This Note will examine public plaintiffs’ use of the public nuisance tort to bring lawsuits against social-media companies. In the last several years, school districts have used public nuisance to bring suits against companies like JUUL, who they believed targeted children to addict them to their products. While other suits were brought alongside the school districts’ public nuisance claim, the JUUL litigation resulted in a staggering $1.7 billion settlement in March of 2023. Following the success of the JUUL litigation, school districts started using public nuisance to target social-media companies, and several lawsuits around the country are now underway. At least two of the public nuisance lawsuits have survived motions to dismiss and have cleared Section 230 and First Amendment issues. This Note will address the complications of school districts’ public nuisance allegations and look to the history of public nuisance, especially as it has been applied to cases that involve products. Additionally, this Note will analyze what success looks like for school districts, specifically whether abatement is a possible remedy. This Note will look to previous public nuisance settlements to see what other potential routes social-media companies might take if abatement is not a possible remedy.
Selling Cezanne: Addressing Legal Gaps in Museum Deaccessioning
Deaccessioning cases in the United States indicate that aside from strictly worded donor restrictions, museum boards have significant legal freedom over the objects in their collections. There are no federal statutes to regulate museum governance, and New York is the only state that has codified museum collection-management practices. The only limitations come from ethical guidelines and industry pressure. By examining the governance structure of museums, the fiduciary duties of nonprofit boards, and controversial deaccessioning cases in the United States, as well as comparing these structures with policies in place in the United Kingdom, this Note proposes that museums in the United States would benefit from implementing regulations to ease the tension of deaccessions. Instituting an independent reviewing committee with academics and industry professionals, a charity commission, and legislation for general low-value deaccessions would alleviate the pressure on state attorneys general, museum boards, local communities, and judges.
Between Juveniles and Adults: Commonwealth v. Mattis and its Role in Redefining Legal Standards for Emerging Adults
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 2024 decision in Commonwealth v. Mattis marked the first time any state has categorically banned life without parole beyond the juvenile context, applying that ban to individuals aged eighteen to twenty. In doing so, the court recognized that these individuals—known as “emerging adults”—share key developmental traits with juveniles, including heightened impulsivity, greater susceptibility to peer influence, and a diminished capacity to assess long-term consequences. These developmental differences make emerging adults more similar to juveniles than to fully mature adults, undermining the justification for life without parole—the harshest punishment available short of the death penalty.
This Note argues that the reasoning underlying the Mattis decision does not end at age twenty. Developmental science generally recognizes “emerging adulthood” as extending through age twenty-five, and the characteristics identified in Mattis persist throughout that period, undermining any meaningful distinction at twenty-one. The age-crime curve likewise shows that criminal behavior peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood before declining sharply, while recidivism data further challenges the assumption that individuals who commit serious offenses during this period remain permanently dangerous. Together, this evidence weakens retributive and deterrence-based justifications for life without parole and supports sentencing approaches that preserve the possibility of rehabilitation.
Situating Mattis within a broader national context, this Note argues that the decision reflects—and accelerates—a shift toward development-informed sentencing. Courts, legislatures, and prosecutors increasingly recognize emerging adults as a distinct category warranting individualized and rehabilitative approaches. Building on these developments, this Note contributes to the growing legal discourse on emerging adulthood by showing how Mattis provides a framework for extending categorical protections through age twenty-five, aligning sentencing law with developmental science, principles of proportionality, and modern understandings of culpability.
Yikes! The Bluebook’s Generative AI Rule is Flawed
Criticism of The Bluebook is not new.1See, e.g., A. Darby Dickerson, An Un-Uniform System of Citation: Surviving with the New Bluebook (Including Compendia of State and Federal Court Rules Concerning Citation Form), 26 Stetson L. Rev. 53, 57 (1996) (“[B]ecause of its complexity and insularity, the Bluebook has attracted challengers . . . .”); Carol M. Bast & Susan Harrell, Has The Bluebook Met Its Match? The ALWD Citation Manual, 92 L. Libr. J. 337, 342 (2000) (“The rules concerning case names are overly complex.”); Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 96–97 (2013) (noting complexity and stating that “there are declining marginal returns to complexity”). The Bluebook is an arguable form of hazing, with a long and storied history of making first-year students cry.2Alex MacDonald, Citation Style Is a Cruel Mistress: A Review of the 21st Edition of The Bluebook, 20 Scribes J. Legal Writing 167, 169 (2022). Judge Posner’s denouncement of the text is perhaps the most famous; he wrote: “I have not read the nineteenth edition. I have dipped into it, much as one might dip one’s toes in a pail of freezing water. I am put in mind of Mr. Kurtz’s dying words in Heart of Darkness—‘The horror! The horror!’—and am tempted to end there.”3See Richard A. Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 Yale L.J. 850, 852 (2011).
The fact that the text is widely disliked makes it an easy scapegoat. That is not to say, however, that the criticism is undeserved.
Past criticism has typically focused on aspects of the book that relate to its usability, not whether the citation format it prescribes is appropriate.4See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 1; Bast & Harrell, supra note 1. A notable exception to this pattern was the widespread condemnation of the sixteenth edition of The Bluebook, which changed the meaning of the signal “see” and the absence of a signal.5Christine Hurt, Network Effects and Legal Citation: How Antitrust Theory Predicts Who Will Build a Better Bluebook Mousetrap in the Age of Electronic Mice, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 1257, 1268–71 (2002). The response to this change “was so vehement that the House of Representatives of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) passed a resolution at its January 1997 meeting condemning [the] changes . . . and encouraging its members, and law reviews, to use the signal rules in the Fifteenth Edition.”6Id. at 1270–71 (citing Pamela Lysaght & Grace Tonner, Bye-Bye Bluebook?, 79 Mich. B.J. 1058, 1058 (2000)).
Despite its unpopularity and the availability of other citation manuals,7See, e.g., Ass’n of Legal Writing Dirs. & Carolyn V. Williams, ALWD Guide to Legal Citation (7th ed. 2021); The Indigo Book: A Manual of Legal Citation (Christopher Jon Sprigman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2022). The Bluebook remains widely used at many law schools to teach legal citation format to law students, and it is relied on by law reviews and courts.8See C. Edward Good, Will The Bluebook Sing the Blues?, Trial, Jan. 2001, at 78, 79 (discussing widespread adoption of The Bluebook). While total sales volume is unknown, in fiscal year 2020, The Bluebook “made $1.2 million in net profits” and the text yielded $16 million in net profits from 2011–2020. Dan Stone, Harvard-Led Citation Cartel Rakes in Millions from Bluebook Manual Monopoly, Masks Profits, Substack: Daniel Stone (June 9, 2022), https://danielstone.substack.com/p/legal-bluebook-profits-havard-yale-columbia-penn [https://perma.cc/WHG7-LFN9].
The twenty-second edition of The Bluebook was released in May 2025.9See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, at VIII (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 22d ed. 2025) [hereinafter The Bluebook]. This new edition includes a new rule—Rule 18.3—that crafts a citation format for legal writers to use when citing generative artificial intelligence (“AI”). This Book Review focuses on The Bluebook’s new generative AI rule, and it concludes that the citation format that The Bluebook prescribes within Rule 18.3 is deeply flawed.10The author is cognizant that The Bluebook is the work product of second and third-year law students and appreciates their efforts toward improving the book. For an insider’s perspective regarding the drafting process, see M. Burke Craighead, The Bluebook: An Insider’s Perspective, 124 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5271305 [https://perma.cc/DY37-S666].
This Book Review proceeds in three parts. First, it examines the purpose of citations in legal writing and identifies circumstances in which the citation of generative AI output is appropriate. Second, it considers what The Bluebook requires of authors using generative AI technology and why The Bluebook’s requirements are inappropriate, focusing on: (1) errors within Rule 18.3 itself; (2) the unreasonable burden Rule 18.3 imposes; (3) Rule 18.3’s incompatibility with how generative AI technology is actually used; and (4) how the requirements imposed by Rule 18.3 violate attorney-client confidentiality requirements and work product protections. Third, and finally, it discusses why The Bluebook’s flawed approach matters and how it might be addressed.
Beyond Words: The Risks of Generative Interpretation
Judges are beginning to use large language models like ChatGPT to interpret legal texts. This Note examines whether they should do so. Prior studies testing LLMs as legal interpreters use survey responses as benchmarks for performance. I offer the first study comparing LLM interpretations to real-world judicial decisions. Across eight Ninth Circuit cases, I test whether GPT-4 Turbo (a model of ChatGPT) correctly identifies legal text as ambiguous or unambiguous. I find that ChatGPT’s assessments diverged from the court’s determinations 50% of the time. I then advance a novel argument: judicial reliance on LLMs may constitute improper ex parte communication under current judicial ethics rules.
Broken Records: Evidentiary Failures in Expedited Removal and Credible Fear Reviews
Expedited removal, a process allowing for the swift deportation of noncitizens without a full hearing, has become a central mechanism in U.S. immigration enforcement. Although the process was designed to expedite removals, it is riddled with evidentiary and procedural deficiencies that undermine asylum seekers’ rights. This Note examines how systemic flaws in record development during initial “credible fear” screenings—such as officer misconduct, language barriers, and trauma—skew credible fear determinations, leading to erroneous deportations. It further critiques the limited reviewability of negative credible fear findings, highlighting inconsistencies among immigration judges regarding the admission of new evidence, credibility assessments, and access to counsel. Additionally, it argues that the “entry fiction” doctrine, which purports to justify the lack of due process protections in expedited removal, is fundamentally incompatible with U.S. asylum law, due process, and non-refoulement obligations. To address these deficiencies, this Note proposes key reforms to credible fear review: (1) requiring immigration judges to allow new evidence and testimony; (2) utilizing a framework adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch for assessing credibility; and (3) guaranteeing a right to counsel during review proceedings. These changes are necessary to align expedited removal with U.S. asylum law, safeguard due process, and prevent the wrongful deportation of bona fide asylum seekers.
Can States Force ICE to Take Off the Masks?
As the federal government has pursued President Donald Trump’s aggressive immigration policy, images of masked Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents seizing people off of the streets have become a potent symbol of the administration’s disregard for democratic and legal norms. While government officials claim that ICE agents must mask to protect themselves from violence and harassment,1Michael Sainato, ICE Chief Says He Will Continue to Allow Agents to Wear Masks During Arrest Raids, The Guardian (July 20, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/20/ice-agents-masks [https://perma.cc/9FEV-DXHS]. critics maintain that the practice helps immigration officials dodge accountability and actually makes them less safe.2NOTUS, Democrats Say Masked ICE Agents Could Create Bigger Safety Issues, San José Spotlight (July 15, 2025), https://sanjosespotlight.com/democrats-say-masked-ice-agents-could-create-bigger-safety-issues [https://perma.cc/V774-JSY7]; Walter Olson, ICE Agents Routinely Mask Up When Seizing People—That’s Wrong, Cato Inst. (May 12, 2025), https://www.cato.org/blog/ice-agents-seizing-people-now-routinely-wear-masks-thats-wrong [https://perma.cc/X6J8-49SQ]. Responding to these concerns, lawmakers across the country have introduced legislation intended to prevent ICE agents from covering their faces while on duty.
Four of these bills, introduced by congressional Democrats,3Immigration Enforcement Identification Safety Act of 2025, S. 2594, 119th Cong. (2025); VISIBLE Act, S. 2212, 119th Cong. (2025); No Secret Police Act of 2025, H.R. 4176, 119th Cong. (2025); No Anonymity in Immigration Enforcement Act of 2025, H.R. 4004, 119th Cong. (2025). are unlikely to advance through a Republican-controlled Congress. Indeed, some congressional Republicans are attempting to provide ICE agents with greater anonymity.4See Protecting Law Enforcement from Doxxing Act, S. 1952, 119th Cong. § 2 (2025) (making it a felony to share the name of an ICE agent with the intent of obstructing an immigration enforcement operation). For a discussion of why the Protecting Law Enforcement from Doxxing Act would violate the First Amendment, see Noah C. Chauvin, The Unconstitutional Attempt to Criminalize Naming ICE Agents, 73 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 5–11) (on file with author). Legislative efforts in several Democrat-controlled states and localities, however, are much more likely to bear fruit (one such bill has already been signed into law5Soumya Karlamangla, California Bars ICE Agents From Wearing Masks in the State, N.Y. Times (Sep. 20, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/20/us/california-ice-agents-masks-law.html [https://perma.cc/3FG8-L64B].)—but could be quickly struck down by the courts as violations of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.6U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. But that does not mean that states are entirely powerless to confront this problem.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief summary of the Supremacy Clause and the ways in which it has been used to strike down state laws purporting to regulate federal activity. Next, Part II details the efforts by state lawmakers to prohibit federal law enforcement officers from masking and explains why those bills, if enacted, would be unconstitutional. Part III outlines five alternative steps state and local officials can take to discourage ICE from masking. Finally, Part IV provides best practices for state and local lawmakers seeking to legislate in this area.
Towards Defensible Judge-Made Democratic Process
What is the function of judicial review? By the stated lights of Article III (“cases” and “controversies”),1U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. to individual judges resolving cases, and to litigants asserting they have suffered an injustice, courts must fairly resolve particular disputes. Yet thanks to the wide-ranging consequences of common law decision-making and the hunger of ambitious law professors to advance novel and transformative scholarly claims, doctrine tends to be evaluated by its purported systemic effects. In election law—which explicitly bears on terms of collective participation—this contrast is especially sharp. Yet contemporary election law scholarship so thoroughly emphasizes systemic accounts that it neglects the foundation of legitimate collective self-governance: the participation and consent of individuals in politics.
The Law of Freedom aspires to return attention to this foundation. Professor Yunsieg Kim’s wonderfully insightful review draws out this point while clearing the path for the challenging but urgent analysis that future jurisprudence and scholarship must undertake. Reconciling judge-made law and constituent autonomy is an endeavor of intimidating analytic and normative complexity. An “operationally useful framework”2Yunsieg P. Kim, Liberty Before Party: The Courts as Transpartisan Defenders of Freedom, 98 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript 74, 92 (2025). will require courts to engage with how personal autonomy is translated into valid collective action through representation, all while diligently respecting the norms of rule of law that ameliorate the counterpopular dilemma.
