This Note analyzes the recent trend of criminalizing homelessness in the United States. The first half discusses homelessness through the lens of American exceptionalism as a comparative tool. Comparing America to its international peers helps us better understand why America’s response to homelessness has become increasingly punitive. In doing so, the Note makes a novel contribution to American exceptionalism literature in applying the concept to homelessness. Specifically, it shows that while American homelessness rates are not unusually high, American shelter rates are unusually low relative to other western democracies. The Note shows this by combining national homelessness reports into a single dataset and document. The second half of the Note discusses current constitutional doctrine relating to homelessness, focusing on City of Grants Pass v. Johnson. This section uses the first half’s analysis to show why, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was, at its core, correct on a legal and sociological level in applying status crimes doctrine to homelessness. In doing so, the Note builds on others’ defenses of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling by both adding to those legal arguments and bolstering them with a sociological grounding, offering a new way of thinking about status crimes in general and homelessness in particular. The Note mounts a defense not only of now-outdated homelessness constitutional doctrine, but also of a shift in American political culture that recognizes homelessness as a product of social circumstances rather than individual failure. Such a change is a necessary prerequisite for curbing, on legal and political levels, America’s intensifying trend of criminalizing homelessness, the first step in bringing America in line with its peers and actually solving homelessness.
Introduction
In 2010, Debra Blake, a resident of Grants Pass, Oregon, lost her job. Already in a precarious financial position, she could not afford to remain in her home and was forced out. For the next ten years, she had no choice but to spend her nights in a variety of locations, either in temporary shelters or on the streets of Grants Pass. This already devastating and tumultuous experience was made worse beginning in 2013, when Grants Pass began issuing civil citations to people sleeping on public property. Between 2013 and 2019, Blake accumulated over $5,000 in fines. If she did not pay those fines and was caught by the police on city property, she would be subject to criminal prosecution for trespass. With nowhere else to go, Blake was on the brink of just such a prosecution. Before any prosecution could take place, however, Debra Blake died. Little is publicly known about her death. She was sixty-two.
Blake’s story is tragic, but it is far from unique in the United States. As of 2024, over 770,000 people were living without a home or apartment in America. In response, cities across the country, including Grants Pass, have passed laws and regulations increasingly hostile to their homeless residents. Before passing away, Blake filed a class action lawsuit with other homeless residents against Grants Pass. She alleged that the practice of fining people for sleeping on public property violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on status crimes—crimes which criminalize people solely for their states of being rather than their actions. Although she did not live to see the result, the Ninth Circuit agreed with her claim that the city’s practice was unconstitutional. Grants Pass, however, appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which in 2024 ruled in favor of the city. The ruling solidified and gave constitutional cover to the nationwide trend of municipalities criminalizing homelessness.
How did we get here? What has led to so many towns and cities in the United States to criminalize homelessness? Is America unique in this regard? How should the Court have ruled? This Note explores these questions through the concept of American exceptionalism and American history to better understand and justify legal doctrine and arguments surrounding the criminalization of homelessness.
The first half of this Note, Part I, explains American homelessness and compares it to America’s international peers. Section I.A outlines its methodology showing that an approach to legal scholarship that puts black-letter law in social context is imperative for understanding law. Section I.B introduces newly synthesized data on homelessness rates and shelter rates among western democracies where data is available, showing that while America’s homelessness rate is not uniquely high, its rate of unsheltered homeless people is. The subsequent parts of this Section explain these findings. Section I.C examines government spending and America’s comparatively weak social safety net writ large. Section I.D outlines American public opinion and ideology, unveiling a culture of individualism over collectivism using a variety of political documents and public opinion polling. Section I.E discusses the role of race and homelessness, showing how America’s history of racial oppression enables and exacerbates the problem of homelessness. Section I.F explains America’s turn towards criminalization as a “solution” to homelessness, embedding it in larger trends of American history and ideology.
The second half of this Note, Part II, outlines and defends current Ninth Circuit legal doctrine on homelessness. Section II.A gives an outline of current law, showing how the Ninth Circuit used the Eighth Amendment’s status crime doctrine to bar cities from utilizing what is effectively a loophole in constitutional law. Section II.B examines the arguments made in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson. Section II.C analyzes the Supreme Court’s eventual decision in the case. Section II.D defends the Ninths Circuit’s ruling against the Court’s decision. It takes the stance that the Ninth Circuit’s understanding and application of status crime doctrine fits well within the more collectivist understanding of reality as comprehended by those in other western democracies. Finally, Section II.E calls for a change in popular American ideology that is likely to motivate the Court’s decision and current municipal law. Only a shift away from an individualist and towards a collectivist understanding of society can fuel the political will to change homelessness law.
Homelessness Compared and Explained
This Part uses the lens of American exceptionalism to elucidate homelessness data and policy in the United States, comparing it to other western democracies in order to better understand America’s turn to criminalization as a “solution” to homelessness.
A.A Preliminary Note on Method
This Note takes a relatively unique approach to the study of homelessness law and doctrine. That is, it does not take law as an isolated field that can (or should) be studied on its own, or with a mere dash of policy analysis thrown in at the end. Rather, it sees law as embedded in and determined by social context. Such a strategy, according to some, has been described as “the single most revolutionary development in modern legal thought.” This is not to say that all legal research must consider law this way. Rather, it is to say that doing so is useful and worthwhile, one of many forms that legal analysis and thought can take. Thus, while not all analysis in this Note is directly legal, the consequences of the ideology and governmental policies outlined in this Note are directly legal, manifesting in municipal decisions to criminalize homelessness and court decisions responding thereto. In addition to the strictly legal arguments made below, another contribution of this Note is an analysis of what motivates recent American legal trends. Such an analysis is imperative not only for understanding and evaluating current trends, but also for analyzing the root causes and offering solutions in domains that extend outside of law yet influence law, such as notions about what has to change in popular American political ideology. When legal arguments go hand-in-hand with political arguments, since law is always bound up with politics, they become all the more potent. As such, this Note takes an approach that is interdisciplinary and necessarily so.
The first half of this Note uses the lens of American exceptionalism to help explain homelessness. There are many approaches to the understanding and use of the concept “American exceptionalism.” This Note seeks to add to the body of literature exploring American exceptionalism by examining a previously understudied topic: homelessness and homelessness policy. The Note deploys a method close to that developed by Charles Lockhart in The Roots of American Exceptionalism. That is, it utilizes a schema that draws on historical, institutional, and cultural variables to explain both the nuances of America’s homelessness problem as well as America’s political reaction to homelessness. In doing so, this Note shows certain aspects in which America is exceptional with regard to its stance towards homelessness, which is reflected both in its policy and ideological belief system.
Moreover, placing America in a comparative light helps explain why America’s response has been increasingly punitive. By analyzing recent American history, one can see how criminalizing homelessness fits within larger cultural and structural trends. A comparative understanding of American societal disposition towards economic opportunity in general and homelessness in particular is imperative for understanding why America is making the choice to criminalize homeless people. These trends explain why the Supreme Court chose to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Johnson. But first, these underlying trends must be identified, and they are examined below.
B. Homelessness Compared
This Section conducts a brief, international comparison of homelessness rates to see if and how America is unique with regard to its treatment of homeless people. Delving into a data collection that is the first of its kind, this Section shows that while the rate of homelessness in America is not exceptional, the percentage of homeless Americans who are unsheltered is very high relative to other western democracies.
Numerous reasons might lead one to suspect that America has an exceptionally high homelessness rate compared to other western democracies. For instance, the United States, even after taxes and monetary transfers, has a very high level of income inequality relative to other western democracies. Its “Gini Coefficient,” which measures income inequality, ranks higher than Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and most European Union countries. Moreover, since the 1980s, the share of income going to the top 10% of earners has consistently increased on an annual basis. While the United States used to have a more egalitarian distribution of income in the early 20th century, this is no longer the case today.
However, a closer examination of the data on homelessness rates from other western democracies reveals that, in this realm, America is unexceptional:
Figure 1. Percentage of Population Homeless by Country
Note: Data assembled by the author. See Appendix infra for methods.
Figure 1 shows the rate of people experiencing homelessness by the percentage of the population of the country in which they reside. Essentially, it is the homelessness rate of each country. As the chart shows, the homelessness rate in the United States is not particularly high compared to other western democracies. Among seventeen other countries where data is available, the United States ranks as having the seventh highest homelessness rate. Its rate almost exactly matches the overall homelessness rate for the European Union.
But homelessness rates alone do not tell the whole story. Delving deeper into the data, when one examines the percentage of homeless people spending nights unsheltered, one sees a very different picture:
Figure 2. Percentage of Homeless Population Unsheltered by Country
Note: Data assembled by the author. See Appendix infra for methods.
Not all countries included in Figure 1 have data available for the rate of unsheltered homeless people in the studies used. Still, thirteen countries do. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of unsheltered homeless people is far higher in the United States than it is in most other western democracies. Its rate of unsheltered homeless people is 33% higher than the next closest country, New Zealand. It is approximately double the EU average. Of the countries examined, only Czechia has a higher rate. Thus, while the United States does not differ in kind from other western democracies in this respect, it does significantly differ in degree.
As such, although there is not a particularly large number of people experiencing homelessness in the United States relative to other western democracies, the percentage of these people that are unsheltered in the United States is relatively high. This difference is important for both analyzing the problem itself and for understanding how America has reacted to homelessness. If America had a unique level of homelessness, one would seek to explain this phenomenon by examining the root causes of homelessness. However, given that America has an unusually high number of people living outdoors or on the streets, this means that shelter availability is comparatively low in the United States relative to other western democracies.
This specific intervention is important. Homelessness has been hitherto neglected in the debate around American exceptionalism. This is likely because, at first blush as shown above, America does not have an exceptionally high rate of homelessness. Still, there is a popular perception that America does have a much higher homelessness rate than other western democracies. The major difference between America and its peers is the rate of shelter availability. Because people (especially in the United States) do not see the level of homelessness in Europe, they think it does not exist.
Therefore, to understand why America is exceptional in the realm of homelessness, the subsequent four Sections of this Note seek to understand America’s response to homelessness rather than homelessness’s causes.
C. The Social Safety Net
The first factor that helps explain why America lacks the homeless shelters that other western democracies have is the relatively weak social safety net its state, local, and federal governments maintain. Seen in this light, America’s lack of homeless shelters is not an isolated fact that sets it apart from other western democracies. Rather, it is part of a larger trend concerning America’s relatively weak social safety net.
In general, American total government expenditure is less, as a proportion of its total GDP, than most other western democracies. In 2019, for example, the U.S. government’s expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 36%, while France’s was 55%, Sweden’s was 48%, the United Kingdom’s was 38%, and New Zealand’s was 39%. Although these are only a few examples, there is a general historical trend of the United States’ government being outspent by other western democracies. This is in spite of the fact that America wildly outspends those same countries on maintaining its military, accounting for 39% of the world’s military expenditure.
This difference in government spending is reflected in the provision of a variety of social services. For example, many other western democracies own and operate their railroad and airline systems. In America, however, the federal government has not made a similar commitment. The same can be said for the operation of utilities. While other western democracies often directly operate means of communication (like telephone lines) or energy distribution (like gas and electricity), the United States has largely left the operation of these basic necessities to the private sector. There is thus a more minimal role of government in the coordination of economic activity in America compared to other western democracies.
America’s social safety net is similarly weak. In a wide variety of areas, from mandated maternity leave to child day care to low-income housing, the U.S. government provides comparatively less to its residents than most other western democracies. A paradigmatic example of this trend is healthcare. The United States is the only western democracy to not ensure medical insurance coverage for virtually all of its residents. This is partially due to the fact that the United States achieves its 90% health care coverage through a patchwork system of private insurers and government programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Moreover, the story goes further than simply who is providing the care. The United States has largely left other key elements of the healthcare system to the private sector, such as price-setting. This has also contributed to the United States’ relatively high cost of healthcare.
In sum, America has a relatively weak social safety net compared to other western democracies. This is intertwined with the fact that the U.S. Constitution does not announce rights in a positive sense. Rather, it accords negative rights. The Constitution’s Bill of Rights consists of private activities that the government will be largely restrained from infringing upon, like the right to freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, and the right against cruel and unusual punishment. Commonplace in other western democracies, however, are positive rights. These are rights that promise positive provisions that the government accords its citizens, such as food, shelter, and healthcare. While not all of these guarantees are necessarily lived up to by those governments, particularly those of poorer nations, the presence of de jure positive rights nonetheless signals a difference between America and its peers.
Thus, on a structural level, the United States’ relative lack of shelter for people experiencing homelessness fits well in this larger picture. America’s government spending in general and social safety net in particular are far weaker than other western democracies. Even though America’s economic and housing systems have not produced more homeless people, a relative lack of spending in social programs can begin to shed light on why American governments—federal, state, and local—have not been willing to build more shelters for those experiencing homelessness.
But more explanation is needed. America is, after all, a democracy. Why have Americans refrained from voting to expand their welfare state? Why are they not voting to expand government funding to include the construction of homeless shelters? What explains the gap between America and its peers?
D. Public Opinion and Ideology
To explain America’s relatively weak social safety net in general and its refusal to adequately shelter homeless people in particular, a deeper dive into American ideology and voter belief is necessary. This Section does exactly that, using a variety of public opinion polling as well as the documents of elected officials to show how ideological beliefs around individualism inform American social policy and homelessness policy.
To engage popular ideology, public opinion polling is a useful place to start. Karabel and Laurison summarized a number of useful studies comparing American public opinion to public opinion in a variety of other countries. Their analysis was enlightening. America was an outlier relative to other western democracies in a variety of ways. Americans were more likely to value freedom over equality than those in other western democracies surveyed. More specifically, Americans were more likely to believe that the freedom to pursue life’s goals outweighed the importance of the state guaranteeing that no one is in need. While the percentage of people favoring this statement was roughly 25% in France and 31% in Germany, it was over 60% in the United States. Additionally, almost 50% of Americans in one survey thought that “it should not be the responsibility of government to reduce income differences.” Amongst the other countries included in the survey, only New Zealand scored higher, and did so only by a small margin. The analogous proportion in most other western democracies was far lower. In another poll, the percentage of Americans surveyed who thought that private ownership of business is preferable to government ownership of business was over 60%, higher than any other western democracy surveyed. The analogous figures for Germany, Australia, and Canada were roughly 38%, 39%, and 52%. Finally, most on the nose, Americans agreed with the statement “it should not be the responsibility of government to provide for the unemployed” at a rate of roughly 49%. This rate was higher than every other country surveyed, except for New Zealand.
From these surveys, we can conclude that Americans not only value personal freedom more than economic equality at a higher rate than other western democracies, but also that Americans are less willing to endorse government action to assist people in dire economic straits.
Still, the differences run deeper than mere social values and government actions. Americans surveyed also differed in their explanations for the root causes of social realities themselves. For instance, one question asked whether “people are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower” or “poor because of an unfair society.” In America, 62% agreed with the former, the highest proportion of any western democracy surveyed. While 50% of both New Zealanders and Australians agreed with that statement, the analogous rate for Finland and Germany was 23% and 17%, respectively. Relatedly, Americans were more likely to believe that their society is meritocratic. For instance, 63% of Americans believed that success is determined by hard work rather than luck and connections, scoring higher than all other western democracies except for Finland. Finally, the United States had the highest rate of disagreement with the statement “success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” relative to other western democracies. Almost 70% of Americans disagreed, while most other countries surveyed had disagreement rates of 50% or less.
Thus, majorities of Americans tend to see poverty not as a social failure, but as a personal one. Moreover, Americans tend to hold these views at much higher rates than most if not all other western democracies.
These attitudes are not only passively held by Americans, but also actively practiced by their elected officials. One can see these ideas made manifest in Paul Ryan’s A Roadmap for America’s Future. In the proposal, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives meticulously lays out not only policy proposals, but also philosophical and historical rationales for those proposals. These policies largely consist of scaling back levels of spending on the federal government’s social safety net. To justify these rollbacks, he appeals to many of the values outlined above, such as personal freedom and individual responsibility. He justifies his favor of markets and individual freedom by stating that in market-based economies, like America’s, “no individual or family is bound to their circumstances: they can advance, they can improve their conditions, through their own efforts.”
Ryan sees this “freedom” as being threatened by government intrusion into the economy through the expansion of the social safety net. Writing of efforts to expand welfare programs, he writes that “government increasingly dictates how Americans live their lives . . . [b]ut dependency drains individual character, which in turn weakens American society.” Thus, although Ryan is a partisan actor arguing for particular policy solutions, here he is appealing to broader sentiments that resonate with large majorities of the American public. The economic failures of individuals are not seen as rooted in structural economic forces. Rather, they are seen as failures of individuals not “bound to their circumstances.’’ Moreover, government action aimed at solving these problems not only fails but exacerbates them. This is in marked contrast to other western democracies, in which even conservative party members do not seek to dismantle welfare state policies.
Government entities, however, are not the only entities that can be used to combat poverty in general and homelessness in particular. Private charity and faith-based organizations can also play a role. The United States has the highest rate of religious belief among western democracies. Although the religious belief of its residents has been moderately decreasing in recent decades, it remains comparatively strong. Churches are an increasingly used source of housing for homeless shelters. Some politicians have also voiced support for faith-based solutions to homelessness. Given these facts, one might suspect that while Americans may be averse to government-run shelters, they may be more supportive of private, faith-based shelters. The data, however, simply does not support such a view. Faith-based shelters make up only 4% of shelter beds available to homeless people. Thus, the American ideological emphasis on self-responsibility for one’s economic conditions outweighs both private, charitable responses as well as publicly funded ones.
Of course, many Americans see economically deprived individuals as the products of circumstances and many Europeans view poor individuals as personally responsible for their economic circumstances. America has no monopoly on these views. However, these ideas are substantially more widespread in the United States than in other western democracies. They are also reflected in U.S. government policy. When economically destitute individuals, like Debra Blake, are seen as solely, personally responsible for their situation, it is less likely that people holding those views will favor government policies to help people falling on hard times. This means that government-run shelters are less likely to receive political support. Other western democracies, meanwhile, are more likely to see homelessness as a product of social circumstances and societal failure, and therefore provide shelter.
Seen through this lens, America’s disinclination to build shelters for individuals facing homelessness does not arise through some unique hatred that America has for homeless people, but rather as part of a larger narrative about the way Americans and policy-makers think about poverty and its root causes.
E. Race and Homelessness
Inextricable from an explanation of homelessness in the United States is an account of who experiences homelessness. This Section shows not only the racial disparities of those experiencing homelessness, but also uses those demographics to help explain American homelessness policy and posture.
Obviously, the people who experience homelessness are those in poverty. Along these lines, Black and Latino people are already overrepresented, with roughly 20.1% of Black folks living in poverty in the United States today, despite being only 13.5% of the population. The respective numbers for Latino folks are 28.4% and 19.3%. But the numbers are even more exacerbated when it comes to homelessness. While 24.1% of homeless people are Latino, a staggering 37.3% of homeless people identify as Black. Thus, the intersection of homelessness and race, at least for Black folks, is not merely equivalent to that of poverty and race. Rather, homeless people are disproportionately Black at a rate even more extreme than that of poverty.
We know that the general causation of these gaps in economic wealth, income, and opportunity are due to longstanding racial oppression. But what effect does the fact that the majority of people sleeping on America’s streets are nonwhite have on our homelessness policy? Although a concrete answer is multifaceted and can probably only be arrived at indirectly, critical race theory can help provide answers. Doing so will help explain why America’s majority-minority homeless population does not receive the same amount of government and public care and attention as other countries.
One book within the discipline of critical race theory that can help explain why the racial makeup of the homeless population likely has an impact on the way homeless people are treated in the United States is Jody Armour’s book, provocatively titled N*gga Theory. Although the book largely focuses on criminal law, it highlights important developments in both the history of American racism and recent research into white Americans’ relationship with Black Americans in the realm of cognitive science.
One of Armour’s central claims is that “the dominant brand of anti-black discrimination in post-civil rights era America is not active racial animus but unconscious racial bias.” This view leads Armour to locate the disparities in treatment across races not as the result of conscious racial hatred but rather that of unconscious or subconscious behavior of white Americans.
One of the ways this unconscious bias operates is through disparities in empathy for others as manifested in specific “neuroanatomical circuits underlying . . . cognitive processes.” Specifically, recent studies show that particular parts of the brain, such as the bilateral anterior insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the medial prefrontal cortex are active when individuals are feeling empathy, in both the emotional and cognitive realm. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) technology has allowed neuroscientists to measure when humans are and are not feeling empathy towards others. Unsurprisingly, many Americans tested in these studies show decreased empathetic neural activity when viewing people of different racial groups. This was true, for instance, when twenty-eight participants were shown scenes depicting individuals of varying racial groups in painful or neutral situations. Upon viewing these images, people who shared a social-racial identity with the person in need exhibited a higher level of empathetic neural activity than they did with those who did not share their ethnic group. This was despite the fact that many people would not likely claim they have explicit racial bias, since the social consequences of having such a bias are negative. Other studies involving mirror-neuron systems, which are responsible for unconsciously mirroring other individuals, show a similar level of racial bias. Thus, there are empathy gaps across racial lines.
Here, it is important to note that these are not inevitable biological responses to inherent human differences. On the contrary, race is not a biological category, but a social one. Thus, the status of who is “in” and “out” of one’s social group are constantly in flux. More importantly, the categories are historically contingent, the outcome of social oppression and not biology. It is likely not the supposed differences in look or skin color that is the cause of these empathy-deficits, but rather socially-reinforced differentiation and hierarchies. Thus, America, as a multiracial liberal democracy, does not inherently have these issues of empathy gaps, but rather has them because of its specifically racist past and present, one that had a beginning and therefore (hopefully) has an end.
Armour eventually goes on to discuss how these empathy barriers contribute to disparities in judge and jury convictions of Black Americans. How do they apply to homelessness? The answer is probably intuitive: in a majority white country with politics dominated by white individuals and interests, a problem that largely affects nonwhite people is likely to be neglected. The fact that most homeless people are mostly not white means that our political system is less likely to respond urgently to the problem. It is a classic case of structural racism. This was true, for instance, of the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, wherein the government responded slower than it could have, an action which many people attributed to the fact that the people most in need were disproportionately Black. Moreover, in the man-made disaster of the Flint, Michigan water crisis of 2014, the largely Black population of Flint likely suffered more intensely and received a less urgent response from the state due to the demographic of who was suffering. In each of these catastrophes, it is likely that the empathy deficits that white officials and members of the public exhibited towards the Black victims contributed to the lackadaisical response by government actors. The same can likely be said for homelessness. If homeless people were not members of an oppressed group, it is likely that there would be a more urgent government response to their plight.
Unconscious bias may explain the lack of a response, but why the personal blame? How does the attribution of individual responsibility to those in poverty (a view that is popular in America and described above) intersect with the government’s general unwillingness to provide shelter to homeless people given the racial lens with which we are operating? Armour’s book has even more answers here. In it, he uses the work of Fritz Heider to show how people ascribe moral blame to individuals. Specifically, when judging others, people who attribute one’s actions to their social circumstances are less likely to morally blame them for those actions than when they see those actions as stemming from an inner psychology. When people focus on the situations in which others find themselves, they are less likely to morally blame those others for their bad acts. Applying this to the criminal sphere, a study done by Birt Duncan found that “violent acts tended to be attributed to internal causes when the harm-doer was black, but to situational causes when the harm-doer was white.” Other studies have verified these findings.
If this phenomenon is occurring in the lab and in the courtroom, it is likely also occurring on the streets. In a country where people are already largely blamed for their actions, and the role of social circumstance is neglected, it makes sense that a racially-charged issue like homelessness would exacerbate this phenomenon. Racial minorities are likely being blamed for being homeless even more intensely than their white peers. Indeed, America’s response to homelessness exhibits precisely the kind of response we would expect if this were the case. Racism, individual and structural, is therefore not only responsible for Black people disproportionately becoming homeless, but also for their remaining homeless. The unwillingness to build homeless shelters and the tendency to blame people for the economic circumstances, which is exacerbated by the history of racial oppression and division in the United States, makes America’s response to homelessness much more understandable (though not justifiable). Thus, the empathy deficit and tendency to blame racial minorities—particularly Black folks—for their actions and economic status intensifies America’s lackluster response to homelessness.
F. America’s Turn to Criminalization
The above sections explain why a substantial number of Americans likely, to a sizeable extent, blame homeless people for being homeless, but they do not explain why there has been an increasing trend towards criminalization of homelessness. This Section addresses this issue. Making sense of this trend requires a broader examination of criminal law and policy. Through this analysis, one can see that criminalizing homelessness and imprisoning people like Debra Blake makes sense according to the ideology of self-responsibility and America’s comparatively harsh criminal system.
The United States has the highest rate of incarceration of any western democracy, and nearly the highest incarceration rate in the world. America is remarkably punitive in a number of ways. Not only is it the only western democracy to retain capital punishment, but its sentencing structure is also one of the harshest in the world. This trend is relatively new. Beginning in the early 1970s, an explosion in the prison population—known popularly as “mass incarceration”—made the United States the world leader in imprisonment rates. America’s recently learned penal instinct for dealing with social problems is more intense than in any other western democracy.
Coupled with this well-known trend is a lesser known but related trend: a proliferation in economic sanctions incorporated into the criminal system. There has been a surge in civil fines, court fines, and other financial penalties levied against individuals since the early 1980s. Although debtors’ prisons are officially banned in every state, people who are unable to pay a variety of civil or court-imposed fines are being increasingly imprisoned as a result.
While laws directly, explicitly criminalizing homelessness are practically nonexistent, laws that impose fines on homeless people are increasingly being passed around the country. This is the kind of criminal penalty that Debra Blake was facing. Although the statute she violated by sleeping on public land only resulted in a fine, a repeated violation of the statute, combined with her inability to pay, would have resulted in a jail sentence. She would not have been the only homeless person with such a fate. While other countries have laws that criminalize some behavior associated with sleeping on public property, the wider availability of shelters makes those laws far less relevant to homeless people abroad.
The American instinct to not only blame people facing homelessness for their camping in public but also to actively oppose them through criminalization is also part of a larger trend. Violent attacks on homeless people have been on the rise in recent years. When homelessness is seen by members of the public as a problem of individual responsibility, it makes sense that when one sees individuals taking up space on public streets or parks, they are angry at the individual rather than the socio-economic system that created the situation. The instinct to criminalize such behavior therefore follows from an individualization of the problem combined with an existing propensity for criminalization. If homeless people are solely responsible for their situation, and their situation interferes with a pedestrian’s ability to move about public grounds unimpeded, the justification for imprisonment on the grounds of public interference also begins to make sense. Imprisonment will solve the immediate problem of getting the person off the street and is justified due to that person’s inability to maintain the economic resources necessary to maintain shelter for themselves.
Of course, such a logic is withdrawn from the social realities that actually create homelessness. While experts disagree on the specific means of reducing homelessness, there is a consensus that to do so, one must dramatically increase the supply of affordable housing and connect homeless people with social services and employment opportunities. Unfortunately, for homeless people and housed people, Americans have a long history of not only ignoring expert opinion, but actively loathing expert opinion and intellectualism writ large. As Richard Hofstadter wrote in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life over 50 years ago, “intellectuals . . . are [seen as] pretentious, conceited, effeminate, and snobbish . . . .” America has no monopoly on anti-intellectualism. Nor has anti-intellectualism as a cultural force been constant in its history. Rather, it is one that fluctuates in intensity. Our current time, however, sees a more intense moment of this fluctuation, rendering a penal response to homelessness that deviates from expert opinion even more likely.
This hostility towards both homeless people and experts on homelessness can be seen in America’s current populist wave. While a deep analysis on the relationship between homelessness and populism is worthwhile, it extends beyond the scope of this Note. Still, a brief discussion can be given. Jan-Werner Müller defines populism as “a particular moralistic imagination of politics,” one that establishes a “morally pure” people against elites and outsiders. While modern populists have long derided experts as part of the elite outsiders, homeless people themselves are increasingly considered outsiders (and paradoxically paired with elites), deviants who are apart from and opposed to “normal” people. For instance, former Fox News host Tucker Carlson recently argued that homelessness is the result of liberal leaders becoming “more lenient on petty crime” and that “because of their liberal attitudes and the mild climate, [Seattle] is a magnet for vagrants.” Overall, political populism and a history of punitive responses to social problems are worryingly combining to produce laws that criminalize homelessness in spite of expert opinion.
In sum, America’s penal response to homelessness stems from both its conception of homelessness as a problem of individual failings combined with its comparatively harsh penal system. As a result, homelessness has become a hot-button political issue, one for which populists have whipped up anti-elite sentiment and anger about homelessness to create false narratives about homelessness and advocate punitive solutions thereto.
Homelessness and the Law
Now that an overview of homelessness, in both a comparative and historic-domestic light, has been given, we can return to an analysis of Debra Blake’s case and use it as a microcosm to understand and evaluate homelessness law in general. This Part, divided into several sections, outlines law concerning homelessness, both before and after the Court’s ruling in Grants Pass. Next, this Part argues that America needs a fundamental reckoning on not only the legal level, but also the ideological and social level. Only once our attitudes towards homeless people change from an individualist understanding to a collectivist understanding can our laws change to reflect that understanding. Absent such a deep reckoning, political and legal responses reflecting such a change are virtually impossible.
A. Law Prior to Grants Pass
Although Debra Blake passed away, the case she and her fellow residents filed, City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, did not. This Section outlines the case law surrounding Blake’s claim.
In 1962, the Supreme Court decided Robinson v. California. In Robinson, the Court struck down as unconstitutional part of a California statute that made it illegal “to be addicted to the use of narcotics.” The Court reasoned that while it was within California’s power to regulate behavior surrounding and including the use of drugs, criminalizing someone for their status of being addicted to illegal drugs was fundamentally different. In doing so, California was enforcing a “statute which makes the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.” Rather than criminalizing an action, the status of being addicted to an illegal narcotic was criminalized. The Court likened addiction to a chronic disease, one over which the defendant had little to no control. The Court reasoned that “in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” This ruling established what became popularly known as the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “status crimes.”
Six years after Robinson, however, this doctrine was complicated by a case titled Powell v. Texas. The case concerned whether or not the state of Texas could criminalize being found drunk “in any public place, or at any private house except his own.” The petitioners argued that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on status crimes since an alcoholic would have to drink, and would therefore inevitably violate the statute. The Powell Court distinguished the Texas statute from California’s statute in Robinson, however, in a number of ways. While certain parts of the decision argued that being drunk was an act rather than a status, other parts highlighted the fact that alcoholic individuals could choose to be drunk in their homes and therefore avoid violating the statute while maintaining their status as alcoholics. In a 4 plus 1 plurality, the Powell Court upheld the statute. Although the precedential impact of this decision was disputed, it is affirmed in the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Grants Pass.
In 2006, a Ninth Circuit ruling found that the Constitution’s ban on status crimes covered homeless individuals. In Jones v. City of Los Angeles, six homeless individuals brought suit against the city of Los Angeles for an ordinance that criminalized “sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets and sidewalks at all times and in all places.” The Ninth Circuit ruled that the City could neither criminalize the status of being homeless, nor acts that are an inevitable result of being homeless. The Court linked the status of being homeless to the number of shelter beds available. If the number of homeless people in a municipality “far exceed[ed]” the number of shelter beds available at any given time, the municipality will have violated the homeless individuals’ Eighth Amendment rights by enforcing a statute that criminalizes an integral aspect of their status as homeless people. Although this specific ruling was later vacated on technical grounds, its logic and holdings were reincorporated into law for the Ninth Circuit in 2019, in Martin v. City of Boise. While these holdings were not binding outside of the Ninth Circuit, they are highly relevant, as many states within the Ninth Circuit, like California, Hawaii, Arizona, and Oregon, have some of the highest rates of homelessness in the nation.
B. City of Grants Pass Heads to the Supreme Court
Before Martin, the City of Grants Pass enforced ordinances that fined individuals for sleeping on public grounds. Although the city modified these ordinances in the aftermath of Martin, it did not repeal them. Rather, it tweaked them to only ban “camping,” which it broadly defined as sleeping while using even rudimentary assistance, like sleeping bags. Still, after Debra Blake was cited for sleeping while using a sleeping bag on public property in 2019, she filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all homeless people in Grants Pass, arguing that the city’s ordinance constituted a violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit agreed, since Grants Pass did not have enough shelter beds to house the homeless population within city limits. Although the ordinance did not directly criminalize camping, mandating only civil fines, the Ninth Circuit panel found that these fines would still lead to criminal prosecution when they were inevitably unpaid by the homeless people fined. Furthermore, although one could still “sleep” on public property, sleeping outside in Grants Pass, Oregon, where temperatures regularly dip into the 30s, surely constituted an untenable option. To sleep outside with the assistance of a blanket was the only option for the city’s homeless residents. Thus, the ordinance was struck down as violating the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights.
This ruling seemed like a hopeful victory for homelessness advocates, one that put a check on the trend of criminalizing homelessness. But the city appealed the case to the Supreme Court, who in 2024 announced their decision overturning the Ninth Circuit’s ruling to allow municipalities to criminalize homelessness.
C. The Supreme Court’s Ruling
In a decision that made headlines nationwide in June of 2024, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and allowed Grants Pass to enforce its ordinance. Justice Gorsuch authored the opinion and was joined by the Court’s five other conservative Justices. The Court’s three liberals, meanwhile, dissented in an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor. Although the Court split along ideological lines in the decision, the decision was celebrated by conservative and liberal lawmakers alike. This Section provides an overview of the opinion.
The Court’s decision does not explicitly argue that homelessness is the fault of the individual and therefore subject to criminal liability. Rather, it is implied. Moreover, personal responsibility for homelessness is the result of the Court’s logic. Nonetheless, it is still worth examining the Court’s reasoning in detail. The policy arguments are analyzed first, then the more strictly doctrinal arguments.
Almost cynically, the Court, largely parroting amicus curiae briefs submitted on behalf of Grants Pass, frames the policy criminalizing sleeping in public as one “protecting the rights, dignity[,] and private property of the homeless.” The decision to ban sleeping in public, by the opinion’s logic, has as much to do with protecting homeless people as it does with serving the interests of the housed public. The Court also highlights that others (with whom it is siding) have concluded that “[j]ust building more shelter beds and public housing options is almost certainly not the answer by itself.” Rather, the Court concludes in its first section, after laying out the severity of America’s homelessness problem, that municipalities need “access to the full panoply of tools in the policy toolbox” to combat the issue.
What is odd about this abstract characterization of the problem is that it sees the Ninth Circuit’s ruling as limiting the options that municipalities have to combat the issue. But the ruling does not ban cities from criminalizing homelessness outright. Rather, it limits municipalities from doing so when the number of homeless people exceeds the number of shelter beds. All cities would have to do is build homeless shelters. They could then criminalize sleeping in public as much as they want. This argument is only engaged with indirectly by the Court. Rather than engaging with it substantively, the opinion argues that the standard is somehow not clear enough, since it may be difficult to count the number of homeless people on any given night and because it may be difficult for cities to estimate the number of shelter beds available and build adequate housing. All the analysis really shows, however, is that many cities have not made good-faith efforts to comply with the ruling. Rather, cities have routinely crafted threadbare policies to “comply” in appearance only with the requirements set forth in Boise, then been challenged in court when their policies are shown for what they are, then complained to the courts that the standards are unworkable using their own ineptitude as the evidence. Thus, the Court uses the city governments’ incompetence to justify overturning the Ninth Circuit’s precedent. The logic does not acknowledge the agency of the cities and locates the failure as a lack of possibility rather than a lack of will. In reality, it is not the former, but rather the latter.
Doctrinally, the Court all but overturns Robinson. The Court states clearly that “[t]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause focuses on the question what ‘method or kind of punishment’ a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not on the question whether a government may criminalize particular behavior in the first place or how it may go about securing a conviction for that offense.” This language leaves no room for Robinson, since that ruling did place substantive limits on what could be punished. The Court states that it does not overrule Robinson because no party argued for it to do so. Instead, it emphasizes that Grants Pass’s ordinance nominally criminalizes the act of camping rather than the act of being homeless. Responding to the argument that those acts inevitably follow from a status, the Court relies on the plurality in Powell, not discussing the argument that being intoxicated in public as an alcoholic is more voluntary than sleeping outside as a homeless person. The Court gives brief mention of a possible common law “necessity” defense, but does not enforce it against Grants Pass and cites a case in which an Oregon appellate court appears to refuse to apply it to the homeless person cited. Finally, the Court argues that there is no limiting principle that would restrict the conduct possibly off limits from punishment, arguing that the decision is better left to the legislature. Given this, laws that criminalize acts that inevitably follow from a status are constitutional under the Court’s standard. The decision reduces the power of Robinson to a mere linguistic limitation. As long as the government body does not explicitly criminalize a status, it is practically free to do so by punishing an act inevitably flowing from a status.
D. What Should the Court Have Done?
This Section devotes some time to defending the logic of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and engaging critics who have spoken out against the ruling.
While many in the activist community and some in the legal community have already defended the Ninth Circuit’s logic, many more in the legal academy have criticized it. To defend many of the justifications already set forth above, the Ninth Circuit’s logic makes sense. If it is unconstitutional to punish someone for their “state of being,” something that does not have an actus reus and cannot be controlled by the individual in question, how can one criminalize acts that inevitably flow from one’s state of being? Being homeless, as the Ninth Circuit said in Jones, is no more in one’s control than being addicted to narcotics. Moreover, even though Los Angeles attempted to ban “sleeping” on public property, which is an act rather than a status, the court’s logic was that to ban an act that inevitably follows from a status would be to offer a gaping loophole in status crime doctrine. It would allow the government, through a simple workaround, to criminalize statuses just as they had in Robinson. The law can and should hold accountable people who commit acts over which they have control, not acts that they are forced to do out of circumstance. Here, Justice White, in his concurrence in Powell, put the reasoning best:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a compulsion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under a different name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion. Unless Robinson is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law.
The same goes for homelessness. If it is unconstitutional to explicitly punish the status of “being homeless,” it should also be unconstitutional to punish acts that inevitably follow from being homeless, like sleeping on the street with a blanket in Oregon.
Moreover, it practically goes without saying that a prison sentence for homelessness will likely be short and will not solve the root causes of homelessness in the first place. It will merely create a cycle of imprisonment and release that will only intensify and worsen the already terrible experience of homelessness.
Other legal scholars, like Martin Gardner, have argued that the logic of five Justices in Powell, and their logical descendants in Jones, apply a logic that would implode the entire criminal justice system. Gardner argues that courts inquiring into the social circumstances of individuals who commit certain acts to determine whether or not they have the proper mens rea for violating a statute “is unwise and poses a radical threat to traditional criminal law doctrine that perhaps even threatens the continued existence of the criminal law itself.” Such hand-wringing is likely unwarranted. Realistically, it is hard to imagine the doctrine of banning status crimes and statutes that indirectly criminalize statuses as going much further than narcotics addiction, homelessness, and perhaps some immigration status issues. Indeed, Gardner himself is light on examples. Thus, a worry that criminal law in general faces a “radical threat” from Robinson and its progeny is likely undue.
But, for a moment, let us assume Gardner is correct, and that the logic of Robinson, Powell, and Jones, which begin to consider the social circumstances that affect the human agency of individuals who commit crimes, does begin to question the underlying premises of criminal law. Below, this Note will take the view that the aforementioned European view of human nature and decision-making is the more accurate one than the hyper-individualistic American view. Considering that view with specific regard to this case, this Note asks: why not? If people accept the underlying logic of Robinson, why not “carry things to their logical conclusion” and begin to inquire into the social circumstances of criminals? It seems that Gardner, like the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp according to Justice Brennan, is simply afraid of “too much justice.”
From a more abstract standpoint, the status crime doctrine juxtaposed to the traditional schema for construing criminal law through actus reus and mens rea can be understood as a counter-principle juxtaposed to a principle. That is, while in current law the counter-principle takes up a minority space relative to the space occupied by the general principle, this Note argues in the general spirit of critical legal studies that there should be an inversion between the two. That is, the status crime doctrine could be the central principle from which courts begin their analysis, while the classical view could take the minority, exceptional position.
Finally, as elaborated on below, extending the status crime doctrine to include homeless individuals better reflects the reality of their circumstances. Homelessness is a status, and sleeping on the street is an inevitable act that follows from that status. Legally acknowledging this reality not only offers protections to homeless people, but also narrows the legislative path to policies that actually address the root causes of homelessness.
Although Gardner concedes that such a reconsideration might be warranted, he argues that it must come from the legislative process rather than through courts. While there is some merit to this argument, other movements for social change have seen courts play a pivotal role in leading the way, like Brown v. Board of Education, which was responsible for ending the policy of separate but equal across the United States. Furthermore, others have argued that dramatic changes that moderate or curtail criminal punishment are far more likely to come from political elites (even democratically elected ones) than through mass movements or popular referenda. Thus, the mere fact that courts would be responsible for such a change is not enough to object to the possibility of such change where an alternative route is not possible or highly unlikely to yield results.
One aspect of the doctrine that Gardner is correct to criticize is the status crime doctrine’s placement in the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the Eighth Amendment was originally intended only to curtail certain methods of punishments, rather than impose substantive limits on what could be punished. While originalism is a deeply flawed and unwise approach to constitutional law, the original intent of an amendment should probably carry some weight. As such, Gardner thinks that the status crime doctrine should be constitutionally grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than in the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, Robinson is the only case that has imposed substantive limits on what can be punished under the Eighth Amendment. This Note agrees that a Fourteenth Amendment grounding is the superior place to couch the status crime doctrine. Still, this Note does not agree with Gardner that doing so would necessarily limit the logical and doctrinal consequences of Robinson, nor should it. The same arguments will inevitably be made no matter where in the Constitution status crime doctrine is placed.
In sum, the Court should have upheld the Ninth Circuit’s decision and not allowed municipalities a cheap workaround to avoid status crime doctrine. In doing so, the Court has solidified and given legal sanction to the nation’s increasing trend of criminalizing homelessness.
E. A Change in Ideology Must Now Precede a Change in Law
Now that the Court has delivered its ruling and allowed the criminalization of homelessness, a change in popular ideology and legislative posture must now precede any novel constitutional argument or policy proposals to tackle homelessness. Essentially, popular consciousness must change and precede any future change in legality in this domain. Ultimately, this Note takes the view that the European conceptualization of economic conditions in general, and homelessness in particular, better recognizes reality. People are products of their environment. Luck plays a role not only in the situations into which people are thrown, but also the decisions they end up making in those situations. Once more Americans begin to agree with the statement “people are poor because of an unfair society” than “people are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower,” homelessness policy can turn away from its increasingly penal tendencies and towards building shelters and restructuring economic relations. While the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was imperfect in that it did not explicitly guarantee minimum requirements of safety and standards for homeless shelters, it acknowledged that homelessness is a “status” akin to drug addiction—one that is dependent on social circumstances and not controllable predominantly by the individual. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling already contains in it the ideological shift required by the rest of the country for combatting homelessness. But absent a larger, popular recognition of the principle, our law is unlikely to reflect such a principle.
Many specific policies for ending homelessness do already exist. Moreover, legal arguments, like the ones outlined above and ignored by the Court, also already exist. But all of these are moot absent a shift in popular consciousness away from individualism and towards collectivism.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court decision reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Johnson is the culmination of long-standing trends of the individualization of societal problems. While America’s homelessness rate is not particularly high relative to other western democracies, its rate of unsheltered homeless people is. This is explained by America’s comparative unwillingness to spend as much as other western democracies on its social safety net. But it is also more fundamentally the product of broadly and deeply held beliefs about the root causes of poverty and homelessness as problems of individual rather than societal failure, beliefs that are exacerbated by structural racism.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Constitution’s status crime doctrine makes sense in this light, since it accurately and shrewdly closed a loophole that governments could use to circumvent status crime doctrine. Nonetheless, the Court reversed the ruling and allowed municipalities to criminalize homelessness. The Court’s ruling effectively legitimized the view that homelessness is an individual “failing” like murder and allowed cities to criminalize people like Debra Blake. This Note has argued not only that such a ruling is misguided, but also that it rests on a fundamentally flawed view of how individuals and society interact. America’s legal approach to homelessness must see it as a social problem rather than a problem arising from a set of atomized individuals. The Supreme Court, however, has taken the opposite view. Seen through the lens of American exceptionalism, it is an exceptionally American response to further allow the criminalization of homelessness.
Appendix
Unable to find a previously published report comparing international homelessness rates, the author assembled this data using a variety of sources. This the first known assemblage of such data and should help contribute to future research in the realm of comparative politics and sociology. For Europe and the U.K., the source used is Fédération Européenne d’Associations Nationales Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri (“FEANTSA”)’s 2023 report titled Eighth Overview of Housing Exclusion. For America, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s report titled The 2022 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress is used. For Canada, the report used is the Government of Canada’s “Everyone Counts 2020-2022” survey. For Australia, see the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare’s data on homelessness and homelessness services. For New Zealand, see the New Zealand Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Homelessness Outlook report. These reports consist of the most recent available data for each respective country.
Each study qualifies that their methods are imperfect and likely undercount the number of homeless people. The point of this Note is not to be the authoritative comparative source on national homelessness rates, since the data is constantly changing and not always reliable, but rather to generally observe that America has a higher rate of unsheltered homeless people than all western democracies analyzed but one, a limited claim which is justified despite some uncertainty in the data. Furthermore, this Note is meant to offer a starting point for future research on the subject, as homelessness is in flux in both the United States and in Europe.
For the population counts, this Note used the following reports: For Europe, see the same FEANTSA report referenced above. For the United States, see the 2022 Census Bureau Data. For Canada, see 2021 Canadian Census data. For Australia, see the Australian Bureau of Statistics. For New Zealand, see the New Zealand Government “Stats.”
It is important to note, however, that various countries define homelessness differently. For instance, New Zealand counts as “homeless” people who are staying with relatives temporarily, while the United States and other countries do not count this group. Thus, in order to ensure that the proper, equivalent numbers are being compared, the data selected from each of the above sources is limited to people falling into one of three categories: (1) people “sleeping rough,” generally outdoors, (2) people sleeping in various forms of short-term emergency housing, and (3) people spending nights in designated homeless shelters. Thus, for the European data, the data from categories one, two, and three from the European Typology of Homelessness and Housing Exclusion (“ETHOS”) is used. For the U.S. data, no special selection is required. For the Canadian data, “sheltered” and “unsheltered” people are counted. For Australia, the categories of “[p]eople temporarily staying with other households” and “[p]eople living in ‘severely’ crowded dwellings” are excluded. For New Zealand, the number of total homeless people is limited to people “[w]ithout shelter” and to those living in “[t]emporary accommodation,” since including the other categories would have been overinclusive.
Compiling the data from the preceding sources yields the following chart:
Figure 1. Percentage of Population Homeless by Country
The table with the raw numbers is included at the end of this Appendix for reference. For the second round of comparisons, which compared countries’ homelessness rate relative to shelter available, the following method of calculation was used. The number of people living without shelter was divided by the number of homeless people using the above methods for determining the number of homeless people. Thus, for the European data, ETHOS category 1 was used. For the United States, the “unsheltered” category was used. For Canada, the “[u]nsheltered” category was used. For Australia, the “[p]eople living in improvised dwellings, tents, or sleeping out (rough sleepers)” category was used. For New Zealand, the “[w]ithout shelter” category was used. The data yields the following chart:
Figure 2. Percentage of Homeless Population Unsheltered by Country
It should be noted that not all countries, particularly in the FEANTSA report, had specific data for the number of people sheltered versus unsheltered. Five countries were unable to be included, therefore, in Figure 2: Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. For the specific numerical breakdown of each category, a chart of the collected data is pasted below. Each number in the chart was collected using the methodology outlined above, and each chart is compiled using this data:
Table 1. Homelessness Data by Country |
Country | Homeless Count | National Population | % of Population | Homeless Unsheltered | % of Homeless Population Unsheltered |
Belgium | 6,700 | 11,554,767 | 0.058 | 1,187 | 17.71641791 |
Czechia | 19,653 | 10,649,800 | 0.185 | 8,892 | 45.24500076 |
Denmark | 3,738 | 5,873,420 | 0.064 | 535 | 14.31246656 |
Finland | 794 | 5,548,241 | 0.014 | N/A | . . . |
France | 209,074 | 67,656,682 | 0.309 | N/A | . . . |
Germany | 210,612 | 83,237,124 | 0.253 | 32,467 | 15.41555087 |
Hungary | 6,944 | 9,689,010 | 0.072 | 1,649 | 23.74711982 |
Ireland | 11,632 | 5,060,005 | 0.230 | N/A | . . . |
Luxembourg | 420 | 590,667 | 0.071 | N/A | . . . |
Poland | 23,812 | 37,972,812 | 0.063 | 2,551 | 10.71308584 |
Portugal | 9,604 | 10,298,252 | 0.093 | N/A | . . . |
Spain | 16,006 | 47,432,805 | 0.034 | 4,508 | 28.16443834 |
Sweden | 14,065 | 9,995,153 | 0.141 | 990 | 7.0387487 |
EU Rate (FEANTSA) | 533,054 | 305,558,738 | 0.174 | N/A | . . . |
United States | 582,462 | 333,287,557 | 0.175 | 233,832 | 40.14545155 |
United Kingdom | 86,288 | 66,796,807 | 0.129 | 17,012 | 19.71537178 |
Canada | 20,000 | 36,991,981 | 0.054 | 5,000 | 25.0 |
Australia | 58,002 | 25,760,867 | 0.220 | 7,636 | 13.165063 |
New Zealand | 11,553 | 4,900,600 | 0.230 | 3,624 | 31.3684757 |
Note: Data used to produce Figures 1 and 2.
