Slouching Towards San Francisco: Opioid Addiction as Public Nuisance

INTRODUCTION

The opioid epidemic has afflicted Americans for twenty years, from California to the New York island. What began as an idealistic effort to alleviate chronic pain turned into a national nightmare: powerful, FDA-approved painkillers, liberally prescribed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, unleashed a Pandora’s box of dependance and demand that south-of-the-border cartels have answered with heroin and fentanyl.1Mike Stobbe, US Overdose Deaths Hit Record 107,000 Last Year, CDC Says, Associated Press (May 11, 2022, 8:32 AM), https://apnews.com/article/overdose-deaths-opioids-fentanyl-8cb302a70ddbb6a435f9e8fbb19f153b [https://perma.cc/EV8Y-U7QT]. In 2021, more than 107,000 Americans died of drug overdoses, and an astounding 71,000 of these deaths involved fentanyl and other synthetic opioids.2Id. The economic costs have been staggering: in 2020 alone, the opioid epidemic cost the United States an estimated $1.5 trillion.3Joint Econ. Comm. Democrats, The Economic Toll of the Opioid Crisis Reached Nearly $1.5 Trillion in 2020 1 (2022), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/67bced7f-4232-40ea-9263-f033d280c567/jec-cost-of-opioids-issue-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV6W-TF3G]. The Joint Economic Committee Democrats calculated this amount using CDC estimates of costs of “health care, public safety, lost productivity, lower quality of life and lives lost due to opioids.” Id. at 2 n.1.

To help redress this catastrophe, every state in the Union, along with countless localities and tribes, has sued opioid manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers.4Leslie Kendrick, The Perils and Promise of Public Nuisance, 132 Yale L.J. 702, 708 (2023). These public plaintiffs have pursued multiple claims, but public nuisance is “a central feature of the litigation and a key to its momentum.”5Id. at 707. To establish a public nuisance, plaintiffs must demonstrate an unreasonable interference with a right common to the public.6Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1979). A typical interference in the early days of public nuisance consisted of blocking a highway or waterway,7Id. § 821B cmt. a. but in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, plaintiffs have argued that mass harms from products such as tobacco, lead paint, and handguns also interfere with public rights.8See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 705–06. In these actions, the alleged interference with public rights enables states or localities to sue on behalf of the public.9See id. at 707 (“That these suits involve a variety of other claims should not lead us to assume that they would exist in the manner absent the public-nuisance template.”).

But while these suits have generated billions of dollars in settlements,10Id. at 708. some courts have rejected these claims on the basis that any harms caused by a legal product interfere with private rights rather than public rights.11See, e.g., State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, 499 P.3d 719, 726–28 (Okla. 2021); City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 609 F. Supp. 3d 408, 473–76 (S.D. W. Va. 2022). These courts cite previous attempts to characterize handguns and lead paint as public nuisances to conclude that the misuse of a product rarely interferes with the public rights traditionally protected by the doctrine, such as the right to use a public highway without interference.12See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 499 P.3d at 726–28. Moreover, these courts portend a flood of lawsuits concerning legal products should public nuisance provide a valid basis of recovery against product manufacturers for harms that should instead be redressed under product liability law.13Id.

However, a successful public nuisance action brought by the City Attorney of San Francisco against Walgreens in federal district court counters the claim that legal products can cause only private harms. In August 2022, Judge Charles Breyer entered judgment in a bench trial against Walgreens for substantially contributing to a public nuisance in San Francisco by failing to comply with federal regulation in filling opioid prescriptions.14See City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2022). While California has a broader view of public nuisance than other states, the evidence at trial presented in compelling detail the social havoc that opioid addiction has inflicted on the city.15See id. at 940–50.

To my knowledge, this Note is the first to examine this trial in detail, and I do so to demonstrate how opioid addiction interferes with public rights traditionally protected by common law public nuisance. Specifically, I examine how opioid addiction interferes with public space and public morals, forcing local governments to incur abatement costs and exposing residents to offensive activity in broad daylight. Because of this interference, courts should not categorically dismiss public nuisance claims against product manufacturers in the name of tradition.

This Note complements the scholarship of Professors Leslie Kendrick and David Dana, who have both argued that the opioid epidemic has interfered with public rights,16See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 753–54; David A. Dana, Public Nuisance Law When Politics Fails, 83 Ohio State L.J. 61, 100 (2022). by examining this interference with public rights in greater detail. In making this argument, this Note urges skeptical courts to adopt a middle-road doctrinal approach between the broad, inclusive understanding of public nuisance in California and the narrow, traditionalist understanding in states such as Oklahoma. This middle-road approach should be more amenable to states in the traditionalist camp because it retains public nuisance’s common law contours but maintains its flexibility to protect public rights from novel interferences caused by harmful products that bypass regulatory oversight.

Part I will provide a brief history of public nuisance in England, the United States, and California. Part II will discuss the opioid epidemic and the litigation it has spawned. Part III will review the evidence submitted at the successful bench trial in California to highlight how opioid addiction has affected San Francisco. Lastly, Part IV will argue that opioid addiction interferes with public rights traditionally protected by common law public nuisance and address various counterarguments.

I.  PUBLIC NUISANCE: A BRIEF HISTORY

A.  Common Law Origins in England

Nuisance developed in the English common law as a non-trespassory tort against the land, or more specifically, an interference with the use or enjoyment of land, or with a right of easement or servitude over the land.17William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997, 997 (1966). This remedy allowed private parties to seek relief from non-trespassory interferences with the use and enjoyment of their land and is the origin of the law of private nuisance today.18Id. at 997–98. Private nuisance is a separate doctrine that has not played a role in opioid litigation, so I will not discuss it further in this Note. An interference with the property of the King also constituted a nuisance, and hence public nuisance was born.19Id. at 998. The earliest cases concerned obstructing the King’s road—a criminal infringement on the rights of the Crown and redressable by a suit brought by the King’s justices—thereby interfering with a public right of way.20Id. By the same reasoning, blocking a waterway constituted a public nuisance.21J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance—A Critical Examination, 48 Cambridge L.J. 55, 58 (1989). By the mid-1300s, public nuisance extended more broadly to other infringements on public rights, such as “interference with a market, smoke from a lime-pit, and diversion of water from a mill.”22Prosser, supra note 17, at 998.

While obstructing a public road or waterway remains the canonical example of public nuisance, the doctrine eventually encompassed “a large, miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, all of which involved some interference with the interests of the community at large.”23Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1979). For example, a description of “common nuisances” (later referred to as public nuisances) by William Sheppard in the 1660s included “pollution from noxious trades,” “victuallers who [sell] unwholesome food,” and “lewd ale-houses.”24Spencer, supra note 21, at 60 (quoting William Sheppard, The Court-Keepers Guide: Or, a Plain and Familiar Treatise Needful and Useful for the Help of Many that Are Imployed in the Keeping of Law-Days, or Courts Baron (5th ed. 1662)). Similarly, William Blackstone’s 1769 catalogue of common nuisances included “the keeping of hogs in any city or market town,” “[c]ottages . . . erected singly on the waste, being harbours for thieves and other idle and dissolute persons,” the “making and selling of fireworks,” and “[a]ll disorderly inns or ale-houses, bawdy-houses, gaming-houses, stage-plays unlicensed, booths and stages for rope-dancers, mountebanks, and the like.”254 William Blackstone, Commentaries *167–68.

Another significant feature of public nuisance in the English common law was the relator action. Public nuisances had traditionally been prosecuted in the courts of leet, local criminal courts that handled “public welfare offences.”26Spencer, supra note 21, at 59. But by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, people began seeking injunctions on behalf of the Attorney General in civil court.27Id. at 66. Plaintiffs sought this civil remedy because “irreparable damage” might occur by the time lengthier criminal proceedings concluded and also because of the difficulty in prosecuting corporations responsible for pollution.28Id. at 66, 70. “At the beginning of the nineteenth century a corporation was regarded as incapable of committing a criminal offence, and was therefore beyond the reach of criminal proceedings for public nuisance.” Id. at 70. Accordingly, by the end of the nineteenth century, civil actions replaced criminal prosecutions in standard public nuisance cases concerning “general health hazards” and highway obstructions.29Id. at 70. Separately, private citizens could also sue for damages if they received a “special injury” from a public nuisance.30Id. at 74. The special-injury action has elicited much controversy and scholarship. See generally Prosser, supra note 17 (discussing the history of public nuisance and the special-injury rule); F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. Rev. 480 (1949) (arguing that the special-injury rule blurs the distinction between negligence and public nuisance).

B.  Public Nuisance in the United States

American courts inherited public nuisance from their English forebears, and the doctrine continued to evolve to address changing social conditions. The early American cases largely fell into two groups: obstruction of public highways and navigable waterways, and a “loose amalgamation of minor offenses involving public morals or the public welfare,” including gambling, “keeping a disorderly house or tavern,” and “enabling prostitution.”31Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741, 800–01 (2003). But as the economy industrialized, courts applied public nuisance to new conditions such as air and water pollution.32Id. at 802. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state legislatures responded to this changing landscape by adopting statutes that defined public nuisance in broad language or enumerated activities constituting a public nuisance.33Id. at 804. For an example of a broad public nuisance statute, see California’s nuisance statute, infra Section I.C. For a hypothetical example of the statutory approach that enumerates activities constituting a public nuisance, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (“[A] common type of statute declares black currant bushes or barberry bushes or other plants that harbor parasites such as rust that are destructive to grain or timber to be public nuisances. These statutes amount to a legislative declaration that the conduct proscribed is an unreasonable interference with a public right.”). These statutes enabled public authorities to use public nuisance as a “stopgap measure” and abate unforeseen activities that “might injure or annoy the general public.”34Gifford, supra note 31, at 804; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (“With the elimination of common law crimes, general statutes have been adopted in most of the states to provide criminal penalties for public nuisances, often without defining the term at all, or with only a very broad and sometimes rather vague definition.”). However, beginning in the Progressive Era, state governments adopted comprehensive statutes and regulations that diminished their reliance on public nuisance as a stopgap measure, thus resulting in fewer public nuisance actions.35Gifford, supra note 31, at 805–06.

By the early twentieth century, individual states as parens patriae—“parent of the country”—sued parties in federal court to enjoin or abate public nuisances.36See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 592, 600, 604–05 (1982). Parens patriae standing rests on a state’s “interest in the abatement of public nuisances, instances in which the injury to the public health and comfort [is] graphic and direct.”37Id. at 604. Parens patriae standing later provided the “architecture” of the tobacco litigation in the 1990s and the opioid litigation in the twenty-first century, with “an official (such as a state’s attorney general or a locality’s district attorney) suing on behalf of the public.”38Kendrick, supra note 4, at 705–07.

In 1979, the American Law Institute published the influential Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Second Restatement”), which included a comprehensive overview of public nuisance.39Public nuisance was not discussed in the Restatement (First) of Torts in 1939. See Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. Tort L. 1, 20 (2011). Section 821B states:

(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.

(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include the following:

(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or

(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or

(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.40Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (Am. L. Inst. 1979). Eminent torts scholar William Prosser had served as reporter for the Second Restatement but resigned after his first draft of section 821B was sent back to him for revision by members who disagreed with his view that a public nuisance must always be criminal. See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 722. These dissenting members believed such a narrow definition would inhibit the doctrine’s use against novel environmental harms. See id.

The Second Restatement further defines a “public right” as a right “common to all members of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.”41Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1979). Scholars have criticized the Second Restatement’s definition of public nuisance as overly broad, vague, and partially responsible for the subsequent increase in public nuisance lawsuits involving novel harms, such as those caused by products.42See e.g., Gifford, supra note 31, at 809 (“[Section 821B] serves instead as an invitation for judges and jurors to provide their own definitions of what constitutes ‘unreasonable interference’ and ‘a right common to the general public’ without the guidance generally provided by precedents.”); Merrill, supra note 39, at 4 (“Courts are invited by the Restatement, based on the presence of one of three very broadly defined ‘circumstances,’ to decide what constitutes a ‘right common to the general public,’ and to determine what sort of circumstances represent an ‘unreasonable interference’ with this right.”).

In the decades that followed the Second Restatement and in the backdrop of a burgeoning environmental movement,43Kendrick, supra note 4, at 721. some states successfully sued defendants under a public nuisance theory for creating an injurious and ongoing condition even though the defendants no longer contributed to the condition or, because they had sold the land, could no longer abate it.44Gifford, supra note 31, at 810. In one prominent case, United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., a federal district court ruled that a chemical company’s formerly owned toxic-waste dump, from which hazardous chemicals later seeped into surrounding surface and groundwater, was a public nuisance and that the company was liable to the State of New York for abatement costs.45United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 961–62, 971 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) [hereinafter Hooker II]. The court rejected the chemical company’s argument that upon its sale of the property to the City of Niagara Falls Board of Education—which included notice of the waste in the deed—its liability ended.46See id. at 968–70. The court instead adopted a rule that the creator of a harmful condition cannot evade restitution liability for abatement costs simply by selling the land.47See id. But see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (“When the vendor or lessor has created the condition his liability continues until the vendee or lessee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it.”). The court in Hooker II considered the public interest at stake and the nature of the activity as reasons to find an exception to the rule in section 834 of the Second Restatement. See Hooker II, 722 F. Supp. at 969. Hooker II and its progeny gave states a framework to recover public health expenditures, incurred to abate an alleged public nuisance, as damages.48See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 723–24; see also Gifford, supra note 31, at 813 (“[T]he focus of public nuisance law shifted dramatically from its origins as a means of forcing the termination of conduct found harmful to public health or public welfare toward becoming a new source of compensatory damages for a wide variety of arguably injurious conditions that fall within the amorphous definition of the tort.”).

Hooker II also exemplifies how damages, as opposed to an injunction, emerged as a viable remedy in public nuisance actions brought by states. At the common law, only plaintiffs who suffered “harm [from a public nuisance] of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public” could recover damages.49See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1979). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some courts did allow government entities to recover damages by demonstrating “peculiar and special damage” from a public nuisance.50Kendrick, supra note 4, at 748. Kendrick has argued that these earlier cases seem “analogous to contemporary courts allowing governmental entities to pursue damages for the extensive funds that they have spent on treating and seeking to remediate harms such as opioid addiction and tobacco-related illnesses.”51Id. at 748–49.

Public nuisance famously provided a breakthrough in twentieth-century tobacco litigation. After four decades of unsuccessful personal injury suits brought by individual plaintiffs,52Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health Through Litigation: Lessons from Tobacco and Opioids, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 285, 291 (2021). These early suits brought by smokers largely failed due to Big Tobacco’s vigorous “no matter the cost” defense as well as legal obstacles relating to assumption of risk, contributory negligence, causation, and damages. Id. at 296–97. the tide turned when state attorneys general sued tobacco companies on a variety of claims, including public nuisance, to recoup public health costs.53Id. at 303. These suits survived early dismissal and got to discovery, unearthing incriminating evidence of Big Tobacco’s dishonest marketing practices.54Id. at 304. As a result, the tobacco companies first settled individually with four states, and then in 1998, collectively settled with the remaining forty-six states—known as the Master Settlement Agreement—for $206 billion.55Id. at 304–05. While the public nuisance claims were not tried on the merits in these suits, their success incentivized states to pursue similar claims against companies that make and sell handguns, lead paint, carbon-emitting energy, and opioids.56See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 724–25.

C.  Public Nuisance in California

California’s expansive view of public nuisance can be traced to the broad definition of “nuisance” in its 1872 statute:

Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway . . . .57Cal. Civ. Code § 3479 (West 2023).

Section 3480 further defines a “public” nuisance as one that “affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.”58Id. § 3480. To establish a public nuisance in California, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant knowingly created or assisted in the creation of a substantial and unreasonable interference with a public right.59People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 518, 525 (Ct. App. 2017).

In 1997, the California Supreme Court clarified the meaning of a “public right” by quoting the Second Restatement’s five categories that are protected from interference: “[T]he public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.”60People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(2)(a)). In upholding an injunction against disruptive gang activity in a San Jose neighborhood, the court articulated the purpose of public nuisance: “[T]o protect the quality of organized social life.”61Id. at 602, 604. The gang activity at issue included open drug use and dealing, loud music, appropriation of public space, vandalism, and violence.62See id. at 601.

This understanding of public rights underpins the enduring use of public nuisance in California to abate problem properties. In 2015, the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the classification of a restaurant as a public nuisance because of ongoing loitering, drinking, drug dealing, prostitution, and violence that occurred on the property.63Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46, 58–59 (Ct. App. 2015). The court dismissed the owner’s argument that he should not be held responsible for the crimes of third parties in a high-crime area because the owner failed to make reasonable operational changes to discourage such activity.64Id. The recommended changes included changing the restaurant’s hours of operation and hiring a security guard. Id. at 53. In other words, the owner was liable for the blighted condition of his property since it attracted morally offensive and dangerous behavior that degraded the quality of life of the surrounding community.

California’s broadly worded nuisance statute and expansive understanding of public rights set the stage for successful public nuisance suits involving products. In People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., the Sixth Court of Appeals held that three companies created a public nuisance by promoting lead-based paint in the past and remanded the case to the trial court to recalculate abatement damages.65People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 518, 598 (Ct. App. 2017). Looking exclusively to California’s public nuisance statute and prior precedent, the court was not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that lead-paint poisoning causes “private harm” that, even in the aggregate, does not interfere with public rights.66Id. at 552. Rather, the court held that lead paint interferes with the “community’s ‘public right’ to housing that does not poison children,” and that “[r]esidential housing, like water, electricity, natural gas, and sewer services, is an essential community resource.”67Id. The defendants ultimately settled for $305 million.68Kendrick, supra note 4, at 725.

Other states have refused to follow California in holding that lead paint poisoning is a public nuisance. In 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a trial court judgment against lead paint manufacturers and a trade association, holding that, among other reasons, the Attorney General had failed to prove that lead poisoning interferes with a public right.69State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008). In the court’s view, lead poisoning harms a private right rather than public right, which it defined as a right to “indivisible resources shared by the public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way.”70Id. at 453. The court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would be antithetical to the common law, extend liability to any legal product that interferes with a private right, and blur the boundaries between public nuisance and product liability law.71Id. at 454–56.

Commentators also share this traditionalist stance and find support in the Second Restatement’s description of a public right as “collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be . . . negligently injured.”72Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1979). Thus, some scholars contend that a product might violate a person’s right to not be negligently injured, but this harm cannot, in aggregate, violate a public right.73See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 31, at 818 (“[T]he exposure to lead-based paint usually occurs within the most private and intimate of surroundings, his or her own home. Injuries occurring in this context do not resemble the rights traditionally understood as public rights for public nuisance purposes . . . .”); Merrill, supra note 39, at 10 (“A mass tort, such as distributing a defective product to millions of consumers, violates a large number of private rights. But this does not convert such a tort into the violation of a public right.”). More fundamentally, they view these public nuisance claims involving products as democratically illegitimate attempts to bypass state product liability law, which state legislatures have set forth in statutes.74See Dana, supra note 16, at 99 (footnote omitted) (“Because (according to this argument) products liability law is legislatively authorized and hence democratically legitimate, the attempt to use public nuisance in what is the realm properly reserved for products liability law is illegitimate. Product-based nuisance claims are an improper effort to avoid state tort law, as duly established by the legislature.”). The Restatement (Third) of Torts similarly states that mass harms caused by dangerous products should be redressed through the law of product liability.75Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 8 cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 2020).

II.  THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

A.  A Brief History

The origin of America’s opioid epidemic can be traced to 1995 when the FDA approved OxyContin, a powerful prescription painkiller made by Purdue Pharma L.P. (“Purdue”).76Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 307. In the late 1980s, Purdue began developing a replacement for its successful painkiller MS Contin, a morphine pill with a patented controlled-release mechanism that was soon to expire.77Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, New Yorker (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain [https://web.archive.org/web/20240122052118/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain]. Purdue’s chemists applied this controlled-release mechanism to oxycodone, an opioid twice as powerful as morphine, and named the resulting pill OxyContin.78Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 308. The delayed-release feature enabled Purdue to sell the pill in high dosages and convince the FDA to allow a package insert suggesting OxyContin was less prone to abuse.79Keefe, supra note 77. The package insert stated the delayed-release mechanism “is believed to reduce the abuse liability.” Id. Following FDA approval, Purdue launched an unprecedented marketing campaign that successfully persuaded doctors to prescribe OxyContin as a general treatment for chronic pain.80Id. Colossal returns followed: annual sales of OxyContin reached $1 billion within five years and ultimately generated $35 billion for the company.81Id.

But Purdue’s bonanza birthed a national catastrophe. OxyContin initiated an epidemic of addiction from the hollers of West Virginia to the hills of San Francisco. Patients prescribed OxyContin soon learned that its advertised twelve-hour relief lasted eight hours, causing them to experience withdrawal symptoms and seek more pills at higher doses.82See Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 309. The pills could also be crushed into powder, removing their delayed-release coating, that could then be ingested or, when mixed with water, intravenously injected for an immediate, euphoric high.83Id. As a result, OxyContin made many unsuspecting patients addicted and was widely abused.84See Keefe, supra note 77.

In response, Purdue ultimately reformulated the drug in 2010 to make it nearly impossible to crush, and doctors reversed their liberal prescribing habits, but this did little to ameliorate the damage done: users turned to illicit alternatives such as heroin and fentanyl for their fix. Even though opioid prescriptions from retail pharmacies fell from a peak of 255 million in 2012 to about 143 million in 2020,85See Arian Campo-Flores & Jon Kamp, Fentanyl’s Ubiquity Inflames America’s Drug Crisis, Wall St. J. (Sept. 30, 2022, 10:54 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fentanyls-ubiquity-inflames-american-drug-crisis-11664549424 [https://perma.cc/MPD8-XV29]. overall opioid overdoses increased, first with heroin,86See, e.g., William N. Evans, Ethan Lieber & Patrick Power, How the Reformulation of OxyContin Ignited the Heroin Epidemic 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24475, 2018); Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 327. and then to a much greater degree with fentanyl.87Opioids: Understanding the Epidemic, CDC (Aug. 8, 2023), https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/basics/epidemic.html [https://perma.cc/2JHY-GBT7]. In total, from 1999 to 2021, nearly 645,000 people died from overdoses involving prescription and illicit opioids.88Id.

B.  The Opioid Litigation

Opioid litigation has followed a similar trajectory to tobacco litigation. Individual plaintiffs pursued the first claims against Purdue, alleging the company breached its duty of care in deceptively promoting a drug with inadequate warnings and defective design, but these suits rarely survived summary judgment.89See Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 310–11. The plaintiffs faced many obstacles in proving their claims: Purdue’s attorneys argued the drug had been approved by the FDA, prescribing doctors had been adequately warned about the drug’s danger, the plaintiffs had illegally abused the drug, and various other causation issues. See id. at 311–12. In contrast, public nuisance claims fared much better. West Virginia’s Attorney General brought the first public suit alleging multiple claims, including public nuisance, that induced Purdue to settle for $10 million in 2004.90See id. at 314. Purdue settled similar suits in 2007, paying $19.5 million to twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, and $24 million to Kentucky.91See id. at 314–16.

Starting in 2014, a new wave of litigation ensued against a wider group of defendants—other opioid manufacturers, distributers, and retail pharmacies—and filed by a more diverse group of public plaintiffs—cities, counties, states, and tribes.92See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 731. This litigation has occurred in both federal and state courts and features a range of claims, including public nuisance and violations of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).93Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 316–19. In federal court, three thousand federal lawsuits were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) in Ohio.94Kendrick, supra note 4, at 732. The magnitude of potential liability facing these defendants has encouraged many to settle. Drugmaker Johnson & Johnson and distributors AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson finalized a nationwide settlement in February 2022.95Geoff Mulvihill, J&J, Distributors Finalize $26B Landmark Opioid Settlement, Associated Press (Feb. 25, 2022, 8:43 AM), https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-business-health-opioids-camden-dec0982c4c40ad08b2b30b725471e000 [https://perma.cc/EJ3X-SHMC]. Purdue, which has since declared bankruptcy, and its owners, the Sackler family, reached a nationwide settlement in March 2022.96Geoff Mulvihill & John Seewer, Purdue Pharma, US States Agree to New Opioid Settlement, Associated Press (Mar. 3, 2022, 11:34 AM), https://apnews.com/article/purdue-pharma-opioid-settlement-9482fa0389f68de6844d13ea2ebefe5a [https://perma.cc/ZDV3-XUYB]. And lastly, Walgreens, Walmart, and CVS agreed to a nationwide settlement in November 2022.97Sharon Terlep & Sarah Nassauer, Walmart to Pay $3.1 Billion to Settle Opioid Lawsuits, Wall St. J. (Nov. 15, 2022, 3:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/walmart-to-pay-3-1-billion-to-settle-opioid-lawsuits-11668514958 [https://perma.cc/73XQ-4S33].

For the few cases that have gone to trial, courts have disagreed on whether the opioid epidemic constitutes a public nuisance. For example, following a bench trial in Oklahoma that resulted in a $465 million judgment against Johnson & Johnson, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed, holding that the district court erred in extending Oklahoma’s public nuisance statute to harms from prescription opioids.98State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, 499 P.3d 719, 720 (Okla. 2021). Likening opioids to lead paint and handguns (the subjects of previous public nuisance litigation), the court explained that the harm from a legal product does not interfere with a public right, which it defined as a “right to a public good, such as ‘an indivisible resource shared by the public at large, like air, water, or public rights-of-way.’ ”99Id. at 726–27 (quoting City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Rather, the court viewed the essence of the state’s claim as “a private tort action for individual injuries sustained from use of a lawful product and in providing medical treatment or preventative treatment to certain, though numerous, individuals.”100Id. at 727. The court also expressed concerns that if it affirmed the trial court, then the misuse of any prescription medicine or legal product could give rise to a public nuisance claim.101Id.

Following the decision in Oklahoma, two bench trials also held defendants not liable for public nuisance. In a bellwether bench trial in the Ohio MDL,102See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 622 F. Supp. 3d 584, 584 (N.D. Ohio 2022). a federal district court in West Virginia followed the traditionalist reasoning of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in finding that the distribution of prescription opioids does not interfere with a public right.103See City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 609 F. Supp. 3d 408, 473–76 (S.D. W. Va. 2022). Similarly, a state court in California entered judgment in favor of various opioid manufacturers but did so because the People did not present evidence that the manufacturer’s allegedly false marketing caused medically inappropriate prescriptions.104People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 31743, at *2, *10 (Dec. 14, 2021). But unlike the district court in West Virginia, the court made clear that the opioid epidemic was a substantial interference with “collective social interests” and that a showing of unreasonable conduct could constitute a public nuisance.105See id. at *9, *31.

However, two other bellwether MDL cases succeeded on the merits: City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., discussed in Part III, and County of Lake, Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P.106In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 622 F. Supp. 3d at 590–91. In the former, Walgreens was found to have substantially contributed to an opioid epidemic in San Francisco,107City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2022). and in the latter, CVS, Walmart, and Walgreens were found liable for contributing to an opioid epidemic in Ohio.108In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 622 F. Supp. 3d at 593.

III.  THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN SAN FRANCISCO

The San Francisco City Attorney filed claims in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against dozens of opioid manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers, and by the trial’s close in July 2022, only Walgreens remained.109City & County of San Francisco, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 938. The city pursued a single public nuisance claim at trial.110Id. Judge Charles Breyer held that the city proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Walgreens knowingly engaged in unreasonable conduct that was a substantial factor in creating an opioid epidemic in San Francisco.111Id. A subsequent remedies trial was scheduled to begin on November 7, 2022, but Judge Breyer vacated this date after Walgreens announced a tentative nationwide opioid settlement for nearly $5 billion.112See Dave Simpson, SF-Walgreens Opioid Trial Called Off Amid Settlement Talks, Law360 (Nov. 4, 2022, 9:16 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1546999/sf-walgreens-opioid-trial-called-off-amid-settlement-talks [https://perma.cc/G4TY-KKSE]; Sharon Terlep, CVS, Walgreens to Pay More Than $10 Billion to Settle Opioid Lawsuits, Wall St. J. (Nov. 2, 2022, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cvs-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-opioid-lawsuits-11667358371 [https://perma.cc/7Y5W-SE8H]. Separately, Walgreens settled with the city for $230 million to be paid across fifteen years.113Alene Tchekmedyian, Walgreens Agrees to Pay San Francisco Nearly $230 Million to Settle Opioid Lawsuit, L.A. Times (May 17, 2023, 9:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-05-17/walgreens-san-francisco-settlement [https://perma.cc/CD3C-D2MP].

Judge Breyer’s lengthy opinion described a city under siege from opioid addiction. The epidemic in San Francisco unfolded in three waves.114City & County of San Francisco, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 941. The first wave, from 2000 to 2010, consisted of an increase in opioid addiction and overdose deaths following a rise in opioid prescriptions.115Id. at 943. By 2010, San Francisco’s rate of opioid overdoses was 2.23 times the national average despite the city’s “significant investment in public health programs designed to combat opioid abuse.”116Id. In the second wave, beginning in the early 2010s, prescriptions declined while heroin use and overdose deaths increased.117See id. at 944. The city had faced a heroin problem in the late 1990s, but in this second wave, the problem became “significantly worse.”118Id. Evidence suggests heroin returned to the city because of prescription-opioid addiction. The Chief of Emergency Medicine at Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital testified that “approximately two-thirds of the patients who present[ed] to the [emergency department] with an opioid-related medical condition report[ed] that their addiction started with pills.”119Id. at 945. The third wave began in 2015 with the arrival of fentanyl, a dangerous synthetic opioid fifty times more potent than heroin.120See id. at 945–46. All in all, the demand for prescription opioids, heroin, and fentanyl caused deaths to skyrocket: from 2015 to 2020, opioid-related emergency room visits tripled, and overdoses increased 478%, from 101 in 2015 to 584 in 2020.121Id. at 946.

The evidence at trial revealed the epidemic’s tremendous toll on city workers and resources. The Fire Department’s Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) team received so many overdose calls that it created a special response team to answer them.122Id. at 947. Encountering unconscious individuals on the streets, many of whom were “frequent callers who rotate from the street to the emergency room and back to the street,” became the “new normal” for EMS.123Id. Similarly, Public Works faced a “significantly more challenging” job cleaning streets and sidewalks because of the large number of opioid users who “often vomit, have diarrhea, and leave used needles in public right of ways.”124Id. These crews collected 95,000 used syringes annually in recent years, often encountered people experiencing overdoses, and sometimes came across deceased opioid users on their rounds.125Id.

The epidemic especially impacted San Francisco’s public parks. The Recreation and Parks Department (“RPD”) created special teams to respond to the harms caused by opioid use in the city’s parks.126Id. at 948. Its outreach team engaged with homeless individuals living in parks, and according to Sergeant Maja Follin, a Head Park Ranger in RPD, the “vast majority” of these individuals suffer from substance abuse.127See id. For Sergeant Follins’s full declaration detailing drug use in the city’s parks, see Declaration of Maja Follin, City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (No. 3:18-cv-07591-CRB). Meanwhile, RPD’s environmental services team removed biohazards such as used syringes and human feces.128City & County of San Francisco, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 948. In 2019, the team recovered 10,360 syringes from Golden Gate Park.129Id. Their work could be high-stakes and laborious: at Dolores Park, needles were thrown into a children’s play area, requiring RPD to “sift through the sand” and recover them.130Id. Because of these biohazards, RPD regularly closed off sections of parks.131Id. And at Jose Coronado Park, so many people “obstruct[ed] the sidewalk using drugs and spending the day . . . lying across the sidewalk and making it impossible for people to . . . access the park or . . . walk down the sidewalk” that the city had to install barricades to create safe passage for park goers.132Id.

The San Francisco Public Library (“SFPL”) system also faced “serious health and safety risks for library visitors and staff” due to the opioid epidemic.133Id. at 949. The SFPL system consists of twenty-eight libraries across the city and had recently drawn over six million annual visitors. Id. Library staff routinely discovered patrons using and overdosing on opioids outside the building, in the stacks, and in the bathrooms.134Id. Similarly, staff found needles in the stacks, in bathrooms, on shelves, inside of books, and in children’s reading areas.135Id. On occasion, staff were even stuck with used syringes.136Id. Damage to plumbing from flushed syringes caused multiple library closures and cost tens of thousands of dollars to fix.137Id. Because of the epidemic, SFPL incurred additional expenses, such as hiring a full-time social worker to connect those suffering from opioid addiction with support services.138Id. SFPL also contracted with the San Francisco Police Department to provide officers to patrol the libraries and help respond to the proliferation of drug use and overdoses.139Id.

At the trial, the aforementioned evidence demonstrated that the opioid epidemic, defined as “high rates of opioid abuse, addiction, and overdoses,” constitutes a public nuisance that interferes with all five categories of public rights recognized by the California Supreme Court: the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort, and public convenience.140Id. at 1008. The city also successfully proved that Walgreens had knowledge that its unreasonable conduct caused the nuisance.141Id. at 998. As the “last line of defense” against the diversion of controlled substances,142See id. at 996. the pharmacy failed to perform due diligence on over 1.2 million red flag prescriptions in a fifteen-year period.143Id. at 985. Red flag prescriptions are “objective warning signs that indicate that a prescription may not be legitimate.” Id. at 979. The city’s expert identified fourteen categories commonly used to identify these prescriptions. Id. For example, some categories flagged “Long Distance Travel,” “Doctor-Shopping,” and “Cash Payment.” Id. at 980. Large volumes of these prescriptions came from “rogue pain clinics and rogue doctors”: from 2006 to 2020, Walgreens pharmacies in the Bay Area filed 161,696 prescriptions from prescribers who later “faced discipline for their prescribing practices and several of whom lost their medical licenses.”144Id. at 993. This failure to perform due diligence violated CSA regulation, so the court concluded this failure was unreasonable.145Id. at 998–1000. Specifically, the court found that Walgreens violated 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). Id. at 999 (“[A] prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment . . . is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of [21 U.S.C. § 829] and the person knowingly filling such a purported prescription . . . shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a))). Moreover, the CSA’s regulatory scheme was sufficient to demonstrate that Walgreens “must have known” about the harms of opioid diversion, notwithstanding external Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) investigations and internal correspondence among executives that revealed Walgreens executives had actual notice of harms from prescription-drug abuse.146Id. at 1000–02. The court noted that the CSA and its implementing regulations “were put in place precisely because of the harms that result when opioids are diverted,” thus giving Walgreens notice that its failure to comply with these regulations would result in harmful opioid diversion. Id. at 1001.

The court also held that the evidence proved factual and proximate causation. “[C]ircumstantial evidence of sufficient substantiality”—namely that Walgreens, the largest dispenser of opioids in San Francisco, had failed to perform due diligence on thousands of suspicious prescriptions from 2006 to 2020 as the city experienced an opioid epidemic—satisfied causation in fact.147Id. at 1003–04. And the “cycle of addiction,” and its downstream burden on the city and the public, was foreseeable.148Id. at 1007. As a part of its proximate cause analysis, the court concluded that extending liability to Walgreens would not open the “floodgates” of litigation against any seller of a product with a known risk of harm because Walgreens’s liability stemmed from its unique fifteen-year failure to comply with federal regulation.149Id.

IV.  OPIOID ADDICTION INTERFERES WITH PUBLIC RIGHTS

The decision in City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P. rebukes the traditionalist, categorical stance that public nuisance should not be extended to products. As demonstrated in San Francisco, opioid addiction interferes with public rights because addiction drives behavior that obstructs public space, forcing local government to incur substantial abatement costs. Moreover, this behavior can essentially turn entire neighborhoods into dangerous public drug dens featuring behavior that is offensive to witness.

Because California broadly defines public nuisance and public rights, the court did not base its judgment on a finding that Walgreens’s conduct interfered with public rights as traditionally understood in the common law.150See id. at 1008–09. This Note seeks to do so in order to demonstrate how products such as opioids can interfere with traditionally protected public rights in the hopes that states that have rejected public nuisance suits against product-caused harms in the name of tradition might be persuaded otherwise.

A.  Opioid Addiction Interferes with Public Space

Courts have refused to extend public nuisance liability in the opioid epidemic because opioids, like lead paint, do not interfere with public rights. For example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma viewed the state’s public nuisance claim as a “private tort action for individual injuries sustained from use of a lawful product.”151State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, 499 P.3d 719, 726–27 (Okla. 2021). This rationale largely stems from the Second Restatement’s definition of a public right as “collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or . . . negligently injured.”152Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1979).

But the opioid epidemic cannot be reduced to individual cases of private injury. It is frequently observed that a public nuisance is a condition rather than conduct,153See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 4, at 755 (“Courts and commentators have observed that public nuisance focuses on a condition rather than on conduct—that is, on whether a particular condition interferes with a public right, not on whether someone acted unreasonably (or worse) in bringing it about.”). so it should be emphasized that, here, the condition is opioid addiction. Addiction inflicts private harm, especially in instances of overdose and death, but as demonstrated in San Francisco, it also inflicts substantial civic harm.

An aspect of opioid addiction’s civic harm resembles a classic common law public nuisance. The archetypal public nuisance is obstruction of a highway,154See id. at 716. and this is often referred to as an interference with the “public convenience” because the highway’s purpose is to improve travel for the public.155See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1979). Similarly, municipalities set aside space for the public convenience: sidewalks make it easier to walk around town safe from motor vehicles; parks provide a place of respite and leisure from concrete city blocks; and libraries facilitate free access to information in a quiet environment.

Opioid addiction interferes with the public’s right to use these spaces as intended. In San Francisco, residents must navigate sidewalks strewn with health hazards, such as feces and needles, and obstructed with the bodies of individuals who are unconscious, and sometimes deceased, from opioid use.156City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 947–48 (N.D. Cal. 2022). Similarly, the prevalence of biohazards in parks impacts the safety of residents, especially infants.157Id. at 948. This is not an abstract danger: in November 2022, a ten-month-old toddler was hospitalized after being exposed to fentanyl in a San Francisco park.158Robert Handa, Baby Exposed to Fentanyl at San Francisco Park, Family Says, NBC Bay Area (Dec. 5, 2022, 1:50 PM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/baby-exposed-fentanyl-san-francisco/3092940 [https://perma.cc/E2QK-TNNG]. Moreover, these biohazards cause closures until they can be removed.159City & County of San Francisco, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 948. People addicted to opioids can also obstruct access while in an opiated stupor, as shown in one park where the city built a barricade to provide safe access for parkgoers because of the number of opioid users lying about.160Id. And in libraries, visitors who seek quiet access to books and computers must contend with people overdosing outside the building, in the stacks, and in the bathrooms; needles left everywhere from bookshelves to children’s reading areas; and closures due to plumbing damage from flushed syringes.161Id. at 949.

1.  Opioid Addiction and Homelessness

Opioid addiction’s interference with public space stems from, at least in part, its significant relationship with homelessness. In making this connection, I do not intend to dehumanize homeless individuals; I simply point out the obvious impact a substantial, concentrated homeless population can have on a city’s public space and resources. While homelessness has many causes, the evidence at trial made clear that many of San Francisco’s homeless residents suffer from addiction. RPD’s outreach teams submitted that the vast majority of the homeless people living in San Francisco’s parks struggle with substance abuse.162Id. at 948. Similarly, the Fire Department’s EMS team described “frequent callers who rotate from the street to the emergency room and back to the street,” also suggesting that many of those suffering from opioid addiction are homeless.163Id. at 947. The EMS team further noted that a majority of individuals who die of overdose deaths in the city had prior contact with EMS.164Id. This underlines the terrifying power that opioids hold over the addicted when one considers that repeated overdose emergencies failed to stop these individuals from abusing opioids.

Unsurprisingly, the opioid epidemic in San Francisco corresponded with an increase in its homeless population. Between 2005 and 2020—the same period of time in which Walgreens’s conduct was examined at trial—the estimated homeless population in San Francisco rose from 5,404 to 8,124, and the unsheltered homeless population rose from 2,655 to 5,180.165Michael Shellenberger, San Fransicko: Why Progressives Ruin Cities 5 (2021). And between 2010—the year of OxyContin’s reformulation, which contributed to an increase in heroin use166See supra Section II.A.—and 2020, the number of calls to the city’s 311 line complaining about used hypodermic needles rose from 224 to 6,275.167Shellenberger, supra note 165, at 7. Assuming that housed opioid users would not be discarding needles in public spaces, this increase in 311 complaints may indicate greater opioid use among the homeless population. Similarly, from 2013 to 2016, complaints about homeless encampments also increased from two per day to sixty-three per day.168Id. at 3. While correlation does not equal causation and many persuasively argue that the primary driver of homelessness in California is a lack of affordable housing,169See, e.g., Jerusalem Demsas, The Obvious Answer to Homelessness, Atlantic (Dec. 23, 2022, 2:52 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/01/homelessness-affordable-housing-crisis-democrats-causes/672224 [https://perma.cc/R6V9-TF7N] (arguing that the primary cause of homelessness in Los Angeles and San Francisco is a lack of affordable housing due to incumbent homeowners who oppose development). it cannot be disputed that a relationship exists between the city’s visible increase in homelessness and drug use, as addiction can cause a person to spurn employment, housing, and family assistance.

Moreover, homelessness has become one of California’s top issues among voters, reflecting, at least in part, a public exasperated with ubiquitous encampments that feature harrowing spectacles of suffering and depravity. In a 2021 poll conducted by Los Angeles County—before the pandemic and then inflation became top concerns—94% of respondents said homelessness was “a serious or very serious problem.”170See id. And in a 2022 survey asking California voters to rank the top issue in California, 13% selected homelessness, just below the 15%—the largest cohort in the study—who selected “inflation or the rising cost of living.”171USC Schwarzenegger Institute—USC Price California Issues Poll Fall 2022 General Election Poll, USC Schwarzenegger Inst. (Nov. 4, 2022), https://schwarzenegger.usc.edu/institute_in_action/usc-schwarzenegger-institute-usc-price-california-issues-poll-fall-2022-general-election-poll [https://perma.cc/QGA9-YKEJ]. The fact that voters expect the government to take greater action on homelessness highlights the issue’s public impact, much like a traditional public nuisance.172See, e.g., Benjamin Oreskes & Doug Smith, L.A. Voters Are Angry, Think Elected Officials Aren’t Equipped to Solve Homelessness, L.A. Times (Feb. 10, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2022-02-10/new-survey-underscores-anger-about-homelessness-among-los-angeles-voters [https://perma.cc/CE96-6JRH] (“The professional pollsters who led the conversations [about homelessness] with 39 people in six groups said they were stunned by the depth of feeling and unanimity across party affiliation, socioeconomic standing, race and ethnicity.”).

2.  Opioid Addiction and Methamphetamine Use

One might counter that the increase in homelessness in cities such as San Francisco owes more to the concurrent rise in street use of the psychostimulant methamphetamine. Beginning in the mid-2000s, DEA chemists noticed a new form of street methamphetamine, one made with phenyl-2-propanone (“P2P”), which can be created in a lab using variety of legal, cheap chemicals that have various industrial uses.173Sam Quinones, ‘I Don’t Know That I Would Call It Meth Anymore,’ Atlantic (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/11/the-new-meth/620174 [https://perma.cc/FE3P-GFVA]. Methamphetamine had previously been made with the ingredient ephedrine in the 1980s and 1990s, but due to government clampdowns on ephedrine in the United States and Mexico, acquiring ephedrine in large quantities became less feasible. Id. An unlimited supply of P2P spurred industrial-scale production by Mexican cartels, making this new form of methamphetamine plentiful and cheap across America.174See id.

Alarmingly, this new methamphetamine is far more debilitating to the mental health of its users: professionals who work with recovering addicts and homeless people have noticed a startling spike of severe, methamphetamine-induced psychosis, even in those with no prior history of mental illness.175See id. For example, Susan Partovi, a physician who treats homeless people in Los Angeles, noticed increasing cases of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder in her clinics starting in 2012 and commented, “Now almost everyone we see when we do homeless outreach on the streets is on meth.” Id. Methamphetamine also causes paranoia and antisocial behavior that might explain the visible increase in tent encampments in San Francisco and Los Angeles, since tents provide privacy.176See id. (“Tents protect many homeless people from the elements. But tents and the new meth seem made for each other. With a tent, the user can retreat not just mentally from the world but physically.”). Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Craig Mitchell, who founded the Skid Row Running Club, attributes much of Los Angeles’ “visible homelessness”—people sleeping on sidewalks and in tents—to meth. Id. As a result, this new methamphetamine has presented difficulties for homeless-service workers and has thus complicated city efforts to abate the obstruction of public space caused by encampments.

However, “the increases in methamphetamine availability and harms are intertwined with the ongoing opioid overdose crisis.”177Christopher M. Jones, Debra Houry, Beth Han, Grant Baldwin, Alana Vivolo-Kantor & Wilson M. Compton, Methamphetamine Use in the United States: Epidemiological Update and Implications for Prevention, Treatment, and Harm Reduction, 1508 Annals N.Y. Acad. Scis. 3, 4 (2022). Opioid involvement in psychostimulant overdoses increased from 34.5% of overdose deaths in 2010 to 53.5% in 2019.178Id. Surveys of recovering addicts reveal that methamphetamine, a stimulant, is often used with opioids, a depressant, to achieve a synergistic high and counteract the negative effects that arise once the opioid high subsides.179See, e.g., id. at 12 (summarizing a study of individuals with opioid-use disorder from 170 treatment facilities in which 51% of respondents stated their primary reason for co-occurring use of the two drugs was “high seeking and synergistic effects” and 38.6% of respondents stated their primary reason was “to balance the effect between the two drugs”); Matthew S. Ellis, Zachary A. Kasper & Theodore J. Cicero, Twin Epidemics: The Surging Rise of Methamphetamine Use in Chronic Opioid Users, 193 Drug & Alcohol Dependence 14, 18 (2018); Public News Video, Homeless Addict in San Francisco Describes Violence on Street and Stealing to Feed His Habit, YouTube (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=koLD091dQ4U (interviewing a homeless man in San Francisco who states that “meth is just a given mostly[, since] you gotta [sic] do something to counteract the downer [of heroin]”). Thus, the rise in methamphetamine use and its severe mental health effects, at the least, cannot be understood independent of the opioid epidemic and, at the most, can be understood as a direct outgrowth of the epidemic. In either interpretation, opioid addiction has played a significant role in the recent increase of homelessness and the related rise in methamphetamine use that has made government efforts to convince people to accept services and leave encampments a Sisyphean challenge.

3.  Opioid Addiction and the High Cost of Abatement

Because of the opioid epidemic and the related interference with public space and rise in homelessness, San Francisco has incurred significant abatement costs. In 2019, the city spent nearly $100 million on street cleaning—an amount four times more than Chicago, which has 3.5 times as many people and a surface area 4.5 times as large.180Shellenberger, supra note 165, at 3. Opioid related conditions “overwhelm the city’s hospitals” and “tax[] the city’s emergency service teams.”181City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2022). San Francisco’s Fire Department, Public Works, Recreation and Parks, and Public Library all have created special teams and allocated resources to respond to the unique challenges presented by the epidemic.182See supra Part III. Additionally, the city has made a “significant investment in public health programs designed to combat opioid abuse.”183City & County of San Francisco, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 943. Moreover, because of the link between opioid addiction and homelessness in San Francisco, the staggering $367.7-million budget for the city’s Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing for 2019–2020 also reflects some of the costs of the opioid epidemic.184HSH Budget, Dep’t of Homelessness & Supportive Hous., https://hsh.sfgov.org/about/budget [https://perma.cc/2JVA-BUXR].

Because of this significant investment, the opioid epidemic also underlines the enduring, important role of public nuisance as a stopgap measure when regulation fails to protect the public. Scholars have argued that public nuisance no longer serves an important stopgap measure in an era of comprehensive regulation.185See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 39, at 32 (arguing that the legislature, rather than the courts, is best equipped to determine how the “costs of regulating public bads should be apportioned among different members of the community”). But, as Dana has noted, “[t]he administrative state has never been perfect at protecting the public from harm, but we do appear to be living in a time when notable regulatory failure and inaction is becoming more, not less, common.”186Dana, supra note 16, at 63.

The opioid epidemic thus reveals the important role of public nuisance in the event of such regulatory failure:

[I]n opioids, an alphabet soup of federal governmental agencies (including the FDA, DEA, and Department of Justice) had significant authority to address the burgeoning opioid problem. In creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme, the legislative branch seemingly did its work. But numerous agencies nevertheless stood by, even as pill mills proliferated, the death toll spiked, and millions of painkillers were pumped into, and decimated, certain communities.187Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 337.

Even though Walgreens paid $80 million to settle investigations brought by the DEA and Department of Justice for CSA violations at a distribution center and six retail pharmacies in Florida,188Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Florida, Walgreens Agrees to Pay a Record Settlement of $80 Million for Civil Penalties Under the Controlled Substances Act (June 11, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/walgreens-agrees-pay-record-settlement-80-million-civil-penalties-under-controlled [https://perma.cc/N6V3-KD6Q]. the company failed to adequately reform its operations and prevent opioid diversion.189City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (“The evidence presented at trial makes clear that Walgreens, the dominant retail pharmacy chain in San Francisco, which had a history of failing to comply with federal regulations, filled a significant volume of illegitimate opioid prescriptions.”). In other words, despite extensive regulation, Walgreens’s San Francisco pharmacies, more likely than not, failed to conduct due diligence on red flag prescriptions from 2006 to 2020, an oversight that forced San Francisco to foot the bill.190Id. at 1000.

B.  Opioid Addiction Interferes with Public Morals

Opioid addiction also interferes with community interests in a manner that resembles problem properties, which were traditionally treated as public nuisances in England and America. William Sheppard identified “lewd-ale houses” as a common nuisance in the 1660s,191Spencer, supra note 21, at 60. and William Blackstone in 1769 listed as public nuisances “all disorderly inns or ale-houses, bawdy-houses, gaming-houses” and “cottages . . . erected singly on the waste, being harbors for thieves and other idle and dissolute persons.”1924 William Blackstone, Commentaries *110. Similarly, early public nuisance cases in America addressed not only obstructions of highways and waterways but also a “loose amalgamation of minor offenses involving public morals or the public welfare.”193See Gifford, supra note 31, at 800–01. William Prosser, who served as reporter of the Second Restatement, categorized problem properties—“houses of prostitution, illegal liquor establishments, [and] gaming houses”—as interfering with public morals.194Prosser, supra note 17, at 1000 (footnote omitted). Thus, the common law in England and America treated properties that attracted illicit, immoral behavior as public nuisances because they were offensive and disruptive to the surrounding community.

California courts have long abated the type of immoral, illicit activity associated with problem properties in public nuisance claims. In 1997, the California Supreme Court upheld an injunction against a San Jose gang for open drug use and dealing, loud music, appropriation of public space, vandalism, and violence.195People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601, 604 (Cal. 1997). Despite widespread criticism of the case among academics,196See Gifford, supra note 31, at 777. the court persuasively articulated that the purpose of public nuisance is to “protect the quality of organized social life.”197Gallo, 929 P.2d at 604. This principle justified the abatement of problem properties in the days of Sheppard and Blackstone and thus marks a common law continuance, not a departure. And in 2015, the Second District Court of Appeals in Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles affirmed the classification of a restaurant as a public nuisance because its operation created a condition of lawless blight that attracted loitering, drinking, drug dealing, prostitution, and violence on the property.198Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46, 58–59 (Ct. App. 2015).

Opioid addiction has similarly ravaged the quality of organized social life in cities by turning parks and neighborhoods into lawless dens of drug use, petty crime, and antisocial behavior. In San Francisco, open-air drug markets have taken over the Tenderloin neighborhood and United Nations Plaza, exposing local residents and visitors to blatant drug deals and drug use in streets strewn with garbage, feces, and needles.199See, e.g., Shellenberger, supra note 165, at 231; Trisha Thadani, Disaster in Plain Sight, S.F. Chronicle (Feb. 2, 2022, 7:30 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/projects/2022/sf-fentanyl-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/3L34-3QEG]; City Officials Detail Efforts to Target Open-Air Drug Dealing, SF.gov (Oct. 5, 2022), https://sf.gov/news/city-officials-detail-efforts-target-open-air-drug-dealing-0 [https://perma.cc/ZSK2-VJNK]. Judge Breyer even noted that “outside this courthouse, people suffering from severe opioid addiction buy, sell, and use opioids in plain sight.”200City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2022). At United Nations Plaza, street vendors sell allegedly stolen goods on the sidewalk,201See J.D. Morris, San Francisco to Crack Down on Stolen Goods Resold on Sidewalks, S.F. Chronicle (Mar. 9, 2022, 6:25 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sf/article/San-Francisco-seeks-to-crackdown-on-stolen-goods-16985089.php [https://perma.cc/CXE2-EAD3]. and some commentators have attributed San Francisco’s increase in property crimes such as larceny, beginning in 2012, to people seeking money to purchase drugs.202See Shellenberger, supra note 165, at 192–94.

Opioid conditions thus interfere with the public morals by facilitating the type of petty criminality and vice that justifies the abatement of problem properties. One might criticize a common law conception of “public morals” as antiquated in the twenty-first century; certainly, public sentiment is far more understanding and lenient towards drug use and prostitution and far more critical of moralistic judgment. But even so, people still seem to respond negatively to illicit behavior in public. To provide just one example, in Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, the record included a citizen’s declaration from nearby residents and business owners lamenting the violence and prostitution outside the restaurant.203Benetatos, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53 (“[W]e have our babies over there in that community, and we need to look out for our babies that’s our future, and something need to be done. I mean, it’s no way that should be going on.” (quoting a citizen in the declaration)). In fact, the Los Angeles Police Department launched its nuisance investigation in response to “recent complaints,”204Id. at 49. presumably from neighbors. And in San Francisco, the successful recall in June 2022 of progressive San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin, who was criticized as being soft on crime, suggests an increasing frustration among residents with quality of life and lawless behavior that the government has failed to address.205See Nellie Bowles, How San Francisco Became a Failed City, Atlantic (June 8, 2022), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/how-san-francisco-became-failed-city/661199 [https://perma.cc/AXP7-9X4R] (“During his campaign, Boudin said he wouldn’t prosecute quality-of-life crimes.”).

C.  Distinguishing Opioids with Other Products

The courts and critics that categorically refuse to apply public nuisance to products might be right to note that California’s recognition of a public right “to housing that does not poison children”206People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 552 (Ct. App. 2017). is essentially the same as a right to not be negligently injured, which the Second Restatement explicitly characterizes as a private, rather than public, right.207Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1979). But see Kendrick, supra note 4, at 750 (arguing that the common law conception of public rights, as outlined by Sheppard and Blackstone, encompassed “individualized rights when threatened in the aggregate”). This reasoning adheres to a traditionalist understanding of public nuisance and distinguishes it from legislatively authorized product liability law.

Other critics have argued the history of public nuisance paints a more complicated picture. Kendrick has looked to the “common nuisances” William Sheppard listed in the 1660s—“victuallers, butchers, bakers, cooks, brewers, maltsters and apothecaries who sell products unfit for human consumption”—and questioned whether “there [is] some fine distinction between the activity of selling products and products themselves.”208Kendrick, supra note 4, at 738. And Dana has argued that while product liability law has been legislatively authorized, it is also a “common law creation of the courts,” so courts should have the authority to “interpret it to leave space for products-based public nuisance claims.”209Dana, supra note 16, at 99.

But this Note primarily argues that opioid addiction has obstructed public space much like the canonical highway blockage and offended public morals much like the canonical problem property. Opioids can therefore be readily distinguished from other products such as lead paint. The former causes tangible harm to the public square, while the latter causes harm within the privacy of the home. The condition of opioid addiction, not unlike the toxic waste in Hooker II, has spilled over onto public sidewalks, parks, and libraries, requiring expensive clean up, emergency response, and social services to abate. And as in Hooker II, in which the chemical company was still liable after selling the toxic dump site, those responsible for the opioid epidemic should not escape liability on the basis that they no longer control the condition that gave rise to the nuisance. Accordingly, the categorical stance against products fails to protect long-recognized public rights from interference.

Thus, the California court of appeal holding in ConAgra Grocery Products, that lead paint interferes with a public right “to housing that does not poison children,”210People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 552 (Ct. App. 2017). is incongruous with the common law understanding of public nuisance. But California’s flexible treatment of public rights should not encourage other states to dismiss public nuisance claims concerning products if those products interfere with traditionally recognized public rights, as opioids do.

D.  Addressing Counter Arguments

This Section will address three counterarguments211This Section does not address all potential critiques to my argument. For a thorough overview of the critiques of public nuisance claims in the context of opioids, see generally Kendrick, supra note 4 (summarizing traditionalist, formalist, and institutionalist objections to public nuisance claims against products and rebutting them in turn).: (1) opioid defendants are not the proximate cause of the interference with public rights, (2) misguided city policy, rather than opioid addiction, is responsible for the public nuisance in San Francisco, and (3) a flood of litigation will ensue if public nuisance is extended to harms caused by legal products.

1.  Proximate Cause Objection

This Note argues that opioid addiction interferes with public rights; nonetheless, even accepting that such an interference has taken place, one might counter that defendants such as Walgreens are not the proximate cause of the interference. In California, proximate causation is an element of a prima facie public nuisance claim,212City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2022). and in a typical action, the causal chain is quite clear: a defendant’s unreasonable conduct creates a harmful condition, and that condition interferes with public rights. For example, a man who digs a ditch in a road has created a condition that interferes with public convenience. However, a defendant’s conduct in opioid cases—whether that be misleading advertising by manufacturers or negligent supervision of red-flag prescriptions by pharmacies—results in an interference with public rights only because of the intervening action of opioid users. The principle of novus actus interveniens would suggest that opioid manufacturers and pharmacies could not be held liable for the behavior of opioid users because their independent wrongdoing marks a break in the causal chain.

However, the stranglehold of opioid addiction can cause a person to spurn employment, family, shelter, and ultimately life itself, distinguishing opioids from other products such as guns that bear no influence over the free will of their user. As Judge Breyer noted, opioids can ensnare even unsuspecting patients into helpless addiction, making downstream consequences such as “crime, homelessness, and destruction of city property” foreseeable.213Id. at 1007. Moreover, just as the crimes of intervening third parties did not absolve the restaurant owner in Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles of public nuisance liability because the owner failed to ameliorate the blighted condition of his property, here, the intervening behavior of opioid addicts should not absolve manufacturers, dispensers, and pharmacies from contributing to the underlying condition that perpetuates this behavior.

2.  The Role of Public Policy

One could also argue that progressive policies, rather than manufacturers and pharmacies, are the cause of the interference with public rights in San Francisco. At least since the Summer of Love in 1967, San Francisco has earned a worldwide reputation for being tolerant towards drug use and homelessness.214See Shellenberger, supra note 165, at 54–55. But following the punitive and, in retrospect, controversial state response to the 1980s crack-cocaine epidemic and the violence it generated, California voters embraced policies more lenient towards drug possession and use. In 2000, voters passed Proposition 36, which required that “people convicted of the possession, use, or transportation of controlled substances and similar parole violations, except sale or manufacture of drugs, receive probation and drug treatment, rather than incarceration.”215California Proposition 36, Probation and Treatment for Drug-Related Offenses Initiative (2000), Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_36,_Probation_and_Treatment_for_Drug-Related_Offenses_Initiative_(2000) [https://perma.cc/SAT9-ZPJN]. Similarly, in 2014, voters passed Proposition 47, which recategorized a variety of nonviolent crimes, including personal use of most illegal drugs and shoplifting of property less than $950, as misdemeanors.216California Proposition 47, Reduced Penalties for Some Crimes Initiative (2014), Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_47,_Reduced_Penalties_for_Some_Crimes_Initiative_(2014) [https://perma.cc/K27L-UMZV]. And beginning in 2009, cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco implemented a “Housing First” approach to homelessness that offers housing with no condition on sobriety.217See Shellenberger, supra note 165, at 58. Critics of these policies argue that it has prevented law enforcement from compelling drug treatment for offenders and from policing crimes such as shoplifting and petty theft that provide those suffering from addiction with the cash to fund their drug use.218See, e.g., id. at 57–58.

While these policies have likely exacerbated the opioid epidemic’s impact on civic order, evidence suggests that opioid addiction has inflicted similar community harm in other states. For example, in the red state of Kentucky, a “county-level survey commissioned by Purdue . . . revealed that ‘[9] out of 10 [people surveyed] agreed that OxyContin had a ‘devastating effect’ on the community.’ ”219Kendrick, supra note 4, at 753–54 (detailing “[i]llegal drug deals . . . in hospital parking lots and school zones,” “[c]oal miners snort[ing] painkillers on the job,” and “FedEx trucks being knocked off”). Thus, it would be inaccurate to categorically claim that opioid addiction does not interfere with public rights.

3.  Concerns About a Flood of Litigation

Many critics contend that if courts extend public nuisance to opioids, then courts would be flooded with product liability suits disguised as public nuisance suits for potentially any legal product that, when misused, causes harm. The middle-road understanding of public nuisance that this Note champions recognizes two primary constraints that should assuage this concern.

First, a product must interfere with a public right to create a public nuisance. As Dana has noted, this requirement distinguishes public nuisance from product liability law because the latter is “focused on the harms specifically borne by discrete individuals, such as individual loss of earning power, medical expenses, and pain and suffering.”220See Dana, supra note 16, at 100. By categorically refusing to apply public nuisance to harms from products, courts may hamper government ability to counteract actual infringements on public rights.

Opposing this categorical view, some critics argue that a dogmatic, traditionalist understanding of public nuisance inhibits the doctrine’s potential as a stopgap measure when regulation fails to protect the public. Kendrick has stated that courts and scholars should “interpret the concept of ‘public rights’ more loosely” and believes that an aggregation of a large number of private harms from products should support a public nuisance claim.221See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 750. Citing early common law cases and broadly worded public nuisance statutes in America, she argues “contemporary formalist tendencies have gone too far.”222See id. at 750–52. California’s statute supports her view.223See id. at 751. California’s statute states that a nuisance is public (rather than private) if it affects a “considerable number of persons.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3480 (West 2023).

Kendrick’s approach, while persuasive, would likely not convince skeptical courts concerned about a flood of litigation. Such concerns are warranted: in the decades following the successful Master Settlement Agreement with tobacco companies, public nuisance claims have proliferated against companies for harms the doctrine has not traditionally redressed.224See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 4, at 705–06 (footnotes omitted) (“[Public nuisance] has also spurred hundreds of mostly unsuccessful actions across the nation involving, among other things, handguns, lead contamination, water pollution, and predatory lending.”). Take opioids: the consolidated MDL litigation in federal court consists of 3,000 lawsuits brought by tribes, municipalities, counties, and states as of October 2022 while separate actions have been brought in state court.225Id. at 732. Unlike the tobacco litigation, in which the attorneys general of all fifty states sued tobacco companies and coordinated an all-encompassing settlement, the opioid litigation features a far greater number of plaintiffs and defendants, complicating an efficient pathway to settle all future claims. Understandably, this litigation presents a “genuinely terrifying” prospect for defendants.226Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 52, at 339–40.

The public nuisance litigation against Juul Labs Inc., which allegedly marketed its e-cigarette and fruit-flavored vapor to youth and downplayed the vapor’s high nicotine content, is another example. Even though these lawsuits have garnered over $1 billion in settlements with forty-seven states and territories and more than five thousand individuals, school districts, and local governments, once Juul withdrew many of its popular flavors in response to regulatory and public pressure, competitors swarmed the market with fruit-flavored alternatives, presenting “an enforcement dilemma” for the FDA, which has only authorized “fewer than two dozen vaping products.”227See Christina Jewett & Julie Creswell, Juul Reaches $462 Million Settlement with New York, California and Other States, N.Y. Times (Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/health/juul-vaping-settlement-new-york-california.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20231011202337/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/health/juul-vaping-settlement-new-york-california.html]. Unlike the centralized state-led tobacco litigation, plaintiff lawyers representing school districts joined the fray and shared in the settlements under a tenuous public nuisance theory, and now these plaintiff lawyers and school districts are bringing similar actions against social media companies.228Cyrus Farivar, School Districts Took on Juul with a Novel Legal Strategy. Now They’re Going After Social Media Giants, Forbes (Apr. 18, 2023, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cyrusfarivar/2023/04/18/school-districts-took-on-juul-with-a-novel-legal-strategy-now-theyre-going-after-social-media-giants [https://perma.cc/2FNG-2J8V].

Thus, critics hold legitimate concerns that public nuisance gives plaintiff lawyers “the ability to intimidate market participants and reshape the economy without ever scoring a conclusive win in a courtroom (never mind a legislature).”229David B. Rivkin Jr. & O.H. Skinner, Opinion, The ‘Public Nuisance’ Menace, Wall. St. J. (Aug. 16, 2023, 1:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-nuisance-gun-pharma-car-theft-pollution-fossil-fuels-trial-lawyer-settlement-abuse-power-f45a8581 [https://archive.ph/xL6fX]. Indeed, the uncoordinated nature of the opioid and Juul litigation and the substitution of prescription opioids and Juul e-cigarettes with alternatives that evade a similar state crackdown raise important questions about whether these suits are more about abatement or more about sharing in the spoils of a company’s downfall, like some communal feast on the savanna after a large lion is outnumbered and slain. Because a public nuisance doctrine in which a large number of private injuries could satisfy the public rights element might result in even more litigation, public nuisance should only redress harms that interfere with traditional public rights.

Second, the other elements in a prima facie public nuisance claim should prevent a flood of litigation against makers of legal products. For example, in California, public nuisance claims require a showing that a party has “knowledge that its unreasonable conduct caused a substantial interference with a right common to the public.”230City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 620 F. Supp. 3d 936, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2022). Even if a state can prove a defendant interfered with a public right, the state still must demonstrate the defendant’s conduct was unreasonable and the cause of the interference. For example, a California state court held that opioid manufacturers were not liable for creating a public nuisance because the state’s evidence of a statistical increase in statewide prescriptions did not prove that false marketing caused medically inappropriate prescriptions.231People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 31743, at *2, *10 (Dec. 14, 2021). With no evidence of inappropriate prescriptions, the court found that the marketing was reasonable because the social utility of medically appropriate prescriptions outweighs any harm they might cause.232Id. at *18. The Second Restatement and many states also require, at a minimum, knowledge of unreasonable risk for a defendant to be liable for public nuisance, so this same burden of proof applies elsewhere.233See Kendrick, supra note 4, at 756–58. Some states require a higher burden of proof: either negligence or violation of a statute. See id. Therefore, if a product has social utility and is sold legally, then a plaintiff must satisfy a high burden of proof to show a defendant acted unreasonably.

CONCLUSION

A daunting drug epidemic confronts the United States and its institutions. Drug overdose deaths are at historic highs, and more than four out of five Americans who need treatment for illicit drug use do not receive it.234Fact Sheet: Addressing Addiction and the Overdose Epidemic, White House: Briefing Room (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/01/fact-sheet-addressing-addiction-and-the-overdose-epidemic [https://perma.cc/FSN4-98CN]. Voracious demand for drugs has poured billions into coffers of drug traffickers, who internationally “threaten[] global stability” and domestically “contribute to public health challenges and violence.”235Id. City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P. provides an indelible account of the impact of addiction on civic order. Those who argue that legal products cannot interfere with public rights need only visit San Francisco’s sidewalks, parks, and libraries. There, opioid addiction interferes with public rights by obstructing public space and exposing residents to illicit behavior that, at the least, is offensive to witness in broad daylight and, at the most, poses a legitimate threat to safety and health.

While the opioid litigation appears to be in its final phase,236See supra Section II.B (detailing the comprehensive settlements that many of the largest manufacturers, distributers, and pharmacies have reached with public plaintiffs). public nuisance should have the flexibility to address infringements on traditional public rights—even if caused by a legal product. Future products may pose novel threats to public rights and, like opioids, may require action from all branches of government. The middle-ground approach to public nuisance outlined in this Note would achieve this end.

97 S. Cal. L. Rev. 767

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* University of Southern California Gould School of Law, Class of 2024. I am grateful to Professor Gregory C. Keating for his excellent seminar on public nuisance and for his personal guidance and feedback on this Note. I am also grateful to my fellow members of the Southern California Law Review, especially Jack Frisbie, Class of 2023, who provided helpful feedback on early drafts, and the editors on Volume 97 who helped edit and refine this Note for publication.

Colorblind Constitutional Torts

Much of the recent conversation regarding law and police accountability has focused on eliminating or limiting qualified immunity as a defense for officers facing § 1983 lawsuits for using excessive force. Developed during Reconstruction as a way to protect formerly enslaved persons from new forms of racial terror, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows private individuals to bring suit against police officers when their use of force goes beyond what the Constitution permits. Qualified immunity provides a way for law enforcement to evade civil suits if officers can show that they did not infringe any constitutional right or they did not violate a clearly established law—concepts that are highly deferential to police. Implicit in the contemporary emphasis on reforming qualified immunity is the idea that but for this concept, § 1983 litigation could effectively fulfill its longstanding goal of holding police officers accountable through civil liability when they beat, maim, or kill without legal justification.

Qualified immunity certainly raises important issues, and reform in this area of law is needed. But deeper problems plague § 1983 claims. In this Article, we examine a key structural deficiency tied to legal doctrine that has largely escaped critique: how the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Graham v. Connor radically transformed § 1983 causes of action. Prior to the Graham decision, federal courts used diverse mechanisms, notably Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, to determine “what counts” as an appropriate use of force. The Graham decision changed this area of law by holding that all claims of police excessive force must be judged against a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. This transformation has led to much discussion about what Graham means for understanding which police practices concerning the use of force are constitutionally permissible. However, there has been little conversation about what Graham has specifically meant for federal courts’ conception of civil enforcement mechanisms such as § 1983 that are designed to provide monetary relief when these constitutional rights are violated. 

In this Article, we engage in the first empirical assessment of Graham’s impact on federal courts’ understanding and application of this statute. We find that the Graham decision was not only constitutionally transformative in terms of how federal courts understand the legal standard for “what counts” as excessive force, but also correlates with changes in how federal courts think about the overall scope, purpose, and nature of § 1983. Our data analysis of two hundred federal court decisions shows that the Graham decision effectively divorced § 1983 from its anti-subordinative race conscious history and intent, recasting it in individualist terms. This has led to a regime of what we call colorblind constitutional torts in that the Graham decision doctrinally filtered § 1983 use of force claims down a structural path of minimal police accountability by diminishing the central roles of race and racism when federal courts review § 1983 cases. These findings and theoretical framing suggest that the contemporary emphasis on qualified immunity in police reform conversations misunderstand and significantly underestimate the doctrinal and structural depth of the police accountability problem. This Article provides a novel and useful explanation for how and why police use of force persists and offers a roadmap for change and greater police accountability.

Introduction

It is not uncommon for diabetics suffering from hypoglycemia (low blood sugar) to have their symptoms of disorientation and loss of consciousness misunderstood as being under the influence of drugs and alcohol, which can lead to mistreatment by the police.[1] This is what happened to Dethorne Graham one fall afternoon in 1984. Graham and his friend were pulled over by a police officer who thought Graham was “behaving suspiciously” when he quickly entered and exited a local convenience store in search of orange juice to offset his medical condition. The officer called for backup and, within a few short minutes, Graham was handcuffed face down on the sidewalk. When his friend tried to explain to the officers that Graham was a diabetic, one officer replied, “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the [motherfucker] but drunk. Lock the [son of a bitch] up.”[2] Another neighborhood friend familiar with Graham’s condition saw the incident and brought orange juice to the scene. Graham begged Officer Matos, saying, “Please give me the orange juice.” She responded: “I’m not giving you shit.”[3] Graham was roughed up by the officers and thrown in the back of a squad car. Eventually, the officers drove him home, threw him on the ground in front of his house, and sped away.

During the altercation, Graham “sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder . . . [along with developing] a loud ringing in his right ear.”[4] Graham brought a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Charlotte, North Carolina, Police Department, alleging that the police violated constitutional rights granted to him under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before this case, plaintiffs sought remedies for excessive use of force by the police through different legal mechanisms, including substantive due process, equal protection, the Fourth Amendment, and even § 1983 as a stand-alone source for making claims.[5] While the district and circuit courts ruled in favor of the officers, the United States Supreme Court made a surprising decision. The Court held that all claims regarding the constitutionality of police use of force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment through a standard of “objective reasonableness.”[6] Graham v. Connor (“Graham”) marks an important, though often underappreciated, moment of doctrinal transformation. It synthesized previously divergent strands of use-of-force case law and established a new constitutional standard for all cases that involve claims of police using excessive force in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop.[7] Rather than framing police use of force as a matter concerning equal protection or substantive due process, the Graham decision effectively forced all conversations concerning excessive force to federal courts’ Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Over the past three decades, legal scholars and practitioners have debated the impact that Graham has had on limiting issues concerning the constitutionality of police use of force to a vague and nebulous standard of “objective reasonableness” in light of the broad deference that society and the courts give to law enforcement.[8] This deference and tendency to see almost all police actions as “reasonable” explains, at least in part, how even the most egregious police behavior often goes without penalty—a concern that is at the heart of the contemporary social movement against police violence. But, despite this almost exclusive preoccupation with what Graham has meant for constitutional law, there are other meaningful doctrinal concerns that deserve exploration. Put differently, what other aspects of use-of-force inquiries have been impacted by the shift in constitutional standards brought by Graham?

There are at least two main components to § 1983 litigation concerning police use of force: the enforcement action, which is a statutory mechanism, and the constitutional standard that is being enforced (Fourth Amendment reasonableness, per Graham). The existing scholarship only examines the influence of Graham in regard to how it changed federal courts’ understanding of the constitutional standard for “what counts” as excessive force. But what has Graham meant for how federal courts understand the scope, context, and meaning of civil rights—particularly statutory enforcement mechanisms such as § 1983?

In this Article, we engage in the first empirical assessment that examines Graham’s impact on how federal courts understand the nature and purpose of § 1983. This issue concerning Graham’s impact on § 1983 litigation beyond shaping the constitutional standard for excessive force is important for several reasons. The statute emerged during Reconstruction pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment section 5 powers to provide civil remedies such as money damages to claimants when state officials violate constitutional rights while working in their official capacities.[9] Thus, understanding Graham’s impact should not be limited to discursive and doctrinal meditations on reasonableness, which is where the bulk of the discussion on this decision lies. It is also important to explore Graham’s impact on a civil rights statute designed to enforce constitutional rights in terms of how, if at all, the decision affected the way that federal courts read and interpret the history, meaning, and application of § 1983—legislation meant to give claims concerning police excessive force purpose and effect. Clearly, § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism has a close relationship with Fourth Amendment standards on reasonableness in the police use of force context. This Article is an attempt to go beyond existing scholarship on how the Graham decision reshaped the constitutional standard to also understand how it may have impacted the way that federal courts conceptualize the reach and intent of the civil statute meant to enforce these rights.

This research is critically important in light of contemporary social movements and proposed legal reforms responding to growing public awareness of police brutality in marginalized communities. Following the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis and subsequent global protests against anti-Black violence, the conversation on how law can compel greater accountability with regards to police use of force has focused heavily on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a judicially created concept that emerged in the 1960s to allow government officials facing constitutional tort actions to avoid civil suits and the possibility of paying money damages when they can show that they did not violate any constitutional right or that the law they were accused of breaking was not clearly established. Qualified immunity morphed over subsequent decades to largely become a mechanism to shield police officers from enduring § 1983 lawsuits in virtually all but the most egregious instances of force.[10] Federal courts’ deferential posture towards police facing constitutional tort actions has turned qualified immunity into an exculpatory tool for law enforcement who use excessive force. As such, the post-Floyd emphasis on eliminating qualified immunity or restricting its use has become a popular public rallying point. For example, at the federal level, Representatives Justin Amash and Ayanna Pressley introduced the Ending Qualified Immunity Act in the House of Representatives in June 2020,[11] which was followed shortly by a similar bill in the Senate proposed by Senators Edward Markey, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders.[12] Other efforts have been pursued to address the use of qualified immunity in state-level legislation. Since George Floyd’s murder in May 2020, “at least 25 states have taken up the issue and considered some form of qualified immunity reform, including Colorado, New Mexico, Connecticut and Massachusetts, which have passed legislation to end or restrict the defense.”[13] The idea behind these and other efforts at ending qualified immunity is that making police officers open to civil lawsuits for using excessive force will increase accountability and prevent officers from engaging in violence that violates constitutional rights.

Without question, qualified immunity presents unjust and unjustifiable barriers to holding police accountable. But there are deeper structural limitations placed on this type of litigation—namely, Graham’s reframing and reorientation of the entire constitutional tort endeavor. The impact of Graham deserves as much or even greater attention to the extent that the reframing of police use of force through Fourth Amendment logics has dislodged constitutional tort litigation from its foundational purpose: protecting the Black community from state violence. Yet, conversations regarding the Graham decision, its transformative impact on policing, and its role in undermining police accountability are largely absent from legal and public discussions regarding police reform. This Article uses empirical evidence to draw attention to this problem and argues for a different focus in efforts to reduce police violence.

To understand the structural limitations on police accountability beyond qualified immunity that were ushered in by the Graham decision, Part I of this Article begins with providing a brief history of § 1983 and explores the constitutional and statutory evolutions that constitute contemporary use-of-force jurisprudence. Part I also shows that legal scholars have mostly discussed the problem of police accountability for using excessive force in terms of qualified immunity. Part II examines the research literature on Graham and how existing scholarship is largely silent on how this doctrinal evolution came to limit constitutional tort actions. The impact of Graham has been discussed in legal scholarship with very little, if any, attention to what the decision to exclusively assess the constitutionality of police use of force through Fourth Amendment frameworks has meant for federal courts’ posture towards civil remedies offered by statute (§ 1983) and sought by plaintiffs. Part III describes our empirical study examining shifts in how federal courts decided § 1983 cases after Graham. We look at two periods: (a) from Monroe v. Pape in 1961 (which marks the beginning of the modern era of § 1983 litigation) through the Graham decision in 1989 and then (b) just after Graham from 1990 to 2016. Part IV discusses the results from our study. We find that there are important changes in how federal courts understand and approach § 1983 that correlate with the Graham decision. In particular, (1) references to § 1983’s descriptive titles—Ku Klux Klan Act, Enforcement Act, etc.—that reflect the racial history tied to this civil rights statute declined substantially after Graham; (2) consistent with Graham’s holding, judicial recognition of § 1983’s tight doctrinal relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment as a more race-conscious constitutional standard for excessive force claims largely ended, diminishing the potential of § 1983 civil remedies by linking them to Fourth Amendment standards of “reasonableness” that largely defer to the police; and (3) mentions of the race of plaintiffs and officers meaningfully decreased after the Graham decision. In Part V, we draw upon these empirical findings to develop a theory of colorblind constitutional torts that can at least partially explain these results as well as the persistence of police violence despite the availability of legal mechanisms designed to prevent and remedy such abuses. We then briefly conclude with a discussion of how these empirical findings and new theoretical framework can help federal courts reimagine constitutional torts in a manner that can produce greater police accountability.

The findings from our research show how the accountability problem regarding police use of force is not simply connected to individual “bad apples” in law enforcement shielded by misguided common law arguments about qualified immunity. More to the point, there are important doctrinal barriers that emerged after the Graham decision’s imposition of a Fourth Amendment framework that infused constitutional tort actions with colorblind sensibilities that undercut the entire historical project of § 1983. The empirical evidence, doctrinal reframing, and theoretical argument provided by this Article open up important new opportunities for change.

The data provided by this study raise important questions about Graham’s significance beyond matters concerning constitutional law. Graham has also had tremendous implications on how federal courts interpret and understand federal civil right statutes, particularly § 1983. By instilling a discourse of colorblindness into excessive-force litigation, Graham disrupts, if not completely undermines the connection between § 1983 and the distinct history of state-sponsored racial terror giving rise to it. By bringing colorblindness through the backdoor into judicial interpretations of this federal statutory remedy, Graham not only fundamentally contradicts the social, political, and historical forces that give meaning to § 1983, but it also frustrates § 1983’s ability to address contemporary abuses under the color of law, such as excessive force by law enforcement.


          [1].      The American Diabetes Association offers resources on how to engage with police officers. It notes that this is a particular concern for people with this medical condition, as “[l]aw enforcement officers [can fail] to identify hypoglycemia emergencies, mistaking them for intoxication or noncompliance. This can lead to the individual being seriously injured during the arrest, or even passing away because the need for medical care was not recognized in time.” Discrimination: Law Enforcement, Am. Diabetes Ass’n, https://www.diabetes.org/tools-support/know-your-rights/discrimination/rights-with-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/RE3M-BXXR].

          [2].      Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989). The quoted language was originally censored by the Court in its opinion, but it appears uncensored here.

          [3].      Direct Examination of DeThorn Graham, Graham v. Connor, No. 87-6571 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 1988).

          [4].      Graham, 490 U.S. at 390.

          [5].      See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1465 (2018) (finding empirical support for that federal courts largely did not use the Fourth Amendment as a constitutional standard in § 1983 excessive-force cases prior to Graham.).

          [6].      Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.

          [7].      Graham notes that this Fourth Amendment analysis applies when the police intentionally engage in an arrest, investigatory stop, or seizure of a citizen. Instances after Graham where the police cause physical harm without this intent (such as with innocent passersby) may still be analyzed through other constitutional mechanisms. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1997). This Article only discusses excessive force that occurs in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop.

          [8].      For a discussion of how deference to law enforcement shapes the federal courts’ understanding of the constitutional boundaries of excessive force, see Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment: An Empirical Assessment of How Police Understandings of Excessive Force Become Constitutional Law, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 1281, 1322 (2019). For a broader assessment of the history of judicial deference to police, see Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 2052 (2017).

          [9].      U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). As background,

On April 20, 1871, the Forty-Second Congress enacted the third Civil Rights Act known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The primary purpose of the Act was to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Act added civil remedies to the criminal sanctions contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 for the deprivation of rights by an officer “under color of law.” Thus, Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was the precursor of the present day 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . . On June 22, 1874, the statute became § 1979 of Title 24 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and upon adoption of the United States Code on June 30, 1926, the statute became § 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code. In 1952 the statute was transferred to § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, where it remains today.

Richard H.W. Maloy, “Under Color of”—What Does It Mean?, 56 Mercer L. Rev. 565, 574 (2005) (citations omitted). Charles Abernathy notes that

we have long recognized that the resurrection of § 1983 converted the fourteenth amendment from a shield into a sword by providing a civil action for vindication of constitutional rights and, to the extent that damages have gradually become the authorized remedy for § 1983 violations, we have easily come to think of such actions as constitutional torts—civil damage remedies for violations of constitutionally defined rights.

Charles Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 Geo. L.J. 1441, 1441 (1989) (citations omitted).

        [10].      See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Anna Zaret, Plainly Incompetent: How Qualified Immunity Became an Exculpatory Doctrine of Police Excessive Force, 170 U. Pa. L. Rev. 407 (2022).

        [11].      H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020).

        [12].      S. 492, 117th Cong. (2021).

        [13].      Emma Tucker, States Tackling ‘Qualified Immunity’ for Police as Congress Squabbles over the Issue, CNN (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/23/politics/qualified-immunity-police-reform/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8HF-WD6H].

* Haas Distinguished Chair and Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (joint appointment with the Joint Medical Program and School of Public Health). B.A. Yale University; J.D. Columbia Law School; Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley. Many thanks to Richard Banks, Laura Gómez, Sonia Katyal, and Gerald López for reviewing early drafts. Comments from participants at the Stanford Law School Race and Law Workshop and UCLA Critical Race Theory Seminar and Workshop were extremely helpful. Sara Jaramillo provided excellent research assistance. 

†Senior Attorney, Legal Aid Association of California. B.A. University of California, Santa Cruz; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness in Online Speech – Article by Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick

Article | Freedom of Speech
Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness in Online Speech
by Thomas E. Kadri* & Kate Klonick†

From Vol. 93, No. 1 (November 2019)
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 37 (2019)

Keywords: Speech, Content Moderation

 

Abstract

In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free expression—particularly the entangled concepts of “public figures” and “newsworthiness.”

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of how judges and content moderators have used these two concepts to shape the boundaries of free speech. It first introduces the legal doctrines developed by the “Old Governors,” exploring how courts have shaped the constitutional concepts of public figures and newsworthiness in the face of tort claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Article then turns to the “New Governors” and examines how Facebook’s content-moderation system channeled elements of the courts’ reasoning for imposing First Amendment limits on tort liability.

By exposing the similarities and differences between how the two systems have understood these concepts, this Article offers lessons for both courts and platforms as they confront new challenges posed by online speech. It exposes the pitfalls of using algorithms to identify public figures; explores the diminished utility of setting rules based on voluntary involvement in public debate; and analyzes the dangers of ad hoc and unaccountable newsworthiness determinations. Both courts and platforms must adapt to the new speech ecosystem that companies like Facebook have helped create, particularly the way that viral content has shifted normative intuitions about who deserves harsher rules in disputes about harmful speech, be it in law or content moderation.

Finally, the Article concludes by exploring what this comparison reveals about the structural role platforms play in today’s speech ecosystem and how it illuminates new solutions. These platforms act as legislature, executive, judiciary, and press—but without any separation of powers to establish checks and balances. A change to this model is already occurring at one platform: Facebook is creating a new Oversight Board that will hopefully provide due process to users on the platform’s speech decisions and transparency about how content-moderation policy is made, including how concepts related to newsworthiness and public figures are applied.

*. Resident Fellow, Yale Law School; Ph.D. Candidate, Yale University.

†. Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. Authors listed alphabetically. Portions of this Article build on research and ideas featured in Thomas Kadri’s and Kate Klonick’s doctoral dissertations and as well as an essay published in the Emerging Threats series organized by the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University. See Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan, Knight First Amend. Inst. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/facebook-v-sullivan [https://perma.cc/W9R8-7K9B]. The authors are grateful for the friends and colleagues whose insights improved this piece, especially Jack Balkin, Molly Brady, Aaron Caplan, Danielle Citron, Jennifer Daskal, Evelyn Douek, Sarah Haan, Margot Kaminski, Daphne Keller, Jennifer Rothman, Robert Post, Rory Van Loo, Morgan Weiland, and colleagues at the Yale Information Society Project. Additional thanks for the opportunity to present this work and receive excellent feedback at the Cornell Tech Speed Conference, Loyola Law School Los Angeles Faculty Workshop, Washington School of Law Faculty Workshop, University of Colorado Boulder Silicon Flatirons Conference, UCLA Social Media Conference, and Yale Freedom of Expression Conference. A very special thank you to David Pozen, whose excellent, patient editing and thoughtful feedback consolidated this Article’s central arguments and encouraged new ones.

 

 

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Protectors of Predators or Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders Amid Sexual Crimes – Article by Zachary D. Kaufman

Article | Criminal Law
Protectors of Predators or Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders amid Sexual Crimes
by Zachary D. Kaufman*

From Vol. 92, No. 6 (September 2019)
92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1317 (2019)

Keywords: Bad Samaritan Laws, Bystanders, Sexual Violence Prevention

 

Abstract

In the wake of widespread revelations about sexual abuse by Harvey Weinstein, Larry Nassar, and others, the United States is reckoning with the past and present and searching for the means to prevent and punish such offenses in the future. The scourge of sexual crimes goes far beyond instances perpetrated by powerful men; this misconduct is rampant throughout the country. In some of these cases, third parties knew about the abuse and did not try to intervene. Scrutiny of—and the response to—such bystanderism is increasing, including in the legal world.

In order to align law and society more closely with morality, this Article proposes a more holistic, aggressive approach to prompt involvement by third parties who are aware of specific instances of sexual crimes in the United States. This Article begins by documenting the contemporary scope of sexual crimes in the United States and the crucial role bystanders play in facilitating them.

The Article next provides an overview and assessment of “Bad Samaritan laws”: statutes that impose a legal duty to assist others in peril through intervening directly (also known as the “duty to rescue”) or notifying authorities (also known as the “duty to report”). Such laws exist in dozens of foreign countries and, to varying degrees, in twenty-nine U.S. states, Puerto Rico, U.S. federal law, and international law. The author has assembled the most comprehensive global database of Bad Samaritan laws, which provides an important corrective to other scholars’ mistaken claims about the rarity of such statutes, particularly in the United States. Despite how widespread these laws are in the United States, violations are seldom, if ever, charged or successfully prosecuted.

Drawing on historical research, trial transcripts, and interviews with prosecutors, judges, investigators, and “upstanders” (people who intervene to help others in need), the Article then describes four prominent cases in the United States involving witnesses to sexual crimes. Each case provides insight into the range of conduct of both bystanders and upstanders.

Because not all such actors are equal, grouping them together under the general categories of “bystanders” and “upstanders” obscures distinct roles, duties, and culpability for violating those duties. Drawing on the case studies, this Article thus presents original typologies of bystanders (including eleven categories or sub-categories), upstanders (including seven categories), and both kinds of actors (including four categories), which introduce greater nuance into these classifications and this Article’s proposed range of legal (and moral) responsibilities. These typologies are designed to maximize generalizability to crimes and crises beyond sexual abuse.

Finally, the Article prescribes a new approach to the duty to report on sexual abuse and possibly other crimes and crises through implementing a combination of negative incentives (“sticks”) and positive incentives (“carrots”) for third parties. These recommendations benefit from interviews with sexual violence prevention professionals, police, legislators, and social media policy counsel. Legal prescriptions draw on this Article’s typologies and concern strengthening, spreading, and standardizing duty-to-report laws at the state and territory levels; introducing the first general legal duty to report sexual crimes and possibly other offenses (such as human trafficking) at the federal level; exempting from liability one of the two main bystander categories the Article proposes (“excused bystanders”) and each of its six sub-categories (survivors, “confidants,” “unaware bystanders,” children, “endangered bystanders,” and “self-incriminators”); actually charging the other main bystander category the Article proposes (“unexcused bystanders”) and each of its three sub-categories (“abstainers,” “engagers,” and “enablers”) with violations of duty-to-report laws or leveraging these statutes to obtain testimony from such actors; and more consistently charging “enablers” with alternative or additional crimes, such as accomplice liability. Social prescriptions draw on models and lessons from domestic and foreign contexts and also this Article’s typologies to recommend, among other initiatives, raising public awareness of duty-to-report laws and creating what the Article calls “upstander commissions” to identify and “upstander prizes” to honor a category of upstanders the Article proposes (“corroborated upstanders”), including for their efforts to mitigate sexual crimes. A combination of these carrots and sticks could prompt would-be bystanders to act instead as upstanders and help stem the sexual crime epidemic.

*. Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Houston Law Center, with additional appointments in the University of Houston’s Department of Political Science and Hobby School of Public Affairs. J.D., Yale Law School; D.Phil. (Ph.D.) and M.Phil., both in International Relations, Oxford University (Marshall Scholar); B.A. in Political Science, Yale University. Research for this Article, including fieldwork, was generously facilitated by a grant from Harvard University as well as institutional support from Stanford Law School (where the author was a Lecturer from 2017 to 2019) and the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government (where the author was a Senior Fellow from 2016 to 2019).

The author primarily thanks the following individuals for helpful comments and conversations: Will Baude; Frank Rudy Cooper; John Donohue; Doron Dorfman; George Fisher; Richard Ford; Jeannie Suk Gersen; Hank Greely; Chris Griffin; Oona Hathaway; Elizabeth D. Katz; Amalia Kessler; Tracey Meares; Michelle Mello; Dinsha Mistree; Mahmood Monshipouri; Joan Petersilia; Camille Gear Rich; Mathias Risse; Peter Schuck; Kathryn Sikkink; David Sklansky; Kate Stith; Mark Storslee; Allen Weiner; Robert Weisberg; Lesley Wexler; Alex Whiting; Rebecca Wolitz; Gideon Yaffe; audiences at Yale Law School, Stanford Law School, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, Stanford University Center for International Security & Cooperation, University of Virginia School of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Penn State Law, University of Hawai’i Richardson School of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, University of Sydney Law School, University of Western Australia Law School, South Texas College of Law, University of Houston Department of Political Science and Hobby School of Public Affairs, and Colorado College; audiences at the 2018 conferences of the Harvard Law School Institute for Global Law & Policy, Law & Society Association, American Political Science Association, International Studies Association, and Policy History Association; and audiences at the 2019 conferences of the Law & Society Association, International Studies Association, CrimFest (at Brooklyn Law School), and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools. The author is especially indebted to his students in the reading group at Stanford Law School on “The Law of Bystanders and Upstanders” he led in spring 2019: Jamie Fine, Katherine Giordano, Bonnie Henry, Jeremy Hutton, Allison Ivey, Andrew Jones, Azucena Marquez, Camden McRae, Sergio Sanchez Lopez, and Spencer Michael Schmider. The author also thanks the following individuals for their valuable feedback: Fahim Ahmed, Matthew Axtell, Maria Banda, Adrienne Bernhard, Isra Bhatty, Charles Bosvieux-Onyekwelu, Sara Brown, Ben Daus-Haberle, Brendon Graeber, Melisa Handl, Janhavi Hardas, Elliot Higgins, Hilary Hurd, Howard Kaufman, Linda Kinstler, Chris Klimmek, Tisana Kunjara, Gabrielle Amber McKenzie, Noemí Pérez Vásquez, Tanusri Prasanna, and Noam Schimmel.

The author is grateful to the following individuals for granting interviews for this Article: an anonymous attorney involved in the Steubenville case; an anonymous employee of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office; an anonymous employee of the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission; Jake Wark of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office in Massachusetts; Manal Abazeed, Jehad Mahameed, Mounir Mustafa, and Raed Saleh of the White Helmets/Syria Civil Defense; Naphtal Ahishakiye of IBUKA in Rwanda; Holocaust survivors Isaac and Rosa Blum; Gili Diamant and Irena Steinfeldt of Yad Vashem in Israel; Alexandria Goddard; Martin Niwenshuti of Aegis Trust in Rwanda; Lindsay Nykoluk of the Calgary Police Service in Canada; Ruchika Budhraja, Gavin Corn, Neil Potts, and Marcy Scott Lynn of Facebook; Jessica Mason of Google; and Regina Yau of the Pixel Project.

For thorough, thoughtful research assistance, the author thanks Chelsea Carlton, Michelle Katherine Erickson, Jana Everett, Thomas Ewing, Matthew Hines, Ivana Mariles Toledo, and Allison Wettstein O’Neill. The author also thanks the following individuals for research assistance on particular topics: Kathleen Fallon, Alexandria Goddard, Josh Goldman, Farouq Habib, Naomi Kikoler, Mariam Klait, Shari Lowin, Riana Pfefferkorn, Kenan Rahmani, Yong Suh, Paul Williams, Regina Yau, and library staff at Harvard Law School (including Aslihan Bulut and Stephen Wiles), Stanford Law School (including Sonia Moss and Alex Zhang), and the University of Houston Law Center (including Katy Badeaux, Christopher Dykes, and Amanda Watson). Of these individuals, the author owes the most gratitude to Katy Badeaux.

Finally, the author thanks the editors of the Southern California Law Review (“SCLR”)—particularly Editor-in-Chief Kevin Ganley, Managing Editor Christine Cheung, Executive Senior Editor Rosie Frihart, Executive Editor Celia Lown, and Senior Editor Evan Forbes—for their excellent editorial assistance. The author was honored that SCLR selected this Article as the subject of its annual symposium held at the University of Southern California’s Gould School of Law on March 21, 2019.

The author’s public engagement on this topic has drawn on the research and recommendations contained in this Article. Those activities include advising policymakers on drafting or amending Bad Samaritan laws and other legislation (including the federal Harassment and Abuse Response and Prevention at State (HARPS) Act sponsored by Congressperson Jackie Speier) and publishing op-eds in the Boston Globe (When Speaking Up is a Civic Duty, on August 5, 2018) and the San Francisco Chronicle (No Cover for Abusers; California Must Close Gap in its Duty-to-Report Law, on June 23, 2019).

This Article is current as of September 27, 2019. Any errors are the author’s alone.

 

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Torts and Restitution: Legal Divergence and Economic Convergence – Article by Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat

 

From Volume 92, Number 4 (May 2019)
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Torts and Restitution: Legal Divergence and Economic Convergence

Robert Cooter[*] & Ariel Porat[†]

This Article explores the divergence in law and convergence in economics in dealing with harms and benefits. While tort law usually makes the injurer internalize wrongful harms through damages, restitution law does not enable the benefactor to internalize the benefits she confers on others without their request. In both harm and benefit cases, however, internalization seems to make economic sense for the same reason: injurers and benefactors alike will behave efficiently if they internalize the externalities that they create. The Article’s main goal is to develop eight liability rules for harm and benefit cases and to point out the symmetry between the rules relating to harms and the rules relating to benefits. It also provides an explanation for the legal divergence between tort law and restitution law and makes the claim that the gap between these two fields should be narrowed. Finally, the Article relates these eight rules to the main relevant categories of harm and benefit cases in positive law and appraises their advantages and disadvantages.

Introduction

Tort law usually makes the injurer internalize wrongful harms through damages. In contrast, restitution law does not enable the benefactor to internalize the benefits she confers on others without their request, through damages, and only seldom allows her to recover the costs she incurs in creating those benefits. Thus, law is divergent in dealing with harms and benefits. In both kinds of cases, however, internalization seems to make economic sense for the same reason: injurers and benefactors alike will behave efficiently if they internalize the externalities that they create.[1] Since the economics is convergent, why is the law divergent? Can efficiency explain the law’s divergent treatment of harms and benefits?[2]

This Article provides a detailed analysis of economic convergence in actual and possible rules of torts and restitution. A better understanding of economic convergence will lead to better understanding of legal divergence, as well as a critique of it. We will argue that legal divergence mostly makes sense, but a modest expansion in restitution’s scope, which would increase convergence, would also increase efficiency.

In Part I we develop eight liability rules for harm and benefit cases and point out the symmetry between the rules relating to harms and the rules relating to benefits. Part II presents and discusses the divergence of tort and restitution laws and provides an explanation for this divergence. It makes the claim that the gap between the two fields should be narrowed. Part III relates the eight rules developed in Part I to the main relevant categories of cases in positive law and appraises their advantages and disadvantages.

I.  Liability Rules for Harms and Benefits

In this Part we discuss and develop eight liability rules—half for harm cases and half for benefit cases. We start by presenting the eight rules by using two examples.

A.  Introducing the Rules

Consider the following cases:

Example 1: Omitting a Test. Doctor in a public hospital performs a beneficial procedure for a patient. In addition to the benefit, the procedure causes harmful side effects of 100. A test that costs Doctor 20 can prevent the harmful side effects. Doctor omits the test and the harm materializes.

Example 2: Constructing a Garden. Builder considers constructing a garden on her land that will increase the market value of her house and five Neighbors’ houses. The garden costs Builder 15. The increase in the value of Builder’s house is 10, and the increase in the value of each Neighbor’s house is 2.[3] The benefits are a public good: Builder cannot prevent Neighbors from enjoying the garden’s benefits once it is created. Since each Neighbor knows that their own benefit from the public good does not depend on their contribution to its costs, they contribute nothing, hoping that Builder and the other Neighbors will pay for the garden. However, since all Neighbors reason in the same way, nobody pays. Nevertheless, Builder constructs the garden, conferring a total benefit to Neighbors of 10.

In both harm and benefit cases the law could make the actor—the injurer or the benefactor—internalize the externalities she creates. One possibility for the law is to make internalization unconditional on the behavior of the actor. In Example 1, unconditional internalization is a rule of strict liability for harm with compensatory damages (Rule H1). Under this rule Doctor is liable for the harm she causes, at the amount of that harm, regardless of whether she behaves negligently. Thus, even if the costs of administering the test were higher than expected harm and therefore there was no negligence on Doctor’s part,[4] Doctor would bear liability for the harm caused to the patient. In Example 2, unconditional internalization is a rule of strict restitution for benefit with disgorgement damages (Rule B1). Under this rule Builder is entitled to restitution at the amount of the benefit she confers, regardless of whether she behaves reasonably. Thus, even if the costs of constructing the garden were higher than expected benefit, Builder would be entitled to disgorgement damages from Neighbors.

Another possibility is to condition internalization on whether the behavior of the actor is reasonable or not. In harm cases, this is a rule of negligent liability for harm with compensatory damages (Rule H3). According to this rule, in Example 1, Doctor will be liable for the harm she causes, at the amount of that harm, only if she is negligent, namely, only if her costs of care are lower than expected harm.[5] In benefit cases, this is a rule of reasonable restitution for benefit with disgorgement damages (Rule B3). According to this rule, in Example 2, Builder will be entitled to damages at the amount of the benefits she confers, only if she behaves reasonably, namely, only if her costs of constructing the garden are lower than expected benefit.

To summarize, under the four rules discussed so far, both negative and positive externalities are internalized by their creators. While under the first two rules (H1 and B1) internalization is unconditional on the character of the creator’s behavior, under the other two rules (H3 and B3) internalization is conditional on the reasonableness of her behavior (under Rule H3 unreasonableness entails internalization, while under Rule B3 reasonableness entails internalization).

Instead of internalization, the law could aim to deter injurers from causing harms or encourage benefactors to confer benefits by removing their incentives to cause harms or not to confer benefits. In harm cases, the law could make the injurer disgorge her benefits from creating risks, thereby deterring her from engaging in such a behavior. It could be unconditional on the injurer’s negligence (Rule H2) or conditional upon it (Rule H4). The first rule (H2) is strict liability for harm with disgorgement damages: damages are not at the amount of the harm caused but rather at the amount of the injurer’s benefits from engaging in the risky behavior. The second rule (H4) is negligent liability for harm with disgorgement damages: damages are at the amount of the injurer’s benefit from engaging in the negligent behavior. Thus, in Example 1, under both Rules H2 and H4, Doctor’s liability is at the amount of 20, rather than 100.

In benefit cases, there are parallels to Rules H2 and H4. Thus, the law could make the benefactor entitled to damages at the amount of her costs in creating the benefits, thereby encouraging her to confer them, either unconditional (Rule B2) or conditional on her behavior being reasonable (Rule B4). Rule B2 is strict restitution for benefit with compensatory damages, and Rule B4 is reasonable restitution for benefit with compensatory damages. Thus, in Example 2, under both Rules B2 and B4, Builder is entitled to damages at the amount of 7.5 from Neighbors (1.5 from each), which is their relative share in the costs incurred by Builder.

The table below summarizes the eight liability rules (marking with an asterisk (*) those rules which currently exist under the law). The next Section analyzes the eight rules in more detail.


B.  Strict Liability and Internalization (Rules H1 and B1)

Under a rule of strict liability for harm with compensatory damages (Rule H1), the injurer is liable whenever his activity causes an accident, regardless of his level of care. Strict liability with perfectly compensatory damages causes the injurer to internalize the harm from accidents that he causes to victims. Consequently, the self-interested injurer has an incentive to take socially efficient precautions and maintain a reasonable activity level.[6] Conversely, under this rule, the victim externalizes the effects of her precautions and activity level. Consequently, the victim has no incentive to take precaution or restrain her activity levels. The victim’s precaution is deficient and her activity is excessive relative to the social optimum. To illustrate, with strict liability with perfect compensatory damages, drivers take efficient precautions (for example, installing cost-justified safety devices in their cars) and their activity level is efficient (for example, driving at efficient frequency). Pedestrians, however, as potential victims, have no incentives to take precautions or restrain their activity, because they are fully compensated.[7]

Now we turn from torts to the equivalent analysis of restitution. Strict liability for harm with compensatory damages (Rule H1) corresponds to strict restitution for benefit with disgorgement damages (Rule B1). Disgorgement by the beneficiary causes the benefactor to internalize the effects on the beneficiary. Consequently, the benefactor has an incentive for the socially efficient benefaction. As in the standard tort model, internalization by one party causes externalization by the other, so Rule B1 makes the beneficiary externalize the value of the gains from the benefaction. Consequently, the beneficiary has no incentive to increase the benefaction’s value. The beneficiary’s activities are deficient relative to the social optimum.[8]

To illustrate by Example 2, under Rule B1, Builder has efficient incentives to construct the garden in the most efficient way (for example, using adequate materials and labor). Also, her ancillary activity (or activity level)—which is mostly relevant if Builder is in the business of constructing gardens—will be efficient (for example, investing in finding adequate places for gardens). At the same time, however, Neighbors lack incentives to take steps that increase the value which they might derive from the garden (for example, by constructing the windows of their homes to face the garden), since the entire value would be disgorged to Builder.[9]

C.  Strict Liability and Deterrence or Encouragement (Rules H2 and B2)

Now we turn from internalizing harms and benefits to deterring harms and encouraging benefits. First, consider a rule of strict liability for harm with disgorgement damages (Rule H2). Disgorgement damages under this rule make the injurer give up his gain from imposing risk on the victim. If the injurer does not expect to gain by imposing risk on the victim, he might as well not impose any. Consequently, disgorgement damages are the minimum damages that deter the injurer from imposing the risk of an accident on the victim. However, efficiency usually requires the injurer to impose some risk on the victim, in which case damages are inefficient—they cause excessive precaution or deficient activity by the injurer. Also, with Rule H2, victims have deficient incentives for precaution and their activity is excessive compared to the social optimum because injurers do not impose any risks on them. To illustrate with Example 1, suppose the test necessary to prevent the side effects to the patient cost Doctor 200 rather than 20. Under Rule H2, Doctor would administer the test—although efficiency-wise, she should not—because not administering the test would cost her 200.[10]

Equivalently, consider the rule of strict restitution for benefits with compensatory damages (B2). Compensatory damages for unrequested benefits are the minimum damages that encourage the benefactor to maximize benefits to the beneficiary. When damages are perfectly compensatory, they exactly offset the benefactor’s cost of supplying an unrequested benefit. Since the benefactor expects to bear no net cost from creating benefits for the beneficiary, the benefactor will maximize the benefaction without regard to the cost of doing so.[11] This inefficiency, however, might disappear if the benefactor creates at the same time benefits for herself and for others and is entitled only to the relative share of her costs proportionate to the benefits she confers on others. To illustrate with Example 2, under Rule B2, Builder would not invest excessively in constructing the garden because Neighbors compensate her for only a relative share of her costs, so that Builder bears the rest of it.[12]

Besides the benefaction, the benefactor’s ancillary activities may increase the benefits to others without increasing her compensatory damages. Consequently, the benefactor’s ancillary activity level will be deficient.[13] As to the beneficiary, his incentives would be efficient because he internalizes the benefits he creates.

D.  Negligent Liability and Internalization (Rules H3 and B3)

Now we turn from strict liability to negligence, beginning with negligent liability for harm with compensatory damages (Rule H3). The incentive effects of a rule of negligence with compensatory damages are well known in torts literature. In the basic model, a negligence rule causes the injurer to avoid liability by satisfying the legal standard, which is assumed to be the efficient level of care. Having escaped liability, the injurer has no incentive to restrain his activity level. When the injurer escapes liability, the victim internalizes the harm from accidents, so she has incentives for socially efficient precaution and activity.[14]

The equivalent rule is reasonable restitution for benefits with disgorgement damages (B3). Under this rule, the benefactor enjoys restitution for her benefaction up to the legal standard, which is assumed to be efficient, and no restitution for additional benefaction beyond it. Therefore, the benefactor satisfies the legal standard and her benefaction is at the socially efficient level. Since she internalizes all the benefits she reasonably creates, her ancillary activity is also efficient. However, the beneficiary, on his part, has no incentives to increase the value produced by the benefactor since he disgorges any value he gains from reasonable benefaction.[15] To illustrate with Example 2, under Rule B3, Builder invests efficiently in constructing the garden and Neighbors have no incentives to increase its value even if they can do so.

E.  Negligent Liability and Deterrence or Encouragement (Rules H4 and B4)

We conclude the analysis of negligent liability by considering damages that deter or encourage reasonable behavior, instead of internalizing it. Instead of compensation, consider disgorgement for unreasonable harms. Under a negligence rule, disgorgement damages make the injurer give up his expected gain from imposing unreasonable risk on the victim. This can be accomplished if damages amount to the savings in untaken precautions. Since the injurer does not expect to gain by imposing unreasonable risk on the victim, he might as well take reasonable care. Consequently, a rule of negligence for harm with disgorgement damages (Rule H4) causes efficient care by the injurer. To illustrate, in Example 1, Doctor’s liability is 20, and this amount (plus epsilon) is enough to deter her from negligently omitting the test for the patient. The injurer’s activity level, however, is excessive,[16] while the victim’s incentives and activity levels are efficient.[17]

Now consider the equivalent rule of restitution, which is reasonable restitution for benefit with compensatory damages (Rule B4). Under this rule, the benefactor is compensated for the cost of conveying unrequested benefits to the beneficiary that are reasonable. So long as the benefaction is reasonable, damages exactly offset the benefactor’s cost of supplying unrequested benefits. Since the benefactor expects to bear no net cost from creating benefits for the beneficiary up to the reasonable level, he might as well supply the reasonable level of benefits.

The rule of reasonable restitution with compensatory damages creates incentives for efficient benefaction. Although the benefactor receives compensatory damages for the benefaction, the benefactor receives no damages for ancillary activities that increase its value to the beneficiary, so he has socially deficient incentives for ancillary activities. The beneficiary, however, internalizes the benefits from her activities, so she has incentives for socially efficient activities.

F.  Summary

Table 2 summarizes the incentive effects of all eight liability rules. The rules are arranged to show the symmetry between liability for harm and for benefits. As the table shows, the symmetry is not perfect, especially when it comes to Rules H3 (negligent liability for harm with compensatory damages) and B3 (reasonable restitution for benefits with disgorgement damages).

The efficiency of the different rules depends crucially on the information available to the parties involved, as well as to courts applying the different rules. Because of space constraints we cannot analyze the informational hurdles systematically. Instead, we refer to them sporadically in the next Parts of this Article, whenever necessary.
II.  Torts and Restitution—A Convergence?

Having explained economic convergence in harms and benefits, we will now explain legal divergence. With zero transaction costs, legal rules do not affect efficiency, as explained by Professor Ronald Coase.[18] With few parties, however, transaction costs are typically low but not zero. When transaction costs are low, the law often encourages the parties to negotiate a contract rather than act unilaterally. In harm cases with two pre-identified parties, as in conversion and trespass cases, the injurer is not allowed to act unilaterally against the victim and pay for the harm done. Instead, the law deters the harm, notably through injunctions against trespass or conversion and disgorgement of benefits,[19] thereby channeling the parties into negotiations. The same is true with benefits. The benefactor is not allowed to paint the beneficiary’s fence and charge her accordingly. Instead, the law deters the benefactor from conferring the unrequested benefit by denying him any recovery, thereby channeling the parties into negotiations.[20]

Whereas the legal rule is symmetrical with respect to harm and benefits in these low transaction cost cases, it is asymmetrical in high transaction cost cases. Assume that high transaction costs preclude market transactions in harm and benefit cases, so the law cannot successfully channel the parties to negotiate. Without negotiations, it seems that injurers and benefactors alike should be allowed to act unilaterally, and the law should make them internalize the consequences or else deter them from behaving inefficiently (in harm cases) or encourage them to behave efficiently (in benefit cases). In fact, however, the law allows the unilateral imposition of harms and often requires internalization by the injurer, whereas the law allows the unilateral conferral of benefits, but does not require internalization by the benefactor, and seldom requires reimbursing her costs.[21]

Can efficiency explain the law’s divergent treatment of harms and benefits?[22] One possible reason could be difficulties in measuring benefits. Thus, in harm cases the plaintiff-victim possesses information about the negative externalities (the harms), while in benefit cases the defendant-beneficiary possesses information about the positive externalities (the benefits). Perhaps courts can measure the former easier than the latter so that courts allow recovery more readily for harms than for benefits.[23]

This argument, however, cannot survive scrutiny. Calculating the harm to the victim of an injury is not systematically easier for the court than calculating the benefit to the beneficiary. Differences in the difficulty of measuring damages seem too random and small to explain systematic and large differences in the scope of liability for harms and benefits.[24]

A more plausible reason for the systematic legal differences is enforcement and litigation costs. If the legal rule for harms is negligence then most injurers do not behave negligently, so few victims can claim damages.[25] In contrast, if the legal rule for benefits is strict restitution or reasonable restitution, many benefactors can claim damages. Thus, we expect many claims by benefactors in the few types of cases where restitution law allows recovery.[26] Perhaps restitution law restricts recovery to a few types of cases in order to avoid a flood of claims.

This explanation of the difference between harm and benefit cases works best when small and unequal benefits accrue to many beneficiaries. However, this difference cannot explain the large asymmetry between torts and restitution. It works poorly when uniformly high benefits accrue to a small group of well-defined beneficiaries.[27] Also, the assertion that harms induce fewer claims applies to a negligence rule but not to a rule of strict liability where many victims of harm can claim damages.[28]

The next reason, in our view, is convincing and more complete. It concerns the difference in costs of market transactions in harm and benefit cases. In a typical harm case with high transaction costs, there is one injurer and many victims. If the law prevents injurers from acting unilaterally without first obtaining consent from the victims, each victim will have veto power over the risky activity. Each victim has an incentive to hold out for a high payment as a condition for consenting. Thus, holdouts will block many socially efficient activities that risk harm to multiple victims.[29] Therefore, the law allows injurers to act unilaterally. However, it also forces them to compensate the victims for the resulting harm or wrongful harm. With permission to act unilaterally, but with no duty to compensate, injurers would not restrain their injurious activities.[30]

Switching from harms to benefits, in a typical benefit case with high transaction costs, there is one benefactor and many beneficiaries. If the law allows the benefactor to act unilaterally without requiring the beneficiaries to pay damages to the benefactor, each beneficiary will have an incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. The free-riding problem will reduce the supply of benefits but not block them.[31] To illustrate, in cases represented by Example 2 (Constructing a Garden), if three out of the five neighbors would share in the costs of construction, even with no liability imposed on the other two (free-riding) neighbors, the garden might be constructed.

As explained, the typical transaction costs in harm cases are holdout, while the typical transaction costs in benefit cases are free riding. Free riding on benefits is less socially destructive than holding out consent to risky activities. The greater legal scope of liability for harms relative to liability for benefits is explained by the greater destructiveness of withholding consent to risky activities compared to free riding on benefits. This fact could provide an explanation for why there are broad rights in the law for the unilateral creation of harms coupled with their internalization and broad rights for the unilateral creation of benefits but only rarely coupled with liability on the part of the beneficiaries.

In our view, however, the law would better promote social welfare with a broader liability for unrequested benefits. In Part I we explained how different liability rules could be applied to harm and benefit cases. In the next Part we apply those rules to the main categories of cases of torts and restitution and show how, by allowing broader liability for unrequested benefits, the asymmetry between torts and restitution should be narrowed.

III.  Applications: Compensate or Disgorge?

In this Part we analyze the main types of cases that pose two questions: (1) Should the law compensate or disgorge? And (2) should liability depend on reasonableness? The first type of cases involves accidental harms, and the second type involves benefits, either accidental or intentional. For all cases, we assume that transaction costs preclude contracts.

A.  Accidental Harms

The most common harm cases that tort law deals with are accidents. Under current law, liability for accidental harms is either strict or conditioned on the injurer’s negligence. If liable, the injurer must compensate the victim for the resulting harm, which implies the internalization of harms (either Rule H1 or H3). The choice between strict liability and negligence rules has been thoroughly discussed in law and economics (and other) literature.[32] In contrast, the choice between compensatory and disgorgement damages for accidents went unanalyzed until a few years ago. Is disgorgement of the injurer’s gains from omitting precaution an adequate remedy? The following example, discussed in the Introduction of this Article (with a small adjustment relating to the probability of infliction of harm) and borrowed from a previous article,[33] illustrates the dilemma whether to allow disgorgement damages for accidents.

Example 1A. Omitting a Test. Doctor in a public hospital performs a beneficial procedure for a patient. In addition to the benefit, the procedure risks harmful side effects. A test that costs Doctor 20 can prevent the harmful side effects. Omitting the test causes harm of 1,000 to the patient in 10 percent of cases. Doctor omits the test and the harm materializes.

In this example, courts apply Rule H3 (negligent liability for harm with compensatory damages) and award damages of 1,000. With this rule doctors have efficient incentives to take care, so the doctor in Example 1A will administer the test as efficiency requires. Theoretically, the law could adopt instead Rule H1: strict liability for harms. With this rule, the doctor in Example 1A will also administer the test.

Consider now the possibility of applying the rules of disgorgement damages for accidents (DDA) to Example 1A: either Rule H4 (a negligence rule) or Rule H2 (a strict liability rule). Under Rule H4 Doctor’s liability is 200, rather than 1,000.[34] With DDA (plus epsilon), the doctor will administer the test as efficiency requires. Liability for 200 instead of 1,000 might provide doctors with incentives to increase their activity level. On many occasions this is a shortcoming of Rule H4, but with doctors’ liability it might be a virtue, since doctoring produces positive externalities.[35] Also, if doctors are subject to chilling effects and as a result are overdeterred or practice defensive medicine, liability of 200 rather than 1,000 would ameliorate the problem.[36]

Rule H4 would also improve victims’ incentives to take precautions and reduce their activity levels. In Example 1A, liability of 200 (undercompensation) would provide patients with stronger incentives than liability of 1,000 to take precautions and reduce their risks.[37]

In order to apply Rule H4, courts need information about the costs of untaken precautions and the probability of harm if precautions are not taken.[38] In Example 1A this information might be available to courts. In other cases, it is not available and the compensatory negligence rule (H3) might be easier to implement.

Returning to accidental harm, suppose now that liability for disgorgement damages is strict (Rule H2) rather than conditioned upon the doctor’s negligence (Rule H4). In accident cases, would strict liability with disgorgement damages (Rule H2) have advantages over strict liability with compensatory damages (Rule H1)? Under Rule H2, the injurer’s liability is the cost of untaken precautions divided by the probability of harm. Thus, assume that the doctor could have reduced the risk to the patient to zero by taking tests that cost 200 rather than 20. Under Rule H2, if Doctor omits the tests and harm materializes, Doctor’s liability would be 2,000 (which is twice the harm caused to the patient). As precautions are taken, Doctor’s liability continues to fall even when precaution exceeds the efficient level. Consequently, there are excessive incentives to take care. Indeed, Doctor has an incentive to take care up to the accident-eliminating level of care, which is 200 and reduces the patient’s risk by only 100. Rule H2 is therefore inefficient: it provides excessive precautions for injurers to take care and reduce their activity level. It also encourages victims not to take care, since  injurers will eliminate any risk they create (assuming no contributory or comparative negligence defense is available).

B.  Rescue Cases

1.  Reasonable Restitution for Benefits

The rule that benefactors who conferred unrequested benefits on beneficiaries are not entitled to any compensation from them has a few exceptions. One is rescue cases, including cases in which the benefactor protected the recipient’s life, health, property, or other economic interest when the latter’s timely consent could not be obtained. Timely consent is impossible in emergencies. Under certain conditions, the law allows the benefactor to recover a reasonable charge for beneficial actions.[39]

Consider the following case:

Example 3. Rescuing a Car. During a storm Rescuer, a bystander, observes Recuee’s car being swept into the river. Getting Rescuee’s consent is impractical, so Rescuer takes reasonable steps and saves the car. Rescuer’s efforts cost 20, while the value of the car which was saved is 100. The probability of the rescue’s success at the time it took place was 100 percent.

Under current law Rescuer is entitled to compensation of 20, which equals the reasonable costs he spent for saving the car (Rule B4).[40] Under an alternative rule, Rescuer would be entitled to disgorgement of 100 (the value of the car), given his reasonable efforts in rescuing the car (Rule B3).

Under Rule B4 Rescuer has efficient incentives to save the car because he would be able to recover his cost of 20. Alternatively, if precautions had cost, say, 200, so that the rescue had been inefficient, Rescuer would not have saved the car because he could not have recovered more than reasonable costs.

Note that in Example 3 the probability of the success of the rescue is 100 percent. If instead it were less than 100 percent, Rule B4 would allow Rescuer to recover more than his costs. Specifically, he would recover his costs divided by the probability of success. Rule B4 deviates from prevailing law under which the magnitude of Rescuer’s damages does not depend on the probability of success.[41] (We do not consider another possibility with equivalent incentives: the rescuer recovers his costs whenever he attempts a rescue, regardless of whether the attempt succeeds or fails; the parallel alternative in harm cases is to impose liability for expected rather than materialized harm.)[42]

Rescuer, however, under Rule B4, does not have efficient incentives for his ancillary activity of rescue since he gains nothing from saving the car. Thus, if Rescuer is a professional rescuer, who could invest in equipment for rescue before any specific rescue becomes concrete or increase his rescuing activity by, say, making intensive searches to find people in need of a rescue, with only compensation for his reasonable efforts, he would not do any of those activities.

What about Rescuee’s incentives? When Rescuer makes efficient efforts to rescue, Rescuee internalizes the increases in the rescue’s worth due to his own actions, so Rescuee has efficient incentives for precautions. Thus, if reasonable efforts by Rescuer will leave the saved car with some harm, and Rescuee could take steps and prevent that harm, Rescuer would take those precautions if they cost less than the expected harm to be saved by them.

Rescuee would also have an efficient activity level. In conducting his activity, Rescuee will take into account that he might need a rescue, and that he would bear the costs of such a rescue (by compensating Rescuer). Internalizing the costs of rescue thus provides him with incentives for an efficient activity level.

Applying Rule B4 requires the court to observe the burden of the rescue, the probability that the benefit materializes, and whether the rescuer’s efforts do not exceed the efficient level. This information is often available to courts.

Imagine now that instead of Rule B4 (compensation), courts apply Rule B3 (disgorgement). According to this rule, as long as Rescuer invests efficiently in rescuing, he is entitled to disgorgement damages at the amount of 100 (the car’s value). Under this rule, Rescuer’s incentives are efficient: he invests in the rescue at the efficient level, which in Example 3 is 20, but would not invest 200. Furthermore, Rescuer’s ancillary activity (investing in equipment and conducting searches for people in need of rescue) is also efficient since under Rule B3 Rescuer fully internalizes the benefits of his rescuing activity.

So far it seems that Rule B3 is more efficient than Rule B4. This impression changes once Rescuee’s incentives are considered. With Rule B3 (disgorgement), Rescuee has no incentives to take precautions to increase the rescue’s value (such as preventing some harm to the car if rescued) since that value would go to the rescuer. Furthermore, he would take excessive precautions to rescue himself to avoid being in need of rescue in the first place and might also take too low of an activity level. The reason for this is that if he is in a need of rescue, he is rescued, but still loses the value which has been rescued instead of just paying for the costs of the rescue (as under Rule B4 (compensation)).

Applying Rule B3 requires the court to observe the value saved and assess whether the rescuer’s efforts do not exceed the efficient level. This information is often available to courts.

In sum, while Rule B3 is better than Rule B4 with respect to Rescuer’s incentives for his ancillary activity, this rule is much worse with respect to Rescuee’s incentives for both his precautions and activity level. Our comparison between the two rules might explain why professional rescuers—such as doctors who provide first aid—are entitled to more than just costs of rescue.[43] By allowing damages higher than costs, professional rescuers’ activity levels are improved.

Our discussion in this Section has two policy implications:

First, when Rule B4 (compensation) is applied, Rescuer should recover more than his costs if the rescue’s probability of success was less than 100 percent (or alternatively, Rescuer would be allowed to recover his costs regardless of success).

Second, the choice between Rule B4 (compensation) and Rule B3 (disgorgement) should depend on the tradeoff between better incentives for Rescuer’s ancillary activity (Rule B3), and better incentives for Rescuee (Rule B4). An amount between compensation and disgorgement might sometimes be a good compromise, as in cases of professional rescuers.

Our recommendations for higher compensation than actual costs, either according to the first or second policy implications above, are limited to cases in which there are no prior relationships or interactions between the parties and manipulation is not plausible. If this is not the case, other considerations should count as well. If Rule B3 (disgorgement) applies, there is a risk that rescuers would put rescuees in peril and then rescue them and gain profits.[44] If Rule B4 (compensation) applies and allows recovery which is higher than actual costs (when probability of success is less than 100 percent), rescuers might also put rescuees in peril, then rescue them, and manipulate the court by underestimating the probability of success.

2.  Strict Restitution for Benefits

Suppose now that rules of strict restitution for benefits are applied. According to Rule B2 (compensation), Rescuer is entitled to recover any costs, reasonable or not, that he spent on the rescue; according to Rule B1 (disgorgement), Rescuer is entitled to recover disgorgement regardless of the costs he spent on the rescue.

Rule B2 (compensation) provides incentives for rescuers to invest too much in the rescue, since the rescuer is entitled to compensation for all his costs divided by the probability of rescue. Thus, Rescuer is indifferent to all levels of efforts, reasonable or not, and if he is paid a bit more than his costs divided by the probability of rescue, he has excessive incentives to rescue (still, his ancillary activity is deficient for the reasons elaborated on above[45]). Rescuee’s incentives are also inefficient: knowing he would pay for rescue beyond reasonable costs, Rescuee would overinvest in rescuing himself or avoiding the need of rescue and might even reduce his activity level. Thus, Rule B2 has no advantages whatsoever.

Rule B1 (disgorgement), in contrast, provides efficient incentives for rescuers with respect to both precautions and ancillary activity. The reason for this is simple: with full internalization of costs and benefits, Rescuer will behave efficiently.

Rule B1, however, is problematic for Rescuee’s incentives for the same reason that Rule B3 is problematic:[46] Rescuee knows that when he is in need of a rescue and is rescued, he still loses the value which was rescued instead of paying for the social costs of his rescue. As a result, he would not try to increase the value of the rescue; he would take excessive precautions to rescue himself or avoid the need for rescue and would reduce his activity level.

C.  Common Funds and Analogous Cases

Another category of cases in which the law allows benefactors to recover for unrequested benefits is “common funds.” Common funds are monies obtained through legal proceedings initiated by one party (or the party’s attorney) against which others can assert claims.[47] Under certain conditions, the initiator of the legal proceedings who incurred expenses to benefit a group of people can collect an equal share from each of them, even if they refused to back these efforts at the outset.[48] An illustration is the case of an heir who initiates legal proceedings resulting in an increase in the value of the estate, to the benefit of the other heirs.[49] Liability in common fund cases is aimed at overcoming the free-riding problem which might hinder the preservation or creation of a common fund; without legal intervention each beneficiary would hope to free ride on other beneficiaries’ efforts, so no one would act to preserve or create the common fund.

In previous publications[50] we argued that efficiency considerations justify expanding the duty of restitution beyond common fund cases to require compensating benefactors for unrequested benefits when the following conditions are met: (1) high transaction costs preclude reaching an agreement for payment of benefits between the benefactor and beneficiaries; (2) risk of overvaluation is low; (3) enforcement costs do not exceed the benefit of the expanded duty of restitution; (4) the benefits will not be created either by other state action or by market mechanisms; and (5) the beneficial activity does not have offsetting welfare-reducing effects.[51]

The main application for this expanded duty of restitution is the private production of public goods when, absent legal intervention, free riding and other transaction costs bar their production.

Consider the following example discussed in the Introduction:[52]

Example 2: Constructing a Garden. Builder considers constructing a garden on her land that will increase the market value of her house and five Neighbors’ houses. The garden costs Builder 15. The increase in the value of Builder’s house is 10, and the increase in the value of each Neighbor’s house is 2. The benefits are a public good: Builder cannot prevent Neighbors from enjoying the garden’s benefits once it is created. Since each Neighbor knows that her benefit from the public good does not depend on her contribution to its costs, she contributes nothing, hoping that Builder and the other Neighbors will pay for the garden. However, since all Neighbors reason in the same way, nobody pays. Nevertheless, Builder constructs the garden, conferring a total benefit to Neighbors of 10.

Legal intervention under restitution law could take several forms, including the adaptation of any of Rules B1–B4. To avoid repetition, we will consider two rules only: Rule B4 (compensating for reasonable costs) and Rule B3 (disgorging the benefits accrued due to the benefactor’s reasonable efforts).

Under Rule B4 (compensation) Builder should recover costs of 7.5 from Neighbors (1.5 from each) because they are reasonable. Consequently, she has efficient incentives to construct the garden.[53]

Things become more complicated if Builder could affect the distribution of the benefits between her and Neighbors in unverifiable ways: she is likely to construct the garden in such a way that more benefits go to her rather than to Neighbors, even if such construction is inefficient. We assume that such behavior would be verifiable and if she does so it would adversely affect her amount of recovery from Neighbors.

Also, Builder’s activity level might be inefficient. To see why, imagine that Builder is in the business of developing residential areas and creating public goods, such as gardens. She needs to make investments in locating the right places for development. Since she does not internalize the full benefits she creates, she will invest inefficiently in locating the right places. In contrast, Rule B3 (disgorgement) would provide Builder with efficient incentives for both constructing the garden efficiently and for her activity level. Therefore, if it were just for Builder’s incentives, Rule B3 would be more efficient than Rule B4.

But when it comes to Neighbors’ incentives, the efficiency effects of the two rules reverse: Rule B4 (compensation), rather than Rule B3 (disgorgement), is the one providing Neighbors with more efficient incentives.

To see why, imagine that Neighbors can take steps and enhance the benefits of the garden for them (say, by constructing the windows of their homes to face the garden). Also, new neighbors could come and build homes in the area. If Rule B3 (disgorgement) applies, Neighbors should disgorge all the benefits created by Builder, so they would not incur costs in constructing windows to face the garden, and some new neighbors that would have come to the neighborhood if they had been allowed to retain at least some of the garden’s benefits would not come.

Things would be different under Rule B4 (compensation). Under this rule, Neighbors pay just for the costs of creating the benefits for them. Given this, they will take efficient measures to enhance their benefits, since those benefits will be fully internalized by them. Also, Neighbors’ decisions whether to live in the area will be efficient.[54]

To summarize, the choice between the two rules depends on whether Builder’s activity level incentives are less or more important than Neighbors’ incentives. Thus, if Builder is a professional in the business of developing residential areas, the optimal solution would be more than just covering costs. A compromise between the two rules might be to allow Builder a recovery somewhere between compensation and disgorgement.

Note that difficulties in verifying the benefits and the probability of their creation (in cases of probabilistic benefits), and whether Builder’s efforts are lower or higher than the efficient level might change the conclusion and affect the choice between the two rules.

Conclusion

This Article developed eight liability rules for harm and benefit cases and pointed out the symmetry between the rules relating to harms and the rules relating to benefits. This Article also provided an explanation for the legal divergence between tort law and restitution law and made the claim that the gap between these two fields should be narrowed. Finally, this Article applied the eight rules to the main categories of harm and benefit cases and appraised their advantages and disadvantages. The simplest model of a liability rule, which this Article uses (most of the time), assumes two actors (injurer and victim, or benefactor and beneficiary) and two actions (precaution and activity level, or benefaction and ancillary activity level). One future extension of our model would increase the number of actors and actions. Instead of two-by-two, the extension would encompass collective choice.[55]

As noted, this Article assumes that transaction costs preclude bargaining among the parties. Consequently, this Article is framed in terms of liability rules in the law of torts and restitution. Another future extension would relax this assumption and allow bargaining among the parties. Instead of framing the eight liability rules as mandatory rules of torts or restitution, the future extension would frame them as alternative contracts. We hope to consider circumstances in which parties can contract into each of the eight liability rules.


[*] *. Herman Selvin Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School.

[†] †. Alain Poher Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University; Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago. We thank Omri Ben-Shahar, Vanessa Casado-Perez, Yun-chien Chang, Daniel Hemel, Alon Klement, Omer Pelled, and the participants at the law and economics workshop at the University of Chicago Law School for very helpful comments. We are grateful to Tom Zur who provided superb research assistance.

 [1]. Later we explain that sometimes compensation for costs incurred would be enough, or even better than full internalization, in encouraging efficient creation of benefits. See infra Sections I.C, I.E.

 [2].               We do not discuss non-efficiency reasons, such as protecting autonomy. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 215–17 (2009) (discussing the concern that restitution would infringe on recipients’ autonomy and suggesting various possible methods to mitigate it).

 [3]. We assume that the increase in the value of the houses fully capitalizes the value of the garden.

 [4].               This is so under the Hand formula, first articulated in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 3 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 2005) (suggesting that negligence can be asserted by a “risk-benefit test,” where the benefit is the advantage that the actor gains if she refrains from taking precautions, a balancing approach that is identical to the Hand formula).

 [5]. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173–74.

 [6]. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 80179 (2004) (explaining that under a strict-liability rule injurers have incentives to minimize total social costs).

 [7]. The common intuition is that, with a risk of severe bodily injury, victims will take care even if they are fully compensated. This intuition is right because with severe bodily injury compensation is in fact never perfect.

 [8]. Things might be different if it were possible to distinguish between the value produced by the benefactor and the value produced by the beneficiary.

 [9]. This assumes that it is not possible to distinguish between the values produced by each actor.

 [10]. More accurately, she is indifferent toward administering or not administering the test. If, however, injuring the patient entails some additional costs (such as costs of reputational sanctions), she will probably administer the test.

 [11].               More accurately, she is indifferent toward providing or not providing the benefit.

 [12]. In more detail: because for each dollar of more benefit for herself, Builder bears the corresponding costs of creating it, she stops creating benefits when marginal costs equal marginal benefits. See Omer Y. Pelled, The Proportional Internalization Principle in Torts, Contracts, and Unjust Enrichment 34–37 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (discussing such rule in a similar context).

 [13]. This argument is valid under the assumption that the benefactor is not also the beneficiary as in Example 2. Otherwise, things would be different. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Deficient ancillary activities by the benefactor correspond to excessive activity levels by the injurer. In more detail: strict restitution for benefits with compensatory damages causes deficient ancillary activities by the benefactor in the restitution model, and, equivalently, strict liability for harm with disgorgement damages causes excessive activity levels by the injurer in the torts model. Note, however, that under strict restitution for compensatory damages, the benefactor continues the benefaction until its marginal value is zero. If no more benefits are possible, there may be no need for more ancillary activities by the benefactor.

 [14]. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 207 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining how a negligence rule provides efficient incentives for both the injurer and the victim).

 [15]. Things might be different if it were possible to distinguish between the value produced by the benefactor and the value produced by the beneficiary.

 [16]. This is because he bears less than the social harm he creates (if he is not negligent, he bears no liability).

 [17]. Once the injurer takes efficient care, the victim bears all the residual harm. For further discussion of the incentive effects of Rule H4, see generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44 J. Legal Stud. 249 (2015).

   [18].               See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960).

 [19]. See Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts §§ 56, 73, 687 (2d ed. 2011).

 [20]. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment ch. 3, intro. (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (explaining that a person who seeks compensation for benefits intentionally conferred needs to show that the benefits were requested and that the recipient has agreed to pay for them).

 [21]. See Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Getting Incentives Right: Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution 151–64 (2014) (providing a full account of the categories of cases in which the prevailing law of restitution imposes liability for the conferral of unrequested benefits); Porat, supra note 2, at 195–98 (same). For the argument to the contrary, see generally Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985) (justifying the law’s different approaches to harm and benefit cases).

 [22]. See supra text accompanying note 2.

 [23]. See Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Externalities in Real Estate Development, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1493, 1512–13 (2018) (arguing that the differences in people’s location, view, and preferences make it hard to treat all individuals as though they were the same).

 [24]. See               Porat, supra note 2, at 210–13 (suggesting the various possible methods of mitigating the risk of overvaluation).

 [25]. See infra text accompanying note 28.

 [26]. See generally Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. Legal Stud. 21 (2009) (arguing that, under a rule of negligence, it is sufficient for the law to have one sanction at its disposal since in equilibrium, there is no negligence and the sanction is never implemented; in contrast, arguing that, in benefit cases, the subsidy should be implemented again and again whenever a benefit is created by one person for another person).

 [27]. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 21, at 161 (“[W]hen the group of recipients is tightly defined and the benefits uniformly high . . . enforcement costs should not preclude restitution.”).

[28]. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 65 (1987).

 [29]. Porat, supra note 2, at 201 (“[A]llowing injurers to force transactions on victims by unilaterally creating risks for them and then bearing all or a substantial proportion of the costs associated with those risks is essential for the occurrence of many important activities in modern society.” (emphasis omitted)).

 [30]. But see Epstein, supra note 23, at 1512–13. Professor Richard Epstein argues that occasionally injurers are constrained by the risks their injurious activities impose on themselves, while such a constraint is absent when benefactors create benefits for which they are compensated by the beneficiaries. Id. We disagree: first, very often injurers do not impose risk on themselves, and even if they do, just bearing their self-risk is not deterring enough; second, there is no reason for benefactors to create excessive benefits as long as they are compensated for the costs they incurred rather than the benefits they conferred.

 [31]. Porat, supra note 2, at 201–02.

 [32]. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1980) (comparing the incentive effects of strict liability and negligence rules); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 54–84.

 [33]. Cooter & Porat, supra note 17, at 250–51.

 [34]. Such a liability rule would be economically equivalent to disgorging the gains to the doctor from omitting the test regardless of whether harm materializes or not.

 [35]. See Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. Tort L. 1, 1 (2006) (arguing for reducing liability of doctors because of the positive externalities they create).

 [36]. See id. at 6 (“For activities with positive externalities like some medical specialties, incentives are optimal when damages are less than 100% of the victim’s actual harm.”).

 [37]. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 17, at 261–62 (arguing that under DDA, victims internalize more of the costs of their activities so they engage in less activity, and their activity levels are more efficient).

 [38]. To apply this rule, courts must know the probability that harm will occur, but it is not necessary to establish causation between omitting the test and the harm suffered by the patient. See id. at 267.

 [39]. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment §§ 20–21 (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (discussing situations of protection of another’s life or health and protection of another’s property, in which the law allows the benefactor to recover a reasonable charge for his beneficial actions); 2 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution 374–83 (1st ed. 1978). See generally Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1152 (1999) (analyzing rescue cases and supporting a broad duty of restitution).

 [40]. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 21(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (“Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by the loss avoided or by a reasonable charge for the services provided, whichever is less.”).

 [41]. See id.

 [42]. See Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty 103–10 (2001) (discussing the possibility of imposing liability for creating risk and arguing that this substitution of the traditional damage-based liability might provide the solution for a number of problems that remain unsolved under the prevalent tort law doctrine).

 [43]. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment §§ 20(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (“A person who performs, supplies, or obtains professional services required for the protection of another’s life or health is entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision to intervene without request.”).

 [44]. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879, 886–87 (1986) (arguing that one of the reasons for the prevailing law not providing large rewards to rescuers is the moral hazard that potential rescuers will create the demand for their own services).

 [45].               See supra Section III.A.

 [46]. See supra Section III.B.1.

 [47].               John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597, 1603–12 (1974) (presenting the development of the “common fund” mechanism); Levmore, supra note 21, at 95–99 (presenting attorney-creators of common funds under prevailing law).

 [48]. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 30(2)(b) (Am Law Inst. 2011) (allowing recovery in cases where “the recipient obtains a benefit in money,” thereby substantially broadening the common-funds category of cases); id. § 29 (setting out specific conditions under which a person who has incurred expenses or rendered services to preserve or create a “fund” in which others are interested may require the others, in the absence of contract, “to contribute to the reasonable and necessary expense of securing the common fund for their benefit, in proportion to their respective interests therein, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment”).

 [49]. For examples of suits brought by an heir against his or her co-heirs, see id. § 29 illus. 23–25; Palmer, supra note 39, at 428–30.

 [50].               Porat, supra note 2, at 194.

 [51]. Another condition requires the finding that the beneficiary’s autonomy interest is not unduly compromised, a criterion not strictly relevant to the efficiency analysis we pursue here. For discussion on the beneficiary’s autonomy interest, see Porat, supra note 2, at 215–17.

 [52]. For discussion of a similar example, see Porat, supra note 2, at 191.

 [53]. Since Builder creates at the same time benefits for herself and for others, also under Rule B2 (strict restitution for benefits with compensatory damages), Builder has efficient incentives to construct the garden as long as she is compensated for a relative share of her costs. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

 [54]. Note that Neighbors would have efficient incentives to enhance the value of living near the garden if they paid Builder a fixed amount, unrelated to their actual benefits from the garden. If this fixed amount were set at the level of Neighbors’ expected benefits from the garden given an efficient level of efforts to enhance their benefits from the garden, both Builder and Neighbors would have efficient incentives to increase social welfare. Still, Neighbors’ activity levels (their incentive to move to the area) would be too low.

 [55]. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, 8 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2018) (developing an informal model that specifies rights of restitution for network members).

 

Convergence and Then Downstream Divergence in Torts and Other Law – Article by Saul Levmore

 

From Volume 92, Number 4 (May 2019)
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Convergence and then Downstream Divergence in Torts and other Law

Saul Levmore[*]

Introduction

All legal systems discourage theft, negligence, and other destructive behaviors, but they do so in disparate ways. They converge as far as many of their aims and starting points are concerned, but eventually they diverge in their details. My claim in this Article is that, at least in the case of tort law, there is a pattern to this descent. The divergence has a recognizable cause and is therefore fairly predictable. Specifically, I argue that convergence is associated with laws that are both efficient and attractivea term that conveys a shared ethical intuition in the society governed by these laws. Divergence, on the other hand, arises around rules or standards that are unnecessary on efficiency groundsbecause alternatives seem equally efficientand that do not reflect some commonly held ethical sensibility.[1] Inasmuch as these terms, as well as this ambitious claim, are open to debate, it is useful to consider a number of legal problems and treatments, both legislative and judicial, in order to clarify and appreciate the claim. The argument draws on elements of comparative law, the reality of shared ethical sentiments within a society, the economic analysis of tort theory, and the limits of empirical work. In this Article, the claim is limited to torts but, as suggestive examples will show, it can be turned into a conjecture that includes other areas of law,[2] and that pertains to both rules and standards.[3] It might also say something about areas in which law outsources decisionmaking to markets, but that subject is left for another day.

I.  Binary Constructions: Contributory and Comparative Negligence

In many jurisdictions, tort law long ago settled on an axiom that is binary in form: liability is assigned to a negligent party who caused harm; causation is also an all-or-nothing game. Law, more generally, vacillates between binary rules and smoother, multifactor ones. A either murdered B or did not; there is no punishment when there is a 30 percent chance that A did it. Similarly, in tort law’s treatment of negligently caused injuries, the long-standing tradition was, first, if C was 70 percent likely to have negligently caused D’s injury, C paid 100 percent, and second, that liability was completely forgiven when the injured party, D, was also negligent.[4] To be sure, there was, and remains, divergence at the first step because some activities were subject to strict liability; still, when this regimen was in force, liability was withdrawn in certain cases if the injured party’s negligence contributed to the injury.[5] Tort liability was thus regularly allornothing, or what I am calling binary, even when law might instead have shared liability between the injurer and injured parties. Several features of this characterization require examination. A newcomer to the legal system might ask where these categories came from and why they are necessary. A more difficult but somewhat tangential question is why and when laws come in binary form. This is especially relevant here, because the binary character is an important starting point for the claim that convergence is located where efficiency and shared ethical sentiments find common ground.

It is apparent that categories as well as binary rules facilitate simplified instructions to those who must make everyday decisions with legal threats hovering nearby, and this is itself a form of efficiency. Categories also smooth the work of government officials asked to judge or enforce laws. The more complicated an organization, and the lower the cost of false positives, the more attractive are binary rules. For example, a law requiring drivers to be at least sixteen years old might be sensible, even though age is an extremely rough proxy for what the law really wants of drivers, including skill, informed judgment, and an appreciation of risks. This is because the cost of barring skilled but underage drivers is low, especially when they are on notice not to invest in early training or in jobs that require them to drive, or where there is public transportation. It might be more efficient to count on insurance markets, concerned parents, or direct and cleverly designed fees to encourage safety training, or even to determine the age at which driving is permitted for particular individuals. However, generalization seems low cost and politically acceptable (note the hint of shared ethical intuitions here); it also makes enforcement easier as very young (illegal) drivers can be identified and removed. In fact, once automobiles came into wide use, virtually every jurisdiction established a minimum age requirement for drivers, as opposed to a standard or to no intervention by the state at all.

However attractive legal systems find binary categorization,[6] it comes at a cost. Categories can be foolish. Thus, people are unlikely to be entirely introverted or extroverted, or cruel or kind, however natural it may be to imagine these binary forms.[7] In some cases, binary legal judgments are attractive because more refined, multifactor decisionmaking is not only costlier to process but also likely to bring on the risk of corruption, at least where the new variables call for judgment rather than straightforward measurement. A standard gives a regulator more discretion, and thus invites common sense, but also abuse.[8] Binary rules make it easy to treat like cases alike, and thus lower a source of discontent by disappointed parties. Much of this is familiar from the rules-versus-standards literature, but some caution is required. An apparent rule might require a great deal of discretionary decisionmaking; thus, negligence and contributory negligence (discussed below), like “net income” in tax law and so many other legal “rules,” are better thought of as standards than as rules. This is in part why it is misleading to associate either binary or multifactor guidelines with what are conventionally described as rules.

The popularity of a negligence or strict liability approach, accompanied in the academic literature by a binary contributory negligence defense, is from this perspective unsurprising. Its efficiency is well known.[9] In the case of automobiles, for example, a driver has reason to be careful because he has no reason to expect that another driver will also be negligent in a way that causes the two to crash. The second driver also has reason to take care because she will know that recovery is unavailable if she does something like speeding out of a driveway without looking and is then hit (even) by another speeding vehicle unable to be stopped in time. Again, describing the law as binary, refers to the fact that liability is allornothing when it might easily have been shared between the two parties.

A more global explanation for the prevalence, or convergence, of the binary character of many laws, is that it suppresses evidence of voting paradoxes.[10] If a decision is to be made by multiple voters or other decisionmakers and there are more than two variables, it is easy for the decisionmakers to be unable to reach a stable result. They might cycle among the available options or be disgruntled when they can see, after the smoke clears, that a majority opposes the decision reached by a legislature or other body of voters that claimed to be governed by majority rule. A majority may prefer outcome X over Y, and then Y over Z, but Z might be preferred over X. Motion-and-amendment voting, found in legislatures around the world and popularized by Robert’s Rules of Order in the case of sizeable private organizations in the United States, finds a Condorcet winnerwhich is to say an option that defeats all other options in head-to-head competitionif one exists.[11] Motion-and-amendment voting allows X to win if it is preferred over both Y and Z, and all other proposals, but it hides the fact that there is no real, consistent majority winner where X beats Y, Y defeats Z, and Z is preferred over X. This voting method does this by always asking for binary decisions and then making it difficult to revisit an option once the option has lost in a head-to-head competition. With its binary decisions, law thus hides evidence of cycling preferences but does an excellent job of finding desirable, Condorcet winners where they exist. This might explain why legislatures are normally asked to vote a proposal, or any amendment or substitution to it, up or down, and why panels of judges on appellate courts, in binary style, affirm or reject rulings that they hear on appeal.[12] Indeed, this is a remarkable example of convergence across legal systems, though I am unsure whether to call it efficient (as it avoids repetitive cycling) or simply politically attractive (as it prevents the outrage expected of people when they see that a majority opposes the result found by another alleged majority). Though this is not unique to tort law, it is useful to see that where there is little risk of cycling, as when preferences are “single peaked,”[13] law is more hospitable to putting multiple variables or ranges on the table.

A good example of the emergence in tort law of a non-binary approach where there is little risk of cycling, and where there is no loss of efficiency and even a gain in terms of law’s ability to conform to political and ethical expectations, is the emergence of comparative negligence. Its predecessor, contributory negligence, is binary in form; a wrongdoer is absolved if the injured party was also negligent. In contrast, comparative negligence, under which the fact-finder spreads liability according to the relative wrongdoing of multiple parties, is more continuous as well as increasingly popular.[14] There are two useful ways to think about the emergence of comparative negligence. First, citizens find comparative negligence attractive because they seem to dislike the idea that mere negligence can reduce an injured party’s recovery all the way down to zero. The shared ethical sentiment is to favor comparative over contributory negligence. This sentiment may be motivated by a fear of mistaken fact-finding, though I hesitate to put too much weight on this conjecture because it introduces a kind of efficiency argument to what is essentially one about ethical sentiments. It seems unlikely that many citizens or legislators think about enforcement costs when they opine about fairness in tort law. A better description might therefore draw on a theory of justice or an evolved taste for retribution. An obvious question is why older law did not reflect these ethical intuitions. One answer is that perhaps we cannot know what ancient shared ethical intuitions looked like. Another, and one with some support in the historical record, is that some lawmakers inserted a version of comparative negligence by quietly reducing damages when the injured party was also negligent.[15]

The second characteristic of the emergence of comparative negligence in tort law returns us to cycling preferences. Imagine decisionmakers deciding whether to award full damages, partial damages, or zero damages to someone who was injured by a speeding driver, but who was arguably contributorily negligent, perhaps by suddenly emerging from a hidden driveway. One fact-finder might rank the desirability of results as Full-Partial-Nonewhere Full means that all of the liability is assigned to the speeding driver on the roadway, and is the fact-finder or decisionmaker’s first choice, Partial means that the first driver pays a fraction of the loss suffered by the negligent victim, so that the two divide the loss, and so forth. Another voter might have the opposite inclination, reasoning that law should strongly discourage drivers from darting into a public road, so that recovery by the negligent injured party should be completely denied. But it is hard to see why anyone would rank Partial last. A voter, or jury member, who thinks the plaintiff should recover full damages will surely be happier with a partial recovery by this plaintiff than with no recovery at all. Similarly, one who thinks that contributory negligence should bar recovery, would certainly prefer partial recovery over full recovery if she cannot have her first choice of None. If so, there is no danger of cycling; Full will beat None, or None will defeat Full, or there could be a tie between these two, but there is no chance that the winner of the Full-None competition will then lose in competition with the Partial option. Partial liability can certainly be a voter’s first choice, and it is almost surely the second choice of those whose first choice is either Full or None, but it is hard to imagine Partial (liability) as anyone’s third choice, and for this reason there will be no cycling. Similarly, the common rule barring anyone under the age of sixteen from operating a motor vehicle is a binary rule where there is no danger of cycling.[16] It is telling, and certainly interesting, that law has moved away from the binary approach of contributory negligence just where there is no apparent risk of cycling preferences.

It is noteworthy that the non-binary form of modern comparative negligence was first introduced in European admiralty law, where judgment was rendered by a single lawmaker who was, therefore, in no danger of cycling.[17] Indeed, it is tempting to say that legal systems that rely on a single judge rather than a jury will be quicker to adopt comparative negligence, though this hardly explains Hammurabi’s Code and other long-standing uses of contributory negligence. But the argument here suggests that juries are unlikely to cycle within a comparative negligence framework, so it is unsurprising that comparative negligence emerged in a wide variety of jurisdictions.[18] Similarly, it is not surprising that comparative negligence comes in many forms; none of these forms would come in last place, and any could emerge in a divided group of voters.

This first example illustrates the idea that there is convergence up high where ethical sentiments and efficiency considerations are in sync. Virtually all legal systems find a means of discouraging negligent behavior toward strangers. This example also supports the claim that divergence arises downstream, when it comes to detail, where ethical intuitions and efficiency considerations are at odds, or where efficiency can be promoted with a variety of legal directives.[19] To be sure, the argument would be better if there were no excluded class; once there is convergence upstream, we do not get to observe whether downstream divergence proves much. My claim might seem obvious or even circular. A better example might be one with upstream divergence and then downstream convergence. It is thus convenient to point to the fact that virtually all systems converge on awarding single damages in tort law, presumably to avoid moral hazard. At first, this example of upstream divergence and downstream convergence will seem contrary to the theory advanced here, and certainly to the title of this Article, but it shows that the theory is hardly obvious or tautological. Where different rules are all efficient, legal systems can afford to be divergent, though they might eventually evolve to a single rule if there develops a shared ethical intuition in its favor. But where efficiency favors a single ruleas it does for single indemnity to combat moral hazardand there is no shared ethical intuition that contradicts this rule, we find convergence. Here we have rare cases where this convergence-divergence pattern is of the downstream-upstream form, respectively, though usually it is the reverse.[20]

II.  Other Examples in Tort Law

A.  Negligence: Strict Liability and Rescue

The choice between negligence and strict liability is perhaps the most obvious and far-reaching example of the theory developed here. Another, yet narrower, example concerns the familiar question of whether there ought to be a duty to rescue.[21] But inasmuch as both of these examples are now obvious and inadvertently addressed elsewhere, they merit just a few words. Again, legal systems must discourage avoidable and intentionally caused injuries. They can do so with a variety of approaches, and of course we find divergence among legal systems.[22] The convergence is with respect to a law that requires one actorincluding negligent and wrongful onesto pay for the loss inflicted on an innocent party. The divergence is in the choice of negligence or strict liability, and then in the treatment of exceptional cases, where a negligencebased system opts for strict liability, or where a system or subsystem that chooses strict liability as its default switches to a negligence formulation.[23] Both approaches are consistent with the idea that tort law promotes efficiency, although reasonable people can disagree as to which is superior once activity levels and enforcement costs are taken into account. This uncertainty might be said to “explain” the divergence between the two approaches. The same is true once ethical sentiments come into play, as the approaches diverge just as these sentiments do.

In the case of a failure to rescue a person in danger, or even to save another person’s property that is at risk, there is variety among legal systems[24] and also disagreement about the efficiency of the various approaches.[25] Where human life is at stake, the shared ethical sensibility is quite clear; it is widely thought that one ought (or is even bound) to rescue another where there is little danger to the rescuer.[26] Indeed, this is an excellent example of the proposition that shared ethical sentiments alone do not predict law, and certainly not convergence of law. There is less agreement about rescuing another’s property when the rescue might be unsuccessful, where rescue requires trespass, and where destruction is unlikely to be immediate. But as an efficiency matter, there is the problem, perhaps just theoretical, that a duty to rescue persons might encourage people to avoid “rescue spots,” and also the problem that so many potential rescues involve multiple parties who might truly believe that someone else has called for help; over-rescue can be inefficient or even dangerous.[27] It might also be difficult to judge when the risk is immediate; a rescuer might claim there was imminent harm when in fact professional help could have been summoned, or there was no threat of harm in the first place. Again, we see variety among laws where there is not agreement between ethical intuitions and efficiency considerations.

B.  Incapacity Exceptions

It is tempting to deflect criticism that this Article is engaging in a form of ex post data fitting by claiming that the ideas offered here fit every nook and cranny of tort law.[28] It is more useful, I think, to limit our inspection to one additional, small application in the law of torts, and then to postpone for future work an expansion to other areas of law. There is great divergence among jurisdictions when negligent behavior by children, insane persons, and other incapacitated defendants have caused injury.[29] Again, there is no shared ethical intuition, as we sometimes excuse the incapacitated person and at other times empathize with the injured victim. On the other hand, there is some de facto convergence, as when an insanity defense tends to be followed by a period of confinement about the same as the length of incarceration for more typical, convicted criminals. Note that ethical intuitions support this similarity in detention.[30] There is also no clear category or principle to separate cases where it is clear that efficiency calls for liability or an exception to the default category of negligence (or strict liability). In the case of young children, for example, liability might lead to optimal supervision by their guardians, but it might also detract from desirable learning, something courts have noted.[31]

III.  Expanding the Theory Outside of Tort Law: From Trust Games to Voting

The ideas offered here are interesting but in some areas they are hard to pin down. It becomes apparent that both efficiency and convergence are imprecise terms, and yet the theory is enticing even outside of conventional legal topics. Consider the first-year curriculum of most law schools. The schools teach torts, civil procedure, and contracts, and thus converge. They then diverge, as predicted, one or two steps downstream when it comes to the length of these courses, the cases that are assigned, the mix of theory and doctrine, and the time spent on particular subjects.[32] The argument would be that it is sensible or “efficient” to begin with these subjects because they prepare students for more advanced courses, though these courses might themselves reflect arbitrary but useful categorization; the schools could just as easily have converged on a course titled unjust enrichment or free-riding. It would be difficult to insist on shared ethical intuitions and, as for efficiency, we do not really know that the convergence in curricula, if it is that, is efficient. There is certainly no controlled experiment in which the emergence of good lawyers or even of impressive bar-passage rates is compared with that of comparable students who experience a different first-year curriculum. To the contrary, no law school appears to discriminate among applications to be admitted as transfer students based on the details of the first-year courses these applicants experienced in other schools. Here, as in so many other institutional practices, there is initial convergence because of intuitions or imitation and, more interestingly, subsequent divergence where there is no way to assess or theorize about the most efficient or ethically attractive details.

Returning to legal systems, rather than the way they are taught, it is noteworthy that they have also converged over time in the way they punish or disable convicted criminals. Nevertheless, they diverge as to the length of imprisonment. It is easy to regard this as another example of basic convergence and subsequent, downstream divergence, but much harder to associate that which converges to a combination of efficiency and shared ethical sentiments. The best we can say is that there is less agreement about these things in questions of length, rather than manner, of punishment. In some cases, efficiency is a matter of theory rather than empirical evidence, as it is for negligence and strict liability, as well as contributory and comparative negligence. The pairs are interchangeable as a theoretical matter, and that is enough for the theory advanced here. If so, we can say that, in theory, imprisonment should deter crime, but when it comes to the length of sentences there are decent arguments for shorter and longer sentences, not to mention more or less substantial gaps as one moves from less serious to more serious crimes.[33] No doubt, divergence also comes from disparate circumstances. A society with little water will probably impose greater criminal penalties for the destruction of a well; cattle rustling (or “duffing”) was treated with severe penalties in the Old West as it was in many countries, and not because the thieves were harder to apprehend. These examples of downstream divergence are best described as responding to different shared ethical sentiments or political pressures, although strained efficiency arguments can be made. Either way, law and politicians obviously respond to outcries, though we might think of these as examples of local ethical sentiments that are fairly predictable.

This optimism suggests that we ought to find divergence even on basic principles where there is neither a common ethical intuition nor empirical evidence or theoretical support for one legal tactic.[34] Many examples will come to mind, but two should suffice. Consider the choice of voting systems. There might be theoretical and even ethical reasons to expect democracy, but divergence begins almost immediately when it comes to its form. We cannot identify the best voting system and of course we find great diversity in this area.[35] The example suffers from the fact that there is a great deal of copying among jurisdictions, but even if we subscribe to the idea of looking for convergence through spontaneous ordering,[36] the divergence is impressive. Convergence is thus limited to questions that are essential for democratic systems, and this fits nicely with the idea that we find convergence where efficiency considerations (broadly defined in this case) and shared ethical sentiments converge.

The same might be said for how democracies function. Consider the decision of a city’s mayor to divert some funds from the anticipated purchase of police cars to the idea of putting some officers on bicycles. The intuition is that these officers could then better patrol a recreational area or interact with citizens. Bicycles might also help keep some officers physically fit, and citizens might simply like them or be inspired to be more fit themselves. The decision is almost impossible to evaluate. Crime or fitness may have increased or decreased after the introduction of bicycles, but so many other factors could cause these changes, and it would be absurd to attribute a dramatic change in crime rates to a small change in the mixture of police vehicles in a large city. It may be ethically and politically irresponsible to run an experiment in which the number of bicycles is randomly altered, and in any event even a sophisticated use of artificial intelligence will find it difficult to overcome the problem of omitted variables.[37] In practice, there is divergence among jurisdictions where efficiency is difficult to determine, and where there is unlikely to be a shared ethical intuition. I suspect that when a serious crime occurs in a location accessible by bike but not by car, there is the intuition that some officers on bicycles would be a good idea. For this or other reasons, there may be convergence by imitation so that we expect at least a few bicycles in every large police force.

Finally, there are subjects where other forces are likely to overwhelm the boundaries suggested here between convergence and divergence. Convergence may, for example, come about because it is of lower cost than innovation and divergence. One can hire officials or draft laws at lower cost if they have been trained or written elsewhere in a particular mode. On the other hand, divergence may be attractive because there is a market for it. Following Professor Charles Tiebout’s well-known hypothesis,[38] a jurisdiction may opt for more or less spending on a good, or on a different legal approach, in order to attract businesses or citizens that prefer that law in the mix they will encounter in the adopting jurisdiction. This form of strategic, market-like diversification might be more apparent the less fundamental the laws, but in some cases it is seen upstream with respect to basic principles, as in the promise by some jurisdictions not to have an income tax. This source of divergence seems unlikely for tort law. A business might choose not to sell a product in an area known to award very high damages in cases of products liability, but it is unlikely that a jurisdiction will gain much by choosing to apply the negligence principle, or an exemption from any liability claim at all, to products, if only because mobile firms normally expect that many of their products will be used in other jurisdictions. One jurisdiction might care more about income redistribution than another, but I prefer to think of this as a subset of what this Article has called ethical intuitionsand thus expect divergence. Though, I note that while academics associate strict liability in tort law with redistribution to poorer consumers, strict liability in fact is often capped at absurdly low amounts that promise to leave wealth in the hands of the owners of many corporations. In any event, Tieboutian logic in favor of diversity is probably better associated with a divergence in jurisdictions’ spending decisions than with threats of liability.[39]

Conclusion

Complete convergence among legal systems is implausible for several reasons. Decisionmakers have reason to copy the laws and practices of other jurisdictionsif only to avoid criticism when things go wrongbut also to distinguish themselves, and then hope for the best. Somewhat similarly, judges have good reasons to follow precedent, but also to diverge on occasion, whether openly or by asserting that a case is one of first impression. This Article has suggested a different, but coexisting, reason for convergence and divergence in tort law, as well as in other far-flung areas of the law. Convergence is associated with efficiency alongside shared ethical sentiments. Where a variety of legal techniques seem equally likely to be efficient, or where ethical intuitions do not match identifiable efficient laws, divergence is expected. A second part of the theory advanced here is that the details of laws are less likely to be uniquely efficient and also less likely to match shared ethical sensibilities. As such, there is almost always divergence as legal systems take fundamental principles and then experiment with, or simply use their experiences or political and social characteristics to fashion, details on the ground. An empirically minded optimist might look at the examples provided here and suggest that divergence offers lawmakers natural experiments, and that these will soon enough lead to more convergence further downstream. I have suggested, and will extend the argument in future work, that this intuition about the impact of empirical work is too optimistic, because as we move downstream it becomes harder to assemble useful empirical evidence. Rules may come to dominate the terrain,[40] but we should continue to expect divergence in the detailsor more technically, in areas where we cannot identify the most efficient legal rule and where there is no widely shared ethical sentiment. These claims about convergence and divergence were demonstrated in this Article with cases drawn from tort law, and in future work I hope to show not only that these claims hold true for many other areas of law, but also that they are necessarily true for the reasons hinted at here.

 


[*] *. William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for comments received at a University of Chicago Law School workshop, from participants in the conference memorialized in this issue of the Southern California Law Review, and over the years from Richard Epstein and Ariel Porat. Better colleagues would be impossible to find.

 [1]. Note that these intuitions can come from very different reasoning processes. Twenty citizens are likely to agree that murderers should be disabled, but they might have twenty different reasons for this view or even for the question of what incarceration will accomplish.

 [2]. As the claim is expanded beyond tort law, it is easier to find exceptions to the idea advanced here. Exceptions may well prove the rule, but it is useful or simply safer to think of the thesis developed here as limited to torts, and to expand the argument to other areas of law in the future.

 [3]. It is worth insisting at the outset that characterizing laws as binary, convergent, divergent, or multifactor is not, as we will see, the same as marking them as rules or standards. There is of course the danger that the upstream-downstream distinction is too malleable. But in many cases that support the theory offered here, the distinction seems unassailable. A country is upstream from a city; deterring theft and murder is upstream from the number of years of imprisonment a thief or murderer is ordered to serve.

 [4]. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 3, 88 (1987) (noting that by the end of the nineteenth century, tort law “had assumed essentially its modern shape” in which the default standard of liability was negligence, and further elaborating on the role of contributory negligence within a negligence standard).

 [5]. See William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1705, 1712 (1992).

 [6]. The prevalence of categories is a deep but manageable question, and it suggests the harder problem of justifying the placement of the negligence convention (and the convergence around it) far upstream in legal systems. The very development of a legal system, not to mention the establishment of a judiciary, can be placed yet further upstream. The characterization of rules and standards as either upstream or downstream is arguably a matter of taste and semantics, and it is not explored here; my claim about the descent from upstream to downstream, and from convergence to divergence, is more interesting than is identifying a starting point for, and the precise boundary of, convergence.

 [7]. See generally Merve Emre, The Personality Brokers: The Strange History of Myers-Briggs and the Birth of Personality Testing (2018) (describing the selling of the widely used Myers-Briggs personality test, replete with binary self-characterizations).

 [8]. Note that while I use public choice theory in explaining the binary character of many legal rules, this Article minimizes the role of public choice in developing rules and standards, and in bringing about convergence and divergence more generally. Powerful interest groups surely have great impact on law, and probably more on downstream than upstream decisions, but they hardly explain convergence and divergence quite generally. For example, something close to strict liability has become common for defective products, and that is hardly at the behest of well-organized interest groups. In other areas of law, like patents, powerful groups simply do not know in advance what rules will benefit them.

 [9]. See Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 235, 235–87 (1986).

 [10]. This theory should be traced to Leo Katz, Why the Law Is So Perverse 6–7 (2011). On the implications for the binary quality of some law then developed, see generally Saul Levmore, Public Choice and Law’s Either/Or Inclination, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1663 (2012) (reviewing Katz’s extraordinary book).

 [11]. See Henry M. Robert et al., Robert’s Rules of Order 42528 (11th ed. 2011).

 [12]. I ignore remands, but these too will eventually lead to a binary decision if they are returned to an appellate court. Note that when a lower court determines damages or other results, these can be binary, but the decision is made by a single judge who is not subject to cycling, as discussed presently. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 829.

 [13]. See Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. Pol. Econ. 23, 24 (1948).

 [14]. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 851, 919 (1981). As a matter of efficiency, the old approach was just fine, and indeed strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence was favored by some legal academics and economists. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 363, 367 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud. 205, 207 (1973).

 [15]. Note the similarity to the divergence found in the law regarding the good-faith purchase of stolen property. Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. Legal Stud. 43, 44–45 (1987).

 [16]. Inasmuch as a driver needs to meet the age requirement and also pass a driving test, the rules might be described as multifactor and not binary. But I will opt for binary because there is no chance that someone would prefer an underage driver who had failed the exam. There are two requirements, but little danger of cycling. Note that this argument assumes that it took years of experience before cycling became apparent and law therefore accommodated the shared ethical intuition in favor of comparative negligence. These evolutionary stories are plausible but sufficiently doubtful. As such, I do not want to make them a centerpiece of the theory offered here.

 [17]. See A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L. Rev. 333, 341–46 (1932). To be fair, there are situations in which a single decisionmaker can face something like a cycling problem, but this twist does not alter the present argument. See Katz, supra note 10, at 25–68.

 [18]. See Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 91920              . A related question is why change comes so slowly in some areas than in others. Why did American jurisdictions take so long to move to comparative negligence? One possibility is that judges felt free to sneak in comparative negligence by lowering damages within binary regimes. And, of course, in other areas of law where we now see convergence, U.S. law moved first.

 [19]. More detailed definitions of upstream and downstream—terms that are used rather loosely here—will emerge below. They are, inevitably, a matter of taste. “Upstream” laws are sometimes, but not always, those that pre-exist their downstream offspring; a legal system might decide to abandon contributory negligence, and then over time it might gravitate from one form of comparative negligence to another. More fundamentally, a system might install a legislature or judiciary and then be equipped to choose negligence or strict liability for wrongs done to others.

 [20]. This important example shows that the title of this Article can be misleading. The theory might better be titled “Convergence Where Efficiency and Shared Ethical Intuitions Are in Sync,” but this is less catchy and fails to suggest that we can explain divergence as well as convergence. In any event, in most areas of law, and certainly in most of tort law, the efficiency/ethical intuition match is found upstream.

 [21]. I could also include the choice between all-or-nothing and probabilistic-recovery rules. Ethical intuitions favor probabilistic recovery; a defendant who is found rather certainly to have caused a harm is commonly regarded as someone who should pay more for a given harm than one who is only 51 percent likely to have caused the injury or been negligent in doing so. There is, however, good reason to celebrate all-or-nothing directives as error-minimizing in most circumstances. I set this consideration aside both because I have addressed it in earlier work and because error minimization is not a synonym for efficiency. See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691, 692 (1990).

 [22]. See generally P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 Duke L.J. 1002 (noting variety in such areas as workers compensation, products liability, mass torts, and pain and suffering claims).

 [23]. Consider, for example, divergence in cases of products liability. While the United States and most European jurisdictions have adopted a strict liability approach, Canada has augmented the traditional negligence-based construction with additional remedies through contract. See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29–33 (EC), amended by Directive 1999/34, 1999 O.J. (L 141) 20–21 (EC); David S. Morritt & Sonia L. Bjorkquist, Product Liability in Canada: Principles and Practice North of the Border, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 177, 180–81 (2000).

 [24]. In general, civil law countries impose a “duty” to rescue. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A Dubious Case for Criminal Enforcement, 20 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 451, 452 (2000). For example, both the French civil and criminal codes provide for a duty to rescue, with the criminal code prescribing five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 euros when individuals withhold aid from a person in danger which could be performed without risk to the rescuer or third parties. Code civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1382 (Fr.); Code pénal [C. pén.] [Penal Code] art. 223-6 (Fr.). The Polish criminal code imposes a similar duty but limits it expressly to situations threatening an immediate danger of loss of life or serious bodily injury and imposes a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment without an associated fine. Kodeks karny [K. K.] [Criminal Code] 1997, art. 162, sec. 1 (Pol.). The Argentine criminal code also limits liability, but bases its limitations on the identity of the would-be rescuer: specifically, it singles out those who “abandonado a su suerte” (“abandon to their fate”) an incapacitated individual in their care, or whom they have themselves incapacitated. Código Penal [Cód. Pen.] [Criminal Code] art. 106 (Arg.). The Argentine code imposes a sliding penalty of between two and fifteen years’ imprisonment based on the harm to the victim but joins Poland in foregoing additional civil penalties. Id. In sharp contrast to its civil law peers, the United States largely maintains that bystanders, though not caregivers or other singled-out parties, will not be liable for failures to rescue—joining in this respect other common law countries, including England. See Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis, 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 77, 87 (2005); Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1447, 1452 (2008). On the other hand, it is common in U.S. jurisdictions to find liability for a failure to rescue when the would-be rescuer is in a “special relationship” with the one in need of rescue, as explained in the works cited in infra note 25. Thus Argentinian law, for instance, is not so different from judge-made laws in U.S. jurisdictions.

 [25]. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879, 881 (1986); see also Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 190 (1973); Eric H. Grush, Note, The Inefficiency of the No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule and a Proposed “Similar Risk” Alternative, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 881, 883900 (1998); Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 Int’l Rev. L. Econ. 141, 141–42 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247, 269, 282 (1980).

 [26]. See Weinrib, supra note 25, at 279–93.

 [27]. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83, 119–28 (1978); Levmore, supra note 25, at 883–84.

 [28]. An objection to ex post selection of examples can of course be made to virtually all theorizing, whether in law or in medicine or any use of artificial intelligence. It is a danger that can only be overcome with more examples and with the promise that many of the examples offered here were chosen after the theory was stated.

 [29]. For example, substantial divergence has historically been present between United States and English jurisdictions, with the former choosing to hold children and the insane liable for tortious acts, and the latter denying their ability to be culpable in cases of tort. See Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9, 9–10 (1924). Still other jurisdictions, including Germany, Argentina, France, and Brazil, have adopted variations on the English view. See James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1079, 1083.

 [30]. Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment?: Comparing the Lengths of Confinement of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 19 L. & Hum. Behav. 375, 377 (1995).

 [31]. See, e.g., A.R.H. v. W.H.S., 876 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishing verdicts following various claims of negligent supervision, in particular by weighing the ability of greater supervision to prevent harm); Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 401–02 (Pa. 1957) (describing the various considerations to be accounted for in determining juvenile negligence).

 [32]. Note that the definitions of upstream and downstream seem unobjectionable here. Upstream laws (or practices) are not necessarily earlier in time, but rather fundamental building blocks.

 [33]. See Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Threats and Criminal Deterrence in Several Dimensions, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1333, 1347–50. Nor is there reason to think that Artificial Intelligence will yield optimal prison sentences. See generally Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, Standards, and Judicial Discretion, 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).

 [34]. Some downstream divergence can be traced to a complete inability to know what a rule accomplishes. Thus, we are not surprised that there is divergence in religious beliefs or even in burial practices—and it is obvious that practitioners are unable to discern the efficiency (or after-life effects) of different rules.

 [35]. For an overview of electoral systems, and an analysis of the axioms driving their selection, see generally Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, 18 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 297 (1997).

 [36]. See generally Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The Evolution of Property Rights Systems, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2341 (2015) (discussing the relationship between spontaneous order and natural law).

 [37]. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 33.

 [38]. For Professor Tiebout’s seminal article on this hypothesis, see generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956) (theorizing that individuals will move to communities with public goods provisions that suit their personal preferences and vice versa).

 [39]. See generally Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Durability of Law, in The Timing of Lawmaking 171 (Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan eds., 2017) (emphasizing lawmakers’ interest in appealing to a particular population’s preferences and doing so in a way that will last for some time).

 [40]. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 33.

 

Tort Reform Through the Back Door: A Critique of Law and Apologies – Article by Yonathan A. Arbel & Yotam Kaplan

From Volume 90, Number 6 (September 2017)
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In this Article, we show how the biggest tort reform of the last decade was passed through the back door with the blessing of its staunchest opponents. We argue that the widely-endorsed “apology law” reform—a change in the national legal landscape that privileged apologies—is, in fact, a mechanism of tort reform, used to limit victims’ recovery and shield injurers from liability. While legal scholars overlooked this effect, commercial interests seized the opportunity and are in the process of transforming state and federal law with the unwitting support of the public.


 

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Risk, Reward, and Responsibility: A Call to Hold UberX, Lyft, and Other Transportation Network Companies Vicariously Liable for the Acts of Their Drivers – Note by Lauren Geisser

From Volume 89, Number 2 (January 2016)
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On December 31, 2013, a car accident killed one and injured two pedestrians. The deceased: a six-year-old girl. Her family brought suit in San Francisco against the driver for wrongful death and personal injuries and against Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, and Rasier-CA LLC on a theory of vicarious liability. The driver had a contract with Uber and Rasier-CA LLC when the accident occurred and at that time was allegedly waiting to “match” with a passenger through Uber’s app. The question of Uber’s liability centers around whether it should be liable for the acts of its driver at all, and if so, whether it should be liable for the acts of a driver when no passenger is yet in the vehicle. Uber answered the complaint claiming that because it is not a transportation carrier, has an independent contractor relationship with its drivers, and the driver-defendant was neither transporting a passenger nor en route to pick up a passenger, Uber was not liable for any damages.


 

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