliva, supra note 333, at 805. The concern, of course, is that the investigation could be pretext, and a means for harassing clinics that provide gender-affirming care as well to their patients. Regardless, HIPAA does almost nothing to stop this kind of disclosure. As Nashville LGBTQIA+ advocate Lance Preston said: “[d]o we believe that Vanderbilt Medical Center could have fought this and taken a bigger stand? Absolutely. But at the same time, we believe that it would have just prolonged the inevitable because the attorney general unfortunately, has the law on his side.”342Kohli, supra note 340.

This Article calls for revisions to HIPAA to remove the breezy access the police have to medical data. The exceptions have become too easy to overcome, without demonstrating a strong investigative need. However, precisely how this statute ought to be revised is beyond the scope of this Article. There is, at least, a strong prima facie argument for requiring cops to do more than issue a written request asking for medical data. The status quo is too permissive. Ironically, HIPAA currently gives the very entity most people worry about sharing their medical data with—the police—incredible free access.

B.  Common Law Courts Should Rethink Tarasoff and Expansive Immunity

The Tarasoff-style duty to warn was ill-conceived from the start. Empirical research has shown that such duty has not resulted in demonstrable improvements in the prevention or prosecution of crime. Instead, it has stifled vulnerable patients’ willingness to obtain mental health treatment. While likely resulting from an intuitive impulse to hold someone accountable for heinous crimes, the Tarasoff-style duty takes the very thing that makes health care special—confidentiality and patient trust—and exploits it in a way that harms not only public health, but also medical ethics. One way to course-correct is to limit the rampant recognition of duties of physicians to warn or protect third parties whom they have never met. Therapists and physicians lack good risk-assessment tools, they are often wrong, and their warnings to third parties are generally ineffective. But requiring them to contact the police to report their patients chills therapeutic trust.

C.  Physicians Need Greater Autonomy to Practice Ethical Medicine

In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the Supreme Court recognized that competent patients have a “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment” under the Fourteenth Amendment.343Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). While this has been interpreted as a negative liberty rather than a positive right, it nonetheless underscores the importance of patient autonomy in our nation’s history and tradition. In another case that refused to recognize a right to physician-assisted suicide, the Court heralded the state’s legitimate interest in “protecting the medical profession’s integrity and ethics and maintaining physicians’ role as their patients’ healers.”344Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703–04 (1997). Federal courts have long-recognized that the physician-patient relationship is special and “common law and historical American practices have traditionally trusted individual doctors and their patients with almost complete autonomy to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments.”345Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Appellants’ Brief at 31). While a legitimate government interest can justify limiting certain rights and is not itself recognition of a right, the articulated state interest in protecting the physician-patient relationship is worth emphasizing.

The Dobbs decision exposes the current Court’s hostility to substantive due process jurisprudence.346See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 359–60 (2022) (Breyer, J., Sotomayor, J. & Kagan, J. dissenting). However, there was a time, not too long ago, when the Court recognized patients’ liberty interest in making autonomous medical decisions. Indeed, before the Dobbs about-face, privacy, informed consent, and medical autonomy were considered deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.347See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. Returning to this orthodox view, and bolstering it in other health care contexts, could make it harder for the police to encroach on health care decisions and disrespect patient autonomy. Of course, this will require focusing strategic appellate efforts on future Courts. In the meantime, advocates should try to develop respect for patient autonomy under state constitutions, and in contexts that are less politicized than abortion or trans care. This can provide helpful counterbalancing to the increasing encroachment of law enforcement and the state into health care.

D.  Health Care Providers Need Training on the Difference Between Permissive and Mandatory Disclosures

As discussed above, nurses and physicians comply with police requests for confidential medical data because they are unsure of what they are allowed to do. Consequently, hospitals and clinics therefore must provide better training for their staff on when they can exclude law enforcement from clinical data and spaces. They also must provide real-time security and support if cops threaten staff for not granting them access to this data.

Additionally, nurses and physicians must be trained on the difference between permissible and required disclosures. While HIPAA permits many unauthorized disclosures to law enforcement, it does not require them unless they are accompanied by a judicial order. Institutions should educate providers on the long-term negative health effects of blurring health care and law enforcement, so that they will reject more requests for health data that are not accompanied by a judicial subpoena or warrant.

E.  We Need to Reimagine Health Care as Being Off-Limits from Police

I leave the reader with many open questions about how far my proposal should go. When I first began this project, I asked myself whether my desire to divorce law enforcement from health care could justify keeping medical data from the police even in cases of child abuse or neglect. Every state requires physicians to report suspected abuse, and while the efficacy of these laws is debated, they are thought to at least reduce ongoing abuse. Surely, despite the negative impact of police encroachment on the physician-patient relationship and trust, there could be a way to justify it when innocent children are at risk.

Upon reflection, I realized that I had fallen into a common trap. This trap presents complex social problems such as poverty, homelessness, mental illness, and child abuse as being either handled by the police, or not being handled at all. However, this is a false binary. Physicians should continue to report suspected abuse and neglect, but to trained social workers and abuse prevention experts, not to the police. Police should only be involved much later in the process, if at all, after allegations of abuse are validated through an investigation led by trauma-informed social workers. And even then, we should prioritize addressing and treating the root cause of the abuse, rather than reflexively removing children from the home.348See Anne Zimmerman, Our System for Reporting Child Abuse Is Unethical, Hastings Ctr. (Sept. 29, 2023), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/our-system-for-reporting-child-abuse-is-unethical [https://perma.cc/FJ6Y-MG4L].

Cops are trained to be “authoritative, physical, and commanding”—traits that might be helpful in some policing situations, but are “ineffective” when responding to most health care needs.349Webb, supra note 265, at 824. But because of chronically underfunded social service programs, when people are in crisis, it is the cops who show up. This leads to law enforcement having a de facto monopoly on the provision of many forms of treatment, which are delivered poorly and in ways that violate medical ethics. We simply lack the collective imagination to see many calls to 911 as health problems deserving of compassionate, ethical, and evidence-based treatment by doctors, and not by cops.

On another front, because physicians are easy regulatory levers, states have increasingly been shoehorning politics into medicine. This takes the very thing that makes the physician-patient relationship sacred—trust—and violates it for ulterior government motives. We have seen this recently with bans on gender-affirming care and in the many laws restricting abortion access. Everywhere we look, law enforcement is encroaching on the practice of medicine. To repair the physician-patient relationship, uphold principles of medical ethics, and promote greater trust in health care, we need to keep doctors from becoming cops.

97 S. Cal. L. Rev. 675

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* James I. Farr Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law; B.A. 2000, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 2004, University of Michigan Law School. She is also Director for the Center for Law and the Biomedical Sciences and a faculty member of the Center for Health Ethics Arts and Humanities (“CHeEtAH”). This research was made possible in part through funding from the Utah Center for Excellence in ELSI Research (“UCEER”). UCEER is supported by the National Human Genome Research Institute of the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) under award number RM1HG009037.

The Healthcure System: A Regional Accountable Care Model to Remedy Healthcare’s Pricing Problem

INTRODUCTION

The most sinister game show in American life commences every time a hospital provides care, draws up an eye-popping bill, and asks its patient how it will be paid.1See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, Time (Apr. 4, 2013, 3:36 PM), https://time.com/198/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us [https://perma.cc/Z7UV-YTW3]. Imagine waking up from a medically induced coma to the words, “Will that be cash or card?” In its own sick twist of the three-legged race, the healthcare system effectively binds patients’ ability to navigate the costs of their care, such that even those with insurance are often left hobbling for answers to the questions, what must I pay and why? The stakes are ever graver for those underinsured or uninsured. In this game, the winners are not those who make it out alive, but those who can afford to keep on living.

In a properly functioning market, supply and demand would theoretically prevent a hospital from wildly inflating its prices, such as charging a patient approximately $200.00 for a routine blood test that would otherwise cost $13.00, but the reality is that healthcare is no such market.2Id.; Ari Mwachofi & Assaf F. Al-Assaf, Health Care Market Deviations from the Ideal Market, 11 Sultan Qaboos Univ. Med. J. 328, 330 (2011). As Princeton Professor Uwe Reinhart put it, “In effect, [patients] enter that market like blindfolded shoppers pushed into a department store to shop around smartly for whatever item they might want or, in the case of health care, need.”3Uwe E. Reinhardt, Priced Out: The Economic and Ethical Costs of American Health Care, at xviii (2019).

Patients cannot expect to make informed decisions when they lack reliable pricing information before seeking care, but this is just one of the many market failures that drives the ever-skyrocketing costs of American healthcare.4See, e.g., Mwachofi & Al-Assaf, supra note 2, at 330–34. Hospital administrators themselves often fail to grasp the true costs of their services, as do doctors when ordering tests and writing prescriptions.5See Brill, supra note 1. In fact, healthcare providers often have financial and legal incentives to overtreat their patients, at the patients’ expense.6Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, New Yorker (May 25, 2009), https://
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum [https://perma.cc/AH58-NLTB].
When providers are paid based on the services they render, in what is known as the “fee-for-service” payment model, providers that do more, make more.7See Jerry Cromwell & Janet B. Mitchell, Physician-Induced Demand for Surgery, 5 J. Health Econ. 293, 294, 311–12 (1986); Christel A. Woodward, Brian Hutchison, Geoffrey R. Norman, Judy A. Brown & Julia Abelson, What Factors Influence Primary Care Physicians’ Charges for Their Services? An Exploratory Study Using Standardized Patients, 158 Can. Med. Ass’n J. 197, 197 (1998) (“Physicians seeing comparable patients may earn much more or less than their colleagues because of differences in the services they provide and the way they apply the fee schedule. Quality-assurance techniques are likely needed to reduce the variability in charges seen and increase value for money spent in health care.”). In the fear of the dreaded medical malpractice lawsuit, providers have an incentive to cover their bases and test for everything, no matter the cost.8Gawande, supra note 6. Even insurance companies, which foot the providers’ bills, stand to gain from exaggerated costs.9Marshall Allen, Why Your Health Insurer Doesn’t Care About Your Big Bills, NPR (May 25, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/05/25/613685732/why-your-health-insurer-doesnt-care-about-your-big-bills [https://perma.cc/5D3J-BHE3]. Unlike insurance companies in other sectors, which derive profit by spending as little of policyholders’ premiums as possible, health insurance companies have incentives to maximize their spending because regulations cap their profits at a certain percentage of their expenditures.10Id.; see also Sarah Kliff & Josh Katz, Hospitals and Insurers Didn’t Want You to See These Prices. Here’s Why., N.Y. Times (Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2021/08/22/upshot/hospital-prices.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20230206220545/https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2021/08/22/upshot/hospital-prices.html]. See generally Michael J. McCue & Mark A. Hall, Insurers’ Responses to Regulation of Medical Loss Ratios, Commonwealth Fund 1 (2012), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/14212/14212.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TAY-39PZ] (explaining the ACA’s creation of medical loss ratios that specify a percentage of insurance premium dollars that insurance companies must spend on care as opposed to retain for profit).
Essentially, insurers earn more when they spend as much of their beneficiaries’ premiums as possible.11Allen, supra note 9. In what is perhaps the most perplexing market failure of them all, individuals continue to pay the rising premiums, copays, coinsurance, and taxes that feed the hungry, hungry healthcare hippo.12Reed Abelson, Workers with Health Insurance Face Rising Out-of-Pocket Costs, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/health/health-insurance-premiums-deductibles.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20221209090035/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/health/health-insurance-premiums-deductibles.html]. Yet, the pricing problem snuck up on no one—the rubbery, rotund river beast of a healthcare system has slowly barreled through America’s regulatory swamp for a century as landlocked policymakers repeatedly tried and failed to halt its growth by trying different reimbursement models, competition enhancements, and delivery programs.13See generally Terree P. Wasley, Health Care in the Twentieth Century: A History of Government Interference and Protection, 28 Bus. Econ. 11 (1993) (tracing the historical development of the law and regulations governing healthcare in the United States).

The most promising opportunity to impose downward cost pressure on the healthcare system came in 2010 with the advent of the Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”) concept as part of the Patient Prevention and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).14See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395–99 (2010). ACOs are networks of healthcare providers that coordinate care, integrate finance and delivery, and share in financial gains and losses.15ACO Operational Elements Toolkit, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 3 (May 2021), https://innovation.cms.gov/media/document/aco-operational-elements-toolkit [https://perma.cc/L3BF-YAQ2]. A primary goal of the ACO is to achieve a more cost-efficient system that incentivizes preventive care and integrated treatment while limiting incentives to drive up costs.16Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Dec. 1, 2021, 8:00 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO [https://
perma.cc/BZ7R-5VP7].
While they come in many forms, ACOs often accomplish cost savings by allocating a set amount of money to providers for each patient they treat, known as capitated payments, thereby exposing providers to the risk of outspending that amount if they do not keep costs down.17Tianna Tu, David Muhlestein, S. Lawrence Kocot & Ross White, The Impact of Accountable Care: Origins and Future of Accountable Care Organizations, Brookings 3 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/impact-of-accountable-careorigins-052015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV2H-QR43]. In essence, ACOs are financially accountable for the care of a particular population.18Id.

ACOs remain a largely underdeveloped concept with as-yet-unsolved complications.19See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 21–22 (2014). For instance, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (“CMMI”) pilots a wide variety of ACO models, ranging from “one-way risk” models with no downside and modest upside to “two-way risk” models with varying levels of risk and reward.20Medicare Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425.600 (2011); see also Anne M. Lockner, INSIGHT: The Healthcare Industry’s Shift from Fee-for-Service to Value-Based Reimbursement, Bloomberg Law (Sept. 26, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insight-the-healthcare-industrys-shift-from-fee-for-service-to-value-based-reimbursement [https://perma.cc/Y55Z-9PGC]. Providers are free to choose how much risk of cost overruns they would like to take on, and they get to keep a proportionate amount of any cost savings.21J. Michael McWilliams & Alice Chen, Understanding the Latest ACO “Savings”: Curb Your Enthusiasm and Sharpen Your Pencils—Part 1, USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Pol’y (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/
2020/11/12/understanding-the-latest-aco-savings-curb-your-enthusiasm-and-sharpen-your-pencils-part-1 [https://perma.cc/2528-E6JV].
For example, one ACO may choose a one-way risk model with a 0% risk of losing money and a 3% share of cost savings, whereas another ACO may choose a two-way risk model that exposes it to a 10% risk of any cost overruns but entitles it to 30% of any cost savings.22See id. Naturally, the more risk a provider faces, the greater the incentive to cut costs.23Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): General Information, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (June 4, 2021), https://innovation.cms.gov/innovation-models/aco [https://perma.cc/
R9EM-3N23].
The prospect of a greater reward has not proven persuasive for ACOs to adopt riskier models, however, and all but the least risky models have struggled to attract provider participation.24Tu et al., supra note 17, at 4; see also Highlights of the 2020 Medicare ACO Program
Results, Nat’l Ass’n ACOs (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.naacos.com/assets/docs/pdf/2021/
NAACOS2020ACOResult%20Summary110321.pdf [https://perma.cc/94SY-MUZR].
Moreover, ACOs fail to address the demand-side concern of consumers’ continued payment for health insurance despite increases in rates—a phenomenon known as the price inelasticity of health insurance premiums.25Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 23. Equally alarming among these concerns is the antitrust component.26Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 20, 2011). In an environment in which providers are already consolidating, ACOs stand to exacerbate a shrinking market and empower consolidated provider networks to wield unmatched pricing power.27Greaney, supra note 19, at 19.

Despite the promise of new models, the healthcare system remains in a precarious position. The ACA has been left on unstable footing following the repeal of the individual mandate tax penalty in 201728Margot Sanger-Katz, Requiem for the Individual Mandate, N.Y. Times (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandate-end-impact.html [https://
web.archive.org/web/20230215204722/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandate-end-impact.html?searchResultPosition=1].
and efforts to either fully repeal or replace the law altogether.29Sahil Kapur, Trump Revives Push to Eliminate Obamacare, Sparking Biden Campaign Blowback, NBC News (Nov. 29, 2023, 9:05 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/
trump-revives-push-eliminate-obamacare-sparking-biden-campaign-pushbac-rcna126768 [https://perma.cc/
X57N-E7ZE].
Meanwhile, insurance premiums have continued to rise.30See, e.g., Leroy Leo & Khushi Mandowara, US Employers to See Biggest Healthcare Cost Jump in a Decade in 2024, Reuters (Sept. 21, 2023, 9:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-employers-see-biggest-healthcare-cost-jump-decade-2024-2023-09-20 [https://web.archive.org/web/
r20231103005554/https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-employers-see-biggest-healthcare-cost-jump-decade-2024-2023-09-20/]; Employer Health Benefits: 2021 Summary of Findings, Kaiser Fam. Found. 1 (Nov. 10, 2021), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Summary-of-Findings-Employer-Health-Benefits-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3DV-LU6H].

This Note proposes a novel framework from which to develop pilot programs for future healthcare regulations and legislation. In doing so, this Note will identify certain regulatory factors that contribute to, or at least fail to stop, the upward march of healthcare prices, and propose a novel alternative model that delivers on the three pillars of healthcare: broad access, low cost, and high quality.31Donald M. Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 Health Affs. 759, 760 (2008). Here, access refers to both access to coverage of costs and access to care. Quality refers to both the breadth of covered benefits and health outcomes.

This Note takes a law and economics approach to healthcare, focusing on the information asymmetry, moral hazards, principal-agent problems, adverse selection, and misaligned incentives that contribute to healthcare’s current market failures.32See Mwachofi & Al-Assaf, supra note 2, at 330–34. To solve these problems, this Note prescribes a new outcomes-based model that aligns the incentives of patients and providers by tying provider funding to certain health indicators. The proposed healthcare model, titled the Healthcure System, achieves universal coverage through regional healthcare districts that draw on the funding model of employer-based insurance, the cost-cutting features of ACOs, the monopoly regulation of public utilities, the accountability of special districts, the mixed public and private partnership of government-sponsored enterprises, and the structure of the corporate form. Under this approach, regional healthcare districts replace private insurance companies, and the districts offer universal coverage to all within the region in return for a direct healthcare tax. The districts pay providers in a capitated payment model, similar to paying a lump sum for each patient, instead of the fee-for-service model that pays per service rendered. The outcomes-based component consists of back-end, per-event incentive payments—which reward providers for each successful treatment—and additional payments that resemble dividends based on the overall health of the region. Providers get additional funding through government adjustment payments if they operate in underserved communities. The result is a synthesis of burgeoning knowledge on finance and governance in healthcare law and economics into the first model of its kind.

This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I traces the development of healthcare regulations from their inception in the early twentieth century and outlines the corresponding rise in healthcare costs. Part II discusses the various economic concepts and challenges that underlie the increase in costs. Part III explains how the Healthcure System achieves access by establishing universal coverage risk pools based on region and price elasticity by reducing individual healthcare expenditures to one income-based payment. Part IV describes the model’s downward price pressures through a new governance model that combines integrated finance and delivery with public electoral accountability. Part V explores how the Healthcure System enhances quality by aligning the incentives of patients and providers through a capitation and incentive payment model. Part VI considers the legal path and obstacles facing the implementation of the Healthcure System before concluding the Note.

I.  BACKGROUND

Healthcare was once an unregulated and uninsured marketplace consisting of independent doctors making house calls in exchange for modest out-of-pocket fees.33George B. Moseley III, The U.S. Health Care Non-System, 1908-2008, 10 AMA J. Ethics 324, 324 (2008). The low cost of this relatively unsophisticated care sustained a functioning market until the early 1900s, when a combination of increasingly complex medical care, growing demand, and rising quality standards led to a surge in the average family’s medical expenses.34Id.

An early insurance market grew organically out of a need to spread out costs and risks by making regular payments to guarantee access to care without financial barrier when it was needed.35Id. at 325. As insurers increasingly became intermediary payers between patients and healthcare providers, a “cost plus” reimbursement methodology emerged that paid doctors whatever “reasonable and customary charges” they set and covered hospital costs plus an additional negotiated rate payment.36Id. at 326. The cost plus model supercharged the already-upward trend in healthcare costs by creating incentives to treat more and charge more.37Wasley, supra note 13, at 12.

The 1940s saw the addition of employers as an integral layer to the increasingly complicated healthcare funding landscape. Amid World War II’s labor shortage and inflation, Congress enacted the Stabilization Act in 1942 to place limits on wage increases, but it carved out an exception that allowed employers to offer fringe benefits like health insurance up to the value of five percent of wages.38Stabilization Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-729, 56 Stat. 765 (codified in 50a U.S.C. § 961 (repealed 1980)); Wasley, supra note 13, at 12; Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance, Monthly Lab. Rev. (Mar.) 3, 6 (1994). In 1951, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) adopted a rule making employer-paid insurance premiums a tax-deductible business expense.39Laxmaiah Manchikanti, Standiford Helm II, Ramsin M. Benyamin & Joshua A. Hirsch, Evolution of US Health Care Reform, 20 Pain Physician 107, 108 (2017). Health insurance thus became a form of tax-free compensation that employers could offer their employees.40Committee on Employment-Based Health Benefits, Institute of Medicine, Employment and Health Benefits: A Connection at Risk 70–71 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993). Once private health insurers instituted provisions requiring that a substantial majority of employees participate in the employer-sponsored plan, insurers had a risk pool of working-age adults that avoided disproportionate inclusion of higher-risk individuals who tend to consume more in medical expenses, such as those in the general population who are too old or ill to work.41Id. at 67. Using the employee risk pool as a guide, insurers then set a standardized premium rate for all participants, regardless of participants’ individual health histories, under what is known as “community rating.”42Id. at 42, 74. Essentially, an employee with a clean bill of health paid the same premium as an employee who previously battled cancer. At the same time, labor unions negotiated rapidly increased employer-paid percentages of insurance premiums, achieving 100% coverage at some of the largest automobile manufacturers by 1961.43Wasley, supra note 13, at 13; Barry R. Furrow, Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Robert L. Schwartz, Brietta R. Clark, Erin C. Fuse Brown, Robert Gatter, Jaime S. King & Elizabeth Pendo, Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems 490 (8th ed. 2018). In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) further solidified employer-provided healthcare by creating a nationally uniform regulatory scheme for multistate employers, imposing fiduciary duties on employer health plans, and providing beneficiaries with a positive right to sue for recovery of denied benefits.44Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in 29 U.S.C. ch. 18 § 1001–1461); Furrow et al., supra note 43, at 423.

The rise in healthcare costs significantly impacted two populations that tend to lack employer-based health insurance: the elderly and the poor. Congress responded with the Social Security Amendments of 1965 that established the Medicare and Medicaid programs, a pair of national insurance programs that positioned the federal government as the single largest third-party payer in healthcare.45Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 70 Stat. 286 (amended 42 U.S.C. ch. 7); Wasley, supra note 13, at 13. Despite its outsize role in the industry, the federal government initially made no changes to the healthcare business model and adopted the same cost plus reimbursement model that had driven up costs in the private insurance industry.46Wasley, supra note 13, at 14.

Lawmakers have struggled to reign in the cost of the healthcare fee-for-service model since the 1970s, when they sought to incentivize adoption of the health maintenance organization (“HMO”) model that had been pioneered by the Ross-Loos Medical Group and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan.47Moseley, supra note 33, at 327. The HMO is the archetypal organizational form of coordinated care in which a network of providers deliver a comprehensive benefit package for a fixed premium.48Nancy De Lew, George Greenberg & Kraig Kinchen, A Layman’s Guide to the U.S. Health Care System, 14 Health Care Fin. Rev. 151, 156 (1992). The primary advantage of HMOs is the integration of finance and delivery of healthcare within the defined network of providers who cut down on costs by managing utilization and provider payments.49Id. A key component of the HMO model is “managed care,” which comprises of “gatekeeping, capitation reimbursement, utilization review, clinical practice guidelines, and selective physician contracting.”50Moseley, supra note 33, at 328. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 encouraged adoption of HMOs by funding the expansion of HMOs and requiring large employers to offer an HMO benefit option in addition to fee-for-service plans.51Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified in 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A § 300e); Moseley, supra note 33, at 327. Despite HMOs’ success at cutting costs, concerns over provider incentives to reduce access to services or diminish patient control ultimately led to the downfall of most HMOs and a return to healthcare cost inflation within two decades.52Tu et al., supra note 17, at 2; Moseley, supra note 33, at 327.

The nature of healthcare evolved in the mid-twentieth century as policyholders sought coverage of medical expenses beyond hospital visits and catastrophic illness. Insurers implemented new forms of sharing the increased costs of new “major medical” coverage with individuals through deductibles, an annual dollar amount that a policyholder must pay before insurance begins covering costs, and co-payments, a share of healthcare service costs paid by policyholders each time they use a service.53Beatrix Hoffman, Restraining the Health Care Consumer: The History of Deductibles and Co-Payments in U.S. Health Insurance, 30 Soc. Sci. Hist. 501, 504 (2006). On paper, insurers had strong reasons for implementing cost sharing in healthcare. As individuals took on more of their healthcare costs, insurers could not only offset some of their expenditures, but also adjust their offerings with lower premiums or higher annual coverage limits.54Id. Cost-sharing measures also looked to solve the “moral hazard” problem that arises when individuals seek medical care that they may not need because they do not bear any of the cost.55Id. at 505–06. Once individuals had to pay each time they visited a doctor or got an X-ray, they would “think twice” and presumably seek fewer services.56Id. at 506.

Healthcare coverage reached an inflection point in the 1980s, at which point the rapid growth in access to health insurance and care began to move in the opposite direction. Employer-sponsored health coverage reached its peak in 1980, when it covered 79.4% of the U.S. population under sixty-five.57National Health Interview Survey: Long-Term Trends in Health Insurance Coverage, Nat. Ctr. Health Stats. 1 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/health_insurance/TrendHealth
Insurance1968_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP75-4ABH].
By 2018, employer-sponsored coverage of the same population had fallen to 58.1%.58Id. at 2. As fewer employers offered insurance, access to private plans did not grow to cover the difference—the rate of uninsured grew from 12% in 1980 to 18.2% in 2010, with the majority of the growth occurring in Medicare and Medicaid enrollment.59Id. at 1–2. Medicaid enrollment grew from 8% in 1980 to 16.9% in 2010, and Medicare enrollment grew from 1.8% in 1980 to 2.3% in 2010. Note, however, that these figures account for the population of individuals under sixty-five, and they do not include Medicare’s primary enrollment population of those sixty-five and older. Id.

Regulators saw an opportunity to cut healthcare costs with market-based interventions that realign competition across the industry. In the early 1990s, President Clinton introduced the Health Security Act that built on economist Alain Enthoven’s concept of managed competition.60Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan, 14 Health Affs. 66, 69 (1995). Under managed competition, sponsor agencies or “alliances” (such as employers, Medicare, or Medicaid) act as referees between the competing health plans available to the sponsors’ members, determining benefits, prices, enrollment, and more.61Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12 Health Affs. 24, 30–31 (supp. 1993). Sponsors focus competition on the price of annual premiums rather than individual services, with the goal of creating price-elastic demand.62Id. at 32. Price-elastic demand occurs when individuals reduce demand as prices go up, and this incentivizes sellers to keep prices as low as possible.63Id. Naturally, regulators try to avoid price inelasticity, which occurs when a seller can increase prices without reducing demand.64Id. Managed competition also pursues cost cutting by dividing providers into competing economic units and imposing market forces to compel them to become efficient delivery systems.65Id. at 29. While President Clinton’s proposal would have introduced the American healthcare system to a new phase of managed care, the bill failed, and it would be another sixteen years before Congress would pass large-scale healthcare reform.66Robert J. Blendon, Mollyann Brodie & John Benson, What Happened to Americans’ Support for the Clinton Health Plan?, 14 Health Affs. 7, 8 (1995); Skocpol, supra note 60, at 71.

When President Obama signed the ACA in 2010, it represented the most significant healthcare reform package since President Johnson’s Great Society gave Americans Medicare and Medicaid.67Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395–99 (2010); see also Furrow et al., supra note 43, at 533. Rather than deconstructing the healthcare system to cut costs as President Clinton had attempted to do a generation prior, the ACA primarily focused on increasing access to health insurance and improving the quality of health benefits. The ACA created a new marketplace for health insurance plans that aimed to streamline the insurance purchase process and required that plans offer ten essential health benefits to all who sign up.68Summary of the Affordable Care Act, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.
kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/2HPE-DY2H].

The ACA took a carrot and stick approach to expanding health coverage in what is known as the “three-legged stool.”69Furrow et al., supra note 43, at 536. The first leg required insurance companies to adopt community rating with guaranteed issue of ten essential health benefits for all who seek coverage.70Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 68. Those who did not buy into the health insurance market, either through the marketplace or another avenue such as an employer, were subject to the second leg: a tax penalty known as the “individual mandate.”71Id. Many who signed up, however, enjoyed tax credits—the third leg—to help cover their premiums and cost sharing, such as co-pays, deductibles, and coinsurance.72Id. As a result, twenty million individuals gained health insurance in its first five years.73Bowen Garrett & Anuj Gangopadhyaya, Who Gained Health Insurance Coverage Under
the ACA, and Where Do They Live?, Urb. Inst. (Dec. 2016), https://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/publication/86761/2001041-who-gained-health-insurance-coverage-under-the-aca-and-where-do-they-live.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PVS-4Q5H].

More than any other aspect of the ACA, the individual mandate faced intense legal and political scrutiny. An array of court battles culminated in NFIB v. Sebelius, a 2012 Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate.74Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that although the individual mandate fails as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, “it is reasonable to construe what Congress has done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without health insurance. Such legislation is within Congress’s power to tax.”75Id. at 588. Constitutionality was not enough to save the individual mandate, however, and Congress repealed the tax penalty in 2017.76Robert Pear, Without the Insurance Mandate, Health Care’s Future May Be in Doubt, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/politics/tax-cut-obamacare-individual-mandate-repeal.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20221116231255/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
12/18/us/politics/tax-cut-obamacare-individual-mandate-repeal.html]; Sanger-Katz, supra note 28.
The ACA itself came just one Senate vote short of repeal,77Robert Pear, Thomas Kaplan & Emily Cochrane, Health Care Debate: Obamacare Repeal Fails as McCain Casts Decisive No Vote, N.Y. Times (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/27/us/politics/senate-health-care-vote.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20221108212744/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/senate-health-care-vote.html%5D.
and there remain efforts to replace it.78Kapur, supra note 29.

II.  ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN HEALTHCARE: FROM ACOS TO HEALTHCARE DISTRICTS

A.  Diagnosing Healthcare’s Market Failures

Healthcare represents not only a lifeline for individuals, but also for the American economy.79U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. Off. Assistant Sec’y Plan & Evaluation, The Effect of Health Care Cost Growth on the U.S. Economy (2007), https://aspe.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/private/pdf/75441/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ST8-4NGJ].
In 1960, healthcare expenditures accounted for 5% of the nation’s gross domestic product (“GDP”).80Ryan Nunn, Jana Parsons & Jay Shambaugh, A Dozen Facts About the Economics of the U.S. Health-Care System, Brookings (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-dozen-facts-about-the-economics-of-the-u-s-health-care-system [https://perma.cc/TS5P-6LRX]. By 2022, that figure had risen to 17.3%.81NHE Fact Sheet, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Dec. 12, 2023, 4:13 PM), https://
http://www.cms.gov/data-research/statistics-trends-and-reports/national-health-expenditure-data/nhe-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/SY28-FL4D].
Some of the increase can be attributed to positive developments in care and coverage. But economists point out that healthcare spending also results from fundamental problems in the healthcare market. In an efficient healthcare market, rational and fully informed individuals could purchase healthcare services they need from fair, perfectly competing sellers.82See, e.g., Mwachofi & Al-Assaf, supra note 2, at 330–34. Healthcare resources could be allocated efficiently in a world in which people can shop around for healthcare, with the full scope of information on the prices and quality of each provider’s services, and the ability to then pay for those services directly. As Americans learned in the early-twentieth century, when complex healthcare emerged and insurance developed to pay for it, such a world is a fiction. The healthcare system that resulted was one fraught with market failures that have driven costs upward, and healthcare reform to this point has failed to stem the tide.

For many, the loss of the individual mandate spelled the end of the ACA.83Avik Roy, Want to See a Health Insurance Death Spiral? Visit Washington State, Forbes (Mar. 30, 2012, 11:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/03/30/want-to-see-a-health-insurance-death-spiral-visit-washington-state/?sh=6efc68785d09 [https://perma.cc/VRJ9-M8X5]. Contra Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, Is a Death Spiral Inevitable if There Is No Mandate?, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Jun. 19, 2012), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/perspective/is-a-death-spiral-inevitable-if-there-is-no-mandate [https://perma.cc/V3NL-GU62]. In theory, the less-risky population of younger, healthier individuals could pull themselves out of risk pools and skip health insurance in a phenomenon that economists call “adverse selection.” With risk pools more heavily concentrated with older and sicker individuals, as the theory goes, prices would increase.84David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, in 1 Frontiers in Health Policy Research 1 (Alan M. Garber, ed., 1998), https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c9822/c9822.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK6H-MGSP]. Increased prices would lead more people to withdraw from the health insurance market, and the so-called “adverse selection death spiral” would lead to a collapse of the market altogether. It turns out that one of healthcare’s greatest problems is what has propped up the system post-mandate: price inelasticity.

Healthcare suffers from price inelasticity because when healthcare costs go up, individuals do not drop insurance coverage, they just drop going to the doctor. By 2010, the uninsured non-elderly population reached its peak at 17.8% before the passage of the ACA.85Jennifer Tolbert, Patrick Drake & Anthony Damico, Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Dec. 19, 2022), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https://perma.cc/29SR-KYRC]. The law’s drafters understandably made it a priority to bring the number of uninsured down, and on that front the law has been largely successful to date.86See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. In 2018, the uninsured rate dropped to 11%,87Tolbert et al., supra note 85. and by 2022 the non-elderly uninsured rate reached 9.6%, the lowest level on record.88Jennifer Tolbert, Patrick Drake & Anthony Damico, Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Dec. 18, 2023), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https://perma.cc/EG4X-8UNE].

Yet, increased coverage did not spell increased access to care. One survey found that in 2001, 19% of adults reported putting off needed care due to costs, but even with the passage of the ACA, by 2022, that figure had risen to 38%.89Megan Brenan, Record High in U.S. Put Off Medical Care Due to Cost in 2022, Gallup (Jan. 17, 2023), https://news.gallup.com/poll/468053/record-high-put-off-medical-care-due-cost-2022.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y29D-LQE2]. Another survey reported that 40% of Americans skipped a recommended medical test or treatment due to cost, and 40% of Americans have cited cost as the reason for going without routine physicals or other preventive care.90Americans’ Views on Healthcare Costs, Coverage and Policy, NORC U. Chi. 5 (2018), https://www.norc.org/PDFs/WHI%20Healthcare%20Costs%20Coverage%20and%20Policy/WHI%20Healthcare%20Costs%20Coverage%20and%20Policy%20Topline.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HUF-V3Y6].

Not all insurance plans are the same, and the differing approaches to cost sharing exposes the disparity in access to care across the healthcare system and the problems that arise from a lack of reliable pricing information. Cost sharing comes in various forms, including percentages of medical service costs or fixed rates set by insurance companies according to a particular service, such as $20 for a physician visit or $150 for a hospital stay. Alternatively, one might pay $150 or 20% for a hospital stay, depending on the type of plan one has. The disparity in insurance can be seen in the enrollment trends in the ACA insurance marketplace, in which the middle “silver” tier has seen declines in enrollment, the “gold” tier has seen modest gains, and the lowest “bronze” tier has seen significant increases.91Dan Grunebaum, Affordable Care Act Enrollment by State and Metal, Health Care Insider (Sept. 9, 2021), https://healthcareinsider.com/affordable-care-act-enrollment-by-state-and-metal-364584 [https://perma.cc/F752-FPY6]. Whereas set rates, rather than percentages, for healthcare services shields individuals from unexpected costs, it simultaneously hides the complex and mysterious world of medical billing.

The key takeaway is this: price elasticity of demand occurs in the provision of healthcare services, rather than in the provision of insurance coverage.92Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is so Different from Other Countries, 22 Health Affs. 89, 100 (2003). More Americans than ever have health insurance, but a great deal of those with coverage forgo the added out-of-pocket costs that come with seeking healthcare services.93Commonwealth Fund, supra note 89. And while that reduced demand for services might compel providers to reduce prices in an efficient market, they have made up the difference by continuing to increase prices and extracting more money per service for those who do seek treatment.94Anderson et al., supra note 92, at 102. Individuals with reduced cost sharing, such as set rates for services, face a reduced barrier to services and do not encounter the prices that keep others away.

Because individuals are not the only payers in the health insurance market, price elasticity could ostensibly come from insurers or employers. In theory, employers ought to balk at rising healthcare costs, but economists have suggested that they pass on the additional costs to employees.95Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Spending and American Competitiveness, 8 Health Affs. 5, 8 (1989). In an era of high inflation, employers can pass on healthcare costs easily through smaller nominal wage increases.96Alain C. Enthoven & Victor R. Fuchs, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Past, Present, and Future, 25 Health Affs. 1538, 1546 (2006). Between 2009 and 2019, worker contributions to employer-sponsored premiums rose 59% and employer contributions rose 54%, while employers’ share of the total premium held steady at 73%.97Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 30; Premiums and Worker Contributions Among Workers Covered by Employer-Sponsored Coverage, 1999–2022, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Oct. 27, 2022), https://www.kff.org/interactive/premiums-and-worker-contributions-among-workers-covered-by-employer-sponsored-coverage-1999-2021/#/?compare=true&coverageTypeComp=worker_contribution [https://perma.cc/E2DU-3Z8N]. Employees absorb the increased prices charged by providers in a way that is largely hidden from them—employees cannot readily know how much they would earn in the absence of healthcare cost increases.98Reinhardt, supra note 95, at 20. Evidence suggests the passing of these costs to employees, combined with rising wage inequality, “significantly reduced the percentage of compensation.”99Gary Burtless & Sveta Milusheva, Research Summary: Effects of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Costs on Social Security Taxable Wages, 73 Soc. Sec. Bull. 83, 84 (2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n1/v73n1p83.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF4T-TNFD]. If providers can increase prices that individuals will ultimately bear, without some other market basis like a proportionate loss in demand or increase in value, the provider gets away with earning what economists call “rents,” or excess prices beyond the minimum price a seller would otherwise be paid in the market.100Anderson et al., supra note 92, at 102. Not only is this harmful to individuals, in that it represents an inefficient allocation of resources, rent-seeking behavior evinces a level of monopolistic power by providers in the market.101Id. Were prices elastic, the number of insured individuals would decrease as prices rose. Over that same period, however, more people have gained insurance.102Kenneth Finegold, Ann Conmy, Rose C. Chu, Arielle Bosworth & Benjamin D. Sommers, Trends in the U.S. Uninsured Population, 2010–2020, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. (Feb. 11, 2021), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/private/pdf/265041/trends-in-the-us-uninsured.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5HY7-QBYN].
While the growth in healthcare coverage is a positive development, it represents a worrying trend when paired with increased prices. The brakes that traditionally keep prices low—the threat of losing paying customers once prices exceed what they are willing to pay—either do not exist or have not been reached.

With market failures taking out downward cost pressures from individuals and employers, insurers stand as the apparent last line of defense against rising healthcare costs. The traditional insurance business model incentivizes cost efficiency—policyholders pay insurers set premiums, and insurers have the incentive to pay as little of those premiums out as reimbursement for services in order to retain the greatest possible profit margin. The ACA turned this model on its head when it mandated a “medical loss ratio”—a requirement that insurance companies spend 80–85% of premium dollars on medical care-related expenses, thereby tying the amount they get to keep (including profits) to a percentage of care dollars spent.103McCue & Hall, supra note 10.

The healthcare marketplace insulates individuals from many of the direct costs of healthcare, and the lack of robust price competition for insurance means that insurers may continue to raise premiums to accommodate the high healthcare prices that net them greater profits.104Allen, supra note 9; Kliff & Katz, supra note 10. Insurers can take advantage of market failures to pursue the perverse incentives of a medical loss ratio policy that was meant to decrease costs but instead incentivizes them to spend as much as they can.105See, e.g., Iván Major, Two-Sided Information Asymmetry in the Healthcare Industry, 25 Int’l Advances Econ. Rsch. 177, 191–92 (2019), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11294-019-09732-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M3F-ES4U]. Furthermore, insurers have an additional incentive to keep costs as high as their premiums can bear because high prices set a high barrier to entry for other potential competing insurers.106Robert A. Berenson, Jaime S. King, Katherine L. Gudiksen, Roslyn Murray & Adele Shartzer, Addressing Health Care Market Consolidation and High Prices: The Role of the States, Urb. Inst. 2 (Jan. 2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101508/addressing_health_care_
market_consolidation_and_high_prices_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ44-4H7K].
These incentives expose the pitfalls of cost-based regulations instead of incentive-based ones, as proposed here.107Major, supra note 105, at 178.

Insurers cannot overpay for services if they are not charged such high prices in the first place. Whereas cost sharing effectively curbed the threat of moral hazard when individuals seek out more medical services than they need because they do not bear the cost, another moral hazard problem arose in the form of provider billing and overtreatment.

The cost-sharing measures implemented by insurers essentially traded one moral hazard problem for another. Insurers overcorrected the moral hazard problem by disincentivizing individuals from seeking treatment, instead incentivizing doctors to overtreat those that do come in.108See Cromwell & Mitchell, supra note 7. In its worst incarnation, physician-induced demand can rack up healthcare expenses when patients do not know any better, and insurers put few, if any, brakes on unnecessary charges.109E.M. Johnson, Physician-Induced Demand, 3 Encyc. Health Econ. 77, 80 (2014), https://www.mit.edu/~erinmj/files/PID.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2WG-EHJC]. A major factor that has enabled healthcare providers to charge ever-higher prices is the lack of transparency around the prices of services between patients, insurers, and even providers.110Oswald A.J. Mascarenhas, Ram Kesavan & Michael D Bernacchi, On Reducing Information Asymmetry in U.S. Health Care, 30 Health Mktg. Q. 379, 380 (2013).

One contributor to healthcare’s price inelasticity is the varying difficulty that consumers, providers, employers, and insurers have with understanding the price of healthcare services, or what economists call “information asymmetry.” Throughout healthcare, there are discrepancies in the amount of information available to transacting parties.111Id. at 382. For instance, doctors typically have more information about the care they can provide than patients. Similarly, healthcare providers generally have more information about the costs of their services than insurers. The discrepancies in information create inefficiencies that drive up costs. When patients seek healthcare services, they likely do not know the cost of the services beforehand.112Id. at 384–85. Depending on their insurance plan, patients can either anticipate paying their insurance plan’s set rate co-pays or face the surprise bill for a percentage of the services they incurred. Information asymmetry gives rise to a principal-agent problem, in which the physician-agent has incentives to use the information asymmetry for the physician’s financial benefit.113Id.

A primary culprit of increased healthcare prices is the mysterious and unscientific hospital “chargemaster” system. Chargemasters are automated systems traditionally employed by large healthcare providers such as hospitals to set price markups and generate the sticker prices for their various services.114Brill, supra note 1. Few, if any, in the hospital administration are involved with the setting of the prices, and even doctors generally are not informed of the prices of the services they perform.115Id. Here, a type of information asymmetry even occurs within providers. Yet, chargemasters set the baseline price from which insurance companies negotiate down to a level the insurer is willing to pay. Those with less bargaining power, such as uninsured individuals, may face the full chargemaster price without the assistance of medical billing consultants to negotiate on their behalf. The result often leads to newsworthy charges such as 675% price hikes.116David Lazarus, Column: Leaked SoCal Hospital Records Reveal Huge, Automated Markups for Healthcare, L.A. Times (Dec. 10, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-12-10/column-healthcare-billing-markups [https://perma.cc/527D-D5ZA].

Providers capitalize on information asymmetry by using chargemasters to extract the highest possible prices, and they have few disincentives to do otherwise. As discussed earlier, many patients never see their medical bills aside from standardized, insurer-set co-pays. One might reasonably expect the other payers in the healthcare system—employers and insurers—to thus bear the sensitivity to providers’ exorbitant costs and apply downward price pressures. Unfortunately, the confluence of healthcare’s market failures renders those pressures toothless.

Efforts over the past decade to improve price transparency will not likely affect individuals’ healthcare decision-making process in a significant enough way because patients are not the ones making many of the decisions about their care.117Sherry Glied, Price Transparency—Promise and Peril, 325 JAMA 1496, 1496–97 (2021). Revealing chargemaster prices, for instance, likely matters more to insurers and employers, as well as smaller hospitals that seek to charge comparable prices to larger competitors, than it would to consumers.118Julie Appleby, Hospitals Forced to Be More Transparent About Pricing. Will That Save You Money?, NPR (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/01/05/
953340571/hospitals-forced-to-be-more-transparent-about-pricing-will-that-save-you-money [https://
perma.cc/4AQP-PTNK].

The goals of universal access, low cost, and high quality can be achieved with a model that addresses the information asymmetry, principal-agent problem, misaligned incentives, adverse selection, poor competition, price inelasticity, and antitrust concerns that plague healthcare today.

B.  Finding a Cure in Accountability

Enter the Healthcure System, an entirely new healthcare model proposed by this Note that adapts the best features of ACOs, incentive payment models, and employer-provided health plans while abandoning fee-for-service cost plus payments, private health insurers, complexity of multiple payment sources, incentives for providers to overtreat, and the power of providers to increase prices by consolidating and reducing competition.

Historically, healthcare reform has consisted of attempts to achieve two of the three pillars: cost, quality, and access. The ideal healthcare system keeps costs low for individuals and providers (whether someone can afford their healthcare costs and whether providers reign in the costs of their services), maintains high quality by making available a breadth of healthcare benefits with strong outcomes (whether a particular ailment is covered and whether a treatment has a high likelihood of success), and ensures that the greatest possible population has access to care and coverage of costs (whether most are able to easily visit a doctor or hospital and will they have a means of paying for their treatment). Medicare focused on cost and access by providing insurance to all who reach a certain age, but it has historically lacked important quality indicators such as coverage of prescriptions, dental, vision, long-term care, and nursing home care.119Furrow et al., supra note 43, at 17; What Isn’t Covered by Part A & Part B?, Medicare, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/what-isnt-covered-by-part-a-part-b [https://perma.cc/
XT6H-ZWWY].
The proposed Clinton health reforms of the 1990s focused on cost and quality by managing competition and guaranteeing benefits, but they did not address a growing number of uninsured.120Skocpol, supra note 60, at 70. The ACA focused on quality and access by guaranteeing ten essential health benefits and expanding access to Medicaid and a private insurance marketplace, but it left intact the payment methods that have driven prices upward.121Berenson, supra note 106, at 1. The Healthcure System rebuts the presumption that no model can achieve all three.

Under the Healthcure System, all residents within a particular region make payments (essentially a healthcare tax) to a healthcare district—a corporate entity that encompasses all of the healthcare providers in the region. Each region would be determined by the state legislature based on population and concentration of providers and should account for the equitable distribution of resources when doing so.122Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 Temp. L. Rev. 49, 74 (2012). The healthcare district coordinates payment and care for residents of the region, employing a front-end per capita payment and back-end incentive payments system that encourages providers to not rack up unnecessary costs but still have an incentive to provide cost-effective quality care. Healthcare districts largely take the place of private health insurers and employer-paid plans, instead centralizing each individual’s healthcare costs into one monthly income-based payment. Each healthcare district’s board of directors sets this progressive healthcare tax rate for the region, and if that percentage exceeds what residents are willing to pay, individuals may vote out the directors during staggered biennial elections or, if feasible, avoid living in the district.

This Note makes some acknowledgments from the start. First, healthcare delivery is inherently local—patients are realistically constrained to choosing providers near them, and healthcare costs are significantly influenced by local factors. Rather than share the struggles Medicare has had with accounting for regional differentiation in markets for medical services, products, and employment when calculating reimbursement, each healthcare district only concerns itself with negotiating local pricing with local providers for local beneficiaries. Districts are therefore organized around a large enough population to distribute risk in a risk pool while also encompassing the entirety of a local market (that is, all of the providers that would compete with one another for individuals in the region). In densely populated states, there may be healthcare districts proportionate to the number of counties, but in more rural areas, districts could theoretically be the size of a state. Second, provider consolidation is inevitable and comes with benefits despite its drawbacks. The upside of a fully functional ACO is the imposition of cost sensitivity on the providers who are responsible for the decision-making behind those costs. Providers would need to evaluate, for instance, whether to use an expensive treatment based on its likelihood of success, rather than indiscriminately prescribing costly remedies, because they can no longer rely on a third-party payer to just foot the bill. Such integration of finance and delivery can act as a powerful downward cost pressure that can alleviate the current upward incentives to overtreat and overprice. Although consolidation also breeds upward price pressures in the form of reducing competition, Healthcure makes use of other downward cost pressures such as regional competition, price elasticity, public accountability, and a market for supplemental benefits to counterbalance antitrust pricing concerns. Third, incentive payments must account for both event-specific outcomes (rewarding providers when a particular treatment works, for example) and community outcomes (rewarding providers for overall health gains in a region) in order to fully align the incentives of payments and providers.

III.  ACCESS: ADOPTING A REGIONAL FOCUS TO DELIVER EMPLOYER-STYLE UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

In a sense, access is the ultimate aim of healthcare reform: it encompasses both cost and quality to a certain degree. High cost is often a barrier to access to coverage, and poor-quality coverage often keeps people from access to care. Any discussion of access in the healthcare system must account for both coverage (as in an individual’s participation in some support system to cover healthcare costs) and care (which accounts for the kinds of healthcare services available to an individual). Both are of major concern in the current United States healthcare system. In early 2023, 7.7% of Americans did not have access to health insurance.123New HHS Report Shows National Uninsured Rate Reached All-Time Low in 2023 After Record-Breaking ACA Enrollment Period, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. (Aug. 3, 2023), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2023/08/03/new-hhs-report-shows-national-uninsured-rate-reached-all-time-low-2023-after-record-breaking-aca-enrollment-period.html [https://perma.cc/9868-957P]. Furthermore, studies have shown that low-income and marginalized communities see a disproportionate decline in access to care from higher odds of losing healthcare facilities.124See, e.g., Jennifer Tsui, Jana A. Hirsch & Felicia J. Bayer, Patterns in Geographic Access to Health Care Facilities Across Neighborhoods in the United States Based on Data from the National Establishment Time-Series Between 2000 and 2014, JAMA Network Open (May 15, 2020), https://
jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2766043 [https://perma.cc/5TTD-D67M].
Healthcure addresses access by co-opting one of the original drivers of health insurance adoption: employer-sponsored health plans.

As evidenced by the public concerns over whether individuals would be able to keep their insurance plans at the time the ACA was passed,125Jeffrey Young, Senate Passes Historic Healthcare Reform Legislation in 60-39 Vote, Hill (Dec. 24, 2009), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/73537-senate-passes-historic-healthcare-reform-bill-60-40 [https://perma.cc/E2NA-RG72]. such employer plans have achieved a level of ubiquity in American society that any reform that upends the status quo would be well-advised to consider. The Healthcure System shares two key elements with employer-sponsored health plans: community rating and income contributions.

A.  Expanding the Risk Pool from Coworkers to Neighbors: A Regional Approach

Today’s healthcare landscape is filled with geographically mismatched systems and entities. When individuals seek care, they are generally constrained to providers within their immediate vicinity. These individuals may participate in health plans through employers that also provide coverage to employees located in other states. Insurance marketplaces through the ACA, on the other hand, are constrained to markets within each state. Meanwhile, the single largest payer in the country—the Medicare system of the federal government—operates nationwide but uses a litany of processes to account for regional disparities in costs. To put it simply, healthcare is inescapably local, and the first step to crafting an efficient healthcare system is recognizing the value of a regional approach.

At its core, the Healthcure System consists of smaller, regional systems that naturally incorporate the idiosyncrasies of their localities in healthcare finance and delivery. Although healthcare districts do not currently exist as envisioned for the Healthcure System here, the concept of regional healthcare districts is not entirely new. Regional health districts under the Healthcure System trace their roots to a different kind of healthcare district employed by state governments to coordinate healthcare in rural areas.126California’s Healthcare Districts: A Local Choice for California’s Health, Ass’n Cal. Healthcare Dists., https://www.achd.org/achd-message [https://perma.cc/6V85-RS8B]. Funded by either general taxes or special taxes, traditional healthcare districts are local governments that operate healthcare facilities, establish managed care, contract with providers, or take on any other health-related service for a community.127Overview of Health Care Districts, Legis. Analyst’s Off. 1, 1–4 (Apr. 11, 2012), https://lao.ca.gov/handouts/Health/2012/Overview_Health_Care_Districts_4_11_12.pdf [https://perma.
cc/NRU9-6KU5].

Any third-party payer that collects funds from a population to distribute medical services must consider risk. The delicate balance between risk and ratemaking can have significant implications for access if those with higher health risks face significantly higher rates (or exclusion from the market altogether). Such was the consequence of experience rating, a method used by health insurers to determine eligibility and rates based on an assessment of one’s health risks. Insurers engaged in favorable selection, attempting to insure healthier individuals and avoid sicker people. Prior to the ACA, those with certain preexisting conditions would face unaffordable premiums or even exclusion from certain health plans. To avoid locking out those with the most medical need from the insurance system, and thereby exposing them to insurmountable out-of-pocket costs, the ACA banned experience rating in all circumstances except age and tobacco use. To counteract the risk imbalance that would result from removing the experience rating mechanism plans could use to reduce risk, especially on small plans, the ACA promised economies of scale that could accommodate high-risk individuals but spread exposure across a larger risk pool. Insurers had the individual mandate to thank in part for the uptick in larger, healthier risk pools, as it compelled those who might otherwise go without health insurance to do so or face tax penalties.128Matthew Fiedler, How Did the ACA’s Individual Mandate Affect Insurance Coverage? 4–5, 27 (May 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/coverage
effectsofmandate2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6FY-3P99].

While the ACA expanded coverage for those who did not otherwise have access, employer-sponsored health coverage still dominates. Employers cover approximately 50% of the U.S. population.129Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, Kaiser Fam. Found., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0 [https://perma.cc/
UB2H-9VYN].
Of those who have access to employer-sponsored coverage, 77% participate in the employer’s group.130Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 30, at 4. In the mid-twentieth century, employer-sponsored plans drove rapid growth in health coverage, but today they are fraught with drawbacks. Employer plans are responsible for additional complications in the payment structure, buffering individuals from the cost of their care by passing on the costs through reduced wages, shifting compensation from paychecks to health plan contributions, limiting coverage to those employed, and constraining risk pools. Studies have shown that the upward cost pressure problems of employer plans are exacerbated in markets with fewer insurance carriers because carriers take advantage of the lack of competition by negotiating higher premiums, especially with employers experiencing profit shocks.131Leemore S. Dafny, Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 1399, 1426 (2010). Moreover, the costs of researching different plans and transitioning to new ones often keep those in employer plans from switching, thereby reducing competition that could impose downward price pressure.132Kliff & Katz, supra note 10.

Even before it was mandated by the ACA, individuals were exposed to community rating by their employer health plans. Rather than engaging in experience rating, which evaluates risk based on the individual health histories of each ratepayer and charges them accordingly, traditional employer plans distribute risk across a group and charge each member the same rate.133Comm. on Emp.-Based Health Benefits, supra note 40, at 67. Because community rating does not take into account health histories, the primary mechanism by which to manage risk is to achieve scale.134Id. at 42. Employer plans are limited by the group of enrollees at a particular firm.

Given the local limitations of healthcare delivery, the Healthcure System’s answer to risk distribution is to expand it from the silos of individual employers to the very limits of a particular region. The general wisdom is that when allocating risk, the larger the risk pool, the better. Although community rating across organizations provides some semblance of risk distribution, it pales in comparison to the distribution across an entire region at all employers except for the largest of firms. The Healthcure System’s expansion of risk pools enables healthcare districts to enjoy the cost savings of the risk distribution.

B.  Simplifying Beneficiary Healthcare Costs to Induce Price Elasticity and Protect Affordability

The “Affordable” in Affordable Care Act may be the most significant undelivered promise of the law. What the ACA did not address is the complex web of payment sources that underlies the entire system. Whereas insurance premiums are the primary focus of the cost debate, and deservedly so, they do not account for the entirety of an individual’s healthcare expenses.

It is this mixture of cost types that shields individuals from grasping the full scope of their healthcare expenditures and buffers their sensitivity to the exorbitant charges providers make for their services.135Elena Prager, Healthcare Demand Under Simple Prices: Evidence from Tiered Hospital Networks, 12 Am. Econ. J.: Applied Econ. 196, 196–97 (2020); Enthoven, supra note 61, at 30. The Healthcure System narrows each individual’s health expenses to a percentage of one’s income—the starkest representation of one’s ability to pay. The percentage is set by each healthcare district and may be adjusted annually by its board of directors. Income contributions have a low-income threshold—individuals with an income below a certain dollar amount pay nothing, and as one’s income crosses the threshold, the percentage gradually rises up to the base percentage that is broadly applied across the district. All residents in a region have access to the district’s health benefits, regardless of income level. To avoid adverse selection of high earners fleeing from risk pools, a high-income cap places a limit on the dollar amount a family may contribute to the healthcare district’s base benefits. While healthcare districts adopt the ten essential health benefits as defined by the ACA and offer them to all residents, those who wish to supplement their benefits may purchase a supplemental plan on an open market similar to Medigap supplemental coverage for Medicare.136What’s Medicare Supplement Insurance (Medigap)?, Medicare, https://www.medicare.
gov/supplements-other-insurance/whats-medicare-supplement-insurance-medigap [https://perma.cc/
M2FJ-K6LY].

The extent of the current healthcare system’s price inelasticity was tested when Congress repealed the individual mandate. With the flick of President Trump’s pen, those who would otherwise leave the market due to high prices could all of a sudden do just that. However, as healthcare costs continued to rise, enrollment did not precipitously decline.137See Sarah Kliff, Republicans Killed the Obamacare Mandate. New Data Shows It Didn’t Really Matter., N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/upshot/obamacare-mandate-republicans.html [http://web.archive.org/web/20221227134009/https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/18/upshot/obamacare-mandate-republicans.html]; Jeanna Smialek, Sarah Kliff & Alan Rappeport, U.S. Poverty Hit a Record Low Before the Pandemic Recession, N.Y. Times (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/business/economy/poverty-record-low-prior-to-pandemic.html [http://web.archive.org/web/2022113065933/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/business/economy/poverty-record-low-prior-to-pandemic.html]; see also Molly Frean, Jonathan Gruber & Benjamin D. Sommers, Disentangling the ACA’s Coverage Effects—Lessons for Policymakers, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 1605, 1607 (2016).
Even with the loss of the individual mandate, price inelasticity may still rely on the buffer between individuals and their healthcare costs to insulate them from the price sensitivity that might otherwise drive them from the market.

The Healthcure System’s approach to individual payment achieves price sensitivity by wrapping up all healthcare costs into one tax payment that is broadly applied to all residents in the healthcare district. The current mix of individual premiums, employer contributions, co-pays, deductibles, coinsurance, and government tax credits all obscure the cost of healthcare to the individual. However, when all that individuals must consider is a particular tax, their understanding of health expenses gains a clarity with which they can impose downward price pressures.

Downward price pressures on the demand side of the Healthcure System consist of individual choice between healthcare districts and public election of district boards of directors. Instead of imposing cost sharing through co-pays for each medical service rendered, Healthcure incentivizes individuals to consider healthcare tax costs when choosing where to live. If a particular healthcare district sets too high of an income contribution rate for its residents, individuals may choose not to move to that particular district. But moving may not always be feasible or desirable, so those who reside in the district can express their objection to high income percentages by voting out the board of directors and electing a board committed to cutting costs.

Traditional cost sharing does not sufficiently cause individuals to better consider which healthcare services they should seek because they lack the information needed to make that determination and will always lack that information in the absence of the training of a medical professional.138Elise Gould, Uwe Reinhardt on Cost-Sharing, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Nov. 15, 2013, 4:46 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/uwe-reinhardt-cost-sharing [https://perma.cc/QK2K-YDV9]; see also Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Disruptive Innovation of Price Transparency in Health Care, 310 JAMA 1927, 1927–28 (2013). Cost sharing on the service level thus results not in cost savings, but in worse health outcomes when people forgo treatment due to cost. Instead, price sensitivity should be focused on what individuals can make informed decisions about and fully understand. For most, that is the total amount they are able to pay for their healthcare tax.

C.  Possible Equity Implications of a Regional Model

The deontological debate over whether healthcare constitutes a commodity, a right, or something in between extends far beyond the scope of this Note. But the law and economics approach taken here does not ignore the ethical implications of equity in its design of a more efficient healthcare system. Policymaking necessarily has ethical and economic consequences, and this Note presents the Healthcure System as a means of compelling providers to become fairer market actors, guaranteeing egalitarian access to healthcare, enhancing competition, and reducing costs.

The general thrust of the Healthcure System model is its introduction of new accountability measures into a healthcare landscape where there are currently few. This lack of accountability, whether it be in hospital pricing or insurers’ willingness to pay, affects every individual regardless of whether they choose to participate in the insurance market. This is true of any market—the actions of firms do not exist in a vacuum without influencing supply and demand for all market participants.139Mwachofi & Al-Assaf, supra note 2, at 333. The imperative for broad public accountability in the market for widgets, however, does not measure up to the imperative in a healthcare industry that every individual is likely to transact with at some point. For healthcare providers to be truly accountable, they must be accountable to everyone, not just their customers. By bringing all individuals under a universal coverage model, the Healthcure System’s accountability measures can internalize the externalities of the healthcare market. In other words, no longer will insurers and providers suscept the uninsured to price inflation.

In its effort to provide universal coverage, the Healthcure System sets forth regional healthcare districts that collect taxes from residents and distribute those funds to providers for the provision of services. Notwithstanding its unique policy prescriptions, the Healthcure System would be wise to adopt some of the innovations of the ACA, such as the guaranteed issue of essential health benefits. All health insurance plans were required to offer ten services as part of their benefit packages under the ACA: (1) ambulance; (2) emergency; (3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) mental health and substance use disorder; (6) prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; (8) lab work; (9) preventive, wellness, and chronic disease management; and (10) pediatric services including oral and vision care.140Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395–99 (2010); HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2022 and Pharmacy Benefit Manager Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 24140, 24143 (May 5, 2021) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 150, 153, 155, 156, 158, 184). Additionally, the ACA ensured that insurers could not turn away or even raise premiums for those with preexisting health conditions. Although the ACA may not have done enough to stem rising costs, it did take significant steps toward improving access to health coverage and the quality of the benefits provided.

A regional, tax-funded healthcare system raises concerns over provider concentration and equity between regions with different income levels. These concerns predate the proposed reforms offered here, but this Note does not seek to entrench an already inequitable system. On the contrary, the Healthcure System can act as a vehicle for identifying areas with inequitable access to healthcare and delivering targeted financial support in the form of supplemental government adjustment payments.

The Health Resources & Service Administration (“HRSA”) currently uses two designations to identify areas of need in the healthcare system: Medically Underserved Areas/Populations (“MUA/P”) and Health Professional Shortage Areas (“HPSAs”).141What Is Shortage Designation?, Health Res. & Servs. Admin. (Aug. 2022), https://
bhw.hrsa.gov/workforce-shortage-areas/shortage-designation#empu [https://perma.cc/58X8-PJS4].
Additionally, Medicaid identifies hospitals that serve large numbers of Medicaid and uninsured individuals and directs supplemental payments through the Disproportionate Share Hospital (“DSH”) program.142Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments, Medicaid, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financial-management/medicaid-disproportionate-share-hospital-dsh-payments/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z4TS-BVKJ]. These programs may be rolled into healthcare districts, which can more easily collect data on the community’s needs due to the coordinated care of all the providers in the region. Federal and state governments can then issue adjustment payments to those districts with the most need, and the payments can come in the form of block grants, incentives to recruit physicians, infrastructure and capital improvement funding, equipment, and even technical assistance and consultation. Further, government payments could subsidize the costs of patients visiting other healthcare districts to make use of equipment, services, or specialists that their underserved district may lack. The district could evaluate the cost of purchasing access to equipment, services, or specialists in other districts and the demand for them, and if cost-effective, petition the government to subsidize the acquisition of them for the underserved district. In this way, the Healthcure System can play an active role in improving health equity in a given region.

Another concern arises over the district’s control over pricing and the potential for monopsony. Whereas monopoly power enables a seller to set prices above what a perfect market would dictate, monopsony power on the buyer side enables one to counterbalance monopoly rent seeking.143Anderson, supra note 92, at 102. But a monopsonist need not face a monopoly on the other side of the transaction in order to wield its power, and in the healthcare context, a single-payer such as a government can lead providers to withdraw supply in response to lack of price power.144Id. It is not difficult to imagine how low-income districts may be disproportionately susceptible to constrained supply if they pay providers less than neighboring districts. Government adjustment payments are just one way districts can avoid these circumstances.

Here, the board of a healthcare district also has work to do to protect individuals’ access to care. One way to fight the possibility of constrained supply is through the system’s per-event incentive payment structure that rewards providers for seeing more patients, rather than rewarding them based on the number of services administered through fee-for-service.

An additional safeguard would be a requirement that providers offer essential health benefits if they are to participate in a supplemental coverage market not subject to price controls by the district. Providers could offer supplemental coverage in a private market for services not otherwise available through the district. The districts must ensure there is no overlap of services between the essential benefits they offer and the supplemental benefits offered by providers because an overlap would open the door for a conflict of interest. If providers’ supplemental services competed with those offered by the district, then providers will have incentives to reduce district essential benefits made available to everyone, offer lesser-quality district benefits, or otherwise push individuals toward its supplemental offerings (which would ostensibly be more lucrative for the providers).

IV.  COST: INNOVATING A NEW HEALTHCARE DISTRICT GOVERNANCE MODEL WITH PUBLIC AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FROM STAKEHOLDERS

Although not a centerpiece of the ACA, a modest provision in section 3022 now stands as one of the most promising elements of the ACA left standing, one that opened the door to a new organizational form dedicated to accountable care: the ACO.145See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. When providers come together to form an ACO, they commit to coordinating care and sharing in the responsibility for financial and quality outcomes for a certain population of patients.146Tu et al., supra note 17, at 3. Not only can ACOs deliver improved health outcomes by sharing information between doctors, hospitals, and other providers, thereby reducing unnecessary or redundant treatment, but they can also reduce costs.

The healthcare market traditionally imposes on insurers—not providers—the risk of losing money when healthcare costs exceed the amounts collected from individual premiums. As discussed earlier, market failures have led to a system in which healthcare providers face no downside to overtreating patients and often have incentives to charge as high of prices as possible.147See supra Section II.A. Thus, the system imposes few, if any, brakes on runaway healthcare costs, and those costs are ultimately passed to individuals in the form of increased premiums, greater cost sharing, and reduced wage gains.148See supra Section II.A. ACOs flip this relationship on its head by shifting risk to the providers who are largely responsible for making decisions about and incurring the costs of care in the first place. Rather than rewarding providers based on the number of services provided, as the traditional fee-for-service model incentivized, ACOs offer providers financial incentives for hitting cost-savings targets and meeting quality benchmarks. In theory, the goal is to align incentives in the healthcare market so that all benefit from low-cost, high-quality care.

In concert with the Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”), the federal government incentivizes cost cutting by offering providers who organize under an ACO model a share of any cost savings they generate from efficient service delivery.149Pioneer ACO Model, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., https://innovation.cms.gov/
innovation-models/pioneer-aco-model [https://perma.cc/C8XW-47K2].
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) offer several levels of shared savings, and the ACO shares a proportionate amount of risk of cost overages according to the level it joins.150Id.

The upside of the ACO is so great that it could—with the right adjustments—avoid the upward cost pressures that come with traditional private insurers.151Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The End of Health Insurance Companies, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2012, 9:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-end-of-health-insurance-companies/?smid=pl-share [http://web.archive.org/web/20230215225222/https://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-end-of-health-insurance-companies/?smid=pl-share].
MSSP reported $1.8 billion in net savings in 2022 after making incentive payments to participating ACOs.152Compare Medicare Shared Savings Program Saves Medicare More Than $1.8
Billion in 2022 and Continues to Deliver High-Quality Care, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., (Aug. 24, 2023), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/medicare-shared-savings-program-saves-medicare-more-18-billion-2022-and-continues-deliver-high [https://perma.cc/KH3B-LME6] (heralding CMS’s claim of $1.8 billion in net savings), with McWilliams & Chen, supra note 21 (questioning the accuracy of CMS’s methodology for calculating savings).
On its face, that number represents a laudable achievement and proof of concept for ACOs, but it does not fully capture the state of the program. The number of participating ACOs shrank from 561 in 2018 to 456 in 2023,153Accountable Care Organizations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Jan. 2023), https://data.cms.gov/medicare-shared-savings-program/accountable-care-organizations [https://perma.cc/
R6A8-NRH2].
and economists point out that the savings figure is largely the product of selective participation.154McWilliams & Chen, supra note 21. Due to the voluntary nature of MSSP, higher-spending ACOs have disproportionately exited the program and lower-spending ACOs have entered. The result is a skewed program that provides incentive payments to smaller, potentially less-efficient providers and falls short of imposing meaningful cost savings on the large providers most responsible for the healthcare system’s increasing costs.155See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 152 (“Approximately 63% of participating ACOs earned payments for their performance in 2022. ACOs that earned more shared savings tended to be low revenue. Low-revenue ACOs are usually ACOs that are mainly made up of physicians and may include a small hospital or serve rural areas. With $228 per capita in net savings, low-revenue ACOs led high-revenue ACOs, who had $140 per capita net savings . . . .”).

A key selling point of ACOs is the integration of finance and delivery among a network of providers, but adverse selection stands in the way of achieving that integration at scale. Healthcare districts may solve the selective participation problem by automatically enrolling all providers and individuals to participate in the district’s network. Such a mandate creates a new set of challenges when considering the varying interests of individual, hospital, and physician stakeholders.

On one side, individuals are responsible for paying healthcare taxes to pay for their access to the district’s provider network and essential health benefits. In their pursuit of quality care at the lowest possible cost, individuals may voice their preferences through choice of provider, district in which to live, and elected directors of the district. In this regard, districts take on qualities resembling special districts.

On the other side, a mix of independently run private for-profit and not-for-profit healthcare providers compete with one another for patients, and they may make different business decisions in light of that competition. To require these providers to join forces might exacerbate provider consolidation and raise antitrust concerns that they might wield too much pricing power in their regional market. In light of this, healthcare districts could take cues from public utilities in the administration of a regulated monopoly on healthcare.

A reasonable objection to the mandated participation of healthcare providers is the restriction on the freedom of private businesses to transact in an open market. With traditional ACOs, providers choose with whom they would form a network; in contrast, healthcare districts bring together all neighboring providers to coordinate. Concerns over the agency of providers are warranted, and it is precisely these concerns that encourage the consideration of the corporate form as a source of inspiration to protect these interests.

The formation of special districts and regulation of corporations are largely functions of state law.156See Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 731, 732, 733 n.5 (2013). When legislating the creation of healthcare districts, state lawmakers will need to consider an organizational form tailored to the idiosyncrasies of healthcare. Whereas the ACO is the archetypal structure from which healthcare districts are designed, the districts must take on characteristics of both public and private entities to overcome the market failures and regulatory shortcomings that otherwise keep ACOs from achieving the integration of finance and delivery at scale today.

A.  Public Governance as a Counterweight to Consolidated Provider Market Power

At the center of the ACO adverse selection problem is the gap between, on the one hand, the good governance principles that CMS inspires through incentives for cost-savings, and on the other, the financial motives for avoiding participation in ACOs due to the risk of cost overages. As a means of broad institutional change, MSSP’s ACO program is a portrait in weak governance.157See Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Thomas J. Bossert, Health Governance: Principal-Agent Linkages and Health System Strengthening, 29 Health Pol’y & Plan. 685, 689 (2014) (describing the healthcare governance relationships that enable policy adoption and implementation). In the tripartite scheme of healthcare governance between individuals, providers, and government, the government’s role in enacting ACOs is more akin to making a series of suggestions than outright rulemaking.158Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 23 (listing the various ACO programs); see also Brinkerhoff & Bossert, supra note 157, at 689.

Despite the federal government’s soft touch when it comes to pushing providers to participate in a two-way risk MSSP model, industry watchers have raised antitrust concerns over ACOs’ potential to exacerbate provider consolidation.159Greaney, supra note 19, at 27–28. Therein lies an inherent conflict within the very concept of the ACO: while ACOs strive to achieve a reduction in costs, they simultaneously enable increased prices by encouraging providers to join forces and reduce competition.160Id. at 21–22. With fewer competitors on price, ACOs can theoretically wield more market power and raise prices with impunity.161Id. at 27–28.

A conflict thus arose between CMS’s encouragement of ACO formation and the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) antitrust enforcement role. Where the two federal agencies stood diametrically opposed, the DOJ capitulated to CMS and issued a policy statement effectively taking a hands-off approach to antitrust enforcement when providers are organized in an ACO.162Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28, 2011) (outlining the “antitrust safety zone” that ACOs may fall under to avoid challenge from the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission). Notwithstanding the multitude of market failures that have largely eviscerated price competition in healthcare, the fact remains that a traditional ACO could adopt a one-sided risk model that imposes no risk for cost overages while enjoying the lax antitrust rule enforcement that comes with participating in MSSP.

Provider consolidation was a growing trend in healthcare even before the ACA took effect, but it has ramped up in the years since.163Michael F. Furukawa, Laura Kimmey, David J. Jones, Rachel M. Machta, Jing Guo & Eugene C. Rich, Consolidation of Providers into Health Systems Increased Substantially, 2016–18, 39 Health Affs. 1321, 1322 (2020). In the two-year span between 2016 and 2018, physician affiliation with vertically integrated health systems jumped 11%,164Id. and the number has doubled over the past decade.165Soroush Saghafian, Lina D. Song, Joseph P. Newhouse, Mary Beth Landrum & John Hsu, The Impact of Vertical Integration on Physician Behavior and Healthcare Delivery: Evidence from Gastroenterology Practices 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 30928, 2023), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30928/w30928.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/
20230329184025/https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30928/w30928.pdf].
The movement toward vertical integration, in which entities along a supply chain such as doctors and hospitals align under one entity, can be a positive development for cost efficiencies and care coordination. After all, coordination is a central component of the ACO model. But consolidation inevitably results in price increases in the absence of downward cost pressures such as ACO cost sharing and strong antitrust regulation, especially when entities such as nearby hospitals horizontally integrate and cease competition.166Karyn Schwartz, Eric Lopez, Matthew Rae & Tricia Neuman, What We Know About Provider Consolidation, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Sep. 2, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/what-we-know-about-provider-consolidation [https://perma.cc/G637-28XP]. With ACOs increasingly opting for one-way risk models and the DOJ relaxing antitrust enforcement, the current system does not pose much of a barrier to increased prices.

The Healthcure System’s mandate to form provider networks by region would not mark the first time a government sanctioned a geographic monopoly over a particular market. The regulation of public utilities arose from the recognition that some businesses operate in the public interest and regulations would ensure that “all must be served, adequate facilities must be provided, reasonable rates must be charged, and no discriminations must be made” when the free market alone would not.1671 Bruce Wyman, The Special Law Governing Public Service Corporations and All Others Engaged in Public Employment xi (1911). Historically, sectors of public interest, such as transportation, communications, electricity, and water, invited regulation as utilities when they were dominated by large businesses with enough market power to exploit customers.168Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 62 (2015). The similarity of circumstances in healthcare today has raised the question of whether medicine should be regulated as a public utility.

The difficulty with applying public utility regulation to medicine lies with its traditional business model: while its rates and service may be mandated by the government, a utility remains a private business that charges a rate based on use.169A.J.G. Priest, Possible Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts in the Health Care Field, L. & Contemp. Probs. 839, 840 (1970). There is a burgeoning movement to change the ways in which utilities charge their customers, though, that augments the traditional pay-by-use model. California lawmakers passed legislation, AB 205, that imposes an income-based fee on ratepayers’ electricity bills. Jason Fordney, Legislature Passes Sweeping Energy Bill, Angering Environmentalists, Localities, Cal. Energy Mkts. (Jul. 1, 2022), https://www.newsdata.com/california_energy_markets/regional_roundup/
legislature-passes-sweeping-energy-bill-angering-environmentalists-localities/article_903b5ed2-f97a-11ec-8f61-bb515331ac82.html [https://perma.cc/KHP9-8C9N]. In theory, the fixed charges would allow the utilities to charge less per kilowatt-hour, ultimately reducing the total electricity bill of low and middle-income customers. Rob Nikolewski, A New Charge Is Coming to Your Electric Bill. Will It Make California Rates More Affordable?, L.A. Times (Apr. 11, 2023, 3:17 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/story/2023-04-11/a-fixed-monthly-charge-is-coming-to-your-electric-bill-will-it-make-caifornia-rates-more-affordable [https://perma.cc/DNB5-9SMR]. There remain questions about how the investor-owned utilities will confirm ratepayer income levels, and the California Public Utilities Commission will consider proposals regarding the dollar amounts of the charges before instituting them in 2025. Id.
For instance, an electricity company may be required to supply energy to all homes in a given region. Not all of those homes may choose to purchase that energy, however, and if they do, they pay an amount proportionate to the amount they consume.170Koichiro Ito, Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 537, 553–54 (2014) (describing household price elasticity in the electricity market as a function of reduced consumption in the face of perceived price). In healthcare, pay-per-use is fraught with complications, most prominently the information asymmetry problem that keeps patients from fully understanding their healthcare services and costs.171Bagley, supra note 168. Patients are simply not equipped to make many choices about constraining their use of healthcare services, especially when they occur in emergency situations.

In the bargain between public utilities and their regulating agencies is the grant of a monopoly to provide services in a given region in exchange for a duty to serve everyone, often at certain price levels.172Id. at 61. The monopoly bestows exclusive access to the market and ensures supply to the populace, but it does not compel demand. Consumers are not required to purchase the services or purchase a certain amount. To do so could run afoul of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause analysis in Sebelius, which would have struck down the individual mandate to purchase health insurance as an overstepping of Congress’s authority had it not been deemed a form of taxation.173Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (“[The Commerce] Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order individuals to engage in it. In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without health insurance.”). It is in this respect that the public utility model falls short of its usefulness in a healthcare system that provides universal coverage—the model must reckon with the public’s expectations of electoral accountability in the face of taxation.

The inextricable relationship between taxation and voting traces its roots to an early moment in American history when colonists protested their lack of electoral representation by turning Boston Harbor into the world’s largest teacup.174Proportional Representation, Hist., Art & Archives, https://history.house.gov/Institution/
Origins-Development/Proportional-Representation [https://perma.cc/6RMT-PBDP] (“American colonists, who were used to controlling their local affairs in the directly-elected colonial legislatures, lacked a voice in Parliament and resented the British policies imposed on them. Thus, they rallied behind the now familiar motto: ‘No taxation without representation!’ . . . Since constitutional framers had to provide for the funding of the new government, they debated the proper relationship between representation and taxation . . . . Delegates [] settled on proportional contributions based on population, and, by extension, the number of Members in the House of Representatives.”).
One can imagine the fervor with which Americans might destroy crates of stethoscopes and gauze bandages in protest of healthcare taxes without a say in how those taxes are spent. The establishment of a specialized entity that lays taxes and delivers services to a particular population naturally invokes a governmental structure—in particular, the ubiquitous local public entities such as school districts and water districts. These special districts are generally governed by a board of elected representatives charged with hiring managers, monitoring the quality of services rendered, and tending to the responsible expenditure of public funds.175Melissa J. Braybrooks, Tina Highfill & Dylan G. Rassier, Accounting for Special District Governments in the U.S. National Accounts 1–2 (2018), https://www.bea.gov/
index.php/system/files/papers/WP2018-14.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20190514222523/https://
http://www.bea.gov/index.php/system/files/papers/WP2018-14.pdf%5D.
When applied to the concept of a healthcare district, the election of directors carries the potential to apply accountability measures that, in tandem with improved consumer price sensitivity, can impose downward cost pressures that counteract the market power of consolidated providers.

The public election of a district’s board of directors is a step toward accountability, but it begs the question: Accountability to whom? In theory, popularly elected directors stand to lose their jobs should taxes exceed what constituents deem acceptable or services fail to meet the desired level of quality. Directors always face the possibility that constituents may vote them out of office. These are conditions under which directors are seemingly incentivized to govern in a manner that is responsive to voter concerns. Indeed, free and fair elections are a hallmark of American democratic governance but so is the pervasive influence of special interests in the electoral process. Individuals do not comprise the entirety of the stakeholder population with an interest in a healthcare district’s decision-making. Providers, and the healthcare industry as a whole, will almost assuredly seek political influence to promote their interests. Such influence peddling can range from the standard fare of lobbyists sharing their expertise to financial contributions to candidates. It is the latter activity that concerned Reinhardt and led him to reject a single-payer model at the federal level “because [the United States federal] government is too corrupt. Medicare is a large insurance company whose board of directors (Ways and Means and Senate Finance) accept payments from vendors to the company. In the private market, that would get you into trouble.”176Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 153. A purely governmental form does not appear wise when a taxing entity is susceptible to corrupt influence and capable of generating profits. Additional measures are in order to best ensure individuals’ interests remain protected.

B.  Drawing on Private Organizational Forms to Balance Stakeholder Interests

A board of directors elected at the local level can be responsive to the ethical concerns of the electorate and its preferences regarding the allocation of resources.177See Brinkerhoff & Bossert, supra note 157. Yet corruption, or even just the undue influence of interests other than that of individual voters, can stand in the way of public accountability.178See id. This is only of concern if the interests of the public and the third-parties are not aligned, and providers’ interest in financial rewards stand to do just that.

As envisioned here, healthcare districts do not force providers to take on nonprofit status. The Healthcure System takes a general approach of noninterference with for-profit providers, recognizing that the pursuit of profits, when earned legitimately and not by taking advantage of market failures, may incentivize innovation and new efficiencies.179Harold S. Luft, Economics Incentives to Promote Innovation in Healthcare Delivery, 467 Clinical Orthopaedics & Related Rsch. 2497, 2503 (2009). In Part IV, this Note instead proposes an aligned incentives payment structure that rewards providers for delivering on cost savings and outcomes measures.

While purely governmental entities are not profit-making ventures, it is not as though governments do not transact with private, for-profit entities.180Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 595 (2000). Taxpayer dollars provide profits to contractors regularly.181See, e.g., Paul Toscano, The 10 Biggest U.S. Government Contractors, CNBC (Jan. 29,
2014, 2:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2011/04/08/The-10-Biggest-U.S.-Government-Contractors.html [https://perma.cc/D5SA-WUXR].
Yet, contractors willingly enter the public bidding process for government contracts with some expectation of their profit margins at the outset, and if the business proposition does not meet their business objectives, they can refrain from participating in the competitive bid.182Understanding the Government Solicitation Bid Package, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 3, 3–4, https://www.fdic.gov/about/diversity/sbrp/52.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9RJ-D55Z]. Here, a governmental structure does not suffice for healthcare districts because the relationship between districts and providers is not a contractual one entered into voluntarily. To realize the goals of aligned incentives and accountability, the Healthcure System devises that all providers retain their organizational form while uniting under the single healthcare district entity in which they share a financial stake. Because healthcare districts compel providers to provide services (to avoid the adverse selection problem of ACOs) and control their payment, providers lose a great deal of their pricing power. Although the districts can attempt to offset the pricing restrictions with promises of increased scale, it is nevertheless reasonable to expect that providers will seek to maximize their financial reward with the highest possible incentive payments.

Thus, an incentive payment model cannot fully rectify the tension between public interest and provider profit motive. The public utility model excels in accommodating a regulated monopoly that provides services in the public interest, but it fails to fulfill the need for electoral representation of a public taxed for their healthcare costs. The special district model does a better job of incorporating democratic ideals into the provider of specialized public services, but it cannot accommodate the profit-generating motive that some providers inevitably seek, such as individual physicians’ practices.

Where public entities fall short of balancing stakeholder interests, state legislators can look to variations on private organizational forms for guidance.

1.  Allocating Rights and Responsibilities Between Patients and Providers
The underpinnings of the Healthcure System’s financial model are an amalgamation of seemingly conflicting revenue collection and distribution streams that do not lend themselves to a cut-and-dry organizational form. Starting with the residents of a healthcare district, individual tax payments form the inflow of capital with which a district procures healthcare services. All told, a district’s residents are stakeholders as (1) financial supporters, (2) beneficiaries of its services, and (3) electors of its board of directors. Once a healthcare district collects taxes, it distributes funds to private provider entities. All healthcare providers in the region are likewise stakeholders, as they (1) provide services to residents, (2) operate under the governance of the district’s board of directors, (3) receive funding from the district, and (4) share in the gains and losses of the district.

Yet, where one party has voting rights to elect a board of directors, and another lacks that right but bears exposure to the financial decisions the board makes, there arises a principal-agent problem.183John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement, Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. Law, Econ. & Bus. 3 (2009). The question then turns to how to legally organize such an entity.

In the private sector, the corporate form offers a number of options for interested parties to organize around a shared mission. Like governments, corporations are governed by representatives elected by a constituency of interested parties.184Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 417 (2006). Those parties—the holders of shares of ownership in the corporation—need not retain the same rights and responsibilities as one another.185Dhruv Aggarwal, Ofer Eldar, Yael V. Hochberg & Lubomir P. Litov, The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs, Colum. L. Sch. Blue Sky Blog (Apr. 21, 2021), https://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2021/04/21/the-rise-of-dual-class-stock-ipos [https://perma.cc/BDB6-A9WJ].
When for-profit corporations wish to assign different rights to different shareholders, they may issue preferred stock or create a dual-class share structure.186Id. As such, certain shareholders may have priority over others when it comes to receiving financial distributions from the corporation, or they may have the right to vote on certain business matters that other classes of shareholders do not.

Ultimately, though, shareholders are owners of the corporation, and to regard individuals and providers as “owners” of a healthcare district opens the door to questions about the relative amounts of shares they hold and whether they can be transferred.187See Velasco, supra note 184, at 437. The concept of owning an entity that has the power to tax and regulate an industry confers power that would undermine electoral accountability to the public.

Other forms also offer distinct benefits but ultimately fail in their application to healthcare districts. A partnership, for instance, offers even more flexibility to cleave apart interested parties into distinct, nonoverlapping roles. Hypothetically, a healthcare district could make individuals partners or members of the manager-managed organization. These members can then assign their rights to distributions to providers while retaining their management rights.188See RUPA § 503(a) (Nat’l Conf. Unif. State L. 2015). An analog to the public’s role in a corporation might be a limited shareholder with a subscription (accounting for tax payments as the subscribed consideration) and retained voting rights but assigned distribution rights to providers. Another possible route for potential exploration is the treatment of providers as creditors to the healthcare district, or a complex contractual (or “contractarian”) relationship that binds individuals, providers, and districts, thereby avoiding the corporate form altogether.189See Velasco, supra note 184, at 443.

This futile exercise represents a microcosm of an ongoing debate in health law. Clearly, a healthcare district is not conducive to cleanly applying a preexisting public or private form, but in light of the struggle between patient and provider interests, the healthcare industry has grappled with the limits of organizational forms for decades.190See, e.g., April Harding & Alexander S. Preker, Understanding Organizational Reforms: The Corporatization of Public Hospitals 14–16 (Sept. 2000), https://documents1.
worldbank.org/curated/pt/905371468780563628/pdf/288770Harding11Organizational1whole.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ALT2-YBPV].
This is where a public-private partnership delivers useful inspiration.

Federal and state governments have established a variety of instrumentalities that skirt the line between public entity and private business. Although the United States has traditionally shunned the kinds of government-owned corporations that are prevalent in other parts of the world,191Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform, 50 Cornell Int’l L.J. 473, 487 (2017). federal corporations are still prominent fixtures in American life.192Kevin R. Kosar, Federal Government Corporations: An Overview, Cong. Rsch. Serv. 7 (June 8, 2011), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL30365.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD8G-JX8M]. Amtrak is one such quasi-corporation,193The Federal Railroad Administration describes Amtrak as a “for-profit corporation” created by Congress and incorporated in Washington, D.C. Amtrak, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. Fed. R.R. Admin., https://railroads.dot.gov/passenger-rail/amtrak/amtrak [https://perma.cc/MM67-QBQF]. In 2015, the Supreme Court had to weigh in on Amtrak’s status as a public or private entity:

[F]or purposes of Amtrak’s status as a federal actor or instrumentality under the Constitution, the practical reality of federal control and supervision prevails over Congress’ disclaimer of Amtrak’s governmental status. . . . The political branches created Amtrak, control its Board, define its mission, specify many of its day-to-day operations, have imposed substantial transparency and accountability mechanisms, and, for all practical purposes, set and supervise its annual budget. Accordingly, the Court holds that Amtrak is a governmental entity, not a private one . . . .

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 54–55 (2015) (citations omitted).
as are government-sponsored enterprises like the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).194Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 191, at 490. Unlike a special district, a government corporation can be “[a] self-funding, self-perpetuating, profit-making corporation [that] enjoys a degree of potential, and perpetual, independence undreamed of in most agencies.”195A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 543, 560. Some of these entities feature characteristics particularly useful for the conception of healthcare districts, such as the ability to distribute dividends and a mixed ownership structure split between a preferred-stock-holding government and common-stock-holding private investors.196Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, https://www.fhfa.
gov/Conservatorship/Pages/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Purchase-Agreements.aspx [https://perma.cc/9JAK-TTJ2].
While the latter opens up a world of possibilities with respect to organizing private healthcare providers in healthcare district, it simultaneously raises questions over who and what guides the district’s decision-making.

The distribution of interests and rights presents healthcare districts with a distinct principal-agent problem, or perhaps stated more accurately, a principal-agent-principal problem.197Armour et al., supra note 183. When those principals have different interests, or “heterogenous preferences,” they must reckon with coordination costs in the form of agents’ difficulty with determining the right goals.198Id.; see also Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, Government Ownership of Banks: A Curse or a Blessing for the United States?, 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 667, 681 (2019) (citations omitted) (“Government corporations are incorporated by Congress through special charter laws to pursue certain governmental objectives. While they are in corporate form, and some of them are even publicly traded companies, their operation often implicates other social or policy goals that are beyond commercial purposes; this complicates the corporate governance of government corporations.”). Confronted with such agency costs, organizations generally look to legal constraints on agents and corresponding enforcement mechanisms.199Id. This Note will next explore the bounds of a healthcare district’s director’s role in light of their principals’ heterogenous preferences, asking whether directors can simultaneously act in the best interests of both individuals and providers.

2.  Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Stakeholder Health Maximization

The election of a public official often involves what political scientists call a “mandate,” or the set of policy priorities that form a candidate’s platform and which the candidate is expected to implement upon election.200Gregg B. Johnson & Brian F. Crisp, Mandates, Powers, and Policies, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 128, 128 (2003). Elected officials are often judged by how they deliver on the promises they made to voters on the campaign trail. Should they fail, they may lose reelection or even a recall election.

The elected representatives of corporations are guided by the ubiquitous and often legally enforced commitment to “shareholder wealth maximization” or “shareholder primacy.”201Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 389, 393 (2014). Delivering value to shareholders is the utmost concern, and a failure to adhere to this principle could result in liability for breach of fiduciary duty.202Id. at 397. The representatives of nonprofit corporations, on the other hand, are guided by the organization’s mission.203Melanie Lockwood Herman, The Top 10 Legal Risks Facing Nonprofit Boards, Venable
LLP (Feb. 2011), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2011/02/the-top-10-legal-risks-facing-nonprofit-boards [https://perma.cc/7GQ9-FUWA].
Directors are generally motivated, at least in large part, by an interest in maintaining tax-exempt status and adhering to the nonprofit’s stated mission in its articles of incorporation and IRS filings.204Id.

The goals of a for-profit corporation and a nonprofit organization are not difficult to discern. But what if an entity comprises both? How should a board of directors square the push and pull of seemingly competing goals?

Healthcare today is dominated by entities that, on paper, appear to be either for-profit or nonprofit, but the rapid growth of nonprofit hospitals has blurred the line between them. The lack of an explicit profit motive does not stop nonprofit hospitals from generating enormous revenue exceeding their costs—but instead of distributing the funds to shareholders, they must instead reinvest the funds.205Derek Jenkins & Vivian Ho, Nonprofit Hospitals: Profits and Cash Reserves Grow, Charity Care Does Not, Health Affs. (June 2023), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.
2022.01542 [https://perma.cc/CP65-A3Q7].
ACOs particularly struggle with the conflicts of differing business models because their provider networks may consist of a mixture of for-profit and nonprofit entities.206Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need for Mission Primacy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12 Ind. Health L. Rev. 103, 167 (2015). The Healthcure System proposed here is no different.

In an era of skyrocketing healthcare costs, health law experts have begun to reevaluate organizational forms in healthcare to better accommodate missions beyond shareholder wealth maximization. The public benefit corporation is a form available in some states, and it allows corporations to augment shareholder wealth maximization and express an additional mission.207Terry L. Corbett, The Case for a Health Care Benefit Corporation, 47 Cap. U. L. Rev. 183, 282, 231 (2019). The form essentially provides “cover” to directors in the event that shareholders bring a lawsuit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty for taking actions not in the interest of shareholder wealth maximization.208See id. at 222. If the directors can point to a stated mission of the public benefit corporation as the motivating factor behind a challenged action, they will be shielded from liability.209Id.

A full exploration of alternative corporate forms reaches far beyond the scope of this Note, but to the extent that some bear on healthcare, it will be useful to acknowledge prior efforts to develop novel forms. Dayna B. Matthew argued for a “fiduciary medicine model” that imposes new fiduciary duties on health care organizations, such as considerations of larger systemic duties and an expansion of fiduciary law to modern health care delivery systems.210Id. at 305. Terry Corbett articulated a new legal form for ACOs based on the benefit corporation form. This form, the health care benefit corporation (“HCBC”), promotes accountability through legally enforceable mission primacy that can supersede the pursuit of profits.211Corbett, supra note 207, at 312 (“[T]hose who use the corporate form of organization to provide such health care must be held to legally-enforceable fiduciary duties to do so in furtherance of an explicitly-stated social mission that necessarily trumps any unlimited right by the enterprise to ‘profit’ beyond certain specified constraints.”).

Accountability measures may even be found in antitrust. Rather than combat consolidation outright, the Healthcure System brings providers together and seeks downward price pressures elsewhere. This would seem to throw antitrust enforcement mechanisms out the window, such as blocking mergers or forcing divestitures in closely competing entities, but antitrust principles may serve some use when considering the role of the board of directors.212David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 JAMA 1964, 1969 (2013). Accordingly, “conduct remedies” that pertain to the behavior of consolidated entities can protect against price increases in the absence of traditional structural remedies.213Id. For instance, states may direct healthcare districts to set an overall expenditure growth target that can be tied to the region’s economy and enforced by the state attorney general’s office as part of its antitrust enforcement.

Ultimately, though, the Healthcure System offers its own theory on which to base director fiduciary duties: what this Note calls “stakeholder health maximization.” Intentionally analogous to shareholder wealth maximization, stakeholder health maximization would be the paramount aim of healthcare district directors and is intended to orient their decision-making toward the constant improvement of health outcomes. Every decision, at its core, must be grounded in an effort to positively impact the health of the community. Cost savings, for instance, can be justified under stakeholder health maximization because the reduction of costs allows for improved allocation of scare resources: additional funds mean more people can get more care and better care. Conversely, efforts by providers to extract higher incentive payments without a justification based on health outcomes result in waste that would otherwise fund care.

With stakeholder health maximization as its guide, a healthcare district’s board of directors can navigate the distinct interests of its stakeholders with a potentially reduced risk of conflict. It is a path forward for balancing the three pillars of cost, quality, and access, even when stakeholders might push to prioritize one pillar over the rest. That is, as long as boards remain answerable to their constituents.

Director fealty to the public is as much an open question in elections of Congress as it is in the proposed healthcare district. There is no easy answer. The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no path for constraining the rights of business entities such as for-profit healthcare providers to engage in political speech.214See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350–51 (2010). Ultimately, representative governance requires trust in the democratic process, and while the Healthcure System certainly relies on that trust, it is bolstered by protections such as stakeholder health maximization and an incentive payment model to help ensure that patient and provider interests are aligned.215See Brinkerhoff & Bossert, supra note 157, at 689 (explaining how local accountability institutions such as municipal health councils reduced corruption in other countries).

V.  QUALITY: ALIGNING THE INCENTIVES OF PROVIDERS AND PATIENTS TO DRIVE COST-EFFECTIVE, VALUE-BASED CARE

For the purposes of this Note, quality refers to both the scope of benefits available to individuals as well as the health outcomes of those benefits. Up to this point, this Note has explored the tax-based revenue stream and novel governance model of healthcare districts, but it has yet to describe how these features translate to cost savings and outcomes improvements. The third and final piece of the Healthcure System directly addresses the misaligned incentives of the traditional fee-for-service provider reimbursement model by replacing it with a three-part outcomes-based incentive structure.

A century’s worth of refinement of the managed care model and the recent piloting of ACOs have led to a moment in which the healthcare system can finally capitalize on the cost-efficiencies of vertical integration. Doing so will require the full participation of providers in the risk and reward to counteract the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that plague the system today.216See supra Section II.A. The Healthcure System’s approach to healthcare payment reform draws on an integrated model that has been successfully implemented in California for over seventy-five years by the nonprofit health system Kaiser Permanente (“KP”).217Jesse Pines, Jeff Selevan, Frank McStay, Meaghan George & Mark McClellan, Kaiser Permanente—California: A Model for Integrated Care for the Ill and Injured 3 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/KaiserFormatted_150504RH-with-image.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE56-GLNG].

KP is made up of three separate entities linked together by exclusive contract to share financial incentives, coordinate care, and manage the health of a population. These entities—the not-for-profit Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (“KFH”), the for-profit medical groups (made up of physicians), and the not-for-profit Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (the insurance company)—share board members and leadership to seamlessly coordinate the allocation of capital between them.218Integrated Care Stories Overview, Kaiser Permanente Inst. Health Pol’y, https://www.kpihp.org/integrated-care-stories-overview [https://perma.cc/3UNQ-XY6P]. The KP model explicitly rejects fee-for-service and its unnecessary incentive on increasing quantity of services over quality, instead using a capitated model of payment. The capitation system consists of the health plan making monthly payments of a set dollar amount calculated per enrollee, regardless of whether they seek services.219Eric Hammelman, Narda Ipakchi, Jennifer Snow & Bob Atlas, Reforming
Physician Payments: Lessons from California 1 (Sept. 2009), https://digirepo.nlm.nih.gov/master/
borndig/101530869/ReformingPhysicianPaymentsLessonsFromCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3VX-2S4X].

If this arrangement sounds familiar, it is because the KP model is one of the earliest in a long lineage of managed care models that counts ACOs and the Enthoven-inspired Health Security proposal of the 1990s as siblings.220Suzanne F. Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Capitation with Quality, Health Affs. Blog (June 6, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140606.039442/full [https://perma.cc/2MRF-HZB8]; John Hubner, The Abandoned Father of Healthcare Reform, N.Y. Times Mag. (July 18, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/18/magazine/the-abandoned-father-of-healthcare-reform.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20221217033907/https://www.nytimes.com/1993/
07/18/magazine/the-abandoned-father-of-healthcare-reform.html].
This Note proposes a further refinement on the model, adding the layers of electoral accountability and novel governance as previously discussed, as well as a dividend payment scheme that emphasizes the shared responsibility of health within a particular region.

Under the Healthcure System’s stakeholder health maximization model, payments to providers consist of capitated payments as well as back-end payments based on outcomes and cost savings. The capitated payments provide hospitals a lump sum per event, and the provider then bears the cost of all services rendered during the patient’s event. But incentives to keep costs as low as possible can only serve a partial role in delivering an aligned-incentives payment structure. On their own, capitated payments can incentivize “bare minimum” treatment that would fulfill a district’s essential health benefits guarantee but disincentivize a great deal of innovative, risky, or even preventive treatments. Furthermore, there will surely be instances when an individual’s course of treatment exceeds the capitated payment a provider receives. While this is a risk the system is designed to handle, the system should equally incentivize providers to go above and beyond with their treatment and reward them when successful. Accordingly, the Healthcure System includes back-end payments in two forms: (1) event-based outcomes incentive payments and (2) regional dividends based on the overall population’s health benchmarks. Event-based incentives offer payments based on each service provided to a patient. Suppose a doctor’s treatments for a patient exceed the capitated payment for a particular illness, but they successfully treat the illness. The event-based outcomes incentive makes the treatment a financially sustainable one. The incentive payments may be calculated using similar formulas to those employed by the Medicare Quality Payment Program Merit Based Incentive Payments System.221MACRA, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-Based-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/
MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs [https://perma.cc/Q4TQ-2HD2].
But even worthwhile treatments may not always be successful, and there are strong policy reasons for encouraging best practices on a macro scale. Regional dividends reward providers for positive health trends across a community. Such dividends can encourage providers to collaborate and promote wellness beyond their particular practice. Moreover, the state or federal government may make additional adjustment payments in certain cases, such as rural healthcare districts, low-income districts, or catastrophic regional events such as natural disasters.

The result is a multi-payer, universal access healthcare system that ensures providers’ basic costs are covered, with downward price pressure to keep those costs as low as possible, while rewarding positive health outcomes and best practices with incentive payments from healthcare districts.

VI.  PRACTICAL CONCERNS OF IMPLEMENTING HEALTHCARE DISTRICTS

The Healthcure System model proposed in this Note is nothing short of a radical rethinking of the overall structure of the healthcare system. To implement it on a state or even national scale would likely mean a reform package even larger than the ACA. As such, there are a number of practical barriers that would need to be overcome for a successful transition to take place.

This Note provides a general overview of the basic structure of the Healthcure System and a broad survey of the economic, legal, and policy considerations it implicates. Additional study will yield a better understanding of its practical applications, particularly through empirical modeling of its operation in various regions. Another topic for exploration is the refinement of formulas with which to draw healthcare districts, calculate healthcare tax rates, set incentive and dividend payment rates, and determine the startup funding necessary for regions to transition into healthcare districts.

The Healthcure System involves a litany of issues of state law, further increasing the challenge of consistent deployment across the United States. One can look to the resistance of states to participate in the Medicaid expansion of the ACA as a preview of the challenge ahead.222See Selena Simmons-Duffin, 12 Holdout States Haven’t Expanded Medicaid, Leaving 2 Million People in Limbo, NPR (July 1, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/07/01/1011502538/12-holdout-states-havent-expanded-medicaid-leaving-2-million-people-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/NT2B-9KF4]. Even financial support from the federal government may not be enough to convince some states to adopt the plan, especially if it is seen as a comparable expansion of coverage through a public program. A related objection is the Healthcure System’s reliance on community rating instead of an actuarial fairness approach that attempts to price healthcare based on use.

Another topic ripe for exploration is the role of Medicare and Medicaid in the model proposed here. The MSSP’s ACO program served as a jumping-off point for the Healthcure System, but the scope of this Note does not include how it might incorporate or augment Medicare or Medicaid. Further study could evaluate whether there are additional efficiencies to be found by merging the public insurance programs with the Healthcure System.

Perhaps the single most significant objection to the Healthcure System is the general resistance to a substantial disruption to the healthcare system. Voters were so concerned that the ACA would make them change their health insurance that President Obama made the promise, “If you like your health care plan, you’ll be able to keep your health care plan” a central part of his pitch.223Obama: ‘If You Like Your Health Care Plan, You’ll Be Able to Keep Your Health Care Plan,’ PolitiFact, https://www.politifact.com/obama-like-health-care-keep [https://perma.cc/AN8M-K9U9]. This Note’s proposal upends healthcare by design. It is an effort to stave off unsustainable increases in healthcare costs by correcting market failures that are endemic to the status quo. A possible approach to easing the transition might be a gradual implementation of healthcare districts over a period of years, offering incentives to individuals who join early before all are eventually enrolled. Of course, this presents its own host of problems, namely a selective participation problem in which the risk pool may be concentrated with higher-risk individuals.  A sound implementation plan would stave off such concerns by making every effort to allow individuals to keep their doctors, thereby reducing an otherwise significant barrier to enrollment.

CONCLUSION

This Note calls its proposed model the Healthcure System because it represents a fundamental fix to some of the most pervasive economic failings of healthcare in the United States. The Healthcure System aims to create downward pressures on cost by introducing three accountability measures: (1) accountability through price-elastic demand; (2) accountability to a population of voters; and (3) accountability through the aligned interests of stakeholders in an incentive payment structure. It does so by setting forth a novel organizational form that uniquely caters to the interest of patients and providers, and guides healthcare district directors to govern in the name of stakeholder health maximization. Although it would represent a monumental reform with an undoubtedly difficult challenge of federal and state lawmaking, the Healthcure System’s regional approach to universal healthcare access and reduced costs could finally deliver broad access, low cost, and high-quality healthcare to an ailing and priced-out America.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1251

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* Editor-in-Chief, Southern California Law Review, Volume 96; J.D. 2023, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Political Science and English 2014, University of California, Riverside. Thank you to Professor Ankit Shah, Professor Jonathan Barnett, the editors of the Southern California Law Review, my family, friends, and classmates for your support throughout this Note’s writing and editing process.

A Dose of Dignity: Equitable Vaccination Policies for Incarcerated People and Correctional Staff During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Postscript | Government
A Dose of Dignity: Equitable Vaccination Policies for Incarcerated People and Correctional Staff During the Covid-19 Pandemic
by Itay Ravid*, Jordan M. Hyatt†, and Steven L. Chanenson‡

Vol. 95, Postscript (September 2021)
95 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript 1 (2021)

Keywords: Criminal Law, Public Health, Government

Since its emergence in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has altered the lives of millions of Americans. As it so often is during times of crisis, our most vulnerable communities have disproportionately suffered and were overlooked. Among these myriad communities, incarcerated people became a particularly potent symbol of our failure to handle the spread of the virus. In December 2020, a beacon of hope emerged with the introduction of new cutting-edge vaccines which promised to bring the world back to where it was just a year-and-a-half ago. Here again, however, policy and politics have led states to adopt different distribution plans that, broadly speaking, deprioritized incarcerated populations and in some cases correctional staff as well. While vaccinations are now much more widespread, things were dramatically different not too long ago. The first goal of this Essay is to ensure we memorialize how society, once again, failed to protect our incarcerated communities when they needed it the most. To illustrate this, we offer a data-driven analysis of the early state-level policies regarding vaccinations of people who live and work in prisons. Our findings show that vaccination policies tended to systematically ignore or disadvantage incarcerated individuals. We argue that by adopting such policies, states have neglected to comply with their legal obligations, grounded in existing and emerging Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and long-standing ethical responsibilities to proactively vaccinate this population. This is particularly true given that prisons are among the high-risk “congregate settings” that are widely recognized by health experts, and often by the states themselves, as deserving of immediate distribution of vaccines. Based on these obligations, and given recent new virus outbreaks and the realization that some form of COVID-19 is here to stay (and other pandemics may be around the corner), this Essay concludes with recommendations for the future.

____________________

*. Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law.
†. Associate Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, Director, Center for Public Policy,

Drexel University.
‡. Professor of Law, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. The authors would

like to thank Kristi Arty and Michael Slights for their terrific research assistance, and the SCLR editorial team for their careful and diligent work. Research for this Article was conducted with support provided to Dr. Hyatt (Drexel University) by Arnold Ventures. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the funder or any of the authors’ respective academic institutions.

 

 

Big Data in Health Care– Predicting Your Future Health by Kristina Funahashi

Note | Health Care & Life Sciences
Big Data in Health Care — Predicting Your Future Health
by Kristina Funahashi*

From Vol. 94, No. 2
94 S. Cal. L. Rev. 355 (2021)

Keywords: Health Care & Life Sciences; Data Privacy

Predictive analytics—a branch of data analysis that generates predictions about future outcomes through the power of computers to process large amounts of data using statistical modeling and machine learning—is increasingly applied in health care. While it has the potential to improve patient health and lower health care costs, the ability to peer into people’s future health status has also raised significant concerns about privacy and patient self-determination. Part I of this Note explains predictive analytics and machine learning in healthcare; it discusses data sources (which may not all be medical records) and examines several predictive analytics models. It concludes by assessing the risks posed by predictive health analytics, including psychological harms to patients and discrimination by healthcare insurers, healthcare providers, and employers. Part II summarizes existing federal data privacy and nondiscrimination legislation relevant to healthcare information in order to assess where the law leaves gaps regarding the regulation of predictive health data. By comparing predictive health analytics with genetic testing—another method of predicting an individual’s risk of disease where laws have been enacted to protect perceived “misuses” of test results—Part III reaches conclusions about how the law could treat the use of predictive health analytics and makes recommendations about future protections for patients.

* Executive Articles Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 94; J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A. Organismic and Evolutionary Biology 2014, Harvard University. I would like to thank Professor Alexander M. Capron for his invaluable guidance and insights during the drafting of this Note. I would also like to thank the Southern California Law Review Staff for their incredibly detailed and diligent assistance throughout the editing process. Last but far from least, a heartfelt thank you to my grandfather, Jerry D. Wu, M.D., and my parents, Lenora and Ted Funahashi, for their unwavering encouragement, love, and support.

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Genetically Edited Sperm: An Ethical Analysis of the Potential for Modified Humans by Avery Nelson

Note | Healthcare & Life Sciences Law
Genetically Edited Sperm: An Ethical Analysis of the Potential for Modified Humans
by Avery Nelson*

From Vol. 94, No. 1
94 S. Cal. L. Rev. 139 (2020)

Keywords: Healthcare & Life Sciences Law, Biotechnology, Public Policy

 

People have been striving for human “perfection” for as long as human civilization has existed, sometimes with questionable and even catastrophic results.1 The idea of perfecting the human population led to eugenics, the nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophical movement to “breed better people.”2 Eugenics ultimately laid the framework for forced sterilization laws in a number of countries, including the United States, where lawmakers prohibited certain people from procreating.3 As appalling as forced sterilization was, eugenics took an even darker turn leading up to and during World War II when Nazi Germany murdered millions in the name of creating a superior Aryan race.4 Adolf Hitler did not come up with the concept of genetic purity on his own.5 “In fact, [Hitler] referred to American eugenics in his 1934 book, Mein Kampf.”6 Although eugenics lost momentum after these atrocities,7 the idea of human enhancement has continued. Today, scientific advancements in gene-editing technology offer a new take on human modification.

Gene editing is a group of technologies that enable scientists to change an individual’s DNA.8 Genetic material can be added, removed, or altered at particular locations in the genome.9 One such gene-editing technique is the revolutionary technology called CRISPR-Cas9, short for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats” and CRISPR-associated protein 9,10 which was discovered in 2012.11 In 2013, groups of scientists led by Feng Zhang and George Church used CRISPR to edit human cell cultures for the first time.12 By 2015, Chinese scientist Puping Liang used CRISPR to edit the genes in human tripronuclear zygotes.13 CRISPR has generated much excitement in the scientific community because it is faster and cheaper, as well as more accurate and more efficient than any other existing method to genetically alter DNA.14 This is of particular interest in the prevention and treatment of diseases, because CRISPR has the potential to correct mutations associated with single-gene diseases such as cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and hemophilia, as well as complex diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and HIV infection.15

However, CRISPR has rekindled debates about the numerous social, ethical, and policy concerns of genetic manipulation.16 These concerns become even more complicated with germline gene editing, which results in changes in sperm, eggs, or embryos that will be passed on to the next generation.17 Critics of germline editing worry about the potential for “designer babies,” children whose traits, including eye color, height, and even athletic ability, are modified by gene editors at the request of their parent-consumers.18 Genetically modified babies remained speculative until November 2018, when Chinese scientist Dr. He Jankui announced that he had created the world’s first “CRISPR babies,” twin girls named Lulu and Nana.19

To conduct his experiment, Dr. He recruited couples in which the men had HIV infection and the women did not.20 After creating embryos by fertilizing the eggs with the sperm, Dr. He used CRISPR to edit the embryos and disable a gene that helps HIV enter healthy cells, for the purpose of giving the twin girls resistance to HIV.21 Notably, however, “Dr. He admitted that the edit was not successful in one of the embryos, and it is unclear whether it was completely or even partially successful in the other.”22 Dr. He’s experiment generated an outpouring of criticism and hand-wringing from scientists and bioethicists around the world, who labeled him a “rogue” scientist23 whose unethical experiment was “amateurish” and “unconscionable.”24 The safety risks and long-term effects of Dr. He’s experiment will remain a mystery for years to come, meaning the twins will likely be studied for the rest of their lives.25 Although Lulu and Nana brought bioethical considerations of gene editing to the forefront, researchers are still striving to advance CRISPR technology, with one of the most recent developments occurring right now in New York City.26

Currently, reproductive biologists at Weill Cornell Medicine are making the first attempt at genetically editing the DNA in human sperm using CRISPR.27 The controversial research is aimed at preventing genetic disorders that are passed down from men, including certain forms of male infertility.28 The researchers are beginning with a gene that increases the risk of breast, ovarian, prostate and other cancers.29 Because DNA is packed very tightly inside the head of each sperm, it is difficult to insert the microscopic CRISPR tool.30 To overcome this challenge, the Cornell scientists electrically shock the sperm with the goal that the shock will cause the cells to loosen up for a moment so that CRISPR can get inside.31 June Wang, a lab technician conducting the experiments at Cornell, admits that “[i]t’s kind of a weird concept” but states that “it works pretty well.”32

Although the experiments are still underway and are not yet successful, the research raises many of the same hopes—and fears—as editing the genes in human embryos.33 Nevertheless, the researchers defend their work.34 Gianpiero Palermo, who runs the lab where the experiment is being conducted, states, “I think it’s important from the scientific point of view to investigate in an ethical manner to be able to learn if it’s possible.”35 Palermo went on to say, “If we can wipe out a particular gene, it would be incredible.”36 However, Françoise Baylis, a bioethicist at Dalhousie University in Canada who is advising the World Health Organization, expresses the view that editing DNA in sperm raises the same troubling questions as editing DNA in embryos.37 In addition to safety concerns for resulting babies and future generations in the event that the genetically edited sperm is used, there are profound ethical and social concerns about conducting the research in the first place.38 As bioethicist Ben Hurlbut put it,

There’s reason to worry about undertaking the research before we’ve asked the question properly whether we would ever actually want to use those techniques . . . . Once those techniques are developed, it becomes much harder to govern them. If you’ve done the hard work of developing the recipe, someone else can bake the cake.39

The willingness of researchers to develop human uses of CRISPR demonstrates the pressing need to regulate such advancements and, in particular, its possible use to genetically edit human sperm. Part I of this Note will provide a scientific background necessary to understand genetically edited sperm, including a brief history of relevant scientific advancements, a discussion of CRISPR-Cas9 technology, and an explanation of somatic cells and germline cells. Part II will analyze various ethical considerations regarding editing human sperm, including safety concerns, informed consent issues, the debate between treatment and enhancement, and the potential for new forms of social inequality. Part III will discuss the most applicable regulations in the United States under the Food and Drug Administration and National Institutes of Health, and ultimately conclude that as it stands, the law is unprepared for the development of genetically edited sperm. Part IV will propose a resolution to address these concerns, including a federal licensing regime, a call for public engagement, and regulations to mitigate equality and accessibility concerns if sperm editing is commercialized.

* Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 94; J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.S. Finance 2017, University of Florida. I thank my family, friends, and the fantastic editors of the Southern California Law Review for their support and guidance throughout the publication process.

 

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An Examination of the Right to Try Act of 2017 and Industry’s Potential Path Moving Forward – Note by Sylvia Zaich

From Volume 92, Number 2 (January 2019)
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An Examination of the Right to Try Act of 2017 and Industry’s potential Path Moving Forward

Sylvia Zaich[*]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. A Brief History of the FDA and the current
Drug development process

A. The Origins of the FDA’s Regulatory Framework

B. The Drug Development Process

II. ChalLenges to the regulatory framework and
an overview of the Expanded access program

A. Prior Pre-Approval Access Challenges

1. 1970s: Laetrile, the FDCA, and Rutherford v. United States

2. 1980s–1990s: The Reagan Administration and the
HIV/AIDS Epidemic

3. 2000s: Pre-Approval Access, a Proposal, and Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach

B. The Expanded Access Program

1. How a Physician Requests Expanded Access for
Individual Patient Use

2. How Companies Evaluate an Individual Patient Request

3. How the FDA Evaluates an Individual Patient Request

III. THE RIGHT-TO-TRY MOVEMENT

A. The Movement’s Rationale for Right to Try and
Success at the State Level

1. The Right-to-Try Movement’s Rationale

2. The Movement’s Success at the State Level

B. The FDA’s Response

1. Clarifying the FDA’s Use of Clinical Outcomes

2. Demystifying Manufacturers’ Eligibility Criteria

3. Increasing Awareness of Expanded Access

4. Streamlining the Individual Patient Request Process70

C. The Push for a Federal Right to Try

IV. the Right to Try Act of 2017

A. The Law

1. Who is Eligible?

2. When Would an Investigational Drug Qualify?

3. What are the Reporting Obligations?

4. When Can the FDA Use Clinical Outcomes?

B. Industry’s Potential Path Moving Forward

1. Even with the Right to Try Act, Most Companies Will
Continue to Use Expanded Access

2. Charting Industry’s Path Forward

CONCLUSION

Appendix

 

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, a petition started to circulate the Internet, urging the CEO of BioMarin Pharmaceutical to provide its investigational drug BMN-673 to then forty-five-year-old attorney Andrea Sloan, who was undergoing treatment for late stage ovarian cancer.[1] With standard treatments no longer an option, her physicians proposed trying BMN-673, one of a new class of cancer drugs called PARP inhibitors developed by BioMarin. The advanced nature of Sloan’s cancer disqualified her from enrolling in a clinical trial, so instead she and her physicians sought access to BMN-673 through the U.S. Food & Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) expanded access program, which allows pre-approval use of drugs outside of the clinical trial setting.[2]

The FDA confirmed Sloan was a candidate for expanded access use, but that confirmation did not guarantee use. That decision was left to the discretion of the company. BioMarin declined to provide BMN-673 because the drug was still in early phase of development: “It would be unethical and reckless to provide [BMN-673 to] end-stage refractory ovarian cancer patients outside a clinical trial.”[3] This decision sparked the Change.org petition that ultimately secured more than 230,000 signatures.[4] Even with this overwhelming public support, BioMarin maintained its position. A different company, which was developing a similar drug, eventually provided Sloan with access on the condition that it remain unidentified. Sloan started the treatment, but her cancer had progressed, and she died shortly thereafter.[5]

Sloan’s expanded access experience is not unique. A number of patients, with the support of their friends and families, launched similar online campaigns, seeking access to investigational medicines after becoming frustrated with companies’ unwillingness to accommodate expanded access requests for investigational drugs.[6] Some were successful; others were not. These campaigns, including Sloan’s, increased public awareness and dialogue regarding terminally ill patients’ ability to access investigational medicine and helped spark a national legislative movement promoting such individuals’ “right to try.”[7]

In 2015, Texas was the twenty-first state to adopt righttotry legislation.[8] The Texas bill was named in Andrea Sloan’s memory. These laws, despite often having bipartisan support, have been divisive, with supporters claiming that the right to try offers “real hope,[9] and critics maintaining that the right to try is merely political theatrics and ultimately will do more harm than good for individual patients.[10] Forty-one states have adopted righttotry laws since the movement first launched in 2014.[11] That success sparked a push for a federal righttotry law.

President Donald J. Trump voiced his support for such legislation in his 2018 State of the Union address: “People who are terminally ill should not have to go from country to country to seek a cure—I want to give them a chance right here at home. It is time for the Congress to give these wonderful Americans the ‘right to try.’”[12] That endorsement was the final nudge Congress needed. On May 30, 2018, President Trump signed the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017 (“Right to Try Act”).[13]

This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly looks back at the FDA’s history and the impact of two significant drug crises in establishing the agency’s current framework before explaining the current drug development process. Part II recounts previous challenges to this regulatory framework, which ultimately led to the development of the current expanded access program. Part II also examines the current expanded access program and, more specifically, the evaluation criteria applied by three of its key decisionmakers: the treating physician; the manufacturer; and the FDA.

Part III traces the beginnings of the right to try movement, examining the rationale for the laws and exploring how social media and increased direct-to-consumer advertising of approved drugs possibly created an opening for widespread support of these laws. Part III also explores why the FDA’s efforts to address criticisms of the expanded access program were unable to dissuade enactment of the Right to Try Act. Part IV provides an overview of the Right to Try Act and how the Act differs from expanded access. Part IV further explores why, in general, mainstream industry likely will not adopt the righttotry pathway, before arguing that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies should avoid maintaining their current positions regarding pre-approval access, and instead address some of the criticisms raised during the right-totry movement by (1) revising their existing expanded access policies and (2) improving clinical trial access.

I.  A Brief History of the FDA and the current Drug development process

To better understand the rationale for the FDA’s regulatory framework and the role it has “effectively balanc[ing] the interests of those patient populations who would benefit from having greater access to investigational drugs, with the broader interests of society in having safe and effective new therapies approved for marketing and widely available,”[14] Part I of this Note reviews how the FDA’s authority developed in response to two significant drug safety crises and provides a primer on the current drug development process.

A.  The Origins of the FDA’s Regulatory Framework

The origins of the FDA can be traced back to the 1800s, but two drug safety crises prompted the development of the agency’s current regulatory framework. The deaths of more than one hundred people from an untested drug formulation led to the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”), which required manufacturers to show “that any new drug was safe before it could be marketed.”[15] The initial effectiveness of the FDCA was limited. If the agency did not respond to a new drug application[16] within sixty days, the drug was automatically approved for public consumption.[17] The FDCA also did not require standardized drug testing.[18] This remained the regulatory environment—despite efforts by some to address these shortcomings—until the second drug safety crisis of the twentieth century.

In 1960, the manufacturer of the thenpopular sedative thalidomide submitted a marketing application for the drug in the United States.[19] The FDA refused to grant approval over concerns about inadequate and deficient safety data.[20] The manufacturer had distributed “more than two and a half million tablets . . . to approximately 20,000 patients” in the United States for clinical testing, but few, if any, of these individuals were actually monitored after receiving the drug.[21] The drug was eventually linked to an “epidemic of congenital malformations.”[22] The global thalidomide crisis motivated politicians to reconsider legislation that would have “tightened restrictions surrounding the surveillance and approval process for drugs.”[23]

Two years later, in 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendment “to assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs.[24] This amendment eliminated the FDCA’s de facto approval loophole and extended the review period to 180 days.[25] Even more significant, the Kefauver-Harris Amendment “laid the groundwork for the [current multi-phased] system of clinical trials”[26] by requiring a manufacturer to submit “substantial evidence” of an investigational drug’s safety and efficacy with its marketing application.[27]

B.  The Drug Development Process

A manufacturer or other protocol sponsor,[28] before conducting a clinical trial, must first submit an investigational new drug (“IND”) application.[29] The IND provides an overview of the biopharmaceutical company’s general investigational plan and clinical trial protocols for the drug.[30] The plan must provide:

(a) [t]he rationale for the drug or research study;

(b) the indication(s) to be studied;

(c) the general approach to be followed in evaluating the drug;

(d) the kinds of clinical trials to be conducted in the first year . . . ;

(e) the estimated number of patients . . . ; and

(f) any risks of particular severity or seriousness anticipated on the basis of the toxicological data in animals or prior studies in humans with the drug or related drugs.[31]

The IND gives the FDA the information it needs to assess the safety of the proposed phase I trials and the “scientific quality of [the proposed phase II and III trials] and the likelihood that the [trials] will yield data capable of meeting statutory standards for marketing approval.”[32]

In phase I, a manufacturer assesses the drug’s safety and determines the appropriate dosage for subsequent trials.[33] The participants are typically healthy volunteers but depending on the condition may be patient volunteers.[34] The enrollment size of these trials is small. A single phase I trial might enroll anywhere between twenty to eighty volunteers.[35] The Biotechnology Innovation Organization (“BIO”) estimates that approximately 60% of drugs advance from phase I to phase II clinical trials.[36]

In phase II, the investigational drug is tested in patient volunteers who have the disease or condition.[37] This commonly involves a randomized clinical trial in which patients are randomly assigned either the investigational drug or some other treatment—“either an inactive substance (placebo), or a different drug that is usually considered the standard of care for the disease”—without knowing which treatment they are receiving.[38] The manufacturer then compares the effectiveness of the investigational drug to the effectiveness of the alternative treatment.[39] Phase II clinical trials are also required to assess the drug’s “common short-term side effects and risks.”[40] In general, this is the stage of development with the lowest success rate”—almost 70% of drugs fail to move beyond phase II.[41]

The pre-approval development process culminates with phase III clinical trials,[42] which are intended to produce “statistically significant data about the safety, efficacy and overall benefit-risk relationship of the investigational medicine.”[43] This data is an integral component of the new drug application a manufacturer submits to the FDA.[44] To obtain statistically significant data, these studies often require a substantial number of volunteers—sometimes upwards of 5,000 volunteers depending on the disease or condition.[45]

The recruitment process throughout clinical development can take several years and be very expensive, with manufacturers often struggling to fully enroll their clinical trials.[46] The low accrual rates can be the result of strict inclusion and exclusion criteria.[47] Still, manufacturers can be resistant to making the criteria less restrictive and more inclusive,[48] perhaps because lessstandardized patients might make it harder to parse through data, extend the length or size of a clinical trial, increase the risk of adverse events potentially impacting a drug’s safety profile and potentially its approval, and make clinical development more expensive.[49]

The estimated time from discovery to FDA approval of a drug is now at least ten years. The cost of development is estimated between $10 million and $2.6 billion, with the higher estimate factoring in costs associated with investigational drugs that never advance beyond clinical development.[50] These costs are then passed on to patients, with some cancer therapies costing upwards of $375,000.[51] “The U.S. spent nearly $88 billion treating cancer in 2014, with patients paying nearly $4 billion out-of-pocket.”[52] All of that spending, however, does not necessarily translate into positive outcomes for every patient.[53]

II.  ChalLenges to the regulatory framework and an overview of the Expanded access program

A.  Prior Pre-Approval Access Challenges

The tension—highlighted most recently by the right-to-try movement—between ensuring patients have access to potentially groundbreaking medicines as soon as possible and ensuring that these therapies are both safe and effective is not nascent. There have been three significant pre-approval access challengesstarting with Rutherford v. United States in 1975to the FDA’s regulatory framework since the enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Amendment.

1.  1970s: Laetrile, the FDCA, and Rutherford v. United States

In 1975, a few individuals with terminal cancer filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the FDA from obstructing the interstate shipment and sale of the alternative treatment laetrile because it was not approved by the FDA.[54] The district court ordered the FDA to allow patients pre-approval access.[55] On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit referred the issue to the FDA,[56] which found laetrile was a new drug within the meaning of the FDCA and could be barred from interstate sale until the necessary safety and efficacy data was submitted for FDA review and received FDA approval.[57] The district court vacated that decision on statutory and constitutional grounds,[58] and the FDA appealed.[59] The Tenth Circuit—rather than relying on the district court’s reasoning—held instead that the FDCA’s “‘safety’ and ‘effectiveness’ terms” did not apply to individuals with terminal cancer diagnoses.[60]

The case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court, which decided in favor of the agency’s FDCA interpretation.[61] The Court held the FDCA made “no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients” based on the statute’s plain language.[62] The Court also explained that it could not imply a statutory exception because the “legislative history and consistent administrative interpretation” of the FDCA did not support one.[63]

2.  1980s–1990s: The Reagan Administration and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

 After President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, his administration ushered in widespread deregulation efforts across all areas of government.[64] Those efforts included (1) amending the FDCA, which the administration viewed as unnecessarily delaying drug approvals, and (2) establishing a defined program for terminally patients seeking access to investigational drugs for treatment rather than research purposes.[65] The FDA, in response to the administration’s latter concern, proposed codifying the agency’s existing informal pre-approval access procedures.[66] Those efforts became even more urgent with the HIV/AIDS epidemic though the agency’s efforts and the administration’s initial concern regarding pre-approval access were not aimed directly at aiding individuals with HIV/AIDS.[67]

 The FDA promulgated several significant changes not only to improve patient access outside of the clinical trial setting to drugs still in clinical development, but also to reduce the length of time between discovery and final FDA approval. The latter issue being one in which the interests of activists and manufacturers aligned, as both advocated for changes to the regulatory framework.[68] First, the FDA amended its regulations in 1987 to allow widespread access to an investigational drug outside of the clinical trial setting through a “treatment protocol.”[69] The agency continued to apply an informal standard for individual requests until the Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 codified the expanded access program, which specifically addressed the need for a formal individual patient request process.[70] Second, the FDA created the Accelerated Approval pathway[71] and introduced a striated review framework[72] to speed up the availability of promising new drugs intended for the treatment of serious diseases or conditions. Subsequent congressional action in 1997 and 2012 armed the FDA with two additional means to further reduce the time from initial development of a drug to its approval.[73]

3.  2000s: Pre-Approval Access, a Proposal, and Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach

There was not another significant challenge to the drug development and approval process until an organization, seeking to improve terminally ill patients’ abilities to obtain investigational drugs, proposed a “three-tiered approval system.”[74] The first approval tier would have allowed limited marketing of investigational drugs following completion of phase I trials.[75] The organizationthe Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (the Abigail Alliance”)[76]claimed terminally ill patients with no other treatment options faced a “different risk-benefit tradeoff” and should have the option to try investigational drugs.[77] The FDA rejected this proposal, explaining that this approach “would upset the appropriate balance” by “giving almost total weight to the goal of early availability and giving little recognition to the importance of marketing drugs with reasonable knowledge . . . of their likely clinical benefit and their toxicity.”[78]

The Abigail Alliance, agency rejection in hand, filed an action against the FDA.[79] The organization sought to block the agency’s policy prohibiting the pre-approval sale of drugs to individuals with terminal conditions.[80] The Abigail Alliance argued that the FDA’s policy “violate[d] terminally ill patients’ constitutional privacy and liberty rights, as well as their due process rights to life.”[81] The district court found these claims legally unpersuasive.[82] But a United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) panel, in a 2–1 split, agreed with the group, holding that the due process clause protected the right of terminally ill patients to decide whether to use investigational drugs that the FDA had determined were safe enough for additional clinical trials after reviewing results from phase I clinical trials.[83] The panel directed the district court to determine whether the FDA’s policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.[84]

The FDA’s request for an en banc hearing was granted before a lower court could apply strict scrutiny.[85] The court en banc flatly rejected the panel’s decision.[86] The court expressed “serious doubt” about the constitutional validity of the Abigail Alliance’s articulated right: a “fundamental right of access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs.”[87] To establish its articulated right, the Abigail Alliance needed to illustrate a tradition of accessibility to drugs that were not proven to be safe or effective.[88] The en banc court found that “FDA regulation of post-phase I drugs [was] entirely consistent with [the United States’] historical tradition of prohibiting the sale of unsafe drugs.”[89] The en banc court also disputed the group’s effectiveness argument, noting the existence of “at least some drug regulation prior to [the Kefauver-Harris Amendment] address[ing] efficacy.”[90] The en banc court also dismissed the Abigail Alliance’s argument that the right to self-preservationbased on the common law doctrine of necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the right to self-defensecreated a constitutionally protected right in this context.[91] The court concluded that the Abigail Alliance’s articulated right was not fundamental.[92] The court held that “the FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational drugs [was] rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects.”[93]

Two years after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abigail Alliance, the FDA finally issued revised expanded access regulation clarifying the process by which an individual patient could request expanded access.[94] The current expanded access program is discussed in greater detail below.

B.  The Expanded Access Program

The expanded access program, as discussed, was designed to address concern that some individuals may not have an opportunity to try a promising therapy given the sometimes ten-year path to formal regulatory approval. The expanded access program allows some patients with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases to use an investigational medical product (drug, biologic, or medical device) for treatment outside of clinical trials when no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy options are available.”[95] The program is available for individual patient use, intermediate-size patient use, and widespread patient use.[96] In addition to the patient, there are three other important decisionmakers. Section II.B.1 describes how a physician would initiate an expanded access request for an individual patient. Sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 then discuss the criteria used by biopharmaceutical companies and the FDA to determine eligibility in the individualpatient setting.

1.  How a Physician Requests Expanded Access for Individual Patient Use

Prior to initiating an expanded access request for a patient, the requesting physician must first conclude that “the probable risk to the person from the investigational drug is not greater than the probable risk from the disease or condition.”[97]

After this determination is made, the physician must then seek a letter of authorization (“LOA”) from the manufacturer.[98] The request must be made by a physician. The LOA allows the FDA to refer to the requested investigational drug’s IND file instead of requiring the requesting physician to obtain confidential information regarding the drug’s pharmacology, toxicology, chemistry, or manufacturing process.[99] As evidenced by Andrea Sloan’s unsuccessful request, this has been the greatest source of frustration for patients seeking expanded access use. Aside from Pfizer, most companies do not disclose how many requests they receive or grant each year.[100] This step of the process can also be lengthy as current FDA regulation does not impose a time restraint.[101] So even if a company acknowledges receipt of a request within twotothree business days,[102] the company is not required to expediently review that request, which often involves multiple parties within a company.[103]

If the company agrees to grant use and provides a LOA, the requesting physician would then submit an application form to the FDA. The FDA asks the physician to provide an overview of the patient’s clinical history, the rationale for the expanded access request, and the proposed treatment plan.[104] The FDA has up to thirty days to review the application and provide feedback.[105] A 2017 U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report found that the FDA’s median response time was no more than nineteen days for non-emergency situations.[106]

While the FDA reviews the application, the physician must also obtain approval from his or her institution’s or hospital’s institutional review board (“IRB”).[107] The requesting physician can also request a waiver from the FDA, which would allow the expanded access request to be reviewed by either the IRB chair or another designated member.[108] The physician must also discuss the expanded access requirements with the patient and secure the patient’s informed consent to treatment.[109]

2.  How Companies Evaluate an Individual Patient Request

The expanded access regulation does not prescribe the criteria a manufacturer should use when determining whether to grant an expanded access request.[110] Industry groups Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) and BIO, however, have each separately published guiding principles for the groups’ respective members that closely mirror the evaluation criteria used by the FDA.[111] PhRMA recommends that manufacturers consider five factors: (1) whether the individual has exhausted all available treatment options for a serious or life-threatening illness; (2) whether “[t]he investigational drug [is] under active clinical development”; (3) whether “[t]he patient is ineligible for, or otherwise unable to participate in, clinical trials”; (4) whether [t]he potential benefit to the patient [outweighs the] potential risk”; and (5) whether approving the request would interfere with the “successful completion of the clinical trial process.”[112]

A survey of twenty biopharmaceutical companies’ eligibility criteria[113] illustrates that most large companies offering expanded access have adopted criteria modeled off either PhRMA or BIO’s guidelines, with only slight variations.[114] In general, companies include criteria limiting expanded access to patients with serious or life-threatening conditions. The extent to which a patient must have tried standard treatment options and must not have other treatment options available varies. A few companies require the patient to have tried standard treatments unsuccessfully and to not have other treatment options available. Other companies just require that the patient does not have other treatment options available. The real difference in this language, however, might be just semantics.

Of the companies surveyed, one also factored in a patient’s ability to regularly travel to a treating site for observation and follow-up while receiving the investigational drug when deciding whether to grant an expanded access request.[115] Likewise, manufacturers will not consider an expanded access request unless the drug is in active development (that is, the company cannot have discontinued the program), but some companies choose to define this criterion more narrowly than BIO or PhRMA.[116] Take for examples, Merck, Amgen, and Allergan, which will not grant requests for a specific drug unless the company is actively developing the drug in the proposed intended use.[117] The criteria used by Merck and a few other companies also requires that the company have plans to submit a marketing application.[118]

Given concerns about expanded access impacting clinical trial enrollment, companies are hesitant to grant an expanded access request unless the individual is unable to participate in a clinical trial. This criterion is generally left vague, but some companies provide specific factors that they will or will not consider.[119] For example, under Genentech’s criteria, an individual who lives too far away from a clinical trial center would not be considered ineligible for a clinical trial and therefore would not qualify for expanded access based on this factor alone.[120] In contrast, Pfizer and Teva Pharmaceutical would consider geographic limitations as a factor affecting a patient’s ability to participate in a clinical trial.[121]

All of the companies surveyed included a criterion requiring the potential benefits of the drug to outweigh the potential combined risks of the treatment and the disease to the individual patient.[122] To make this risk-benefit assessment, PhRMA explains, there should be sufficiently robust preliminary safety and efficacy data, including dosing information, to determine that the preliminary benefit-risk balance is positive for the specific indication for which the request is made.”[123] While some companies keep this criterion vague to allow for greater discretion, a few companies’ criteria specifically mentions a dosing requirement.[124] Although most companies’ criteria did not distinguish between children and adults, one company’s guidelines specifically require sufficient pediatric data to determine the appropriate dosage before it will grant expanded access use for a child.[125]

Like the other criteria, almost all of the companies surveyed had some language in their expanded access guidelines addressing the clinical trial process and, more specifically, the need to ensure that pre-approval access use did not interfere with the clinical trial process.[126] A few companies specifically consider whether they have adequate drug supply for both their clinical trials and expanded access when making the determination.[127] While not specifically addressed, this criterion likely also considers the extent to which expanded access use might impact other aspects of clinical development, such as the FDA’s use of adverse events occurring during expanded access use, when reviewing an investigational drug’s marketing application.[128] A few companies also build in additional discretion by allowing their medical teams to establish additional criteria in light of a given drug’s current development and available data.[129]

As discussed, however, most companies do not disclose how many expanded access requests they receive or, of those, how many they grant.[130] This lack of disclosure makes it difficult for physicians, patients, or even the FDA to hypothesize how companies apply their criteria when reviewing an expanded access request. Two companies have made this type of information publicly available, but through different channels and with different levels of information. Pfizer, for example, discloses its overall expanded access approval rate on its website, but it does not explain the rationale for the small percentage of denials. By contrast, as part of a case study in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”), Janssen released limited expanded access data regarding one investigational drug for a distinct period of time. That study reported the most common reason the company denied a request was an unfavorable risk-benefit profile.[131]

3.  How the FDA Evaluates an Individual Patient Request

The FDA, as mentioned, must review all expanded access requests. When reviewing an expanded access requestwhether for individual patient use, intermediate-size patient use, or widespread patient usethe FDA examines three threshold criteria: (1) patient eligibility; (2) risk-benefit analysis; and (3) impact on clinical trials.

a.  Patient Eligibility

The patient or group of patients must have a “serious or immediately life-threatening disease or condition,” in which “no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy” is available.[132] An “immediately life-threatening disease” is defined as a stage of disease in which there is reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely without early treatment.”[133] A “serious disease” is defined as one “associated with morbidity that has substantial impact on day-to-day functioning.”[134] The FDA has previously authorized expanded access use for serious diseases like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”), narcolepsy, and Alzheimer’s disease.[135] In guidance from the FDA, the agency further clarifies its standard for a serious disease explaining: “short-lived and self-limiting morbidity will usually not be sufficient to qualify a condition as serious, but the morbidity need not be irreversible, provided it is persistent or recurrent.”[136] The FDA interprets no comparable or satisfactory therapy to “mean that there exists no other available therapy to treat the patient’s condition or that the patient has tried available therapies and failed to respond adequately or is intolerant to them.”[137]

b.  Risk-Benefit Analysis

The second requirement is that the “potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the treatment use and those potential risks are not unreasonable in the context of the disease.[138] This criterion acknowledges “the need for the risks and benefits of drugs to be well characterized” before the FDA will grant an expanded access request for an individual or group of patients.[139] This criterion is not intended to establish a uniform minimum approval threshold; that determination is dependent on the expanded access category and the seriousness of the disease.[140]

c.  Impact on Clinical Trials

The availability of expanded access also hinges on the FDA’s determination that “providing the investigational drug . . . will not interfere with . . . clinical investigations that could support marketing approval.[141] While it is understandable that many patients would prefer to secure an investigational drug outside of the confines of a clinical trial, especially given their randomized nature, expanded access use cannot “compromise enrollment in the trials” that would ultimately support a marketing application.[142] This criterion attempts to address concerns that expanded access would reduce individuals’ willingness to participate in clinical trials, especially given evidence that approximately 3% of adults with cancer enroll in clinical trials.[143]

* * *

The three expanded access categories each have additional category-specific criteria that the FDA must consider before granting a request (Table 1).With an individual patient expanded access request, the FDA must also conclude that “the patient cannot obtain the drug under another IND or protocol.”[144] This means that the patient is either ineligible to enroll in ongoing clinical trials based on eligibility criteria or unable to enroll for some other reason.[145]

The FDA approves most expanded access requests.[146] Between 2012 and 2015, the agency approved approximately 99% of the more than 5,000 single-patient expanded access requests it received.[147] The FDA does not just rubber-stamp these requests. The FDA made “meaningful changes in approximately 10 percent of these cases to enhance patient safety” such as adjusting dosage, increasing safety oversight, and strengthening informed consent.[148] FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb explained:

[t]he changes are based on the scientific and medical expertise of our staff, and informed by confidential information provided to FDA by product sponsors during the course of development. This information is often unavailable to the treating physician—and the larger medical community—and becomes available only after a drug is approved.[149]

The real question is how many expanded access requests never reach the FDA because the manufacturer declines to provide a letter of authorization.[150]

III.  THE RIGHTTOTRY MOVEMENT

In 2014, the Goldwater Institute, a conservative and libertarian public policy think tank, launched a new initiative based on patients’ right to “some choice over their own destinies.”[151] The think tank’s initial goal was to pass state laws giving terminally ill patients the right to obtain access to investigational drugs that have completed phase I clinical trials without interference from the FDA.[152] This goal was later expanded to secure the enactment of a federal law under the same premise.

Section III.A outlines and assesses the movement’s rationale for proposing a new pre-approval access pathway before briefly discussing the movement’s success at the state level. Section III.B examines the FDA’s attempts to address the movement’s claims and why those attempts by the agency were insufficient. Section III.C discusses the efforts by Senator Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) to secure enactment of federal right to try legislation.

A.  The Movement’s Rationale for Right to Try and Success at the State Level

1.  The RighttoTry Movement’s Rationale

The arguments for right to try can be distilled to three main claims: (1) the expanded access program is “so riddled with bureaucracy and delay that a patient’s chances of obtaining potentially lifesaving treatment in time are practically negligible”;[153] (2) the FDA is irreparably broken because it prevents individuals from using “potentially lifesaving medicines and treatments until those treatments receive final approval”;[154] and (3) patients with life-threatening diseases should be allowed to try an investigational drug that has already passed the FDA’s basic safety testing in phase I trials and remains within the FDA’s approval process because they are “safe.”[155]

a.  The Expanded Access Program Is Overly Bureaucratic and Slow

The Goldwater Institute specifically claimed that the expanded access program burdens people’s right to try because: (1) the FDA has “unfettered authority to deny a terminal patient access . . . for a variety of reasons, including nonmedical reasons”; (2) the application is overly burdensome and complicated for requesting physicians; and (3) the IRB review requirement prolongs and prevents access for patients undergoing treatment at non-academic centers outside of major metropolitan areas.[156]

There are two problems with the first part of this claim. First, this claim completely ignores the GAO report findings, which suggest a contrary proposition.[157] Second, this claim fails to acknowledge that sign-off from the FDA is only the last step in the process.[158] Take Andrea Sloan’s story as an example. The FDA acknowledged Sloan was an appropriate candidate for expanded access, but BioMarin would not provide BMN-673.[159] While the FDA approves nearly all of the expanded access requests it receives, the perception is that the bigger obstacle is manufacturer cooperation.[160] Most companies do not publicly disclose the number of requests received or promote the number of times the company has approved an individual patient’s request.[161] Of the company policies surveyed in Section II.B.2,[162] only Pfizer publicized information on its website about the number of requests it received and how many were approved by the company.[163] The lack of collective disclosure by manufacturers––and the inability of the FDA to require manufacturers to provide this information––leaves the public and politicians with a myopic view of the expanded access program.

The FDA has since introduced Form FDA 3926 (“Individual Patient Expanded Access – Investigational New Drug Application”) and modified the IRB review requirement addressing the second and third part of this claim, which are both discussed in greater detail in Section III.B. These changes could improve accessibility to the expanded access program over time.

 b.  The FDA Regulatory Framework Is Broken

The Goldwater Institute argued that the current regulatory framework is broken because it can take years before the FDA approves a drug. Yet instead of offering a solution to address the clinical trial process (for example, lobbying for legislation to support the use of different clinical trial designs,[164] or to incentivize companies to reconsider their rationale for certain inclusion and exclusion criteria that could provide data that more accurately reflects real-world patients[165])––which could potentially improve access to investigational drugs more broadly––the organization decided the easier path was pre-approval access legislation that cut-out the FDA. This strategy was shortsighted and arguably based on the Goldwater Institute’s overarching goal of limiting the FDA’s oversight of drugs for all patients and not just those drugs designed for the treatment of immediately life-threatening diseases.[166]

The claim that the framework is “broken” also focuses on speed to the detriment of safety and efficacy. The need for adequate safety and effectiveness data can prolong the drug approval process,[167] however, even with these requirements, the FDA is consistently faster at approving investigational drugs than other regulatory authorities. For example,

[a]mong the 289 unique novel therapeutic agents [approved between 2001 and 2010], 190 were approved in both the United States and Europe (either by the EMA or through the mutual recognition process), of which 121 (63.7%) were first approved in the United States; similarly, 154 were approved in both the United States and Canada, of which 132 (85.7%) were first approved in the United States.[168]

The speed with which a drug is approved, however, should not be the only priority—safety and efficacy are still important concerns. Some argue the agency is now underemphasizing these two criteria in its aim to ensure patients can access novel drugs more quickly.[169] A JAMA study found that “nearly a third of [drugs] approved [by the FDA] from 2001 through 2010 had major safety issues years after they were widely available to patients.”[170] A patient with a life-threatening disease or condition may understandably be frustrated by the lengthy development timeline, especially when a drug is touted as a potential “breakthrough” early on in its development cycle. However, pre-approval access without FDA oversight does not directly fix this lag between development and approval; it could make it worse for everyone if patients attempt to seek pre-approval access instead of enrolling in clinical trials.[171]

 c.  Patients Should Be Allowed to Use Investigational Drugs that Have Completed Phase I Clinical Testing

Finally, the Goldwater Institute’s claim that patients should be able to try investigational drugs because completion of phase I testing renders them safe fails to acknowledge that most investigational drugs are not approved by the FDA. The “overall likelihood of [FDA] approval . . . from Phase I for all developmental candidates [between 2006 and 2015] was 9.6%.”[172] The successful completion of a phase I clinical trial also does not guarantee a drug’s safety, and in general, investigational drugs have the lowest successful transition rates at phase II.[173] Take the example of fialuridine. In 1993, five individuals enrolled in a phase II clinical trial studying the use of fialuridine in hepatitis B died, despite an earlier phase I clinical trial in which 25% of a twenty-four-patient trial were cured after receiving fialuridine for twenty-eight days.[174] This example might seem extreme, but it still illustrates the risks associated with equating successful completion of a phase I trial with a broad endorsement of safety. As discussed, an approved drug’s safety profile is also not fully understood until sometimes years after it is approved. The potential harm of an investigational drug, even to someone “facing imminent death,” still needs to be considered before allowing an individual with a serious or life-threatening disease to use the investigational drug merely on the basis of completion of phase I testing.[175]

In conclusion, the movement’s rationales for these laws were misplaced and ill-guided. There is no doubt, however, that despite these claims, the Goldwater Institute was successful in securing the support necessary to pass both state and federal legislation.

2.  The Movement’s Success at the State Level

Post-Abigail Alliance, efforts were made to enact legislation to amend the expanded access program. While these federal bills failed to make it beyond congressional committee,[176] the state righttotry bills, from the outset, gained more support. There are several possible reasons for this increased support. First, information regarding investigational drugs, especially data from medical meetings, has become more accessible with the Internet and social media.[177] This increased accessibility is good, but it also can lead to increased interest in investigational drugs—especially when a drug is deemed “revolutionary” by the medical community, even with limited safety and efficacy data.[178] Timothy Turnham, the former executive director at the Melanoma Research Foundation, explains: “There is a disconnect between what researchers think is statistically significant and what is really significant for patients . . . . Patients hear ‘progress,’ and they think that means they’re going to be cured.”[179]

Second, there has been an increase in direct-to-consumer advertising of approved specialty drugs for the treatment of conditions such as cancer and autoimmune disorders by pharmaceutical companies[180] and of specific practices areas such as oncology and organ transplantation by cancer hospitals.[181] The United States is one of only a small number of countries which allows drug company advertising to not only mention an approved drug and its intended use, but also claims about its safety and efficacy.[182] These advertisements—though meant to be scientifically accurate—can also sometimes have misleading effects on people’s perceptions of their individual health outcomes.[183] If patients’ perceptions are skewed when they see a television advertisement claiming an FDA-approved drug will give them “a chance to live longer,” it is reasonable to think that patients’ perceptions could be equally skewed about investigational drugs given that investigational drugs are often touted as “revolutionary” at medical meetings by the manufacturers, tweeted as “ground-breaking” by physicians, and reported as “life-saving” by media, as compared to the currently available treatment option.

Third, with social media, individual patients like Andrea Sloan have a more accessible, widely-used platform by which to raise awareness of their struggle to obtain these investigational drugs through expanded access.[184] In the past, publicized efforts to pressure manufacturers for expanded access were generally a coordinated effort led by advocacy groups, aimed at obtaining an investigational drug for more widespread use.[185] Individual patients were often left to phone calls and letter writing with slim chance of successfully obtaining an experimental treatment without a connection.[186] This changed with social media. The news media found these campaigns and latched onto Sloan’s and other patients’ stories with headlines like “Company Denies Drug to Dying Child” and “Merck Expands Cancer Drug Access but too Late for Denver Dad,” which only amplified the public’s frustration with expanded access.[187] The social media campaigns and media attention, in turn, increased pressure on politicians to fix the system and allow individuals access to investigational drugs.[188]

The Goldwater Institute initially targeted more conservative states like Colorado, Arizona, and Texas,[189] but the movement also gained traction and success in more liberal states like California and Oregon.[190] The state bills also often had little political opposition and were supported by members on both sides of the aisle.[191] In total, forty states adopted righttotry laws prior to the enactment of the federal Right to Try Act. With Alaska’s enactment of its own righttotry law in July 2018, that total is now forty-one states.[192]

The goal of these state-level righttotry laws, as discussed, is to enable terminally ill patients to bypass the FDA expanded access program and request pre-approval use directly from manufacturers, but there are variations in these laws’ provisions regarding, among other things, cost recovery,[193] insurance coverage,[194] and informed consent.[195] The extent to which those variations now matter given the enactment of the Right to Try Act of 2017 is still not fully clear, but as discussed below, at least some are likely still applicable.

B.  The FDA’s Response

In response to the righttotry advocates’ criticisms, the FDA further clarified and modified aspects of the expanded access program to address its perceived shortcomings. The FDA also stepped up efforts to increase awareness and understanding of the expanded access program.

1.  Clarifying the FDA’s Use of Clinical Outcomes

A major issue for manufacturerswhich face external pressure from investors, physicians, and patient groups to bring new drugs to marketconcerns the potential impact an adverse event during expanded access use could have on an investigational drug’s development and subsequent agency review.[196] This concern was likely overstated, particularly given that “clinical safety data from expanded access treatment” has only been considered in a “small number of cases” when determining an approved drug’s label,[197] and that such a criterion has never been used to deny approval.[198] Still, the potential for an adverse event was often cited as an obstacle for patients seeking expanded access use.[199]

The FDA attempted to address these concerns, even if arguably overstated, by clarifying its policy. The treating physician needs to report only “suspected [serious or unexpected] adverse reactions . . . if there is evidence to suggest a causal relationship between the drug and the adverse event.”[200] The agency also noted that given the nature of expanded access use (in other words, an investigational drug administered outside of a controlled clinical trial to a terminally ill patient with multiple comorbidities), it would be difficult to often establish the necessary causal relationship.[201]

This modification, however, did not address the other major concern raised by manufacturers: the lack of a readily available supply of the drug sought for expanded access.[202] The FDA cannot directly tackle this issue, but it could affect the drug supply indirectly through clinical trial policies promoting diversity and inclusion.[203] This, in turn, could help some patients, who are willing to participate in a clinical trial but are instead driven to seek expanded access due to their failure to satisfy clinical eligibility requirements given age or certain comorbidities.[204]

2.  Demystifying Manufacturers’ Eligibility Criteria

A long-standing frustration for patients and their physicians was biopharmaceutical companies’ lack of transparency regarding how they evaluated expanded access requests. Before the enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”), manufacturers were not required to disclose their evaluation processes.[205] A few biopharmaceutical companies released their criteria after either coming under pressure from patients’ social media campaigns, which requested expanded access, or observing the impact that such campaigns had on other, similar companies.[206] Generally, however, this information was not easily available to patients or physicians.[207]

The Cures Act now requires manufacturers to disclose how they evaluate and respond to individual patient requests for access to investigational drugs.[208] The following information must be included on a manufacturer’s website: (1) contact information; (2) expanded access request procedures; (3) individual patient eligibility criteria; (4) anticipated response time; and (5) a link or other reference to information about the clinical trials of the drug for which expanded access is sought, available on ClinicalTrials.gov.[209]

Three primary issues have impacted the Cures Act’s effectiveness. First, not all companies are in compliance with its provisions.[210] The Cures Act does not contain an enforcement mechanism to give the FDA the ability to penalize companies that do not publish policies. Second, the Cures Act does not require participation in expanded access—just that a company post its policies. Though most companies have guidelines similar to the ones previously detailed in Section II.B.2, a company is still allowed under the Cures Act to have a policy against providing expanded access, so long as that policy is available on the company’s website.[211] And even if a company’s criteria mirrors that of PhRMA’s criteria, they are still subject to interpretation by that company’s employees. This could make it difficult to determine whether a physician’s request on behalf of a patient will be approved. Third, the Cures Act does not ensure timely response—just that a company post an anticipated response time. In general, that time frame represents the estimated time to an acknowledgment rather than an estimated time to a decision.[212] The FDA seems posed to address this final issue but has not announced definite plans to institute a timing requirement.[213]

3.  Increasing Awareness of Expanded Access

The FDA has also attempted to dispel many of the misconceptions regarding expanded access and clarify the application process for physicians and patients, especially those outside of major academic medical centers. The Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, for example, created the Expanded Access Navigator.[214] This website provides an overview of the application process from both a physician and patient perspective. The physician-specific section includes contact information for independent IRB committees should a physician’s institution not have its own IRB committee,[215] and a manufacturer directory listing companies’ expanded access criteria and their anticipated response time. 

4.  Streamlining the Individual Patient Request Process

a.  Form FDA 3926

Prior to the release of Form FDA 3926, a physician could spend up to one hundred hours in his or her attempt to secure expanded access use for a single patient.[216] Although a significant portion of that estimate likely included time spent negotiating with the manufacturer to obtain a LOA and coordinating with the IRB, physicians complained the application, comprised of Form FDA 1571 (“Investigational New Drug Application”) and Form FDA 1572 (“Statement of the Investigator”),[217] was unnecessarily complex and took upwards of eight hours to complete.[218]

In 2016 the FDA rolled out a streamlined application, Form FDA 3926, to ease the application process.[219] This change was meant not only to reduce the burden on physicians already familiar with requesting expanded access, but also, more importantly, to encourage doctors less familiar with the regulatory process who may have been previously dissuaded from submitting an expanded access request for their patients because of the forms’ complexities.[220] Form FDA 3926 only requires the physician to provide: (1) the patient’s initials; (2) the date of submission; (3) the type of submission; (4) clinical information; (5) treatment information; (6) a LOA; (7) the physician’s qualification statement; and (8) the physician’s name, address, and contact information.[221] The new two-page form takes forty-five minutes to complete—a time savings of more than 90%.[222] The total application process is now estimated to take thirty hours with this new estimate likely factoring in the FDA’s simplified IRB requirement.[223]

b.  IRB Review

In October 2017, the FDA announced another change to the single-patient expanded access process. A requesting physician can now seek approval from a specifically assigned IRB or the IRB chairperson, rather than waiting for a full IRB review (in other words, a committee meeting where “a majority of the members are present”).[224] This change was intended to reduce the time between when the patient and treating physician determine an investigational drug might be appropriate and when the treating physician’s IRB approves that request, as well as to remove another potential hurdle for physicians outside of major academic centers.[225]

This modification attempts to strike the appropriate balance between oversight and timeliness as it recognizes the continued need for independent confirmatory review, while also acknowledging that full IRB review may be unnecessary in the individual patient expanded access setting, given that it could cause undue delays and potentially deter some community-based physicians from using the expanded access pathway. Yet this change also has at least one limitation and two potential drawbacks. With respect to the limitation, it is difficult to know whether hospitals will adopt this modification as it is permissive not mandatory. At least a few major centers appear to be utilizing it, though further research is necessary to determine the full extent of its adoption.[226] To facilitate more widespread adoption, the FDA or the Reagan-Udall Foundation should work with those institutions effectively utilizing the less-stringent IRB review process to develop recommended criteria that other institutions could utilize.

With respect to potential concerns, first, the modification to the IRB requirement potentially reduces the amount of independent oversight. The average IRB is composed of fourteen members, so before the change, an average of seven members would need to be present to constitute a full IRB review.[227] This change places that decision in the hands of one chairperson or another designated member; this type of reduced oversight is typically reserved for research that poses “minimal risk” to the individual.[228] Second, the FDA did not establish specific eligibility criteria for this waiver. Instead, the FDA has said such a waiver is appropriate for individual patient expanded access INDs when the physician obtains concurrence by the IRB chairperson or another designated IRB member before treatment use begins.”[229] This standard again places that decision in the hands of one person; the same person who also decides whether expanded access treatment is appropriate. To address these concerns, the FDA should closely monitor incoming expanded access requests to determine if reducing the number of IRB reviewers increases the number of denied FDA requests based on patients not meeting the eligibility criteria. As an initial step, the FDA could refer institutions incorrectly utilizing the waiver to other hospitals that are correctly applying the waiver criteria, and if that appears to not resolve this potential problem, the FDA should consider changing its policy to require at least two or three IRB members or one designated IRB member and a consulting physician specializing in the patient’s disease or condition.[230]

* * *

There were arguably three reasons that these modifications did not quell the righttotry movement and those ultimately pushing for a federal law. First, the legislation—both at the state and federal level—was not aimed at improving pre-approval access for patients, but was instead meant “to weaken” the FDA.[231] Congress did not even wait to assess the impact of the modifications before voting on the Right to Try Act, even though it had authorized the agency to release a report assessing the impact of some of these modifications in 2017.[232] That report, published after the enactment of the Right to Try Act, suggests that all of the key stakeholders, patients, physicians, manufacturers, and payers, have a positive perception of the program and the FDA’s role in pre-approval access decisions.[233] The efforts to reduce some of the administrative burdens associated with expanded access appear to be well-received.[234] In 2017 (the first full year Form FDA 3926 was available and the year the Expanded Access Navigator was launched), there were 1,151 single-patient expanded access requests, which was a 12% increase from 2016 (1,025 requests).[235] Moreover, Congress did not thoroughly assess the effectiveness of the state righttotry laws before moving forward with the federal law.

Second, the slow implementation of the FDA’s modifications likely further validated for some the righttotry advocates’ argument that the FDA is too rigid and unresponsive. For example, the modifications to the application process were introduced more than two years after the righttotry movement started.[236]

Third, the modifications, aside from the clarification regarding use of clinical outcomes, also did not address the other weakness of the expanded access program—uneven manufacturer participation.[237] The movement’s supporters argued a federal righttotry law would improve manufacturer participation in pre-approval access.[238]

C.  The Push for a Federal Right to Try

Capitalizing on the success at the state level, proponents pushed for federal legislation,[239] even though (1) there was little evidence to suggest that existing state laws had a real impact on patients’ ability to secure pre-approval access,[240] and (2) the effects of the FDA’s modifications to the expanded access program were not fully evaluated.

The first proposed bill never made it out of committee,[241] but in 2016 Senator Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) started strategically laying the groundwork. As Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, he convened a hearing to discuss how Congress could reform the regulatory framework to provide “more patients a chance to save their lives.”[242] He introduced a righttotry bill later that year,[243] but this bill was blocked by Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) who objected over the bill’s lack of bipartisan support and nonexistent review through a formal hearing process.[244] In January 2017, Senator Johnson reintroduced a federal righttotry billthe Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act of 2017 (“S. 204”).[245] On August 3, 2017, the Senate passed the bill with no opposition, thus moving the debate over right to try to the U.S. House of Representatives.[246]

The fate of S. 204 remained in limbo for several months after an October hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.[247] The momentum shifted in favor of the righttotry movement, however, after President Trump singled out the proposed righttotry law in his 2018 State of the Union address.[248] This mention was enough to reenergize efforts in the House. In March 2018, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce introduced H.R. 5247, Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2018, a narrower righttotry bill incorporating feedback from the FDA.[249] H.R. 5247 failed an initial vote on March 13, but a week later, on March 21, 2018, the bill passed by a vote of 267–149, mostly along partisan lines.[250]

H.R. 5247 never reached the Senate floor.[251] With the Senate at a standstill, the House renewed discussions over S. 204.[252] In spite of ongoing criticism from industry, patient groups, and physicians,[253] on May 22, 2018, the House passed S. 204 by a vote of 250–169, again on partisan lines.[254] On May 31, 2018, President Trump signed the Right to Try Act and declared the law a victory for patients.[255]

IV.  the Right to Try Act of 2017

A.  The Law

The Right to Try Act creates “national standards and rules by which investigational drugs may be provided to terminally ill patients.”[256] The federal law—like its predecessor state laws—is permissive and not mandatory. A manufacturer is not required and cannot be compelled to provide access to an investigational drug after receiving a righttotry request pursuant to the federal Right to Try Act.[257]

1.  Who is Eligible?

First, a patient may pursue a right-to-try request if they have a “life-threatening disease or condition.”[258] Senator Johnson chose this disease threshold, rather than the “immediately life-threatening disease” standard previously used in the expanded access program “because [he thought that the immediately life-threating disease definition] would exclude patients with Duchenne muscular dystrophy, an illness [he] explicitly intended to be covered.”[259] Second, the patient must have “exhausted approved treatment options” and be “unable to participate in a clinical trial involving the eligible investigational drug.”[260] A physician—but not necessarily the requesting physician—must certify the patient cannot participate in a clinical trial.[261] The physician who certifies that a patient is unable to participate in the clinical trial must be in “good standing” and cannot receive compensation from the manufacturer in direct response to the certification.[262] Third, the patient must provide “written informed consent”––a term that is undefined under the law, rather than using the existing federal regulation defining informed consent.[263]

2.  When Would an Investigational Drug Qualify?

To qualify for right to try, an investigational drug must satisfy four requirements. First, it must have completed a phase I clinical trial.[264] The Act does not specify whether the investigational drug must have completed a phase I clinical trial in the requested indication. The Act also does not preclude requests for investigational drugs that have only been tested in healthy volunteers. Second, the drug must not be approved for any other use.[265] Third, the manufacturer must either (1) have already filed a marketing application for the investigational drug with the FDA, or (2) be investigating the drug in a clinical trial that is “intended to form the primary basis of a claim of effectiveness in support of approval” and is the subject of an active IND.[266] This language is broad because, as Senator Johnson explains, the Act was not intended to enable the FDA to exclude any clinical trial as a basis for precluding access to treatments under right to try.”[267] Fourth, the drug must be in active development (that is, not discontinued) and not subject to a clinical hold.[268]

An investigational drug that meets these requirements is then exempt from certain statutory and regulatory requirements[269] as long as the providing company also complies with sections 312.6 (labeling of investigational new drugs), 312.7 (promoting investigational drugs), and 312.8 (charging for investigational new drugs) of the Code of Federal Regulations.[270]

3.  What are the Reporting Obligations?

a.  Companies              ’ Reporting Obligations

The Right to Try Act requires a company to file a yearly report of right-to-try use with Health and Human Services (“HHS”). This yearly report to HHS must include “the number of doses supplied, the number of patients treated, [and] the uses for which the drug was made available”; the manufacturer must also report “any known serious adverse events.”[271]

b.  FDA’s Reporting Obligations

The Right to Try Act also requires the publication of a yearly report summarizing right-to-try use on the FDA’s website. This yearly report must disclose how often the FDA determines a clinical outcome to be critical to deciding safety, how often a manufacturer asks the FDA to consider such outcomes, and how often the FDA does not consider clinical outcomes when reviewing the investigational drugs marketing application.[272]

4.  When Can the FDA Use Clinical Outcomes?

The Right to Try Act bars the FDA from considering a “clinical outcome” related to a patient’s use of an investigational drug “to delay or adversely affect the review or approval” of that drug––except in two situations.[273] The FDA is allowed to use a clinical outcome if it is (1) critical to the assessment of the investigational drug’s safety, and (2) the company that provided the investigational drug can also ask for a clinical outcome to be considered.[274] The Act does not define “critical.”

* * *

 

B.  Industry’s Potential Path Moving Forward

 This Section proceeds as follows. Section IV.B.1 explains why regardless of future FDA guidance, most companies are unlikely to adopt a two-pathway approach or even a single-pathway approach using just right to try, favoring continued use of the expanded access program instead. Section IV.B.2 argues that the status quo, however, is insufficient and that companies need to address some of the criticisms raised during the right-to-try movement by (1) revising their existing expanded access policies, and (2) improving clinical trial access.

1.  Even with the Right to Try Act, Most Companies Will Continue to Use Expanded Access

All along, right-to-try advocates have contended that the Right to Try Act’s provisions limiting liability and limiting the FDA’s use of outcome data would incentivize manufacturers to utilize this new pre-approval pathway.[275] Yet, as this Note explains below, these two provisions are not enough for most companies to utilize the Right to Try Act.[276]

Lack of Support from Key Stakeholders. The Right to Try Act lacks support from industry, advocacy groups, physician organizations, and the FDA. Companies, including Janssen and Bristol-Myers Squibb, have already stated that right-to-try requests will be funneled through the expanded access pathway.[277] Janssen announced prior to the enactment of the federal Right to Try Act that it would not “evaluate right-to-try requests because [the state] laws don’t allow for FDA input, which is ‘critical for ensuring patient safety.’”[278] Patient advocacy groups and physician organizations have not significantly changed their position on the Right to Try Act since its adoption.[279] The FDA has also since voiced its continued preference for use of the expanded access program in November 2018,[280] and announced in December 2018 a new program, “Project Facilitate,” which aims to further alleviate the criticisms of the expanded access program. Project Facilitate will establish a department within the FDA that (1) will field calls from physicians requesting expanded access on behalf of a patient and patients seeking single-patient expanded access for themselves; (2) complete Form FDA 3926, and if necessary forward the completed form to a patient’s treating physician for sign-off if the initial request was made by the patient; (3) forward the request to an IRB; and (4) ultimately submit the request to the company developing the requested drug, which must make a determination “within a specified time period . . . yet [to be] determined” by the FDA.[281] With industry generally reticent to act without agency guidance,[282] the November 2018 announcement and the forthcoming Project Facilitate arguably send strong signals to keep using the expanded access program.

Insufficient Incentives. The Right to Try Act’s provisions limiting a company’s liability and limiting the FDA’s use of outcome data are insufficient incentives. First, the Right to Try Act does limit a company’s potential liability but does not protect a manufacturer against any and all liability claims. As attorney James M. Beck notes, the Act still allows claims of reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or intentional tort.[283] The Right to Try Act also does not foreclose claims under state or federal product liability, tort, consumer protection, or warranty law.[284] A company would also be trading more liability protection for less FDA input when it is not clear further liability protection is even necessary. As others have pointed out, there are no examples of patients suing manufacturers of investigational drugs for “treatment-related harm[s]” stemming from expanded-access use.[285] Therefore, companies––at least within the context of expanded access––should have minimal concern over potential tort claims.

Second, although the Right to Try Act limits the FDA’s use of outcome data to when it is “critical” to determining safety, in practice the FDA rarely uses expanded access data when reviewing an investigational drug unless there is evidence to suggest a causal relationship.[286] Even though the FDA’s use of outcomes is often a concern for manufacturers, the FDA has assured companies it rarely uses expanded access data, so it is unclear how the Right to Try Act’s provision further limits the FDA’s use. Furthermore, as the Act does not define “critical,” without some guidance from the FDA it is unclear whether this is the same standard as used in expanded access, a more relaxed standard, or a heightened standard given that the FDA is not involved in reviewing the righttotry request and determining proper usage, such as dosage. Finally, even if the FDA is limited in its ability to assess reported events, manufacturers may still be concerned about whether any adverse events associated with righttotry use would impact regulatory approval in other countries.[287]

Third, the Right to Try Act does not contain a significant financial incentive for industry. The Act requires companies to comply with the existing regulation, which limits cost recovery to direct costs, except under specific circumstances.[288] A two-pathway approach would require companies to allocate additional money, personnel, and drug supply to another program that is outside the drug development process. With the cost of developing a new drug estimated to be around $2.6 billion,[289] it seems unlikely that manufacturers would be willing to expend any additional resources to only recoup direct costs.[290] A publicly traded company, like Pfizer or Janssen, might have the necessary financial resources and employees but will still answer to shareholders and still have concerns about maintaining adequate supply of the drug for its clinical trials.[291] A small, private company under pressure from investors is likely to have even less motivation to redirect limited resources to a two-pathway pre-approval program, or even a single-pathway program without some financial upside.[292] Take, for example, BrainStorm Therapeutics, which announced plans to offer its therapy through right to try and would have charged patients seeking the right to try its drug potentially $300,000. The company’s nowretracted plan likely did not comply with federal regulation given that it was positioned as a “semicommercial enterprise with modest profits.”[293]

Unanswered Implementation Questions. The Right to Try Act is meant to be a parallel pathway to expanded access and not a replacement, but it would be difficult for a company to implement a pre-approval access program in which both of these programs co-exist. The Right to Try Act does not provide companies considering utilizing right to try as a parallel pathway guidance to the threshold issue: when it should use right to try and when it should use expanded access. The FDA is working to develop guidance,[294] but for now it has said that companies are in the best position to make that determination.[295] While this Note identifies two potential options, each is not without their own drawbacks and complexities. A company could (1) use right to try when an investigational drug will be used by a single patient and use expanded access when an investigational drug will be used by a larger patient population, or (2) use right to try under certain pre-defined circumstances (for example, pediatric patients or patients with exceptional safety risks) and use expanded access in all other circumstances.

 The first option—use of right to try in the single-patient setting—would be administratively easier. A company would not need to develop new policies delineating between the two pathways for individual patients. That said, this approach does have potential challenges. First, individuals with certain types of serious diseases would not qualify for the righttotry pathway, therefore limiting their pre-approval access options until the drug has sufficient evidence to support expanded access for intermediate-size or widespread treatment.[296] Take, for example, the conditions narcolepsy or rheumatoid arthritis, which the FDA has said would independently qualify as a serious disease; these conditions would not be considered lifethreatening because both are considered chronic diseases and are alone not fatal.[297] Therefore, adoption of this approach would likely be dependent on a company’s investigational drug pipeline. A company with a single drug in development might be less concerned about this issue, but a company with a large disease pipeline that targets multiple different disease areas might be.

Second, it is not clear what the patient limit should be for right to try (that is, at what point should a company stop providing pre-approval access through right to try and transition over to expanded access for intermediatesize and widespread treatment). The Right to Try Act does not provide any guidance. A company should not be able to provide five, ten, or fifteen patients at a single hospital with an investigational drug through the right to try pathway. That starts looking more like an intermediate-size expanded access protocol[298] and arguably should have FDA oversight. Without specific right-to-try guidance, a manufacturer would need to rely on expanded access guidance as a benchmark for when a company should transition from the righttotry pathway to intermediate-size or widespread use through expanded access, but even then the existing FDA guidance does not address other concerns regarding the potential applicability of the Right to Try Act’s provisions limiting liability and use of outcome data once a certain patient threshold is crossed.

The second option—use of right to try under certain pre-defined settings—would be administratively more complicated, given that it would require companies to determine those pre-defined circumstances and ensure that the criteria for those standards is clear and easy to apply. That said, some companies might consider this approach in order to allow some patients who might otherwise not be eligible for expanded access to receive the drug through right to try, given the Act’s provisions limiting liability and use of outcome data. Two such settings that a company might reasonably consider are (1) patients who have exceptional safety risks[299] and (2) patients who are children.[300] The former group is frequently ineligible for a clinical trial and likely to be denied expanded access use because of manufacturers’ concerns about potential liability or adverse events impacting clinical development.[301] The latter group—often the face of the righttotry movement[302]is also frequently ineligible for industry-sponsored clinical trials and may be denied expanded access use because of manufacturers’ concerns about inadequate clinical data to determine an adequate dosage in the pediatric setting, potential liability, or adverse events impacting clinical development.[303]

This second approach is also not without its drawbacks. First, the pre-defined settings would need to be unambiguous. Though pediatric patients can be more clearly defined by age, the term “exceptional safety risks” is not susceptible to one definition, so companies allowing pre-approval access in this setting would need to establish a specific standard and make sure it is clearly communicated internally and externally. Second, with pediatric patients[304] and patients who are terminally ill,[305] there are also ethical considerations requiring companies to adopt more rigorous informed consent requirements and procedures. Take pediatric patients, for example, cases in which “[p]arents or other surrogates technically provide ‘informed permission’ for diagnosis and treatment, with the assent of the child whenever appropriate.”[306] Third, companies would also still need to refer back to the state righttotry laws to ensure their pre-defined settings are compliant. Oregon, for example, limits the right to try pathway to individuals who are at least eighteen years old.[307] This could increase the complexities of implementation. Fourth, the drawbacks relating to the first option likely would also impact the second option.

The practical complexities of operating a two-pathway approach, stemming from presently unanswered legal questions regarding the Right to Try Act and concerns that might arise from utilizing Right to Try in specific patient settings, make companies unlikely to use right to try even if the FDA provides guidance.

State Right-to-Try Laws. The applicability of state righttotry laws is also still uncertain.[308] While the Right to Try Act creates a national standard,[309] it does not explicitly preempt these state laws.[310] Senator Ron Johnson has previously stated that the Right to Try Act was meant to be the “federal counterpart” to the state righttotry laws.[311] With forty-one statelevel righttotry laws, implementation and compliance would be complicated. A company would likely need to comply with at least some of the provisions of the state righttotry laws in addition to the Right to Try Act’s provisions.

Take, for example, the California state statute’s criteria for patient eligibility, which requires a person to have: (1) “an immediately life-threatening disease or condition”; (2) “considered all other treatment options currently approved”; (3) “not been accepted to participate in the nearest clinical trial to his or her home . . . within one week of completion of the clinical trial application process, or, in the treating physician’s medical judgment, it is unreasonable for the patient to participate in that clinical trial”; (4) “received a recommendation from his or her primary physician and a consulting physician”; (5) “given written informed consent”; (6) documentation . . . attesting that the patient has met the requirements . . . .[312]

The first requirement limiting patient eligibility is narrower than the Right to Try Act.[313] The second requirement is arguably broader, because it would allow a patient to rely on the pathway after considering, but not exhausting, all treatment options. The first part of the third requirement could possibly supplement the Right to Try Act’s clinical trial requirement if it was interpreted as requiring proof of non-acceptance, but it is likely more accurately interpreted as allowing a patient to make a request within one week of not receiving a response, which is broader than the Right to Try Act. The second part of that requirement is clearly broader, however, than the federal law, as the Right to Try Act requires a physician to certify that a patient cannot participate in a clinical trial, and not just that it would be unreasonable for a patient to participate in a clinical trial; the California law uses a different standard. The fourth requirement supplements the Right to Try Act because it requires confirmation from a second physician.[314] The fifth requirement also supplements the federal law because, whereas the federal law leaves “informed consent” undefined, California defines “informed consent” in another part of the statute.[315] The sixth requirement mirrors the federal law.[316]

Although a company could theoretically challenge state right to try laws as preempted by the federal provision, this is not an issue that an individual company, or companies collectively, are likely to challenge, particularly given the high costs of litigation and limited financial incentive of success on the merits.[317] This issue could also impact patient’s actual interest[318] and healthcare providers’ willingness to offer such treatments.[319]

External Regulatory Challenges. The adoption of the Right to Try Act by industry seems less likely given that companies already face “challenges particularly related to . . . managing divergent requirements and guidance from ex-US health authorities” when implementing expanded access.[320] The potential effect of righttotry use on product development or regulatory review in other countries is unclear. And, if companies are already overly tasked from other countries’ requirements, they are not going to add another pathway to that mix.

Confidential Information. A final reason the Right to Try Act will not gain industry support is that, as practitioners James Valentine and David Clissold explain, some of the Right to Try Act’s drug eligibility requirements may require companies to “disclose details of their development program that might otherwise be confidential, commercial information.”[321] This potential disclosure requirement is not an issue with expanded access because the FDA has access to this proprietary information  through the drug’s IND file and can utilize it when evaluating an expanded access request and making recommendations regarding use and dosage.[322] With the FDA’s ability to review proprietary drug information, the expanded access program offers two benefits over the righttotry pathway—(1) it limits a company’s potential need to disclose confidential commercial development information and (2) it ensures patients who may not be undergoing treatment from a physician also acting as a clinical trial investigator can still request access to an investigational drug.[323]

These reasons make adoption of a two-pathway approach or abandonment of expanded access in favor of right to try unlikely. However, maintaining the status quo is not feasible––nor is it appropriate. Companies have already started receiving calls from patients seeking the right to try with some of those calls even escalating to threats when people are referred back to the expanded access program.[324] This could further escalate to widespread social media campaigns and media coverage if companies do not explicitly address right to try within their existing pre-approval access policies. With the public’s negative perception of the pharmaceutical industry,[325] companies need to address at least some of the criticisms raised during the righttotry debate that were not rectified through adoption of the Right to Try Act.

2.  Charting Industry’s Path Forward

a.  Companies Should Revise Existing Expanded Access Guidelines

RighttoTry Position Statement. Companies should update both their expanded access guidelines to include language that clearly addresses the Right to Try Act and their plans to only offer pre-approval access through expanded access. Some companies have already done this. Take, for example, the statement Bristol-Myers Squibb features prominently on the section of its website addressing pre-approval access:

We believe our current approach to early patient access . . . is consistent with the objectives of the Right to Try Act. Requests for early patient access to Bristol-Myers Squibb investigational medicines should continue to be made through the treating physician and by visiting Bristol-Myers Squibb Early Patient Access Requests Portal.[326]

To avoid potential criticisms from righttotry advocates and patients, companies need to take additional steps outlined below.

Company Pre-Approval Access Reporting. Companies should publish annual reports on their websites regarding their expanded access programs. Although companies are granting expanded access requests,[327] this information is often not publicly available. The reports should include detailed information, such as the number of requests received (and of those the number of requests approved), the most common reasons for a denial (for example, ability to enroll in a clinical trial or insufficient clinical data to support the requested use), and the number of patients referred to clinical trials (and of those, the number that chose to enroll).[328] If companies are unwilling to publish this data on their own websites, then an alternative approach would be for BIO and PhRMA to commission a report summarizing this data. If the report is published by BIO and PhRMA, companies might be more comfortable providing additional data, such as the number of requests received by investigational drug (or class of drug) and the number of requests received by disease (or category of disease). Either approach—self-reporting or industry-wide reporting—could increase transparency regarding the gap between the number of requests received by companies and the number of requests received by the FDA.

Patient Eligibility—Clinical Trial Ineligibility. Companies need to better explain what factors render a patient unable to participate in clinical trials beyond just not qualifying. The only factor sometimes listed is geographic limitations, and companies sometimes list this as only an example of a factor that will generally not support expanded access use. This creates two distinct problems. First, without additional information, physicians and patients are left guessing what other factors render a patient unable to participate in a clinical trial. This could discourage a physician from submitting an otherwise valid request. Second, the FDA will consider geographic limitations when reviewing a request even when the company does not, making the agency’s guidance at odds with some companies’ policies. This is confusing. For those companies generally unwilling to consider geographic limitations as a factor impacting a patient’s ability to participate, companies could add additional criteria such as transportation and financial limitations. The FDA has identified both as common obstacles to clinical trial enrollment.[329]

Patient Eligibility—Pediatrics.[330] Companies often either do not address pediatric expanded access use[331] or will not consider pediatric expanded access use without sufficient pediatric data.[332] The former approach is short-sighted from a public relations perspective, especially with the enactment of the Right to Try Act and its focus on pediatric access. In 2014, Bristol-Myers Squibb cited lack of pediatric data when asked about a specific patient’s denial by CNBC, but even four years after that media firestorm, the company still does not address pediatric expanded access use in its published guidelines.[333] A physician might recommend expanded access for a child only to learn after submitting a request that the company will not provide pre-approval access without sufficient pediatric data. Thus, companies should strive to increase transparency. The latter approach also needs to be reconsidered. With so many pediatric patients currently being treated using FDA-approved drugs that only underwent clinical testing in adults,[334] the justification that pediatric data is needed can be difficult to reconcile, especially given how few industry-sponsored pediatric trials there are.[335] There is also evidence, at least with oncology drugs, that “[d]rug exposure in adolescents (age 12 to 18 years) and adults is similar, supporting the enrollment of adolescents in adult trials that involve the same disease and/or therapeutic target.”[336] Therefore, companies with explicit pediatric expanded access criteria should reconsider whether it would be appropriate to loosen or eliminate this requirement for adolescents.

Qualifying Drugs. A manufacturer’s determination of when an investigational drug has sufficient data can sometimes differ from that of the treating physician and patient.[337] Companies should consider publishing a list of drugs (updated on a regular basis) for which they will consider expanded access requests. This is a practice already adopted by some companies.[338]

External Review Committee. Companies should consider adopting Janssen’s approach of utilizing an outside review board in collaboration with its internal decisionmakers.[339] Janssen piloted the New York University program, Compassionate Use Advisory Committee (“CompAC”), in 2015 with one investigational drug.[340] Janssen has since rolled out the program to other disease areas.[341] The CompAC approach is as follows: (1) the treating physician submits expanded access request to Janssen; (2) company physicians and medical personnel review requests to determine whether any are medically inappropriate or eligible for clinical trials and expanded-access programs; (3) CompAC reviews the other requests providing an “independent recommendation” to Janssen; (4) the treating physician can appeal a CompAC decision.[342] An independent review committee could reduce public misconceptions that companies’ default response to an expanded access request is “no,” especially given media’s widespread coverage of those denials. Likewise, the committee may be helpful when evaluating cases involving pediatric patients or patients with exceptional safety risks. The built-in appeal process could reduce the public appeals initiated through social media. Furthermore, just as there are independent IRBs available for physicians whose institutions do not have internal committees,[343] smaller companies with limited financial and personnel resources to devote to expanded access requests could consider partnering with other companies to develop an independent, external review committee to aid in assessing expanded access requests.

Cost-Recovery Policy. Companies need to adopt more transparent cost recovery guidelines even if their policies mandate not charging patients because of concerns that doing so could impact a “higher sale price” [344] in the future or because insurance will not reimburse even direct costs.[345] A few companies do post cost-recovery policies,[346] but of the companies surveyed in this Note, none had this information available. The rising cost of healthcare in the United States is on the public’s mind; it was the top issue in the 2018 mid-term elections.[347] Furthermore, HHS recently announced “a proposed rule to require pharma to include list prices in direct-to-consumer ads” for approved drugs.[348] This increasing scrutiny makes it even more important for companies to publish clear cost-recovery policies for their expanded access programs.

Expanded Access Navigator. Companies should submit a Navigator Directory listing when they initiate a phase II or phase III study for an investigational drug. Companies’ websites should also refer physicians and patients to the Expanded Access Navigator. Neither of these recommendations are currently required by the Cures Act.

b.  Companies Need to Improve Access to Clinical Trials

 Companies will often cite concern about maintaining adequate supply of an investigational drug for their clinical trials as a factor in their expanded access criteria. This is arguably a genuine concern given that a manufacturer will develop only enough supply for its clinical trials, but not more until it receives FDA approval.[349] At the same time, however, companies often struggle to fully enroll their clinical trials.[350] Trials often have strict inclusion and exclusion criteria, which can affect some patient populations more so than others.[351] Furthermore, clinical trials are often conducted in regions with large academic institutions and major medical centers,[352] which can limit certain patients’ ability to participate and negatively affect some patient populations disproportionately from others.[353]

 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. As discussed in Section II.B, companies generally prefer standardized study groups, but companies should reconsider eligibility criteria because “[b]roadening the eligibility criteria for clinical trials [would] provide the opportunity for more people to participate in research studies,” and “it [would] make the trial results more reflective of the people that will ultimately use the drug.”[354] While specific to oncology, the American Society of Clinical Oncology (“ASCO”) and Friends of Cancer Research, identified five common exclusion factors (brain metastases, age, HIV infection, organ dysfunction, and prior or concurrent cancer diagnoses) and proposed recommended clinical trial protocols that would facilitate inclusion of patients with these factors in clinical trials.[355] Their recommendations address both early-phase trial design (for example, proposing study groups limited to “specific patient population” to “inform the decision as to whether and how to include (or not) the patient population in later phase trials”) and later-phase trials (for example, “expand[ing] eligibility criteria to include a specific patient population,” but “restricting primary analysis to defined patient population”).[356] A JAMA Oncology study, published in January 2019, estimates that at least “6,317 additional patients would be allowed to join trials each year” if these recommendations were adopted.[357] Companies should work with the FDA, ASCO, and Friends of Cancer Research to determine how to incorporate these recommendations into their existing clinical trials, not only to ease patient access to the clinical trial process, but also to ensure clinical trial data reflects real-world patients.

 Diversity in Clinical Trials. Some companies have initiatives aimed at improving diversity in participation,[358] but others are more resistive.[359] With most clinical trial participants white, more companies need to adopt measures addressing diversity in clinical trials that go beyond just patient education. In 2015, the FDA approved a drug for the treatment of multiple myeloma, a blood cancer that disproportionately affects blacks, “yet of the 722 participants [enrolled in its phase III study] only 13—or 1.8 percent—were black.”[360] Efforts to improve potential pre-approval access through the clinical trial process need to address this underrepresentation of minorities. Companies, rather than resisting those efforts, should work with the FDA, patient groups, and professional organizations to develop legislation that would incentivize widespread participation. For example, companies could propose legislation, modeled off of state laws encouraging diversity and inclusion in certain industries,[361] that would give tax credits and clinical trial grants to companies[362]utilizing the FDA’s various expedited approval pathwaysthat submit diversity proposals detailing how they plan to ensure clinical trial enrollment is representative of a disease’s U.S. incidence rates by race, age, and gender even if specific risk factors don’t require it and then meet certain minimum thresholds based on those incidence rates.[363]

CONCLUSION

The Right to Try Act passed with great fanfare and proclamations of hope by President Trump and others. Yet industry—as a whole—is unlikely to adopt this parallel pathway.[364] This will likely further increase frustration and confusion amongst the public regarding pre-approval access,[365] especially since the Right to Try Act was marketed as a “right to try” when in reality it is simply a “right to ask”—a right the public has had all along through the expanded access program.[366] With this added risk, companies should and need to move beyond the status quo, adopting measures aimed at increasing transparency and awareness of their expanded access programs and pursuing initiatives aimed at improving access to clinical trials.

This proposal is not without its limitations. First, it relies on companies choosing to adopt these changes. Companies already do not fully comply the Cures Act expanded access requirements. These proposed changes may be more broadly implemented if BIO and PhRMA revise their existing expanded access guidelines to incorporate some of these proposals as many companies now model their guidelines off of the either BIO or PhRMA’s guidelines. Another option is for Congress to amend the Cures Act to not only to give the FDA power to assess civil monetary penalties when a company fails to comply with the Cures Act expanded access requirements, but also to further require companies to submit an annual summary of their expanded access programs to the FDA, thereby extending the Right to Try Act’s reporting requirement to the expanded access program. These amendments will not, however, have any weight unless the FDA has enforcement capability.[367] Any civil money penalties collected for non-compliance could be used to support “Project Facilitate” and other expanded access awareness initiatives such as the Expanded Access Navigator, FDA-sponsored webinars, or targeted educational programming in regions underutilizing expanded access.

Second, changes aimed at increasing manufacturer transparency and clarifying companies’ existing policies admittedly do not directly improve manufacturer participation. That said, increased manufacturer transparency may reveal greater manufacturer participation than one would anticipate based on the media’s coverage of companies denying expanded access requests. Furthermore, clarification of companies’ existing policies may ease physicians’ and patients’ overall frustration with the expanded access program and encourage more widespread utilization of the program.

Third, the second part of this proposal relies on companies to adopt clinical trial measures that improve overall access through diversity and inclusion initiatives and less-restrictive eligibility criteria or to advocate for legislation that would help facilitate these efforts. With some companies potentially resistive due to ongoing concerns that increased diversity or less-restrictive eligibility criteria could delay drug development or cost millions of dollars, it may be difficult to secure wide-scale adoption without Congressional action aimed at not only improving patient access to investigational drugs through the clinical trial process, but also ensuring that clinical trials produce the data necessary to allow the FDA “to separate the relative handful of discoveries which prove to be true advances in therapy from a legion of false leads and unverifiable clinical impressions,”[368] and also to “maximize generalizability of results” to patients in the real world.[369]

 

 

Appendix

 


[*] *. Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 92; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.S., Journalism and Political Science 2011, Northwestern University, Medill School of Journalism. I would like to thank Professor Michael H. Shapiro for encouraging me to pursue this topic, which first sparked my interest in 2013. His feedback and insights on early drafts was invaluable. Special appreciation and thanks to my parents, Jon and Anna, for their love and support even after reviewing multiple drafts; to my friends and classmates, and in particular Aly, for allowing me to talk through my ideas on numerous occasions; and to my niece and nephew for their superb editing skills! I would also like to thank the Volume 92 editors of the Southern California Law Review for their careful editing and invaluable feedback, especially Nick Thomas, Jay Simmons, and Chris Phillips. Lastly, I would like to report working for Weber Shandwick where I represented biopharmaceutical and medical device clients (2011–2014) and working for Adaptive Biotechnologies (2014–2016).

 [1]. BioMarin Pharmaceutical: Give Andrea Sloan (@andi_sloan) Access to the Cancer Drug That Could Save Her Life, Change.org, [hereinafter Change.org] https://www.change.org
/p/biomarin-pharmaceutical-give-andrea-sloan-andi-sloan-access-to-the-cancer-drug-that-could-save-her-life (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).

 [2]. William Hudson, In Cancer Drug Battle, Both Sides Appeal to Ethics, CNN (Sept. 28, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/28/health/compassionate-drug-use. Expanded access is sometimes also referred to as either “compassionate use” or “pre-approval access.”

 [3]. Id. At the time of Sloan’s request, BioMarin had only completed a phase I trial in thirty-nine patients. Johann Sebastian De Bono et al., First-in-Human Trial of Novel Oral PARP Inhibitor BMN 673 in Patients with Solid Tumors, Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology (June 3, 2013), https://meetinglibrary.asco.org/record/83852/abstract.

 [4]. Change.org, supra note 1; Andrea Ball, Austin Woman Dies After Battle for Access to Experimental Cancer Drug, Austin Am.-Statesman (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.statesman.com
/NEWS/20140103/Austin-woman-dies-after-battle-for-access-to-experimental-cancer-drug (noting her “Facebook page—Andi’s Army—ha[d] more than 15,000 followers”).

 [5]. Meg Tirrell, When Unapproved Drugs Are the Only Hope, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/05/a-case-for-compassionate-use-when-unapproved-drugs-are-the-only-hope.html.

 [6]. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Company Denies Drug to Dying Child, CNN (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/health/cohen-josh; accord Tirrell, supra note 5; Amanda Woerner, Dying 25-Year-Old Fights for Compassionate Use Access to Cancer Treatment, Fox News (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2014/03/26/dying-25-year-old-fights-for-compassionate-use-access-to-cancer-treatment. With the enactment of the federal Right to Try Act, some patients and their families are once again turning to social media to request access to investigational drugs through right to try. See Sumathi Reddy, The ‘Right to Try’ Law Says Yes, the Drug Company Says No, Wall St. J. (June 6, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/family-battling-a-rare-disease-sees-roadblocks-despite-right-to-try-law-1528293923 (discussing how—after a company declined to provide an investigational drug because an expanded access program was not yet available—given the limited clinical data in only a small number of patients, the parents of a toddler—both of whom were doctors—launched a Change.org petition in June 2018 that collected more than 100,000 signatures in just two weeks).

 [7]. Erin Mershon, ‘Right-to-Try’ Law Intended to Weaken the FDA, Measure’s Sponsor Says in Blunt Remarks, Stat News (May 31, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/31/right-to-try-ron-johnson.

 [8]. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 489 (West 2015); Eric Janez, Andrea Sloan Bill Signed into Law, KXAN (June 12, 2015), http://kxan.com/2015/06/12/andrea-sloan-bill-signed-into-law.

 [9]. Kenneth Artz, U.S. House Approves Federal Right to Try Bill, Heartland Inst. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/u-s-house-approves-federal-right-to-try-bill (quoting Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.)); see also Christina Sandefur, Safeguarding the Right to Try, 49 Ariz. St. L.J. 513, 521 (2017) (arguing right-to-try laws are a “major change” from expanded access). See generally Christina Corieri, Goldwater Inst., Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their Treatment (2014), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/cms_page_media/2015/1/29/Right%20To%20Try.pdf (proposing the right-to-try legislation).

 [10]. Ron Leuty, The Right to Try: Terminally Ill Patients Say Trying Experimental Drugs Offers Hope. But Is It Just False Hope?, S.F. Bus. Times (June 8, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/06/08/biotech-2017-right-to-try-laws-biomarin-fda-ca.html. See generally Rebecca Dresser, The “Right to Try” Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1631 (2015) (examining the right to try movement and the role of patient stories in the debate); Lisa Kearns & Alison Bateman-House, Who Stands to Benefit? Right to Try Law Provisions and Implications, 51 Therapeutic Innovation & Reg. Sci. 170 (2017) (arguing the laws are not pro-patient); Rebecca Dresser, “Right to Try” Laws: The Gap Between Experts and Advocates, 45 Hastings Ctr. Report, May-June 2015, at 9–10 [hereinafter Dresser, The Gap] (proposing ways to shift public debate regarding right to try in favor of existing programs).

 [11]. Press Release, Goldwater Inst., Alaska Becomes 41st State to Enact Right to Try Legislation (July 13, 2018), http://righttotry.org/alaska-becomes-41st-state-to-enact-right-to-try-legislation (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).

 [12]. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address. Vice President Mike Pence, who signed into law the Indiana Right to Try Act, is also a public proponent of right-to-try legislation. E.g., Vice President Mike Pence (@vp), Twitter (Aug. 3, 2017, 12:21 PM), https://twitter.com/vp/status/893190193829875713 (“Right to Try is about giving terminally ill patients hope & a chance. Proud of @POTUS’ & @SenRonJohnson’s work to help pass it in Senate.”); Vice President Mike Pence (@vp), Twitter (Mar. 13, 2018, 2:12 PM) [hereinafter Vice President Mike Pence, March 13 Tweet], https://twitter.com/vp/status/973668021028950017 (“Always great to see Jordan McLinn & his mother Laura McLinn, 2 great Hoosiers who have been fierce advocates for the Right to Try legislation the House will consider today. This bipartisan bill is about restoring hope to patients w/ terminal illnesses & it’s the right thing to do.”).

 [13]. Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump to Sign Right to Try Legislation Fulfilling the Promise He Made to Expand Healthcare Options for Terminal Americans (May 30, 2018) [hereinafter White House Press Release], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-sign-right-try-legislation-fulfilling-promise-made-expand-healthcare-options-terminal-americans.

 [14]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,160, 75,160 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

 [15]. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The History of Drug Regulation in the United States 2, 7 (2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/PromotingSafeandEffectiveDrugsfor100Years/UCM114468.pdf; Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Jan.–Feb. 2006, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/FOrgsHistory/CDER
/UCM586463.pdf. The marketing application had to include information regarding “all clinical investigations . . . the drug’s components and composition, methods of manufacture including facilities and controls, and copies of both the packaging and labeling of the new drug.” Suzanne White Junod, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History 6 (2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/History/ProductRegulation/UCM593494.pdf.

 [16]. A new drug application “is the vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S. The data gathered during the animal studies and human clinical trials . . . become part of the NDA.” New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess
/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2016).

 [17]. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938).

 [18]. Junod, supra note 15, at 6–7. The randomized, controlled trial is now considered to be the “gold standard” of clinical research. See generally Laura Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard—Lessons from the History of RCTs, 374 New Eng. J. Med. 2175 (2016) (describing how randomized, controlled trials rose to prominence and transformed medical research).

 [19]. The drug’s sales equaled those of aspirin. Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, Helix (July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article
/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation.

 [20]. Id.

 [21]. Id.

 [22]. Tom Brody, Clinical Trials: Study Design, Endpoints and Biomarkers, Drug Safety, and FDA and ICH Guidelines 783 (2nd ed. 2016). More than 8,000 babies were born missing limbs, blind, or intellectually disabled as a result of the drug. Id.

 [23]. Fintel et al., supra note 19.

 [24]. Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).

 [25]. Id. § 104(c), 76 Stat. at 784.

 [26]. Jeremy A. Green & Scott H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—The Kefauver-Harris Amendments at 50, 367 New Eng. J. Med. 1481, 1481 (2012). See also infra Section II.A for further discussion of the clinical trial process.

 [27]. Kefauver-Harris Amendment §§ 102(d), 103(b), 76 Stat. at 780–81, 783. To meet this requirement, a manufacturer needs to conduct “adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience.” Id. at § 102(d), 76 Stat. at 780–81.

 [28]. A sponsor can be an individual physician or researcher, company, or institution that is responsible for the initiation, management, and possibly funding of the clinical trial. Int’l Council for Harmonisation of Tech. Requirements for Pharm. for Human Use (ICH), Guidance for Industry: E6 Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guidance 7 (2016) [hereinafter E6 Good Clinical Practice].

 [29]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2018) (listing IND requirements). The FDA defines “[a]n Investigational New Drug Application [(‘IND’) as] a request for authorization . . . to administer an investigational drug or biological product to humans.” Investigational New Drug (IND) or Device Exemption (IDE) Process (CBER), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines
/developmentapprovalprocess/investigationalnewdrugindordeviceexemptionideprocess/default.htm (last updated Jan. 19, 2018). A company must secure an IND prior to shipping a drug interstate or administering any investigational drug not the subject of an approved marketing application. Id.

 [30]. 21 § 312.23(a)(3)(iv). A clinical trial protocol describes “the objective(s), design, methodology, statistical considerations, and organization of a trial . . . [and] usually gives the background and rationale for the trial.” E6 Good Clinical Practice, supra note 28, at 6.

 [31]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(3)(iv).

 [32]. Id. § 312.22(a). The number of clinical trials necessary during each phase of clinical development can vary depending on the disease and availability of current treatments. It is estimated about seventy trials are needed during clinical development. Rick Ng, Drugs: From Discovery to Approval 140 (2005).

 [33]. Biotech. Innovation Org., Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, at 13 (2016) [hereinafter Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015], https://www.bio.org/sites/d
efault/files/Clinical%20Development%20Success%20Rates%202006-2015%20-%20BIO,
%20Biomedtracker,%20Amplion%202016.pdf; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (describing the three phases of clinical development); Brody, supra note 22, at 321 (noting phase I trials for cancer therapies are designed to identify the “minimal dose that can cause significant toxicity” given the assumption that “the most appropriate dose” is just below the “dose that produces unacceptable toxicity”).

 [34]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).

 [35]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 22 Case Studies Where Phase 2 and Phase 3 Trials Had Divergent Results 2 (2017) [hereinafter 22 Case Studies], https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM535780.pdf; Pharma. Research & Mfrs. of Am., Biopharmaceutical Research & Development: The Process Behind New Medicines 13 (2015) [hereinafter Biopharmaceutical Research & Development], http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites
/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf.

 [36]. Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 10.

 [37]. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 13.

 [38]. Id.

 [39]. See id.

 [40]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2018).

 [41]. Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 7.

 [42]. A company will sometimes conduct phase IV studies post-approval. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 16.

 [43]. Id. at 13.

  [44]. 21 C.F.R.  § 314.50 (describing the requirements for submitting a new drug marketing application); id. § 601.2 (describing the requirements for submitting a biologics license application). The new drug application must “tell the drug’s whole story” so that the FDA can decide

[1] [w]hether the drug is safe and effective in its proposed use(s), and whether the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks[;] [2] [w]hether the drug’s proposed labeling (package insert) is appropriate, and what it should contain[;] [3] [w]hether the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the controls used to maintain the drug’s quality are adequate to preserve the drug’s identity, strength, quality, and purity.

New Drug Application (NDA), supra note 16.

 [45]. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 13.

 [46]. See Benjamin Carlisle et al., Unsuccessful Trial Accrual and Human Subjects Protections: An Empirical Analysis of Recently Closed Trials, 12 Clinical Trials 77, 81 (2015) (“19% of trials registered as newly closed in 2011 either terminated due to failed accrual or completed with less than 85% of their expected [enrollment.]”); Aylin Sertkaya et al., Key Cost Drivers of Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials in the United States, 13 Clinical Trials 117, 117 (2016) (finding the three main causes of high clinical trial expenses were clinical procedures, administrative staff, and site monitoring); Gina Kolata, A Cancer Conundrum: Too Many Drug Trials, Too Few Patients, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vsMRXf. There are even companies that manufacturers hire to increase volunteer enrollment. See, e.g., Putting Our Focus to Work, Praxis, https://www.gopraxis.com/experience (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (providing various case studies of successful clinical trial enrollment campaigns).

 [47]. ASCO and Friends of Cancer Research Release Comprehensive Recommendations to Broaden Eligibility Criteria for Cancer Clinical Trials, Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology (Oct. 2, 2017) [hereinafter ASCO and Friends], https://www.asco.org/advocacy-policy/asco-in-action/asco-and-friends-cancer-research-release-comprehensive (noting factors, including age, comorbidities––such as heart disease, liver dysfunction, or kidney disease––advanced stage of disease, prior history of cancer, and HIV/AIDS).

 [48]. Id.

 [49]. Edward Kim et al., Broadening Eligibility Criteria to Make Clinical Trials More Representative: American Society of Clinical Oncology and Friends of Cancer Research Joint Research Statement, 35 J. Clinical Oncology 3737, 3742 (2017). See generally Susan Jin et al., Re-Evaluating Eligibility Criteria for Oncology Clinical Trials: Analysis of Investigational New Drug Applications in 2015, 35 J. Clinical Oncology 3745 (2017) (discussing the problems with eligibility criteria and finding that current criteria is too narrow in cancer clinical trials).

 [50]. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 1 (“The overall probability of clinical success . . . is estimated to be less than 12%.”); see also Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 7 (“[O]nly 9.6% of drug development programs successfully make it to market.”); Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. Health Econ. 20, 20 (2016); Matthew Herper, The Cost of Developing Drugs Is Insane. That Paper that Says Otherwise Is Insanely Bad, Forbes (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper
/2017/10/16/the-cost-of-developing-drugs-is-insane-a-paper-that-argued-otherwise-was-insanely-bad.

 [51]. Michelle Cortez, The ‘Right to Try’ Could Cost Dying Patients a Fortune, Bloomberg (June 20, 2018, 10:44 AM) [hereinafter Cortez, Cost Dying Patients], https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2018-06-20/the-price-to-try-a-drug-could-be-300-000-for-dying-patients.

 [52]. Liz Szabo, Widespread Hype Gives False Hope to Many Cancer Patients, Kaiser Health News (Apr. 27, 2017), https://khn.org/news/widespread-hype-gives-false-hope-to-many-cancer-patients.

 [53]. See id.

 [54]. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979). Laetrile, derived from apricot pits, had been touted as an anti-cancer drug despite limited clinical studies examining its safety and efficacy. Barron H. Lerner, McQueen’s Legacy of Laetrile, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/health/mcqueens-legacy-of-laetrile.

 [55]. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 548 (citing Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1215 (W.D. Okla. 1975)).

 [56]. Id. at 549 (citing Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976)).

 [57]. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Okla. 1977). A new drug is one “not generally recognized, among experts . . . as safe and effective for use under conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2018).

  In addition to determining that laetrile was a new drug, the FDA also concluded that the Kefauver-Harris Amendment’s grandfather clause did not apply. Rutherford, 438 F. Supp. at 1289. The grandfather clause exempted drugs from the effectiveness requirement if they were on the day prior to enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (1) “commercially used or sold in the United States,” (2) not a new drug under section 201(p) of the 1938-version of the FDCA, and (3) not “covered by an effective application” under section 505 of the 1938-version of the FDCA. See Kefauver-Harris Amendment § 107(4).

 [58]. Rutherford, 438 F. Supp. at 1294, 1300–01 (finding FDCA’s grandfather clause exempted laetrile from any pre-market approval requirement and that regardless of the statutory interpretation the right to “use a nontoxic substance” was encompassed within one’s “constitutional right of privacy”).

 [59]. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1235 (10th Cir. 1978).

 [60]. Id. at 1236. The court was not persuaded by the FDA’s argument that a non-effective drug used in the treatment of a life-threatening disease was also not safe. Id. at 1236–37. The court also expressly declined to address the lower court’s constitutional findings. Id. at 1237.

  In another case involving laetrile, a physician and several other co-defendants appealed misdemeanor convictions “for conspiracy to sell and prescribe an unapproved drug laetrile”—a violation of California Health and Safety Code section 1707.1—as unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court held, however, that “a right of access to drugs not recognized by the government as effective” was not a fundamental right recognized by the California or U.S. Constitutions. People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 925 (Cal. 1979).

 [61]. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979).

 [62]. Id. (explaining how FDCA section 505 requires FDA approval of a new drug unless the drug qualifies for grandfather clause exemption or is being administered through a clinical trial).

 [63]. Id. at 552.

 [64]. The deregulation efforts of the Trump administration, which include the Right to Try Act, arguably closely mirror, if not surpass, the deregulation efforts of the Reagan administration. See Paul Bedard, Trump Ahead of Reagan’s Record in Cutting Regulations, Wash. Examiner (Oct. 3, 2017, 7:16 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-ahead-of-reagans-record-in-cutting-regulations.

 [65]. Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of America’s Drug Constitution, 42 Am. J.L. & Med. 687, 700–01 (2016).

 [66]. Id. at 699–700 (citing Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, 26,742 (June 9, 1983) (codified at 2 C.F.R. pt. 312)).

 [67]. Id. at 701–02, 706.

 [68]. Id. at 694, 704–07 (“AIDS activism was the first mass movement for freedom of therapeutic choice within orthodox scientific medicine.”); see also Rebecca Dresser, When Science Offers Salvation: Patient Advocacy and Research Ethics 48–49, 52–55 (2001) (citing individual autonomy, the anticipated hastened development of improved treatments as a result of more clinical involvement, and justice by way of non-exclusionary participation as reasons to change the regulatory framework).

 [69]. A protocol sponsor could request that an investigational drug be made available for widespread use if the drug was intended for the treatment of a “serious or immediately life-threatening disease” for which there was “no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy available.” 21 C.F.R. 312.34 (1987). The FDA also required the manufacturer to be actively investigating the drug in a “controlled clinical trial” or to have completed testing, and “actively pursuing marketing approval” of the therapy with “due diligence.” Id. A sponsor requesting access for a “substantial population” of patients with a serious disease would likely need to submit data from phase III trials. Id.

 [70]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,148 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312); Grossman, supra note 65, at 735. The current individual patient expanded access program is separately discussed in Section II.B.

 [71]. The Accelerated Approval pathway enables a drug for the treatment of a serious condition to be approved based on a “surrogate endpoint.” U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions—Drugs and Biologics 1–7 (2014) [hereinafter Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM358301.pdf. Although a surrogate endpoint is not always indicative of the viability of a treatment, it “may be used instead of stronger indicators, such as longer survival or improved quality of life, because the results of the trial can be measured sooner.” Surrogate Endpoint, Nat’l Cancer Inst., https://www.cancer.gov/publications
/dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=729831 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). The FDA has approved more than 100 new drug applications submitted through the accelerated approval pathway since its introduction in 1992. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., CDER Drug and Biologic Accelerated Approvals Based on a Surrogate Endpoint (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/NDAandBLAApprovalReports/UCM404466.pdf.

 [72]. With the striated review framework, an investigational drug will either receive “Priority” or “Standard Review.” The FDA will grant an investigational drug Priority Review when it “treats a serious condition and, if approved, would provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness.” See Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions, supra note 71, at 24. The designation requires the FDA to review a marketing application within six months of receiving the submission rather than the standard ten-month review. Id. at 8.

 [73]. In the last twenty years, the FDA has introduced two other approaches to address concerns regarding the lengthy approval process—Fast Track and Breakthrough Therapy. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309–10 (1997); Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 902, 126 Stat. 993-1132 (2012). For more background regarding these two expedited designations, see Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions, supra note 71, at 9–15.

 [74]. Karyn Hede, Patient Group Seeks Overhaul of FDA Clinical Trial System in Court, 98 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 1268, 1268 (2006); see also Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance and the Washington Legal Foundation to the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, In re Tier 1 Initial Approval Program to Expedite the Availability of Lifesaving Drugs (June 11, 2003) [hereinafter Abigail Alliance Citizen Petition].

 [75]. Abigail Alliance Citizen Petition, supra note 74, at 5.

 [76]. The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (the “Abigail Alliance”) was founded in November 2001 following the death of twenty-one-year-old Abigail Burroughs from squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck. About, Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs, https://www.abigail-alliance.org/p/about.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). Burroughs’s story is similar to that of Andrea Sloan’s. After traditional chemotherapy and radiation failed, Burroughs attempted to enroll in multiple clinical trials but did not meet the eligibility requirements. While she was ultimately able to enroll in a clinical trial, her cancer had progressed, and she died shortly thereafter. Peter Hart, Abigail Alliance Case Discussed: Balancing Study Drugs, Safety, Univ. Pitt. Times (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.utimes.pitt.edu/?p=8605; Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 205 (2007). The investigational drug that Burroughs sought, cetuximab, was at the time only being studied in patients with colorectal cancer. Id. In 2011—ten years after Burroughs’s death—cetuximab was approved by the FDA for the treatment of patients with late-stage head and neck cancer. Ben Leach, Cetuximab Approved by FDA for Patients with Late-Stage Head and Neck Cancer, OncLive (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.onclive.com/web-exclusives/cetuximab-approved-by-fda-for-patients-with-late-stage-head

-and-neck-cancer.

 [77]. Abigail Alliance Citizen Petition, supra note 74, at 9.

 [78]. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. McClellan, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594 at *4, *20–21 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Associate Commissioner for External Relations, Department of Health and Human Services, to Frank Burroughs, President Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Apr. 25, 2003)).

 [79]. Id. at *5.

 [80]. Id.

 [81]. Id. The Abigail Alliance reasoned that if companies were allowed to profit from sales of investigational drugs to terminally ill patients, they would be more apt to provide terminally ill patients access under compassionate use. Id.

 [82]. Id. at *25–36. The court concluded that no recognized fundamental right was involved because the “plaintiffs have stated the holdings of Glucksberg, Cruzan, and Griswold too broadly in their attempt to apply the privacy and liberty rights to the instant case,” and that there was no authority supporting “the proposition that the due process right to life extends to requiring affirmative access by terminally ill patients to investigational drugs.” Id. at *31–32. Therefore, the FDA policy was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id.

 [83]. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Of note, the court distinguished this action from Rutherford v. United States by emphasizing that in this action, terminally ill patients were seeking investigational drugs that had successfully completed phase I trials. Id. at 486.

 [84]. Id.

 [85]. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

 [86]. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711–12, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Only the author of the panel’s majority opinion dissented. Id.

 [87]. Id. at 703. The en banc court noted that the Alliance’s “claimed right depends on a regulatory determination that the drug is safe for testing, prompting an obvious question: How can a constitutional right be defined by an administrative regulation that is subject to change?” Id. at 702 n.6.

 [88]. Id. at 702–03.

 [89]. Id. at 703 n.7, 704–06 (discussing the long history of drug regulation in England, the adoption of drug-dispensing legislation by the Virginia colony, and enactment of various other legislation regulating unsafe drugs in Louisiana, Alabama and Georgia).

 [90]. Id. at 706–07 (explaining that if lack of government interference was sufficient, “it would be easy to employ such a premise to support sweeping claims of fundamental rights”). The court posited that a more “plausible explanation for the limited efficacy regulation” was the fact that “[t]he history of the effectiveness requirement in drug regulation is inextricably linked to the advent of the randomized, controlled clinical trial as the cornerstone of medical research . . ., [which] would not become widely recognized until the twentieth century.” Id. at 706 n.12 (quoting Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 127, 131 (1999)).

 [91]. See id. at 707–10.

 [92]. Id. at 713.

 [93]. Id. The en banc court further substantiated its reasoning with previous Supreme Court decisions upholding the FDCA and prior circuit court decisions rejecting “arguments that the Constitution provides an affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably prohibited by the Government.” Id. at 710–13 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979)); see also id. at 711 n.18 (citing Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993); N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc’y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980); Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980)).

 [94]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900, 40,942–45 (Aug. 13, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312, 316). While the Abigail Alliance case made its way through the judicial system in 2006, the FDA announced proposed rules to clarify the individual patient expanded access program. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,148 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

 [95]. Expanded Access, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents
/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/default.htm (last updated Nov. 8, 2018).

 [96]. Expanded Access Categories for Drugs (Including Biologics), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm431774.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).

 [97]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a)(1) (2018); Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,153 (Dec. 14, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

The evidence needed to make this determination for expanded access for an individual patient will vary. For a patient with an immediately life-threatening condition, the evidentiary burden could be very low—little if any clinical evidence to suggest a potential benefit or possibly only animal data to support safety of the use. For a patient with a serious, but not immediately life-threatening, condition who could expect to enjoy a reasonable quality of life for an extended time without any treatment, the evidentiary burden would be higher.

Id. § 312.310(a)(1).

 [98]. Expanded Access: Information for Physicians, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. [hereinafter Information for Physicians], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus
/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm429624.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2018).

 [99]. IND Applications for Clinical Treatment: Contents and Format, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/ucm363005.htm (last updated Dec. 23, 2015). The criteria used by a manufacturer to determine whether to provide a letter of authorization (“LOA”) is covered in Section II.B.2.

 [100]. Compassionate Use and Expanded Access, Pfizer [hereinafter Pfizer Policy], https://www.pfizer.com/purpose/medicine-access/compassionate-use (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (“In 2017, the PfizerCAReS portal received 4,818 requests from 59 countries, of which 98% were approved.”); see also Criteria for Consideration of Access, Genentech [hereinafter Genentech Policy], https://www.gene.com/patients/investigational-medicines/criteria (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs: FDA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Expanded Access Program but Should Further Clarify how Adverse Events Data Are Used 16 (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs], https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685729.pdf (discussing findings of an FDA survey of nine manufacturers, in which manufacturers reported receiving between thirty-nine and 800 individual patient expanded access requests).

 [101]. Steve Usdin, FDA to Facilitate Access to Unapproved Drugs, BioCentury (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.biocentury.com/biocentury/regulation/2018-12-14/how-fda-plans-help-patients-get-expanded-access-unapproved-drugs.

 [102]. See generally Company Directory, Reagan-Udall Found., http://navigator.reaganudall.org
/company-directory
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

 [103]. See infra Appendix.

 [104]. Information for Physicians, supra note 98. An abbreviated form was introduced by the FDA in 2016 after complaints that the previous form, which was required for all expanded access categories, was overly complex and time consuming. See discussion infra Section III.B.

 [105]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(c) (2018). A patient may start treatment thirty days after the FDA’s receipt of the IND submission, or earlier if the FDA informs the treating physician that expanded access use can start. Id. § 312.20(c); FDA, Expanded Access: Information for Patients, https://www.fda.gov
/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm20041768.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 2018). The criteria used by the FDA to determine whether to grant expanded access is covered in Section II.B.3.

 [106]. GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 20.

 [107]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Individual Patient Expanded Access Applications: Form FDA 3926 Guidance for Industry 6 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs
/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm432717.pdf. “An [institutional review board (“IRB”)] means any board, committee, or other group formally designated by an institution to review, to approve the initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of biomedical research involving human subjects. The primary purpose of IRB review is to assure that the rights and welfare of human subjects are protected.” Id. at 6 n.10.

 [108]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.10 (2018); see also Scott Gottlieb, Expanded Access: FDA Describes Efforts to Ease Application Process, FDA Voice (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom
/FDAVoices/ucm612009.htm
.

 [109]. Information for Physicians, supra note 98.

 [110]. There is also no guidance on who within a biopharmaceutical company should make that decision. In general, most companies delegate decisionmaking authority to their medical or clinical team. See infra Appendix.

 [111]. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials and Communication of Clinical Trial Results 28–29 (2015) [hereinafter Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials], http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/042009
_clinical_trial_principles_final_0.pdf; BIO Principles on Expanded Access to Investigational, Unapproved Medicines, Biotech. Innovation Org. [hereinafter BIO Principles on Expanded Access], https://www.bio.org/articles/bio-principles-expanded-access-investigational-unapproved-medicines (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); see also Bill Chin, Newly Implemented Expanded Access Principles Support Commitment to Patients, PhRMA: The Catalyst (June 3, 2015), https://catalyst.phrma.org/newly-implemented-expanded-access-principles-support-commitment-to-patients. The evaluation criteria of the FDA, respectively, are discussed in Section II.B.3.

 [112]. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 28–29.

 [113]. The Appendix surveys the expanded access criteria of the top twenty pharmaceutical companies by global sales. Top Pharma List: Top 25 Pharma Companies by Global Sales, PMLiVE, http://www.pmlive.com/top_pharma_list/global_revenues (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). For additional analysis of expanded access policies, see Emily Jung et al., Prevalence of Publicly Available Expanded Access Policies, 104 Clinical Pharm. & Therapeutics 1016 (2018).

 [114]. See infra Appendix. These policies were not widely available until the enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”). For a more in-depth discussion of the Cures Act, see supra Section III.B.

 [115]. See infra Appendix.

 [116]. Id. PhRMA and BIO do not define active clinical development. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 28; BIO Principles on Expanded Access, supra note 111.

 [117]. See infra Appendix.

 [118]. Id.

 [119]. Id. This aligns with PhRMA’s approach. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 28 (“Geographic limitations alone would generally not be considered a barrier to participation in clinical trials.”).

 [120]. Genentech Policy, supra note 100. This could have implications for some rural patients, who might have difficulties enrolling in a clinical trial given the distance and costs associated with travel. Rebecca A. English et al., Transforming Clinical Research in the United States: Challenges and Opportunities 24 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50892/pdf
/Bookshelf_NBK50892.pdf.

 [121]. Pfizer Policy, supra note 100; see also Teva Pharm., Expanded Access Programs 2 (2015), https://www.tevapharm.com/files/policy.pdf.

 [122]. See infra Appendix.

 [123]. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 29; see also BIO Principles on Expanded Access, supra note 111 (discussing similar requirements).

 [124]. See, e.g., Position on Expanded Access to Investigational Medicines, Astellas [hereinafter Astellas Position], https://www.astellas.com/system/files/Position%20on%20Expanded%20Access
%20E%202017-04-11.pdf (last updated Apr. 2017).

 [125]. Allergan Pre-Approval Access Program, Allergan, https://www.allergan.com/research-and-development/pre-approval-access (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

 [126]. See infra Appendix.

 [127]. See, e.g., Genentech Policy, supra note 100.

 [128]. See Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 29; BIO Principles on Expanded Access, supra note 111. See also infra Section III.B for a discussion regarding the FDA’s use of adverse events.

 [129].               See infra Appendix.

 [130]. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

 [131]. Arthur L. Caplan & Amrit Ray, The Ethical Challenges of Compassionate Use, 315 JAMA 979, 980 (2016).

Between July 1 and December 31, 2015, Janssen received 160 preapproval access requests for daratumumab. Of these, company physicians determined that [forty-three] had a benefit-risk profile that was not favorable, [twenty-eight] requests had not exhausted all approved alternative therapies or were eligible for expanded-access programs or clinical trials, and [thirteen] were excluded for other reasons (eg, incomplete data for assessment).

Id.

 [132]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(1) (2018).

 [133]. Id. § 312.300(b).

 [134]. Id.

 [135]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,151 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). Additional examples of diseases and conditions that would fit in this category include seizures, rheumatoid arthritis, and chronic depression. Id.

 [136]. Id.

 [137].               Id.

 [138]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(2).

 [139]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,150.

 [140]. Id. at 75,151.

 [141]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3).

 [142]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,151.

 [143]. Rebecca A. English et al., supra note 120, at 64.

 [144]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a)(2).

 [145]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use—Questions and Answers: Guidance for Industry 12 (2017) [hereinafter Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances
/ucm351261.pdf.

 [146]. For additional discussion regarding why the FDA might deny a request for individual patient expanded access, see id. at 12.

 [147]. GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 17 (reporting FDA received more than 5,000 single-patient expanded access requests during this period). The FDA also granted 245 requests from trial sponsors for expanded access in the intermediate-size and treatment protocol setting. Id. (stating that the FDA allowed 95.1% of intermediate-size requests and 100% of treatment protocol requests to proceed). The FDA does not specifically track the number of patients who are treated under intermediate-size or treatment protocol applications. In 2006, the FDA estimated that since the formal implementation of the expanded access program, this number was around 100,000 patients. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,148 (Dec. 14, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

 [148]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Scott Gottlieb, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Comm’r), https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asl/testimony/2017-10/examining-patient-access-to-investigational
-drugs.html.

 [149]. Id.

 [150]. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

 [151]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.)); see also Sandefur, supra note 9, at 528.

 [153]. Sandefur, supra note 9, at 519.

 [154]. Id. at 513.

 [155]. Id. at 529–30. The Goldwater Institute attempted to root this final argument in a constitutional right to access while distinguishing it from the prior failed attempts to challenge FDA regulatory oversight in Rutherford and Abigail Alliance. Sandefur, supra note 9, at 513, 519 (suggesting that in Abigail Alliance, patients wanted the “authority to access drugs that had not yet been approved for safe use by the FDA”). That claim, however, that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to use non-FDA approved drugs that have successfully completed phase I testing is the very same fundamental right the Abigail Alliance unsuccessfully advocated for in Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (examining “whether terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to experimental drugs that . . . passed Phase I clinical testing”). For additional background regarding Rutherford and Abigail Alliance, see supra Section II.A.

 [156]. Corieri, supra note 9, at 11.

 [157]. See supra Section II.B.3.

 [158]. Id.

 [159]. See supra Introduction.

 [160]. Gail A. Van Norman, Expanding Patient Access to Investigational Drugs, 3 JACC: Basic Translational Sci. 280, 291 (2018); see also GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 17; Hudson, supra note 2. But see U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Expanded Access Program Report 21 (2018) [hereinafter Expanded Access Program Report], https://www.fda.gov
/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM618903.pdf (noting that manufacturers with active expanded access programs approve 40% to 95% of expanded access requests).

 [161]. See supra Section II.B.2; infra Appendix.

 [162]. Top Pharma List: Top 25 Pharma Companies by Global Sales, supra note 113.

 [163]. Pfizer Policy, supra note 100.

 [164]. See Margot J. Fromer, Accelerating Pediatric Drug Development: Master Protocols May be a Way to Go, ASCO Post (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/april-25-2017/accelerating-pediatric-drug-development-master-protocols-may-be-a-way-to-go (proposing a master protocol to aid pediatric research); Press Release, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr., FDA Announces First Approval of Targeted Therapy Based on Basket Study (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.mskcc.org/trending-topics/fda-announces-first-approval-targeted-therapy-based-basket-study (discussing similar protocol used in the adult setting, which lead to FDA approval).

 [165]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3742.

 [166]. See generally Mark Flatten, Goldwater Inst., Studied to Death: FDA Overcaution Brings Deadly Consequences (2018), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11
/Studied-to-Death-web.pdf
(proposing additional means to reduce FDA oversight through conditional approval, reciprocal review upon approval from a foreign regulatory authority, and off-label promotion of approved drugs).

 [167]. See supra Section I.B.

 [168]. Nicholas S. Downing et al., Regulatory Review of Novel Therapeutics—Comparison of Three Regulatory Agencies, 366 New Eng. J. Med. 2284, 2284 (2012). Of note, this study was conducted prior to the creation of the Breakthrough Therapy designation. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

 [169]. Caroline Chen, FDA Repays Industry by Rushing Risky Drugs to Market, ProPublica (June 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/fda-repays-industry-by-rushing-risky-drugs-to-market. Of note, some HIV/AIDs activists now argue that their efforts during the 1980s and 1990s “opened a Pandora’s box.” Id.

 [170]. Sydney Lupkin, Nearly 1 in 3 Recent FDA Drug Approvals Followed by Major Safety Actions, Kaiser Health News (May 9, 2017), https://khn.org/news/1-in-3-recent-fda-drug-approvals-followed-by-major-safety-actions (“It took a median time period of 4.2 years after the drugs were approved for these safety concerns to come to light, and issues were more common among . . . drugs that were granted ‘accelerated approval’ and drugs that were approved near the regulatory deadline for approval.”).

 [171]. See How Will the Federal Right to Try Law Impact Drug Development?, Clinical Leader (June 27, 2018) [hereinafter Clinical Leader], https://www.clinicalleader.com/doc/how-will-the-federal-right-to-try-law-impact-drug-development-0001.

 [172]. Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 3 (“Phase II clinical programs continue to experience the lowest success rate of the four development phases, with only 30.7% of developmental candidates advancing to Phase III.”); see also 22 Case Studies, supra note 35, at 1.

 [173]. See supra Section I.B.

 [174]. Larry Thompson, The Cure that Killed: FIAU Destroyed a Deadly Virus. Then It Began to Destroy Patients., Discover Mag. (Mar. 1, 1994), http://discovermagazine.com/1994/mar
/thecurethatkille345.

 [175]. Mark Flatten, Dead on Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves Little Hope for Dying Patients, RighttoTry (Feb. 24, 2016), http://righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival (“Those facing imminent death cannot access a drug while it is being tested, even if early results show that it works better than existing treatments, unless they are among the fortunate few who qualify for clinical trials. That amounts to a death sentence for most patients, even though their cure may have already been found.”); see also Thompson, supra note 174.

 [176]. H.R. 6288 (112th): Patient Choice Act of 2012, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/112/hr6288 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (proposing to allow “provisional approval” of drugs with Fast Track designation); S. 3045 (110th): ACCESS Act, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/110/s3046 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (proposing the creation of a “conditional approval system”).

 [177]. See Debate: Benefits, Harms of Social Media Sharing from Medical Conferences,  HemOnc Today (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.healio.com/hematology-oncology/practice-management/news
/online/%7Bfa961a3a-28d2-4909-a186-dbad928ddd03%7D/debate-benefits-harms-of-social-media-sharing-from-medical-conferences (describing how non-attendees can follow along on Twitter or access abstracts and posts through conference databases); Forums, Myeloma Beacon, https://myelomabeacon.org/forum (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (including example of patient forum discussing treatment options).

 [178]. See Sharon Begley, Beware the Hype: Top Scientists Cautious About Fighting Cancer with Immunotherapy, Stat News (Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/25/cancer-immunotherapy-caution; Joy Victory, A Cancer Doctor Speaks Out: How Premature Hype About Experimental Drugs Fails Patients, HealthNewsReview (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.healthnewsreview.org/2018/04/a-cancer-doctor-speaks-out-how-premature-hype-about-experimental-drugs-fails-patients.

 [179]. Szabo, supra note 52.

 [180]. Ned Pagliarulo, Viagra No More: The Changing Face of Drug Ads on TV, BioPharmaDive (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/drug-ads-tv-pharma-changing-face-dtc-advertising/539982; see also Kevin McCaffrey, Merck’s DTC Ad for Keytruda Hints at More Cancer Brands Turning to TV, MM&M (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.mmm-online.com/home
/channel/commercial/mercks-dtc-ad-for-keytruda-hints-at-more-cancer-brands-turning-to-tv (“From June 2013 to February [2017], pharma companies spent an estimated $223 million on more than 42,000 airings for DTC ads . . . Before 2013, when the first Provenge DTC aired, it was unheard of for brands to use direct-to-consumer advertising for oncology drugs.”).

 [181]. Kathryn Doyle, Cancer Hospital Advertising Triples Since 2005, Reuters (July 11, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-cancer-ads-idUSKCN0ZR2D6.

 [182]. C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic?, 36 Pharmacy & Therapeutics 669, 669, 673–82 (2011).

 [183]. Stephanie M. Lee, Cancer Hospital Ads Deceive Patients About Their Chances of Survival, New Report Finds, BuzzFeed (Oct. 25, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article
/stephaniemlee/cancer-treatment-center-misleading-ads; Szabo, supra note 52 (“A TV commercial for the Bristol-Myers Squibb drug Opdivo projects the words ‘a chance to live longer’ on the side of skyscrapers, as a captivated crowd looks on. In much smaller type, a footnote reveals that lung cancer patients taking Opdivo lived just 3.2 months longer than others.”).

 [184]. Tim K. Mackey & Virginia J. Schoenfeld, Going “Social” to Access Experimental and Potentially Life-Saving Treatment: An Assessment of the Policy and Online Patient Advocacy Environment for Expanded Access, 14 BioMed Cent. Med., no. 17, 2016, at 1–10; see also Alison Bateman-House et al., Findings on “Right to Try” Laws and Pre-Approval/Compassionate/Expanded Access to Investigational Medical Products, N.Y.U. Sch. Med. (July 1, 2016) [hereinafter Bateman-House, Findings], https://med.nyu.edu/pophealth/sites/default/files/pophealth/RTT%20Findings
%20FINAL%207_1.pdf (“The number of Change.org online petitions in support of individual requests has increased over the last several years.”).

 [185]. See, e.g., Laura Fraser, The Demonstration, Genentech (Sept. 2016), https://www.gene.com
/stories/the-demonstration.

 [186]. E.g., Darshak M. Sanghavi, The Pills of Last Resort, N.Y. Times Mag. (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/magazine/how-dying-patients-get-access-to-experimental-drugs
.html.

 [187]. Cohen, supra note 6; Sydney Lupkin, Merck Expands Cancer Drug Access but too Late for Denver Dad, ABC News (Mar. 18, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/merck-expands-cancer-drug-access-late-denver-dad/story?id=22954543; Tirrell, supra note 5.

 [188]. See Dresser, The Gap, supra note 10, at 10 (“To lawmakers and the public hearing these stories, it would be cruel to vote against a right to try law.”); Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: How ‘Right to Try’ Caught Washington’s Eye, Wash. Post (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/02/01/the-health-202-how-right-to-try-caught-washington-s-eye/5a71fcc330fb041c3c7d755e (discussing how the right-to-try movement’s success is in part due to patients and their families reaching out to their representatives); Richard Halstead, BioMarin Denies ‘Compassionate Use’ of Experimental Drug, Considers Adding Cancer Patient to Clinical Trial, Marin Indep. J. (Jul. 19, 2018, 3:17 AM), https://www.marinij.com
/2013/09/06/biomarin-denies-compassionate-use-of-experimental-drug-considers-adding-cancer-patient-to-clinical-trial (discussing how Rep. Jared Huffman (D-San Rafael, Cal.) was involved in a case after receiving “a flood of calls to his office”).

 [189]. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-45-101–108 (2014); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 489.001–.151 (West 2015); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1311–1314 (2014); see also Patti Parson, Colorado First State to Pass ‘Right to Try,’ or the ‘Dallas Buyers’ Club’ Law, PBS News Hour (May 19, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/colorado-first-state-pass-right-try-dallas-buyers-club-law.

 [190]. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 127 (2017); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548–111548.5 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [191]. Some of the state laws were sponsored by politicians with personal connections. Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Right to Try” Laws Spur Debate Over Dying Patients’ Access to Experimental Drugs, Wash. Post (May 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/right-to-try-laws-spur-debate-over-dying-patients-access-to-experimental-drugs/2014/05/16/820e08c8-dcfa-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html (the Colorado law was co-sponsored by a Democrat whose brother benefited from a clinical trial); Michele Munz, Missouri’s “Right to Try” Law No Guarantee Patient Will Get Experimental Drugs, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (May 20, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com
/news/local/metro/missouri-s-right-to-try-law-no-guarantee-patientwill/article_05c07958-5217-5c3f-9f15-1a43c8a3e740.html (reporting the Missouri law was sponsored by a Republican lawmaker whose daughter died of cancer). Others, like California Assembly Majority Leader Ian Calderon, sponsored the right-to-try bill because it was “a logical companion to Death with Dignity.” Exploring a Right to Try for Terminally Ill Patients: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 1–2 (2016) (statement of Ian C. Calderon, Majority Leader, Cal. State Assemb.), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Calderon-2016-09-22.pdf. He explained before Congress:

I never saw the two issues as incompatible. I didn’t want to limit the options for those diagnosed with a terminal illness, to only death, albeit a more controlled one. I felt strongly that if we were going to pass Death with Dignity, and thus make it easier for terminally ill patients to die in California, that we should also make it easier for these terminally ill patients to fight to live, by giving them access to potentially life-saving drugs and treatments, that have been deemed safe, but not yet approved by the FDA.

Id. at 2–3.

 [192]. See supra note 11 (listing states that have adopted right-to-try laws).

 [193]. Compare Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.  § 489.053(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Regular & First Called Sess.) (stating a company cannot charge a patient), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1312(B)(2) (West, Westlaw through First Special & Second Regular 2018 Sess.) (stating a company can charge a patient “costs of or associated with the manufacture of the investigational drug”), and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.2(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (same).

 [194]. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.2(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (stating insurance providers are allowed to choose not to cover the cost of the therapy or costs related to that treatment); Or. Rev. Stat. § 127 (2017), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors
/ors127.html (same); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-45-104(b)–(c) (2014) (stating insurance providers are also allowed to deny certain coverage for a period of up to six months after the commencement of treatment).

 [195]. Compare Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h)(1)­(A)–(H), (h)(2) (stating a patient must be informed, among other things, of potential impact on hospice eligibility and at-home care), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-45-103(4) (West, Westlaw through Second Regular 2018 Sess.) (same), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1311(1)(d) (2014) (including no definition of informed consent).

 [196]. See Alexander Gaffney, Company’s Compassion Leads to Clinical Hold on Experimental Drug, Reg. Focus (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2014/11/19/20780
/Companys-Compassion-Leads-to-Clinical-Hold-on-Experimental-Drug (noting the FDA stopped enrollment of an expanded access treatment protocol after a patient died).

 [197]. Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 18. A drug label includes information “such as disease indications, target populations, drug–drug interactions, and [adverse drug reactions]. The label of a prescription drug is prepared by manufacturers and approved by the FDA and, thus, in its final form, reflects the collective input from regulators, drug manufacturers, and scientific experts.” Hong Fang et al., FDA Drug Labeling: Rich Resources to Facilitate Precision Medicine, Drug Safety, and Regulatory Science, 21 Drug Discovery Today 1566, 1566 (2016).

 [198]. Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 18.

 [199]. GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 17.  

 [200]. Gottlieb, supra note 108; see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry and Investigators: Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies 29 (2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM227351.pdf (providing criteria regarding what might qualify as an adverse event).

 [201]. Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 18.

 [202]. Shannon Firth, FDA Head Expresses Doubt About ‘Right to Try’, MedPage Today (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.medpagetoday.com/washington-watch/fdageneral/68310 (FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb stated, “I think that the biggest obstacle to providing drugs through expanded access is the supply constraints”). Adequate supply is often a factor when evaluating an expanded access request. See infra Appendix. This is a genuine concern because a manufacturer initially only develops sufficient supply for its trials. See Fraser, supra note 185 (“[Genentech] was already in the process of trying to dramatically ramp up its production of Herceptin, encountering roadblocks in machinery, engineering and chemistry along the way.”).

 [203]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria in Clinical Trials: Workshop Report 10 (2018) [hereinafter Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria], https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/RegulatoryInformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDARA/UCM613054.pdf.

 [204]. See Tirrell, supra note 5 (explaining that fifteen-year-old Nathalie Traller was unable to enroll in clinical trials—despite meeting all of the eligibility criteria—because of her age).

 [205]. Juliet Eilperin & Carolyn Y. Johnson, Obama, Paying Tribute to Biden and Bipartisanship, Signs 21st Century Cures Act Tuesday, Wash. Post: PowerPost (Dec. 13, 2016), https://wapo.st
/2gXhOsT.

 [206]. E.g., Hal Barron, A Scientific Application of Compassion, Genentech (May 15, 2013), https://www.gene.com/stories/a-scientific-application-of-compassion. But see Press Release, Cancer Survivor Andrea Sloan, Ovarian Cancer Survivor Andrea Sloan Seeks Compassionate Use Exemption from BioMarin to Save Her Life (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/ovarian-cancer-survivor-andrea-sloan-seeks-compassionate-use-exemption-from-biomarin-1825934.htm (“Despite best efforts to contact BioMarin, the company has not been cooperative, merely sighting their lack of a policy on the issue.”).

 [207]. Ed Silverman, 21st Century Cures Would Require Pharma to Post Policies on Experimental Drugs, Stat: PharmaLot (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/28/21st-century-experimental-drugs.

 [208]. See generally 21st Century Cures Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–0 (2018).

 [209]. Id. § 360bbb–0(c).

 [210]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 4 (2017) (statement of the Alison Bateman-House, Assistant Professor, Division of Medical Ethics, Department of Population Health, N.Y.U. Langone Health) [hereinafter Bateman-House, Examining Patient Access] (explaining why an enforcement mechanism is necessary, given that there is “less than 100% compliance with the rule”). For additional discussion about compliance with respect to specific provisions in the Cures Act, see Jung et al., supra note 113.

 [211]. See Expanded Access/Right to Try Act, BrainStorm Cell Therapeutics, http://www.brainstorm-cell.com/patients-caregivers/expanded-accesscompassionate-use (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (stating the company currently does not offer expanded access).

 [212]. Company Directory, supra note 102.

 [213]. Usdin, supra note 101.

 [214]. About the Expanded Access Navigator, Reagan-Udall Found., http://navigator.reaganudall.org/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (“The Expanded Access Navigator, or EA Navigator, represents a unique partnership between the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, patient advocacy organizations, the pharmaceutical industry, and the federal government to provide clear, digestible information on single-patient EA.”).

 [215]. See id. The addition of this resource (that is, connecting community physicians with regional IRB committees) could be a relatively simple way of helping alleviate potential application disparities between patients who are primarily treated at academic centers where physicians are more aware of clinical trials and expanded access, and patients who are primarily treated by a community physician who might have less familiarity and access to these resources.

 [216]. Zachary Brennan, FDA Looks to Revitalize Compassionate Use Program with Simplified Form, Final Guidance, Reg. Focus (June 2, 2016) [hereinafter Brennan, Revitalize Compassionate Use], https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2016/6/fda-looks-to-revitalize-compassionate-use-program-with-simplified-form,-final-guidance.

 [217]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Investigational New Drug Application (IND): Form FDA 1571 [hereinafter Form FDA 1571], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM083533.pdf (last updated July 2018); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement of Investigator: Form FDA 1572, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM074728.pdf (last updated Feb. 2016).

 [218]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 5.

 [219]. Statement, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Robert Califf, M.D. on the Release of the Final Individual Patient Expanded Access Form (Jun. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Statement from FDA Commissioner Califf], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom
/PressAnnouncements/ucm504579.htm.

 [220]. Brennan, Revitalize Compassionate Use, supra note 216.

 [221]. Id. Form FDA 1571 has twenty-six fields and requires seven attachments. Form FDA 1517, supra note 217. Form FDA 3926 has eight fields and requires one attachment. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Instructions for Filling out Form FDA 3926—Individual Patient Expanded Access, Investigational New Drug Application (IND), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM504574.pdf (last updated Apr. 2017).

 [222]. Id.; see also Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 5.

 [223]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 16.

 [224]. Gottlieb, supra note 108; Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 6.

 [225]. Gottlieb, supra note 108; see also FDA Simplifies IRB Requirements for Individual Patient Expanded Access, Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.asco.org/advocacy-policy/asco-in-action/fda-simplifies-irb-requirements-individual-patient-expanded-access. But see Kelly McBride Folkers & Alison Bateman-House, Will New FDA Regulation on IRB Review Speed Patient Access to Experimental Drugs?, Health Affairs Blog (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171205.384786/full (suggesting it is difficult to assess the actual impact of this change without “baseline data” regarding the role of IRB review in the expanded access process).

 [226]. E.g., Expanded Access to Unapproved Drugs, Biologics, or Devices and Right to Try Laws, U. Cal. Irvine: Off. Res., https://www.research.uci.edu/compliance/human-research-protections
/researchers/expanded-access-and-right-to-try.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); Investigational New Drugs and Biologics, U. Cal. S.F.: Off. Ethics & Compliance, https://irb.ucsf.edu/investigational-new-drugs-and-biologics (last updated Apr. 13, 2018).

 [227]. E.g., Joseph A. Catania et al., Survey of U.S. Human Research Protection Organizations: Workload and Membership, 3 J. Empirical Res. on Hum. Res. Ethics 57, 61–62 (2008); see also IRB—Human Participants Committee Membership, Cornell Univ. Off. Res. Integrity & Assurance, https://www.irb.cornell.edu/membership (noting the university’s IRB committee is generally made up of twelve to eighteen voting members) (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

 [228]. See Levels of Review: Expediated Research, U. Cal. Irvine: Off. Res., https://www.research.uci.edu/compliance/human-research-protections/researchers/levels-of-review.html
#Expedited (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (anonymous surveys and chart reviews).

 [229].  Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 6.

 [230]. The idea of a “consulting physician” builds from a few of the state right-to-try laws, including California, which still require a second physician to review and concur with the treating physician’s opinion, but not an IRB to review and approve the treating physician’s opinion. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(a), (b)(4), (b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [231]. Mershon, supra note 7; Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Johnson to FDA: Agency Should Comply with Right to Try Law (May 31, 2018) [hereinafter Press Release, Johnson to FDA], https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-to-fda-agency-should-comply-with-right-to-try-law (“This law intends to diminish the FDA’s power over people’s lives, not increase it. It is designed to work within existing FDA regulations, definitions, and approval processes. It is not meant to grant FDA more power or enable the FDA to write new guidance, rules, or regulations . . . .”); see also Alison Bateman-House & Christopher T. Robertson, Opinion, The Federal Right to Try Act of 2017—A Wrong Turn for Access to Investigational Drugs and the Path Forward, 178 JAMA Internal Med. 321, 321–22 (2018) (arguing that as-written the federal Right to Try Act was meant to undercut the FDA’s authority rather than to create a more effective pre-approval access pathway).

 [232]. FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–52, § 610(a)(2), 131 Stat. 1005, 1052 (2017).

 [233]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 13.

 [234]. Id. at 13–14.

 [235]. Expanded Access INDs and Protocols 2009–2017, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/publichealthfocus/expandedaccesscompassionateuse/ucm443572.htm (last updated Feb. 21, 2018). The number of requests between 2015 and 2016 increased 31% from 779 to 1,025. Id.

 [236]. See Statement from FDA Commissioner Califf, supra note 219.

 [237]. This is not just an expanded access problem. The right-to-try laws, both state and federal, do not compel manufacturer participation. See infra Section IV.A.

 [238]. Sammy Caiola, Federal Right to Try Proposal Could Make California Law More Effective, Capital Pub. Radio (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/109381 (discussing the need for complementary federal legislation).

 [239]. See Right to Try Act of 2015, H.R. 3012, 114th Cong. (as reported by H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec. & Investigations, July 29, 2015); see also Caiola, supra note 238.

 [240]. Zachary Brennan, Who’s Actually Using ‘Right-to-Try’ Laws? A Texas Oncologist Explains His Experience, Reg. Aff. Blog (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2017
/8/who-s-actually-using-right-to-try-laws-a-texas-oncologist-explains-his-experience (“The six patient testimonies provided to Focus by the libertarian Goldwater Institute . . . all focus on obtaining this same investigational cancer therapy outside of a clinical trial from the former director of therapeutic nuclear medicine at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center.”); David Kroll, Trump’s Call for #RightToTry Experimental Drug Access: A Nothingburger for Patients and Families, Forbes (Jan. 31, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2018/01/31/trumps-call-for-righttotry-experimental-drug-access-a-nothingburger-for-patients-and-families (citing National Right to Try Movement, Meet Dr. Ebrahim Delpassand, Facebook (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/RightToTry/videos
/592616080918116; and Richard Pazdur, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., NDA Approval Letter, NDA-208700 for Luthathera 4–5 (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter
/2018/208700Orig1s000ltr.pdf).

It’s disingenuous of #RightToTry advocates to use [Dr. Delpassand’s story] to justify non-FDA-reviewed patient access to drugs after Phase 1 preliminary safety studies, the very early stage of drug studies in humans. If you look specifically around 0:54 of the Right To Try video, Dr. Delpassand’s disappointment on behalf of his patients was due to the FDA’s denial of his broad expanded-use request—that is, after Phase 3 safety and efficacy trials were completed and under FDA review. If one looks at the NDA approval letter, the FDA still had at least another year of questions and concerns about the drug since the April 28, 2016, NDA submission.

Kroll, supra (emphasis in original); see also Munz, supra note 191 (discussing how one man with ALS moved back to Missouri after the state passed its right-to-try law thinking that he would be able to obtain an investigational drug through the pathway, but the company declined).

 [241]. H.R.3012—Right to Try Act of 2015, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3012/actions (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).

 [242]. Connecting Patients to New and Potential Life Saving Treatments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Sen. Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/chairman-ron-johnson-opening-statement-connecting-patients-to-new-and-potential-life-saving-treatments. Of note, no one from the FDA was present at the hearing, which included the president and CEO of the Goldwater Institute, two patients, the now former executive director of the Rothman Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship at Fairleigh Dickinson University, who also authored the book Innovation Breakdown: How the FDA and Wall Street Cripple Medical Advances, and the executive director of the non-profit organization Kids v. Cancer. Connecting Patients to New and Potential Life Saving Treatments, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov’t Aff. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/connecting-patients-to-new-and-potential-life-saving-treatments. See generally Joseph Gulfo, Innovation Breakdown: How the FDA and Wall Street Cripple Medical Advances (2014) (arguing the FDA is “horribly broken”).

  Senator Ron Johnson convened a second hearing in September 2016 that included testimony from one patient, the California Assembly Majority Leader Ian Calderon, U.S. Representative Jim Neely (R-Mo.), the former president and CEO of Neuralstem, Inc., the executive director of the non-profit organization the Isaac Foundation, and the FDA’s Associate Commissioner for Public Health Strategy and Analysis Peter Lurie. Exploring a Right to Try for Terminally Ill Patients, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov’t Aff. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/exploring-a-right-to-try-for-terminally-ill-patients.

 [243]. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Johnson Introduces Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act (May 10, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-introduces-trickett-wendler-right-to-try-act.

 [244]. Bill Glauber, Johnson’s Right-to-Try Bill Blocked, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/09/28/johnsons-right–try-bill-blocked
/91225922.

 [245]. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Chairman Johnson Introduces Bill to Help Terminally Ill Patients (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media
/majority-media/chairman-johnson-introduces-bill-to-help-terminally-ill-patients.

 [246]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, S. 204, 115th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Aug. 3, 2017).             

 [247]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (2017), https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/examining-patient-access-investigational-drugs. This hearing included testimony from Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.), FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, the Director for Health Care from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, New York University Assistant Professor and Bioethicist Alison Bateman-House, one patient, the Director of Healthcare Policy from the Goldwater Institute, the president and CEO from Cognition Therapeutics, and the chairperson of the non-profit organization Friends of Cancer Research. Id.

 [248]. Donald Trump, State of the Union Address, supra note 12.

 [249]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2018, H.R. 5247, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Mar. 21, 2018). H.R. 5247 was narrower than S. 204 because it would have required a requesting patient to have an immediately life-threatening diseases and would have limited eligible drugs to those with an active IND application that were not subject to a clinical hold. Id. The bill would have also required the manufacturer to notify the FDA within seven days of granting a right-to-try request and to report adverse events. Id.

 [250]. See Actions Overview: H.R. 5247 — 115th Congress, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5247/actions (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [251]. Id.

 [252]. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: How Democrats Got a Version of ‘Right to Try’ They Like Even Less, Wash. Post: PowerPost (May 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/powerpost/1anada/the-health-202/2018/05/23/the-health-202-how-democrats-got-a-version-of-right-to-try-they-like-even-less.

 [253]. Rachel Roubein, House Eyes Changes for ‘Right to Try’ Bill, Hill (Feb. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/372858-house-eyes-changes-for-right-to-try-bill (quoting Letter from the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network et al., to U.S. Reps. Paul Ryan & Nancy Pelosi (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.asco.org/sites/new-www.asco.org/files/content-files/February-2018-Right-to-Try-Coalition-Letter.pdf) (noting a group of almost forty patient advocacy groups and professional organizations sent a letter to House leaders that “warned the measure would ‘likely do more harm than good’”).

 [254]. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018); Actions Overview: S. 204 — 115th Congress, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/204/actions (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [255]. White House Press Release, supra note 13.

 [256]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–176, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2018).

 [257]. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018) (noting no such liability exists under the law).

 [258]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(A). “Life-threatening” is defined to be “where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted” or where there is the potential for fatal outcomes. 21 C.F.R. § 312.81(a) (2018).

 [259]. Press Release, Johnson to FDA, supra note 231.

 [260]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B) (2018).

 [261]. Id.

 [262]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). Of note, the Act does not limit other types of compensation (in other words, the certifying physician could theoretically have an equity interest in the drug company).

 [263]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(C). This may have been intentional given that the federal regulation does not allow informed consent to include “any exculpatory language through which the subject . . . is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to release . . . the sponsor [that is, manufacturer], the institution, or its agents from liability for negligence.” 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2018); see also id. § 50.25 (describing the basic elements of informed consent); Id. § 312.305(c)(4) (cross-referencing 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 as the applicable informed consent standard for the expanded access program).

 [264]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(A). The Act uses the definition of phase I trial from section 312.21 of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulation. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(3); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2018).

These studies are designed to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness. During Phase 1, sufficient information about the drug’s pharmacokinetics and pharmacological effects should be obtained to permit the design of well-controlled, scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies.

21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).

 [265]. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(B).

 [266]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(C).

 [267]. Press Release, Johnson to FDA, supra note 231.

 [268]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(D) (2018). “A clinical hold is an order issued by FDA to the sponsor to delay a proposed clinical investigation or to suspend an ongoing investigation.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.42(a).

 [269]. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (2018) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (stating directions for use and warnings on labels); id. § 353(b)(4) (misbranded drugs); id. § 355(a)(i) (necessity of effective approval of application; exemptions of drug research); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (biologics license); 312 C.F.R. § 50 (protection of human subjects); id. § 56 (IRBs)). Of note, the Act, however, does not exempt a company from all statutory and regulatory requirements pertaining to INDs. Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Opinion, Promoting Patient Interests in Implementing the Federal Right to Try Act, 320 JAMA 869, 870 (2018) (noting ongoing reporting obligations).

 [270]. Id.

 [271]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(d)(1).

 [272]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(d)(2).

 [273]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(c)(1).

 [274]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(c)(1)(a)–(b). If the FDA decides it needs to use outcome data, it must give written notice to the company explaining why it was necessary for public health. Id. § 360bbb-0a(c)(2). This decision can only be made by “the director of the agency center that is charged with the premarket review of the eligible investigational drug.” Id.

 [275]. Sammy Caiola, Federal Right to Try Law Could Mean More Access—and Risk—for California Patients, Capital Pub. Radio (May 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/05/31/federal-right-to-try-law-could-mean-more-access-and-risk-for-california-patients. The Right to Try Act does not “modify or otherwise affect the right of any person to bring a private action under any State or Federal product liability, tort, consumer protection, or warranty law.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018) (Limitation of Liability).

 [276]. See Reddy, supra note 6; Arlene Weintraub, Biotech Executives Fret Over Hassles and Uncertainties of ‘Right to Try’, Forbes (Jun 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arleneweintraub/2018/06/13/biotech-executives-fret-over-hassles-and-uncertainties-of-right-to-try/#6df52d69bc78.

 [277]. See Janssen Policy: Evaluating and Responding to Pre-Approval Access Requests for Investigational Medicines, Janssen [hereinafter Janssen Policy], http://www.janssen.com/sites/wwwjanssencom/files/janssenpolicyevaluatingrespondingpreapprovalrequests022018.pdf; Pfizer’s Position on Federal Right to Try Legislation, Pfizer (May 2018), https://www.pfizer.com/files/research/PolicyPositionRighttoTryFederalLegislationMay2018.pdf; GlaxoSmithKline, U.S. Public Policy Position Paper: Right-to-Try Legislation, GlaxoSmithKline (Mar. 2015), https://us.gsk.com/media/1444389/ppright-to-trylegislation.pdf; Early Patient Access to Investigational Medicine, Bristol-Myers Squibb [hereinafter Bristol-Myers’ Position], https://www.bms.com/healthcare-providers/early-patient-access-to-investigational-medicine.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); see also Michelle Cortez, Dying Patients Face Reality Check on Right to Try, Bloomberg (June 8, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-08/dying-patients-seeking-drugs-face-reality-check-on-right-to-try (discussing how manufacturers do not plan to change their “current approach” even after the enactment of the Right to Try Act).

 [278]. Dan Diamond, Johnson & Johnson Won’t Consider Patients’ Right-to-Try Requests, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2018/01/17/hhs-readying-new-rule-to-expand-conscience-protections-075342; see also Janssen Policy, supra note 277.

 [279]. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Why Oncologists Should Decline to Participate in the Right to Try Act, ASCO Post (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/august-10-2018/declining-to-participate-in-the-right-to-try-act (“Because the extra risks posed by the Right to Try Act are not offset by any countervailing benefit, it would be unethical for oncologists to use it to gain access to an experimental drug for their patients.”).

 [280]. See Statement, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Efforts to Strengthen FDA’s Expanded Access Program (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm625397.htm.

 [281]. Usdin, supra note 101. The goal of this program is two-fold: (1) “to remove impediments that prevent physicians and patients from seeking access to investigational drugs and [(2)] to communicate FDA’s support for manufacturers providing access.” Id. The agency anticipates rolling out a pilot version for oncology requests in 2019. Id.

  This modification to the expanded access program goes well beyond the modifications discussed in Section III.B. The aptly named program creates a new tension within the expanded access program: the FDA is now not only a key decisionmaker, but also, as the program is aptly named, a facilitator, and possibly the key facilitator. This modification raises new questions that, although beyond the scope of this Note, are worth noting. First, to what extent will a patient-initiated request impair the treating physician’s decisionmaking responsibility? Will FDA staff consult with the requesting patient’s physician to ensure he or she weighed the risks associated with use of the investigational drug against the risks associated with the disease (and discussed those risks with the patient) prior to filling out Form FDA 3926 and sending to the physician for signature? Second, will an FDA-facilitated request ensure a fair and separate IRB review process? Will the FDA be responsible for costs associated with the IRB or will those costs continue to be covered by the patient? Third, how will the FDA ensure companies comply with a response deadline? Will the FDA’s to-be-determined manufacturer review period result in more companies denying requests to avoid simply missing that deadline?

 [282]. See, e.g., Rich Thomaselli, FDA’s Social-Media ‘Guidelines’ Befuddle Big Pharma, AdAge (Dec. 30, 2011), https://adage.com/article/digital/fda-s-social-media-guidelines-befuddle-big-pharma/231855 (suggesting the lack of FDA guidance regarding social media has restrained biopharmaceutical companies’ use of expanded access).

 [283]. James M. Beck, Federal Right to Try Legislation—Is It Any Better?, Drug & Device L. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/09/federal-right-to-try-legislation-is-it-any-better.html.

That’s not much protection at all, given how readily the other side throws around such allegations, and how infrequently judges throw them out. In subsection 1, “Reckless/willful” is a standard for punitive damages, which routinely survive dismissal in [multidistrict litigation] and other actions around the country. “Gross negligence” is a standard even less than that—merely an aggravated form of negligence that doesn’t require any finding of intent at all. Intentional torts include fraud, which is currently included in just about any product liability complaint. Battery, which encompasses informed consent in many states, is also an intentional tort.

Id.

 [284]. Though some states’ right-to-try laws could preclude these types of claims. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.5 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [285]. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 279, 282 (2015) (“Litigation in this arena, however, has been limited to obtaining access rather than seeking redress of treatment-related harm.”); see also Lynch et al., supra note 269, at 870 (suggesting that FDA input and IRB oversight might be “an important indication of reasonableness” in a hypothetical expanded access-product liability case).

 [286]. See supra Section III.B.

 [287]. See, e.g., ClinRegs: Canada, Nat’l Inst. Health, https://clinregs.niaid.nih.gov/country
/1anada (last updated Feb. 8, 2018) (“During a clinical trial, the sponsor is required to inform [Health Canada] of any serious, unexpected [adverse drug reaction] that has occurred inside or outside Canada.”).

 [288]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2018) (charging for investigational drugs under an IND); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Charging for Investigational Drug Under an IND—Questions and Answers: Guidance for Industry 6–7 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm351264.pdf.

 [289]. See DiMasi et al., supra note 50, at 20; Herper, supra note 50.

 [290]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (2018) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2018) (charging for investigational drugs under an IND)).

 [291]. See infra Appendix (listing companies citing adequate supply); see also Darrow et al., supra note 285, at 280–81 (describing the “administrative burden” for companies when preparing an intermediate-size patient expanded access protocol).

 [292]. Clinical Leader, supra note 171; see also Paige E. Finkelstein, Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs: What Physicians and the Public Need to Know About FDA and Corporate Processes, 17 Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics 1142, 1143–44 (2015). See generally Kenneth I. Moch, Ethical Crossroads: Expanded Access, Patient Advocacy, and the #SaveJosh Social Media Campaign, 1 MedAccess 1 (2017) (describing one company’s response to a targeted expanded access social media campaign).

 [293]. Cortez, Cost Dying Patients, supra note 51.

 [294]. Zachary Brennan, FDA Prepares to Implement ‘Right-to-Try’ Law, Reg. Focus (May 31, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/5/fda-prepares-to-implement-right-to-try-law (“[The FDA] is convening an internal group to assess how to effectively and efficiently implement the new law. [The FDA] will report on [their] implementation steps regularly.” (quoting an emailed statement from the FDA)).

 [295]. Id.(“[I]f [FDA staff] receive inquiries about the legislation from patients or physicians about a specific product, [they] refer them to the sponsor of the investigational drug . . . . If sponsors contact [FDA staff] regarding their obligations under this law, [the FDA] suggest[s] that [staff] refer them to the statute.” (quotation omitted)).

 [296]. See supra Table 1 (describing the additional criteria the FDA needs to determine whether intermediate-size or widespread expanded access use is appropriate).

 [297]. Jennifer Freeman, RA Life Expectancy: Can I Live a Long Life with Rheumatoid Arthritis?, Rheumatoid Arthritis Support Network (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.rheumatoidarthritis.org/ra
/prognosis/life-expectancy (characterizing rheumatoid arthritis as a chronic, but progressive disease); Narcolepsy Fact Sheet, Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-Education/Fact-Sheets/Narcolepsy-Fact-Sheet (describing narcolepsy as a chronic neurological condition) (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [298]. The FDA has not established an exact numeric threshold that would trigger intermediate-size use, but explains that it will recommend when “it is generally most efficient to consolidate expanded access in a single intermediate-size patient population IND or protocol.” Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 14. The FDA has also not established a threshold for when intermediate-size expanded access as opposed to widespread treatment expanded access should be used, instead considering two criteria: (1) “whether the drug is under development for marketing for the expanded access use,” and (2) “the size of the patient population.” Id. at 15.

 [299]. See, e.g., How We Operate: Compassionate Use, Shire, https://www.shire.com/who-we-are/how-we-operate/policies-and-positions/compassionate-use (last updated Apr. 2015) (excluding “patients with exceptional safety risks that have not been sufficiently studied” from expanded access use).

 [300]. See Florence T. Bourgeois et al., Pediatric Versus Adult Drug Trials for Conditions with High Pediatric Disease Burden, 130 Pediatrics 285, 286 (2012) (children often treated with drugs only approved for adult use); Tirrell, supra note 5 (companies declining to grant pediatric expanded access request due to insufficient pediatric data).

 [301]. Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria, supra note 203, at 3.

 [302]. See RighttoTry, http://righttotry.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); Vice President Mike Pence, March 13 Tweet, supra note 12.

 [303]. See Bourgeois et al., supra note 300, at 286; Tirrell, supra note 5; Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria, supra note 203, at 4–5.

 [304]. Pathama D. Joseph et al., Clinical Trials in Children, 79 British J. Clinical Pharmacology 357, 360–61 (2013) (describing complex nature of informed consent in the pediatric setting).

 [305]. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) found that not only do “cancer patients tend to overestimate their prognoses,” but that the overestimation impacts treatment decisions. Jane C. Weeks et al., Relationship Between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 JAMA 1709, 1712–13 (1998); see also Andrew S. Epstein et al., Discussions of Life Expectancy and Changes in Illness Understanding in Patients with Advanced Cancer, 34 J. Clinical Oncology 2398, 2398–2401 (2016) (“Results of this study demonstrate how poorly patients with advanced cancer understand their prognoses and how effective recent prognostic discussions are to improve illness understanding by patients.”).

 [306]. Am. Acad. Of Pediatrics, Informed Consent in Decision-Making in Pediatric Practice, 138 Pediatrics 2 (2018), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2016/07/21/peds.2016-1484.full.pdf.

 [308]. Kate Gallin Heffernan et al., Federal “Right to Try”: Don’t Disregard Your State Laws Just Yet! How Federal Preemption (or Lack Thereof) Could Influence the Use of Federal “Right to Try”, Verrill Dana LLP (2018), http://www.verrilldana.com/federal-right-to-try-dont-disregard-your-state-laws-just-yet.

 [309]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–176, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2018).

 [310]. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”); see also Phoebe Mounts et al., A Closer Look at New Federal ‘Right to Try’ Law, Law360 (June 1, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/news/2018/law360-a-closer-look-at-new-federal-right-to-try-law-01jun18.ashx; Heffernan et al., supra note 308 (suggesting enactment of the Right to Try Act revives the preemption issue because the Act is “less in conflict with its state counterparts” and “state laws could reasonably be found by a court to supplement and explicate the way in which this activity (the provision of investigational drugs outside of FDA’s purview) can occur in a given jurisdiction, rather than serving to frustrate Congress’ intent in making the ‘right to try’ pathway available”).

 [311]. Exploring a Right to Try for Terminally Ill Patients: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Sen. Ron Johnson). The Act also authorizes pre-approval access “in accordance with State law.” Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–176, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2018).

 [312]. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(b)(1)–(6) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [313]. Compare id. § 111548.1(d) (“‘Immediately life-threatening disease or condition’ means a stage of disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months.”), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(A) (2018) (requiring “life-threatening disease or condition”).

 [314]. See supra Section IV.A (describing Right to Try Act provisions).

 [315]. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (right to try informed consent requirements); id. § 24173(a)–(e) (general informed consent requirements).

 [316]. See supra Section IV.A (describing Right to Try Act provisions).

 [317]. See Press Release, Pharm. Research & Mfg. of Am. & Biotech. Innovation Org., PhRMA and BIO Initiate Litigation to Challenge Unconstitutional Provisions of Nevada’s SB 539 (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.phrma.org/phrma-bio-release (initiating litigation over a Nevada law, which the groups argued “attempt[s] to set de facto price controls” on diabetes medicines).

 [318]. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 

 [319]. See Bateman-House, Findings, supra note 184.

[T]here is no guidance for physicians about which law to follow in cases of conflicts. For example, if a patient lives in South Dakota but seeks care in North Dakota, which state law ought to be observed? If a hospital is located in Arkansas but is part of a network based in Delaware, which state law ought to be observed? If the patient and doctor are in Tennessee but the experimental product they wish to try can be administered only in Texas, which state law ought to be observed?

Id.

 [320]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 3.

 [321]. James E. Valentine & David B. Clissold, Burden of “Right to Try” Implementation on Sponsors (for Now); Risk of Unexpected SAEs Negatively Impacting Development and Approval Still Remains, Hyman, Phelps & McNamara PC: FDA L. Blog (June 8, 2018), http://www.fdalawblog.net
/2018/06/burden-of-right-to-try-implementation-on-sponsors-for-now-risk-of-unexpected-saes-negatively-impacting-development-and-approval-still-remains.

 [322].  Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900, 40,924 (Aug. 13, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312, 316).

 [323]. Cortez, Cost Dying Patients, supra note 51. BrainStorm planned to limit provider access to those physicians “who participated in the drug’s clinical trials,” and therefore would be experienced with the drug and, presumably, its appropriate dosage and potential side effects. Id. This plan might be one way to combat widespread disclosure, but it would arguably limit the availability of right to try to academic centers and other major hospitals where clinical trials are conducted as opposed to increasing access across the United States—the whole point of the Right to Try Act.

 [324]. Weintraub, supra note 276 (“The new law doesn’t require drug makers to comply with Right to Try requests, but that doesn’t make the burden of dealing with phone calls and e-mails from patients demanding access to experimental products any less burdensome.”).

 [325]. See Edelman, Edelman Trust Barometer—Healthcare: Global 26–27 (2018) (presenting an online survey in twenty-eight markets with 1,150 respondents per market); Laura Entis, Inside Pharma’s Trust Problem, MM&M (June 26, 2018), https://www.mmm-online.com/home
/channel/commercial/inside-pharmas-trust-problem (citing high drug prices, misconceptions that companies are withholding the cure for financial gain, and misleading direct-to-consumer advertising as reasons for this distrust).

 [326]. Bristol-Myers’ Position, supra note 277; see also Janssen Policy, supra note 277 (“We are committed to helping patients with serious illnesses and their families request access to our investigational medicines. We support these requests through our established review and evaluation processes, which includes independent review by the FDA.”).

 [327]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 21 (“40% to 95% [are] the manufacturer approval rates for [expanded access] requests.”).

 [328]. See Rep. Michael McCaul, Expanded Access to 21st Century Cures Act, https://mccaul.house.gov/sites/mccaul.house.gov/files/Expanding%20Access%20to%2021st%20Century%20Cures.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (proposing the Cures Act include a provision requiring manufacturers to track and report requests for expanded access to the FDA).

 [329]. Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria, supra note 203, at 6; Caroline McNeil, Broadening the Evidence Base for Older Patients: FDA-ASCO Workshop Explores Emerging Strategies, ASCO Post (Dec. 25, 2017), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/december-25-2017/broadening-the-evidence-base-for-older-patients-fda-asco-workshop-explores-emerging-strategies (“50% of U.S. oncologists are concentrated in eight states.”). Some patients’ jobs might also limit their ability to travel to a clinical trial site on a regular basis while other patients’ insurance may not cover the portions of the clinical trial not paid for by the trial sponsor. See Caroline Chen & Riley Wong, Black Patients Miss Out on Promising Cancer Drugs, ProPublica (Sept. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/black-patients-miss-out-on-promising-cancer-drugs.

 [330]. See supra notes 6, 177 and accompanying text (discussing specific cases of companies denying pediatric patient expanded access requests).

 [331]. Tirrell, supra note 5; see infra Appendix.

 [332]. Allergan Pre-Approval Access Program, supra note 125.

 [333]. Tirrell, supra note 5; see infra Appendix.

 [334]. See Bourgeois et al., supra note 300.

 [335]. Id. at 287.

 [336]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3740.

 [337]. Reddy, supra note 6.

 [338]. Investigational Drugs Available, Bristol-Myers Squibb, https://www.bms.com/healthcare-providers/early-patient-access-to-investigational-medicine/investigational-drugs-available.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); Investigational Medicines for Compassionate Use Requests, Janssen, https://www.janssen.com/compassionate-use-pre-approval-access/investigational-medicines-for-compassionate-use-requests (last updated Feb. 11, 2019).

 [339]. Janssen Policy, supra note 277, at 361.

 [340]. CompAC: The Compassionate Use Advisory Committees, N.Y.U. Langone Health, https://med.nyu.edu/pophealth/divisions/medical-ethics/compassionate-use-advisory-committee (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (describing the role of CompAC and the composition of the committee).

 [341]. Id.

 [342]. Caplan & Ray, supra note 131, at 979–80. This approach emphasizes fairness, attempting to ensure that requests are not granted to only those individuals who are social media savvy or well-connected. Id.

 [343]. About the Expanded Access Navigator, supra note 215 (providing a “roadmap” for IRBs).

 [344]. Alexander Gaffney, Regulatory Explainer: FDA’s Expanded Access (Compassionate Use) Program, Reg. Focus (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2014/2/regulatory-explainer-fda-s-expanded-access-(compassionate-use)-program.

 [345]. Letter from Marc B. Wilenzick, Pfizer Senior Counsel on behalf of Pfizer, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Charging for Investigational Drugs 7 (Feb. 14, 2007), https://www.pfizer.com/sites
/default/files/research/research_clinical_trials/Charging_for_Investigational_Drugs.pdf.

 [346]. Jung et al., supra note 113, at 1018.

While the 21st Century Cures Act did not require manufacturers to include pricing information in their expanded access policies, seven addressed financial aspects of accessing investigational medicines. Five indicated that they provide investigational medicines to patients at no cost, and among these five, one also stated that the manufacturer may reimburse fees and expenses associated with the use of the drug for expanded access. The other two manufacturers described pricing as depending on insurance and other factors.

Id.

 [347]. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Election Tracking Poll: Health Care in the 2018 Midterms, Kaiser Family Found. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-election-tracking-poll-health-care-in-the-2018-midterms.

 [348]. Dan Diamond, Drug Prices in Ads Are Coming—If HHS Gets Its Way, Politico Pulse (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2018/10/15/drug-prices-in-ads-are-coming-if-hhs-gets-its-way-373552. PhRMA has proposed its own plan in which “[a]ll TV ads that mention a medicine by name should direct patients to information about cost, ‘such as a company-developed website.’” Feds, Big Pharma Issue Competing Price Transparency Plans, Modern Healthcare (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181020/NEWS
/181019859.

 [349]. See infra Appendix (adequate supply); Fraser, supra note 185 (“[Genentech] was already in the process of trying to dramatically ramp up its production of Herceptin, encountering roadblocks in machinery, engineering and chemistry along the way.”).

 [350]. See supra notes 4647 and accompanying text.

 [351]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3740 (studies often exclude pediatric patients); Chen & Wong, supra note 329 (noting criteria often excludes patients with more than chronic condition, which can disproportionately affect African Americans); Judith Graham, Seniors Miss out on Clinical Trials, Kaiser Health News (June 29, 2017), https://khn.org/news/seniors-miss-out-on-clinical-trials (“[O]nly 40 percent of patients participating in cancer clinical trials were 65 and older” despite “more than 60 percent of cancer patients [being] older adults.”).

 [352]. See Pharma. Research & Mfr. of Am., Biopharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials: Impact on State Economies, at I (2015) (“The five states with the highest number of active clinical trial sites were California (3,111), Florida (2,571), Texas (2,799), New York (2,476), and Pennsylvania (1,972).”).

 [353]. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.

 [354]. ASCO and Friends, supra note 47; see also Bateman-House & Robinson, supra note 231, at 322 (proposing Congress should explore measures that would encourage greater potential access to investigational drugs through clinical research).

 [355]. Kim et al., supra note 49.

 [356]. Id. at 3742.

 [357]. Press Release, SWOG Cancer Research Network, Cancer Comorbidities Reduce Trial Enrollment (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.swog.org/news-events/news/2019/01/10/cancer-comorbidities-reduce-trial-enrollment. The lead author of the JAMA Oncology study Joseph Unger explained,

[i]f you look at the numbers, they tell you that the ASCO/Friends/FDA guidelines were well focused, as they alone would account for more than half of the potential gains from updating eligibility criteria in trials. . . . This would have the short-term impact of helping patients by giving them access to new treatments and have a long-term impact on the discovery of new treatments, speeding the time it takes to run trials and get new treatments to the public.

Id.

 [358]. Compare Diversity in Lilly-Sponsored Clinical Trials in North America, Eli Lilly, https://www.lilly.com/diversity-in-lilly-sponsored-clinical-trials-in-north-america (“[E]very study conducted with more than 25 clinical trial sites must select at least two sites meeting Lilly’s diversity criteria.”) (last visited Feb. 11, 2019), with Advancing Inclusive Research, Genentech, https://www.gene.com/patients/advancing-inclusive-research (assessing its site selection process and developing new “inclusive research” standards) (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [359]. Chen & Wong, supra note 329 (noting biotech firm CEO citing concerns that regulation aimed at improving diversity would delay development efforts).

 [360]. See id.

 [361]. Chreasea Dickerson, Incentives Watch: Illinois Diversity and Inclusion Tax Credit Initiatives, Bloomberg BNA: Salt Talk Blog (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/incentives-watch-illinois-b57982087723 (discussing state efforts to include diversity and inclusion provisions in film production tax credits). The adoption of diversity inclusion plans could require companies to reevaluate their inclusion and exclusion criteria.

 [362]. The FDA already gives tax credits, trial grants, and exemptions from the Prescription Drug User Fee Act to incentivize development of drugs for rare diseases. Designating an Orphan Drug Product: Drugs and Biological Products, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/forindustry
/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/howtoapplyfororphanproductdesignation/default.htm (last updated July 26, 2018). For more information about the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, see Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee (last updated Feb. 8, 2019).

 [363]. See Chen & Wong, supra note 329.

 [364]. But see Michelle Cortez, Brain Cancer Patient Is First to Get Untested Treatment Under Trump-Backed Law, Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2019, 6:16 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2019-01-10/brain-cancer-patient-gets-unproven-therapy-first-under-new-law (reporting that a European-based biotechnology company is “the first publicly known” company to provide an investigational drug through the Right to Try Act).

 [365]. E.g., Munz, supra note 191 (discussing a patient moving to a state with a right-to-try law, but who is unable to secure access); Weintraub, supra note 276 (noting that one relative’s calls seeking right to try for a family member escalated to threats).

 [366]. Rita Rubin, Experts Critical of America’s Right-to-Try Drug Laws, Lancet (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(15)00393-1/fulltext.

 [367]. The FDA can currently assess civil monetary penalties against companies that fail to submit registration or clinical trial results to ClinicalTrials.gov. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j) (2018). Congress should also amend the Cures Act to give the agency a similar enforcement mechanism when a company fails to publish its expanded access guidelines and related cost recovery policies. Id.; see also Bateman-House, Examining Patient Access, supra note 210.

 [368]. Junod, supra note 15 (quoting William Thomas Beaver, who drafted the controlled clinical trial regulation promulgated after the enactment of the Kefauver–Harris Amendment). The adoption of diversity and inclusion plans would likely require companies to reevaluate their inclusion and exclusion criteria. See ASCO and Friends, supra note 47 (“Broadening the eligibility criteria for clinical trials will provide the opportunity for more people to participate in research studies. Not only will this improve access, it will make the trial results more reflective of the people that will ultimately use the drug.”).

 [369]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3737.

 

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 [ii]. Managed Access Programs, Novartis, https://www.novartis.com/our-focus/healthcare-professionals/managed-access-programs (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [iii]. Genentech Policy, supra note 100.

 [iv]. Compassionate Use of Sanofi Investigational Products, Sanofi, https://www.sanofi.com/en/science-and-innovation/clinical-trials-and-results/compassionate-use-expanded-access (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [v]. Access to Investigational Medicines, Merck, https://www.merck.com/about/views-and-positions/access-to-medicines/home.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [vi]. Janssen Policy, supra note 277.

 [vii]. GlaxoSmithKline, GSK Public Policy Positions: Compassionate Use 1–2 (2017), https://www.gsk.com/media/3368/compassionate-use.pdf.

 [viii]. Expanded Access: Individual Access to Investigational Medicines Intended to Treat Serious Diseases, Gilead, http://www.gilead.com/research/expanded-access (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [ix]. Pre-Approval Access to Investigational Drugs Policy, AbbVie, https://www.abbvie.com/our-company/access-to-investigational-drugs-policy.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [x]. Access to Investigational Medicines, Amgen, https://www.amgen.com/responsibility/access-to-medicine/access-to-investigational-medicines (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xii]. Early Patient Access to Investigational Medicine, Bristol-Myers Squibb, https://www.bms.com/healthcare-providers/early-patient-access-to-investigational-medicine.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xiii]. Teva Pharm., supra note 121, at 1–8.

 [xiv]. How to Request Access to Investigational Medicines, Bayer, http://pharma.bayer.com/en/commitment-responsibility/ethics-and-transparency/ethics-in-r-and-d/access-to-investigational-medicinal-products (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

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 [xvi]. Expanded Access, Novo Nordisk, http://www.novonordisk-us.com/whoweare/about-novo-nordisk/expanded-access.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xvii]. Allergan Pre-Approval Access Program, supra note 125.

 [xviii]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, Takeda Oncology, http://www.takedaoncology.com/medicines/access-to-investigational-drugs (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xix]. Clinical Trials, Celgene, https://www.celgene.com/research-development/clinical-trials (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xx]. Astellas Position, supra note 124.