Filling the California Ninth Circuit Vacancies

From Volume 92, Postscript (March 2018)
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FILLING THE CALIFORNIA NINTH CIRCUIT VACANCIES

Carl Tobias[*]

INTRODUCTION

At President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced ample vacancies that the United States Courts’ Administrative Office labeled “judicial emergencies” because of their protracted length and its huge caseload. Recent departures by Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt and former Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who occupied California posts, and other jurists’ decision to change their active status mean that the circuit has five emergencies, three in California, because Trump has appointed only three nominees. The court also resolves the most filings least expeditiously.

Limited clarity about whether more judges will leave active service over Trump’s presidency suggests that additional confirmations may be necessary; however, the selection process’s stunning politicization will compromise this initiative. For example, when the tribunal enjoined Trump’s controversial determinations which excluded immigrants from seven predominately Muslim nations, he excoriated multiple jurists of the circuit. Trump afforded numerous candidates, but merely three have received approval, partly because home state Democratic politicians retained “blue slips” when the White House minimally consulted. The vacancieswhich exceed seventeen percent, and three California openings, which are tenshow the crucial need to fill more vacancies.

This piece first analyzes the vacancy conundrum’s history. It evaluates selection throughout the presidencies of Barack Obama and Trump, while scrutinizing California’s pressing situation. Ascertaining that the predicament comes from reduced Democratic and Republican cooperation and some jurists’ departures, this Article reviews that complication’s impacts and detects that systematic partisanship has subverted confirmations, attributes which Trump could exacerbate. Because the plentiful vacancies injure myriad litigants by eroding judicial resources to decide lawsuits, the final Part proffers solutions for the President and the Senate to promptly fill the California openings.

I. Modern Selection Difficulties

The history warrants little treatment here, as others have canvassed the background,[1] and the current standoff enjoys greatest relevance. One aspect is the permanent difficulty that results from enhanced federal jurisdiction, cases and judges.[2] Significant now is the modern concern, which is political and emanates from contrasting Senate and presidential control that started four decades ago.[3] Both constituents have affected California. For instance, rampant population growth driven by rising financial expansion and immigration enlarged district cases with related appeals; thus, circuit seats increased to twenty-eight in 1984.[4] Mounting partisanship also undermined confirmations by slowing and halting nominees.[5] However, certain phenomena tempered appointments problems. Over most of the Ninth Circuit’s 128 years, it faced nominal difficulties. The judicial complement was extremely small, openings were rare, and the chamber easily filled many positions. Indeed, until 1968, the tribunal performed efficaciously with merely nine members.

A 1978 statute authorized manifold posts, while President Jimmy Carter had success, primarily because Democrats held the upper chamber, so President Ronald Reagan had no vacancy upon election.[6] He quickly confirmed jurists, although five positions were created, as the GOP had the chamber Reagan’s initial six years and once Democrats became the majority they coordinated.[7] Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), the able Judiciary Committee Chair, astutely canvassed nominees, and the majority confirmed Justice Anthony Kennedy and six circuit jurists across the U.S.  over 1988, yet three posts, two located in California, were open upon year’s end.[8] Smooth appointments prevailed for most of George H.W. Bush’s time but slowed in 1992, meaning that a California appellate position was empty.[9]

President Bill Clinton appointed a judge for this slot partially because Democrats acquired a majority in his first half term, but Republicans recaptured Senate control during 1995. At various later times, openings reached ten, including three California posts with his tenure’s end.[10] This situation improved over George W. Bush’s presidency, especially when the GOP enjoyed a majority. He approved several jurists primarily by consulting Democrats; yet controversy arose, leaving a sole vacancy at his time’s close.[11]

In short, judicial appointments were mixed, but certain periods allowed relatively successful endeavors. Illustrations were Bush père and son; yet circumstances gradually deteriorated after United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge Robert Bork’s confirmation fight for the Supreme Court until 2009 when they markedly declined.[12]

II. Obama Administration Selection

The practices worked rather effectively across Obama’s initial six years when Democrats had a chamber majority. He actively consulted home state Republicans, seeking, and normally following, proposals of capable, mainstream nominees.[13] Those initiatives encouraged cooperation in the early Obama era because senators received deference, as they may slow the process through keeping blue slips, which the Senate respected in Obama’s tenure.[14] Even with Obama’s assertive pleading, some did not coordinate by forwarding accomplished prospects.[15]

The GOP collaborated with regular hearings but “held over” discussions and votes a week for all except one circuit nominee.[16] Republicans slowly allowed chamber debates, if required, and ballots, forcing strong centrists to languish months until Democrats pursued cloture.[17] The GOP also sought plenty of roll call votes and debate hours on capable, moderate aspirants, who felicitously captured approval, thus consuming rare floor time.[18] This left some Ninth Circuit vacancies across Obama’s initial half decade; yet he appointed several preeminent, consensus, diverse judges the first three years.[19]

In the 2012 presidential election year, Republicans coordinated less.[20] Delay increased, while appellate confirmations ended in June.[21] Upon Obama’s reelection, Democrats hoped for improved collaboration, but recalcitrance expanded in 2013 when he proffered three fine, mainstream, diverse nominees for the D.C. Circuit, the nation’s second most important tribunal.[22] Republicans provided them no Senate ballots, and protracted obstruction made Democrats unleash the “nuclear option” which confined filibusters, allowing the Ninth Circuit to have every seat filled at 2014’s conclusion.[23]

The following year, once Republicans held a Senate majority,[24] already negligible cooperation decreased. GOP leaders promised to reinstitute “regular order,” the approach which governed before Democrats ostensibly eroded this. In January, Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the new Majority Leader, stated, we must “return to regular order.”[25] Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), the Judiciary Chair, pledged that he would similarly assess prospects.[26] Despite incessant vows, Republicans slowly offered Obama picks hearings and committee votes and chamber debates and ballots. With 2015’s close, these phenomena meant that eight appellate emergencies lacked nominees for states which GOP senators represented, and California had one, when Harry Pregerson took senior status that December.[27]

In Obama’s last half term, the chamber promptly approved Kara Farnandez Stoll, an expert, moderate lawyer, but slowly confirmed District Judge Felipe Restrepo, a prominent centrist, to the Federal and Third Circuits.[28] Appointing so few jurists over two years was nearly unprecedented.[29] In 2016a presidential election year when circuit approvals conventionally halt earlyGOP denial of review to Judge Merrick Garland, Obama’s exceptional Supreme Court nominee,[30] intensified these attributes. Despite the tradition ensuring that preeminent, mainstream nominees receive floor ballots after May, this did not materialize.[31] Obama nominated seven well qualified, moderate candidatesincluding District Judge Lucy Koh for the California openingyet none realized appointment.[32]

Judge Koh merits emphasis because she possesses superb abilities, deserved prior confirmation, and warrants Ninth Circuit renomination, and California Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Kamala Harris powerfully favor her elevation.[33] The judge is distinctly qualified.[34] She was the initial Asian American on the Northern District of California [35] and has carefully resolved major litigation, including her effective disposition of Apple’s patent infringement case against Samsung.[36] The nominee earned a wellqualified rating from a substantial majority of the American Bar Association (ABA) evaluation committee.[37]

Accordingly, Koh was a dynamic pick who merited appointment, while she resembles many fine Obama confirmees who afford benefits. Circuits with all their jurists can rapidly, economically, and fairly treat huge caseloads.[38] Increased ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation diversity improves comprehension and resolution of critical questions which tribunals decide.[39] Minority judges also curtail prejudices that undermine justice, and they instill public confidence.[40]

Selection and election year politics should not have undercut Koh’s review. Koh is a district jurist, which speeds the process; her ABA and FBI analyses only required updating; she was confirmed once and compiled a long, accessible record.[41] The panel fully investigated her by cooperating with the ABA, FBI, and Department of Justice (DOJ).[42] The Chair only set a hearing five months after nomination, although the Ninth Circuit required all posts filled.[43] Feinstein and Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.) introduced Koh, praising her as the classic “American success story.”[44] Members robustly queried the nominee who duly responded.[45] Koh appeared to satisfy most. A few next posited written questions that she promptly answered.[46] Grassley convened a September panel debate [47] where the members rigorously discussed the nominee.[48] Four Republicans, including Grassley, favored Koh, who earned approval.[49]

Many ideas show why she deserved rapid appointment. The GOP leader had a duty to follow the regular order that he always lauds and distinctly relevant Bush precedent.[50] McConnell had numerous weeks to vote on Koh but refused once Trump captured the presidency.[51] Excellent centrists usually attain final ballots, so her proponents should have pursued cloture and senators who honor custom must have agreed.[52] When Koh reached the floor, the leader ought to have arranged a respectful debate, which robustly canvassed many questions, and a chamber vote. In short, Republican obstruction meant that Koh lacked a final ballot and her nomination expired in early 2017.[53]

III. Trump Administration Selection

A. Nomination Process

Over the campaign, Trump promised to name and seat ideological conservatives and kept the vows by sending and confirming Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh and manifold similar circuit and certain district nominees.[54] He created records for appointing circuit jurists the initial year with a dozen and eighteen the next but has tapped eight Ninth Circuit picks and only three won confirmation.[55]

Trump applies some customs, yet discards, reverses or deemphasizes others. For instance, he, like modern predecessors, assigned lead nomination efforts to the White House Counsel, located related duties in DOJ and stressed circuit openings.[56] When proffering appellate nominees, former White House Counsel McGahn emphasized conservative perspectives and youth. The Counsel relied on litmus tests, including opposition to the administrative state, and proposed aspirants in their forties, while he often used the list of twenty-five potential Supreme Court picks whom the Federalist Society and Heritage Foundation assembled.[57] Those procedures continue applying because the Society’s Executive Vice President, Leonard Leo, advises Trump on selection.[58] The White House stresses the circuits, as they comprise tribunals of last resort for virtually all cases, announce greater policy than district courts  and issue rulings which cover multiple states.[59]

However, Trump omits and downplays myriad traditions. Crucial is failing to assiduously consult home state politicians, an effective convention which Presidents use that is a critical reason for blue slips.[60] Peculiarly relevant are the conflicting approaches deployed when filling two Ninth Circuit vacancies. McGahn suggested, and Trump nominated, Ryan Bounds without consulting Oregon Democratic Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley or allowing invocation of a bipartisan selection committee, provoking slips’ aggressive retention.[61] In profound contrast, McGahn avidly consulted Hawaii Democratic Senators Mazie Hirono and Brian Schatz prior to sending Mark Bennett, prompting their full support of him and praise for McGahn’s endeavors in a smooth hearing and Bennett’s quick approval.[62]

A related abandonment of efficacious precedent is the ABA’s nearly complete exclusion from judicial selection. All Presidents after Dwight Eisenhower, save George W. Bush, had employed ABA ratings when proposing candidates, and Obama eschewed candidates whom the ABA ranked not qualified.[63] However, Trump nominated six prospects with this rating.[64]

He also deletes or ignores effective tools. One is not prioritizing nominations by initially filling eighty-seven emergency vacancies, which courts ground in their substantial length or caseloads;[65] in fact, these emergency vacancies have multiplied since Republicans won the chamber.[66] Trump as well nominates fewer picks in states which Democrats represent, even though most have plentiful emergencies.[67] California includes three Ninth Circuit emergencies, but Trump only named Patrick Bumatay, Daniel Collins and Kenneth Lee last October, although the senators opposed confirmation, favoring as nominees Collins, James Rogan and Koh; Bumatay, Collins and Lee received no 2018 hearing, saw their nominations expire and received renomination, with Bumatay receiving renomination to the Southern District of California and Daniel Bress receiving nomination to the Ninth Circuit.[68]

Another useful idea, which Trump rejects or deemphasizes, is enhancing minority individuals’ bench representation, particularly vis-à-vis Democrats.[69] For example, he seemingly effectuated no initiatives that suggest and confirm ethnic minority or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ) prospects by assigning diverse staff to selection or urging that politicians send numerous minorities.[70] Among Trump’s eightynine lower federal court confirmees, only Amul Thapar, James Ho, John Nalbandian, Neomi Rao, Karen Gren Scholer, Jill Otake, Fernando Rodriguez, and Terry Moorer are persons of color, and of 170 nominees, twenty-one are – the initial six confirmed, Bumatay, Lee, and five more constitute Asian Americans, while Rodriguez and two others are Latinos, Moorer and four more comprise African Americans, Bumatay is gay, and Mary Rowland is a lesbian.[71]

McGahn consulted Feinstein and Harris somewhat respecting the three California appellate vacancies. Feinstein has marshaled astute panel service, operating collegially with GOP politicians, especially Grassley, and is now the Ranking Member.[72] For example, she promoted controversial Bush circuit nominees, like Kavanaugh, who secured a panel vote, which should ingratiate her with Republicans, but they demonize Feinstein over his recent promotion.

At Trump’s election and for much of 2017, California had one vacancy; yet the Kozinski and Reinhardt departures left it with three, changing the dynamics.[73] In Trump’s first year, Feinstein held productive selection meetings with Mike Pence and the White House Counsel, Donald McGahn.[74] In August 2017, a source claimed that McGahn had analyzed twenty-five people to fill the California vacancy and offered the senators “possible nominees;[75] while in 2018, outlets said that Feinstein’s panel had reviewed several Trump picks and some candidates whom it first vetted.[76] Despite much press coverage of the two newer California vacancies and speculation proclaiming how Trump might remake the circuit, he named Bumatay, Collins, and Lee in late 2018, notwithstanding the senators’ opposition and concerted efforts to reach a deal by proffering Collins, Rogan, and Koh.[77]

B. Confirmation Process

The appointments process resembled the nomination system’s detrimental features in certain ways by omitting, altering or diluting effective customs or mechanisms. Instructive examples were changing (1) the 100-year-old blue slip procedurewhich denies nominee consideration when politicians retain slipsand (2) valuable committee duties.

In fall 2017, Grassley amended the slip policy for circuit nominees by processing aspirants without two home state politicians’ slips, particularly when senators oppose them for “political or ideological” reasons.[78] This altered the construct which both parties applied during Obama’s years, the most recent similar precedent,[79] especially as the Chair modestly supported placing in himself much discretion to decide if the White House “adequately consulted.”[80] Most pertinent was resolution of the dispute between the executive and the Oregon lawmakers.[81] Grassley had not forced the issue by denying the slips effect. He conferred with the politicians and seemingly recognized that Counsel minimally consulted, because Grassley delayed a hearing while the senators tendered candidates whom their panel suggested but ultimately acceded by convening a hearing.[82] He urged that slips are intended to ensure Presidents consult and protect home state prerogatives in the selection process.[83]

The Chair also changed many panel hearing rules and conventions. Integral was arranging ten sessions for two circuit nominees without the minority’s permission and the Ninth Circuit one during a recess for campaigning; ten hearings acutely contrast to Democratic use of three sessions in Obama’s eight years which the GOP had clearly allowed.[84] Circuit hearings were rushed, and they lacked care for nominees who may be life-tenured appointees on courts of last resort.[85] Some appeared to intentionally stall by reiterating questions, and they evasively answered queries.[86]

Many discussions before panel votes similarly lacked content. Legislators rarely engaged on issues about core judicial qualifications. One pernicious deviation was setting hearings, and even votes, before the ABA finished ratings, despite Feinstein’s importuning to have ballots after rankings’ completion. Grassley strenuously asserted that this exogenous political group must not drive scheduling.[87] It was predictable, therefore, that controversial aspirants would secure party-line votes.[88]

These phenomena did not affect the Hawaii vacancy, as McGahn fully consulted the senators about Bennett which prompted their support and rapid chamber analysis.[89] However, the Chair’s determination to not honor the Wyden and Merkley blue slips meant that he processed Bounds, thus undermining slips’ purpose, although when Senator Tim Scott (R-S.C.) raised concerns over his deleterious writings about diversity and people of color, Trump summarily withdrew Bounds.[90]

After the committee reported nominees, analogous, yet less problematic, dynamics frustrated effective canvasses: Both parties forced cloture and roll call ballots on most nominees; members voted in lockstep; and the nuclear option’s 2013 explosion permitted selections to win confirmation on majority ballots.[91] Problematic was compressing six 2018 appellate nominees’ chamber action into one week;[92] this left the minority with deficient resources for preparing.[93] The quality of Senate debates resembled numerous panel discussions,[94] while many of the thirty hours reserved for debate after cloture examined questions lacking relationships to individual nominees.[95]

The GOP Senate majority, like Trump, prioritized seating appellate, over district, judges, nominees in states with Republican senators, conservative white males, and filling non-emergency openings, ideas which mostly derived from the nomination regime.[96] Those facets allowed Trump to set appellate records yet left twenty-plus 2017 district picks without floor votes, while few realized approval in states with two Democrats, only two minority nominees won confirmation and emergencies soared.[97] McGahn neglected blue state Ninth Circuit vacancies, especially in California. Negligible consultation delayed the Oregon effort, and Trump’s deteriorated relations with Republican Senators John McCain, who died, and Jeff Flake, who eschewed reelection, slowed the Arizona nomination.[98]

IV. Reasons For And Implications Of Problematic Selection

The reasons for selection problems are complex,[99] but some commentators trace the “confirmation wars” to Judge Bork.[100] The process has unraveled, as seen with constant partisanship and striking divisivenessmanifested in slowing Kavanaugh and denying Garland review, exploding nuclear options to confirm Gorsuch and Obama nominees whom Republicans blocked and demanding cloture and roll call votes for most nominees.[101]

The effects are crucial. The 2015 to 2016 inaction and Trump’s deficiencies leave eight circuit, and eightyseven emergency, vacancies, many in the Ninth.[102] Circuits had “few” empty slots at 2014’s close only after Democrats mustered the nuclear option.[103] However, 2015 to 2016 inactivity and judges’ later departures multiplied Ninth Circuit emergencies; California lacked nominees for three until October 2018 while Trump has approved merely three Ninth Circuit jurists.[104] Slow appointments deprive the court of judicial resources to deliver myriad litigants justice.[105] Few circuits address conditions so daunting as the Ninth that resolves immense filings most slowly.[106]

In sum, this canvass elucidates the appellate process’ state, which inattention to California worsened, and the need for speedy action. The Constitution grants the executive and chamber many appointments duties. Clear precedent that supports approvals near a presidency’s institution should govern.[107] The parties, thus, ought to cooperate and fill the California emergencies.

V. Suggestions For Filling The Vacancies

A. General Suggestions

Trump’s major task remains creating an effective government. Confirming Gorsuch and Kavanaugh consumed resources that would have been dedicated to circuits.[108] Trump’s nominal familiarity with judges and selection may explain the California vacancies, but his presidency is rather nascent and ideas may be derived from efforts thus far.[109]

Some behavior inspires little confidence. Trump’s degrading remarks on jurists and their decisions [110] suggest that he confronts more appointments problems than other new executives but may rectify the situation. Because crafting the government and confirming two Justices devoured resources and Trump gave California nominal priority, he must emphasize it.[111]

Trump needed to avidly consult the senators. Cultivation helps in states with two opposition lawmakers, as they could delay processing by retaining slips.[112] The Oregon stalemate manifested the perils of not consulting, while smooth Hawaii approval showed the benefits.[113] Trump ought to have cultivated the Californians, who cooperated and supplied fine, consensus suggestions.[114]

The chief executive should also keep applying earlier Presidents’ salient practices. When appointing circuit judges, one would be nominating federal district judges and state Supreme Court jurists.[115] Related is renominating and easily confirming able, centrist Obama nominees who almost captured appointment, namely Judge Koh.[116] The ideas are constructive, as the chamber has already carefully evaluated and confirmed federal jurists.[117] Many state justices’ activities resemble those of federal circuit judges.[118] Other promising sources are dynamic federal court litigators.[119]

Republican and Democratic Presidents afford White House Counsel abundant responsibility for circuit court nominees.[120] Trump assigns many courts preference yet accorded California little and excluded the ABA.[121] Thus, he should assure California priority, ABA input, and designee canvassing that is more careful. Lawmakers’ sending a few picks and swift, open communications permitted Trump and the senators flexibility. If each persistently rejects all his choices, they should reconcile prolonged differences, as chronic opposition imposes delay, cost and the need to restart consideration.[122]

After nomination, the parties must ensure efficient, intensive and fair confirmation systems. Republicans and Democrats ought to astutely conclude scrutiny by expediting panel, ABA and FBI checks, and nominees should help by fully completing questionnaires.[123] Senators may retain slips, if nominees are unacceptable after they exhaust initiatives to have Trump change aspirants’ path, elements which California senators are pursuing. The core is merit: independence, ethics, intelligence, diligence and temperament.[124] When the White House renominated Collins and Lee and nominated Bress for the Ninth Circuit, the California senators urged Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), who replaced Grassley as Judiciary Chair, to honor their blue slips.[125] However, Graham stated that “once (Democrats) changed the rules on circuit courtsthey did it, not meto expect that the blue slip system would survive is pretty naïve,” refused to respect the senators blue slips[126]and observed that he was “very supportive of the nominees submitted by President Trump to serve on the Ninth Circuit” because they are “highly qualified nominees.”[127]

Once lawmakers provide slips for qualified nominees, the panel must swiftly convene hearings. Despite when they are fine centrists and nominees’ ABA, FBI, and committee reviews are probing and strong, yielding untroubling conclusions, few members attend sessions that proceed well.[128] Should controversy arise, hearings ought to feature robust, comprehensive and equitable questioning. Senators pose written queries, which nominees carefully answer, while holding meetings to discuss them and vote. If the panel approves, but the majority refuses chamber ballots, designee advocates file cloture that able, mainstream nominees win.[129] The Majority Leader then stages floor debates, which must be complete, rigorous discussions that respect nominees and the process, and conducts fast votes.

B. Specific Vacancies

Trump should have assiduously consulted Feinstein and Harris, who cooperated by proffering multiple able, consensus designees for every opening. The senators asked him to rename Judge Koh, who achieved February 2016 nomination.[130] Promptly filling all vacancies is compelling for myriad litigants, jurists, and California active circuit judge representation.

Trump ought to have assessed renaming Koh,[131] because she deserved a 2016 final vote which GOP obstruction prevented, but Koh would now have to secure only that and a panel ballot. The last idea shows why she merits selection and approval: California needs three jurists, the panel, ABA and FBI recently scrutinized Koh fully and their prior surveys necessitate mere updating. Precedent sustains that effort. Koh warrants no hearing, as Grassley mandated none for the many Obama district nominees Trump renamed, yet members who opposed Koh earlier and newer colleagues might favor a hearing.[132]

California requires each vacancy filled, so the politicians agreed on a few candidates they support, but the President named others, despite the endeavors of the senators, who pointedly retain blue slips. They must keep slips, which the Chair needs to honor. During October, the senators proposed Collins, Rogan, and Koh, who merit Trump’s serious review, as they would promote quick, smooth confirmation, which fills half the circuit vacancies with one nominee he tapped, another on the White House list, who is an experienced jurist, and a third who is on the senators’ list and is a respected federal judge.[133]

Because Trump may reject the senators’ deal and needs multiple nominees, Feinstein and Harris might assemble other prospects. One source is the twenty-plus Obama California district appointeesmost have been superb jurists across years. For instance, Central District Judge Dolly Gee affords ethnic, and rare experiential, diversity, from prodigious work on labor issues.[134] Twenty-one Bush confirmees have served well over more than a decade. For example, Gee’s colleague, Andrew Guilford, would impart expertise from dozens of years being a revered civil litigator and federal jurist.[135]

The California Supreme Court is another possibility. Justices Goodwin Liu and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar were groundbreaking law faculty, while Justice Leondra Kruger practiced at the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office.[136] Trump could also prefer more conservative aspirants, notably Chief Justice Toni Cantil-Sakauye.[137] Active federal court litigators would be apt sources. For instance, Obama confirmees Paul Watford and Michelle Friedland were excellent attorneys with a respected firm.[138] Counsel whom Trump or Feinstein’s panel assessed were Daniel Bress, Collins, Lee and Jeremy Rosen.[139]

Once the senators concurred, they proposed several strong prospects for each slot to Trump, who should have proffered mutually satisfactory nominees.[140] The many exceptional California attorneys and three vacancies offer much flexibility vis-à-vis ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, ideological and experiential diversity. A finely-calibrated analysis of these diversity facets and other relevant criteria, namely diligence, intelligence and ethics, was merited.

Because Trump and the senators differ, they could use a more dramatic approach: the “bipartisan judiciary,” which a few states’ lawmakers employ.[141] Members of the party lacking executive control suggest a percentage of nominees. Reasoning by analogy, Trump may choose one and the senators can propose a second, while he and they might agree on a third. A related option is “trades.”[142] For example, Trump may nominate one stellar, conservative, young aspirant, the politicians might send Koh and the third nominee would be a Bush district confirmee whom all favor.[143] When he and senators concur, they ought to apply efficient, comprehensive and fair confirmation processes like those reviewed.[144]

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit addresses least promptly the biggest docket mainly because it confronts five emergencies, three affecting California. If President Trump, Senators Feinstein and Harris, and the chamber robustly adopt the mechanisms scrutinized, they can expeditiously fill these vacancies with able, consensus jurists.

 


[*] *. Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Margaret Sanner for valuable suggestions, Emily Benedict for valuable research and editing, the Southern California Law Review Postscript editors for valuable suggestions and editing, Leslee Stone and MJ Chinworth for excellent processing as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Andrews Kurth Summer Research Endowment Fund for generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are mine alone.

 [1]. Miller Ctr. Comm’n No. 7, Report of the Commission on Selecting Federal Judges 3–6 (1996); Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 Miss. C. L. Rev. 319, 320–33 (1994). California has fourteen active Ninth Circuit judgeships.

 [2]. It needs less scrutiny; some delay is intrinsic, resists meaningful change and has been analyzed. Carl Tobias, Combating the Ninth Circuit Judicial Vacancy Crisis, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 687, 689–91 (2017).

 [3]. Some periods, as 2017 to 2018, have one-party control. For fuller treatment, see generally Miller Ctr. Comm’n, supra note 1; Bermant, supra note 1, and Tobias, Combating Ninth Circuit Vacancies, supra note 2.

 [4]. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (increasing the number of circuit and district court judgeships); Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 345 (1984) (same); Pub. L. No. 110-177 §509, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543 (2008) (transferring a D.C. Circuit judgeship to the Ninth Circuit and bringing the Ninth Circuit judgeships to 29).

 [5]. That partisanship was incremental, declining after Judge Robert Bork’s monumental Supreme Court battle. However, even later, some cooperation occurred. See discussion infra notes 79, 12. See generally Charles Geyh, When Courts and Congress Collide: The Struggle for Control of America’s Judicial System (2007) (discussing the relationship between Congress and the federal courts).

 [6]. See U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary: August 1, 1981, at 4 (1981); see also Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection From Roosevelt Through Reagan 285–345 (1997).

 [7]. See 143 Cong. Rec. S2,541 (daily ed. Mar., 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also Goldman, supra note 6, at 285345. 

 [8]. See U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary (Article III Judges Only): November 1, 1988, at 3 (1988). Bork was an exception to collegial selection.

 [9]. U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary Article III Judges Only): November 1, 1993, at 3 (1993).

 [10]. Clinton’s naming fine centrists and a few GOP senators’ help meant that some states functioned well. See generally U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary Article III Judges Only): November 1, 1995; U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary Article III Judges Only): November 1, 2000.

 [11].  See generally U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary Article III Judges Only): November 1, 2007; U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary Article III Judges Only): November 1, 2008 (confirming ten 2007 to 2008 George W. Bush circuit picks); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Feb. 15, 2018) (evaluating a California-Idaho dispute over which state would fill Judge Stephen Trott’s vacancy).

 [12]. E.g., Mark Gitenstein, Matters of Principle: An Insider’s Account of America’s Rejection of Robert Bork’s Nomination to the Supreme Court 11–12 (1992); Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 18 n.14 (2007). See generally Geyh, supra note 5.

 [13]. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2233, 2239–40, 2253 (2013); see also Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary, 97 Judicature 7, 8–17 (2013).

 [14]. No nominee moved without two slips. Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular Order, Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. Inter Alia (Nov. 20, 2018). But see discussion infra notes 7883 and accompanying text.

 [15]. Some sent none. Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 17; see also 161 Cong. Rec. S6,151 (daily ed. July 30, 2015).

 [16]. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 22, 2013); see also Tobias, supra note 13, at 2242–43.

 [17]. I depend below on Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 26–29; Tobias, supra note 13, at 2243–46.

 [18]. Tobias, supra note 13, at 2244; see also Juan Williams, The GOP’s Judicial Logjam, Hill (July 27, 2015), https://thehill.com/opinion/juan-williams/249196-juan-williams-the-gops-judicial-logjam.

 [19]. Judicial Vacancy List for December 2009, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2009/12/vacancies/html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2014, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2014/12/vacancies/html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); see also 156 Cong. Rec. S4,608 (daily ed. June 7, 2010) (discussing and confirming judicial nominee Lucy Koh); id. at S10,986 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (discussing and confirming judicial nominee Mary Murguia); 157 Cong. Rec. S8,625 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (discussing and confirming judicial nominee Morgan Christen).

 [20]. Tobias, supra note 13, at 2246; Russell Wheeler, The ‘Thurmond Rule’ and Other Advice and Consent Myths, Brookings Inst. (May 25, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25
/the-thurmond-rule-and-other-advice-and-consent-myths; Michael Shear et al., Obama Pick Opens Court Battle, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2016, at A1; see also S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 17, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (May. 19, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley); Carl Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 160, 169 (2016).

 [21]. 158 Cong. Rec. S4,108 (daily ed. June 12, 2012) (elevating Andrew Hurwitz). Jacqueline Nguyen and Paul Watford won 2012 approval to California seats. Id. at S2,931 (daily ed. May 14, 2012); id. at S3,388 (daily ed. May 21, 2012).

 [22]. See generally Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 Ind. L.J. 121 (2015) (discussing the filling of three D.C. Circuit vacancies at this time).

 [23]. John Owens and Michelle Friedland won approval to California seats. 160 Cong. Rec. S1,881 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2014); id. at S2,426 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2014).

 [24]. Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfaction with Obama, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2014), http://wapo.st/1rZ20TB?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.d7667ffae95a; Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1.

 [25]. He repeats the mantra. 161 Cong. Rec. S27 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015); id. at S2,767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015).

 [26]. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015).

 [27]. They helped little, so Obama sent no 2015 nominee. See Judicial Emergencies for December 2015, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2015/12/emergencies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Emergencies for December 2016, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies
/2016/12
/emergencies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).

 [28]. Carl Tobias, Confirming Judge Restrepo to the Third Circuit, 88 Temple L. Rev. Online 37, 38 n.4, 45–46 (2017).

 [29]. Chris Kang, GOP Obstruction Could Be Worst Since the 1800s, Huffington Post (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-kang/republican-obstruction-of_b_9741446.html; see also discussion supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text.

 [30]. Wheeler, supra note 20; Shear et al., supra note 20, at A1.

 [31]. Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year, supra note 20, at 169; see also S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 17, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (May. 19, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley).

 [32]. See generally Carl Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh to the Ninth Circuit, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 449 (2016); Tobias, supra note 31.

 [33]. Emily Cadei, Dianne Feinstein, Kamala Harris Try to Cut a Deal with Trump, Sacramento Bee (May 22, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert
/article211603954.html; Zoe Tillman, Here’s How Trump Is Trying to Remake His Least Favorite Court, Buzzfeed News (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/heres-who-the-white-house-pitched-for-the-federal-appeals; see also Letter from Sen. Dianne Feinstein to Donald McGahn, White House Counsel (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files
/d/4/d4757388-8ebc-446c-8283-1719f1054d60/C0422EA4863812AFB2A2BEF78E242426.2018.10.5-df-letter-to-mcgahn-re.-ninth-circuit.pdf.

 [34]. She was a well-respected prosecutor, law firm partner, and Superior Court and Northern District of California judge, earning an excellent reputation since 2010. For these ideas and more, see Tobias, supra note 32, at 450.

 [35]. Bob Egelko, Lucy Koh Nominated for U.S. Court of Appeals in S.F., S.F. Gate (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Obama-nominates-local-judge-to-federal-appeals-6855113.php; Howard Mintz, San Jose Judge Lucy Koh Nominated to Federal Appeals Court, Mercury News (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/02/25/san-jose-judge-lucy-koh-nominated-to-federal-appeals-court.

 [36]. Apple v. Samsung, No. 11–CV–01846–LHK, 2011 WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); see also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (settling ably 3000 workers’ antitrust claims).

 [37]. See generally ABA Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, Ratings of Article III and Article IV Judicial Nominees: 114th Congress (2017).

 [38]. 160 Cong. Rec. S5,364 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2239, 2254.

 [39]. They resolve cases that involve critical issues like civil rights and abortion. For additional discussion on these issues, see Sally Kenney, Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (2013); Frank Wu, Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White (2003). But see Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 504 (2011).

 [40]. Report, First Circuit Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias Task Forces (1999); Sylvia Lazos, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 Ind. L.J. 1423, 1442 (2008); Tobias, supra note 13, at 2249.

 [41]. Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2258; see also discussion supra note 36 and accompanying text for more on Koh’s qualifications.

 [42]. Koh had been vetted, so evaluation was brief. See Egelko, supra note 35; Mintz, supra note 35.

 [43]. See supra notes 8, 29 and accompanying text. He also needed to reciprocate for Democrats’ appointing ten circuit judges, one to an Idaho seat, in Bush’s last two years. 

 [44]. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (July 13, 2016).

 [45]. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) asked why she “effectively invalidated the Electronic Privacy Act.” Id.; In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 13–MD–02430–LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014). Her circuit lacked precedent, so she consulted other cases.

 [46]. Hearing, supra note 44. Most were uncontroversial; her responses were careful.

 [47]. The GOP held over Koh like most nominees. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Sept. 8, 2016); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 22, 2013); see also Tobias, supra note 13, at 2242–43.

 [48]. Cornyn based opposition on the Google opinion. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Sept. 15, 2016); see supra note 45 for further discussion.

 [49]. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Sept. 15, 2016). Obama-elevated judges—whom Judge Nguyen typifies—easily won panel votes, as they had captured them and appointment once. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Dec. 1, 2011); see supra note 21 for further discussion.

 [50]. Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 32, at 454, 455 n.29 (urging regular order and confirmation of 2008 Bush nominees).

 [51]. Tobias, Confirming Circuit Judges in a Presidential Election Year, supra note 31; see also 162 Cong. Rec. S5,312 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2016) (denying Obama nominees floor votes). Many GOP senators opposed any Supreme Court choice; few opposed Koh. Ted Cruz, The Scalia Seat: Let the People Speak, Wall St. J. (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-scalia-seat-let-the-people-speak-1457307358.

 [52]. Tobias, Confirm Judge Koh to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 32, at 457 nn.36–41; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.

 [53]. 162 Cong. Rec. S7,183 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2017).

 [54]. Carl Tobias, Confirming Justices in a Presidential Election Year, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1093, 1103 (2017); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2017, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12/vacancies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2018, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/vacancies (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Amber Phillips, Another Big Mitch McConnell Supreme Court Gamble Looks Set to Pay Off, Wash. Post (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/04/another-big-mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-gamble-looks-set-pay-off/?.

 [55]. (Judicial Confirmations for December 2009, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies
/2009/12/confirmations/html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for December 2017, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies
/2017/12/confirmations (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for December 2018, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies
/201/12/confirmations (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); for further discussion see infra notes 6768, 8788. I rely below on Jason Zengerle, Bench Warfare, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2018, at SM30.

 [56]. Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2240; Robert Costa, McGahn’s Last Stand, Wash. Post (Oct. 4, 2018), https://wapo.st/2RoSiiY?tid=ss_tw&utm
_term=.c4cbd464d2de; see also Michael Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Lawyer for President Steps Down, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2018, at A13.

 [57]. Jeremy Peters, Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking the ‘Administrative State’, N.Y. Times (March 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/politics/trump-judges-courts-administrative-state.html; Charlie Savage, Courts Reshaped at Fastest Pace in 5 Decades, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2017, at A1; see also infra note 77 for further discussion.

 [58]. Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on the Sidelines, This Conservative Group Is Primed to Reshape the Courts Under Trump, BuzzFeed News (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com
/article/zoetillman/after-eight-years-on-the-sidelines-this-conservative-group. For more discussion of Leo’s impact, see Richard Patterson, The Man Behind Trump’s Judicial Nominees, Boston Globe (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/09/06/the-man-behind-trump-conservative-judicial-nominees/bJOU7yNNHSGKkcSEXbb4KM/story.html.

 [59]. Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 13, at 2240–41; Joan Biskupic, Trump Fast-Tracks Appeals Judges, but Lags on Lower Courts, CNN (May 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/politics/appeals-district-court-trump/index.html.

 [60]. Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting Indelible Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2018, at A15; Tillman, supra note 33.

 [61]. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces Seventh Wave of Judicial Nominees (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions
/president-donald-j-trump-announces-seventh-wave-judicial-candidates; Letter from Donald McGahn, White House Counsel, to Sens. Ron Wyden & Jeff Merkley (Sept. 6, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4042623/9-6-17-McGahn-Letter.pdf; Letter from Sens. Ron Wyden & Jeff Merkley to Don McGahn, White House Counsel (Sept. 7, 2017), http://static.politico.com
/59/2a/f5b886e44d6ba505b1551125a32e/wh-judicial-vacancy-signed.pdf; see also infra notes 8182, 90 for more on later history.

 [62]. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces Eleventh Wave of Judicial Nominees (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions
/president-donald-j-trump-announces-eleventh-wave-judicial-nominees; see also S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Apr. 11, 2018). For more on later history, see infra note 89.

 [63]. 163 Cong. Rec. S8,022, S8,024 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Leahy & Feinstein).

 [64]. Ratings, 115th Cong., supra note 37. The GOP contested Steven Grasz’s rating, alleging that the ABA is a liberal interest group. See S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Nov. 1, 2017); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Dec. 7, 2017); see also 163 Cong. Rec. S7,965 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2017) (Grasz’s approval); Adam Liptak, White House Cuts A.B.A. Out of Judge Evaluations, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2017, at A16.

 [65]. Judicial Emergencies for March 2019, U.S. Cts.,  https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/03/emergencies (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (showing that seven of eight circuit vacancies are emergencies).

 [66]. They soared from twelve to eighty-seven. Id. (2019 Judicial Emergencies); Judicial Emergencies for December 2015, U.S. Cts.,  https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2015/12/emergencies (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). But see Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Tenth Wave of Judicial Nominees (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-tenth-wave-judicial-nominees.

 [67]. For more blue state nominees, see Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Ninth Wave of Judicial Nominees (Dec. 20, 2017); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Fourteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, May 10, 2018; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Sixteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, July 13, 2018; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Eighteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, Oct. 10, 2018. Data verify “red” state priority. Judicial Emergencies, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).

 [68]. When the White House issued a notice of intent to renominate fifty of the seventy-three candidates whose nominations expired on January 2, which excluded all three, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial that criticized the White House Counsel for negotiating with the California senators and urged prompt renomination. Editorial, A Bad Judges Deal, Wall St. J. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-bad-judges-deal-11548807717. The editorial ignited a firestorm of criticism from conservative media that apparently triggered the renominations, leaving the situation unclear. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces His Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees (Jan. 22, 2018); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Announces His Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees (Jan. 30, 2018); Press Release, Feinstein, Harris on Ninth Circuit Nominees (Jan. 30, 2019); Eighteenth Wave, supra note 67; Letter from Sen. Dianne Feinstein to Donald McGahn, supra note 33; 165 Cong. Rec. S23 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2018) (expired nominations). The nominees are lawyers. Rogan is a respected California Superior Court Judge. 

 [69]. Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 400 (2018); Michael Nelson & Rachel Hinkle, Trump Appoints Lots of White Men as Federal Judges. Here’s Why It Matters., Wash. Post (Mar. 13, 2018), http://wapo.st/2Hn6aUT?tid=ss_tw&utm
_term=.e00c0046f478.

 [70]. LGBTQ means “out” sexual orientation; it is possible that some may not have revealed theirs. LGBTQ people are considered “minorities” here. Jennifer Bendery, Trump Finally Has an LGBTQ Judicial Nominee, Huffington Post (June 7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-lesbian-judicial-nominee-mary-rowland_us_5b19b351e4b09d7a3d708461.

 [71]. For confirmees, see Judicial Confirmations for December 2017, U.S. Cts.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12
/confirmations
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for December 2018, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12
/confirmations
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019). For nominees, see Seventh Wave, supra note 61; Tenth Wave, supra note 66; 4 Waves, supra note 67; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Twelfth Wave of Judicial Nominees (Apr. 10, 2018); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Thirteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees (Apr. 26, 2018); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Donald Trump Nominates Fifteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees (June 7, 2018).

 [72]. Michael Doyle, Whats Ahead for Wests Liberal Appeals Court, Once Trump Takes Over?, Sacramento Bee (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government
/article116777848.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=amp&utm_source=www.sacbee.com-RelayMediaAMP; see Sarah Wire, Is Trump Finally Ready To Turn His Sights Toward Remaking the Ninth Circuit?, L.A. Times (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-ninth-circuit-vacancies-20180815-story
.html.

 [73]. Maura Dolan, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski Steps Down After Allegations of Sexual Misconduct, L.A. Times (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-judge-alex-kozinski-20171218-story.html; Noah Feldman, The 9th Circuit Court Battle Falls Silent, BloombergView (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-02/stephen-reinhardt-alex-kozinski-and-the-battle-for-9th-circuit; Carl Hulse, Judge’s Death Gives Trump a Chance to Remake a Vexing Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2018, at A13.

 [74]. Seung Min Kim, Trump Has Not Taken Aim at the Court That Annoys Him Most, Wash. Post (May 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-is-transforming-the-judiciary-but-he-has-yet-to-take-aim-at-the-court-that-annoys-him-most/2018/05/06/53886d30-4f9d-11e8-b966-bfb0da2dad62_story.html;  Zoe Tillman, Why Trump Must Work with the Senate, Including Democratic Senators, To Confirm His Judges, BuzzFeed News (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com
/article/zoetillman/why-trump-will-have-to-work-with-democrats-to-get-his.

 [75]. David Lat, Federal Judicial Nominations: A Quick Recap, Above the Law (Aug. 18, 2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/federal-judicial-nominations-a-quick-recap.

 [76]. Id.; Kim, supra note 74; see also supra notes 33, 68.

 [77]. The senators first suggested the third be mutually agreeable but substituted Collins to increase the offer’s appeal. The initial White House decision to not renominate the three California October nominees apparently reflected ongoing negotiations between it and the senators, which the conservative media onslaught extinguished. See supra note 68; see also Letter from Sens. Feinstein and Harris to Pat Cipollone, White House Counsel, Nov. 19, 2018; Emily Cadei, Trump Will Have to Nominate 9th Circuit Judges All Over Again in 2019, Sacramento Bee (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article223580900.html; supra notes 33, 57, 67, 73, 75.

  The committee scheduled a March 13 hearing for Collins and Lee, despite the California senators’ powerful opposition and retention of blue slips. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Mar. 13, 2019); Press Release, Feinstein and Harris: Kenneth Lee Nomination Hearing Should Not Move Forward (Mar. 4, 2019); Marianne Levine, Trump Judicial Pick Facing Scrutiny Over Extreme Views in Past Writings, Politico (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/04/kenneth-lee-9th-circuit-1202707; But see Editorial, Kenneth Kiyul Lee’s White Privilege, Wall St. J. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kenneth-kiyul-lees-white-privilege-11551741146; Senators Feinstein and Harris also opposed, and retained blue slips on, Bress partly because the nominee lacks California ties. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Mar. 7, 2019); Press Release, Feinstein Speaks on Blue Slips, Ninth Circuit Nominees (Mar. 7, 2019); Michael Macagnone, Trump Ninth Circ. Pick’s Lack of Calif. Ties May Imperil Chances, Law360 (Mar. 7, 2019, https://www.law360.com/legalindustry/articles/1136369?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=section.

 [78]. 163 Cong. Rec. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Nov. 29, 2017); Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley to Sens. Patty Murray & Maria Cantwell, Oct. 18, 2018. But see Letter from Sen. Murray to Sen. Grassley, Oct. 22, 2018.

 [79]. Grassley honored this Obama’s last two years; Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) did the first six. See Mtg., supra note 11.

 [80]. Id.; S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (June 6, 2018) (hearing when Sen. Casey kept slip); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 10, 2018) (same for Sen. Brown); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 24, 2018) (same for Sens. Murray & Cantwell); see supra note 78; 164 Cong. Rec. S2,607 (daily ed. May 10, 2018).

       82      Maxine Bernstein, Oregon U.S. Senators Say Federal Prosecutor Ryan Bounds Unsuitable for 9th Circuit, Oregonian (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/02/oregons
_us_senators_say_federa.html
; Jimmy Hoover, 9th Circ. Pick Forces Grassley to Choose: Trump or Tradition?, Law360 (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1025855. For further discussion see supra note 61.

 [82]. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (May 9, 2018); see also Bernstein, supra note 81 (analyzing the four picks, including Bounds, the panel recommended and senators’ reasons for continuing to oppose Bounds). For further discussion see supra notes 1315, 61.

 [83]. See supra notes 1315.

 [84]. E.g., S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 10, 24, 2018); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Oct. 17, 2018) (this and second hearing held in recess); Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 2161, 2174–76 (2011) (Obama example).

 [85]. Feinstein statement, supra note 63; Leahy statement, supra note 63.

 [86]. Judge Ho did not discuss his DOJ torture advice, which DOJ did not disclose, and Judge Don Willett dodged many queries. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Nov. 15, 2017); see also Leahy Statement, supra note 63.

 [87]. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (June 14, 2018); Patrick Gregory, ABA Rates Picks Not Qualified, BloombergLaw (Sept. 17, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump-picks-more-not-qualified-judges-1; Statements, supra note 63 (ABA input’s value); see also supra notes 5758 (external group).

 [88]. For committee approval and Senate confirmation of Judge Michael Brennan, see S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Feb. 15, 2018), supra note 11; 164 Cong. Rec. S2,607 (daily ed. May 10, 2018); supra note 64 (same for Grasz).

 [89]. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (May 10, 2018); 164 Cong. Rec. S4,858 (daily ed. July 10, 2018); see also supra note 62; David Lat, President Trump’s Eleventh Wave of Judicial Nominees, Above the Law ( Feb. 23, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/02/president-trumps-eleventh-wave-of-judicial-nominees.

 [90]. The members failed to discuss Bounds before voting. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (June 7, 2018); 164 Cong. Rec. S5,098 (daily ed. July 19, 2018) (nomination’s withdrawal); see also supra notes 61, 82.

 [91]. See sources cited supra notes 17–18, 22–23, 89.

 [92]. U.S. Senate Democrats, Schedule for May 7, Apr. 26, 2018. Bush and Obama never approved so many.  Judicial Vacancy List for December 2017, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov
/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12/vacancies
(last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Judicial Vacancy List for December 2018, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/vacancies  (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); supra note 6 (Bush); see the judicial vacancy list from 2009 to 2017 for Obama.

 [93]. 2017 notice on four came Thursday evening as senators recessed. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Nov. 2, 2017); U.S. Senate Democrats, Schedule for Oct. 31, Oct. 26, 2017.

 [94]. See supra notes 88–89.

 [95]. When senators address nominees, few members hear them. GOP senators find the thirty-hour post-cloture rule so unhelpful they urge limiting it. S. Rules Comm., Hearing on S. Res. 355 (Dec. 19, 2017); S. Rules Comm., Hearing on S. Res. 355, (Apr. 25, 2018) (approving resolution); S. Rules Comm., Exec. Business Mtg. (Feb. 13, 2019) (approving S. Res. 50); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell Preps New Nuclear Option to Speed Trump Judges, Politico (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/trump-mcconnell-judges-1205722; Carl Hulse, Ghost of Garland Lurks as GOP Brandishes Nuclear Option Again, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2019, at A14, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/us/politics/senate-nuclear-option-trump.html. 

 [96]. See sources cited supra notes 55–62, 65–71.

 [97]. U.S. Senate, Exec. Calendar, Dec. 23, 2017; see id., Dec. 31, 2018 (31 awaited floor votes); Judicial Vacancy List for March 2019, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/03/vacancies  (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (129 district openings); Judicial Emergency List for March 2019, U.S. Cts, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/03
/emergencies(87); see supra notes 23–24, 68, 92, 97 and accompanying text.

 [98]. Lat (Part 2), supra note 73; Robert McFadden, John McCain Dies, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2018, at A18; Oct. 24 Hearing, supra note 80 (Arizona & Washington resolution); see supra notes 33, 61, 72–78, 82–83. But see supra notes 62, 90; 164 Cong. Rec. S6,883 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2018) (Ryan Nelson’s confirmation, so Idaho resembles Hawaii).

 [99]. Compare Michael Gerhardt & Michael Stein, The Politics of Early Justice, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 551 (2014), with Orrin Hatch, The Constitution as Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1035 (2009).

 [101]. The latest began with stalling claims at the end of Bush’s time. The GOP retaliated with huge delay in approving Obama’s nominees. Democrats then used the nuclear option. The GOP next slowed all nominees. See sources cited supra notes 11, 13, 53, 92.

 [102]. Wheeler, supra note 20; see also supra notes 66, 98.

 [103]. See supra notes 23–24, 92 and accompanying text.

 [104]. Hulse, supra note 74. For more, review the U.S. Court’s website and their archive of judicial vacancies.

 [105]. John Roberts, Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 7–8 (2010); Tobias, supra note 13, at 2253; Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Burned Out, Overworked, and Wondering Where Congress Is, Huffington Post (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.

 [106]. Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, Courts of Appeals – Median Times for Merits Terminations in 12 Months Ending Sept. 30, 2017, Tbl. B-4 (2017); Kimberly Robinson, Heavy Caseload Creates 9th Circuit’s Bad Rap, BloombergLaw (May 3, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/heavy-caseload-to-blame-for-ninth-circuits-bad-rap?context=article-related.

 [107]. Approval is easier at a presidency’s outset, but the duties always apply. See supra notes 30–32.

 [108]. Adam Liptak, Gorsuch Clinched Spot After Long Process, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2017, at A15; see also supra note 54.

 [109]. He seated many circuit judges who may be too new, and too little hard data exist to posit definitive conclusions. Jasmine Lee, Trump Could Flip the Supreme Court. His Impact on the Lower Courts Is Less Clear, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09
/04/us/politics/trump-federal-judge-appointments.html
.  But see Alison Frankel, Trump Appellate Judges Are Paving the Way to Challenge Precedent, Reuters (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-otc-courtingchange/trump-appellate-judges-are-paving-the-way-to-challenge-precedent-idUSKCN1MD2RD
. See generally  People for the American Way, Confirmed Judges, Confirmed Fears (2019).

 [110]. David Cole, ‘So-Called Judges’ Trump Trump, Wash. Post (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/so-called-judges-trump-trump/2017/02/10/573fd1c8-ef42-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html.  But see Hawaii v. Trump, 438 S. Ct. 923 (2018). He might ignite unproductive circuit-splitting efforts. Transcript of Trump Press Confer., N.Y. Times (Feb 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-press-conference-transcript.html; see Cadei, supra note 33; Bob Egelko, Trump May Reopen 9th Circuit Split Debates, S.F. Chron. (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Trump-attack-may-reopen-debate-on-splitting-Ninth-10943304.php. 

 [111]. Emergencies reflect conservative work and case load estimates and vacancy length; they show California needs priority. Emergencies, Judicial Emergency Definition, U.S. Cts https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies/judicial-emergency-definition  (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).

 [112]. Kim, supra note 75; see supra note 66 (finding that presidents and senators deem circuits critical). But see supra notes 80–84 (finding Judiciary Chair Grassley eroded blue slips’ protection regarding seven nominees by processing them without home state senators’ slips).

 [113]. See sources cited supra notes 61–62, 82-–3, 90-91 (two states); supra note 11 (Bush’s effective consultation).

 [114]. The California senators ranked and explained preferences. See supra note 68 and infra note 140.

 [115]. Examples are Thapar, his first confirmee, and Joan Larsen, another early circuit appointee. Elisha Savchak et al., Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 478 (2006); Tobias, supra note 13, at 2243–46; supra note 71 (Thapar); 163 Cong. Rec. S6,944 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017) (Larsen).

 [116]. This saves time used to restart selection, cultivates relationships with Democrats and rapidly fills California seats. See supra notes 32–53 (California senators favor Koh); Lat (Part 2), supra note 73 (affiliations); see also supra note 67 (nominating Collins and Lee to the Ninth Circuit and Rosen to the Central District); infra note 130 (discussing Obama nominees whom Trump renominated).

 [117]. Obama and Trump seated many with full records, expediting review. See, e.g., supra note 19 (Murguia); supra note 115 (Thapar).

 [118]. Obama and Trump appointed many. See, e.g., supra note 21 (Hurwitz); supra note 115 (Larsen).

 [119]. Obama and Trump confirmed many. See, e.g., supra note 21 (Watford); supra note 23 (Friedland); supra note 64 (Grasz); see supra note 75; Maura Dolan, They Dismissed Her as a Lightweight, L.A. Times (May 28, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-chief-justice-20170528-story.html. 

 [120]. Goldman et al., supra note 13, at 14–16; Tobias, supra note 13, at 2239; see also supra notes 56–59.

 [121]. See supra notes 63–64, 78 and accompanying text (rating 6 not qualified).

 [122]. This may occur, devouring resources, and suggests why picking and ranking a few is preferable to sending one.

 [123]. Certain nominees ignored some questions or omitted critical matters. See supra note 121 (Jeff Mateer & Brett Talley); Hearing, supra note 62 (Wendy Vitter); Hearing, supra note 82 (Bounds).

 [124]. Senators must insure that nominees possess (1) mainstream perspectives, (2) ample respect for Supreme Court precedent and legitimate federal or state conduct and (3) no prejudgments on relevant issues.

 [125]. Emily Cadei, Showdown Looms Over Trump’s Picks for 9th Circuit Court, Sacramento Bee (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article225349515.html; see also supra note 68.

 [126]. Cadei, supra note 126.

 [127]. Patrick Gregory, New Trump Appeals Nominee Kirkland Partner, Ex-Scalia Clerk, BloombergLaw (Jan. 31, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/new-trump-appeals-nominee-kirkland-partner-ex-scalia-clerk-3; Niels Lesniewski, Debate Over Ninth Circuit Seats Is Latest Battle in Trump-Senate Judicial Wars, Roll Call (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com
/news/congress/debate-ninth-circuit-seats-latest-round-judical-wars
.

 [128]. Restrepo’s hearing was typical. Some members posed mundane queries he easily fielded. Tobias, supra note 28, at 45–46.

 [129]. E.g., Tobias, supra note 13, at 2244–46; see supra notes 23, 50–52.

 [130]. Tobias, supra note 32, at 450 n.1. When senators concur on a single choice, Trump may want to defer, as they know more strong aspirants who best represent California and can slow review by keeping slips.

 [131]. The senators favor Koh. See supra note 33. I rely below on Tobias, supra note 32.

 [132]. The sixteen nominees had 2016 panel approval; nine have won confirmation. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in the Trump Administration, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 9 (2017); see also supra notes 45–49. But see Jan. 22 & Jan. 30, 2018 Notices of Intent, supra note 68 (excluding five Obama district nominees whom Trump had renominated). The Chair should poll members; if some prefer another session, he should arrange that.

 [133]. The White House was apparently considering this possibility, as the President did not include any of the three October nominees in the January 22 package of fifty renominees, although the White House did include the three in the January 30 package of nominees. See supra notes 68, 78. But see supra note 67; Letter, supra note 78.

 [134]. Biographical Directory of Judges, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships-/BiographicalDirectoryOf Judges.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Tim Arango, Who Is Dolly Gee?, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/us/immigration-judge-executive-order-trump.html (deftly treating immigration cases).

 [135]. Directory, supra note 135; Cadei, supra note 33 (senators proposed him). McGahn assessed Bush District Judge James Otero and Judge Rogan. Lat (Part 2), supra note 73; Lat, supra note 76; Tillman, supra note 33.

 [136]. Each would increase diversity. Bob Egelko, Liu Confirmed to Supreme Court, S.F. Chron. (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Gov-Brown-s-senior-legal-adviser-wins-13485312.php; David Siders, Jerry Brown Names Law Professor to California Supreme Court, Sacramento Bee (July 22, 2014), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article2604510.html; see Maura Dolan, As Brown Ponders Supreme Court Vacancy, Earlier Appointee Defies Expectations, L.A. Times (June 1, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-kruger-court-20180531-story.html.

 [137]. See generally Cadei, supra note 33; Dolan, supra note 120.

 [138]. It was Munger, Tolles & Olson where Judge Owens and nominee Lee also worked. Directory, supra note 135; see Eighteenth Wave, supra note 67; supra notes 21, 23 (approvals); Cadei, supra note 33 (senators’ choices).

 [139]. Lat (Part 2), supra note 73 (affiliations); see also supra note 67 (nominating Collins and Lee to the Ninth Circuit and Rosen to the Central District); supra note 68 (renominating Collins and Lee to the Ninth Circuit, Bumatay to the Southern District, and Rosen to the Central District and nominating Bress to the Ninth Circuit).

 [140]. The senators’ approach can facilitate disputes’ resolution and avoid restarting the process. See supra note 122.

 [141]. For more on this idea, see Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 Emory L. J. Online 2051 (2016); Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 667, 694 (2003). New York nominees suggest use of a similar regime or perhaps trades. Thirteenth Wave, supra note 71; Eighteenth Wave, supra note 67.

 [142]. Tobias, supra note 13, at 2260 n.126; see Letter, supra note 33 (suggesting trades); supra note 77.

 [143]. See supra note 142 (Bush appointees Guilford whom the senators proposed and Otero whom McGahn interviewed) They must only do this, if the situation is dire. Biden statement, supra note 7 (trades are controversial).

 [144]. See, e.g., supra notes 79–99, 124–27.

 

Filling the California Ninth Circuit Vacancies

At President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced ample vacancies that the United States Courts’ Administrative Office labeled “judicial emergencies” because of their protracted length and its huge caseload. Recent departures by Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt and former Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who occupied California posts, and other jurists’ decision to change their active status mean that the circuit has five emergencies, three in California, because Trump has appointed only three nominees. The court also resolves the most filings least expeditiously.

Limited clarity about whether more judges will leave active service over Trump’s presidency suggests that additional confirmations may be necessary; however, the selection process’s stunning politicization will compromise this initiative. For example, when the tribunal enjoined Trump’s controversial determinations which excluded immigrants from seven predominately Muslim nations, he excoriated multiple jurists of the circuit. Trump afforded numerous candidates, but merely three have received approval, partly because home state Democratic politicians retained “blue slips” when the White House minimally consulted. The vacancies—which exceed seventeen percent, and three California openings, which are ten—show the crucial need to fill more vacancies.

Read More »

Crushing Creativity: The Blurred Lines Case and Its Aftermath

On March 10, 2015, the music world was stunned when a jury in Federal District Court in Los Angeles rendered a verdict in favor of the heirs of Marvin Gaye against Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, who, along with rapper Clifford Harris, Jr., professionally known as “T.I.,” wrote the 2013 mega-hit song entitled “Blurred Lines.” The eight-member jury unanimously found that Williams and Thicke had infringed the copyright to Marvin Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.” On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict and recently rejected Williams and Thicke’s Petition for Rehearing en banc.

The case is significant for a number of reasons. In typical music copyright cases—at least successful ones—the two works share the same (or at least a similar) sequence of pitches, with the same (or at least similar) rhythms, set to the same chords. The Blurred Lines case was unique, in that the two works at issue did not have similar melodies; the two songs did not even share a single melodic phrase. In fact, the two works did not have a sequence of even two chords played in the same order, for the same duration. They had entirely different song structures (meaning how and where the verse, chorus, etc. are placed in the song) and did not share any lyrics whatsoever.

Read More »

Book Review: Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court by Richard H. Fallon, Jr.

Richard Fallon has written another important book about American constitutional law. Indeed, it brings to mind Hilary Putnam’s definition of a classic: the smarter you get, the smarter it gets. Fallon presents a rich, thick description of our constitutional law and practice and an argument for how we may best continue and improve this practice. While intended to be accessible to a broad readership, Fallon’s arguments cut to the core of much current constitutional scholarship, even while urging us to move past many of these sterile debates. Most importantly, Fallon takes seriously his mission of speaking to the Court, as well as to the academy, and takes a real run at changing how the Justices decide cases and articulate their decisions. He accomplishes all of this in a startlingly concise book, running only 174 pages of text and 36 pages of notes and without even a subtitle.

Fallon sets out to explain the nature of constitutional law, the constitutional disagreements of cases, constitutional argument, and the nature of the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions and, ultimately, the Court itself. That’s a tall order for a little book, but Fallon can make a claim to have accomplished his mission.

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Supreme Court Reform: Desirable—And Constitutionally Required

As decisions by—and appointments to—the Supreme Court have become increasingly divisive, many observers have renewed calls for reform. For example, we could replace lifetime tenure with non-renewable terms of eighteen years, such that one term ends every two years. That way, less would be at stake with each nomination, Justices could not time their retirements for partisan reasons, and appointments would be divided more evenly between Democratic and Republican presidents. Or we could establish a non-partisan, judicial nominating commission.

Concerns about the Supreme Court are not new, but increasing political polarization and partisan maneuvering over the two most recent Court appointments have accentuated tensions. With the legitimacy of the Court at stake, reform to depoliticize the Court seems essential. And whichever reform is promoted, it is generally assumed that implementation would require a constitutional amendment, legislation, or a change in Senate rules.

But the conventional wisdom is wrong. There is a sound argument to be made that Supreme Court reform is constitutionally required.

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Profound Sophistication or Legal Sophistry?

In the midst of growing debate and—according to widely publicized news accounts—growing evidence against President Donald Trump’s impeachment, esteemed former Harvard Law Professor and public intellectual, Alan Dershowitz, recently published The Case Against Impeaching Trump. In this brief, but passionate, defense of the President, Professor Dershowitz provides arguably the strongest legal argument against impeaching the Forty-Fifth President of the United States. Professor Dershowitz’s argument, while beautifully written, is largely a selectively applied textualist attempt to thwart the mounting evidence against President Trump and his administration.

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The Weintraub Principle: Attorney-Client Privilege and Government Entities

Amidst the backdrop of a federal investigation into the actions of President Donald Trump, a previously unexplored legal question has emerged on a topic that forms the foundation of legal practice: Can a succeeding government official revoke a predecessor’s claim of the attorney-client privilege? Although the question is novel, its role within the government context is well established—having been asserted by Presidents Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton in their respective administrations. The context of current events, however, underscores the need to further define the operation of a privilege that is once again being relied upon by a president under investigation.

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Crushing Creativity: The Blurred Lines Case and Its Aftermath

From Volume 92, Postscript (February 2018)
DOWNLOAD PDF


CRUSHING CREATIVITY: THE BLURRED LINES CASE AND ITS AFTERMATH[*]

EDWIN F. MCPHERSON[†]

On March 10, 2015, the music world was stunned when a jury in Federal District Court in Los Angeles rendered a verdict in favor of the heirs of Marvin Gaye against Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, who, along with rapper Clifford Harris, Jr., professionally known as “T.I.,” wrote the 2013 mega-hit song entitled “Blurred Lines.” The eight-member jury unanimously found that Williams and Thicke had infringed the copyright to Marvin Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.”[1] On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict and recently rejected Williams and Thicke’s Petition for Rehearing en banc.

The case is significant for a number of reasons. In typical music copyright casesat least successful onesthe two works share the same (or at least a similar) sequence of pitches, with the same (or at least similar) rhythms, set to the same chords. The Blurred Lines Case [DB1]was unique, in that the two works at issue did not have similar melodies; the two songs did not even share a single melodic phrase. In fact, the two works did not have a sequence of even two chords played in the same order, for the same duration. They had entirely different song structures (meaning how and where the verse, chorus, etc. are placed in the song) and did not share any lyrics whatsoever.

The verdict in this caseassuming (perhaps naively) that it was based upon the music at all,[2] and not, for example, the jury’s dislike for Robin Thicke and his admitted drug usewas no doubt based upon a perception that the overall “feel” or “groove” of the two works is similar, as songs of a particular genre often are. In essence, Williams and Thicke have been found liable for the infringement of an idea, or a series of ideas, and not for the tangible expression of those ideas, which is antithetical to Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.[3] Such a result is very dangerous to the music community and is certain to stifle future creativity.

All music shares inspiration from prior musical works, especially within a particular musical genre. The import of the Blurred Lines Case is, therefore, that songwriters can now be punished for creating new music that is merely inspired by prior works. By eliminating any meaningful standard for drawing the line between permissible inspiration and unlawful copying, the verdict is certain not only to impede the creative process and stifle future creativity, it ultimately does a disservice to past songwriters as well and adversely affects the entire music industry. The law, and specifically the intent behind the Copyright Act, would be much better served if the courts could provide clearer rules so that songwriters could know when the line is crossed, or at least where the line is.

I.  District Court’s Denial of Summary Judgment

Just prior to trial, the district court denied Williams and Thicke’s motion for summary judgment based upon the declarations of two musicologists submitted by the Gayes, which were filled with abstract theories, identifying certain remote, seemingly unrelated, factors of alleged similarity.[4] The court dismissedsimply as “issues of fact”the multitude of dissimilarities in the two works that were identified by Williams and Thicke’s musicologistincluding distinct, material differences in the actual melodies of the two songs.

Because “Got to Give it Up” was a pre-1978 composition and was recorded prior to 1972, the Court properly limited the Gayes’ proof to include only the deposit copy of the sheet music that was presented to the U.S. Copyright Office upon registration by Marvin Gaye’s publisher and did not allow the jury to hear the entire sound recording. However, immediately following this ruling, the court systematically and completely emasculated the ruling in the following significant ways:

  1. After the court had ruled on summary judgment that “Theme X” (a four-note melody) was not on the deposit copy, the court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to testify that her “Theme X” was different from the court’s “Theme X,” and that her “Theme X” was implied[5] in the deposit copy (as was much of the music that was contained in the sound recording).
  2. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to further testify that although the keyboard part in “Got to Give it Up” similarly was not in the deposit copy, “professional musicians would understand[6]” to play the keyboard part as she transcribed it—and that keyboard part was the “heartbeat” of “Got to Give it Up.”
  3. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to use a transcription of the bass part from the sound recording that was different than the bass part on the deposit copy.
  4. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to use sound bites from both works to show a “total concept and feel,” while in actuality compounding the issue with an instruction to the jury to disregard the actual clips and only to consider the musicologist’s “opinions.”
  5. The court allowed the Gayes’ musicologist to present a “mashup” of the two works, which was prepared after the close of expert discovery, and which included the bass and keyboard elements (that were not in the deposit copy)—while excluding mashups that were prepared by Williams and Thicke’s musicologist between “Got to Give it Up” and numerous old soul songs and many pop songs that could be played over the same four chords.
  6. The court allowed a lay witness who was in charge of the Marvin Gaye catalogue at Marvin Gaye’s record label (which also happened to be Robin Thicke’s record label), who does not even know how to read music, to testify that he listened to “Blurred Lines,” and thought that it was similar to the “Got to Give it Up” sound recording.

At the same time, the district court excluded evidence that Marvin Gaye’s own publisher strongly believed that there was no infringement. One of the functions of a music publisher is to police the copyrights of the songs in its catalogue, to assess whether or not its songwriters’ music has been infringed, and to commence litigation against the infringers.

In this case, according to Marvin Gaye’s publisher, EMI/Jobete, as stated in the Joint Rule 16(b) Report, EMI/Jobete

first internally analyzed whether ‘Blurred Lines’ was an infringement of ‘Got To Give It Up’ and determined that there was no infringement. Thereafter, Jobete secured the opinion of an expert musicologist who similarly concluded that there was no basis for a claim of infringement. Jobete duly reported its determinations to Frankie and Nona Gaye’s representatives . . . . Further Jobete advised that it could not, in good faith, bring infringement claims (either for ‘Got To Give It Up’ or for ‘After The Dance’ [another song that the Gayes claimed was infringed by Williams and Thicke] because its analysis, including expert analysis confirmed that neither work had ben infringed by Blurred Lines . . . . Jobete advised that, consistent with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it therefore could not and would not either defend Frankie and Nona Gaye [in Williams and Thicke’s declaratory relief action] or pursue the infringement claim they demanded.[7]

Ultimately, the Gayes actually sued EMI/Jobete for not pursuing the infringement claim against Williams and Thicke.[8]

II.  Infringement of An Idea, Which Is Not Copyrightable

It appears that the jury in this case was persuaded by a number of factors, including the foregoing similarities that were extraneous to the sheet music, interviews given by Robin Thicke, the number of musicologists that each side had (Gayes: two; Williams and Thicke: one), and the biased lay witness opinion. Not one of these factors had anything to do with any perceived similarity in pitch, rhythm, or chords, and not one of these factors constituted a proper basis for a finding of copyright infringement.

A result such as this, in which the melodies are not even close to being similar, is very dangerous, in that it does not distinguish between an idea and the expression of that idea, nor does it distinguish between the influence of a predecessor’s music and the unlawful copying of that music. The inherent danger of such a result is that, without drawing a proper line between what is an idea and what is an expression or between what is an influence and what is an infringement, future songwriters do not know whether their “influence” is going to land them with the next hit record or land them in courtor both, as demonstrated in this case.

Much has been said about Williams’s and Thicke’s apparent ability to afford to fund a case like this. Whether or not Williams and Thicke are able to afford to defend this case and pay a judgment, most of the musicians in the world are not in a position to do so. Clearly then, when a budding songwriter is contemplating the composition of a song, it is axiomatic that he or she is going to think twice before he or she writes a song that “feels” like a Marvin Gaye song or any other artist’s song, always with one foot in the recording studio and one foot in the courtroom. This is an untenable situation that most certainly will not foster uninhibited creativity.

III.  The Ninth Circuit Decision

Devastated by the effect that the verdict would have on future songwriters and the music industry in general, Williams and Thicke appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuitin a 2-1, very lengthy decision,[9] written by Judge Milan D. Smith Jr.affirmed the bulk of the district court’s decision and ignored the cries of the 212 Amicus songwriters (and dissenting judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen). The majority asserted that its entire decision was about narrow procedural matters and concluded its decision by stating that: “[f]ar from heralding the end of musical creativity as we know it, our decision, even construed broadly, reads more accurately as a cautionary tale for future trial counsel wishing to maximize their odds of success.”[10]

At the heart of the appeal was the issue of whether the copyright protection enjoyed by the Gayes was limited to the sheet music of “Got to Give it Up” that was deposited with the U.S. Copyright Office, or whether the jury could hear the sound recording as well. Williams and Thicke had successfully argued to the district court that because the Gaye song was created under the Copyright Act of 1909, the jury should not get to hear the sound recording. The Gayes’ attorney argued at the district court and at the Ninth Circuit that their proof should not be so limited. On appeal, Williams and Thicke’s attorney argued that Judge Kronstadt erred by initially restricting the Gayes’ proof to the deposit copy but then allowing in bits and pieces of the sound recording through the testimony of the handsomely paid musicologist, Judith Finell.

The majority noted that Williams and Thicke’s position that the scope of the Gayes’ copyright was limited to the deposit copy did not appear to be specifically supported by any case law until the district court’s ruling. However, the court decided to avoid the issue altogether: “Nevertheless, because we do not remand the case for a new trial, we need not, and decline to, resolve this issue in this opinion.”[11]

The Court did affirm that the district court had discretion to allow testimony from both of the Gayes’ music experts, which Williams and Thicke’s lawyers claimed to have improperly incorporated opinions about the similarity of the sound recordings, notwithstanding its earlier limitation of proof to sheet music.

In response to Williams and Thicke’s assertion that Judge Kronstadt erroneously denied their motion for summary judgment, the appellate court determined that the denial of summary judgment, after a complete trial on the merits, is not reviewable unless the issue is one of pure law. The court determined that this was not such a case: “The district court’s application of the extrinsic test of similarity was a factbound inquiry far afield from decisions resolving ‘disputes about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law.’ The district court’s ruling bears little resemblance to legal issues we have reviewed pursuant to our exception.”[12]

With respect to Williams and Thicke’s claim that the district court should not have allowed certain portions of the testimony of the Gayes’ musicologists, the court pointed out that Finell “was impeached with her deposition testimony, in which she admitted that the rhythm of the keyboard parts in the sound recording of Got To Give It Up is not notated in the deposit copy.”[13] The court further noted that Williams and Thicke’s expert disputed her testimony and that the whole thing “boiled down to a question of whose testimony to believe,” which was the purview of the jury.[14] Ultimately, the court ruled that the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence.

The Blurred Lines decision was indeed a procedural one and is on very narrow grounds. The court held that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of evidence and refused to disturb or “second guess” the jury’s fact-finding at trial. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams and Thicke’s motion for a new trial.[15]

Even Williams and Thicke’s contention that the damages were excessive was met with a purely procedural response. The jury had awarded the Gayes 50% of the publishing revenue from “Blurred Lines” as actual damages, which amounted to approximately $3.2 million. The court ruled that the Gayes’ expert testimony in that regard was not speculative and, therefore, affirmed the amount. Similarly, the court determined that the jury’s verdict awarding profits to the Gayes of $1.8 Million against Robin Thicke and $375,000 against Williams was “not clearly erroneous,” nor was the continuing 50% royalty rate.[16]

The court did take exception to the district court’s treatment of T.I. and the Interscope parties, but that was on procedural grounds as well. The jury had rendered a general verdict in favor of T.I. and the Interscope parties, finding (albeit inconsistently) that neither had violated the Gayes’ copyright. The district court disregarded the jury’s verdict in that regard and brought them back into the case.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Gayes waived their challenge to the consistency of the jury’s verdict in this regard by not asserting their position at trial before the jury was discharged. The court went on, however, to rule that, even if the Gayes had properly preserved their challenge, “neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) nor our decisions in Westinghouse and El-Hakem v. BJY Inc. conferred authority on the district court to upset the jury’s verdicts in this case.”[17] The court further noted that “no evidence showed Harris was vicariously liable.”[18]

The majority, by focusing on the procedural aspects of the case, minimized the precedential value of the appeal itself, ignoring the potentially catastrophic ramifications of the case as a whole. This cavalier dismissal by the majority precipitated a blistering dissent by Judge Jacqueline Nguyen and an actual rebuttal to the dissent by the majority.

Judge Nguyen writes: “The majority allows the Gayes to accomplish what no one has before: copyright a musical style.”[19] She states further that: “‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got to Give It Up’ are not objectively similar. They differ in melody, harmony, and rhythm. Yet by refusing to compare the two works, the majority establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future musicians and composers everywhere.”[20]

With respect to the expert musicologists, the dissent goes on:

While juries are entitled to rely on properly supported expert opinion in determining substantial similarity, experts must be able to articulate facts upon which their conclusions—and thus the jury’s findings—logically rely. Here, the Gayes’ expert, musicologist Judith Finell, cherry-picked brief snippets to opine that a constellation of individually unprotectable elements in both pieces of music made them substantially similar. That might be reasonable if the two constellations bore any resemblance. But Big and Little Dipper they are not. The only similarity between these constellations is that they’re both compositions of stars.[21]

Judge Nguyen then picks up on a theme that was forefront in the 212 Songwriters, etc. Amicus Brief, and that was that it is axiomatic that copyright laws do not protect ideas, but only the expression of ideas. In the Blurred Lines Case, the only similarities that exist between the two compositions is the “idea” of, for example, clapping hands, yells, different instruments, etc.

Judge Nguyen goes on to challenge the majority to explain which elements of “Got to Give It Up” were protectable. She also does not believe in the “sliding scale” of access vs. similarity, in other words, the more access can be proved, the less substantial the similarity that is required. The majority adopted the inverse ratio rule, which was designed for cases with limited accessessentially, the less likely the access, the more similarity that is necessary to prove “copying.”[22] Judge Nguyen does not believe that, with undisputed access, the extent of similarity necessary to fulfill a plaintiff’s burden of proof essentially dwindles down to nothing.[23]

In response, the majority strikes back, stating:

[T]he dissent prophesies that our decision will shake the foundations of copyright law, imperil the music industry, and stifle creativity. It even suggests that the Gayes’ victory will come back to haunt them, as the Gayes’ musical compositions may now be found to infringe any number of famous songs preceding them. Respectfully, these conjectures are unfounded hyperbole. Our decision does not grant license to copyright a musical style or groove. Nor does it upset the balance Congress struck between the freedom of artistic expression, on the one hand, and copyright protection of the fruits of that expression, on the other hand. Rather, our decision hinges on settled procedural principles and the limited nature of our appellate review, dictated by the particular posture of this case and controlling copyright law. Far from heralding the end of musical creativity as we know it, our decision, even construed broadly, reads more accurately as a cautionary tale for future trial counsel wishing to maximize their odds of success.[24]

A.  The Denial of Rehearing En Banc

After their appeal to the Ninth Circuit failed, Williams and Thicke filed a petition for an en banc rehearing of the case. Judge Nguyen was the sole judicial proponent of en banc review, which was therefore denied.

IV.  All Music Is InSpired By Other Music

From time immemorial, every songwriter, composer, and musician has been inspired by music that came before him or her. Even one of the musicologists for the Gayes admitted that, with respect to music: All composers share devices and building.” This is especially so within a particular musical genre. Virtually no music can be said to be 100% new and original.

David Bowie was influenced by John Coltrane, Velvet Underground, and Shirley Bassey, among others.[25] Lady Gaga was influenced by David Bowie, Elton John, and Queen, among others.[26] Elton John was influenced by The Beatles, Bob Dylan, The Kinks, and Elvis Presley, among others.[27] The Beatles were influenced by Chuck Berry, Cliff Richard, The Beach Boys, and Elvis Presley.[28] Elvis Presley’s musical influences were “the pop and country music of the time, the gospel music he heard in church and at the all-night gospel sings he frequently attended, and the black R&B he absorbed on historic Beale Street as a Memphis teenager.”[29]

Marvin Gaye, himself, was reportedly influenced by Frank Sinatra, Smokey Robinson, Nat “King” Cole, Sam Cooke, Ray Charles, Bo Didley, and James Brown.[30] In fact, “Got To Give It Up” was apparently inspired by Johnnie Taylor’s song “Disco Lady.”[31]

One can only imagine what our music would have sounded like if David Bowie would have been afraid to draw from Shirley Bassie, or if the Beatles would have been afraid to draw from Chuck Berry, or if Elton John would have been afraid to draw from the Beatles, or if Elvis Presley would have been afraid to draw from his many influences. Presumably, it would also be difficult for the Gayes to imagine if their father had been afraid to draw from Ray Charles or Bo Didley. Quite simply, if an artist is not allowed to display his or her musical influences, for fear of legal reprisal, there is very little new music that is going to be created, particularly with the limitations that already naturally exist in songwriting.

V.  Music Copyright Cases Need A Bright Line Test

In the world of film, television, and books, the universe of choices is unlimited. One can write about the past, the present, or the future; one can write about things that actually happened, things that one wished had happened, or things that could never happenthere is absolutely no limit beyond the author’s imagination.

Yet, notwithstanding those unlimited options, there is somewhat of a bright line test for infringement (and for obtaining summary judgment) in the film/television/book world that does not exist in the music world. With a film, an expert conducts the extrinsic test by comparing the plots, sequence of events, characters, theme, mood, and pace of the two works. The expert also filters out all of the scènes à faire, such as a car chase in an action movie or a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat.

A motion for summary judgment in such cases will weed out the protectable elements from the unprotectable elements. It will then demonstrate how the works are different with respect to protectable elements, and how any perceived similarities are based upon commonplace, unprotectable elements. The “language” spoken by the experts is typically one that the judge understands and can articulate freely.

In music, unlike film, etc., however, there is a “limited number of notes and chords available to composers,” and composers are therefore much more restricted in their options.[32] There are literally twelve notes per octave, and not all of those notes can be used in the same song. As Judge Learned Hand once wrote: “It must be remembered that, while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism.”[33]

Yet, notwithstanding the severe actual and practical limitation of choices in music cases, the line drawing that exists in film copyright cases does not appear to exist in music cases. Musicologists speak a language that is often foreign to judges (and juries), and therefore confuse judges into denying summary judgment motions whenever two musicologists disagree.[34] There appears to be no easy way, no bright line, to determine in music casesand it was certainly not done in this casethe difference between creating the same “feel” or “style,”[35] and infringing a copyright.[36]

This is particularly so when a plaintiff can hire three, four, or five musicologists, conflict out three of them that find no similarities between any protectable elements, and know that, even if he only has one musicologist that can argue a case for infringement, he will avoid summary judgment. This is exactly what happened in the Blurred Lines Case. There were two or three musicologists that were initially consulted, rendered strong opinions of non-infringement, and ultimately were conflicted out of the case.[37]

VI.  Copyright Law Should Stimulate, Not Stifle, Creativity

The “ultimate aim” of the Copyright Act is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good,” and most musicians applaud and appreciate that endeavor.[38] However, they also understand that, like the music that was created before them, their own music will serve as building blocks for future songwriters, who will create their own music. As discussed in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., “copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”[39]

As written by Peter Alhadeff and Shereen Cheong in the Berklee College of Music Music Business Journal, “The Lesson of Blurred Lines,” quoting an interview with Berklee College of Music professor, Dr. E. Michael Harrington:If you’re not influenced by Marvin Gaye, there must be something wrong with you.”[40] The authors go on to write: “[h]e could just as well be talking about James Brown, Chuck Berry, the Beatles, or Michael Jacksonall of them a product of their own influences. Copyright law should make musical creativity flourish, not stifle.”[41]

Parker Higgins, director of copyright activism at the Electronic Frontier Foundation writes that

[w]hen we say a song sounds like a certain era, it’s because artists in that era were doing a lot of the same thingsor, yes, copying each other. If copyright were to extend out past things like the melody to really cover the other parts that make up the feel of a song, there’s no way an era, or a city, or a movement could have a certain sound. Without that, we lose the next disco, the next Motown, the next batch of protest songs.[42]

Finally, as written by composer Ron Mendelsohn, owner of production music company Megatrax:

All musical works, indeed all creative works, are born from a spark of inspiration. It is essential for musicians and composers to be able to find this spark anywhere and everywhere without having to constantly look over their shoulders and worry about being sued. To extinguish this spark, to replace it with fear, is to stifle creativity and deprive society of the next generation of great artists and new music. And yes, artists should be able to talk freely about their sources of inspiration without having to worry about their exuberant proclamations being played back as damning evidence in a court of law.[43]

VII.  The Celebration Of Influences Should Be Encouraged

Mendelsohn’s last point is an especially important one. In addition to the potential adverse impact that this case is certain to have on future songwriters, this case will have a lasting effect on past songwriters and musicians as well. Many interviews were played during the trial in which Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke both expressed that they loved Marvin Gaye, and wanted, as an homage to him, to create a song that had the feel of “Got To Give It Up.” One might ask if there could possibly be a better legacy for a songwriter than to inspire other songwriters to write music and expressly pay homage to him or her for inspiring that musicpublicly, on national television and elsewhere, keeping his name and his music alive for generations to come.

Yet there can be no doubt in this case that the jury was swayed, at least in part (arguably in large part), by hearing such interviews. Ultimately, the jury held Williams and Thicke liable for copyright infringement and rendered an award of several million dollars against them. It is difficult to imagine a songwriter that comes along after this case publicly affording any credit to any influence that he or she receives from any songwriter.

Conclusion

It is apparent that the denial of summary judgment and the ultimate verdict in this case were based upon an undeniable musical inspiration, the overall look and feel of the two works, and a series of random, coincidental, and unimportant alleged similarities between unprotectable elements in the sound recording of “Got To Give It Up” (random elements that were not in the “Got To Give It Up” deposit copy) and “Blurred Lines.”

Many important popular songs in the modern era would not exist today if they were subjected to the same scrutiny as “Blurred Lines” was in this case. This case, which was based upon such factorswith no similarities in melody, with virtually no similarities with the music notation on the actual deposit copy, and simply based on a “groove”will clearly stifle future creativity, will undoubtedly diminish the legacies of past songwriters, and, without a doubt, is antithetical to the principals of the Copyright Act.

 

 

 


[*] *. This article was adapted from an amicus curiae brief that was filed by the author on behalf of 212 songwriters, composers, musicians, and producers, in connection with the appeal of the Blurred Lines Case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See generally Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter the Blurred Lines Case].

[†] †. Edwin F. McPherson is a partner at McPherson Rane LLP in Century City, California, specializing in entertainment litigation, intellectual property litigation, and crisis management. He attended much of the trial in the Blurred Lines Case, has given numerous lectures on the case, and submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Ninth Circuit on behalf of 212 songwriters, composers, musicians, and composers.

 [1]. Though Williams and Thicke were both found liable for copyright infringement, T.I. was exonerated by the jury. Although the district court purported to overrule the jury and brought back in T.I. and the Interscope-related entities as defendants, the Ninth Circuit reversed that portion of the District Court’s judgment. The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1182–83.

 [2]. In the two days in which the jury deliberated, they did not once listen to any of the music.

 [3]. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018).

 [4]. Those theories were difficult enough (if not impossible) for trained musicians to understand; it is difficult to imagine how the Court could possibly fully grasp their import.

 [5]. Even to a person with no musical training, the concept of certain music being implied by certain other music sounds a bit suspect; however, to anyone with a modicum of musical training, this concept is absurd.

 [6]. Similarly, this concept makes no musical sense whatsoever.

 [7]. Joint Rule 16(b) Report at 5–6, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193633.

 [8]. This illustrates an important (perhaps rhetorical) question for the courts and the music world in general. If the executives at EMI/Jobete, whose job it is to assess copyright claims involving their songwriters, did not believe that “Blurred Lines” infringed “Got To Give It Up,” and if the expert musicologist that EMI/Jobete hired to assist it in that determination did not believe that “Blurred Lines” infringed “Got To Give It Up,” and if the lawyer that was hired by EMI/Jobete believed so strongly that there was no infringement that he advised EMI/Jobete that suing Williams and Thicke might very well be a violation of Rule 11, how in the world could a songwriter, with no experience policing copyrights, no experience as an expert musicologist, and no legal training, determine that his or her own song might be an infringement?

 [9]. The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1183.

 [10]. Id. at 1182.

 [11]. Id. at 1165–66.

 [12]. Id. at 1166–67 (citations omitted).

 [13]. Id. at 1170.

 [14]. Id.

 [15]. Id. at 1172.

 [16]. Id. at 1174.

 [17]. Id. at 1175 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Circuit Breaker & Elec. Supply, Inc., 106 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1997) and El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005)).

 [18]. Id.

 [19]. Id. at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).

 [20]. Id.

 [21]. Id.

 [22]. Although this rule makes sense in the context of proving “copying” (access plus substantial similarity), when there is limited or a low likelihood of access, it is absurd to suggest that, if access is 100% proved, no similarity whatsoever is necessary. Moreover, this “test” also ignores the requirement, independent of proof of copying, that protectable elements of the two works must be substantially similar in order to prove actual infringement through the extrinsic test. In other words, copying alone does not constitute infringement if the elements copied are not protectable. There must be substantial similarity in copyrightable expression. The inverse ratio rule is so controversial that, in an amended decision, the Ninth Circuit deleted the paragraph from its original opinion discussing the rule and its application. Compare The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1163, with Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018).

 [23]. The inverse ratio analysis has been criticized and rejected in other jurisdictions. For instance, in Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 1961), the Second Circuit ruled that access will not make up for a lack of similarity, “and an undue stress upon that one feature can only confuse and even conceal this basic requirement.”

 [24]. The Blurred Lines Case, 885 F.3d at 1182 (majority opinion).

 [25]. Commencement 1999, Berklee, https://www.berklee.edu/commencement/past (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).

 [26]. Sam Stryker, Lady Gaga and the Glam Rock Men Who Inspire Her, Mic (Nov. 14, 2013), https://mic.com/articles/73263/lady-gaga-and-the-glam-rock-men-who-inspire-her#.YIo314rrY.

 [27]. Neil McCormick, Leon Russell Interview for the Union with Elton John, Telegraph (Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/rockandpopfeatures/8062253/Leon-Russell-interview-for-The-Union-with-Elton-John.html.

 [28]. Ten Artists and Bands that Inspired the Beatles, Reader’s Digest U.K.,

https://www.readersdigest.co.uk/culture/music/ten-artists-and-bands-that-inspired-the-beatles
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019).

 [29]. Elvis Presley Biography, Graceland, https://www.graceland.com/elvis/biography.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2018)              .

 [30].  Marvin Gaye Influences, Shmoop, https://www.shmoop.com/whats-going-on/influences
.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).

 [31]. See generally Graham Betts, Motown Encyclopedia (2014).

 [32]. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2nd Cir. 1988).

 [33]. Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2nd Cir. 1940) (per curiam).

 [34]. What the Gayes’ musicologists did in this case to avoid summary judgment (and ultimately at trial) is the equivalent of an expert in a film case testifying that the word “destruction” was used four times in the first scene of one film and two times in the second scene of the second film. They might go on to say that the word “destruction” was followed by the words “of a house” in the first film, and “of a truck” in the second film, along with an explanation that “house” and “truck” both have five letters, and many trucks are parked at houses. Such testimony would be readily dismissed, if not laughed at, in a film case, and the motion for summary judgment granted. Unfortunately, the musical equivalent—which is essentially what occurred in this case—is not as easy to understand and dismiss.

 [35]. Music law is further hampered by the Ninth Circuit’s intrinsic test, in which a lay jury is asked to determine the “total concept and feel” of the works in question. Such a test simply does not work in a music context. One might argue that virtually every disco song has the same “total concept and feel.” One could argue that every blues song or every rap song has the same “total concept and feel.” This notion is antithetical to the reality of musicians’ inspirations and borrowing and is entirely preventative of creativity.

 [36]. Duke Law School music copyright law professor Jennifer Jenkins, after noting that “Got to Give It Up” was inspired by Johnnie Taylor’s song “Disco Lady,” writes that “Gaye cannot claim copyright over material that he himself borrowed.” As professor Jenkins further discusses: “Copyright only covers ‘original, creative expression.’ Anything Marvin Gaye copied directly from his Motown, funk, or disco predecessors is not ‘original’ and should be off the table.” She writes further: “In addition, copyright’s “scènes à faire” doctrine allows anyone to use the defining elements of a genre or style without infringing copyright, because these building blocks are ‘indispensible’ to creating within that genre . . . . Many of the musical elements common to ‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got To Give It Up’ fall into these unprotectable categories.” Jennifer Jenkins, The “Blurred Lines” of the Law, Ctr. for the Study of the Pub. Domain, https://law.duke.edu/cspd/blurredlines (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).

 [37]. This is another practice that should be discontinued. Expert witnesses, if they are to maintain any credibility of non-bias whatsoever, should be allowed to testify for whatever side they agree with, and not be immediately conflicted out from testifying in favor of the second party/attorney that calls them just because they were second. The Court could also retain its own expert(s) pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

 [38]. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

 [39]. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (emphasis added).

 [40]. Dr. Harrington has analyzed more than 230 of Marvin Gaye’s songs and uses his music in classes that he has taught. He agrees that the “groove” and “bounce” of the two works are similar, but is adamant that “[o]bjectively, there is NO protectable expression (melody, harmony, etc.) that has been copied by Thicke” and that “[t]here is no copying of copyrightable expression involving harmonies of the two songs. What is extremely close between the songs is the tempo . . . but tempo is not copyrightable.” Peter Alhadeff & Shereen Cheong, The Lesson of Blurred Lines, Music Bus. J. (Feb. 2016), http://www.thembj.org/2016/01/the-lesson-of-blurred-lines; see also Dr. E Michael Harrington, Good News for Robin, Katy & One Direction: Music Copyright Expert Says Nobody’s Ripping Off Anybody, E Michael Music (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.emichaelmusic.com/good-news-for-robin-katy-one-direction-music-copyright-expert-says-nobodys-ripping-off-anybody.

 [41]. Alhadeff & Cheong, supra note 40.

 [42]. Adam Pasick, A Copyright Victory for Marvin Gaye’s Family Is Terrible for the Future of Music, Quartz (Mar. 10, 2015), https://qz.com/360126/a-copyright-victory-for-marvin-gayes-family-is-terrible-for-the-future-of-music.

 [43]. Ron Mendelsohn, Will the “Blurred Lines” Decision “Stifle Creativity”?, Megatrax (Apr. 1, 2015), http://blogtrans.megatrax.com/will-the-blurred-lines-decision-stifle-creativity.

 

 

Book Review: Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court by Richard H. Fallon, Jr.

From Volume 92, Postscript (December 2018)
DOWNLOAD PDF


 

 

Toward a Reflective Equilibrium: Making Our Constitutional Practice Safe for Constitutional Theory

Book Review: Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court,[*]
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.

André LeDuc[†]

Richard Fallon has written another important book about American constitutional law.[1] Indeed, it brings to mind Hilary Putnam’s definition of a classic: the smarter you get, the smarter it gets. Fallon presents a rich, thick description of our constitutional law and practice and an argument for how we may best continue and improve this practice. While intended to be accessible to a broad readership, Fallon’s arguments cut to the core of much current constitutional scholarship, even while urging us to move past many of these sterile debates. Most importantly, Fallon takes seriously his mission of speaking to the Court, as well as to the academy, and takes a real run at changing how the Justices decide cases and articulate their decisions.[2] He accomplishes all of this in a startlingly concise book, running only 174 pages of text and 36 pages of notes and without even a subtitle.

Fallon sets out to explain the nature of constitutional law, the constitutional disagreements of cases, constitutional argument, and the nature of the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions and, ultimately, the Court itself. That’s a tall order for a little book, but Fallon can make a claim to have accomplished his mission.

Contemporary constitutional scholarship falls into two dominant styles. Most common are the systematic works. They articulate a unifying theory of the Constitution, prescriptively reinterpreting the nature of our process of constitutional adjudication and resulting constitutional doctrine to create a systematic, unifying account of our constitutional law. These projects are often embodied in dense and lengthy tomes with catchy titles like The Living Constitution,[3] The Invisible Constitution,[4] The Unwritten Constitution,[5] The Flexible Constitution,[6] Living Originalism,[7] and The Classic Liberal Constitution,[8] among others.[9] The second style of analysis is marked by its granularity and attention to the details of constitutional doctrine and the particularity of our constitutional practices. They are rarely self-consciously therapeutic, but they are edifying, urging the reader to enrich her understanding of our constitutional law and practice, not to radically revise her view of what the Constitution says or requires. Prominent examples of such an approach include classics like Charles Fried’s Saying What the Law Is, Laurence Tribe’s Constitutional Choices, and John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust. Fallon undertakes something like the scholarship of this minority, edifying style in Law and Legitimacy, despite its aspirational title. He pursues his task of explaining the nature of constitutional law and legitimacy modestly, eschewing the common practice of discovering (and christening) a new Constitution. He is comfortable acknowledging the ways in which his views have developed and the views that he no longer holds.[10] Fallon’s mastery of the literature is impressive[11] and his treatment of its authors is both penetrating and charitable (sometimes perhaps too charitable).[12]

The infelicities in Fallon’s account are few. Notably, he rarely distinguishes between indeterminacy and underdetermination of legal texts and rules.[13] That’s an important distinction, however. Recognizing that legal authorities are underdetermined is consistent with an account of how the argument and resolution of constitutional controversies are channeled and constrained. These constraints make our practice of constitutional law far less vulnerable to challenges of radical indeterminacy or lawlessness. (Fallon believes that the practice of constitutional law is constrained in this way, so the error is more one of infelicity of expression than of substance.)[14] Sometimes the charity of Fallon’s reading of other scholars work glosses over profound issues. For example, he appears to accept the New Originalists’ move to distinguish constitutional provisions that require only interpretation from those that allow construction without ever questioning whether the two types of provisions can be adequately distinguished and, if not, what the implications of that failure would be for New Originalism.

The richness of Fallon’s argument and analysis requires a reviewer to choose among the important themes of the book. I will engage two principal subjects. First, I focus on what Fallon doesn’t address and suggest what those omissions tell us about the direction of American constitutional legal scholarship in the early twenty-first century. Those omissions generally do not reflect significant gaps in Fallon’s argument. They instead are part of a subtle strategy to redirect our approach to the Constitution and the Court in our Republic. Underlying Fallon’s argument is an implicit account of who’s not who, as it were, in the current pantheon of American constitutional scholarship. But Fallon gracefully (and graciously) does this only by showing how our discourse should proceed, rather than stating his argument that we need not engage these theorists expressly.

Second, I explore the two most important elements of Fallon’s book, his project to move us beyond the current debates about constitutional theories of interpretation and his argument that the Court ought to adopt a process of pursuing a reflective equilibrium in its constitutional decision and constitutional practice in order to enhance the legitimacy of our constitutional law and the Court. The first strategy is commendable, but his proposed path reflects an unstated and misplaced commitment to the logical priority of theory. Fallon purports to articulate an account of constitutional practice, but he cannot cast off a fundamental commitment to the priority of concepts, theory, and interpretation. The second argument for a practice of reflective equilibrium may generate a more plausible account of constitutional adjudication than the dominant models in the legal academy, but Rawlsian reflection—even in the situated, historical, thick sense defended by Fallon—is not likely the path forward in understanding the nature of constitutional decision in adjudication or in enhancing the legitimacy of the Constitution and the Court.

I

Fallon begins his account of law by outlining a theory of legal meaning and legal interpretation. His analysis comprises one of the most detailed parts of the book, reflecting the importance Fallon accords the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text and the importance of interpretation of the text in constitutional adjudication. Fallon has previously explored originalism’s claims about constitutional language and its interpretation in some depth.[15] In his earlier analysis he was more critical of originalism, denying that originalism could be reconciled with our actual practice and emphasizing the inadequacy of originalist approaches to non-originalist precedent.[16] His account is more sympathetic in Law and Legitimacy, although he does not endorse the complete originalist theory. Fallon is more sympathetic to originalism because his own analysis and constitutional theory has moved more deeply into questions of the nature of constitutional language and its interpretation.

Fallon makes Scott Soames’s philosophical analysis of the meaning and interpretation of legal texts a central anchor of his own analysis of constitutional meaning.[17] Soames, along with his former colleague at the University of Southern California Andrei Marmor, is among the leading philosophers of language who have explored the particular issues of meaning in legal texts. Soames argues for a version of an originalist theory he terms deferentialism.[18] In this theory the spare semantic meaning of the text is expressly augmented with the force of its pragmatics and the shared presuppositions that the linguistic community holds.[19] It is a representational account that views language as representing the world.[20] It is also an interpretative account that accords priority to the original linguistic meaning of the constitutional text, not a later linguistic meaning or its purpose, although intent figures as an evidentiary matter in determining the legal text’s meaning.[21] But while Soames recognizes the performative dimension of legal texts, his focus on legal texts as stipulations (assertions that make something so) allows him to focus on the element of assertion in the legal text. It is to the assertions made by legal texts that Soames directs his linguistic philosophical analysis.

For reasons I have defended elsewhere, I think Soames has it backwards: the analysis should begin with what the legal text does, not what it says. The enacting legislature was principally concerned to do something, not to say something. When we begin with what the constitutional text is doing rather than what it is saying, the analysis proceeds differently, without overemphasis upon linguistic meaning. Fallon follows the philosophers into this same error.

Fallon is not concerned to match the academic philosophers of language nuance for nuance, distinction for distinction.[22] He is expressly satisfied to articulate a practical account of meaning.[23] It’s a theory of meaning that’s good enough to use for our constitutional theory. Moreover, Fallon argues that the determination of the nature of constitutional meaning is a matter of our ordinary practice of language and law.[24] Accordingly, Fallon argues, philosophers do not have a persuasive claim to special knowledge with respect to the analysis and description of such meaning.[25] At a more conceptual level, Fallon, like Soames, adopts a representational account of language.[26] Language represents the world and constitutional language represents the Constitution-in-the-world. But that implicit foundation receives little attention in Law and Legitimacy. This commitment is, however, more express in one of the articles preceding Law and Legitimacy, The Meaning of Meaning.[27]

There are alternative, non-representational accounts of language, linguistic meaning, and linguistic truth.[28] Even if we endorse these theories, however, it is not clear that Fallon’s representational theory of language leads his constitutional theory astray. Even if Fallon’s tacit representational account of constitutional language is wrong, because of the limited granularity with which Fallon wants to articulate his account of constitutional meaning and employ it in his account of the Constitution and legitimacy, it is not clear that the error has damaging consequences. Fallon’s account of meaning is employed principally to show the sources and extent of ambiguity, polysemy, and underdetermination of constitutional texts and authorities.[29] Those claims of ambiguity, polysemy, and underdetermination—and the implications of those features of constitutional language—are as applicable to constitutional language understood on a representational theory as of an inferentialist, non-representational theory.[30]

Fallon argues from the ambiguity, polysemy, and underdetermination that he identifies in the meaning of authoritative constitutional texts to a different conclusion than Lawrence Solum and Scott Soames, however. Fallon asserts that such linguistic indeterminacy permits and requires Justices to make choices among potential interpretations and associated decisions. Because the nature of the underdetermination of meaning is so expansive for Fallon, even the New Originalist strategy of distinguishing constitutional texts requiring interpretation and those permitting a more open-ended construction is inadequate to encompass the authorities Fallon wants to recognize and the interpretations he wants to adopt for the decision process he endorses. [31]

Academic concerns with the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and its decisions focused upon two problems in the late twentieth century. The first was the countermajoritarian dilemma. First articulated by Alexander Bickel, the countermajoritarian dilemma asserts that judicial review by an unelected Court is inconsistent with democracy.[32] While some scholars have rejected that challenge, others continue to believe that Bickel articulated a genuine problem in our constitutional theory and practice.[33] The second problem, emphasized by Ronald Dworkin’s response to the dominant positivist jurisprudence,[34] was the role of judicial discretion in constitutional adjudication. Twentieth century constitutional theorists worried that judicial discretion undermined the rule of law and the dominant positivist theory of law. Neither problem figures prominently in Fallon’s analysis of legitimacy. Indeed, to the extent that Fallon welcomes the inevitable role of normative values in constitutional decision, he rejects the positivist premise.[35]

The countermajoritarian dilemma receives only passing attention in Fallon’s account.[36] Although Fallon has explored the countermajoritarian arguments and offered his own proposed solution, he doesn’t apparently think that addressing those issues is particularly important for his contemporary analysis of the legitimacy of the Constitution and the Court. Although he doesn’t expressly explain why the problem of judicial review can be so easily passed over, I think his argument can be reconstructed along the following lines. First, our constitutional practice has accepted and incorporated the practice of judicial review. Judicial review therefore has a sociological legitimacy. Second, judicial review has a moral legitimacy because it is important in protecting constitutionally protected rights.[37] These two sources of legitimacy explain why there is no fundamental problem with judicial review in our democratic republic.

Fallon’s argument reduces the legitimacy of judicial review to these two disjunctive forms. Judicial review also has a legal, constitutional legitimacy that his theory ignores. While that form of legitimacy may be described as sociological because, as a matter of legal positivism, it is a matter of social fact, constitutional and legal legitimacy (I here conflate the two) also have a normative dimension, as captured by H. L. A. Hart’s concept of the internal point of view. The legal legitimacy of our constitutional practice of judicial review is more than a shared social behavior. It is freighted with normative commitments and beliefs, but these are not principally moral commitments and beliefs. It is not clear that these normative commitments are moral commitments. We can imagine a judge or citizen endorsing our practice of judicial review while believing that as a matter of political morality a more direct form of democracy would be preferable.

In light of Fallon’s defense of judicial review, why does he recommend greater deference by the Court to the legislature’s judgment? Fallon grounds his argument for the desirability of greater deference to the legislature on constitutional questions as a matter of enhancing and reinforcing democracy in the Republic. Thus, Fallon appears at once to stand Ely’s defense of the democracy-enhancing judicial activism on its head and to tacitly acknowledge Bickel’s countermajoritarian challenge after having neatly dispatched it.

But both appearances are largely unfair. First, Fallon wants to focus the exercise of greater deference on highly controversial, politicized issues. Matters of procedural fairness—which would encompass much of the Warren Court jurisprudence that Ely wanted to put on a firm foundation—would not be entitled to greater deference on Fallon’s account. While counseling greater deference as a means to enhance and revivify American democracy, Fallon’s does not argue that the exercise of stricter judicial review would be illegitimate. It would, however, prejudice a fuller development of American democracy and compromise the pursuit of democratic legitimacy.[38]

Fallon’s argument would appear to face the celebrated Brown v. Board of Education challenge[39] and would seemingly fail the challenge even more clearly with respect to Bolling v. Sharpe and Loving v. Virginia. Those decisions, striking down state and federal legislation, would not appear to easily satisfy Fallon’s test for a more assertive judicial review. The Court’s efforts, led by Justice Frankfurter, to avoid challenges to state anti-miscegenation statutes for more than a decade after Brown is powerful evidence for this claim. But the price of deference would have been to permit the continued enforcement of statutes that we now almost universally recognize as morally repugnant. Fallon makes it very clear that he endorses Brown as a litmus test for plausible theories of constitutional theories and accounts of the Court’s legitimacy.[40]

Although Fallon thus acknowledges this concern with how he can reconcile his theory with Brown (and expressly asserts his commitment to the decision in Brown), it is not clear how he would reconcile his argument for a more deferential practice of judicial review.[41] He argues, somewhat unpersuasively, that his theory is not meant to discredit Brown. His argument is not persuasive because while his argument might not discredit Brown, once decided, it is hard to see how his call for increased deference could have allowed the Warren Court to have decided Brown as it did and to reject Plessy v. Ferguson. It may be that the importance of the moral commitments that Fallon would include in constitutional argument and to support constitutional decision would allow him an exception to his principle of greater deference.  How do we tell which moral propositions have this constitutional force? I am not sure Fallon explains, and I suspect that an explanation might require him to introduce a discussion of constitutional judgment that would fit only awkwardly into his theoretical account. Alternatively, it may simply be that his call for enhanced judicial deference to the legislature is best heard as a whisper.

Fallon’s analysis of the challenge of legitimacy for the Court and the Constitution focuses less on the academy and more on the polity as a whole. He is less worried with theoretical puzzles like the countermajoritarian dilemma and the scope of judicial discretion than with fundamental questions of when and how the Constitution and the Court provide authoritative legal obligations that are accepted and followed by the citizens.[42] In Hartian terms, he is interested both in when we can say from the external point of view that there is a shared behavior and when we can say from the internal point of view that such shared behavior follows the law. This is a welcome and important move in our constitutional jurisprudence. I don’t know if the legitimacy of the Court and the Constitution are more in question than they were in the wake of either the Dred Scott or Brown decisions, but the nature of the confirmation process for many recent nominees to the Court and our constitutional rhetoric certainly reveal significant live questions about legitimacy.

Fallon’s account of the moral legitimacy of the Court and the Constitution does not expressly address the challenge of moral relativism, but it is arguably compatible with it. Moral relativism challenges the claim that moral obligations are timeless and universal for all persons, instead arguing that moral obligations may vary over time and across communities. The challenge of moral relativism to non-positivist theories of the Constitution underlies some important threads in both the originalist canon[43] and the efforts of critics like Philip Bobbitt and John Hart Ely to rehabilitate the legacy of the Warren Court.[44] In each case, concern about the difficulties inherent in finding common moral ground led those theorists (with the exception of Bobbitt) to a positivist account of constitutional legitimacy that was not grounded on moral theory. Fallon discounts these concerns by welcoming Justices’ non-constitutional normative values into their decision process, on the grounds that such a role is both inevitable and proper. [45]

Judicial discretion does not figure in Fallon’s analysis as an important problem in constitutional theory or for the legitimacy, either for the Court or for the Constitution, because Fallon argues that judicial decision is circumscribed in a number of institutional and normative ways, and he describes how.[46] He understands that judicial authorities are underdetermined, not entirely indeterminate.[47] The sources of that constraint are several; the constraints imposed by the constitutional text are not a significant part of Fallon’s practice-centered account. Linguistic meaning, as informed by our understandings and practices, and our constitutional and institutional practices and expectations are all important.[48] These constraints on judicial discretion are, for Fallon, sufficient to disarm the nihilist challenge of indeterminacy and the more traditional concerns with judicial discretion. While I think there are somewhat richer ways to describe the sources of the constraint and to reconcile them with the authority and discretion Justices have, the core of Fallon’s analysis seems right.[49]

Fallon believes that the fundamental problems of legitimacy facing the Court and the Constitution are both sociological and moral.[50] We need to explain both why we do accept the Court’s authority and why we should accept that authority. We need constitutional practices that reinforce this acceptance and the associated authority of the Court. Expressed in these more general terms, Fallon’s restatement of the problem of legitimacy is a twenty-first century account. While Fallon is right to emphasize both the sociological and moral dimensions of constitutional legitimacy, inherent in his dichotomy is a disregard for, or at least a lack of interest in, a third dimension of legitimacy, legal legitimacy. In the current divided political climate that has deeply shaped the Justices’ confirmation process and the public reactions to the Court’s decisions, the Court’s legitimacy is not only an academic concern.

Having set a bold agenda, Fallon’s account of the moral legitimacy is cautious and almost anodyne. While he acknowledges the challenge that racial discrimination poses for claims of legitimacy, he doesn’t explore the extent to which this discrimination affects minorities and, indeed, all of us. He does not acknowledge the chilling challenges that Richard Rothstein’s The Color of Law or Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow pose for white complacency with respect to the extent of racial discrimination in our society and the Court’s profound and continuing role in preserving and protecting that discrimination. Fallon also ignores the originalists’ challenge to the Court’s legitimacy. Many originalists—including Justice Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork—sometimes suggest that the failure to follow the original understanding of the constitutional text generates an illegitimate constitutional law.[51] That appears descriptively mistaken as a matter of sociological legitimacy and at best highly problematic as a matter of moral legitimacy. But the originalists don’t generally offer an express descriptive or prescriptive account of constitutional legitimacy or the role of the Court in place of that implicit claim. The claim also calls into question the legitimacy of these originalists’ own position. Nearly thirty years ago Philip Bobbitt called out Bork’s challenge to the legitimacy of the Court. Bobbitt argued that Bork’s theoretical commitment to originalist interpretative principles and his corresponding criticism of the Warren and Burger Courts’ non-originalist decisions as illegitimate constituted dispositive grounds for denying him a seat on that Court.[52] That’s a powerful claim, but one Fallon does not engage when he asserts that Justices must accept the authority of the Constitution and, albeit to a lesser degree, the authority of the Court’s own precedent. Fallon ought to have acknowledged that any criticism of the Court’s own precedents by members of the Court must be limited to a criticism of the merits of those decisions, not their legitimacy. There is no comparable clarity in Fallon’s analysis of the challenges of legitimacy today.

Fallon’s exploration of the legitimacy of the Court and the Constitution is, however, refreshingly express. By confronting those issues directly, Fallon avoids some of the confusions that infect much of our contemporary constitutional discourse. By confronting the challenge of legitimacy directly, Fallon articulates a theory that can be assessed and accepted or challenged.

II

Fallon’s first principal goal is to shift the focus of our academic—and our public—constitutional discourse away from the current, longstanding disputes about constitutional interpretative methodology. He offers a brief survey of the principal outstanding theories. After canvassing the principal originalist theories, the pluralist theory of Bobbitt, the pragmatic realism of Posner, and the Critical Legal Studies’ challenge of indeterminacy, Fallon argues very briefly that all of those theories are inadequate. His principal objection to the originalist theories is that they cannot accomplish the mission for which they were created and that constitutional adjudication requires more tools than originalists—at least classical originalists—can provide.[53]

Fallon offers some of his harshest criticism of what he terms Cynical Realists.[54] This category lumps together some unidentified law professors and political scientists; he names only Professor Eric Segall and Judge Richard Posner.[55] According to Fallon, these theorists reject any dimension of autonomy for law, reducing judicial decision to politics. Certainly the classical Critical Legal Studies theorists reduced the account of constitutional law to power and politics. It’s not clear Fallon is fair here to Posner. In his early, utilitarian phase Posner clearly did not reduce law to politics. More importantly, in his more recent analysis of the nature of law, while he is far more critical of theory in general (and moral theory in particular) as a source of legal decision, his pragmatist emphasis upon the exercise of judgment in decision and the doctrinal and factual context of decision is inconsistent with the reductive account Fallon attributes to him. But Fallon is right that the Cynical Realists who deny that the Constitution is law and deny that constitutional rules constrain judges purport to offer a better description of our constitutional practice. Fallon argues that they neither describe the outcomes of judicial controversies better than competing theories but that they must inject the additional complexity of arguing that the Court either deceives itself or seeks to deceive us when it articulates the rationales for its decisions.[56] Fallon does not have much to say about Bobbitt’s pluralist theory. I think that gap reflects the extent to which Fallon has not fully thought through how an account of constitutional law that makes practice prior to theory works.

Fallon argues that none of the dominant theories offers an adequate account of our constitutional law or the Court’s constitutional practice.[57] His principal objection is that these accounts begin by putting the theory first, then asks the Justice to apply the theory in the decision of the cases that come before her.[58] While that criticism is apt for many contemporary constitutional theories, it is probably unfair of the most plausible pluralist theories, like those offered by Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson.[59] Those theories emphasize the role of incommensurable arguments and the exercise of situated judgment. They deny that any constitutional theory can provide answers to constitutional controversies. In place of a decision theory that proceeds directly from theoretical foundations, Fallon endorses an iterative account that emphasizes constitutional practice. In this practice, constitutional theory does not have pride of place. It figures in the iterative process, together with our intuitions about the proper outcomes in actual and related hypothetical cases. But Fallon nevertheless believes that constitutional interpretation is logically prior to decision; that assumption is questionable. Moreover, while it’s a common assumption, shared with many of the other theorists Fallon discusses, Fallon does not defend it.

Fallon’s second central and ultimately more important argument is that we should adopt an iterative methodology drawn from analogy to John Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium in moral philosophy in our constitutional decision. The pursuit of constitutional reflective equilibrium is the process by which Fallon proposes to situate constitutional decision and to incorporate our moral and constitutional intuitions and competing modes of constitutional argument within sometimes-inconsistent constitutional interpretive theories.[60]

Reflective equilibrium is central to Rawls’s moral theory of the nature of justice in the modern, advanced liberal democracies. According to Rawls, to determine the requirements of distributive justice, we should imagine ourselves in the original position. In the original position we are separated from our actual selves by a veil of ignorance. That veil prevents us from knowing who we are and how we have fared in the allocation of natural capabilities and the distribution of social and economic resources. From the original position we are to consider what fairness and justice require in the design of a social and political system with respect to the allocation of social and economic resources. Rawls emphasizes that the requirements that are imposed by the principles of distributive justice are abstract and general. The principles of justice are compatible with various particular political systems. Nevertheless, this process imposes substantial constraints on political systems.

Fallon argues that this approach offers the best description of how our practice of constitutional adjudication goes as well as delivering the best normative prescription for how our constitutional decisional practice should proceed.[61] Originalists may fear that Fallon is answering affirmatively to Justice Scalia’s withering rhetorical question whether the Constitution incorporates Rawls’s moral theory.[62] This concern is mistaken, at least in its simplest and starkest form. Fallon’s incorporation of Rawlsian methods does not commit him to the substantive commitments of Rawls’s moral theory. Indeed, on balance Fallon’s invocation of Rawls is a little misleading: Fallon’s account of constitutional judicial decision is consistent with accounts of practical reasoning more generally. It misleadingly highlights the role of theory in that process. Fallon is really describing a role of practical inference, from premises and underlying grounds to conclusions and implications. (The originalists’ fear is not misguided, however, to the extent that Fallon endorses a role for Justices’ substantive moral and other normative commitments in constitutional argument and decision that is inconsistent with the dominant, positivist originalist theories. This incorporation is not pursuant to a peculiarly Rawlsian methodology, however.)

It is important to define the relationship of Fallon’s constitutional methodology to the philosophical methodology of Rawls. The most important difference between the methods of Rawls and Fallon are three. First, Rawls’s methods are methods of moral philosophy. A full metaphilosophical discussion of the implications of classifying Rawls’s theory and argument as philosophical is unnecessary here. But both important originalist and legal pragmatist critics of philosophical methods capture some of the implications of that classification when they lament the essentially contested nature of much philosophical argument.[63] Moral philosophy is no exception. Rawls’s arguments yield theoretical conclusions, not practical judgments. This difference matters if we take the concept of our existing constitutional practices of constitutional argument and decision as fundamental to our constitutional law. That practice is a pluralist practice of argument, as Fallon acknowledges. The various arguments made are not obviously commensurable.[64] The process of reflective equilibrium and the arguments and conclusions that it generates in the abstract, are relevant in our constitutional law and practice only if and to the extent that they may be articulated within the constraints and conventions of that constitutional practice. Fallon thinks that the process of iterated articulation of constitutional judgment from a position of reflective equilibrium can generate authoritative, binding constitutional judgments. By contrast, for Rawls, reflective equilibrium yields a moral theory that supersedes any of our prior moral thinking to the extent inconsistent with where we end up in reflective equilibrium as a result of our deliberations from the original position.

Second, Rawls pursues reflective equilibrium from the original position, a place where we imagine ourselves without all of the elements that make us who we are—our entitlements, capabilities, limitations, history, and personal commitments, for example. From the original position we are disembodied spirits imagining our future corporeal selves and seeking fairness and justice. Fallon’s process unfolds in the real world and real time of constitutional adjudication, with full knowledge of our history and ourselves.

Third, the iterated process that Fallon contemplates is modest and circumscribed; as such, it is very different from the open-ended, no-holds-barred theoretical inquiry of Rawls. In the constitutional context, Fallon believes that reflection on the demands of decision will result in “significant revisions . . . but . . . no troubling disruptions” to our constitutional law and practice.[65] In Rawls’s pursuit of reflective equilibrium, there can be no comparable confidence in the status quo. While the account of justice derived bears a noted resemblance to our advanced liberal western democracies, the role of the state and the commitment to redistribution looks very different from any actual sovereign states.

One of the most powerful criticisms offered against Rawls’s method was that it fails to capture the richness of who we are and what makes us human individuals.[66] Rawls’s description of who we are maximizes the abstraction of our self-descriptions. Critics have argued that we can’t have an adequate account of justice if we excise so much of what we are. Justice, from the perspective of these critics, is not nearly so abstract a concept as Rawls suggests. Justice for us, the argument goes, but take into account more fully who we are—what our desires are, what our capabilities are, and what our history has been. It’s the difference between the ahistorical account of Kant and the historicist account of Hegel.

For Fallon, the process of constitutional reflection begins with a working theory of constitutional interpretation.[67] Fallon believes that a theory of constitutional interpretation must have a logical priority in the process of constitutional adjudication because he believes that the texts of constitutional authorities must be interpreted (in a manner that Fallon defines broadly) so that their meaning may be applied in constitutional decision.[68] To the extent that the meaning is underdetermined or manifestly undesirable, Justices are generally empowered to interpret and apply the Constitution accordingly. Fallon wants to shift the focus of our analysis to the process by which working theories of interpretation are refined and corrected as we confront constitutional controversies and decide constitutional cases.[69]

Fallon doesn’t intend for the process of reflective equilibrium to begin from the original position. But it is less clear what beliefs or other conceptual commitments Justices should or may bring with them to the decision of constitutional cases. They are certainly entitled to bring a methodological stance with respect to interpretation.[70] This stance is, however, subject to testing and refinement against the Justices’ (and our) moral intuitions about particular potential actual and hypothetical judicial decisions.[71] The Justices may bring—indeed, on Fallon’s account, sometimes must bring—their own normative moral values to their work on the Court.[72] Are there, then, any beliefs or commitments that Justices may not take into account in their decisions?

There would appear to be at least three categories of belief that are out of bounds. First, procedurally, Fallon is at pains to recognize that any account of our constitutional law must preserve the important distinctions between what the law holds and what we think that the law should state and what we would want the law to state.[73] In their decision practice Justices must recognize the limits of their authority within our constitutional republic. Second, substantively, to the extent that a Justice holds a belief that is inconsistent with the Constitution, the substance of the Constitution should prevail. Third, to the extent that a Justice holds a moral belief that she recognizes is not shared within the community, that moral belief should not form the basis for a judicial decision that is otherwise indefensible.

These limits are more complex and difficult to apply than this bare statement may suggest. When is a substantive moral or other normative position inconsistent with the Constitution? How should a Justice determine whether a moral belief is shared (however that would be determined) or idiosyncratic? Before District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago were decided, upholding a fundamental right to hold firearms without onerous state or federal regulation, was a broad understanding of a protected right to own or carry firearms inconsistent with the Constitution? Is a belief that the abortion of a human fetus is murder inconsistent with the Constitution? Is a belief that lashing is not a cruel and unusual punishment because not so originally understood at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights inconsistent with the Constitution? Is a belief that non-originalist precedent of the Court is not authoritative law inconsistent with an acknowledgment of the limits of the Court’s authority? None of these cases are easily classified within Fallon’s framework, even if our intuitions about them are clear. They are hard even with Fallon’s account of the constraints that should figure in constitutional adjudication. Articulating the ways in which Justices’ own moral commitments may figure in decision while preserving the moral legitimacy of decision is a project that Fallon has foreshadowed rather than completed.

Readers may also wonder whether Fallon’s position is vulnerable to the criticisms that have been made of Dworkin’s account of Justice Hercules.[74] Focusing upon Dworkin’s claim that law required the comprehensive articulation of a theory grounded on, and derived from, fundamental moral and political theory, Cass Sunstein famously characterized Justice Hercules as an oddball.[75] Sunstein emphasized the inability of such a Justice, committed to constructing a comprehensive and complete decisional theory, to decide cases together with other members of an appellate court.[76] When we look at Fallon’s reflective equilibrium methodology, we may wonder whether any Justice adopting it would face a similar criticism. Fallon’s methodology is ambitious, requiring both sophisticated historical research and sophisticated philosophical argument, even if it doesn’t require the formulation of a single, unified theory that Dworkin’s law as integrity demands.[77] Critics may wonder whether the process of seeking reflective equilibrium belongs to philosophers in their arm chairs, not judges charged with deciding hard cases in the hurly burly pressures of our deeply divided pluralistic constitutional republic. Fallon goes further than most in the academy in recognizing the untheoretical nature of much our practice of constitutional adjudication, but he does not reject a foundational role for theory and an obligation on the part of a Justice to formulate and apply such a theory.

Fallon thinks he has disarmed critics who might argue that the process of reflective equilibrium would be impracticable or result in absolute, uncompromisable judgments in constitutional controversies. His requirement that Justices proceed in good faith appears to be an important part of his argument for the collegiality and integrity of judicial decision-making.[78] But Fallon does not explain the requirement of good faith in much depth. Good faith imposes a duty of consistency, in the absence of a change in view. But the constraint does more in Fallon’s theory. It requires the introduction of an implicit distinction between the arguments that may be made to the Court and the arguments made by the Court. In the case of the arguments made to the Court much, perhaps all, of any requirement of good faith would appear to be properly subordinated to requirements of effective argument—an advocate can surely make arguments to the Court that she does not herself endorse. Moreover, as Fallon acknowledges, the desideratum of good faith, in the face of prudential considerations that may support more artificial approaches, like that pursued by the Court in the period between its decision in Brown and its decision in Loving, is controversial. The constraint of good faith warrants a fuller development if Fallon is to be persuasive in his claim that it can play the important role he ascribes to it.

Fallon believes that the process of reflection is practicable, at least in a limited, practical way because it is a description of how much of our judicial constitutional decisionmaking actually proceeds.[79] He argues that by articulating the process more formally we may improve our judicial decisionmaking, without needing to change it in any fundamental way. With respect to Sunstein’s objection to Dworkin, Fallon argues that by requiring that his Justices proceed reasonably, taking into account the perspectives and values of the other Justices he can insure that his theory is consonant with the need for multimember panels to achieve consensus, even if members of the panel begin from different normative points of departure and apply different decisional methods.[80]  But can Fallon so easily pair his notion of reflective equilibrium with a commitment to collegiality and reasonableness on the part of his Justices?

Fallon may argue that while his reflective equilibrium generates substantive constitutional outcomes and doctrine, the requirement of reasonableness addresses the epistemic dimension of the adjudication process. The requirement of reasonableness limits the confidence that Justices should take in the conclusions that the process of pursuing reflective equilibrium generates, and the doctrine and decisions that arise from it. If this is the way to understand Fallon’s theory, it is very different from the concept of reflective equilibrium that Rawls defends, at least in A Theory of Justice.[81] For Rawls, the pursuit of a reflective equilibrium is a theoretical, philosophical inquiry. There are no epistemic limits on the conclusions generated in reflective equilibrium. Fallon’s reconciliation of his more situated, historical, and practical account of constitutional practical reasoning that makes a place for reasonableness and collegiality in our constitutional practice is not implausible.

When we understand how Fallon wants his process of historically situated reasoning to reflective equilibrium to work, we are left wondering what Rawls has to do with it. The iterated articulation of a constitutional reflective equilibrium is a far more practical exercise than Rawls’s theoretical exercise from the original position. On Fallon’s account, we begin with a great deal of knowledge about and commitment to our constitutional law and practice and to our socially instantiated moral intuitions and expectations. We can see this if we compare Fallon’s account with Gilbert Harman’s account of how we change our views as a matter of practical reason.[82] Fallon’s description of the process of reasoning to a constitutional reflective equilibrium is not inconsistent with Harman’s account of how we change our beliefs and actions as a matter of practical reason. Briefly, on Harman’s account, we reason by inference to the best explanation, adding and culling beliefs and inferential commitments until we arrive at the most persuasive, most coherent overall relevant view. Fallon also dispenses with the most salient features of Rawls’s method (principally, the original position and the veil of ignorance) in his proposed constitutional decision and theory-building process. The process of reflective equilibrium is the means by which Fallon limits the power of the competing theories of constitutional interpretation. But if we don’t begin by according the competing theories of constitutional interpretation a logical priority in our practice of constitutional adjudication, then we don’t need to emphasize the complicated process of iterated reasoning to a reflective equilibrium. This is the most important way in which Fallon betrays his unarticulated commitment to the priority of theory. I think Fallon’s invocation of Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium—admittedly only as analogy—may be best understood as reflecting his misplaced commitments to a pride of place for theoretical and conceptual reasoning in our constitutional practice.

Fallon’s Rawlsian tack is not easily reconciled with Rawls’s own later political philosophy.[83] Rawls’s later work appears to retreat from the systematic claim of A Theory of Justice that philosophy could derive the formulation of the political institutions that would create a just society that could and should be accepted by all.[84] Instead, Rawls later appears to argue that a just society requires pluralism and continuing tolerance for dissent, because a shared understanding of moral doctrine can only be maintained by oppression.[85] (Note how consistent the commitment of the later Rawls to continuing argument and dissent and the absence of an agreed upon comprehensive canon is with a modal, pluralist account of constitutional law. This parallel does not seem to have been highlighted by the constitutional pluralists.)

If this reading is right, then the later Rawls poses a substantial challenge for Fallon’s claim that our goal should be a constitutional decision process that decides cases on the basis of constitutional reflection that aims at a reasonably comprehensive account of the proper understanding and application of the Constitution. Constitutional adjudication yields authoritative, binding legal decisions. If the Rawls of Political Liberalism is right, the resulting law is either incomplete or sustainable only with force, not reason. For Fallon, constitutional adjudication is fundamentally a matter of using constitutional interpretative theory to find the right constitutional meaning, not to choose among essentially contested or otherwise inconsistent resolutions of constitutional controversies on the basis of structured, canonical forms of constitutional argument. While Fallon makes a place for dissent and disagreement, it does not take the pride of place that features in more fundamentally pluralist accounts. His focus falls on argument and disagreement as a means for developing the underlying constitutional theory in modest and incremental ways, not as a fundamental or constitutive feature of our constitutional law and practice. For Fallon, with reflective equilibrium comes consistent, reasoned constitutional decision and constitutional theory. Despite invoking Rawls’s theory at multiple levels, Fallon does not adequately address the challenge posed by the later Rawls.[86]

Doctrinal coherence is also important for an inferentialist account of constitutional decision. Constitutional opinions, like the text of the Constitution itself, both do things and say things.[87] When opinions say things in their holdings and in their reasoning, they make discursive commitments that are part of our constitutional law (This dimension of the way Justices say things accounts for much of the reason why the celebrated (infamous?) analogy with umpires is so manifestly inadequate to explain what Justices do.[88])

As suggested above, Fallon gets it backwards. We ought to begin with our constitutional practice—and the importance of discursive inferential commitments in the opinion writing part of that practice. From that practice we can understand the need for doctrinal and inferential coherence with respect to the Court’s holdings and in the doctrine articulated in the Court’s opinions, because the discursive commitments of those authoritative constitutional texts inform and ultimately constitute much of our constitutional law.

But, contrary to Fallon’s account, we can insist on consistency and coherence as an important requirement for our discursive commitments without a commitment to the priority of constitutional interpretative theory. An inferentialist account accomplishes this directly. According to an inferentialist account, the meaning of statements and assertions arises not simply from their use, but also from the discursive commitments that follow from them. Most simply, when the Court asserts, for example, “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,[89] that assertion carries a number of important inferential commitments but also leaves open other important questions. The assertion, at least as a matter of linguistic if not semantic meaning,[90] holds racial segregation unconstitutional in schools. It does not appear to admit of exceptions. The assertion does not explain whether it speaks to schools that are in fact separate or separate by law, but on its face it does not appear to distinguish the two. It does not expressly foreclose all forms of racial discrimination or even all forms of racial segregation. It does not determine what remedies may exist for racial segregation in schools. It appears inconsistent on its face with Plessy,[91] and the opinion elsewhere makes this inconsistency express—but does not expressly overrule that case.[92] Attention to these inferential dimensions of the assertion gives the linguistic content, its meaning and force, to the text. They also impose some consistency and coherence on constitutional doctrine and law. If a holding or an argument is inconsistent with the constitutional text or with other authoritative assertions of constitutional law, we can call that flaw out. If an opinion fails to offer a canonical, authoritative argument for the decision made, we can call that out, too—again without the need to construct a theoretical superstructure.[93] We don’t first need a theory of constitutional meaning and interpretation before making such judgments or deciding cases.

It may appear that an inferentialist account, with its emphasis on the discursive commitments that flow from the assertions made in constitutional authorities—the text of the Constitution and of constitutional precedents—is itself inconsistent with a modal account of constitutional argument and decision. The modal, pluralist account asserts that there are multiple, sometimes inconsistent forms of argument that we invoke and rely upon to decide constitutional cases. This conflict is not best understood as a conflict about meaning so much as a conflict about what the Constitution says and should be understood to do. The modal conflict—and central prudential and doctrinal arguments, while sometimes couched in terms of the meaning of the relevant authoritative texts—are better understood in terms of what we should do, how we should hold in a constitutional case. The conflicts inherent in a pluralist theory are not inconsistent with an inferentialist account of the meaning of our constitutional texts.

Although Fallon long ago endorsed something that he himself termed a pluralist theory,[94] it’s not clear that he remains a pluralist today. Moreover, his defense of his reflective methodology appears vulnerable to important criticisms from pluralist theory. Constitutional pluralism asserts plurality, variously asserting the existence of multiple, independent theories of interpretation and construction, readings of the Constitution that inform constitutional adjudication, and modes of constitutional argument. Pluralism, most fundamentally, recognizes the limits of constitutional theory and the corresponding priority of our faculty of constitutional judgment in our constitutional practice. The locus classicus for this claim—albeit in an often-misunderstood and admittedly opaque expression—is Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate.[95] Subtitled Theory of the Constitution, the book has sometimes been misunderstood to articulate six dueling theories of the Constitution, although Bobbitt introduced these forms archetypes, but he later came to refer to them as modalities.[96] Bobbitt acknowledged that some of his readers had mistakenly thought that he was describing multiple theories, not a single theory of the Constitution.[97] The confusion likely arose because Bobbitt’s theory made constitutional practice central and constitutive of our constitutional law; that theory doesn’t look much like other constitutional theories. Central to Bobbitt’s account is that there is no algorithm or decision methodology that can resolve conflicts among competing modalities of argument. (While many constitutional theorists implicitly discount the role of constitutional judgment, few (perhaps none) expressly assert that an algorithm could determine the proper resolution of constitutional cases.) For Bobbitt, the resolution of the conflict was a matter of conscience.[98] Secular readers found that account problematic.[99] But one can imagine a secularized account of judgment, even an account that is consistent with moral relativism.[100]

Pluralism, with the logical priority that it assigns to our practice of constitutional argument and decision, is inconsistent with Fallon’s reflective account that begins with a theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation.[101] Choosing between Fallon’s emphasis on the contribution and role of theory in constitutional adjudication and the social practice account of pluralism requires us to make a judgment about the nature of constitutional judgment. Constitutional judgment requires wisdom as well as mastery of constitutional methods and doctrine. The lingering question is whether Fallon offers a compelling account of the role and relative importance of each.

Finally, it is helpful to examine Fallon’s account against the constitutional jurisprudence of another, more conservative member of Rawls’s posse, Fallon’s colleague Charles Fried. There are important parallels between the two descriptions of our constitutional law and the normative perspectives each holds. For example, both Fried and Fallon believe that reasoning about constitutional doctrine is important in constitutional adjudication.[102] For Fallon, doctrinal and precedential reasoning explicates the meaning of the constitutional text; for Fried, precedent shapes and determines constitutional doctrine and decision. But the differences between the two accounts are also significant and these differences highlight some central elements of Fallon’s argument. Leaving aside the differences in the substantive constitutional law each would endorse, Fried’s emphasis on the granularity of constitutional doctrine and on the importance of judgment[103] reflects his view that downplays the role of theories of constitutional interpretation in our constitutional law and constitutional adjudication. For Fried, constitutional law and the resolution of constitutional controversy requires very careful attention to the facts of the case and the relevant constitutional doctrine with respect to which the case arises. It is in that particularized context that situated constitutional judgment may be best made.[104] Theories of meaning and interpretation, which sometimes impair the exercise of good constitutional judgment, do not play for Fried the central role that Fallon’s theory accords them.

III

Fallon’s new book makes an important contribution to our thinking about the Constitution and the Court. The arguments Law and Legitimacy makes expressly, as well as the unstated assumptions that underlie these arguments and the focus of the book more generally, would move our constitutional thinking forward if others master its lessons. Fallon’s book is more likely, however, to elicit criticism both for what it says and what it doesn’t bother to say. Legal pragmatists may feel slighted by Fallon’s brief engagement with their claims, for example, as well as by being termed Cynical Realists. Most of them don’t self-identify either as cynical or as realists. The committed interpretivists on both sides of the originalism debate will likely forcefully reject Fallon’s argument that Justices may properly look to their own moral commitments in deciding certain constitutional cases. To the extent that the originalists are tempted by Fallon’s account their project of delegitimizing the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts will be called into question. 

To the extent that the constitutional academy does not respond critically, it will likely attempt to assimilate Law and Legitimacy into the canon of our current practice of normal constitutional theory. That response will be, at least in important respects, misleading. Thus, for example, we may anticipate that New Originalists like Solum will emphasize Fallon’s openness to originalist methodologies. They will emphasize the centrality of the constitutional text to Fallon’s account of constitutional interpretation and decision. Although Fallon endorses much of Soames’s theory (including employing without objection Soames’s barbarism of precisification),[105] Soames must surely reject Fallon’s methodological claims about ordinary language and our knowledge thereof. Leaving aside the modest substantive disagreements, while Soames is interested in natural language, methodologically he is no ordinary language philosopher. He is committed to a canonical analytical metaphilosophical account of his project.[106] For analytic philosophers of language, ordinary language users are not authoritative informants about the nature of linguistic meaning or other, related philosophical questions. Soames should reject Fallon’s methodological claim to participate in the analysis of constitutional meaning, because the nature of meaning, ambiguity, truth, and knowledge are matters as to which philosophers have special expertise and knowledge. Fallon, as a legal scholar, does not have this professional expertise or knowledge. Originalists are more likely to focus critically on Fallon’s willingness to incorporate underlying normative values into constitutional judgments. Originalist critics like Sunstein will emphasize the role of consensus and collegiality in appellate constitutional adjudication and Fallon’s call for greater deference to Congress, overlooking Fallon’s tacit denial of a central role for incompletely theorized opinions.[107] They may also emphasize Fallon’s suggestion that the Court should be more deferential to the Congress. They will likely emphasize Fallon’s reliance on the earlier rather than the later, Rawls. Because of the measured style and the balance of Fallon’s argument, it is possible, indeed, perhaps likely, that other scholars will selectively find in Fallon’s arguments what is most in harmony with their own positions. Some may find the same tendency in this review. This may result in underestimating the originality and importance of Fallon’s contribution.

Implicit in this review’s narrative is the claim that we should recognize how far Fallon departs from the traditional traces of our contemporary constitutional theory. He is not just providing new answers; he is redirecting us to new or lost questions about the nature of the Constitution, the role of the Court, and the nature of the legitimacy of the Republic. By focusing on the foundations for the moral legitimacy of the Court and the Constitution, Fallon would shift our constitutional discourse away from the sterile debate over constitutional interpretation and originalism and other theoretical issues. That would be a signal achievement in its own right.[108] By casting the discussion of legitimacy in the fundamental new terms that look expressly to our moral and political theory and our constitutional practice—rather than in the narrower, traditional terms of the countermajoritarian dilemma and the role of, and limits on, judicial discretion—Fallon tacitly challenges the dominant positivism that has informed both most originalism and the competing constitutional theories of originalism’s critics. But in so doing, he needs to acknowledge the challenges that originalists and their critics have historically posed to reliance on underlying normative values in our constitutional adjudication.

Within the realm of the possible, Fallon’s new book accomplishes a lot. How important it will prove to have been in reshaping our constitutional theory and practice, to echo Zhou Enlai, it’s simply too soon to say. If Law and Legitimacy should have that impact, it will be more a matter of changing what we do than of changing what we merely say.


[*] *.. Harvard University Press, 2018.

[†] †.. I am grateful to Laura Litten for comments on an earlier draft of this review. © 2018 André LeDuc.

 [1]. Another reflects books Fallon has himself written, including The Dynamic Constitution and Implementing the Constitution.

 [2].  Other academics may claim the same ambition, of course, but the disconnect between how those scholars write about the Court and Constitution and how the Justices write about their decisions reveals how implausible that claimed mission is.

 [3].  David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010).

 [4].  Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution (2008).

 [5].  Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By (2012).

 [6].  Sean Wilson, The Flexible Constitution (2013).

 [7].  Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011).

 [8].  Richard A. Epstein, The Classic Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2014).

 [9].  Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004); Louis Michael Seidman, The Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2001). Admittedly, Fallon has already gone down that road with The Dynamic Constitution: An Introduction to American Constitutional Law and Practice.

 [10].  Thus, for example, Fallon disavows his 1987 claim that linguistic meanings would not conflict in ways that would generate constitutional controversies. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court 80, 193 n.42 (2018) [hereinafter Fallon, Law and Legitimacy].

 [11].  See, e.g., id. at 188, nn.149–54 (discussing Scott Soames’s philosophical arguments). The index, unfortunately, does not adequately capture the depth of Fallon’s analysis, either substantively or in its entries for the scholars and scholarship that Fallon addresses.

 [12].  Examples of Fallon’s charity include his characterization of Steven Sachs’s arguments for a positivist originalism as “bracing.” and Bruce Ackerman’s radical theory of de facto constitutional change as “theoretically ambitious and highly provocative,” and his willingness to glide past continuing confusion in the New Originalist camp over the distinction between the broader concept of linguistic meaning and the narrower, less relevant concept of semantic meaning. Id. at 204 n.7 (Sachs), 196 n.28 (Ackerman).

 [13].  See id. at 48–49, 137–40.

 [14].  See id. at 48–49.

 [15].  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 13–25 (2001).

 [16].  Id. at 3, 15–16.

 [17].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 61–64; Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 597 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, Deferentialism]; 1 Scott Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about the Law, in Philosophical Essays: Natural Language: What It Is and How We Use It 403 (2009).

 [18].  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 17, at 597 (characterizing deferentialism as originalism without the baggage). While characterizing deferentialism as jettisoning originalism’s baggage Soames never expressly articulates what he thinks he has accomplished. I think he means to claim that he has eliminated some of the more implausible claims originalists have made about the determinacy of semantic meaning, and dispensed with a need for those claims by amplifying the recourse to semantic meaning with reference to the pragmatics of utterances and texts.

 [19].  Id. at 597–98.

 [20].  Scott Soames, Philosophy of Language 1 (2010) (“The central fact of language is its representational character.”).

 [21].  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 17, at 597.

 [22].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 61–62.

 [23].  Id. at 62–65.

 [24].  Id. at 64.

 [25].  Id. at 64–65.

 [26].  Admittedly, Fallon does not make this claim expressly. But in discussing other theorists who are committed to a representational account of language he expresses no reservations about those accounts. Id. at 188, nn.50–56.

 [27].  Richard H. Fallon, Jr. The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1307 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Meaning] (unreflectively writing of the referents of interpretations of meaning).

 [28]. André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119 Penn. St. L. Rev. 131 (2014).

 [29].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 49–51.

 [30].  By contrast, many of the participants in the debates over constitutional originalism employ their representational accounts of language to make claims about the precision and determinativeness of language that fit more easily with representational theories. See André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7 Wash. U. Juris. Rev. 263 (2015).

 [31].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 43–44, 76–78.

 [32].  See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16–23 (1962) (arguing that the fundamental challenge of constitutional theory is to explain the legitimacy of judicial review).

 [33].  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1406 (2006) (concluding that judicial review is inappropriate as a matter of democratic political philosophy in reasonably democratic societies).

 [34].  See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules: I, in Taking Rights Seriously 14, 43–45 (1977).

 [35].  Here, too, Fallon is indifferent to the jurisprudential debate between legal positivists and natural law theorists. While asserting the importance of moral commitments in deciding constitutional cases and thereby determining our constitutional law, he nevertheless presses Hart’s positivist notion of a rule of recognition into service.

 [36].  Fallon offered his defense of judicial review in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (2008) (arguing against Waldron’s indictment if judicial review and offering an affirmative theoretical defense thereof). Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, and the countermajoritarian difficulty do not even merit entries in the brief index.

 [37].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 159–60.

 [38].  See id. at 159–165.

 [39].  The Brown challenge asserts that any constitutional theory that characterizes Brown as wrongly decided (as distinguished from wrongly reasoned) is thereby discredited and must be rejected.

 [40].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 145, 162.

 [41].  See id.at 162–63.

 [42].  Id. at 22–24, 41–46.

 [43].  Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting The Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 45–46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).

 [44].  Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).

 [45].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 68.

 [46].  See id. at 105–24.

 [47].  See id. at 48–49.

 [48].  See id. at 107–09.

 [49].  See Robert B. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in Pragmatism, Law, and Language 19, 19–20 (Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014). Fallon occasionally hints at a perspective like this but does not develop it.  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 107.

 [50].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 7.

 [51].  Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 143 (1990) (characterizing originalism as the only approach to constitutional interpretation that possesses “democratic legitimacy” and is “consonant with the design of the American Republic”).

 [52].  Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 83–108 (1991).

 [53].  See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 49–51.

 [54].  See id. at 169–71.

 [55].  Id. at 169, 212 n.43.

 [56].  See id. at 169–71.

 [57].  Id. at 136–38.

 [58].  Id.

 [59].  Bobbitt, supra note 44; Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth (1996).

 [60].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 142–48.

 [61].  Id. at 142–48, 170–71.

 [62].  Scalia, supra note 43, at 45.

 [63].  See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 43, at 44–45; Bork, supra note 51, at 253–55; Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637 (1998).

 [64].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 125–27.

 [65].  Id. at 147.

 [66].  Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 79 (1983) (arguing that Rawls’s argument as to what is just in the abstract from behind the veil of ignorance cannot offer a rich enough account to give us answers as to what justice requires in the rich historical context in which we find ourselves in life).

 [67].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 126–27.

 [68].  Id. at 41–46.

 [69].  See id. at 126–27.

 [70].  Id. at 144.

 [71].  Id.

 [72].  Id. at 128.

 [73].  See id. at 10–11, 121–23.

 [74].  See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 379–92 (1986).

 [75].  Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 49 (1996).

 [76].  Id. at 48–50.

 [77].  Compare Dworkin, supra note 74, at 264–65 (acknowledging but dismissing the objection to his account of adjudication based on the practical impossibility of human judges adopting and following the ambitious methodology of law as integrity) with Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 149 (history), 48–49 (theoretical analysis of language).

 [78].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 130–32.

 [79].  Id. at 147–48.

 [80].  Id. at 151–53.

 [81].  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48–51 (1971).

 [82].  Gilbert Harman, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning 1 (1986). Harman’s account of belief change is embedded in a representational account of language, but I believe that his account of practical reasoning could be recast in a non-representational, inferentialist form.

 [83].  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback ed. 1996).

 [84].  Id. at 37.

 [85].  See Burton Dreben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 316, 317–18 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).

 [86].  To the extent we read Cass Sunstein’s judicial minimalism and defense of incompletely theorized decisions as relying fundamentally on the later Rawls, Fallon’s focus on the earlier Rawls is also reflected in his relative non-engagement with Sunstein’s constitutional theory. See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 46–48, 199 nn.13–14 (citing Political Liberalism).

 [87]. See André LeDuc, Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The New Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. Pub. L. 111 (2016).

 [88].  See Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 Emory L.J. 641 passim (2012) (exploring the metaphor Chief Justice John Roberts offered in his confirmation hearings but arguing, most importantly, that the role and contribution of the judge to adjudication in the law is more complex and more important than the role of the umpire in playing sports games). It also accounts for why Sunstein’s argument for incompletely theorized opinions is overstated, if not mistaken. Sometimes constitutional cases are best resolved by the Court, despite the important inherent limitations on the Court, by a more comprehensive or sweeping opinion to announce the decision. When and why that may be the case is not a question that Fallon engages directly, but unlike Sunstein, he does not reject the possibility that certain constitutional cases may require a decision on the basis of an argument with broad application or implications.

 [89]. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

 [90]. While the pragmatics of the text—context and role in the decision of the constitutional case—make it clear that it speaks as a matter of federal constitutional law, even though it does not expressly assert its conclusion as a matter of federal constitutional law.

 [91]. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

 [92]. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95.

 [93]. Bernard Wolfman et al., Dissent Without Opinion: The Behavior of Justice William O. Douglas in Federal Tax Cases (1975) (arguing that the consistent failure of Justice Douglas to articulate any grounds as the basis on which he struck down federal taxes contested before the Court was illegitimate).

 [94].  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987).

 [95].  Bobbitt, supra note 44.

 [96].  Id. at 7; Bobbitt, supra note 52, at 11–22.

 [97].  Bobbitt, supra note 52, at xi.

 [98].  Id. at xvii, 184–86.

 [99].  Patterson, supra note 59, at 142–46, 149–50.

 [100].  Harman’s account of practical judgment would appear to be such an example.

 [101]. It may appear that Bobbitt’s notion of the style of a particular Justice, reflected in his preference for one or more particular modes of argument, is analogous to Fallon’s claim that a Justice begins the decision of a constitutional case with a working theory of constitutional interpretation. I think the parallel is misleading because the modes of arguments are not theories of the Constitution, still less theories of interpretation. Moreover, while not foundational (because they are merely types or classes of argument) and because they are not confirmed or reinforced by intuitions about the best resolution of constitutional controversies.

 [102].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 98–99; see Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court 241–42 (2004).

 [103].  See Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1025 passim (2011) (emphasizing the often underestimated importance of judgment in constitutional cases in lieu of emphasizing the importance of interpretive theory). Even the title of Fried’s earlier book—Saying What the Law Is—emphasizes the performative, character of our constitutional law and practice, at least if we understand the Court to make the law so by saying.

 [104].  Id. at 1043–44 (highlighting the power of Justice Scalia’s non-originalist opinions and decisions).

 [105].  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 67.

 [106].  Soames, supra note 20, at 1–10 (beginning his theoretical analysis with Frege).

 [107].  Fallon mentions Sunstein’s concept and argument only in passing. Fallon, Law and Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 208, n.65. While Fallon argues for greater judicial deference to the legislature, he does not endorse the systematic judicial minimalism that Sunstein calls for.

 [108].  For a more cautious view that it will take more than merely compelling or even dispositive, rational argument to reach that result, see André LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel: Originalism, Its Critics, and the Promise of Our American Constitution, 26 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 101 (2017).

 

Supreme Court Reform: Desirable—And Constitutionally Required

From Volume 92, Postscript (November 2018)
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Supreme Court Reform: Desirable—and Constitutionally Required

David Orentlicher[*]

As decisions by—and appointments to—the Supreme Court have become increasingly divisive,[1] many observers have renewed calls for reform.[2] For example, we could replace lifetime tenure with non-renewable terms of eighteen years, such that one term ends every two years.[3] That way, less would be at stake with each nomination, Justices could not time their retirements for partisan reasons, and appointments would be divided more evenly between Democratic and Republican presidents. Or we could establish a non-partisan, judicial nominating commission.[4]

Concerns about the Supreme Court are not new, but increasing political polarization and partisan maneuvering over the two most recent Court appointments have accentuated tensions. With the legitimacy of the Court at stake, reform to depoliticize the Court seems essential. And whichever reform is promoted, it is generally assumed that implementation would require a constitutional amendment, legislation, or a change in Senate rules.

But the conventional wisdom is wrong. There is a sound argument to be made that Supreme Court reform is constitutionally required.[5]

DUE PROCESS AND ideological baLANCE

With Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment to the Supreme Court, it seems pretty clear that President Donald Trump and Senate Republicans have been able to solidify a staunchly conservative majority on the Court. In all likelihood, this new majority will stake out firmly conservative positions on a range of critical issues, including voting rights, reproductive rights, and corporate rights. With a second Trump nominee on the bench, the Supreme Court will bring a strong ideological bias to its decision making. While that is highly controversial, it is one of the features of our judicial appointment process. As is often said, elections have consequences.

Or should they when it comes to the judicial branch? We ought to consider the constitutional implications of ideological bias on the Supreme Court. In particular, principles of due process and the framers’ original intent provide good reason to think that neither a conservative nor liberal Court majority should be able to impose its views on the country. 

A.  Ideological Bias and Due Process

The Due Process Clause promises litigants that they will receive an impartial hearing before a neutral court.[6] And a neutral court decides cases without any personal, political, or other bias.[7] With a fifth strongly conservative Justice on the Supreme Court, it is not a neutral court. Any party promoting a liberal viewpoint before the Justices will not be able to count on a fair shot at prevailing.[8]

To be sure, if Justices merely acted like umpires, doing something akin to the calling of balls and strikes, as suggested by Chief Justice John Roberts in his confirmation hearings,[9] a Justice’s political philosophy would not matter. But of course, a Justice’s political philosophy does matter.[10] Otherwise, Republican Senators would have considered Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 2016, and other nominations also would not fail because of partisan opposition. Some Justices take more conservative positions, while others take more liberal positions.[11] A conservative majority will render different decisions on environmental regulation, consumer protection, or voting rights than will a liberal majority. When Court decisions reflect the philosophical leanings of the Justices, and decisions can be determined by one side of the ideological spectrum, our system denies an impartial hearing to parties on the other side of the ideological spectrum. And that is fundamentally unfair in a constitutional system that promises litigants due process in court.

Because it is unfair for litigants to have their cases decided by an ideologically-biased court, other countries have designed their highest courts so decisions do not reflect only one side of the philosophical spectrum. Arguably, due process requires something similar for the Supreme Court.

A strong view of due process would demand ideological moderation for each Justice, an approach taken in some European countries. In Germany, for example, nominees to the Constitutional Court must receive a two-thirds vote of approval and therefore must appeal to legislators on both sides of the partisan aisle.[12] Instead of getting judges who are either strongly conservative or liberal, German litigants get judges who are moderate. Like Germany, Portugal and Spain require supermajority votes for appointments to their constitutional courts.[13] So we might say that due process requires restoration of a strong filibuster rule in the Senate or a strong supermajority on final voting for judicial nominations. That would force presidents to nominate Justices acceptable to both conservatives and liberals.[14]

A less demanding view of due process would focus on overall balance on the Court rather than on the ideologies of individual Justices. While there are different ways to achieve overall balance,[15] the simplest path for the Supreme Court would be to follow the example of a number of countries. In many European nations, high court decisions are made by consensus, or at least a supermajority vote, so Justices on both sides of the ideological spectrum have to support the courts’ opinions.[16] The U.S. Supreme Court itself observed a norm of consensual decision-making for most of its history. Until 1941, the Justices typically spoke unanimously.[17] Only about 8% of cases included a dissenting opinion. Now, one or more Justices dissent in about 60% of rulings.[18] Chief Justice John Roberts has pushed for greater consensus on the Court,[19] saying that the court functions best “when it can deliver one clear and focused opinion.”[20]

An advantage of this path to ideological balance is that it allows for a greater range of perspectives among the different Justices. Instead of nine relatively moderate Justices, we would get a mix of conservative and liberal Justices. And that would make for a stronger decision making process. Studies on group decision making demonstrate that better outcomes result when the decision makers bring a range of viewpoints to the table.[21] Accordingly, I discuss this path to ideological balance in the remainder of this essay.

How large should a supermajority be? Since there may be times when six Justices are either conservative or liberal, it probably would be necessary to require more than a two-thirds supermajority to ensure that decisions always reflect the perspectives of both sides of the philosophical divide. We could require at least a 7-2 vote or even decisionmaking by consensus of the entire Court.

B.  Ideological Bias and Original Intent

What would the framers think about this? On one hand, they did not include in Article III of the Constitution a requirement for ideological balance on the Supreme Court. On the other hand, they did not reject ideological balance. Moreover, they recognized the need to amend the Constitution with a Bill of Rights that includes the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of impartial courts.

The framers’ intent is consistent with this essay’s due process analysis. With ideological balance, the Supreme Court would be more faithful to the framers’ design for our constitutional system. The Founding Fathers worried greatly about “factions” pursuing their self-interest to the detriment of the overall public good. Accordingly, the constitutional drafters devised a system that they thought would block factional control of the national government.[22] But the framers did not anticipate the extent to which political parties would form dominant factions that could gain command of government power. For example, the framers did not anticipate how partisan ties between presidents and members of Congress would limit the legislative branch’s checking and balancing of the executive branch.[23] Similarly, the framers did not expect—nor did they want—a Supreme Court that would reflect the views of only one side of the ideological spectrum. Indeed, when Alexander Hamilton explained the Constitution’s appointment provisions in The Federalist Papers, he emphasized the need to avoid nominations that reflect partiality instead of the overall public interest.[24]

The Due Process Clause and original intent both support ideological balance on the Supreme Court. As discussed in the next section, Supreme Court precedent is consistent with such a requirement.

C.  Ideological Bias and Supreme Court Precedent

In previous cases, the Supreme Court has observed that constitutional concerns are not raised when a judge favors one or another ideological view.[25] Anyone with the appropriate training and experience for the judiciary will have opinions on important legal issues. According to the Court, due process prohibits judicial bias against a party to a proceeding, not bias against a legal view that the party might advocate.[26]

But there are important reasons to distinguish Court discussions of the issue. First, these discussions were dicta. The question whether it is impermissible for an appellate court to have an overall ideological bias has not been decided by the Court. Rather, it has come up in cases addressing other issues of judicial neutrality. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, for example, the issue before the Court was whether a state could prohibit judicial candidates from announcing their positions on issues that might come before them if elected.[27] In another case, Tumey v. Ohio, the issue before the Court was whether judges could have a financial stake in the outcome of their decisions.[28]

Second, the Court’s reasoning is consistent with a due process argument against a Court that has an overall ideological bias. In Republican Party of Minnesota, the Justices discussed the kinds of personal biases that should disqualify a judge, and the Court wrote that a judge’s ideological bias is not disqualifying in the way that a personal financial bias is disqualifying. It took that view in Republican Party of Minnesota and earlier cases because anyone who has the experience and training that would be desirable in a judge will inevitably develop an ideological bias.[29] But the fact that we must accept individual judges with ideological leanings does not prevent us from ensuring an overall ideological balance on the Court. Under a fair reading of the Constitution, litigants ought to be able to ensure that their cases are decided in an ideologically-balanced way.

In addition, it is difficult to identify a good reason for permitting the Court to function with a majority on one side or the other of the ideological spectrum. While we can point to the principle of majority rule to justify partisan control in the executive or legislative branches, popular majorities do not deserve special recognition in a judicial branch that should be guided by legal principle rather than prevailing sentiment.

d.  Potential concerns with a requirement of ideological balance

In general, concerns about cost, efficiency, and fairness have limited policies to address judicial bias.[30] For example, one solution to judicial bias is recusal of the biased judge. But if reasons for recusal are not strictly limited, litigants might clog the courts with baseless recusal motions,[31] and lawyers might exploit the rules to game the system in favor of their clients.[32] Supreme Court Justices also have resisted strict recusal rules on the ground that there is no one who can step in for the disqualified Justice.[33] A supermajority requirement avoids the problems raised by judicial disqualification. It addresses bias not by removing partial Justices, but by counterbalancing their partialities. 

Still, one might worry that a supermajority requirement would lead the Court to deadlock with some frequency and leave too many issues to be decided by the lower courts. However, a few considerations indicate that it is unlikely to do so. First, the Justices would have a strong incentive to find common ground. Supreme Court Justices want to leave their imprint on the law—after spending years, if not decades, maneuvering for a Court appointment and having reached the pinnacle of the judiciary, they would be driven by their desire to leave an important judicial legacy. If the Justices spent their years on the Court bogged down in gridlock, they would not be able to issue key decisions that would allow them to make a difference in resolving critical legal questions. Accordingly, they would come to accommodations that would allow them to issue important decisions.

Empirical evidence supports this prediction. High courts operate successfully under a supermajority requirement in other countries. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively operated under a supermajority requirement from time to time. On a number of occasions, the Court has heard cases with only eight members and therefore has needed a 62.5% supermajority (5/8) to reach a decision. Sometimes this happens when a seat is temporarily unfilled; other times when Justices take ill or have to recuse themselves.[34] In a study of the 1,319 cases in which a tie could have occurred between the 1946 and 2003 terms of the Court, researchers found that a tie vote occurred less than 6% of the time.[35] And, of course, a number of landmark decisions have been decided by a supermajority vote. A 9-0 Court issued its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,[36] a 7-2 Court issued its opinion in Roe v. Wade,[37] and a 4-0 Court issued its opinion in Marbury v. Madison.[38]

The experience with juries also suggests that supermajority courts would reach decisions regularly. Criminal court juries typically have twelve members, and they usually have to reach unanimous decisions. Hung juries occur, but not very often.[39] Moreover, juries reach their unanimous decisions in a setting that allows for less compromise than does a decision by the Supreme Court. A criminal jury must acquit or convict.[40] The example of juries is important for a second reason. I have argued that to be impartial, the Court should issue decisions that reflect the views of Justices from both sides of the ideological spectrum.[41] Similarly, in defining the meaning of an impartial jury, the Supreme Court has required that jurors be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.[42]

Game theory provides further reason to believe that the Court would find middle ground regularly under a supermajority requirement. Game theory can identify the kinds of relationships that are likely to encourage cooperative rather than oppositional strategies.[43] The Supreme Court includes important elements of cooperative relationships. For example, when individuals have an ongoing relationship with frequent and repeated interactions, as with members of the Court, they are much more likely to choose cooperation with each other than when they have a one-shot relationship. Cooperation is also more likely in relationships with an indefinite time horizon, as with Justices who have lifetime appointments, than when there is a finite time horizon. Finally, cooperation is more common among individuals who come to their relationship with equal status and authority. That is true about Supreme Court Justices, except perhaps with Chief Justices. The extra authority of a Chief Justice may not be that important, but if it is, we could make the Chief’s role a rotating position, as is the case with some state supreme courts.[44]

Conclusion

There is much dissatisfaction among Supreme Court observers with the Court and its appointment process. And as the Court’s decisions and appointment process have become increasingly divisive, public approval of the Supreme Court has declined. A majority of Americans once expressed strong confidence in the court. According to a July 2018 Gallup poll, only 37% do now.[45] Reforming the Supreme Court would do much to restore public faith in the Court. And it also would bring the Court into conformity with the requirements of due process.

 


[*] *. Cobeaga Law Firm Professor of Law, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law; M.D., Harvard Medical School; J.D., Harvard Law School. This essay draws on my earlier discussions of ideological bias, infra note 2, and makes the novel argument that ideological balance is constitutionally required. I am grateful for the comments of Judy Failer and Ruben Garcia, the research assistance of Lena Rieke, and the editorial assistance of Daniel Brovman and other Southern California Law Review editors.

 [1]. While the U.S. Senate approved the appointment of Justice Anthony Kennedy by a 97-0 vote, his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, squeaked by on a vote of 50-48. Similarly, the Senate approved Justice Antonin Scalia by a vote of 98-0, while the vote on his successor, Justice Neil Gorsuch, was 54-45. Supreme Court Nominations: present-1789, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout
/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).

 [2]. I have previously discussed the desirability of ideological balance on the Supreme Court in David Orentlicher, Politics and the Supreme Court: The Need for Ideological Balance, 79 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 411 (2018), and David Orentlicher, Two Presidents Are Better Than One: The Case for a Bipartisan Executive 2731 (2013).

 [3]. See generally Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington, Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices (2006).

 [4]. Many states have judicial nominating commissions, though they tend to be partisan since the governor appoints many of the commission members. See, e.g., Ind. Const. art. VII, § 9; Kan. Const. art. III, § 5(e).

 [5]. The logic of my argument also would apply to the circuit courts of appeal, as well as state appellate courts.

 [6]. Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 34, 3637 (2014).

 [7]. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 493, 499–509 (2013).

 [8]. Likewise, if a fifth liberal Justice had joined the Court, parties promoting a conservative viewpoint would not be able to count on a fair shot at prevailing.

 [9]. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005).

 [10]. Lee Epstein et al., The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 103 (2013).

 [11]. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483, 1491 (2007).

 [12]. Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany 83 (2005); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 669 (2000).

 [13]. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1671, 1682 (2004).

 [14]. This approach would be especially valuable at the district court level, where there is a single judge deciding cases.

 [15]. Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 417–23.

 [16]. European Parliament, Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Member States (2012),  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130423ATT64963
/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf

 [17]. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 771 (2015).

 [18]. Id. at 776–77.

 [19]. Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, Wash. Post (May 21, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100678.html.

 [20]. Geoffrey R. Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, Huffington Post (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/chief-justice-roberts-and_b
_40277.html.

 [21]. Alan Blinder, The Quiet Revolution: Central Banking Goes Modern 43 (2004); Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies 2–3 (2007); Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 16385 (2004).

 [22]. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 18–21 (7th ed. 2013).

 [23]. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2313, 232324 (2006).

 [24]. The Federalist No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).

 [25]. The Court’s opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), provides a nice summary of the Court’s discussions of the topic.

 [26]. Id. at 77778.

 [27]. Id. at 768. The Court held that the prohibition violated the First Amendment. Id. at 788.

 [28]. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1927). The Court held that the judges’ financial interests violated due process. Id at 534.

 [29]. Republican Party of Minnesota, 536 U.S. at 77778.

 [30]. Geyh, supra note 7, at 514–15.

 [31]. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890–91, 899–900 (2009) (Roberts C.J., dissenting).

 [32]. Id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

 [33]. Gabriel Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 1109, 1136–38 (2011).

 [34]. There also have been periods when the Court had an even number of Justices. For most of the period between 1789 and 1807, the Court had six members. Why Does the Supreme Court Have Nine Justices?, Const. Daily (July 6, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/why-does-the-supreme-court
-have-nine-justices.

 [35]. Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. App.  Pract. & Proc. 75, 85–86 (2005).

 [36]. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

 [37]. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

 [38]. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The Marbury Court had six Justices, but two did not take part because of illness.

 [39]. Studies suggest an average hung jury rate of around 6% nationwide. Paula L. Hannaford-Agor et al., Are Hung Juries a Problem?: Executive Summary 2 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199372.pdf.

 [40]. In some cases, juries can compromise if they have the option of convicting on a less serious charge.

 [41]. See supra notes 921 and accompanying text.

 [42]. Taylor v. Louisiana, 429 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1975).

 [43]. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 12432 (1984); Itzhak Gilboa, Rational Choice 10001 (2010); Ming Zeng & Xiao-Ping Chen, Achieving Cooperation in Multiparty Alliances: A Social Dilemma Approach to Partnership Management, 28 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 587 passim (2003).

 [44]. See, e.g., Supreme Court Judges, Mo. Cts. https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133 (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (“[T]he chief justice typically is elected on a rotating basis by a vote of all seven Supreme Court judges to a two-year term.”). Or consider a model from Switzerland. The members of the Swiss Federal Council rotate through the position of president so they remain true equals in the Swiss executive branch.

 [45]. Megan Brenan, Confidence in Supreme Court Modest, but Steady, Gallup (July 2, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236408/confidence-supreme-court-modest-steady.aspx.

Profound Sophistication or Legal Sophistry?

From Volume 92, Postscript (November 2018)
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Profound Sophistication or Legal Sophistry?

Ediberto Roman,[*] Katryna Santa Cruz,[†] Melissa Gonzalez,[‡] and Dianet Torres[§]

In the midst of growing debate andaccording to widely publicized news accountsgrowing evidence against President Donald Trump’s impeachment, esteemed former Harvard Law Professor and public intellectual, Alan Dershowitz, recently published The Case Against Impeaching Trump.[1] In this brief, but passionate, defense of the President, Professor Dershowitz provides arguably the strongest legal argument against impeaching the Forty-Fifth President of the United States. Professor Dershowitz’s argument, while beautifully written, is largely a selectively applied textualist attempt to thwart the mounting evidence against President Trump and his administration.

Dershowitz argument boils down to the following: “[I]f a president has not committed any of these specified crimes [those specified in the Constitution], it would be unconstitutional to remove him, regardless of what else he may have done or may do.”[2] The Dershowitz defense focuses on the Constitution’s Impeachment ClauseArticle II, Section 4which provides: “The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”[3] Dershowitz’s argument is based on the premise that because “the Constitution speaks in clear terms, [its] plain meaning must prevail over other considerations.”[4] This argument is interesting because Dershowitz himself examines all of the subtle ambiguities that the Constitution’s lack of explanation creates, including: Can evidence be introduced? Who rules on admissibility? Common law? Exclusionary rule? Further, even Dershowitz recognizes the Constitution is missing a good deal of information on the issue of impeachment (in terms of Congressional trials for impeachment), but yet, according to Dershowitz, the Clause’s plain meaning should only allow for impeachment for treason and bribery.[5] Seems like his reading of the Constitution is a little too convenient.

According to Dershowitz’s argument, the Constitution provides the only basis for impeaching and removing the President of the United States, and in Trump’s case, there is no grounds for impeachment. The first part of his position—the Constitution provides the exclusive basis for impeachment—is uncontroversial. What is far more problematic is Dershowitz’s use of textualism. Dershowitz is both a self-professed champion of civil liberties as well as a textualist reader of the Constitution. Yet in this defense of Trump, the good professor fails to recognize one of the Constitution’s three stated grounds for impeachment, which is far from engaging in a textualist approach. In doing so, this champion of civil liberties fails to acknowledge a constitutional provision aimed at protecting the citizenry’s rights from tyrannical executive power. Dershowitz’s legitimate basis for impeachment focuses on only two of the three constitutional bases for impeachment: 1) treason and 2) bribery. Dershowitz’s lack of focus on a recognized reading of the third stated basis for impeachment is nothing short of perplexing especially given his textualist leaning and prior textualist positions. For example, he does not believe the Constitution includes privacy rights that protect a right to abortion because the document fails to specifically provide for such a right.[6]

Indeed, Dershowitz’s dismissal of the Constitution’s third specifically stated ground for impeachmentother high Crimes and Misdemeanors”is insufficiently explained in the book. This blatant omission leaves the reader wanting for a less partisan analysis. But before focusing on this shortcoming, an analysis of Dershowitz’s argument on what he views as the legitimate grounds for impeachment—treason and bribery—is in order.

In terms of his first legitimate basis for impeachment, Dershowitz notes that only treason is defined. The Constitution defines treason as “levying War against [the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”[7] This constitutional definition applies within Dershowitz’s textual approach, and is therefore a legitimate basis for impeachment. Though he admits that the second and third enumerated basesbribery, and high crimes and misdemeanorsare not defined in the Constitution, it is only the high crimes and misdemeanors basis that Dershowitz apparently finds fatally vague and therefore is an unavailable basis for impeachment.[8] Dershowitz apparently has less of a concern for bribery because it is a crime.[9] Dershowitz doesn’t openly state his antipathy for the high crimes or misdemeanors basis for impeachment. Instead, in what is an overall cryptic and truncated analysis, which amounts to no more than thirtytwo pages (including the book’s conclusion) of new materials (the remaining 114 pages of the book are excerpts of the professor’s previous editorials and interviews arguably related to his main thesis), Dershowitz spends the bulk of his argument addressing the purported procedural shortcomings of the high crimes impeachment basis attempting to limit its use to crimes.[10] Indeed, while Dershowitz spends virtually no time objecting to the bribery basis for impeachmentwhich he admits is not defined in the text of the Constitution, causing him to look to bribery’s common law definitionhe harps on the high crimes basis, without effectively explaining this choice. Then instead of looking to what the drafters of the constitution stated concerning the high crimes or misdemeanor grounds for impeachmentor even looking to judicial or congressional pronouncements on the subjectDershowitz shifts his focus to attacking those that advocate a broad interpretation of the “and other high crimes and misdemeanor” basis. He ultimately rejects any reading of the impeachment clause that does not make a crime a prerequisite to impeachment.[11] As a result, he rejects previous interpretations by both President Ford, when he served in Congress, and current Congresswoman Maxine Waters; each have argued that high crimes and misdemeanors is whatever the house of representatives  deems appropriate.[12] Another questionable aspect of Dershowitz’s argument against impeachment is his effort at equating the process of impeachment to the procedural requirements of a criminal trial. Yet the Impeachment Clause does not call for a criminal proceeding for impeachment. Instead, it provides for a trial by the House of Representatives, a political endeavor by definition. Thus, Dershowitz’s criminal law and criminal procedure-based arguments may very well be misplaced. While the text of the Impeachment Clause is far from clear on this point, interestingly, Dershowitz does not consider that the very placement of “and other high crimes and misdemeanor” in the list of impeachable acts alone strongly suggests this clause is in fact the broadest, or even the catch-all, basis for impeachment.[13] Further, as a matter of statutory interpretation and basic sentence construction, the fact the broadest language happens to be listed last similarly suggests this basis should be read broadly. Indeed, such a broad reading was exactly what the framers of the Constitution intended. While Dershowitz, as a self-professed textualist, is no fan of anything other than the text of the Constitution if the text is unambiguous,[14] it is in interpreting the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause where the shortcomings of his approach are highlighted. Indeed, it is here where textualism falls short because it utterly fails to seek or acknowledge what the drafters of the Constitution intendedevidently because, according to Dershowitz, the text is in fact unambiguous. If the text is in fact unambiguous, why is the debate over its language still the subject of dispute 200 years later? Protestations to the contrary, the legislative history of the Impeachment Clause makes clear that the third basis for impeachment—high crimes and misdemeanors—was drafted and intended to be a broad catch-all provision. As Yale Professor Thomas I. Emerson observed:

[T]he founding fathers did not wish to take over the English practice lock, stock and barrel. Impeachment was intended to be applicable only in a narrower set of circumstances and with more limited results. Hence, after some preliminary discussion, the proposal was made that the President could be removed from office by impeachment and conviction “for treason, or bribery.” This was deemed too restricted and, after rejecting “maladministration” as a cause for impeachment, on the ground it was too broad, the Convention settled on the addition of other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The grounds for impeachment were thus intended to be limited but, apart from a narrow definition of treason elsewhere in the Constitution, the limits were not precisely delineated.[15]

Further, at the Constitutional Convention, the substitute phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” was to be interpreted broadly. Madison in fact believed that it allowed the President to be tried “for any act which might be called a misdemeanor.”[16] Indeed, while debate remains on how broadly the high crimes or misdemeanors basis should be read,[17] even a narrow reading of the clause allows for impeachment for a host of wrongs in a variety of settings:

[A] standard that the framers intentionally set at this extraordinarily high level to ensure that only the most serious offenses and in particular those that subverted our system of government would justify overturning a popular election. Impeachment is not a remedy for private wrongs. It is a method of removing someone whose continued presence in office would cause grave danger to the Nation.[18]

The weight of scholarly authority recognizes the “high Crime and Misdemeanors” Clause should be interpreted to address serious wrongs, but ultimately those wrongs can arise in a wide variety of ways.[19] As one scholar observed, Congressional practice confirms that “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” is broad enough in scope to reach all misconduct that undermines fitness to serve.[20] Professor Stephen Presser, a leading scholar on this constitutional provision, for instance, agreed with Gerald Ford’s famous suggestion that high Crimes and Misdemeanors means anything the House of Representatives wants it to mean when arguing that the provision reflects the essential notion that the Constitution confers broad discretion on the House of Representatives to make up its own mind about what kinds of conduct should lead to an impeachment proceeding. [W]hile giving members of Congress discretion to determine whether a particular act or series of acts amounts to grounds for impeachment, [the Constitution] requires them to move forward to impeach if they determine there are such acts.”[21] Professor Gary L. McDowell, similarly found, “[i]n the end, the determination of whether presidential misconduct rises to the level of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ as used by the Framers, is left to the discretion and deliberation of the House of Representatives. No small part of that deliberation . . . must address what effect the exercise of this extraordinary constitutional sanction would have on the health of the Republic . . . .[22] Imminent constitutional scholar, Professor Cass R. Sunstein, likewise observed: “[t]ext, history, and longstanding practice suggest that the notion of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ should generally be understood to refer to large-scale abuses that involve the authority that comes from occupying a particular public office.”[23]

Dershowitz spends no time addressing either this legislative history or scholarly analysis. Instead of contending with the bulk of authority on the matter, he employs a tried and true lawyerly tact: instead of defending a difficult position, it is far easier and perhaps at times more persuasive to go the offensive and attack the position of others that take a differing view. Indeed, instead of examining the case law explaining and interpreting “other high Crimes or Misdemeanors,” which he briefly undertakes with respect to the bribery cases, Dershowitz proceeds to attack “the most extreme and reductionist” defenses of a broad reading of the high crimes and misdemeanor basis.[24] Yet, even under the tenets of his own textualist philosophy, his argument fails. Under a textualist approach, recourse to the ‘legislative history’ or intended ‘original meaning’ is inappropriate when the words are unambiguous. The plain meaning under such circumstances must prevail over all other interpretative mechanisms, since it was the word, not the intentions behind them, that were voted on and accepted. But even under a textualist approach, if the text is ambiguousand the high crimes and misdemeanor language is far from unambiguousfurther inquiry is necessary, particularly into the Framers intent.[25] It is here where the book’s analysis is weakest because Dershowitz fails to accept the value of further inquiry when text is ambiguous. Thus, a reader is left with a scant interpretation, lacking any significant legal reinforcement.

In terms of President Trump’s potential impeachment, Dershowitz, somewhat unsurprisingly argues that impeachment would be inappropriate because the alleged wrongs purportedly committed by President Trump involve neither treason nor bribery—two of his legitimate enumerated wrongs under Article II’s Impeachment Clause.[26] While Dershowitz may be correct that any charges or claims against President Trump may not involve bribery, there are growing calls arguing President Trump has in fact committed treason.[27] Perhaps more importantly, Dershowitz’s primary analytical flaw is that he simply ignores the text of the Constitution, its interpretation in terms of legislative history, and case law on the third impeachable basis under Article II’s Impeachment Clause: high crimes or misdemeanors.

In the end, Dershowitz attempts to largely ignore a broad reading of “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” either because he may appreciate they provide problems for his client,[28] or following his stated reasons, such wrongs are not defined in Article II or other parts of the Constitution and there are no procedural requirements set forth for convictions of such crimes.[29] Yet his stated reasons are supported with slight authority and scant analysis. Dershowitz’s analysis is accordingly incomplete, thereby allowing the professor to accept bribery as a legitimate ground for impeachment (even permitting him to look to the common law, ever so briefly, on bribery), but in almost the same breath, he refuses to examine the legislative history of the Constitution, the common law, or the weight of authority on the high crimes or misdemeanor basis for impeachment. Any of these inquiries would have provided not only a more thoughtful undertaking, but also valuable guidance for interpreting the high crimes and misdemeanors basis for impeachment. It should not be forgotten, and he may himself point out, that he refuses to engage in an analysis that goes beyond the text’s “plain meaning.” However, in his own words, “‘other Crimes and Misdemeanors’ are not defined.”[30] So, according to his own preferred interpretive approach, we should not become inflexible and inexplicably resort to the plain meaning when there is textual ambiguity in this case. Not only will case law and legislative history analysis provide the reader with a more thoughtful undertaking, they are essential to understanding the text itself.

Ultimately, in what appears to be an apologist’s vain effort, Dershowitz does not address historical precedent, including the obstruction of justice charges brought in President Clinton’s impeachment proceedings,[31] and the proposed charges against President Nixon,[32] which were each based on high Crimes and Misdemeanors, and specially contained obstruction of justice charges (the likely charges against President Trump if impeachment is recommended).[33] Moreover, in the four lengthy legal opinions on impeachment and criminal charges against a president drafted by the Justice Department’s Legal Office and the Office of Special Counsel in the Nixon impeachment effort, as well as in Clinton’s impeachment, there was no hesitation to accept that a president could be impeached under the high Crimes and Misdemeanors provision of the Impeachment Clause of Article II.[34] Despite these historical facts, in one chapter of the book, Dershowitz tries to defend the President against any impending charge by arguing Trump cannot be charged with obstruction of justice where he was just basically doing what he has the power to do.[35] The problem with this argument is that it not only disregards the law of obstruction of justice, on which there is extensive caselaw and scholarship,[36] but also that Dershowitz, as a champion of civil liberties, astonishingly argues for a form of executive supremacy that would in fact make a sitting president above the law.[37]

In essence, despite the wealth of authority stating the contrary, Dershowitz asserts that a president can only be impeached for a crime. Yet his textual argument falls flat under its own weight—Dershowitz wants the interpretation of the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause to follow the enumerated wrongs listed in the Clause while also completely ignoring a specifically stated basis for impeachment that has historically and repeatedly been interpreted to be the broadest basis for impeachment. In the end, Dershowitz asserts that it would be dangerous to use a broad reading of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors because doing so could jeopardize our system of government.[38] How it would do so remains unclear, however. And even for somewhat playful arguments’ sake, if Dershowitz is correct in his selective reading of Article II’s Impeachment Clause, as he himself admits, more than one political candidate, including Professor Richard Painter, who is running for the U.S. Senate, has asserted that Trump’s actions amount to Treason.[39] Dershowitz harshly criticizes Painter, saying that he “should read the words of the Constitution, rather than making up crimes for partisan and personal advantage.”[40] Interestingly, Dershowitz defends his own “pure motives” for writing the book by noting how many individuals and even legal scholars have accused him of doing the very same thing: “My motives have also been questioned by some of my academic and political colleagues. Am I being paid? Am I auditioning to be Trump’s lawyer?”[41]

In conclusion, Dershowitz asserts that he merely wants to focus on the importance of following precedent,[42] arguably the most interesting assertion in the book. Yet in his defense of President Trump, Professor Dershowitz fails to examine the legal precedent on the law concerning impeachment. Much like his attacks on those he differs with in this book, Professor Dershowitz is being selectively principled with his arguments and review of the law. Perhaps the following best highlights a flaw in this book: it is evidently shameless for Painter to attack President Trump while Painter is running for office, but it is not shameless for Dershowitz to defend Trump while Dershowitz is selling books? Further, by his own admission, Dershowitz wants all to appreciate the importance of precedence,[43] but he fails or refuses to address legal precedence when dismissing “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” as a basis for impeachment, despite said basis being used against both President Clinton and President Nixon.

 


[*] *.. Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.

[†] †.. J.D. Candidate 2020, Florida International University College of Law.

[‡] ‡.. J.D. Candidate 2020, Florida International University College of Law.

[§] §.. J.D. Candidate 2020, Florida International University College of Law.

 [1]. Alan Dershowitz, The Case Against Impeaching Trump (2018).

 [2]. Id. at 1.

 [3]. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.

 [4]. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 10.

 [5]. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 5.

 [6]. Sandy Fitzgerald, Alan Dershowitz: Constitution Doesn’t Guarantee Right to Abortion, Newsmax (Oct. 27, 2013), https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/dershowitz-constitution-abortion
/2013/10/27/id/533294.

 [7]. U.S. Const. art. III, § 3.

 [8]. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 3.

 [9]. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 2–3, 10.

 [10]. Id. at 3–7.

 [11]. Id. at 12.

 [12]. Id. at 7–8.

 [13]. Dershowitz’s attack on the “ejusdem generis” argument is peculiar. He says that that the argument is built on a ‘logical fallacy’ but (1) that’s absolutely untrue because this argument is based on the basics of grammar and (2) he doesn’t back up his point. Further, he goes on to talk about how a crime is needed. But we have that in Trump’s case: obstruction of justice.

 [14]. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at, 17.

 [15]. Thomas Emerson, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 131, 131 (1974) (emphasis added).

 [16]. John O. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 650, 653 (1999).

 [17]. See generally Mark Slusar, Comment, The Confusion Defined: Questions and Problems of Process in The Aftermath of the Clinton Impeachment, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 869 (1999).

 [18]. Id. at 872.

 [19]. See generally, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, Defining “High Crimes And Misdemeanors”: Basic Principles, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 712 (1999).

 [20]. Id. at 712–15.

 [21]. Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 666, 676 (1999).

 [22]. Gary L. McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 626, 649 (1999).

 [23]. Cass R. Sunstein, Impeachment and Stability, 67 Geo Wash. L. Rev. 699, 711 (1999)

 [24]. See Dershowitz supra note 1, at 7–8.

 [25]. See generally Linda Jellum, The Art of Statutory Interpretation: Identifying The Interpretive Theory of the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 59 (2010); Elliot M. Davis, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 983 (2007).

 [26]. Id. at 23–24.

 [27]. See, e.g., Matthew Bell, Did Trump Commit Treason in Helsinki?, PRI (July 17, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-07-17/did-trump-commit-treason-helsinki; Grace Panetta, Former CIA Director John Brennan Said Trump’s Press Conference with Putin Was ‘Treasonous’ — Here’s What Legal Experts Say, Bus. Insider (July 16, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/did-trump-committ-treason-russia-summit-2018-7; Ian Schwartz, Ralph Peters: Trump “Committed Treason” if He Got Info from Russians, Attacking Press Like Goebbels, Real Clear Pol. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/08/01/ralph_peters_trump_committed_treason_if_he_got_info_from_russians_attacking_press_like_goebbels.html.

 [28]. Though he has repeatedly denied he represents Trump, he at least takes the position of an apologist for Trump.

 [29].  See Dershowitz supra note 1, at 7–8.

 [30]. See The Clinton Impeachments, Justia: US Law, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article
-2/55-the-clinton-impeachment.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).

 [31]. Approved Articles of Impeachment, Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (presenting the text of the articles of impeachment against Bill Clinton).

 [32]. Dan Nonicki, In 1974, Goldwater and Rhodes Told Nixon He Was Doomed, AZCentral (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.azcentral.com/story/azdc/2014/08/03/goldwater-rhodes-nixon-resignation
/13497493.

 [33]. Articles of Impeachment, Watergate.info, http://watergate.info/impeachment/articles-of-impeachment (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (presenting Article 1 of the Articles of Impeachment against Richard Nixon adopted by the House Judiciary Committee on July 27, 1974, contain an obstruction of justice charge).

 [34]. Charlie Savage, Newly Discovered Clinton-era Memo Says Presidents Can Be Indicted, N.Y. Times (July 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/22/us/document-Savage-NYT-FOIA-Starr-memo-presidential.html (Appendix to the article); see also Jack Maskell, Cong. Res. Serv., Status of a Senator Who Has Been Indicted for or Convicted of a Felony (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34716.pdf; A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, Dep’t of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-amenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).

 [35]. Dershowitz supra note 1, at 24.

 [36]. See Ediberto Roman et al., Collusion, Obstruction of Justice, and Impeachment, 45 Notre Dame J. Legis. (forthcoming 2018).

 [37]. Dershowitz supra note 1, at 24.

 

 [38]. Dershowitz supra note 1, at 5–6.

 [39]. Id.

 [40]. Id.

 [41]. Id. at 54.

 [42]. Id. at 27.

 [43]. Id. at 3.

 

The Weintraub Principle: Attorney-Client Privilege and Government Entities

From Volume 92, Number 1 (August 2018)
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The Weintraub Principle: Attorney-Client Privilege and Government Entities

Jason Batts[*]

Amidst the backdrop of a federal investigation into the actions of President Donald Trump, a previously unexplored legal question has emerged on a topic that forms the foundation of legal practice: Can a succeeding government official revoke a predecessor’s claim of the attorney-client privilege? Although the question is novel, its role within the government context is well established—having been asserted by Presidents Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton in their respective administrations. The context of current events, however, underscores the need to further define the operation of a privilege that is once again being relied upon by a president under investigation.

In this Article, I argue that a public official should be permitted to revoke a predecessor’s claim of the attorney-client privilege if made on behalf of the government entity. I justify this determination by applying the same corporate rationale put forth by the Supreme Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub to the government context. Termed the “Weintraub Principle,” I contend that government agents should have the same authority afforded to their corporate counterparts for three primary reasons: (1) corporate and government entities are restricted to operating through replaceable agents; (2) corporate and government agents are granted authority from others to act on behalf of the entity; and (3) agents in both contexts owe a duty to act in the best interests of the entity—as well as to shareholders in the corporate setting and to the public in the government environment. While acknowledging the likely counterarguments to my proposal, further analysis reveals how each criticism falls short of prohibiting the rule’s application to government entities. In conclusion, I summarize the rationale for my argument and highlight the Weintraub Principle’s real-world application.

Introduction

“Attorney-client privilege is dead!”[1] This announcement by President Donald Trump declaring the passing of one of the oldest concepts known to law, came as a surprise to many in the legal community and garnered headlines around the world.[2] Absent from the death certificate was the cause of the privilege’s untimely, alleged demise—the search and seizure by federal agents of files maintained by President Trump’s private attorney, Michael Cohen.[3] The taking of Cohen’s documents represented the latest maneuver by federal officials charged with investigating alleged wrongdoings by President Trump and his associates.[4]

Political scandals are as old as government itself.[5] While far from a uniquely American phenomenon,[6] the modern political investigations regarding Presidents Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton captivated a worldwide audience and set a precedent for future actions involving high-ranking government officials.[7] Although such legal actions can involve defendants who are as concerned about the court of public opinion as the court of legal decision,[8] the spotlight in such cases can grow as focused on the legal doctrines involved as easily as it can upon the parties to the action.[9] For example, during the impeachment of President Clinton, an American public that typically associated privilege with political leaders also became acquainted with a legal form of privilege between an attorney and client.[10] While the Clinton impeachment process played out, the privilege rose in notoriety as Clinton’s White House cited it in fighting to keep private certain conversations with in-house counsel.[11]

In the current tumultuous political environment, fueled by investigations into President Trump and those associated with his administration, the attorney-client privilege is again gaining notoriety as part of the legal toolkit for a president under investigation.[12] Following the seizure of documents from properties being used by the President’s attorney, President Trump and Mr. Cohen asked a court to throw out the material collected, arguing it was privileged.[13] In addition, the President’s son, Donald Trump, Jr., cited the attorney-client privilege as justification for refusing to answer questions in a hearing before the House Intelligence Committee.[14] This resurgent notoriety of the attorney-client privilege and discussion of how the privilege operates within the government context will likely grow as the investigations into the Trump administration continue.[15]

It would be disingenuous, however, to suggest that the attorney-client privilege was an ignored legal issue outside the realm of modern political events.[16] Presidential sagas—like those of Nixon, Clinton, and Trumpmerely provide a catalyst for media pundits and legal commentators to discuss a topic that is all too familiar to legal scholars[17] Much has been written about the privilege’s history and its application to courts in the United States and abroad.[18] Scholarship has also delved into the intricate theories of the privilege by discussing its potential application to government lawyers.[19] However, one question remains unanswered: Whether the successor to a government official can revoke a predecessor’s claim of attorney-client privilege? Faced with this unresolved issue, courts should apply the corporate principle outlined in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub[20] to government actors and permit a successive government agent to revoke a predecessor’s claim of the attorney-client privilege.

I.  Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporate and Government Entities

Although courts and scholars have relied upon various enunciations of the rule for attorney-client privilege, one replete with the intricacies of modern practice is found in the often-cited case United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation.[21] For entities, that analysis becomes complicated because they are restricted to acting through agents.[22] To assist with the task of applying the privilege in the entity context, courts have developed various tests that are largely focus on the status of the entity employee.

In 1950, a Massachusetts District Court put forth the first such test in a broad holding that permitted an employee to invoke the privilege on a corporation’s behalf if the majority of the employee’s job activities involved legal work and the communication remained secret from public disclosure.[23] In 1962, a District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania created the “control-group test,” which narrowed application of the corporate privilege to include only those communications between corporate counsel and agents who controlled the corporation.[24] Under this test, the privilege would apply if the recipient possessed sufficient authority to implement changes within the corporation based upon the advice received.[25] Considering the different approaches, in 1970, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals created the “subject-matter test.”[26] This test required an employee to seek legal advice at the direction of a supervisor on a “subject matter” within the employee’s realm of work responsibility.[27] Finally, in 1981, the United States Supreme Court announced the Upjohn Test in an opinion that acknowledged the different tests, but refused invitations to endorse one over the other.[28] Instead, the Court used five factors to determine whether a communication is privileged in the corporate context.[29]

The boundaries for government application of the attorney-client privilege are not as established as their corporate counterparts.[30] This is particularly true in the criminal context, which—as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals wryly notedis ripe for a Supreme Court decision to resolve the current judicial split.[31] The public function served by government agents and the potentially high-ranking clients involved in such cases further demonstrates the need for clarity as to how the privilege operates within the government context.[32] Often with little underlying analysis, courts have seemingly deferred to a version of the control-group test by assuming that elected officials have authority to assert the privilege.[33]

In contrast to the disagreement over how the privilege operates with respect to entities, unanimity exists as to how the entity itself operates. Whether the entity is a business or a government agency, both act through agents.[34] The agents, in turn, possess authority and bear responsibility for asserting the attorney-client privilege on behalf of the entity when in its “best interests.”[35] This intersection—where the requirement of entity agents to invoke the privilege as well as their power to do so collide—highlights the unresolved issue of a succeeding government official’s authority.

This analysis has practical implications because it is not hard to imagine a scenario where a newly elected politician might revoke the privilege of her or his predecessor. For instance, the Obama administration could have sought to revoke the privilege that protected communications made during the Bush administration—a practice which frustrated some in Congress at the time.[36] In addition, a future president could seek to revoke any claims of privilege put forth by officials within the Trump administration on behalf of the executive branch.[37] Applying the Weintraub Principle in the government context permits a court to logically draw upon similarities to corporate entities, while furthering the distinctively public function of public agencies.[38]

II.  Development of the WeintrAUb Principle

In the seminal case Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, the Supreme Court set out to resolve a circuit split as to “whether the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the debtor corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that took place before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.”[39] Although not appearing in the title, the case stemmed from an inquiry into the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (“CDCB”) by the Commodity Trading Commission (“the Commission”).[40] After the CDCB filed bankruptcy, a permanent trustee was appointed to act on its behalf, thus setting the stage for a confrontation to determine which agent was authorized to assert attorney-client privilege on behalf of a corporate entity in bankruptcy.[41]

While the trustee moved forward with the corporation’s bankruptcy action, so too did the Commission with its investigation into allegations of misconduct by CDCB agents. As part of its inquiry, the Commission subpoenaed Mr. Gary Weintraub—the former counsel for the CDCB.[42] Although Weintraub provided sworn answers to the Commission, he “refused to answer 23 questions, asserting CDCB’s attorney-client privilege.”[43] In response, the Commission filed a motion requiring Mr. Weintraub to answer the remaining questions, while taking the unorthodox approach of communicating directly with the bankruptcy trustee to request the trustee use his authority to waive CDCB’s privilege. The trustee agreed to abandon any right to the privilege owned by the CDCB up to the date he was appointed. Although the district court found the trustee could waive the privilege, thus requiring Mr. Weintraub to testify, the Seventh Circuit overturned this decision, placing the power to waive privilege back in the hands of Mr. Weintraub.[44] Subsequently, the Supreme Court accepted the case to resolve the issue and the circuit split that had developed.[45]

As respondents, Mr. Weintraub and his counsel put forth five primary arguments for why the Court should permit management of a corporation in bankruptcy to retain the authority to assert attorney-client privilege. First, they argued that the allegiances of a trustee would be to the creditors that selected her or him, as opposed to the shareholders of the debtor corporation.[46] The Court dismissed this argument by noting that the fiduciary duties of a trustee are to “shareholders as well as to creditors.”[47] Furthermore, were there to be no trustee appointed, the managers of the insolvent corporation would share the same dual fiduciary duty as a trustee.[48] The Court also shrewdly observed that “out of all management powers” lost to a trustee during bankruptcy, the respondents had offered no justification as to why the attorney-client privilege should be the sole power treated differently.[49]

Second, the respondents argued that the Court’s decision “would also apply to individuals in bankruptcy.”[50] However, the Court rejected this notion by drawing upon the distinction between human and entity clients to convey that any such result would be an overly broad application of their ruling. As the Court noted, whereas a person makes his or her own decisions, “a corporation, as an inanimate entity, must act through agents.”[51] Therefore, the decision held that any subsequent ruling involving a person in the same context would require different legal reasoning than employed in Weintraub.[52]

Third, the respondents claimed that granting a bankruptcy trustee power over the privilege would “have an undesirable chilling effect on attorney-client communications.”[53] Corporate executives, the theory went, would be far less willing to communicate openly with entity attorneys if the conversations were discoverable in an ensuing bankruptcy matter. However, the Court dispelled this argument by noting that any hesitancy would be no greater than the amount already existing for corporations operating outside of bankruptcy. Future managers of corporations that are not going through bankruptcy could always “waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to prior management’s communications with counsel.”[54]

Fourth, the respondents claimed that vesting authority to control an insolvent entity’s attorney-client privilege in a trustee is tantamount to “‘economic discrimination.’”[55] The Court acknowledged that solvent and insolvent corporations were treated differently, but noted that this was by legislative design. Bankruptcy laws grant courts the ability to “change radically and materially [the] rights and obligations” of an insolvent debtor, and the respondents failed to provide the Court with an explanation as to why the disparity in treatment was unwarranted.[56]

Finally, the respondents claimed that permitting a trustee to waive a corporate successor’s privilege would deter individuals and entities from pursuing the shelter of bankruptcy.[57] Ruling in favor of the Commission, according to the respondents, would “provide an incentive for creditors to file for involuntary bankruptcy.”[58] However, the Court disagreed, noting that there are a number of factors that might motivate a party to pursue or avoid bankruptcy.[59] The Court felt that any impact of its decision upon the calculus of a party weighing the possibility of bankruptcy, would be in accord with “congressional intent.”[60]

Having considered and refuted the arguments put forth by Mr. Weintraub, the Court overruled the Seventh Circuit and implemented the Weintraub Principle—that a corporate successor in interest can revoke a predecessor’s assertion of attorney-client privilege.[61]

III.  Applying the Weintraub Principle to Government Entities

With the well-articulated, point-by-point approach taken in Weintraub, the Court laid the groundwork for applying the rationale to similar scenarios. The characteristics of corporate entities described by the Court are also applicable to government agencies. Further analysis of each shared trait establishes strong evidence for employing the Weintraub Principle in both contexts.

A.  The Agent Requirement

The Court in Weintraub held that, “[a]s an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents [and] cannot directly waive the attorney-client privilege when disclosure is in [the entity’s] best interest.”[62] Likewise, a government agency is an inanimate entity that must act through its agents.[63] It cannot speak for itself, and similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest.[64] Furthermore, the agents operating within each type of entity are replaceable.[65] Whether the chief executive officer of a company or the president of the country, the end of their tenure does not result in the expiration of the entity.[66] By operating via agents who are replaceable, entities can carry on in perpetuity, with varying individuals speaking on its behalf throughout its lifespan.[67] Since both government and corporate entities are restricted to operating through interchangeable agents, courts should apply the Weintraub Principle to successive government agents.

B.  The Sources of Authority

The Court in Weintraub also justified its decision to allow corporate successorsininterest the power to revoke a predecessor’s claim of privilege by recognizing that the power wielded by entity agents stems from other authorities.[68] Corporate officers are empowered to act on behalf of the entity by the board of directors, who in turn are vested with authority by the shareholders.[69] Similarly, government agents are endowed by the people to act on their behalf.[70] Actors within a government entity may be elected by the people, appointed by the elected official, or hired by a subordinate to the officeholder.[71] The existence of empowering authorities, who select agents to act on their behalf, illustrates another similarity between the two entity types that justifies application of the Weintraub Principal in both contexts.[72]

C.  The Duty Owed to Others

Finally, operating as an agent carries certain obligations to act in the interests of the principle.[73] Private entities, for example, rely on senior officers to assert the privilege “in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.”[74] Likewise, government entities often act through high-ranking elected officials[75] who must take care to assert the privilege in accord with the official’s duty to the public in honest and open government.[76] Breach of duty in either context can result in judicial action against the agent.[77] Permitting a government official to revoke a predecessor’s assertion of the privilege is in furtherance of the official’s duty to “open government” since it would reveal government information.[78] Furthermore, a government agent’s decision to waive a predecessor’s claim of privilege would be a direct implementation of the people’s will since the people elected the new public official.[79]

IV.  Counterarguments to Applying the Weintraub Principle to Government Entities

Applying the Weintraub Principle to the government context will not be without critics. The attorney-client privilege is central to the practice of law, and any proposed hindrance to its operation might understandably inspire well-intentioned counterarguments. Ultimately, just as with corporate employees, an elected official can retain a private attorney to deliver independent advice that would be exempt from future revocation by a successor in interest.[80] After all, the Court in Weintraub acknowledged that its ruling applied solely to entities, given their unique structure, and that any similar conclusion reached by a court in the context of individuals would require different reasoning.[81] While the option of hiring private counsel remains available to an agent of either entity, it is not the only rebuttal available to courts responding to criticisms of applying the Weintraub Principle to government entities.

A.  Applying the Weintraub Principle to Government Entities Would Have a Chilling Effect

Opponents may argue that applying this corporate standard to government entities would produce a chilling effect on government communications.[82] As the respondents in Weintraub argued, permitting discovery of attorney-client communications could deter agents from having candid conversations with entity attorneys.[83] This point is significant as it cuts to the very purpose of the privilege—to induce open communications between attorneys and clients.[84] Ultimately, this argument is unpersuasive because the attorney-client privilege is not absolute and other opportunities exist to seek legal advice that are exempt from public inspection.

For example, the privilege does not protect communications pertaining to ongoing criminal or fraudulent activity.[85] Clients continue to successfully seek competent legal advice in spite of this exemption. In addition, “[e]xisting protections, including exemptions to the [Freedom of Information Act], special governmental privileges, and the attorney work product doctrine, offer sufficient protection for the government’s legitimate interests in confidentiality.”[86]

Considering the privilege exceptions already in operation, as well as the additional safeguards available for certain communications, revoking a predecessor’s claim of privilege would not “have an undesirable chilling effect on client-attorney communications.”[87] Furthermore, the lack of any cognizable chilling impact brought to light in the corporate context since Weintraub provides strong circumstantial evidence supporting the Court’s decision as well as my thesis.[88] In fact, some express skepticism as to whether or not the privilege actually promotes candor at all.[89]

B.  Applying the Weintraub Principle to Government Entities Will not Reflect the Will of the People

Critics may also argue that applying the Weintraub Principle to government entities is not in furtherance of the public duty owed by government officials.[90] Those opposed to the government’s application of the rule could note that it is impossible to know if the revocation would be representative of the people’s will because it is unlikely a candidate would run on the platform of “promising to revoke my predecessor’s claim of privilege on day one.” Although a candidate may face a variety issues in a campaign, an elected official faces a myriad of issues that are not thoroughly expounded on during a campaign—either because there were more important topics that occupied the limited time of the election or because it was not an issue yet.[91] Thus, government officials should be permitted to revoke a predecessor’s claim of privilege because the decision to do so may be one of many issues not discussed during the campaign.

C.  Applying the Weintraub Principle to Government Entities Would Endanger National Security

Even conceding the application of Weintraub to government officials, opponents may argue against allowing government successors the power to revoke claims of privilege by their predecessors because government lawyers have access to confidential material that should not be divulged to the public.[92]

While “the government entity has a unique public function”[93] involving access to “military secrets [and] sensitive negotiations with foreign governments,” it must also adhere to the strict regulations barring distribution of such information that would prevent the disclosure of national security secrets or other highly confidential matters.[94] For example, the Freedom of Information Act contains provisions that prevent the general public from accessing secretive information.[95] Such protections would adequately safeguard critical communications from being disclosed by a succeeding government official.

CONCLUSION

In summary, considering the inherent conflict between the public’s right to open government and an individual’s interest in having private communications with an attorney, it seems inevitable that a court will confront the question considered by this paper. In the context of current events, President Trump could invoke the privilege yet again—this time in his position as president—to defend against the federal inquiry that is ongoing at the time of this writing.[96] While it is impossible to predict the course of an investigationespecially one occurring within the political settingthe President’s assertion of the privilege already demonstrates its value to his defense strategy. If the investigations continue with the same scope and public intensity as have been exhibited thus far, the likelihood only grows that President Trump will invoke the privilege in the same manner as former Presidents Nixon and Clinton. If that occurs, the next president would face the question of whether revocation of Trump’s assertion serves the public interest.

Even absent further assertion of the privilege by President Trump, the surging popularity of the rule during his tenure highlights the need for an answer to the question posed in this paper.[97] Confronted with a case on this issue, a court should draw upon the parallels between private corporations and government agencies and apply the corporate Weintraub Principle to the government context. Both types of entities are restricted to acting through agents who acquire authority from others and must assert the privilege in keeping with their duty to shareholders or the public. Such an application applies sound legal principles to further the public interest, while also proving that the attorney-client privilege is not only alive and well, but healthy enough to survive the transition of government power in a democracy.[98]


[*] *. Prosecutor, Hickman County, Kentucky; B.A. 2005, Morehead State University; J.D. 2010, Washington University School of Law; Editor-in-Chief, Washington University Law Review, Volume 87. Special Victim’s Counsel to sexual-assault victims as a Judge Advocate in the United States Army Reserve. Military information does not imply endorsement by the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army. All analysis and opinions are my own. I remain very thankful to Professor Kathleen Clark for her helpful comments and express my sincere gratitude to Professor Brad Areheart and Professor Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff for their respective time, assistance, and encouragement.  In addition, I appreciate the staff on the Southern California Law Review, especially Daniel Brovman, for their helpful and professional guidance. I am forever grateful to Judge Hunter B. Whitesell, II and attorneys, Richard Major and Amanda Major, for their unending patience and teaching. I dedicate this Article to my family, without whom this would not be possible.

 

 [1]. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 10, 2018, 6:07 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/983662868540346371.

 [2]. E.g., Andrew Buncombe, Trump ‘Bouncing Off Walls’ with Rage After FBI Raid on Personal Lawyer’s Offices, The Independent, Apr. 11, 2018, at 27; Ben Riley-Smith, Republicans Warn Trump not to Fire Mueller, Daily Telegraph, Apr. 11, 2018, at 11; Chidanand Rajghatta, Trump Goes Ballistic as FBI Closes in, Raids His Personal Lawyer, Times of India, (Apr. 10, 2018, 9:09 PM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/trump-goes-ballistic-as-fbi-closes-in-raids-his-personal-lawyer/articleshow/63700727.cms; Lawrence Douglas, The Cohen Raid Is a Game Changer: Trump’s Reaction Tells Us So, Guardian, (Apr. 10, 2018, 11:03 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/10/donald-trump-michael-cohen-raid-comment. Research of news articles via Google News that included the terms “Trump attorney client privilege”, restricted to the twenty-four hours after the President’s Tweet regarding the privilege’s death, returned about 14,500 results. Similarly, a search of Lexis Advance that I limited to “major non-U.S. newspapers” for the same twenty-four-hour period returned twenty-six results within this more defined pool of news outlets.

 [3]. Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Raids Office of Trump’s Longtime Lawyer Michael Cohen; Trump Calls it ‘Disgraceful’, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2018), https: //www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/us/politics/fbi-raids-office-of-trumps-longtime-lawyer-michael-cohen.html; Josh Gerstein, Trump Lawyer Presses for Access to Seized Cohen Files, Politico (Apr. 15, 2018, 10:57 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 2018/04/15/trump-cohen-files-access-seized-526268.

 [4]. See Philip Bump & Devlin Barrett, Investigation of Trump Attorney Cohen Underway for Months, Filing Shows, Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 2018, at A5; Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Sees Inquiry into Cohen as Greater Threat than Mueller, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2JDyg0h.

 [5]. See Ramsay MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome (1988); Kyle Swenson, America’s First ‘Hush Money’ Scandal, Wash. Post (Mar. 23, 2018), http://wapo.st
/2u90MD2?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.97f3aeccf148.

 [6]. See, e.g., Choe Hang-Sun, Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s Ousted President, Gets 24 Years in Prison, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EmuUec; Lula: Former Brazilian President Surrenders to Police, BBC News (Apr. 8, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-43686174.

 [7]. See e.g., Caryn James, Testing of a President: The Speech; Apology and Defiance Echo a Nixon Address, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1991, at A16; Suzanne Garment, Nixon’s Decisions During Watergate May Help Us Understand the Legal Trouble Trump Is in Now, NBC News (Apr. 5, 2018, 1:29 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/nixon-s-decisions-during-watergate-may-help-us-understand-legal-ncna862821; Sex, Lies and Impeachment, BBC News (Dec. 22, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/12/98/review_of_98/themes/208715.stm.

 [8]. State of the Union with Jake Tapper, CNN (Apr. 15, 2018, 9:00 AM to 10:00 AM), https://archive.org/details/CNNW_20180415_160000_State_of_the_Union_With_Jake_Tapper/start/1299/end/1359 (starts at 9:20 AM).

My guess is that his lawyers don’t want him to go about it that way. That there’s lots of evidence, not necessarily in this Tweet storm, but in other Tweet storms, that will be bad for him if Bob Mueller you know ends up coming around to bringing some kind of case together either in a report or otherwise relating to obstruction. Every single time the President makes clear that he doesn’t like an investigation of him or his associates, and wants that investigation to stop, that adds to the narrative that when he takes an action that actually can cause the investigation to stop that that was intentional and was potential obstruction. I’m not saying it is obstruction, but its adds grist for people to find that to be true.

Id. In addition, during investigations concerning President Clinton, the President boldly pronounced that he “did not have sexual relations with that woman.” Bill Clinton: ‘I Did Not Have Sexual Relations with that Woman.’, Wash. Post (January 25, 2018, 4:39 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/video/politics/bill-clinton-i-did-not-have-sexual-relations-with-that-woman/2018/01/25/4a953c22-0221-11e8-86b9-8908743c79dd_video.html (affirming this story under oath caused the President to commit perjury); Mr. Clinton’s Last Deal, N. Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com
/2001/01/20/opinion/mr-clinton-s-last-deal.html. Likewise, President Trump’s social media commentary may boost his standing among his political base but could prove detrimental to his legal interests. See Julie Bykowicz & Janet Hook, Trump Weekend Tweetstorm Responds to Mueller Indictment, Wall St. J. (Feb. 18, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-weekend-tweetstorm-responds-to-mueller-indictment-1518967910.

 [9]. The investigations into Presidents Nixon, Clinton, and Trump increased the popular notoriety of the privilege through its repeated appearance in media reporting. See, e.g., Lesley Oelsner, Ehrlichman Blames Nixon, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1974, at A1; Jacqueline Thomsen, Trump Lawyers Argue Material Seized in Cohen Raid Is Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege, The Hill (Apr. 13, 2018, 11:41 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/383019-trump-lawyers-argue-material-seized-in-cohen-raid-is-protected-by.

 [10]. Bob Franken, White House Says Clinton Needs Attorney-Client Privilege for Impeachment Fight, CNN (Aug 21, 1998), http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/21/lewinsky.

 [11]. Id.; H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong., 144 Cong. Rec. 11774 (1998) (enacted).

 [12]. See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, We’ve Seen This Movie Before. It Ended in Impeachment., Wash. Post (Apr. 10, 2018), https://wapo.st/2qkNFJO?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.f83b124ba01c; Mike Huckabee (@GovMikeHuckabee), Twitter (Jun 13, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://twitter.com
/govmikehuckabee/status/874719159585841152?lang=en (“Dems act like they never heard of atty/client privilege; AG is top atty in Exec branch; serves @POTUS and not stooge of Congress.”).

 [13]. Thomsen, supra note 9.

 [14]. Kyle Cheney, Trump Jr. Cites Attorney-Client Privilege in not Answering Panel’s Questions About Discussions with his Father, Politico (December 6, 2017, 7:37 PM), https://www.politico.com
/story/2017/12/06/donald-trump-privilege-questions-284841.

 [15]. It is worth noting that the current investigations concerning President Trump are occurring amidst the backdrop of a federal government controlled by members within the President’s own political party. Congress has immense investigatory powers, which are most practically limited by its willingness to utilize them. Should the Democratic Party take control of Congress, or simply the House of Representatives or Senate, members in the new majority would likely have a far greater willingness to investigate the Trump administration.

 [16]. See, e.g., 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961); John Damin, Thawing the Chill Between Government Attorneys and Their Clients: The Need for Legislative Intervention in Protecting the Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege, 111 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1009, 1010 (2007).

 [17]. See, e.g., Gregory I. Massing, The Fifth Amendment, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1179 (1989); Clinton’s Senate Trial: How It Will Work, Palm Beach Post, Dec. 20. 1998, at 22A.

 [18]. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 1:11 (2d ed. 1999); Damin, supra note 16, at 1013–15.

 [19]. See, e.g., Damin, supra note 16, at 1010–11 (quoting In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); Michael Stokes Paulson, Who “Owns” the Government’s Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1998) (“My topic concerns one of the many important practical consequences that flows from this post-Morrison constitutional order: how control over the government’s attorney-client privilege works under a regime of divided executive management of USA, Inc.”) (providing analysis, in the context of the impeachment of President Clinton, of the privilege’s operation within the federal Executive Branch).

 [20]. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).

 [21]. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950).

The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be come [sic] a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.

Id. See also John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 445 n.5 (1982) (claiming Dean Wigmore’s definition is “the most widely cited formulation of the elements of the attorney-client privilege” before also reciting the definition put forth in United Shoe).

 [22]. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (stating “the inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only act to produce its records through its individual officers or agents”); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (citing Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90) (“Artificial entities such as corporations may act only through their agents.”).

 [23]. United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 361.

 [24]. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

 [25]. Id. at 485–86.

 [26]. Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1970).

 [27]. Id.

[A]n employee at a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation’s attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney’s advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.

Id.

 [28]. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).

 [29]. Id. at 394–95. The Court first considered whether the information was “available from upper-echelon management.” Id. Second, the Court examined whether the information was “needed to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas.” Id. Third, the Court reviewed whether the “communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties.” Id. Fourth, it asked whether “the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice.” Id. Finally, the Court considered whether “the communications were considered ‘highly confidential’ when made . . . and have been kept confidential by the company.” Id. at 395.

 [30]. The evolutionary development of the corporate privilege spans decades and includes several tests developed by courts to determine the operation of the rule. See supra notes 2229 and accompanying text.

 [31]. United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 399 F.3d 527, 536 n.4 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We are in no position, however, to resolve this tension in the law.”).

 [32]. See supra note 8 (stating examples of the potential high-ranking clients in government-privilege cases by comparing the investigations of Presidents Nixon and Clinton).

 [33]. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997). Unlike in cases involving corporations and other private entities, when the client is a public entity, courts often include a public-function element within their analysis. See, e.g., Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273 (“[T]he loyalties of a government lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”); Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920 (“[T]he general duty of public service calls upon calls upon government employees and agencies to favor disclosure over concealment.”).

 [34]. Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982) (“At some level of authority, there must be an official whose acts reflect governmental policy, for the government necessarily acts through its agents.”). See also Anne Bowen Poulin, Party Admissions in Criminal Cases: Should the Government Have to Eat Its Words?, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 401, 404 (“Like a corporation, the government speaks and acts only through its agents.”); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment not Amend the Constitution?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 127, 132 (2003) (considering the degree to which government entities represent the will of the people).

 [35]. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 34–49.

 [36]. See Cheney, Rice Approved Use of Waterboarding, Other Interrogation Tactics, FOX News (April 11, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,349948,00.html.

 [37]. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

 [38]. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.

 [39]. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 345.

 [40]. Id. The Commission sought to determine whether the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (“CDCB”) had “violated the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.” Id.

 [41]. Id. at 345–46. The bankruptcy court named Mr. John K. Notz, Jr. as the permanent trustee for CDCB, granting him authority to proceed with the bankruptcy action on behalf of the company, which occurred on the same day the Commodity Trading Commission (“the Commission”) filed a complaint against CDCB. Id.

 [42]. Id. at 346.

 [43]. Id.

 [44]. Id. at 346–47.

 [45]. Id. at 347.

 [46]. Id. at 354–55.

 [47]. Id. at 355–56.

 [48]. Id. at 355 (Respondents also ignore that if a debtor remains in possession—that is, if a trustee is not appointed—the debtor’s directors bear essentially the same fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor out of possession.”) (citing Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649–52 (1963).

 [49]. Id.

 [50]. Id. at 356 (emphasis in original).

 [51]. Id.

 [52]. Id. at 356–57.

 [53]. Id. at 357.

 [54]. Id.

 [55]. Id. 

 [56]. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Williams, 174 U.S. 397, 404 (1899)).

 [57]. Id. at 357–58.

 [58]. Id. at 357.

 [59]. Id. at 358.

 [60]. Id.

 [61]. Id. (noting that a corporate bankruptcy trustee “has the power to waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications”).

 [62]. Id. at 348.

 [63]. Rice, supra note 18, at § 4:28.

 [64]. Id.

 [65]. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).

A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being. 

Id. Practically speaking, a potential counterargument could be the small, family-run corporation that may cease to exist beyond the original proprietors. This potential result, however, does not negate the well-stated case herein, nor the excellent article authored by Professor Schwartz. See Schwartz, infra note 66.

 [66]. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 764, 766 (2012) (“Natural persons can get sick and die, and similarly, other forms of business organization, such as the partnership or sole proprietorship, have only limited lifespans. But one of the defining legal characteristics of the corporation is its capacity to live forever.”).

 [67]. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 636.

 [68]. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 n.4 (1985) (citing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 375 (1975)).

 [69]. Id.; Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 2 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 434, at 339 (perm. rev. ed. 1992)).

 [70]. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935) (“The congress cannot revoke the sovereign power of the people . . . .”); The Federalist No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The Fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”); The Federalist No. 49, at 313–14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which THE several branches of government hold their power, is derived.”).

 [71]. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (stating “the People of the several States” are to elect House of Representatives members).

 [72]. Although differences between public and private entities can emerge when examining how a senior agent may be terminated in either context, similarities between the two continue when discussing employees operating at other levels. Employment contracts can result in countless different scenarios; however, in the context of an at-will-employment relationship, public and private entities enjoy broad latitude in deciding whether to terminate an employment relationship. Engquist v. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008) (“In light of these basic principles, we have often recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”); Hugley v. Art Inst., 3 F. Supp. 2d 900, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (quoting Kahn v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 64 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir. 1995)). Yet differences can emerge with respect to elected officials because their employment in a particular office is restricted to certain timespans as well as limits on the number of terms the official can serve. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2; Haw. Const. art. V, § 1. This variance for elected officials does not dilute the number of similarities between public and private entities enough, however, to warrant a result other than applying the Weintraub Principle to public entities.

 [73]. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).

 [74]. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348–49. See also Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 171 (Del. Ch. 2014).

 [75]. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (involving a president); United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005) (involving a governor).

 [76]. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 918 (finding that restricting communications involving the first family would be “in derogation of the search of the truth”) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).

 [77]. Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“If a public officer authorizes the doing of an act not within the scope of his authority, . . . he will be held responsible.”); Vertin, 102 A.3d at 171–72.

 [78]. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 918 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710). A succeeding administration could also determine that revoking the prior claim of privilege undersuch circumstances would be contrary to a duty to maintain a truthful, open government that instills confidence in the people. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979) (“The Act is an attempt to meet the demand for open government.”).

 [79]. Hastings Ctr., The Ethics of Legislative Life 29 (1985). One theory of political representation describes an elected official’s duty as “carrying out [the] set of express or tacit instructions” expressed by her or his constituents. Id.

 [80]. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356 (1985) (“An individual, in contrast, can act for himself; there is no ‘management’ that controls a solvent individual’s attorney-client privilege.”).

 [81]. Id.

 [82]. See, e.g., id. at 357.

 [83]. Id.

 [84]. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984) (citing People v. Flores, 139 Cal. Rptr. 546, 547–48 (1977) (“Clearly, the fundamental purpose behind the privilege is to safeguard the confidential relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters.”).

 [85]. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2298)).

 [86]. Lory A. Barsdate, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 Yale L.J. 1725, 1742 (1988).

 [87]. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 357 (1985).

 [88]. Although I agree with the insufficiency of a “lack-of-evidence-to-the-contrary,” it is difficult to believe that the dire “chilling effect” warned of by the respondents in Weintraub has come to fruition in the more than thirty years since the Supreme Court’s decision, given the silence on the matter since. However, this question is primed for further research to shed light on this possibility.

 [89]. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 Ind. L.J. 469, 482–84 (2002).

 [90]. See supra notes 7071 and accompanying text.

 [91]. If a predecessor invoked privilege in between the successor’s election and successor’s swearing-in ceremony, there is arguably less incentive for the successor to have spoken about the issue during the previous campaign. This likelihood stems from the fact that neither political party currently recognizes the operation of attorney-client privilege as a campaign issue. See, e.g., Our Platform, Democrats, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform (last visited Aug. 21, 2018); RNC Communications, The 2016 Republican Party Platform, GOP: Blog (July 28, 2016), https://www.gop.com/the-2016-republican-party-platform. As party platforms are updated in response to issues of significance to the electorate, the platforms could include the issue of privilege revocation if it became significant.

 [92]. See Barsdate, supra note 86, at 1742–44 (noting and then refuting the existence of concerns surrounding the “sensitive communications” government attorneys have access to).

 [93]. Id. at 1738.

 [94]. Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 291, 294–95 (1991) (citing 26 U.S.C §§ 6103, 6104, 6108, 6110 (1988); 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552(a) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988)).

 [95]. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2007).

 [96]. Prior invocation of the attorney-client privilege by Presidents Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton—as well as the current assertions by President Donald Trump and others associated with his administration—signal the possibility that the test case may involve a president. However, application of my thesis is by no means limited to members of the White House, as the rationale and logic put forth herein apply to local- and state-government agencies, as well.

 [97]. Analysis of the news articles regarding the privilege and President Trump’s references to the long-standing rule have resulted in a public-relations campaign that has promoted the privilege. With so much scholarship devoted to attorney-client privilege in recent years, such publicized talk of the privilege’s application to the President prove the need to resolve this unexplored question. Yet the test case may not end up involving a president or even federal officials; however, no matter the level of government agent involved, the current discussions stemming from President Trump illustrate the importance of the privilege in a government official’s day-to-day operations.

 [98]. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing President Trump declaring the privilege dead).