On Electronic Word of Mouth and Consumer Protection: A Legal and Economic Analysis by Jens Dammann

Article | Computer & Internet Law
On Electronic Word of Mouth and Consumer Protection: A Legal and Economic Analysis
by Jens Dammann*

From Vol. 94, No. 3
94 S. Cal. L. Rev. 423 (2021)

Keywords: Internet and Technology Law, Product Reviews, Consumer Protection

The most fundamental challenge in consumer protection law lies in the information asymmetry that exists between merchants and consumers. Merchants typically know far more about their products and services than consumers do, and this imbalance threatens the fairness of consumer contracts.

However, some scholars now argue that online consumer reviews play a crucial role in bridging the information gap between merchants and consumers. According to this view, consumer reviews are an adequate substitute for some of the legal protections that consumers currently enjoy.

This Article demonstrates that such optimism is unfounded. Consumer reviews are—and will remain—a highly flawed device for protecting consumers, and their availability therefore cannot justify dismantling existing legal protections.

This conclusion rests on three main arguments. First, there are fundamental economic reasons why even well-designed consumer review systems cannot eliminate information asymmetries between merchants and consumers.

Second, unscrupulous merchants undermine the usefulness of reviews by manipulating the review process. While current efforts to stamp out fake reviews may help to eliminate some of the most blatant forms of review fraud, sophisticated merchants can easily resort to more refined forms of manipulation that are much more difficult to address.

Third, even if the firms operating consumer review systems were able to remedy all the various shortcomings that such systems have, it is highly unlikely that they would choose to do so: by and large, the firms using review systems lack the right incentives to optimize them.

*. Ben H. and Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law, The University of Texas School of Law. For research assistance or editing, or both, I am grateful to Jael Dammann, Elizabeth Hamilton, Stella Fillmore-Patrick, and Jean Raveney.

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Administering Artificial Intelligence – Article by Alicia Solow-Niederman

Article | Technology
Administering Artificial Intelligence
by Alicia Solow-Niederman*

From Vol. 93, No. 4 (September 2020)
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633 (2019)

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Data Governance

As AI increasingly features in everyday life, it is not surprising to hear calls to step up regulation of the technology. In particular, a turn to administrative law to grapple with the consequences of AI is understandable because the technology’s regulatory challenges appear facially similar to those in other technocratic domains, such as the pharmaceutical industry or environmental law. But AI is unique, even if it is not different in kind. AI’s distinctiveness comes from technical attributes—namely, speed, complexity, and unpredictability—that strain administrative law tactics, in conjunction with the institutional settings and incentives, or strategic context, that affect its development path. And this distinctiveness means both that traditional, sectoral approaches hit their limits, and that turns to a new agency like an “FDA for algorithms” or a “federal robotics commission” are of limited utility in constructing enduring governance solutions

This Article assesses algorithmic governance strategies in light of the attributes and institutional factors that make AI unique. In addition to technical attributes and the contemporary imbalance of public and private resources and expertise, AI governance must contend with a fundamental conceptual challenge: algorithmic applications permit seemingly technical decisions to de facto regulate human behavior, with a greater potential for physical and social impact than ever before. This Article warns that the current trajectory of AI development, which is dominated by large private firms, augurs an era of private governance. To maintain the public voice, it suggests an approach rooted in governance of data—a fundamental AI input—rather than only contending with the consequences of algorithmic outputs. Without rethinking regulatory strategies to ensure that public values inform AI research, development, and deployment, we risk losing the democratic accountability that is at the heart of public law.

*. 2020–2022 Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; 2017–2019 PULSE Fellow, UCLA School of Law and 2019-2020 Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Alicia Solow-Niederman drafted this work during her tenure as a PULSE Fellow, and the arguments advanced here are made in her personal capacity. This Article reflects the regulatory and statutory state of play as of early March 2020. Thank you to Jon Michaels, Ted Parson, and Richard Re for substantive engagement and tireless support; to Jennifer Chacon, Ignacio Cofone, Rebecca Crootof, Ingrid Eagly, Joanna Schwartz, Vivek Krishnamurthy, Guy Van den Broeck, Morgan Weiland, Josephine Wolff, Jonathan Zittrain, participants at We Robot 2019, and the UCLAI working group for invaluable comments and encouragement; to Urs Gasser for conversations that inspired this research project; and to the editors of the Southern California Law Review for their hard work in preparing this Article for publication. Thanks also to the Solow-Niederman family and especially to Nancy Solow for her patience and kindness, and to the Tower 26 team for helping me to maintain a sound mind in a sound body. Any errors are my own.

Data Protection in the Wake of the GDPR: California’s Solution for Protecting “the World’s Most Valuable Resource” – Note by Joanna Kessler

Note | Privacy Law
Data Protection in the Wake of the GDPR: California’s Solution for Protecting “the World’s Most Valuable Resource”

by Joanna Kessler*

From Vol. 93, No. 1 (November 2019)
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 99 (2019)

Keywords: California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

This Note will argue that although the CCPA was imperfectly drafted, much of the world seems to be moving toward a standard that embraces data privacy protection, and the CCPA is a positive step in that direction. However, the CCPA does contain several ambiguous and potentially problematic provisions, including possible First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, that should be addressed by the California Legislature. While a federal standard for data privacy would make compliance considerably easier, if such a law is enacted in the near future, it is unlikely to offer as significant data privacy protections as the CCPA and would instead be a watered-down version of the CCPA that preempts attempts by California and other states to establish strong, comprehensive data privacy regimes. Ultimately, the United States should adopt a federal standard that offers consumers similarly strong protections as the GDPR or the CCPA. Part I of this Note will describe the elements of GDPR and the CCPA and will offer a comparative analysis of the regulations. Part II of this Note will address potential shortcomings of the CCPA, including a constitutional analysis of the law and its problematic provisions. Part III of this Note will discuss the debate between consumer privacy advocates and technology companies regarding federal preemption of strict laws like the CCPA. It will also make predictions about, and offer solutions for, the future of the CCPA and United States data privacy legislation based on a discussion of global data privacy trends and possible federal government actions.

*. Executive Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 93; J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.A., Sociology 2013, Kenyon College. 

 

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The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, Standards, and Judicial Discretion – Article by Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore

Article | Legal Theory
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, Standards, and Judicial Discretion
by Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore*

From Vol. 93, No. 1 (November 2019)
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2019)

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Algorithmic Judging

 

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (“AI”), and machine learning in particular, promises lawmakers greater specificity and fewer errors. Algorithmic lawmaking and judging will leverage models built from large stores of data that permit the creation and application of finely tuned rules. AI is therefore regarded as something that will bring about a movement from standards towards rules. Drawing on contemporary data science, this Article shows that machine learning is less impressive when the past is unlike the future, as it is whenever new variables appear over time. In the absence of regularities, machine learning loses its advantage and, as a result, looser standards can become superior to rules. We apply this insight to bail and sentencing decisions, as well as familiar corporate and contract law rules. More generally, we show that a Human-AI combination can be superior to AI acting alone. Just as today’s judges overrule errors and outmoded precedent, tommorrow’s lawmakers will sensibly overrule AI in legal domains where the challenges of measurement are present. When measurement is straightforward and prediction is accurate, rules will prevail. When empirical limitations such as overfit, Simpson’s Paradox, and omitted variables make measurement difficult, AI should be trusted less and law should give way to standards. We introduce readers to the phenomenon of reversal paradoxes, and we suggest that in law, where huge data sets are rare, AI should not be expected to outperform humans. But more generally, where empirical limitations are likely, including overfit and omitted variables, rules should be trusted less, and law should give way to standards.

*. Fagan is an Associate Professor of Law at the EDHEC Business School, France; Levmore is the William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. We are grateful for the thoughtful comments we received from William Hubbard, Michael Livermore, and Christophe Croux, as well as participants of the University of Chicago School of Law faculty workshop. 

 

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The New Data of Student Debt – Article by Christopher K. Odinet

Article | Regulations
The New Data of Student Debt
by Christopher K. Odinet*

From Vol. 92, No. 6 (September 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1617 (2019)

Keywords: Student Loan, Education-Based Data Lending, Financial Technology (Fintech)

 

Abstract

Where you go to college and what you choose to study has always been important, but, with the help of data science, it may now determine whether you get a student loan. Silicon Valley is increasingly setting its sights on student lending. Financial technology (“fintech”) firms such as SoFi, CommonBond, and Upstart are ever-expanding their online lending activities to help students finance or refinance educational expenses. These online companies are using a wide array of alternative, education-based data points—ranging from applicants’ chosen majors, assessment scores, the college or university they attend, job history, and cohort default rates—to determine creditworthiness. Fintech firms argue that through their low overhead and innovative approaches to lending they are able to widen access to credit for underserved Americans. Indeed, there is much to recommend regarding the use of different kinds of information about young consumers in order assess their financial ability. Student borrowers are notoriously disadvantaged by the extant scoring system that heavily favors having a past credit history. Yet there are also downsides to the use of education-based, alternative data by private lenders. This Article critiques the use of this education-based information, arguing that while it can have a positive effect in promoting social mobility, it could also have significant downsides. Chief among these are reifying existing credit barriers along lines of wealth and class and further contributing to discriminatory lending practices that harm women, black and Latino Americans, and other minority groups. The discrimination issue is particularly salient because of the novel and opaque underwriting algorithms that facilitate these online loans. This Article concludes by proposing three-pillared regulatory guidance for private student lenders to use in designing, implementing, and monitoring their education-based data lending programs.

*. Associate Professor of Law and Affiliate Associate Professor in Entrepreneurship, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK. The Author thanks Aryn Bussey, Seth Frotman, Michael Pierce, Tianna Gibbs, Avlana Eisenberg, Richard C. Chen, Kaiponanea Matsumara, Sarah Dadush, Jeremy McClane, Emily Berman, Donald Kochan, Erin Sheley, Melissa Mortazavi, Roger Michalski, Kit Johnson, Eric Johnson, Sarah Burstein, Brian Larson, John P. Ropiequet, the participants and the editorial board of the Loyola Consumer Law Review Symposium on the “Future of the CFPB,” the participants of the Central States Law Schools Association Conference, the faculty at the University of Iowa College of Law, and Kate Sablosky Elengold for their helpful comments and critiques on earlier drafts, either in writing or in conversation. This Article is the second in a series of works under the auspices of the Fintech Finance Project, which looks to study the development of law and innovation in lending. As always, the Author thanks the University of Oklahoma College of Law’s library staff for their skillful research support. All errors and views are the Author’s alone.

 

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Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability – Article by Margot E. Kaminski

Article | Regulations
Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability
by Margot E. Kaminski*

From Vol. 92, No. 6 (September 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529 (2019)

Keywords: Algorithmic Decision-Making, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

 

Abstract

Algorithms are now used to make significant decisions about individuals, from credit determinations to hiring and firing. But they are largely unregulated under U.S. law. A quickly growing literature has split on how to address algorithmic decision-making, with individual rights and accountability to nonexpert stakeholders and to the public at the crux of the debate. In this Article, I make the case for why both individual rights and public- and stakeholder-facing accountability are not just goods in and of themselves but crucial components of effective governance. Only individual rights can fully address dignitary and justificatory concerns behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making. And without some form of public and stakeholder accountability, collaborative public-private approaches to systemic governance of algorithms will fail.

In this Article, I identify three categories of concern behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making: dignitary, justificatory, and instrumental. Dignitary concerns lead to proposals that we regulate algorithms to protect human dignity and autonomy; justificatory concerns caution that we must assess the legitimacy of algorithmic reasoning; and instrumental concerns lead to calls for regulation to prevent consequent problems such as error and bias. No one regulatory approach can effectively address all three. I therefore propose a two-pronged approach to algorithmic governance: a system of individual due process rights combined with systemic regulation achieved through collaborative governance (the use of private-public partnerships). Only through this binary approach can we effectively address all three concerns raised by algorithmic decision-making, or decision-making by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”).

The interplay between the two approaches will be complex. Sometimes the two systems will be complementary, and at other times, they will be in tension. The European Union’s (“EU’s”) General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is one such binary system. I explore the extensive collaborative governance aspects of the GDPR and how they interact with its individual rights regime. Understanding the GDPR in this way both illuminates its strengths and weaknesses and provides a model for how to construct a better governance regime for accountable algorithmic, or AI, decision-making. It shows, too, that in the absence of public and stakeholder accountability, individual rights can have a significant role to play in establishing the legitimacy of a collaborative regime.

*. Associate Professor of Law, Colorado Law School; Faculty Privacy Director at Silicon Flatirons; Affiliated Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School; Faculty Fellow, Center for Democracy and Technology. Many thanks to Jef Ausloos, Jack Balkin, Michael Birnhack, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Bryan H. Choi, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Giovanni Comandé, Eldar Haber, Irene Kamara, Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson, Kate Klonick, Mark Lemley, Gianclaudio Maglieri, Christina Mulligan, W. Nicholson Price, Andrew Selbst, Alicia Solow-Niederman, and Michael Veale for reading and for detailed comments. Thanks to the Fulbright-Schuman program, Institute for Information Law (“IViR”) at the University of Amsterdam, and Scuola Sant’Anna in Pisa for the time and resources for this project. Thanks to the faculty of Tel Aviv University, the Second Annual Junior Faculty Forum on the Intersection of Law and Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, and my own Colorado Law School faculty for excellent workshop opportunities. Extra thanks to Matthew Cushing, whose incredible support made this project possible, and to Mira Cushing for joy beyond words.

 

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Unlock Your Phone and Let Me Read All Your Personal Content, Please: The First and Fifth Amendments and Border Searches of Electronic Devices – Note by Kathryn Neubauer

Note | Constitutional Law
Unlock Your Phone and Let Me Read All Your Personal
Content, Please: The First and Fifth Amendments and
Border Searches of Electronic Devices

by Kathryn Neubauer*

From Vol. 92, No. 5 (July 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1273 (2019)

Keywords: First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Border Search Exception, Technology

 

Until January 2018, under the border search exception, CBP officers were afforded the power to search any electronic device without meeting any standard of suspicion or acquiring a warrant. The border search exception is a “longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be obtained . . . .” It provides that suspicionless and warrantless searches at the border are not in violation of the Fourth Amendment merely because searches at the border are “reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border . . . .” The CBP, claiming that the border search exception applies to electronic devices, searched more devices in 2017 than ever before, with approximately a 60 percent increase over 2016 according to data released by the CBP. These “digital strip searches” violate travelers’ First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. With the advent of smartphones and the expanded use of electronic devices for storing people’s extremely personal data, these searches violate an individual’s right to privacy. Simply by travelling into the United States with a device linked to such information, a person suddenly—and, currently, unexpectedly—opens a window for the government to search through seemingly every aspect of his or her life. The policy behind these searches at the border does not align with the core principles behind our longstanding First and Fifth Amendment protections, nor does it align with the policies behind the exceptions made to constitutional rights at the border in the past.

In order to protect the privacy and rights of both citizens and noncitizens entering the United States, the procedures concerning electronic device searches need to be rectified. For instance, the border search exception should not be applied to electronic devices the same way it applies to other property or storage containers, like a backpack. One is less likely to expect privacy in the contents of a backpack than in the contents of a password- or authorization-protected devices—unlike a locked device, a backpack can be taken, can be opened easily, can fall open, and also has been traditionally subjected to searches at the border. Moreover, there are many reasons why electronic devices warrant privacy.

*. Executive Notes Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 92; J.D., 2019, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; B.B.A., 2014, University of Michigan. My sincere gratitude to Professor Sam Erman for his invaluable feedback on early drafts of this Note as well as to Rosie Frihart, Kevin Ganley and all the editors of the Southern California Law Review. Thank you to Brian and my family—Mark, Diane, Elisabeth, Jennifer, Alison, Rebecca, Tony, Jason, Jalal, Owen, Evelyn, Peter and Manny—for all of their love and support. Finally, a special thank you Rebecca for reading and editing countless drafts, and to Jason for bringing to my attention this important issue.

 

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An Uneasy Dance with Data: Racial Bias in Criminal Law

 

From Volume 93, Postscript (June 2019)
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an uneasy dance with data: racial bias in criminal law

Joseph J. Avery[*]

INTRODUCTION

Businesses and organizations expect their managers to use data science to improve and even optimize decisionmaking. The founder of the largest hedge fund in the world has argued that nearly everything important going on in an organization should be captured as data.[1] Similar beliefs have permeated medicine. A team of researchers has taken over 100 million data points from more than 1.3 million pediatric cases and trained a machine-learning model that performs nearly as well as experienced pediatricians at diagnosing common childhood diseases.[2]

Yet when it comes to some criminal justice institutions, such as prosecutors’ offices, there is an aversion to applying cognitive computing to high-stakes decisions. This aversion reflects extra-institutional forces, as activists and scholars are militating against the use of predictive analytics in criminal justice.[3] The aversion also reflects prosecutors’ unease with the practice, as many prefer that decisional weight be placed on attorneys’ experience and intuition, even though experience and intuition have contributed to more than a century of criminal justice disparities.

Instead of viewing historical data and data-hungry academic researchers as liabilities, prosecutors and scholars should treat them as assets in the struggle to achieve outcome fairness. Cutting-edge research on fairness in machine learning is being conducted by computer scientists, applied mathematicians, and social scientists, and this research forms a foundation for the most promising path towards racial equality in criminal justice: suggestive modeling that creates baselines to guide prosecutorial decisionmaking.

I.  Prosecutors and Racial Bias

More than 2 million people are incarcerated in the United States, and a disproportionate number of these individuals are African American.[4] Most defendants—approximately 95%—have their cases resolved through plea bargaining.[5] Prosecutors exert tremendous power over the plea bargaining process, as they can drop a case, oppose bail or recommend a certain level of bail, add or remove charges and counts, offer and negotiate plea bargains, and recommend sentences.[6]

When it comes to racial disparity in incarceration rates, much of it can be traced to prosecutorial discretion. Research has found that prosecutors are less likely to offer black defendants a plea bargain, less likely to reduce their charge offers, and more likely to offer them plea bargains that include prison time.[7] Defendants who are black, young, and male fare especially poorly.[8]

One possible reason for suboptimal prosecutorial decisionmaking is a lack of clear baselines. In estimating the final disposition of a case, prosecutors have very little on which to base their estimations. New cases are perpetually commenced, and prosecutors must process these cases quickly and efficiently, all while receiving subpar information; determining what happened and when is a matter of cobbling together reports from victims, witnesses, police officers, and investigators. In addition, prosecutors must rely on their own past experiences, a reliance that runs numerous risks, including that of small sample size bias. Given these cognitive constraints, prosecutors are liable to rely on stereotypes, such as those that attach to African Americans.[9]

II.  Predictive Analytics in Criminal Justice

The use of predictive analytics in the law can be bifurcated into two subsets. One involves policing, where what is being predicted is who will commit future crimes.[10] Embedded in this prediction is the question of where those crimes will occur. In theory, these predictions can be used by police departments to allocate resources more efficiently and to make communities safer.

Dozens of police departments around the United States are employing predictive policing.[11] Since 2011, the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) has analyzed data from rap sheets in order to determine how best to utilize police resources.[12] Chicago officials have experimented with an algorithm that predicts which individuals in the city are likely to be involved in a shooting—either as the shooter or as the victim.[13]

The second subset primarily involves recidivism. Here, we have bail decisions in which predictions about who will show up to future court dates are made.[14] Embedded in these predictions is the question of who, if released pretrial, will cause harm (or commit additional crimes).[15] This subset also includes sentencing, such that judges may receive predictions regarding a defendant’s likelihood of recidivating.[16]

The Laura and John Arnold Foundation (“Arnold Foundation”) designed its Public Safety Assessment tool (“PSA”) to assess the dangerousness of a given defendant.[17] The tool takes into account defendants’ age and history of criminal convictions, but it elides race and gender and supposed covariates of race and gender, such as employment background, where a defendant lives, and history of criminal arrests.[18] Risk assessments focusing on recidivism are consulted by sentencing courts.[19] These statistical prediction tools make use of a number of features (factors specific to a defendant) to produce a quantitative output: a score that reflects a defendant’s likelihood of engaging in some behavior, such as committing additional crimes or additional violent crimes.[20]

III.  Against Predictive Analytics in Criminal Justice

Statistical algorithms that have been used for risk assessment have been charged with perpetuating racial bias[21] and have been the subject of litigation.[22] A 2016 report by ProPublica alleging that an algorithm used in Florida was biased against black defendants received nationwide attention.[23] The subsequent debate about whether the algorithm actually was biased against black defendants pivoted on different definitions of fairness, with a specific focus on rates of false positives, true negatives, and related concepts.[24] Overall, the fear is that, at best, algorithmic decisionmaking perpetuates historical bias; at worst, it exacerbates bias. As one opponent of the LAPD’s use of predictive analytics said, “[d]ata is a weapon and will always be used to criminalize black, brown and poor people.”[25]

Professor Jessica Eaglin has argued that risk itself is a “malleable and fluid concept”; thus, predictive analytics focused on risk assessment give a spurious stamp of objectivity to a process that is agenda-driven.[26] Furthermore, Professor Eaglin argues that the agenda of these tools is one of increased punishment.

Critics also address the creation of the models. Some argue that the training data is nonrepresentative.[27] Others argue that recidivism is difficult to define[28] and that some jurisdictions are improperly defining it to include arrests, which may be indicative of little beyond police bias.[29] Still others debate which features such models properly should include.[30]

IV.  The Importance of Data for Criminal Justice Fairness

While it is important to question how data is used in criminal justice, the importance of data’s role in diminishing racial disparity in incarceration should not be underestimated. First, without robust data collection, we have no way of knowing when similarly-situated defendants are being treated dissimilarly. If we cannot clearly identify racial bias in the different stages of the criminal justice system, then we cannot fix it. And there is still a ways to go before prosecutorial data is properly organized and digitized.[31]

Second, data is essential for collaborative intelligence, which shows significant potential for improving prosecutorial decisionmaking. Prosecutors’ offices are in possession of information that can be used to form clear and unbiased baselines: hundreds of thousands of closed casefiles. Using advanced statistical and computer science methods, these casefiles can be used as a corpus from which to build a model that, based on an arresting officer’s narrative report and suggested charges, produces a prediction as to how a case would resolve if the defendant were treated race-neutrally. This is a classic machine-learning task: train an algorithm to produce a prediction function that relates case characteristics to case outcomes. This model can then be used to guide prosecutorial decisionmaking to make it more consistent (less variance across attorneys and across time) and less biased.

Algorithms will produce biased outcomes when the training data (the historical record) is biased and the algorithm is designed to maximize predictive accuracy. It should be obvious as to why this is the case: if predictive accuracy is the goal and the data is biased, then bias is a feature of the system, not a bug. In other words, bias must be taken into account if the prediction is to be accurate.

This is the reason why, in my research, I do not optimize prediction. My colleagues and I have different goals. Our models are not predictive models but “suggestive” models. One of our primary goals is to remove suspect bias from the model, bringing its suggestions into closer accord with Constitutional mandates for racially equal treatment of criminal defendants by state actors.

Can this be done? It is no easy feat, but researchers around the country are diligently working to build models that correct for suboptimal historical records.[32] Some of these approaches involve a weak version of disparate treatment in which the protected attribute (for example, race) is accessed during model training but omitted during classification.[33] Such approaches build from the recognition, long established in the scholarly community, that not only does blindness not entail fairness,[34] it often is a poor notion of fairness.[35]

Lastly, such models can themselves be used to identify racism that is endemic to the historical record or which emerges in the construction of the model. One strength of machine learning is that it is able to make connections between inputs and outputs that elude human actors. Social science long ago established that the human mind itself is a black box, and human actors have poor insight into their reasons for acting.[36] The black box of human decisionmaking, however, can be unpacked through careful use of statistics. Local-interpretable-model-agnostic explanations,[37] for instance, can be used to identify the aspects of input data on which a trained model relies as it makes its predictions, which should, in turn, offer insight into historical human reliance.[38]

CONCLUSION

When it comes to racial disparities, the U.S. criminal justice system is failing, and it has been failing for many years. In addition, charges of racial bias have been leveled against various organizations that are employing predictive analytics in their legal decisions. Scholars are right to question how data is being used. Past discrimination must not become enshrined in our machines. But movement away from data is also movement away from identification of unequal treatment, and it represents abandonment of the most promising path towards criminal justice fairness. While it is tempting for prosecutors’ offices to maintain the status quo and not augment their processes with data science, this would be a mistake. Collaborative intelligence has the potential to render prosecutorial decisionmaking more consistent, fair, and efficient.

 


[*] *. Joseph J. Avery is a National Defense Science & Engineering Graduate Fellow at Princeton University; Columbia Law School, J.D.; Princeton University, M.A.; New York University, B.A.

 [1].               Ray Dalio, Principles: Life and Work 527 (2017).

 [2]. Huiying Liang et al., Evaluation and Accurate Diagnoses of Pediatric Diseases Using Artificial Intelligence, 25 Nature Med. 433, 433 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-018-0335-9.pdf.

 [3]. Karen Hao, AI is Sending People to Jail—and Getting It Wrong, MIT Tech. Rev. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai.

 [4]. Danielle Kaeble & Mary Cowhig, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2016, Bureau Just. Stat. 1 (Apr. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf.

 [5].               Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary, Bureau Just. Assistance 1 (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf. Plea bargaining is a process wherein a defendant receives less than the maximum charge possible in exchange for an admission of guilt or something functionally equivalent to guilt. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1303, 131012 (2018).

 [6]. Scott A. Gilbert & Molly Treadway Johnson, The Federal Judicial Center’s 1996 Survey of Guideline Experience, 9 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 87, 88–89 (1996); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1215, 1219–20 (2004); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420, 142226 (2008); Besiki Kutateladze et al., Do Race and Ethnicity Matter in Prosecution? A Review of Empirical Studies, Vera Inst. Just., 3–4 (June 2012), https://www.vera.org/publications/do-race-and-ethnicity-matter-in-prosecution-a-review-of-empirical-studies.

 [7]. See Besiki Kutateladze et al., Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 Criminology 514, 518, 527-537 (2014).

 [8]. See Gail Kellough & Scot Wortley, Remand for Plea: Bail Decisions and Plea Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions, 42 Brit. J. Criminology 186, 194–201 (2002); Besiki Kutateladze et al., Opening Pandora’s Box: How Does Defendant Race Influence Plea Bargaining?, 33 Just. Q. 398, 410-419 (2016).

 [9]. Decades of research at the nexus of law and psychology have identified stereotypical associations linking blackness with crime, violence, threats, and aggression. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1314, 1324-1328 (2002); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 876, 889-891 (2004); Brian Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 181, 190-191 (2001).

 [10]. See Albert Meijer & Martijn Wessels, Predictive Policing: Review of Benefits and Drawbacks, Int’l J. Pub. Admin. 1, 2-4 (2019).

 [11].               Issie Lapowsky, How the LAPD uses Data to Predict Crime, Wired (May 22, 2018, 5:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/los-angeles-police-department-predictive-policing.

 [12]. Id.

 [13]. Jeff Asher & Rob Arthur, Inside the Algorithm That Tries to Predict Gun Violence in Chicago, N.Y. Times: The Upshot (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/upshot/what-an-algorithm-reveals-about-life-on-chicagos-high-risk-list.html.

 [14].               See, e.g., Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, Pub. Safety Assessment [hereinafter Risk Factors and Formula], https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors (last visited June 6, 2019).

 [15]. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishment in an Actuarial Age 1 (2007); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 Emory L.J. 59, 61 (2017); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803, 808–18 (2014).

 [16].               Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 3 (2015); Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing, Marshall Project (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing.

 [17]. About the PSA, Pub. Safety Assessment, https://www.psapretrial.org/about (last visited June 6, 2019).

 [18]. Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 14.

 [19]. Timothy Bakken, The Continued Failure of Modern Law to Create Fairness and Efficiency: The Presentence Investigation Report and Its Effect on Justice, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 363, 363–64 (1996); Starr, supra note 15, at 803.

 [20]. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 Va. L. Rev. 391, 405–06 (2006).

 [21]. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 674, 678 (2016); Jessica M. Eaglin, Predictive Analytics’ Punishment Mismatch, 14 I/S: J.L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 87, 102–03 (2017).

 [22]. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 75760 (Wis. 2016).

 [23]. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.

 [24]. See Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.”, 80 Fed. Prob., Sept. 2016, at 38; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2014) (calling for predictions that are consistent with normative concepts of fairness).

 [25]. Cindy Chang, LAPD Officials Defend Predictive Policing as Activists Call for Its End, L.A. Times (July 24, 2018, 8:20 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-data-policing-20180724-story.html.

 [26]. Eaglin, supra note 21, at 105; see also Eaglin, supra note 15, at 64.

 [27]. See Eaglin, supra note 15, at 118.

 [28]. Joan Petersilia, Recidivism, in Encyclopedia of American Prisons 215, 215–16 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank R. Williams III eds., 1996).

 [29].               See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 523, 528–35 (1993) (arguing against reliance on unadjudicated conduct at sentencing).

 [30]. See Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 Big Data 153, 153-162 (2017); Don A. Andrews, Recidivism Is Predictable and Can Be Influenced: Using Risk Assessments to Reduce Recidivism, Correctional Serv. Can. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/forum/e012/12j_e.pdf; Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, Proc. of Innovations in Theoretical Computer Sci. (forthcoming 2017).

 [31].               Besiki L. Kutateladze et al., Prosecutorial Attitudes, Perspectives, and Priorities: Insights from the Inside, MacArthur Foundation 2 (2018), https://caj.fiu.edu/
news/2018/prosecutorial-attitudes-perspectives-and-priorities-insights-from-the-inside/report-1.pdf; see also Andrew Pantazi, What Makes a Good Prosecutor? A New Study of Melissa Nelson’s Office Hopes to Find Out, Fla. Times Union, https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180309/what-makes-good-prosecutor-new-study-of-melissa-nelsons-office-hopes-to-find-out (last updated Mar. 12, 2018, 11:18 AM).

 [32]. See Alexander Amini et al., Uncovering and Mitigating Algorithmic Bias through Learned Latent Structure (2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.aies-conference.com/wp-content/papers/
main/AIES-19_paper_220.pdf. For another approach at building a non-discriminatory classifier, see Irene Chen et al., Why Is My Classifier Discriminatory?, in 31 Advances in Neural Info. Processing Systems 1, 3-9 (2018), http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7613-why-is-my-classifier-discriminatory.pdf.

 [33]. See Zachary C. Lipton et al., Does Mitigating ML’s Impact Disparity Require Treatment Disparity?, in 31 Advances in Neural Infor. Processing Systems 1, 9 (2018), https://papers.nips.cc/
paper/8035-does-mitigating-mls-impact-disparity-require-treatment-disparity.pdf.

 [34]. Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness through Awareness, in Proceedings 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Sci. Conf. 214, 218 (2012), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2090255.

 [35]. Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning 1819 (Oct. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.02413.pdf.

 [36]. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 Psychol. Rev. 231, 251-257 (1977).

   [37].               Introduced by Professors Marco Ribeiro, Sameer Singh, and Carlos Guestrin, “local interpretable model-agnostic explanations,” refers to a computer science technique that attempts to explain the predictions of any classifier by learning an interpretable model around the primary prediction. See Marco T. Ribeiro et al., “Why Should I Trust You?”: Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, ACM 1 (Aug., 2016), https://www.kdd.org/kdd2016/papers/files/rfp0573-ribeiroA.pdf.

 [38]. See Michael Chui et al., What AI Can and Can’t Do Yet for Your Business, McKinsey Q., Jan. 2018, at 7, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/what-ai-can-and-cant-do-yet-for-your-business.