Miss-Stake by IRS: Proof-of-Stake’s Underinclusive Regulatory Guidance

Death and taxes are the two certainties of life, and for some, the former may be more conceptually pleasant than the latter. To allay some of that unpleasantness, this Note uses the IRS’s guidance (or lack thereof) on the taxation of new types of digital currencies to provide a basic conceptual understanding of how tax law is formed. “Staking rewards,” which is income derived from new types of digital currencies, have sparked debate over when it should be taxed. However, such ambiguity has failed to elicit a clear response from the IRS.

It is understandable why this area of law feels convoluted to many. Unlike other disciplines, tax law is not judge-made law. Therefore, tax law often lacks clear natural-language holdings from case law. Instead, it is applied either statutorily (under the Internal Revenue Code) or administratively (through regulations, notices, and letters from the IRS). This Note illustrates that in many instances, our tax system is not as convoluted or ambiguous as it is appears.

This Note looks at the IRS’s non-response up until the Revenue Ruling on July 31, 2023, to argue that such silence regarding income from staking rewards was not only deliberate but also necessary, at least during that time. This argument analyzes the taxation of staking rewards in three parts. Part I explains the background and mechanics of staking rewards and how those traits factor into questions of how it should be taxed. Scholarship on taxing staking rewards is growing yet scarce, and typically published either by advocates or adversaries of digital currencies. Accordingly, Part I of this Note also provides a consolidation of arguments and analyses from both sides of the debate. Part II outlines what is left unclear by the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS, and case law. Part III explains what the IRS had ruled up until the recent Revenue Ruling, and what guidance may be expected to follow. Here, in Part III, is this Note’s novel contribution. Part III uses the debate on staking rewards as a lens to justify non-guidance by the IRS to balance the risk of stifling innovation in new technology sectors and avoid commitment to “unfair” tax guidance. These considerations draw on tort law to illustrate the need to allow for development of a sufficient “background of experience” before regulating developing technology into the ground.

INTRODUCTION

Digital assets, cryptocurrency, and blockchain are areas of rapid growth in the legal field and are consequently raising new questions about their legal and tax implications and treatments. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has provided some guidance on the taxation of a few mechanisms, such as proof-of-work (“PoW”), Mining, Hard Forks, and transfers to investors and service providers.1Charles R. Zubrzycki, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Virtual Currency, LexisNexis, https://

plus.lexis.com/document/openwebdocview/Tax-and-Accounting-Aspects-of-Virtual-Currency/?pddoc
fullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A62PH-S571-JB7K-23MY-00000-00&pdcomponentid=500749&pdmfid=1530671&crid=eac337b2-6033-4b53-ad74-f9b9a36ae1f0 [https://perma.cc/46NG-ESGP] (last updated Nov. 30, 2023).
However, newer applications to blockchain systems, namely proof-of-stake (“PoS”) consensus mechanisms, have highlighted the ambiguities in the existing guidelines. This Note will address two main questions: first, what are the different ways a statutory analysis may qualify the timing and character of staking rewards as assets or income, and second, whether and how the IRS may choose to provide guidance for interpreting and applying the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”). This Note will only provide a high-level, normative assessment of what “should” be the approach to taxation of staking rewards. It will serve as a roadmap by compiling and interpreting the (limited) guiding authority that has been obscured for a variety of reasons, including writing on the topic, which is primarily the conjecture of staking advocates and cryptocurrency skeptics. This roadmap will explain why Congress and the IRS had, for so long, declined to clarify their intentions to regulate and interpret the reporting requirements of staking rewards, with a focus on why such ambiguity was and is justified for the developing nature of digital currencies under our tax system. More broadly, this Note should be used to understand how and why the IRS finally issued Revenue Ruling 2023-14 on July 31, 2023 stating its opinion that staking rewards should be taxed at receipt.2Rev. Rul. 2023-14, 2023-33 I.R.B. 484, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-23-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6WL-FVAX]. While there are some arguments that the recent ruling does not necessarily impose tax on all staking rewards, it is premature to explore such edge cases before the IRS’s opinion (which is not binding on courts) is interpreted by a court.3Matthew Dimon, David Forst & Sean McElroy, IRS Issues Revenue Ruling 2023-14 on Staking, JD Supra (Aug. 1, 2023), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/irs-issues-revenue-ruling-2023-14-on-5931377 [http://perma.cc/69VK-3QQB] (noting that the ruling was issued three days after oral arguments in the Jarrett case’s appeal).

I.  BACKGROUND

A.  What Is a Blockchain?

Another more descriptive name for blockchains is “distributed ledgers.” Information is shared among participants on the blockchain (“purveyors”), and transactions are constantly appended to the ledger, and then redistributed to users. Once a majority of those users agree that the new ledger is valid, it becomes the standard for all future transactions. The utility of the blockchain is that every user is incentivized to republish only validated ledgers because to publish an invalid ledger would conflict with the “distributed” version propagated by all the other users and cause the party publishing the invalid ledger to lose credibility and consequently, lose the ability to record its own transactions on the ledger.

If the utility of organizing data like this is not immediately clear, consider a typical property law topic: recording acts. Different jurisdictions have different ramifications for failure to properly record, or check the recording of, a real estate transaction in indices that are maintained by a county clerk. So, prompt recording and diligent record checking are important (but sometimes insufficient) to prevent title disputes in land transactions. For example, imagine purchasers A and B are both interested in purchasing Blackacre from seller X, in a state with a “notice” recording act. Here, A purchases Blackacre from X in year 1, and B “purchases” Blackacre from X in year 2 and records the deed of sale on the same day (before A had recorded her deed). So long as B is a bona fide purchaser, and she did not have notice of A’s transaction, her claim to the property would prevail. Blockchain systems are designed to solve exactly this type of problem. Through use of a “consensus mechanism,” each subsequent transaction is validated before it is added to the ledger, which maintains the integrity of frequently updated data sets. Had Blackacre’s state used such a consensus mechanism, the automatic validation of A’s transaction would generate notice to other buyers like B, not only cementing A’s deed, but also saving B from accidentally buying Blackacre from an unscrupulous seller. This illustrates how seamlessly this kind of technology can promote fair function of law without any change needed to our laws or regulations. While some people are still skeptical of “new blockchain applications,” in 2018, Burlington, Vermont, contracted with a blockchain startup, “Propy,” to provide exactly this kind of blockchain-supported recordkeeping for the County’s recording of land transactions.4Vermont Blockchain Legislation and Propy: Things You Need to Know, Propy (Mar. 28, 2019), https://propy.com/browse/vermont-blockchain-legislation-and-propy-things-you-need-to-know [http://perma.cc/7Y2K-GFK6]; see Office of the Vt. Sec’y of State, Blockchains for Public Recordkeeping and for Recording Land Records 21 (2019), https://sos.vermont.
gov/media/r3jh24ig/vsara_blockchains_for_public_recordkeeping_white_paper_v1.pdf [http://perma.
cc/ZKH6-G2L3].

B.  What Are Consensus Mechanisms and Staking Rewards?

A consensus mechanism is the way in which a blockchain validates transactions of cryptocurrency; the validation itself is carried out through cryptography (encryption or decryption).5Pete Ritter, Joshua Tompkins & Hubert Raglan, Early Signs from Treasury on the Scope of Digital Asset Cost Basis Reporting, The Tax Adviser (June 1, 2022) [hereinafter Ritter, KPMG Article], https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2022/jun/treasury-scope-digital-asset-cost-basis-reporting [https:

//perma.cc/F4DK-V9EK].
Consensus mechanisms used are either PoW or PoS. PoW is the older mechanism (launched by technologies like Bitcoin), which is why it is more familiar to the IRS. PoS mechanisms are newer, and accordingly, enjoy much less tax guidance from the IRS, specifically with respect to “staking rewards” (discussed below). A PoS consensus mechanism expands its ledger and confirms transactions by selecting users to “verify that a transaction is legitimate and add it to the blockchain,” rather than have every user assess the accuracy of each newly published ledger.6E. Napoletano, Proof of Stake Explained, Forbes (Aug. 25, 2023, 1:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/cryptocurrency/proof-of-stake [http://perma.cc/N9S7-TW5L] (quoting Marius Smith, head of business development at digital asset custodian Finoa). Those who verify transactions are called “validators,” which is a desirable role because validators who successfully confirm a transaction receive a reward in the blockchain’s native cryptocurrency—a staking reward.7Id. Prospective validators must “stake” some of their own native cryptocurrency (or cryptocurrency that has been “delegated” to them by “stakers”) as a form of collateral to ensure that they will not verify fraudulent transactions. However, should they “improperly validate bad or fraudulent data, they may lose some or all of their stake as a penalty.”8Id. (describing what a “slash” is). Validators receive a fee in the native currency, called “gas,” which they will use to pay staking rewards to the participants who delegated/staked tokens to them.9A Comprehensive Guide on Crypto Staking Taxes, ZenLedger (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.zenledger.io/blog/crypto-staking-taxes [http://perma.cc/3JCS-SLKT]. Network participants also hope to be selected as validators because they desire to support the good function of the blockchain.10David Rodeck, Crypto Staking Basics, Forbes (Aug. 2, 2022 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/cryptocurrency/crypto-staking-basics [http://perma.cc/7GA4-4NQA]. This type of “skin in the game” means that the larger a stake, the more likely the network is to deem the person as a provider of trustworthy consensus votes, increasing the chance that the person will be selected as a validator.11Id. This mechanism causes the participants holding only a small amount of native currency to pool their coins or delegate them to a validator (rather than trying to be a validator themselves) and receive staking rewards in return on a pro rata basis, similar in some respects to a partnership.12Id. Tokens received as staking rewards are not distributed from a preexisting fund. Instead, they are actually created through the validation.13K. Peter Ritter & Joshua S. Tompkins, Proof of Stake—What’s Really at Stake on the Tax Front?, 19 J. Tax’n Fin. Prods. 25, 28 (2022) [hereinafter Ritter, Journal Article]. This may lead to novel and unique tax treatment based on ambiguities of asset character or uncertainties in the timing of their receipt or credit.14Napoletano, supra note 6. After an explanation of income, this Note will outline some difficulties in applying traditional timing rules for inclusion of income to staking rewards.

C.  How to Measure Income

Defining what is income is a chronic question in the world of tax law, and for purposes of this Note, it is necessary to understand how to measure and identify income before we can decide if/when such income is “taxable income.” The Haig-Simons definition of income is widely accepted and illustrative of a non-statutory measurement of income: “Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.”15Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy 50 (1938) (modeling income as an individual’s change in wealth). This broad definition of income is constructed to measure a person’s change in wealth (∆W) by comparing the inflow and outflow of their assets. For example, Consumer B has $10 of wages per week, $100 in savings (S), and every week his only consumption (C) is purchasing groceries. To illustrate, assume two scenarios: in scenario 1, he consumes $5 this week (increasing his savings by $5) and in scenario 2, he consumes $15 (decreasing his savings by $5). In both scenarios his income will be the same because he still received $10 of wages. To maintain equivalency of income, the Haig-Simon algebraic sum compensates for the different consumptions by factoring in B’s change in savings (∆S). In scenario 1, B was underbudget, so his change in savings (∆S) was +$5, but in scenario 2, B went overbudget, which required spending $5 of his savings, generating a negative change in savings of -$5. The variables for this income definition are change in wealth (∆W), consumption (C), and change in savings (∆S), which are related as the following equation dictates.

Going forward, the relevant variable for questions of income from staking rewards is the change in savings (∆S) because it is a broader model for income, representing a taxpayer’s purchasing power, rather than just net receipts.16Michael J. Graetz, Deborah H. Schenk & Anne L. Alstott, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 566–67 (8th ed. 2018) (illustrating that income, especially capital income, should only be recognized from real gain that elevates a taxpayer’s purchasing power).

D.  Unique Tax Nature of Staking Rewards

Two fundamental aspects of measuring income are tax-free recovery of capital and determining when income is sufficiently concrete such that it should be taxed.17Id. at 38–40. Here, “capital” is the amount invested in an asset, the “recovery” of which is not taxed at the asset’s “disposition.”18See James Chen, Disposition: Definition, How It Works in Investing, and Example, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/disposition.asp [https://perma.cc/8SAQ-9LYM] (Aug. 22, 2022); see generally I.R.C. § 904(f)(3)(B)(i) (defining “disposition” as “a sale, exchange, distribution, or gift of property”). To note, § 904 is not relevant here. The amount invested in an asset (“basis”) is typically determined to be the amount paid for the asset (“cost basis”).19See I.R.C. § 1012. For example, if Investor X buys Z stock for $100 in year 1, and in year 2 it has a fair market value (“FMV”) of $200, X has then realized $100 in gain (the $200 FMV less the $100 cost basis); however, because Investor X did not sell the asset, that gain is not seen as sufficiently concrete, and she does not recognize any taxable income. If instead our tax system treated X as recognizing her amount realized (that is, even though she had not sold the Z stock), she would owe taxes on the full $100. Additionally, there would be another problem if the system taxed the full FMV of $200. X bought stock Z with “post-tax dollars,” money that had already been taxed when it was first received. Now she is being taxed on that same $100 again, despite such value not reflecting any real gain. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass defined the test for recognition of real gain under I.R.C. § 61 as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”20Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (emphasis added). The previous focus on measurements of ∆S or purchasing power flows from the emphasis that the Glenshaw Glass test puts on accessions to wealth.

1.  New Property

The fundamental reason that the taxation of staking rewards is unclear is because of the meaning of “recognition.” If X had sold the Z stock for dollars, it would be clear (1) that she had realized gain and (2) how to measure amount of gain. However, because she continues to hold Z stock, it is harder to determine if she has experienced an accretion to wealth and how much that accretion is.

Application of our tax system is not always limited to strict statutory interpretation. In such gaps of explicit authority, the spirit of the law assumes that what an unrelated buyer is willing to pay X for an asset is an adequate estimated valuation from which the appropriate tax effect may be calculated. However, applying this question to staking rewards is not as simple as merely determining the market value of the reward because the tokens received are “newly minted”; therefore, there is no purchase or sale, and no third-party source has given up any tokens—even though the number of tokens held by a given person has increased.21Abraham Sutherland, Cryptocurrency Economics and the Taxation of Block Rewards, Part 2, 165 Tax Notes Fed. 953, 962 (2019) [hereinafter Sutherland, Block Rewards Part 2]. That said, determining gain when a taxpayer receives assets without any purchase or sale (and therefore no cost basis) is not wholly uncharted waters in tax law. For example, § 1221(a)(3) of the Code specifically excludes certain “self-created” assets from the definition of capital assets.22I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3). Further, analysis of the relevance of staking rewards being “new property” is explored later as part of the review of staking rewards as capital assets.

2.  Dilutionary Effect

The “dilutionary” characteristic of staking rewards is a result of their status as “created property” and is one of the main factors current cryptocurrency tax guidance fails to address. Recall that staking rewards are distributed because PoS consensus mechanisms provide participants with the opportunity to maintain the network.23See Abraham Sutherland, Cryptocurrency Economics and the Taxation of Block Rewards, 165 Tax Notes Fed. 749, 750 (2019) [hereinafter Sutherland, Block Rewards]. Additionally, because validators increase their frequency of opportunities to maintain the network by pledging more tokens, they are willing to pay staking rewards to participants who pledge tokens roughly proportionate to the size of each pledge.24See id. This is where issues of dilution can arise.

Abraham Sutherland, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law and legal advisor to the Proof of Stake Alliance, explains that the amount of “true gains and losses” for stakers depends on two variables: the “staking rate” and the “token creation rate.”25Mattia Landoni & Abraham Sutherland, Dilution and True Economic Gain from Cryptocurrency Block Rewards, 168 Tax Notes Fed. 1213, 1215 (2020). The staking rate represents what percent of a network’s total tokens are actively staked, and the token creation rate represents the rate that tokens are created on the network through other means.26See id. at 1213–15 (explaining that tokens may also be created by the incumbent owners of a network outside of the staking process). Describing or creating useful models that account for the token creation rate is beyond the scope of this Note, so the following analyses will assume there is no alternative method of token production, setting the token production rate equal to zero. Sutherland goes on to illustrate that as the staking rate increases, the amount of true economic gain decreases.27See id. (explaining that once the staking rate reaches 100% there is no longer any true economic gain for staking). So, when enough participants on the network receive staking rewards in proportion to their initial holdings, they may hold more tokens, but that will not be indicative of a relative increase to their purchasing power (which is another measurement of “income”). Imagine if tomorrow every person in the world had their net worth doubled; the inevitable parallel result would be that the price of goods and services would also double. That is a simplistic illustration of Sutherland’s models of true economic gain on PoS networks and how applying IRS guidance intended for PoW mining income will result in the overstatement of income.28See id. at 1221.

Understanding dilution’s effect on income is easier through analogy to inflation. For such an analogy, it is helpful to apply a non-statutory definition (such as section 61 of the Code). Recall the Haig-Simons definition of income modeled by equation (1) below.29See Simons, supra note 15.

As explained above, tracking ∆S is necessary to ensure income correlates with purchasing power.30Graetz et al., supra note 16. For example, consider Investor X, who purchases $100 of stock B when the constant, annual rate of inflation is 10%. Inflation in this case, is “a rise in prices, which can be translated as the decline of purchasing power over time.”31Jason Fernando, Inflation: What It Is, How It Can Be Controlled, and Extreme Examples, Investopedia (Dec. 14, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inflation.asp [http://
perma.cc/8LED-E4GU].
This means that for B’s stock to maintain its same purchasing power it must appreciate at a rate equal to the inflation rate, which would require stock B’s value rise to $110 by year’s end.3210% (rate of return equal to rate of inflation) multiplied by $100 (the principal value of stock B) equals $10 (appreciation of stock). Assume that B’s value does go up by $10. That change in savings would result in $10 of income despite X having no “real” income (“true income” in dilution explanation above) because inflation raised the prices of everything by 10%.33See Fernando, supra note 31. Similarly, if a holder of 100 tokens, representing 1% of total tokens on the network receives 1 token as a staking reward at a time when the quantity of tokens increases by 1%, that holder will continue to hold 1% of all tokens and will not have any more purchasing power. This illustrates how effects of dilution and inflation can be similar. Despite reductions in purchasing power caused by inflationary effects, there is no exception to the requirement that all of a taxpayer’s nominal gains must be included in the year of receipt.34See I.R.C. § 461. Dilution in the cryptocurrency context is similarly insufficient (by itself) to justify an exception from inclusion at receipt. It does, however, indicate a need for a better method of valuing the true economic income of taxpayers.35See Landoni & Sutherland, supra note 25 (detailing three possible methods of modeling and calculating true economic income from staking rewards).

Another real-world analogue is the taxability of stock dividends. A stock dividend is simply a payment from a corporation to its shareholders in the form of additional shares.36James Chen, Stock Dividend: What It Is and How It Works, with Example, Investopedia (June 30, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stockdividend.asp [https://perma.cc/RW73-GNGS]. Receipt of stock qualifies as an “accession to wealth” under the Glenshaw Glass rule and would typically be includable as section 61 income.37Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); I.R.C. § 61(a). But that was not the case in Eisner v. Macomber, in which a stock dividend was issued to all shareholders in proportion to the number of shares owned.38Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 203 (1920). The Supreme Court justified the lack of income because of the non-change in positions of the corporation and the shareholders, based on the fact that the corporation’s “property [was] not diminished, and . . . . [t]he proportional interest of each shareholder remain[ed] the same.”39Id. Now partially enshrined by I.R.C. § 305, the lack of change to the shareholders’ position is the more relevant factor than the lack of disposition of property by the corporation.

This stock dividend is similar to dilution, which is why it is cited by some staking advocates. There are, however, two differences between the dilution effects and the stock dividends in Macomber. First, the distribution was pro rata, exactly proportional to the recipients’ holdings, and second, the distributed shares had a definite “source”: the corporation.40See id.

First, staking rewards were only distributed exactly pro rata in the above hypothetical where the staking rate was 100% and every participant either received rewards for maintaining the network as a validator or delegated their tokens to a validator and received a pro rata share of that validator’s income. The Court in Macomber leaned heavily on the fact that the distribution was pro rata to show that the shareholder’s “interests [were] not increased.”41See id. at 203; see also id. at 216 (citing other cases supporting the holding because the distribution was pro rata). The Court doubled down on the pro rata requirement for a stock dividend to be excluded from income in Koshland v. Helvering, in which the Court determined a stock dividend that “gives the stockholder an interest different from that which his former stock holding represented” is includable as income.42Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446 (1936).

For the second issue, tax law generally does not always know what to do with an ambiguity, such as a lack of source, because it makes it harder to confirm that the tax consequences adequately follow the economic reality of a transaction.43See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 203. Here, without a source like a donor or seller, there is nobody whose situation can be compared with the recipient. By confirming that the corporation’s “property [was] not diminished,” the Court illustrated that the corporation did not give up anything and reinforced the reasoning that a taxable event did not occur.44See id.

Proponents of preferential tax treatment for staking rewards point to the lack of source to support arguments varying from categorizing staking rewards as found property, created property, or even property entirely outside the scope of our tax system.45See Sutherland, Block Rewards Part 2, supra note 21, at 960 (discussing a range of potential classifications of staking rewards ranging from found property to self-created property). Conversely, opponents to preferential treatment for staking rewards point to the lack of source as an example of an ambiguity beyond the scope of reasonable speculation; the New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”) even drafted a report requesting clear guidance to determine the source of the staking rewards.46N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Cryptocurrency and Other Fungible Digital Assets 9 (2022), https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2022/04/1461-Report-on-Cryptocurrency-and-Other-Fungible-Digital-Assets.pdf [https://perma.cc/37JP-XZDL] (“The government should provide clear guidance regarding the source of any staking rewards includable in gross income . . . .”).

Regarding staking income, the fact that the holder received additional tokens may not be determinative. In Macomber, the shareholder received additional stock from a “distribution,” which the Court qualified as essentially a stock split (a stock split is done by “splitting” outstanding shares that are in the hands of shareholders, which increases the stock issued while lowering the stock price in proportion to the number of shares into which each share was split).47See Adam Hayes, What a Stock Split Is and How It Works, with an Example, Investopedia (Oct. 31, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stocksplit.asp [http://perma.cc/AY9Q-GVNC]. Stock splits are analogous to staking rewards because neither have a source. Additionally, per I.R.C. § 305 (which partially codified Macomber), stock splits are not includable as income.48I.R.C. § 305(b)(4). But for the difference that a stock split is virtually always exactly pro rata, Macomber and I.R.C. § 305 support the argument that staking rewards should not be included in taxable income at receipt.

3.  Lack of Explicit Guidance

In 2014, the IRS issued IRB Notice 2014-21 (the “2014 Notice”), and, despite such Notices not being law or even binding authority,49“IRS notices . . . do not constitute legal authority.” Stobie Creek Invs. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 671 (2008), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010). it remains one of the most informative pieces of guidance on taxing cryptocurrency, due in part to the scarcity of any guidance at all.50I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. The 2014 Notice determined that income from cryptocurrency “mining” was taxable; its applicability to the newer PoS and staking consensus mechanisms, however, is disputed.51See Sutherland, Block Rewards, supra note 23, at 751 (arguing that the 2014 Notice was released primarily with Bitcoin in mind, which uses a Proof of Work consensus mechanism). While some tax professionals believe that the differences between mining and staking are insignificant and assume the reasoning applied by the IRS to mining should also apply to staking, the IRS itself showed that it was not prepared to make that assumption in/after Jarrett v. United States, after successfully having the case dismissed as moot (such dismissal was affirmed on appeal this past July).52Jarrett v. United States, No. 21-CV-00419, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178743, at *13–14 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2022); see also Jarrett v. United States, 79 F.4th 675 (6th Cir. 2023).

In Jarrett, taxpayers sued the IRS seeking a refund for taxes paid on staking rewards.53Nikhilesh De & Cheyenne Ligon, US Tax Agency Moves to Dismiss Lawsuit by Tezos Stakers Who Refused Refund, Demanded Trial, CoinDesk ] (May 11, 2023, 10:06 AM), https://
http://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/03/03/us-tax-agency-moves-to-dismiss-lawsuit-by-tezos-stakers-who-refused-refund-demanded-trial [https://perma.cc/CV56-FDFL].
Not willing to offer a decisive ruling, the IRS decided to simply refund the taxes paid, and when the Jarretts declined the refund seeking a legal determination by forcing a case in federal court, the IRS (successfully) moved for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.54Brief in Support of Taxpayer Joshua Jarrett’s 1040-X Amended Return and Claim for Refund at 2, Jarrett v. United States, No. 21-CV-00419 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2022). There are many possible reasons for the IRS’s refusal to provide clear guidance here; perhaps the IRS thought that an informed ruling was not yet possible because staking is too new, or the IRS could see material differences between mining and staking (mining requires computational “work” to receive mined tokens, which could liken it more to traditional income producing activities, while staking rewards are paid to holders who passively delegate their tokens to validators). This indeterminacy has split members of the tax and crypto community into two groups who disagree on the appropriate method of taxing staking rewards. The first group’s position, supported by the NYSBA, is that staking rewards should be immediately included as income.55N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46. The second group’s position, supported by groups like the Proof of Stake Alliance, is that taxes on staking rewards should be deferred until the disposition of the tokens.56See Abraham Sutherland, Proof of Stake Alliance, Tax Treatment of Block Rewards: A Primer 8 (2020) [hereinafter Sutherland, Primer], https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780102 [https://perma.cc/2V72-8B9R]. The arguments of each of these groups are analyzed in Sections II.B and II.C.

II.  WHAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED

For PoS mechanisms, the two main questions regarding staking rewards are: (1) Character: What kind of income is it? and (2) Timing: When should it be taxed? The character analysis in this Note is only concerned with the effect capital asset status would have on the timing of inclusion in income.

A.  Character: What Makes it Capital?

One of the main factors in determining the taxes one owes is determined by the “character” of the underlying asset/transaction that resulted in gain or loss of income. Generally, the character of gains and losses is either “ordinary” or “capital.” Capital gains/losses result from transactions in assets that were or are held for investment, with most other income being ordinary.57Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and Losses, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 [https://perma.cc/QH8N-J69J]. While asset character can be nuanced, the factors used to determine whether an asset is capital should be the same for digital assets and traditional assets.

Courts and the IRS have been resolving character determinations of digital currencies since well before the inception of blockchains and cryptocurrencies. The main example is litigation on the taxability of “miles” provided by airlines. In Charley v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit approved a tax deficiency assessed against a taxpayer due to his failure to report his receipt of airline miles as income. 58Charley v. Comm’r, 91 F.3d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1996). In this case, the court declined to comment on whether, “in the abstract” the receipt of airline credits was income, but the court did hold that here there was taxable income (that is, not capital gain) upon their redemption because the taxpayer (1) received the credits from his employer through his job, and (2) converted them to cash.59Id. However, six years later, the IRS provided an announcement that taxpayers who fail to report frequent flyer miles received through their business would not be pursued for a deficiency.60I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 C.B. 621 (Mar. 11, 2002). This case and announcement illustrate the IRS’s familiarity with digital assets and its acknowledgment that determining the tax treatment of receiving digital assets is complicated. Unfortunately, it does not provide much guidance for staking rewards.

Whether an asset is capital or ordinary depends on multiple factors, like its intrinsic qualities, the nature of its use, and how it was acquired, among other factors.61I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231. In the case of staking rewards, tax experts are unable to agree on a statutory determination under those factors for the character of staking rewards. Therefore, this Note first will look through a policy lens to assess whether staking rewards align with the justifications for preferential tax treatment of capital assets in the first place.

1.  Policy Supporting Preferential Treatment Applied to Staking Rewards

When determining the character of new classes of assets, people seem to jump straight to the statutory analysis despite the lack of precedent for how courts and the IRS will apply the Code to that new class of assets. Here, the IRS is in fact likely waiting to assess the character of these assets to determine where the Code may be applicable and where it may require an update to accommodate the crypto sphere. Before analyzing the statutory application or inferring how new statutory language may mimic existing code, a step back to the policy level should be taken. This is important because in the past, the IRS has denied valid textual applications of the Code in favor of interpretations that it believed better carried out the intent of Congress.62See, e.g., Ark. Best Corp. v. Comm’r, 485 U.S. 212, 219–21 (1988) (explaining why the “semantically” correct interpretation by the petitioner of § 1221 was not what they would rule); see also Corn Prods. Refin. Co. v. Comm’r, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955). Generally, arguments in favor of preferential treatment of capital assets are grouped under “lock-in effect,” liquidity, bunching, inflation, double taxation, and investment incentives.63Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 566–70 (defining these terms but also including arguments beyond the scope of this Note, such as questioning whether capital income even constitutes income in the first place).

Crypto investments are subject to the lock-in effect, which is where a holder avoids selling an asset that has appreciated in value because the holder will recognize taxes on the realized gain at the time of disposition, sale, or exchange. This externality is a transaction cost, which may cause the asset to be held when it otherwise would have been disposed of, absent the imposed taxation. Taxing cryptocurrencies such that transactions that otherwise would have occurred are prevented reduces market efficiency by slowing the flow of assets to the holder who most values that asset. The lock-in effect is especially prevalent for assets (such as crypto) which taxpayers may hold longer than they would have absent tax incentives (such as stepped-up-basis, which allows the elimination of gains in appreciated property inherited from a decedent).64Edward J. McCaffery, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Income Tax Law 12–15 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2012); I.R.C. § 1014.

A justification for preferential treatment related to lock-in is the liquidity problem. A reduction in liquidity impairs the mobility of capital.65Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 570. Liquidity is reduced when taxpayers realize gains on assets in excess of their income from other sources. For example, X has an income of $10,000 per year, and her most valuable asset is her house and the land it sits on, which are capital assets valued at $10,000. Absent preferential treatment for capital gains, if tomorrow some market force causes the fair market value of her home to jump to $100,000, she would owe taxes on $90,000 of appreciation. This would be consistent with the goal of tax law to track “accessions to wealth;” however, forcing taxpayers like X to satisfy her tax obligation by selling her home runs against the “efficiency” goals our tax system.66Id. at 29 (explaining that a tax, which changes peoples’ behavior in “bad” ways, is an efficiency cost). This treatment applies to assets like stock and securities too, and those same reasons also apply to crypto holdings.

“Bunching” is the recognition of lump sum gains all at once, which is the analogue to the lock-in effect. It results from the fact that we generally do not measure taxable gain “mark-to-market” (as value accrues), but rather only when the asset is sold. This means that gains accrued over many years may end up being recognized in a single year. In our progressive tax system, lower tax rates are applied to a taxpayer’s income up to a certain “bracket” threshold, after which a higher rate is applicable to each subsequent dollar earned. If instead, the gain was spread over a taxpayer’s holding period, they would normally enjoy the benefits of “running through the brackets” by having their first dollars earned each year enjoy the lower tax rates of the lower brackets. However, for a one time “lump” gain, the brackets are only “run through” once, and the excess gain is all taxed at the taxpayer’s marginal rate. The typical critique of this policy rationale is that bunching may not matter for most taxpayers, who already “run through the brackets” each year from other income. However, there is insufficient data on the average wealth of crypto investors, and accordingly, it is unclear if there is a need to counteract the bunching effect. Data is lacking because a feature of blockchains is the protection of anonymity. This illustrates potential support for delaying determinations about asset character until the IRS and Congress have sufficient information to inform their legislation.

Inflation (which this Note acknowledges above in Section I.D.2, does not warrant other tax benefits such as deferred reporting) is a concern for investment income across the board (regardless of whether measured in crypto or government legal tender—“fiat”). Taxes are supposed to correlate with “accessions to wealth” experienced by taxpayers. During times of inflation, an investor may see the nominal value of her assets rise, but not any faster than the costs of other goods did. This lack of “real economic gain” is why our tax system attempts to (partially) correct for taxing income that does not represent an accession to wealth. The two main ways our tax system addresses these issues are (1) by correlating (“indexing”) tax brackets to inflation67I.R.C. § 1(f)(3); I.R.S Rev. Proc. 2021-45, 2021-48 I.R.B. 764. and (2) by allowing preferential treatment on gains prone to reflect inflation. Crypto investments can face inflation just like fiat investments, and it is a particularly tricky question to answer for staking income. As mentioned above in Section I.B, PoS consensus mechanisms impose “gas” fees (paid in additional native coins) to process the validation. Depending on the cost of the gas relative to the staking reward, some exchanges may be more inflationary, and others may even be deflationary. If staking rewards cause inflation in their markets, that may further suggest that their nature warrants preferential tax treatment because they are prone to growth without an accession to wealth.68Note that inflation caused by gas fees is a separate but similar issue to dilution described above.

One of the most established reasons given in support of preferential treatment for capital assets is that it incentivizes investment, which in turn promotes economic development. While there is still some skepticism on the merit of cryptocurrencies, taxes should not control investment in this sphere. An “efficient” tax system is not supposed to excessively alter the behavior of taxpayers or harm the good function of our free market.69Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 29. Accordingly, tax incentives to invest in cryptocurrencies may be justifiable if there are substantial benefits derived from the development of cryptocurrencies, blockchain technologies like “web3,”70The Investopedia Team, Web 3.0 Explained, Plus the History of Web 1.0 and 2.0, Investopedia (Oct. 18, 2023), https://www.investopedia.com/web-20-web-30-5208698 [https://
perma.cc/35VS-CKKM] (defining Web 3.0).
or other future applications. It is in that way that investment in this sector is akin to traditional investing. Evidence of Congress’s concern that the potential benefits of capital asset treatment for cryptocurrencies could be lost by improper regulation is shown in a letter from members of Congress to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen.

Digital assets could be impactful technological developments in certain sectors, and clear guidelines on tax reporting requirements will be important to those in this ecosystem. It will be important that we continue to work to provide further clarity, and to help ensure that the United States remains a global leader in financial innovation and development, while ensuring that this technology does not become a vector for illicit finance, tax evasion, or other criminal activity.71Letter from Rob Portman, Mark R. Warner, Mike Crapo, Kyrsten Sinema, Pat Toomey & Cynthia M. Lummis, Sens., to Janet Yellen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/9/a/9a6b3638-1a81-4b70-80a3-98f239c34c3b/94715
01FAEB0E61BD2E5C1A5D11EC799.12.14.21-yellen-cryptocurrency-letter—final.pdf [https://perma.
cc/VAA5-HLN4].

Ultimately, taxes are imposed to sustain the federal government’s budget. The Treasury would obviously like to have as large a fund as it needs; however, increasing the government’s tax revenue is not as simple as raising taxes on taxpayers. At a certain point, excessive taxes will result in reasonable taxpayers opting to engage in different activities because the tax burden of the activity will have exceeded the benefit of that activity. To illustrate this kind of “tax elasticity,” imagine two taxpayers, A and B. A lives in State Y and B lives in State Z, but otherwise, they are identical, working the same job, and paying 30% of their income in taxes. If tomorrow, State Z decides to raise the tax rate for B’s profession by 60%, a likely result would be that B would decide to move to State Y, where she may enjoy the better tax treatment that A has.

In this (exceptionally oversimplified) hypothetical, State Z raised taxes to pad its budget, but instead, it lost a source of taxable income by causing B to move to Y (think Cayman Islands). This concept is illustrated by economist Dr. Arthur Laffer’s “revenue maximizing rate,” which is the theoretical ideal rate of taxation to apply that will be as large as possible, without being so excessive that whatever action the tax is targeting begins to be avoided by taxpayers.72See Lisa Smith, How the Ideal Tax Rate Is Determined: The Laffer Curve, Investopedia (Jan. 21, 2024), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/08/laffer-curve.asp [https://perma.cc/4TWT-WDBF]. Economists and tax professionals argue over what rate for capital gains would maximize revenue. However, there is a consensus that at some point, a marginal increase in tax rates will not raise the tax revenue to the Treasury. The key for taxing cryptocurrency, then, is to find that point.

Cryptocurrency investment has seen expansive growth and adoption, with many sources, including Coinbase, creating expectations among purveyors, without clear factual support, that growth to their assets will qualify as capital gains.73Coinbase, Understanding Crypto Taxes, Coinbase, https://www.coinbase.com/learn/crypto-basics/understanding-crypto-taxes [https://perma.cc/W36N-FV3D]. Perhaps a factor in causing this: 75% of Americans who invested in cryptocurrency indicated that they invested in cryptocurrency because they think “it is a good way to make money.”74Michelle Faverio & Navid Massarat, 46% of Americans Who Have Invested in Cryptocurrency Say It’s Done Worse than Expected, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Aug. 23, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2022/08/23/46-of-americans-who-have-invested-in-cryptocurrency-say-its-done-worse-than-expected [https://perma.cc/9BUG-WDE7].
If so, many people are choosing to invest based on expectations on their return, and such purveyors may be very sensitive to tax burdens reducing their returns on investment. So, explicit removal of preferential treatment, even only in part, may result in an outsized withdrawal from the crypto sphere.

While typically an argument in favor of giving preferential treatment to certain capital gains, “double taxation” does not support such treatment for staking rewards. Double taxation occurs in the corporate setting. Companies are taxed on their profits, and then may distribute a portion of those profits to shareholders as “capital outlays” (like stock or dividends). These capital outlays are then included as taxable income for the shareholders. Because the “same” income is taxed twice, here, some argue that shareholders/corporations should enjoy a lower tax rate on their receipts. Staking rewards are not taxed prior to the receipt of the validator, however, because they are not derived from a corporation’s profits. In short, one of the reasons relied on to justify preferential treatment for capital gains on financial instruments, such as stock, is not applicable to staking rewards. However, as is the case for other capital gains (such as dispositions of real property), double taxation is not a requirement to receive capital gain preferential treatment.

2.  Statutory Determination of Capital Assets: Quality, Use, and Receipt

The following high-level statutory analysis is only intended to provide context for the inclusion of income analysis. The fundamental statutory authority on the matter is I.R.C. § 1221, with most character determinations starting or ending in § 1221(a), which lists assets that would otherwise be capital assets (“§ 1221 exceptions”).75I.R.C. § 1221. The main § 1221 exception that might apply to staking income is § 1221(a)(3), which covers self-created property (generally, self-created property is not taxed until it is sold, but at that point, it is taxed as ordinary income—with certain exceptions).76Id.; Ritter, Journal Article, supra note 13, at 33. Despite validators “making” rewards, some staking advocates argue that like the comparison to “new property,” this analogy is not applicable to the Code, which excludes from capital asset status any “patent, invention, model or design (whether or not patented), a secret formula or process, a copyright, . . . or similar property” held by “a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property.”77I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3). The argument that the § 1221(a)(3) exception does not apply relies on the conclusion that staking rewards do not qualify as any of the explicitly listed property, nor would it qualify as “similar.”78Ritter, Journal Article, supra note 13, at 33. However, note that digital assets are pieces of “cryptography,” which can be imagined as a unique serial number, which at the very least one could argue is “similar property” to Intellectual Property such as a copyright. Arguments like these are beyond the scope of this Note but can be seen in the work cited here. The self-created property argument often analogizes a farmer’s crop or a mineral miner’s ore.79See, e.g., Sutherland, Primer, supra note 56, at 14–15. While these arguments can be pursued under a capital asset determination, this Note will not try to resolve disputes that tax experts have so far failed to resolve. Instead, this Note will revisit these arguments80See infra Section II.D.1 to illustrate the different methods for tax accounting as that question is more aligned with the timing of inclusion for staking rewards.

B.  Timing: When Is it Income?

Tax planning is a timing game of “pulling” benefits (like accelerating loss recognition) and “pushing” burdens (conversely, deferring gain recognition).81Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 313 (“The ability to accelerate deductions, and thereby defer tax, is of major advantage to taxpayers.”). This shifting of tax benefits and burdens can yield great value to a taxpayer, which is why taxpayers and the Treasury are so keen to determine when taxable gain/loss is recognized. Due to the time value of money, taxpayers derive benefit from pushing/deferring tax burdens, essentially getting the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the government.82Id. Reciprocally, deferrals taken by taxpayers reduce the government’s tax revenue, and such “tax expenditures” by the Treasury can sum to substantial burdens in funding the government.83Id. at 659. The Treasury seeks timely and consistent payment of taxes to maintain its budget, which is why the Treasury may not want to grant tax-timing benefits like permitting stakers to defer inclusion of their income (that is, until they sell the newly received tokens).84Id. at 42. This is further developed below in the context of tax accounting methods. Notwithstanding the time value of tax deferral, timing considerations (when a receipt should be taxed) are also important to ensure that taxes owed correlate to the taxpayer’s “ability to pay,” which is one of the main characteristics of a just tax.85Id. at 33.

Tax accounting is the method used by taxpayers to determine when receipts should be included for the purpose of “clearly reflect[ing] income.”86I.R.C. §§ 451, 446(b). The two main methods of accounting for income are the “cash method,” which includes income at receipt, and the “accrual method,” which includes income at the time it was earned.87Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 704, 720. Deference is given to taxpayers to select their method of tax accounting.88I.R.C. §§ 451, 461. Accordingly, most analyses of staking income apply the cash method, rather than the accrual method, because stakers have an easier time arguing the doctrine of constructive receipt than arguing that they never even nominally received the actual reward when new tokens were actually credited to their wallet.89Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-14(a), 1.446-1(c)(1) (specifying that found property (“treasure trove”) income like that of cash found in a piano is includable in gross income in the taxable year in which it was reduced to undisputed possession).

The constructive receipt doctrine is used by stakers to argue that the amount received is an overstatement of their true economic income. Additionally, there may be grounds for a reduction in the amount of includable income based on the “cash equivalence doctrine,” which was added as a factor for determining constructive receipt. Constructive receipt is relevant because it requires an actual receipt of property or the right to receive property in the future.90Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 712. Recall that cryptocurrencies were deemed to be “property” for tax purposes under the 2014 Notice. When receipts, like staking rewards, lack sufficient determinacy as to what the “cash equivalent” is, an additional test may be applied to assess the kind of “economic benefit” received.91Id. at 709. Economic benefit can be a source of debate because “[a]lthough the courts are uniform in holding that a ‘cash equivalent’ is taxable on receipt, there is disagreement as to what types of property interests are cash equivalents.”92Id. So, a takeaway from this source of debate is that even though there may not be satisfactory legislation to inform stakers on when to include income, there are policy arguments that staking income should not be taxed on receipt. On the other hand, the failure of these accounting doctrines to produce a clear answer of when staking income must be included has supported arguments that immediate taxation is appropriate (such as the NYSBA’s suggestion that we should apply imperfect guidance like the 2014 Notice to staking income, even though staking income was not considered by the Notice at its time of announcement).93N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 45.

An investment vehicle similarly subject to a timing of receipt analysis is the taxation of Simple Agreements for Future Equity (“SAFEs”).94Lesley P. Adamo, Tax Treatment of SAFEs, Lowenstein Sandler (Jul. 12, 2018), https://www.lowenstein.com/news-insights/publications/client-alerts/tax-treatment-of-safes-tax [https://
perma.cc/24XL-62SM].
SAFEs are relevant because they are investment mechanisms promising to return some amount of stock to be determined at a future triggering event.95Id. The IRS has ruled that SAFEs, which do not specify a “substantially fixed amount of property” are not “forward contract[s]” and therefore do not satisfy the requirements of a constructive sale, nor is their conversion into preferred stock a taxable event.96Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363; see also I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1259. Simply put, SAFEs are an example of how the IRS and the Code have previously distinguished actual receipt of rights to property from constructive receipt of value.

C.  Taxable at Time of Receipt

The IRS could resolve this issue by ruling that staking rewards will be treated the same way as mining rewards, taxing the rewards as gain at the time of receipt. This resolution would be easy to manage for the government and is justifiable because staking rewards appear to be income because the taxpayer actually received additional tokens. This is the position of the NYSBA, which argued in a 2022 report that there is not a significant difference between staking rewards and mining rewards (which the IRS has said is includable as gross income at receipt).97N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 45. However, the NYSBA did acknowledge that this is an area lacking regulation and that “[t]he government should provide specific guidance clarifying that staking rewards should be includable as gross income when received at their fair market value at such time.”98Id. at 9.

1.  Support for Taxation at Receipt

Taxation upon receipt would simplify the issue by bifurcating the timing and character determinations. Taxing the rewards at receipt may further simplify the determination of tax liability because without satisfaction of the § 1222 one-year holding period requirement, the gain would be taxed at ordinary rates whether or not the asset is a capital asset.99I.R.C. § 1222. (Per this code section, a taxpayer may only enjoy capital gain treatment if the duration that the asset was held by the taxpayer exceeds one year, regardless of the assets character otherwise.) There may be a future need to determine the character for a later disposition, but having already been taxed at receipt, the issue of basis determination will presumably have been resolved—allowing the established rules of capital asset character determination to apply.100I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. Lastly, this may be a palatable answer if legislators or the IRS are worried about tax evasion. The realization requirement is one of the greatest tax planning tools and by ruling that realization of income from staking rewards occurs immediately, the staker/validator would have no ability to manipulate the timing of tax liabilities to her benefit.101Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 149 (describing the function, utility, and limits on the realization requirement); see also 26 CFR § 1.1001-1. This plan also helps the Treasury by providing tax revenues earlier, which is the preference of the government because of the time value of money.

D.  Taxable at Time of Disposition

A key difference between crypto exchanges and fiat exchanges is that the market never “closes” for crypto currencies. Knowing the prices of stocks at the moment of receipt can be important for determining a purchaser’s cost basis, and that is possible because they are listed on nationally regulated exchanges.102I.R.C § 1012. This may seem unimportant because cost basis (in the most basic case) is set at the amount an investor paid for the asset. However, while that is the most familiar scenario for assets on a secondary market like the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ, staking rewards (like stock dividends) are different because they are comprised of freshly “minted” coins, which were actually created by the staking process.103See supra Sections I.D, II.A. Lacking a bona fide sale or purchase, our tax system must apply some other way to assess the reward’s fair market value, potentially even by deferring taxation until there is a disposition that makes the value clear. This raises logistical questions like whether an asset’s value should be some average of each crypto exchange’s sale price measured at the precise instant of sale. Assuming stakers would even be able to determine and track such information across hundreds of transactions, what kind of administrative practicality could the IRS hope to enforce in an audit? The speculative nature of a solution like exchange price averaging shows the lack of clear solutions without a better understanding of the scope of the problem at hand.

1.  Support for Taxation at Disposition

Immediate taxation of staking rewards generally benefits the government at the expense of taxpayers and the crypto industry. There are three main issues with this approach: (1) liquidity of taxpayers, (2) difficulty in valuation resulting in overstatement of income, and (3) the magnitude of the burden imposed by guidance.

First, the liquidity issue (defined above in Section II.A.1) is particularly problematic. Even if the IRS rules that staking rewards are recognized immediately, the taxpayer will not be able to use that income to satisfy her tax liability (because she cannot pay taxes with the cryptocurrency received). So, absent alternative income, she will not have the liquidity to pay her tax liability without selling her staked rewards immediately upon receipt.104Sutherland, Block Rewards Part 2, supra note 21, at 964 (“When the law is otherwise silent on the matter, creators of property are unlikely to think they’ve got income until they’ve converted the property to cash or something else of value.”). The illustrative example of this problem is a farmer’s crop harvest.105Id. at 965. In Schniers v. Commissioner, a cash basis farmer was found to have neither actually, nor constructively, received income until the sale of his raised cotton crop.106Schniers v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 511, 516 (1977). The tax court stated, in relevant part:

The point is that income is not realized by a cash basis farmer from merely harvesting his crops. He realizes income only when he actually or constructively receives income from the sale of those crops. He is not required to sell the crops in the year in which he harvests them. He may decide not to sell them until the following year.107Id. at 517–18.

However, proponents of immediate taxation compare staking rewards to Cesarini v. United States, in which the plaintiffs were deemed to have recognized income of cash found in a piano after they purchased it.108Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (“[I]ncome from all sources is taxed unless the taxpayer can point to an express exemption.”). The flaw in this comparison is that the property creating income was actual cash, and while the court in Cesarini properly applied Regulation § 1.61-14, subsection (a) of that regulation stipulates that income from found property is includable “to the extent of its value in United States currency.”109Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (specifying that found property (“treasure trove”) income like that of cash found in a piano is includable in gross income in the taxable year in which it was reduced to undisputed possession). And while staking rewards are not really “found property” to begin with, the importance of being able to determine an equivalent value in U.S. dollars creates a second problem with respect to immediate taxation of staking rewards: valuation difficulties.

The second issue, valuation, is driven by three factors. First, crypto exchanges are volatile and do not have closing prices. Second, there are dilutionary effects of the distribution of staking rewards (discussed above in Section I.D.2); and third, there is an excessive burden for taxpayers to document their rewards. Such difficulties illustrate a shortcoming of the NYSBA’s position that “staking rewards should be includable as gross income when received at their fair market value at such time.”110N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 9 (emphasis added). Here, their suggestion takes for granted that the IRS can overcome the difficulty of determining fair market value in the first place. Additionally, there is no account for which of the multiple crypto exchanges (which often have different prices, unlike regulated stock markets) should be consulted for value determination, nor have they proposed a way to measure FMV factoring in dilution.111See OECD Paris, Taxing Virtual Currencies: An Overview of Tax Treatments and Emerging Tax Policy Issues 51–52, 55 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/taxing-virtual-currencies-an-overview-of-tax-treatments-and-emerging-tax-policy-issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMC3-6X59].

Finally, the third factor is one that should be carefully considered before presenting guidance on staking rewards. In assessing burdens, the IRS will want to consider the magnitude of that guidance’s impact, which is directly related to the number of taxpayers or size of industry that will be affected. For example, the IRS should be cautious of yielding to groups like the NYSBA, which argue that processes like mining and staking are so similar that mining guidance (like the 2014 Notice) also covers new forms of crypto income like staking rewards.112See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 45. The NYSBA’s argument fails to account for the difference in magnitude of effect that would result from regulating mining and staking identically—the 2014 Notice affects so few taxpayers because miners make up a small percentage of PoW network participants.113Sutherland, Primer, supra note 56, at 8 (affecting more taxpayers). By contrast, the effect of applying this guidance to PoS networks, such as Tezos (the underlying asset in Jarrett), would have a much higher magnitude because around 70% of network participants actively stake, and would therefore be affected.114Landoni & Sutherland, supra note 25. This would compound the harm done by potentially imperfect legislation because it would be unjust to more taxpayers, possibly to the extent that the imposed compliance burden pushes people away from PoS networks.115See Sutherland, Block Rewards, supra note 23, at 750–51. This raises three issues: compliance by stakers, administration by the IRS, and efficiency of the tax altogether.116Id. at 751–52; Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 29 (promoting efficiency in the tax system). Sutherland uses the Jarrett case to illustrate the excessive burdens of compliance and administration if stakers were required to follow the 2014 Notice.117Brief in Support of Taxpayer Joshua Jarrett, supra note 54, at 4; see also Sutherland, Block Rewards, supra note 23, at 755. Sutherland asserts that due to the frequency that staking rewards are distributed, even small stakers could have around 125 annual taxable events, each of which would need to be recorded for basis reporting purposes.118Sutherland, Block Rewards, supra note 23, at 755 He goes on to point out that administration would be practically infeasible too, as the IRS would need to pull excessive amounts of data to audit a staker.119Id.; see also OECD Paris, supra note 111, at 55.

III.  IRS RESPONSE

Tax law is typically seen as a discipline of well-defined and mechanical rules,120See Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 1321, 1355 (2016); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (1993). which is why the uncertainties of the application of the Code and the IRS’s legislative intent has generated confusion. Jarrett has become the (non)landmark case for exactly this type of uncertainty with respect to staking income.121Jarrett v. United States, No. 21-CV-00419, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178743, at *13–14 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2022), aff’d, 79 F.4th 675 (6th Cir. 2023).

A.  Governance So Far

The guidance provided prior to the recent Revenue Ruling was limited to the 2014 Notice,122I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. Revenue Ruling 2019-24 (with an accompanying FAQ) (“Rev. Rul. 2019”),123Rev. Rul. 2019-24, 2019-44 I.R.B. 1004, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-19-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HCH-6ZNA]. and expansion of I.R.C. § 6045.124I.R.C. § 6045; see also Ritter, KPMG Article, supra note 5 (detailing the expansion of § 6045 under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act). These three pieces of guidance (hereinafter, the “Big Three”) do not make any mention of staking rewards or PoS networks, and only Revenue Ruling 2019-24 and § 6045 have the force of law.125Julia Kagan, Revenue Ruling, Investopedia (June 30, 2023), https://www.investopedia.

com/terms/r/revenue-ruling.asp [https://perma.cc/SBM7-4FY9].
The review of gaps in guidance below is not exhaustive and is intended to illustrate the types of issues caused by inadequate guidance.

1.  Ambiguities and Gaps in Guidance

In addition to not accounting for the implications of newer technology like PoS and staking rewards, much of the Big Three contains gaps and ambiguities resulting in variable interpretations. Section 6045 is particularly illustrative of this issue. This section’s recent updates (effective as of the start of 2024) primarily relate to the regulation of “digital assets” as securities and focus on transactions conducted by “brokers.”126I.R.C. § 6045. The characterization of cryptocurrencies as securities is beyond the scope of this Note (and regardless, determination of a crypto currency as a security by the IRS is mostly independent from similar determinations by the SEC). However, § 6045 is still referenced by tax analyses.127See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 5–6 (relying on the definition of “digital assets” under § 6045(g)(3)(D) to provide a definition for cryptocurrency). Section 6045(g)(3)(D) defines a digital asset as “any digital representation of value which is recorded on a cryptographically secured distributed ledger or any similar technology as specified by the Secretary.”128I.R.C. § 6045(g)(3)(D). Without any distinction of the consensus mechanism, token type, or validation method, it is likely that this definition of “digital asset” was drafted with the intent of bringing cryptocurrencies under the applicable securities regulations, not to inform appropriate methods of taxation in general. Section 6045(c)(1)(D) was also expanded to include as “brokers,” those responsible for “effectuating transfers of digital assets on behalf of another person.”129Id. § 6045(c)(1)(D). This section defines brokers in order to require them to report cost basis of exchanged digital assets.130Id. § 6045. Some tax professionals are concerned with this requirement because the textual definition of a broker may now include miners and stakers if their activities were considered as “effectuating transfers of digital assets.”131Ritter, KPMG Article, supra note 5. In response to these concerns, Congress attempted to pass two poorly-formed and conflicting amendments to clarify that § 6045 should not be read to have that effect. Failing to pass either of them resulted in the drafters of the legislation writing a letter to Secretary Janet Yellen (quoted above in Section II.A.1).132Id.; Letter to Yellen, supra note 71. Review of such previous attempts to provide guidance can be incredibly informative, especially when viewed with a consideration of why they failed.133See Lauren Vella & Samantha Handler, IRS Crypto Broker Rules Are Months Overdue: The Delay, Explained, Bloomberg Tax (Aug. 3, 2023 8:31 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/irs-crypto-broker-rules-are-months-overdue-the-delay-explained [https://perma.cc/A4HN-XECA] (detailing the resulting delays in attempts to regulate “nascent” technologies).

The interpretations of the 2014 Notice and Rev. Rul. 2019 that followed demonstrate the problems with attempting to interpret legislative intent with respect to an application that essentially did not exist at the time of drafting.134Sutherland, Block Rewards, supra note 23, at 751. For example, the NYSBA points out in their report, the 2014 notice did not address whether virtual currencies fall under an existing asset class or are a new class of assets, which is necessary to apply the Code, further illustrative of the gaps of the 2014 Notice.135N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 3.

Lastly, Rev. Rul. 2019 does not cover staking rewards either; it covers income from “airdrop[s],” another type of token distribution, which follows something called a “hard fork.”136Rev. Rul. 2019-24, 2019-44 I.R.B. 1004; see generally Eric D. Chason, Cryptocurrency Hard Forks and Revenue Ruling 2019-24, 39 Va. Tax Rev. 279 (2019). However, Rev. Rul. 2019 is still referenced in the staking argument because it applies a rigid requirement to include income at the time of receipt even if “the airdropped cryptocurrency is not immediately credited to the taxpayer’s account.”137Rev. Rul. 2019-24, 2019-44 I.R.B. 1004. Although the related Q&A required an investor—but not an employee—to have “dominion and control” over the tokens—basically holding them on a network that allowed trading—so that people were not taxed on a receipt of which they were unaware. Recall the analysis of the constructive receipt doctrine in Section II.B to see how this is a divergence from the general rule of including income “in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account.”138Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a).

The IRS’s relative silence is understandable because any determination, announcement, or notice would fill the vacuum of existing authority and possibly assume greater weight than the IRS is prepared to put forth at this time. The motion to dismiss the Jarrett case, and avoidance of providing a ruling, illustrates the IRS’s reluctance to be “pinned down” in the future, and its desire to have taxpayers carry some of the uncertainty.139See Rev. Proc. 2022-1, 2022-1 I.R.B. 1. The question is what the intended purpose of this kind of uncertainty is, and whether it is effective in accomplishing that purpose.

B.  The Importance of IRS Action or Inaction

At a certain point, absent guidance from the IRS, the development of blockchain and cryptocurrency industries may be shaped by a reliance on continued non-regulation, or at least an expectation that potential future regulation will not be overly burdensome (or will be prospective). Cryptocurrency has a checkered reputation among many skeptics, and stories like the collapse of the world’s second largest crypto-exchange, FTX, do not help with that image.140Courtney Degen, FTX Bankruptcy Draws Increased Calls for Crypto Regulation, Pensions & Investments (Nov. 17, 2022, 2:41 PM), https://www.pionline.com/cryptocurrency/ftx-collapse-draws-increased-calls-cryptocurrency-regulation [https://perma.cc/S3LD-SR88]. And while the collapse of FTX is an issue of securities regulation, rather than tax-specific regulation, its effects were still hugely impactful to the market for cryptocurrencies as a whole, which indicates the possibility that more legislators will be calling for new swaths of legislation soon.

1.  Appropriate and Unavoidable Uncertainty in Tax

In practice, the IRS wants to let taxpayers carry some uncertainty, particularly when it comes to new legal ground.141See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2022-1, 2022-1 I.R.B. 1. The IRS has good reason to avoid the creation of bright-line rules, especially in the case of emerging technologies. Taxpayers carrying uncertainty caused by a lack of regulation must act with a certain degree of reasonableness for fear of pushing the bounds of what is permissible too far. Once taxpayers know exactly when they trigger tax effects, they will often allow that limit to dictate their behavior, in some cases engaging in activities which they would not have done but for those tax effects. Take for example the annual gift tax exclusion. Each year, the IRS sets a limit on the size of a gift that one may make without paying taxes (for 2022 that amount was $16,000).142Instructions for Form 709, IRS (2023), https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i709#en_US_2022 [https://perma.cc/H4GE-FQ93]. A common practice among the wealthy is to gift their children this maximum amount each year.143Hayden Adams, The Estate Tax and Lifetime Gifting, Charles Schwab (May 18, 2023), https://www.schwab.com/learn/story/estate-tax-and-lifetime-gifting [https://perma.cc/5XDM-5Y79] (explaining the method in which large net worth taxpayers may capitalize on the gift tax exemption); Kate Dore, The Wealthy May Avoid $163 Billion in Taxes Every Year. Here’s How They Do It, CNBC (Sept. 20, 2021, 2:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/20/the-wealthy-may-avoid-163-billion-in-annual-taxes-how-they-do-it-.html [https://perma.cc/8HET-4BFE] (illustrating the component that estate taxes play in tax avoidance by the wealthy). Naturally, this tax benefit is disproportionately enjoyed by the wealthy, and is an example of how our system fosters generational wealth among the rich. This shows how even if the IRS determines a “limit” which it is okay with, such bright-line rules can cause taxpayers to let tax effects change their behavior, which may be an efficiency cost if that behavior is bad.144Graetz et al., supra note 16, at 29 (defining efficiency cost). However, to note, the behavior (gifting money to a child) may only be an attempt to reduce future estate tax liabilities under I.R.C § 2001 (outlining the taxes imposed on estates transferred from a decedent) in which case the bright-line rule is not changing economically motivated behavior, but rather it is changing the tax motivated behavior of reducing future estate tax liability.

While clear guidance from Congress and the IRS may help address concerns that cryptocurrency transactions are underreported, such clear limits in tax law may cause taxpayers to try and game the system. This “gaming” can be particularly pernicious in the face of illogical or poorly planned rules. For example, consider the Cohan rule, which was intended to reduce the compliance burden of recording certain deductible expenditures by allowing taxpayers to approximate their total deductions.145Cohan v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5–T(c)(3); see also Rev. Proc, 83-71, 1983-2 C.B. 590. Taxpayers realized that the lowered burden of compliance made it nearly impossible to audit the accuracy of their “approximations,” resulting in increased abuse of the rule; this resulted in the amendment of § 274(d), which closed this loophole by imposing substantiation rules (requiring taxpayers to maintain adequate records).146I.R.C. § 274(d). So, if Congress or the IRS present illogical rules, they risk opening opportunities for tax arbitrage.

Congress and the IRS must therefore weigh the need for regulation now against the risk of providing regulation without enough information to do so as thoughtfully as is necessary.

2.  Risk of Stifling Innovation

Regardless of the public’s perception of cryptocurrency, it is a large part of web3, the next generation of the internet.147Akash Takyar, How Web3 in IoT Will Bring Digital Transformation, LeewayHertz https://www.leewayhertz.com/web3-in-iot [https://perma.cc/Z6ER-GRNN] (“Web3 aims to decentralize the internet and allow consumers to take back control of their data. IoT simultaneously aspires to connect nearly everything around us with the internet and eliminate the gap between the virtual and the real worlds.”). As the letter from members of Congress to Secretary Yellen shows, there is real reason/motivation to avoid inhibiting this development with poor regulation.148 Letter to Yellen, supra note 71. It is helpful to look outside of tax law to an area of law rich in considerations of how to balance regulation of new technology: tort law. For example, in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., Judge Cardozo limited another case, which required drivers to fully exit their vehicles to look down each side of a railroad before crossing, or else the drivers risked being found contributorily negligent if hit by a train.149Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 102, 105–06 (1934). In his ruling, Judge Cardozo explained the risk of arbitrary and uninformed rule making:

Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed from without.150Id. at 105 (emphases added).

While Judge Cardozo ruled with respect to railway accident tort law, his reasoning was truly premised on the fact that (at the time) railroads were new and disruptive technology in some respects. Requiring drivers to fully exit their vehicle was a burdensome and often ineffectual (as was the case for John Pokora, who followed the regulation and was still hit by a train.)151Id. at 99, 105. Judge Cardozo’s reasoning was particularly sound, considering that trains were so fast that a perfectly compliant person, such as John Pokora, could still end up injured because a train could appear in the time it took a driver to turn around and reenter their car. Today, the clear answer is to retrofit crossings with gate arms that indicate when a driver may cross safely. At the time, such technology was not available. The point, however, is that prematurely creating rules that may have led to the public resenting the adoption of railways could have chilled the development of infrastructure that would inevitably become crucial to the economy of the United States. Regulations on cryptocurrencies and blockchains may have the same effect if those rules are not informed by a “background of experience,” which is still expanding.152Id. at 105. Previously advanced amendments have been conflicting, and sometimes, practically ineffective.153See Ritter, KPMG Article, supra note 5. This implies that we may still be waiting for the “crossing-gate arm” that the crypto space needs. Now, if you are convinced that the utility of railroads seems greater than that of blockchain technology, refer to the legislators in Boston (now a hub of the tech industry) who decided that computer sales was too risky of a business and therefore barred the purchase of Apple stock by individuals in Massachusetts when the company went public in 1980.

In Boston, state regulators said the offering is too risky and barred sale of the shares in the Bay State.

The decision affects individual investors, but doesn’t extend to financial institutions, which are presumed to be sophisticated. . . . 

Under the Massachusetts ruling, the Apple stock falls short of several provisions aimed at weeding out highfliers that don’t have solid earnings foundations.154Richard E. Rustin & Mitchell C. Lynch, Apple Computer Set to Go Public Today; Massachusetts Bars Sale of Stock as Risky, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1980, at 5, https://www.wsj.
com/public/resources/documents/AppleIPODec12_1980_WSJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3WL-BBJE].

Limiting regulation like Boston’s is especially frustrating when the opportunity was only withheld from individuals but not large entities, which is another illustration of the harm that may result from poorly informed regulation.

3.  Other Concerns the Treasury and IRS Must Consider

In general, the IRS wants to be careful when outlining rules. Putting aside the obvious concerns of allowing tax planning avenues conducive of tax evasion, whenever a bright-line rule is put forth, tax planners will now have a hard limit on what is permissible, and therefore may act in ways that take their tax saving right up to the edge of what may be permitted by the IRS (recall Section III.B.1 detailing the abuse of the Cohan rule).155Cohan v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930). This is exactly why the IRS tends to prefer taxpayers carry some of the uncertainty, which requires taxpayers to plan more carefully, and often, more reasonably. A sequential point for the IRS and Treasury to consider is related to the potential for stifling invention discussed above. Taxing PoS participants like PoW miners could have a large negative impact on the viability of PoS networks. By overburdening PoS networks with taxes that may push more people to PoW networks, and because PoW networks consume much more energy than PoS networks, there may even be a negative environmental impact based on applied taxes, which had not been considered.156N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, supra note 46, at 4–5.

C.  Possible Points of Reference for Predicting Future IRS Action

There have been a multitude of other possible interpretations not explored by this Note, which may form the basis for future action by the IRS. For instance, Sutherland examined the argument that tokens on a PoS network should be treated as interests in a partnership, where the tokens are just used as a way of “voting” how the network should be maintained.157Sutherland, Block Rewards Part 2, supra note 21, at 962. If the IRS took that position, it would then be at least partially constrained by subsection K, the Code’s rules of partnership tax. It is also possible that the IRS will determine staking rewards are “new property,” warranting actual amendment of the Code. The “new property” argument is popular among staking advocates, and legal experts have already pointed out that the recent Revenue Ruling 2023-14 made no determination of whether or not staking rewards are “new property,” implying that the ruling may not cover every mode of receipt regarding staking rewards.158Dimon et. al, supra note 3. In any scenario, it is important to recognize that the IRS does not promulgate the Code; rather, it is “organized to carry out the responsibilities of the secretary of the Treasury under section 7801 of the Internal Revenue Code.”159The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-agency-its-mission-and-statutory-authority [https://perma.cc/74XT-2NVF] (explaining how Congress promulgates tax laws of the I.R.C. under Title 26, and that it is the Secretary of Treasury’s responsibility to administer and enforce those laws, which was supported by the creation of the IRS under § 7803). Accordingly, before attempting to use past actions of the IRS to predict the trajectory of tax legislation over cryptocurrencies, one should remember that the IRS is not the legislating body (it only seems that way in the context of staking rewards due to the lack of actual legislation). As an arm of the government, it acts more like a computer, applying information to the Code and returning answers of “compliant” or “noncompliant.”

1.  Determinations Based on All Facts and Circumstances

Deferral of explicit guidance on staking income is not to say that the IRS may not adopt flexible regulation as we wait for a sufficient background of experience to develop. There are plenty of instances in the Code of overbroad rules intended to apply where individualized review is needed, but providing such review would be too difficult administratively. One such code section, possibly informative of additional future action by the IRS (albeit substantively unrelated to staking rewards), is the “loose” rule of § 302 relating to stock redemptions when corporations repurchase stock from its shareholders.160I.R.C. § 302. Section 302 is “loose” in two ways: first, it sets an apparently arbitrary threshold of 80% on what constitutes “substantially disproportionate” with respect to reduction in voting control by a shareholder following a redemption.161Id. § 302(b)(2)(C)(i). Second, the accompanying regulation § 1.302–3 requires that a “facts and circumstances” assessment should be used to smoke out any intent that indicates a “substantially disproportionate redemption.”162Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a)(2)–(3). The 80% threshold in § 302 seems “loose” for the lack of explanation of what materiality 80% holds. This implies that at one point the Treasury may have decided that precise measurements of control were too difficult to apply, so using a high precision test would not have resulted in a significantly more efficient application of the rule. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that the IRS could administer guidance similarly vague for staking rewards, which are incredibly burdensome to track as they stand. The second “looseness”—stemming from the facts and circumstances test in § 1.302-3—illustrates the Treasury’s willingness to apply flexible guidance that accounts for the unique aspects of different applications. In the face of calls for guidance, the Treasury may adopt similarly flexible approaches to staking rewards in an attempt to balance the importance of express rulings with its desire to avoid premature regulation.

CONCLUSION

Pressure on the IRS to provide guidance has waned after Revenue Ruling 2023-14, but there is still lingering uncertainty on the need for additional guidance,163Landoni & Sutherland, supra note 25, at 1214–15 (explaining that there is no single perfect method for addressing even dilution on its own). and many possible solutions risk replacing current uncertainties with new ones. Therefore, the IRS should consider Judge Cardozo’s concerns on premature regulation by observing whether the effects of this Revenue Ruling indicate that this guidance waited for PoS networks to develop a sufficient “background of experience” with which the IRS was equipped to provide informed guidance.164Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934). Such retrospection by the IRS will be important for any further guidance down the track, else we risk “shutting down the railroad” just because we have yet to invent the crossing-gate arm.165Id.

97 S. Cal. L. Rev. 537

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* Senior Submissions Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 97; J.D. Candidate 2024, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.S. Mechanical Engineering 2019, Tufts University. Thank you to my dad, John B. Duncan, and my academic success fellow, Tia Kerkhof, for each of their support. I would also like to thank Professor Edward McCaffery for his guidance. Finally, many thanks to all the Southern California Law Review members for their invaluable work on this Note.

Regulation by Enforcement

An increasingly common response by regulators to what they view as undesirable market trends or challenges has been a sharp turn toward litigation to introduce novel legal theories and frameworks that could have been the product or subject of legislative or administrative rulemaking. The decision to do so has been met by calls claiming such administrative action to be unfair, and in some instances, illegal.

This Article revisits the New Deal origins of regulation by enforcement, and its more recent incarnations, and explains that as a legal matter, regulators generally enjoy discretion as to whether to make policy through rulemaking, adjudication, or by filing a lawsuit in federal court. However, there are some exceptions to this principle, as well as some reasons to believe that recent doctrinal developments hostile to agency adjudications could reduce the discretion of agencies to choose their policymaking tool, especially when their actions are understood to be naked attempts to grab turf or circumvent democratic norms embedded in the Administrative Procedure Act. In this Article, we analyze the incentives facing agencies when choosing to regulate by enforcement, consider some of the new risks, and lay out a framework for thinking about when agencies should regulate by rule, and when they should regulate by enforcement.

INTRODUCTION

One visible response by regulators to what they view as persistent—or particularly fast-moving—market challenges has been a sharp turn toward litigation to introduce or test out novel legal theories and frameworks that could have been the product or subject of legislative or administrative rulemaking.1We recognize that regulators often deploy adaptive, innovative regulatory strategies when addressing new technologies and market trends. Our argument here relates to analyzing the tradeoffs between regulation and enforcement, two critical regulatory strategies within the larger regulatory toolkit. On administrative innovation see generally, Hilary Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 579 (2019) (detailing the deployment of regulatory sandboxes as an administrative technique); Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 2011 (2017) (noting the significance of administrative innovation within the regulatory toolkit). This approach, popularly termed “regulation by enforcement,” prompted fierce critiques from commentators and the marketplace, often from the standpoint of fairness—and based on an implicit assumption that such regulatory conduct might be illegal, or at the very least, politically motivated.2See e.g., Andrew James Lom & Rachael Browndorf, Regulation by Enforcement Takes Center Stage Again for the US SEC, Norton Rose Fulbright (July 2022), https://www.
nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/df8f5eab/regulation-by-enforcement-takes-center-stage-again-for-the-us-sec [https://perma.cc/F54B-FA8X]; Andrew B. Kay & P. Randy Seybold, Combating Regulation by Enforcement: A Strategic Framework for Responding to State Agency Overreach, Venable LLP (June 2019), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/
2019/06/combating-regulation-by-enforcement-a-strategic [https://perma.cc/7HSH-XMHW] (noting regulation by enforcement at state-based levels). For an early discussion of aspects of regulation by enforcement within the context of international securities regulation, see generally Paul Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: an International Perspective, 7 Yale J. Reg. 305 (1990); Fran Velasquez, CFTC’s Regulation by Enforcement Needs to Change, Commissioner Says, CoinDesk (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/10/06/cftcs-regulation-by-enforcement-needs-to-change-commissioner-says/ [https://perma.cc/2QXZ-MKAH].
In response, defenders of agency action have called the criticisms “bogus,” “misguided,” and lambasted politicians, market participants and even academics, for uttering the phrase.3Stephen Katte, Former SEC Chief Blasts ‘Bogus’ Catchphrase: ‘Regulation by Enforcement,’ CoinTelegraph (Jan. 23, 2023), https://cointelegraph.com/news/former-sec-chief-blasts-bogus-catchphrase-regulation-by-enforcement [https://perma.cc/49S9-75DB].

In this Article, we work to give substance to what is all too often a nebulous term of art. In Part I, we provide an overview of how this particular species of regulatory intervention—visible across multiple issue areas such as the oversight of cryptocurrencies, environmental and social governance (“ESG”), insider trading and antitrust—tests certain assumptions about the nature of the administrative state. Specifically, we show that the work of regulatory agencies is traditionally understood as consisting of creative and destructive functions, mapped along axes of rulemaking and enforcement, respectively. Rulemaking by enforcement, however, blurs the lines between the two, both disrupting and supplementing the rulemaking toolkit.4Generally, the term “regulation” derives from the verb to “regulate,” meaning to “govern or direct according to rule.” Regulate, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regulate [https://perma.cc/B94T-CSBA] (last updated July 30, 2023). In financial regulation, for example, the term regulation typically refers to the establishment of rules and guidelines for overseeing the marketplace. Regulation contrasts with the supervisory function that involves evaluating compliance with applicable rules and ultimately, promoting enforcement. See e.g., What is the Fed: Supervision and Regulation, Fed. Rsrv. Bank S.F., https://www.frbsf.org/education/teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/supervision-regulation; Supervising and Regulating Financial Institutions and Activities, 5 Fed. Rsrv. Sys. Purposes & Functions 73, 74 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUN6-7WA7] (“Regulation entails establishing the rules within which financial institutions must operate—in other words, issuing specific regulations and guidelines governing the formation, operations, activities, and acquisitions of financial institutions. Once the rules and regulations are established, supervision—which involves monitoring, inspecting, and examining financial institutions—seeks to ensure that an institution complies with those rules and regulations . . . ”); Peter Conti-Brown & Sean Vanatta, Focus on Bank Supervision, Not Just Bank Regulation, Brookings (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/we-must-focus-on-bank-supervision/ [https://perma.cc/SW3Q-PG3Y] (“If regulation sets the rules of the road, supervision is the process that ensures obedience to these rules (and sometimes to norms that exist outside these rules entirely). Regulation is the highly choreographed process of generating public engagement in the creation of rules . . . supervision functions as a distinct mechanism of legal obedience—a means by which government or private actors seek to alter bank behavior . . . These mechanisms can be displayed on two axes, between public and private mechanisms, which require the exercise of coercive and non-coercive power.”). Moreover, as discussed in this Article, the regulatory toolkit comprises an array of formal and more informal levers that extend along a continuum of intensity between fulsome rulemaking and enforcement actions. In addition to the hard power visible in rulemaking and enforcement, agencies can deploy “softer,” situational and tailored mechanisms like interpretative guidance, press releases, no-action and exemptive letters, or public statements and speeches that can indicate the direction of agency thinking and regulatory priorities. James Cox, Robert Hillman, Don Langevoort, & Ann Lipton, Securities Regulation: Cases & Materials, Ch. 1(B)(f) (Aspen, 10th Ed., 2021). See generally Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 Duke L.J. 1841 (2011) (detailing the increasing use of “threats” or make or enforce a rule as a useful regulatory device to address fast-moving industry trends); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 294 (1996) (highlighting using empirical analysis and increasing use of best practices as an administrative tool). Thus, while creating important opportunities for advancing regulatory priorities, it invariably raises normative questions about its appropriateness as a matter of legal and historical precedence.

In Part II, we take a closer look into rationales explaining why a regulator might choose to create policy by means of enforcement rather than through more traditional rulemaking.5Or by using intermediary measures, such as no-action letters, interpretative guidance, or public statements. To begin, we first identify what “regulation by enforcement” has meant historically, starting with key precedent and decisions introduced at the twilight of the New Deal era, and moving toward more recent iterations in the last quarter century. Next, we identify what can be understood as a spectrum of possible incentives and motivations behind regulation by enforcement. These range from the necessary—where agencies act because they have no other option, such as when notice-and-comment rulemaking is not possible owing to the absence of clear legislative authority—to the optional, where regulation by enforcement (rather than detailed rulemaking) offers a faster or more expedient pathway to exercise or expand oversight. Underlying these motives driving regulation by enforcement, we highlight opportunities for regulators to achieve a variety of laudable goals, such as promoting the realization of their institutional missions, delivering desirable marketplace outcomes in relatively expeditious ways, and offering a statement of intent on the part of authorities about preferred policy positions in a manner designed to arrest misconduct before it can wreak actual damage.6Scholars have increasingly pointed to the challenges regulators confront in determining optimal policy priorities and trade-offs. See e.g., Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 617, 2020) (noting the high information asymmetries impacting financial regulators in an innovating financial market); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 Geo. L.J. 232 (2019) (positing a trilemma where regulators are only able to achieve two objectives when balancing market integrity, rules clarity, and financial innovation). However, we also point out other less savory possible incentives to pursuing rulemaking through enforcement, as opposed to through administrative processes, including an interest in reducing or circumventing the transparency and accountability intended by traditional administrative processes, and extending an agency’s authority in ways that might otherwise be impermissible, politically costly or even illegal.7See, e.g., Jennifer Huddleston, Supreme Court Considers Case Against Agencies Run Amok, The Reg. Rev. (Nov. 22, 2022) https://www.theregreview.org/2022/11/22/huddleston-supreme-court-considers-case-against-agencies-run-amok/ [https://perma.cc/A56Z-F2UB]; John Joy, The Race to Regulate Crypto: CFTC vs. SEC, Jurist (Nov. 24, 2021) https://www.jurist.org/
commentary/2021/11/john-joy-crypto-sec/ [https://perma.cc/7UJR-SYTA].

In Part III, we investigate the legality of regulation by enforcement and explore these trade-offs in greater depth. In analyzing applicable case-law, we suggest that its legality is more complicated than scholars and commentators might appreciate. On the surface, the strategy of regulation by enforcement is perfectly legal and stands on solid legal ground—well within the authorization afforded to agencies by governing case law. Looking deeper, however, courts have been silent on a more fundamental question: whether regulation by enforcement is legal when it involves more than filling gaps in administrative and legislative dictates, and it is used as a substitute for detailed rulemaking or, even more extreme, in a way designed to undermine the procedural safeguards put in place to ensure informed rulemaking. With this in mind, Part III then moves to examine the appropriateness (rather than just the legality) of regulation by enforcement. Here, the Article inspects under what circumstances this regulatory strategy is (and is not) in line with normative rule-of-law values that underpin the administrative state, as well as expectations that rulemaking be informed and loyal to the values of legitimacy and procedural fairness.

We observe that regulation by enforcement can enable regulators to achieve a range of positive outcomes. It gives agencies teeth to promote their institutional mandates and to generate confidence among the public that the agency is, in fact, doing the job it is charged to do. Regulation by enforcement can thus create efficiencies in agency administration when it produces sought-after policy results (for example, improved investor protections, more competitive markets) at relatively lower bureaucratic cost (for example, with greater speed and encompassing fewer procedural steps). On the other hand, the strategy can also come with notable shortcomings. When enforcement attempts to circumvent longstanding norms of procedural fairness, informed rulemaking, deliberative analysis, and the quality of the policymaking can be diminished, with lower informational content, shallower expertise, and limited public engagement underlying decision-making.8Letter from John Boozman, Senator, to Helen Albert, acting SEC Inspector General (Mar. 16, 2023), https://www.boozman.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0/d/0d9ca45c-01d6-4bc1-b284-888f7
79e9d61/9FE27A1BD55965A2C221EB9F8C301CCE.senator-boozman-sec-oig-audit-letter-31623.pdf [https://perma.cc/33KQ-WGW4] (expressing concerns about the significance of preserving procedural safeguards in the notice-and-comment process, and noting that short notice-and-comment periods can be detrimental for the quality of rulemaking. See generally, Yuliya Guseva, When the Means Undermine the End: the Leviathan of Securities Law and Enforcement in Digital-Asset Markets, 5 Stan. J. Blockchain L. & Pol’y 1 (2022) (detailing sub-optimal outcomes from enforcement actions in cryptocurrency markets resulting in a market environment with less information).
Regulatory effects may be scattershot, where high-profile actions target certain actors but leave others alone. These procedural and outcomes-driven effects can mean that regulation by enforcement can end up suffering from a perception of limited legitimacy, increasing the reputational risks to agencies, as well as raising the critique that agency action may be excessively political and not grounded in the rule of law. Regulatory agencies thus risk being viewed as less technocratic and expert and driven more by selfish, rather than public interests. In such cases, concerns can filter into the judicial review mechanism, and ambitious attempts to engage in regulation by enforcement can run around in which courts rule against the government’s position—or even more dramatically, roll back the general authority being asserted by the litigating agency.9Evan Weinberger, CFPB Appellate Ruling Portends ‘Chaos’ in Financial System, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 21, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpb-appellate-ruling-portends-chaos-in-financial-system?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/LBC4-ULJ4] (on the capacity of judicial rulings to entirely defang agency authority and competence); Lauren Feiner, Meta Acquisition of Within Reportedly Approved by Court in Loss for FTC, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2023), https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/01/ftc-loses-attempt-to-block-meta-acquisition-of-within.html [https://
perma.cc/5VNR-EET6].

Against this backdrop, this Article provides a framework for understanding regulation by enforcement, and examines the historical precedent, legal basis, and tradeoffs that undergird the practice. Throughout, we recognize the complexity of agency decision-making, tasked with maintaining stability, integrity, as well as entrepreneurialism within the market. Our Article situates regulation by enforcement as part of a spectrum of tools deployed by regulators looking to fulfill the demands of their institutional mandates, within tight budgets and under the eye of political critics and an engaged public. As such, the strategy comes with a number of significant advantages and benefits. But it also presents notable risks and costs for advocates of governmental authority, especially given recent Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers jurisprudence that have privileged settled expectations as a check on regulatory innovation.10See e.g., West Virginia v. Env’t Protection Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). See also the Supreme Court’s decision to review the principle of Chevron deference that has traditionally afforded administrative agencies extensive latitude in how they exercise authority. Josh Gerstein & Alex Guillen, Supreme Court Move Could Spell Doom for Power of Federal Regulators, Politico (May. 1, 2023), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/01/supreme-court-chevron-doctrine-climate-change-00094670. Rather than taking a particular side—and seeking to overcome the ideological tensions that have polarized discussion on this topic—we offer an account that highlights the legal and normative trade-offs involved, in a bid to contribute to a more thoroughgoing understanding of regulation by enforcement as an administrative phenomenon of the 21st century regulatory state.

I.  THE RULEMAKING/ADJUDICATION DICHOTOMY

The modern regulatory agency has two principal ways to make policy with the force of law.11For discussion of less formal and softer administrative measures, see infra, Section II.B. It can promulgate rules of prospective application and general applicability that interpret the statutory authority given to it by Congress. This is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act as “rulemaking,” and almost always takes the form of “notice and comment” or “informal” rulemaking.125 U.S.C. § 553. “Formal rulemaking,” is an effort to create a rule—policy with prospective application and general applicability—in a courtroom proceeding presided over by an administrative law judge. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57. It is essentially never used in the modern administrative state. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 106 (2003) (arguing that “formal rulemaking has turned out to be a null set”). Alternatively, it can enforce those rules, and its other statutory authorities, through adjudications pursued either through administrative adjudicatory proceedings or by filing suit in federal court—or through informal settlement negotiations with entities charged with illegal conduct.135 U.S.C. §§ 554–57. In this section, we describe the basic implications and processes required to engage in rulemaking and adjudication. We then illustrate them with some examples from the SEC’s halting efforts to regulate cryptocurrencies, which have been undertaken largely through enforcement actions that are adjudicated either by agency officials or in the federal courts, rather than through rulemaking.14For a detailed empirical analysis of the history of enforcement against crypto, see generally Yuliya Guseva, The SEC, Digital Assets & Game Theory, 46 J. Corp. L. 629 (2021) (noting that early enforcement trends showcased an attempt to create greater clarity and certainty, but that this approach has evolved to become more scattershot and predictable, fostering greater distrust between industry and regulators). It should be noted that some discrete proposed rulemaking has been put forward in the area of overseeing custody of investor assets that can extend to include cryptocurrency assets. See SEC Proposes Enhanced Safeguarding Rule for Registered Investment Advisers, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-30 [https://perma.cc/W8JL-LJK7]. In addition, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have jointly proposed amendments to disclosures made by private funds in Form PF with respect to these funds’ holdings of digital assets. See SEC/CFTC Proposed Amendments to Form PF, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/files/ia-6083-fact-sheet-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD6Z-PWBL]. Finally, the SEC has put out a bulletin (rather than proposed notice-and-comment rulemaking) setting out regulatory stipulations for those providing custody of crypto assets. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121 on Accounting for Obligations to Safeguard Crypto-Assets an Entity Holds for Platform Users, 17 C.F.R. 211 (Apr. 11, 2022).  In the following section we consider some of the incentives the agency must consider when it decides how, exactly, it should make policy—and what the tradeoffs are of making policy through adjudication—that is, by suing the entities that it regulates, rather than via the rulemaking process.15The SEC looks to have increased its enforcement intensity in the context of crypto-related cases between 2020-2023. In 2021, the agency brought 30 crypto-related enforcement actions, a rise of 50% from 2020 figures. By May 2023, the SEC had brought 13 crypto-related actions, putting it on track to beat 2022 numbers by 25%. The SEC has brought around 30% of its 140 crypto-related enforcement actions between late 2021-mid-2023. For a detailed description and discussion, SEC Crypto Enforcement Actions on Track to Outpace 2022, PYMTS (May. 5, 2023) https://www.pymnts.com/cryptocurrency/2023/sec-crypto-enforcement-actions-could-outpace-2022/ [https://perma.cc/84T5-Y6HS].

Conceptually, rulemaking and adjudication are distinct exercises. Rulemaking can be understood as a “creative act.” It might be analogized to legislation—or at least “legislation” in an agency-specific area subject to a particular set of procedural requirements.16Those requirements are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. When Congress passes statutes, it is making laws of prospective application and general applicability, as opposed to a backwards-looking individualized determination.17Admittedly, the APA defines rules confusingly, but general applicability and future effect seem to be important: “agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). When making rules, agencies are doing the same thing. Regulatory agencies embark on a process that is intended to be both open to public observation and comment, and that is conducted on the basis of the expertise that the agency can mobilize in developing the rule, both from resources developed within the agency, and from whatever knowledge that can be harnessed outside of it.18Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; The Administrative Procedure Act generally tries to strike a balance between transparency and the legal basis to act. When an agency promulgates rules with the force of law, the traditional test is found in Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 842 (1984); For further discussion, see sources and comments, infra notes 116–126. The agency drafts the rule, publicizes the proposal, seeks and responds to public comment from interested parties, revises the rule, obtains approval for promulgation from the political leaders of the agency, and then publishes the final rule, making it subject to judicial review.19For a much more detailed investigation into this process, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (6th ed., American Bar Association 2018).

Policymaking through enforcement, by contrast, can be interpreted as more of a “destructive” act. Successful agency litigation stops conduct by a regulated industry, through a cease-and-desist order, for example, a censure, license suspension, or fine.20Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/992R-TUPS] (discussing sanctions that Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) may impose, including “cease-and-desist orders; investment company and officer-and-director bars; censures, suspensions, limitations on activities, or bars from the securities industry. . . [and] civil penalties,” among other sanctions). For a discussion, see David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1155, 1219 (2016). It imposes sanctions in most cases in which the agency wins in court. Agency adjudication is the administrative law version of a judicial proceeding—it looks backwards at conduct that has already occurred and, if it concludes that the conduct violated the law, it imposes penalties.21See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 744 (2002) (noting the “numerous common features shared by administrative adjudications and judicial proceedings”). As with a judicial proceeding, adjudication begins with an investigation by the agency’s personnel, and then the filing of a lawsuit or an administrative proceeding. The government and the defendants then participate in a process of discovery (usually very limited in the administrative law context), briefings, arguments, and a decision rendered old by an adjudicator as to whether a violation has in fact occurred.22The process, notably, can involve courts and judges both internal and external to the regulatory agency. In the former case, individuals litigate issues in federal court; in the latter, cases can be litigated internally in administrative proceedings, which are increasingly subject to scrutiny and constitutional challenge. See Petition for Review of an Order of Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Jarskey v. SEC, No. 20-61007 (5th Cir. 2022) (No. 20-61007) (holding that held that Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the SEC when it gave the SEC full discretion to choose whether to bring actions in an Article III court or before an ALJ). https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-61007-CV0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8N5-M9FH]; Rebecca Fike, Fifth Circuit Issues a New Blow to SEC Administrative Law Judges, Vinson & Elkins (May 19, 2022), https://www.velaw.com/insights/fifth-circuit-issues-a-new-blow-to-sec-administrative-law-judges/ [https://perma.cc/XJF3-LNB3].

As a general heuristic, “rulemaking” refers to an action when an agency behaves like a legislature, and “adjudication” occurs when it acts like a court. However, there are complications. Enforcement through adjudication can take place in courts of law, or in in-house administrative proceedings run by agency officials, the administrative law judges who preside over formal adjudications, or the myriad other kinds of agency judges who decide various kinds of agency adjudications.23As Christopher Walker and Melissa Wasserman have explained, “Some new-world adjudicatory systems handle hundreds of thousands of cases a year, while others handle just a few cases annually. Many are essentially just as formal as APA-governed formal adjudication; others are quite informal.” Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 141, 143 (2019). See also sources and discussion, supra note 4. And, of course, it can take place through settled enforcement actions. In such cases, the agency is not acting like a court at all, but rather like a prosecutor extracting a plea deal, at times before even bringing a charge.24Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 873, 923 (1997) (“although arm-twisting by agencies is not akin to plea bargaining by prosecutors, there are similar grounds for fearing abuse”).

Crucially, policymaking for the future—which is ultimately, the point of rulemaking—can also take on guises that escape simple dichotomies. In other words, agencies can exercise authority through a sophisticated, “softer” range of levers that, while carrying persuasive and expressive power, wield lesser formal intensity and legal obligation than notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication.25Tim Wu, for example, has described agency threats—the threat to make or enforce a rule—as a desirable policy levers, especially within industries that are in a state of change and where there is a high degree of uncertainty within market conditions. Wu, supra note 4, at 1842. Agencies can spotlight their positions using mechanisms like no-action and exemptive letters, interpretative guidance, and even press releases and public statements.26For discussion, Donna Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 924–27(1998) (highlighting the profound significance of no-action letters for market participants and noting that they are often viewed as formal and legal, but highlighting that they express unofficial informal interpretations). See also, Cox, Hillman, Langevoort, & Lipton, supra note 4; Wu, supra note 4 (highlighting the use of threats as a regulatory device). Noting debates surrounding the ambiguity attaching to the definition of “force of law” in the context of agency interpretations, see discussion and analysis in Lisa Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005). Interpretations of law, and in the case of no action letters, the application of law to specific facts—while avoiding the process of rulemaking—can set expectations and impact market behavior. At the same time, such intermediate measures do not possess the hard finality offered by rulemaking or enforcement. Agency staff can always reconsider positions taken in the letters and adjust course (and even abandon it) when necessary. Indeed, verbiage accompanying such letters makes clear that staff disseminating them speak only for themselves, and not the agency as a whole.27Cox et al., supra note 4; 17 C.F.R § 202.1(d).

Moreover, adjudication can involve the application of law to facts in a way that can result in new interpretations with binding effect on how the law is pertains to like circumstances, effectively creating prescriptive direction for regulators and industry alike.28In this way, adjudication maps along a popular and larger debate in legal philosophy, and the question as to whether judges “find” or “make” law. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 37 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that “these judgments will become a ‘source’ of law” resembling “the exercise of delegated rule-making power by an administrative body”). Adjudication can, in the process, draw on the soft law tools noted above, like staff guidance or answers to frequently asked questions, all the way to previous formal rulemaking, to create new support structures for the law that themselves carry legal effect.29See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of their government statutes only if those interpretations have been promulgated pursuant to a rulemaking or formal adjudication, as then the agency has acted with force of law). Similarly, even findings of fact—like whether certain behavior meets a condition precedent for establishing an illegal act or violation of the law—may involve interpreting and expanding black-letter legal requirements, even as fact-finding ordinarily ranks as the least law-oriented task of an adjudicator.30See Hart, supra note 28, at 97 (observing that if courts can “make authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been broken, these cannot avoid being taken as authoritative determinations of what the rules are”).

Securities law offers no shortage of examples illustrating just how consequentially law making can be performed by adjudicators. In what is widely considered to be the most important case for establishing the perimeter of securities law, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court (not Congress) defined the bedrock concept of an “investment contract”—a “catch-all” type of “security” falling outside of more traditional categories (for example a stock or a bond).31Congress defined the term, “security,” in the Securities Act of 1933 and gave the SEC the power to regulate investment contracts in the Exchange Act of 1934; the agency and the courts then had to define what counted as an investment contract and what did not. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Drawing on prior judicial interpretations of states’ Blue Sky Laws, Howey laid out a broad set of standards with which the SEC would, quite literally, prosecute the shifting parameters of its authority for the next eight decades.32See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For discussion of the historic impact of the Howey test on the marketplace and securities jurisprudence see for example, Miriam Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading this Test on a Curve?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2011). It is important to note that SEC staff has issued no-action letters that provide guidance on the application of the Howey test to situations in which promoters are operating within grey areas and in which guidance from the SEC can carry special legal and commercial importance. See, e.g., Re: Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., Response of the Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 25, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/pocketful-quarters-inc-072519-2a1 [https://perma.cc/KT5T-V44K]; Re IMVU, Inc., Response of the Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/imvu-111920-2a1%5Bhttps://perma.cc/Y8EV-QTUE%5D. The 1946 case, which concerned real estate transactions involving orange groves in Florida, declared that an investment contract arises where there is (i) an investment of money; (ii) in a common enterprise; (iii) for profit; and (iv) derived from the efforts of others.33See supra note 32. This court-created framework was intended to anchor a facts-and-circumstances based analysis, and was flexible enough to apply to situations in which investor-risks arose from novel or new financing arrangements. But in detailing these four prongs in 1946, even the Supreme Court could not have possibly imagined the sheer range of schemes and assets to which the Howey test would eventually be applied, from animal breeding arrangements to contracts for death benefits.34See e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group Inc, 494 F.2d 414 (1974) (on animal breeding arrangements for chinchillas); SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (on life insurance benefits); Albert, supra note 32. Invariably, these individual requirements have each been subject to a multitude of interpretations over time as Howey prongs have been thoroughly litigated by parties contesting the ambit of the market’s regulatory perimeter—and whether a particular kind of issuer should be included, or not.35See also, requests to the SEC for guidance and no-action letters to determine the scope and interpretation of Howey. See supra notes 25–26. See also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017) (setting out analysis and guidance on the potential application of securities laws to tokens issued by a decentralized autonomous organization (“DAO”)); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, Investor.gov (July 25, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins-16 [https://perma.cc/T8LJ-MU8C] (guidance on the application of the Howey test to initial coin offerings (“ICOs”)).

To take one example, the Howey Court itself left unresolved how the common enterprise prong should be interpreted. In other words, it did not lay out specific and exclusive criteria to define what a common enterprise should be, and the elements needed to constitute one. To fill this gap, the lower courts have created different tests for the type and intensity of “common enterprise” required to be found to establish that a contract is an investment contract subject to SEC oversight. In Howey, the common enterprise could be found through the service contract, which gave the servicer “full and complete” possession of the land specified in the contract, and permitted the servicer to pool the investors’ money and to then distribute returns from selling oranges to them on a pro rata basis in accordance with their contribution.36See supra note 35. In this scenario, the Howey contract purchasers enjoyed so-called “horizontal commonality” with one another, as the returns to the investors were pooled and correlated with one another pro rata. When seeking out such commonality, the analysis looks at the relationship between the investors themselves to determine whether they were all facing similarly shared risks, collective action burdens and information asymmetries that could be mitigated by the presence of SEC regulation. 

But courts have also found other kinds of commonality sufficient to satisfy Howey’s common enterprise prong. Specifically, “vertical commonality” examines the relationship between investors and a promoter or issuer.37SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (“a common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent on the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties”). Vertical commonality can exist even if investors receive diverging returns as among each other (in contrast to horizontal commonality). Some courts have divided vertical commonality into a “broad” and a “strict” variance. In the case of “broad vertical commonality,” investors need not show any kind of intertwined risk between themselves and a promoter as long as they are dependent on the promoter’s efforts with respect to money management (in other words the promoter gets paid regardless of whether investors make money).38SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-479 (5th Cir. 1974); Albert, supra note 32, at 17–19. “Narrow vertical commonality,” on the other hand, requires showing shared risk between the investors and the promoter (that is, the promoter only gets paid if the investors make money).39For a discussion, see Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 Tenn. L. Rev. 897, 935 (2018); Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.; Albert, supra note 32, at 17–19.

The common enterprise components of the Howey test affect different securities-adjacent businesses in different ways. Consider cryptocurrencies in their various forms. For example, a crypto-token that is digitally developed by a promoter to raise money for a venture and sold to buyers with the promise of future returns from the business might look like a pretty conventional type of common enterprise.40This kind of transaction broadly describes an ICO. There are, of course, multiple other kinds of crypto-asset transaction types, such as stablecoin issuance. On ICOs, see for example, James Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed (UCLA Sch. L., Lowell Milken Inst., Rsch. Research Paper No. 18-13 2018). For a discussion of variety of crypto-asset types and dynamic pathways resulting in token characteristics evolving over time, see Yuliya Guseva, A Conceptual Framework for Digital Asset Securities: Tokens and Coins as Debt and Equity, 80 Maryland L. Rev. 166 (2020). Money is pooled. And the fortunes of the purchasers are linked to each other and to the success of the promoter’s efforts.41SEC v. Int’l Loan Networks, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (DC Cir. 1992). But relatively more “decentralized” cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin look quite different. There is no typical promoter as such.42Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 25, 2017). That said, purchasers of the crypto-token will see their fortunes rise and fall depending on whether the currency is adopted widely and appreciates in value. Because of this shared state, it may be argued that holders are part of a kind of common enterprise, but one that happens to be a uniquely decentralized one. Does that satisfy the definition of an investment contract? Or does the absence of pooling by a central issuer as well as its apparent absence for the purposes of vertical commonality mean that the definition of common enterprise is unable to reach relatively more decentralized cryptocurrencies? 

The definitions of an investment contract—and interpretations of the Howey test—provide one important example of how SEC enforcement through adjudication can make policy—and why incremental litigation against one sort of coin can still leave important questions unanswered with regard to other kinds of coins.43As noted above, see also, the work of the SEC in guiding policy interpretations on Howey through softer tools like no-action letters. On more informal sources of SEC rulemaking, see Nagy, supra note 26. But additional examples abound of critical policy derived by or generated through litigation.44Interestingly, commentators note that that enforcement actions, alongside settlements, undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) are resulting in the creation of a novel body of law on privacy and cybersecurity. For example, Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog argue that FTC’s enforcement actions against corporate privacy policies—generally resulting in settlements—have produced what the authors call “a common law of privacy.” Using its authority to policy unfair and deceptive trading practices, the FTC’s enforcement efforts have produced a corpus of agreements that companies look to when crafting their information privacy policies. For a detailed analysis, see Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2014). For a detailed analysis of varying sources of privacy regulation in the United States, see Anupam Chander, Margot Kaminksi & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1733 (2021). For example, it has been courts that have not only defined what counts as “material” information but have also defined its application for industry standards and practice. What a reasonable investor would find important given the “total mix” of information is both a fact based inquiry and court policymaking that, while based on the specific circumstances of litigants in a dispute, ultimately define the outer reaches of securities law and the agency’s jurisdiction.45TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The meaning of materiality has thus been worked out through a number of enforcement actions, as well as through other adjudications. For example, the SEC has worried that ordinary investors will not understand the material risks posed by cryptocurrency investments.46See Tyler C. Lee, Decrypting Crypto: Issues Plaguing Today’s Hottest Regulatory Nightmare, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 551, 561–62 (2020) (“SEC Chairman Clayton continues to raise concerns that the material facts and risks involved in cryptocurrencies are beyond the understanding of the Main Street investors.”).

In these instances, the line between “finding the law” and “creating the law” can become blurry as the law intersects with unanticipated, real-world operations of new technologies. Cryptocurrencies offer plenty of obvious examples: do staking services constitute an “investment of money,” where the customer maintains control and ownership of staked digital assets? Does it matter when those wishing to stake their crypto assets do so to protect the integrity and continuity of a blockchain rather than for the reward of additional tokens? Does the presence of a permissioned blockchain, in which participation in its infrastructure is restricted rather than open to all—necessarily mean that its native cryptocurrency is “dependent on the efforts of others”? Can an instrument that begins life as a security become so decentralized in its underlying governance that, eventually, it no longer qualifies as one? And if so, what constitutes the legal inflection point at which this transition occurs? Just as these questions involve the application of long-standing principles to new fact patterns, they can also involve exercising judgment about how entire domains of technology, and their supporting operational systems and transactions should be categorized, and under what circumstances. Thus, they represent issues that could well be clarified as a matter of administrative rulemaking or more informal guidance (for instance, through no-action letters). But at the same time, they could also constitute questions that are sufficiently substantive and related to precedent or statute that they end up being adjudicated in court.47For example, in some foreign legal systems, like that of the European Union, questions such as these have been subject to detailed rulemaking. See, e.g., Justin Williams, Davina Garrod, Peter I. Altman, Ezra Zahabi, Jenny Arlington & Alexander Armytage, EU Close to Introducing Groundbreaking Law to Regulate Crypto, Akin Gump (Oct. 27, 2022), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/eu-close-to-introducing-groundbreaking-law-to-regulate-crypto.html [https://perma.cc/6HXQ-KVCT].

II.  WHY WOULD AN AGENCY SEEK TO CREATE LAW THROUGH ENFORCEMENT?

Regulation by enforcement, while effective in times of crisis, is usually a choice, something regulators have themselves explicitly acknowledged.48See infra note 65. In this section, we review the discretion traditionally afforded to regulators, and the logic behind it. We then explore the criticisms and incentives faced by regulators who choose to engage in regulation by enforcement.

A.  Policymaking by Enforcement: The Historical Endorsement

So, why should agency leadership choose to make policy through adjudication rather relying on a more formal rulemaking process?

Regulators do not spend much time justifying their choice of policymaking tools.49For a detailed discussion on the continuum of regulatory priorities and factors governing the decision-making of the SEC in choosing between adjudication and rulemaking, see generally, Don Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1591, 1619–622 (2006) (highlighting the impact of a highly motivated, litigation-minded enforcement division as impacting the choice between enforcement vs. rulemaking). But courts have identified reasons why making policy on a case-by-case basis is useful. The traditional view, as we have observed, is that adjudication creates a common law regime where precedents produced by a series of enforcement actions can give regulated industry direction about the concerns of regulators, while giving regulators the flexibility to take a different approach in the next enforcement action.

The case most famously associated with this proposition is Chenery v. SEC.50332 U.S. § 194 (1947). Chenery involved a breakup of a utility company holding company scheme that allowed insiders to control the utility despite having a tiny amount of equity in the enterprise by a pyramid corporate structure. The Supreme Court considered the case twice, and on the first occasion in 1943, invited the SEC to promulgate a rule setting forth limits on minority control through the holding company structure, something to which the dissent objected.51SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943) (“Had the Commission, acting on its experience and peculiar competence, promulgated a general rule of which its order here was a particular application, the problem for our consideration would be very different.”). The dissent believed that Congress had given the SEC “wide powers to evolve policy standards, and this may well be done case by case.” Id. at 100.

When the agency declined to do so, the Court, reviewing the case a second time in 1947, took the refusal in stride.52Robert Thompson and Adam Pritchard argue that the embrace in Chenery II of the Chenery I dissent’s indifference between policymaking through rulemaking or adjudication is due to a change in personnel on the Court, resulting in declining influence of Justice Frankfurter, who had been a leading thinker on administrative law at the time. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 Va. L. Rev. 841, 900 (2009). It held that “the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”53Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 194 (1947). As the Court observed,

Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.54Id.

The idea is that administrative agencies should be able to engage in discrete, incremental lawmaking via litigation if this happens to be their preferred choice. Like common law, where judges are tasked with making rules on a case-by-case basis, adjudication allows courts and agencies to engage in problem-by-problem or issue-by-issue analysis, building on precedent to create a well-established body of law.55See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design As the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 139, 160 (2004) (identifying “instances in which the U.S. common law model has captured some of those advantages in its administrative adjudications”). See also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 403–09 (1981) (characterizing common law adjudication as incremental regulation). For the Court, this sort of phased analysis may be appropriate when a rule may not obviously be the best approach or if the risks in implementation are unknown. This scenario may arise if there is a novel administrative scheme, or if the costs and benefits of a particular formal rule may not be clear. In such cases, regulators may decide to establish rules via courts as they recognize shortcomings, as opposed to putting forward an entire regulatory framework from the outset, or so the administrative law traditionalists have put it.56See Diver, supra note 55. On regulatory uncertainties and information asymmetries facing financial regulators, see Awrey & Judge, supra note 6.

The limits to agency discretion, at least by this classical account, are few.57For limitations on deference to administrative agencies, see for example, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). In analyzing the scope for deference to rules made by the Department of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Supreme Court highlighted the significance of factors like fair notice, procedural fairness, and substantive consistency of promulgated rules with governing statutes. In this case, the Court overturned rules made by the Department of Labor, noting that, in the Court’s opinion, the rulemaking did not comport with standards of procedural fairness and substantive coherence. Most important has been something akin to a regulatory “eye test”: as the First Circuit has put it, “an agency cannot merely flit serendipitously from case to case, like a bee buzzing from flower to flower, making up the rules as it goes along.”58Henry v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996). Especially when adjudications are made in-house, a showing of very different outcomes for similarly situated cases could form the basis for a conclusion by a court that the agency has been acting arbitrarily, and thus violating basic procedural norms and rules that authorize its work.59Id. (quoting Davila-Bardales v. I.N.S., 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994)) (“[A]gencies do not have carte blanche. While a certain amount of asymmetry is lawful an agency may not ‘adopt[ ] significantly inconsistent policies that result in the creation of conflicting lines governing the identical situation.’ ”) (citation omitted). Still, inaction by agencies—indeed a decision to pursue an enforcement action in one case, and not to do so in a similar case—is largely protected. As discussed below, the Supreme Court has held that an agency’s decision not to pursue an enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable, as such actions are “committed to agency discretion by law,” under § 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), with very narrow exceptions, such as when an agency is totally abandoning its statutory responsibilities.60Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

B.  The Contemporary World of Regulation by Enforcement—and its Critics

Fast forward eighty years, and the deployment of regulation by enforcement has grown in ways unanticipated by the Court in Chenery. Some government officials have explicitly, and proudly, identified their willingness to use litigation as a means of progressing novel legal theories to change the law, rather than merely addressing unexpected or unanticipated facts with which agencies have limited experience.61See e.g., Sheelah Kolhatkar, Lina Khan’s Big Battle to Rein in Big Tech, New Yorker (Nov. 29, 2021) (reporting statements made by FTC Chair, Lina Khan: “Even in cases where you’re not going to have a slam-dunk theory or a slam-dunk case, or there’s risk involved, what do you do?” she said. “Do you turn away? Or do you think that these are moments when we need to stand strong and move forward? I think for those types of questions we’re certainly at a moment where we take the latter path.”). Others have leveraged enforcement proceedings to make policy after abandoning a failed notice and comment processes.62One recent example comes from the CFTC. In 2018, Chairman Giancarlo proposed a revised rule for SEFs—exchanges created after Dodd Frank Act that are intended to provide the regulated venues for swaps trading. The rule suggested that trade reporting protocols should be a part of SEF functionality—and the process for releasing it was subject to the APA, and there were numerous comments received. After considerable pushback from industry, however, Chairman Tarbert officially withdrew the proposed rule in 2020. However, just a year later, the same day as a settlement with a platform for running an unregistered swap exchange facility, CFTC published a Staff interpretation that essentially restated what had been proposed in the 2018 rule and that was officially withdrawn by the Chair, in effect using the enforcement action to state its interpretation of what was now the law. Yet others highlight an interest in sending strong signals to the market, seemingly prioritizing innocuous but “high profile” cases with media personalities to drive home their policy points and underscore their authority in contested fields.63Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Nov. 4, 2021) (transcript on file with the SEC) (“[H]igh-impact cases are important. They change behavior. They send a message to the rest of the market, to participants of various sizes, that certain misconduct will not be permitted. Some market participants may call this ‘regulation by enforcement.’ I just call it ‘enforcement.’ ”). In doing so, commentators have argued that they depart from at least the tone and tactics taken on some other issues in similar circumstances in the past.64In the case of Regulation FD, for example, the SEC publicly admitted contemplating between enforcement and rulemaking for advancing disclosure policy, and opting ultimately for rulemaking:

“Prior to Regulation FD, the legal question presented by selective disclosure was whether this practice violated insider trading law and was thus subject to civil and criminal penalties as a type of securities fraud. Under judicial interpretations regarding insider trading law, the answer has not always been clear.



Against this backdrop of legal uncertainty, the Commission began to see increasing numbers of public reports that issuers were disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to selected securities analysts or institutional investors before public disclosure. Even after Commissioners began to focus public attention on this practice through speeches, reports of additional selective disclosures continued. The issue for the Commission then became what, if any, regulatory response was appropriate. One option would have been to pursue a series of “test cases” charging fraudulent insider trading in some of these matters, with the goal of clarifying existing judicial interpretations in this area. Ultimately, however, rather than engage in what some might call “regulation by enforcement,” the Commission determined that the better approach was to engage in rulemaking proceedings, with full opportunity for public notice and comment, in order to craft a more targeted regulatory response to selective disclosure.”

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Written Statement Concerning Regulation Fair Disclosure (May 17, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htm [https://perma.cc/27BP-P4KR].

Not surprisingly, the flexibility to choose between making rules or making policy through a case-by-case adjudicatory process, has had its share of critics dating back to Chenery. In the last forty years, they have slowly earned greater prominence in both academic and regulatory circles. As early as 1982, Former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel argued that the SEC was using its enforcement powers to enlarge its regulatory turf, and suggested that rulemaking was better for predictability.65See generally Roberta Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution (1982). A decade later, former SEC Chair Harvey Pitt and Karen Shapiro similarly concluded that regulation by enforcement was deployed to “utilize enforcement proceedings to develop new legal theories and remedies.”66Harvey Pitt & Karen Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 149, 155 (1990) (“Unlike many of its sister agencies, the SEC consistently has maintained a vigorous, highly visible, and largely successful enforcement profile.”). Pitt and Shapiro echoed argued “that notions of due process require ample, advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be prohibited, before any person may be civilly or criminally prosecuted for a violation of those standards.” Id. For a discussion, see Nagy, supra note 26, at 1013. For Pitt and Shapiro, the enforcement paradigm, which emerged once the Supreme Court created a private right of action through doctrine rather than an explicit legislative rule, incentivized the agency to try to expand its regulatory powers through enforcement actions that sought to push at the existing edges of the doctrine.67Id. Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). This created fertile ground for a consequential but otherwise fairly “amorphous” body of law, epitomized by the prohibition against insider trading, which has evolved in its application largely through litigation, rather than rulemaking.68See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1999) (noting that it was an enforcement action “that for the first time treated exchange-based insider trading as federal securities fraud”); Langevoort, SEC as Lawmaker, supra note 49, at 1619–620. But see some rulemaking in the area, notably, Rule 10b-5(1) and Rule 10b-5(2), 17 CFR § 240.10b5-1; 17 CFR § 240.10b5-2. For a detailed discussion of the history, Adam Pritchard & Robert Thompson, A History of Securities Law in the Supreme Court, Ch. 5., (Oxford Un. Press, 2023) As detailed by Pritchard and Thompson, the prohibition against insider trading has evolved as a “quasi common-law prohibition” under Rule 10b-5, alongside a much narrower type of statute-based violation under Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934. The statutory track, they note, is narrow but relatively clear. According to Pritchard and Thompson, the case-based, Rule 10b-5-derived body of law is much less clear and more “amorphous” in its construction.

The criticism has intensified recently, especially in the context of cryptocurrency, as well as climate-related and environmental-social-governance-related (“ESG”) rulemaking.69On the history of the term ESG and an analysis of the controversies that have arisen in light of the term’s popularity, including the empirical challenges in demonstrating the connection between ESG and financial performance, see generally, Elizabeth Pollman, The Meaning and Making of ESG, U. Penn., Inst Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 22–23 (Oct. 2022). Critics argue that the agency has made notable attempts to police what it has perceived as “green-washing” and illegal issuances of securities by cryptocurrency sponsors without first offering actionable or coherent rules on the implementation of standards for ESG principles or concrete guidelines to outline when a crypto-asset is a security.70For example, in Spring 2021, the SEC announced the creation of its Climate and ESG Task Force within the Division of Enforcement. This Task Force was created to, “identify any material gaps or misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules. The task force will also analyze disclosure and compliance issues relating to investment advisers’ and funds’ ESG strategies.” Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues (Mar. 21, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42 [https://perma.cc/ZAG5-LY5A]. See also Kevin B. Muhlendorf and Martha E. Marrapese, SEC’s First ESG Enforcement Action Is Latest Move In Agency’s ESG Efforts, Wiley (May 17, 2022), https://www.wiley.law/alert-SECs-First-ESG-Enforcement-Action-Is-Latest-Move-In-Agencys-ESG-Efforts [https://perma.cc/AF9W-RCRF]; Andrew Ramonas, Recent SEC Enforcement Hints at Looming Crackdown on ESG Claims, Bloomberg (Aug. 10, 2022) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/recent-sec-enforcement-hints-at-looming-crackdown-on-esg-claims [https://perma.cc/N44C-2VX3]. Similarly, in the context of cryptocurrency and cyber-enforcement, the SEC has significantly increased its enforcement staff in recent years with the creation of the Crypto and Cyber Unit (formerly, the Cyber Unit), boasting fifty specific positions. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Nearly Doubles Size of Enforcement’s Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit, (May 3, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-78 [https://perma.cc/2Q6L-G9EC]. What rulemaking the agency has done in the space is limited to a proposed reinvigoration of the Names Rule, which constrains the ability of investment funds from inaccurately describing their investment strategy. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investment Company Names, 17 CFR Parts 232, 270 and 274, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ic-34593.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q6L-G9EC]. The criticisms, recently encapsulated by the Wall Street Journal, lament that the SEC’s “regulation by enforcement isn’t working and merely fuels market uncertainty.”71Editorial Board, The FTX Crypto Fiasco, Wall Street J. (Nov. 10, 2022) https://
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ftx-crypto-fiasco-cryptocurrency-sam-bankman-fried-alameda-coindesk-binance-11668122004; see also, James Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 Duke L.J. 625, 663 (2007) (“for the most part, the regulated prefer that regulators utilize rulemaking over principles-based enforcement actions”); Comm. Capital Mkts. Regul., Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 66, 66 (2006), http://www.
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFT-PLG3] (“When new standards are introduced through specific enforcement actions and only later codified as explicit rules, confusion and distrust are likely to be the consequences.”).
For cryptocurrencies, SEC Commissioner Mark Uyeda has criticized his own agency for pursuing enforcement actions instead of making rules. “This is an example of a situation where regulation through enforcement does not yield the outcomes achievable through a process that involves public comment, because without the benefit of comments from crypto investors and other market participants, the commission is unable to consider their perspectives in developing an appropriate regulatory framework.”72Kenneth Corbin, ‘Regulation by Enforcement’ Won’t Work for Crypto, Argues SEC Commissioner, Barron’s (Sept. 9, 2022), https://www.barrons.com/advisor/articles/sec-regulation-enforcement-crypto-commissioner-51662747452 [https://perma.cc/32QV-BG9E]. Another Republican SEC Commissioner, Hester Pierce, also complained that the agency has “tried to cobble together a regulatory framework through enforcement actions.”73Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Regulatory Transparency Project Conference on Regulating the New Crypto Ecosystem: Necessary Regulation or Crippling Future Innovation? (June 14, 2022). Not surprisingly, cryptocurrency entrepreneurs have also loudly criticized an approach driven by regulation by enforcement as regulatory technique.74Brian Armstrong, Op-ed: Crypto Markets Need Regulation to Avoid More Washouts like FTX, CNBC (Nov. 11 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/11/op-ed-crypto-markets-need-regulation-to-avoid-ftx-type-situations.html [https://perma.cc/9RWX-K2AW] (“Instead of putting in place clear guidelines for crypto, U.S. regulators have focused on regulation by enforcement.”).

The criticisms have bothered the SEC under the Biden administration. For example, the agency’s enforcement director has characterized the agency’s approach to emerging technologies and novel investment contracts as something that involves enforcement, but that is not using enforcement as a particular policymaking tool. As Director Gurbir Grewal noted in a keynote address, “this is not ‘regulation by enforcement.’ This is not ‘regulation by enforcement.’ This is not ‘regulation by enforcement.’ There. I have said it thrice and what I tell you three times is true.”75Gurbir Grewal, Director, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Div. Enf’t, Remarks at the 2021 SEC Regulation Outside the United States—Scott Friestad Memorial Keynote Address (Nov. 8, 2021) (on file with Sec. Exch. Comm’n).

Notwithstanding such statements, accumulating critiques have set the stage over the years for considerable push-back striking at regulation by enforcement..76Still, courts have tried to preserve the integrity of enforcement, and even in some instances incented adversarial process. For example, when the SEC proposed to settle cases against banks in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis without obligating them to admit any wrongdoing, judges questioned the policy and tried to throw out some of the settlements as being nonbinding–taking on regulation by enforcement by incenting more adversarial proceedings. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated and remanded, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A] n allegation that is neither admitted nor denied is simply that, an allegation. It has no evidentiary value and no collateral estoppel effect.”). See, e.g., Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 Mich. St. Int’l .L. Rev. 961, 988 (2014) (declining to approve proposed settlement). The SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy has been questioned by several judges, most notably Judge Jed Rakoff. As, for example, the SEC diverted more cases to administrative adjudicatory proceedings, the securities bar responded with a successful effort to characterize these proceedings as technically unconstitutional based on the relative independence of agency adjudicators from political oversight.77Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). As a result, the courts have started to demand that administrative proceedings be politically controlled, an idea usually inconsistent with the fact that an individual should be entitled to a hearing before an unbiased judge. And even more recently, defendants have pushed to vacate civil monetary judgments based on the structure of regulatory agencies and “unprecedented agency action that ignores fundamental constitutional principles.”78Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Pro. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, No. 19-7, slip op. (2020). These tactics, grounded in separation of powers arguments, have found a receptive audience at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and ushered in a reduction in agency independence.79PHH Corp.. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. Ct of App., 2018). For a discussion, see David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 Yale J.  Reg. 708, 754 (2020).

C.  A Continuum of Agency Incentives Driving Regulation by Enforcement

Many attempts to undermine regulation by enforcement are indirect and at times lead to outcomes eroding governmental supervision that are, in our view, inconsistent with the best interests of regulators and industry alike. Still, the rising tide of criticism is important insofar as it highlights an underappreciated theoretical and practical reality—namely, that there are a range of possible incentives that can drive the adoption of regulation by enforcement, or at least make it more attractive.80See also, Langevoort, SEC as Lawmaker, supra note 49, at 1619–21. Sometimes these incentives push agencies to enforce for the right reasons—regulators are unsure how to proceed, and so make policy on a case-by-case basis. By taking this careful approach, the damage of a bad choice is limited. In other cases, however, viewed more skeptically, regulators can use enforcement to avoid the burdens of other kinds of rulemaking—processes designed to make policymaking decisions better informed and more accountable.

We think that when regulators turn to adjudication, their incentives to do so can thus plausibly be characterized as lying along a continuum ranging from an interest in cautious case-by-case refinement and regulatory modulation to attempts to bypass administrative controls intended to enhance public participation and review. We have identified the bull case for regulation by enforcement as an essential gap filler and crisis response mechanism. For example, such an approach can reap gains where rulemaking still lags in its early stages or if its application and impact may be unclear. Regulation by enforcement can step in to tamp down on public harms in the absence of a clear rule or one that is under development. We have also explained that, as a matter of administrative law, courts have generally deferred to agency choices to prosecute, instead of legislating. But it is worth highlighting that there is a bare case, with tradeoffs that extend beyond the more usual concerns about whether regulation by enforcement makes for an unpredictable, unclear, and more ad hoc regulatory system.81See e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. Banking, Housing & Urban Affs., Toomey: SEC’s Regulation-by-Enforcement Approach Harmed Consumers (July 28, 2022), https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/toomey-secs-regulation-by-enforcement-approach-harmed-consumers [https://perma.cc/WAY5-96L5].

First, agencies could pursue adjudications, or at a minimum find adjudication attractive, insofar as it enables rulemaking in ways that avoid the kind of public scrutiny and involvement entailed in administrative procedure. Normally, the rule writing process is just that—a process that, by definition, is intended to attract attention and inspection. The most visible and significant element of such review is the notice-and-comment process, designed to encourage commentary on rulemaking in ways that expose it to critique, criticism, and refinement. During notice-and-comment, new proposals are exposed to review by industry and civil society, and agencies are often required to, at a minimum, respond to the concerns raised in the review.82A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, Fed. Reg., https://www.federalregister.
gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/758S-NU8U].

While this is how rulemaking is meant to work, the standard process can create political obstacles that draw negative media attention, private sector pushback, and can end up diluting or strengthening proposals in ways that might be out-of-sync with the views of agency leadership. The potential for such frictions provides one reason why adjudication can be such an attractive administrative tool. Adjudications limit the required responsiveness of agencies to the sort of wide-ranging assessments and suggestions that notice-and-comment rulemaking entails. Furthermore, they channel primary responsibility of dissent to the particular defendant selected by an agency to be the subject of an enforcement action. In this way, agencies can choose to set the terms of a debate, and even rope in other actors without necessarily giving them their day in court or a direct opportunity to participate.83For example, the SEC’s 2022 complaint against three cryptocurrency traders is illustrative of an approach whose fullest regulatory implications can extend well beyond the actors and issues laid out in the case itself. In this instance, the SEC brought charges for insider trading in violation of securities rules against three crypto-traders, one of whom worked for the crypto-exchange, Coinbase Inc. In its complaint, the SEC offered the argument that the defendants were involved in insider trading with respect to nine “crypto-asset securities,” thus triggering the application of insider trading rules. This case comes with a number of intriguing and expansive implications. First, while alleging that nine coins were crypto-asset securities, the SEC did not sue the issuers of these assets as part of the complaint. In addition, by suggesting that these coins were securities, the SEC also raised the prospect that any crypto-exchanges hosting trading in these assets could face potential sanction for doing so. However, in the complaint itself, the SEC did not sue any exchange transacting in these assets, nor did it explicitly threaten them. As commentators note, this enforcement strategy appears especially tricky by causing a number of coins to become viewed as “securities,” owing to the fact that the onus of showing that they are not ends up falling on three defendants, rather than issuers or exchanges that may be better placed to absorb the costs of making that case. They can also potentially extract negotiated settlements from weaker or vulnerable actors without even ever having to go to court, and by publicizing the terms of the settlement and the infraction shape the public perception as to what the law “is.”

Practically, adjudication can also enable agencies to bypass some internal restraints accompanying administrative rulemaking.84Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rulemaking in the 21st Century (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015); Langevoort, SEC as Lawmaker, supra note 49, at 1619 (“As administrative law has long worried, enforcement actions bypass controls, such as notice, comment, and judicial review, designed to introduce deliberation and accountability.”). Following the decision of the DC Circuit in Business Roundtable vs. SEC, agency rulemaking must be supported, in most instances, by a detailed cost-benefit analysis in order for it to pass muster.85Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The demand to produce such analyses in the promulgation of a rule means that agencies must demonstrate that their rule has been developed in a way that considers costs, if not numerically, then at least seriously.86See id. In Business Roundtable, the court faulted the SEC for failing to consider the entirety of the costs that would be imposed on public companies if long term minority shareholders could place dissident candidates on the same ballot as management nominees to the board in the annual vote by shareholders. In NAM v. SEC, however, the same court allowed the SEC to not try to calculate the benefits of a rule designed to help to end a civil war in central Africa because those benefits would be difficult to calculate, and whatever the outcome of a cost benefit analysis, Congress had ordered the SEC to try to help in ending the war. NAM v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As the D.C. Circuit put it, “the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified,” it risks reversal for failing to follow its legal requirement that it consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation in its rulemakings.87See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144. That court also faulted the SEC’s evaluation of costs and benefits in an earlier case. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Often, this means employing experts (for example, economists) that can develop an unimpeachable economic case to support the rule. Otherwise, the rule might be challenged and struck down in court as one that is arbitrary and capricious. 88Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (requiring reviewing courts to take a “hard look” at agency policymaking make with the force of law). All the while, most of the records involved in the analysis are “FOIAable,” enabling any member of the public the right to access scrutinize them—and use them as the basis for potential criticism of agency leaders or even litigation.89David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 Yale J. Reg. 708, 751 (2020). This process has generated intermittent risks to agency rulemaking. For example, in reviewing a rule designed to reduce human rights abuses from armed groups financed by conflict minerals, academics and industry pointed to extensive shortcomings in the SEC’s analysis, noting deficiencies in modeling, the assumptions being made in these models, and resulting cost estimates. More recently, SEC’s 2022 proposal to regulate climate disclosure has attracted critique for its cost-benefit analysis by industry and lobbying groups. Notably, such critiques may derive from self-interest or ideological disagreement with the goals of the regulation. Nevertheless, precisely because agencies are constantly under the spotlight for their expertise, research and economic analysis, rulemaking entails procedural steps and strategy designed to ensure that it is informed and methodologically robust. In particularly contentious, ideological or high-stakes areas of oversight, playing offense by litigating—as opposed to engaging in rulemaking and waiting to be sued—can present a lower risk route to making policy.

Additionally, adjudication need not be as rigorous as typical administrative processes. As Jim Cox has observed, “when the SEC brings enforcement actions, it does not have to do cost-benefit analysis.”90James D. Cox, Headwinds Confronting the SEC, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 105, 107 (2013). Additionally, while litigation itself consists of a (potentially long and winding) process, it does immediately signal the policy posture of the agency without opening the agency up to the same kinds of risks entailed in rulemaking. The administrative checks of rulemaking, for better or worse, can be mostly avoided by pursuing an enforcement action.

Adjudication also enables agencies to shift responsibility for rulemaking to the courts, a shirking strategy.91The typical armchair economic incentives invoked in these contexts are rather at odds with one another. See, e.g., Xingxing Li, The Cross-Border Transplantation of Variable Universal Life Insurance: The Evolution and the Regulatory Challenges, 20 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 279, 326 (2021) (noting cases in which “an agency’s typical behavior is shirking responsibility in spite of their tendency to relentlessly expand their turf”). In short, regulatory agencies, especially when faced with politically difficult choices, may wish to punt the ultimate responsibility for crafting particular rules to other actors. To the extent that legislation is not forthcoming, agencies may view courts as more optimal forums for hashing out difficult questions in ways that relieve agencies of the pressure, or responsibility, associated with “making law” through the administrative process. As a part of this balancing process, agency administration may also be tempted to view an enforcement decision as a way to relieve relevant leaders of the need to confront the criticism involved in taking on contentious rulemaking. Generously, adjudication may arguably be seen as an expression of administrative modesty. More critically, it may be viewed as a kind of shirking or avoidance in cases in which regulators should really be coming forward to engage in detailed and ambitious rulemaking.

In other situations, agencies could alternatively turn to adjudication as an expressly political act. Litigation is, by definition, a confrontational exercise, whether in order to enforce existing rules or to make new policy. As a result, regulation by enforcement presents an opportunity for agencies to signify their interest in taking action in ways that conform with certain policy or ideological moorings. Litigation can be designed to bolster or echo the Executive’s priorities or the priorities of key members of Congress to demonstrate high performance and in the process, enhance the career prospects of agency leaders. Alternatively, agencies could perceive certain forms of conduct as especially odious or dubious, and as a result, wish to engage in litigation as a more effective route of bringing media attention to the issue than the rulemaking process.

Finally, regulation by enforcement, even in the case of unsuccessful or discredited lawsuits, offers a means to extend the regulatory perimeter in ways unavailable under more conventional administrative rulemaking. To fully understand this particular strategy, it is important to understand that enforcement actions, particularly when exercised in novel ways, can freeze activity in the sector targeted by an agency. For example, by asserting that a particular digital asset is a security, a lawsuit can cool or temper the production or trading of that and similar digital assets. One question raised by the SEC vs. Wahi litigation, for example, was whether the mere claim by the SEC that a token was a security might prompt platforms that offer trading to preemptively delist it and any others deemed similar to avoid any potential punishment for themselves.92See e.g., Andrew Hinkes, Richard Kerr & Keri Riemer, SEC v. Wahi: An Enforcement Action Impacting the Broader Crypto/Digital Assets and Investment Management Industries, K&L Gates (Aug. 23, 2022), https://www.klgates.com/SEC-v-Wahi-An-Enforcement-Action-Impacting-the-Broader-Crypto/Digital-Assets-and-Investment-Management-Industries-8-23-2022 [https://perma.cc/N9XD-CNX5]. This kind of preemptive deterrence effect takes place the moment the litigation is filed and can remain in effect for as long as the litigation is arising. As a consequence, the act of litigation can have an injunctive impact on actors, regardless of its merits, but with potentially high upside for a regulator. If successful, the suit helps to establish precedent that cannot be undone by future agencies; if unsuccessful, the suit chills politically undesirable but legal activities in ways that can extend far beyond its regulatory perimeter.

III.  THE LEGALITY AND TRADEOFFS OF REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT

The turn to arguably more ambitious and consequential forays into regulation by enforcement raises two key questions. First, does this trend violate the strict letter of the law? And second, even if regulatory action is legally justified, does it offer a more effective means of governance – in other words, do the trade-offs justify the move? These inquiries are not mutually exclusive. For example, to the extent that the first question may not yield a straight-forward answer, the greater or lesser benefits of pursuing regulation by enforcement might impact judicial (in)tolerance for its continued use within the administrative canon. To state things differently, even if the practice might be acceptable legally or is at least ambiguous in this regard, it might yet fall foul of norms that underlie a deeper administrative commitment to the rule of law, such that the continued reliance on regulation by enforcement warrants further scrutiny.93Kevin Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1985, 1986–87 (2015); Richard Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 43–44 (1997) (highlighting the framing significance of the concept of rule of law).

A.  The Legal Question: Does It Violate the Law?

As described earlier, it is now well-established that courts afford expansive latitude to agencies in determining how best to forward rulemaking.94On certain limitation to agency deference, see for example, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). But while Chenery supports the proposition that agencies should be given discretion to pursue lawmaking through the judicial system, it is not without its complications. Perhaps the most important of these is the  APA. Outlined earlier, the APA governs the process by which federal agencies develop and issue regulations. A bedrock of administrative practice and good governance, the APA includes requirements for agencies to publish notices of proposed and final rulemaking as well as to offer the public opportunities to provide comment on notices of proposed rulemaking.95A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, supra note 82. In this way, the APA provides a systematic form of an “external” check on the processes and procedures that govern administrative agencies charged with carrying out the grunt work of implementing congressional statutes and that exercise extensive latitude to do so under Chenery.96Gillian Metzger & Kevin Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239 (2017) (detailing the tension between the “external law” and the “internal law” of agencies and highlighting the application of the APA as being consistent with the imposition of both external and internal constraints).

Enacted in 1946, just months before the release of the Chenery decision, the APA explicitly directs agencies to engage in a particularized and defined process when developing and writing rules. The process is intended to (1) ensure that agencies keep the public informed of their organization, procedures, and rules, (2) provide for public participation in the rule-making process, (3) prescribe uniform internal, organizational standards for the conduct of formal rule making and adjudicatory proceedings, and (4) restate the law of judicial review.97Cynthia Scheopner, Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Administrative-Procedures-Act [https://perma.cc/6WHZ-5BTE] As Ed Rubin writes, the APA is far from perfect.98Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 97–98 (2003). Some scholars suggest that it goes too far in its strictures, while others advocate that it does not go far enough.99See id. What is clear, however, is that it imposes a range of internal organizational norms alongside external checks that were devised as a way to respond to the rapid expansion of the administrative state following the New Deal reforms of the 1930s.100Metzger & Stack, supra note 96, at 1266–76 (detailing the historical dynamics giving rise to the passage of the APA in 1946).  

But what does the APA mean for regulation by enforcement? In particular, does it curtail the ability of agencies to govern through litigation? Chenery, as noted above, does allow agencies considerable discretion to engage in both rulemaking and adjudication. But what about in more murkier instances? Specifically, could an agency willfully circumvent the APA, and its public policy goals, by engaging in regulation by litigation rather than through detailed rulemaking?

At least at first glance, the APA should make little difference to an agency’s ability to engage in regulation by enforcement, even if this reflects a deliberate strategy to circumvent the act. That is, because the APA lacks an anti-evasion clause, it should allow agencies to pursue a workaround its provisions. Moreover, courts have tended to interpret their ability to intervene in enforcement-related issues as being highly constrained. In Heckler v. Chaney, perhaps the most cited example of this principle, inmates sought redress after had been sentenced to death by lethal injection. They petitioned the FDA to take enforcement action to prevent the use of a specific drug protocol in capital punishment cases, alleging that use of these drugs constituted a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).10121 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq. The FDA refused to intervene. Seeking review under the APA, the inmates filed suit in District Court asking that the FDA be required to stop the use of the drugs. The Court of Appeals held that the FDA’s refusal to take enforcement action was both reviewable and an abuse of discretion and remanded the case with the directions that the FDA be required “to fulfill its statutory function.”102Id. When the case was finally appealed to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that an agency’s decision to refrain from taking enforcement action should be assumed to be insulated from judicial review under the APA. That is, the FDA’s determination to avoid intervening was perfectly legitimate.103Id.

Looking deeper, however, it is worth asking whether Heckler is the last and complete word on the question. Crucially, it is silent on the issue of whether an agency’s decision to proactively enforce—rather than to refrain from enforcing – constitutes a potential violation of the APA. Heckler speaks to an agency refusing to deploy its resources in a case—the implication being, that by dint of its inaction, it chooses to leave the existing parameters of the law unchanged. By contrast, the Court in Heckler does not address what happens when an agency decides to bring a case—that is, to use its power, authority, and resources to sanction a regulated entity in a bid to further a specific interpretation of the law. Stated differently, Heckler leaves open the question of what legal consequences follow under the APA when an agency takes steps to either “make law” or “find law” through an active deployment of its enforcement power. As detailed in this Article, agencies might decide to pursue enforcement for any number of reasons. Chenery provides considerable latitude allowing such a strategy. But, as noted above, agencies may opt for launching litigation over rulemaking for reasons that might reflect a more cynical motive to affirmatively avoid the requirements of the APA. What happens then? Heckler, arguably, does not provide an answer.104To be sure, this enforcement discretion can be exploited by agencies. Selective enforcement of rules can undo some of the consistency advantages of rulemaking.

To be sure, there are serious difficulties involved in identifying that line between an agency’s decision to pursue sanctions as part of its expected exercise of enforcement authority, and one in which its choices lie in deliberately (or recklessly) skirting the APA’s administrative process. Perhaps the most obvious is the challenge of finding evidence that might point to this administrative intention.105In the question of deference to agency decision-making, the Supreme Court highlighted that deference may not be given when the Court suspects that the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question,” such as when it might promote a “convenient litigating position.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012). As any lawyer knows, the task of uncovering “proof” that points to a state-of-mind is notoriously difficult. First, agencies are complicated creatures, staffed by many people, and it is difficult to attribute a single intent to so many individuals. Second, it requires looking for incriminating materials like internal memos, emails, or evidence of conversations had between decision-makers that could suggest a nefarious motive, and obtaining discovery against an agency in an APA case is very difficult.106As the Supreme Court has observed, “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). Obtaining this kind of material is challenging in the best of times. But it is especially difficult when agencies decide to pursue adjudication. Notably, the APA affirmatively shields agencies from having to publish their own internal organizational processes and rulemaking for public consumption. That is, there is no need for an agency to subject its own in-house enforcement deliberations to notice-and-comment.107Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). This leaves agencies relatively unconstrained in their abilities to develop their own procedures and processes without having to first subject them to outside scrutiny.108Metzger & Stack, supra note 96, at 1277–78. Without such affirmative disclosure about internal policies, those looking to understand why agencies might be acting as they do have to rely on costlier measures. Discovery within litigation offers one expensive pathway, if a court is willing to allow it.109As one commentator has noted, “After all, the presumption of regularity is a rebuttable presumption.” Conley Hurst, Comment, The Scope of Evidentiary Review in Constitutional Challenges to Agency Action, 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1511, 1519 (2021). Or, when possible, observers could also try to gain informational access through Freedom of Information Act requests that might yield clues as to agency process—but which itself has notable constraints as to what information must be provided by government.110Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). As a result, understanding whether an agency’s enforcement decisions are being driven by a wish to deliberately avoid the APA is, ironically enough, a task made more difficult by the very application of the APA itself.111Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996).

In short, the question as to whether regulation by enforcement is legal under the APA is not entirely settled, even as most of the foundational principles are. On the one hand, agencies clearly have wide latitude under Chenery. And according to Heckler, the decision to avoid enforcing is essentially unreviewable. However, Heckler is incomplete: it does not address the scenario in which agencies affirmatively choose to bring a case. Moreover, there is little in either Chenery or Heckler that addresses a much more foundational inquiry, namely whether the pursuit of enforcement to circumvent the APA deliberately or recklessly is permissible, especially when it is intended to establish novel legal arrangements or dictates normally reserved for the rulemaking function.

B.  Legal Scrutiny Beyond the APA

The APA is but one vector of risk for agencies dependent on regulation by enforcement for rulemaking. Even where the APA offers few restrictions on agency action, perceptions of agency abuse or mischievousness can create considerable perils for the administrative state. Some commentators and scholars have noted that regulation by enforcement may lead to Congressional oversight hearings and the politicization of agency action—whether in the form of traditional rulemaking or litigation.112See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 66; Karmel, supra note 65. But we think the consequences may be far greater, and perceptions of overzealous regulation could, over time, catalyze court reactions that ultimately undermine the very authority of the agencies to pursue their missions.113See, e.g., William Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 4 (2003) (addressing, for what it is worth critically, “contemporary political critiques often including battle cries that there is just too much regulation, and poor regulation at that”). At a minimum, litigation efforts can backfire, creating unfavorable precedent for the particular regulatory action or claim in question. But far more ominously, agency overreach can become grounds for courts to rein in the larger administrative authority. To be sure, normatively, imposing checks and balances on agencies constitutes the preserve of the judiciary. However, an ambitious agency pushing novel rules and doctrine in ways found to be unfair, unvetted, or unaccountable can increase the risk to itself of attracting judicial ire, and ultimately undermining the scope of its authority and sphere of influence.

Risks are particularly acute given the recent arc of Supreme Court decisions and posture. One possible target lies in the Chevron doctrine, a Constitutional principle many scholars argue was designed to get the courts out of the policing of agency policymaking. The Supreme Court has formally agreed to review its constitutionality, with a decision likely to be delivered in summer 2024, placing in jeopardy a critical lever by which agencies have exercised their authority with relative legal confidence over the decades.114See, e.g., Gerstein & Guillen, supra note 10. The doctrine, named after “the most cited case in administrative law,”115David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 135, 144 (2010). The Financial Stability Oversight Council, for example, saw its designation powers challenged and curtailed through litigation, where the court found that the FSOC violated administrative law when designating Metlife as a systemically risky firm and that its process was “fatally flawed.” See Lee Myerson, Metlife: FSOC “Too-Big-to-Fail” Designation, Metlife: FSOC “Too-Big-to-Fail” Designation, Harvard L. Sch. Forum Corp. Gov. (May 2, 2026), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/02/metlife-fsoc-too-big-to-fail-designation/ [https://perma.cc/U2TH-FPTF]. outlines the standard of review courts must exercise when reviewing agency actions. For the first step, the reviewing court must ask whether, after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” it is evident that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”116Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984). If so, the statute is “unambiguous[],” and the agency must not differ from Congress’ clearly expressed command.117Id. If, however, the court decides that the statute empowering the agency action is ambiguous, it then moves to step two of the inquiry. That step requires the court to uphold the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”118Id. For one of the leading critiques, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (“the failure of Chevron to perform as expected can be attributed to the Court’s reluctance to embrace the draconian implications of the doctrine for the balance of power among the branches, and to practical problems generated by its all-or-nothing approach to the deference question”).

The standard was popular in the courts for decades, but increasingly seems to have fallen out of favor at the Supreme Court.119See e.g., Nathan Richardson, Deference is Dead (Long Live Chevron), 73 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 441 (2021) (arguing that the Chevron doctrine has been in steady decline). Although the Court has not expressly overruled the case, it has unanimously restricted certain aspects of agency deference for in-house adjudication, and has not deferred to an agency interpretation of its government statute in six years.120Editorial Board, Supreme Court 9, Administrative State 0, Wall St. J. (Apr. 14,
2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-axon-v-ftc-sec-v-cochran-administrative-state-federal-court-elena-kagan-43f6b20 (discussing the ruling in Axon Enterprise v. FTC and SEC v. Cochran, in which the Court stated that litigants did not need to first exhaust agencies’ administrative processes before being able to proceed to federal court).
The Court did not cite Chevron in a majority opinion during the 2021 term, and cited it only three times in 2020, raising the likelihood that the Justices may have soured on the idea that courts should defer to agencies in most matters of legal interpretation.121But see Isaiah McKinney, The Chevron Ball Ended at Midnight, but the Circuits are Still Two-Stepping by Themselves, Yale J. Reg. Notice & Comment (2022), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-ended/ [https://perma.cc/VXP9-7KYC] (noting that circuit courts do often adhere to Chevron). No agency would wish for the end of deference. But the seeming diminishing of Chevron at the Supreme Court opens up questions about what kinds of agency conduct may have irritated the Court sufficiently into taking a much closer and critical look at agency behavior.122McKinney, supra note 121. Here, the pursuit of enforcement, if designed or interpreted to bypass administrative norms, could provide an easy target for fully unwinding judicial deference.123In slightly different context, the Bankruptcy Court strongly admonished the SEC in the context of judicial hearings designed to scrutinize and approve Binance.US’s plan to buy the bankrupt entity, Voyager Digital. In responding to the SEC’s contention that Binance.US and the proposed sale were in violation of applicable securities law, Judge Wiles demanded specific evidence and criticized the agency for failing to offer clarity about the application of securities regulation. See, e.g., Dietrich Knauth, SEC Objections to Voyager-Binance Deal Criticized by U.S. Judge, Reuters (Mar. 2, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/sec-objections-voyager-binance-deal-criticized-by-us-judge-2023-03-02.

And Chevron is not the only source of legal scrutiny. Notably, the Court has recently emphasized that an agency, when it breaks new policymaking ground, must “be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”124Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020). See also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) (also invoking the reliance interest). An agency that has used enforcement actions to expand its regulatory turf, or to try out novel legal theories, might be particularly vulnerable to a charge that it arbitrarily failed to consider the settled expectations of a regulated (or previously unregulated) industry. Reliance interests are not dispositive, but they must be part of an agency’s reasoned decision-making. As the Supreme Court has explained, an agency “may determine, in the particular context before it, that other interests and policy concerns outweigh any reliance interests,” but “that difficult decision [is] the agency’s job.”125Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 1914. See also, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) (on the importance of fair notice and procedural fairness in granting deference to agencies). An agency that proceeds through litigation is going to find it difficult to establish that its enforcement action included some sort of attention to the reliance interests of the defendant in the action.126For example, in April 2023, Coinbase filed an appellate petition in the Third Circuit to compel the SEC to clarify the scope of its rulemaking vis-à-vis Coinbase and to respond to questions that Coinbase had requested the SEC to address. This petition took the form of “a writ of mandamus,” designed to compel the SEC to respond to Coinbase questions. Coinbase’s petition followed service by the SEC in March 2023 of a “Wells Notice”—a common precursor to a potential enforcement action. Crystal Kim, The SEC Has 10 Days to Respond to Coinbase, Axios (May 4, 2023), https://www.axios.com/2023/05/04/coinbase-sec-crypto-regulation; Dave Michaels, Coinbase Tries Novel Defense in SEC Fight, Wall St. J. (May 5, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coinbase-tries-novel-defense-in-sec-fight-43298183. In June 2023, the SEC formally launched an enforcement action against Coinbase, alleging, inter alia, that Coinbase was operating an unregistered securities exchange. For discussion of the complaint, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Coinbase for Operating as an Unregistered Securities Exchange, Broker, and Clearing Agency (June 6, 2023).

Another possible vector of risk involves the “major questions doctrine,” which holds that courts should not defer to agency statutory interpretations that concern questions of “vast economic or political significance.” In 2022, the Court indicated that it intended to take the major question doctrine seriously with a last-day-of-term effort to gather the few cases applying the doctrine into a coherent whole. In West Virginia v. EPA, a case concerning the EPA’s power to encourage power plants to shift away from coal, and toward gas, wind, and solar, the Court explained that “in certain extraordinary cases . . . something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary” to permit a new agency to go forward.127West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022). To do so, the “agency instead must point to clear congressional authorization for the power it claims.”128Id. (quotation marks omitted). So far, the major questions doctrine has only been deployed by the Supreme Court to reverse rules—which incentivizes agencies like the SEC to avoid rulemaking and make policy through enforcement.129In one case, the Court reversed a rule like “order” promulgated by the Centers of Disease Control setting and extending a nationwide eviction moratorium. See 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (2020) (charactering the moratorium as an “Order”). The order was rule-like in that it was a government action of general applicability and future effect, per the definition of a rule in 5 U.S.C. § 551. See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021). Nonetheless, to the extent that regulation by enforcement is turf expansive, there is some risk that the courts could get frustrated and sanction regulators who move beyond their usual remits, however they do so, including by enforcement. Indeed, in the Wahi litigation outlined above, when the SEC sought to sanction defendants engaged in insider trading, arguing that the tokens traded are securities—led to a tussle on the major questions doctrine in court. In the Wahi case, defendants argued that the determination of tokens as securities constituted a major question, one that the SEC should seek Congressional permission to answer.130Matthew Bultman, Ex-Coinbase Manager Tests If SEC Crypto Reach Is ‘Major’ Question, Bloomberg (Feb. 16, 2023), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/ex-coinbase-manager-tests-if-sec-crypto-reach-is-major-question [https://perma.cc/5BJW-4ZKY] (“If the court agrees with the defendants here and grants the motion to dismiss, this will be one of the first cases of this magnitude,” Rutgers Law School professor Yuliya Guseva said. “It will have broad implications in future cases.”); Dave Michaels, Coinbase Ex-Manager Convicted of Insider Trading Is Crypto’s Latest Legal Hope, Wall St. J. (Mar. 26, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coinbase-insider-trading-case-spearheads-cryptos-latest-bid-to-avoid-sec-oversight-a43bd268. 

This set of concerns, then, leads to what is perhaps the most fundamental question: whether agencies even have constitutional basis on which to bring their claims. In other words, agencies face the risk that the legal basis for their very authority to legislate and enforce comes under challenge. This risk is not theoretical. Already the courts of appeals have invoked two rarely invoked constitutional provisions, the nondelegation doctrine and the appropriations power, to stop relatively novel exercises of agency power, in a sort of thermostatic constitutional response to policymaking perceived as overzealous.

The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers to other entities—including the President, administrative agencies or, perhaps most disapprovingly, private organizations. In J.W. Hampton v. United States, the Court ruled that Congress must give its delegates an “intelligible principle” on which to base their legislative-like regulatory actions; and that, if it did so, it could appropriately transfer some of its legislative responsibilities to someone else.131“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The doctrine has not been used to strike down legislation since 1935, so it is a doctrine that has, as Cass Sunstein has put it, had “one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”132Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000). The Fifth Circuit turned to the doctrine nonetheless to reject an enforcement action brought administratively by the SEC. The appellate court objected to the absolute discretion, per Chenery and Heckler, the agency thought it enjoyed when it came to choosing its forum for enforcement actions. When Congress did not create a standard about when to bring an enforcement action, if “the intelligible principle standard means anything, it must mean that a total absence of guidance is impermissible under the Constitution,” the court concluded, meaning that the decision to bring the case administratively had been made without any congressional guidance.133Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446, 462 (5th Cir. 2022). That in turn meant that the enforcement proceeding had to be dismissed.

In Community Financial Services Association of America Ltd. v. CFPB, trade associations sought to challenge how the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is funded, arguing the agency’s financing model—where it receives its working budget from the Federal Reserve rather than via the Congressional appropriations process—was unconstitutional.134Cmty Fin. Serv. Ass’n of Am. Ltd. v. CFPB, No. 21-50826 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2022). It should be noted that the CFPB has appealed and filed an application for certiorari with the US Supreme Court. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, Scotus Blog, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-v-community-financial-services-association-of-america-limited/ [https://perma.cc/E4BA-Z9ME]. See also Cecilia Kang, F.T.C.’s Court Loss Raises Fresh Questions About Its Chair’s Strategy, N.Y. Times (July 11, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/technology/lina-khan-ftc-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/6SA5-JE9M] (highlighting risks of the FTC’s litigation’s strategy after the FTC’s lawsuit challenging Microsoft’s proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard, a video game maker); An Interventionist SEC Risks a Courtroom Backlash, Financial Times (Sept. 10, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/630a9923-6d63-4cf4-af0d-9668d2404bcb [https://perma.cc/5EV5-5EQ9]. The plaintiff trade associations made the argument that the CFPB’s Payday Lending Rule was invalid owing, amongst other things, to its unusual funding process. The Fifth Circuit agreed, opening the door for plaintiffs to now contest any number of rules and enforcement actions delivered by the CFPB. While this case relates specifically to the workings of the CFPB, its implications can arguably extend much farther.

When agencies pursue litigation in ways that depart cavalierly from Chenery, and in ostensible circumvention of more traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, their actions, however well intentioned, risk judicial pushback and may prove to be fertile grounds for rollbacks of administrative power more broadly. Stated differently, regulation by enforcement, while largely permissible under Chenery, does not mean that it is always allowed, and miscalculations carry risks for not only discrete cases, but also for the very powers of the regulatory state.

C.  The Normative Question: (When) Are the Trade-Offs Worth It?

Recapping, we earlier described the bull case for regulation by enforcement. Regulation by enforcement, rather than rulemaking, enables important gap filling and incremental rule-giving. Regulators can reduce errors and respond to unforeseen situations and even emergencies when necessary. In pushing high-profile litigation, agencies can additionally send a powerful signal of their intent to police the marketplace.135Sometimes, of course, they can do so without filing an enforcement action. See Wu, supra note 4 (“The use of threats instead of law can be a useful choice—not simply a procedural end run”). This can foil activities by reckless risk-takers that become fearful of punishment and being publicly shamed in the media. A litigation-focused strategy—being public and liable to deter widely—can also instill confidence in the agency’s competence and its commitment to the cause it has been created to forward.

But there are deeper normative risks—both to the quality of the rulemaking, as well as to the underlying legitimacy of the regulatory framework. As we discuss below, regardless of the ultimate legality of rulemaking via litigation, its deployment can have costs to the quality of resulting rules, as well as to its acceptance as legitimate and fair. Furthermore, by shifting rulemaking to courts rather than agencies, the approach invites judicial interpretations and interventions that can ultimately undermine, rather than expand, regulatory authority. In other words, the courts can reject an agency’s adjudicatory efforts, and leave regulators red-faced, equipped with a much lighter reserve of institutional power that the agency might have wanted.

1.  Informational Costs and Rulemaking Quality

Favoring ex post adversarial litigation over formal ex ante rulemaking creates the possibility of a much lower-quality, lesser-informed policy intervention. The content of the new law can end up being less sophisticated substantively and more thinly informed.136On information asymmetry facing regulators in financial regulation, see Awrey & Judge, supra note 6.

There are internal-to-the-agency advantages of rulemaking. The act of developing a new rule requires an agency to engage in extensive research, crafting, analysis, and careful drafting even before it is presented to the public for scrutiny. This rulemaking process is designed to generate a deep reserve of information, opinion and analysis that exposes new proposals to various forms of expertise and the exigencies of real-world application. It requires agencies to engage substantively with the industry they are seeking to regulate, understand the risks, model the various directions that implementation might take, calibrate the costs that firms will have to pay when seeking to comply with the rule, as well as calculate the overall aggregate effect of the rule on the market (for instance through cost-benefit analyses). Well before the rule takes shape, then, it must be developed through an internal process designed to collect information, make a case for its benefits, to substantiate this argument for a potential challenge in the courts, and then to draft a rule that can coherently reflect the most optimal statement of the agency’s concerns versus the costs involved in execution.137See e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost–Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882 (2015); Jonathan Guynn, The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking after Business Roundtable, 99 VA. L. Rev. 641(2013) (highlighting court scrutiny of agency rulemaking on cost-benefit grounds).

There are also outside-of-the-agency benefits to rulemaking. Rulemaking can prompt extensive dialogue between the public and agencies even before proposals reach the notice-and-comment stage, opening up pathways for information to flow between agencies and others well before any drafting begins. Envisioning future rulemaking (because it is mandated by a Congressional statute), members of the public often try to engage with agencies early in a bid to see their interests reflected in upcoming proposal drafts—ahead of when the proposal is ready for publication in the notice-and-comment period. Lobbying by certain interest groups offers the most visible example of such a practice, where industry or citizen representatives seek out opportunities to make their views heard at early stages of drafting. In her study of the Volcker Rule—a post-2008 Financial Crisis measure designed to restrict how freely banks could engage in risk-taking for their own account—Kimberly Krawiec examined 8000 comment letters received by the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the pre-proposal stage.138Kimberly Krawiec, Don’t Screw Joe the Plumber: The Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 55 Arizona L. Rev. 53 (2013). In addition to industry input, her study observed a surprising degree of private-public interest, bolstered by organizations like Americans for Financial Reform or Public Citizen.139Id. at 58. To be sure, scholars diverge on whether such public commentary is, in fact, expert and informative for agencies.140Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions, 55 Duke L.J. 893 (2006) (highlighting a lack of informational value in public comment by members of the everyday public); Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. Public Admin. Res. & Theory 103 (2005) (showing that public comment letters can make a difference to the content of rulemaking); Krawiec, supra note 138, at 58. However, as Krawiec notes, the fact of receiving such input can often be informative in its own way, notwithstanding concerns about substantive content.141Krawiec, supra note 138, at 58.

Litigation, by contrast, involves fewer informational inputs. In lieu of notice-and-comment, it offers informational opportunities through three critical tools: the discovery process, testimony, and amicus briefs. Discovery, for its part, creates the parameters for dispute and comprises the occasion where parties to the process supply information to one another. But discovery is an imperfect proxy for detailed policy-based research. It is centered on the case itself and, therefore, on the alleged conduct of the defendant. Its data gathering and analysis may not reach the interests of the industry as a whole, or offer a rigorous public analysis conducted by the agency about the merits of the case. And even where it is collected, not all data will be presentable during a dispute and could be disregarded for any number of legal or procedural reasons.142Sometimes, one supposes too much data can be a trap for the aggressive regulator—an increased number of bases to find problems with a rule, a harsh spotlight on the decision-making process. But it is ever the case, and generally we think that more informed policymaking is better than its less-informed alternative.

Amicus briefs or “friends of the court” briefs, by contrast, enable expert and interested third parties to offer instruction and insight to the court. However, like litigation, amicus briefs do not involve the opportunity for policy engagement, much less counterproposals. Instead, they represent occasions for authors to provide legal theory or partial legal analyses courts may or may not deem to be relevant to assigning liability or guilt. As a result, full scrutiny need not be brought to bear on specific rulemaking agenda items. And there is also no requirement or even expectation for agencies to respond to amicus briefs, unlike in the case of rulemaking, where regulators are expected to consider and address input gathered through the notice-and-comment process. For these reasons, even as the number of briefs issued has grown,143Leah Ward Styles, Why and When to File an Amicus Brief, Smith Gambrell Russell https://www.sgrlaw.com/ttl-articles/why-and-when-to-file-an-amicus-brief/ [https://perma.cc/X99L-AB4J]; Brendan Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs?, Slate (Apr. 1, 2003), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2003/04/do-judges-read-amicus-curiae-briefs.html. scholars have long debated whether they really impact the decision-making of judges in practice. On the one hand, their contribution has been noted in cases where they offer judges specific expertise (for example, statistics) that is not included as part of the record. Briefs can be cited in decisions, showcasing their significance. On the other, judges are, as mentioned above, under no duty to heed such briefs. Unlike agencies that must be cognizant of the comments they receive and cannot just ignore them, judges can exercise far greater discretion.144Koerner, supra note 143. Indeed, one study points to a divergence in attitude to amicus briefs between judges. While some welcome the interventions, others like Judge Richard Posner have been openly hostile.145Joseph Kierney & Thomas Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Court Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Penn. L. Rev. 743 (2000). Ultimately, the receptivity toward amicus briefs, even in their limited utility, can depend on a number of factors, such as the particular court in which they are filed, the judge in the case, the kind of brief offered (for example, offering specific expertise), as well as whether the person submitting is respected and trusted by the court.146Koerner, supra note 143.

Testimony, as a final source of information, comprises statements gathered by critical parties to the dispute. It can take place in the form of pre-trial depositions or in-court testimony. Like both discovery and amicus briefs, testimony is generally tied to specific facts. And in order to be admitted into deliberations, it, like discovery, must meet procedural and substantive requirements, like avoiding hearsay and other requirements—standards inapplicable to notice-and-comment. Moreover, larger questions deemed irrelevant to the dispute, even if critical or central to policy considerations, will have no sanctioned weight in the adjudication—even where agencies engage courts in order to regulate by enforcement.

2.  Fairness and Legitimacy

Regulation by enforcement, as opposed to regulation by administrative process, also raises important fairness and legitimacy concerns. The APA aims to create a system of procedural fairness around the rulemaking process to ensure that authorities govern through proper, transparent, well-evidenced, and objective processes.147Stack, supra note 93, at 1993. Through publicity, notice-and-comment, and mandatory agency engagement, those that may be bound by new legislation —as well as anyone else—is invited to provide input and contribution. Judicial review of rulemaking offers the ultimate check on the implementation of the process. Though agencies enjoy considerable deference, they do confront the possibility of being challenged, for example, where regulations are found to be arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, the process is intended to give regulated entities and the public a preview of the expectations and rules that will apply to them.

By pursuing an enforcement action as a first means of creating new law, policymakers raise the risk of doing so in a way that, justified or not, could appear to give those affected scant prior notice of illegality or expected punishment.148Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). Or even where parties ought to understand or expect enforcement, the absence of a rule can create unequal compliance opportunities for firms. Some firms will have greater resources to track potential regulatory actions. Moreover, certain defendants are better positioned to bear these costs than others. Smaller companies may have few resources to defend themselves, while larger actors might be better placed to withstand and contest the action. The Wahi case again offers an example. Rather than target large entities like crypto trading platforms or issuers, the SEC chose to bring a case against three individuals, whose capacity to direct vast resources to the litigation was arguably extremely limited.149Hinkes et al., supra note 92. This asymmetry leads to the potential for procedural unfairness (or perceived unfairness) in situations where smaller defendants or individuals may be specifically selected as test cases, owing to the likelihood that they fail to contest the claim (because they are small firms) or, conversely, if they are sufficiently high profile that agencies can generate the needed buzz, publicity, and wider deterrent effects on smaller players in order to make the case for a new jurisprudence.150On selective enforcement by the SEC in the context of initial coin offerings, where the SEC has brought actions against “small and significant” defendants, and possible explanations for this trend, see James Park & Howard Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and Initial Coin Offerings, 61 Wash. J.L. Policy 99 (2020). Because rulemaking in such cases arises by dint of an adversarial process, it arguably necessitates an even greater need to show procedural fairness. As enforcement implies the need for defendants to fight back, it makes sense to consider whether those subject to new rules have the capacity, notice, and opportunity to take on the contest.

Finally, fairness norms may also call into relief the motives of agencies to make new rules and ultimately their authority and technocratic credibility. As Kevin Stack observes, achieving coherence within the law represents an essential value within the regulatory system. Agencies, he notes, have a key role in implementing coherence to facilitate the creation of a legal “system” that aims to be internally and philosophically consistent.151Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 329–30 (1990). They are expected to deliberate and execute policy in a way that can connect into and reflect the wider administrative/legal system of which it is a part, to offer continuity with past practice as well as contemporary policy priorities.152Stack, supra note 93, at 2011–13.

When policy is generated through litigation that does not derive from clearly articulated rulemaking, or that is designed to shape industries or punish particular actors without prior notice and guidelines, there may be doubts about the agency’s adherence to these rule of law norms. For example, in August 2023, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled against the SEC in the agency’s decision to deny asset manager Grayscale’s application for a bitcoin exchange-traded fund. Strikingly, in reviewing the legality of the SEC’s decision, the D.C. Circuit unanimously determined that the agency had acted in an “arbitrary and capricious manner” when it refused Grayscale’s petition.153Paul Kiernan, Grayscale’s Court Win Over SEC Lifts Hopes for Bitcoin ETF Approval, Wall St. J. (Aug. 29, 2023) https://www.wsj.com/finance/regulation/grayscale-wins-lawsuit-against-sec-over-bitcoin-etf-1b305cfa. In other words, there emerges, in short, a difference between “filling a gap” and “filling a legislative void.” The former involves targeted elaboration of existing legislative or administrative processes and thinking. The latter attempts to create a legal artifice in the absence of such groundwork. Eliding the rigors of information gathering and public input can, in short, have costs. Rather than being perceived as fair, impartial, and guided by their public interest mission, deficiencies within the rulemaking process can fuel negative views of agencies as being excessively political, insufficiently motivated by internal expertise and lacking technocratic professionalism.154In a startling decision, the court in SEC vs. Digital Licensing (Debt Box) ruled that the SEC’s behavior in bringing a restraining order against the defendant crypto company constituted a “gross abuse of power.” The court ordered the SEC to pay the defendant’s legal and other costs relating to the complaint, noting that the SEC had repeatedly misled the court by presenting falsehoods and mischaracterizations of the facts to support its submissions in the case. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Digital Licensing, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-00482 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 2023); see also Nikhilesh De, SEC Committed ‘Gross Abuse of Power’ in Suit Against Crypto Company, Federal Judge Rules, CoinDesk (Mar. 18, 2024), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2024/03/18/sec-committed-gross-abuse-of-power-in-suit-against-crypto-company-federal-judge-rules/ [https://perma.cc/SQ74-GHFG]. Ultimately an erosion of trust in the fundamental norms governing agency rulemaking can curtail confidence in the mission of the agency and its ability to execute it successfully and legitimately.

III.  WHEN SHOULD AGENCIES REGULATE BY ENFORCEMENT?

Enforcement is a critical function of the regulatory state, and for the most part noncontroversial. Government agencies are charged with mission-critical responsibilities aimed at serving the public and undertaking actions that preserve the integrity of rules designed to protect investors, consumers, and even the overall economy. For what purpose enforcement is used can, however, vary. At times, agencies may seek to utilize their enforcement powers in ways that preserve the integrity of existing law; at others, they may seek to establish new legal theories, or even regulatory regimes, powers, or jurisdiction. In all cases, discrete and expansive, regulatory action may be considered essential, or even vital and a necessary action to send powerful signals to the market in a timely manner. Or it could deliberately enable what are ultimately abusive practices by agencies.

The sheer variety of ways and motives driving regulation by enforcement raises a number of pressing doctrinal questions. Overall, regulation by enforcement is a firmly established and jurisprudentially sanctioned practice. Still, precedent has not to our knowledge distinguished among the different scenarios in which it is practiced. This void offers the courts, and especially a Supreme Court skeptical of broad remits of administrative authority, considerable leeway to respond in ways that regulators may find surprising. Agencies also risk the possibility that their actions could have serious reputational consequences, and provide fodder for legislative actions clipping their budgets, and legal decisions eroding their very authority.

Enforcement by regulation should thus be undertaken with a clear understanding by regulators as to its risks and exercised in ways that optimize the long-term interests of agencies, their stakeholders, and regulated entities. From this standpoint, we foresee a number of helpful rules of thumb. Ultimately, some of the same kinds of cost-benefit and data analysis compelled in rulemaking should be institutionally embedded in agencies for enforcement actions. Here, coordination among enforcement and rulemaking staff might be helpful. We understand that the distinction between preserving and creating law can be murky, but cases in which serious questions arise, the cost benefit analysis should, in turn, likewise increase in its rigor. A practical understanding of the divergent incentives of staff in each office is warranted, as well as the incentives of agency stakeholders in approving and guiding enforcement actions.

Additionally, enforcement actions in novel policy areas should be ideally initiated as early as possible in the lifecycle of the disputed market practice as to mitigate subsequent market disruption. If an entity is selling what an agency believes is an unregistered security, or if an entity is violating rules as an unregistered securities exchange or unlicensed bank, enforcement activity should be brought to bear early—or a rulemaking initiated. Waiting years to bring an enforcement action can be misinterpreted, as well as heightens perceptions of agencies acting only when convenient, politically palatable, or for other than merits-based reasons.155See e.g., Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85 (2023) (discussing the Due Process Clause and requirements for fair notice in the context of the Bank Secrecy Act).

At the same time, regulation by enforcement is likely to be most accepted as legitimate when it is understood to be a last, rather than first resort. The APA is designed to enable not only democratic participation and accountability, but also predictability. Taking the pains to articulate the agency’s expectations, even if only through soft law tools like staff guidance and no action letters, are more likely to set the stage for more broadly accepted enforcement actions with high policy throughput. Yet even here, in order to be effective, the guidance should be coherent, thought through, and offer a clear set of expectations for market and industry participants built on top of established legal principles, precedent, and rulemaking.

Finally, enforcement actions designed to promote policy should embrace some of the public facing norms of administrative process. Adjudications are, as mentioned, by their very nature confrontational, and usually represent a zero-sum game for participants. Nevertheless, regulatory agencies should, when possible, respond to amicus briefs and other interventions by industry and civil society, even in the context of legal proceedings. By conferring voice to a broader set of stakeholders, agencies can relieve the pressure generated by opting out of administrative process.

Ultimately the increasing attention directed toward regulation by enforcement creates a rich research area for academics, policymakers, and the press. Commentators would do well to keep an eye out for developments that suggest such strategies risk decisions that not only create bad precedent, but also risk decaying the very authority of the agency.

At the same time, the drivers behind regulation by enforcement deserve greater scholarly and popular attention. To some extent, the turn to enforcement can be attributed to partisan politics. Litigation can further the political objectives of democratically elected representatives who have appointed personnel to the administrative state. And it can be used to bolster the bona fides of officials and regulators seeking greater visibility, and perhaps, professional promotion. And in such cases, the incentives of a regulator may not necessarily conform with their agency, with the regulator having moved on when the agency faces potentially adverse litigation or judicial weakening. Still, regulation by enforcement may also reflect how changes in the reception of administration of policy may drive the exploration of a greater toolbox for regulators. In this sense, litigation may beget litigation, and proliferating lawsuits by private actors to agency rulemaking incents regulators to sue preemptively instead, creating a doom loop of legal challenges that not only stifle courts, but also ultimately add to regulatory uncertainty.

In the end, identifying and disentangling motives will not always be easy. Though attempts to do so will continue to abound—if not by courts, then from legislators and the public. In this process, the credibility of all actors will be tested. The ability of government to solve problems resides in trust, just as does the ability of the private actors to sell their goods and services. The outcry from “regulation by enforcement,” however well or ill-informed, at a minimum indicates that the trust is no longer always there. The key for regulators, lawmakers, and courts will be to see just what is responsible for its decay, and how to restore it in ways that advance the public interest.

96 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1297

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* Chris Brummer is the Agnes Williams Sesquicentennial Professor of Financial Technology at Georgetown University Law Center.

† Yesha Yadav is the Milton R. Underwood Chair, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School.

‡ David Zaring is Elizabeth F. Putzel Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. For their invaluable insights, perspectives and comments, we are most grateful to Anita Bandy, Anupam Chander, Patrick Corrigan, Elizabeth de Fontenay, Keir Gumbs, Kathryn Judge, Don Langevoort, Jai Massari, Donna Nagy, Peter Molk, Alex Platt, Todd Phillips, Adam Pritchard, Elizabeth Pollman, Bob Rasmussen, Adriana Robertson, Kevin Stack, Bob Thompson, Anne Tucker, Yuliya Guseva, and to participants at the BYU Winter Deals Conference, the Digital Transformation in Business and Law Symposium sponsored by the Southern California Law Review at USC and the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics (ILE) Roundtable (Spring 2023). We thank Alex Ang Gao for excellent research assistance. Errors are our own.

Chinese State Capitalism and the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act

In an age of unicorns that “[m]ove fast and break things,”1obert J. Watkins/Proctor & Gamble Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. Chinese startup Luckin Coffee Inc. (“Luckin Coffee” or “Luckin”) moved at exceptional speed. Founded in October 2017, the Chinese Starbucks-equivalent2Qingxiu Bu, The Anatomy of Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA): A Panacea or a Double-Edge Sword?, 16 Cap. Mkts. L.J. 503, 505 (2021). grew from a single Beijing location to nearly 4,400 self-operated stores, over 1,600 partnership stores, and about 1,100 Luckin Coffee “EXPRESS” machines in over 220 cities in China by the end of 2021.3Luckin Coffee Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 9 (Apr. 14, 2022). Yet while the company was achieving tremendous growth—quickly overtaking Starbucks as the leading coffee chain in China—company management attempted to make the company appear even more successful through a series of fraudulent financial statements. Among other things, company executives created a “fake operations database,” altered bank records, and engaged in sham sales designed to create the appearance of faster growth, while simultaneously hiding their misconduct from regulators and their own finance department.4Complaint at 2, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Luckin Coffee, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-10631 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020). The company overstated its revenues by 27% in the second quarter of 2019, and by 45% in the third quarter of 2019, while also understating its net losses for those quarters by 15% and 34%, respectively.5Id. at 2.

Luckin provided these false statements in earnings calls with investors and in filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including offering documents for its 2020 initial public offering of $418 million in stock and its convertible bond issuance of $446.7 million.6Id. at 1. However, some investors were suspicious, and a “cryptic email” sent to numerous short sellers in January, 2020, warned that a “new generation of Chinese Fraud 2.0 has emerged,” with “[c]ompanies that start off as fundamentally and structurally flawed business model [sic] that evolves into fraud.”7Jing Yang, Juliet Chung & Julie Steinberg, Coffee’s for Closers: How a Short Seller’s Warning Helped Take Down Luckin Coffee, Wall St. J. (June 29, 2020, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/coffees-for-closers-how-a-short-sellers-warning-helped-take-down-luckin-coffee-11593423002 [http://perma.cc/EWW5-HJEK].
The email offered to share customer receipts and videos from Luckin locations, and included an eighty-nine-page report about the company that the anonymous sender suggested could be published under the name of one of the short sellers. Carson Block, an investor and founder of Muddy Waters LLC, posted the report on Twitter on January 31, 2020.8Id.

The stock price hardly moved after the posting, with much of the information in the report seemingly having already been impounded into the market price before it was broadly disseminated. But the stock took a tumble several weeks later as new information emerged and the full extent of the scandal began to take shape. Among other things, investigations later revealed that Luckin executives engaged in conflicted transactions, such as the sale of vouchers for tens of millions of cups of coffee to companies tied to Luckin’s controlling shareholder and chairman, Charles Lu.9Jing Yang, Behind the Fall of China’s Luckin Coffee: A Network of Fake Buyers and a Fictitious Employee, Wall St. J. (May 28, 2020, 12;12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the-fall-of-chinas-luckin-coffee-a-network-of-fake-buyers-and-a-fictitious-employee-11590682336 [http://perma.cc/Q32D-9NT3].

Luckin Coffee’s fraud was a large but not unusual kind of corporate scandal. Similar (and even larger) accounting scandals contributed to the bursting of the Dot-Com Bubble in 2000, including frauds at HealthSouth, Tyco, WorldCom, and Enron. As a result of these scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,10Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745. which imposed a series of measures designed to ensure that corporate financial statements are accurate and fairly present the financial position of the company. Part of these regulations included the creation of a new quasi-governmental regulator, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”),11Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750–753. which was designed to scrutinize the auditors who themselves scrutinize the financial statements of public companies. For the PCAOB to properly perform its work in protecting against accounting frauds, it must have access to the information that the auditors used to perform their audits.

The PCAOB’s access requirement brings the PCAOB in conflict with recently enacted Chinese law and policy, which not only limits what Chinese companies can share with external parties but also formally prohibits their cooperation with the PCAOB.12See infra Part II. In response to China upping the ante in a high-stakes game of sovereignty over financial regulation, the United States recently played its strongest hand: the SEC, at the direction of Congress, blacklisted Chinese companies listed on U.S. securities exchanges, threatening them with expulsion from U.S. securities markets unless the Chinese government allows access to the PCAOB. The blacklisting regulation, promulgated under the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (“HFCAA” or “the Act”), includes not only suspect companies like Luckin Coffee but also any company headquartered in China and operating under Chinese law. Further, preventing accounting fraud is only part of the purpose of the HFCAA, and a fulsome understanding of the Act requires consideration of the political, economic, and regulatory context from which the Act emerged.

The HFCAA gambit seems to have been successful, as Chinese regulators recently agreed to allow PCAOB officials review audit records in Hong Kong—though some practitioners are skeptical that the agreement reached between Chinese and U.S. regulators will ultimately hold.13Jessica Seah, Lawyers Skeptical That US-China Audit Agreement Will Succeed, Am. Law. (August 30, 2022, 5:24 PM), http://www.law.com/international-edition/2022/08/30/lawyers-skeptical-that-us-china-audit-agreement-will-succeed [http://perma.cc/MEB3-275U]. Much is at stake because, while the HFCAA helps protect investors against accounting frauds of the type Luckin is alleged to have committed, the effects of the Act are subtler and more far-reaching, and the Act’s purpose in blacklisting foreign companies is as much (if not more) about foreign policy as it is about investor protection.

This Essay examines market blacklisting—a term the Essay uses to describe extraordinary government restrictions that limit a corporation’s ability to trade freely in U.S. markets—as a regulatory tool used to deny the benefits of U.S. markets to Chinese firms. Analyzing and recharacterizing the recently enacted HFCAA as a foreign-policy-oriented regulation, this Essay argues that jarring and serious accounting frauds such as Luckin’s are not the most important—or even primary—target of the Act. While capital markets blacklisting operates in opposition to the traditionally open posture of U.S. financial markets, blacklisting can also serve to achieve strategic foreign policy goals. In particular, the passage of the HFCAA demonstrates that, in response to recent Chinese investment activity, the United States increasingly considers its financial markets as a rivalrous national resource and is becoming less willing to share that resource with its greatest economic competitor.

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The New Data of Student Debt – Article by Christopher K. Odinet

Article | Regulations
The New Data of Student Debt
by Christopher K. Odinet*

From Vol. 92, No. 6 (September 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1617 (2019)

Keywords: Student Loan, Education-Based Data Lending, Financial Technology (Fintech)

 

Abstract

Where you go to college and what you choose to study has always been important, but, with the help of data science, it may now determine whether you get a student loan. Silicon Valley is increasingly setting its sights on student lending. Financial technology (“fintech”) firms such as SoFi, CommonBond, and Upstart are ever-expanding their online lending activities to help students finance or refinance educational expenses. These online companies are using a wide array of alternative, education-based data points—ranging from applicants’ chosen majors, assessment scores, the college or university they attend, job history, and cohort default rates—to determine creditworthiness. Fintech firms argue that through their low overhead and innovative approaches to lending they are able to widen access to credit for underserved Americans. Indeed, there is much to recommend regarding the use of different kinds of information about young consumers in order assess their financial ability. Student borrowers are notoriously disadvantaged by the extant scoring system that heavily favors having a past credit history. Yet there are also downsides to the use of education-based, alternative data by private lenders. This Article critiques the use of this education-based information, arguing that while it can have a positive effect in promoting social mobility, it could also have significant downsides. Chief among these are reifying existing credit barriers along lines of wealth and class and further contributing to discriminatory lending practices that harm women, black and Latino Americans, and other minority groups. The discrimination issue is particularly salient because of the novel and opaque underwriting algorithms that facilitate these online loans. This Article concludes by proposing three-pillared regulatory guidance for private student lenders to use in designing, implementing, and monitoring their education-based data lending programs.

*. Associate Professor of Law and Affiliate Associate Professor in Entrepreneurship, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK. The Author thanks Aryn Bussey, Seth Frotman, Michael Pierce, Tianna Gibbs, Avlana Eisenberg, Richard C. Chen, Kaiponanea Matsumara, Sarah Dadush, Jeremy McClane, Emily Berman, Donald Kochan, Erin Sheley, Melissa Mortazavi, Roger Michalski, Kit Johnson, Eric Johnson, Sarah Burstein, Brian Larson, John P. Ropiequet, the participants and the editorial board of the Loyola Consumer Law Review Symposium on the “Future of the CFPB,” the participants of the Central States Law Schools Association Conference, the faculty at the University of Iowa College of Law, and Kate Sablosky Elengold for their helpful comments and critiques on earlier drafts, either in writing or in conversation. This Article is the second in a series of works under the auspices of the Fintech Finance Project, which looks to study the development of law and innovation in lending. As always, the Author thanks the University of Oklahoma College of Law’s library staff for their skillful research support. All errors and views are the Author’s alone.

 

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Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability – Article by Margot E. Kaminski

Article | Regulations
Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability
by Margot E. Kaminski*

From Vol. 92, No. 6 (September 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529 (2019)

Keywords: Algorithmic Decision-Making, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

 

Abstract

Algorithms are now used to make significant decisions about individuals, from credit determinations to hiring and firing. But they are largely unregulated under U.S. law. A quickly growing literature has split on how to address algorithmic decision-making, with individual rights and accountability to nonexpert stakeholders and to the public at the crux of the debate. In this Article, I make the case for why both individual rights and public- and stakeholder-facing accountability are not just goods in and of themselves but crucial components of effective governance. Only individual rights can fully address dignitary and justificatory concerns behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making. And without some form of public and stakeholder accountability, collaborative public-private approaches to systemic governance of algorithms will fail.

In this Article, I identify three categories of concern behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making: dignitary, justificatory, and instrumental. Dignitary concerns lead to proposals that we regulate algorithms to protect human dignity and autonomy; justificatory concerns caution that we must assess the legitimacy of algorithmic reasoning; and instrumental concerns lead to calls for regulation to prevent consequent problems such as error and bias. No one regulatory approach can effectively address all three. I therefore propose a two-pronged approach to algorithmic governance: a system of individual due process rights combined with systemic regulation achieved through collaborative governance (the use of private-public partnerships). Only through this binary approach can we effectively address all three concerns raised by algorithmic decision-making, or decision-making by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”).

The interplay between the two approaches will be complex. Sometimes the two systems will be complementary, and at other times, they will be in tension. The European Union’s (“EU’s”) General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is one such binary system. I explore the extensive collaborative governance aspects of the GDPR and how they interact with its individual rights regime. Understanding the GDPR in this way both illuminates its strengths and weaknesses and provides a model for how to construct a better governance regime for accountable algorithmic, or AI, decision-making. It shows, too, that in the absence of public and stakeholder accountability, individual rights can have a significant role to play in establishing the legitimacy of a collaborative regime.

*. Associate Professor of Law, Colorado Law School; Faculty Privacy Director at Silicon Flatirons; Affiliated Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School; Faculty Fellow, Center for Democracy and Technology. Many thanks to Jef Ausloos, Jack Balkin, Michael Birnhack, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Bryan H. Choi, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Giovanni Comandé, Eldar Haber, Irene Kamara, Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson, Kate Klonick, Mark Lemley, Gianclaudio Maglieri, Christina Mulligan, W. Nicholson Price, Andrew Selbst, Alicia Solow-Niederman, and Michael Veale for reading and for detailed comments. Thanks to the Fulbright-Schuman program, Institute for Information Law (“IViR”) at the University of Amsterdam, and Scuola Sant’Anna in Pisa for the time and resources for this project. Thanks to the faculty of Tel Aviv University, the Second Annual Junior Faculty Forum on the Intersection of Law and Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, and my own Colorado Law School faculty for excellent workshop opportunities. Extra thanks to Matthew Cushing, whose incredible support made this project possible, and to Mira Cushing for joy beyond words.

 

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Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk – Article by Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz

Article | Financial Regulation
Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk
by Jeremy C. Kress*, Patricia A. McCoy† & Daniel Schwarcz‡

From Vol. 92, No. 6 (September 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1455 (2019)

 

Abstract

The recent financial crisis demonstrated that, contrary to longstanding regulatory assumptions, nonbank financial firms—such as investment banks and insurance companies—can propagate systemic risk throughout the financial system. After the crisis, policymakers in the United States and abroad developed two different strategies for dealing with nonbank systemic risk. The first strategy seeks to regulate individual nonbank entities that officials designate as being potentially systemically important. The second approach targets financial activities that could create systemic risk, irrespective of the types of firms that engage in those transactions. In the last several years, domestic and international policymakers have come to view these two strategies as substitutes, largely abandoning entity-based designations in favor of activities-based approaches. This Article argues that this trend is deeply misguided because entity- and activities-based approaches are complementary tools that are each essential for effectively regulating nonbank systemic risk. Eliminating an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic risk—either formally or through onerous procedural requirements—would expose the financial system to the same risks that it experienced in 2008 as a result of distress at nonbanks like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. This conclusion is especially salient in the United States, where jurisdictional fragmentation undermines the capacity of financial regulators to implement an effective activities-based approach. Significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework are necessary, therefore, before an activities-based approach can meaningfully complement domestic entity-based systemic risk regulation.

*. Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Ross School of Business. Kress was previously an attorney in the Federal Reserve Board’s Legal Division.

†. Liberty Mutual Insurance Professor, Boston College Law School. McCoy founded the Mortgage Markets group at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2011 and was responsible for mortgage policymaking at the Bureau.

‡. Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Schwarcz has testified before Congress on issues relating to entity-based nonbank designations on six different occasions, and he was one of four academic participants in the Presidential Memorandum Engagement Process for the 2017 United States Department of Treasury Report to the President on Financial Stability Oversight Council Designations. For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Anat Admati, Hilary Allen, Michael Barr, Christopher Bruner, Gregg Gelzinis, Erik Gerding, Claire Hill, Michael Malloy, Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Steven Schwarcz, Art Wilmarth, David Zaring, and the audiences at presentations at The Wharton School, Tulane Law School, Center for International Governance Innovation, National Business Law Scholars Conference, Academy of Legal Studies in Business Annual Conference, Office of Financial Research—University of Michigan Annual Conference, and Villanova Workshop on Insurance and Contract Law. Thanks to Alexander Tibor for research assistance.

 

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The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Commendable Start and a Welcome Invitation – Article by​ Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley

Article | Securities Law
The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds:
A Commendable Start and a Welcome Invitation

by Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley*

From Vol. 92, No. 5 (July 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155 (2019)

Keywords: Securities, SEC, Regulation, Exchange-Traded Funds (“ETFs”)

 

Abstract

Exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) are among the most important financial innovations of the modern era. And yet they still have no coherent regulatory system. This Article addresses the problem by assessing the SEC’s recent effort in this area in light of the recommendations we provided in prior research. In March 2018, we offered the first academic work to show the need for, or to present, a comprehensive regulatory framework for all ETFs. On June 28, 2018, just prior to that article’s scheduled publication, the SEC issued a proposal to change the way it regulates certain types of ETFs. On May 20, 2019, the SEC issued its “Precidian” exemptive order, allowing for the first time “non-transparent” actively managed ETFs—an order that we believe has surprising, hitherto unexplored implications for ETF regulation.

This new Article thus considers the SEC proposal and the Precidian order in the context of our earlier article’s proposed regulatory framework, and also refines that framework. We provide additional rationales for the framework, relying in part on new empirical findings.

The SEC’s proposal does not seek to provide a comprehensive regulatory framework for all ETFs. However, the proposal is a commendable start to addressing some of the problems in the current ad hoc approach to ETF regulation, especially as to the substantive side of ETF regulation. In proposing a more rules-based approach, the SEC helps deal with the central problem of current substantive ETF regulation—the reliance on individualized exemptive letters. However, this partial shift only applies to certain ETFs that are organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and also leaves in place an anomalous set of individualized exemptions for several specific Investment Company ETFs, including those offering leveraged and inverse exposures. More broadly, the proposal does not address problems of SEC discretion pertaining to the underlying process of financial innovation in ETFs. The proposed rule also neglects to address the frequent need for individualized exemptions with respect to stock exchange listing requirements.

With respect to the disclosure side of regulation, the SEC proposal again only covers Investment Company ETFs, but is even more incremental in nature. The SEC contemplates modest enhancements of disclosures related to “trading price frictions” of such ETFs. And, going the other direction, the SEC contemplates eliminating the primary source of information for retail investors on intraday values of ETF shares. We welcome the SEC’s invitation for views on more fundamental disclosure reforms. We offer a refined version of the comprehensive disclosure approach advanced in our first article, and provide fresh rationales for such an approach, based in part on new empirical findings. This approach would apply to all ETFs, and would be cognizant of the distinctive characteristics of ETFs and the subtle complexities introduced by the underlying innovation process. Collectively, a disclosure regime consisting of a “dynamic” SEC-specified ETF nomenclature and required ETF self-identification (which nomenclature and self-identification we refer to as the “disclosure building block”), fuller quantitative disclosures of trading price frictions (such as those related to the arbitrage mechanism and bid-ask spreads), and periodic Management’s Discussion and Analysis-style qualitative information centered on the arbitrage mechanism (including, as appropriate, consideration of the impact of the liquidity of the assets in which the ETF is invested) would help individual and institutional investors alike.

*. Professor Hu holds the Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance, University of Texas Law School. Professor Morley is Professor of Law, Yale Law School. We much appreciate the insights of Cary Coglianese, Jill Fisch, Itay Goldstein, Joseph McCahery, David Musto, Steve Oh, Landon Thomas, Jr., executives and counsel at a number of major ETF sponsors and other entities involved with ETFs, the library assistance of Scott Vdoviak and Lei Zhang and the research assistance of Jacob McDonald and Helen Xiang. We thank conference and workshop participants at the Wharton Finance Department/Institute of Law and Economics (University of Pennsylvania Law School) Finance Seminar (Sept. 20, 2018), the Nasdaq-Villanova Synapse 2018 (Nov. 9, 2018), the ETP Fall 2018 Forum (Nov. 29, 2018), and the Tilburg University Law and Economics Center Seminar (Feb. 6, 2019). Professor Hu served as the founding Director of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (formerly called the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation) (2009-2011), and he and his staff were involved in certain matters discussed in this Article. This Article speaks as of July 1, 2019.

 

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An Examination of the Right to Try Act of 2017 and Industry’s Potential Path Moving Forward – Note by Sylvia Zaich

From Volume 92, Number 2 (January 2019)
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An Examination of the Right to Try Act of 2017 and Industry’s potential Path Moving Forward

Sylvia Zaich[*]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. A Brief History of the FDA and the current
Drug development process

A. The Origins of the FDA’s Regulatory Framework

B. The Drug Development Process

II. ChalLenges to the regulatory framework and
an overview of the Expanded access program

A. Prior Pre-Approval Access Challenges

1. 1970s: Laetrile, the FDCA, and Rutherford v. United States

2. 1980s–1990s: The Reagan Administration and the
HIV/AIDS Epidemic

3. 2000s: Pre-Approval Access, a Proposal, and Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach

B. The Expanded Access Program

1. How a Physician Requests Expanded Access for
Individual Patient Use

2. How Companies Evaluate an Individual Patient Request

3. How the FDA Evaluates an Individual Patient Request

III. THE RIGHT-TO-TRY MOVEMENT

A. The Movement’s Rationale for Right to Try and
Success at the State Level

1. The Right-to-Try Movement’s Rationale

2. The Movement’s Success at the State Level

B. The FDA’s Response

1. Clarifying the FDA’s Use of Clinical Outcomes

2. Demystifying Manufacturers’ Eligibility Criteria

3. Increasing Awareness of Expanded Access

4. Streamlining the Individual Patient Request Process70

C. The Push for a Federal Right to Try

IV. the Right to Try Act of 2017

A. The Law

1. Who is Eligible?

2. When Would an Investigational Drug Qualify?

3. What are the Reporting Obligations?

4. When Can the FDA Use Clinical Outcomes?

B. Industry’s Potential Path Moving Forward

1. Even with the Right to Try Act, Most Companies Will
Continue to Use Expanded Access

2. Charting Industry’s Path Forward

CONCLUSION

Appendix

 

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, a petition started to circulate the Internet, urging the CEO of BioMarin Pharmaceutical to provide its investigational drug BMN-673 to then forty-five-year-old attorney Andrea Sloan, who was undergoing treatment for late stage ovarian cancer.[1] With standard treatments no longer an option, her physicians proposed trying BMN-673, one of a new class of cancer drugs called PARP inhibitors developed by BioMarin. The advanced nature of Sloan’s cancer disqualified her from enrolling in a clinical trial, so instead she and her physicians sought access to BMN-673 through the U.S. Food & Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) expanded access program, which allows pre-approval use of drugs outside of the clinical trial setting.[2]

The FDA confirmed Sloan was a candidate for expanded access use, but that confirmation did not guarantee use. That decision was left to the discretion of the company. BioMarin declined to provide BMN-673 because the drug was still in early phase of development: “It would be unethical and reckless to provide [BMN-673 to] end-stage refractory ovarian cancer patients outside a clinical trial.”[3] This decision sparked the Change.org petition that ultimately secured more than 230,000 signatures.[4] Even with this overwhelming public support, BioMarin maintained its position. A different company, which was developing a similar drug, eventually provided Sloan with access on the condition that it remain unidentified. Sloan started the treatment, but her cancer had progressed, and she died shortly thereafter.[5]

Sloan’s expanded access experience is not unique. A number of patients, with the support of their friends and families, launched similar online campaigns, seeking access to investigational medicines after becoming frustrated with companies’ unwillingness to accommodate expanded access requests for investigational drugs.[6] Some were successful; others were not. These campaigns, including Sloan’s, increased public awareness and dialogue regarding terminally ill patients’ ability to access investigational medicine and helped spark a national legislative movement promoting such individuals’ “right to try.”[7]

In 2015, Texas was the twenty-first state to adopt righttotry legislation.[8] The Texas bill was named in Andrea Sloan’s memory. These laws, despite often having bipartisan support, have been divisive, with supporters claiming that the right to try offers “real hope,[9] and critics maintaining that the right to try is merely political theatrics and ultimately will do more harm than good for individual patients.[10] Forty-one states have adopted righttotry laws since the movement first launched in 2014.[11] That success sparked a push for a federal righttotry law.

President Donald J. Trump voiced his support for such legislation in his 2018 State of the Union address: “People who are terminally ill should not have to go from country to country to seek a cure—I want to give them a chance right here at home. It is time for the Congress to give these wonderful Americans the ‘right to try.’”[12] That endorsement was the final nudge Congress needed. On May 30, 2018, President Trump signed the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017 (“Right to Try Act”).[13]

This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly looks back at the FDA’s history and the impact of two significant drug crises in establishing the agency’s current framework before explaining the current drug development process. Part II recounts previous challenges to this regulatory framework, which ultimately led to the development of the current expanded access program. Part II also examines the current expanded access program and, more specifically, the evaluation criteria applied by three of its key decisionmakers: the treating physician; the manufacturer; and the FDA.

Part III traces the beginnings of the right to try movement, examining the rationale for the laws and exploring how social media and increased direct-to-consumer advertising of approved drugs possibly created an opening for widespread support of these laws. Part III also explores why the FDA’s efforts to address criticisms of the expanded access program were unable to dissuade enactment of the Right to Try Act. Part IV provides an overview of the Right to Try Act and how the Act differs from expanded access. Part IV further explores why, in general, mainstream industry likely will not adopt the righttotry pathway, before arguing that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies should avoid maintaining their current positions regarding pre-approval access, and instead address some of the criticisms raised during the right-totry movement by (1) revising their existing expanded access policies and (2) improving clinical trial access.

I.  A Brief History of the FDA and the current Drug development process

To better understand the rationale for the FDA’s regulatory framework and the role it has “effectively balanc[ing] the interests of those patient populations who would benefit from having greater access to investigational drugs, with the broader interests of society in having safe and effective new therapies approved for marketing and widely available,”[14] Part I of this Note reviews how the FDA’s authority developed in response to two significant drug safety crises and provides a primer on the current drug development process.

A.  The Origins of the FDA’s Regulatory Framework

The origins of the FDA can be traced back to the 1800s, but two drug safety crises prompted the development of the agency’s current regulatory framework. The deaths of more than one hundred people from an untested drug formulation led to the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”), which required manufacturers to show “that any new drug was safe before it could be marketed.”[15] The initial effectiveness of the FDCA was limited. If the agency did not respond to a new drug application[16] within sixty days, the drug was automatically approved for public consumption.[17] The FDCA also did not require standardized drug testing.[18] This remained the regulatory environment—despite efforts by some to address these shortcomings—until the second drug safety crisis of the twentieth century.

In 1960, the manufacturer of the thenpopular sedative thalidomide submitted a marketing application for the drug in the United States.[19] The FDA refused to grant approval over concerns about inadequate and deficient safety data.[20] The manufacturer had distributed “more than two and a half million tablets . . . to approximately 20,000 patients” in the United States for clinical testing, but few, if any, of these individuals were actually monitored after receiving the drug.[21] The drug was eventually linked to an “epidemic of congenital malformations.”[22] The global thalidomide crisis motivated politicians to reconsider legislation that would have “tightened restrictions surrounding the surveillance and approval process for drugs.”[23]

Two years later, in 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendment “to assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs.[24] This amendment eliminated the FDCA’s de facto approval loophole and extended the review period to 180 days.[25] Even more significant, the Kefauver-Harris Amendment “laid the groundwork for the [current multi-phased] system of clinical trials”[26] by requiring a manufacturer to submit “substantial evidence” of an investigational drug’s safety and efficacy with its marketing application.[27]

B.  The Drug Development Process

A manufacturer or other protocol sponsor,[28] before conducting a clinical trial, must first submit an investigational new drug (“IND”) application.[29] The IND provides an overview of the biopharmaceutical company’s general investigational plan and clinical trial protocols for the drug.[30] The plan must provide:

(a) [t]he rationale for the drug or research study;

(b) the indication(s) to be studied;

(c) the general approach to be followed in evaluating the drug;

(d) the kinds of clinical trials to be conducted in the first year . . . ;

(e) the estimated number of patients . . . ; and

(f) any risks of particular severity or seriousness anticipated on the basis of the toxicological data in animals or prior studies in humans with the drug or related drugs.[31]

The IND gives the FDA the information it needs to assess the safety of the proposed phase I trials and the “scientific quality of [the proposed phase II and III trials] and the likelihood that the [trials] will yield data capable of meeting statutory standards for marketing approval.”[32]

In phase I, a manufacturer assesses the drug’s safety and determines the appropriate dosage for subsequent trials.[33] The participants are typically healthy volunteers but depending on the condition may be patient volunteers.[34] The enrollment size of these trials is small. A single phase I trial might enroll anywhere between twenty to eighty volunteers.[35] The Biotechnology Innovation Organization (“BIO”) estimates that approximately 60% of drugs advance from phase I to phase II clinical trials.[36]

In phase II, the investigational drug is tested in patient volunteers who have the disease or condition.[37] This commonly involves a randomized clinical trial in which patients are randomly assigned either the investigational drug or some other treatment—“either an inactive substance (placebo), or a different drug that is usually considered the standard of care for the disease”—without knowing which treatment they are receiving.[38] The manufacturer then compares the effectiveness of the investigational drug to the effectiveness of the alternative treatment.[39] Phase II clinical trials are also required to assess the drug’s “common short-term side effects and risks.”[40] In general, this is the stage of development with the lowest success rate”—almost 70% of drugs fail to move beyond phase II.[41]

The pre-approval development process culminates with phase III clinical trials,[42] which are intended to produce “statistically significant data about the safety, efficacy and overall benefit-risk relationship of the investigational medicine.”[43] This data is an integral component of the new drug application a manufacturer submits to the FDA.[44] To obtain statistically significant data, these studies often require a substantial number of volunteers—sometimes upwards of 5,000 volunteers depending on the disease or condition.[45]

The recruitment process throughout clinical development can take several years and be very expensive, with manufacturers often struggling to fully enroll their clinical trials.[46] The low accrual rates can be the result of strict inclusion and exclusion criteria.[47] Still, manufacturers can be resistant to making the criteria less restrictive and more inclusive,[48] perhaps because lessstandardized patients might make it harder to parse through data, extend the length or size of a clinical trial, increase the risk of adverse events potentially impacting a drug’s safety profile and potentially its approval, and make clinical development more expensive.[49]

The estimated time from discovery to FDA approval of a drug is now at least ten years. The cost of development is estimated between $10 million and $2.6 billion, with the higher estimate factoring in costs associated with investigational drugs that never advance beyond clinical development.[50] These costs are then passed on to patients, with some cancer therapies costing upwards of $375,000.[51] “The U.S. spent nearly $88 billion treating cancer in 2014, with patients paying nearly $4 billion out-of-pocket.”[52] All of that spending, however, does not necessarily translate into positive outcomes for every patient.[53]

II.  ChalLenges to the regulatory framework and an overview of the Expanded access program

A.  Prior Pre-Approval Access Challenges

The tension—highlighted most recently by the right-to-try movement—between ensuring patients have access to potentially groundbreaking medicines as soon as possible and ensuring that these therapies are both safe and effective is not nascent. There have been three significant pre-approval access challengesstarting with Rutherford v. United States in 1975to the FDA’s regulatory framework since the enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Amendment.

1.  1970s: Laetrile, the FDCA, and Rutherford v. United States

In 1975, a few individuals with terminal cancer filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the FDA from obstructing the interstate shipment and sale of the alternative treatment laetrile because it was not approved by the FDA.[54] The district court ordered the FDA to allow patients pre-approval access.[55] On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit referred the issue to the FDA,[56] which found laetrile was a new drug within the meaning of the FDCA and could be barred from interstate sale until the necessary safety and efficacy data was submitted for FDA review and received FDA approval.[57] The district court vacated that decision on statutory and constitutional grounds,[58] and the FDA appealed.[59] The Tenth Circuit—rather than relying on the district court’s reasoning—held instead that the FDCA’s “‘safety’ and ‘effectiveness’ terms” did not apply to individuals with terminal cancer diagnoses.[60]

The case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court, which decided in favor of the agency’s FDCA interpretation.[61] The Court held the FDCA made “no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients” based on the statute’s plain language.[62] The Court also explained that it could not imply a statutory exception because the “legislative history and consistent administrative interpretation” of the FDCA did not support one.[63]

2.  1980s–1990s: The Reagan Administration and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

 After President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, his administration ushered in widespread deregulation efforts across all areas of government.[64] Those efforts included (1) amending the FDCA, which the administration viewed as unnecessarily delaying drug approvals, and (2) establishing a defined program for terminally patients seeking access to investigational drugs for treatment rather than research purposes.[65] The FDA, in response to the administration’s latter concern, proposed codifying the agency’s existing informal pre-approval access procedures.[66] Those efforts became even more urgent with the HIV/AIDS epidemic though the agency’s efforts and the administration’s initial concern regarding pre-approval access were not aimed directly at aiding individuals with HIV/AIDS.[67]

 The FDA promulgated several significant changes not only to improve patient access outside of the clinical trial setting to drugs still in clinical development, but also to reduce the length of time between discovery and final FDA approval. The latter issue being one in which the interests of activists and manufacturers aligned, as both advocated for changes to the regulatory framework.[68] First, the FDA amended its regulations in 1987 to allow widespread access to an investigational drug outside of the clinical trial setting through a “treatment protocol.”[69] The agency continued to apply an informal standard for individual requests until the Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 codified the expanded access program, which specifically addressed the need for a formal individual patient request process.[70] Second, the FDA created the Accelerated Approval pathway[71] and introduced a striated review framework[72] to speed up the availability of promising new drugs intended for the treatment of serious diseases or conditions. Subsequent congressional action in 1997 and 2012 armed the FDA with two additional means to further reduce the time from initial development of a drug to its approval.[73]

3.  2000s: Pre-Approval Access, a Proposal, and Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach

There was not another significant challenge to the drug development and approval process until an organization, seeking to improve terminally ill patients’ abilities to obtain investigational drugs, proposed a “three-tiered approval system.”[74] The first approval tier would have allowed limited marketing of investigational drugs following completion of phase I trials.[75] The organizationthe Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (the Abigail Alliance”)[76]claimed terminally ill patients with no other treatment options faced a “different risk-benefit tradeoff” and should have the option to try investigational drugs.[77] The FDA rejected this proposal, explaining that this approach “would upset the appropriate balance” by “giving almost total weight to the goal of early availability and giving little recognition to the importance of marketing drugs with reasonable knowledge . . . of their likely clinical benefit and their toxicity.”[78]

The Abigail Alliance, agency rejection in hand, filed an action against the FDA.[79] The organization sought to block the agency’s policy prohibiting the pre-approval sale of drugs to individuals with terminal conditions.[80] The Abigail Alliance argued that the FDA’s policy “violate[d] terminally ill patients’ constitutional privacy and liberty rights, as well as their due process rights to life.”[81] The district court found these claims legally unpersuasive.[82] But a United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) panel, in a 2–1 split, agreed with the group, holding that the due process clause protected the right of terminally ill patients to decide whether to use investigational drugs that the FDA had determined were safe enough for additional clinical trials after reviewing results from phase I clinical trials.[83] The panel directed the district court to determine whether the FDA’s policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.[84]

The FDA’s request for an en banc hearing was granted before a lower court could apply strict scrutiny.[85] The court en banc flatly rejected the panel’s decision.[86] The court expressed “serious doubt” about the constitutional validity of the Abigail Alliance’s articulated right: a “fundamental right of access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs.”[87] To establish its articulated right, the Abigail Alliance needed to illustrate a tradition of accessibility to drugs that were not proven to be safe or effective.[88] The en banc court found that “FDA regulation of post-phase I drugs [was] entirely consistent with [the United States’] historical tradition of prohibiting the sale of unsafe drugs.”[89] The en banc court also disputed the group’s effectiveness argument, noting the existence of “at least some drug regulation prior to [the Kefauver-Harris Amendment] address[ing] efficacy.”[90] The en banc court also dismissed the Abigail Alliance’s argument that the right to self-preservationbased on the common law doctrine of necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the right to self-defensecreated a constitutionally protected right in this context.[91] The court concluded that the Abigail Alliance’s articulated right was not fundamental.[92] The court held that “the FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational drugs [was] rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects.”[93]

Two years after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abigail Alliance, the FDA finally issued revised expanded access regulation clarifying the process by which an individual patient could request expanded access.[94] The current expanded access program is discussed in greater detail below.

B.  The Expanded Access Program

The expanded access program, as discussed, was designed to address concern that some individuals may not have an opportunity to try a promising therapy given the sometimes ten-year path to formal regulatory approval. The expanded access program allows some patients with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases to use an investigational medical product (drug, biologic, or medical device) for treatment outside of clinical trials when no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy options are available.”[95] The program is available for individual patient use, intermediate-size patient use, and widespread patient use.[96] In addition to the patient, there are three other important decisionmakers. Section II.B.1 describes how a physician would initiate an expanded access request for an individual patient. Sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 then discuss the criteria used by biopharmaceutical companies and the FDA to determine eligibility in the individualpatient setting.

1.  How a Physician Requests Expanded Access for Individual Patient Use

Prior to initiating an expanded access request for a patient, the requesting physician must first conclude that “the probable risk to the person from the investigational drug is not greater than the probable risk from the disease or condition.”[97]

After this determination is made, the physician must then seek a letter of authorization (“LOA”) from the manufacturer.[98] The request must be made by a physician. The LOA allows the FDA to refer to the requested investigational drug’s IND file instead of requiring the requesting physician to obtain confidential information regarding the drug’s pharmacology, toxicology, chemistry, or manufacturing process.[99] As evidenced by Andrea Sloan’s unsuccessful request, this has been the greatest source of frustration for patients seeking expanded access use. Aside from Pfizer, most companies do not disclose how many requests they receive or grant each year.[100] This step of the process can also be lengthy as current FDA regulation does not impose a time restraint.[101] So even if a company acknowledges receipt of a request within twotothree business days,[102] the company is not required to expediently review that request, which often involves multiple parties within a company.[103]

If the company agrees to grant use and provides a LOA, the requesting physician would then submit an application form to the FDA. The FDA asks the physician to provide an overview of the patient’s clinical history, the rationale for the expanded access request, and the proposed treatment plan.[104] The FDA has up to thirty days to review the application and provide feedback.[105] A 2017 U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report found that the FDA’s median response time was no more than nineteen days for non-emergency situations.[106]

While the FDA reviews the application, the physician must also obtain approval from his or her institution’s or hospital’s institutional review board (“IRB”).[107] The requesting physician can also request a waiver from the FDA, which would allow the expanded access request to be reviewed by either the IRB chair or another designated member.[108] The physician must also discuss the expanded access requirements with the patient and secure the patient’s informed consent to treatment.[109]

2.  How Companies Evaluate an Individual Patient Request

The expanded access regulation does not prescribe the criteria a manufacturer should use when determining whether to grant an expanded access request.[110] Industry groups Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) and BIO, however, have each separately published guiding principles for the groups’ respective members that closely mirror the evaluation criteria used by the FDA.[111] PhRMA recommends that manufacturers consider five factors: (1) whether the individual has exhausted all available treatment options for a serious or life-threatening illness; (2) whether “[t]he investigational drug [is] under active clinical development”; (3) whether “[t]he patient is ineligible for, or otherwise unable to participate in, clinical trials”; (4) whether [t]he potential benefit to the patient [outweighs the] potential risk”; and (5) whether approving the request would interfere with the “successful completion of the clinical trial process.”[112]

A survey of twenty biopharmaceutical companies’ eligibility criteria[113] illustrates that most large companies offering expanded access have adopted criteria modeled off either PhRMA or BIO’s guidelines, with only slight variations.[114] In general, companies include criteria limiting expanded access to patients with serious or life-threatening conditions. The extent to which a patient must have tried standard treatment options and must not have other treatment options available varies. A few companies require the patient to have tried standard treatments unsuccessfully and to not have other treatment options available. Other companies just require that the patient does not have other treatment options available. The real difference in this language, however, might be just semantics.

Of the companies surveyed, one also factored in a patient’s ability to regularly travel to a treating site for observation and follow-up while receiving the investigational drug when deciding whether to grant an expanded access request.[115] Likewise, manufacturers will not consider an expanded access request unless the drug is in active development (that is, the company cannot have discontinued the program), but some companies choose to define this criterion more narrowly than BIO or PhRMA.[116] Take for examples, Merck, Amgen, and Allergan, which will not grant requests for a specific drug unless the company is actively developing the drug in the proposed intended use.[117] The criteria used by Merck and a few other companies also requires that the company have plans to submit a marketing application.[118]

Given concerns about expanded access impacting clinical trial enrollment, companies are hesitant to grant an expanded access request unless the individual is unable to participate in a clinical trial. This criterion is generally left vague, but some companies provide specific factors that they will or will not consider.[119] For example, under Genentech’s criteria, an individual who lives too far away from a clinical trial center would not be considered ineligible for a clinical trial and therefore would not qualify for expanded access based on this factor alone.[120] In contrast, Pfizer and Teva Pharmaceutical would consider geographic limitations as a factor affecting a patient’s ability to participate in a clinical trial.[121]

All of the companies surveyed included a criterion requiring the potential benefits of the drug to outweigh the potential combined risks of the treatment and the disease to the individual patient.[122] To make this risk-benefit assessment, PhRMA explains, there should be sufficiently robust preliminary safety and efficacy data, including dosing information, to determine that the preliminary benefit-risk balance is positive for the specific indication for which the request is made.”[123] While some companies keep this criterion vague to allow for greater discretion, a few companies’ criteria specifically mentions a dosing requirement.[124] Although most companies’ criteria did not distinguish between children and adults, one company’s guidelines specifically require sufficient pediatric data to determine the appropriate dosage before it will grant expanded access use for a child.[125]

Like the other criteria, almost all of the companies surveyed had some language in their expanded access guidelines addressing the clinical trial process and, more specifically, the need to ensure that pre-approval access use did not interfere with the clinical trial process.[126] A few companies specifically consider whether they have adequate drug supply for both their clinical trials and expanded access when making the determination.[127] While not specifically addressed, this criterion likely also considers the extent to which expanded access use might impact other aspects of clinical development, such as the FDA’s use of adverse events occurring during expanded access use, when reviewing an investigational drug’s marketing application.[128] A few companies also build in additional discretion by allowing their medical teams to establish additional criteria in light of a given drug’s current development and available data.[129]

As discussed, however, most companies do not disclose how many expanded access requests they receive or, of those, how many they grant.[130] This lack of disclosure makes it difficult for physicians, patients, or even the FDA to hypothesize how companies apply their criteria when reviewing an expanded access request. Two companies have made this type of information publicly available, but through different channels and with different levels of information. Pfizer, for example, discloses its overall expanded access approval rate on its website, but it does not explain the rationale for the small percentage of denials. By contrast, as part of a case study in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”), Janssen released limited expanded access data regarding one investigational drug for a distinct period of time. That study reported the most common reason the company denied a request was an unfavorable risk-benefit profile.[131]

3.  How the FDA Evaluates an Individual Patient Request

The FDA, as mentioned, must review all expanded access requests. When reviewing an expanded access requestwhether for individual patient use, intermediate-size patient use, or widespread patient usethe FDA examines three threshold criteria: (1) patient eligibility; (2) risk-benefit analysis; and (3) impact on clinical trials.

a.  Patient Eligibility

The patient or group of patients must have a “serious or immediately life-threatening disease or condition,” in which “no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy” is available.[132] An “immediately life-threatening disease” is defined as a stage of disease in which there is reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely without early treatment.”[133] A “serious disease” is defined as one “associated with morbidity that has substantial impact on day-to-day functioning.”[134] The FDA has previously authorized expanded access use for serious diseases like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”), narcolepsy, and Alzheimer’s disease.[135] In guidance from the FDA, the agency further clarifies its standard for a serious disease explaining: “short-lived and self-limiting morbidity will usually not be sufficient to qualify a condition as serious, but the morbidity need not be irreversible, provided it is persistent or recurrent.”[136] The FDA interprets no comparable or satisfactory therapy to “mean that there exists no other available therapy to treat the patient’s condition or that the patient has tried available therapies and failed to respond adequately or is intolerant to them.”[137]

b.  Risk-Benefit Analysis

The second requirement is that the “potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the treatment use and those potential risks are not unreasonable in the context of the disease.[138] This criterion acknowledges “the need for the risks and benefits of drugs to be well characterized” before the FDA will grant an expanded access request for an individual or group of patients.[139] This criterion is not intended to establish a uniform minimum approval threshold; that determination is dependent on the expanded access category and the seriousness of the disease.[140]

c.  Impact on Clinical Trials

The availability of expanded access also hinges on the FDA’s determination that “providing the investigational drug . . . will not interfere with . . . clinical investigations that could support marketing approval.[141] While it is understandable that many patients would prefer to secure an investigational drug outside of the confines of a clinical trial, especially given their randomized nature, expanded access use cannot “compromise enrollment in the trials” that would ultimately support a marketing application.[142] This criterion attempts to address concerns that expanded access would reduce individuals’ willingness to participate in clinical trials, especially given evidence that approximately 3% of adults with cancer enroll in clinical trials.[143]

* * *

The three expanded access categories each have additional category-specific criteria that the FDA must consider before granting a request (Table 1).With an individual patient expanded access request, the FDA must also conclude that “the patient cannot obtain the drug under another IND or protocol.”[144] This means that the patient is either ineligible to enroll in ongoing clinical trials based on eligibility criteria or unable to enroll for some other reason.[145]

The FDA approves most expanded access requests.[146] Between 2012 and 2015, the agency approved approximately 99% of the more than 5,000 single-patient expanded access requests it received.[147] The FDA does not just rubber-stamp these requests. The FDA made “meaningful changes in approximately 10 percent of these cases to enhance patient safety” such as adjusting dosage, increasing safety oversight, and strengthening informed consent.[148] FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb explained:

[t]he changes are based on the scientific and medical expertise of our staff, and informed by confidential information provided to FDA by product sponsors during the course of development. This information is often unavailable to the treating physician—and the larger medical community—and becomes available only after a drug is approved.[149]

The real question is how many expanded access requests never reach the FDA because the manufacturer declines to provide a letter of authorization.[150]

III.  THE RIGHTTOTRY MOVEMENT

In 2014, the Goldwater Institute, a conservative and libertarian public policy think tank, launched a new initiative based on patients’ right to “some choice over their own destinies.”[151] The think tank’s initial goal was to pass state laws giving terminally ill patients the right to obtain access to investigational drugs that have completed phase I clinical trials without interference from the FDA.[152] This goal was later expanded to secure the enactment of a federal law under the same premise.

Section III.A outlines and assesses the movement’s rationale for proposing a new pre-approval access pathway before briefly discussing the movement’s success at the state level. Section III.B examines the FDA’s attempts to address the movement’s claims and why those attempts by the agency were insufficient. Section III.C discusses the efforts by Senator Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) to secure enactment of federal right to try legislation.

A.  The Movement’s Rationale for Right to Try and Success at the State Level

1.  The RighttoTry Movement’s Rationale

The arguments for right to try can be distilled to three main claims: (1) the expanded access program is “so riddled with bureaucracy and delay that a patient’s chances of obtaining potentially lifesaving treatment in time are practically negligible”;[153] (2) the FDA is irreparably broken because it prevents individuals from using “potentially lifesaving medicines and treatments until those treatments receive final approval”;[154] and (3) patients with life-threatening diseases should be allowed to try an investigational drug that has already passed the FDA’s basic safety testing in phase I trials and remains within the FDA’s approval process because they are “safe.”[155]

a.  The Expanded Access Program Is Overly Bureaucratic and Slow

The Goldwater Institute specifically claimed that the expanded access program burdens people’s right to try because: (1) the FDA has “unfettered authority to deny a terminal patient access . . . for a variety of reasons, including nonmedical reasons”; (2) the application is overly burdensome and complicated for requesting physicians; and (3) the IRB review requirement prolongs and prevents access for patients undergoing treatment at non-academic centers outside of major metropolitan areas.[156]

There are two problems with the first part of this claim. First, this claim completely ignores the GAO report findings, which suggest a contrary proposition.[157] Second, this claim fails to acknowledge that sign-off from the FDA is only the last step in the process.[158] Take Andrea Sloan’s story as an example. The FDA acknowledged Sloan was an appropriate candidate for expanded access, but BioMarin would not provide BMN-673.[159] While the FDA approves nearly all of the expanded access requests it receives, the perception is that the bigger obstacle is manufacturer cooperation.[160] Most companies do not publicly disclose the number of requests received or promote the number of times the company has approved an individual patient’s request.[161] Of the company policies surveyed in Section II.B.2,[162] only Pfizer publicized information on its website about the number of requests it received and how many were approved by the company.[163] The lack of collective disclosure by manufacturers––and the inability of the FDA to require manufacturers to provide this information––leaves the public and politicians with a myopic view of the expanded access program.

The FDA has since introduced Form FDA 3926 (“Individual Patient Expanded Access – Investigational New Drug Application”) and modified the IRB review requirement addressing the second and third part of this claim, which are both discussed in greater detail in Section III.B. These changes could improve accessibility to the expanded access program over time.

 b.  The FDA Regulatory Framework Is Broken

The Goldwater Institute argued that the current regulatory framework is broken because it can take years before the FDA approves a drug. Yet instead of offering a solution to address the clinical trial process (for example, lobbying for legislation to support the use of different clinical trial designs,[164] or to incentivize companies to reconsider their rationale for certain inclusion and exclusion criteria that could provide data that more accurately reflects real-world patients[165])––which could potentially improve access to investigational drugs more broadly––the organization decided the easier path was pre-approval access legislation that cut-out the FDA. This strategy was shortsighted and arguably based on the Goldwater Institute’s overarching goal of limiting the FDA’s oversight of drugs for all patients and not just those drugs designed for the treatment of immediately life-threatening diseases.[166]

The claim that the framework is “broken” also focuses on speed to the detriment of safety and efficacy. The need for adequate safety and effectiveness data can prolong the drug approval process,[167] however, even with these requirements, the FDA is consistently faster at approving investigational drugs than other regulatory authorities. For example,

[a]mong the 289 unique novel therapeutic agents [approved between 2001 and 2010], 190 were approved in both the United States and Europe (either by the EMA or through the mutual recognition process), of which 121 (63.7%) were first approved in the United States; similarly, 154 were approved in both the United States and Canada, of which 132 (85.7%) were first approved in the United States.[168]

The speed with which a drug is approved, however, should not be the only priority—safety and efficacy are still important concerns. Some argue the agency is now underemphasizing these two criteria in its aim to ensure patients can access novel drugs more quickly.[169] A JAMA study found that “nearly a third of [drugs] approved [by the FDA] from 2001 through 2010 had major safety issues years after they were widely available to patients.”[170] A patient with a life-threatening disease or condition may understandably be frustrated by the lengthy development timeline, especially when a drug is touted as a potential “breakthrough” early on in its development cycle. However, pre-approval access without FDA oversight does not directly fix this lag between development and approval; it could make it worse for everyone if patients attempt to seek pre-approval access instead of enrolling in clinical trials.[171]

 c.  Patients Should Be Allowed to Use Investigational Drugs that Have Completed Phase I Clinical Testing

Finally, the Goldwater Institute’s claim that patients should be able to try investigational drugs because completion of phase I testing renders them safe fails to acknowledge that most investigational drugs are not approved by the FDA. The “overall likelihood of [FDA] approval . . . from Phase I for all developmental candidates [between 2006 and 2015] was 9.6%.”[172] The successful completion of a phase I clinical trial also does not guarantee a drug’s safety, and in general, investigational drugs have the lowest successful transition rates at phase II.[173] Take the example of fialuridine. In 1993, five individuals enrolled in a phase II clinical trial studying the use of fialuridine in hepatitis B died, despite an earlier phase I clinical trial in which 25% of a twenty-four-patient trial were cured after receiving fialuridine for twenty-eight days.[174] This example might seem extreme, but it still illustrates the risks associated with equating successful completion of a phase I trial with a broad endorsement of safety. As discussed, an approved drug’s safety profile is also not fully understood until sometimes years after it is approved. The potential harm of an investigational drug, even to someone “facing imminent death,” still needs to be considered before allowing an individual with a serious or life-threatening disease to use the investigational drug merely on the basis of completion of phase I testing.[175]

In conclusion, the movement’s rationales for these laws were misplaced and ill-guided. There is no doubt, however, that despite these claims, the Goldwater Institute was successful in securing the support necessary to pass both state and federal legislation.

2.  The Movement’s Success at the State Level

Post-Abigail Alliance, efforts were made to enact legislation to amend the expanded access program. While these federal bills failed to make it beyond congressional committee,[176] the state righttotry bills, from the outset, gained more support. There are several possible reasons for this increased support. First, information regarding investigational drugs, especially data from medical meetings, has become more accessible with the Internet and social media.[177] This increased accessibility is good, but it also can lead to increased interest in investigational drugs—especially when a drug is deemed “revolutionary” by the medical community, even with limited safety and efficacy data.[178] Timothy Turnham, the former executive director at the Melanoma Research Foundation, explains: “There is a disconnect between what researchers think is statistically significant and what is really significant for patients . . . . Patients hear ‘progress,’ and they think that means they’re going to be cured.”[179]

Second, there has been an increase in direct-to-consumer advertising of approved specialty drugs for the treatment of conditions such as cancer and autoimmune disorders by pharmaceutical companies[180] and of specific practices areas such as oncology and organ transplantation by cancer hospitals.[181] The United States is one of only a small number of countries which allows drug company advertising to not only mention an approved drug and its intended use, but also claims about its safety and efficacy.[182] These advertisements—though meant to be scientifically accurate—can also sometimes have misleading effects on people’s perceptions of their individual health outcomes.[183] If patients’ perceptions are skewed when they see a television advertisement claiming an FDA-approved drug will give them “a chance to live longer,” it is reasonable to think that patients’ perceptions could be equally skewed about investigational drugs given that investigational drugs are often touted as “revolutionary” at medical meetings by the manufacturers, tweeted as “ground-breaking” by physicians, and reported as “life-saving” by media, as compared to the currently available treatment option.

Third, with social media, individual patients like Andrea Sloan have a more accessible, widely-used platform by which to raise awareness of their struggle to obtain these investigational drugs through expanded access.[184] In the past, publicized efforts to pressure manufacturers for expanded access were generally a coordinated effort led by advocacy groups, aimed at obtaining an investigational drug for more widespread use.[185] Individual patients were often left to phone calls and letter writing with slim chance of successfully obtaining an experimental treatment without a connection.[186] This changed with social media. The news media found these campaigns and latched onto Sloan’s and other patients’ stories with headlines like “Company Denies Drug to Dying Child” and “Merck Expands Cancer Drug Access but too Late for Denver Dad,” which only amplified the public’s frustration with expanded access.[187] The social media campaigns and media attention, in turn, increased pressure on politicians to fix the system and allow individuals access to investigational drugs.[188]

The Goldwater Institute initially targeted more conservative states like Colorado, Arizona, and Texas,[189] but the movement also gained traction and success in more liberal states like California and Oregon.[190] The state bills also often had little political opposition and were supported by members on both sides of the aisle.[191] In total, forty states adopted righttotry laws prior to the enactment of the federal Right to Try Act. With Alaska’s enactment of its own righttotry law in July 2018, that total is now forty-one states.[192]

The goal of these state-level righttotry laws, as discussed, is to enable terminally ill patients to bypass the FDA expanded access program and request pre-approval use directly from manufacturers, but there are variations in these laws’ provisions regarding, among other things, cost recovery,[193] insurance coverage,[194] and informed consent.[195] The extent to which those variations now matter given the enactment of the Right to Try Act of 2017 is still not fully clear, but as discussed below, at least some are likely still applicable.

B.  The FDA’s Response

In response to the righttotry advocates’ criticisms, the FDA further clarified and modified aspects of the expanded access program to address its perceived shortcomings. The FDA also stepped up efforts to increase awareness and understanding of the expanded access program.

1.  Clarifying the FDA’s Use of Clinical Outcomes

A major issue for manufacturerswhich face external pressure from investors, physicians, and patient groups to bring new drugs to marketconcerns the potential impact an adverse event during expanded access use could have on an investigational drug’s development and subsequent agency review.[196] This concern was likely overstated, particularly given that “clinical safety data from expanded access treatment” has only been considered in a “small number of cases” when determining an approved drug’s label,[197] and that such a criterion has never been used to deny approval.[198] Still, the potential for an adverse event was often cited as an obstacle for patients seeking expanded access use.[199]

The FDA attempted to address these concerns, even if arguably overstated, by clarifying its policy. The treating physician needs to report only “suspected [serious or unexpected] adverse reactions . . . if there is evidence to suggest a causal relationship between the drug and the adverse event.”[200] The agency also noted that given the nature of expanded access use (in other words, an investigational drug administered outside of a controlled clinical trial to a terminally ill patient with multiple comorbidities), it would be difficult to often establish the necessary causal relationship.[201]

This modification, however, did not address the other major concern raised by manufacturers: the lack of a readily available supply of the drug sought for expanded access.[202] The FDA cannot directly tackle this issue, but it could affect the drug supply indirectly through clinical trial policies promoting diversity and inclusion.[203] This, in turn, could help some patients, who are willing to participate in a clinical trial but are instead driven to seek expanded access due to their failure to satisfy clinical eligibility requirements given age or certain comorbidities.[204]

2.  Demystifying Manufacturers’ Eligibility Criteria

A long-standing frustration for patients and their physicians was biopharmaceutical companies’ lack of transparency regarding how they evaluated expanded access requests. Before the enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”), manufacturers were not required to disclose their evaluation processes.[205] A few biopharmaceutical companies released their criteria after either coming under pressure from patients’ social media campaigns, which requested expanded access, or observing the impact that such campaigns had on other, similar companies.[206] Generally, however, this information was not easily available to patients or physicians.[207]

The Cures Act now requires manufacturers to disclose how they evaluate and respond to individual patient requests for access to investigational drugs.[208] The following information must be included on a manufacturer’s website: (1) contact information; (2) expanded access request procedures; (3) individual patient eligibility criteria; (4) anticipated response time; and (5) a link or other reference to information about the clinical trials of the drug for which expanded access is sought, available on ClinicalTrials.gov.[209]

Three primary issues have impacted the Cures Act’s effectiveness. First, not all companies are in compliance with its provisions.[210] The Cures Act does not contain an enforcement mechanism to give the FDA the ability to penalize companies that do not publish policies. Second, the Cures Act does not require participation in expanded access—just that a company post its policies. Though most companies have guidelines similar to the ones previously detailed in Section II.B.2, a company is still allowed under the Cures Act to have a policy against providing expanded access, so long as that policy is available on the company’s website.[211] And even if a company’s criteria mirrors that of PhRMA’s criteria, they are still subject to interpretation by that company’s employees. This could make it difficult to determine whether a physician’s request on behalf of a patient will be approved. Third, the Cures Act does not ensure timely response—just that a company post an anticipated response time. In general, that time frame represents the estimated time to an acknowledgment rather than an estimated time to a decision.[212] The FDA seems posed to address this final issue but has not announced definite plans to institute a timing requirement.[213]

3.  Increasing Awareness of Expanded Access

The FDA has also attempted to dispel many of the misconceptions regarding expanded access and clarify the application process for physicians and patients, especially those outside of major academic medical centers. The Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, for example, created the Expanded Access Navigator.[214] This website provides an overview of the application process from both a physician and patient perspective. The physician-specific section includes contact information for independent IRB committees should a physician’s institution not have its own IRB committee,[215] and a manufacturer directory listing companies’ expanded access criteria and their anticipated response time. 

4.  Streamlining the Individual Patient Request Process

a.  Form FDA 3926

Prior to the release of Form FDA 3926, a physician could spend up to one hundred hours in his or her attempt to secure expanded access use for a single patient.[216] Although a significant portion of that estimate likely included time spent negotiating with the manufacturer to obtain a LOA and coordinating with the IRB, physicians complained the application, comprised of Form FDA 1571 (“Investigational New Drug Application”) and Form FDA 1572 (“Statement of the Investigator”),[217] was unnecessarily complex and took upwards of eight hours to complete.[218]

In 2016 the FDA rolled out a streamlined application, Form FDA 3926, to ease the application process.[219] This change was meant not only to reduce the burden on physicians already familiar with requesting expanded access, but also, more importantly, to encourage doctors less familiar with the regulatory process who may have been previously dissuaded from submitting an expanded access request for their patients because of the forms’ complexities.[220] Form FDA 3926 only requires the physician to provide: (1) the patient’s initials; (2) the date of submission; (3) the type of submission; (4) clinical information; (5) treatment information; (6) a LOA; (7) the physician’s qualification statement; and (8) the physician’s name, address, and contact information.[221] The new two-page form takes forty-five minutes to complete—a time savings of more than 90%.[222] The total application process is now estimated to take thirty hours with this new estimate likely factoring in the FDA’s simplified IRB requirement.[223]

b.  IRB Review

In October 2017, the FDA announced another change to the single-patient expanded access process. A requesting physician can now seek approval from a specifically assigned IRB or the IRB chairperson, rather than waiting for a full IRB review (in other words, a committee meeting where “a majority of the members are present”).[224] This change was intended to reduce the time between when the patient and treating physician determine an investigational drug might be appropriate and when the treating physician’s IRB approves that request, as well as to remove another potential hurdle for physicians outside of major academic centers.[225]

This modification attempts to strike the appropriate balance between oversight and timeliness as it recognizes the continued need for independent confirmatory review, while also acknowledging that full IRB review may be unnecessary in the individual patient expanded access setting, given that it could cause undue delays and potentially deter some community-based physicians from using the expanded access pathway. Yet this change also has at least one limitation and two potential drawbacks. With respect to the limitation, it is difficult to know whether hospitals will adopt this modification as it is permissive not mandatory. At least a few major centers appear to be utilizing it, though further research is necessary to determine the full extent of its adoption.[226] To facilitate more widespread adoption, the FDA or the Reagan-Udall Foundation should work with those institutions effectively utilizing the less-stringent IRB review process to develop recommended criteria that other institutions could utilize.

With respect to potential concerns, first, the modification to the IRB requirement potentially reduces the amount of independent oversight. The average IRB is composed of fourteen members, so before the change, an average of seven members would need to be present to constitute a full IRB review.[227] This change places that decision in the hands of one chairperson or another designated member; this type of reduced oversight is typically reserved for research that poses “minimal risk” to the individual.[228] Second, the FDA did not establish specific eligibility criteria for this waiver. Instead, the FDA has said such a waiver is appropriate for individual patient expanded access INDs when the physician obtains concurrence by the IRB chairperson or another designated IRB member before treatment use begins.”[229] This standard again places that decision in the hands of one person; the same person who also decides whether expanded access treatment is appropriate. To address these concerns, the FDA should closely monitor incoming expanded access requests to determine if reducing the number of IRB reviewers increases the number of denied FDA requests based on patients not meeting the eligibility criteria. As an initial step, the FDA could refer institutions incorrectly utilizing the waiver to other hospitals that are correctly applying the waiver criteria, and if that appears to not resolve this potential problem, the FDA should consider changing its policy to require at least two or three IRB members or one designated IRB member and a consulting physician specializing in the patient’s disease or condition.[230]

* * *

There were arguably three reasons that these modifications did not quell the righttotry movement and those ultimately pushing for a federal law. First, the legislation—both at the state and federal level—was not aimed at improving pre-approval access for patients, but was instead meant “to weaken” the FDA.[231] Congress did not even wait to assess the impact of the modifications before voting on the Right to Try Act, even though it had authorized the agency to release a report assessing the impact of some of these modifications in 2017.[232] That report, published after the enactment of the Right to Try Act, suggests that all of the key stakeholders, patients, physicians, manufacturers, and payers, have a positive perception of the program and the FDA’s role in pre-approval access decisions.[233] The efforts to reduce some of the administrative burdens associated with expanded access appear to be well-received.[234] In 2017 (the first full year Form FDA 3926 was available and the year the Expanded Access Navigator was launched), there were 1,151 single-patient expanded access requests, which was a 12% increase from 2016 (1,025 requests).[235] Moreover, Congress did not thoroughly assess the effectiveness of the state righttotry laws before moving forward with the federal law.

Second, the slow implementation of the FDA’s modifications likely further validated for some the righttotry advocates’ argument that the FDA is too rigid and unresponsive. For example, the modifications to the application process were introduced more than two years after the righttotry movement started.[236]

Third, the modifications, aside from the clarification regarding use of clinical outcomes, also did not address the other weakness of the expanded access program—uneven manufacturer participation.[237] The movement’s supporters argued a federal righttotry law would improve manufacturer participation in pre-approval access.[238]

C.  The Push for a Federal Right to Try

Capitalizing on the success at the state level, proponents pushed for federal legislation,[239] even though (1) there was little evidence to suggest that existing state laws had a real impact on patients’ ability to secure pre-approval access,[240] and (2) the effects of the FDA’s modifications to the expanded access program were not fully evaluated.

The first proposed bill never made it out of committee,[241] but in 2016 Senator Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) started strategically laying the groundwork. As Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, he convened a hearing to discuss how Congress could reform the regulatory framework to provide “more patients a chance to save their lives.”[242] He introduced a righttotry bill later that year,[243] but this bill was blocked by Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) who objected over the bill’s lack of bipartisan support and nonexistent review through a formal hearing process.[244] In January 2017, Senator Johnson reintroduced a federal righttotry billthe Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act of 2017 (“S. 204”).[245] On August 3, 2017, the Senate passed the bill with no opposition, thus moving the debate over right to try to the U.S. House of Representatives.[246]

The fate of S. 204 remained in limbo for several months after an October hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.[247] The momentum shifted in favor of the righttotry movement, however, after President Trump singled out the proposed righttotry law in his 2018 State of the Union address.[248] This mention was enough to reenergize efforts in the House. In March 2018, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce introduced H.R. 5247, Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2018, a narrower righttotry bill incorporating feedback from the FDA.[249] H.R. 5247 failed an initial vote on March 13, but a week later, on March 21, 2018, the bill passed by a vote of 267–149, mostly along partisan lines.[250]

H.R. 5247 never reached the Senate floor.[251] With the Senate at a standstill, the House renewed discussions over S. 204.[252] In spite of ongoing criticism from industry, patient groups, and physicians,[253] on May 22, 2018, the House passed S. 204 by a vote of 250–169, again on partisan lines.[254] On May 31, 2018, President Trump signed the Right to Try Act and declared the law a victory for patients.[255]

IV.  the Right to Try Act of 2017

A.  The Law

The Right to Try Act creates “national standards and rules by which investigational drugs may be provided to terminally ill patients.”[256] The federal law—like its predecessor state laws—is permissive and not mandatory. A manufacturer is not required and cannot be compelled to provide access to an investigational drug after receiving a righttotry request pursuant to the federal Right to Try Act.[257]

1.  Who is Eligible?

First, a patient may pursue a right-to-try request if they have a “life-threatening disease or condition.”[258] Senator Johnson chose this disease threshold, rather than the “immediately life-threatening disease” standard previously used in the expanded access program “because [he thought that the immediately life-threating disease definition] would exclude patients with Duchenne muscular dystrophy, an illness [he] explicitly intended to be covered.”[259] Second, the patient must have “exhausted approved treatment options” and be “unable to participate in a clinical trial involving the eligible investigational drug.”[260] A physician—but not necessarily the requesting physician—must certify the patient cannot participate in a clinical trial.[261] The physician who certifies that a patient is unable to participate in the clinical trial must be in “good standing” and cannot receive compensation from the manufacturer in direct response to the certification.[262] Third, the patient must provide “written informed consent”––a term that is undefined under the law, rather than using the existing federal regulation defining informed consent.[263]

2.  When Would an Investigational Drug Qualify?

To qualify for right to try, an investigational drug must satisfy four requirements. First, it must have completed a phase I clinical trial.[264] The Act does not specify whether the investigational drug must have completed a phase I clinical trial in the requested indication. The Act also does not preclude requests for investigational drugs that have only been tested in healthy volunteers. Second, the drug must not be approved for any other use.[265] Third, the manufacturer must either (1) have already filed a marketing application for the investigational drug with the FDA, or (2) be investigating the drug in a clinical trial that is “intended to form the primary basis of a claim of effectiveness in support of approval” and is the subject of an active IND.[266] This language is broad because, as Senator Johnson explains, the Act was not intended to enable the FDA to exclude any clinical trial as a basis for precluding access to treatments under right to try.”[267] Fourth, the drug must be in active development (that is, not discontinued) and not subject to a clinical hold.[268]

An investigational drug that meets these requirements is then exempt from certain statutory and regulatory requirements[269] as long as the providing company also complies with sections 312.6 (labeling of investigational new drugs), 312.7 (promoting investigational drugs), and 312.8 (charging for investigational new drugs) of the Code of Federal Regulations.[270]

3.  What are the Reporting Obligations?

a.  Companies              ’ Reporting Obligations

The Right to Try Act requires a company to file a yearly report of right-to-try use with Health and Human Services (“HHS”). This yearly report to HHS must include “the number of doses supplied, the number of patients treated, [and] the uses for which the drug was made available”; the manufacturer must also report “any known serious adverse events.”[271]

b.  FDA’s Reporting Obligations

The Right to Try Act also requires the publication of a yearly report summarizing right-to-try use on the FDA’s website. This yearly report must disclose how often the FDA determines a clinical outcome to be critical to deciding safety, how often a manufacturer asks the FDA to consider such outcomes, and how often the FDA does not consider clinical outcomes when reviewing the investigational drugs marketing application.[272]

4.  When Can the FDA Use Clinical Outcomes?

The Right to Try Act bars the FDA from considering a “clinical outcome” related to a patient’s use of an investigational drug “to delay or adversely affect the review or approval” of that drug––except in two situations.[273] The FDA is allowed to use a clinical outcome if it is (1) critical to the assessment of the investigational drug’s safety, and (2) the company that provided the investigational drug can also ask for a clinical outcome to be considered.[274] The Act does not define “critical.”

* * *

 

B.  Industry’s Potential Path Moving Forward

 This Section proceeds as follows. Section IV.B.1 explains why regardless of future FDA guidance, most companies are unlikely to adopt a two-pathway approach or even a single-pathway approach using just right to try, favoring continued use of the expanded access program instead. Section IV.B.2 argues that the status quo, however, is insufficient and that companies need to address some of the criticisms raised during the right-to-try movement by (1) revising their existing expanded access policies, and (2) improving clinical trial access.

1.  Even with the Right to Try Act, Most Companies Will Continue to Use Expanded Access

All along, right-to-try advocates have contended that the Right to Try Act’s provisions limiting liability and limiting the FDA’s use of outcome data would incentivize manufacturers to utilize this new pre-approval pathway.[275] Yet, as this Note explains below, these two provisions are not enough for most companies to utilize the Right to Try Act.[276]

Lack of Support from Key Stakeholders. The Right to Try Act lacks support from industry, advocacy groups, physician organizations, and the FDA. Companies, including Janssen and Bristol-Myers Squibb, have already stated that right-to-try requests will be funneled through the expanded access pathway.[277] Janssen announced prior to the enactment of the federal Right to Try Act that it would not “evaluate right-to-try requests because [the state] laws don’t allow for FDA input, which is ‘critical for ensuring patient safety.’”[278] Patient advocacy groups and physician organizations have not significantly changed their position on the Right to Try Act since its adoption.[279] The FDA has also since voiced its continued preference for use of the expanded access program in November 2018,[280] and announced in December 2018 a new program, “Project Facilitate,” which aims to further alleviate the criticisms of the expanded access program. Project Facilitate will establish a department within the FDA that (1) will field calls from physicians requesting expanded access on behalf of a patient and patients seeking single-patient expanded access for themselves; (2) complete Form FDA 3926, and if necessary forward the completed form to a patient’s treating physician for sign-off if the initial request was made by the patient; (3) forward the request to an IRB; and (4) ultimately submit the request to the company developing the requested drug, which must make a determination “within a specified time period . . . yet [to be] determined” by the FDA.[281] With industry generally reticent to act without agency guidance,[282] the November 2018 announcement and the forthcoming Project Facilitate arguably send strong signals to keep using the expanded access program.

Insufficient Incentives. The Right to Try Act’s provisions limiting a company’s liability and limiting the FDA’s use of outcome data are insufficient incentives. First, the Right to Try Act does limit a company’s potential liability but does not protect a manufacturer against any and all liability claims. As attorney James M. Beck notes, the Act still allows claims of reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or intentional tort.[283] The Right to Try Act also does not foreclose claims under state or federal product liability, tort, consumer protection, or warranty law.[284] A company would also be trading more liability protection for less FDA input when it is not clear further liability protection is even necessary. As others have pointed out, there are no examples of patients suing manufacturers of investigational drugs for “treatment-related harm[s]” stemming from expanded-access use.[285] Therefore, companies––at least within the context of expanded access––should have minimal concern over potential tort claims.

Second, although the Right to Try Act limits the FDA’s use of outcome data to when it is “critical” to determining safety, in practice the FDA rarely uses expanded access data when reviewing an investigational drug unless there is evidence to suggest a causal relationship.[286] Even though the FDA’s use of outcomes is often a concern for manufacturers, the FDA has assured companies it rarely uses expanded access data, so it is unclear how the Right to Try Act’s provision further limits the FDA’s use. Furthermore, as the Act does not define “critical,” without some guidance from the FDA it is unclear whether this is the same standard as used in expanded access, a more relaxed standard, or a heightened standard given that the FDA is not involved in reviewing the righttotry request and determining proper usage, such as dosage. Finally, even if the FDA is limited in its ability to assess reported events, manufacturers may still be concerned about whether any adverse events associated with righttotry use would impact regulatory approval in other countries.[287]

Third, the Right to Try Act does not contain a significant financial incentive for industry. The Act requires companies to comply with the existing regulation, which limits cost recovery to direct costs, except under specific circumstances.[288] A two-pathway approach would require companies to allocate additional money, personnel, and drug supply to another program that is outside the drug development process. With the cost of developing a new drug estimated to be around $2.6 billion,[289] it seems unlikely that manufacturers would be willing to expend any additional resources to only recoup direct costs.[290] A publicly traded company, like Pfizer or Janssen, might have the necessary financial resources and employees but will still answer to shareholders and still have concerns about maintaining adequate supply of the drug for its clinical trials.[291] A small, private company under pressure from investors is likely to have even less motivation to redirect limited resources to a two-pathway pre-approval program, or even a single-pathway program without some financial upside.[292] Take, for example, BrainStorm Therapeutics, which announced plans to offer its therapy through right to try and would have charged patients seeking the right to try its drug potentially $300,000. The company’s nowretracted plan likely did not comply with federal regulation given that it was positioned as a “semicommercial enterprise with modest profits.”[293]

Unanswered Implementation Questions. The Right to Try Act is meant to be a parallel pathway to expanded access and not a replacement, but it would be difficult for a company to implement a pre-approval access program in which both of these programs co-exist. The Right to Try Act does not provide companies considering utilizing right to try as a parallel pathway guidance to the threshold issue: when it should use right to try and when it should use expanded access. The FDA is working to develop guidance,[294] but for now it has said that companies are in the best position to make that determination.[295] While this Note identifies two potential options, each is not without their own drawbacks and complexities. A company could (1) use right to try when an investigational drug will be used by a single patient and use expanded access when an investigational drug will be used by a larger patient population, or (2) use right to try under certain pre-defined circumstances (for example, pediatric patients or patients with exceptional safety risks) and use expanded access in all other circumstances.

 The first option—use of right to try in the single-patient setting—would be administratively easier. A company would not need to develop new policies delineating between the two pathways for individual patients. That said, this approach does have potential challenges. First, individuals with certain types of serious diseases would not qualify for the righttotry pathway, therefore limiting their pre-approval access options until the drug has sufficient evidence to support expanded access for intermediate-size or widespread treatment.[296] Take, for example, the conditions narcolepsy or rheumatoid arthritis, which the FDA has said would independently qualify as a serious disease; these conditions would not be considered lifethreatening because both are considered chronic diseases and are alone not fatal.[297] Therefore, adoption of this approach would likely be dependent on a company’s investigational drug pipeline. A company with a single drug in development might be less concerned about this issue, but a company with a large disease pipeline that targets multiple different disease areas might be.

Second, it is not clear what the patient limit should be for right to try (that is, at what point should a company stop providing pre-approval access through right to try and transition over to expanded access for intermediatesize and widespread treatment). The Right to Try Act does not provide any guidance. A company should not be able to provide five, ten, or fifteen patients at a single hospital with an investigational drug through the right to try pathway. That starts looking more like an intermediate-size expanded access protocol[298] and arguably should have FDA oversight. Without specific right-to-try guidance, a manufacturer would need to rely on expanded access guidance as a benchmark for when a company should transition from the righttotry pathway to intermediate-size or widespread use through expanded access, but even then the existing FDA guidance does not address other concerns regarding the potential applicability of the Right to Try Act’s provisions limiting liability and use of outcome data once a certain patient threshold is crossed.

The second option—use of right to try under certain pre-defined settings—would be administratively more complicated, given that it would require companies to determine those pre-defined circumstances and ensure that the criteria for those standards is clear and easy to apply. That said, some companies might consider this approach in order to allow some patients who might otherwise not be eligible for expanded access to receive the drug through right to try, given the Act’s provisions limiting liability and use of outcome data. Two such settings that a company might reasonably consider are (1) patients who have exceptional safety risks[299] and (2) patients who are children.[300] The former group is frequently ineligible for a clinical trial and likely to be denied expanded access use because of manufacturers’ concerns about potential liability or adverse events impacting clinical development.[301] The latter group—often the face of the righttotry movement[302]is also frequently ineligible for industry-sponsored clinical trials and may be denied expanded access use because of manufacturers’ concerns about inadequate clinical data to determine an adequate dosage in the pediatric setting, potential liability, or adverse events impacting clinical development.[303]

This second approach is also not without its drawbacks. First, the pre-defined settings would need to be unambiguous. Though pediatric patients can be more clearly defined by age, the term “exceptional safety risks” is not susceptible to one definition, so companies allowing pre-approval access in this setting would need to establish a specific standard and make sure it is clearly communicated internally and externally. Second, with pediatric patients[304] and patients who are terminally ill,[305] there are also ethical considerations requiring companies to adopt more rigorous informed consent requirements and procedures. Take pediatric patients, for example, cases in which “[p]arents or other surrogates technically provide ‘informed permission’ for diagnosis and treatment, with the assent of the child whenever appropriate.”[306] Third, companies would also still need to refer back to the state righttotry laws to ensure their pre-defined settings are compliant. Oregon, for example, limits the right to try pathway to individuals who are at least eighteen years old.[307] This could increase the complexities of implementation. Fourth, the drawbacks relating to the first option likely would also impact the second option.

The practical complexities of operating a two-pathway approach, stemming from presently unanswered legal questions regarding the Right to Try Act and concerns that might arise from utilizing Right to Try in specific patient settings, make companies unlikely to use right to try even if the FDA provides guidance.

State Right-to-Try Laws. The applicability of state righttotry laws is also still uncertain.[308] While the Right to Try Act creates a national standard,[309] it does not explicitly preempt these state laws.[310] Senator Ron Johnson has previously stated that the Right to Try Act was meant to be the “federal counterpart” to the state righttotry laws.[311] With forty-one statelevel righttotry laws, implementation and compliance would be complicated. A company would likely need to comply with at least some of the provisions of the state righttotry laws in addition to the Right to Try Act’s provisions.

Take, for example, the California state statute’s criteria for patient eligibility, which requires a person to have: (1) “an immediately life-threatening disease or condition”; (2) “considered all other treatment options currently approved”; (3) “not been accepted to participate in the nearest clinical trial to his or her home . . . within one week of completion of the clinical trial application process, or, in the treating physician’s medical judgment, it is unreasonable for the patient to participate in that clinical trial”; (4) “received a recommendation from his or her primary physician and a consulting physician”; (5) “given written informed consent”; (6) documentation . . . attesting that the patient has met the requirements . . . .[312]

The first requirement limiting patient eligibility is narrower than the Right to Try Act.[313] The second requirement is arguably broader, because it would allow a patient to rely on the pathway after considering, but not exhausting, all treatment options. The first part of the third requirement could possibly supplement the Right to Try Act’s clinical trial requirement if it was interpreted as requiring proof of non-acceptance, but it is likely more accurately interpreted as allowing a patient to make a request within one week of not receiving a response, which is broader than the Right to Try Act. The second part of that requirement is clearly broader, however, than the federal law, as the Right to Try Act requires a physician to certify that a patient cannot participate in a clinical trial, and not just that it would be unreasonable for a patient to participate in a clinical trial; the California law uses a different standard. The fourth requirement supplements the Right to Try Act because it requires confirmation from a second physician.[314] The fifth requirement also supplements the federal law because, whereas the federal law leaves “informed consent” undefined, California defines “informed consent” in another part of the statute.[315] The sixth requirement mirrors the federal law.[316]

Although a company could theoretically challenge state right to try laws as preempted by the federal provision, this is not an issue that an individual company, or companies collectively, are likely to challenge, particularly given the high costs of litigation and limited financial incentive of success on the merits.[317] This issue could also impact patient’s actual interest[318] and healthcare providers’ willingness to offer such treatments.[319]

External Regulatory Challenges. The adoption of the Right to Try Act by industry seems less likely given that companies already face “challenges particularly related to . . . managing divergent requirements and guidance from ex-US health authorities” when implementing expanded access.[320] The potential effect of righttotry use on product development or regulatory review in other countries is unclear. And, if companies are already overly tasked from other countries’ requirements, they are not going to add another pathway to that mix.

Confidential Information. A final reason the Right to Try Act will not gain industry support is that, as practitioners James Valentine and David Clissold explain, some of the Right to Try Act’s drug eligibility requirements may require companies to “disclose details of their development program that might otherwise be confidential, commercial information.”[321] This potential disclosure requirement is not an issue with expanded access because the FDA has access to this proprietary information  through the drug’s IND file and can utilize it when evaluating an expanded access request and making recommendations regarding use and dosage.[322] With the FDA’s ability to review proprietary drug information, the expanded access program offers two benefits over the righttotry pathway—(1) it limits a company’s potential need to disclose confidential commercial development information and (2) it ensures patients who may not be undergoing treatment from a physician also acting as a clinical trial investigator can still request access to an investigational drug.[323]

These reasons make adoption of a two-pathway approach or abandonment of expanded access in favor of right to try unlikely. However, maintaining the status quo is not feasible––nor is it appropriate. Companies have already started receiving calls from patients seeking the right to try with some of those calls even escalating to threats when people are referred back to the expanded access program.[324] This could further escalate to widespread social media campaigns and media coverage if companies do not explicitly address right to try within their existing pre-approval access policies. With the public’s negative perception of the pharmaceutical industry,[325] companies need to address at least some of the criticisms raised during the righttotry debate that were not rectified through adoption of the Right to Try Act.

2.  Charting Industry’s Path Forward

a.  Companies Should Revise Existing Expanded Access Guidelines

RighttoTry Position Statement. Companies should update both their expanded access guidelines to include language that clearly addresses the Right to Try Act and their plans to only offer pre-approval access through expanded access. Some companies have already done this. Take, for example, the statement Bristol-Myers Squibb features prominently on the section of its website addressing pre-approval access:

We believe our current approach to early patient access . . . is consistent with the objectives of the Right to Try Act. Requests for early patient access to Bristol-Myers Squibb investigational medicines should continue to be made through the treating physician and by visiting Bristol-Myers Squibb Early Patient Access Requests Portal.[326]

To avoid potential criticisms from righttotry advocates and patients, companies need to take additional steps outlined below.

Company Pre-Approval Access Reporting. Companies should publish annual reports on their websites regarding their expanded access programs. Although companies are granting expanded access requests,[327] this information is often not publicly available. The reports should include detailed information, such as the number of requests received (and of those the number of requests approved), the most common reasons for a denial (for example, ability to enroll in a clinical trial or insufficient clinical data to support the requested use), and the number of patients referred to clinical trials (and of those, the number that chose to enroll).[328] If companies are unwilling to publish this data on their own websites, then an alternative approach would be for BIO and PhRMA to commission a report summarizing this data. If the report is published by BIO and PhRMA, companies might be more comfortable providing additional data, such as the number of requests received by investigational drug (or class of drug) and the number of requests received by disease (or category of disease). Either approach—self-reporting or industry-wide reporting—could increase transparency regarding the gap between the number of requests received by companies and the number of requests received by the FDA.

Patient Eligibility—Clinical Trial Ineligibility. Companies need to better explain what factors render a patient unable to participate in clinical trials beyond just not qualifying. The only factor sometimes listed is geographic limitations, and companies sometimes list this as only an example of a factor that will generally not support expanded access use. This creates two distinct problems. First, without additional information, physicians and patients are left guessing what other factors render a patient unable to participate in a clinical trial. This could discourage a physician from submitting an otherwise valid request. Second, the FDA will consider geographic limitations when reviewing a request even when the company does not, making the agency’s guidance at odds with some companies’ policies. This is confusing. For those companies generally unwilling to consider geographic limitations as a factor impacting a patient’s ability to participate, companies could add additional criteria such as transportation and financial limitations. The FDA has identified both as common obstacles to clinical trial enrollment.[329]

Patient Eligibility—Pediatrics.[330] Companies often either do not address pediatric expanded access use[331] or will not consider pediatric expanded access use without sufficient pediatric data.[332] The former approach is short-sighted from a public relations perspective, especially with the enactment of the Right to Try Act and its focus on pediatric access. In 2014, Bristol-Myers Squibb cited lack of pediatric data when asked about a specific patient’s denial by CNBC, but even four years after that media firestorm, the company still does not address pediatric expanded access use in its published guidelines.[333] A physician might recommend expanded access for a child only to learn after submitting a request that the company will not provide pre-approval access without sufficient pediatric data. Thus, companies should strive to increase transparency. The latter approach also needs to be reconsidered. With so many pediatric patients currently being treated using FDA-approved drugs that only underwent clinical testing in adults,[334] the justification that pediatric data is needed can be difficult to reconcile, especially given how few industry-sponsored pediatric trials there are.[335] There is also evidence, at least with oncology drugs, that “[d]rug exposure in adolescents (age 12 to 18 years) and adults is similar, supporting the enrollment of adolescents in adult trials that involve the same disease and/or therapeutic target.”[336] Therefore, companies with explicit pediatric expanded access criteria should reconsider whether it would be appropriate to loosen or eliminate this requirement for adolescents.

Qualifying Drugs. A manufacturer’s determination of when an investigational drug has sufficient data can sometimes differ from that of the treating physician and patient.[337] Companies should consider publishing a list of drugs (updated on a regular basis) for which they will consider expanded access requests. This is a practice already adopted by some companies.[338]

External Review Committee. Companies should consider adopting Janssen’s approach of utilizing an outside review board in collaboration with its internal decisionmakers.[339] Janssen piloted the New York University program, Compassionate Use Advisory Committee (“CompAC”), in 2015 with one investigational drug.[340] Janssen has since rolled out the program to other disease areas.[341] The CompAC approach is as follows: (1) the treating physician submits expanded access request to Janssen; (2) company physicians and medical personnel review requests to determine whether any are medically inappropriate or eligible for clinical trials and expanded-access programs; (3) CompAC reviews the other requests providing an “independent recommendation” to Janssen; (4) the treating physician can appeal a CompAC decision.[342] An independent review committee could reduce public misconceptions that companies’ default response to an expanded access request is “no,” especially given media’s widespread coverage of those denials. Likewise, the committee may be helpful when evaluating cases involving pediatric patients or patients with exceptional safety risks. The built-in appeal process could reduce the public appeals initiated through social media. Furthermore, just as there are independent IRBs available for physicians whose institutions do not have internal committees,[343] smaller companies with limited financial and personnel resources to devote to expanded access requests could consider partnering with other companies to develop an independent, external review committee to aid in assessing expanded access requests.

Cost-Recovery Policy. Companies need to adopt more transparent cost recovery guidelines even if their policies mandate not charging patients because of concerns that doing so could impact a “higher sale price” [344] in the future or because insurance will not reimburse even direct costs.[345] A few companies do post cost-recovery policies,[346] but of the companies surveyed in this Note, none had this information available. The rising cost of healthcare in the United States is on the public’s mind; it was the top issue in the 2018 mid-term elections.[347] Furthermore, HHS recently announced “a proposed rule to require pharma to include list prices in direct-to-consumer ads” for approved drugs.[348] This increasing scrutiny makes it even more important for companies to publish clear cost-recovery policies for their expanded access programs.

Expanded Access Navigator. Companies should submit a Navigator Directory listing when they initiate a phase II or phase III study for an investigational drug. Companies’ websites should also refer physicians and patients to the Expanded Access Navigator. Neither of these recommendations are currently required by the Cures Act.

b.  Companies Need to Improve Access to Clinical Trials

 Companies will often cite concern about maintaining adequate supply of an investigational drug for their clinical trials as a factor in their expanded access criteria. This is arguably a genuine concern given that a manufacturer will develop only enough supply for its clinical trials, but not more until it receives FDA approval.[349] At the same time, however, companies often struggle to fully enroll their clinical trials.[350] Trials often have strict inclusion and exclusion criteria, which can affect some patient populations more so than others.[351] Furthermore, clinical trials are often conducted in regions with large academic institutions and major medical centers,[352] which can limit certain patients’ ability to participate and negatively affect some patient populations disproportionately from others.[353]

 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. As discussed in Section II.B, companies generally prefer standardized study groups, but companies should reconsider eligibility criteria because “[b]roadening the eligibility criteria for clinical trials [would] provide the opportunity for more people to participate in research studies,” and “it [would] make the trial results more reflective of the people that will ultimately use the drug.”[354] While specific to oncology, the American Society of Clinical Oncology (“ASCO”) and Friends of Cancer Research, identified five common exclusion factors (brain metastases, age, HIV infection, organ dysfunction, and prior or concurrent cancer diagnoses) and proposed recommended clinical trial protocols that would facilitate inclusion of patients with these factors in clinical trials.[355] Their recommendations address both early-phase trial design (for example, proposing study groups limited to “specific patient population” to “inform the decision as to whether and how to include (or not) the patient population in later phase trials”) and later-phase trials (for example, “expand[ing] eligibility criteria to include a specific patient population,” but “restricting primary analysis to defined patient population”).[356] A JAMA Oncology study, published in January 2019, estimates that at least “6,317 additional patients would be allowed to join trials each year” if these recommendations were adopted.[357] Companies should work with the FDA, ASCO, and Friends of Cancer Research to determine how to incorporate these recommendations into their existing clinical trials, not only to ease patient access to the clinical trial process, but also to ensure clinical trial data reflects real-world patients.

 Diversity in Clinical Trials. Some companies have initiatives aimed at improving diversity in participation,[358] but others are more resistive.[359] With most clinical trial participants white, more companies need to adopt measures addressing diversity in clinical trials that go beyond just patient education. In 2015, the FDA approved a drug for the treatment of multiple myeloma, a blood cancer that disproportionately affects blacks, “yet of the 722 participants [enrolled in its phase III study] only 13—or 1.8 percent—were black.”[360] Efforts to improve potential pre-approval access through the clinical trial process need to address this underrepresentation of minorities. Companies, rather than resisting those efforts, should work with the FDA, patient groups, and professional organizations to develop legislation that would incentivize widespread participation. For example, companies could propose legislation, modeled off of state laws encouraging diversity and inclusion in certain industries,[361] that would give tax credits and clinical trial grants to companies[362]utilizing the FDA’s various expedited approval pathwaysthat submit diversity proposals detailing how they plan to ensure clinical trial enrollment is representative of a disease’s U.S. incidence rates by race, age, and gender even if specific risk factors don’t require it and then meet certain minimum thresholds based on those incidence rates.[363]

CONCLUSION

The Right to Try Act passed with great fanfare and proclamations of hope by President Trump and others. Yet industry—as a whole—is unlikely to adopt this parallel pathway.[364] This will likely further increase frustration and confusion amongst the public regarding pre-approval access,[365] especially since the Right to Try Act was marketed as a “right to try” when in reality it is simply a “right to ask”—a right the public has had all along through the expanded access program.[366] With this added risk, companies should and need to move beyond the status quo, adopting measures aimed at increasing transparency and awareness of their expanded access programs and pursuing initiatives aimed at improving access to clinical trials.

This proposal is not without its limitations. First, it relies on companies choosing to adopt these changes. Companies already do not fully comply the Cures Act expanded access requirements. These proposed changes may be more broadly implemented if BIO and PhRMA revise their existing expanded access guidelines to incorporate some of these proposals as many companies now model their guidelines off of the either BIO or PhRMA’s guidelines. Another option is for Congress to amend the Cures Act to not only to give the FDA power to assess civil monetary penalties when a company fails to comply with the Cures Act expanded access requirements, but also to further require companies to submit an annual summary of their expanded access programs to the FDA, thereby extending the Right to Try Act’s reporting requirement to the expanded access program. These amendments will not, however, have any weight unless the FDA has enforcement capability.[367] Any civil money penalties collected for non-compliance could be used to support “Project Facilitate” and other expanded access awareness initiatives such as the Expanded Access Navigator, FDA-sponsored webinars, or targeted educational programming in regions underutilizing expanded access.

Second, changes aimed at increasing manufacturer transparency and clarifying companies’ existing policies admittedly do not directly improve manufacturer participation. That said, increased manufacturer transparency may reveal greater manufacturer participation than one would anticipate based on the media’s coverage of companies denying expanded access requests. Furthermore, clarification of companies’ existing policies may ease physicians’ and patients’ overall frustration with the expanded access program and encourage more widespread utilization of the program.

Third, the second part of this proposal relies on companies to adopt clinical trial measures that improve overall access through diversity and inclusion initiatives and less-restrictive eligibility criteria or to advocate for legislation that would help facilitate these efforts. With some companies potentially resistive due to ongoing concerns that increased diversity or less-restrictive eligibility criteria could delay drug development or cost millions of dollars, it may be difficult to secure wide-scale adoption without Congressional action aimed at not only improving patient access to investigational drugs through the clinical trial process, but also ensuring that clinical trials produce the data necessary to allow the FDA “to separate the relative handful of discoveries which prove to be true advances in therapy from a legion of false leads and unverifiable clinical impressions,”[368] and also to “maximize generalizability of results” to patients in the real world.[369]

 

 

Appendix

 


[*] *. Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 92; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.S., Journalism and Political Science 2011, Northwestern University, Medill School of Journalism. I would like to thank Professor Michael H. Shapiro for encouraging me to pursue this topic, which first sparked my interest in 2013. His feedback and insights on early drafts was invaluable. Special appreciation and thanks to my parents, Jon and Anna, for their love and support even after reviewing multiple drafts; to my friends and classmates, and in particular Aly, for allowing me to talk through my ideas on numerous occasions; and to my niece and nephew for their superb editing skills! I would also like to thank the Volume 92 editors of the Southern California Law Review for their careful editing and invaluable feedback, especially Nick Thomas, Jay Simmons, and Chris Phillips. Lastly, I would like to report working for Weber Shandwick where I represented biopharmaceutical and medical device clients (2011–2014) and working for Adaptive Biotechnologies (2014–2016).

 [1]. BioMarin Pharmaceutical: Give Andrea Sloan (@andi_sloan) Access to the Cancer Drug That Could Save Her Life, Change.org, [hereinafter Change.org] https://www.change.org
/p/biomarin-pharmaceutical-give-andrea-sloan-andi-sloan-access-to-the-cancer-drug-that-could-save-her-life (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).

 [2]. William Hudson, In Cancer Drug Battle, Both Sides Appeal to Ethics, CNN (Sept. 28, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/28/health/compassionate-drug-use. Expanded access is sometimes also referred to as either “compassionate use” or “pre-approval access.”

 [3]. Id. At the time of Sloan’s request, BioMarin had only completed a phase I trial in thirty-nine patients. Johann Sebastian De Bono et al., First-in-Human Trial of Novel Oral PARP Inhibitor BMN 673 in Patients with Solid Tumors, Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology (June 3, 2013), https://meetinglibrary.asco.org/record/83852/abstract.

 [4]. Change.org, supra note 1; Andrea Ball, Austin Woman Dies After Battle for Access to Experimental Cancer Drug, Austin Am.-Statesman (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.statesman.com
/NEWS/20140103/Austin-woman-dies-after-battle-for-access-to-experimental-cancer-drug (noting her “Facebook page—Andi’s Army—ha[d] more than 15,000 followers”).

 [5]. Meg Tirrell, When Unapproved Drugs Are the Only Hope, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/05/a-case-for-compassionate-use-when-unapproved-drugs-are-the-only-hope.html.

 [6]. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Company Denies Drug to Dying Child, CNN (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/health/cohen-josh; accord Tirrell, supra note 5; Amanda Woerner, Dying 25-Year-Old Fights for Compassionate Use Access to Cancer Treatment, Fox News (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2014/03/26/dying-25-year-old-fights-for-compassionate-use-access-to-cancer-treatment. With the enactment of the federal Right to Try Act, some patients and their families are once again turning to social media to request access to investigational drugs through right to try. See Sumathi Reddy, The ‘Right to Try’ Law Says Yes, the Drug Company Says No, Wall St. J. (June 6, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/family-battling-a-rare-disease-sees-roadblocks-despite-right-to-try-law-1528293923 (discussing how—after a company declined to provide an investigational drug because an expanded access program was not yet available—given the limited clinical data in only a small number of patients, the parents of a toddler—both of whom were doctors—launched a Change.org petition in June 2018 that collected more than 100,000 signatures in just two weeks).

 [7]. Erin Mershon, ‘Right-to-Try’ Law Intended to Weaken the FDA, Measure’s Sponsor Says in Blunt Remarks, Stat News (May 31, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/31/right-to-try-ron-johnson.

 [8]. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 489 (West 2015); Eric Janez, Andrea Sloan Bill Signed into Law, KXAN (June 12, 2015), http://kxan.com/2015/06/12/andrea-sloan-bill-signed-into-law.

 [9]. Kenneth Artz, U.S. House Approves Federal Right to Try Bill, Heartland Inst. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/u-s-house-approves-federal-right-to-try-bill (quoting Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.)); see also Christina Sandefur, Safeguarding the Right to Try, 49 Ariz. St. L.J. 513, 521 (2017) (arguing right-to-try laws are a “major change” from expanded access). See generally Christina Corieri, Goldwater Inst., Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their Treatment (2014), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/cms_page_media/2015/1/29/Right%20To%20Try.pdf (proposing the right-to-try legislation).

 [10]. Ron Leuty, The Right to Try: Terminally Ill Patients Say Trying Experimental Drugs Offers Hope. But Is It Just False Hope?, S.F. Bus. Times (June 8, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/06/08/biotech-2017-right-to-try-laws-biomarin-fda-ca.html. See generally Rebecca Dresser, The “Right to Try” Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1631 (2015) (examining the right to try movement and the role of patient stories in the debate); Lisa Kearns & Alison Bateman-House, Who Stands to Benefit? Right to Try Law Provisions and Implications, 51 Therapeutic Innovation & Reg. Sci. 170 (2017) (arguing the laws are not pro-patient); Rebecca Dresser, “Right to Try” Laws: The Gap Between Experts and Advocates, 45 Hastings Ctr. Report, May-June 2015, at 9–10 [hereinafter Dresser, The Gap] (proposing ways to shift public debate regarding right to try in favor of existing programs).

 [11]. Press Release, Goldwater Inst., Alaska Becomes 41st State to Enact Right to Try Legislation (July 13, 2018), http://righttotry.org/alaska-becomes-41st-state-to-enact-right-to-try-legislation (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).

 [12]. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address. Vice President Mike Pence, who signed into law the Indiana Right to Try Act, is also a public proponent of right-to-try legislation. E.g., Vice President Mike Pence (@vp), Twitter (Aug. 3, 2017, 12:21 PM), https://twitter.com/vp/status/893190193829875713 (“Right to Try is about giving terminally ill patients hope & a chance. Proud of @POTUS’ & @SenRonJohnson’s work to help pass it in Senate.”); Vice President Mike Pence (@vp), Twitter (Mar. 13, 2018, 2:12 PM) [hereinafter Vice President Mike Pence, March 13 Tweet], https://twitter.com/vp/status/973668021028950017 (“Always great to see Jordan McLinn & his mother Laura McLinn, 2 great Hoosiers who have been fierce advocates for the Right to Try legislation the House will consider today. This bipartisan bill is about restoring hope to patients w/ terminal illnesses & it’s the right thing to do.”).

 [13]. Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump to Sign Right to Try Legislation Fulfilling the Promise He Made to Expand Healthcare Options for Terminal Americans (May 30, 2018) [hereinafter White House Press Release], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-sign-right-try-legislation-fulfilling-promise-made-expand-healthcare-options-terminal-americans.

 [14]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,160, 75,160 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

 [15]. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The History of Drug Regulation in the United States 2, 7 (2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/PromotingSafeandEffectiveDrugsfor100Years/UCM114468.pdf; Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Jan.–Feb. 2006, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/FOrgsHistory/CDER
/UCM586463.pdf. The marketing application had to include information regarding “all clinical investigations . . . the drug’s components and composition, methods of manufacture including facilities and controls, and copies of both the packaging and labeling of the new drug.” Suzanne White Junod, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History 6 (2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/History/ProductRegulation/UCM593494.pdf.

 [16]. A new drug application “is the vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S. The data gathered during the animal studies and human clinical trials . . . become part of the NDA.” New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess
/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2016).

 [17]. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938).

 [18]. Junod, supra note 15, at 6–7. The randomized, controlled trial is now considered to be the “gold standard” of clinical research. See generally Laura Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard—Lessons from the History of RCTs, 374 New Eng. J. Med. 2175 (2016) (describing how randomized, controlled trials rose to prominence and transformed medical research).

 [19]. The drug’s sales equaled those of aspirin. Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, Helix (July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article
/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation.

 [20]. Id.

 [21]. Id.

 [22]. Tom Brody, Clinical Trials: Study Design, Endpoints and Biomarkers, Drug Safety, and FDA and ICH Guidelines 783 (2nd ed. 2016). More than 8,000 babies were born missing limbs, blind, or intellectually disabled as a result of the drug. Id.

 [23]. Fintel et al., supra note 19.

 [24]. Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).

 [25]. Id. § 104(c), 76 Stat. at 784.

 [26]. Jeremy A. Green & Scott H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—The Kefauver-Harris Amendments at 50, 367 New Eng. J. Med. 1481, 1481 (2012). See also infra Section II.A for further discussion of the clinical trial process.

 [27]. Kefauver-Harris Amendment §§ 102(d), 103(b), 76 Stat. at 780–81, 783. To meet this requirement, a manufacturer needs to conduct “adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience.” Id. at § 102(d), 76 Stat. at 780–81.

 [28]. A sponsor can be an individual physician or researcher, company, or institution that is responsible for the initiation, management, and possibly funding of the clinical trial. Int’l Council for Harmonisation of Tech. Requirements for Pharm. for Human Use (ICH), Guidance for Industry: E6 Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guidance 7 (2016) [hereinafter E6 Good Clinical Practice].

 [29]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2018) (listing IND requirements). The FDA defines “[a]n Investigational New Drug Application [(‘IND’) as] a request for authorization . . . to administer an investigational drug or biological product to humans.” Investigational New Drug (IND) or Device Exemption (IDE) Process (CBER), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines
/developmentapprovalprocess/investigationalnewdrugindordeviceexemptionideprocess/default.htm (last updated Jan. 19, 2018). A company must secure an IND prior to shipping a drug interstate or administering any investigational drug not the subject of an approved marketing application. Id.

 [30]. 21 § 312.23(a)(3)(iv). A clinical trial protocol describes “the objective(s), design, methodology, statistical considerations, and organization of a trial . . . [and] usually gives the background and rationale for the trial.” E6 Good Clinical Practice, supra note 28, at 6.

 [31]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(3)(iv).

 [32]. Id. § 312.22(a). The number of clinical trials necessary during each phase of clinical development can vary depending on the disease and availability of current treatments. It is estimated about seventy trials are needed during clinical development. Rick Ng, Drugs: From Discovery to Approval 140 (2005).

 [33]. Biotech. Innovation Org., Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, at 13 (2016) [hereinafter Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015], https://www.bio.org/sites/d
efault/files/Clinical%20Development%20Success%20Rates%202006-2015%20-%20BIO,
%20Biomedtracker,%20Amplion%202016.pdf; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (describing the three phases of clinical development); Brody, supra note 22, at 321 (noting phase I trials for cancer therapies are designed to identify the “minimal dose that can cause significant toxicity” given the assumption that “the most appropriate dose” is just below the “dose that produces unacceptable toxicity”).

 [34]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).

 [35]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 22 Case Studies Where Phase 2 and Phase 3 Trials Had Divergent Results 2 (2017) [hereinafter 22 Case Studies], https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM535780.pdf; Pharma. Research & Mfrs. of Am., Biopharmaceutical Research & Development: The Process Behind New Medicines 13 (2015) [hereinafter Biopharmaceutical Research & Development], http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites
/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf.

 [36]. Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 10.

 [37]. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 13.

 [38]. Id.

 [39]. See id.

 [40]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2018).

 [41]. Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 7.

 [42]. A company will sometimes conduct phase IV studies post-approval. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 16.

 [43]. Id. at 13.

  [44]. 21 C.F.R.  § 314.50 (describing the requirements for submitting a new drug marketing application); id. § 601.2 (describing the requirements for submitting a biologics license application). The new drug application must “tell the drug’s whole story” so that the FDA can decide

[1] [w]hether the drug is safe and effective in its proposed use(s), and whether the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks[;] [2] [w]hether the drug’s proposed labeling (package insert) is appropriate, and what it should contain[;] [3] [w]hether the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the controls used to maintain the drug’s quality are adequate to preserve the drug’s identity, strength, quality, and purity.

New Drug Application (NDA), supra note 16.

 [45]. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 13.

 [46]. See Benjamin Carlisle et al., Unsuccessful Trial Accrual and Human Subjects Protections: An Empirical Analysis of Recently Closed Trials, 12 Clinical Trials 77, 81 (2015) (“19% of trials registered as newly closed in 2011 either terminated due to failed accrual or completed with less than 85% of their expected [enrollment.]”); Aylin Sertkaya et al., Key Cost Drivers of Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials in the United States, 13 Clinical Trials 117, 117 (2016) (finding the three main causes of high clinical trial expenses were clinical procedures, administrative staff, and site monitoring); Gina Kolata, A Cancer Conundrum: Too Many Drug Trials, Too Few Patients, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vsMRXf. There are even companies that manufacturers hire to increase volunteer enrollment. See, e.g., Putting Our Focus to Work, Praxis, https://www.gopraxis.com/experience (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (providing various case studies of successful clinical trial enrollment campaigns).

 [47]. ASCO and Friends of Cancer Research Release Comprehensive Recommendations to Broaden Eligibility Criteria for Cancer Clinical Trials, Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology (Oct. 2, 2017) [hereinafter ASCO and Friends], https://www.asco.org/advocacy-policy/asco-in-action/asco-and-friends-cancer-research-release-comprehensive (noting factors, including age, comorbidities––such as heart disease, liver dysfunction, or kidney disease––advanced stage of disease, prior history of cancer, and HIV/AIDS).

 [48]. Id.

 [49]. Edward Kim et al., Broadening Eligibility Criteria to Make Clinical Trials More Representative: American Society of Clinical Oncology and Friends of Cancer Research Joint Research Statement, 35 J. Clinical Oncology 3737, 3742 (2017). See generally Susan Jin et al., Re-Evaluating Eligibility Criteria for Oncology Clinical Trials: Analysis of Investigational New Drug Applications in 2015, 35 J. Clinical Oncology 3745 (2017) (discussing the problems with eligibility criteria and finding that current criteria is too narrow in cancer clinical trials).

 [50]. Biopharmaceutical Research & Development, supra note 35, at 1 (“The overall probability of clinical success . . . is estimated to be less than 12%.”); see also Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 7 (“[O]nly 9.6% of drug development programs successfully make it to market.”); Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. Health Econ. 20, 20 (2016); Matthew Herper, The Cost of Developing Drugs Is Insane. That Paper that Says Otherwise Is Insanely Bad, Forbes (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper
/2017/10/16/the-cost-of-developing-drugs-is-insane-a-paper-that-argued-otherwise-was-insanely-bad.

 [51]. Michelle Cortez, The ‘Right to Try’ Could Cost Dying Patients a Fortune, Bloomberg (June 20, 2018, 10:44 AM) [hereinafter Cortez, Cost Dying Patients], https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2018-06-20/the-price-to-try-a-drug-could-be-300-000-for-dying-patients.

 [52]. Liz Szabo, Widespread Hype Gives False Hope to Many Cancer Patients, Kaiser Health News (Apr. 27, 2017), https://khn.org/news/widespread-hype-gives-false-hope-to-many-cancer-patients.

 [53]. See id.

 [54]. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979). Laetrile, derived from apricot pits, had been touted as an anti-cancer drug despite limited clinical studies examining its safety and efficacy. Barron H. Lerner, McQueen’s Legacy of Laetrile, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/health/mcqueens-legacy-of-laetrile.

 [55]. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 548 (citing Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1215 (W.D. Okla. 1975)).

 [56]. Id. at 549 (citing Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976)).

 [57]. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Okla. 1977). A new drug is one “not generally recognized, among experts . . . as safe and effective for use under conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2018).

  In addition to determining that laetrile was a new drug, the FDA also concluded that the Kefauver-Harris Amendment’s grandfather clause did not apply. Rutherford, 438 F. Supp. at 1289. The grandfather clause exempted drugs from the effectiveness requirement if they were on the day prior to enactment of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (1) “commercially used or sold in the United States,” (2) not a new drug under section 201(p) of the 1938-version of the FDCA, and (3) not “covered by an effective application” under section 505 of the 1938-version of the FDCA. See Kefauver-Harris Amendment § 107(4).

 [58]. Rutherford, 438 F. Supp. at 1294, 1300–01 (finding FDCA’s grandfather clause exempted laetrile from any pre-market approval requirement and that regardless of the statutory interpretation the right to “use a nontoxic substance” was encompassed within one’s “constitutional right of privacy”).

 [59]. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1235 (10th Cir. 1978).

 [60]. Id. at 1236. The court was not persuaded by the FDA’s argument that a non-effective drug used in the treatment of a life-threatening disease was also not safe. Id. at 1236–37. The court also expressly declined to address the lower court’s constitutional findings. Id. at 1237.

  In another case involving laetrile, a physician and several other co-defendants appealed misdemeanor convictions “for conspiracy to sell and prescribe an unapproved drug laetrile”—a violation of California Health and Safety Code section 1707.1—as unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court held, however, that “a right of access to drugs not recognized by the government as effective” was not a fundamental right recognized by the California or U.S. Constitutions. People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 925 (Cal. 1979).

 [61]. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979).

 [62]. Id. (explaining how FDCA section 505 requires FDA approval of a new drug unless the drug qualifies for grandfather clause exemption or is being administered through a clinical trial).

 [63]. Id. at 552.

 [64]. The deregulation efforts of the Trump administration, which include the Right to Try Act, arguably closely mirror, if not surpass, the deregulation efforts of the Reagan administration. See Paul Bedard, Trump Ahead of Reagan’s Record in Cutting Regulations, Wash. Examiner (Oct. 3, 2017, 7:16 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-ahead-of-reagans-record-in-cutting-regulations.

 [65]. Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of America’s Drug Constitution, 42 Am. J.L. & Med. 687, 700–01 (2016).

 [66]. Id. at 699–700 (citing Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, 26,742 (June 9, 1983) (codified at 2 C.F.R. pt. 312)).

 [67]. Id. at 701–02, 706.

 [68]. Id. at 694, 704–07 (“AIDS activism was the first mass movement for freedom of therapeutic choice within orthodox scientific medicine.”); see also Rebecca Dresser, When Science Offers Salvation: Patient Advocacy and Research Ethics 48–49, 52–55 (2001) (citing individual autonomy, the anticipated hastened development of improved treatments as a result of more clinical involvement, and justice by way of non-exclusionary participation as reasons to change the regulatory framework).

 [69]. A protocol sponsor could request that an investigational drug be made available for widespread use if the drug was intended for the treatment of a “serious or immediately life-threatening disease” for which there was “no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy available.” 21 C.F.R. 312.34 (1987). The FDA also required the manufacturer to be actively investigating the drug in a “controlled clinical trial” or to have completed testing, and “actively pursuing marketing approval” of the therapy with “due diligence.” Id. A sponsor requesting access for a “substantial population” of patients with a serious disease would likely need to submit data from phase III trials. Id.

 [70]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,148 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312); Grossman, supra note 65, at 735. The current individual patient expanded access program is separately discussed in Section II.B.

 [71]. The Accelerated Approval pathway enables a drug for the treatment of a serious condition to be approved based on a “surrogate endpoint.” U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions—Drugs and Biologics 1–7 (2014) [hereinafter Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM358301.pdf. Although a surrogate endpoint is not always indicative of the viability of a treatment, it “may be used instead of stronger indicators, such as longer survival or improved quality of life, because the results of the trial can be measured sooner.” Surrogate Endpoint, Nat’l Cancer Inst., https://www.cancer.gov/publications
/dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=729831 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). The FDA has approved more than 100 new drug applications submitted through the accelerated approval pathway since its introduction in 1992. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., CDER Drug and Biologic Accelerated Approvals Based on a Surrogate Endpoint (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/NDAandBLAApprovalReports/UCM404466.pdf.

 [72]. With the striated review framework, an investigational drug will either receive “Priority” or “Standard Review.” The FDA will grant an investigational drug Priority Review when it “treats a serious condition and, if approved, would provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness.” See Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions, supra note 71, at 24. The designation requires the FDA to review a marketing application within six months of receiving the submission rather than the standard ten-month review. Id. at 8.

 [73]. In the last twenty years, the FDA has introduced two other approaches to address concerns regarding the lengthy approval process—Fast Track and Breakthrough Therapy. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309–10 (1997); Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 902, 126 Stat. 993-1132 (2012). For more background regarding these two expedited designations, see Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions, supra note 71, at 9–15.

 [74]. Karyn Hede, Patient Group Seeks Overhaul of FDA Clinical Trial System in Court, 98 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 1268, 1268 (2006); see also Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance and the Washington Legal Foundation to the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, In re Tier 1 Initial Approval Program to Expedite the Availability of Lifesaving Drugs (June 11, 2003) [hereinafter Abigail Alliance Citizen Petition].

 [75]. Abigail Alliance Citizen Petition, supra note 74, at 5.

 [76]. The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (the “Abigail Alliance”) was founded in November 2001 following the death of twenty-one-year-old Abigail Burroughs from squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck. About, Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs, https://www.abigail-alliance.org/p/about.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). Burroughs’s story is similar to that of Andrea Sloan’s. After traditional chemotherapy and radiation failed, Burroughs attempted to enroll in multiple clinical trials but did not meet the eligibility requirements. While she was ultimately able to enroll in a clinical trial, her cancer had progressed, and she died shortly thereafter. Peter Hart, Abigail Alliance Case Discussed: Balancing Study Drugs, Safety, Univ. Pitt. Times (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.utimes.pitt.edu/?p=8605; Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 205 (2007). The investigational drug that Burroughs sought, cetuximab, was at the time only being studied in patients with colorectal cancer. Id. In 2011—ten years after Burroughs’s death—cetuximab was approved by the FDA for the treatment of patients with late-stage head and neck cancer. Ben Leach, Cetuximab Approved by FDA for Patients with Late-Stage Head and Neck Cancer, OncLive (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.onclive.com/web-exclusives/cetuximab-approved-by-fda-for-patients-with-late-stage-head

-and-neck-cancer.

 [77]. Abigail Alliance Citizen Petition, supra note 74, at 9.

 [78]. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. McClellan, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594 at *4, *20–21 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Associate Commissioner for External Relations, Department of Health and Human Services, to Frank Burroughs, President Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Apr. 25, 2003)).

 [79]. Id. at *5.

 [80]. Id.

 [81]. Id. The Abigail Alliance reasoned that if companies were allowed to profit from sales of investigational drugs to terminally ill patients, they would be more apt to provide terminally ill patients access under compassionate use. Id.

 [82]. Id. at *25–36. The court concluded that no recognized fundamental right was involved because the “plaintiffs have stated the holdings of Glucksberg, Cruzan, and Griswold too broadly in their attempt to apply the privacy and liberty rights to the instant case,” and that there was no authority supporting “the proposition that the due process right to life extends to requiring affirmative access by terminally ill patients to investigational drugs.” Id. at *31–32. Therefore, the FDA policy was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id.

 [83]. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Of note, the court distinguished this action from Rutherford v. United States by emphasizing that in this action, terminally ill patients were seeking investigational drugs that had successfully completed phase I trials. Id. at 486.

 [84]. Id.

 [85]. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

 [86]. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711–12, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Only the author of the panel’s majority opinion dissented. Id.

 [87]. Id. at 703. The en banc court noted that the Alliance’s “claimed right depends on a regulatory determination that the drug is safe for testing, prompting an obvious question: How can a constitutional right be defined by an administrative regulation that is subject to change?” Id. at 702 n.6.

 [88]. Id. at 702–03.

 [89]. Id. at 703 n.7, 704–06 (discussing the long history of drug regulation in England, the adoption of drug-dispensing legislation by the Virginia colony, and enactment of various other legislation regulating unsafe drugs in Louisiana, Alabama and Georgia).

 [90]. Id. at 706–07 (explaining that if lack of government interference was sufficient, “it would be easy to employ such a premise to support sweeping claims of fundamental rights”). The court posited that a more “plausible explanation for the limited efficacy regulation” was the fact that “[t]he history of the effectiveness requirement in drug regulation is inextricably linked to the advent of the randomized, controlled clinical trial as the cornerstone of medical research . . ., [which] would not become widely recognized until the twentieth century.” Id. at 706 n.12 (quoting Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 127, 131 (1999)).

 [91]. See id. at 707–10.

 [92]. Id. at 713.

 [93]. Id. The en banc court further substantiated its reasoning with previous Supreme Court decisions upholding the FDCA and prior circuit court decisions rejecting “arguments that the Constitution provides an affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably prohibited by the Government.” Id. at 710–13 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979)); see also id. at 711 n.18 (citing Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993); N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc’y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980); Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980)).

 [94]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900, 40,942–45 (Aug. 13, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312, 316). While the Abigail Alliance case made its way through the judicial system in 2006, the FDA announced proposed rules to clarify the individual patient expanded access program. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,148 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

 [95]. Expanded Access, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents
/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/default.htm (last updated Nov. 8, 2018).

 [96]. Expanded Access Categories for Drugs (Including Biologics), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm431774.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).

 [97]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a)(1) (2018); Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,153 (Dec. 14, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

The evidence needed to make this determination for expanded access for an individual patient will vary. For a patient with an immediately life-threatening condition, the evidentiary burden could be very low—little if any clinical evidence to suggest a potential benefit or possibly only animal data to support safety of the use. For a patient with a serious, but not immediately life-threatening, condition who could expect to enjoy a reasonable quality of life for an extended time without any treatment, the evidentiary burden would be higher.

Id. § 312.310(a)(1).

 [98]. Expanded Access: Information for Physicians, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. [hereinafter Information for Physicians], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus
/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm429624.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2018).

 [99]. IND Applications for Clinical Treatment: Contents and Format, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/ucm363005.htm (last updated Dec. 23, 2015). The criteria used by a manufacturer to determine whether to provide a letter of authorization (“LOA”) is covered in Section II.B.2.

 [100]. Compassionate Use and Expanded Access, Pfizer [hereinafter Pfizer Policy], https://www.pfizer.com/purpose/medicine-access/compassionate-use (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (“In 2017, the PfizerCAReS portal received 4,818 requests from 59 countries, of which 98% were approved.”); see also Criteria for Consideration of Access, Genentech [hereinafter Genentech Policy], https://www.gene.com/patients/investigational-medicines/criteria (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs: FDA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Expanded Access Program but Should Further Clarify how Adverse Events Data Are Used 16 (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs], https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685729.pdf (discussing findings of an FDA survey of nine manufacturers, in which manufacturers reported receiving between thirty-nine and 800 individual patient expanded access requests).

 [101]. Steve Usdin, FDA to Facilitate Access to Unapproved Drugs, BioCentury (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.biocentury.com/biocentury/regulation/2018-12-14/how-fda-plans-help-patients-get-expanded-access-unapproved-drugs.

 [102]. See generally Company Directory, Reagan-Udall Found., http://navigator.reaganudall.org
/company-directory
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

 [103]. See infra Appendix.

 [104]. Information for Physicians, supra note 98. An abbreviated form was introduced by the FDA in 2016 after complaints that the previous form, which was required for all expanded access categories, was overly complex and time consuming. See discussion infra Section III.B.

 [105]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(c) (2018). A patient may start treatment thirty days after the FDA’s receipt of the IND submission, or earlier if the FDA informs the treating physician that expanded access use can start. Id. § 312.20(c); FDA, Expanded Access: Information for Patients, https://www.fda.gov
/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm20041768.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 2018). The criteria used by the FDA to determine whether to grant expanded access is covered in Section II.B.3.

 [106]. GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 20.

 [107]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Individual Patient Expanded Access Applications: Form FDA 3926 Guidance for Industry 6 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs
/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm432717.pdf. “An [institutional review board (“IRB”)] means any board, committee, or other group formally designated by an institution to review, to approve the initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of biomedical research involving human subjects. The primary purpose of IRB review is to assure that the rights and welfare of human subjects are protected.” Id. at 6 n.10.

 [108]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.10 (2018); see also Scott Gottlieb, Expanded Access: FDA Describes Efforts to Ease Application Process, FDA Voice (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom
/FDAVoices/ucm612009.htm
.

 [109]. Information for Physicians, supra note 98.

 [110]. There is also no guidance on who within a biopharmaceutical company should make that decision. In general, most companies delegate decisionmaking authority to their medical or clinical team. See infra Appendix.

 [111]. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials and Communication of Clinical Trial Results 28–29 (2015) [hereinafter Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials], http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/042009
_clinical_trial_principles_final_0.pdf; BIO Principles on Expanded Access to Investigational, Unapproved Medicines, Biotech. Innovation Org. [hereinafter BIO Principles on Expanded Access], https://www.bio.org/articles/bio-principles-expanded-access-investigational-unapproved-medicines (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); see also Bill Chin, Newly Implemented Expanded Access Principles Support Commitment to Patients, PhRMA: The Catalyst (June 3, 2015), https://catalyst.phrma.org/newly-implemented-expanded-access-principles-support-commitment-to-patients. The evaluation criteria of the FDA, respectively, are discussed in Section II.B.3.

 [112]. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 28–29.

 [113]. The Appendix surveys the expanded access criteria of the top twenty pharmaceutical companies by global sales. Top Pharma List: Top 25 Pharma Companies by Global Sales, PMLiVE, http://www.pmlive.com/top_pharma_list/global_revenues (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). For additional analysis of expanded access policies, see Emily Jung et al., Prevalence of Publicly Available Expanded Access Policies, 104 Clinical Pharm. & Therapeutics 1016 (2018).

 [114]. See infra Appendix. These policies were not widely available until the enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”). For a more in-depth discussion of the Cures Act, see supra Section III.B.

 [115]. See infra Appendix.

 [116]. Id. PhRMA and BIO do not define active clinical development. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 28; BIO Principles on Expanded Access, supra note 111.

 [117]. See infra Appendix.

 [118]. Id.

 [119]. Id. This aligns with PhRMA’s approach. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 28 (“Geographic limitations alone would generally not be considered a barrier to participation in clinical trials.”).

 [120]. Genentech Policy, supra note 100. This could have implications for some rural patients, who might have difficulties enrolling in a clinical trial given the distance and costs associated with travel. Rebecca A. English et al., Transforming Clinical Research in the United States: Challenges and Opportunities 24 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50892/pdf
/Bookshelf_NBK50892.pdf.

 [121]. Pfizer Policy, supra note 100; see also Teva Pharm., Expanded Access Programs 2 (2015), https://www.tevapharm.com/files/policy.pdf.

 [122]. See infra Appendix.

 [123]. Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 29; see also BIO Principles on Expanded Access, supra note 111 (discussing similar requirements).

 [124]. See, e.g., Position on Expanded Access to Investigational Medicines, Astellas [hereinafter Astellas Position], https://www.astellas.com/system/files/Position%20on%20Expanded%20Access
%20E%202017-04-11.pdf (last updated Apr. 2017).

 [125]. Allergan Pre-Approval Access Program, Allergan, https://www.allergan.com/research-and-development/pre-approval-access (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

 [126]. See infra Appendix.

 [127]. See, e.g., Genentech Policy, supra note 100.

 [128]. See Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials, supra note 111, at 29; BIO Principles on Expanded Access, supra note 111. See also infra Section III.B for a discussion regarding the FDA’s use of adverse events.

 [129].               See infra Appendix.

 [130]. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

 [131]. Arthur L. Caplan & Amrit Ray, The Ethical Challenges of Compassionate Use, 315 JAMA 979, 980 (2016).

Between July 1 and December 31, 2015, Janssen received 160 preapproval access requests for daratumumab. Of these, company physicians determined that [forty-three] had a benefit-risk profile that was not favorable, [twenty-eight] requests had not exhausted all approved alternative therapies or were eligible for expanded-access programs or clinical trials, and [thirteen] were excluded for other reasons (eg, incomplete data for assessment).

Id.

 [132]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(1) (2018).

 [133]. Id. § 312.300(b).

 [134]. Id.

 [135]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,151 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). Additional examples of diseases and conditions that would fit in this category include seizures, rheumatoid arthritis, and chronic depression. Id.

 [136]. Id.

 [137].               Id.

 [138]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(2).

 [139]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,150.

 [140]. Id. at 75,151.

 [141]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3).

 [142]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,151.

 [143]. Rebecca A. English et al., supra note 120, at 64.

 [144]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a)(2).

 [145]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use—Questions and Answers: Guidance for Industry 12 (2017) [hereinafter Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances
/ucm351261.pdf.

 [146]. For additional discussion regarding why the FDA might deny a request for individual patient expanded access, see id. at 12.

 [147]. GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 17 (reporting FDA received more than 5,000 single-patient expanded access requests during this period). The FDA also granted 245 requests from trial sponsors for expanded access in the intermediate-size and treatment protocol setting. Id. (stating that the FDA allowed 95.1% of intermediate-size requests and 100% of treatment protocol requests to proceed). The FDA does not specifically track the number of patients who are treated under intermediate-size or treatment protocol applications. In 2006, the FDA estimated that since the formal implementation of the expanded access program, this number was around 100,000 patients. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,148 (Dec. 14, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).

 [148]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Scott Gottlieb, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Comm’r), https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asl/testimony/2017-10/examining-patient-access-to-investigational
-drugs.html.

 [149]. Id.

 [150]. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

 [151]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.)); see also Sandefur, supra note 9, at 528.

 [153]. Sandefur, supra note 9, at 519.

 [154]. Id. at 513.

 [155]. Id. at 529–30. The Goldwater Institute attempted to root this final argument in a constitutional right to access while distinguishing it from the prior failed attempts to challenge FDA regulatory oversight in Rutherford and Abigail Alliance. Sandefur, supra note 9, at 513, 519 (suggesting that in Abigail Alliance, patients wanted the “authority to access drugs that had not yet been approved for safe use by the FDA”). That claim, however, that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to use non-FDA approved drugs that have successfully completed phase I testing is the very same fundamental right the Abigail Alliance unsuccessfully advocated for in Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach. Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (examining “whether terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to experimental drugs that . . . passed Phase I clinical testing”). For additional background regarding Rutherford and Abigail Alliance, see supra Section II.A.

 [156]. Corieri, supra note 9, at 11.

 [157]. See supra Section II.B.3.

 [158]. Id.

 [159]. See supra Introduction.

 [160]. Gail A. Van Norman, Expanding Patient Access to Investigational Drugs, 3 JACC: Basic Translational Sci. 280, 291 (2018); see also GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 17; Hudson, supra note 2. But see U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Expanded Access Program Report 21 (2018) [hereinafter Expanded Access Program Report], https://www.fda.gov
/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM618903.pdf (noting that manufacturers with active expanded access programs approve 40% to 95% of expanded access requests).

 [161]. See supra Section II.B.2; infra Appendix.

 [162]. Top Pharma List: Top 25 Pharma Companies by Global Sales, supra note 113.

 [163]. Pfizer Policy, supra note 100.

 [164]. See Margot J. Fromer, Accelerating Pediatric Drug Development: Master Protocols May be a Way to Go, ASCO Post (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/april-25-2017/accelerating-pediatric-drug-development-master-protocols-may-be-a-way-to-go (proposing a master protocol to aid pediatric research); Press Release, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr., FDA Announces First Approval of Targeted Therapy Based on Basket Study (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.mskcc.org/trending-topics/fda-announces-first-approval-targeted-therapy-based-basket-study (discussing similar protocol used in the adult setting, which lead to FDA approval).

 [165]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3742.

 [166]. See generally Mark Flatten, Goldwater Inst., Studied to Death: FDA Overcaution Brings Deadly Consequences (2018), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11
/Studied-to-Death-web.pdf
(proposing additional means to reduce FDA oversight through conditional approval, reciprocal review upon approval from a foreign regulatory authority, and off-label promotion of approved drugs).

 [167]. See supra Section I.B.

 [168]. Nicholas S. Downing et al., Regulatory Review of Novel Therapeutics—Comparison of Three Regulatory Agencies, 366 New Eng. J. Med. 2284, 2284 (2012). Of note, this study was conducted prior to the creation of the Breakthrough Therapy designation. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

 [169]. Caroline Chen, FDA Repays Industry by Rushing Risky Drugs to Market, ProPublica (June 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/fda-repays-industry-by-rushing-risky-drugs-to-market. Of note, some HIV/AIDs activists now argue that their efforts during the 1980s and 1990s “opened a Pandora’s box.” Id.

 [170]. Sydney Lupkin, Nearly 1 in 3 Recent FDA Drug Approvals Followed by Major Safety Actions, Kaiser Health News (May 9, 2017), https://khn.org/news/1-in-3-recent-fda-drug-approvals-followed-by-major-safety-actions (“It took a median time period of 4.2 years after the drugs were approved for these safety concerns to come to light, and issues were more common among . . . drugs that were granted ‘accelerated approval’ and drugs that were approved near the regulatory deadline for approval.”).

 [171]. See How Will the Federal Right to Try Law Impact Drug Development?, Clinical Leader (June 27, 2018) [hereinafter Clinical Leader], https://www.clinicalleader.com/doc/how-will-the-federal-right-to-try-law-impact-drug-development-0001.

 [172]. Clinical Development Success Rates 2006–2015, supra note 33, at 3 (“Phase II clinical programs continue to experience the lowest success rate of the four development phases, with only 30.7% of developmental candidates advancing to Phase III.”); see also 22 Case Studies, supra note 35, at 1.

 [173]. See supra Section I.B.

 [174]. Larry Thompson, The Cure that Killed: FIAU Destroyed a Deadly Virus. Then It Began to Destroy Patients., Discover Mag. (Mar. 1, 1994), http://discovermagazine.com/1994/mar
/thecurethatkille345.

 [175]. Mark Flatten, Dead on Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves Little Hope for Dying Patients, RighttoTry (Feb. 24, 2016), http://righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival (“Those facing imminent death cannot access a drug while it is being tested, even if early results show that it works better than existing treatments, unless they are among the fortunate few who qualify for clinical trials. That amounts to a death sentence for most patients, even though their cure may have already been found.”); see also Thompson, supra note 174.

 [176]. H.R. 6288 (112th): Patient Choice Act of 2012, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/112/hr6288 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (proposing to allow “provisional approval” of drugs with Fast Track designation); S. 3045 (110th): ACCESS Act, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/110/s3046 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (proposing the creation of a “conditional approval system”).

 [177]. See Debate: Benefits, Harms of Social Media Sharing from Medical Conferences,  HemOnc Today (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.healio.com/hematology-oncology/practice-management/news
/online/%7Bfa961a3a-28d2-4909-a186-dbad928ddd03%7D/debate-benefits-harms-of-social-media-sharing-from-medical-conferences (describing how non-attendees can follow along on Twitter or access abstracts and posts through conference databases); Forums, Myeloma Beacon, https://myelomabeacon.org/forum (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (including example of patient forum discussing treatment options).

 [178]. See Sharon Begley, Beware the Hype: Top Scientists Cautious About Fighting Cancer with Immunotherapy, Stat News (Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/25/cancer-immunotherapy-caution; Joy Victory, A Cancer Doctor Speaks Out: How Premature Hype About Experimental Drugs Fails Patients, HealthNewsReview (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.healthnewsreview.org/2018/04/a-cancer-doctor-speaks-out-how-premature-hype-about-experimental-drugs-fails-patients.

 [179]. Szabo, supra note 52.

 [180]. Ned Pagliarulo, Viagra No More: The Changing Face of Drug Ads on TV, BioPharmaDive (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/drug-ads-tv-pharma-changing-face-dtc-advertising/539982; see also Kevin McCaffrey, Merck’s DTC Ad for Keytruda Hints at More Cancer Brands Turning to TV, MM&M (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.mmm-online.com/home
/channel/commercial/mercks-dtc-ad-for-keytruda-hints-at-more-cancer-brands-turning-to-tv (“From June 2013 to February [2017], pharma companies spent an estimated $223 million on more than 42,000 airings for DTC ads . . . Before 2013, when the first Provenge DTC aired, it was unheard of for brands to use direct-to-consumer advertising for oncology drugs.”).

 [181]. Kathryn Doyle, Cancer Hospital Advertising Triples Since 2005, Reuters (July 11, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-cancer-ads-idUSKCN0ZR2D6.

 [182]. C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic?, 36 Pharmacy & Therapeutics 669, 669, 673–82 (2011).

 [183]. Stephanie M. Lee, Cancer Hospital Ads Deceive Patients About Their Chances of Survival, New Report Finds, BuzzFeed (Oct. 25, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article
/stephaniemlee/cancer-treatment-center-misleading-ads; Szabo, supra note 52 (“A TV commercial for the Bristol-Myers Squibb drug Opdivo projects the words ‘a chance to live longer’ on the side of skyscrapers, as a captivated crowd looks on. In much smaller type, a footnote reveals that lung cancer patients taking Opdivo lived just 3.2 months longer than others.”).

 [184]. Tim K. Mackey & Virginia J. Schoenfeld, Going “Social” to Access Experimental and Potentially Life-Saving Treatment: An Assessment of the Policy and Online Patient Advocacy Environment for Expanded Access, 14 BioMed Cent. Med., no. 17, 2016, at 1–10; see also Alison Bateman-House et al., Findings on “Right to Try” Laws and Pre-Approval/Compassionate/Expanded Access to Investigational Medical Products, N.Y.U. Sch. Med. (July 1, 2016) [hereinafter Bateman-House, Findings], https://med.nyu.edu/pophealth/sites/default/files/pophealth/RTT%20Findings
%20FINAL%207_1.pdf (“The number of Change.org online petitions in support of individual requests has increased over the last several years.”).

 [185]. See, e.g., Laura Fraser, The Demonstration, Genentech (Sept. 2016), https://www.gene.com
/stories/the-demonstration.

 [186]. E.g., Darshak M. Sanghavi, The Pills of Last Resort, N.Y. Times Mag. (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/magazine/how-dying-patients-get-access-to-experimental-drugs
.html.

 [187]. Cohen, supra note 6; Sydney Lupkin, Merck Expands Cancer Drug Access but too Late for Denver Dad, ABC News (Mar. 18, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/merck-expands-cancer-drug-access-late-denver-dad/story?id=22954543; Tirrell, supra note 5.

 [188]. See Dresser, The Gap, supra note 10, at 10 (“To lawmakers and the public hearing these stories, it would be cruel to vote against a right to try law.”); Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: How ‘Right to Try’ Caught Washington’s Eye, Wash. Post (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/02/01/the-health-202-how-right-to-try-caught-washington-s-eye/5a71fcc330fb041c3c7d755e (discussing how the right-to-try movement’s success is in part due to patients and their families reaching out to their representatives); Richard Halstead, BioMarin Denies ‘Compassionate Use’ of Experimental Drug, Considers Adding Cancer Patient to Clinical Trial, Marin Indep. J. (Jul. 19, 2018, 3:17 AM), https://www.marinij.com
/2013/09/06/biomarin-denies-compassionate-use-of-experimental-drug-considers-adding-cancer-patient-to-clinical-trial (discussing how Rep. Jared Huffman (D-San Rafael, Cal.) was involved in a case after receiving “a flood of calls to his office”).

 [189]. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-45-101–108 (2014); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 489.001–.151 (West 2015); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1311–1314 (2014); see also Patti Parson, Colorado First State to Pass ‘Right to Try,’ or the ‘Dallas Buyers’ Club’ Law, PBS News Hour (May 19, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/colorado-first-state-pass-right-try-dallas-buyers-club-law.

 [190]. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 127 (2017); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548–111548.5 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [191]. Some of the state laws were sponsored by politicians with personal connections. Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Right to Try” Laws Spur Debate Over Dying Patients’ Access to Experimental Drugs, Wash. Post (May 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/right-to-try-laws-spur-debate-over-dying-patients-access-to-experimental-drugs/2014/05/16/820e08c8-dcfa-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html (the Colorado law was co-sponsored by a Democrat whose brother benefited from a clinical trial); Michele Munz, Missouri’s “Right to Try” Law No Guarantee Patient Will Get Experimental Drugs, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (May 20, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com
/news/local/metro/missouri-s-right-to-try-law-no-guarantee-patientwill/article_05c07958-5217-5c3f-9f15-1a43c8a3e740.html (reporting the Missouri law was sponsored by a Republican lawmaker whose daughter died of cancer). Others, like California Assembly Majority Leader Ian Calderon, sponsored the right-to-try bill because it was “a logical companion to Death with Dignity.” Exploring a Right to Try for Terminally Ill Patients: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 1–2 (2016) (statement of Ian C. Calderon, Majority Leader, Cal. State Assemb.), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Calderon-2016-09-22.pdf. He explained before Congress:

I never saw the two issues as incompatible. I didn’t want to limit the options for those diagnosed with a terminal illness, to only death, albeit a more controlled one. I felt strongly that if we were going to pass Death with Dignity, and thus make it easier for terminally ill patients to die in California, that we should also make it easier for these terminally ill patients to fight to live, by giving them access to potentially life-saving drugs and treatments, that have been deemed safe, but not yet approved by the FDA.

Id. at 2–3.

 [192]. See supra note 11 (listing states that have adopted right-to-try laws).

 [193]. Compare Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.  § 489.053(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Regular & First Called Sess.) (stating a company cannot charge a patient), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1312(B)(2) (West, Westlaw through First Special & Second Regular 2018 Sess.) (stating a company can charge a patient “costs of or associated with the manufacture of the investigational drug”), and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.2(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (same).

 [194]. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.2(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (stating insurance providers are allowed to choose not to cover the cost of the therapy or costs related to that treatment); Or. Rev. Stat. § 127 (2017), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors
/ors127.html (same); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-45-104(b)–(c) (2014) (stating insurance providers are also allowed to deny certain coverage for a period of up to six months after the commencement of treatment).

 [195]. Compare Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h)(1)­(A)–(H), (h)(2) (stating a patient must be informed, among other things, of potential impact on hospice eligibility and at-home care), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-45-103(4) (West, Westlaw through Second Regular 2018 Sess.) (same), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1311(1)(d) (2014) (including no definition of informed consent).

 [196]. See Alexander Gaffney, Company’s Compassion Leads to Clinical Hold on Experimental Drug, Reg. Focus (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2014/11/19/20780
/Companys-Compassion-Leads-to-Clinical-Hold-on-Experimental-Drug (noting the FDA stopped enrollment of an expanded access treatment protocol after a patient died).

 [197]. Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 18. A drug label includes information “such as disease indications, target populations, drug–drug interactions, and [adverse drug reactions]. The label of a prescription drug is prepared by manufacturers and approved by the FDA and, thus, in its final form, reflects the collective input from regulators, drug manufacturers, and scientific experts.” Hong Fang et al., FDA Drug Labeling: Rich Resources to Facilitate Precision Medicine, Drug Safety, and Regulatory Science, 21 Drug Discovery Today 1566, 1566 (2016).

 [198]. Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 18.

 [199]. GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs, supra note 100, at 17.  

 [200]. Gottlieb, supra note 108; see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry and Investigators: Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies 29 (2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM227351.pdf (providing criteria regarding what might qualify as an adverse event).

 [201]. Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 18.

 [202]. Shannon Firth, FDA Head Expresses Doubt About ‘Right to Try’, MedPage Today (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.medpagetoday.com/washington-watch/fdageneral/68310 (FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb stated, “I think that the biggest obstacle to providing drugs through expanded access is the supply constraints”). Adequate supply is often a factor when evaluating an expanded access request. See infra Appendix. This is a genuine concern because a manufacturer initially only develops sufficient supply for its trials. See Fraser, supra note 185 (“[Genentech] was already in the process of trying to dramatically ramp up its production of Herceptin, encountering roadblocks in machinery, engineering and chemistry along the way.”).

 [203]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria in Clinical Trials: Workshop Report 10 (2018) [hereinafter Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria], https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/RegulatoryInformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDARA/UCM613054.pdf.

 [204]. See Tirrell, supra note 5 (explaining that fifteen-year-old Nathalie Traller was unable to enroll in clinical trials—despite meeting all of the eligibility criteria—because of her age).

 [205]. Juliet Eilperin & Carolyn Y. Johnson, Obama, Paying Tribute to Biden and Bipartisanship, Signs 21st Century Cures Act Tuesday, Wash. Post: PowerPost (Dec. 13, 2016), https://wapo.st
/2gXhOsT.

 [206]. E.g., Hal Barron, A Scientific Application of Compassion, Genentech (May 15, 2013), https://www.gene.com/stories/a-scientific-application-of-compassion. But see Press Release, Cancer Survivor Andrea Sloan, Ovarian Cancer Survivor Andrea Sloan Seeks Compassionate Use Exemption from BioMarin to Save Her Life (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/ovarian-cancer-survivor-andrea-sloan-seeks-compassionate-use-exemption-from-biomarin-1825934.htm (“Despite best efforts to contact BioMarin, the company has not been cooperative, merely sighting their lack of a policy on the issue.”).

 [207]. Ed Silverman, 21st Century Cures Would Require Pharma to Post Policies on Experimental Drugs, Stat: PharmaLot (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/28/21st-century-experimental-drugs.

 [208]. See generally 21st Century Cures Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–0 (2018).

 [209]. Id. § 360bbb–0(c).

 [210]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 4 (2017) (statement of the Alison Bateman-House, Assistant Professor, Division of Medical Ethics, Department of Population Health, N.Y.U. Langone Health) [hereinafter Bateman-House, Examining Patient Access] (explaining why an enforcement mechanism is necessary, given that there is “less than 100% compliance with the rule”). For additional discussion about compliance with respect to specific provisions in the Cures Act, see Jung et al., supra note 113.

 [211]. See Expanded Access/Right to Try Act, BrainStorm Cell Therapeutics, http://www.brainstorm-cell.com/patients-caregivers/expanded-accesscompassionate-use (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (stating the company currently does not offer expanded access).

 [212]. Company Directory, supra note 102.

 [213]. Usdin, supra note 101.

 [214]. About the Expanded Access Navigator, Reagan-Udall Found., http://navigator.reaganudall.org/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (“The Expanded Access Navigator, or EA Navigator, represents a unique partnership between the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, patient advocacy organizations, the pharmaceutical industry, and the federal government to provide clear, digestible information on single-patient EA.”).

 [215]. See id. The addition of this resource (that is, connecting community physicians with regional IRB committees) could be a relatively simple way of helping alleviate potential application disparities between patients who are primarily treated at academic centers where physicians are more aware of clinical trials and expanded access, and patients who are primarily treated by a community physician who might have less familiarity and access to these resources.

 [216]. Zachary Brennan, FDA Looks to Revitalize Compassionate Use Program with Simplified Form, Final Guidance, Reg. Focus (June 2, 2016) [hereinafter Brennan, Revitalize Compassionate Use], https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2016/6/fda-looks-to-revitalize-compassionate-use-program-with-simplified-form,-final-guidance.

 [217]. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Investigational New Drug Application (IND): Form FDA 1571 [hereinafter Form FDA 1571], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM083533.pdf (last updated July 2018); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement of Investigator: Form FDA 1572, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM074728.pdf (last updated Feb. 2016).

 [218]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 5.

 [219]. Statement, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Robert Califf, M.D. on the Release of the Final Individual Patient Expanded Access Form (Jun. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Statement from FDA Commissioner Califf], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom
/PressAnnouncements/ucm504579.htm.

 [220]. Brennan, Revitalize Compassionate Use, supra note 216.

 [221]. Id. Form FDA 1571 has twenty-six fields and requires seven attachments. Form FDA 1517, supra note 217. Form FDA 3926 has eight fields and requires one attachment. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Instructions for Filling out Form FDA 3926—Individual Patient Expanded Access, Investigational New Drug Application (IND), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM504574.pdf (last updated Apr. 2017).

 [222]. Id.; see also Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 5.

 [223]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 16.

 [224]. Gottlieb, supra note 108; Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 6.

 [225]. Gottlieb, supra note 108; see also FDA Simplifies IRB Requirements for Individual Patient Expanded Access, Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.asco.org/advocacy-policy/asco-in-action/fda-simplifies-irb-requirements-individual-patient-expanded-access. But see Kelly McBride Folkers & Alison Bateman-House, Will New FDA Regulation on IRB Review Speed Patient Access to Experimental Drugs?, Health Affairs Blog (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171205.384786/full (suggesting it is difficult to assess the actual impact of this change without “baseline data” regarding the role of IRB review in the expanded access process).

 [226]. E.g., Expanded Access to Unapproved Drugs, Biologics, or Devices and Right to Try Laws, U. Cal. Irvine: Off. Res., https://www.research.uci.edu/compliance/human-research-protections
/researchers/expanded-access-and-right-to-try.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2019); Investigational New Drugs and Biologics, U. Cal. S.F.: Off. Ethics & Compliance, https://irb.ucsf.edu/investigational-new-drugs-and-biologics (last updated Apr. 13, 2018).

 [227]. E.g., Joseph A. Catania et al., Survey of U.S. Human Research Protection Organizations: Workload and Membership, 3 J. Empirical Res. on Hum. Res. Ethics 57, 61–62 (2008); see also IRB—Human Participants Committee Membership, Cornell Univ. Off. Res. Integrity & Assurance, https://www.irb.cornell.edu/membership (noting the university’s IRB committee is generally made up of twelve to eighteen voting members) (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

 [228]. See Levels of Review: Expediated Research, U. Cal. Irvine: Off. Res., https://www.research.uci.edu/compliance/human-research-protections/researchers/levels-of-review.html
#Expedited (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (anonymous surveys and chart reviews).

 [229].  Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 6.

 [230]. The idea of a “consulting physician” builds from a few of the state right-to-try laws, including California, which still require a second physician to review and concur with the treating physician’s opinion, but not an IRB to review and approve the treating physician’s opinion. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(a), (b)(4), (b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [231]. Mershon, supra note 7; Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Johnson to FDA: Agency Should Comply with Right to Try Law (May 31, 2018) [hereinafter Press Release, Johnson to FDA], https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-to-fda-agency-should-comply-with-right-to-try-law (“This law intends to diminish the FDA’s power over people’s lives, not increase it. It is designed to work within existing FDA regulations, definitions, and approval processes. It is not meant to grant FDA more power or enable the FDA to write new guidance, rules, or regulations . . . .”); see also Alison Bateman-House & Christopher T. Robertson, Opinion, The Federal Right to Try Act of 2017—A Wrong Turn for Access to Investigational Drugs and the Path Forward, 178 JAMA Internal Med. 321, 321–22 (2018) (arguing that as-written the federal Right to Try Act was meant to undercut the FDA’s authority rather than to create a more effective pre-approval access pathway).

 [232]. FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–52, § 610(a)(2), 131 Stat. 1005, 1052 (2017).

 [233]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 13.

 [234]. Id. at 13–14.

 [235]. Expanded Access INDs and Protocols 2009–2017, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/publichealthfocus/expandedaccesscompassionateuse/ucm443572.htm (last updated Feb. 21, 2018). The number of requests between 2015 and 2016 increased 31% from 779 to 1,025. Id.

 [236]. See Statement from FDA Commissioner Califf, supra note 219.

 [237]. This is not just an expanded access problem. The right-to-try laws, both state and federal, do not compel manufacturer participation. See infra Section IV.A.

 [238]. Sammy Caiola, Federal Right to Try Proposal Could Make California Law More Effective, Capital Pub. Radio (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/109381 (discussing the need for complementary federal legislation).

 [239]. See Right to Try Act of 2015, H.R. 3012, 114th Cong. (as reported by H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec. & Investigations, July 29, 2015); see also Caiola, supra note 238.

 [240]. Zachary Brennan, Who’s Actually Using ‘Right-to-Try’ Laws? A Texas Oncologist Explains His Experience, Reg. Aff. Blog (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2017
/8/who-s-actually-using-right-to-try-laws-a-texas-oncologist-explains-his-experience (“The six patient testimonies provided to Focus by the libertarian Goldwater Institute . . . all focus on obtaining this same investigational cancer therapy outside of a clinical trial from the former director of therapeutic nuclear medicine at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center.”); David Kroll, Trump’s Call for #RightToTry Experimental Drug Access: A Nothingburger for Patients and Families, Forbes (Jan. 31, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2018/01/31/trumps-call-for-righttotry-experimental-drug-access-a-nothingburger-for-patients-and-families (citing National Right to Try Movement, Meet Dr. Ebrahim Delpassand, Facebook (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/RightToTry/videos
/592616080918116; and Richard Pazdur, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., NDA Approval Letter, NDA-208700 for Luthathera 4–5 (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter
/2018/208700Orig1s000ltr.pdf).

It’s disingenuous of #RightToTry advocates to use [Dr. Delpassand’s story] to justify non-FDA-reviewed patient access to drugs after Phase 1 preliminary safety studies, the very early stage of drug studies in humans. If you look specifically around 0:54 of the Right To Try video, Dr. Delpassand’s disappointment on behalf of his patients was due to the FDA’s denial of his broad expanded-use request—that is, after Phase 3 safety and efficacy trials were completed and under FDA review. If one looks at the NDA approval letter, the FDA still had at least another year of questions and concerns about the drug since the April 28, 2016, NDA submission.

Kroll, supra (emphasis in original); see also Munz, supra note 191 (discussing how one man with ALS moved back to Missouri after the state passed its right-to-try law thinking that he would be able to obtain an investigational drug through the pathway, but the company declined).

 [241]. H.R.3012—Right to Try Act of 2015, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3012/actions (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).

 [242]. Connecting Patients to New and Potential Life Saving Treatments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Sen. Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/chairman-ron-johnson-opening-statement-connecting-patients-to-new-and-potential-life-saving-treatments. Of note, no one from the FDA was present at the hearing, which included the president and CEO of the Goldwater Institute, two patients, the now former executive director of the Rothman Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship at Fairleigh Dickinson University, who also authored the book Innovation Breakdown: How the FDA and Wall Street Cripple Medical Advances, and the executive director of the non-profit organization Kids v. Cancer. Connecting Patients to New and Potential Life Saving Treatments, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov’t Aff. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/connecting-patients-to-new-and-potential-life-saving-treatments. See generally Joseph Gulfo, Innovation Breakdown: How the FDA and Wall Street Cripple Medical Advances (2014) (arguing the FDA is “horribly broken”).

  Senator Ron Johnson convened a second hearing in September 2016 that included testimony from one patient, the California Assembly Majority Leader Ian Calderon, U.S. Representative Jim Neely (R-Mo.), the former president and CEO of Neuralstem, Inc., the executive director of the non-profit organization the Isaac Foundation, and the FDA’s Associate Commissioner for Public Health Strategy and Analysis Peter Lurie. Exploring a Right to Try for Terminally Ill Patients, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Gov’t Aff. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/exploring-a-right-to-try-for-terminally-ill-patients.

 [243]. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Johnson Introduces Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act (May 10, 2016), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-introduces-trickett-wendler-right-to-try-act.

 [244]. Bill Glauber, Johnson’s Right-to-Try Bill Blocked, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/09/28/johnsons-right–try-bill-blocked
/91225922.

 [245]. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Chairman Johnson Introduces Bill to Help Terminally Ill Patients (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media
/majority-media/chairman-johnson-introduces-bill-to-help-terminally-ill-patients.

 [246]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, S. 204, 115th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Aug. 3, 2017).             

 [247]. Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (2017), https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/examining-patient-access-investigational-drugs. This hearing included testimony from Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.), FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, the Director for Health Care from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, New York University Assistant Professor and Bioethicist Alison Bateman-House, one patient, the Director of Healthcare Policy from the Goldwater Institute, the president and CEO from Cognition Therapeutics, and the chairperson of the non-profit organization Friends of Cancer Research. Id.

 [248]. Donald Trump, State of the Union Address, supra note 12.

 [249]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2018, H.R. 5247, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Mar. 21, 2018). H.R. 5247 was narrower than S. 204 because it would have required a requesting patient to have an immediately life-threatening diseases and would have limited eligible drugs to those with an active IND application that were not subject to a clinical hold. Id. The bill would have also required the manufacturer to notify the FDA within seven days of granting a right-to-try request and to report adverse events. Id.

 [250]. See Actions Overview: H.R. 5247 — 115th Congress, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5247/actions (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [251]. Id.

 [252]. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: How Democrats Got a Version of ‘Right to Try’ They Like Even Less, Wash. Post: PowerPost (May 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/powerpost/1anada/the-health-202/2018/05/23/the-health-202-how-democrats-got-a-version-of-right-to-try-they-like-even-less.

 [253]. Rachel Roubein, House Eyes Changes for ‘Right to Try’ Bill, Hill (Feb. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/372858-house-eyes-changes-for-right-to-try-bill (quoting Letter from the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network et al., to U.S. Reps. Paul Ryan & Nancy Pelosi (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.asco.org/sites/new-www.asco.org/files/content-files/February-2018-Right-to-Try-Coalition-Letter.pdf) (noting a group of almost forty patient advocacy groups and professional organizations sent a letter to House leaders that “warned the measure would ‘likely do more harm than good’”).

 [254]. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018); Actions Overview: S. 204 — 115th Congress, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/204/actions (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [255]. White House Press Release, supra note 13.

 [256]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–176, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2018).

 [257]. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018) (noting no such liability exists under the law).

 [258]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(A). “Life-threatening” is defined to be “where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted” or where there is the potential for fatal outcomes. 21 C.F.R. § 312.81(a) (2018).

 [259]. Press Release, Johnson to FDA, supra note 231.

 [260]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B) (2018).

 [261]. Id.

 [262]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). Of note, the Act does not limit other types of compensation (in other words, the certifying physician could theoretically have an equity interest in the drug company).

 [263]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(C). This may have been intentional given that the federal regulation does not allow informed consent to include “any exculpatory language through which the subject . . . is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to release . . . the sponsor [that is, manufacturer], the institution, or its agents from liability for negligence.” 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2018); see also id. § 50.25 (describing the basic elements of informed consent); Id. § 312.305(c)(4) (cross-referencing 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 as the applicable informed consent standard for the expanded access program).

 [264]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(A). The Act uses the definition of phase I trial from section 312.21 of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulation. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(3); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2018).

These studies are designed to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness. During Phase 1, sufficient information about the drug’s pharmacokinetics and pharmacological effects should be obtained to permit the design of well-controlled, scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies.

21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).

 [265]. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(B).

 [266]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(C).

 [267]. Press Release, Johnson to FDA, supra note 231.

 [268]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(2)(D) (2018). “A clinical hold is an order issued by FDA to the sponsor to delay a proposed clinical investigation or to suspend an ongoing investigation.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.42(a).

 [269]. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (2018) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (stating directions for use and warnings on labels); id. § 353(b)(4) (misbranded drugs); id. § 355(a)(i) (necessity of effective approval of application; exemptions of drug research); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (biologics license); 312 C.F.R. § 50 (protection of human subjects); id. § 56 (IRBs)). Of note, the Act, however, does not exempt a company from all statutory and regulatory requirements pertaining to INDs. Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Opinion, Promoting Patient Interests in Implementing the Federal Right to Try Act, 320 JAMA 869, 870 (2018) (noting ongoing reporting obligations).

 [270]. Id.

 [271]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(d)(1).

 [272]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(d)(2).

 [273]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(c)(1).

 [274]. Id. § 360bbb-0a(c)(1)(a)–(b). If the FDA decides it needs to use outcome data, it must give written notice to the company explaining why it was necessary for public health. Id. § 360bbb-0a(c)(2). This decision can only be made by “the director of the agency center that is charged with the premarket review of the eligible investigational drug.” Id.

 [275]. Sammy Caiola, Federal Right to Try Law Could Mean More Access—and Risk—for California Patients, Capital Pub. Radio (May 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/05/31/federal-right-to-try-law-could-mean-more-access-and-risk-for-california-patients. The Right to Try Act does not “modify or otherwise affect the right of any person to bring a private action under any State or Federal product liability, tort, consumer protection, or warranty law.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018) (Limitation of Liability).

 [276]. See Reddy, supra note 6; Arlene Weintraub, Biotech Executives Fret Over Hassles and Uncertainties of ‘Right to Try’, Forbes (Jun 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arleneweintraub/2018/06/13/biotech-executives-fret-over-hassles-and-uncertainties-of-right-to-try/#6df52d69bc78.

 [277]. See Janssen Policy: Evaluating and Responding to Pre-Approval Access Requests for Investigational Medicines, Janssen [hereinafter Janssen Policy], http://www.janssen.com/sites/wwwjanssencom/files/janssenpolicyevaluatingrespondingpreapprovalrequests022018.pdf; Pfizer’s Position on Federal Right to Try Legislation, Pfizer (May 2018), https://www.pfizer.com/files/research/PolicyPositionRighttoTryFederalLegislationMay2018.pdf; GlaxoSmithKline, U.S. Public Policy Position Paper: Right-to-Try Legislation, GlaxoSmithKline (Mar. 2015), https://us.gsk.com/media/1444389/ppright-to-trylegislation.pdf; Early Patient Access to Investigational Medicine, Bristol-Myers Squibb [hereinafter Bristol-Myers’ Position], https://www.bms.com/healthcare-providers/early-patient-access-to-investigational-medicine.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); see also Michelle Cortez, Dying Patients Face Reality Check on Right to Try, Bloomberg (June 8, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-08/dying-patients-seeking-drugs-face-reality-check-on-right-to-try (discussing how manufacturers do not plan to change their “current approach” even after the enactment of the Right to Try Act).

 [278]. Dan Diamond, Johnson & Johnson Won’t Consider Patients’ Right-to-Try Requests, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2018/01/17/hhs-readying-new-rule-to-expand-conscience-protections-075342; see also Janssen Policy, supra note 277.

 [279]. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Why Oncologists Should Decline to Participate in the Right to Try Act, ASCO Post (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/august-10-2018/declining-to-participate-in-the-right-to-try-act (“Because the extra risks posed by the Right to Try Act are not offset by any countervailing benefit, it would be unethical for oncologists to use it to gain access to an experimental drug for their patients.”).

 [280]. See Statement, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Efforts to Strengthen FDA’s Expanded Access Program (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm625397.htm.

 [281]. Usdin, supra note 101. The goal of this program is two-fold: (1) “to remove impediments that prevent physicians and patients from seeking access to investigational drugs and [(2)] to communicate FDA’s support for manufacturers providing access.” Id. The agency anticipates rolling out a pilot version for oncology requests in 2019. Id.

  This modification to the expanded access program goes well beyond the modifications discussed in Section III.B. The aptly named program creates a new tension within the expanded access program: the FDA is now not only a key decisionmaker, but also, as the program is aptly named, a facilitator, and possibly the key facilitator. This modification raises new questions that, although beyond the scope of this Note, are worth noting. First, to what extent will a patient-initiated request impair the treating physician’s decisionmaking responsibility? Will FDA staff consult with the requesting patient’s physician to ensure he or she weighed the risks associated with use of the investigational drug against the risks associated with the disease (and discussed those risks with the patient) prior to filling out Form FDA 3926 and sending to the physician for signature? Second, will an FDA-facilitated request ensure a fair and separate IRB review process? Will the FDA be responsible for costs associated with the IRB or will those costs continue to be covered by the patient? Third, how will the FDA ensure companies comply with a response deadline? Will the FDA’s to-be-determined manufacturer review period result in more companies denying requests to avoid simply missing that deadline?

 [282]. See, e.g., Rich Thomaselli, FDA’s Social-Media ‘Guidelines’ Befuddle Big Pharma, AdAge (Dec. 30, 2011), https://adage.com/article/digital/fda-s-social-media-guidelines-befuddle-big-pharma/231855 (suggesting the lack of FDA guidance regarding social media has restrained biopharmaceutical companies’ use of expanded access).

 [283]. James M. Beck, Federal Right to Try Legislation—Is It Any Better?, Drug & Device L. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/09/federal-right-to-try-legislation-is-it-any-better.html.

That’s not much protection at all, given how readily the other side throws around such allegations, and how infrequently judges throw them out. In subsection 1, “Reckless/willful” is a standard for punitive damages, which routinely survive dismissal in [multidistrict litigation] and other actions around the country. “Gross negligence” is a standard even less than that—merely an aggravated form of negligence that doesn’t require any finding of intent at all. Intentional torts include fraud, which is currently included in just about any product liability complaint. Battery, which encompasses informed consent in many states, is also an intentional tort.

Id.

 [284]. Though some states’ right-to-try laws could preclude these types of claims. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.5 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [285]. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 279, 282 (2015) (“Litigation in this arena, however, has been limited to obtaining access rather than seeking redress of treatment-related harm.”); see also Lynch et al., supra note 269, at 870 (suggesting that FDA input and IRB oversight might be “an important indication of reasonableness” in a hypothetical expanded access-product liability case).

 [286]. See supra Section III.B.

 [287]. See, e.g., ClinRegs: Canada, Nat’l Inst. Health, https://clinregs.niaid.nih.gov/country
/1anada (last updated Feb. 8, 2018) (“During a clinical trial, the sponsor is required to inform [Health Canada] of any serious, unexpected [adverse drug reaction] that has occurred inside or outside Canada.”).

 [288]. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2018) (charging for investigational drugs under an IND); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Charging for Investigational Drug Under an IND—Questions and Answers: Guidance for Industry 6–7 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm351264.pdf.

 [289]. See DiMasi et al., supra note 50, at 20; Herper, supra note 50.

 [290]. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (2018) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2018) (charging for investigational drugs under an IND)).

 [291]. See infra Appendix (listing companies citing adequate supply); see also Darrow et al., supra note 285, at 280–81 (describing the “administrative burden” for companies when preparing an intermediate-size patient expanded access protocol).

 [292]. Clinical Leader, supra note 171; see also Paige E. Finkelstein, Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs: What Physicians and the Public Need to Know About FDA and Corporate Processes, 17 Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics 1142, 1143–44 (2015). See generally Kenneth I. Moch, Ethical Crossroads: Expanded Access, Patient Advocacy, and the #SaveJosh Social Media Campaign, 1 MedAccess 1 (2017) (describing one company’s response to a targeted expanded access social media campaign).

 [293]. Cortez, Cost Dying Patients, supra note 51.

 [294]. Zachary Brennan, FDA Prepares to Implement ‘Right-to-Try’ Law, Reg. Focus (May 31, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/5/fda-prepares-to-implement-right-to-try-law (“[The FDA] is convening an internal group to assess how to effectively and efficiently implement the new law. [The FDA] will report on [their] implementation steps regularly.” (quoting an emailed statement from the FDA)).

 [295]. Id.(“[I]f [FDA staff] receive inquiries about the legislation from patients or physicians about a specific product, [they] refer them to the sponsor of the investigational drug . . . . If sponsors contact [FDA staff] regarding their obligations under this law, [the FDA] suggest[s] that [staff] refer them to the statute.” (quotation omitted)).

 [296]. See supra Table 1 (describing the additional criteria the FDA needs to determine whether intermediate-size or widespread expanded access use is appropriate).

 [297]. Jennifer Freeman, RA Life Expectancy: Can I Live a Long Life with Rheumatoid Arthritis?, Rheumatoid Arthritis Support Network (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.rheumatoidarthritis.org/ra
/prognosis/life-expectancy (characterizing rheumatoid arthritis as a chronic, but progressive disease); Narcolepsy Fact Sheet, Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-Education/Fact-Sheets/Narcolepsy-Fact-Sheet (describing narcolepsy as a chronic neurological condition) (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [298]. The FDA has not established an exact numeric threshold that would trigger intermediate-size use, but explains that it will recommend when “it is generally most efficient to consolidate expanded access in a single intermediate-size patient population IND or protocol.” Expanded Access: Guidance for Industry, supra note 145, at 14. The FDA has also not established a threshold for when intermediate-size expanded access as opposed to widespread treatment expanded access should be used, instead considering two criteria: (1) “whether the drug is under development for marketing for the expanded access use,” and (2) “the size of the patient population.” Id. at 15.

 [299]. See, e.g., How We Operate: Compassionate Use, Shire, https://www.shire.com/who-we-are/how-we-operate/policies-and-positions/compassionate-use (last updated Apr. 2015) (excluding “patients with exceptional safety risks that have not been sufficiently studied” from expanded access use).

 [300]. See Florence T. Bourgeois et al., Pediatric Versus Adult Drug Trials for Conditions with High Pediatric Disease Burden, 130 Pediatrics 285, 286 (2012) (children often treated with drugs only approved for adult use); Tirrell, supra note 5 (companies declining to grant pediatric expanded access request due to insufficient pediatric data).

 [301]. Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria, supra note 203, at 3.

 [302]. See RighttoTry, http://righttotry.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); Vice President Mike Pence, March 13 Tweet, supra note 12.

 [303]. See Bourgeois et al., supra note 300, at 286; Tirrell, supra note 5; Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria, supra note 203, at 4–5.

 [304]. Pathama D. Joseph et al., Clinical Trials in Children, 79 British J. Clinical Pharmacology 357, 360–61 (2013) (describing complex nature of informed consent in the pediatric setting).

 [305]. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) found that not only do “cancer patients tend to overestimate their prognoses,” but that the overestimation impacts treatment decisions. Jane C. Weeks et al., Relationship Between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 JAMA 1709, 1712–13 (1998); see also Andrew S. Epstein et al., Discussions of Life Expectancy and Changes in Illness Understanding in Patients with Advanced Cancer, 34 J. Clinical Oncology 2398, 2398–2401 (2016) (“Results of this study demonstrate how poorly patients with advanced cancer understand their prognoses and how effective recent prognostic discussions are to improve illness understanding by patients.”).

 [306]. Am. Acad. Of Pediatrics, Informed Consent in Decision-Making in Pediatric Practice, 138 Pediatrics 2 (2018), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2016/07/21/peds.2016-1484.full.pdf.

 [308]. Kate Gallin Heffernan et al., Federal “Right to Try”: Don’t Disregard Your State Laws Just Yet! How Federal Preemption (or Lack Thereof) Could Influence the Use of Federal “Right to Try”, Verrill Dana LLP (2018), http://www.verrilldana.com/federal-right-to-try-dont-disregard-your-state-laws-just-yet.

 [309]. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–176, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2018).

 [310]. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”); see also Phoebe Mounts et al., A Closer Look at New Federal ‘Right to Try’ Law, Law360 (June 1, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/news/2018/law360-a-closer-look-at-new-federal-right-to-try-law-01jun18.ashx; Heffernan et al., supra note 308 (suggesting enactment of the Right to Try Act revives the preemption issue because the Act is “less in conflict with its state counterparts” and “state laws could reasonably be found by a court to supplement and explicate the way in which this activity (the provision of investigational drugs outside of FDA’s purview) can occur in a given jurisdiction, rather than serving to frustrate Congress’ intent in making the ‘right to try’ pathway available”).

 [311]. Exploring a Right to Try for Terminally Ill Patients: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Sen. Ron Johnson). The Act also authorizes pre-approval access “in accordance with State law.” Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–176, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2018).

 [312]. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(b)(1)–(6) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.).

 [313]. Compare id. § 111548.1(d) (“‘Immediately life-threatening disease or condition’ means a stage of disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months.”), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(A) (2018) (requiring “life-threatening disease or condition”).

 [314]. See supra Section IV.A (describing Right to Try Act provisions).

 [315]. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (right to try informed consent requirements); id. § 24173(a)–(e) (general informed consent requirements).

 [316]. See supra Section IV.A (describing Right to Try Act provisions).

 [317]. See Press Release, Pharm. Research & Mfg. of Am. & Biotech. Innovation Org., PhRMA and BIO Initiate Litigation to Challenge Unconstitutional Provisions of Nevada’s SB 539 (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.phrma.org/phrma-bio-release (initiating litigation over a Nevada law, which the groups argued “attempt[s] to set de facto price controls” on diabetes medicines).

 [318]. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 

 [319]. See Bateman-House, Findings, supra note 184.

[T]here is no guidance for physicians about which law to follow in cases of conflicts. For example, if a patient lives in South Dakota but seeks care in North Dakota, which state law ought to be observed? If a hospital is located in Arkansas but is part of a network based in Delaware, which state law ought to be observed? If the patient and doctor are in Tennessee but the experimental product they wish to try can be administered only in Texas, which state law ought to be observed?

Id.

 [320]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 3.

 [321]. James E. Valentine & David B. Clissold, Burden of “Right to Try” Implementation on Sponsors (for Now); Risk of Unexpected SAEs Negatively Impacting Development and Approval Still Remains, Hyman, Phelps & McNamara PC: FDA L. Blog (June 8, 2018), http://www.fdalawblog.net
/2018/06/burden-of-right-to-try-implementation-on-sponsors-for-now-risk-of-unexpected-saes-negatively-impacting-development-and-approval-still-remains.

 [322].  Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900, 40,924 (Aug. 13, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312, 316).

 [323]. Cortez, Cost Dying Patients, supra note 51. BrainStorm planned to limit provider access to those physicians “who participated in the drug’s clinical trials,” and therefore would be experienced with the drug and, presumably, its appropriate dosage and potential side effects. Id. This plan might be one way to combat widespread disclosure, but it would arguably limit the availability of right to try to academic centers and other major hospitals where clinical trials are conducted as opposed to increasing access across the United States—the whole point of the Right to Try Act.

 [324]. Weintraub, supra note 276 (“The new law doesn’t require drug makers to comply with Right to Try requests, but that doesn’t make the burden of dealing with phone calls and e-mails from patients demanding access to experimental products any less burdensome.”).

 [325]. See Edelman, Edelman Trust Barometer—Healthcare: Global 26–27 (2018) (presenting an online survey in twenty-eight markets with 1,150 respondents per market); Laura Entis, Inside Pharma’s Trust Problem, MM&M (June 26, 2018), https://www.mmm-online.com/home
/channel/commercial/inside-pharmas-trust-problem (citing high drug prices, misconceptions that companies are withholding the cure for financial gain, and misleading direct-to-consumer advertising as reasons for this distrust).

 [326]. Bristol-Myers’ Position, supra note 277; see also Janssen Policy, supra note 277 (“We are committed to helping patients with serious illnesses and their families request access to our investigational medicines. We support these requests through our established review and evaluation processes, which includes independent review by the FDA.”).

 [327]. Expanded Access Program Report, supra note 160, at 21 (“40% to 95% [are] the manufacturer approval rates for [expanded access] requests.”).

 [328]. See Rep. Michael McCaul, Expanded Access to 21st Century Cures Act, https://mccaul.house.gov/sites/mccaul.house.gov/files/Expanding%20Access%20to%2021st%20Century%20Cures.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (proposing the Cures Act include a provision requiring manufacturers to track and report requests for expanded access to the FDA).

 [329]. Public Workshop: Evaluating Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria, supra note 203, at 6; Caroline McNeil, Broadening the Evidence Base for Older Patients: FDA-ASCO Workshop Explores Emerging Strategies, ASCO Post (Dec. 25, 2017), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/december-25-2017/broadening-the-evidence-base-for-older-patients-fda-asco-workshop-explores-emerging-strategies (“50% of U.S. oncologists are concentrated in eight states.”). Some patients’ jobs might also limit their ability to travel to a clinical trial site on a regular basis while other patients’ insurance may not cover the portions of the clinical trial not paid for by the trial sponsor. See Caroline Chen & Riley Wong, Black Patients Miss Out on Promising Cancer Drugs, ProPublica (Sept. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/black-patients-miss-out-on-promising-cancer-drugs.

 [330]. See supra notes 6, 177 and accompanying text (discussing specific cases of companies denying pediatric patient expanded access requests).

 [331]. Tirrell, supra note 5; see infra Appendix.

 [332]. Allergan Pre-Approval Access Program, supra note 125.

 [333]. Tirrell, supra note 5; see infra Appendix.

 [334]. See Bourgeois et al., supra note 300.

 [335]. Id. at 287.

 [336]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3740.

 [337]. Reddy, supra note 6.

 [338]. Investigational Drugs Available, Bristol-Myers Squibb, https://www.bms.com/healthcare-providers/early-patient-access-to-investigational-medicine/investigational-drugs-available.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); Investigational Medicines for Compassionate Use Requests, Janssen, https://www.janssen.com/compassionate-use-pre-approval-access/investigational-medicines-for-compassionate-use-requests (last updated Feb. 11, 2019).

 [339]. Janssen Policy, supra note 277, at 361.

 [340]. CompAC: The Compassionate Use Advisory Committees, N.Y.U. Langone Health, https://med.nyu.edu/pophealth/divisions/medical-ethics/compassionate-use-advisory-committee (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (describing the role of CompAC and the composition of the committee).

 [341]. Id.

 [342]. Caplan & Ray, supra note 131, at 979–80. This approach emphasizes fairness, attempting to ensure that requests are not granted to only those individuals who are social media savvy or well-connected. Id.

 [343]. About the Expanded Access Navigator, supra note 215 (providing a “roadmap” for IRBs).

 [344]. Alexander Gaffney, Regulatory Explainer: FDA’s Expanded Access (Compassionate Use) Program, Reg. Focus (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2014/2/regulatory-explainer-fda-s-expanded-access-(compassionate-use)-program.

 [345]. Letter from Marc B. Wilenzick, Pfizer Senior Counsel on behalf of Pfizer, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Charging for Investigational Drugs 7 (Feb. 14, 2007), https://www.pfizer.com/sites
/default/files/research/research_clinical_trials/Charging_for_Investigational_Drugs.pdf.

 [346]. Jung et al., supra note 113, at 1018.

While the 21st Century Cures Act did not require manufacturers to include pricing information in their expanded access policies, seven addressed financial aspects of accessing investigational medicines. Five indicated that they provide investigational medicines to patients at no cost, and among these five, one also stated that the manufacturer may reimburse fees and expenses associated with the use of the drug for expanded access. The other two manufacturers described pricing as depending on insurance and other factors.

Id.

 [347]. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Election Tracking Poll: Health Care in the 2018 Midterms, Kaiser Family Found. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-election-tracking-poll-health-care-in-the-2018-midterms.

 [348]. Dan Diamond, Drug Prices in Ads Are Coming—If HHS Gets Its Way, Politico Pulse (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2018/10/15/drug-prices-in-ads-are-coming-if-hhs-gets-its-way-373552. PhRMA has proposed its own plan in which “[a]ll TV ads that mention a medicine by name should direct patients to information about cost, ‘such as a company-developed website.’” Feds, Big Pharma Issue Competing Price Transparency Plans, Modern Healthcare (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181020/NEWS
/181019859.

 [349]. See infra Appendix (adequate supply); Fraser, supra note 185 (“[Genentech] was already in the process of trying to dramatically ramp up its production of Herceptin, encountering roadblocks in machinery, engineering and chemistry along the way.”).

 [350]. See supra notes 4647 and accompanying text.

 [351]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3740 (studies often exclude pediatric patients); Chen & Wong, supra note 329 (noting criteria often excludes patients with more than chronic condition, which can disproportionately affect African Americans); Judith Graham, Seniors Miss out on Clinical Trials, Kaiser Health News (June 29, 2017), https://khn.org/news/seniors-miss-out-on-clinical-trials (“[O]nly 40 percent of patients participating in cancer clinical trials were 65 and older” despite “more than 60 percent of cancer patients [being] older adults.”).

 [352]. See Pharma. Research & Mfr. of Am., Biopharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials: Impact on State Economies, at I (2015) (“The five states with the highest number of active clinical trial sites were California (3,111), Florida (2,571), Texas (2,799), New York (2,476), and Pennsylvania (1,972).”).

 [353]. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.

 [354]. ASCO and Friends, supra note 47; see also Bateman-House & Robinson, supra note 231, at 322 (proposing Congress should explore measures that would encourage greater potential access to investigational drugs through clinical research).

 [355]. Kim et al., supra note 49.

 [356]. Id. at 3742.

 [357]. Press Release, SWOG Cancer Research Network, Cancer Comorbidities Reduce Trial Enrollment (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.swog.org/news-events/news/2019/01/10/cancer-comorbidities-reduce-trial-enrollment. The lead author of the JAMA Oncology study Joseph Unger explained,

[i]f you look at the numbers, they tell you that the ASCO/Friends/FDA guidelines were well focused, as they alone would account for more than half of the potential gains from updating eligibility criteria in trials. . . . This would have the short-term impact of helping patients by giving them access to new treatments and have a long-term impact on the discovery of new treatments, speeding the time it takes to run trials and get new treatments to the public.

Id.

 [358]. Compare Diversity in Lilly-Sponsored Clinical Trials in North America, Eli Lilly, https://www.lilly.com/diversity-in-lilly-sponsored-clinical-trials-in-north-america (“[E]very study conducted with more than 25 clinical trial sites must select at least two sites meeting Lilly’s diversity criteria.”) (last visited Feb. 11, 2019), with Advancing Inclusive Research, Genentech, https://www.gene.com/patients/advancing-inclusive-research (assessing its site selection process and developing new “inclusive research” standards) (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [359]. Chen & Wong, supra note 329 (noting biotech firm CEO citing concerns that regulation aimed at improving diversity would delay development efforts).

 [360]. See id.

 [361]. Chreasea Dickerson, Incentives Watch: Illinois Diversity and Inclusion Tax Credit Initiatives, Bloomberg BNA: Salt Talk Blog (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/incentives-watch-illinois-b57982087723 (discussing state efforts to include diversity and inclusion provisions in film production tax credits). The adoption of diversity inclusion plans could require companies to reevaluate their inclusion and exclusion criteria.

 [362]. The FDA already gives tax credits, trial grants, and exemptions from the Prescription Drug User Fee Act to incentivize development of drugs for rare diseases. Designating an Orphan Drug Product: Drugs and Biological Products, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/forindustry
/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/howtoapplyfororphanproductdesignation/default.htm (last updated July 26, 2018). For more information about the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, see Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee (last updated Feb. 8, 2019).

 [363]. See Chen & Wong, supra note 329.

 [364]. But see Michelle Cortez, Brain Cancer Patient Is First to Get Untested Treatment Under Trump-Backed Law, Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2019, 6:16 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2019-01-10/brain-cancer-patient-gets-unproven-therapy-first-under-new-law (reporting that a European-based biotechnology company is “the first publicly known” company to provide an investigational drug through the Right to Try Act).

 [365]. E.g., Munz, supra note 191 (discussing a patient moving to a state with a right-to-try law, but who is unable to secure access); Weintraub, supra note 276 (noting that one relative’s calls seeking right to try for a family member escalated to threats).

 [366]. Rita Rubin, Experts Critical of America’s Right-to-Try Drug Laws, Lancet (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(15)00393-1/fulltext.

 [367]. The FDA can currently assess civil monetary penalties against companies that fail to submit registration or clinical trial results to ClinicalTrials.gov. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j) (2018). Congress should also amend the Cures Act to give the agency a similar enforcement mechanism when a company fails to publish its expanded access guidelines and related cost recovery policies. Id.; see also Bateman-House, Examining Patient Access, supra note 210.

 [368]. Junod, supra note 15 (quoting William Thomas Beaver, who drafted the controlled clinical trial regulation promulgated after the enactment of the Kefauver–Harris Amendment). The adoption of diversity and inclusion plans would likely require companies to reevaluate their inclusion and exclusion criteria. See ASCO and Friends, supra note 47 (“Broadening the eligibility criteria for clinical trials will provide the opportunity for more people to participate in research studies. Not only will this improve access, it will make the trial results more reflective of the people that will ultimately use the drug.”).

 [369]. Kim et al., supra note 49, at 3737.

 

 [i]. Pfizer Policy, supra note 100; Pfizer’s Position on Preapproval Access to Investigational Drugs, Pfizer (May 2018), https://www.pfizer.com/files/research/Policy_paper_Preapproval_Access_to_Investigational_Drugs_May2018.pdf.

 [ii]. Managed Access Programs, Novartis, https://www.novartis.com/our-focus/healthcare-professionals/managed-access-programs (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [iii]. Genentech Policy, supra note 100.

 [iv]. Compassionate Use of Sanofi Investigational Products, Sanofi, https://www.sanofi.com/en/science-and-innovation/clinical-trials-and-results/compassionate-use-expanded-access (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [v]. Access to Investigational Medicines, Merck, https://www.merck.com/about/views-and-positions/access-to-medicines/home.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [vi]. Janssen Policy, supra note 277.

 [vii]. GlaxoSmithKline, GSK Public Policy Positions: Compassionate Use 1–2 (2017), https://www.gsk.com/media/3368/compassionate-use.pdf.

 [viii]. Expanded Access: Individual Access to Investigational Medicines Intended to Treat Serious Diseases, Gilead, http://www.gilead.com/research/expanded-access (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [ix]. Pre-Approval Access to Investigational Drugs Policy, AbbVie, https://www.abbvie.com/our-company/access-to-investigational-drugs-policy.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [x]. Access to Investigational Medicines, Amgen, https://www.amgen.com/responsibility/access-to-medicine/access-to-investigational-medicines (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xii]. Early Patient Access to Investigational Medicine, Bristol-Myers Squibb, https://www.bms.com/healthcare-providers/early-patient-access-to-investigational-medicine.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xiii]. Teva Pharm., supra note 121, at 1–8.

 [xiv]. How to Request Access to Investigational Medicines, Bayer, http://pharma.bayer.com/en/commitment-responsibility/ethics-and-transparency/ethics-in-r-and-d/access-to-investigational-medicinal-products (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xv]. Expanded Access, Lilly, https://www.lilly.com/discovery/clinical-trials/expanded-access (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xvi]. Expanded Access, Novo Nordisk, http://www.novonordisk-us.com/whoweare/about-novo-nordisk/expanded-access.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xvii]. Allergan Pre-Approval Access Program, supra note 125.

 [xviii]. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, Takeda Oncology, http://www.takedaoncology.com/medicines/access-to-investigational-drugs (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xix]. Clinical Trials, Celgene, https://www.celgene.com/research-development/clinical-trials (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).

 [xx]. Astellas Position, supra note 124.