Standing for Rivers, Mountains—and Trees—in the Anthropocene

In his well-known article, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Professor Christopher Stone proposed that courts grant nonhuman entities standing as plaintiffs so their interests may directly represented in court. In this Article, I review Stone’s ideas about standing and our relationship with the natural environment and describe the current, burgeoning, widespread trend toward granting not just standing, but legal rights and legal personhood to rivers, mountains, and other natural entities. I analyze the ways in which courts and legislatures in New Zealand, Australia, Colombia, and elsewhere are addressing concerns similar to Stone’s with expansive, even radical results. I draw from multiple sources, including interviews I conducted with actors advocating for or implementing these legal initiatives. Stone eloquently describes how to rationalize and implement standing and other kinds of moral consideration for nonhuman entities, but he did not envision the diverse, expansive, paradigm-shifting, justice-altering ways such rights are being granted in diverse locales around the world. Various human communities have adapted lifeways that ensure their behaviors continue to sustain their environments so that their environments continue to sustain them; often they have been dispossessed from the legal right to manage their natural environment. When jurisdictions grant rights for rivers, they simultaneously honor the cosmologies and practices of those who are staking moral, historical, ecological, and now legal, claims to speak for nonhuman entities. The very notion—espoused by Stone and now inscribed in law around the world—that law should be rooted in ecological interrelationship is itself a paradigm shift that shapes our mindsets and thus our behaviors toward the natural world that is us.

INTRODUCTION

For one, the fact that we can bring a suit on behalf of loggerheads and leatherbacks is an affirmation of who we are, or may become, as a people. . . . But these happenings, together with the collapsing glaciers and vanishing frogs, are offered to us the way a sly God scatters omens—black cats and thunderclaps—to test whether a people is really worth saving, offering them a final chance, if they will only make the right interpretation, to mend their ways. It should not take an oracle to read the signs.

In his famous law review article, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Professor Christopher Stone proposed that courts grant nonhuman entities standing as plaintiffs to have their interests directly represented in court. In this Article, I revisit Trees and other writings from Stone through the lens of the current global movement to grant legal rights to rivers, mountains, and other nonhuman ecosystems.

For Stone, “standing” stood for more than whose interests count in the law. Writing (presumably) as a dutiful law professor who wanted to get published, Stone framed his original article around constitutional standing requirements, that is what would and should get an entity a hearing in court. But more profoundly, Stone was reaching for a new understanding of humans’ place on the planet. Standing was a vehicle for a disquisition on matters that were, as he wrote, “a bit unthinkable”—a holistic, radical (as in, from the roots) paradigm shift on humans’ place in the natural world, and our hubris in not seeing where our proper place should be. Stone later wrote that his “concern is not with moral and legal philosophy for their own sake. Rather, the animating concern is worldly: What sort of planet will this be?”

In this Article, I describe the current, burgeoning, widespread trend toward granting not just standing, but legal rights and legal personhood to rivers, mountains, and other natural entities. These legal moves leap beyond standing in ways Stone could not have anticipated fifty years ago and reimagine our relationship to the nonhuman world, as inscribed in the law.

In Victoria, Australia, the Yarra River Protection Act (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) names the Yarra as “one living . . . natural entity.” The law creates the eleven-person Birrarung Council, including at least two Aboriginal traditional custodians, as well as representatives from environmental groups, and scientific, planning, and agricultural interests. They are the Voice of the River and now speak for the interests of the Yarra as the government charts a fifty-year plan to manage the river. Colombia’s highest court has drawn upon ecocentric philosophy to give rights to the polluted Río Atrato, while ordering the government to assemble a committee of local residents and government officials to determine what legal personhood means for the river. Following this lead, Colombian courts have declared that the Amazon, several other rivers, a high-altitude ecosystem, and the spectacled bear are legal persons. In New Zealand, the legislature has passed laws granting personhood—with “all the rights powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person”—to the Whanganui River and to the Te Urewera mountain ecosystem on the North Island. In both cases, the legislation grants local Māori communities the rights to speak for the natural features; they have started by laying out the traditional community values that define their interrelationship with the natural entities for whom they will speak.

When, as the Māori express it, “Ko au te awa, ko te awa, ko au” (“I am the River and the River is me”), the river’s interests must be taken into account, based on a worldview that the river’s interests are our interests. In numerous locales, citizens, governments, legislatures, and courts are moving toward Stone’s idea of a “radically different law-driven consciousness,” and in so doing, this posture both reflects and evolves communities’ views of themselves. When the law turns from “we own the river” to “we are the river,” we redefine how the law understands “property.” At the same time, we create new legal paradigms that conceive of the human-nature relationship in novel ways and that empower different voices who speak for what that relationship should comprise, and why. In these nations, legislatures and courts are redefining who “we” actually are. These shifts in worldview also hack traditional power hierarchies, as those who have been disenfranchised from managing environmental resources gain legal control to say what the river or mountain (and therefore their own human communities) really need. These changes build upon and reflect Stone’s ideas, but they also transcend them in ways he might never have envisioned.

Ideas can act as forces of nature. Our evolving views of who we are and what nature needs shape our ethical precepts about these relationships; these ethical evolutions (re)shape the law. The law, in turn, shapes the natural world through what it permits and proscribes, and that remade nature, in turn, shapes our views and ethics. When a particular worldview prevails and ecosystems gain formal rights, the evolution has not been in the original views of those who have proposed such conceptions, now inscribed in law: the Māori, for example, have long believed in an indivisible relationship with the natural world around them. Instead, the ethics of the hegemonic cultures in some nations are evolving. When governments or courts grant rivers legal rights, they reflect and propel changing views both of human relationships with the natural world, and of dominant groups’ relationships with indigenous peoples or other disenfranchised subpopulations from whom the right to manage the natural world had been taken.

In this Article, I review Stone’s ideas about standing and our relationship with the natural environment and analyze the ways in which courts and legislatures in Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, and elsewhere have addressed similar questions with expansive, even radical results. I draw from multiple sources, including interviews I conducted with actors advocating for or implementing these legal initiatives. Stone eloquently describes how to rationalize and implement standing and other kinds of moral consideration for nonhuman entities. But he did not envision the diverse, expansive, paradigm-shifting, justice-altering ways such rights are being granted in diverse locales around the world. When jurisdictions grant rights for rivers, they honor the cosmologies and practices of those who are staking moral, historical, ecological, and now legal, claims to speak for nonhuman entities. Various human communities have adapted certain lifeways that ensure their behaviors continue to sustain their environments so that their environments continue to sustain them; often they have been dispossessed from the legal right to manage their natural environment. The very notion—espoused by Stone and now inscribed in law around the world—that law should be rooted in ecological interrelationship is itself a paradigm shift that shapes our mindsets and thus our behaviors toward the natural world that is us.

I.  THE THEMES THAT ANIMATE CHRISTOPHER STONE’S WORK

By advocating for legal standing for rivers, mountains, and, famously, trees, Stone was really standing for an evolved view of humans’ relationships with the natural world to be inscribed in the law.

A.  Standing

Constitutional standing was the legitimated, law-professor-proper way to write about more radical ideas. Criticizing U.S. standing doctrine is a favorite pastime of some law professors. But Stone goes beyond the normal complaints. Standing, as he notes, “does nothing but get you through the courthouse door; it does not mean the case on behalf of the environment is won, or can even be argued intelligibly.” He decries that in environmental cases, nature—whales, trees, rivers, whatever—are the real objects of concern, even though the law does not treat them as such. Stone advocated that nonhumans should have direct legal rights, where an appropriate custodian could institute legal actions on the entity’s behalf.

When the law recognizes this, injury to the entity itself must be the focus of legal attention, and relief from injuries must flow to the entity’s benefit. For example, in the 1970s debate over Disney Corporation’s planned development in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierras, Stone advocated:

[W]hy not designate Mineral King, the wilderness area, as the plaintiff ‘adversely affected,’ let the Sierra Club be characterized as the attorney or guardian for the area, and get on with the merits? Indeed, that seemed a more straightforward way to get at the real issue, which was not what all the gouging of roadbeds would do to the club or its members, but what it would do to the valley. Why not come right out and say—and try to deal with—that?

In the resulting case, Sierra v. Morton, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas cites Stone’s work (albeit in dissent): “Permitting a court to appoint a representative of an inanimate object would not be significantly different from customary judicial appointments of guardians ad litem, executors, conservators, receivers, or council for indigents.” Justice Douglas suggests that the suit should “be more properly labeled as Mineral King v. Morton.” But with the current state of the law, to get through the courtroom gates, an appellant had to argue that it is their human interests that matter. Stone pithily sums up his opinion on this state of affairs: “How grotesque.”

It is not that standing did not matter to Stone—it is just that the current state of standing is a symbolic surrogate for the misdirected ways we apply our environmental laws. For Stone, then, standing was a professorially suitable stand-in for much more. As he wrote, “My concern is not with moral and legal philosophy for their own sake. Rather, the animating concern is worldly: What sort of planet will this be?” But despite the expansive views Stone promoted, even in his later writings, I cannot see that he could have envisioned the bends and oxbows the flow of developments has taken in the current movement to give rights to nonhuman entities.

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

Stone proposes, soundly, that apt “guardians” or “conservators” exist who have earned a place to speak for the needs of the nonhuman world. Writing as late as 2010, he does not envision the place-specific, justice-promoting answers of who will speak for nature that different rights-granting governments now envision, which I will detail below. Even if fitting guardians could be identified, Stone visualizes problems in what they would say about what the nonhuman world would actually want. He wrote extensively about how difficult it is to assess the needs and wants of nonpersons. He asks, “On what basis, and in what manner, might a nonhuman, a thing, be accorded legal or moral standing or considerateness?” While he dislikes that “[o]rthodox legal and moral theories provide nonhumans only a limited accounting, one that generally makes the claim on behalf of the thing directly dependent upon human interests,” he nonetheless continues that this “is particularly so when we turn to things like rivers that (unlike whales) have no interests or preferences of their own.” And thus, because the “lake itself being utterly indifferent to whether it is clear and full of fish or muddy and lifeless, when the guardian for the river gets up to speak, what is he or she supposed to say?

Because “[n]onpersons . . . have no preferences[,] . . . [w]hat, then, could comprise a working solution” to those who would be granted standing to speak for those alleged preferences? As he goes on about how difficult it is to assess the needs and wants of nonpersons, Stone’s imagination fails him. When jurisdictions grant legal rights to nonhuman entities, they impute that the river is not indifferent, and neither are the communities that depend upon and speak for the river. The communities know and depend upon the river, and the law could thus allow the communities to speak for the lake and community symbiosis. Ecosystem entities may, indeed, tell us what they want. In his book, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Jurisprudence, Cormac Cullinan writes:

Fortunately rivers communicate rather a lot about their essential natures. We know that they need to flow, tend to rush over rocks in a highly oxygenated, high-energy flurry in their upper reaches, and have a distinct inclination to meander languidly in their lower reaches. They create microclimate and Riverine ecosystems along their banks and they flood from time to time, compensating for what they destroy with rich silt and demarcating a flood plain as their territory. In other words, a flooding River is almost certainly acting in accordance with its nature.

       We will see that in granting rights to rivers and mountains, modern legal actors are coming to recognize that these entities might tell us what they need, and apt spokespersons exist for conveying these messages. At the same time, nature is becoming a fulcrum to leverage power for disparate actors who have been previously disenfranchised from speaking for nature or for managing the resources upon which they depend. In his writings, Stone does suggest scientists could be the guardians because of their “authoritative” opinions and could thus speak with “practical wisdom and humility.” Stone does not contemplate indigenous people who have been guardians (even if they would choose a different translated term) for natural objects.

C.  Property

Stone was also using standing as a disquisition on the nature of “property.” It is interesting that the star-making idea of his career—in his retelling, at least—came from an off-the-cuff series of thoughts at the end of a property class: “I sensed that the students had already started to pack away their enthusiasm for the next venue. (I like to believe that every lecturer knows this feeling.)” In class, he used “property” to illustrate that

[t]hroughout history, there have been shifts in a cluster of related property variables, such as: what things, at various times were recognized as ownable . . . who was deemed capable of ownership . . . the powers and privileges ownership conveyed . . . and so on. It was easy to see how each change shifted the locus and quality of power. . . . “So,” I wondered aloud, reading their glazing skepticisms, “what would a radically different law-driven consciousness look like? . . . One in which Nature had rights[.]” I supplied my own answer: “Yes, rivers, lakes, . . .” (warming to the idea) “trees . . . animals . . .” (I may have ventured “rocks”; I am not certain.) “How would such a posture in law affect a community’s view of itself?”

Around the world, governments, legislatures, and courts are moving toward this “radically different law-driven consciousness” and in so doing, this posture is both affecting and reflecting communities’ views of themselves and of what constitutes “property.” When we move from “we own the river” to “we are the river,” we enter into a new paradigm of what “property” is and who “we” actually are. But Stone does not quite go where some of the cultures and governments I portray here will travel.

Stone was reaching for a paradigm shift, a break with a worldview, reflected nearly universally in property (but also other forms of) law, that humans are apart from and not a part of the natural world. Even by the time he was writing, the Public Trust Doctrine had made its peripatetic way around the world for more than a millennium (connoting that certain natural features are so essential to human survival that the sovereign could not arrogate them to private interests). States and nations were beginning to pass environmental human rights resolutions, declaring that the right to a healthy environment (or some elements thereof) is essential to human well-being and dignity. That did not mean, however, that those who would vindicate those rights could find their way into court, or if they did, that the natural world upon which the appellant depended would benefit from a favorable ruling; nor did it change the nature of human ownership over the natural world.

Stone was reaching for not only a new worldview on what “private property” is and could be, although in a more limited way than the legal maneuvers I describe below will lead:

Wherever it carves out “property” rights, the legal system is engaged in the process of creating monetary worth. . . . I am proposing we do the same with eagles and wilderness areas as we do with copyrighted works, patented inventions, and privacy: make the violation of rights in them to be a cost by declaring the ‘pirating’ of them to be the invasion of a property interest.

The interest is held by the nonhuman entity itself and defendable by suitable guardians who will insure against unjust infringements on the property right. And so, for example, when the Endangered Species Act protects “critical habitat,” it is giving the listed species a kind of defendable property right.

Stone’s vision was both expansive (nature belongs to all of us and none of us for our stewarded, essential, interconnected uses) and circumscribed (expanding who might own a property right, but still the nature of property remained rooted in Western notions of ownership).

D.  Nature as Relationship

Even as he finds it difficult to discern how a “guardian” would speak for the desires of nonhuman entities, Stone still roots his views in our need to reconfigure our laws, so we recognize the fundamental interconnection between human and nonhuman. Ecological science should shape how we view our relationships with the nonhuman world, and thus how we shape our laws:

This learning to look at the world from the other thing’s distinctive standpoint is a major step toward respecting its moral worth . . . the growing recognition that we are all, even amidst so much conflict and competition, part of one fragile global community encourages rearranging the legal-moral framework so as to make more room not only for the infirm, insane, and infants, but for animals, plants—indeed, for the entire planet as an organic whole.

Specifically, he wished that we took these relationships more seriously, to treat those relationships as if our lives depended on it—because, of course, they do.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the movement to grant legal rights to nature is the recognition in the law of the essential, interwoven relationship between humans and nonhumans, and that modern, Western law is simply catching up to what indigenous peoples and other communities dependent upon the natural world (but aren’t we all?) have long known. Stone notes:

Mankind is part of this organic planetary whole; and there can be no truly new global society, and perhaps in the present state of affairs no society at all, as long as man will not recognize, accept and enjoy the fact that mankind has a definite function to perform within this planetary organism of which it is an active part.

His underlying concern is that

[t]he problems we have to confront are increasingly the world-wide crises of a global organism: not pollution of a stream, but pollution of the atmosphere and of the ocean. Increasingly, the death that occupies each human’s imagination is not his own, but that of the entire life cycle of the planet earth, to which each of us is as but a cell to a body.

Similarly, “[b]ecause the health and well-being of mankind depend upon the health of the environment, these goals will often be so mutually supportive that one can avoid deciding whether our rationale is to advance ‘us’ or a new ‘us’ that includes the environment.” Below, we will see how courts and legislatures are redefining who “we” might be.

Clearly, Stone had a lot more on his mind than constitutional standing. He is trying to figure out how to fit the round peg of ecological science and ecological consciousness into the square hole of myopic legal doctrine. In standing, and in figuring out who would be appropriate guardians and what they should say when asked about nature’s needs, Stone states that “while the habitat may include higher animals, we may find ourselves wishing to speak for some value not reducible to the sum of the values of the habitat’s parts, the various things that the habitat sustains in relation.” Writing about Ecuador’s constitutional change that granted legal rights to nature, he notes this “may reflect a shift, in Ecuador at least, from an exclusively homocentric view of the environment to one in which some consideration of Nature itself constrains permissible levels of ‘resource’ exploitation.”

The legal rights that I describe below have disparate answers to how to name and prize and legalize these synergistic values.

E.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

As, I believe, Stone was aware, ideas act as forces of nature. He notes that “[h]ow we arrange our affairs so that the future we choose is the future that becomes the reality: that is the question of social institutions, of law.” Our ethical systems should be informed by our scientific understanding of how we are interconnected with the natural world. And our laws need to reform to reflect this evolved understanding. In so doing, the law would mold the natural world through permitted and proscribed human behaviors. Remade nature then molds our worldviews and our ethics and, eventually, our laws.

In the United States, our current limited standing doctrine represents a pronounced anthropomorphic (or even egocentric) view of our place in the natural world: it is my needs that count. And this limits the possibility for sustaining the natural world: when the benefits of a successful environmental legal battle fail to flow to protect and restore the harmed natural entity, nature continues to degrade. If we achieved what Stone was seeking—recognition that healthy human communities require healthy ecological communities—we would continue to restore and protect the natural world, whose contours would continue to shape our experiences of it. Below I describe what has happened when nations evolve their laws to reflect an evolved conception of the value of the human and nonhuman relationship.

II.  AUSTRALIA

A.  Introduction

The Yarra River flows 150 miles through the heart of the Australian State of Victoria, weaving through farms, vineyards, ranches, Aboriginal lands, national, state, and local parks, and, eventually, meandering through the heart of Melbourne and its sprawling suburbs. The Yarra is the state’s most vital resource, and everyone wants a part of it. The 2017 Yarra River Protection Act (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron, which translates to “Keep the Birrarung Alive” in Wujundjeri) describes the Yarra as “one living and integrated natural entity.” The Yarra River Protection Act is the first Australian law containing both English and an Aboriginal language. “Birrarung” translates to “river of mists and shadows.” Part of the Act’s Wujundjeri text reads (in translation):

The Birrarung is alive, has a heart, a spirit and is part of our Dreaming. We have lived with and known the Birrarung since the beginning. We will always know the Birrarung. . . . Since our beginning it has been known that we have an obligation to keep the Birrarung alive and healthy—for all generations to come.

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

The Act provides one solution to Stone’s challenge to find appropriate spokespersons for what a nonhuman ecosystem wants or needs. The Birrarung Council, which the Act names as “the Voice of the River,” is an eleven-person body who will speak for what the river might require. Appointed by the Environment Minister, the council acts as an independent (meaning without government representatives) advisory body. Currently, the group comprises three Aboriginal elders (the Act requires at least two), an infrastructure expert, two members from a Yarra Riverkeeper NGO, a landscape architect, a farmer or rancher, and an environmental lawyer and legal scholar. This disparate group seeks to be independent, transparent, accountable, consultative, expert, and considered.

The council is not the Yarra’s official legal “guardian”; it serves as “the independent voice of the river” and reports to the Minister for Water, Planning, and Environment. The council is currently tasked with speaking for the river during a ten-year strategic plan and fifty-year community vision processes hosted by the state’s municipal water agency.

COVID-19 has delayed much of the council’s preparatory work during the past two years, but its first two annual reports have been about relationship building with key stakeholders and, especially, with local governments along the Yarra River. It has played a major role in getting the Yarra Strategic Vision completed, and it looks forward to playing a major role in holding responsible public entities accountable as they implement the plan.

As in several other grants of rights for nonhuman entities (see below), the answer to Stone’s investigation of who should be empowered to speak for the nonhuman world includes indigenous or local, ecosystem-dependent populations. Here, in addition to the Act requiring that Aboriginal elders serve, the Birrarung Council has framed its mission “[a]s a bi-cultural, independent and authentic voice of the Yarra, the Birrarung Council champions the interests of the river as one living and integrated natural entity, guided by the voice and knowledge of Traditional Owners as the custodians of the river and its lands.” The council describes that some of the initial work they are doing has included building “a collective Council understanding of Wurundjeri Woi-wurrung appreciation of the River and its corridor,” and notes that such “learning cannot occur just by sitting at the conference table but requires the council to physically engage with the River.”

The Wurundjeri Forward to the 2022 Yarra Strategic Plan acknowledges that the Act gives the people “a legislative mechanism and a formal process through which to engage with responsible public entities to work collaboratively and oversee the governance of the Birrarung and its lands as one living entity” and that “[o]ur inclusion in the Act was highly significant for the first time a legislative mechanism included a placed-based approach to the management of a waterway—pairing right Country with the right people—our people.” The Forward from the Bunurong people stresses the 35,000 year history (over 2,000 generations) of their ancestors as lending credibility to their right and wisdom to help speak for what the river might need; for them, “[a]ll of [their] Country is highly significant, every square inch, every rock, every leaf, every dune and every artefact.”

The ideas that Stone championed, decades ago and far away, now provide a fulcrum to leverage power for those who have been disempowered from stewarding their own resource base. And those people are using these ideas to advance their own rights to manage their own resource base according to their own traditional and modern concepts of what is right for the human and nonhuman community bond. For example, in the Kimberly of northwest Australia, Anne Poelina, a Nykina Aboriginal elder, is spearheading a movement to have the Fitzroy River (Martuwarra in local language) recognized as a living being with legal rights, with the local Aboriginal groups acting as the voice of the river. She wishes to translate Nykina lore into Australian law. Their Fitzroy River Declaration declares that “[t]he Fitzroy River is a living ancestral being and has a right to life.” Dr. Poelina and other scholars have published in Transnational Environmental Law, Recognizing the Martuwarra’s First Law Right to Life as a Living Being. The “Martuwarra RiverOfLife” itself is listed as the first author. The article draws upon other grants of legal rights to rivers as a basis for its own assertion that this River in the Kimberly deserves similar recognition, with the local Martuwarra Nations accorded the rights to speak for what the river and culture nexus requires.

The article decries the farming, ranching, mining, and fracking that is destroying the river (and the ancient cultures that depend upon it and have long depended upon it). They assert the right to speak for the river as “Traditional Owners” who “view Country as alive, vibrant, all encompassing, and fully connected in a vast web of dynamic, interdependent relationships; relationships that are strong and resilient when they are kept intact and healthy by a philosophy of ethics, empathy and equity.” Dr. Poelina and others (see below) are using our desire to find appropriate spokespersons for the human and nonhuman relationship, to sustain our natural environment, and to atone for past wrongs committed against indigenous people. Initiatives that include or devolve cultural and thus management authority to indigenous or local communities make compelling cases that these communities’ histories, worldviews, and ecological knowledge grant them the authority to speak for and thus regulate the ecosystems that sustain them. They assert that they will manage nature as if their lives depended on it, because their lives depend on it.

C.  Standing

It is not clear that the Birrarung Council would ever have formal legal standing to represent the Yarra River’s interests in a court proceeding. The Act grants the river its spokes-council, but it does not look like the Yarra has legal rights of its own that the council would be empowered to defend. That is to say, the Act recognizes that many, many entities have interests in the Yarra, and simply names a suitable entity to advocate for the river’s own needs when its waters are being allocated.

D.  Property

As a result of this Act, the river does not own itself, or own any rights to its own water. As Birraung Council member Erin O’Donnell has noted disapprovingly of all newly established legal rights for rivers, “None of the river persons has a legally recognised right to flow.” So while the Birrarung Act recognizes the vital force of the river in the life of Victorians, and provides voices to protect that force, it does not radically change the idea of who can own what ecosystem resource or what counts as “property” under the law.

E.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

The Birrarung Council has stated its vision grounded in relationship and respect: “For the Yarra River [Birrarung] and its lands to be forever protected as a living entity and kept alive and healthy for the benefit of future generations.” One of the council’s early ideas promotes the concept of the Great Birrarung Parkland.” It aims to “champion the extension and greater recognition of this unique asset” to preserve more of the river and its riparian corridor for future generations. Furthermore, the council sees its role “to challenge conventional thinking about the nature of a ‘park’ as a parcel of land which exists for a public purpose.” Specifically, it advocates that Victoria take the “one living and integrated natural entity” language seriously, which should include the way we conceive of parklands not as disconnected parcels, but a continuous entity:

The narrative about the Parkland should convey that its significance is about more than just gazetted land, and relates to a combined landscape of all land parcels that form the river corridor landscape. Such an understanding would allow the public to more fully and respectfully experience the River, understand its cultural significance for all Australians and improve connection to the River.

The brand new Yarra Strategic Plan’s Aboriginal name—Burndap Birrarung burndap umarkoo—means “[w]hat is good for the Yarra is good for all.” The Yarra Strategic Plan proposes that “[c]ollaborative management of the river will rightly see Traditional Owners and authorities working together to manage Yarra River land.” Informed by the Birrarung Council, the vision is of a multicultural panel that represents various interests in sustaining the river. The Victoria government has empowered the council to speak for what the river needs because of both traditional and modern forms of wisdom. It sees the river as a vital entity that links ecology and culture, past and present in a seamless, flowing whole.

According to the Birrarung Council, recognition of the Yarra and other rivers as living beings “has been explicitly grounded in the relationship between the river and the people(s) who live along and near it.” The legally appointed “Voice of the River,” composed of diverse individuals with different access to different expertise, will speak for that relationship going forward. If the goals of the statute are realized, the river and its interrelated communities will be healthier in the future. We should continue to watch how the legally appointed “Voice of the River” uses its voice to speak for how the relationship should be sustained.

III.  COLOMBIA

A.  Introduction

While in Australia, answers to some of Stone’s challenges came through statute, in Colombia, those answers come from court decisions. In a 2016 case brought by Afro-Caribbean communities in the Chocó, “one of the most bio-diverse regions of the planet” and part of “mega-biodiverse” country of Colombia, the Constitutional Court declared that the Rio Atrato’s “basin and tributaries are recognized as an entity subject to rights [(which translates to ‘entidad sujeto de derechos’)] of protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration by the State and ethnic communities.” Following this decision, Colombian courts have declared that the Amazon, several other rivers, a high-altitude ecosystem, and the spectacled bear are legal persons. What is going on here, and what might Stone have made of all this?

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

Unlike in Australia or New Zealand, where communities stake their claims to manage their environment in part due to cultural identities as indigenous peoples whose arrival and environmental stewardship long predated the colonizers, here the affected communities are marginalized—Afro-Caribbean residents whose ancestors migrated to this region a couple of centuries ago and who are dependent on and connected to the affected river.

To represent the river, the court orders the national government to “exercise legal guardianship and representation of the rights of the river,” designating one government minister to join a community-appointed guardian. These “legal representatives,” in turn, are tasked with designating a “commission of guardians of the Atrato River” guided by two NGOs who “have the necessary experience to guide the actions to take. This advisory team can be formed and receive support from all public and private entities, universities[,] . . . research centers on natural resources and environmental organizations (national and international), community and civil society wishing to join the protection project.” Each of seven river communities appointed one male and one female guardian to develop a plan to implement the court’s ruling. The members of the Collegiate Corps of Community Guardians are responsible comanagers for seeing that the order of the court is fulfilled as part of the Commission of Guardians of the Rio Atrato, consisting, as the court ordered, of representatives of government and affected communities.

Chief Justice Palacio informed me that it is not working as quickly as we all would like, but enormous efforts have been made to comply with it, especially by the Colombian Attorney General’s Office. The work has not been easy, with COVID-19 making a new model of environmental management even more difficult than it would otherwise be, as the most recent report of the committee acknowledges. The scope of work that the committee has taken on is impressive—that is, the judicial decision does seem to have prompted the remedial actions the government is now taking. Throughout the report, the rights of the river are addressed as the co-managers develop their expertise to say what the river might need.

The court proclaims that “the protection of a healthy environment of the black communities acquires special relevance from the constitutional point of view, since it is a necessary condition to guarantee the validity of their lifestyle and their ancestral traditions.” According to the court, “[t]he communities have made the Atrato River Basin not only their territory, but the space to reproduce life and recreate culture.” Chief Justice Palacio reiterated to me that these isolated, ethnic minority communities had been abandoned by the government as their environment was being destroyed and thus required special judicial intervention. The local Afro-Caribbean inhabitants require a healthy river, and they wish to help the river return to health through managing “according to their own laws and customs—and the natural resources that make up their habitat, where their culture, their traditions and their way of life are developed based on the special relationship they have with the environment and biodiversity.”

As in Australia and New Zealand, the law is highlighting a certain kind of relationship that gives those who would speak for nature legal authority to sustain that relationship. Although the communities are not indigenous per se, “since ancestral times,”

there is a close and intimate relationship between the individual and the river, which is observed in expressions such as “he does not like to leave his river” or “when I return to my river.” In this configuration the river represents a notion of home, a strong feeling of belonging full of symbolic, territorial and cultural values.

To answer Stone’s challenge for who ought to be empowered to speak for what an ecosystem might want, the decision contains a lengthy, learned analysis of “biocultural rights” founded on the interdependence of biological and cultural diversity. It is this connection that gives these communities the right to speak for what the river needs, because it is what the communities’ livelihoods and cultures need:

[T]he rights that ethnic communities have to administer and exercise autonomous guardianship over their territories—according to their own laws and customs—and the natural resources that make up their habitat, where their culture, their traditions and their way of life are developed based on the special relationship they have with the environment and biodiversity.

Inherent in the ecocentric philosophy articulated by the court is the idea that the ecosystem and its constituent parts have moral worth and legally recognized needs, and thus legal rights to meet those needs. The court does not say exactly what the river requires, but it names the associated, culturally and environmentally connected communities as the logical mouthpieces for what the river might need. The now-ongoing resulting work is aimed at cleaning up the Atrato and halting the illegal, damaging mining and logging that despoils the river.

C.  Standing

The Constitutional Court addresses the standing requirement:

In this case, the representative of the ethnic communities is claiming that the acción de tutela [(a writ for protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights in Colombia)] is necessary to restrain the intensive and large-scale use of various methods of mining and illegal logging. These methods include heavy machinery, such as dredgers and backhoes, and highly toxic substances, such as mercury, in the Atrato River (Chocó), its basins, swamps, wetlands and tributaries. The methods have been intensifying for several years and are having harmful and irreversible consequences on the environment, thereby affecting the fundamental rights of ethnic communities and the natural balance of the territories they inhabit.

The NGO (Tierra Digna) has standing to represent the special rights of the Afro-Caribbean communities who have special solicitude as indigenous and pluri-ethnic communities to have their rights protected.

As in the other cases I describe herein, it is not yet clear how the river or any of the other ecosystem elements now given legal rights will have their own rights represented in court. That is to say, Stone’s starting point—formal legal standing in court—remains to be explicated should the river’s ongoing injuries find their way to court.

D.  Property

The court notes that these communities have a notion of the river-as-community that diverges from the Western model of river-as-property: “[F]or the ethnic communities, the territory does not fall on a single individual—as it is understood in the classical conception of private law—but above all the human group that inhabits it, so that it acquires an eminently collective character.” However, in the resulting decision, while the river becomes the object of legal obligations, the community does not come to own the river, and the river does not own itself or the waters it contains.

But more so than in the other developments I portray, the court is influenced by, and seeks to promote, ecocentric philosophy. The river may not own itself, but its own needs matter in the law, even apart from the connected needs of the communities that depend on it. Chief Justice Palacio confirmed that his decision was influenced by his deep readings in ecocentric philosophy. The decision respects

other living organisms with whom the planet is shared, which are understood to be worthy of protection in themselves. It is about being aware of the interdependence that connects us to all living beings on earth; that is, recognizing ourselves as integral parts of the global ecosystem—the biosphere—, rather than from normative categories of domination, simple exploitation, or utility.

[The] ecocentric approach starts from a basic premise according to which the land does not belong to man . . . . According to this interpretation, the human species is just one more event in a long evolutionary chain that has lasted for billions of years and therefore is not in any way the owner of other species, biodiversity, or resources, or the fate of the planet.

E.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

Nonetheless, the court had no viable way to change the very nature of property in the Colombian legal system. Instead, the court notes that “the relationship between the Constitution and the environment [is] dynamic and in constant evolution.” Like Stone, the court here is looking for a new appreciation of the human interrelationship with the natural world, wishes that law would reflect this interrelationship, and takes steps toward this desired evolution. Beyond what Stone envisioned, the court finds that a new legal form is necessary to effect that evolution, one that grants direct rights to nature, with a reasonable answer for who should speak for those rights, meaning those communities most dependent on and knowledgeable about the river, in association with the government bodies best poised to stop the pollution destroying that river. Chief Justice Palacio told me that the decision was mean to “send the message: to preserve life. Not just the life of human beings, rather all of life on Planet Earth.” Ecocentric philosophy becomes instantiated in legal rights for an ecosystem; ecologically dependent, culturally rooted populations gain legal rights to speak for the river’s rights. Chief Justice Palacio hopes that if the court’s decision is implemented correctly, it would create a feedback loop remaking and revitalizing the river and the human communities that depend on it.

IV.  NEW ZEALAND

A.  Introduction

New Zealand is providing the most far-reaching, innovative answers to some of the challenges Stone posed. The government has passed statutes that grant the North Island’s Whanganui River and Te Urewera mountain ecosystem (formerly a national park) legal personhood, with Māori communities granted the right to speak for what the river or mountain will require going forward. A third ecosystem, Mount Taranaki, has also been granted legal personhood, with prepared arrangements for conservatorship shared between eight local Māori in the works. I believe the dimensions of these legal revolutions go beyond what Stone could have envisioned.

B.  Who Is to Say What the Natural Entity Wants?

Stone wrote extensively about who nature’s “guardian” could and should be, and what they might do once appointed. In Australia and Colombia, legislatures and courts have named appropriate guardians based upon ecological connection and expertise, and historical or cultural claims to have authority in resource management. In New Zealand, the Crown’s desire to remedy past colonial wrongs, and spiritual, cultural, and ecological connections to the ecosystem legitimated the Māori claims to say what the river or mountain wants.

Statutes grant that various Mãori communities now serve as guardians of the environment. Except, the communities themselves would not use the term “guardians.” Gerrard Albert, chief negotiator for the Whanganui Māori, reminded me that the term “guardian” (or anything similar) does not appear in the statute; more importantly, if anything, the Whanganui guards over the community. I think Stone himself would recognize that in some ways it turns reality on its head to say we are guardians for natural objects, as opposed (as Albert believes) that nature, in fact, guards us. We might need to assert a certain fiction in court, but the worldview underlying so much of environmental law is that functioning ecosystems make life possible.

The 2017 Whanganui River Claims Act, or “Te Awa Tupua” (“River With Ancestral Power”) grants legal personhood to the Whanganui River and deeds legal stewardship over the river to the local Māori, based on their longstanding relationship with the river. Under the Act, the river “is an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements.” The Act acknowledges “Tupua te Kawa,” as the “intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua,” including that the river is a “spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the life and natural resources within the Whanganui River and the health and well-being of the iwi, hapū, and other communities of the River.” “Te Pou Tupua” is a newly enshrined governance entity; as newly named conservators of the river, “[t]he iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an inalienable connection with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and well-being.”

The Te Urewera Act turns a former national park (which had been the largest on the North Island)—a magnificent land of mountains, lakes, and rivers—into “a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person” with the local Māori given the duties to govern. The Act notes that “Te Urewera is ancient and enduring, a fortress of nature, alive with history . . . a place of spiritual value, with its own mana [status, prestige] and mauri [life force] . . . has an identity in and of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care.”

Stone had qualms that anyone could know what a nonhuman biophysical entity wants: “Even if moral obligations to a mountain are conceded to exist in principle, the question of how they can be discharged remains: How does one ‘do right by’ a mountain?” Operating “as the voice of the living personality of Te Urewera,” the Tühoe Māori have presented its guiding values “that inspirit wise and beneficial decision making” in a preliminary document, “Te Kawa.” They will know what the mountain wants because “[w]atching Te Urewera over many seasons and centuries reveals her moral conduct acted out in her interrelationships with all life that she has created.” So for example, “Papatūānuku” or “landscape,” means that “[w]e revere nature, we respect her ability in connecting us to all living things.” “Mauri,” or “her life” means “the living relationship between the forest the land and everything living within that relationship.” This means that “prioritized action” will include that “[w]e treasure our indigenous ecological systems and biodiversity through significantly reducing key existing pressures, enabling Te Urewera to a natural state of balance,” which means “we customise smart respectable ways to reduce known and potential pressures.” So, for example, Te Kawa notes that “[g]uards are effective against new or external pressures looking for a home within [Te Urewera].” A few initial controversies suggest how these values will enlighten knowledge about the mountain’s desires, as described below.

C.  Standing

It is not yet clear how or whether the empowered Māori communities will have formal legal standing to represent their associated ecosystems in court. For example, for the Whanganui, Te Awa Tupua “may participate in any statutory process affecting Te Awa Tupua in which Te Pou Tupua would be entitled to participate under any legislation”; it is not clear if that means formal legal standing. Albert told me that the Whanganui Māori prefer to stay out of court for the present time, choosing instead to build capacity within their communities around what the new laws mean and to build relationships with other neighbors of the Whanganui. He described an occasion shortly after Te Awa Tupua’s passage where the government began construction of a bike bridge over the river without discussing this with the Māori; rather than appeal to a court, Te Awa Tupua sought dialogue with the government agency to explain the new legal authority.

In Te Urewera, the Tūhoe rejected an oil-based asphalt sealant for a neighboring road, even though the delay could result in loss of funding. While the local government accused the Tūhoe of “hillbilly thinking,” the Tūhoe reject the “rape and pillage mentality . . . of unchecked tourism,” and plan, instead, to proceed with road construction that reflects Te Kawa’s environment-friendly values. Also in Te Urewera, the Tūhoe governing body delayed fixing a flood-damaged footbridge around Lake Waikeremoana that forms part of one of New Zealand’s tourist-friendly “Great Walks.” According to Tūhoe Chairman Tāmati Kruger, “[the Tūhoe] are wanting engineers to come in because the issue could very well be that the bridge is in the wrong place,” and perhaps Te Urewera did not want the footbridge there to start with. So we do not know how standing would play out should these skirmishes arrive in court; but we do see that newly empowered Māori communities wish to use their new legal powers to govern their ecosystems according to traditional precepts, merging traditional values with Western law.

D.  Relationship

When explaining that “Suits on Behalf of Nature Are Better Suited to Moral Development,” Christopher Stone wrote, “As I argue in the original Trees, the law has not merely an educative, but a spiritualizing role in our society.” I do not know what, exactly, he means by “spiritualizing,” but I do think I know what he means by moral development. And this is one place where the New Zealand experiment pushes us forward: it asks that the morality of how we treat the Earth embrace a relationship that has always existed and must exist, but which Western ethical systems, and the law that flows from those systems, tend to ignore. These grants of rights for nature and rights to protect that nature are sanctifying a certain kind of relationship, a web of mutually protective being. Te Awa Tupua and the Te Urewera Act grant the Māori the right to have their conception of relationship with rivers and mountains sanctified in the law, which simultaneously allows them to speak for the ecosystems on which they have always depended. These steps toward self-determination honor the saying “I am the River and the River is me,” reflecting a more capacious vision of “self” than the dominant cultures normally understand. As a New Zealand court has explained,

One needs to understand the culture of the Whanganui River iwi [tribe] to realise how deeply ingrained the saying ko au te awa, ko te awa, ko au [I am the River, the River is me] is to those who have connections to the river. . . . Their spirituality is their ‘connectedness’ to the river. To take away part of the river . . . is to take away part of the iwi. To desecrate the water is to desecrate the iwi. To pollute the water is to pollute the people.

I believe Stone was advocating for moral systems rooted in deep connection to the environment, even if he did not envision the particular arrangement advancing in New Zealand.

E.  Property

According to both Christopher Finlayson, then-Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, and Albert, chief negotiator for the local Māori, the two sides negotiated cordially, and the government agreed to grant what the Māori wanted on their own terms that reflected their cosmology. Scholar Anne Salmond has called previous New Zealand arrangements that granted formal property rights to the Māori “ontological submission”: although they gained the right to control their relationship with the ecosystem around them, by accepting a Western version of legal property ownership, they had to violate their own cosmology that defined their relationship with the world around them.

As in the other nations discussed here, neither the river nor mountain own itself in New Zealand. The Māori themselves did not wish to own the ecosystem elements in any traditional, Western legal sense. The Māori traditional notions of “property” differ from the Crown’s conceptions, as you could not “own” that to which you belong, and the new statutes respect this notion of environment-as-relationship. The government did not wish to cede formal ownership of the Whanganui, and, as Albert explained to me, “ownership does not provide for the totality of the relationship.” In the negotiations, Albert said, his community “[d]idn’t want to change the dance—we wanted to change the music so people would dance a different way: what instrument can we play to change the music?” In Te Kawa, the initial governing guide for Te Urewera, the Tūhoe Māori explain that the

use of property rights by the western legal system has hidden from view the concept of nature; rendered her parts as natural resources now capable of rival priorities competing with other household choices. These human granted rights have displaced our devotion for Papatūānuku [landscape] with ownership now serving individual advantage . . . property rights do not give life nor do they encourage the connectedness of all living things for life . . . our fracturing of nature has sponsored our own fragmentation.

At the end of the day, the Crown still “owns” the entities. Still, for the Māori, the exact nature of “property” matters less than having their cosmology recognized in the law, their historical injustices mitigated, and their relationship with their environments back under their control.

It remains to be seen whether any new conception of “property”—in the formal ownership way Western law understands it—emerges. Absent formal ownership of the ecosystems, how far the Māori are able to take their new powers remains to be seen. The ultimate prize will be the 2040 relicensing of the Tongariro Power Scheme, which diverts eighty percent of the Whanganui’s water; Albert told me that the years leading up to 2040 will be about building his community’s and the government’s capacity to truly understand and respect the new vision of human and nonhuman relations, and the Tongariro Power Scheme will be the test.

F.  Ideas as Forces of Nature

In Should Trees Have Standing?, Stone mused on why we would use “rights” language to refer to nonhuman entities in the first place, given the ambiguities of what such rights might comprise:

In the case of such vague rules . . . . [t]hese terms work a subtle shift into the rhetoric of explanation available to judges; with them, new ways of thinking and new insights come to be explored and developed. In such fashion, judges who could unabashedly refer to the “legal rights of the environment” would be encouraged to develop a viable body of law—in part simply through the availability and force of the expression.

Rights exert moral suasion on all actors. In the New Zealand examples, the nation is moving way beyond the “right to a healthy environment” or similar grants that the majority of nations bequeath their citizens. These laws and constitutional provisions are still anthropocentric: I have the right to breathe healthy air or drink clean water. Through granting rights directly to rivers or mountains, New Zealand is designing a new idea of our relationship with the natural world, with new stewards of that relationship, inscribed in law.

Like Stone, Cormac Cullinan had some qualms about rights for nonhuman entities; he noted:

[E]ven if the law were to acknowledge that, say, a river had the capacity to hold rights, extending the language of rights and duties to relations with nonhuman subjects is potentially confusing. Terms such as ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ are infused with our experience of existing legal systems and burdened with the connotations of conflicts.

New Zealand imposes an entirely new conception of what it means to have rights, one the nation now must make more justiciable. If we are the river and the river is us, then the new ideas supporting these legal reforms are an eco-anthropocentric hybrid. The ecosystems still support human communities, but the humans who depend on the ecosystems also serve the ecosystems’ needs. Which is why, for example, in Te Urewera, the Māori community has started by naming what the values are that the mountain ecosystem holds. Anticipating judicial decisions, they have made contractual obligations contingent on attestations that those profiting from Te Urewera will first and foremost respect those values that flow from the right.

These agreements lend themselves to a broader understanding of how all New Zealanders (and those of us far from that enclave) relate to, and thus manage the ecological world around us. The New Zealand Office of Māori-Crown relationships has adopted a new name, “Te Arawhiti,” which means “The Bridge.” These reforms present a new vision for how law can reflect ecological reality and can change that reality. If the Māori succeed in cleaning up the Whanganui, changing the management regime of Te Urewera, and, eventually, shutting down the Tongariro Power Scheme, then a new hierarchy of whose ideas about nature count will have been remade into law, which will have remade nature.

CONCLUSION

When, as the Māori express it, “I am the River and the River is me,” we must take into account the river’s interests, based on a worldview that the river’s interests are our interests. Around the world, governments, legislatures, and courts are moving toward Stone’s idea of a “radically different law-driven consciousness” and in so doing, this posture both reflects and evolves communities’ views of themselves. When we move from “we own the river” to “we are the river,” we enter into a new paradigm of what “property” is, and who we actually are.

Stone opined:

The time may be on hand when these sentiments, and the early stirrings of the law, can be coalesced into a radical new theory or myth—felt as well as intellectualized—of man’s relationships to the rest of nature. I do not mean “myth” in a demeaning sense of the term, but in the sense in which, at different times in history, our social “facts” and relationships have been comprehended and integrated by reference to the “myths” that we are co-signers of a social contract, that the Pope is God’s agent, and that all men are created equal. . . . What is needed is a myth that can fit our growing body of knowledge of geophysics, biology and the cosmos.

In the scenarios I have portrayed here, that growing knowledge dovetails with, informs, and is informed by the lifeways of people who have long created and lived by “myths” that guide how they treat the world around them. Myth is not pejorative: where cultures have survived pre- and post- colonial invasion, they have survived because their myths kept them from undercutting the ecosystems that sustained them. When Western cultures grant nonhuman entities formal rights, the evolution in worldview has not been in the original views of those who have proposed such conceptions, now inscribed in law: Australia’s Aborigines or New Zealand’s Māori, for example, have long believed in an indivisible relationship with the natural world around them. Instead, the ethics of the hegemonic cultures in some Western nations are evolving toward the direction that nature-connected communities have long understood and implemented in their own lore, that is their own law. Stone muses that “[o]ne is certain to wonder how, in selecting the critical boundary variables or supplying content to the key ‘ideal’ (riverhood, habitathood), we can avoid being, on the one hand, totally arbitrary or, on the other, guilty of smuggling in whatever standard advances our own most ‘raw’ homocentric interests.” Thus who “we” are is going to matter a lot. In the models I have described here, governments have designated appropriate spokespersons for nature, who, it is hoped, will not simply smuggle in their own “raw” homocentric interests. When governments or courts in these nations grant ecosystems legal rights, they reflect and propel changing views both of human relationships with the natural world. In the examples I describe here, they also reflect and propel evolving views of dominant groups’ relationships with indigenous peoples or other disenfranchised subpopulations from whom the right to manage the natural world had been taken.

The legal evolutions I have described here go beyond what Stone imagined. Despite his foresight, in his writings, he is here, and the river is there: he is not the river. This makes sense. Stone’s worldview was rooted in the U.S. tradition; he was writing for U.S. audiences and was concerned with the intricacies of U.S. constitutional and statutory law. Stone dedicated much of one of his books to the idea of moral and legal pluralism; meaning, he espoused that no one size fits all as we seek to remake our cultural and thus legal relationships with the natural world. He advocated “a whole network of mutually supportive principles, theories and attitudes toward consequences.” The ideas he espoused find pluralistic fruition in the disparate ecological, historical, and cultural milieux I have described here, where previously subordinated groups have hacked the legal hierarchy to allow their views of human and nonhuman relationships to take legal precedence.

I am not a moral philosopher, and this is not a journal of moral philosophy. Laws, however, reflect our moral inclinations. And our moral inclinations—in Western philosophy and law—derive from how we see ourselves in relationship to the “other,” including the relative worth of the others in relation to other entities and in relation to ourselves. When a society gives rights to rivers or mountains, law is acknowledging that one way of knowing one’s place on the Earth is to see oneself as the Earth. It is the value of the indivisible relationship that gives rise to legal pathways that honor that relationship, with one entity in that relationship given priority to speak for and protect that relationship.

Ideas are forces of nature, acting with greater force when they are translated into law. Law—especially environmental laws—should be adaptive in the evolutionary sense; that is, they should evolve to fit the changing ecological matrix, and should evolve to protect and sustain that matrix, if communities and our species is to survive and thrive. As described here, law in some locales is acknowledging that one way of knowing one’s place on the Earth is to see oneself in a relationship with the Earth, or to see oneself simply as the Earth. We do not know whether or how any of these instantiations of Christopher Stone’s ideas will work to protect the ecological matrix that sustains the relationship between ecosystems and the communities who are being given new rights to speak for those ecosystems. We do not know whether or how nature will be remade, but newly empowered stewards for these experiments in “standing” and more may well improve on the way we have been managing the ecosphere up until now.

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1469

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Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco. J.D., University of California Hastings College of the Law; LL.M., University of London, School of Oriental & African Studies; B.S. (Biology), M.A. (History & Philosophy of Science), & Ph.D. (Science & Technology Studies), Cornell University. I may be reached at takacsd@uchastings.edu. I thank the people who took the time to speak with me about this project: Gerrard Albert, Christopher Finlayson, Ian Hicks, Michelle Maloney, Erin O’Donnell, Claudia Orange, Jorge Iván Palacio, and Anne Poelina. For intellectual contributions, I also thank Hadar Aviram, Larry Carbone, Ming Chin, James May, Michelle Maloney, Dave Owen, Michael Pappas, Zach Price, Reuel Schiller, Linda Sheehan, Jodi Short, Michael Pappas’ Online Workshop for Environmental Scholarship, and the Green Bag group at the University of Tasmania Law School. Final thanks to the excellent editors at the Southern California Law Review.

Fish, Whales, and a Blue Ethics for the Anthropocene: How Do We Think About the Last Wild Food in the Twenty-First Century

One of the lesser celebrated threads of Christopher Stone’s scholarship was his interest in the ocean—especially international fisheries and whaling. Fish and whales are among the “last wild food”—that is, species that humans take directly from the wild for food purposes. While whales are primarily cultural food, fisheries remain important contributors to the human diet globally. Indeed, the food security issues surrounding marine foods are increasingly being recognized as an important international and domestic component of human well-being and equity. These concerns helped to spur the fall 2021 launch of the Blue Foods movement and the conscious incorporation of aquatic foods into the pursuit of the United Nations’ sustainable development goals.

At the same time, changes in the ocean resulting from climate change and other anthropogenic forces are making the commercial harvest of marine wild foods increasingly unsustainable, simultaneously undermining ocean ecosystem function, marine biodiversity, and human food security. Humanity’s continued engagement in industrial-scale commercial marine fisheries is thus both factually uncertain and ethically suspect.

This Article explores the multilayered ethical issues surrounding Blue Foods in the Anthropocene, drawing from Stone’s work in environmental ethics and “Moral Pluralism.” Finding a balance between protecting the world’s marine ecosystems and appropriately promoting the ocean’s contribution to global food security remains an important policy challenge for the twenty-first century, but it is one that nations can meet by privileging indigenous and local fisheries while simultaneously carefully expanding the more environmentally benign forms of marine aquaculture, particularly shellfish and kelp aquaculture.

Introduction

Food security is a global issue garnering increasing attention from academics and policymakers alike. For example, Martin Barry Cole, Mary Ann Augustin, Michael John Robertson, and John Michael Manners noted that “[f]eeding the world sustainably is one of our society’s grand challenges” and that “[i]n 2050, it is estimated there will be 9.7 billion people, and we will require about 70% more food available for human consumption than is consumed today.” After a period of improvement, global food insecurity is increasing, exacerbated over the last two years by the coronavirus pandemic and attending economic stress. According to the United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization’s (“FAO”) 2021 food security report, “Nearly 2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food in 2020—an increase of 320 million people in just one year”; 720 to 811 million people faced actual hunger in 2020. Among other impacts, the pandemic exposed “the fragility of our food systems,” with the result that 30 million more people will likely be dealing with hunger in 2030 than if the pandemic had not occurred. Impacts have been worst in Asia and Africa and among children. “[B]old actions” are needed to achieve the goal of eradicating world hunger by 2030, prompting the FAO to offer both a pragmatic and an ethical vision of future food systems. In its summary, food systems “need to provide decent livelihoods for the people who work within them,” “need to be inclusive and encourage the full participation of Indigenous Peoples, women and youth,” and need to “ensure that children are no longer deprived of their right to nutrition.”

The recognition that achieving food security has an ethical dimension, while not new, has gained force over the last decade, in part because of increasing acknowledgement that food insecurity derives from multiple drivers, many of which require redress of larger social inequities. Over the last five years, for example, the FAO has documented that “[c]onflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns and downturns (now exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic) are behind recent rises in hunger and slowing progress in reducing all forms of malnutrition,” while “high and persistent levels of inequality” and inability to pay for healthy food exacerbate these drivers. For example, “More than half of the people who are undernourished and almost 80 percent of stunted children live in countries struggling with some form of conflict, violence or fragility.” As for climate, “Hunger is significantly worse in countries with agri-food systems highly sensitive to rainfall and temperature variability and extremes, and where a high proportion of the population depends on agriculture for livelihoods.” Economic insecurity leads to multiple negative impacts on food security and nutrition, including increased hunger, consumption of cheaper but less nutritious foods, reduced nutrition, and food insecurity. Finally, healthy diets are often not the cheapest diets, and “[t]he unaffordability of healthy diets . . . is associated with increasing food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition, including stunting, wasting, overweight and obesity.” Given these multiple drivers and influences, the FAO identified six combinable pathways toward ethical, sustainable, and resilient food systems.

Pathway 6—strengthening food environments and changing consumer behavior to promote the environment as well as human health—is the most relevant to both Christopher Stone’s vision of an “Earth Ethics” and this Article’s pursuit of a “Blue Ethics.” By “Blue Ethics,” this Article refers to how we think about and modify human use of the ocean in the twenty-first century in order to keep ocean ecosystems resilient to the Anthropocene while still meeting critical human needs. Among the most pivotal of humans’ uses of the ocean in terms of promoting a new Blue Ethics is food supply.

What the FAO’s food security report largely left to one side is foods from the ocean and other aquatic systems, now dubbed Blue Foods. That elision is not unusual; the oceanic component of human food supply is often left out of food security discussions, including the ethical dimensions of food security. This Article seeks to begin filling that near void by sketching an ethical path forward for humanity’s continued dependence on Blue Foods.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I details humanity’s continued reliance on the ocean for food. Part II explores the issue of whether humanity should continue to engage in wild-caught fisheries, sketching out a Blue Ethics at the same time. Part III establishes that attitudes toward the ocean and its importance are already changing in ways that support a Blue Ethics, while Part IV concludes by arguing that humans can pursue Blues Ethics and Blue Food security simultaneously through a measured and careful investment in marine aquaculture.

I.  Human Food Security and Blue Foods

As the FAO is well aware, marine foods are a significant part of the global food security equation. Worldwide, total consumption of food fish has increased at a rate almost double the rate of human population growth and about 50% faster than the increasing rate of consumption of other animal protein. Indeed, “In 2017, fish consumption accounted for 17 percent of the global population’s intake of animal proteins, and 7 percent of all proteins consumed.” Around the world, 3.3 billion people consume 20% of their animal protein in the form of fish, and that number can reach “50 percent or more in countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and several small island developing States (SIDS).”

Importantly, despite the increase in aquaculture globally, wild capture fisheries still outstrip Blue Food production in aquaculture, particularly with respect to marine fish. In 2018, the latest year for which global data are available, freshwater and marine wild capture fisheries together produced 96.4 million tonnes of fish, seafood, and algae, while freshwater and marine aquaculture produced 82.1 million tonnes. The shares from the ocean, in contrast, were 84.4 million tonnes and 30.8 million tonnes, respectively. In other words, almost three-quarters of the human food taken from the ocean still comes from wild-caught fisheries. These marine fisheries mostly target fish. Indeed, “Finfish represent[] 85 percent of total production” in wild capture fisheries, with anchoveta, Alaska pollock, and skipjack tuna leading the lists of species caught. Seven countries account for almost 50% of this wild harvest: China (15%), Indonesia (7%), Peru (7%), India (6%), the Russian Federation (5%), the United States (5%), and Viet Nam (3%).

Of potential relevance to the ethics of fishing, much of this wild Blue Food is not of particularly high value. Indeed, three of the four most valuable wild-caught groups of species—cephalopods (octopus and squid), shrimps, and lobsters—are not finfish. The most valuable group of finfish species, perhaps not surprisingly, is tuna.

Given humanity’s dependence on Blue Foods, when the FAO noted in 2020 that “as we approach a world of 10 billion people, we face the fact that since 2015 the numbers of undernourished and malnourished people have been growing,” it also emphasized that capture fisheries and especially aquaculture will play a “crucial role in global food security.” However, most other food security researchers and food policymakers ignore the ocean, instead focusing on land-based crops and livestock. For example, Alexander Y. Prosekov and Svetlana A. Ivanova discuss food security in terms of “[g]rain and cereals, vegetable and animal fats, and meat and dairy products.” Other researchers focus solely on agriculture and crops. As such, the role of Blue Foods in global food security remains an underacknowledged issue for law, policy, and ethics.

Nevertheless, the world’s dependence on marine foods raises real, if underappreciated, food security concerns. Simultaneously, however, the continued dependence on wild-caught fisheries also raises several ethical concerns, particularly in terms of preserving and enhancing marine biodiversity and the resilience of ocean ecosystems to climate change and other anthropogenic stressors. Part II will explore these concerns in more detail.

II.  Blue Ethics and Wild Capture Fisheries: Should We Keep Fishing the Ocean?

Commercial exploitation of wild fisheries stocks in the ocean has plateaued, despite increased fishing effort, raising important ethical questions about the continued pursuit of these wild foods. The desire for a more ethical path forward regarding humanity’s dependence on ocean food gave birth to the Blue Food Assessment, an emerging movement seeking to ensure that all food policies, including the environmental and climate policies surrounding food, take account of the importance and potential benefits of aquatic foods—fish and shellfish, both marine and freshwater, together with more culturally specific aquatic delicacies such as kelp and sea cucumber.

The Blue Food Assessment launched September 16, 2021. It focuses on using aquatic foods to help bring about the transformation of the global food system to end hunger while increasing sustainability. As its report announces:

There is growing recognition that food systems must be transformed—that achieving the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) requires shifting toward a system that is more diverse, resilient and just, as well as healthier. “Blue foods”—foods derived from aquatic animals, plants and algae cultivated and captured in freshwater and marine environments—have much to offer in that transformation.

Like the FAO, therefore, the Blue Food Assessment seeks to promote a
new ethical approach to food security as well as more comprehensive food management policies and assessments. For example, one of its key
platforms is the need to “[c]ommit to human rights in policy and practice— . . . empowering in every part of the food value chain women, Indigenous groups, marginalized communities and youth.”

Another goal of the Blue Food movement is to consider the impact of Blue Food harvest on the environment itself—a critical component of Blue Ethics. As such, an ethical approach to Blue Foods must start by considering what industrial-scale commercial fishing of wild marine species does both to those species and to their attendant ecosystems.

A.  The Current Harvest of Wild Marine Species Is Unsustainable

The FAO maintains the most reliable and comprehensive sets of data about how the world supplies itself with aquatic food, and roughly every two years it publishes a State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture report. According to the 2020 report, in 2018 the world produced (from all sources, including fishing and freshwater aquaculture) about 179 million tonnes of fish, crustaceans like crab and lobster, mollusks like clams and oysters, and other aquatic animals, worth $401 billion. Of that total harvest, 156 million tonnes, or over 87%, were used for human food.

The world’s taste for fish and seafood, however, comes at a cost. Wild capture fisheries in the ocean leveled off in the late 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, wild marine fisheries are becoming increasingly unsustainable:

The state of marine fishery resources, based on FAO’s long-term monitoring of assessed marine fish stocks, has continued to decline. The proportion of fish stocks that are within biologically sustainable levels decreased from 90 percent in 1974 to 65.8 percent in 2017 (a 1.1 percent decrease since 2015), with 59.6 percent classified as being maximally sustainably fished stocks and 6.2 percent underfished stocks. The maximally sustainably fished stocks decreased from 1974 to 1989, and then increased to 59.6 percent in 2017, partly reflecting improved implementation of management measures. In contrast, the percentage of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10 percent in 1974 to 34.2 percent in 2017. In terms of landings, it is estimated that 78.7 percent of current marine fish landings come from biologically sustainable stocks.

Not coincidentally, marine aquaculture industries have been growing rapidly since 1986 to close the gap in global seafood demand.

Christopher Stone provided as succinct a summary as anyone of the perils facing the ocean:

The oceans—over 70% of the planet’s surface—are in trouble. The omens are everywhere. Marine catches have stagnated in almost every region, even in the face of intensified harvest efforts. The wetlands and coastal nurseries vital to maintain the stocks are vanishing under the pressures of commercial development and a siege of sewage and waste. We are dousing the seas with chemicals, and seasoning them with millions of tons of stubbornly persistent litter. Periodic red tides, kelp and coral afflictions, and major die-offs of marine mammals such as harbour seals and dolphins, may be early warning signs of worse to come.

The succeeding two decades since his summary have made clear that the “worse to come” is climate change and its “evil twin,” ocean acidification, which are wreaking havoc on marine ecosystems. In particular, ocean warming is driving marine species poleward, but not at uniform rates, disrupting marine food webs and shifting the concentrations of increasing numbers of important fisheries across management boundaries.

These current and future changes to the ocean resulting from climate change and ocean acidification will only exacerbate the global insecurity of wild-caught marine fisheries. From a global perspective, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) concluded in 2019 that, already, “[c]hanges in the ocean have impacted marine ecosystems and ecosystem services with regionally diverse outcomes, challenging their governance (high confidence).” While, at the moment, these changes are both enhancing and undermining food security, depending on the exact community involved, the impacts on ecosystem services already “have negative consequences for health and well-being (medium confidence), and for Indigenous peoples and local communities dependent on fisheries (high confidence).”

For example, coral reef ecosystems produce critical fisheries for island peoples, but they are increasingly vulnerable to both increasing temperatures and ocean acidification. In addition, increasing ocean temperatures are already causing many marine species to shift their ranges—and those range shifts are already complicating fisheries management. For example, a 2018 study of 686 marine species indicated that species along the Pacific Coast of North America could shift ranges as much as 1,500 kilometers (more than 930 miles), while those on the Atlantic Coast could shift more than 600 kilometers (more than 370 miles). As the researchers noted, “In the United States, fisheries are managed regionally, including species that are managed by individual states and federally managed fisheries that are governed by regional councils with representatives from neighboring states,” and their projected range shifts are more than sufficient to move commercially important fish stocks across regulatory jurisdictions within the United States, from the United States to Canada, from Mexico to the United States, and, on the Pacific Coast, from Canada to the United States and Alaska. Other management challenges include “shifts in fishing locations, conflict over regional allocation of fisheries quota, displaced fisherman, and changes in stock boundaries.”

Future changes to the ocean, including species migration and food web simplification, pose even greater threats to global food security, fisheries governance, and even national security—including for the United States. Moreover, the decreasing supplies of seafood are also likely to be less safe because of elevated concentrations of mercury and other toxics in marine plants and animals and increasing contamination, especially of shellfish, by both Vibrio pathogens (the family of bacteria that include cholera and the flesh-eating Vibrio vulnificus) and harmful algal blooms like red tides. “These risks are projected to be particularly large for human communities with high consumption of seafood, including coastal Indigenous communities (medium confidence), and for economic sectors such as fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism (high confidence).” In addition, while climate-adaptive management can in some circumstances delay the collapse of fisheries, tipping points are still likely at about 2.0°C of warming.

Thus, in light of overexploited fisheries and worsening impacts from climate change and ocean acidification, enlightened self-interest alone counsels humanity to reconsider its current reliance on wild-caught Blue Foods and commercial marine fisheries. Blue Ethics adds the additional consideration of preserving marine biodiversity and increasing the resilience of marine ecosystems.

B.  Blue Ethics: From Food to Ecosystems and Biodiversity

Enlightened self-interest only goes so far toward increasing the planet’s chances of retaining high levels of marine biodiversity and functional ocean ecosystems. As Christopher Stone noted repeatedly, getting courts and legislatures to protect these values can be difficult, leading him to propose that natural objects and places—like the Mineral King Valley in California—should have standing to represent their own interests in court. While the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, the problem of protecting larger natural values remained, a problem Stone found particularly vexing for whales:

[A]s long as the judges . . . remain within the bounds of conventional international and U.S. legal principles, with no accounting for invasion of the whales’ interests, the “harvesting” will continue. An argument truly on behalf of the whales has as its starting point not the sanctity of treaties and regard for “political questions,” but respect for whales.

To account for the value of whales (and trees and mountains and functional ecosystems), he eschewed “Moral Monism”—the positing of one theory of ethics, such as utilitarianism, to resolve all ethical dilemmas—in favor of Moral Pluralism. Moral Pluralism

invites us to conceive moral activities as partitioned into several distinct frameworks, each governed by distinct principles and logical texture. We do not try to force the analysis of good character into the same framework as for good acts; nor are our obligations to the spatially and temporally remote subject to exactly the same rules that relate us to our kin, on the one hand, or to species, on the other.

From this pluralistic framework, whales and other natural entities are entitled to moral considerateness even if they are not legal persons, such that “killing a whale is prima facie wrong: one is obligated in a fairly strong sense not to do so.”

However, as Stone immediately noted, the strength of that obligation can vary by the exact moral context from which we evaluate the issue, and the Inupiat occupy a different moral framework with respect to whales than a twenty-first-century Angelina who teaches at the University of Southern California (and who has absolutely no interest in eating whale meat, it should be emphasized). Expanding on Stone’s point, the Inupiat’s moral duty to the whale may be not to waste whales, or, as was true of the Makah Tribe in the U.S. Pacific Northwest, to forebear whale hunts for cultural purposes when other food is sufficient and the whale species in question is endangered. Conversely, increasing numbers of studies confirm that one key to both food security and better health for indigenous communities is access to traditional foods—including Blue Foods and, when culturally and ecologically appropriate, even whales.

Moral Pluralism thus allows for a Blue Ethics that takes multiple values into account simultaneously while still demanding a moral conversation about humans’ uses of the ocean that goes beyond mere human utility. Applying this Blue Ethics to Blue Foods, if one method of getting the Blue Foods essential to human food security imperils marine biodiversity and ocean ecosystems, while another available method not only avoids those impacts but also contributes to the ocean’s resilience to climate change and other stressors, the choice between these two Blue Food security pathways is not an amoral one. As with Stone’s example of killing whales, a Blue Ethics for the twenty-first century must posit that the first path—specifically, the continued reliance on industrial-scale commercial wild-caught fisheries—is simply “prima facie wrong,” and “one is obligated in a fairly strong sense” to switch to the second pathway to achieve Blue Food security.

C.  Marine Biodiversity Is at Risk—and the Primary Legal Tool to Protect Marine Biodiversity Conflicts with Fishing

1.  Overfishing Is a Threat to Marine Biodiversity

Fishing clearly has an impact on the species caught, and multiple case studies—perhaps most famously, the collapse of the cod fishery in Canada—have documented how overfishing can semi-permanently render the target species commercially extinct. However, ecosystem and biodiversity impacts extend beyond the fished species, in part because fishers initially target the largest members of the largest species, effectively removing apex predators from marine ecosystems. As a result, wild-caught marine fisheries at commercial scale have also pervasively altered marine ecosystem function and ocean biodiversity. Indeed, in 2001 a large group of marine biologist luminaries concluded that “[e]cological extinction caused by overfishing precedes all other pervasive human disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including pollution, degradation of water quality, and anthropogenic climate change.” Moreover, “Any fishing tends to alter biodiversity at some or all of its levels, from genes to ecosystems,” and the “fishing . . . of the largest animals results in alteration of age structure, population size, relative abundance of predators and prey, food webs, and ecosystems.”

Thus, overfishing has long been considered a primary threat to marine biodiversity and ecosystem function, and “since the advent of industrial fishing . . . the sequential depletion of coastal, then offshore populations of marine fish has become the standard operating procedure.” Indeed, a whole vocabulary has developed to describe these impacts. “Ecological extinction” is the elimination of a species’ ability to function as it should in an ecosystem, even if it is not entirely biologically extinct. “Fishing down marine food webs” describes how fishers move from the most desirable fish to lower trophic levels—for example, from apex predators like tuna and swordfish to herring—as they exhaust the initial target species. “Bycatch,” in turn, encapsulates the incidental catch of nontarget species, such as marine mammals, turtles, and seabirds, and “[f]isheries bycatch has been implicated as an important factor in many population declines, including Pacific loggerhead . . . and leatherback . . . sea turtles, North Atlantic harbor porpoises . . . , vaquita . . . in the Sea of Cortez, Mediterranean striped dolphins . . . , the wandering albatross . . . and white-chinned petrel . . . of the Southern Ocean.” Finally, Daniel Pauly coined “shifting baseline syndrome” to describe how each generation of fishers accepts an increasingly impoverished ocean as normal.

2.  Climate Changes and Ocean Acidification Are Also Significant Threats to Marine Biodiversity

Fishing is no longer the only primary threat to marine biodiversity; climate change has become its equal. A 2015 meta-analysis of 632 peer-reviewed studies related to ocean biodiversity concluded that warming ocean waters will likely increase primary production in the ocean (phytoplankton growth) while simultaneously disrupting marine ecosystems overall and starving both herbivores and carnivores farther up marine food chains. Although specific results will likely vary by location, in general,

We find that ocean warming and acidification increase the potential for an overall simplification of ecosystem structure and function, with reduced energy flow among trophic levels with little scope for acclimation. Ocean acidification per se appears to have the potential to bring penetrating modifications to ecological systems through changes in ecosystem processes and shifts in species community structures.

Similarly, the United Nations’ May 2019 biodiversity report concluded that “almost 33% of reef-forming corals and more than a third of all marine mammals are threatened” with extinction, and the planet has already lost about 30% of seagrass meadows and 50% of coral reefs—two highly productive marine habitats—since 1970 and 1870, respectively. By the end of the century on the current trajectory, primary production in the ocean could decrease by 10% and total fish biomass by 25%.

The IPCC concurs that, by 2100, we likely will not recognize the world’s ocean. Even under a low emissions scenario, ocean heat waves will likely occur twenty times more often than they do now; under a business-as-usual scenario, they will likely occur fifty times more often. Most coastal ecosystems, including kelp forests, sea grass meadows, and salt marshes, face an increasing risk of destruction as a result of this heat, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise. By mid-century, on our current trajectory, oxygen loss will occur to depths of 600 meters (almost 1970 feet) in 59% to 80% of the ocean. Extreme sea-level events that used to occur once per century will be occurring once a year by 2050 in many locations, especially the tropics, and the rate of global average sea level rise will continue to accelerate to centimeters per year. By the end of the twenty-first century, again assuming business as usual, 60% of the ocean will be experiencing all five of the IPCC’s drivers of ecosystem change—surface warming, acidification, oxygen loss, nitrate pollution, and change in net primary production (growth of marine plants and zooplankton).

3.  Protecting Marine Biodiversity Leads to Fisheries Conflicts

Between climate change and fishing, fishing is by far the easier anthropogenic stressor to ocean ecosystems to control immediately through regulation. The primary legal tool for protecting marine biodiversity and promoting the marine resilience are marine protected areas (“MPAs”). MPAs legally set aside a specific area of the ocean and restrict at least some uses of that area. The most protective MPAs, generally referred to as marine reserves, significantly restrict or prohibit all resource extraction from the area—especially fishing.

As such, MPAs and especially marine reserves often impose tradeoffs on coastal communities: the health of local biodiversity, and often of the local fisheries themselves, may depend on leaving large swaths of the ocean unfished. In this classic environmental law conflict between short-term economic gain and longer-term ecological (and often economic and personal) health, time after time, existing fishers protest the creation of these areas. For example, virtually no marine reserve created for biodiversity purposes has come into existence in the United States without significant opposition, often from fishers or indigenous groups. These conflicts manifest as political machinations, litigation, or lengthy negotiations and collaborations. Nevertheless, however they arise legally, they evidence some of the practical difficulties of balancing Blue Food security with ocean health.

D.  Nevertheless, Blue Ethics Requires Recognition that Not All Fisheries Are Equal

As already hinted at with respect to indigenous whaling, the Blue Ethics assessment, based on Moral Pluralism, shifts frameworks when the focus moves from reducing or eliminating large-scale commercial fishing to regulating indigenous, local community (subsistence), or artisanal fishing. While the terminology is fluid, these types of fisheries are usually much smaller in scale than even small-scale commercial fisheries, generally have fewer impacts on marine ecosystem function, provide food and economic security to communities that often have few other resources, and often are deeply ingrained into local and traditional culture. They also employ a much higher proportion of women than industrial fisheries.

To be sure, these smaller-scale fisheries are not all the same in terms of their cultural and food security importance, nor does a twenty-first-century Blue Ethics require that all existing small-scale fisheries continue unaltered. The point, rather, is that not all fisheries important to food security operate at an industrial scale, and the Blue Ethics frameworks for evaluating their continuing morality may be different.

As one example, a context of redressing the harms of colonialism may require a different framework for assessing the morality of a marine reserve. The Māori of New Zealand, for example, have strong traditions in both fishing and coastal management, and much of the early reconciliation focus and implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand focused on the redistribution of fishing rights. Nevertheless, New Zealand’s impulses toward reconciliation clashed with its desires to protect the Kermadec Islands, “one of the most pristine and unique places on the planet,” located halfway between New Zealand and Tonga. Christopher Finlayson, a former member of the New Zealand Parliament who was instrumental in according the Whanganui River personhood rights and Māori co-management, notes that “[t]he legislation to give effect to the Sanctuary is still stalled in the New Zealand Parliament because of objections of the indigenous people of New Zealand (The Māori) who say that the proposal will breach a historic settlement reached with them in 1992.” Specifically, “The complaint of Māori about the Kermadecs is that if the Crown can unilaterally alter the system it entered into as a condition of the Fisheries Settlements of 1989 and 1992, it has the capacity to alter any Treaty Settlements on its own political whim. That could undermine the entire historical settlement framework.” As a result, he concludes, national efforts to protect marine ecosystems from overfishing “depend[] on the circumstances and in particular the history, the expectations of the indigenous people, and the relevant legal framework.”

Similar conflicts are occurring in the United States in Hawai’i, where marine reserve establishment threatens subsistence fishing and privileges (or at least appears to privilege) the non-indigenous tourist sector. As a result, Native Hawaiian fishers on the Big Island of Hawai’i protested on these grounds “the establishment of the Ka’ūpūlehu Marine Reserve, the island’s first initiative to put a reef off-limits to fishing,” which sought to impose a ten-year moratorium on all taking of fish while a subsistence plan was being drafted for Ka’ūpūlehu Bay coastline.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the Moral Pluralism underlying Blue Ethics is not moral relativism. As Stone elaborated, “Pluralism conceives the realm of morals to be partitioned into several planes. The planes are intellectual frameworks that support the analysis and solution of particular moral problems, roughly in the way that algebra and geometry provide frameworks for the problems to which they are respectively suited.” Concrete examples will help to illustrate the difference.

       Moral relativism evaluates the morality of a given action or decision according to the ethical framework of the actor. Under this approach, the morality of hunting whales varies according to the ethics of each group proposing to hunt them. Notably, even under moral relativism it is fairly simple to conclude that the Makah Tribe acts ethically when its members hunt non-endangered eastern gray whales, but the nations that are signatories to the International Whaling Convention and who voted for its commercial whaling moratorium act unethically when they authorize their non-indigenous citizens to kill whales to sell. The different ethical rules that the Makah and signatory nations impose upon themselves still mandate different answers to the question: Is it ethical to kill a whale?

A Blue Ethics based on Moral Pluralism, however, identifies different ethical frameworks independently of what individuals or specific groups believe. With respect to Blue Foods, for example, three of the relevant frameworks might be Mass Production of Seafood for Global Trade, Blue Foods as Cultural Preservation, and Indigenous Subsistence Fishing. Within the first framework, the moral considerateness of both whales and marine ecosystems is particularly strong, such that killing whales is prima facie wrong and large-scale capture fisheries become ethically suspect because of their impacts on marine biodiversity. Within the second framework, which encompasses the Makah Nation’s whale hunt, the moral considerateness of the whales is still strong, but it must be balanced against the cultural and legal rights of the Makah. As a result, the species’ ecological status becomes ethically relevant, and application of Blue Ethics can allow limited indigenous hunting of non-endangered eastern gray whales at levels unlikely to harm the species but prohibit any hunting of still-endangered western gray whales. Within the third framework, the survival and food security of individual community members is potentially at stake, reducing still further the moral considerateness of whales and other marine species needed for food security—but only if more ethical substitutes are not readily available.

Thus, Moral Pluralism requires Blue Ethics to distinguish among types of wild-capture marine fishing rather than embrace an outright ban on all versions of wild-capture fisheries in all locations, while still creating a presumption that there are more ethical pathways to Blue Food security than large-scale commercial marine fishing. The next question is whether the larger cultural context surrounding the ocean and the laws that govern human use of it will allow for this nuanced shift away from wild-capture fisheries, a question to which Part III now turns.

III.  A Blue Ethics for the Twenty-First Century Can Emerge: Evolving Attitudes Toward and Understanding of the Anthropocene Ocean

Blue Ethics requires seeing the ocean with a new morality that makes species, marine biodiversity, and ocean ecosystems ethically and legally considerate—essentially valuing the ocean as a complex adaptive planetary life support system, not just as a grocery store. Importantly for the future success of any Blue Ethics project, nations increasingly value these larger systemic functions over fisheries.

Marine tourism provides an important example. Coral reefs are some of the most valuable ecosystems on the planet, contributing over $375 billion each year to the global economy. Many of these benefits derive from tourism. For example, the economic benefits from recreation on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef alone have been valued from $700 million to $1.6 billion. A study in the Maldives calculated that each shark that tourists can see when diving or snorkeling is worth $33,500, while a similar study in Palau calculated that each shark was worth $1.9 million over the course of its lifetime in reef tourism revenue—far exceeding its paltry value in a fishery. In Indonesia, shark and ray (such as manta rays) tourist diving was worth at least $22 million in 2017, dwarfing the export value of the entire Indonesian shark fishery ($10 million) and expected to increase dramatically over the next decide if Indonesia invests in these species’ conservation. More comprehensively, a study in support of marine spatial planning in Wales found that “the economic importance of non-extractive recreational uses of marine biodiversity,” such as “diving, kayaking, wildlife watching from boats and seabird watching,” “is comparable to that of commercial fisheries for the same region,” arguing that these interests should be given equal weight to fishing in marine planning.

Marine recreation is a form of ecosystem service, and identifying and valuing these ecosystem services more generally is another means of articulating the morality of protecting the ocean’s systemic functions. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystem services broadly as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems.” More specifically, according to Gretchen Daily, “Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life.” In 1997, Robert Costanza and several colleagues estimated that the world’s ecosystem services were worth $16 to $54 trillion each year, underscoring the economic importance of ecosystem services to human well-being.

The ocean provides a significant portion of the Earth’s ecosystem services. As the IPCC summarized in 2019, In addition to their role within the climate system, such as the uptake and redistribution of natural and anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) and heat, as well as ecosystem support, services provided to people by the ocean and/or cryosphere include food and water supply, renewable energy, and benefits for health and well-being, cultural values, tourism, trade, and transport.

In their 1997 Nature article, Costanza and his colleagues estimated that about 63% of the total world value of ecosystem services—about $20.9 trillion—comes from marine environments, and about 60% of the value of marine ecosystem services derives from coastal ecosystems. These researchers emphasized that the ocean is particularly important for the gas regulation, disturbance regulation, nutrient cycling, biological control, habitat, food production, raw materials, recreation, and cultural services it provides. As one often-undervalued example, the ocean provides oxygen production. Tiny plants that float near the ocean’s surface around the world, known as phytoplankton, produce this oxygen. Some of the oxygen remains dissolved within the ocean itself, where fish and other marine animals (but not marine mammals or sea turtles, which breathe atmospheric oxygen) use it. Most of the oxygen, however, is released into the atmosphere. In fact, marine phytoplankton produce half of the world’s atmospheric oxygen—the oxygen upon which terrestrial animals, including humans, depend.

Reflecting the greater moral consideration that the ocean thus deserves, many nations have shifted to ecosystem-based or resilience-based management of their marine resources. Indeed, ecosystem-based management (“EBM”) has become the dominant approach for governing marine ecosystems as ecosystems. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), for example, has adopted EBM for many of its programs in the United States, describing that approach as follows:

Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is an integrated management approach that recognizes the full array of interactions within an ecosystem, including humans, rather than considering single issues, species, or ecosystem services in isolation. EBM is a broad resource management approach that considers dynamic, cumulative effects on marine environments using data and indicators . . . . EBM supports working across sectors to consider tradeoffs between marine resources, ultimately sustaining both diverse ecosystems as well as the services they provide to humans.

Moreover, The overarching goal of EBM is to sustain the long-term capacity of marine ecosystems to deliver a range of ecosystem services, such as seafood, clean water, renewable energy (e.g., wave, tidal, and biofuels), protection from coastal storms, and recreational opportunities, with a focus on both ecosystem health and human well-being.

Most recently, an ever-broadening systems view of the ocean has led to the increased adoption of resilience-based marine management. There is little debate that the ocean is a complex adaptive system containing multiple linked complex adaptive ecosystems. Specifically, it is a complex of marine ecosystems, and “marine ecosystems are complex adaptive systems linked across multiple scales by flow of water and species movements.” The many calls for increased use of EBM arose in part because, “[d]espite their adaptive character and often redundant linkages, marine ecosystems are vulnerable to rapid changes in diversity and function.” “In short, marine ecosystems are in trouble, indicating that many previous attempts to manage individual threats in the absence of a system-wide approach have not worked.”

The concept of ecological resilience is important for the systems approach to ocean law. Ecological resilience and resilience thinking acknowledge that ecosystems and social-ecological systems are dynamic—not, as prior theories had assumed, inherently stable systems tending toward an equilibrium. “Resilience,” as a concept, recognizes that, in fact, there are at least three ways in which ecosystems experience and respond to changes. The first and most common understanding of resilience refers to an ecosystem’s ability to resist change or bounce back from system disturbances. Sometimes referred to as “engineering resilience,” this sense of resilience refers to “the rate or speed of recovery of a system following a shock.” The second aspect of resilience acknowledges that ecosystems can exist in multiple states rather than stabilizing around a single equilibrium state; as a result, changes and disturbance can “push” ecosystems over thresholds from one ecosystem state to another. This second sense of resilience, ecological resilience, “assumes multiple states (or ‘regimes’) and is defined as the magnitude of a disturbance that triggers a shift between alternative states.” Finally, resilience thinking also acknowledges “the surprising and discontinuous nature of change, such as the collapse of fish stocks or the sudden outbreak of budworms in forests.” The long-time persistence of an ecosystem (or collection of multiple ecosystems) like the Gulf of Mexico in an apparently stable, productive ecosystem state is absolutely no guarantee that humans can continue to disturb (abuse) the system and expect only a gradual or linear response. Indeed, sudden regime shifts have been documented for a number of marine ecosystems, including Jamaican coral reefs (caused by the combined impacts of overfishing, hurricanes, and disease) and Alaskan kelp forests (caused by sea otter hunting and predation).

A complex systems and resilience-based approach to ocean management provides a governance framework that can operationalize Blue Ethics in the twenty-first century because this perspective changes the very goals of marine management. Increasing numbers of marine scientists are concluding, for example, that because it is no longer possible to completely control or prevent change in ocean systems, “the goal of management should be to maintain ecosystems in a healthy, productive, and resilient condition so that they can sustain human uses and provide the goods and services humans want and need.” Among these scientists, the adoption of a complex systems view of the ocean, including ecological resilience and the potential for regime shifts, has led to calls for a new approach to management: resilience-based management (“RBM”). “Resilience-based management is defined as using knowledge of current and future drivers influencing ecosystem function (e.g., coral disease outbreaks; changes in land-use, trade, or fishing practices) to prioritize, implement, and adapt management actions that sustain ecosystems and human well-being.” These prioritized actions include threat mitigation (“controlling pollution, sedimentation, overfishing”), actions that support ecosystem processes (for example, improving water quality), and strengthening the abilities of communities dependent on particular marine ecosystems to adapt to the changes occurring in those ecosystems, including by changing how people earn their livelihoods. RBM seeks not to maximize the goods that humans can extract from the ocean but rather to cope with the changes that overfishing, marine pollution, climate change, and ocean acidification are bringing to the ocean, simultaneously “acknowledg[ing] that humans are capable of driving change, adaptation, and transformation.”

Resilience-based management effectively promotes Blue Ethics by prioritizing the reduction of anthropogenic stressors to ocean systems. These stressors, as noted, include commercial fishing. The question then becomes whether we can shift humanity’s dependence on Blue Foods from commercial fishing to something else. As the next Part explores, that “something else” is likely to be certain kinds of marine aquaculture.

IV.  Toward a Blue Ethics for Blue Foods: Replacing Fisheries with Marine Aquaculture

Blue Ethics requires that the pursuit of human food security not impoverish the rest of the planet, particularly in terms of worsening biodiversity loss and the impacts of climate change. Certain forms of marine aquaculture hold the promise of not only increasing food global security but also global planetary health and—if done with attention to access and the special needs of indigenous and small coastal communities, women, and children—equity.

However, this transition in Blue Food production and consumption patterns has two components. First, laws and policies need to de-incentivize, if not outright prohibit, large-scale marine commercial fishing. Christopher Stone had much to say on this subject. Simultaneously, however, nations need to recognize both that a replacement source of Blue Foods—marine aquaculture—exists and that not all forms of marine aquaculture are equally ethical. This Part explores both sides to implementing a more ethical approach to Blue Foods.

A.  Tools to Decrease Wild-Caught Fisheries: Christopher Stone’s Five-Step Program for the Twenty-First-Century Ocean

Christopher Stone recognized that global wild-caught fisheries were plateauing. He noted the longstanding clash between biologists and economists on how to calculate optimum yield from a fishery, but he also underscored the need to consider bycatch and habitat destruction, as well. In so doing, he made seabirds, sea turtles, and benthic habitat morally considerate in fisheries management—and he championed a multipronged approach to give that moral consideration real-world impact.

1.  End Commercial Fishing Subsidies

According to Stone, the fishing “industry has been the historical beneficiary of public subsidy. Subsidization lowers private costs at public expense, thereby increasing the investment in fishing beyond the level that market signals would warrant.” Government subsidies to fishers, he concluded, have “been a crucial culprit in over-fishing,” promoting an increase in commercial fishing instead of its reduction. “Hence, the first step in restoring the health of the oceans is to wean the industry from subsidies,” a task that Stone thought international trade law was well-suited to address.

2.  Improve and Extend Resource Management

According to Stone, reducing fishing subsidies, “by reducing interest-group pressures in the political and regulatory environment, would enable the managers to do their jobs.” However—and again emphasizing international trade law as an enforcement mechanism—Stone also argued that global fisheries management also needs to be enhanced through stronger regional fisheries organizations and better management of the high seas. Notably, with regard to the high seas, the United Nations is currently drafting a new treaty to protect marine biodiversity in the high seas, rendering large portion of the open ocean marine reserves protected from fishing.

3.  Charge for Use

Stone also advocated that, rather than rely (solely) on command-and-control catch limits and gear restrictions, governments or fishery managers charge for fishing, in the form of either a landings tax or a royalty. “A charge raises the cost of fishing to the fisher,” and the goal would be

to create cost conditions that result in the fleet extracting fish at the revenue maximizing level of effort that would be employed by a sole owner. Such a sole owner would stop fishing when the landed value of a marginal stock reduction equalled the marginal cost of catch (including congestion costs and any impairment in future yield).

Specifically, and consistently with making impacts to marine ecosystems and biodiversity morally and legally considerate, this charge would go beyond the recovery of management costs and seek “to confront the fisher with (ideally) the marginal costs of harvest rivalry, stock depletion and environmental damage.”

4.  Establish an Ocean Trust Fund

Revenues from the fishing tax, in turn, would fund the Ocean Trust Fund that Stone proposed. This fund “could support”

the monitoring of fishing regulations; this could include expansion of satellite programmes, on-board inspectors, etc; defending, restoring, even purchasing wetland and nursery areas; carry-over payments for investors and workers to compensate for tie-up losses required by stock rehabilitation; gathering and analysis of stock data; fisheries health services, including monitoring health effects of mariculture on coastal quality and safeguarding against incursions of exotic species.

Thus, in addition to making fishing itself more expensive, the fishing tax would make fisheries enforcement more effective, protect marine habitat, transition fishers to other jobs, improve fisheries science, and protect marine ecosystems more generally. Again, Stone was already effectively practicing a Blue Ethics, incorporating the greater health of the ocean into the economics and regulation of fishing.

5.  Establish Ocean Guardians

At the heart of Stone’s Earth Ethics was a quest to give the environment a legal voice that could press at least a legal advantage (as opposed to a legal right) of intactness. That voice would often come in the form of a legal guardian, because “Nonpersons such as whales, . . . while possessing interests and even preferences, are at best restricted in their capacities to express them.” Similarly, for the ocean, “while we cannot orient the law to a Thing’s welfare, we can orient it to some ideal state of the Thing,” and the guardian can urge action consistent with that legal orientation. Viewed in this light, guardians for the ocean could also operationalize a Blue Ethics in marine fisheries by articulating the ideal of healthy, resilient marine ecosystems free from the stresses of large-scale commercial marine fishing.

B.  The Ethical Promise of the More Environmentally Benign Forms of Marine Aquaculture

The last step for a Blue Ethics agenda is to substitute a more ethically sound Blue Foods production system for commercial wild-capture fisheries—and that substitute is already emerging. Given the plateauing of wild fisheries, marine aquaculture industries have been growing rapidly since 1986 to close the gap in global seafood demand. Indeed, for most categories of fisheries, aquaculture production has already exceeded that of wild commercial fisheries:

Based on time-series data of major species groups, world aquaculture production has progressively surpassed that of capture fisheries. The “farming more than catch” milestones were reached in 1970 for aquatic algae, in 1986 for freshwater fishes, in 1994 for molluscs, in 1997 for diadromous fishes, and in 2014 for crustaceans. However, despite the increasing output from global aquaculture, farming of marine fishes is unlikely to overtake marine capture production in the future.

Aquaculture production of marine animals has grown from an average of 6.3 million tonnes per year between 1986 and 1995 to almost 31 million tonnes in 2018, a growth rate of 489% over about 35 years. While, overall, finfish aquaculture dominates aquaculture production, most of that production occurs inland, in freshwater. In contrast, “[i]n 2018, shelled molluscs (17.3 million tonnes) represented 56.3 percent of the production of marine and coastal aquaculture. Finfish (7.3 million tonnes) and crustaceans (5.7 million tonnes) taken together were responsible for 42.5 percent, while the rest consisted of other aquatic animals,” including sea turtles and marine invertebrates such as sea cucumbers.

However, food animals are not the only aquacultured marine species of global importance. In 2018 the world produced 32.4 million tonnes of aquacultured algae (kelp, seaweed) worth $13.3 billion and 26,000 tonnes of ornamental seashells and pearls worth $179,000. Seaweeds dominate the aquacultured algae, and while tropical seaweed aquaculture in Southeast Asia has decreased in recent years, seaweed aquaculture in temperate and cold waters—like those that surround most of the United States—continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace than marine animal aquaculture.

As such, aquaculture, both freshwater and marine, already plays an increasing role in preserving Blue Food security. The issue is whether this global expansion of marine aquaculture is also an example of Blue Ethics. The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is “sometimes.”

As both the FAO and the Blue Food Assessment have recognized, sometimes an ethical approach to food security requires shifting consumer demand. For Blue Foods, the more ethical approach must include a careful expansion of marine aquaculture—but not in the form of the most common finfish aquaculture, Atlantic salmon. Instead, that expansion should focus on marine algae (seaweed) and bivalves such as clams, mussels, and oysters. “[A]cross all blue foods, farmed bivalves and seaweeds generate the lowest stressors” to the environment, making them the most ethical choice of Blue Foods.

1.  Marine Aquaculture and Climate Change

On the whole, Blue Foods are better for the environment than terrestrial foods, and most forms of marine aquaculture are better for the environment than wild-caught fisheries. The multi-author article entitled Environmental Performance of Blue Foods appeared in the journal Nature to accompany the launch of the Blue Food Assessment. It provides a standardized evaluation of the environmental impacts of twenty-three species groups of blue foods across several parameters, including greenhouse gas emissions, water and land use, and nutrient pollution, all conveniently compared to chicken production. Importantly, both environmental impacts and human nutritional values vary considerably across marine foods, whether wild-caught or farmed (aquaculture). To take greenhouse gas emissions as just one example, the authors found that “[a]cross assessed blue foods, farmed seaweeds and bivalves generate the lowest emissions, followed by small pelagic capture fisheries, while flatfish and crustacean fisheries produce the highest.”

As the authors note, “fuel use drives capture fisheries emissions.” Even so, the greenhouse gas emissions from several wild capture fisheries remain lower than emissions from terrestrial chicken production when assessed by weight of edible food produced. These fisheries include herring, sardines, anchovies, cods, hakes, haddocks, salmon, trout, and smelts; in addition, fisheries for tunas, bonitos, billfishes, squid, cuttlefishes, and octopuses are about equivalent in greenhouse gas emissions, on average (albeit with a wider range of variation) to domestic chicken production. Nevertheless, tradeoffs abound—including with respect to impacts on marine biodiversity. For example, finfish fishing practices that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as use of gill nets and entangling nets, simultaneously increase risks to marine mammals.

Seaweed and bivalve marine aquaculture avoid greenhouse gas emissions because neither seaweed nor bivalves need to be fed. “For fed aquaculture, feed production is responsible for more than 70% of emissions for most groups.” While seaweeds are technically not plants, like plants they rely on chlorophyll and sunlight to grow—but, unlike land crops, they do not require fertilizer. Bivalves, in turn, are filter feeders and rely on small plants and animals in the water column, known as plankton, for their food.

More impressively, seaweed aquaculture has the potential to actually sequester carbon dioxide, the most ubiquitous greenhouse gas. As noted, kelps and marine algae photosynthesize, meaning that they take in carbon dioxide. However, while the potential for terrestrial plants, especially forests, to mitigate climate change as carbon sinks is well recognized and promoted, the same has not been true for seaweed aquaculture. Indeed, although “[t]he world production of marine macroalgae, or seaweed, has more than tripled, up from 10.6 million tonnes in 2000 to 32.4 million tonnes in 2018,” only recently has seaweed aquaculture been “gaining increasing attention to be promoted and monitored for climate and environmentally friendly bioeconomy development.” Nevertheless, seaweed aquaculture’s potential contribution to climate change mitigation is significant. Marine kelps generally have been left out of world “blue carbon” (ocean-based climate mitigation) strategies until recently because, unlike seagrasses and salt marshes, they grow on rocks, not in submerged soil, raising questions about their ability to sequester carbon dioxide for long periods. However, more recent investigations indicate that natural seaweeds do indeed sequester carbon in the deep ocean (eventually becoming, somewhat ironically, petroleum).

Given the sequestration capacity of natural seaweeds, researchers have proposed that seaweed aquaculture could also significantly contribute to climate change mitigation. In particular, seaweed aquaculture “should prove to be expandable to the offshore environment and the open sea, . . . unlocking a capacity to greatly increase carbon capture in biomass. This approach has been termed Seaweed Carbon Capture and Sink (‘Seaweed CCS’; analogous to terrestrial Carbon Capture and Storage).”

2.  Marine Aquaculture and Nutrient Pollution

Bivalve and seaweed aquaculture can also help to address marine nutrient pollution. Water flowing over and from farms, in the forms of both irrigation return flows and runoff from rain or snowmelt, carries excess fertilizer (mostly nitrogen compounds) to the ocean. Nutrients also reach the waters through atmospheric deposition, such as from the burning of fossil fuels. Once there, nutrients induce large blooms of marine plants—phytoplankton and algae. Algae are marine plants, many of which are beneficial to marine food webs. Marine algae include both the large marine seaweeds and kelp and the nearly microscopic algal forms of marine phytoplankton. However, the small phytoplankton forms of algae can create an “algal bloom,” which “is a rapid increase in the population of algae in an aquatic system,” which often “may be recognized by discoloration of the water resulting from the high density of pigmented cells.” This discoloration can give algal blooms common names, such as “red tides.” Increasing nutrient concentrations are the usual cause of algal blooms, because, like terrestrial plants, marine phytoplankton respond to nitrogen and phosphorus compounds as fertilizers.

Algal blooms impact both marine ecosystems and human health. At the ecosystem level, as the blooms die off, their decomposition consumes all the oxygen in the water column, leading to hypoxic (low-oxygen) conditions that make large areas of the ocean uninhabitable by marine animals. In the United States, the largest of these so-called “dead zones” occurs seasonally in the northern Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the Mississippi River and can reach the size of Massachusetts or New Jersey—over 7,000 square miles. However, dead zones are now common throughout the world’s coastal regions. The number of dead zones in the world’s seas has doubled every decade since 1960 as a result of increasing marine pollution, and a 2008 study identified more than 400 dead zones throughout the world. Perhaps most disturbingly, dead zones are missing biomass compared to what would be expected, suggesting that the oxygen deprivation that algal blooms cause can have long-term effects on the region’s biodiversity and productivity.

In part because of these aquatic impacts, researchers have concluded that nutrient pollution (along with biodiversity loss)—not climate change—actually poses the greatest current risk of pushing planetary systems across potentially irreversible thresholds. Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, and their colleagues at the Stockholm Resilience Center first identified their nine planetary boundaries in 2009. Planetary boundaries “are human-determined values of the control variable” to keep the planet from crossing thresholds and entering into transformations that represent existential threats to current social-ecological systems. The nine boundaries identified represent systems operating at a global scale, either directly or cumulatively, and include climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, atmospheric aerosol loading, biogeochemical flows (phosphorus and nitrogen nutrient pollution), global freshwater use, land system change, biodiversity loss, and chemical pollution. The researchers’ 2015 update article moderated those conclusions by working with risk zones instead of hard boundaries but nevertheless concluded that genetic biodiversity loss and both nitrogen and phosphorus pollution had crossed into red zones, while climate change remained in the yellow (lesser) risk zone.

As the FAO has emphasized, mollusks like clams and oysters are filter feeders, meaning that aquacultured mollusks do not need to be fed. Similarly, seaweeds grow through photosynthesis. As a result, “[m]arine bivalves, filter-feeding organisms that extract organic matter from water for growth, and seaweeds, which grow by photosynthesis by absorbing dissolved nutrients, are sometimes described as extractive species.” These species can reduce nutrient pollution in marine environments, regardless of whether the pollution comes from fed finfish aquaculture or other sources, such as fertilizer runoff from upstream agriculture.

Thus, shellfish and kelp aquaculture can improve marine water quality as well as feed human beings. For example, “In the U.S., oysters are the largest grossing marine species group for U.S. aquaculture, valued at $192 million in 2016.” Oysters are also particularly good at filtering water. Statistically significant water quality improvements have been measured in and around oyster farms in Virginia’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay, and the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) and NOAA have determined that “[a]ll of the nitrogen currently polluting the Potomac River estuary could be removed if 40 percent of its river bed were used for shellfish cultivation.” In the Maryland portion of Chesapeake Bay, oyster aquaculture removes nitrogen pollution associated with farm runoff, allowing oyster aquaculture (and clam aquaculture) to potentially participate in nutrient trading programs under the federal Clean Water Act.

Kelp aquaculture can also improve water quality. For example, some species of kelp can remove up to 94% of ammonia pollution and up to 61% of phosphorus. Similar studies along the northeastern (Atlantic) coast of the United States have “demonstrat[ed] that nutrient bioextraction through seaweed aquaculture can be an effective coastal nutrient management tool in urbanized estuaries.” Moreover, the nutrient extraction benefits potentially multiply when marine aquaculture facilities grow kelp and shellfish together.

C.  Ethical Transitions to Shellfish and Seaweed Aquaculture

Careful attention to Blue Foods could improve both the environmental impacts of human food security and human nutrition. For example, “blue foods provide the highest nutrient richness across multiple micronutrients (for example, iron and zinc), vitamins (for example, B12), and long-chain polyunsaturated fatty acids (for example, EPA and DHA) relative to terrestrial animal-source foods.”

More specifically as discussed above, marine aquaculture, particularly kelp and shellfish aquaculture, is a key component of a more ethical Blue Food future. On the whole, both aquacultured kelp and “bivalves have a low environmental impact per gram of protein produced, compared with finfish aquaculture, most capture fisheries, and terrestrial livestock.” Moreover, FAO data indicate “that 70 percent of people involved in aquaculture production are women,” suggesting that marine aquaculture is already promoting gender equity in Blue Food production.

       There are, of course, other ethical considerations, such as how to transition fishers to new jobs and finding ways to support communities that transition from fishing to aquaculture. Access to the new industry needs to remain equitable, and sometimes contentious issues regarding how to locate new businesses and infrastructure in crowded coastal zones will require resolution—although marine aquaculture is increasingly moving into deeper ocean waters, and co-location with offshore renewable energy facilities can save space. In other words, the transition to more ethical Blue Food security will require work, careful planning, new laws and policies, and probably some money, either from governments or investors.

Conclusion

The Anthropocene requires humanity to continually adjust law and policy to meet basic human needs—like food and water—without sacrificing the rest of the biosphere in the process. Although Christopher Stone is now most strongly associated with the Rights of Nature movement (as other articles in this volume make clear), he also recognized that progress was also possible through a new Earth Ethics that gives Things and Nonhumans in nature—like whales and coral reef ecosystems—both legal advantage in court and moral considerateness in policymaking while still stopping short of giving nature actual legal rights.

This more limited ethical framework, and the Moral Pluralism that Stone developed to support it, provides a workable framework for reconsidering the ethics of humans’ dependence on Blue Foods for our overall food security. Under this new Blue Ethics, the choice of how to procure Blue Foods is not amoral; instead, giving full moral considerateness to ocean species and marine ecosystems requires consciously shifting Blue Food production away from industrial-scale commercial fishing to the most environmentally benign forms of marine aquaculture, generally involving aquaculture of bivalves and kelp. At the same time, adopting Moral Pluralism provides a principled basis for using multiple frameworks and analyses to evaluate the continued morality of other kinds of wild-caught fisheries, particularly subsistence fishing among the world’s indigenous communities.

The transition from large-scale marine fishing to increased aquaculture will not be easy in all, or even most, locations. Moreover, the details of how to first define and then shift among relevant ethical frameworks without devolving into moral relativism and its political manifestations will require careful thought and intimate situational wisdom, as well as a strong commitment to improving the ocean’s resilience. However, the result could be both increased food security and improved health for many coastal communities and an ocean with more capacity to adapt to climate change and ocean acidification, extending the many non-fish ecosystem services it provides to future generations.

 

 

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1307

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* Robert C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law, Los Angeles, CA. My thanks to the editors of the Southern California Law Review for including me in the Christopher Stone Symposium on Environmental Law. I may be reached at rcraig@law.usc.edu.

Identifying Contemporary Rights of Nature in the United States

The Rights of Nature movement is at the precipice of watershed social changes. Leaders of this international, Indigenous-led movement call upon the public to radically reimagine the human relationship with nature. This Article comes at a crucial moment when some leading environmental law scholars are questioning the potential Rights of Nature within the United States. This Article responds by building upon the ideas of Christopher Stone to chart the theoretical and doctrinal pathways that breathe life into the legal framework of Rights of Nature. It sketches the present status of Rights of Nature in the United States and links this overview to environmental, animal, and natural resources law literatures.

Most scholarly discourse about the Rights of Nature focuses on a few well-known examples outside of the United States, such as constitutional rights in Ecuador or New Zealand and Australia granting rights to wind and rivers. In fact, the United States has a growing body of diverse Rights of Nature that legal scholars have largely overlooked. For example, in six federal statutes, natural resource damages have resulted in over ten billion dollars of tort remedies that benefit nature. Indigenous governments located throughout the United States—including the Band of Ojibwe, Ho-Chunk Nation, Navajo Nation, and Ponca Nation—have created legal personhood, statutory personhood, and constitutional provisions in tribal government. Additionally, wildlife holds many rights hidden in federal statutes, as with bald eagles claiming property rights superior to those of humans in the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Collectively, this diffuse and innovative set of laws forms a body of existing Rights of Nature, showing that such rights exist in the United States today—examples that deserve discussion, consideration, and potential extension.

This Article seeks to uncover and elevate these rights, thus promoting, amplifying, and calling attention to many diffuse efforts to capitalize upon their collective potential to reshape the human relationship with nature and address the environmental problems of our time. It links popular discourse on the Rights of Nature with its theoretical foundations and well-established statutory systems of environmental law. It seeks to help and inspire legal thinkers in disparate fields to collectively co-create a more robust role for Rights of Nature—within the United States and beyond.

INTRODUCTION

“Rights of Nature” recognize natural objects (such as trees, rivers, and wind) as having some legal rights, including them in our system of law and government. The Rights of Nature movement is international and Indigenous-led. It is part of a broader effort to displace anthropocentric conceptions of the human relationship with nature with an alternative worldview that prioritizes the needs of all parts of an ecosystem.

Famous international examples of governments recognizing natural objects as rightsholders have captivated public attention. Despite this public yearning to reimagine our relationship with nature, U.S. environmental law scholars were long slow to embrace the idea. Some have defined the idea narrowly, presupposing that Rights of Nature are narrowly confined to unenforceable constitutional provisions. Others have yet to engage the idea, thinking of it as orthogonal to environmental law, as it is conventionally understood as a set of statutes enacted in the 1970s (such as the Clean Air Act). This Article makes the novel claim that Rights of Nature not only exist but are actually widespread and can be found in many contemporary U.S. laws not conventionally understood as affording legal rights to natural objects. Further, it links conventional environmental law to the Rights of Nature movement, showing how merging these fields can revitalize environmental law to address pressing problems that presently narrow definitions of the field leave untouched. (This builds upon prior work in which I link Rights of Nature to animal law and animal rights literatures.) This Article suggests that we, collectively as a community of scholars continuously co-creating the field of law governing the human relationship with the environment, should use our collective talent, time, and skills to identify, amplify, and extend Rights of Nature because they hold considerable potential to forward new legal pathways to much-needed ecological objectives.

After a slow start, the Rights of Nature movement is quickly gaining momentum. Christopher Stone was influential in the creation of the Rights of Nature. Stone challenged conventional Western understandings of how law interacts with nature by considering affording standing to natural objects. Since then, Stone’s thinking has influenced a large and growing international consortium of lawmakers, activists, and scholars in granting objects natural rights.

Yet, scholars and commentators may not have yet developed a shared understanding of what “Rights of Nature” are. Precision matters at this precarious moment, when an enthusiastic international group of legal scholars are beginning to seriously engage with the concept. There exists a danger that some scholars might ascribe the term a narrow definition—such as constitutional provisions—with understanding that they link to others—such as natural resource damages—which could lead commentators and courts to prematurely dismiss Rights of Nature. Thus, substantive outcomes result from the terminological definition—making proper understanding and definitions of critical importance.

Moreover, the early-stage practical challenges of forging new legal pathways give some leading environmental law scholars cold feet about the administrability of natural rights. For example, Mauricio Guim and Michael A. Livermore are self-described skeptics of the idea, noting “rights for nature are unlikely to provide the solution that frustrated environmentalists seek.” Although I have tremendous respect for these talented environmental thinkers, I think they dismiss the idea too quickly. Every legal movement is messy at first, needing many iterations to develop and mature into a well-functioning regime. Narrowly defining Rights of Nature and looking at early efforts to actualize it may produce too much skepticism for something that has the potential to provide a much-needed shakeup to the status quo. A broader definition of the Rights of Nature—the vision outlined in this Article—shows that, in fact, they already exist and are functioning quite well in natural resource damages statutes and Indigenous governments within the United States—two sources of Rights of Nature that Guim and Livermore do not contemplate in their valuable paper.

Despite the domestic origins of these ideas in contemporary legal structures, some U.S. scholars have dismissed the Rights of Nature as unworkable in our legal structure. That is beginning to change, with a wave of new scholarship on the Rights of Nature taking a more optimistic tone. Yet, even among this growing body of work, U.S. scholars have not created a typology of Rights of Nature or mined existing domestic law to uncover examples of these rights with an eye towards reforming domestic environmental law. As a result, some scholars are engaging with a superficial subpart of Rights of Nature as if it were the whole, dismissing that subpart and with it the entire idea. The problem is that the concept of Rights of Nature does not match the narrow definition that some scholars are ascribing to it. As a result, some are quickly dismissing the important movement as the latest iteration of the attractive-but-meaningless concept of “sustainability.”

I believe that definition matters a great deal here—that defining the Rights of Nature in a broad and multifaceted way for an audience of legal scholars can save this vital movement from being dismissed as unworkable before it really starts. This Article seeks to bridge the gap between the popular discourse on the Rights of Nature and law. It lays a very modest foundation for lawyers, commentators, and judges to situate the Rights of Nature within the legal context. 

This Article begins to explore the idea that the Rights of Nature are not only viable within the U.S. legal structure but are, in fact, already in existence. It begins by creating a novel typology of Rights of Nature, which is sometimes used in different ways in international discourse. Then, having briefly set forth types of rights, it maps this typology onto domestic laws to see whether—and where—there are Rights of Nature within our existing legal structure.

In doing so, this Article begins to reimagine how we define the field of environmental law—a definition that erodes the existing boundaries of the field as a set of statutes from the 1970s and takes a broader, more expansive approach. Reframing environmental law as laws that govern the human relationship with nature represents a profound, much-needed shift in the field—one that may hold the potential to address the issues of inclusion and rapid geophysical change that we so sorely need at this moment.

Environmental law scholars may have underestimated the potential of existing laws by confining our understanding of the field to federal statutes. This underestimation has caused us to believe that our hands are tied to address environmental issues, that we must wait for Congress to enact new laws to address the many colliding crises of our time to save us as they once did in the 1970s. But this is not the case. Environmental law scholars can find threads running through black letter law that may create legal pathways for new ideas. Reframing environmental law through the Rights of Nature provides a new solution to pressing environmental problems. It also serves to fill a gap between how most people feel about nature and what law on the books states. A more expansive view of environmental law serves to integrate these values—and the long-marginalized populations who hold them—into the canon of environmental law.

This Article proceeds in three Parts.

Part I defines environmental law and the Rights of Nature. Until now, the field of environmental law has been largely understood as a subset of administrative law, focused on federal agency administration of statutes that Congress enacted in the 1970s with very little subsequent updating. This disappointingly narrow conception of the field falls short of the legal tools society must wield to stem climate change and biodiversity loss. Rights of Nature is an Indigenous-led effort to ascribe legal meaning to the rights of natural objects within government. Some hope that Rights of Nature represents the most important shift in environmental law since the health-based statutes of the 1970s, which form the canonical version of environmental law. This analysis foreshadows not only the pluralistic descriptive analysis of the Rights of Nature in the United States but also foregrounds the need for new worldviews.

Part II explains that environmental crises highlight the need for alternative worldviews to inform the human relationship with nature. This begins by challenging the received wisdom of a legal and economic system that excludes natural interestsa human-created construct that erases the interests of nonhuman animals and plants. It advocates for readers to radically reimagine the human relationship with nature; it urges legal thinkers to forge creative pathways between the status quo and where we need to go.

Part III provides a typography of Rights of Nature, then compares this framework to existing laws within the United States today (inclusive of Indigenous governments). By mapping the origins of the term and its legal actualization in positive law in the United States today, I show that the concept is much broader than it is sometimes assumed to be. This analysis reveals that there are, in fact, widespread Rights of Nature for natural objects in the United States today. The conclusion considers the implications for Rights of Nature to revitalize environmental law. It briefly flags how some of the most pressing problems of our time—those that statutes alone are failing to address—can, and should, be addressed through innovative tools that integrate the interests of nonhuman rights-holders. This Article reveals that Rights of Nature extend beyond the narrow, commonly understood idea of affording legal personhood to nature in constitutions.

This Article concludes by calling for a change in what counts as environmental law. Students sign up for environmental law courses to learn how to protect pandas and save the world. They are so disappointed when they realize environmental law is mostly about pollution control. An unspoken secret about environmental law is that it is a tremendously narrow field. At the time the classic environmental law statutes (such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act) were created, they were revolutionary. Today, they are clearly not enough to meet public demand. Why, then, do scholars and practitioners in the field accept the narrow constraints of current law? As a relatively new field, a living generation of environmental scholars and advocates built the field of environmental law from scratch. Early actors fought for legitimacy. They worked hard and earned it. Now, it is time to think of new and bold ideas. Rights of Nature hold the potential to revitalize and reconceive environmental law. This Article suggests that following the path of Rights of Nature—the theories undergirding it and its statutory and doctrinal framework—provides a path to a new iteration of environmental law that is more inclusive, relevant, and expansive.

I.  Rights of Nature in Environmental Law

In a recent TED talk, Kelsey Leonard introduced the Rights of Nature to an international audience, suggesting that we should treat “water [as] a living relation and grant[] it the legal personhood it deserves.” Over three million people watched Leonard’s talk. Rights of Nature enjoy widespread popularity—most people like the idea of treating rivers and animals well in the abstract. But how do Rights of Nature intersect with the legal system?

Understanding the nexus of current federal policy and the Rights of Nature begins with two interrelated questions: What is environmental law? And what is the Rights of Nature movement? The answer to both revolves around human relationships with nature. At present, the field of environmental law is largely anthropocentric—focusing on the needs of humans while largely ignoring those of other species. Many (although not all) of our laws are focused on constraining human uses of natural objects (such as airscapes and rivers) so that they do not degrade to the point that they no longer satisfy human needs for clean air and drinking water. The premise of protecting the environment to satisfy ongoing human use of it is a centerpiece of much of the field.

In contrast, the fundamental premise of the Rights of Nature movement challenges this anthropocentric view. It suggests that other living things—rivers, wild rice, wind, animals—also have interests in the environment, which human uses should not fully degrade. Asserting rights on behalf of nature within contemporary human legal systems expands law beyond serving humans, creating a more expansive vision of our legal systems as navigating the human relationship with nature. Notably, this is not a new worldview. Many religions and cultures across time and history, including in much of the world today, reflect this ethos: the idea that the Earth and its resources are shared between its inhabitants, and humans ought not take more than our share from other creatures or destroy natural environments. Through legal formalities and corporate structures, the legal functionaries administering Western systems of law, government, and commerce have often pretended away the idea of nonhuman interests as worthy of equal consideration under the law—separating law from ecological morality.

The remainder of this Part shows how Rights of Nature may resolve some of the shortcomings in current environmental law. Section A describes environmental law as a field of study and practice area. Section B shows that Rights of Nature provide an alternative worldview to existing environmental law, one in which nonhuman interests are formally recognized.

A.  Environmental Law

Environmental law as a field is generally understood as a set of statutes enacted in the 1970s, such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National Environmental Policy Act. These laws have largely sat stagnant since then—rarely amended with very little new environmental legislation. As a result, existing environmental laws are not addressing ecological vicissitudes including climate change, wildfire policy, factory farming, and biodiversity loss. Environmental laws are sorely out of date.

In the fifty years since the environmental laws were enacted, astonishing shifts have occurred in scientific understanding, showing many imbricated challenges that the statutory framework does not begin to address. Climate change, biodiversity loss, wildfire smoke emissions, and factory farming are modern environmental disasters. The worldview undergirding current laws are out-of-step with updated understandings of nature as part of an interconnected world.

While we have learned more about the natural world, so too has society shifted since the environmental laws were created. First, an understanding of intergenerational, systemic racism has shown how racist institutions have created environmental justice problems that intersect with climate change, wildfire, and biodiversity in troubling ways. Second, Indigenous governments worldwide are innovating new laws that draw on traditional ecological knowledge to address environmental issues. Third, Wicca and Paganism are quickly growing religions, emerging from the ashes of European and domestic genocide of people (generally identifying as women) who advocated on behalf of nature. Fourth, animal law scholars have advanced a new agenda for radically reimagining a legal system focused on interspecies equity and expanding the law to make nonhumans co-participants in our systems of governance.

Environmental law statutes have failed to keep pace with these social shifts. Laws that represented colonial perspectives and were largely developed by non-inclusive groups of lawmakers are still on the books. Scholars, lawyers, legislators, and judges should broaden environmental law to keep up with the times. New laws, tools, and approaches are desperately needed from more diverse voices. The crucial question is how to update the field to incorporate new perspectives. Relying solely upon a narrow, statutory approach—by enacting more federal law—is insufficient to the intertwined challenges of natural and social concerns.

This is where the Rights of Nature come in—offering an opportunity to radically reimagine the human relationship with nature in ways that reflect both ancient worldviews and modern scientific understandings. The Rights of Nature is an international, Indigenous-led movement to update the law to recognize the legal rights of natural objects.

B.  Rights of Nature

The term “Rights of Nature” describes affording legal rights to nonhuman natural beings and objects. Rights of Nature incorporate nonhumans into human legal systems. Affording rights to a river, for example, allows the river to independently assert its interests to legal institutions through human trustees. A constitutional provision may allow citizens to sue on behalf of natural objects. This removes the need for a human plaintiff to assert adequate standing—providing built-in access for natural entities to the judicial process.

The Rights of Nature is also a movement—an international effort for governments worldwide to fold nature into systems of law and government. Rights of Nature seek to reinfuse pre-colonial values of human-nature relationships into legal and economic institutions in the United States and beyond. It is sometimes described as decolonization of property or the natural world. The movement challenges anthropomorphic conceptions of the world by folding nature’s interests into man-made institutions of law and markets.

The “Rights of Nature” are once new and ancient. Legal scholars often credit Christopher Stone’s canonical article Should Trees Have Standing? with giving birth to each of these ideas. Three central features define Stone’s conception of affording legal rights to natural objects: (1) the standing to sue for a legal remedy in court; (2) the opportunity to obtain a legal remedy, such as money damages or an injunction; and (3) the opportunity to directly benefit from the legal remedy provided. The effect of giving nature legal rights is to allow natural objects to collect damages, reallocating the cost of damaging nature as it presently is (costless, in economic terms) to having a value (the harm caused to nature through its damage). This essentially shifts an externality to the person creating it, a form of the “polluter pays” principle. In his seminal article, Stone argued that conferring rights on nature would impose economic costs on the value of nature that people had harmed. Granting legal rights to nature also reduces the damage to nature by encouraging precaution to protect against harm, the cost of which is not justified under a system in which the harm is not paid for.

Environmental law scholars tend to credit Stone’s canonical article Should Trees Have Standing? with giving birth to the Rights of Nature. Surely, Stone’s work is of vital importance to the legal actualization of Rights of Nature, which is credited as an influence by European and South American scholars. For example, influential scholar Delphine Misonne has meticulously traced the influence of Stone’s writings on international legal developments, showing that his ideas were foundational to a number of international efforts to afford nature rights, which might otherwise appear scattered but—thanks to the work of Misonne—are instead rightfully linked to Stone’s influence.

Yet, world-changing ideas rarely come to one person at one time; instead, they are things that people have always believed. Stone’s writing might be understood as an excellent modern legal interpretation of similar concepts found in other cultural traditions, past and present. The genesis for humans acknowledging the right of natural objects is present in cultural and religious ideas throughout time and history. Indeed, Western culture might be unique for creating legal and economic constructs that erase nature. The Rights of Nature movement merely seeks to reincorporate natural interests in legal regimes that erased them. For these reasons, Rights of Nature can be understood as either a modern legal invention or a return to pre-colonial ideas of rules governing human interactions with nature, which some cultures have held uninterrupted since time immemorial.

Today, Rights of Nature are a burgeoning area of environmental law scholarship. Yet, existing scholarship overlooks the extent to which damages are already being collected for human harms to nature and the extent to which they have (or have not) deterred additional harm. Scholars tend to focus on the question of standing, debating the possibility (or impossibility) of natural objects seeking legal remedies in court. This Article takes a different approach. It starts by looking at remedies obtained by natural objects in practice. In this way, this Article shows that the Rights of Nature are neither wholly theoretical nor confined to international examples; they are embedded in a variety of laws. But first, I briefly highlight the importance of searching for Rights of Nature in domestic law by outlining why they might serve to incorporate vitally needed diverse perspectives into our field and practice.

II.  Infusing Diverse Worldviews into Environmental Law and Policy

A radically different model of envisioning human relationships with nature requires finding alternatives to the dominant discourse that frames environmental law in scientific and economic terms. This Part briefly overviews alternative inputs that could inform our field, drawing upon a body of my work that engages environmental values from diverse perspectives. This opens the door to more pluralistic worldviews that—directly and indirectly—are informing the Rights of Nature movement and could be incorporated into environmental law.

Dramatically increasing the diversity of inputs into ecological policymaking is crucial to course-correcting our current, disastrous environmental trajectory. One way to understand the myriad overlapping environmental problems is through a relational perspective, understanding the human relationship with nature as frayed. Humans are acting badly in our relationship with Earth and the other living creatures on it. From this perspective, the key to solving problems like climate change or factory farming is not merely practical (reduce CO2 emissions), but also philosophical (live sustainably). Sustainable living within the confines of a living world is not a value system embedded in dominant Western capitalist perspectives. Indeed, the values undergirding the dominant social views are what landed us in our current crisis. It follows, then, that backing away from the crisis cannot be achieved through the policies that landed us in this predicament, nor by the people whose decision-making is informed by worldviews that have landed us there. To do better and differently in our relationship with the natural world requires new understandings of our perspectives and obligations to it. For this, diversity is sorely needed—not for the sake of diversity alone (which would be valid), but also because our current mindsets have proven limited and problematic.

In recent work, I note, “I believe that marginalized members of society—those most absent from academic discourse and positions of federal policymaking—hold the insights that are key to our collective survival.” Without adapting our existing property laws and environmental statutes to incorporate other perspectives, we are doomed to continue unknowingly replicating the flaws in the code of our laws. Only rethinking the underlying mindsets—which requires engaging with voices left out in prior iterations of federal statutory decision-making—will point out the problems in our perspective that led to too-narrow, ineffective, and dated laws.

Fortunately, legal scholars in related fields are shedding light on how to update common law and statutory fields to reflect more diverse perspectives. We can learn from the reckoning happening in administrative law and property law. Administrative law professor Bijal Shah suggests that “[t]he core models of analysis in administrative law are inflexible and entrenched, and the scope, quality, and materiality of administrative law scholarship has stagnated as a result.” Shah advocates for introducing critical legal study of administrative law in order to invigorate the field. Relatedly, in property law, K-Sue Park notes that “[a] growing body of legal scholarship suggests that erasure of the histories of conquest, slavery, and race is widespread across doctrinal areas.” Park advocates for scholars to review the historical development of legal doctrines through a presumption of erasure and a close look at buried material. Shah and Park both point to the work of scholars who have done important, critical work that speaks to administrative law, property law, and—by extension—environmental law.

Animal law scholars are calling for interspecies equity and shifts in the legal status of nonhuman animals. Maneesha Deckha is leading an international coalition of scholars in considering how Indigenous and eco-feminist perspectives might transform anthropocentric systems into more pluralistic spaces. An Ecuadorian court recently found that the Rights of Nature protects individual nonhuman animals.

Environmental law scholars are considering perspectives outside of the mainstream environmental status quo, considering concepts like decolonization and unsettling. Rights of Nature provides one of many opportunities to engage these concepts within Western legal structures. Learning from pluralistic worldviews about the ways in which Rights of Nature provides insight into how environmental law scholars can and should engage our body of law amidst personal examination and institutional critiques about diversity, equity, and inclusion.

III.  A Typology of Rights of Nature Applied to U.S. Law

This Part provides an overview of Rights of Nature. Section A provides a typology of Rights of Nature, which applies to domestic and international law. Section B explores domestic law, comparing existing laws outside environmental law that nevertheless map on to Rights of Nature. Section C suggests that natural resource damages might constitute the best-developed Right of Nature in the United States, although it has not previously been considered as such. Section D outlines three crucial next steps to expanding existing legal instruments to more fully accommodate a Rights-of-Nature approach.

A.  Typology of Rights of Nature

This Section sketches a very rough typology of the legal instruments to actualize Rights of Nature. At present, various sources of positive law exist under this broad term, which lacks the requisite exactitude for legal purposes. Concretely identifying the legal meaning of Rights of Nature requires taking a broad view of possible sources of rights, sifting through potential applications, and delineating various sources of rights.

The inquiry in this Section proceeds in three steps. First, it draws upon actions by Indigenous communities worldwide, which have been forerunners in granting a variety of rights consistent with traditional ecological knowledge. Second, it draws upon emerging definitions that international law scholars are giving to Rights of Nature, such as constitutional provisions in some South American countries and tort remedies for repairing nature under French law. Third, it looks to law—treaties, constitutions, cases, statutes, regulations, and ordinances. From these diverse sources, I link the ephemeral concept of right to concrete legal instruments.

Two brief disclaimers are necessary. First, mapping a quickly emerging area of law runs the risk of overlooking an important component. Therefore, I present this list tentatively as a modest first step, with the assumption that subsequent scholarly discussion will refine and better it. Second, it is necessary to note a technical point: rights can overlap. For example, a constitutional provision could also create legal personhood. Therefore, this is a rough typology and not a perfect mapping, which ideally will emerge collaboratively as the field matures.

This Article identifies various legal meanings of “the Rights of Nature,” including constitutional provisions, standing, tort remedies, the right to own property, equitable consideration under the law, and rights-based personhood. This novel typology seeks to provide a legal framework for the many different meanings that scholars and commentators are assigning to the Rights of Nature.

Constitutional provisions provide perhaps the best-known Rights of Nature. International bodies, national governments, states, and Indigenous constitutions can (and do) create positive, written rights to nature in their constitutions. This can be anthropocentric—guaranteeing citizens a right to nature—or eco-centric—making an independent right of nature exist. Over one hundred governments provide some variation of a right to the environment. Some well-known examples include the constitutional provisions in Ecuador and the Navajo Nation.

Legal personhood allows defined natural objects the opportunity to participate in the legal system by suing in court. A crucial question embedded in this is standing, or whether—and by whom—legal remedies can be sought on behalf of nature. Potential intermediaries include government entities, Indigenous communities, and nongovernmental organizations. Broader considerations of personhood include communities and governments granting natural features legal personhood, as with communities that have declared the Whanganui River or Klamath River legal persons. Standing can be granted statutorily, with Congress explicitly allowing standing through statute. Courts can also grant legal personhood, creating a “jurisprudential paradigm shift.” Tribal, state, and local laws are also being used.

Equitable consideration means a court considering the fairness of a particular outcome on a nonhuman animal. This is most evident in the growing number of states in which judges engage in a “best interest of all involved” standard to determine the custodial interests of pets—a degree of judicial consideration previously confined to human children.

Tort remedies provide a judicial remedy for a court to order that a person who harms nature pay money damages to compensate for that harm. French scholar Matthieu Poumarède asserts that making humans pay to fix nature when they hurt it is one form of a Right of Nature. This is essentially saying that nature deserves to be free from harm—much as tort law suggests that people should not be harmed—and to receive damages when it is harmed.

Property rights describe nature, or natural elements such as trees, having the right to own property for its benefit. The federal natural resource damage fund is an example of this: hundreds of millions of dollars that can only be spent to restore nature. More recently, philosophers and legal scholars are considering extending the ability to own property to nature, including wildlife.

Right to Exist confers rights on nature equivalent to those enjoyed not only by people but also by corporations. “[N]ature has certain rights as a legal subject and holder of rights[,] . . . such as the rights to exist, to survive, and to persist and regenerate vital cycles.” Philosophers urge the distinction between moral and legal rights. For example, we may believe animals have a right to dignity, but that is not legally enforceable.

International agreements are also creating Rights of Nature. In 1982, 111 countries signed a United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter for the Rights of Nature declaring rights for all living things. Also, in September 2012, the fifth World Conservation Congress of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) passed a resolution on “[i]ncorporation of the Rights of Nature as the organizational focal point in IUCN’s decision making.” Former U.N. Special Rapporteur to the Environment, John Knox, advocates for a U.N. provision recognizing a right to a clean environment.

Having sketched out a very rough typography of Rights of Nature, the next Section considers whether such rights exist within the United States

B.  Mapping Current Rights of Nature in the United States

This Article makes a surprising claim: the United States, in fact, already partially recognizes the Rights of Nature. This survey of U.S. law setting aside the legal elements of the Rights of Nature reveals a surprising overlap. Familiar examples include the Endangered Species Act providing a right-to-exist for plants and wildlife. The National Environmental Policy Act affords procedural protections—and attendant dignity—to government actions on viewsheds.

At its core, Rights of Nature allow human advocates to bring suit to collect damages for ecosystems or their component parts. Rights of Nature can be found in various sources of law, ranging from constitutional provisions to federal statutes, but they always involve a focus on natural objects or systems.

The Rights of Nature exist in many forms. For example, a nongovernmental organization may sue for a legal remedy on behalf of an animal. A whale can sue the United States, asking the government to stop sonar testing that damages the whale’s vital organs and interferes with important biological behaviors such as feeding and mating. A monkey can sue a photographer, asserting that he owns a copyright for a picture that he took using the photographer’s camera. A pet, represented by a trustee, can inherit millions of dollars from her owner. Similarly, a government can sue as a trustee for damages that someone causes to public lands or resources. If an oil spill kills a bird, the government must sue the oil company for the cost of restoring the habitat so more of that species can live there.

Unlike human litigants, natural objects do not sue on their own behalf. The monkey does not stand in the courtroom and seek to convince the judge that the picture is his. A human trustee must stand in for the natural object. Many legal thinkers get stuck on this point of standing—who may rightfully stand in for an animal, when, and how? As scholars debate these questions, nature continues to participate in the legal system—collecting billions of dollars in damages, amassing countless funds in inheritance, and benefiting through tort deterrence of natural action.

Below, this Article begins to tentatively chart how legal advocacy for Rights of Nature occurs in practice, studying the activist lawyering that is expanding the margins of the legal Rights of Nature and the little-known federal statutes that form the basis for collecting damages on behalf of natural objects, as Stone imagined. It begins by setting aside the questions of standing and focuses instead on the remedies garnered. This reveals a large, previously unseen set of laws in place, from which one can trace back the questions of standing. This analysis provides insights that reframe our understanding of how, in practice, litigation for nature occurs.

Table 1.  Rights of Nature in U.S. Law

Legal Aspect

Analogy in U.S. Law

Constitutional Provision

  • None; some argue it is embedded in the human “right to happiness”
  • Ecuadorian Constitutiona
  • Indigenous constitutions within the United States (Navajo Nation)

Legal Personhood

  • Pa. Gen. Energy Co., LLC v. Grant Twp., No. 14-209ERIE, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2069 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2018).
  • Colo. River Ecosystem ex rel. Deep Green Resistance v. Colorado, No. 17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Colo. 2017).
  • Mute swan case: Fund for Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2003).
  • Legal Personhood of Klamath River

Standing

  • Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004); Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Sea World Parks & Ent. Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012). But see Palila v. Haw. Dep’t Land & Nat. Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988).
  • Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

Human Rights

  • ESA = right to exist
  • Public trust doctrine
  • Steven Wise; Nonhuman Rights Project litigationb

Tort Remedy

  • Natural resource damages

Dignity

  • Cultural resource claims—Native American
  • Wild and Scenic River Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271, stakeholder collectives
  • National Park Service and Related Programs Act, 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), and the National Monument enabling statute, Antiquities Act of 1906, 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–320303

Property Rights

  • Animal property rights
  • Public lands management
  • National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2)
  • National Park Service and Related Programs Act, 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)c

Sources: a Constitución de la República del Ecuador, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 7. b Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (2000). For critiques of this approach, see Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 Yale L.J. 527, 539–40 (2000); Richard Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 171, 2002). For a summary of efforts in court, see Bradshaw supra note 58, at 812, 812 n.10. c Bradshaw, supra note 58, at 823–30.

 

Of the potential Rights of Nature outlined above, perhaps the remedy most closely tracking Stone’s conception are the natural resource damages statutes, which are discussed in greater detail below.

C.  Natural Resource Damages as Rights of Nature

This Article links the existing environmental law tort remedy of natural resource damages to the Rights of Nature. This account radically reframes legal discussions of nature’s rights, showing them to be far more tangible and well-developed than the nascent rights that scholars and commentators generally describe them as. This advances scholarly discourse about the Rights of Nature beyond whether they should exist to sophisticated discussions of how they have been already operating in practice for decades at the highest levels of federal and international law. Conceptualizing Rights of Nature as including natural resource damages has important implications for environmental law activists and scholars—it charts new pathways for pursuing Rights of Nature.

Natural resource damages are a tort remedy that require tortfeasers that harm public lands or natural resources to pay money damages to fix them. Tort remedies provide a judicial remedy for a court to order that a company, agency, or individual who harms nature must pay money damages to compensate for that harm.

Six federal statutes provide nature with a natural resource damages remedy. Natural resource damages are collected by the government under the public trust doctrine. Teams of environmental lawyers employed by the government seek natural resource damages on behalf of the federal trusts. The damages can only be used to restore nature to a pre-incident baseline condition; they are not a fine or penalty, nor are they used for clean-up. This remedy has produced over ten billion dollars in the past thirty years. It is best known as the vehicle through which British Petroleum (“B.P.”) paid for the restoration of the gulf coast following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

Although widespread in practice, natural resource damages are relatively rarely studied. Until recently, environmental law scholars largely overlooked natural resource damages. In 2012, Sanne Knudsen provided an outstanding introduction to the remedy, describing it as protecting ecosystem health and serving as a limitation on environmentally detrimental uses of private property. In 2016, I published a descriptive article that provided a longitudinal mapping of the various statutes in which the remedies arise and reported the collection activities by the thirteen federal and resource management agencies.

Despite not yet being understood as conceptually linked, natural resource damages may be the best-developed actualization of Rights of Nature in the United States. The United States has quietly and unwittingly charted a novel path for statutory Rights of Nature. This is a departure from the splashier continuation of all recognitions afforded Rights of Nature in other countries and tribal governments. Situating natural resource damages among other, international efforts to advance the Rights of Nature paves the way to revitalizing environmental law.

Courts and commentators alike underestimate the importance of tort damages for nature. This leads courts to rubber stamp settlements, which in turn allows overstretched agencies to settle for cents on the dollar. Parties, in turn, rely upon agencies’ inability to litigate cases to push hard for aggressive settlements that do not satisfy the fix what you broke nature of the statute. For example, the agencies in Deepwater Horizon were reliant on B.P. to provide early-stage funding to mitigate damage and assessment costs. This creates an inherent conflict for agencies, which must threaten to sue the party funding the science underlying the settlement. Understanding natural resource damages as Rights of Nature revitalizes the statutes and agencies, providing outside attention to offset the financial interests of responsible parties. Agencies should be increasingly comfortable taking more aggressive settlement and litigation positions if courts and outside commentators—such as environmental nongovernmental organizations—are playing an active role advocating for nature through these statutes. In other words, to realize the potential of natural resource damages, courts and commentators must realize its intellectual hook to Rights of Nature.

Advocating for legal acceptance of the Rights of Nature is at once prosaic and radical. Pragmatically, this Article proceeds in the established model of environmental law by pointing towards six federal natural resource damages statutes in the United States. In 2016, a longitudinal research project revealed that Congress has enacted six statutes that clearly give natural objects legal rights, under which federal agencies, tribes, and states have collected over ten billion dollars. This Article links natural resource damages to the canonical legal thinking on affording nature rights, linking the law with the theory. This effectively ends the conversation about whether Rights of Nature could possibly exist in the United States. They can, and they do.

Rights of Nature—as they presently exist in federal law—elevate the legal status of nonhuman animals, plants, and natural objects on public lands as protected by law. If a party (person, company, or government entity) harms nature, they must pay tort damages. Those damages can only be used to actively repair the harmed object. If an oil spill kills songbirds, government agencies will sue the vessel that spilled the oil and use the money damages to restore songbirds. This might mean buying land in Costa Rica where the songbird nests, devoting that land to the songbirds, and rebuilding the population to the point that the songbirds return to the California coast. This is one example of hundreds of well-documented cases in which federal agencies used statutes to collect money damages on behalf of nature, then used those funds to restore natural objects that humans had damaged. This is the actualization of Christopher Stone’s idea in Should Trees Have Standing?—his vision has come to fruition. If we believe that natural resource damages give nature legal rights, then one could argue that Rights of Nature have existed in the United States for at least forty years.

Theoretically, Rights of Nature shift environmental law from an anthropocentric to eco-centric perspective. Nature deserves to exist outside of its uses to humans. Courts might apply the Endangered Species Act to outline the economic purposes of the songbirds—for tourists to see, for hunters to shoot. The Rights of Nature take a dramatic step, suggesting that the public trust doctrine invests in public land and resources a shared, communal right to the continued existence of the resources. Songbirds should exist because they are part of nature, which is part of the American public. Tribal and international examples take a step further still, citing the independent right of natural objects to exist, showing how existing examples of Rights of Nature might evolve in U.S. law over time.

D.  Expanding the Rights of Nature

Despite widespread public enthusiasm for reimagining the human relationship with nature, desire and discourse are insufficient to create lasting change. Legal and political institutions translate public will into law. Scholars, lawyers, and law students can act quickly to leverage public will for protecting nature into a powerful, enduring, and meaningful set of legal instruments. I identify three core steps for doing so as the Rights of Nature develop: establishing trusteeship; institutionalizing sound governance models; and innovating legal routes to institutionalize emerging, continually evolving notions of Rights of Nature.

1.  Trustees

The first and most urgent step is to institutionalize the early gains of legal personhood by establishing appropriate trustees. Who can be a trustee for a river? Federal, state, local, or tribal governments? What about trustee claims by nongovernmental organizations, corporations, trusts, or individuals? Who is best situated to advocate for, establish, protect, and manage the Rights of Nature?

These are urgent questions. Public will has outpaced legal answers. There already exist rivers and lakes in the United States that are legal persons. Now, environmental law theorists owe it to the efforts of hard-working environmental advocates to take the baton of shepherding these rights through the legal system. This means providing solid legal analysis and advice for institutionalizing early gains. Nongovernmental organizations are surely working on them, but they should not work alone.

Lessons from the history of environmental law can shape the answers to these questions. For example, a body of extremely valuable recent work by Jessica Owley, tracing the development of conservation easements, can provide valuable lessons for this emerging tool.

2.  Institutionalizing Governance

The second task is to consider the institutional features of adjudicating trust responsibilities. Environmental law scholars can bring to bear the cumulative lessons of fifty years of environmental history to craft well-reasoned governance mechanisms. As a default, courts are responsible. Judges have deep expertise in the procedural questions of trusts. They are generally less expert, however, on scientific topics—a reason for the substantial deference generally afforded agencies. Perhaps a system of private governance should exist to answer the scientific management question of natural rights (an argument I make specifically with regard to wildlife property trusts elsewhere).

Trustees, unlike agencies, are not responsive to public will and lack democratic legitimacy. As such, I argue, it is vital that a unified system of private governance emerges, composed of a certifying body representing diverse expertise including scientists, animal advocates, sociologists, and persons with traditional ecological knowledge. Here, too, we find an analogy in land trusts: the Land Alliance is a certifying body to which many reputable trusts remain. History from sustainability certifications, however, warn of the danger of look-alike certifications with less stringent objectives. To avoid this, I argue, the certifying body should follow the model of Administrative Conference of the United States—a federal government agency that is composed of public and private members. The imprimatur of the federal government will add legitimacy to the proposal; the private element guards against capture.

3.  Expanding the Rights of Nature

The broader task of environmental law is to integrate its current narrow framing with the Rights of Nature and environmental justice to create a meaningful, evolving, substantive area of law. This means looking beyond the statutory confines of environmental law. It means listening to what members of the public want for the environment and figuring out how to actualize it. It also means, as a field, engaging in robust debate.

Much as lawyers are called “deal killers” in corporate transactions because they spot the potential problems, so too must we bring skepticism to this project, however aligned we might be with its aims. Some ideas that sound good initially may prove ultimately detrimental. What is the worst that could happen? How could it be guarded against? Lessons learned from environmental law should also apply. If we impose on rural and landowner interests without consultation, they might derail even the clearest of laws. If elite legal architects discount the perspectives of underrepresented voices of women and people of color, our environmental law will not reflect our social values.

The difficult balance of brainstorming, experimentation, and debate may change the nature of the field. Environmental law scholars have long been aligned with one another, assessing the risk from the outside, and thus perhaps not pushing and challenging ideas far enough. But two crucial things have changed since the advent of environmental law. Public sentiment is increasing, and our field has matured. Unification in the fight for legitimacy is no longer necessary; in fact, it holds back the potential to create debate within the field that differentiates a field of scholarship from advocacy. We are ready for that leap; the world needs it. Boldly setting forth new ideas is essential. We can preserve the enviable norms of our field for supporting junior scholars, actively welcoming and encouraging women and people of color. But environmental law scholars must also look for vital and undeniable links between our fields and Indigenous law, animal law, health law, and corporate law.

Conclusion

Indigenous communities and nongovernmental organizations are investing heavily in creating Rights of Nature. Environmental law scholars might collectively choose to answer that call by taking the idea seriously and charting the theoretical and doctrinal pathways to breathe life into it. Although it is simpler to continue forward without critical examination of the past, our present environmental crises warn that is not enough. It is time for a radical reimagining of the human relationship with nature, a shift that must take place through law.

 Environmental law scholars need not be the “deal killers” of bold, new ideas. Instead, it is our task to find throughlines in black letter law that create pathways to give legal life to social ideas. This Article strives to do just that—linking popular discourse on the Rights of Nature with its theoretical foundations and well-established statutory systems in the United States. It argues that Rights of Nature have become embedded in seldom-explored cracks and crevices of the law, waiting to be discovered and mined for ideas and new approaches.

This Article links the passion for Rights of Nature to the existing legal framework, providing a novel theoretical analysis and charting doctrinal pathways to institutionalize and actualize Rights of Nature in the United States. Desire and discourse are necessary but not enough. Legal and political institutions translate public will into law. Scholars, lawyers, and law students must act quickly to leverage public will for protecting nature into a powerful, enduring, and meaningful set of legal instruments. I identify three core steps for doing so: establishing trusteeship, institutionalizing sound governance models, and innovating legal routes to institutionalize emerging, continually evolving notions of Rights of Nature. Reframing environmental law like this expands the available remedies in a way that can respond to increased environmental challenges such as climate change, which existing statutes alone cannot address.

It could be the chosen task of a new generation of environmental law scholars to find the Rights of Nature, explore them, and expand them. The public enthusiasm behind Rights of Nature provides precisely such an opportunity. We are not confined to a dozen leading environmental law statutes or to history; our collective scholarly effort should not be limited to merely building upon what is, but also searching out what could be. The Rights of Nature are playing out across hundreds of seldom-explored sources of law in many courtrooms. Identifying them, creating typologies, and assessing outcomes—this is work worthy of the minds available to do it.

Environmental statutes, although vital, may have been a scaffold to build toward a more sophisticated reconciliation of capitalist and environmental values. At this moment in history, we have the combination of the urgent need, public will, and legal pathways to actualize sweeping change. Both the will and tools exist. We have the matches and the kindling—environmental law scholars can collectively choose to build the fire. I hope we do.

 

 

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1439

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* Professor of Law and Mary Sigler Research Fellow, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. Senior Sustainability Scientist, Global Institute for Sustainability, Arizona State
University. Faculty Affiliate, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University Law School. I am thankful for the comments provided by attendees at the University of Southern California Law Review Symposium, Christopher Stone: Assessing the Influence of “Do Trees Have Standing” (2022), the Rights of Nature: Opening the Academic Debate in the European Legal Context, University of Toulouse, IEJIJC, France, and Sustainability Conference of America Legal Educators, Arizona State University (2022). This Article benefitted greatly from comments by, and conversations with, Robin Kundis Craig, Michael
Livermore, Delphine Misonne Julien Betaille, John Knox, Hendrik Schoukens, Guillaume Chapron, and Jan Darpo. I am thankful for the outstanding research assistance of Sarah Brunswick, Caitlin Doak, and Clayton Kinsey

The Rise of Bankruptcy Directors

In this Article, we use hand-collected data to shed light on a troubling development in bankruptcy practice: distressed companies, especially those controlled by private equity sponsors, often now prepare for a Chapter 11 filing by appointing bankruptcy experts to their boards of directors and giving them the board’s power to make key bankruptcy decisions. These directors often seek to wrest control of self-dealing claims against shareholders from creditors. We call these directors “bankruptcy directors” and conduct the first empirical study of their rise as key players in corporate bankruptcies. While these directors claim to be neutral experts that act to maximize value for the benefit of creditors, we argue that they suffer from a structural bias because they often receive their appointment from a small community of repeat private equity sponsors and law firms. Securing future directorships may require pleasing this clientele at the expense of creditors. Indeed, we find that unsecured creditors recover on average 20% less when the company appoints a bankruptcy director. While other explanations are possible, this finding shifts the burden of proof to those claiming that bankruptcy directors improve the governance of distressed companies. Our policy recommendation, however, does not require a resolution of this controversy. Rather, we propose that courts regard bankruptcy directors as independent only if an overwhelming majority of creditors whose claims are at risk supports their appointment, making them accountable to all sides of the bankruptcy dispute.

Introduction

In August 2017, the board of directors of shoe retailer Nine West confronted a problem. The firm would soon file for Chapter 11 protection, and its hopes to emerge quickly from the proceeding were in danger due to the high probability of creditor litigation alleging that the firm’s controlling shareholder, private equity fund Sycamore Partners Management, had looted more than $1 billion from the firm’s creditors.[1] The board could not investigate or settle this litigation because it had a conflict of interest.[2]

To take control of the litigation, the board appointed two bankruptcy experts as new directors who claimed that, because they had no prior ties to Sycamore or Nine West, they were independent and could handle those claims.[3] Once the firm filed for bankruptcy, its creditors objected. They argued that the new directors still favored Sycamore because it stood behind their appointment, so the directors would “hamstring any serious inquiry into [its] misconduct.”[4] Nevertheless, the gambit was successful. The bankruptcy court allowed the new directors to take control of the litigation.[5] The new directors blocked creditor attempts to file lawsuits on their own[6] and ultimately settled the claims for about $100 million.[7]

The Nine West story illustrates the emergence of important new players in corporate bankruptcies: bankruptcy experts who join boards of directors shortly before or after the filing of the bankruptcy petition and claim to be independent[8] The new directors—typically former bankruptcy lawyers, investment bankers, or distressed debt traders—often receive the board’s power to make important Chapter 11 decisions or become loud voices in the boardroom shaping the company’s bankruptcy strategy.[9] We call them “bankruptcy directors.”

The rising prominence of bankruptcy directors has made them controversial. Proponents tout their experience and ability to expedite the reorganization and thus protect the firm’s viability and its employees’ jobs.[10] Opponents argue that they suffer from conflicts of interest that harm creditors.[11]

This Article is the first empirical study of these directors. While a voluminous literature has considered the governance of Chapter 11 firms, this Article breaks new ground in shining a light on an important change in the way these firms make decisions in bankruptcy and resolve conflicts with creditors.[12] It does so by analyzing a hand-collected sample of all large firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 2004 and 2019 that disclosed the identity of their directors to the bankruptcy court.[13] To our knowledge, it is the largest sample of boards of directors of Chapter 11 firms yet studied.[14]

We find that the percentage of firms in Chapter 11 proceedings claiming to have an independent director increased from 3.7% in 2004 to 48.3% in 2019.[15] Over 60% of the firms that appointed bankruptcy directors had a controlling shareholder and about half were under the control of private equity funds.

After controlling for firm and bankruptcy characteristics, we find that the recovery rate for unsecured creditors, whose claims are typically most at risk in bankruptcy, is on average 20% lower in the presence of bankruptcy directors. We cannot rule out the possibility that the firms appointing bankruptcy directors are more insolvent and that this explains their negative association with creditor recoveries. Still, this finding at least shifts the burden of proof to those claiming that bankruptcy directors improve the governance of distressed companies to present evidence supporting their view in this emerging debate.

We also examine a mechanism through which bankruptcy directors may reduce creditor recoveries. In about half of the cases, these directors investigate claims against insiders,[16] negotiate a quick settlement, and argue that the court should approve it to save the company and the jobs of its employees.[17] We supplement these statistics with two in-depth studies of cases in which bankruptcy directors defused creditor claims against controlling shareholders: Neiman Marcus and Payless Holdings.

Finally, we consider possible sources of pro-shareholder bias among bankruptcy directors. Shareholders usually appoint bankruptcy directors without consulting creditors. These directors may therefore prefer to facilitate a graceful exit for the shareholders. Moreover, bankruptcy directorships are short-term positions, and the world of corporate bankruptcy is small, with private equity sponsors and a handful of law firms generating most of the demand. Bankruptcy directors depend on this clientele for future engagements and may exhibit what we call “auditioning bias.”

In our data, we observe several individuals appointed to these directorships repeatedly. These “super-repeaters” had a median of 13 directorships and about 44% of them were in companies that went into bankruptcy when they served on the board or up to a year before their appointment.[18] Our data also show that super-repeaters have strong ties to two leading bankruptcy law firms.[19] Putting these pieces together, our data reveal an ecosystem of a small number of individuals who specialize in sitting on the boards of companies that are going into or emerging from bankruptcy, often with private equity controllers and the same law firms.

These findings support the claim that bankruptcy directors are a new weapon in the private equity playbook. In effect, bankruptcy directors assist with shielding self-dealing transactions from judicial intervention. Private equity sponsors know that if the portfolio firm fails, they could appoint bankruptcy directors to handle creditor claims, file for bankruptcy, and force the creditors to accept a cheap settlement.[20] Importantly, the ease of handling self-dealing claims in the bankruptcy court may fuel more aggressive self-dealing in the future.[21]

Our findings have important policy implications. Bankruptcy law strives to protect businesses while also protecting creditors. These goals can clash when creditors bring suits that threaten to delay the emergence from bankruptcy. While bankruptcy directors may aim for speedy resolution of these suits, their independence may be questionable because the defendants in these suits are often the ones who appoint them. Moreover, bankruptcy directors often bypass the checks and balances that Congress built into Chapter 11 when they seek to replace the role of the official committee of unsecured creditors (“UCC”) as the primary check on management’s use of the powers of a Chapter 11 debtor.

We argue that the contribution of bankruptcy directors to streamlining bankruptcies should not come at the expense of creditors. We therefore propose a new procedure that bankruptcy judges can implement without new legislation: the bankruptcy court should treat as independent only bankruptcy directors who, in an early court hearing, earn overwhelming support of the creditors whose claims are at risk, such as unsecured creditors or secured creditors whom the debtor may not be able to pay in full. Bankruptcy directors without such support should not be treated as independent and therefore should not prevent creditors from investigating and pursuing claims.

The creditors will likely need information on the bankruptcy directors to form their opinion, and bankruptcy judges can rule on what information requests are reasonable. This will create standardization and predictability. However, disclosure is no substitute for creditor support. Requiring disclosure without heeding creditors on the selection of bankruptcy directors will not cure bankruptcy directors’ structural biases.

Some might argue that our solution is impractical or otherwise lacking. We answer these claims. More importantly, our solution is the only way to ensure that bankruptcy directors are truly independent. If it cannot be made to work, bankruptcy law should revert to the way it was before the invention of bankruptcy directors, where federal bankruptcy judges were the only impartial actors in most large Chapter 11 cases. In such a scenario, debtors will be free to hire whomever they want to help them navigate financial distress, but the court will regard these bankruptcy directors as ordinary professionals retained by the debtor. The court should weigh the bankruptcy directors’ position against the creditors’, allow the creditors to conduct their own investigation and sue over the bankruptcy directors’ objections, and not approve settlements merely because the bankruptcy directors endorse them.

Our study also lends support to the bill recently introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren to prevent debtors from prosecuting and settling claims against insiders.[22] Like our proposal, this bill would restore the traditional checks and balances of the bankruptcy process while allowing distressed firms to appoint directors of their choice. Still, our proposal has several advantages. It does not require new legislation, it preserves greater flexibility for the bankruptcy court and, by requiring that bankruptcy directors be acceptable to creditors, it ensures that all board decisions in bankruptcy, not just decisions regarding claims against insiders, advance creditor interests.

Our analysis also has implications for corporate law. Much of the literature on director independence in corporate law has focused on director ties to the corporation, to management, or to the controlling shareholder.[23] We explore another powerful source of dependence: dependence on future engagements by other corporations and the lawyers advising them. 

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the theoretical background to our discussion, showing how the use of independent directors has migrated from corporate law into bankruptcy law. Part II presents examples of bankruptcy director engagements from the high-profile bankruptcies of Neiman Marcus and Payless Holdings. Part III demonstrates empirically how large firms use bankruptcy directors in Chapter 11. Part IV discusses concerns that bankruptcy directors create for the integrity of the bankruptcy system and puts forward policy recommendations.

          [1].      See Notice of Motion of the 2034 Notes Trustee for Entry of an Order Granting Leave, Standing, and Authority to Commence and Prosecute a Certain Claim on Behalf of the NWHI Estate at 15, In re Nine West Holdings, Inc., No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Notice of Motion of the 2034 Notes Trustee]; Kenneth Ayotte & Christina Scully, J. Crew, Nine West, and the Complexities of Financial Distress, 131 Yale L.J.F. 363, 373 (2021) (describing some of the transfers in detail). For example, the private equity sponsor had allegedly purchased the assets of Kurt Geiger for $136 million in April 2014 and sold them in December 2015 for $371 million. See Notice of Motion of the 2034 Notes Trustee, supra, at 34.

          [2].      See Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Granting Leave, Standing, and Authority to Commence and Prosecute Certain Claims on Behalf of the NWHI Estate and Exclusive Settlement Authority in Respect of Such Claims at 17, In re Nine West Holdings, Inc., No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Nine West Standing Motion].

          [3].      See Transcript of Hearing at 43, In re Nine West Holdings, Inc., No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2018).

          [4].      See Nine West Standing Motion, supra note 2, at 34 (“[The lawyers for the independent directors] attended . . . depositions . . . but asked just a handful of questions of a single witness . . . . [And they] chose not to demand and review the Debtors’ privileged documents relating to the LBO . . . .”).

          [5].      See Nine West Standing Motion, supra note 2, at 13 (“The Debtors have barred the Committee from participating in its settlement negotiations with Sycamore . . . .”).

          [6].      Shortly after the unsecured creditors proposed to put the claims against the private equity sponsor into a trust for prosecution after bankruptcy, the independent directors unveiled their own settlement plan. See Notice of Filing of the Debtors’ Disclosure Statement for the Debtors’ First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 1–3, In re Nine West Holdings, Inc., No. 18-10947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Nine West Disclosure Statement Announcing Settlement].

          [7].      See Nine West Standing Motion, supra note 2, at 11 (seeking permission to prosecute claims for “well over $1 billion”); Soma Biswas, Nine West Settles Potential Lawsuits Against Sycamore Partners, Wall St. J. (Oct. 18, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nine-west-settles-
potential-lawsuits-against-sycamore-partners-1539886331 [https://perma.cc/RLH4-M9EU] (“Nine West Holdings Inc. unveiled Wednesday an amended restructuring plan that settles potential lawsuits against private-equity owner Sycamore Partners LP for $105 million in cash, far less than the amount the unsecured creditors committee is seeking.”).

          [8].      See, e.g., Notice of Appearance—Lisa Donahue, AlixPartners, Petition (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.petition11.com/news/2020/2/19/notice-of-appearance-lisa-donahue-alixpartners [https://
perma.cc/NA6H-69AT] (noting that “[independent directors in bankruptcy have] . . . become the latest cottage industry in the restructuring space”).

          [9].      See Regina Stango Kelbon, Michael DeBaecke & Jonathan K. Cooper, Appointment of Independent Directors on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Why The Growing Trend? 17 (2014) (“Employing an outside director to exercise independent judgment as to corporate transactions in bankruptcy may not only provide additional guidance to a suffering business, but can make the decision-making process seem right in the eyes of stakeholders and ultimately, the court.”).

        [10].      See Robert Gayda & Catherine LoTempio, Independent Director Investigations Can Benefit Creditors, Law360 (July 24, 2019, 3:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1174248/independent-director-investigations-can-benefit-creditors [https://web.archive.org/web/20220401015757/https://
http://www.law360.com/articles/1174248/independent-director-investigations-can-benefit-creditors%5D (noting that independent directors are helpful in bankruptcy where “speed to exit is paramount”).

        [11].      See, e.g., “Independent” Directors Under Attack, Petition (May 16, 2018), https://petition.substack.com/p/independent-directors-under-attack [https://perma.cc/G9RY-U9D4]; Lisa Abramowicz, Private Equity Examines Its Distressed Navel, Bloomberg (May 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-26/payless-shoesource-private-equity-examines-its-distressed-navel [https://perma.cc/NC4H-DK9M]; Mark Vandevelde & Sujeet Indap, Neiman Marcus Director Lambasted by Bankruptcy Judge, Fin. Times (June 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/
0166cb87-ea50-40ce-9ea3-b829de95f676 [https://perma.cc/5VY4-VQA8]; American Bankruptcy Institute, RDW 12 21 2018, Youtube (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Ah8RkXYdraI&ab_channel=AmericanBankruptcyInstitute [https://perma.cc/KG37-TJUC]; The “Weil Bankruptcy Blog Index, Petition (Jan. 10, 2021), https://petition.substack.com/p/weilbankruptcy
blogindex [https://perma.cc/L356-TFPY] (calling the Nine West case a “standard episode of ‘independent director’ nonsense”).

        [12].      See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 Yale L.J. 648, 651 (2010) (considering creditor conflict); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 784 (2002); David A. Skeel Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 919 (2003) (considering the role of secured creditors); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 Vand L. Rev. 749, 754–56 (2011) (considering the role of unsecured creditors). For other articles that, like this Article, criticize recent changes in Chapter 11 practice, see generally Adam J. Levitin, Purdue’s Poison Pill: The Breakdown of Chapter 11’s Checks and Balances, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 1079 (2022); Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11’s Descent into Lawlessness, 96 Am. Bankr. L.J. 247 (2022).

        [13].      Our full dataset consists of the boards of directors of 528 firms and the 2,895 individuals who collectively hold 3,038 directorships at these firms. While all Chapter 11 firms are required to provide information on their board to the bankruptcy court, not all comply with the law. For more on our sample, see infra Part III.

        [14].      See infra note 152 and accompanying text.

        [15].      We identified bankruptcy directors using information from each firm’s disclosure statement. We then searched those disclosure statements and identified 78 cases in which the debtor represented that its board was “independent” or “disinterested.” See infra Section III.C.1. Independent directors are not new to bankruptcy. WorldCom, for example, used independent directors as part of its strategy to get through the bankruptcy process in its 2003 Chapter 11 filing. See Kelbon, supra note 9, at 20. The change is that a practice that was once relatively uncommon has become ubiquitous and a central and standard part of the process of preparing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, leading to the growth of an industry of professional bankruptcy directors who fill this new demand for bankruptcy experts on the board of distressed firms. See infra Section III.C.1

        [16].      See infra Table 2.

        [17].      In many cases, a debtor-in-possession contract that requires the firm to leave bankruptcy quickly heightens the debtor’s urgency. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis, 37 Yale J. on Regul. 651, 672 (2020).

        [18].      See infra Section III.C.4.

        [19].      See infra Section III.C.5.

        [20].      See Telephonic/Video Disclosure Statement and KEIP Motion Hearing at 34, In re Neiman Marcus Grp. Ltd. LLC, No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 30, 2020) [hereinafter Neiman Marcus Settlement Transcript] (arguing that independent directors are changing incentives for private equity sponsors, who will be “encouraged to asset strip”).

        [21].      As Sujeet Indap and Max Frumes write, a leading bankruptcy law firm that advises debtors “developed a reputation for keeping a stable of ‘independent’ board of director candidates who could parachute in to bless controversial deal making.” Sujeet Indap & Max Frumes, The Caesars Palace Coup: How a Billionaire Brawl Over the Famous Casino Exposed the Power and Greed of Wall Street 419 (2021).

        [22].      See Alexander Saeedy, Elizabeth Warren Floats Expanded Powers for Bankruptcy Creditors Against Private Equity, Wall St. J. (Oct. 20, 2021, 1:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-floats-expanded-powers-for-bankruptcy-creditors-against-private-equity-11634750237 [https://
perma.cc/P3XE-U24Y].

        [23].      See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1271 (2017); Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. Corp. L. 515 (2019).

* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

† Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law.

‡ Associate Professor, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law; Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. We thank Kenneth Ayotte, Lucian Bebchuk, Vincent Buccola, Anthony Casey, Alma Cohen, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jesse Fried, Lynn LoPucki, Tobias Keller, Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge, Adam Levitin, Robert Rasmussen, Adriana Robertson, Mark Roe, Daniel Sokol, Robert Stark, Roberto Tallarita, Robert Tennenbaum, and seminar and conference audiences at the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, Bay Area Corporate Law Scholars Workshop, the Bar Ilan University Law Faculty Seminar, the Corporate Law Academic Webinar Series (CLAWS), the Duke Faculty Workshop, Florida–Michigan–Virginia Virtual Law and Economics Seminar, the Harvard Law School Empirical Law and Economics Seminar, the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop, Harvard Law School Law and Economics Workshop, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law Workshop, the Turnaround Management Association, the University of Toronto Seminar in Law and Economics, and the University of California, Berkeley Law, Economics, and Accounting Workshop for helpful comments. We also thank Noy Abramov, Jacob Barrera, Jade Henry Kang, Spencer Kau, Victor Mungary, Julia Staudinger, Or Sternberg, Jonathan Tzuriel, and Sara Zoakei for excellent research assistance. This research was supported by The Israel Science Foundation (Grant No. 2138/19).

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The Rise of Bankruptcy Directors

In this Article, we use hand-collected data to shed light on a troubling development in bankruptcy practice: distressed companies, especially those controlled by private equity sponsors, often now prepare for a Chapter 11 filing by appointing bankruptcy experts to their boards of directors and giving them the board’s power to make key bankruptcy decisions. These

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Cannon Fodder, or a Soldier’s Right to Life

In recent years, hundreds of American service members have died in training exercises and routine non-combat operations, aboard American warships, tactical vehicles, and fighter planes. They have died in incidents that military investigations and congressional hearings and journalists deem preventable, incidents stemming from the U.S. government delaying maintenance of deteriorating equipment or staffing vessels with crews that are too small or sending soldiers and sailors and marines on missions with inadequate training. After someone dies, high-level officials sign off on investigations, declare that those lost will not be forgotten, and occasionally institute changes in training or maintenance. Meanwhile, the law and legal scholarship say nothing about the government’s failures to train and equip service members, reflecting and reinforcing the notion that soldiers offer illimitable service to the state but cannot ask for even the most basic legal protections in return.

These deaths, and the government failures that precede them, have been absent from legal scholarship, but this Article surfaces them and centers them. While U.S. law offers no way to reckon with the lapses in leadership at the heart of such incidents, international human rights law has provided an architecture for understanding government accountability for failures to adequately train or equip service members. And yet, these events continue to go unnoticed.

This Article documents the human rights community’s neglect of these events and of the opportunity to give legal significance to the U.S. government’s failure to protect its own service members, and it situates this neglect in the broader, long-standing conception of soldiers as mere instruments of the state. The corpus of human rights law thus provides a set of categories and doctrines to name and classify the government’s conduct, and it also offers, through its recognition of the legitimacy of a soldier’s claims upon their government, a necessary corrective to a culture of treating American service members as volunteering for unquestioning sacrifice.

Introduction

The term “cannon fodder” is conventionally traced to Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1. The play depicts a process of reconciliation between father and son; King Henry IV must quell a rebellion, and Prince Hal transforms from wayward youth into a valiant fighter. Along the way, Prince Hal’s friend Falstaff, technically a nobleman but penniless and disreputable, contributes to the war effort by taking bribes from “good householders, yeoman’s sons” who can pay to avoid going to war, while gathering up instead a motley crew of men “as ragged as Lazarus” to send to battle.[1] When Hal encounters this band of would-be warriors, he derides them as “pitiful rascals,” but Falstaff—a comic figure who betrays both his heartlessness and his willingness to name the exploitation in which he himself participates—protests that they are fit to serve their purpose: “Tut, tut; good enough to toss; food for powder, food for powder; they’ll fill a pit as well as better.”[2]

Much has changed since the days of Shakespeare. The singsong “food for powder” mutated, first emerging in German as kanonenfutter, before jumping back to English in the current form we now know.[3] War, too, has transformed. Today, war is no longer recognized as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy.[4] Today, a robust body of law governs both the resort to armed force and the conduct of hostilities.[5] Today, the term “cannon fodder” is no longer played for laughs.[6]

And yet, the status of military service members remains murky. We might shift uncomfortably in our seats when Falstaff jokes about the disposable nature of these warriors, but what does it mean to respect the lives of soldiers?[7] In the United States, the answer to this question usually relates to how we treat service members when they return home. We offer them thanks for their service, proper medical care and mental health support, access to education and jobs.[8] On the floor of the House of Representatives, during a debate on a military appropriations bill, Representative Bob Filner embraced these practices as an American tradition, one with roots all the way back to the founding: “General Washington said over 220 years ago,” declared Filner, “The single most important factor in the morale of our fighting troops is a sense of how they’re going to be treated when they come home.”[9]

We say less, however, about what happens to service members while they are serving. When they are fighting wars, yes, we “support the troops”—that much is a “fixed point[] of American politics.”[10] But there is little public discourse, and hardly any legal scholarship, on the U.S. government’s obligations to adequately protect soldiers—despite an urgent need for it. War is of course a dangerous business, one that—in what might be described at the same time as a deal with the devil and a simple reflection of state interests—international law has continued to allow, even with the advent of the corpus of human rights law.[11] But service members are dying and suffering severe injuries not only at the hands of the enemy on the battlefield, but also in incidents deemed “unacceptable” and “preventable” even by military leaders. In the early days of the Iraq War, for example, a secret study by the U.S. Department of Defense found that some eighty percent of marines who died from upper-body wounds could have survived if they had extra body armor—armor that was available but that the Pentagon decided not to provide.[12] These failures of prevention and protection are not limited to combat. In the last fifteen years, hundreds of American service members have died during training exercises and routine non-combat operations, aboard American warships and tactical vehicles and fighter planes.[13] They are given deteriorating equipment or crews that are too small or inadequate training. After someone dies, high-level officials sign off on investigations, declare that those lost will not be forgotten, and occasionally institute changes in training or maintenance.[14]

Meanwhile, the law nearly completely ignores these events. When congressional hearings are convened in the aftermath of these events, their focus is on military readiness, overshadowing questions of the legal obligations of the government or the legal rights of service members.[15] Legal scholarship, despite robust engagement on crucial questions of human rights in wartime,[16] generally focuses on protections for civilians and enemy soldiers, neglecting discussion of what a government owes its service members in proper training, well-maintained equipment, or sufficiently staffed crews.[17] In the pages of U.S. law reviews, the main focus of any analysis of government accountability to service members is the Feres doctrine, which prevents civil suits against the government for injuries sustained incident to military service.[18] But entirely overlooked are the deaths and injuries that stem from inadequate training and shoddy equipment, from putting lives at risk in order to speed operational tempo or rush into deployment. Their absence from the literature suggests that they are seen as routine, part of the job, part of the unquestioning sacrifice for which these individuals have willingly volunteered. Soldiers are expected to give of themselves completely; because they accept the possibility of death on the battlefield on account of their military service, it seems, they must accept the possibility of death outside of it, too. Even if no longer cannon fodder, in the national socio-legal imaginary[19] they have been endowed with a different kind of inhumanity, as individuals whose service is seemingly illimitable, who give their lives but are permitted to ask almost nothing from the governments they serve.[20]

Across the Atlantic, international human rights law paints a starkly different picture. In 2013, the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in Smith v. Ministry of Defence that the British government has an affirmative obligation under human rights law to protect the lives of service members.[21] The suit was initiated by the families of three British soldiers who had been killed in Iraq by roadside bombs when they were traveling in Snatch Land Rovers, vehicles that the government had initially developed in the 1990s to grab suspects off the street in Northern Ireland.  As dozens more soldiers died in those vehicles, the Snatch Rovers came to be known in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as “mobile coffins”—a far cry from the level of protection that was needed, said the soldiers, their families, and, as would be later revealed, the government itself.[22] The Court held not only that the government’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights extends to military service members deployed overseas, but also that the government’s decision to use vehicles that would not adequately protect those individuals could be a violation of its Convention obligations.[23] In the vision of human rights law, the soldier is not expected to sacrifice everything for the state. Instead, the government is expected to fulfill a duty toward the soldier, just as it is expected to protect any other person under its care.

This Article takes as its starting point the juxtaposition of these two vastly contrasting approaches—on the one hand, the expectation of complete sacrifice by a soldier, and on the other, the expectation that the government owes a duty of care to the soldier even while the soldier takes on the significant risks inevitably imposed by the position. From this foundation, it makes two contributions. First, the Article documents the absence of engagement by scholars and practitioners of human rights with the question of U.S. government failures to adequately train and equip military service members. Even though human rights instruments applicable to the United States—including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man—could provide the basis for interpretations similar to Smith in the European system, scholars and advocates have entirely neglected any exploration of whether or how the many failures of the U.S. government leading to service member injuries and deaths may constitute violations of its human rights obligations.[24] This Article fills that gap. Second, the Article situates this neglect within the law’s broader failure to recognize the soldier as an individual endowed with human rights, and it analyzes the consequences of conceiving of soldiers as rights-bearers. Debating the government’s obligation to train and equip service members through the language and legal framework of rights emphasizes that soldiers are agents, not mere instruments of the state who can be disposed of however the government chooses. In so doing, recognition of the soldier’s human rights can chip away at the expectations of unquestioning sacrifice that pervade social and legal treatment of service members.

This Article intervenes in a burgeoning literature on the applicability of international human rights in armed conflict and specifically on the meaning of the right to life in armed conflict. As bodies such as the International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Committee have articulated the scope and application of particular human rights in armed conflict,[25] some scholars have considered how and whether obligations of the law of war, such as the principle of distinction and the requirement of proportionality in attack, should be interpreted to incorporate the human rights protection against arbitrary deprivation of life.[26] Others, meanwhile, have argued that the criminalization of aggression should be understood as rooted in the protection of the right to life in armed conflict.[27] Overlooked in this literature, however, have been the deaths of service members described by journalists and members of Congress and official government investigations as “preventable”[28]: deaths that are traced to failures to properly maintain ships and aircraft and land vehicles and their treads and navigation systems and propellor blades; deaths that stem from failures to adequately train service members to use the equipment they are responsible for;[29] deaths that—like those of Phillip Hewett and Lance Ellis, the British soldiers whose deaths gave rise to Smith—can be traced to decisions on the part of the state to underequip soldiers for combat.[30]

It is these deaths that the Smith case and its underlying principles speak to but that human rights law and scholarship have not yet adequately considered. And it is these deaths to which this Article turns its attention, not only explaining the relevance of human rights law in identifying the U.S. government’s responsibility for training and equipping its service members, but also offering a normative argument for why rendering these deaths a matter of human rights law should form a part of the larger human rights project of subjecting war to its regulation.[31] In short, this Article hopes to do these soldiers justice.

This Article proceeds in three parts. To situate the arguments of this Article in recent events, Part I presents an account of two collisions of Navy destroyers that caused the deaths of seventeen sailors in 2017. The goal of this Part is primarily descriptive, as these are events that have clear parallels with the facts underlying Smith and that have clear legal implications, and despite that, they have received no dedicated attention in legal scholarship.[32] These collisions, replete with high-level leaders’ preventable errors and even negligence, offer representative examples that ground Part II, which explains the legal characterizations that are available to describe these deaths under the frameworks available both in U.S. law and in international human rights law. Part III documents how and analyzes why situations like these collisions remain overlooked. It first explains how the human rights approach discussed in Part II could be used to seek accountability for the U.S. government’s failures with respect to incidents like the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions, and so many more. It then turns to detailing and explaining the absence of any such efforts in human rights law and to analyzing the significance of a human rights framing of situations like the Navy collisions. Bringing human rights law to bear on the U.S. government’s failures to adequately equip and train its troops not only makes clear that war is no longer off-limits to human rights as a general matter, but it also declares with the authority of law that soldiers are not to be sacrificed unquestioningly to the cause of war. By bringing service members’ lives more squarely into its realm, human rights law rejects the notion that soldiers are mere cannon fodder to be disposed of however the state pleases.

          [1].      William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 1 act 4, sc. 2, ll. 2382, 2392.

          [2].      Id. ll. 2433–35.

          [3].      Charles Edelman, Shakespeare’s Military Language: A Dictionary 132–33 (2000).

          [4].      See U.N. Charter art. 2 (prohibiting non-defensive use or threat of armed force by states); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The power and Purpose of International Law: Insights from the Theory & Practice of Enforcement 180 (2008); see also Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1275, 1317–21 (2010) (discussing the nature of military force as a community instrument under the U.N. Charter system). See generally Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (2017).

          [5].      E.g., Jakob Kellenberger, Foreword to Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules xv, xv–xvii (2009).

          [6].      See David Ellis, Falstaff and the Problems of Comedy, 34 Cambridge Q. 95, 99–100 (2005).

          [7].      This Article uses “soldier” in the colloquial sense, that is, to describe a person who serves in the military. The term thus includes not only those in a state’s army, but also services such as the air force or navy. See Soldier, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2012).

          [8].      E.g., Phillip Carter, What America Owes Its Veterans: A Better System of Care and Support, Foreign Affs., Sept./Oct. 2017, at 115.

          [9].      154 Cong. Rec. 9238 (2008) (statement of Rep. Bob Filner); see also, e.g., Loretta Sanchez, What We Owe Our Troops, Hill (May 20, 2015, 8:35 PM), https://thehill.com/special-reports/
tommorrows-troops-may-21-2015/242772-what-we-owe-our-troops [https://perma.cc/PY73-FPPV].

        [10].      Cheyney Ryan, Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of Soldiers, 122 Ethics 10, 18–19 (2011).

        [11].      See Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 171, 174–75 (2004); Frédéric Mégret, What Is the Specific Evil of Aggression, in The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary 1398, 1432 (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga eds., 2017); Thomas W. Smith, Can Human Rights Build a Better War?, 9 J. Hum. Rts. 24, 24 (2010).

        [12].      Michael Moss, Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor, N.Y. Times (Jan.
7, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/politics/pentagon-study-links-fatalities-to-body-armor.
html [https://perma.cc/JF67-55P9].

        [13].      See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on Mil. Aviation Safety, Report to the President and the Congress of the United States 1 (2020) [hereinafter NCMAS Report]; Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB/MAR-19/01 PB2019-100970, Marine Accident Report: Collision Between US Navy Destroyer John S McCain and Tanker Alnic MC, Singapore Strait, 5 Miles Northeast of Horsburgh Lighthouse, August 21, 2017, at 21 (2019) [hereinafter NTSB Report].

        [14].      See, e.g., Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 116th Cong. 82 (2019) [hereinafter Indo-Pacific Command Hearing] (statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson) (explaining that he “produced a 170-page report with 58 recommendations” after the two Naval collisions of 2017 and that “the Navy has been moving out on those recommendations to provide the kind of unit personnel training, to provide advice and resources to the type commanders, the fleet commanders, the Naval Systems Command, all with recommendations to improve [the] situation”).

        [15].      See, e.g., Navy Readiness—Underlying Problems Associated with the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Readiness & Subcomm. on Seapower and Projection Forces of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 21 (2017) [hereinafter Joint Subcommittees 2017 Hearing]; Recent United States Navy Incidents at Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 6 (2017) [hereinafter SASC September 2017 Hearing]. During the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Senator John McCain emphasized obligation during his opening remarks, when he noted “our sacred obligation to look after the young people who . . . serve in [our] military.” SASC September 2017 Hearing, supra, at 3.

        [16].      See, e.g., International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (collecting essays on interaction between international humanitarian law and human rights law); Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2016) (same).

        [17].      See infra notes 205–07 and accompanying text (discussing limited scholarship on these questions); Saira Mohamed, Abuse by Authority: The Hidden Harm of Illegal Orders, 107 Iowa L. Rev. 2183, 2212–17 (2022) (discussing international law obligations of a state toward its own soldiers).

        [18].      See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); infra Section II.A (discussing the Feres doctrine).

        [19].      See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries 23–26 (2003) (explaining the idea of the “social imaginary,” on which the concepts of the legal imaginary and sociolegal imaginary draw, as “the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”); see also Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society 145 (Kathleen Blamey trans., 1987) (describing the social imaginary as that “which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, . . . the source of that which presents itself in every instance as an indisputable and undisputed meaning, the basis for articulating what does matter and what does not”).

        [20].      See infra Section III.A.2.

        [21].      See Smith v. Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41.

        [22].      James Sturcke, SAS Commander Quits in Snatch Land Rover Row, Guardian (Nov. 1, 2008, 5:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/nov/01/sas-commander-quits-afghanistan [https://
perma.cc/5926-2JJ8]; Comm. of Privy Couns., 11 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 23–24 (2016) [hereinafter Chilcot Report].

        [23].      See infra Section II.B.

        [24].      See infra Section III.A.

        [25].      See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19); Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶¶ 64, 69–70, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment 36].

        [26].      See, e.g., Michael Newton & Larry May, Proportionality in International Law 121–54 (2014); Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: Reconciling Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, in Counterinsurgency law: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare 24, 34 (William Banks ed., 2013).

        [27].      See Tom Dannenbaum, The Crime of Aggression, Humanity, and the Soldier 13 (2018); Mégret, supra note 11, at 1428, 1440–44; see also Eliav Lieblich, The Humanization of Jus ad Bellum: Prospects and Perils, 32 Eur. J. Int’l L. 579, 581 (2021).

        [28].      E.g., Update on Navy and Marine Corps Readiness in the Pacific in the Aftermath of Recent Mishaps, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Seapower and Projection Forces & the Subcomm. on Readiness of the H. Comm. on Armed Serv., 116th Cong. 2 (2020) (statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Seapower and Projection Forces) (describing “loss of life associated with Navy surface forces and Marine Corps aviation forces” as “preventable”); id. at 4 (statement of Hon. John Garamendi, Chair, Subcomm. on Readiness) (describing sailors and marines’ deaths in surface ship and aviation incidents as “preventable”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-361, Military Vehicles: Army and Marine Corps Should Take Additional Actions to Mitigate and Prevent Training Accidents 26 (2021); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Report on the Collision Between USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel ACX Crystal and Report on the Collision Between USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and Motor Vessel ALNIC MC 20, 59 (2017), https://s3.document
cloud.org/documents/4165320/USS-Fitzgerald-and-USS-John-S-McCain-Collision.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5D5U-L52T] [hereinafter Navy Reports on Fitzgerald and McCain] (describing collisions as “avoidable”); Alex Horton & Gina Harkins, Military’s Effort to Reduce Deadly Vehicle Accidents Deemed Inadequate, Wash. Post (July 14, 2021, 4:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/2021/07/14/military-rollover-deaths-gao-report [https://perma.cc/NWT9-9DWG] (discussing findings of a Government Accountability Office report on noncombat tactical vehicle accidents that the “military didn’t take sufficient action to reduce . . . grievous, preventable incidents” causing the deaths of more than 120 service members in a decade).

        [29].      See infra Part I.

        [30].      See 11 Chilcot Report, supra note 22, at 23–24.

        [31].      This Article focuses on the U.S. military, but these concerns are not unique to the United States. The Smith case of course deals with the United Kingdom’s involvement in Iraq, but the same concerns have been raised with respect to its military actions in Afghanistan, and the Italian government, too, has been accused of not adequately equipping its soldiers. Cecilia Åse, Monica Quirico & Maria Wendt, Gendered Grief: Mourners Politicisation of Military Death, in Gendering Military Sacrifice: A Feminist Comparative Analysis 145, 155 (Cecilia Åse & Maria Wendt eds., 2019). Similar questions could be raised regarding the lack of proper training and equipment of Israeli soldiers in the 2006 Lebanon War. See Press Release, PM Received the Final Winograd Report (Jan. 30, 2008), https://www.
gov.il/en/Departments/news/spokewinog300108 [https://perma.cc/S443-6R8C]; see also Anthony H. Cordesman with George Sullivan & William D. Sullivan, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud., Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War 57–59, 92, 95–98 (2007).

        [32].      As of July 2021, these events appear in a total of five articles in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Periodicals database, and in those five, their mention is limited to a few lines at most and is ancillary to arguments unrelated to government obligations to protect soldiers. See Michael C.M. Louis, Dixie Mission II: The Legality of a Proposed U.S. Military Observer Group to Taiwan, 22 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 75, 112 (2021) (using the crashes as examples of the customary international law principle that “any foreign vessel in distress has a right of entry to any port”); Tod Duncan, Air & Liquid Systems Corporation v. DeVries: Barely Afloat, 97 Denv. L. Rev. 621, 638 (2020) (noting a brief, in discussion of the doctrine of “special solicitude” afforded to sailors, that mentions the collisions as evidence for the assertion that “today’s maritime work is precarious”); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Designing a Pattern, Darkly, 22 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 57, 79 (2020) (using the McCain’s touch-screen failures as “example[s] of the complexity and stakes of design decisions”); Arctic L. & Pol’y Inst., Arctic Law & Policy Year in Review: 2017, 8 Wash. J. Env’t. L. & Pol’y 106, 220 (2018) (listing collisions in section on marine casualties and noting that they and other collisions “provide new insight into the risks posed by vessel traffic in the Arctic”); Erich D. Grome, Spectres of the Sea: The United States Navy’s Autonomous Ghost Fleet, Its Capabilities and Impacts, and the Legal Ethical Issues That Surround, 49 J. Mar. L. & Com. 31, 43–44 (2018) (mentioning the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions to support an argument in favor of a “ghost fleet” that could avoid dangers posed to ships in the South China Sea region).

* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. For helpful comments and conversations, I am grateful to Nels Bangerter, Lori Damrosch, Laurel Fletcher, Monica Hakimi, Julian Jonker, Eliav Lieblich, Christina Parajon Skinner, David Zaring, and participants in the Columbia Law School International Criminal Law Colloquium and the Wharton Legal Studies and Business Ethics Faculty Seminar. I thank the editors of the Southern California Law Review for their contributions. Toni Mendicino, Jennifer Chung, Anthony Ghaly, Dara Gray, Diana Lee, and Jenni Martines provided invaluable research assistance.

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Colorblind Constitutional Torts

Much of the recent conversation regarding law and police accountability has focused on eliminating or limiting qualified immunity as a defense for officers facing § 1983 lawsuits for using excessive force. Developed during Reconstruction as a way to protect formerly enslaved persons from new forms of racial terror, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows private individuals to bring suit against police officers when their use of force goes beyond what the Constitution permits. Qualified immunity provides a way for law enforcement to evade civil suits if officers can show that they did not infringe any constitutional right or they did not violate a clearly established law—concepts that are highly deferential to police. Implicit in the contemporary emphasis on reforming qualified immunity is the idea that but for this concept, § 1983 litigation could effectively fulfill its longstanding goal of holding police officers accountable through civil liability when they beat, maim, or kill without legal justification.

Qualified immunity certainly raises important issues, and reform in this area of law is needed. But deeper problems plague § 1983 claims. In this Article, we examine a key structural deficiency tied to legal doctrine that has largely escaped critique: how the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Graham v. Connor radically transformed § 1983 causes of action. Prior to the Graham decision, federal courts used diverse mechanisms, notably Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, to determine “what counts” as an appropriate use of force. The Graham decision changed this area of law by holding that all claims of police excessive force must be judged against a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. This transformation has led to much discussion about what Graham means for understanding which police practices concerning the use of force are constitutionally permissible. However, there has been little conversation about what Graham has specifically meant for federal courts’ conception of civil enforcement mechanisms such as § 1983 that are designed to provide monetary relief when these constitutional rights are violated. 

In this Article, we engage in the first empirical assessment of Graham’s impact on federal courts’ understanding and application of this statute. We find that the Graham decision was not only constitutionally transformative in terms of how federal courts understand the legal standard for “what counts” as excessive force, but also correlates with changes in how federal courts think about the overall scope, purpose, and nature of § 1983. Our data analysis of two hundred federal court decisions shows that the Graham decision effectively divorced § 1983 from its anti-subordinative race conscious history and intent, recasting it in individualist terms. This has led to a regime of what we call colorblind constitutional torts in that the Graham decision doctrinally filtered § 1983 use of force claims down a structural path of minimal police accountability by diminishing the central roles of race and racism when federal courts review § 1983 cases. These findings and theoretical framing suggest that the contemporary emphasis on qualified immunity in police reform conversations misunderstand and significantly underestimate the doctrinal and structural depth of the police accountability problem. This Article provides a novel and useful explanation for how and why police use of force persists and offers a roadmap for change and greater police accountability.

Introduction

It is not uncommon for diabetics suffering from hypoglycemia (low blood sugar) to have their symptoms of disorientation and loss of consciousness misunderstood as being under the influence of drugs and alcohol, which can lead to mistreatment by the police.[1] This is what happened to Dethorne Graham one fall afternoon in 1984. Graham and his friend were pulled over by a police officer who thought Graham was “behaving suspiciously” when he quickly entered and exited a local convenience store in search of orange juice to offset his medical condition. The officer called for backup and, within a few short minutes, Graham was handcuffed face down on the sidewalk. When his friend tried to explain to the officers that Graham was a diabetic, one officer replied, “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the [motherfucker] but drunk. Lock the [son of a bitch] up.”[2] Another neighborhood friend familiar with Graham’s condition saw the incident and brought orange juice to the scene. Graham begged Officer Matos, saying, “Please give me the orange juice.” She responded: “I’m not giving you shit.”[3] Graham was roughed up by the officers and thrown in the back of a squad car. Eventually, the officers drove him home, threw him on the ground in front of his house, and sped away.

During the altercation, Graham “sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder . . . [along with developing] a loud ringing in his right ear.”[4] Graham brought a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Charlotte, North Carolina, Police Department, alleging that the police violated constitutional rights granted to him under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before this case, plaintiffs sought remedies for excessive use of force by the police through different legal mechanisms, including substantive due process, equal protection, the Fourth Amendment, and even § 1983 as a stand-alone source for making claims.[5] While the district and circuit courts ruled in favor of the officers, the United States Supreme Court made a surprising decision. The Court held that all claims regarding the constitutionality of police use of force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment through a standard of “objective reasonableness.”[6] Graham v. Connor (“Graham”) marks an important, though often underappreciated, moment of doctrinal transformation. It synthesized previously divergent strands of use-of-force case law and established a new constitutional standard for all cases that involve claims of police using excessive force in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop.[7] Rather than framing police use of force as a matter concerning equal protection or substantive due process, the Graham decision effectively forced all conversations concerning excessive force to federal courts’ Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Over the past three decades, legal scholars and practitioners have debated the impact that Graham has had on limiting issues concerning the constitutionality of police use of force to a vague and nebulous standard of “objective reasonableness” in light of the broad deference that society and the courts give to law enforcement.[8] This deference and tendency to see almost all police actions as “reasonable” explains, at least in part, how even the most egregious police behavior often goes without penalty—a concern that is at the heart of the contemporary social movement against police violence. But, despite this almost exclusive preoccupation with what Graham has meant for constitutional law, there are other meaningful doctrinal concerns that deserve exploration. Put differently, what other aspects of use-of-force inquiries have been impacted by the shift in constitutional standards brought by Graham?

There are at least two main components to § 1983 litigation concerning police use of force: the enforcement action, which is a statutory mechanism, and the constitutional standard that is being enforced (Fourth Amendment reasonableness, per Graham). The existing scholarship only examines the influence of Graham in regard to how it changed federal courts’ understanding of the constitutional standard for “what counts” as excessive force. But what has Graham meant for how federal courts understand the scope, context, and meaning of civil rights—particularly statutory enforcement mechanisms such as § 1983?

In this Article, we engage in the first empirical assessment that examines Graham’s impact on how federal courts understand the nature and purpose of § 1983. This issue concerning Graham’s impact on § 1983 litigation beyond shaping the constitutional standard for excessive force is important for several reasons. The statute emerged during Reconstruction pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment section 5 powers to provide civil remedies such as money damages to claimants when state officials violate constitutional rights while working in their official capacities.[9] Thus, understanding Graham’s impact should not be limited to discursive and doctrinal meditations on reasonableness, which is where the bulk of the discussion on this decision lies. It is also important to explore Graham’s impact on a civil rights statute designed to enforce constitutional rights in terms of how, if at all, the decision affected the way that federal courts read and interpret the history, meaning, and application of § 1983—legislation meant to give claims concerning police excessive force purpose and effect. Clearly, § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism has a close relationship with Fourth Amendment standards on reasonableness in the police use of force context. This Article is an attempt to go beyond existing scholarship on how the Graham decision reshaped the constitutional standard to also understand how it may have impacted the way that federal courts conceptualize the reach and intent of the civil statute meant to enforce these rights.

This research is critically important in light of contemporary social movements and proposed legal reforms responding to growing public awareness of police brutality in marginalized communities. Following the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis and subsequent global protests against anti-Black violence, the conversation on how law can compel greater accountability with regards to police use of force has focused heavily on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a judicially created concept that emerged in the 1960s to allow government officials facing constitutional tort actions to avoid civil suits and the possibility of paying money damages when they can show that they did not violate any constitutional right or that the law they were accused of breaking was not clearly established. Qualified immunity morphed over subsequent decades to largely become a mechanism to shield police officers from enduring § 1983 lawsuits in virtually all but the most egregious instances of force.[10] Federal courts’ deferential posture towards police facing constitutional tort actions has turned qualified immunity into an exculpatory tool for law enforcement who use excessive force. As such, the post-Floyd emphasis on eliminating qualified immunity or restricting its use has become a popular public rallying point. For example, at the federal level, Representatives Justin Amash and Ayanna Pressley introduced the Ending Qualified Immunity Act in the House of Representatives in June 2020,[11] which was followed shortly by a similar bill in the Senate proposed by Senators Edward Markey, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders.[12] Other efforts have been pursued to address the use of qualified immunity in state-level legislation. Since George Floyd’s murder in May 2020, “at least 25 states have taken up the issue and considered some form of qualified immunity reform, including Colorado, New Mexico, Connecticut and Massachusetts, which have passed legislation to end or restrict the defense.”[13] The idea behind these and other efforts at ending qualified immunity is that making police officers open to civil lawsuits for using excessive force will increase accountability and prevent officers from engaging in violence that violates constitutional rights.

Without question, qualified immunity presents unjust and unjustifiable barriers to holding police accountable. But there are deeper structural limitations placed on this type of litigation—namely, Graham’s reframing and reorientation of the entire constitutional tort endeavor. The impact of Graham deserves as much or even greater attention to the extent that the reframing of police use of force through Fourth Amendment logics has dislodged constitutional tort litigation from its foundational purpose: protecting the Black community from state violence. Yet, conversations regarding the Graham decision, its transformative impact on policing, and its role in undermining police accountability are largely absent from legal and public discussions regarding police reform. This Article uses empirical evidence to draw attention to this problem and argues for a different focus in efforts to reduce police violence.

To understand the structural limitations on police accountability beyond qualified immunity that were ushered in by the Graham decision, Part I of this Article begins with providing a brief history of § 1983 and explores the constitutional and statutory evolutions that constitute contemporary use-of-force jurisprudence. Part I also shows that legal scholars have mostly discussed the problem of police accountability for using excessive force in terms of qualified immunity. Part II examines the research literature on Graham and how existing scholarship is largely silent on how this doctrinal evolution came to limit constitutional tort actions. The impact of Graham has been discussed in legal scholarship with very little, if any, attention to what the decision to exclusively assess the constitutionality of police use of force through Fourth Amendment frameworks has meant for federal courts’ posture towards civil remedies offered by statute (§ 1983) and sought by plaintiffs. Part III describes our empirical study examining shifts in how federal courts decided § 1983 cases after Graham. We look at two periods: (a) from Monroe v. Pape in 1961 (which marks the beginning of the modern era of § 1983 litigation) through the Graham decision in 1989 and then (b) just after Graham from 1990 to 2016. Part IV discusses the results from our study. We find that there are important changes in how federal courts understand and approach § 1983 that correlate with the Graham decision. In particular, (1) references to § 1983’s descriptive titles—Ku Klux Klan Act, Enforcement Act, etc.—that reflect the racial history tied to this civil rights statute declined substantially after Graham; (2) consistent with Graham’s holding, judicial recognition of § 1983’s tight doctrinal relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment as a more race-conscious constitutional standard for excessive force claims largely ended, diminishing the potential of § 1983 civil remedies by linking them to Fourth Amendment standards of “reasonableness” that largely defer to the police; and (3) mentions of the race of plaintiffs and officers meaningfully decreased after the Graham decision. In Part V, we draw upon these empirical findings to develop a theory of colorblind constitutional torts that can at least partially explain these results as well as the persistence of police violence despite the availability of legal mechanisms designed to prevent and remedy such abuses. We then briefly conclude with a discussion of how these empirical findings and new theoretical framework can help federal courts reimagine constitutional torts in a manner that can produce greater police accountability.

The findings from our research show how the accountability problem regarding police use of force is not simply connected to individual “bad apples” in law enforcement shielded by misguided common law arguments about qualified immunity. More to the point, there are important doctrinal barriers that emerged after the Graham decision’s imposition of a Fourth Amendment framework that infused constitutional tort actions with colorblind sensibilities that undercut the entire historical project of § 1983. The empirical evidence, doctrinal reframing, and theoretical argument provided by this Article open up important new opportunities for change.

The data provided by this study raise important questions about Graham’s significance beyond matters concerning constitutional law. Graham has also had tremendous implications on how federal courts interpret and understand federal civil right statutes, particularly § 1983. By instilling a discourse of colorblindness into excessive-force litigation, Graham disrupts, if not completely undermines the connection between § 1983 and the distinct history of state-sponsored racial terror giving rise to it. By bringing colorblindness through the backdoor into judicial interpretations of this federal statutory remedy, Graham not only fundamentally contradicts the social, political, and historical forces that give meaning to § 1983, but it also frustrates § 1983’s ability to address contemporary abuses under the color of law, such as excessive force by law enforcement.


          [1].      The American Diabetes Association offers resources on how to engage with police officers. It notes that this is a particular concern for people with this medical condition, as “[l]aw enforcement officers [can fail] to identify hypoglycemia emergencies, mistaking them for intoxication or noncompliance. This can lead to the individual being seriously injured during the arrest, or even passing away because the need for medical care was not recognized in time.” Discrimination: Law Enforcement, Am. Diabetes Ass’n, https://www.diabetes.org/tools-support/know-your-rights/discrimination/rights-with-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/RE3M-BXXR].

          [2].      Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989). The quoted language was originally censored by the Court in its opinion, but it appears uncensored here.

          [3].      Direct Examination of DeThorn Graham, Graham v. Connor, No. 87-6571 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 1988).

          [4].      Graham, 490 U.S. at 390.

          [5].      See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1465 (2018) (finding empirical support for that federal courts largely did not use the Fourth Amendment as a constitutional standard in § 1983 excessive-force cases prior to Graham.).

          [6].      Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.

          [7].      Graham notes that this Fourth Amendment analysis applies when the police intentionally engage in an arrest, investigatory stop, or seizure of a citizen. Instances after Graham where the police cause physical harm without this intent (such as with innocent passersby) may still be analyzed through other constitutional mechanisms. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1997). This Article only discusses excessive force that occurs in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop.

          [8].      For a discussion of how deference to law enforcement shapes the federal courts’ understanding of the constitutional boundaries of excessive force, see Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment: An Empirical Assessment of How Police Understandings of Excessive Force Become Constitutional Law, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 1281, 1322 (2019). For a broader assessment of the history of judicial deference to police, see Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 2052 (2017).

          [9].      U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). As background,

On April 20, 1871, the Forty-Second Congress enacted the third Civil Rights Act known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The primary purpose of the Act was to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Act added civil remedies to the criminal sanctions contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 for the deprivation of rights by an officer “under color of law.” Thus, Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was the precursor of the present day 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . . On June 22, 1874, the statute became § 1979 of Title 24 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and upon adoption of the United States Code on June 30, 1926, the statute became § 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code. In 1952 the statute was transferred to § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, where it remains today.

Richard H.W. Maloy, “Under Color of”—What Does It Mean?, 56 Mercer L. Rev. 565, 574 (2005) (citations omitted). Charles Abernathy notes that

we have long recognized that the resurrection of § 1983 converted the fourteenth amendment from a shield into a sword by providing a civil action for vindication of constitutional rights and, to the extent that damages have gradually become the authorized remedy for § 1983 violations, we have easily come to think of such actions as constitutional torts—civil damage remedies for violations of constitutionally defined rights.

Charles Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 Geo. L.J. 1441, 1441 (1989) (citations omitted).

        [10].      See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Anna Zaret, Plainly Incompetent: How Qualified Immunity Became an Exculpatory Doctrine of Police Excessive Force, 170 U. Pa. L. Rev. 407 (2022).

        [11].      H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020).

        [12].      S. 492, 117th Cong. (2021).

        [13].      Emma Tucker, States Tackling ‘Qualified Immunity’ for Police as Congress Squabbles over the Issue, CNN (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/23/politics/qualified-immunity-police-reform/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8HF-WD6H].

* Haas Distinguished Chair and Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (joint appointment with the Joint Medical Program and School of Public Health). B.A. Yale University; J.D. Columbia Law School; Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley. Many thanks to Richard Banks, Laura Gómez, Sonia Katyal, and Gerald López for reviewing early drafts. Comments from participants at the Stanford Law School Race and Law Workshop and UCLA Critical Race Theory Seminar and Workshop were extremely helpful. Sara Jaramillo provided excellent research assistance. 

†Senior Attorney, Legal Aid Association of California. B.A. University of California, Santa Cruz; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

Who’s on the Hook for Digital Piracy? Analysis of Proposed Changes to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Secondary Copyright Infringement Claims

FBI Anti-Piracy Warning: The unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work is illegal. Criminal copyright infringement, including infringement without monetary gain, is investigated by the FBI and is punishable by up to five years in federal prison and a fine of $250,000.[1]

Chances are that many Americans have seen the warning above at some point in their lives, whether they saw the words stamped on the back of a music album sleeve or displayed on a screen before viewing a film.[2] Still, despite the threat of severe liability, chances are that many of these individuals will nevertheless engage in illegal pirating activity.[3]

Prior to the rise of the internet, individuals who made illegal copies of copyright-protected works like movies and music recordings were necessarily limited by the technology available to make such copies.[4] Magnetic audio and videotape cassettes allowed individuals to record songs played on the radio or movies and television shows to create “bootleg” versions by crude processes which, by nature, hindered one’s ability to reproduce multiple copies of similar quality to the original work.[5] However, as technology progressed, the opportunities to create illegal copies of copyrighted works, specifically within the newly emerging digital landscape, expanded with ease, and digital piracy grew more and more rampant.[6] The development of compact discs (“CDs”) and MP3 compression software provided easier avenues to create impermissible copies of digital media, and access to high-speed internet coupled with the rise of peer-to-peer sharing systems streamlined opportunities for fast and simple illegal downloading.[7] Today, in the current landscape of internet ubiquity, digital piracy has become an all but inevitable obstacle that every copyright owner, be it a large established entity such as a record label or a small independent content creator, has come to anticipate.[8]

The issue of digital piracy has not gone unaddressed by Congress, as evidenced by the promulgation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998.[9] One goal of the DMCA was to address the growing rates of digital piracy in the 1990s by providing copyright owners additional causes of action against copyright infringers, particularly infringers that impermissibly circumvented technological tools used by rights-owners to protect their works.[10] However, the drafters of the DMCA were also careful to remain consistent with the main underpinnings of copyright law, which are to maintain a balance between protecting copyright owners’ works and facilitate the constitutional charge to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”[11] Within the context of the emerging digital age, Congress applied this balance by seeking to (1) instill confidence in rightsholders that copyright protections would remain effective in a digital landscape and (2) provide assurances to new, growing online service providers (“OSPs”) that their unprecedented business models would not be decimated by imputing liability to the providers for the infringing conduct of their users.[12] Thus, Title I of the DMCA laid out “anti-circumvention provisions” that prohibit circumvention of technological measures, such as password keys and encryption codes, used to protect copyrighted works.[13] Title II of the DMCA mitigated liability for internet service providers (“ISPs”)[14] by granting “safe harbor” protections to ISPs that comply with statutory requirements—these safe harbors largely aimed to incentivize ISPs to promptly respond to reports of infringing content.[15]

Since its enactment, the DMCA has received criticism that its measures are outdated and ill-equipped to address the ongoing digital piracy problems that continue today.[16] The internet is undoubtedly a different landscape from what it was at the time the DMCA was promulgated more than two decades ago.[17] With current considerations to amend the DMCA in light of the areas of growth that were unimagined at the time the DMCA was written,[18] coupled with recent litigation seeking to hold ISPs secondarily liable for infringing conduct of their subscribers,[19] the path to reducing digital piracy is still paved with uncertainty.

Following a discussion of ongoing proposed changes to the DMCA and developing litigation concerning the potential for vicarious liability claims against ISPs, this Note will ultimately argue that the current DMCA safe harbor provisions require updated eligibility requirements for ISPs, but the availability of vicarious liability claims against “mere conduit” ISPs overreaches the scope of protection afforded to copyright owners. Part I will provide a brief history of the DMCA, including a discussion of the safe harbor provisions and the requirements therein. Part II will incorporate current discussions regarding the need for DMCA reform, address the competing policies at play, and note potential areas of reform. Part III will discuss the origins of secondary copyright infringement liability caselaw, including recent cases that have considered extending vicarious liability claims to ISPs that act as “mere conduits” to provide internet to their users. Part IV will propose clarifications in the DMCA safe harbor protection most needed in the current digital landscape while arguing that ISPs must still be properly insulated from open floodgates of liability. This Note will conclude that the DMCA should be revised to alleviate rightsholders’ burden of monitoring incidents of copyright infringement, but the DMCA should still insulate “mere conduit” ISPs from vicarious liability claims.


          [1].      FBI Anti-Piracy Warning Seal, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, https://www.fbi.
gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/piracy-ip-theft/fbi-anti-piracy-warning-seal [https://perma.cc/6HEN-PT3G].

          [2].      See id. All U.S. copyright holders are authorized by 41 C.F.R. § 128-1.5009 to use the FBI’s Anti-Piracy Warning (“APW”) Seal, the purpose of which is to deter infringement of U.S. intellectual property laws by educating the public of these laws’ existence and notifying citizens of the FBI’s authority to enforce these laws. Id.

          [3].      Maria Petrescu, John T. Gironda & Pradeep K. Korgaonkar, Online Piracy in the Context of Routine Activities and Subjective Norms, 34 J. Mktg. Mgmt. 314, 324–25 (2018). Studies have shown that although some consumers may view digital piracy as an infringement of another’s intellectual property rights, this did not impact their moral perceptions of the act of infringement. Id. Digital piracy may be regarded as a “soft crime,” as one study noted that consumers who state they would not steal a CD from a store would still consider illegally downloading the contents of the CD online, due to a lowered risk of getting caught. Id. at 325.

          [4].      Thomas J. Holt & Steven Caldwell Brown, Contextualising Digital Privacy, in Digital Piracy: A Global, Multidisciplinary Account 3, 4 (Steven Caldwell Brown & Thomas J. Holt eds., 2018).

          [5].      See id.

          [6].      See id.

          [7].      See id.

          [8].      See id. The authors note that “it is thought that millions of people engage in digital piracy every day. The true scope of piracy is, however, difficult to document as clear statistics are difficult to obtain.” Id. at 5. One report by Music Watch estimated 57 million Americans pirated digital copies of music in 2016; another report by Nera estimated the revenue loss for the global movie industry to be between $40 billion and $97.1 billion per year. Damjan Jugović Spajić, Piracy Statistics for 2021, DataProt (March 19, 2021), https://dataprot.net/statistics/piracy-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/5CMV-BH8N%5D.

          [9].      Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–02.

        [10].      See Holt & Caldwell Brown, supra note 4, at 189; Cyberlaw: Intellectual Property in the Digital Millennium § 1.02, Lexis [hereinafter Cyberlaw § 1.02] (database updated Oct. 2020).

        [11].      U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

        [12].      See Bill D. Herman, The Fight Over Digital Rights: The Politics of Copyright and Technology 45, 48–49 (2013).

        [13].      Cyberlaw § 1.02, supra note 10.

        [14].      For the purposes of this Note, the term “ISP” will refer to service providers that merely provide internet access to their subscribers (for example, Charter Spectrum, AT&T, and Frontier). The term “OSP” will refer to all other online service providers that provide services such as user material hosting or system caching (for example, YouTube, Facebook, and Google).

        [15].      Cyberlaw § 1.02, supra note 10.

        [16].      See U.S. Copyright Off., Section 512 of Title 17: A Report of the Register of Copyrights 27–28 (2020) [hereinafter Report of the Register of Copyrights], https://
http://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8Z9-JQME].

        [17].      See id.

        [18].      See id. at 10.

        [19].      Compare UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bright House Networks, LLC, No. 8:19-CV-710, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122774, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2020) (declining to hold defendant ISP vicariously liable for user infringement because ISPs do not receive a direct financial benefit from ongoing infringement), with Warner Recs. Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1079 (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 2019) (holding that defendant ISP may be vicariously liable for infringement because the ISP plausibly receives a financial benefit from infringing users “motivated” to use the ISP’s service due to the ISP’s lax approach to curbing infringement).

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The Agency Problem in SPACs: A Legal Analysis of SPAC IPO Investor Protections

The events that occurred in 2020 drastically altered the world’s financial markets,[1] contributing to an increase in Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”) of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (“SPACs”).[2] In particular, 2020 was a year marked by numerous records within the SPAC market, including the highest number of SPAC IPOs (248), the highest amount of proceeds raised in SPAC IPOs ($83.3 billion), the highest average SPAC IPO size ($336.2 million),[3] and the largest SPAC IPO ever ($4 billion).[4] SPAC IPO activity continued at a record pace during the first quarter of 2021, as $111.9 billion was raised through 317 SPAC IPOs, which surpassed the annual records set in 2020 in a single quarter.[5] SPAC proponents argued that SPACs provided disruptive private companies with a viable route to access capital via the public markets.[6] Furthermore, and central to this Note, SPACs caught the attention of potential investors,[7] potential SPAC sponsors,[8] and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).[9] SPACs have become subject to an increasing amount of regulatory scrutiny and litigation risk.[10] After two years of record-breaking activity in the SPAC market, the future of the SPAC’s role in the capital markets is clouded with uncertainty.[11]

A SPAC is a publicly-held shell company created to merge with a private company and bring the private company public.[12] A shell company is a development stage company that has no physical assets (other than cash and cash equivalents) and either has no business plan or its business plan is to merge or acquire another company or entity.[13] The “merger” between the shell company and private company is commonly known as a “de-SPAC transaction,”[14] and this Note uses the terms interchangeably. First, the SPAC sponsor (“sponsor”),[15] the financiers and managers running the SPAC deal, raise a war chest of capital with the intention of pursuing a de-SPAC transaction in a process similar to the typical IPO process.[16] The sponsor has a set time limit, typically two years (the “outside date”), to find a target company, negotiate a merger or purchase agreement, and take the company public through the de-SPAC transaction or the SPAC liquidates and returns its IPO proceeds to its investors.[17] During this process, the investment proceeds raised in connection with the IPO are held in a trust account.[18] Once the target company is identified, the de-SPAC transaction is subject to shareholder approval.[19] Even if the transaction is approved, SPAC IPO investors are able to opt out of the transaction by redeeming their shares at the time of the merger, receiving a pro rata share of the trust account (plus interest).[20] At the time of the SPAC IPO, potential SPAC IPO investors do not know which company the sponsor plans to merge the SPAC with, only finding out when the potential target company is proposed to them.[21] In light of the speculative nature of investments in SPAC IPOs emerges a nuanced question of whether or not potential SPAC IPO investors are provided with sufficient disclosure at the time of the SPAC IPO.[22] Secondly, SPAC commentators have argued that the SPAC’s compensation structure can incentivize sponsors to pursue a “losing” de-SPAC transaction at the expense of some investors.[23] This Note addresses these two key concerns potential SPAC IPO investors are faced with.

The first concern that potential SPAC investors are faced with is whether they are provided with sufficient disclosure at the time of the SPAC IPO and until the target company is announced. The primary purpose of federal securities law is to ensure that investors are provided with enough information to sufficiently evaluate the merits of investment opportunities themselves.[24] If the sponsor does not provide sufficient disclosure at the time of the SPAC IPO, potential SPAC IPO investors will be forced to make a misinformed decision about whether to invest in the SPAC.[25] This Note concludes that the current regulations and applicable exchange rules demand sufficient disclosure at the time of the SPAC IPO and before the de-SPAC transaction is announced. Going forward, the SEC should ensure that investors are provided with adequate disclosure when the target company is proposed and at the time of the de-SPAC transaction.

The second concern for potential SPAC IPO investors, and the focus of this Note, is whether the regulations governing SPACs and SPAC terms provide adequate protection against the partial misalignment of incentives between the sponsor and SPAC IPO investors that stem from the SPAC’s compensation structure.[26] The sponsor is either compensated with a twenty percent stake in the target company post-merger if the sponsor completes a de-SPAC transaction or is left uncompensated if the sponsor fails to complete a deal before the outside date.[27] SPAC IPO investors want the sponsor to complete a de-SPAC transaction that will increase the value of their shares post-merger.[28] The sponsor largely shares the same goal. A successful transaction is more profitable for the sponsor and can lead to future fundraising opportunities.[29] However, if the outside date is approaching and the sponsor has yet to complete a merger, the sponsor can be incentivized to complete a de-SPAC transaction that may be value-destroying to SPAC IPO investors,[30] creating an agency problem.[31] Sponsor compensation is not substantially tied to SPAC IPO investor compensation.[32] While the sponsor would prefer a merger in which the SPAC shareholders do well, as the outside date approaches, the sponsor will favor a merger that is bad for shareholders rather than no merger at all.[33] SPAC incentives could be better aligned if the SPAC’s compensation structure closely tied sponsor compensation to SPAC IPO investor compensation.

This Note concludes that while redemption rights largely protect SPAC IPO investors against the partial misalignment of incentives created by the SPAC’s compensation structure,[34] SPAC warrants can incentivize some SPAC IPO investors to exercise their redemption rights in self-serving ways at odds with the SPAC’s ultimate goal of completing a successful de-SPAC transaction.[35] A warrant is a contract to purchase additional shares of common stock at a later time for a pre-determined price.[36] The warrants incentivize investors to invest in the SPAC IPO by providing additional compensation to investors if the target company performs well post-merger.[37] However, the warrants do not encourage SPAC IPO investors to hold onto their shares after the IPO.[38] Rather, the warrants can incentive SPAC IPO investors to redeem their shares even if they believe the target company will be successful post-merger. By redeeming their shares, these investors guarantee that they receive their initial investment back (plus interest), while retaining the potential upside the warrants provide.[39] By acting on these incentives, redeeming SPAC IPO investors harm non-redeeming SPAC IPO investors and pose a threat to the SPAC’s long-term viability as an investment vehicle. The inefficiencies prevalent in SPACs today could be mitigated if there were an incentive for SPAC IPO investors to not redeem their shares outside the protective purpose that redemption rights serve.

This Note utilizes a case study of Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. (“Pershing Square Tontine”), the largest SPAC IPO to date,[40] to analyze its claims. In March 2021, Pershing Square Tontine had just issued its SPAC IPO, and the SPAC was being praised by commentators for its “shareholder-friendly terms” and “strong alignment” of incentives.[41] Pershing Square Tontine made a bold attempt to align sponsor and SPAC IPO investor incentives with its compensation structure and warrant structure, which significantly departed from common SPAC terms at the time.[42] Pershing Square Tontine’s shares performed exceptionally well in the months following its SPAC IPO,[43] indicating that the market valued its innovative structure.[44] Unfortunately, Pershing Square Tontine proposed an excessively complex transaction that abandoned any resemblance to a typical de-SPAC transaction to acquire a ten percent stake in Universal Music Group (“UMG”).[45] Shortly after, Pershing Square Tontine issued a letter to its shareholders canceling the transaction, noting issues raised by the SEC and investors.[46] After the failed transaction, Pershing Square Tontine faced multiple challenges that will only be touched upon briefly in this Note.[47] In July 2022, after failing to complete a merger before its outside date, Pershing Square Tontine announced that it would liquidate and return all of its capital to its investors.[48] Pershing Square Tontine will be viewed as a failure. Nonetheless, commentators still view Pershing Square Tontine’s original terms as some of the most investor-friendly SPAC terms ever introduced,[49] noting that the sponsor’s “determination to innovate and reform SPACs” was “admirable.”[50] The entire SPAC market was left to wonder what would have happened had Pershing Square Tontine succeeded in completing a de-SPAC transaction.[51]

Since January 2021, the overall sentiment of the SPAC market has steadily declined due to SPAC’s “lackluster aftermarket performance,”[52] SPAC litigation threats, and increasing regulatory scrutiny within the SPAC market.[53] While we will likely never see the SPAC deal volume of 2020 to 2021 again, the flexibility of the SPAC’s structure may enable future SPACs to “carve out specific niches” within the capital markets.[54] But doing so would require addressing the inefficiencies that were prevalent in the SPACs of 2020–2021. An analysis of Pershing Square Tontine’s original terms provides a starting point for this discussion. Future SPACs should consider replicating some of Pershing Square Tontine’s original terms to mitigate the agency problem common in SPACs.

On March 30, 2022, the SEC proposed a sweeping new set of highly criticized rules regarding SPAC IPOs and de-SPAC transactions.[55] SEC Commissioner, Hester Peirce, opposed the proposed rules, stating in a hearing that they “seem designed to stop SPACs in their tracks.”[56] The proposed rules will likely face extensive comments and the final rules will “attract close scrutiny and potential legal challenges.”[57] Given that the scope and effect of the regulation is yet to be determined, this Note narrows its analysis to the SPACs and applicable regulation of 2020–2021 before the SEC proposed new rules. The focus on the SPAC market of 2020–2021 sheds light on an unprecedented time within the capital markets. The analysis that follows will be relevant regardless of how SPAC regulation evolves and its corresponding effects within the SPAC market. If the regulation is reasonable, the proposals set forth in this Note will serve as recommendations for future SPAC sponsors to adopt, as originally intended. Similarly, if certain proposed rules are adopted, commentators argue that there will be unintended consequences that will magnify the current SPAC criticisms addressed in this Note.[58] Alternatively, in a world in which excessive regulation kills the SPAC market, these proposals will serve as an alternative solution to addressing SPAC criticisms.

Part I sets out the offsetting costs and benefits faced by SPAC IPO investors and sponsors that form the core of the SPAC’s agency problem. Part II describes the typical SPAC transaction in detail, elaborating on the mechanisms that drive this partial misalignment of incentives. Part III compares a SPAC IPO to a traditional IPO, analyzes the advantages and recent popularity SPACs have had within the capital markets, and describes the incentives that underlie the SPAC IPO process. Part IV explores the fraudulent history of shell company offerings, providing a rationale for investors and regulators to be wary of SPACs. Part IV then depicts how Rule 419 and other securities laws and regulations helped mitigate concerns posed by shell company offerings, ultimately leading to the creation of the SPAC.[59] While regulation was necessary for shell company offerings, SPACs provide many of their protections through contractual obligations, thus the looming threat of excessive regulation will likely lead to the demise of this valuable alternative to a traditional IPO. Part V describes the SPAC boom (or bubble) of 2020 to 2021 and the original terms of Pershing Square Tontine. Part VI addresses the first concern posed to SPAC IPO investors, utilizing Pershing Square Tontine’s SEC filings to argue that there is sufficient disclosure at the time of the SPAC IPO. Part VII observes how SPAC sponsor compensation has resulted in a partial misalignment of incentives in the SPAC form and the effect that investor voting rights and redemption rights have had on balancing these incentives. In light of these findings, this Note proposes modifications to common SPAC terms. Future SPACs should consider adopting some of the novel terms Pershing Square Tontine introduced in an attempt to better align sponsor and SPAC IPO investor interests.

          [1].      See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.

          [2].      See infra notes 160, 168–72 and accompanying text.

          [3].      SPAC Statistics, SPACInsider, http://spacinsider.com/stats [http://perma.cc/M8X7-AQZW].

          [4].      Christopher Anthony & Steven J. Slutzky, Bill Ackman and Pershing Square Launch
Largest SPAC To Date: A Harbinger of Things to Come?
, Debevoise & Plimpton (July
24, 2020), http://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2020/07/bill-ackman-and-pershing-square-launch-largest [http://perma.cc/D8QJ-E5K4].

          [5].      PitchBook, Uncertainty Clouds Future for SPACs: SPAC Market Update Q3 2021, at 2 (2021) [hereinafter Uncertainty Clouds Future for SPACs].

          [6].      E.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Defense of SPACs, N.Y. Times: Deal Book (June 12, 2021), http://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/12/business/dealbook/SPACs-defense.html [http://perma.cc/
KS79-8E7P].

          [7].      Alexander Osipovich & Dave Michaels, Investors Flock to SPACs, Where Risks Lurk and Track Records Are Poor, Wall St. J. (Nov. 13, 2020), http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-flock-to-spacs-where-risks-lurk-and-track-records-are-poor-11605263402 [http://perma.cc/UGP2-2ECD].

          [8].      Seasoned investment professionals, industry executives, and celebrities are sponsoring SPACs. Brian DeChesare, The Great SPAC Scam: Why SPACs Are a Great Deal for Celebrity Sponsors, But Not Companies or Normal Investors, Mergers & Inquistions, http://www.mergersandinquisitions.com/
great-spac-scam [http://perma.cc/6PAP-Q59T] (noting that “Shaquille O’Neal, Gary Cohn, Bill Ackman, [and] Paul Ryan” all have sponsored SPACs).

          [9].      In September 2020, given the frenzy SPACs were causing in the capital markets, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that the SEC would be taking a closer look at SPAC disclosures. Dave Michaels & Alexander Osipovich, Blank-Check Firms Offering IPO Alternative Are Under Regulatory Scrutiny, Wall St. J. (Sept. 24, 2020), http://www.wsj.com/articles/blank-check-firms-offering-ipo-alternative-are-under-regulatory-scrutiny-11600979237 [http://perma.cc/8XUE-KXTD].

        [10].      See infra notes 359–61, 432, 479 and accompanying text.

        [11].      Uncertainty Clouds Future for SPACs, supra note 5, at 6; The Daily Upside, Things Have Gone from Bad to Worse for SPACs to Round Out the Year, Motley Fool (Dec. 12, 2022, 7:00 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/2021/12/12/things-have-gone-from-bad-to-worse-for-spacs-to-ro [http://perma.cc/3AK2-MPT4].

        [12].      Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs, 39 Yale J. on Regul. 228, 235 (2022); Ramey Layne, Brenda Lenahan & Sarah Morgan, Update on Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Aug. 17, 2020), http://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2020/08/17/update-on-special-purpose-acquisition-companies [http://perma.cc/KTM9-Q3NX].

        [13].      Ramey Layne & Brenda Lenahan, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An Introduction, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (July 6, 2018), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/06/
special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-introduction [http://perma.cc/Q8KQ-TN8Q].

        [14].      Layne et al., supra note 12. While the “A” in “SPAC” stands for acquisition, a SPAC typically merges with the target in a process similar to a reverse merger. Klausner et al., supra note 12, at 240.

        [15].      This Note considers the term “sponsor” to apply broadly. While technically, a sponsor is usually a person or an entity, see infra note 91, this Note considers “sponsor” to apply to all affiliates of that person or entity involved in the transaction, such as the investment team. This approach follows other financial literature. E.g., Milan Lakicevic & Milos Vulanovic, A Story on SPACs, 39 Managerial Fin. 384, 389 (2013).

        [16].      Layne & Lenahan, supra note 13.

        [17].      Id.

        [18].      See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.

        [19].      Lakicevic & Vulanovic, supra note 15, at 8–9.

        [20].      Id. at 20 (“SPAC common shareholders can redeem their shares at pro rata value . . . .”).

        [21].      Michelle Earley & Rob Evans, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, LexisNexis
(
database updated Oct. 25, 2021).

        [22].      See Russell Invs., Watching the Equity SPAC-Tacle, Seeking Alpha (Sept. 24, 2020, 8:59 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/4376232-watching-equity-spac-tacle [http://perma.cc/4RWD-6JLD] (“[A]re SPACs a good investment? Maybe.”).

        [23].      Klausner et al., supra note 12, at 296; James Talevich, Investors Must Understand SPACs’ Time Constraints, Wall St. J. (Jan. 19, 2021, 3:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-must-understand-spacs-time-constraints-11611087968 [http://perma.cc/55AU-XCE7].

        [24].      Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 126 (7th ed. 2016) (“[T]he primary purpose of 1933 Act registration statements is to provide full and adequate information regarding the distribution of securities . . . .”).

        [25].      See infra Section IV.A; see infra note 313 and accompanying text.

        [26].      See infra Part I.

        [27].      Andrew R. Brownstein, Andrew J. Nussbaum & Igor Kirman, The Resurgence of SPACs: Observations and Considerations, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Aug. 22, 2020), http://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/22/the-resurgence-of-spacs-observations-and-considerations [http://
perma.cc/F3SW-HXRV].

        [28].      Lakicevic & Vulanovic, supra note 15, at 22; see infra text accompanying note 96.

        [29].      See infra notes 379–81 and accompanying text.

        [30].      Press Release, William A. Ackman, Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. Releases Letter to Shareholders (Aug. 19, 2021), https://pstontine.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/8.19.2021-Press-Release-PSTH-Letter-to-Shareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TVM-2XSM] (“In a de-SPAC merger transaction, time pressure on the sponsor is the enemy of a good deal for shareholders.”).

        [31].      See infra notes 7679 and accompanying text.

        [32].      See infra notes 74, 383–84 and accompanying text.

        [33].      Klausner et al., supra note 12, at 247; Layne & Lenahan, supra note 13.

        [34].      See infra Sections VII.C.1, VII.D.

        [35].      See infra Sections VII.C.2–3, VII.D.

        [36].      SPAC Warrants: 5 Tips to Avoid Missed Opportunities, FINRA (Aug. 30, 2021), http://www.finra.org/investors/insights/spac-warrants-5-tips [http://perma.cc/AR9N-GXY7]; Chizoba Morah, How Do Stock Warrants Differ from Stock Options?, Investopedia (May 3, 2021), http://
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/stock-option-warrant.asp [http://perma.cc/KSM3-LUB9].

        [37].      Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), supra note 102 (“The purpose of the warrant is to provide investors with additional compensation for investing in the SPAC.”).

        [38].      Klausner et al., supra note 12, at 246, 248–49.

        [39].      SPAC Warrants: 5 Tips to Avoid Missed Opportunities, supra note 36.

        [40].      Nicholas Jasinski, Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square Files for Largest-Ever SPAC IPO, Barron’s (June 22, 2020, 4:30 PM), http://www.barrons.com/articles/bill-ackmans-pershing-square-files-for-largest-ever-spac-ipo-51592857837 [http://perma.cc/WT73-5DUX].

        [41].      Michael W. Byrne, Pershing Square’s Supersized SPAC Looks Well-Positioned to Deliver a Splash Acquisition, Seeking Alpha (Aug. 10, 2020, 3:50 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/4367199-pershing-squares-supersized-spac-looks-well-positioned-to-deliver-splash-acquisition [http://perma.cc/
ZJ8A-WK3N].

        [42].      See infra Sections V.B.3, VII.E.

        [43].      Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. (PSTH): Historical Data, Yahoo! Fin., http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/PSTH/history?p=PSTH [http://perma.cc/YC3K-Z36M].

        [44].      Will Ashworth, Play Bill Ackman’s SPAC Without the Inherent Frothiness, InvestorPlace (Jan. 22, 2021, 12:37 PM), http://investorplace.com/2021/01/psth-stock-play-bill-ackmans-spac-without-frothiness [http://perma.cc/ZEQ5-CBU9]; Byrne, supra note 41.

        [45].      Stephen Wilmot, Ackman’s SPAC Deal to End All SPACs, Wall St. J. (June 4, 2021, 11:04 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ackmans-spac-deal-to-end-all-spacs-11622818252?reflink=desktop
webshare_permalink [http://perma.cc/Z88G-QZJY].

        [46].      Press Release, William A. Ackman, Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. Releases Letter to Shareholders (July 19, 2021), https://pstontine.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Letter-to-Share
holders-from-PSTH-CEO-Bill-Ackman.pdf [https://perma.cc/42MM-3PZW].

        [47].      Will Ashworth, 4 Better Buys than Bill Ackman’s Failed Pershing Square SPAC, Nasdaq (Nov. 11, 2021, 6:00 AM), http://www.nasdaq.com/articles/4-better-buys-than-bill-ackmans-failed-pershing-square-spac-2021-11-11 [https://perma.cc/A6LG-KWNS] (“It now looks as though Ackman will wind up PSTH, [and] return the funds to investors . . . .”); Ian Bezek, It’s the Final Chapter for Pershing Square Tontine, InvestorPlace (Sept. 10, 2021, 6:00 AM), http://investorplace.com
/2021/09/psth-stock-its-the-final-chapter-for-pershing-square-tontine [http://perma.cc/Q38U-FQWW] (“PSTH stock represents little more than a low-interest bond at this point”).

        [48].      Julie Steinberg, Ackman to Close $4 Billion SPAC, Wall St. J. (July 12, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bill-ackman-to-close-4-billion-spac-11657629142?page=1 [https://perma.
cc/PG6U-DN55]; Marlena Haddad, Pershing Square Tontine Holdings (PSTH) to Liquidate Trust, SPACInsider (July 11, 2022), https://spacinsider.com/2022/07/11/pershing-square-tontine-holdings-to-liquidate-trust [https://perma.cc/2KWT-HKNX].

        [49].      E.g., Kristi Marvin, Pershing Square Tontine Faces Suit on Abandoned UMG Deal, SPACInsider (Aug. 19, 2021), http://spacinsider.com/2021/08/19/pershing-square-tontine-faces-suit-on-abandoned-meal [http://perma.cc/W6R7-APZB].

        [50].      Chris Bryant, Bill Ackman Was Too Clever for His Own Good, Bloomberg (July 19, 2021, 3:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-07-19/-psth-pulls-universal-music-deal-bill-ackman-was-too-clever-for-his-own-good [http://perma.cc/3FZ9-KLMR].

        [51].      Matthew Frankel, Should Investors Stick with Pershing Square Tontine Holdings?, Motley Fool (Aug. 4, 2021, 6:22 AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/2021/08/04/should-investors-stick-with-pershing-square-tontin [http://perma.cc/YGK4-L33A] (“I’m disappointed . . . . The whole point of a SPAC is to acquire a full business. To have a business combination.”); Michelle Celarier, Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square Just Had a $1.6 Billion Payday, Institutional Inv. (Sept. 21, 2021), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1tpd3k78fxvrb/Bill-Ackman-s-Pershing-Square-Just-Had-a-1-6-Billion-Payday [http://perma.cc/HA5C-954P] (noting the success of the sponsor’s hedge fund that completed the UMG deal).

        [52].      Uncertainty Clouds Future for SPACs, supra note 5, at 1.

        [53].      Matthew Solum & Gianni Mascioli, Legal Scrutiny for SPACs on the Rise, Kirkland & Ellis (Apr. 29, 2021), http://www.kirkland.com/publications/article/2021/04/legal-scrutiny-for-spacs [http://
perma.cc/JH6V-DYCE].

        [54].      Uncertainty Clouds Future for SPACs, supra note 5, at 2.

        [55].      Norm Champ, Sophia Hudson, Christian O. Nagler, Stefan Atkinson, Tamar Donikyan, Joshua N. Korff & Peter Seligson, The SEC Proposes New Rules Regarding SPACs, Kirkland & Ellis (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirkland-alert/2022/03/sec-proposes-new-rules-regard
ing-spacs [https://perma.cc/2BVH-XQ6B].

        [56].      Michelle Celarier, SEC Deals a Big Blow to SPACs, Institutional Inv. (Mar. 30,
2022) (quoting SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/
b1xdf3qfv7sckm/SEC-Deals-a-Big-Blow-to-SPACs [https://perma.cc/8UPT-VZFJ].

        [57].      Margeaux Bergman, Katie Butler, Alain Dermarkar, Adam Hakki, Harald Halbhuber, Daniel Lewis, Jonathan Lewis, Ilya Mamin, John Menke, Ilir Mujalovic, Lona Nallengara, Bill Nelson, Sara Raisner & Pawel Szaja, SEC Proposes New SPAC Rules, JD Supra (Apr. 12, 2022), https://
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-proposes-new-spac-rules-6508226 [https://perma.cc/S39Y-DR2M].

        [58].      Celarier, supra note 56.

        [59].      The SPAC was created immediately after these regulations came into effect as an investment vehicle that is exempt from Rule 419 but contractually complies with many of Rule 419’s restrictions, providing investors with adequate protection while preserving an alternative route for private companies to go public. See infra Section IV.B.1.

* Senior Editor, Southern California Law Review, Volume 95; J.D. Candidate 2023, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; M.B.A. Candidate 2023, University of Southern California Marshall School of Business; B.A. Economics 2017, University of California, Santa Barbara. I would like to thank Professor Jonathan Barnett for his guidance throughout the note-writing process and Professor Michael Chasalow for his invaluable insights on the substance of my Note. In addition, thank you to the Southern California Law Review editors for their excellent work. Most importantly, thank you to my family, Arianne, and Charles for their support throughout my time in law school.

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